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ORDINARY & EXTRAORDINARY RESISTANCES:
THE STRUGGLE FOR LAND AND SPACE BY THE PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

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Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD
2015

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Declaration for SOAS PhD thesis

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the dialectic relationship between ‘power’ and ‘resistance’ through the lens of the struggle for land and space, by the Palestinian citizens of Israel. Ever in contention, ever in conversation, dynamics of power and resistance dislodge, dislocate and displace one another, transformed through their intersections and interactions. Thus to understand Palestinian-citizen struggle is to see it in dialogue with the trajectories of the Israeli hegemonic order: in which the indigenous Palestinian is always othered, outside and absent; a threat to be removed and replaced, despite (or even because of) their inclusion in the political and spatial organisations of the state. There is no room for the indigenous Palestinian within the state’s dual rationales of ethnic-nationalism and settler-colonialism. And yet, there is a never-ending encounter between the Zionist state and subaltern Palestinian-citizen, essential to the shape and journey of both. This encounter produces the particular story, the particular space, in which both are housed, the lines and boundaries of which are articulated and disrupted through unique spatial and social relations.

The analysis stems from a three year exploration of three cases of community land-struggles: a popular movement for housing rights in Palestinian neighbourhoods of Jaffa-Tel Aviv; an enduring protest-movement against the Judaization project in the Galilee region; and the existential struggle for land rights of Bedouin communities in the Naqab desert. Their stories are a window into the unique reverberations of Zionist hegemony as it clashes with a real, contextualised, material history; with a Palestinian community surviving, resisting, antagonising and engaging the structures of power. Through investigating their moments of containment, contention and transgression, we unravel how resistance is entangled with the structures of power; and how the lines that determine this relationship are challenged, unveiled and disarticulated, and even transcended and transformed.
Acknowledgements

This study would not have been possible without the support of family and friends, colleagues and academics, interlocutors and interviewees, academic institutions and funding bodies. Without them, I could not have completed this long journey and I would like to take this space to thank as many of them as possible.

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I am especially grateful to the communities of struggle that are the core of this research: the activist/residents of Ajami, the Central Galilee and the Naqab, who shared their resistance with me, as they continue to carve out Palestinian space against the erasures of the Israeli-state.

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A Word on Language

In this thesis, Arab terms and names have been transliterated into English, based primarily on their appearance in English language media sources. As well, the thesis primarily uses the English translations for most place names, as is the case of Jaffa and Acre. At the same time, when there is some contestation as to how a place-name is ‘translated’, the direct Arabic transliteration is used. This was the case with the use of the term ‘the Naqab’, which is the Arabic name for the desert region in which and for which the Bedouins’ land struggles take place. The term has been ‘Hebraised’ on Israeli maps, as ‘the Negev’. In this manuscript, ‘Negev’ only appears when taken from a direct quote or title of a document. In this way, this thesis attempts to take into account the fabric of language politics that reproduce relations of power in the Israeli/Palestinian context, and intersect with the use of maps, signs and symbols towards the colonisation of Palestinian space.

It should also be noted that the English transliteration of the Arabic and Hebrew names of interlocutors to this study respects the individuals’ spelling of their own names. In some cases this has informed the use of different spellings of the same family name. The differences are footnoted, when the names appear for the first time in the manuscript.
Map: Cases of Ordinary & Extraordinary Resistances

Source: Map Design by Keith Cook, in Jonathan Cook, *Disappearing Palestine: Israel’s Experiments in Human Despair*, 2008; ‘Cases’ (Red & Blue Boxes), author’s addition
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Introduction: The Ordinary and Extraordinary Resistances of the Palestinian Citizens of Israel

A Day of Rage in Haifa

Haifa Anti-Prawer Movement Demonstration
“Demonstrators Running Away From a Police Water Canon”
Source: Manor, Keren, Activestills.org/972 Magazine, November 30th, 2013
On July 15th, 2013, the Palestinian citizens’ of Israel’s collective leadership, known as the **High Follow-Up Committee**, announced a national strike day against a programme of planned evictions of the Bedouin-Arab community, living in the Naqab, the southern desert region of the country. The spark for the strike was the passing of the **Draft Law to Regulate Bedouin Settlement in the Negev** through a first-round reading in the Israeli Knesset (Israel’s parliamentary body). The Draft Law was based on a planning document devised by the Prime Minister’s Director of Planning, Ehud Prawer. On the basis of this document, 30,000 to 40,000 out of approximately 90,000 Bedouin Arabs, who live in villages unrecognised by the state, are facing mass forced displacement; and more than 250,000 dunams of their traditional land holdings will be expropriated by the state.

The call for solidarity by the High Follow-Up Committee was taken up by Palestinian-citizen activists from across the country. They turned the single strike day into months of public protest activities, working alongside the Bedouin communities and some Jewish-Israeli activists to cultivate what they came to call ‘the Anti-Prawer Movement’. The protests were given the name ‘Days of Rage’, inspired by actions that had overthrown leaders throughout their Middle-Eastern neighbourhood. The protests, which took place every few weeks with increasing numbers and intensity, were mobilised in multiple cities; simultaneously and collectively demanding an end to the plan and the colonial, ethno-national logic that produced it. The campaign continued to grow, reaching its peak on the last ‘Day of Rage’ (Nov. 30th, 2013), when thousands of protesters invaded the streets of Israel, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and in demonstrations in cities throughout the globe. Mere days later, the Knesset backed down, the Plan was frozen, and a key battle was won.

The Anti-Prawer Movement marked a new (re)turn in the Palestinian citizens’ struggle in Israel. While everyday and explosive acts of protest are a common feature of Palestinian life...

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1 The terms ‘Bedouin-Arabs’ or ‘Naqab-Bedouin’ are used throughout this thesis, to reflect the way the community most often refers to itself. This is with full acknowledgement that the Bedouins of the Naqab are part of the wider Palestinian people and the regional Bedouin-Arab Community, which includes those who were expelled from the Naqab in 1948, and those who are part of the larger desert landscape in the region.

2 Details of the Draft Law can be found in the table on Israel’s Legal-Land Regime that appear in the Appendices to this thesis; in addition, a map proposing the borders and limits to Bedouin space that act as an addendum to the Law is included as Appendix 3.4.

3 Draft Laws in Israel pass into Legislation after three readings before the entire plenum. After the first round, the draft is sent to the appropriate committee – in this case, the Committee for Interior Affairs and Environment – to be prepared for second and third readings.

4 A ‘dunam’ was the traditional unit of land area utilised by the Ottoman Empire. The unit is still in use in many areas that were once included in the Ottoman sphere of influence, including Israel. One dunam of land is the equivalent of one square kilometre.

5 The term ‘Palestinian citizen(s)’ is shorthand for ‘Palestinian citizen(s) of Israel’; each is used interchangeably throughout this thesis, in reference to the core interlocutors of this study.
inside the Israeli state, these tend to be segregated to particular enclaves, localised within the politics of place and the stakeholders who live there. The exception to this are the annual events that commemorate Palestinian heroes and memories, which have long since stopped being intrinsically disruptive to the Israeli-Jewish public sphere. The last nationally organised, collective stand against the state’s treatment of Palestinian communities in Israel took place in 1976; an event commemorated as Land Day. The Palestinian-citizen leadership called a national strike then, too; the first of its kind. Its catalyst, much like the one that took place in 2013, 40 years later, was the expropriation of land. The state had planned to confiscate 21,000 dunams of land for Jewish settlement in the north of the country, in the Galilee, where the majority of Palestinian citizens of Israel were – and still are – concentrated. Events were organised across the country, at a period in time when the community was less vocal, less connected, more vulnerable and more afraid (with good reason: 6 protesters died on Land Day in 1976). They succeeded. The state gave up its plan, and a new politics began taking shape among the Palestinian citizens of Israel.

With the new wave of collective protest again anchored in land (many call the Bedouins’ campaign ‘the last Palestinian stand over land’), an underlying ethos of Palestinian struggle inside Israel is unveiled. For an indigenous community, living in, surrounded by and integrated within the structures of a settler-colonial state – the same state that “ethnically cleansed” its peoples from the territory they share (Pappé, 2006) – the key impetus for their collective struggle is and always will be about land: land as space, land as identity, land as memory, land as resource, land as home. At the same time, Palestinian-citizen struggle, from Land Day through to the Days of Rage, is constantly evolving, in its methods, tactics, interlocutors and targets. The struggle confronts the state to provoke new boundaries and sites of conflict, which in turn produce new voices and ways of challenging the dynamics of power. The locus of these transformations, in their relationship to particular geographies of resistance, forms the core focus of this research.

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6 The term Ethnic Cleansing is used here in reference to the systematic expulsion of Palestinians from vast areas of Palestine, and the frameworks created to prevent their return. The conceptualisation of the events of 1948 as Ethnic Cleansing is debated extensively in the body of literature on the Zionist state. The debate primarily pivots around the question of ‘purpose’ – did the Zionist militias intend to forcefully and violently expel Palestinians from their territory, or was this an ‘accident of war’, as the state and Zionist historians contend (Pappé, 2006)? This research works with a historical analysis that includes the expulsion of people, irreversible destruction of places, expropriations of land and the definitive prevention of the return of displaced refugees to their homes. Intention converges with results that changed the demographic reality in Palestine, and thus Ethnic Cleansing is an apt lens through which to understand the state’s actions. More extensive discussion of this topic, and the surrounding myths and debates, can be found in Pappé (2006), W. Khalidi (1988), Robinson (2013) and Morris (1987), among many others.
Paradoxes and Dialectics – the Palestinian Citizens of Israel

Israel’s Palestinian citizens were segmented from the larger Palestinian people in the aftermath of a war that forever shifted the political and demographic conditions in Palestine, at the moment when the Zionist settler-colonial project formally became the state of Israel in 1948\(^7\) and the refugee Palestinian population was born (Bishara, 1993). For over a year\(^8\), the Jewish militias performed what has been named their ‘War of Independence’, clearing the territory of infrastructure and people that could challenge Zionist sovereignty, destroying more than 500 villages and expelling more than 750,000 Palestinians in the process (Pappé, 2011). The new regime then constructed a legal-political lexicon through which to cement its dominion over the spoils of war – 78% of ancient Palestine – and ensure that the erasures taking place would be irreversible (Robinson, 2013). The Palestinian citizens at the heart of this study are those who remained in the state after this *Nakba* (Catastrophe)\(^9\) that emptied Palestine of a majority of its people; descendants from the approximately 160,000\(^{10}\) who struggled to retain and reclaim space within Israeli-controlled territory, as they became integrated in and integral to the political project of the Zionist state.

In this thesis, these internal Palestinians – who number approximately 1.6 million and make up 20% of Israel’s population in 2014 – are discussed primarily through their struggle to disrupt and transgress the spatial and political frame in which they are contained. This struggle is entangled in an ongoing, dialectic relationship with the Israeli state, and the processes used to maintain Zionist territory. The trajectory of this relationship begins with the

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\(^7\) The series of events that led to Israel’s establishment are discussed throughout this thesis (including the long historical process of settling and colonising the country), but this statement refers explicitly to the events of 1947/1948. These begin with the UN’s November 29\(^{th}\), 1947 announcement (known as UN Resolution 181) of its plan and map for the partition of Palestine into two national entities, one Jewish and one ‘Arab’ (see Appendix 3.1 for details of the map); then continue with the dissolution of the British Mandate in Palestine (May 14\(^{th}\), 1948), the declaration of the Jewish Leadership, led by future Prime Minister Ben Gurion, of the Jewish state (*Eretz Israel*) on the same date, the 1948 War that expelled over 750,000 Palestinians (Pappé, 2011); and end with the official signing of the Armistice Agreements in 1949 with the Arab states which had taken part in the 1948 War. Details of these events are discussed explicitly in multiple studies of Palestine, including Pappé (2006), W. Khalidi (1988), Robinson (2013), Morris (1987), among many others.

\(^8\) As discussed below, Israel’s military campaign began several months before the British dissolved their Mandate in Palestine and the war with the surrounding Arab states began; for details see Pappé (2011), W. Khalidi (1988).

\(^9\) The term ‘Nakba’ refers to the entire spectrum of actions that led to and then entrenched the expulsion of the Palestinian people from Palestine. These include the 1947 Jewish militia activities that targeted Palestinian villages in Jewish majority-held territories before the 1948 War (also known as the Israeli War of Independence); the 1948 War itself, and in particular the violent destruction and depopulation of villages in areas the militias sought to conquer; and the post-1948 legal and political discourses that constructed the status of Palestinian people as refugees, dispossessed of their homeland.

\(^{10}\) This number, like the number of Palestinian refugees forcefully expelled in 1948, is contested in the multiple sources that discuss Palestine. However, as it is one of the most reproduced statistics in such texts, it is used here.
state’s pre-1948 legacies. The attempts of the Zionist settlement project to “purify” the landscape, and create an ethnically exclusive colony on top of an indigenous population (which greatly outnumbered the immigrant community), lives on in the state’s relationship to the Palestinian citizens (Zureik, 1979; Shafir, 1989; Kimmerling, 1983; Abdo & Yuval-Davis, 1995; Piterberg, 2001; Pappe, 2006; among others). The Zionist settler-colonial programme is built into the DNA of the state (Robinson, 2014). Its hallmark is the dispossession of indigenous Palestinians from the land, a process and practice that has been incorporated into all social, political and spatial relations in Israel. An aesthetic expressed in “spatial apartheid”, with definitive limits for who lives where, how and with whom (Falah, 2003). However, this relationship is not an innate product of the violence of the colonial paradigm, through which the Palestinian citizens are mere victims of the Zionist project in Palestine\(^\text{11}\). Rather, their shared journey has been articulated, disarticulated and rearticulated in a spectrum of encounters, anchored in the specific and ambiguous position of Palestinians who were incorporated into the Jewish-Zionist state.

After 1948, the Palestinian citizens became colonial subjects of the Israeli state, demarcated from the Palestinian majority in the region, and included – as a new ‘Arab-Israeli’ minority – in its political, social and physical structures; albeit excluded from any decision-making powers about their lives, or their futures, within the state. These citizens evolved as a paradox, part of the state, but incommensurate with its logics, in which there is no ‘Palestine’ and no ‘Palestinians’. The state built its frameworks around them, producing an internal Palestinian frontier; an enclosed population whose material and ideological ties to the Palestinian people (outside) and roots (inside) were immediately severed. Through the lens of the state, these ‘Arab-Israelis’ were constructed as the ethnic other, eternally linked to the conflict outside. As a result, they were treated as a fifth column and demographic time bomb, whose presence undermined the Jewish territorial project to redeem Eretz Yisrael and turn it anew into the Jewish homeland. To protect its space, land and legitimacy from the internal-external Palestinian threat, the state anchored its entire legal lexicon in the bifurcation of ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’, and enshrined privilege, rights and ownership according to this distinction.

\(^{11}\) The innate link between the structure of the settler-colonial/ethno-national state and the forms of victimisation it imposes on the Palestinian citizens, is a common thread throughout the body of literature on this case. The debate surrounding this approach to the social-political context in Israel is further elaborated below, and in the following chapter. As well, for some examples of this argument, see: Lustick (1980); Yiftachel (1999); Kedar (2003); Pappé (2011); White (2012); Naamnih (2013); Molavi (2013); and Hamdan-Saliba (2014).
The initial constructors of Zionist statehood formalised the process of inclusion and exclusion in two key laws, which established separate, hierarchical legal categories for Jewish and Palestinian citizens. These were *The Law of Return* (1950), which stipulated that all Jews can immigrate to Israel on the basis of an innate right to nationality in the Jewish state; and *The Nationality Law* (1952), which stipulated who has access to citizenship, differentiating between those who have the right of ‘Return’ as nationals (Jews), and those who needed to be registered and naturalised, based on their presence in the country at the time of the state’s establishment (Arabs)\(^\text{12}\). This institutionalised the confiscation and control of the Israeli space and assigned the state, not to its ‘citizens’, which included Arabs and Jews, but, exclusively, to the Jewish people, whether inside or outside the country\(^\text{13}\).

The state then developed a series of ‘containers’ through which to maintain these tensions. It orchestrated a 20 year military regime that prevented free movement and access to the state’s social, economic or political institutions. A legal and planning machinery was then devised to outline and constrict Palestinian space within the state, evolving into the primary constrictor of Palestinian growth and development, after the military administration was dismantled in 1966. In parallel to these, the state designed a “procedural democracy” that hid the essence of the state’s erasures, discriminations and exclusions in liberal mechanisms and neutral, rights-based rhetoric (Robinson, 2013)\(^\text{14}\). These came to constitute the matrix through which land and people have been colonised in Israel, constructing the basic outlines within and against which the Palestinian citizens have negotiated their identities, narratives and experiences of the Jewish state.

The state has built this system in order to protect itself from its internal Palestinian other, creating boxes and ghettos that aim to segregate and remove Palestinians from its core territorial project. However, this is not the whole picture, as the lines and borders produced

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12 See Robinson (2013) for a recent discussion of how the laws were developed and promulgated into the essential framework of Israel’s legal regime; see also previous dealings with the topic in Lustick (1980); Kretzmer (1990); Rouhana (1997); Kedar (2003); Hussein & McKay (2003); and Holzman-Gazit (2007).

13 In addition to the citizenship/nationality division, this process was orchestrated, in part, by granting a share of the state’s power and authority to the same extraterritorial Jewish organisations that bankrolled the Zionist settler-project before the establishment of the state (i.e. the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Federation). In light of their particular involvement in planning, settlement and land-policy, Israel’s Palestinian citizens are prevented from purchasing, leasing, or using land in around 80% of the country (Yiftachel, 1999). See also Kedar (2003); Lustick (1980); and Hussein & McKay (2003) for further elaborations of this argument.

14 Details of these legal and planning mechanisms are explored in the individual case chapters, and (as mentioned above) tables of the most relevant land and planning laws are included in the Appendices section of this thesis. There are, technically, hundreds that constitute the full list of laws affecting land and space in Israel.
through the logics of Judaisation\textsuperscript{15} constantly evolve in everyday and catalytic encounters between the state and its Palestinian citizens. These internal others are still present, still part of this place, and still have claims on it; which is why the state works so hard to excise them from it. In response, the Palestinian citizens fight to carve themselves from the erasures of the state, resisting ongoing efforts to strangle, remove and replace them. This research is concerned with how this othered community – contained, excluded, internal and threatening – pushes against these boundary lines. It examines the unruly practices of collective and individual protest, resistance and dissonance, looking for how Palestinian citizens inform and engage the lines the state has constructed to hold them. It looks for the inevitable clashes between Israeli state power and Palestinian-citizen resistance on these border-lines, which are activated and unveiled as they are challenged and encroached upon. These points of contention – the sites of contact, conflict, resistance and struggle – between Palestinian citizens and the ethno-national, settler-colonial Israeli state, are pivotal in understanding how the subaltern other engages with the system of power, and informs the trajectory of this relationship as well as the colonial geography that surrounds them.

**Anchoring the Research – a Lacuna in the Field**

There is a preoccupation among critical researchers of the Palestinian citizens of Israel, to see this group mainly in terms of their victimisation by the Israeli state, and what this victimisation means to understanding the Zionist, settler-colonial framework in which they are situated. This body of research, exemplified in the works of Zureik (1979), S. Jiryis (1976), Lustick (1980), Shafir (1989), Rouhana (1997), Yiftachel (2006), Ghanem (2001), White (2009) and Pappé (2011), has been exceptionally important to changing the way research on Israel is developed. These studies have participated in challenging the tradition of academic myopia to the histories and experiences of Palestinian citizens. They have also broken down the theoretical and political walls that prevent linking the Zionist state to the larger bodies of work that deal with colonialism, conflict, apartheid/ethnic regimes and power. However, there is a tendency in these studies to disregard the multiple, contradictory and evolving relations that constitute both the state and the Palestinians within it, in order to critique the production of the Palestinian subaltern in Israel. Moreover, as these researchers emphasize the Palestinian-citizen community’s victimisation by the system, they tend to

\textsuperscript{15} The terms ‘Judaisation’ and ‘Judaise’ are discussed extensively throughout this thesis, as the particular expression of Zionist colonisation. It has taken different forms throughout the territories under Israeli control, but primarily refers to the methods by which Palestinian space is reconfigured by Jewish ‘presence’, either through direct settlement, or mechanisms of spatial and political control.
overlook their agency in and resistance to the structures of the Zionist state. Through this prism, the structure of power becomes intrinsic and permanent; and its victims, in the words of Ian Lustick (1980), ‘passive’, ‘acquiescent’ and ‘quiet’. We lose sight of the ordinary and extraordinary resistances that have become endemic to Palestinian life in Israel, and how these contribute to and change the dynamics of power.

This research attempts to introduce empirical study of Palestinian-citizen struggle in light of these silences. It works with different locations of Palestinian struggles for land and space in order to examine the evolving contradictions that stem from a multiplicity of modes of exclusion and inclusion. These locations are sites through which to examine the contact zones; to understand the essence of what it means to struggle from ‘inside’ the state’s political paradigm, while at the same time being outside it. By ‘inside’, this study does not propose that Palestinian citizens are integrated or assimilated into the state, nor that they seek to be. That said, it does acknowledge the complexity of this history: Some communities and individuals did and do look for their survival within the state’s framework, and some unintentional results of Palestinian-citizen resistance integrate the community further into the system of power. Rather, ‘inside’ refers to the community’s steadfast and enduring resistances against a multitude of erasures; to their ongoing and embedded Sumud\textsuperscript{16}, as Palestinians within the state.

There is a need to unveil Palestinian-citizen struggle on the seam lines of inclusion and exclusion; to acknowledge and analyse how Palestinian space is reclaimed within Israel, and the multiple forms, practices and arenas in which it takes place. Seeing these practices as part of the trajectories of both the state and Palestinian experiences of the state, contributes a new lens on how we see relations of power – in this context and in the larger field of study that looks at resistance and struggle in general. It contributes new understandings of ethnic regimes, settler-colonial states and systems of domination, assuming that it is not only the greed\textsuperscript{17} for land, space, resources and control, but the encounter with the resistant and resilient indigenous community, ethnic other and dominated groups, that drives these

\textsuperscript{16} The Arabic term Sumud appears throughout this thesis and is discussed more extensively in the following chapters. The term was initially conceived in reference to a category of non-violent resistance developed within the Palestinian context. It means ‘steadfastness’ or ‘resilience’ and is often used to describe Palestinian struggles that are, literally, ‘grounded’, in holding onto their lands, against appropriation by the state.

\textsuperscript{17} Understanding systems of domination in terms of their “greed” for land and capital, stems from the literature on settler colonialism, discussed in the next chapter. See in particular Veracini (2010), Ram (1993) and Shafir (1989), for more elaborate analyses in utilising this prism.
projects. It endeavours to argue that structures of power are not permanent, that change is part of history, and that the agents of change come from multiple places, people and actions.

Situating Struggle in Land and Space – Questions and Potential Answers

“In response to the Israeli establishment’s efforts to Judaise Palestinian space and consciousness, the Palestinian movement in all of its currents has worked to entrench Palestinian steadfastness and dignity. Despite the various processes facing Palestinians in Israel, (we) have remained strong and held our heads up high. For decades, the Israeli authorities have played a carrot-and-stick game to transform Palestinians into a servile minority called “Arab-Israelis”; a minority with no connection to their Palestinian identity, with a collective amnesia of their relationship with the land around them and of the ongoing crimes committed against them and most importantly, loyal to their jailers.”


This research explores the complexities of Palestinian-citizen struggle, contained and embedded within the Zionist, settler-colonial state. It is a study of how the subaltern, ethnic other, which is both inside and outside the hegemonic political order, engages and reshapes the truncated arenas in which this struggle is housed. It looks at the web of relations that are activated through the encounter between the coloniser and colonised. That is, the ethnicised borders, the stratification of rights and access, the bifurcation – and bombardment – of space and peoples; but also the sites of contention, the enclaves of everyday resistance and survival, and the public acts of protest and provocation. The emphasis is on the shared frontiers, and the lines that determine the locus of power and resistance in the control and ownership over land and space. Through this lens, this research seeks to unravel the puzzle, not merely of how power and resistance impact one another, but how each transforms the other in an ongoing dialectic of entanglements, negotiations, permeations and clashes.

In essence, this thesis explores how structures of Israeli state power are disrupted, challenged and changed through the Palestinian citizens’ perpetual struggle for land and space. It works with the complexities of subaltern resistance, which is both inside and outside, integral and external to the Zionist paradigm. It also contributes to an attempt to shift focus away from debates on the shape and structure of the State, which tend to dominate this field of study.\(^\text{18}\) A series of questions have acted as the anchor for this research. They ask: What impacts and shapes Palestinian-citizen resistance to the power dynamics of the settler-colonial/ethno-national state? How do we categorise ordinary and extraordinary resistances, in a context where struggle is intrinsic and everyday? Is it possible to reclaim and radicalise Palestinian

\(^{18}\) These debates are discussed more extensively in Chapter One.
spaces within the Zionist state; if so, how and when? And, finally, how does Palestinian-citizen resistance impact, engage, subvert and transcend the borders constructed to contain it?

To answer these questions, the thesis examines three contemporary cases of Palestinian community land struggles. The first is a popular movement for housing rights – and thus survival – in Palestinian neighbourhoods of Jaffa-Tel Aviv, a primarily Jewish metropolitan city; the second is the Palestinian citizens’ enduring protest movement against the Judaization project in the Galilee region, since Land Day; and the third is the struggle for land rights by the Bedouin-Arab communities living in the Unrecognised Villages of the Naqab, discussed above as the essence of the anti-Prawer demonstrations. Individually and collectively, these three cases exemplify the dialectic encounter investigated through this research: the multiple processes employed in the colonial appropriations of Palestine, and the evolution of an endogenic, indigenous struggle over land and space, in response.

Each of these cases shares and contributes to the overarching experience of what it means to be Palestinian in Israel. Each case is contained within and inducted into the political and spatial order of the State. Each represents the material expression of this tension, persisting as Palestinian enclaves, ghettos and frontiers; spaces that are always under siege, increasingly constricted and strangled, intentionally segregated from and illegitimate within the hegemonic order. Each produces ‘struggle’ in relation to the deep chasms and fractures that colour the ethno-national, settler-colonial landscape; and is anchored in the fight for Palestinian land and space within the Judaising enclosures of the Israeli state.

At the same time, the State built particular containers into its colonial geographies, in relation to the different communities it encountered in these particular places. Therefore, the cases each hold their own spatial and social relationships. These, in turn, have produced different lines and borders with the State, as well as different forms of struggle through which to engage, provoke and challenge them. For example, the Jaffa case describes struggle, as it is evolved by a poor and weakened community, from within space it shares with middle and upper classes of Jewish-Israelis, at the centre of the country. The community’s struggle is about claiming a place to be Palestinian, against and within the daily siege it encounters as a neighbourhood inside the Mixed City\(^{19}\) of neoliberal, cosmopolitan Tel Aviv. The Galilee

\(^{19}\) The spatial configuration of the ‘Mixed City’ is a label devised by the Israeli state for urban spaces in Israel that include a ‘substantial’ number of Palestinian residents in a primarily Jewish settlement. The label is used for the purpose of devising appropriate services and infrastructure for a ‘bi-national’ community, in a country where very few arenas are considered officially ‘mixed’. The significance and impact of the Mixed City on the struggle of Palestinian citizens is discussed extensively in the case chapter on Jaffa (Chapter Two).
case describes struggle that has evolved from the periphery of the country, in an area in which the Palestinian citizens make up the demographic majority and have built their social and political structures away, but never removed from the power centres of the state. The Northern struggle functions to bolster the borders that maintain the space as a stronghold against Judaisation; and that protect and strengthen the residents’ capacity for autonomy vis à vis the Zionist political project. The Naqab case describes resistance as it evolves in places the state erased from the map, from within ‘non-spaces’ allegedly outside the regulations of law and planning. It deals with the paradox of the Bedouins’ struggle to be recognised in/through formal institutional mechanisms that are explicitly anchored in the erasures of Palestinian indigenous space. Each case unveils a unique and extensive spectrum of resistance practices, in light of the dialectic of spatial-social relations. At the same time, they collectively describe the repertoires of a political practice situated in and against Israeli Zionist productions of space. These necessarily include ‘ordinary’, ‘everyday’ acts of Palestinian-citizen resistance and the ‘extraordinary acts’ of protest that bring the interlocutors of this struggle into direct contact with the borders that contain them. As shall be discussed throughout this thesis, for Palestinian citizens of Israel, struggle is an innate part of their lives, and thus acts of contention include those that resist erasures in daily life, as much as those that mobilise thousands into the street. Each can become either ordinary or extraordinary ‘moments’, in their ability to disrupt and reshape the constantly evolving boundaries that the state constructs in its attempts to contend with challenges to its spatial controls.

Palestinian-citizen resistances build from and are layered into one another, as a spectrum of intersecting actions. The anti-Prawer demonstrations were borne out of the resilience and resistance of the Bedouins living in unrecognised spaces for more than 60 years. Land Day developed out of long-term, everyday and politicised struggles against the Judaisation project. Conscious and unconscious, organised and unorganised practices are anchored in the cases of Jaffa, the Galilee and the Naqab; and, together, they engage in the larger, collective project to push back the state, to reclaim and hold onto Palestinian spaces, each in their own way.

At the same time, the different spatial-social locations of Palestinian resistance are not exclusively informed by their relationship with the Zionist settler project. A grid of multiple subjectivities is articulated in the act of carving out Palestinian space in Israel. National identity intersects with and is mediated by divisions of gender, ethnicity, religious practice
and affiliation, class and geography; but also, because of the schisms of 1948, divisions between the urban and the rural, and between those able to remain on their land and those who were displaced, further determine one’s experience, position and status within the resistance community. Sharpened by the stratifications of the colonial space, these divisions inform the way resistance is experienced, performed and perceived. They take us beyond the monolithic analysis of ‘Palestinians’ as homogenous group\textsuperscript{20}, and enable a more complex understanding of the dialectics of struggle and power. Within each case, there are intra-group tensions and fragmentations, power struggles between dominant and subordinant groups, shifting alliances and opposing positions and politics: Women take up different leadership roles in the struggle in Jaffa than they do in the Northern political sphere. Secular and religious divides play an important role in the Galilee case, but are less relevant in discussions of the Naqab. Hierarchies are entrenched in the possession of land in the Naqab, but not as much in Jaffa. It is beyond the scope of this thesis –whose focus is on the dialectics of struggle and power between Palestinian citizens and the state – to highlight and compare these different intersections and divisions, within and between cases. However, they do play an intricate part in understanding the Palestinian communities at the heart of this study, and are part of the stories of resistance discussed in the forthcoming chapters\textsuperscript{21}.

**Evolving Methods of Inquiry**

“What is a map? For the colonizer, it was a plan of action and a testament to conquest. It was a blank piece of paper awaiting those who were allowed to draw lines. Lines were supposed to be clear, marking boundaries...In such times, mapping becomes a form of resistance. But in the era of GIS and GPS, maps do not only describe physical features. The map indexes debt, deprivation and destruction that the colonial power would prefer to remain invisible—so that these conditions are recognized as normal and acceptable, as if they are a part of the landscape itself.”

*Michael Hardt, ‘Palestine: Cartography of an Occupation’, 2013*

This study evolved in the process of collecting the stories of struggle that constitute the major focus of this thesis. Each case holds together the multifarious actors and actions that drive

\textsuperscript{20} While beyond the scope of this research, the same intersectional analysis must be applied to Jewish-Israelis, in light of their different experiences of the state’s colonial legacy, which in turn informs their different perspectives on and contributions to Palestinian-citizen struggle. For additional research on intersectional subjectivities and divisions within Israeli-Jewish society, see Abdo & Yuval-Davis (1995), Kleiman (1987), Shafir (1989), Tzfadia & Yacobi (2011) and Natanel (2012, 2014).

\textsuperscript{21} For additional discussion and research on intersectional divisions within Palestinian communities (all of which intersect with the settler-colonial bifurcations of people and space), see Jamal (2011) and Ghanem (2001) on fragmented politics; McGahern (2011) and Cook (2012c) on religious divisions; on spatial-class divisions, see Yacobi (2011) and Raja Khalidi (1988); and for a gendered analysis of Palestinian-citizen struggle, see Hamdan-Saliba (2014). For a narrative, literary view of the divisions in Palestinian communities, see Sayed Kashua’s (2006), *Let it Be Morning*.
resistance; and methods of inquiry involved the comprehensive collation of data from an extensive range of individuals, practices, documents, plans, policies, maps, images and performances from each of the cases. Resistance, as shall be discussed throughout this thesis, is chaotic, ongoing and difficult to capture in a set of boxes, episodes, moments or linear ‘movements’. The cases offer a concrete anchor through which to investigate and understand Palestinian struggle as it develops, evolves and transforms; in its many moments of ordinary and extraordinary resistances.

Data collection began in the summer of 2011, with a set of semi-structured interviews with key interlocutors\(^22\) from each of the cases. These offered initial insights into the histories and evolutions of the different land struggles, which snowballed into more interviews, visits to different sites of contention, and access to different tools and arenas of protest. A mosaic of practices and practitioners unfolded as I was invited to join demonstrations, community events, public performances and campaign movement meetings, from each of the cases. However, the essence and shape of this research only took concrete form as I toured the different sites of struggle, with guides from within the different communities. These interlocutors shared the histories of their homes, narrating their experiences with the structures of power, while unveiling the multiple layers that constitute Palestinian space.

Through the lens of Atef Abu Rabia, a local Bedouin-Arab resident and activist from the Unrecognised Villages, I visited the spatial apartheid\(^\text{22}\)\(\text{23}\) embedded in the Naqab. He introduced me to the harsh reality of Bedouin living-space, which exists outside the legality and protections of the state, and includes daily demolitions and extensive state violence, as well as living without water, municipal infrastructures or state services. With him, I saw the kind of struggles that have emerged on the ground to resist and redefine the state’s vision for ‘dealing’ with the unruly and ungovernable Bedouin settlements.

I walked through Jaffa’s Palestinian ghetto-neighbourhood, Ajami, with Sami Abu Shehadeh\(^\text{23}\), a resident and key activist in the protest against the community’s ‘quiet transfer’ from the neighbourhood. He spotlighted the sites of ethnic gentrification alongside the

\(^22\) The term ‘interlocutor’ is intentionally used throughout this thesis in lieu of ‘interviewee’. The term more accurately captures the active and ongoing dialogue between myself and those who guided my study of Palestinian-citizen struggle. Those individuals whom I interviewed, visited and observed in sites and acts of protest were not objective observers of nor passive participants in social phenomena, but stakeholders in the production of struggle in this context. The term further acknowledges these actors as essential links between the struggle, as it is practiced, and my way of conceptualising and writing about it.

\(^23\) It should be noted that a second ‘Abou Shhadeh’ appears in this study, under this different spelling. The interlocutor’s name is Abed Abou Shhadeh, and he is Sami’s first cousin. The distinct spelling is not an accident. It respects the way each spells their own name in English, in articles, on facebook and in their email addresses.
condemned buildings that house the weakest residents of the neighbourhood. I saw evidence of the erasures of the city’s Palestinian past, overtaken by Jewish memorials, symbols, famous names and images. He also took me through the sites that house the community’s political theatre; the streets, buildings and public squares where Palestinian identity and protest reclaim the urban space.

Shadi Shbeta\textsuperscript{24}, a resident of the Galilee and part of its professional political community, took me through the cities and villages that make up the alienated Palestinian enclave. He exposed me to the infrastructure of ‘separation’: the gated agricultural communities that house the limited number of Jews that live in the region; the spatial, social and economic differences between Nazareth, the largest Arab city in Israel, and Upper Nazareth, a Jewish settlement town with infinitely more resources and development potential than its ‘lower’ neighbour; and the highways, railway lines and utility works that run through the landscape, dividing Arab localities and infringing on their growth and land-usage. He also took me to his home town, which is embroiled in a battle against the state and its Jewish neighbours, in an attempt to reclaim lands that were appropriated for Jewish settlements 60 years previously.

These journeys unveiled the material articulations of power and struggle, in space and daily life. However, they were not the only ones. I visited the sites of villages destroyed during the Nakba and afterwards, in the Galilee and in the Naqab. On multiple occasions, I visited the site of a village in the Naqab called al-Araqib. The village has been destroyed more than 65 times in four years, as its residents continue to inhabit it, protesting its destruction by continuously attempting to rebuild it. I visited the Mixed City of Acre, whose old city is struggling against similar acts of gentrification and Jewish infiltrations as Jaffa. I also visited Haifa more than a dozen times, as a witness to its evolution as the new centre for Palestinian political action and professional politics. I visited Rahat and Lakiya, both ‘Planned townships’ in the Naqab; as well as Karmiel and Saknin, which feature as key sites of conflict in the chapter on the Galilee. Finally, I spent a day in the town of Jisr al-Zarqa, the only Palestinian-citizen locality to retain its lands on the Israeli coast. This town is dealing with the impact of a long history of social and political exclusions, expressed acutely in a wall that divides it from one of the country’s richest Jewish localities, a neighbourhood of Caesaria where Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu has his own house. Walking through this town,

\textsuperscript{24} It should be noted that there is also a second ‘Shbayta’ in this study, whose name appears in public fora according to this alternative spelling. The interlocutor’s name is ‘Fadi Shbayta’ and he is an activist from the Jaffa case.
one is exposed to the essence of spatial apartheid in Israel, and its impact on one of Israel’s weakest and poorest communities.

Between July 2011 and July 2014, I interviewed over one hundred different interlocutors from the cases; many of whom I spoke to on more than one occasion, and some of whom I continue to speak to, asking questions and following up with details they shared while I was still in the field. Several have also read different versions of the case chapters, and continue to offer advice and insight into what is happening on the ground. I interviewed residents/activists from the different sites of struggle, as well as politicians, planners, lawyers, academics, employees and directors of Palestinian-citizen NGOs, and journalists involved in the different struggles.

The interviews were held primarily in Hebrew and English, although several were conducted in Arabic. As a non-Arabic speaker, I worked with Arabic-speaking ‘guides’ from the local communities I visited; individuals active in the community, and able to act as both interlocutors and translators. In particular, this was a key component of conducting interviews in the Naqab, which were held primarily in Arabic, with non-professional and grassroots activists and residents. However, even when language wasn’t an issue, I entered new communities with key leaders from the different struggles. This enabled me to move past many of the innate obstacles that come with being an outsider, without the ability to speak the local language. This was especially poignant as an Israeli-Jewish woman, whose position of ethnic privilege will always act as a potential barrier to developing trust in this context. This was also the main reason I interviewed several key interlocutors multiple times, coming back every few months to advance my conversations with local activists, and unravel some of the performances and tropes that I encountered in my first meetings. Working slowly and gradually to break down many of the walls that tend to persist between researcher and community, Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian-citizen, I gained access to critical materials, insights and individuals that would have otherwise been restricted to me. At the same time, I recognise that language, nationality and distance may always mediate my relationships in Israel/Palestine. These are issues I continue to invest in and attempt to work beyond, by strengthening my local connections, learning Arabic and expanding my knowledge of the communities with which I work.

Over these last three years, I visited each community of activists and residents multiple times, sitting in tents, in houses, in public and open spaces, listening to stories of oppression and resistance. Additional observations were gleaned through the documentation of the different
practices of protest and their perceived impact on Israeli policy. These were taken from civil society reports, newspaper articles, youtube videos, government policy documents, UN and international foreign ministry documents. I also joined protests, attended sit-ins and conferences, and participated in workshops and public community meetings; I sat in cafes, in theatres, in universities, in parks. I observed the safe and unsafe spaces for community resistance; and the norms, habits and provocations of Palestinian political practice. Finally, woven throughout these materials and experiences are the maps, the physical plans, the boundaries, the borders and the aesthetics of the dialectic encounters of power and resistance, in space.

Brought together, the micro-moments of the cases coalesce as a window into the entanglements of power and resistance; how they inform, produce and reproduce the other. They describe how struggle intersects with the colonial programme, and, more importantly, unveil the processes by which the structures of power are disrupted, transcended and transformed. At the same time, I do not negate the fact that this lens stems from my own bias and position within this conflict, as a Jewish Canadian and Israeli woman, integrally tied to the country, by law and through family. As a non-Zionist, I seek ways through which to change the country, and the relations of people on the ground. For this reason, I attend protests, work with advocacy organisations, and have developed my professional career in human rights and Israeli/Palestinian politics. I am looking at the struggle of Palestinians as both a diagnostic of resistance, and as a diagnostic of power; for how the structures of the ethnically exclusive and racist settler-colonial state can be challenged and reshaped, for the sake of a genuinely shared space. I have worked with theoretical and empirical triangulations, coming back to my research community often for advice and checks to my analysis and argument. However, I acknowledge that I am also working with my own assumption and hope that the acts of struggle I witnessed can disarticulate the field of force that surrounds them, and thus contribute to changing its path.

Structure of this Thesis

The thesis is structured to develop and evolve the story of Palestinian struggle. It moves from a theoretical discussion of how struggle engages, intersects with and transforms relations of power, into the empirical details of how Palestinian citizens encounter the Israeli state. It

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25 The majority of materials were in English, Hebrew and Arabic. As a reader of Hebrew and Arabic (in addition to English), I translated much of these myself, and worked with translators for some of the longer materials in Arabic.
aims to understand struggle as a vehicle of change, and the thesis concludes as a window into how this ‘change’ evolves through acts that retain and reclaim Palestinian spaces inside Israel.

Chapter One reviews the main bodies of literature that analyse the dialectics of power and struggle. It develops a conceptual framework, in light of the particular context of Palestinian citizens, as present and absent, included and excluded, within and yet outside the political and spatial structures of the Zionist state. The main debates deal with questions of hegemonic power, and the spectrum for resistance, contentious politics, and spatial struggles that develop in relation to the settler-colonial/ethno-national order.

Chapters Two through Four make up the bulk of the thesis. They unveil the moments and trajectories of Palestinian-citizen struggle, as they evolve in each case; first in Ajami/Jaffa, then the Galilee, and finally, in the Naqab. Each chapter chronicles a story from the case that exemplifies the complexity of the community’s relationship with the state. In the Jaffa Case, the chapter starts with the tale of a resident of Ajami fighting against her eviction from the neighbourhood. In the Galilee Case, the chapter follows the story of Land Day as the initiator of a new set of social and spatial relations between its Palestinian residents and the state. In the Naqab Case, the chapter starts with the explosive destruction and extensive resilience of al-Araqib, and the village’s intersections with a long term struggle for recognition by all Unrecognised Villages. Each chapter then moves on to discuss how the particular bounded space evolves, impacts and frames relations of power; how these relations are activated and informed by the community’s resistance practices; and how the struggle, itself, is embedded in and interacts with the space in which it is housed. However, more than anything, each describes the lived-experience of the Palestinian citizens’ struggles, and their ordinary and extraordinary resistances against the borders that attempt to confine and define them.

The fifth and final chapter offers a comparative analysis of the three cases. In it, a theory is articulated for how to understand struggle in its relationship with power, and the spaces that are produced and transformed in the encounter and entanglement between them.

**A Last Thought about Borders and Shared Space**

“No border can really pass between these two peoples, because the land is one, and the story – convoluted and complex as it may be – is shared by both.”

Hillel Cohen, 1929: Year Zero of the Jewish-Arab Conflict, 2013

The colonial story is all about building borders: dividing communities, restricting their access to resources, and ensuring they don’t encounter one another except under strictly imposed
conditions. As Yuval Ben-Ami (2012), an Israeli-Jewish blogger, political activist and travel-writer, explains through his journey through/to the borders, Israel, itself, is obsessed with them. There is a ‘Blue Line’ that separates Israel from Lebanon, marked by an electric fence and border guards. There is a ‘Green Line’, the most well-known of Israel’s boundary lines, which separates Israel from the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; a border fence and checkpoints mark the majority of these divisions, and outposts with gunmen sit at intervals along each side. There is even a ‘Red Line’ running through East and West Jerusalem, to remind us of where Jordan once ended and Israel once began, and which effectively continues to split the city by language, by appearance, by religion, by municipal services and by rights (Ben Ami, 2012). Finally, there is a 20 foot wall that separates Israeli ‘seam territories’ – land inside the West Bank, beyond the Green Line – from Palestinian occupied territories and people.

However, the essence of this research is consumed with the internal fixtures and lines that bifurcate space – and life – inside Israel: the blue lines that appear on planning documents as a way of surrounding Palestinian localities and defining their rights and limits to development; or the roads and train lines that bypass Arab towns and further incise the landscape between those who use the space, and those who control it. There are ‘lines’ that are abruptly clear, as with the wall that divides Jisr al-Zarqa from Caesarea; or the ones that divide rich Jewish neighbourhoods from poor Palestinian ones within the Mixed Cities of Lydda and Ramle. There are those that are less visible, like the lines that protect Jewish space in Tel Aviv from infiltration by Palestinian residents of Jaffa, but not the other way around. Finally, there are those that don’t exist at all, as with the Unrecognised Villages that have no borders, no jurisdictions, nothing to distinguish them from the allegedly ‘empty space’ around them.

These borders express the state’s desire to protect itself from its internal paradox; from the spaces inhabited by its own citizens, their histories, their experiences and their ongoing claims to this place. The borders are activated, as these citizens challenge, transgress and disarticulate the way in which the state attempts to assert its colonial map onto Palestinian spaces. However, as this thesis clearly demonstrates, the Palestinian citizens are not so easily containable or erasable, and encounters with them – in the entanglements of resistance and power, but also in the everyday experience of sharing space – are inherently part of the living and lived experience of both peoples.
There is a clash between the colonial story and the reality on the ground. The desire to segregate and separate the Zionist project from the material reality of a shared-geography is impossible. Through this study, we unravel what this means for the trajectory of Palestinian-citizen resistance, for a people surrounded by borders, and yet are integral to the production of this space. The remaining chapters of this thesis constitute an attempt at resolving this puzzle.
Chapter 1: Dialectics of Power and Resistance – Theoretical Concepts

“In politics, the siege is a reciprocal one, despite all appearances, and the mere fact that the ruler has to muster all his resources demonstrates how seriously he takes his adversary.”

Antonio Gramsci, ‘Excerpts from the Prison Notebooks’, 1999, p.496

Introduction – The theoretical acid test

In this thesis, the theoretical terrain traverses the dialectics of power and resistance. Following the perennial statement in Michel Foucault’s work on this subject, struggle and power are ever in conversation, ever in contention; framing, shaping, reforming and reshaping one another. Resistance and power are relational, each clashing with and permeating their other. At times, they move with perfect fluidity, at times they dislodge, dislocate and displace one another. But they are always moving, always unfinished; changing through their intersections and interactions (Tripp, 2013). The debates that are explored here are anchored in these moments of engagement, alternating as sites of struggle and acquiescence, resilience and transformations. The foundational dispute is in how to understand resistance: its agents and trajectories, its obstacles and impacts. At its core, this is a question about how struggle evolves; how it encounters the dynamics of power and domination; and how it changes the trajectory of social and political relations, of which it is a part. This is the essential lens through which this thesis explores the evolving resistances of the Palestinian citizens of Israel, embedded in and surrounded by the matrix of ethnic, liberal-colonial logics of the Israeli state.

In this thesis, Palestinian-citizen struggle is approached without abstracting from the socio-political context in which it takes place. The theoretical discussion of power and resistance are immediately anchored in their exercise by particular actors, in a particular territory, through the social relations that emerge in this place, through their particular encounters. To theorise resistance is to understand the structures within and against which it emerges; it does not function in a vacuum. It is lived, experienced, produced and transformed by real people, their bodies and lives existing in real places26. To quote David Harvey (1989), “the acid test of any set of theoretical propositions comes when we seek to relate them to the experience of history and to the practice of politics.” (p.73)

Thus, the starting point for understanding the dialectic trajectories of power and resistance is the historical-material fact of the symbiotic relationship of Israeli and Palestinian

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26 This paraphrases Henri Lefebvre’s (1991) disdain for the semiotic fetish for abstractions, in which he explains: “This space was produced before being read; nor was it produced in order to be read and grasped, but rather in order to be lived by people with bodies and lives in their own particular urban context.” (p. 143)
nationalisms, identities, narratives and lived and living experiences – despite the attempt of Zionist historiographers to erase the connection (Kimmerling & Peled, 2003; Shafir, 1989; Kretzmer, 1990; Piterberg, 2008; Cohen, 2013; Lockman, 1996). As Gershon Shafir (1989) argues in his analysis of the settler-colonial legacy of the Israeli state, “it was essentially in the context of this national conflict that both the Jewish and Arab sides assumed their modern identities. It transformed the Jewish immigrants into Israelis, and the inchoate Zionism of Eastern Europe into the concrete practices of Israeli state and nation formation. The Arab residents of Palestine developed their own distinct nationalism and became Palestinians in the same context.” (p.5) In accordance with Shafir, it is in the clash between the two, their physical and ideological conflicts in and over space that power and resistance take form.

More complex analyses also allow for multidimensional encounters between the two, as in Lockman’s (1996) study of Arab and Jewish labour relations during Mandate Palestine, where he argues that conflict is not the only determinant in the production of Israeli-Palestinian relations. Others allow for larger frames of impact, as is the case in Rashid Khalidi’s (2010) study of the construction of Palestinian identities, in which he argues that Palestinian identity has been shaped by much more than its contest with Zionism; he references other colonial powers, and the Arab world as key interlocutors in this process. However, it remains clear that in ‘reading’ the social and political landscapes of Israel-Palestine, the structures and apparatuses of Israeli power are a window into how Palestinian-citizen resistances have been framed, trapped as they are within Israeli space. They are also a window into the tools and capacity of these communities to challenge and transcend limits, borders and boundaries defined by the state. From the grounded analysis of how power and resistance intersect atop the Israeli-Palestinian landscape, it will be possible to develop a conceptual analysis of struggle through its engagement with and transformation of the arena of power in and against which it functions.

**Part I – The Dialectics of Power and Resistance**

The chapter that follows is an attempt to understand struggle as a grounded, real and relational experience; to see it in terms of its intersections with the field of force that both surrounds and permeates it. The key theoretical challenge, then, is to analyse the Palestinian citizens as part of the trajectories of Zionist-Israel, as opposed to outside them; and yet to challenge the range of literature that utilise this same lens to invisibilise Palestinian citizens,
or see them as silent, disengaged or acquiescent to the systems of power and domination.

Here we understand the resistance of Palestinian citizens through their direct and insidious engagements with the structures that maintain their subordination within the Jewish state; ‘structures’ that seek to separate, marginalise and contain a threat that its own national-imaginations help to create, and ‘engagements’ that are politicized, conscious, powerful and radical, and getting louder with each passing day. As Antonio Gramsci (1999), quoted above, explains, a ‘siege’ is always reciprocal, breeding its other, its challengers. The struggle of Palestinian-citizens of Israel has evolved in response to an ongoing siege, which attacks their presence within the legal, political, geographic and narrative arenas of the state. Palestinian-citizen politics are part of and inherent to the system they challenge; even as those politics manifest with unique voices, identities, needs and methods of struggle. Thus, the key debates in this section attempt to understand resistance through the space it inhabits, within the internal Palestinian frontier. The starting point – a well-travelled and still polarised academic terrain – is an analysis of the Israeli state, and the position of Palestinian citizens within it.

**Power and Hegemony: The Israeli State**

*Constructing Consent – Through the Lens of Antonio Gramsci*

A range of buzzwords characterise the debates housed within the question of ‘what is Israel’. The spectrum includes conceptualisations of the Zionist state as a system of apartheid, as settler-colonialism, as an ethnocracy, as a liberal-settler state and even as an ethnic or Jewish democracy. The core of this debate begets the question of how deeply the policies surrounding the Jewishness, and thus exclusiveness of the state, run. The first step is in understanding this system – and the state – as a hegemonic order, a product and evolving process of an internalised and entrenched belief system. Hegemony is a loaded concept and one that accompanies many of the debates surrounding the labels, mentioned above.

However, it also offers a window into the depth and breadth of Zionist ideology, not only within Israel, but among Jews throughout the world; particularly in its nuanced exploration by Gramsci (1999) in his *Prison Notebooks*. To understand Zionism as a hegemonic project is

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27 See for example Rabinowitz (1997), in his embedded study of Palestinian citizens in Nazareth, and Lustick (1980), in his more general analysis of the Palestinian citizens of Israel, for this limited view of relations of power and resistance in Israel. See also Ranajit Guha (1997), Chakrabarty (2000) and Chakravorty-Spivak (1988), each studying peasant resistances in India, as well as James Scott (1984; 1990), who studies resistance-practices of rural communities in Malaysia, for the limitations they also place on ‘subaltern’ resistances in colonial and post-colonial contexts; in their desire to give voice to subaltern struggle within the silencing discourses of elite readings of revolutionary processes, they limit their analyses to subaltern actions that remain outside and disengaged from the hegemonic order.

28 See Peleg (2004; 2007), and Yiftachel & Ghamem (2004), for their use of ‘hegemony’ as an analytical tool through which to understand the production of the Israeli state and its relationship with its Palestinian-citizens.
to understand Palestinian struggle in light of the entrenched walls and boundaries of the system against which and through which it evolves. It is to understand its ambiguities and its difficulties, in its peculiar existence outside and inside the Zionist political order; as the constructed other and – in light of the external conflict with the Palestinian people – an innate threat, in dialectic conversation with the hegemonic state.

The term ‘hegemony’ has multiple uses, at times describing the systems of domination that are imposed by a single state over others; or a single class over the rest of society, through a set of simple alliances (Mouffe, 1979). In Gramsci, however, hegemony takes on more nuanced meaning. For him, the eternal puzzle is situated in understanding how a system of rule is produced and maintained; how it evolves through the praxis of individuals and groups that interact with the structures in which they are embedded, and, thus, how it can be changed. He conceives of hegemony as the capacity of one group to articulate the needs and interests of others, and integrate them within its world-view. Legitimacy is gained through a negotiation of interests, and in this way becomes more than the expression of a class-alliance. While coercion and force are an integral part of this negotiation, it is primarily grounded in the struggle for and attainment of active consent, through which a complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of social relations is re-articulated as the collective will and common sense of society (Gramsci, 1999, p.690). This is what Gramsci calls an ‘historic bloc’, and the basis for cultivating a new ideological terrain, through which to see, experience and understand the world (ibid). What is especially relevant here for understanding how structures of power are challenged and changed is the process by which hegemony is constructed.

In his analysis, Gramsci recognizes that the struggle for hegemony implies more than a mystification of the masses, and their implicit acquiescence to the dominant ideology of the ruling power (Mouffe & Laclau, 1985, p.4). Instead, the process by which consent is constructed is dynamic and complex. It involves the cultivation and articulation of a collective will, based on the mutual imposition of social norms from above, by those who legislate law and society; and from their living practice from below, by the masses (Gramsci, 1999, p.438-439). Collective will becomes a material and ideological lens, activated and normalised through conscious as well as coerced and spontaneous consent, and integrated in all aspects of society, through the domains of civil and political life (ibid, p.502). In Gramsci’s thinking, hegemony is a living-praxis, an integral world-view that is internalised, reproduced and practiced through social relationships in society.
With understanding Gramsci’s hegemony as internalised, constituted, embodied and reproduced in the everyday practice of agents in social space, a complimentary theoretical terrain can be found in the work of French Sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977, 1984, 1990) conceptualisation of *habitus*. Habitus is Bourdieu’s “dispositional theory of action” (Wacquant, 2011, p.85), which – as is the case with Gramsci’s hegemony – recognises that while action is not merely the product of a personal will or individual, subjective choice, “agents are not passive beings pulled and pushed about by external forces, but skilful creatures who actively construct social reality.” *(ibid)* In Bourdieu’s (1990) notion, habitus is “a product of history”, constituting and constituted by individual and collective practices (p.91). It functions as a “schemata” of dispositions, perceptions, preferences, tastes and appreciations, which are the product of collective and individual history (Bourdieu, 1977). It is further mediated and reconstituted through its constant interactions in the ‘social field’ (Bourdieu, 1984), which in turn, as Yuval-Davis (2011) explains, is further structured by “symbolically mediated relations of power.” (p.3) Durable and transposable, active and unconscious, habitus is “structured and structuring” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 52); it both shapes and is shaped (and then reshaped) by practice. In this thesis, habitus is integrated into the theorisations of hegemony, in line with Charles Tripp’s (2013) discussion of the ‘norms and habits of power’. This analysis offers a way to understand how hegemony is structured, mediated, reproduced and disrupted in social space, as it is embodied and practised by individual agents.29

Thus, hegemony is constructed, as opposed to determined or inevitable *(ibid, p.450)*. It is a developing ‘organism’ that evolves, changes and is transformed, through its engagement with struggle *(ibid, p.331)*. As a result, it is an unfinished and porous political process that is the story not of one group, or of an alliance of several, but of all elements in society, whether they are inside or outside, friend or enemy *(ibid, p.358)* 30. It is on this point that we begin to understand the relationship of the Palestinian citizens to the Israeli hegemonic order. Even those groups subaltern to the hegemonic project, which neither consented nor contributed to

29 Brief discussions in this thesis of the ‘habitus’ of bifurcated space (in the Galilee) and neoliberal, Judaised space (Jaffa) follow this thinking, and appear in the forthcoming case chapters. However, in addition to Bourdieu’s own work, see Wacquant (2011, 1996), Gomez (2007), Goringe & Rafanelle (2007) and Swartz (1997), for a more complete discussion of habitus, and its associated concepts. These include but are not limited to: ‘field’ (the structured space of objective relations, in which the individual habitus intersects with and is constituted by ‘the social’ (Gomez, 2007)); ‘capital’ (taking multiple forms, ranging from economic to social, symbolic and cultural capital, it is articulated as a range of ‘capabilities’ that inform the agent’s relative position and power in a particular field (Wacquant, 1996)); ‘practice’ (the site of the dialectic encounter and intersection of structure and agent, it is the embodiment of habitus (Bourdieu, 1990; Gomez, 2007)); and ‘strategy’ or ‘strategic action’ (the site of struggle within the field of practice; it is informed by the intended and reflexive interacting interests, decisions and movements of agents, seeking to strengthen their relative position in the social field (Bourdieu, 1990; Gomez, 2007)).

30 Additional analyses of Gramsci’s expansive understanding of hegemony, and the dialectic evolution of the hegemonic project, can be found in Mouffe (1979); Laclau & Mouffe (1985); Butler, Laclau & Zizek (2000); and Chalcraft & Noorani (2007).
its construction, are contained within the system; as they engage with it, challenge it and attempt to disarticulate and reshape it.

**Hegemony, the Case of Israel and Its Other**

The evolution of the Israeli state is informed by the same hegemonic trajectory Gramsci describes, in which its Jewish settler-community developed a deeply internalized and overarching logic, produced through a long-term project of nation-building and cultural construction (Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2003). According to Yiftachel & Ghanem (2004), Zionist hegemony intersects the ideological with the material, lived experience with mythical legacies. It has grown out of a dual rationale of ethnic nationalism and settler-colonialism, with land as the nexus of economic and political power. Zionist-Jewish hegemony functions at all levels of society, articulated as an inherent, natural and legitimate ethnic exclusivity over the right to and control over the state. Under this skewed logic (Peleg, 2007; Yiftachel, 1999; Ghanem, 2010), the state – its land, its institutions, its bureaucracy – not only belong exclusively to the Jewish people, but are in service of the perpetuation and propagation of this ethnic hierarchy. The result has been the construction of a highly segregated and stratified society, in which the ethnic other, and the space they inhabit, is targeted for de-legitimisation, removal and replacement.

Here there is no room for the indigenous Palestinian, and yet, the Palestinian communities that were still present in Israel after the Nakba, were incorporated into the state’s political project. Through their inclusion, the state constructed an additional hegemonic veil that enabled its self-representation and self-imagination as a Jewish and democratic-liberal society; despite the fact that Israel’s ‘democratic’ programme privileged one ethnic group over another and cultivated separate spheres of rule in its dealings with its heterogeneous ethno-national groupings. The hegemonic order became intertwined with the construction of a liberal image, created through the fact of granting citizenship to the Palestinian other. This, in turn, integrated Palestinian citizens into the system, and determined their use of and dependence on its mechanisms. However, their inclusion was predicated on the fact that Palestinian citizens must be maintained as a minority, contained and segregated from the external Palestinian threat (Achcar, 2004; Shafir & Peled, 2000; Lustick, 1980). This has

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31 See also Piterberg (2008) for discussion of the intersection of Zionist history with biblical myths to construct the present-day structures of the Israeli settler-colonial state.

32 The foundational idea of a ‘Jewish and Democratic’ Israel stem directly from Ben Gurion’s ‘Declaration of Independence’ in 1948 (State of Israel, 1948). This is one of the most debated conceptualisations borne of Zionist hegemony, and will be discussed further, below.
entrenched the pre-state Zionist-ethos of settlement, control, separation and segregation, in the preservation of the demographic balance of Jew to non-Jew in all areas of the state, through each leg of policy change since 1948; literally turning the Palestinian ‘body’ into a demographic threat (Steinfeld, 2012). Moreover, the state relies on its antagonism with the other, with the threat it constitutes to the system, to cultivate a seemingly intractable collective-belief in exclusively Jewish rights to the state, hidden within and bound to the liberal-methods it has evolved for protecting them.

In Patrick Wolfe’s (1999) study of the indigenous experience of settler-colonialism in Australia, he asks what happens to the indigenous population when the colonial order isn’t dependent on the exploitation of native labour; in his assessment, their marginalisation and peripheralisation become endemic to the system, and they ultimately disappear into it. In Israel, likewise, Palestinian labour was explicitly excluded from participation in early settlement development, dooming them to the periphery, if anywhere at all (Shalev, 2000; Kimmerling, 1983). However, where the story differs is that the Palestinians that remained after the Nakba were still needed, and used, as a symbol of the democratic process in Israel (Robinson, 2013). They became a key factor in the global legitimization Israel received, and in garnering consent from its own supposedly liberal constituencies, for whom a democratic veil was and still is to some degree essential. Based on a diligent examination of archival documents from the first decade after the establishment of the state, Robinson (2013) explains that the system, at its core, is an essential paradox. Jewish conquest of land and labour is pursued while “extending individual political rights to those Arabs of Palestine who remained after 1948 – to bind voting Palestinians to the state while simultaneously denying them access to it.” (p.198) Its first leaders, stemming from the community of Zionist founding elites, established Israel’s external democratic image while developing a coherent set of laws that would “render Palestinian citizenship and suffrage meaningless.” (ibid)

Palestinian-citizen struggle pivots on this ambiguity, in which the state is veiled in its liberal-project; and through which has bound and subsumed the Palestinian community within it, even as it is inherently and systemically excluded. Naamnih (2013) and Piterberg (2001) take this idea further, explaining that citizenship was in fact used as a way to create an unseen and excluded minority, without the capacity to challenge the state except in ways that sanction and reproduce the veil of Zionist-liberal hegemony.

Yet, seeing Palestinians as essential to the production of Zionist-Jewish hegemony is not to assume their mystification, apoliticisation or their genuine incorporation into the system, as
part of the hegemonic bloc or collective will. Extensive debates and documents that attribute to this fact, fill the Palestinian-citizens’ social, political and academic networks. Of particular note, in 2006, a representative-group from across the spectrum of Palestinian-citizen society published a series of papers, known as The Future Vision Documents, in which they collectively asserted their rejection of the ‘Jewish-democratic’ construct, and the position it articulates for Palestinian communities within Israeli society. That said, the subordinate, subaltern group need not consent to the hegemonic paradigm, in order to be impacted by or included within its range of influence (Chalcraft and Noorani, 2007); or vice versa. The very fact that the Palestinian citizens exist within this space implies that their engagement with the state, and their living experience as citizens, are shaped by Israeli hegemony. They have evolved a social and political consciousness, and thus their struggle, in direct response to the shape, scope and scape of the material and ideological constructions of the Zionist-hegemonic project. It is a struggle by ‘the excluded other’, ‘the enemy’, ‘the fifth column’ and ‘internal threat’; responding to an entrenched hegemonic process that has come to define itself both in terms of that threat and in light of the liberal-veil that is infused with the Palestinian-citizen community’s presence, language and culture. The hegemonic project has been shaped by both the inclusion and exclusion of Palestinian citizens from the political organization of the state (Shalev, 2000); which, as a ‘minority-group’, has (some) access to the political and legal infrastructure that enshrines and cultivates Jewish privilege. The chasms and contradictions caused by this relationship are expressed both in terms of the overt, direct challenges of and resistance to the state; and implicitly, in the uncomfortable space within which Palestinian citizens are contained. They innately and immediately challenge the different blocks upon which the state has built its project of consent: that is, of a faith in a liberal democracy, which is, at its core, anchored in the idea, and absolute protection of a Jewish haven in Palestine.

The Hegemony of the Democracy Debates

“The crisis facing democracy in the Jewish state is as old as the state itself. Israel’s development as a liberal settler-state was the outcome of the imperative to establish a colonial rule of difference within a liberal order imposed largely from the outside – to find a legal way to partition the population and thus facilitate the colonization for exclusive Jewish use... Liberal settler rule relied on a combination of legislated

33 Additional examples of which can be found in Badil’s quarterly publication, al-Majdal, titled, The Paradox of Using the Law of the Oppressor (2014); and Mada al Carmel’s publication, Jadal, on the same topic, 2 years earlier, The Masters’ Tools: Palestinian Citizens Appeal Within the Legal System (2012).

34 For further discussion of the Future Vision Documents, see Chapter Three, on the Galilee case.
privilege, practices of informal discrimination, and the creation of territorial zones where the standard rules of governance did not apply.”

Shira Robinson, Citizen Strangers, 2013, p. 198

With Israeli hegemony turning on the paradox of its democratic self-imagination, much of the literature on Israel/Palestine has been seized by debates on this topic. Questions by a mass of social scientists, legal scholars, historians and political analysts, let alone an endless array of activists and advocates, target the structure of the state, its regime and its legitimacy. This discourse has often been limited to a political and polemic debate, ultimately directed at bolstering or pulling back the hegemonic veil surrounding Israel’s democratic nature. For example, Yiftachel’s (1999, 2006) foundational works in which he conceptualises Israel as an ethnocratic regime\(^{35}\) – in which ethno-nationalism, settler-colonialism and ethno-classism converge in a system in which one ethnic group captures and dominates contested territories and power structures – are directed primarily towards a debunking of Zionist hegemony over Israeli politics. Fifteen years later, Shira Robinson’s (2013) extensive treatise of Israel’s liberal programme for colonising Palestinian lives and territories during the Military Regime, is still preoccupied with this debate. Moreover, many of the authors who focus on the Palestinian experience of the Israeli state, for example, Rouhana (1997), Ghanem (2010), White (2010), and Pappé (2011), also target the same realm of discourse; working to prove that Israel is not a democracy, to its internal and external audiences.

There is good reason for this. Even if the academic discussion has lain bare the system of power, the political system is still entrenched in the hegemony of Zionism and the logic of ethnically defined power structures, as well as the need to protect and defend them. There are extensive examples of this in the public and political spheres of the state. These include, but are not limited to, the Committee for Higher Education’s (CHE) 2011–2013 (unsuccessful) campaign to close down Ben Gurion University of the Negev’s Politics Department for its ‘anti-Zionist’ bias and direct criticisms of the state; the attempts by ‘neo-Zionist’ paragovernmental groups like Im Tirzu (‘If you will it’) and its cohorts, to vilify Israeli civil society groups for their support of Palestinian human rights and ‘anti-Israel’ propagandizing; and the attempts to ban MK Haneen Zoabi from running in the national elections in 2013, for

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\(^{35}\) Yiftachel’s theorisation of ‘ethnocracy’ and the ‘ethnocratic regime’ appears throughout his writings, but the foundational and most extensive can be found in his (1999) *Ethnocracy: The Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine* and his (2006) *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine*.

\(^{36}\) Amal Jamal’s (2011) *Arab Minority Nationalism in Israel: the Politics of Indigeneity* is one of a handful of exceptions to the rule. His appraisal of the state and the debates as to its structure is included in his work, in order to understand Palestinian struggle, as opposed to unveiling the paradoxes and contradictions of Israeli hegemony.
her participation in the Mavi Maramara protest against the siege on Gaza\(^{37}\). Each example serves to highlight the hegemony of Zionist, exclusionary discourses in Israel, and exemplifies their clear dissonance with characteristics normally associated with a liberal-democracy (freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of political protest). The democracy debate is an attempt to unveil the contradictions of the Zionist imaginations; and can be seen as an integral component of Palestinian-citizen struggles over the years. It is a useful means of understanding the system’s influence on the tools, tactics and spaces of Palestinian-citizen resistance: this is what informs the communities’ uses of state institutions, demanding rights and protections on the basis of the state’s democratic claims; and their multi-layered attempts to unveil the democratic myth, and tear large fissures in the imagined balance between Jewish and democratic values in Israel, and thus negate the system’s global and local legitimacy. However, as Rabinowitz (2001), in his analysis of ‘trapped minorities’, contends, the majority of the ‘democracy debate’ literature gets lost in the audience and the structures it seeks to unveil, and loses sight of the Palestinian experience of and engagement with the hegemonic project. As Rabinowitz (2001) explains, through this lens “the Palestinian citizens of Israel become a case from which to generalize about the nature of the state. The state thus remains the primary unit of analysis. The subjective view of the minorities is secondary – more a tool with which to think and analyse than a focus of attention in its own right.” (p.69)

This thesis does not seek to resolve nor dismiss the long-standing debate on the structures of the Jewish-Zionist state. Acute and extensive analysis of this topic has been developed by a range of critical researchers, including Nadim Rouhana (1997), Elia Zureik (1979), Oren Yiftachel (1999; 2006), Shira Robinson (2013), Gabriel Piterberg (2008), Gershon Shafir (1989), and a plethora of others. In their work they have sufficiently challenged the idea that a state can be labelled a democracy, while its laws, conceptual logic and social and economic relations privilege one ethno-national group over the other. When the spotlight shifts away from the debate, and towards Palestinian experiences of and in the state, the regime is easily conceptualised, not in terms of a package of meagre political rights, but the entrenchment of stratified relations, along ethnic, territorial, and class lines; and the methods Palestinians have devised for challenging them.

\(^{37}\) For details of each story, a range of media can be consulted. See for example, Trabelsi-Hadad (2011), Barak (2011), and Sheizaf (2012), respectively.
The paradigm through which to understand the clash of Palestinian citizens with the hegemonic state is their historical and material experience of the Zionist territorial project, primarily based on analyses developed by the above authors. The starting point for this relationship is the Zionist transformation of the Jewish Diaspora from an ethnic identity to a national project. The formation of the Jewish ‘nation’ and the setting up of an autonomous political community was inherently linked to their development of a territorial community; which, as Benvenisti argues, sought to legitimise the Zionists’ presence in Palestine, through material and spiritual propriety of Palestinian lands. The crux of this colonization process was in settling the land, through the cultivation and use of a Jewish labour force, while excising Palestinian labour from Jewish-owned lands. As Zureik explains, “neither of these issues was resolved without ethnic separation, exploitation and downright dispossession.” Its legacy, then – from the first settlements in the 19th century through the establishment of the state and up until today – is the ethnicisation of capital, nationhood, citizenship and belonging. Its ethos was and is expressed, like so many settler-colonial projects, in the displacement and erasure of the indigenous populations which came before it, through its greed for the Palestinian landscape and in its absolute conviction of the righteousness of the project. Thus, the distinct character of the Israeli state incorporates a link between a colonial and ethnic logic, in which ethnic hierarchies manifest explicitly in the appropriation of and control over land; and is reproduced in the bifurcation of labour, capital and space. Moreover, as Yiftachel & Ghanem contend, these mirror-processes of Judaisation and de-Arabisation are at the core of the state's relationship to its Palestinian citizens.

The myths upon which ‘Jewish and democratic’ hegemony is built are disarticulated in any analysis that, as Shafir & Peled argue, “includes both Jews and Palestinians.” The boundaries of analysis should extend to the limits of Israel's effective rule, turning

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38 Others to be added to this list include Ram (1993); Veracini (2010); Stasiulis & Yuval-Davis (1995); and Woolfe (2012).
39 At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that the project of labour segregation was never complete. Many agricultural communities continued to use Palestinian labour; and, as Lockman’s (1996) research demonstrates, industries that were established during the Mandate period, incorporated both Jewish and Palestinian workers.
40 Ethnic hierarchies are not limited to the state’s relationship to its Palestinian citizens; the immense gaps that exist between the original European (Ashkenazi) settlers, and the next generations of Jewish immigrants from North Africa & the Middle East (Mizrahi), the Ex-Soviet Union and Ethiopia, evolve out of the same colonial structure, and were spatialised as marginal and peripheral expressions of those hierarchies. However, this discussion is beyond the scope of this work, and will only be discussed briefly within the case chapters, relevant. See Yacobi & Tzfadia (2011), Abdo & Yuval-Davis (1995), Shafir (1989), and Kedar & Yiftachel (2006), for further discussion of the topic.
interests, rather than ideas, into the prime moving power of history; and actions and their results, rather than intentions and their ideological justifications, into the focus of social and historical analysis (ibid)\textsuperscript{41}. In fact, as Wolfe suggests, in seeing the state in terms of the struggle by its victims, a key tool is constructed with which to bypass the polemics of the debate on the nature of the state, and its rubric of colonial and ethno-nationalist privileging\textsuperscript{42}. Through this lens, it is possible to understand Palestinian struggle in light of the community’s experience and prevention of attempted erasures by Israeli-Zionist conquest, expulsion and replacement – and the resulting apartheid logic of Israeli political and physical geography\textsuperscript{43}. It becomes possible to understand the Palestinians in terms of their survival in and reclaiming of this space; their resistance emerging from within and against the integrated and embedded colonial geographies of the hegemonic state (Yacobi, 2012).

**Anti-Colonialist Struggle, Trapped Within the Colonial Space**

It is from here that the dialogue truly emerges, between the field of force and its subaltern struggles. According to Yiftachel & Ghanem (2004), Peleg (2007), and Benvenisti (2000), the ethnocratic state is predicated on the creation and containment of a threat. That threat entrenches the collective political will, and reifies the legitimacy of its system of privileges and protections in the common sense of all social and economic institutions. In the work of Gramsci (1999), Mouffe (1979) and Foucault (1978)\textsuperscript{44}, this ‘threat’ is the ‘other’, constructed in contravention to the system and structures of power, and yet is inherently part of them. The system that shapes itself through struggle, through engagement with its other, also defines

\textsuperscript{41}This statement exists in contrast to the historical exceptionalism often attributed to Israel’s settler project, due to its social-nationalist philosophy, the tragic history of the global Jewry and their mythic claims to the land (Veracini, 2010).

\textsuperscript{42}See Zureik (2010), as well as Piterberg (2008) for similar discussions of this topic.

\textsuperscript{43}As shall be discussed in the following chapters, the nature of Israel’s internal apartheid laws and logics are understood in terms of their spatial configurations and impacts on its citizens, as opposed to the political integration of its minorities, with an (allegedly) ‘equal’ vote to the Zionist state. See Hass (2013) and Abu-Freih (2012) for additional discussion of this topic.

\textsuperscript{44}Foucault is mentioned here, because he theorises resistance as an essential part of the relations of force. Through his “genealogy” of power (Foucault, 2003), he unveils its disciplinary nature as being dispersed and diffused, circulated and exercised through our subjecthoods, our bodies, our language and practice (1978, 1979, 1991, 1997, 2003). For Foucault, power is everywhere, hidden in the norms of discourse, law, social rules and self-discipline; until resistance subverts or diverts its limits and unveils its violence. However, even as he argues that power is shaped, activated and disrupted by resistance, and that resistance is as ubiquitous as power, his spotlight is on what resistance is against (the limits and lines of power), as opposed to what resistance produces or changes in the structures of power (Pickett, 1996). Thus, while Foucault’s work is discussed at different points in this thesis in support of its central concepts, the emphasis throughout this manuscript is on Gramsci’s conceptualisations of resistance, as it encapsulates the agonisms of struggle, as well as what is reconstituted and rearticulated through its contestations to the flow of power. A further discussion of both the strengths and limits of Foucault’s analysis (the majority of which focuses on the expansive, productive and often total nature of power) can be found in a large array of literature; for some examples see Fraser (1981), Pickett (1996), Heller (1996), Taylor (1984), and Wickham & Kendall (2008).
itself by and through it\textsuperscript{45}. Thus this ‘threat’ becomes integral to the creation of an expansive hegemony, even as it struggles with and against it. As discussed above, that threat, that other, in this story, is unarguably the Palestinian demos, which evolved in conjunction with, or rather directly counter to the Zionist national entity (Piterberg, 2008). The Palestinian citizens, in light of their connection to the larger demos, became a fifth column, and were seen as a direct threat to the territorial project on Palestinian lands. However, this group, so often overlooked in the study of Palestinian and Israeli politics, also became the foundational ‘other’ in the trajectory of Zionist praxis, which shapes and is shaped by this relationship. As discussed above, this is the ultimate paradox of the Israeli political system, and the source of the constant crises and instability inherent in such a project (Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004; Peleg, 2007); because its foundation in the absolute spiritual and material control of state and land is so vulnerable when the excluded other, the Palestinian threat, is included (and needed).

The internal Palestinian community, with its own spiritual and material claims to ‘Israel’, which includes an ongoing and historical presence on the land (Sand, 2009; 2012), is in contravention with the Zionist logic of the Jews’ legitimate and historical right to this place. As a result, the very space this group inhabits is a target, designated by Zionist hegemony as the ethnic frontier: to be conquered, contained, and continuously strangled and encroached upon. The Judaization of Israel’s map engendered the severing of Palestinian ties, inside and outside the state’s semi-formalized boundaries, cutting any possible line of congruity between internal and external threats to Jewish sovereignty and statehood. The Palestinian citizens became ‘trapped’ in Israeli space (Rabinowitz, 2001), cut off from one another; cut off from the rest of their exiled populous and segmented from the rest of their ‘fellow citizens’ due to their othered-ness. The precarity of this position emerges in the image of the Palestinian ghetto, as the intentionally and necessarily exiled periphery at the edge of Israeli spaces, throughout the country (Yiftachel, 2009b). In physical terms, Palestinian-citizen space exists as segmented neighbourhoods in the Mixed Cities, as hidden and unrecognised villages in the Naqab, or as an entire ‘black hole’ periphery in the Central Galilee; each in its own way, living off the grid of economic, social and political power of Jewish-Israel.

\textsuperscript{45} This paraphrases a long discussion in Gramsci (1999), elaborated in Chalcraft & Noorani (2007) and Mouffe (1979), on the question of how hegemony is shaped and re-shaped through an ongoing process of struggle with competing ideologies. This discussion has been re-interpreted here, as a way to understand the ‘other’ as integral to creating a more expansive, integrative and entrenched hegemonic order.
Continuing from above, in the hegemonic discourse, the ‘other’ evolves its own ethos in struggle with that of the hegemonic bloc. As an indigenous group targeted for removal, their resistance becomes embedded in remaining. As land is stolen and re-settled in mass amounts, so land becomes integral to the subaltern’s sense of survival. As the state seeks to infiltrate their strongholds, the other seeks to keep them out. Most importantly, as the state denies their very identity as Palestinians, so that identity, through its symbols, language, narratives and memorialisations, becomes paramount to their struggle. Thus, the essence of Palestinian-citizen struggle – mirroring the hegemony of political Zionism – is the fight to maintain their presence, their symbols, their identities, their memories and their rights to and in this place; which are also always under siege, threatened and threatening to the state.

However, this is not enough to understand the evolution of Palestinian citizens’ struggle over the last six and a half decades, which responds to both its physical and ideological positioning by and within Zionism. First, it is necessary to layer back in the colonial construction of stratified and segmented spaces, the ethnocratic regime’s ethnicization of capital and politics, and the mythology of liberal democracy embedded in Israel’s hegemonic story. On top this, it is also necessary to discuss the ongoing conflict between the state of Israel and the Palestinian ‘parent’ nation (Rabinowitz, 2001), as well as the subsequent ‘divorce’ of the Palestinian citizens by the rest of the Palestinian people, particularly their political leadership⁴⁶. Finally, it is necessary to incorporate an understanding of how, where and with whom the Palestinians live their daily lives, develop their communities, and grow as part of the Israeli state, as excluded and included citizens. Only then is it possible to build some understanding of the complex realm inhabited by Palestinian citizens, and the truncated arena from within which Palestinian citizens’ resistance is negotiated. It is from here that the story of this thesis truly begins.

The Context for ‘Authentic Resistance’

Two circles of debate frame the essential puzzle of this thesis, as to the nature of Palestinian citizens’ resistance, its relationship to the state and the Zionist project, and its ability to transcend – and even transform – imposed limits and boundaries. One occurs within the larger body of literature surrounding the themes of power and resistance, particularly in

⁴⁶ This is slowly being repaired, albeit mostly at a grassroots level, as with the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, in which an overarching call for Palestinian rights include those of the Palestinian citizens for equality under the Israeli state. At the level of leadership in the oPt, this process is not necessarily being replicated, as 2014 negotiations with Israel around the future of the Palestinian state clearly indicated. No Palestinian citizens were included in the negotiations, and their needs were not mentioned in the main categories for ‘final status’ negotiations.
reference to subaltern groups. The other has evolved from within the case itself, mirroring the theoretical debate in the conversations and everyday practice of the different practitioners and participants of struggle. The circles converge on the question of what kind of resistance, under which circumstances, engenders what kind of changes.

‘Resistance’ has traditionally been conceptualised in both academic and activist discourses, in terms of a set of fixed actors, arenas, practices and goals. Practitioners and historians alike conjure pictures of large-scale upheavals, mass social mobilisations and revolutionary movements as the sole constructions and constructors of social and political change. This bias in the literature tends to limit the scope for analysis to the revolutionary moment, and prevents looking at social movements in the making, when things are messier, less easily categorized, and functions in micro-steps and micro-politics. Interestingly, this contrasts with the process Gramsci describes as essential to constructing hegemony; in which the other permeates and disarticulates the system from within all spheres of action, and all structures of society; what Mouffe (1979) has labelled ‘hegemony from below’. Thus, just as the system exists in all avenues of life, struggle and revolution cannot be held or contained by a particular few, in a limited arena of practice.

That said, there are a number of authors who do speak of the slower, more integrative, and essentially unseen travels of resistance; several of whom have evolved their own discipline on the topic, called ‘Subaltern Studies’. This community of authors shift the spotlight to the trench-like warfare of everyday struggles against authoritarian systems; or rather, they shift the story from the language and lens of the colonisers, to that of the subaltern, turning them from objectified other to historical subject (Chakravorty-Spivak, 1988). The study of the subaltern – the ‘non-hegemonic’, the non/excluded classes – began a breakdown of the categories of power and class-relations as they have been determined by Western thinkers, and opened up the space to see struggle in multiple movements and spheres, according to alternative readings of political change. Amidst this body of work, resistance is seen in

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47 This bias is also discussed in Bayat (2010) in his work on ‘non-movements’; and Tarrow (1998), in their work on silenced actors and voices in much of the research on social movements.

48 See Chakrabarty (2000) for a brief overview of the field, and its contributions to the tradition of seeing history ‘from below’ and beyond the elite readings of anti-colonial movements in the (post)colonised/peripheried world. The original group looked explicitly at Indian historiography, but the field has broadened to include the stories of all who might fit the category of ‘marginalised’ and ‘dominated’ other, within a range of oppressive systems.

49 A long list of authors contribute to the ‘Subaltern Studies’ Literature, including James Scott (1985); Dianne Singerman (1995); Douglas Haynes & Gyan Prakash (1991); Lila Abu-Lughod (1990); Lori Allen (2008); Asef Bayat (2010); and Salwa Ismail (2013).

50 For example, Chakravorty-Spivak (1988) challenges Foucault and Deleuze; and Guha (1997) directs his work at all ‘colonialist’ and ‘elite-nationalist’ erasures of subaltern experiences.
relation to the social context, to power and to the field of force in which they participate; but also as a process, found in a range of contentious actions, instigated by a spectrum of individuals (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004; Abu-Lughod, 1990; Pickett, 1996). It can be conscious and unconscious, public and private, collective and individual, active and passive, developed by both ordinary and extra-ordinary resisters, whether or not they are recognized as such.

In sum, as Haynes and Prakash (1991) explain, resistance is characterized in these works, more by the ways in which it challenges and unravels the system, than by the conscious, collective or coherent intention towards social change. The lens and language of revolutions are widened to incorporate the messy process of the everyday and sometimes unintended struggle, which in turn determines a new methodology for analysing change. The implication of which is that – at least to some degree – the system can be disarticulated in the minutia of ordinary and individual actions. In other words, the same actors othered and seemingly silenced by the hegemonic project, impact the system through a process of slow encroachment that incrementally – and yet integrally – reshapes it (Bayat, 2010). Regarding the colonial and ethnocratic construction of Palestinian-citizens’ presence and space, it is relevant to consider how they resist the hegemonic system in their everyday lived-experience of it, as well as through large scale, collective acts of public protest. Both sets of actions reveal the community’s direct and indirect entanglements with control, containment and ghettoization. Together, they become a lens through which to unravel how multiple layers of struggle engender transformation of the system and the truncated spaces in which they are housed.

There is a long debate as to the capacity of non-revolutionary acts of resistance to shift the trajectories of the system they challenge. The discussion primarily revolves around differing interpretations of the limits of hegemonic ‘power’, and the ways power and resistance engage and relate to one another. The starting point is the process by which hegemony is established. As discussed above, it evolves out of and in struggle with the previous order, always from within society, permeating its layers and levels until it is internalized individually and collectively, and becomes the natural order of things (Mouffe 1979; Mouffe & Laclau, 1985; Roseberry, 1994). Building from this understanding of the hegemonic project, resistance, which evolves out of the hegemonic order, never exists external from it, and is ever in dialogue with it. It seeks its legitimacy by antagonizing the system, breaking its hold, and filling the chasms and fissures left open by the losing hegemon. The process then repeats
itself, as a new class seeks to disarticulate and rearticulate the hegemonic order, in struggle with the previous one. The repercussions of this are discussed in Richard Day’s (2005) analysis of the ‘new’ transnational social movements. He argues that the project of struggle, in so far as it attempts to be counter-hegemonic, is never separate from the previous order. It emulates the forms and practices of the dominant hegemony in order to replace it, thereby negating its capacity to truly transform the reigning system. This is echoed in Mouffe’s (1985) description of counter-hegemony "(whose) objective is not to reject the system and all its elements but to rearticulate it, to break it down to its basic elements and then to sift through past conceptions to see which ones… can serve to express the new situation.” (p.192) The hegemonic order, thus, continues to reproduce and reshape itself in a seemingly endless cycle, and the field of force seems insurmountable. Accordingly, hegemony becomes so pervasive, so complex and resilient, that in its reciprocal relationship with resistance, hegemony determines all lines and limits to struggle, including the spaces within which it acts and the length to which ‘counter-hegemonic’, or even ‘non-hegemonic’, action is even feasible. Hegemony through this lens, in so far as it is incomplete and constantly evolving, becomes an all-consuming, nebulous space, integrating “progressive actions and ideologies into itself, thus retaining the power of the dominant class.” (Chalcraft & Noorani, 2007, p.9) Such a view seems to negate any strategy coming from below; in particular, that which incorporates actions that evolve through the institutions that house and perpetuate the hegemonic project (Day, 2005). It also informs deep criticisms of both intellectual analyses and practical work that conceptualises such activities as potential arenas for change. A polar argument has been developed in the work of James Scott (1985) and several of his colleagues in the Subaltern Studies cohort, who frame subversive actions of the ‘weak’ as weapons against hegemonic systems. Scott developed his analysis through his investigations into the rebellious, and what he called ‘survivalist’ actions, of poor rural communities in Malaysia – actions that included ‘slander’, ‘false-compliance’, ‘sabotage’ and ‘foot-dragging’. He saw the subaltern’s lack of belief in the dominant order as proof of their ability to act outside and beyond, even counter to its hegemony; as if the subaltern community functions within a separate political terrain, unimpinged by the spheres of power that surround them. In light of which, Scott is heavily critiqued for divorcing hegemony from its material and political anchors, expressed in the containment and control of the subalterns’ lives, labour, and the spaces they inhabit (Roseberry, 1994; Haynes & Prakash, 1991). According to Mitchell (1990), Scott dismisses the relations of power and inequalities that
exist in society, and also inform the type of resistance, the ‘choice’ of weapons and, in the case he describes, the oppressed group’s lack of direct engagement with those in power. However, despite the existence of other, much more nuanced discussions of similar phenomena of resistance, Scott is not the only one taken to task in this range of critiques. Vivek Chibber (2013), a Marxist scholar of social and political history, takes this critique to its furthest end, delegitimising the entire field of Subaltern Studies for what he sees as a misdiagnosis of capitalist power and the constraints it places on those trapped within it; the fallacy of which, he alleges, is inscribed in their foundational argument that a separate politics exists for those who are left out of the system of capitalist reproduction. Rabinowitz (2001) and Mitchell (1990) argue similarly that all such actions – the minute, the individual, the local and the institutional, reminiscent to those found throughout the Palestinian citizens’ arsenal – merely give the illusion of agency, while reinforcing the radical asymmetric power relations that limit subaltern resistances to their truncated corners. As Rabinowitz warns in his analysis of the Palestinian citizens’ case, this small-scale resistance "is the paradoxical vehicle that reinforces complicit reproduction of the system." (p.180)

A plethora of activists and academics take up this stream of thought, of a hegemony that is ever-corrupting and impenetrable; and yet paradoxically articulate a strategy for change that dislocates the dynamic relationship of power and resistance. On one hand, hegemony functions in all layers and all institutions of the dominant system; and thus all actions taking form within the structures, are coercive. Resistance – counter-hegemonic or otherwise – that passes through the system can only ever mirror the hegemonic order, and reproduce as well as reinforce the system of oppression inherent in it. Thus, according to this group of thinkers, struggle that seeks to overcome a system of hegemony must disengage from it. Either in Day’s (2005) conception of a minor-politics, that is always outside and fragmented from the structures of power; or as a mass revolutionary movement that clashes with the system from above and outside it, as conceptualised by Rabinowitz (1997), Martieu (2009) and Payes (2005).

Within this paradigm, to use legal, civil, market, bureaucratic, cultural or parliamentary politics in service of a minority resistance, is to corroborate and legitimize the relations of power in society. As Jamal (2012) contends – utilising the specific example of court-based struggle – appeals to and through this system, even when they challenge state policies, legitimate its principles. He continues:
“It is true that they utilize gaps in the legal and judicial philosophy in order to transform it and challenge its fairness. However, a new dialectical relationship emerges where contention and legitimation become inherently interdependent. When litigation challenges the system, it grants it the right and even the duty to intervene in disputes between its own logic and alternative ones. The result is that, through judicial act, the court system legitimates its own logic—the dominant logic of the state—even when it criticizes the policies enacted by agents of this logic. This is a catch-22 that cannot be overcome when playing by the dominant rules of the game.” (p.2)

In the context of Israel and its Palestinian citizens, where so much of the resistance tool box is concentrated in the use of these ‘hegemonic tools’, such actions are implicated in more than just the reproduction of ethnic discrimination and inequality of outputs or outcomes. Palestinian citizens are precariously positioned on the inside, integrated into a system in which the Judaisation/de-Arabisation programme is veiled in the hermeneutics of liberality and law. Accordingly, in order to use these tools effectively, ‘politics’ (which involves the overt naming of the system’s colonial, ethno-national ethos) are allegedly sanitized in order to fit within the language and logic of the ‘Jewish and Democratic State’\textsuperscript{51}. Thus, through this lens, resistance practices with the capacity to change the boundaries and structures of hegemony, whether individual or collective, fragmented or cohesive, conscious or unconscious, must exist outside the flattened political space that sanctions and is thus sanctioned by the state. Within this frame, there is only one type of ‘authentic’ resistance. There is an alternative reading to that of a hegemony that is all-encompassing, and that of a resistance practice that is inherently corrupted by the hegemonic order, when developed from within its tools and arenas. Moutte (1985), Roseberry (1994), Haynes & Prakash (1991), and Chalcraft & Noorani (2007) find something else in their readings of Gramsci’s work and his theorising of hegemony. They see the perpetual struggle in hegemony as a potential window through which the non-hegemonic and counter-hegemonic can act. Rather than obtuse, the hegemonic order is constantly changing and evolving into something new. Consent is active, even if spontaneous and internalised, and thus can be negotiated, transformed, and reshaped. Moreover, the slow process of encroaching state institutions, apparatuses and spaces, is critical to hegemonic transformation and inherent to a dialectic relationship between resistance and hegemony. This does not simply imply that they impact one another, but that they each evolve and transform the other. Thus, ‘authentic resistance’ is indeed possible; and

\textsuperscript{51} The term politics refers to the ‘Palestinianisation’ of a particular struggle inside Israel; as shall be discussed in the case chapters, Palestinianisation is equated with politicisation, or consciousness raising as to the link between Palestinian identity (and its material expressions) and the issue/struggle experienced by Arab citizens of Israel.
seems to exist in the clash, the struggle, the moment of exchange between the powerful and the subaltern.

The essence of the tension between resistance and hegemony is in the space they inhabit together. This is particularly true in the case of the Palestinian citizens, who are inherently vulnerable to and contained within the hegemonic system; which is likewise vulnerable to the other and their counter-claims to the same space, territory and history. If struggle evolves out of, with and against this system, then its agents, the Palestinian citizens, are not deluded, passive captives of the state; yet their activities and organizations are not "autonomous expressions of subaltern politics and culture." (Roseberry, 1994, p.360) Their tools, targets and goals necessarily develop from their positioning within the hegemonic project of the state. Thus, "what hegemony constructs is not a shared ideology, but a common material and meaningful framework for living through, talking about and acting upon the world (ibid, p.364)". Therefore, we can see how "forms and languages of protest or resistance must adopt the forms and languages of domination in order to be registered or heard." (ibid) At the same time, one must ask, by whom is it being heard or registered? When does the language become radical, and when do the dynamics shift and reshape themselves?

It is clear that Rabinowitz and his cohort are correct in arguing that hegemony defines a common language, logic, and structure of practice; and that Palestinian-citizen politics navigate the language of an ethnically exclusive system, in which certain spaces necessarily corroborate the Zionist hegemonic narrative. However, there are a series of authors who would support the argument forwarded through this study, that the use of hegemonic tools does not necessarily constitute the programme of legitimization that these authors and activists describe. Moreover, the use of a hegemonic instrument in political struggle does not mean it is used hegemonically (De Sousa Santos, 2002; O’Brian, 1996; Sfard, 2009; Fitzpatrick, 2014). Lisa Hajjar (2013) argues that her work engages legal frames and terminology to disrupt her government’s hegemony over its legal narratives. Avinoam Meir (2005), an anthropologist and expert on Bedouin spatialities, follows a similar logic when describing the Bedouin leadership’s use of public planning channels in Israel, to unveil, challenge and change hidden Judaisation policies in the Naqab. As does Tripp (2013), in the way he ascribes the use of public art as means to subvert authoritarian control and dominance of public space. A set of articles by Palestinian activists, published in Majdil (Badil, 2013), continue this trend, explaining that while the law is among the Masters’ tools for colonisation, segregation and oppression – and by extension, so are all Israeli state
institutions – it can and should be used surgically in the service of Palestinian struggle. Charles Tilly (1977), one of the founding thinkers in theories of social movements, likewise concludes on the basis of his analysis of 19th century insurgent activities of a ‘Mutual Aid Society’, that radical action can evolve from within state-sanctioned spaces for collective organising, particularly in a context where repressive policies are used to subdue and contain forms of collective resistance.

Accordingly, several of the above authors see the emancipatory and empowering capacity of these tools as part of a spectrum of integral actions that mobilise and move through multiple social and political realms (De Sousa Santos, 2002; O’Brian, 1996; Sfard, 2009; Elian Weizman, 2013). Moreover, to maintain the disarticulating capacity of hegemonic tools, it is necessary to link struggle inside and outside state-sanctioned ‘boxes’ for protest; to engage from within and without, through multiple forms, opportunities and languages. Thus, within the Palestinian-citizen context, there is potential for radical change through the links that exist between legal actions and political mobilization, between claims to individual rights and community-based recognition, and between rights-based discourses and the rejection of a Zionist democracy (Jamal, 2005; 2006; 2008).

There is always a danger in working within the hegemonic project. However, radical action doesn’t necessarily come through ‘disengagement’ from the spaces hegemony inhabits. In the hegemonic context, the ‘subaltern’ are inherently excluded and included, contained and under siege, separate and yet in dynamic contention with the structures of power. Thus, tactics of resistance are both potentially reproductive and transformative. However, they are always part of, and in tension with the system that surrounds them (Fitzpatrick, 2014). The issue, according to Chalcraft (2014), in his analysis of contentious politics in the Middle East, is ‘creativity’, in the capacity of an action to transgress the norms of thinking and practice; or as Tripp (2013) explains, to interrupt the norms and everyday practices of power. While some arenas are more conducive to what Chalcraft (2014) calls ‘unruly resistances’, they still must engage the system – activating and unveiling its frontiers and limits in the process – in order to transform it. Moreover, in a context where the integral expression of the system of power is the segregation and colonisation of space, ‘authentic resistance’ is to be found in the disarticulation and transgression of physical and ideological borders. Thus, the analysis of Palestinian struggle inside Israel is anchored in its encounters with those boundaries.
PART II – Struggle as the Unit of Analysis

The story of Palestinian resistance is necessarily conceptualised in light of its relationship to the hegemony of Zionism over and through Israeli state and space; struggle cannot be separate from the field of force against, upon and within which it acts. However, there are limits to this analysis. The most salient of which is the long-standing practice of seeing Palestinian citizens only in terms of their victimisation by this state, which in turn minimises the complexity and heterogeneity of the Palestinian-citizen experience of Israeli hegemony; the fact that space, collective and personal experiences, and different arenas for action exist and are reshaped by the process of struggle52. The oft-quoted myth of an acquiescent and subordinate Palestinian community in Israel that stems from this lens (Lustick, 1980) has been shattered by the newer, more radical contentious politics that will be discussed throughout this thesis: Practices that include the politicised academic contributions of Palestinian-citizen intellectuals and professionals; the collective production and key articulations of the Future Vision Documents by Palestinian-citizen civil and political society; the provocative actions of parliament leaders and grassroots activists; and the absolute resilience of even the weakest communities to ongoing attempts at displacement. To approach struggle as ‘the unit of analysis’, however, is not to ignore its engagement and permeations with the field of force. Rather, it is a means through which to shift the spotlight from a diagnostic of power to a diagnostic of resistance, and begin to see its intricacies, its messiness, its practices, its transformations and its impacts on the trajectories of power.

As many of the Subaltern Studies scholars point out, it is the micro-politics of the case that offer a window into how history and power unfold, and the particularity of contexts and cultures of resistance take form53. The subalterns become agents, as opposed to ‘objects’ externalised and victimised by their social and political relationships. Their tactics and strategies are intentional acts, as much as they are informed by the structures that surround them. As Tilly (1977) explains, through this “bottom-up approach”, it is possible to identify the ways in which “ordinary people organise” around their own needs and experiences (p.8-8). In other words, it is possible to see them as agents of change who intersect with and

52 Examples of this trend in thinking include Ben White’s (2012) Palestinian Citizens of Israel; Al-Majdil’s Winter 2012-2013 publication on Palestinian Citizens, and Areej Sabbagh-Kouri’s (2013) writings on Palestinian cities; but this phenomenon is present in most academic and non-academic circles, including the news, policy documents, and advocacy campaigns to international institutions and human rights instruments.

53 A culture of resistance is a term discussed in Bourgois’ (2003) study of a New York ghetto (el-Barrio), to describe the idiosyncracies of a particular struggle, and its social-spatial relations to the arena in which it happens; but similar discussions are held in Bayat (2010), and throughout the debates that haunt social movement theorists, on the idiosyncratic versus general mechanisms that mobilise social movements.
inform the field of force they inhabit. As opposed to seeing resistance as being shaped exclusively by hegemonic structures, we begin to see a political order that is transformed by its attempts to contain, repress and harness these multiple forms of struggle (Chalcraft, 2008). The last half of this chapter foregrounds debates that attempt to analyse struggle – and its agents – through the internal moments and movements of collective and fragmented actions, and thus highlight struggle as the practice of real people, with lived-experiences of resistance, even as they act in dialogue with the space that surrounds them.

Social Movements and Contentious Politics

Taken broadly, the literature that constitutes theories of ‘social movements’ and ‘contentious politics’ attempts to explain the evolution of collective action as harbingers of social and systemic change. These two intersecting bodies of work are among the core theoretical terrain for an analysis of struggle. Much like the literature on hegemony, power and resistance discussed above, much of their disciplinary contributions examine the contexts and catalysts that promote the dissolution and reshaping of political systems. The focus for both is on the drivers of change: the different arenas, opportunities, resources, and intra and inter-community relations, which enable new contenders for power to emerge, overtake and transform the incumbent system. Moving from an initial narrow lens on social movements as conceived within Western/European historical contexts, the field has broadened to comparative research of a full spectrum of ‘contentious episodes’. This range allows authors to compare peasant uprisings, civil rights movements and large scale revolutionary mobilisations; finding the same mechanisms and processes that animate movements and set change in motion, throughout the repertoire of contentious politics.

The essential debates of this literature can be found in the ongoing turf wars between what Doug McAdam & Sydney Tarrow (2011), key theorists of social movements and contentious politics, label the ‘structuralists’ and the ‘culturalists’ or ‘constructivists’. The structuralist group, of which Tarrow and McAdam (as well as Charles Tilly) had traditionally been a part, is so called for the methodological model it has forwarded. The model is based on the idea that certain social and political structures are necessarily present, as causal or correlational variables in propelling social movements, and thus their potential to incur social change. Six basic categories were identified – and later expanded on – as key to understanding the spark and momentum of certain movements for change. Tilly (1977) gave them shape, but they appear in every treatise on the topic. Briefly, they are: 1) ‘Interests’, referring to the level of shared advantages and disadvantages the population feels it is likely to experience as a
consequence of their participation in a particular movement (*ibid*, p. 3-4). 2) ‘Organisation’, referring to the level of and capacity for the development of a common identity and unifying structures, within the movement population (*ibid*). 3) “Mobilization”, which describes the extent of a movement’s resources and its capacity for increasing collective acquisition and control over additional resources (*ibid*, p.3-5). 4) “Collective action”, the extent to which the action is jointly conceived and pursued as movement towards a common good (*ibid*). 5) “Framing”, referencing the different ways a movement and its agents articulate their goals, impacts, achievements and failures (*ibid*). And finally, the one that, according to Goodwin & Jasper (2004) – theorists from the ‘culturalist’ group – receives the most attention, 6) “opportunity” (and its reversal “threat”), which describes the relationship between a “population’s interests and the current state of the world around it (Tilly, 1977, 3-5)”. In other words, ‘political opportunity’ refers to the way in which the system itself intersects with the momentum of the movement, wherein fluctuations and crises are understood to facilitate or hinder the capacity for challengers to emerge and contend for power, against both repressive and open political spaces, within both “safe” and “unsafe” political arenas.

It is important to note that Tilly’s initial categorisations were a first attempt to find the common denominators in social movements; to find links across time and space that could explain their radical potential. It was also a call to others to contribute ethnographic and empirical studies that would strengthen and expand his categorical analysis. Despite this, the field was ultimately hijacked by an attempt to fit everything into these six “black boxes”; and further stifled by the field’s prioritisation of the experience of Western nation states within social movement theory and history (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2003; Bayat, 2010). The reverberations of these containers assert themselves in field-based analysis of social movements on the ground. For example, Shany Payes’ (2005) comprehensive and foundational empirical analysis of Palestinian NGOs in Israel gets bogged down in whether Palestinian NGO-based activism can be ‘categorized’ as a social movement, on the basis of these broadly-stroked limits. It is these confining parameters that led to the strongest critiques of the ‘structuralist’ mechanisms.

As discussed in Jasper & Goodwin (2004), there are two key realms of criticism attributed to the Structuralist canon: First, that it is guilty of opening its lens too wide and too far, creating a tautology in order to make large-scale ‘N’ comparisons, despite calls for the ethnographic, bottom-up approach Tilly (1977) claims it perpetuates. Within this conceptualisation, there is almost no space for the idea that a movement has a unique and idiosyncratic culture. On the
basis of this, the critics make their second point, that there is a paradoxically narrow reliance on structural explanations of agency. Opportunities for and constraints on mobilisation are pre-existing structures, as opposed to creations of the movements themselves. Accordingly, the model becomes a formula that inherently ignores the ways in which the movements’ members affect and articulate collective action, and thus affect and change, not just what happens within the movement, but within the political environ, as well.

That said, as mentioned above, the theory doesn’t end with these models. As far back as Tilly’s foundational work (1977) and as far forward as McAdam and Tarrow’s more recent writing on the Dynamics of Contention (2011), there is both acknowledgement of and an attempt to work with these criticisms. Tilly’s own assertion is that he was trying to find a balance between understanding structural-social relations as predictors of group interests in the long-run, and yet rely as much as possible on the groups’ own articulation of their interests and behaviour in the short-run\(^{54}\). McAdam & Tarrow (2011) explain that they have been trying to respond and contribute to the “cultural side of things (p.4)”, since the 1990s, with their attempts to investigate the unbounded, more fluid links between structure and agency.

The new trend, initiated by McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly (2003) with what they labelled ‘Dynamics of Contention’, opened the aperture of the social movement field to investigate the more relational, less static ‘variables’ and ‘mechanisms’ that appear throughout the spectrum of collective actions, albeit in different sequences. In their work, they offer a new way of thinking about and comparing the different moments, wherein individuals and groups, both those contained in ‘normal’ political channels and those that transgress the typical political order, set out to disrupt, ‘transgress’ and, ultimately, break down the system of oppression. In this new canon of work, the focus on cohesive movements shifted to ‘episodes’, or continuous streams of contention. Instead of the individual categories of interests, organisation, mobilisation, and opportunity, they looked at the relational spectrum of ‘mechanisms’, or those events that alter social and political relations in a given society, and ‘processes’, which refers to the regular sequence in which such mechanisms appear in contentious, collective, and unruly actions. McAdam et al then break down ‘mechanisms’ to differentiate between the external impacts, internal collective and cultural impacts, and relational impacts that stem from building links across different communities and geographic

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\(^{54}\) Tilly (1977) works within the Marxist tradition, and describes social-structural relations as ‘relations of production’.
arenas. In other words, they attempted to give those scholars looking at hegemonic contestation, a more holistic way of understanding the way structures and agents intersect to disarticulate and reshape a system, than they had in previous iterations of the ‘social movement agenda’ (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2003).

There is a robust and tangible offering in both the structural and cultural schools of thought; their mutual focus on the ‘who, why, when and what’ of struggle and resistance informs thick and detailed analyses of how agents and systems change in light of contentious actions. The culturalists delineate the particularity of experiences within a movement; the ‘structuralists’, today, look at the intersections between agents and the mechanisms that spark, mobilise, constrain and support a movement’s growth, impact and limits. Both are relevant lenses to the particular cases of struggle discussed in this thesis. On the one hand, the culturalists offer tools for understanding the idiosyncratic nodes and modalities of each case, foregrounding particular boundaries, histories, agents and experiences of and within the colonising Judaisation project. Using this lens, stakeholders from the Jaffa case define and frame their movement in relation with the urban, ‘mixed’, neoliberal context that seeks to swallow and remove them; political agents in the Galilee determine their struggle from their primarily all-Arab enclave, a frontier on the edge of Jewish Israel; and the Bedouins of the Naqab’s Unrecognised Villages define theirs from outside, from unseen non-spaces, emptied by the Judaisation project. The structuralists broaden this picture, seeing these ‘moments of struggle’ as part of the larger spectrum of mechanisms that frame Palestinian politics within and beyond the Israeli state, and to social movement processes, in general. This is a critical contribution toward dissolving the lines Israel has placed around each case, and the larger lines that determine Israel as a unique, idiosyncratic context.

At the same time, both sets of literature are rigid and bounded; both require ‘boxes’, either to encourage comparison – as with the structuralists – or, as is the case with the culturalists, to distinguish the agents of one territory, one case, from another. As a result, there is very little fluidity or flexibility in methodology and thus in what it captures and what it sees. In particular, inherent limits are set by its ‘who’, ‘what’ and ‘when’ containers. In his treatise of ‘non’ social movements and resistances in the Middle East, Asef Bayat (2010) explains this essential gap: The adherence to the conscious, collective, coherent and episodic moments of a movement for social change is immediately blinded to the way dominant systems respond to and shift in light of resistance that is ordinary, everyday, passive and fragmented. This bias is acknowledged throughout the work of the contentious politics cohort, particularly its volume
on the silenced voices in social movement literature (Tarrow, 2001). However, it is never resolved, and is perhaps unresolvable, due to an inherent myopia to processes as opposed to products; dialogue and dialectics, as opposed to binaries of structures and agents, threats and opportunities. It cannot articulate the messy, complex reality that is incorporated within a culture of resistance, as something that is always happening, and is part of all aspects of the life of struggle.

This is not to say that Bayat (2010) and his cohort ever resolve the issue either. They often get stuck in the opposite perspective, stemming from the impetus to describe a separate subaltern politics and a separate enclave for resistance. For example, in Bayat (2010) – as with Scott (1985) and Guha (1997), discussed above – there is an ever-present dichotomy between the passive, resilient, and subversive struggles of the urban poor in the Middle East and the collective, conscious, organised movements that develop within the technologically advanced and politically open societies of the West; as if the contexts never mix. In addition to being a dated assessment of Middle East struggles, Bayat’s (2010) analysis misses the way in which non-movement intersects with movement; collective with individual resistance; activism with the practice of everyday life. At the same time, his method, which opens a lens onto a culture of resistance that interacts within specific spaces, as a movement for presence and place, is more open to seeing these intersections than the containment that seems to be inherent in the social movement/contentious politics literature.

Ultimately, just as hegemony is never static and containable, components of struggle do not fit into neat boxes. It is this practice that turns the ‘movement’ into a thing-in-itself, and defines a narrow unit of analysis that misses the dialogue between power and resistance, between the episodic moments and everyday-ness of contentious actions. This lack of insight is most clearly exposed in the endless debate between the Social Movement ‘Culturalists’ and ‘Structuralists’, as to whether agents drive structures or structures drive agents (Goodwin & Jasper, 2004); a debate that cannot see the way each intersects and permeates the other. As has been discussed extensively above, power and struggle function as part of a field of force that is constantly evolving in response to this interaction. Struggle is therefore relational, as are the movements, agents and arenas that participate in it.

In this particular context – as well as anywhere that a revolutionary process is still in motion – resistance doesn’t end when the immediate threat has been relieved, or the momentum of protest has reached its conclusion. Struggle, in its dialectic relationship with power, needs to be understood as disruptive and yet fluid, ongoing and constant, because the system of power
is likewise fluid, integrated and unrelenting. In this light, struggle constitutes the episodic and
everyday, extraordinary and ordinary, conscious and passive; it explodes in waves, but is also
always present. As will become clearer in the case chapters that follow, struggle is embedded
in every aspect of Palestinian life in Israel, permeating and permeated by the hegemonic state.
It is threatening and threatened, segregated and linked, inside and outside. An additional lens
is therefore needed through which to articulate this dialectic of relations, in which resistance
is trapped in Zionist space, and must constantly respond to it. Through this lens, hegemony is
most clearly unveiled on the borders, at the point of contact and conflict, disarticulation and
disruption; where the powers of the state and the resistance of subaltern Palestinians clash
and are most clearly in tension. In the section that follows, these dynamics are explored
through the fluid and contextualised lens of spatial theories, which see struggle as a culture
and a way of life, embedded in and expressed through/by the space in which it is housed.

What’s Space Got to Do with It? Struggle as a Spatial Relationship

“Social space can in no way be compared to a blank page upon which a specific message has
been inscribed. Both natural and urban spaces are, if anything, ‘over-inscribed’: everything
therein resembles a rough draft, jumbled and self-contradictory.”


The starting point for any discussion of ‘space’ is the seminal writings of Henri Lefebvre. In
his work, he sets himself the task of finding a unitary theory for understanding the social
relationship we have with and within the space we inhabit. He argues, in accordance with a
Marxist theory of social relations, that every society and hence every mode of production
“produces a space, its own space.” (Lefebvre, 1991, p.11) The space is appropriated from its
natural form, manipulated, reshaped, produced and then reproduced; but for a revolution of
the system to be complete, a new space must be – and is – produced. In this theory, there is
no abstract space, removed from its practice, its reproduction, its representation. There is no
ideology, no system of thought, without a space to which it can refer, and “whose vocabulary
and links it makes use of, and whose code it embodies.” (ibid, p.44) Any system can be
understood to create its own geography, and thus the study of geography is the study of a
system (Harvey, 1989).

At the foundation of the body of work developed by Lefebvre –as well as the spectrum of
literature that came after – is his “dialectic triad” of conceived, perceived and lived space,
which together inform the ‘production of space’ (Lefebvre, 1991). Conceived space refers to
the way the system is conceptualised and represented in society, by those who build, plan,
and design it. The conceived space belongs to the hegemonic classes, to those who dominate
the system and both overtly and subversively invest the space with its signs and symbols of power (ibid, p.40). Perceived or representational space is linked to the production and reproduction of economy and society (Karplus & Meir, 2014). It describes the realm of those who use space, often passively, unconsciously, who reproduce it and represent it in symbols, icons and images (Lefebvre, 1991, p.39). Lived space is an evolving spatial practice; a slow, dialectic relationship between a system of relations – a society – and its expression, its articulation, its “secretion” in space (ibid, p.38). ‘Lived space’ is the social experience that transforms the space that was conceived, and deciphers the space, as it is perceived. Thus space is both produced and transformed through the social relations that evolve with and within it.

In many ways, Lefebvre describes the production of space as an inevitable and internalised practice of social relations, in a specific time and place. However it is also conscious and intentional. The act of spatial production is conceived and not just lived or perceived. It is a spectrum of unconscious and conscious productions that must be understood and retained as a dialectic, as both product and process; a dialogue of relations all happening at once. As Lefebvre (1991) explains:

“(Space) is a product to be used, to be consumed; it is also a means of production; networks of exchanges and flows of raw materials and energy fashion space and are determined by it. Thus the means of production, produced as such, cannot be separated either from the productive forces, including technology and knowledge, or from the social division of labour which shapes it, or from the state and the superstructures of society.” (p.85)55 Much like the process through which hegemony evolves, the production of space is active, but as it is articulated, represented and reproduced, it expresses a common sense of the collective will of society, and becomes something assumed, hidden, unseen. As will be discussed throughout this thesis, the process through which Israeli space has been colonized by Zionist hegemony, exemplifies this triad: the conscious, conceived project, in which space has been reshaped, redefined, redesigned, and internalised. It becomes intrinsically understood and unquestioned, only then to be reshaped and reconceived, as space is lived, challenged, produced and reproduced once more. This is embodied in the policies of Judaisation, discussed above, as expressed, for example, in the mapping project Meron Benvenisti (2000) describes in his book, Sacred Landscapes. He describes how his father was tasked, as part of a team of cartographers, archaeologists, and historians, to ‘re-discover’ the

55 James Scott (2009) and Ernest Gellner (1969) each describe a similar point in their work, in their discussion of the intentional, as well as inevitable, use of space as a tool of resistance. For example, the ungovernability of a particular terrain appeals to those who reject mechanisms and systems of control; at the same time, the space itself determines how it is linked to central systems of governance.
biblical map of Israel, and rename the new Israel, accordingly, and in the process, erase the
to names of places that had evolved in this space between ‘the exodus’ and ‘the return’. This
map has become the map of Eretz Yisrael. It is taught in schools, hangs in government
offices, and is depicted in Israeli road maps and atlases. It is the essence of Israeli ideology,
and has been abstracted from the original project, in which a group of technocrats set out to
re-map the territory in the name of Zionist ideology and its need for a new space within
which to articulate itself.

Space and Struggle
The essential legacy of Lefebvre – and the foundation of his work – is in the idea that
“struggle is inscribed in space”, integral to the production of social relations, which are ever-
changing and changeable (Lefebvre, 1991, p.55). Mirroring the debates surrounding
hegemony and resistance, above, he argues that ‘spaces’ – and thus social relations – are
never closed, absolute, or finite constructions. They are constantly transformed through the
process of spatial practice. His inheritors, among whom include Bayat (2010), Scott (2009)
and Holston (2010), argue similarly that space, and thus the system that has produced it,
changes through our relationship with it. Through both unconscious and conscious actions,
space that is conceived ‘from above’ is usurped and re-imagined from below, which in turn
encroaches and reshapes the system as a whole; although, Lefebvre also argues that the
system does not truly change until the space is fully transformed.

Resistance in this canon seems to articulate a similar logic to the Subaltern Studies literature
discussed above, in which the problem of disarticulation is resolved, not through the
overarching revolution and destruction of space, but through the production of ‘difference’.
In this work – which moves away from Lefebvre’s more limited contention that ‘users’ are
passive, producers are active – the subaltern and the marginalised carve out their separate
spheres, innately and inherently, as they live in contrast to the hegemonic order. Theorised as
inscribing one’s ‘place’ onto and in contravention with abstract and imposed ‘spaces’
(Massey, 1994; Fenster, 2004; Safa Abu Rabia, 2009)56, the sphere of difference is imbied
with the material, aesthetic and ideological expressions of ‘other’. As forwarded by David
Harvey (1989, 2003, 2012), a keen follower of Lefebvre’s work, the construction of
‘difference’ - in its rebellions and insurgent clashes with the borders of hegemonic order – is
infused with the capacity to un-mask and unveil the spatial order; to de-fetishize space and

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56 The theorising of ‘place’ is not an integral component of this thesis; the authors referenced here, Massey,
Fenster and Safa Abu Rabia, offer a comprehensive and extensive discussion of ‘place’ as an expression of
struggle.
articulate its link to the system and mode of production that disenfranchises its inhabitants from their rights to conceive, produce and control the space in which they live. The expression of ‘other’ and ‘difference’ is often discussed by these same authors, in terms of its ‘threat’ to the system of power, embedded and represented in space. James Holston (2010) works with this analysis in his study of ‘insurgent’ citizenship, as a response to modern planning mechanisms in Brazilia. For him, this idea is expressed as the displacing or reclaiming of imposed space – the ideal of the modern planning model – with its polar-opposite, lived space; space that evolves through the experience of living in it. In Bayat (2009), space, particularly authoritarian space, is challenged through the illegal encroachment and appropriation of public space – ‘the street’ – by those who are not represented by it, or even formally permitted to share it. In Tripp (2013), overtaking such spaces directly challenges the symbolic and real representations of power. In the context of Israel-Palestine, this dissonance and threat to the hegemonic order is often ascribed to the conscious and unconscious re-writing, re-mapping, re-experiencing and re-imagining of the Zionist scape as Palestinian, which is other and outside the system, and appears as an essential component of this thesis, as well. That said, there is something unsatisfactory in this theorisation of resistance as merely ‘difference’. Antagonistic as ‘otherness’ may be, it does not, on its own, disrupt and disarticulate a system of power and structures of hegemony. Looking in particular through the lens of this study, it is not merely the ‘otherness’ of Palestinian presence and resistance that disrupts the flow of Zionist hegemony; particularly its impact on and control of Palestinian space.

As has been discussed above, the hegemony of state Zionism is – by its own framing and through its interaction with Palestinian struggles – threatened by the internalised presence of a Palestinian spiritual and material claim to the land. As such, the state has evolved a matrix of laws and policies to remove the threat, and where this has proved impossible, to contain it, bombard it and overwhelm it. That containment – the creation of Palestinian enclaves inside Israel – is at the heart of the problematic of seeing ‘difference’ as the core subaltern project. The creation of an alternative, but isolated, autonomous identity within the larger scape of power, does not inherently penetrate the state’s structural make-up. In so far as the state continues to separate and segment Palestinian-citizen society, from its own people, and from the Jewish majority, this spatial practice describes a way for the hegemonic order to continue to function, in relation to resistance and difference. Rather, it is when they come into contact that disruptions may and do occur. As discussed extensively above, struggle evolves with and
within the system. If ‘difference’ is to be conceived as transformative and disruptive, it does so only in so far as it clashes, engages and permeates the hegemonic order, of which it is part and with which it must always share the space. Scott (2009) convincingly argues that the cultivation of ‘different’ space can be and often is, in and of itself, part of the resistance toolbox. However, in Israel, where othered space has become essential to the hegemonic spatial order, separate space, even if seemingly autonomous, cannot be considered exclusively as a ‘choice’ of the subaltern community, although it is not necessarily only imposed from above. As Scott (2009) explains, such spaces of non-governance, of autonomous identity, are no longer possible; not that they ever were in Israel. Accordingly, as will come to the fore in the chapters to follow, no space in Israel is ungoverned, unsurveyed or unseen.

The literature that will guide much of this thesis comes from the work of critical geographers, urban theorists and planners, anti-colonialist scholars and other analysts of space, working in Israel/Palestine. Authors, such as Safa Abu Rabia, Mark Levine, Tovi Fenster, Haim Yacobi, Oren Yiftachel, Gazi Falah, Yuval Karplus, Avinoam Meir, Meron Benvenisti, Michael Warschawski, Eyal Weizman and countless others, who articulate a politics of space and struggle, as they assess the aesthetics of the conflict. There is a strong contrast to be made between Lefebvre or Harvey, who articulate a Marxist meta-theory of space which is then applied to particular configurations of spatial relations, particularly in their work on cities; and these field-based theorists, who start with the space itself, and then frame their analysis on the basis of the physical landscape. This can be attributed to the fact that the unit of analysis for theorising space in Israel/Palestine is always the conflict; whereas, for Lefebvre and Harvey, the unit of analysis is the system itself – the mode of production and the space that it necessarily produces. But, then again, in Israel/Palestine, this means the same thing. The Israeli-Palestinian theorists articulate a particularly persuasive language of metaphors, through which to conceptualise the lived-spatial practice of the conflict; and many have appeared throughout this chapter and will take theoretical and practical form throughout this thesis: the ethnic frontier, the ghetto, the Judaisation and de-Arabisation of land and space, elastic borders and trapped minorities. Beyond the vivid imagery, these are tools through which to break down the material articulations of Zionist hegemony, and, thus, Palestinian struggle. They are also tools with which to re-understand how Palestinian resistance comes into contact with the Zionist field of force. In light of which, the Palestinian struggle for land and space is re-analysed, here, as a social relationship that produces and is produced, shaped
and reshaped through this struggle; which is, in turn, lived, perceived and conceived, ever in
tension, ever in dialogue with the boundaries of settler-colonialism and the liberal-
ethnocractic state. Converging Scott (2009) and Lefebvre (1991), through this lens,
Palestinian space in Israel is always a target of hegemonic power and always a tool of
resistance.

The lens of space is another way of seeing struggle, in its relationship with the matrix of
power and hegemony. It is a way to understand the ‘other’, as it clashes with boundaries and
borders carved out by the resister and enclosed by the enforcer. It is a way of seeing the
system contend with the threat that is both inside and outside, and with which it is always in
tension. It is also a window into how that system is challenged and changed, shaped and
reshaped through struggle that is embedded in the everyday, the lived and unseen; alongside
how it is disarticulated in direct protest and contention. To reiterate the point made by
Holston (2010), Bayat (2010) and Scott (2009), above, no conceptualisation of space is
imposed without clashing with the lived-experience of the ‘user’. Colonial appropriation is
permeated and disrupted by indigenous presence; Zionism by Palestinianism; core by
periphery; majority by minority; hegemonic power by subaltern resistance. This is the
essence of this research’s understanding of the Palestinian culture of resistance. The coming
chapters will explore these intersections through specific cases, where struggle is
extraordinary and ordinary, and both are inherent to Palestinian life inside Israel.
Chapter 2: Jaffa – Popular Struggle in the Mixed City

Map of Evictions and Demolitions – Ajami Neighbourhood, Jaffa-Tel Aviv

Erasing Palestinian Ajami
This map of the Ajami neighbourhood, shows (in red) approximately half the homes threatened with demolition or eviction by the Amidar Housing Company.
Source: The Jaffa Popular Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands and Housing, 2007
The Story of Struggle and Space in Jaffa

The Spark

On Thursday, March 10th, 2007, Ester Saba came home to find an eviction notice tacked to the front door of her apartment. The notice explained that on Sunday, March 13th, a bailiff would be coming with police, empty boxes, and a moving truck, with the full authority of the state and her landlords behind him, to move her, her three children, her husband and all their belongings out to the street. The essential tone of the notice was that the Palestinian family living on these premises was in breach of their contract with the landlord due to a series of violations. Accordingly, the Saba family’s continuing presence in the property is illegal and hence criminal; trespassers on state-owned and controlled space. It would soon-after come to the fore that Ester Saba’s family was one of 497 (one out of four Palestinian families in Jaffa) that had received a near-identical version of the same notice, and threatened with forced eviction from their homes.

The backdrop to this story is the neighbourhood in which the Saba house was built, whose residents are descendant from a group of “3900 souls” that remained in the city after the catastrophes of 1948 (Omar Siqsiq, 2012). This particular and contextualised Nakba emptied the city of 95% of its pre-war Palestinian population, including its elites, its intellectuals, and its nationalist-leaders; and with them, the city’s position as the urban, cultural and political centre of the Palestinian-Arab world (Levine, 2005; Cohen, 2011; Monterescu, 2009). Those who were left behind were rounded up into Ajami, one of the dozens of neighbourhoods and villages that once made-up Arab-Jaffa. The neighbourhood was then surrounded by a chain-link fence and became etched in the discourse of state and community, as the Ajami ghetto (Abu Shehadeh & Shbayta, 2009; Piterberg, 2008). This ‘fence’ marked the spatial borders for the matrix of colonial and ethnocratic policies that evolved around and inside it, long after it was removed in 1949. Today, when ‘Jaffa’ is discussed as Arab space, this truncated version, a 10 km grey-zone on the edge of the Tel Aviv metropole, is what is meant. Ester’s struggle is for and in this neighbourhood, set within lines drawn by an evolving encounter between the state and the Palestinian community living there. As her story unfolds, so, too, do the trajectories of those encounters and the ways in which they each transform the other. A multitude of processes fed and feed into the ghettoization of Ajami; the starting point for which was the official status constructed for both properties and residents. The urban space

57 More than 26 villages were immediately destroyed and swallowed by Tel-Aviv in the aftermath of the 1948 war and the annexation of Jaffa (Levine, 2005).
became the spoils of war, and its properties absorbed by the state under the label *Absentee Properties*, named for the Law\(^{58}\) created to transfer legal ownership of Palestinian-owned properties to the state. The Law was based on a technicality, applying to any properties that had been left ‘empty’, for any length of time, between November 29\(^{th}\), 1947 and May 19\(^{th}\), 1948. Jaffa was captured on May 13\(^{th}\), 1948; the fate of its leftover people and properties therefore determined on the same day. These were then transferred to the state’s “Custodian” for Absentee Properties, the Development Authority, allegedly to be held in trust until such time as the conflict is resolved and property-issues are settled\(^{59}\). The same Law produced the civil status for those who were allegedly ‘absent’, including those who remained and were contained within walls and fences, spread out across the country; a status enforced by a military regime that lasted up to 20 years in some areas, and ensured they were unable to reach their ‘absentee properties’. This group became the ‘present absentees’, a legal frame that articulates the paradoxical experience of Palestinians who were ‘present’ within the borders of the state after 1948; and yet forever ‘absent’, excluded and outside the legal-land system that had been built around them (Piterberg, 2001). Jaffa’s Present Absentees were moved into Ajami’s Absentee Properties, and have lived ever since in the dual-limbo this status represents: refugees from their own homes, holding onto properties of other refugees who cannot return to them\(^{60}\).

Management of Absentee Properties throughout the country was sub-contracted out to the company Amidar, a pseudo-public enterprise, whose board membership is monopolised by the Israel Lands Authority (ILA) and its managing council\(^{61}\). Today, they are still Ester

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\(^{58}\) Jaffa’s Absentee Properties were initially appropriated under the *Abandoned Areas Ordinance* (1948), which remanded the fate of ‘abandoned’ areas to the jurisdiction of the state (Allweil, 2013). *The Absentees Property Law* evolved out of these emergency ordinances and determined how such property was to be treated within the legal-land lexicon, while creating a civil category for the people with claims to them (The Absentees Property Law, 1950). Further details can be found in the table on the Legal Land Regime, in the Appendices to this thesis.

\(^{59}\) In a *2009 Land Reform*, the state established conditions by which some of these properties could be sold on the public market, most in the urban centres of the country. This act assigned a fait accompli to the claims of hundreds of Absentee Owners in Jaffa. The Land Reform is discussed more comprehensively in Chapter Three and in the table on legal land statutes that appear in the Appendices to this thesis.

\(^{60}\) This status was also assigned to residents who remained in their own homes, but who were considered absent during the capture of Jaffa, as was the case of several interlocutors of this study; see in particular Siqsiq (2012).

\(^{61}\) Amidar manages the largest percentage of Israel’s public housing. Its shareholders include: The Jewish Agency (50%); followed by the government (20%), the JNF (20%), and five housing companies (10%) (Amidar, accessed 2013). The ILA manages all ‘public land’ in Israel, which includes state property, as well as land holdings of the JNF and the Development Authority. Known as ‘Israel Lands’, 93% of all land in Israel is qualified as such (Israel Lands Authority, accessed 2013). Further details on ‘Israel Lands’ and the laws that outline their administration can be found in the tables in the Appendices to this thesis.
Saba’s landlords. While the state – through Amidar – maintains proxy-ownership of the properties, the tenants were inducted into what is called “a protected tenancy scheme”. The tenant pays a minimal and fixed rental contract throughout their lifetime, so long as they continue to live in the property and have no ties to any other property. However, the tight restrictions to life under ‘protected tenancy’, which include a multitude of bureaucratic constrictions, have informed a lack of control over the property and how life develops within it. For example, any change to or repair of the property, any change to the lease, and any change to the circumstances of the residents, each require express permission from the landlord (which was never forthcoming).

As Amir Badran (2012), a lawyer engaged in the housing struggle, explained, the contracts encourage their violation, and contribute to the precarity of Jaffa’s residents. Moreover, while the contract may be passed onto the next generation, again under immensely restrictive conditions, the third generation – Ester’s children – have no claims, nor access to capital that may contribute to their purchase of another property. There has been much scrutiny of how the different hierarchies of class and privilege have been configured through the uneven distribution of property and land-access across different Palestinian and Jewish-ethnic groups. On the basis of this, a link can and should be made between circles of poverty and their roots within ‘protected tenancy’, further discussion of which is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is directly relevant to see the production of these contracts as a method for encouraging a vulnerable and weak community to maintain a temporary and ephemeral position within the law, and in this place.

“Protected Tenancy” acts as part of a matrix of formal and informal policies that work to contain and shrink Palestinian presence in the city. The initial modalities of which include the annexation of Jaffa to Tel Aviv in 1950, the influx of thousands of Jewish refugees in the decade that followed, and the subsequent planning – or rather ‘unplanning’ – of the neighbourhood, as a ‘slum clearing zone’. This status, which remained intact until 1992, prevented the development of public services, the building of private or public infrastructure,

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62 The Development Authority Properties have changed hands several times since 1948; passing first to Amidar, then to Arieli, Gadish and Amidar again, making ownership claims even harder to trace and substantiate (Allweil, 2013; Siqsiq, 2012).

63 There are many discussions of the hierarchies of privilege borne out of the Zionist-territorial project, and reified in property and land ownerships. The subaltern position of the dispossessed/non-land-owners is articulated throughout Yiftachel’s work on ethnocracy (1999, 2006), but also in Kedar (2003), Shafir (1989), Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis (1995), and Kallus & Law-Yone (2002). An intentional bi-product of the settler-colonial legacy in Palestine/Israel, land and property are essential in the frame of Zionist legitimacy; to be without it is to be peripheral to or outside the system.
the processing of permits for home renovations, or the expansion of neighbourhoods. The residents lived off the grid, building without permits, and establishing public works, services and schools, without state budgets or permission. Moreover, the lack of official plans did not prevent the city from demolishing more than 3000 units (70% of Ajami’s buildings) throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as part of an unsanctioned radical construction project to turn Ajami’s beachfront into a 5-star resort area (called the Jaffa Slopes Project)\(^64\).

The plan failed – in large part due to a legal and public struggle led by Jaffa’s community leadership, a popular and unofficial community council organised in the form of an NGO, known as Al-Rabita: the League of Arabs in Jaffa. However, Ajami was left strewn with the rubble of the buildings. The neighbourhood became an unofficial landfill, while the state and Amidar set about selling off what was left; the majority, dellapidated and collapsing properties. In the 1990s, when new municipal plans were orchestrated to “strengthen” (meaning to replace) Jaffa’s ‘weaker’ demographic, and gentrify the buildings, the poor Palestinian residents were in no position to fight it. The illegal construction and long-term neglect of contracts from both landlord and tenant engendered the community’s vulnerable status and further informed the new methodology for marginalising, and then emptying Palestinian urban space. Today, as the neighbourhood finds itself being advertised as a popular real-estate investment to wealthy Tel Avivians, the ghettoisation of Ajami is conceived and cultivated as an easy target.

**Ester’s Story\(^65\)**

On that fateful day in March, Ester, notice in hand, went to see Gabi Abed, the head and one of the founders of al-Rabita. Al-Rabita was established in 1979, with the mandate to unite the fragmented communities of Jaffa, regardless of denomination or political affiliation. They have been working to improve the lives of Jaffa’s Palestinian residents, challenging their neglect by the state, and what they call a project of ‘quiet transfer’. The organisation works through local actions that focus on education, culture, community and infrastructure rehabilitation, legal support, and most importantly, issues related to housing (Payes, 2005; Abed, 2011; Siqsiq, 2012, Sami Abu Shehadeh, 2011). That night, a community-wide

\(^64\) Local Master Plan – Jaffa Slopes No. 2236 was submitted to the municipal council and housing ministry in 1965; implementation began immediately, although its approval, in truncated form, was only confirmed in 1995 (Goldhaber, 2010; Rajagopalan, 2002). Details of the plan, as well as others impacting the neighbourhood, can be found in the table of relevant planning documents in the Appendices section of this thesis.

\(^65\) The description of the events that surround Ester Saba’s eviction and the catalysis of local actions are compiled from various interviews, including Ester Saba (2012), Fadi Shbayta (2011), Gabi Abed (2012) and Hana Amouri (2011), among others.
meeting was called where Ester was invited to share her story and through which she called for help. Those present speak of light bulbs flashing on – boundaries that had been veiled through daily life and spatial practices, became suddenly clear: the meaning of the crisis; its links to past legacies of removal and replacement; the existential nature of the threat and the absolute imperative to stop it (Hana Amouri, 2011; Fadi Shbeta, 2010; Yudit Ilani, 2011). Plans to stop the eviction were put into immediate action. First, an activist entourage, both Jewish and Palestinian, gathered at Ester’s home from Saturday afternoon onwards. Over a hundred people congregated there, barricading it against the ten or so officers that showed up on Sunday morning. In parallel time, a lawyer was discovered among the network, who offered to take the case pro bono, and who wrote an immediate request for an *Order Nisi*\(^{66}\). The lawyer’s brief was run over to the court by three young activists. As one of whom, Hana Amouri (2011), who became a key leader of the current struggle, remembers:

“The judge was fascinated or shocked by us, I think. He wasn’t used to having people like us at the court... And this made him act a bit more human. He liked us enough to approve the Order Nisi.”

The unruly ‘shock’ to the system sent the activists back to Jaffa and the Saba household, where their comrades had been holding off the bailiff, with good news. The on-going legend of this story is that during those long hours, settled in Ester’s living room, an idea and a programme of action came into being (Ilani, 2011). It was quickly understood that the problem had far-reaching tentacles. Everyone knew of someone with an eviction or demolition order hanging over their heads. Within days, someone from the group managed to pry the number ‘497 families’ from Amidar\(^{67}\); a number that doesn’t even include the additional 200 families living in municipal public housing under similar conditions of illegality and vulnerability. The conversation centred on the link al-Rabita had been making since it opened its doors, and the methods for challenging them: that this is not an accident of neoliberal gentrification, or a problem of individuals acting outside the law. This was a crisis, and it was systemic, historical, collective and intentional, especially when considering that the infractions now being targeted took place more than 30 years before the notices of eviction appeared (Weitzer, 2007; Ibrahim, 2008).

\(^{66}\) A legal term, and a tactic often employed in Palestinian-related struggles against the state. It is “a conditional order which is to be confirmed unless something be done, which has been required, by a time specified (Black’s Law Dictionary, Free Online Legal Dictionary, accessed 2013)”.

\(^{67}\) See Yitzhak (2007) (annexed document in Ibrahim, 2008), for details of Amidar’s report on ‘squatted properties’.
The Sabas’ living room witnessed the forming of Jaffa’s ‘Popular Committee for the Defence of Land and Housing Rights’. The Popular Committee, with its mix of Palestinian and Jewish residents, activists, intelligentsia, and political representatives, among others, henceforth became the core network for a concerted campaign against the on-going erasure of Palestinian-Jaffa. Their essential discourse and centre of practice were infused with the singular goal of Ajami’s survival as a Palestinian neighbourhood. Ester and her family was their first case. While, at the time of writing, the story is still unresolved, Ester continues to fight her cause at court and challenge the shifting methods used by the state in its attempts to evict her. She has battled them back, and still remains in her home. As she told me:

“My struggle is to stay here. I gave birth to my children here. I raised them here. I will die here.” (Saba, 2012)

The Dialectics of Jaffa – Palestinians in the Mixed City
The housing struggle sparked in the events surrounding Ester Saba’s eviction notice becomes an acute lens for understanding the dialectic relationship of power and resistance, in Jaffa. The locus of this encounter is the ongoing, systemic and constant siege on Palestinian space. The siege – and its activation and intersection with Jaffa’s culture of resistance – is an inherent component of the anomalous spatial organisation Jaffa represents. Jaffa is a neighbourhood within the ‘Mixed City’; an Israeli categorisation for an urban context, allegedly shared by Jewish and Palestinian residents.

The Mixed-City is antithetical to the foundational Zionist methodologies that underscore the colonial map in Israel, which cuts away, segregates, and fragments, in the physical expression of a separate ‘other’ that is included yet excluded from the hegemonic centre. The rest of the country’s localities are demarcated by clear ethnic and national lines, cross-cut with class and religious beliefs. Only 8% of Israel’s Palestinian population live in the “Mixed Cities”, all of which have a clear Jewish majority. In most cases, this ‘majority’ was transposed onto previously all-Arab, or majority Arab localities that were divested of their non-Jewish residents during and in the aftermath of the 1948 war. A critical phenomenon of this process has been the use of Jewish bodies, symbols and signs to construct a new Jewish history to efface evidence of an Arab presence that existed before or since the birth of the state.

68 There are some exceptions to this: For example, Nazereth Elit and Karmiel, which were planned as all-Jewish settlements on Palestinian lands in the Central Galilee, have become new Mixed Cities due to an influx of Palestinian migration over the past 10 years. See Rajagopalan (2002) and Yacobi & Yiftachel (2003) for further elaboration on the different histories of Israeli Mixed-Cities details.
The experience of Jewish and Arab neighbours, in space that is supposedly shared, is not of co-existence and equal rights of place, despite the rhetoric implied in the term ‘Mixed’.

Rather, the “Mixed City” tells the story of marginalised neighbourhoods, their uneven development and neglect reinforced with high walls and racial divisions. While some neighbourhoods, streets and even buildings do host a mixed-constituency of Arabs and Jews, the majority of space is segregated; and Arab residents are contained and disconnected from the structures of power and policy that design and determine life in the city (Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2003; Goldhaber, 2010). However this conceptualisation of a completely excluded, subaltern Palestinian space is not sufficient to capture the ongoing mediations, contradictions and intersecting matrix of power relations in Jaffa (Monterescu, 2011; Belkind, 2013).

Jaffa’s own story conflates the Zionist processes of settler-colonialism, ethno-nationalism and modernisation (which, in the present day, takes the form of neoliberalism). Each is a core project of dispossession, geared toward the removal and replacement of its other: the native, the non-Jew and the pre-modern/pre-capitalist figure, all of which, from the perspective of the state and hegemonic order, is embodied in the ‘Palestinian citizen’. Haim Yacobi and Oren Yiftachel (2003) have conceived this particular spatialisation of the Zionist project, as urban ethnocracy; the expression of which can be captured in the logic of an inherent, ongoing, and unending internal frontierism – or internal colonialism (Yacobi, 2012).

Palestinian space within this frame is not merely truncated, ‘othered’ or unseen. It is also confronted as a threat and thus constantly targeted and bombarded (Yacobi, 2009). In many ways, this can be understood as a colonial reaction to the difficulty of containing the encounter with the Palestinian neighbourhood, which persists, permeates and engages with Jewish space; unlike in other parts of the country, where demographics and geography help ensure the segregation of communities. This translates into a programme of de-legitimisation of Palestinian presence within the Mixed City, and, in light of the cracks and chasms endemic to the hegemony of an ethnocracy (Peled, 2007; Yiftachel, 1999), further transforms it into a contested city, where struggle is innate to the culture of this space.

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69 The term and ideology behind it have been challenged extensively in the works of critical urban theorists, such as Yiftachel & Yacobi (2003), Rajagopalan (2002), Yacobi (2009), Monterescu (2009) and Hamdan-Saliba (2014).

70 As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, Israel’s obsession with borders takes on multiple forms throughout Israeli-controlled territory. In some Mixed Cities, these take on material form as brick walls between communities: in the “Mixed City” of Lydda (15 km southeast of Tel Aviv), Jewish residents of Moshav Nir Zvi built a 4 metre high wall to separate their homes from the neighbouring Palestinian-citizen community of Pardes Snir. A similar wall was built in Ramle (22 km southeast of Tel Aviv) to separate the Jewish compound of Gannei Dan and the Palestinian community in the Jawarish neighbourhood.
The siege begins with the construction of a border, of sorts. Jaffa’s particular political, economic and geographic position on the margins of Tel Aviv, the epicentre of Jewish Israel, was an effective container for Palestinian life in the city. Jaffa – or rather, the truncated Palestinian neighbourhood of Ajami – is completely surrounded, bounded on its Western frontier by the Mediterranean Sea, and by Jewish neighbourhoods on its northern, southern and eastern limits. The lines were determined in the violence that helped force Jaffa’s surrender in May, 1948. Jaffa’s Northern-most neighbourhood, Manshiyya, was bombed to the ground to create a clear definition between Jewish and Arab space (Aleksandrowicz, 2013); an urban scar – and open wound – that persists in the border that continues to stretch between Ajami and present-day south Tel Aviv, which now includes a remodelled promenade of five star hotels that ultimately replaced Manshiyya. The aesthetics of this border are what Wallah (2010) coins ‘the in-between places’, visualised in the stark differences one experiences when crossing into Jaffa, of graffittied walls, empty plots of land, and crumbling buildings scattered along the edges of towering skyscrapers, well-kept streets and bustling shopping areas. Salome Street, the thoroughfare that connects these two worlds, was produced as a clear line that divides modern from traditional, new from old, rich from poor, strong from weak, Jewish from Arab (ibid). But these gaps are neither permanent, nor protected. Ajami, as a ghetto-space, was produced to keep Palestinians out of Tel Aviv, but not the other way around. The Palestinian community was sequestered, and then besieged by acts of ongoing destruction, ghettoisation and debilitation; the legacy of which is inherent in the framework for Ester Saba’s story.

Within the bounded space, the siege was and is articulated in erasures. These took shape in the absorption of Palestinian properties and the effacement of Jaffa’s separate history, identity and character. Jaffa’s incorporation into the Mixed City became a conundrum to the Judaisation project, and an immediate target of the mission to infiltrate and overwhelm non-Jewish spaces left after the Nakba. This ‘infiltration’ mission is known as one of the

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71 Ajami is contained on the eastern, western and northern fronts by Jaffa neighbourhoods that have already been gentrified and filled with Jewish residents, businesses and architecture; of special note is Jaffa’s old city, which sits on the north-eastern edge of Ajami, overlooking the beach. Its beautiful cobblestoned streets and ancient buildings were targeted for ‘renewal’ in the 1980s, and became home to a Jewish artists’ colony (Abu Shehadeh & Shbayta, 2009). Ajami’s northern border has been swallowed by the re-developed Jaffa Port, the shopping promenade that surrounds Jaffa’s ‘clock-tower’, one of Jaffa’s most recognisable landmarks, and an area the municipality refers to as ‘Northern Jaffa’. Its southern border is with Bat Yam, a Jewish city that was founded before the establishment of the state. The Manshiyya neighbourhood, when it existed, was situated north of the Clock-Tower and Salome Street. A map of Ajami appears in the Appendices to this thesis as Appendix 3.9.

72 For a map of Jaffa in 1948, just before the bombing of Manshiyya, see Appendix 3.10.
‘successes’ of the Mixed Cities (Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2003). It sets out to contain ‘the other’ through the imposition of Jewish ownership, legitimacy and power, with the expansion of Jewish presence, physically and symbolically in these frontier neighbourhoods. There are endless examples of the state’s infiltrations into Jaffa: The first targets were the street signs and public symbols that spoke to a Palestinian past. These were re-mapped to connote Jewish presence and historical stakes on Jaffa (Abu Shehadeh, 2011; The Jaffa Project, accessed 2013; Palestine Remembered, accessed 2013). Today there are no street signs named for Arab-heroes or state-sponsored monuments to Arab history. The subsequent ‘attack’ can be construed in the settling of Jewish refugees in Ajami, a fact that diminished any lingering Palestinian hold on the space. More than 50,000 Jewish immigrants infiltrated Jaffa in the 1950s. Most were then removed southward in the wave of demolitions that allegedly sought to ‘modernise’ Jaffa’s architecture, all the while destroying evidence of its pre-state history (Levine, 2005). In the wake of the Jaffa Slopes project, 3127 building-units were destroyed. A mountain of garbage replaced them and constructed the foundation for today’s housing crisis. With the failure of the first Jaffa-Slopes project, new development plans – approved from 1992 onwards – were created. These shifted tact, seeking new ways to attract a ‘stronger’ demographic, through increased infrastructure investment, protection of historical and architectural sites, and restricting population densities (Wallerstein and Silverman, 2009). These have evolved with the new neoliberal programme to privatise public property and divest direct responsibility for the neighborhood from the state and Amidar. Today, these processes have been intensified as real estate booms in Tel Aviv and Jaffa is slated to house those who can no longer afford to live in the northern parts of the city. Thus, while the ghetto still contains the Palestinian minority and creates a protective border around Tel Aviv (Wallah, 2010); the internal aesthetic of Jaffa is constantly being attacked and re-written. Tel Aviv has encroached directly into the ghetto, with an evolving methodology for transforming – and ‘transferring’ – the neighbourhood. Today, this takes form in complex intersections of ethnic gentrification, the targeting of Amidar’s residents,

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73 This ‘success’ is seen in opposition to the failures of this policy in the Arab peripheries of the Galilee and the Naqab (Swaid, 2012); this will be discussed more fully in Chapter Three.

74 As with the Judaisation of the maps and street signs, the use of Jewish refugees to construct Israel’s frontiers against Palestinian return or the possibility of partition in areas of Arab concentrations, was rampant throughout the territory, and does not only speak to the events that solidified Jaffa as part of Jewish Israel (Falah, 1989).

75 For further details of the shift in wording and treatment of Ajami through the Planning bureaucracy, see Tel Aviv Local Master Plans 449 (1958), 2660 (2001) and 2660a (2013), among others; further discussion of these documents can be found in the Appendices to this thesis.

76 Other than some minute encroachments outside the neighbourhood, into the area surrounding the Jabaliya Mosque, on the edge of Bat Yam, the community has remained contained within the ghetto-borders.
and new infiltrations of elite (as opposed to refugee) Jews to the neighbourhood. On top of this, new settler-communities are arriving from the West Bank, with full state support, to build Jewish community-centres, yeshivas and public schools in the midst of Arab streets; strengthening the Jewish demographic, while unveiling the clear discrimination in plans, budgets and infrastructure development for the Palestinians still living in the neighbourhood (Abu Shehadeh, 2011; Saba, 2012). Accordingly, the geographic gaps between these worlds are disappearing.

Throughout its history as part of the Israeli state, the intention has been to intervene and transform Jaffa. Yet, different waves of Palestinian resistance have pushed back the state, clashing with the totalising and unforgiving project to Judaise Palestinian space. The fact that the neighbourhood still exists despite an endless line of policies to destroy it requires a multi-layered understanding of the impact of both subaltern and hegemonic city-residents, on the production of the city-scape. Through this lens, struggle is an interlocutor in the matrix of social relations, and an integral part of the lived spatial experience. Thus, the ordering of space around and inside the neighbourhood, can be understood as an outcome of the encounter between powerful state structures and the subaltern community, embedded within them.

Ester Saba’s experience depicts Jaffa’s current resistance culture, one that is expressed as an evolving spatial praxis, whose agents, actions, politics and perspectives develop through their entanglement with urban ethnocracies, as discussed above. That entanglement has informed a constant, ongoing struggle that is endemic to being a Palestinian resident here, in the urban frontier of the “Mixed City”. Underlying its modes and modalities is the question of what happens to struggle and resistance in such a volatile space; a struggle informed by close engagement with the Jewish majority, without borders, without autonomy to define the space as Palestinian, as different or separate from the centre. As so many of Jaffa’s activists and residents repeated to me in our interviews: “Struggle in Jaffa is existential”; a fact clearly expressed in the battle to retain Palestinian presence at almost any cost, against the state’s powerful impetus to efface the community from the Mixed City. Every element of this movement ripples with the fact that it is a movement for survival, and this has immense ramifications for the practice of resistance – its politics, its strategies, its tactics, its targets, and even its collaborators.
Evolving Encounters – The Changing Struggle for Jaffa

As discussed above, the frontier ethos of the hegemonic project in Tel Aviv evolves, permeates and clashes with its other: the struggle for survival, for Palestinian presence, for collective and historical rights to and in Jaffa. The following sections explore the resistance (non)movements that intersect with the waves of cleansing, enclosure, infiltration and removal. This includes some of the essential stories of resistance, battles won and lost; the development of the culture of struggle in Jaffa, and its changing relationship with the state. These sections are organised as a series of debates, tensions and dialogues between the different actions and actors, their ghosts and current heroes, their successes and their failures. Together these make up the struggle for Jaffa, and offer a clear window into the debates and tensions that are inherent to carving out a Palestinian space in the Mixed City.

The First Struggles – The Tension Between Exclusion and Engagement

The Popular Committee and the current wave of struggle in Jaffa is entangled in the legacy of Jaffa’s resistance culture. While Ester’s case sparked a new trajectory for action, the current discourse, many of its methods, and the logics of this work cannot be separated from the networks that came before them. This section looks at the first struggles, how they functioned in relation to the hegemonic order, and how they continue to resonate what is conceived here as an ongoing debate between exclusion from and engagement with the structures of power in Jaffa-Tel Aviv.

Until 1979 with the founding of al-Rabita, there was a vacuum of collective challenges to the state and its treatment of the Palestinian residents of the city. This is attributed to the particular Nakba that befell Jaffa and the complete reorganisation of the space, as a result. The chain link fence signified the severed ties between residents and their city, as well as to their families and kinship lines splintered across new nation-states, and even the Palestinians congregating in the north around Nazareth. The great city was demoted to a neighbourhood in the Tel Aviv municipality, establishing its future as part of one of the new Mixed Cities, where Jews and Palestinians would supposedly share the same urban jurisdictions. Poor Jewish immigrants, part of the demographic frontier lending facts on the ground to the Judaisation of Israeli space, were moved in. First to the surrounding neighbourhoods, then into Ajami, and then into the homes of Palestinian families. At the same time, Jaffa also became a holding space for other groups of Palestinians, some internal refugees, some transferred from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, after 1967. Divisions and entrenchments along religious, class, ethnic, national and family-lines were part of the tensions of the

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77 Jaffa developed a reputation for housing collaborators and spies from other parts of the country, with properties in Ajami offered as compensation for their support of the state (Monterescu, 2007).
Palestinian enclosure, as they were jumbled together, one on top of the other. Jaffa became an Israeli ‘project’ neighbourhood and Ajami was a slum with a beautiful view of the sea (Shaker, 1996, interview from The Jaffa Project archive; Goldhaber, 2010).

Echoing discussions in Rabinowitz & Abu-Baker (2005) and Cohen (2010), interlocutors from Jaffa qualify the struggle of these first and second post-Nakba generations in terms of their tactics for survival. They rebuilt their networks, developed relationships with their Jewish and Palestinian neighbours, and found new employment in the ‘Jewish’ sector, as wage labourers. Most importantly, Ajami residents created a necessary gap between themselves and the state, entrenching themselves within the truncated space allotted to them. Within it they built their homes and occupied space without permits, much of it in direct defiance of laws that would inevitably and retroactively criminalise these actions.78

Yiftachel (2009) conceived a language for understanding the phenomenon of such neighbourhoods in Israel and elsewhere, in which a community’s resilience is dependent on its precarious vulnerability. He calls this ‘grey space’, as a way to conceptualise space that exists outside the boundaries or protections of law (the white space), but which continue to resist the ‘blackness’ that is “criminal”, “destruction”, “death” (Yiftachel, 2009a). Grey space is an essential feature of Palestinian space within Israel, although it has evolved in multiple manifestations, dependent on its permeations and positions within the state and vice versa.

The neighbourhood’s survival should be understood as part of the etymology of Jaffa’s resistance culture; borne out of a debilitated community, whose capacity for direct resistance and political contention had been destroyed, just as Palestinian Jaffa had been destroyed and swallowed by Tel Aviv. In contravention to Lustick’s (1980) assertions, survival in the Mixed City does not imply acquiescence to the state, nor consent to its Judaising project. This was where the ground was laid for carving out a different, Palestinian space inside Jewish Israel. It took them (the residents of Jaffa) another 30 years to build it up, to repair the fragmentation of the communities, and resist the encroachment of the state and the shrinking of their political space.

Unlike the current wave of activists in Jaffa – many of whom come from the Galilee and the Triangle region – al-Rabita’s founders were born into the world described above: Jaffa’s poor, fractured, and increasingly isolated and self-isolating community. Ajami lived off the

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78 The main legal apparatus for criminalising unplanned, unlicensed housing, was the Planning and Building Law (1965); but unlicensed construction was rampant even before 1965.

79 For further discussion and debunking of Lustick’s (1980) observations of “an acquiescent and silent Palestinian minority”, see the Introduction and Chapter One of this thesis.
grid of both Israeli and Palestinian leaderships, both of which were focused on the north, as the main arena of contention. The cultivation of a subaltern, othered sphere, as grey and marginal to the new Israeli-urban infrastructure, was inherent to surviving the Zionist siege on Palestinian space, post 1948. Within the grey space, a repertoire of resistance is performed as a response to the absent and disengaged state; despite the fact that, as Yacobi (2009) argues, the state is always present. Alternate rules, laws and affiliations were developed in response to the community’s status as unseen and disconnected. There are echoes here of what was discussed in the previous chapter as Lefebvre’s (1991) theorisation of a ‘different space’ and Holston’s (2010) insurgent citizenships, in light of the resilience of Jaffans in carving out their survival against the impositions of Judaisation and de-development.

The illegal construction rampant in Jaffa and its circumvention of the state’s legal infrastructure is a perfect example of this ‘grey-spaced agency’. The development of alternative leaderships, religious arenas, and cultural and linguistic space, likewise come together to participate in their evolving resistance. It is on this basis that al-Rabita came to be, and their first struggles exemplify the impact of grey-space on their strategies and tactics in those early years. Al-Rabita’s founding activists sought to strengthen the resilience of the community, to ensure its survival and development against the impetus of enclosure and encroachment by the state, by enhancing the autonomy pressed upon Jaffa, as the disconnected poor Arab neighbourhood of Tel Aviv. However, as becomes clear in Jaffa’s case, the grey space could only survive so long as the state treated it as such, unseen and unchallenged as a sequestered, marginalised entity. As has been argued above, the key impetus in the Mixed City not to sequester and forget Palestinian space, but to bombard, infiltrate and conquer it; and this has had deep ramifications for collective struggle in Jaffa.

Al-Rabita’s founders were among the first university graduates to come out of the Ajami Ghetto. They were part of a changing economic and educational platform evolving in Jaffa, in the 1960s and 1970s (Abed, 2012; Payes, 2005). Inspired by the political movements that erupted around Land Day, al-Rabita’s initiators sought an alternative political forum, through which to support and advocate for the needs of the local residents. Their key objective was to treat Ajami as a singular collective, through which lines between families, religious groups, class and even nationality could be erased. Accordingly, they chose issues they felt...
cut across Jaffa’s divisions and impacted everyone: the crises in housing, in education and among Jaffa’s youth. Al-Rabita became a de-facto local council, with regular elections open to all residents of Jaffa, regardless of denomination, in lieu of a representative at the municipality. It is still considered the centre of Jaffa’s politics today, as it houses the Popular Committee and was behind the 1993 campaign to create a seat for Jaffa at the city council (called the Jaffa List) (ibid; Abu Shehadeh, 2011).

The first activities – bent on “strengthening the Palestinian population of Jaffa (Abed, 2012; Siqsiq, 2012)” – were described as follows by Omar Siqsiq (2012), one of al-Rabita’s founding members:

“We started by cleaning the streets of Jaffa. After the total neglect of Jaffa by the municipality; after the municipality decided to completely ignore the area, after it existed with no plans, no development, and no legal construction, we had no water, no electricity, no roads, no services or infrastructure. After we established the organisation, we realised that the first focus needed to be on how to create a more normal existence for Jaffa. We started with issues of welfare, and focused in on cleaning the streets, building roads, creating infrastructure – this was the best work we ever did at al-Rabita. Only after this did we start to work on issues of the place, seeking from the state, from the municipality, the needs, services and rights for the population.”

Al-Rabita’s role within the community starts from these direct actions. They had minimal engagement with the state. As the state consistently ignored their calls for services – and their responding curses – al-Rabita began to entrench the population further inside Ajami’s figurative borders, utilising the subversive networks and repertoires already at their disposal (Abed, 2012). They helped the community defy the restrictions on construction and to expand the space available for the growing population.

These were the first ‘weapons’ in the struggle to maintain Palestinian presence in Jaffa. Al-Rabita focused on the buildings themselves, reinforcing them, renovating them; they worked on the community, providing services and establishing some normalcy within the lives of the residents. They worked against – but also with – a policy of intentional neglect; a policy reproduced in the practice of surviving without the state. According to Siqsiq (2012), “they made it possible for the Arab population to stay in Jaffa; not to run away or disappear to other areas, because the plan was always to get rid of Jaffa’s Arab population.” That is, until a trickle and then a deluge of demolitions invaded Ajami, and changed the game. After this, the space was no longer grey and hidden, and the state was no longer distant and unseen.

81 According to Payes (2005), the municipality refused to recognise al-Rabita as representatives of Jaffa’s Arab population until well into the 1990s. Moreover, they were labelled ‘PLO supporters’, in order to engender their de-legitimisation before the authorities and general, Jewish public, and to frighten away support from the local Palestinian community.
Jaffa-Slopes and Garbage Mountain - The Direct Entanglements

The ‘Jaffa Slopes Project’ was developed to turn southern Jaffa’s ‘slum zone’ into a riviera, similar to what befell Manshiyya in the north. The plan aimed to “reclaim land from the sea” and re-designate the area for the millionaires of Tel Aviv and Jewish-Israel (Rajagopalan, 2002; Goldhaber, 2010). According to Ilani (2009), it would “uplift the local population” in the process, transforming the spatial, social and demographic fabric of the neighbourhood. The ‘plan’ – a joint brain-child of Tel Aviv’s then mayor, Maj. Gen. Shlomo Lahat, and then Housing Minister, David Levy – required an extensive amount of rubble to create the artificial land upon which the new luxury homes would be constructed. That rubble was sourced from Ajami; or rather, from the more than 3000 homes demolished for the sake of the project.

The story is famous among Jaffa’s activists, not simply because of the physical legacy it left behind, but because the razing of Ajami and the direct act of Judaisation, embodied in the invasion of the bulldozers, signified a new kind of violence in Ajami; and because it catalysed the first collective response to the state’s siege on the neighbourhood. According to Siqsiq (2012) and Abed (2012), it took the al-Rabita activists time to understand what was happening. At first they responded as they had always done, working to defend the neighbourhood’s infrastructure and the capacity of the community to survive within it. However, as the depth of the plan became clearer, al-Rabita was forced to contend with and engage directly with the state, using whatever tools they could access. With the help of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, a Jewish human rights organisation, they began by recruiting the community into a collective legal appeal, through which to articulate their rights within the main structures of the state. Concurrently, they worked directly with Jewish residents and local Jewish organisations to help support and develop a public campaign that would reach mainstream, Tel Aviv audiences and the Knesset leadership. Their main repertoire worked with/within the liberal, hegemonic language and arenas in which such politics are practiced, i.e. law, jurisprudence and media. Al-Rabita hid behind the ‘democracy’ veil (at least in public), and demanded an end to the plan on the basis that it ‘harmed the local community’, and had been implemented without formal approval. It is on this technicality that the case was won at the Supreme Court, in 1985; after most of the neighbourhood was already devastated, and without concretely changing the hegemonic logic with which the plan was devised in the first place (Goldhaber, 2010).
Al-Rabita won the battle, but not the war. The plan was delayed and reframed, but not discarded. The municipality was admonished for its radical and brutal rehabilitation programme, but the underlying ethos to alter the demographic makeup of the community was retained (Goldhaber, 2010). This is evident in the gentrification and renewal programmes that have been discussed above, as part of the new erasures in Ajami; and which are no longer implemented with direct acts of violence, but, rather, with slow, incremental evictions, the auctioning off of properties, the privatisation of Jaffa’s housing market and the influx of the new Jewish residents. Moreover, the razed homes were not replaced with new construction for the local residents. Instead, the debris was left to rot, attracting additional garbage from the neighbourhood until it became a ‘mountain’. Twenty years later, without the consent of the community, the municipality spent a million shekels to turn Ajami’s beachfront/garbage mountain into a park82; while the housing crisis continues unabated.

At the same time, Al-Rabita’s first major Supreme Court success became a watershed moment that shifted the arena, landscape, tactics and strategies of Jaffa politics. The organisation increasingly worked within the Mixed City infrastructure, engaging the state through its own institutions – using the courts, targeting the municipality, changing tactics from outside to inside83. Al-Rabita, in these methodological shifts, cultivated a more direct challenge to the process of Judaisation, but at the same time, increasingly relied on strategic engagement with/within the hegemonic arenas of the state, particularly through connections with Jewish organisations and political representatives. This evolved as a necessary reality, as the othered, rooted space of Palestinian-Jaffa is ever in contact, ever under siege. Survival, thus, became integrated and dependent on state structures, which at the same time continued to encounter the community through the Mixed City contradictions that seek to enclose, exclude and remove. Which, as it turned out, was not so easy to do.

Al-Rabita, regardless of its new resistance arsenal, remained anchored in the Sumud and grey-spaced exclusions of the neighbourhood. As many of my interlocutors explained, there is still a Palestinian community in Jaffa because, after the dust settled from the bulldozers, the

82 The park is called ‘Park Hamidron’, and was constructed as part of the ‘Jaffa Renewal Project’, the same planning scheme currently at work to gentrify the neighbourhood (Local Master Plan, 2660 and 2660a).
83 Other stories beyond the scope of this chapter illustrate the shift in methods. For example, another major ‘round’ of battles took place in 1990, when then Mayor Shlomo Lahat (the same architect of the Jaffa Slopes project) published a plan to construct 5000 new units to house incoming Russian immigrants – which he publicly labelled a Judaisation Plan (Payes, 2005). Al-Rabita again roused the community, the legislators, the courts, and their various support networks from Tel Aviv’s Jewish community, to prevent the plan’s approval. They succeeded, to a degree; but ultimately, the Russian Infiltration Plan was shifted to Lydda, instead, with its logic intact (Yacobi, 2009).
residents had nowhere else to go. This was their space, surrounded by their language, their community, their memories and ghosts (Abu Shehadeh, 2011; Amouri, 2011; Saba, 2012; Goldhaber, 2010). For its part, al-Rabita continued to support this entrenchment, by “doing what it does best”, by making life normal again, servicing the community and cleaning the rubble (Siqsiq, 2012; Payes, 2005).

**The Housing Intifada**

In Jaffa, transgressive and unruly politics are geared to disarticulate the everyday, the habitus of the urban ethnocracy and the neoliberal project encroaching upon the neighbourhood. Present-day actions of this kind – creative, innovative, disruptive and difficult to contain – are said to have been inspired by a particular moment, found in the al-Rabita archives, reminding us that community struggle depends on a repertoire of tactics, previously performed and tested, as much as its own new ideas about how to change the status quo. Called the *Housing Intifada*, it is the story of a radical act that resulted in the capitulation of all the powers-that-be in Jaffa. It stands out after more than a decade of reacting to incessant practices of exclusion and the threat of direct and indirect ‘transfer’ policies; in this case, al-Rabita initiated and defined its own trajectory for action. In Monterescu’s (2008) analysis, the *Housing Intifada* was a catalytic moment, informing Jaffa’s essential shift from “a liberal discourse of coexistence to an assertive claim for political entitlement and collective existence.” (p. 21)

According to Omar Siqsiq (2012) and Gabi Abed (2012), both key organisers of this action, an acute expression of the housing and development crisis, as well as some of its potential solutions, were the dozens of sealed buildings that exist in Jaffa. Some had been sealed since 1948, some since the Jewish families that once occupied them were chased out by the demolitions. All were Absentee Properties and by the 1990s, many had been sold off at public auctions, as part of the privatisation project evolving out of the increasingly neoliberal political scape (Levine, 2005). For years, al-Rabita promoted a concerted campaign (mostly in the form of letter-writing), asking the state for help in resolving the crisis, primarily through unsealing the houses and making them liveable. The campaign made no dent in the

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84 A discussion of Bourdieu’s theory of habitus appears in a footnote in Chapter One. The term is used here (and at different moments in the case chapters) as an extension of his (1984) analysis of the ‘social space’, as the field in which the logic of social domination and the mechanisms whereby it disguises and perpetuates itself (both materially and symbolically), are practiced and legitimised.

85 Sami Abu Shehadeh (2011) and Yudit Ilani (2011), both activists from the Popular Committee, offered similar analyses in their interviews for this thesis.
state’s policy, until, as Siqsiq (2012) explained, they “broke down the walls of the sealed buildings and moved in.”

This ‘Night of the Squatters’, as it is also known, is the stuff of legends in Jaffa, much like the obstacle al-Rabita created to the success of the Jaffa Slopes project (Ilani, 2011). It was well-organised, beginning with the collation of a list of young couples and female-headed households, who would normally be considered for affordable and public housing schemes, but had nowhere to live in Jaffa86. Next, they collected the necessary support networks they would need to see the action through, including permission from neighbours to link these homes to the electricity and water grids; legal, public, and media support, ready at a moment’s notice to step in; Jewish NGOs who could intervene with the state; and a collective of activists prepared to act as human shields to protect these young families against violent interventions by the police. Then, one Friday night in March, 1995, al-Rabita unsealed 20 previously prepared apartments, and moved in the families. However, by the end of the following day, the word spreading through Jaffa was that al-Rabita had given the green light to take over all the empty buildings, and so, within 24 hours, over 120 units had been occupied.

The stunt was something new for Jaffa – disruptive, collective, direct – and it wrestled a near immediate response and negotiated solution from the authorities. By Sunday, the police were mobilised to deal with the squatters. However, when the police arrived to evict the families, al-Rabita intervened, explaining that for every family the state removed, they would replace them with ten; that they were prepared to fight, and hold the space indefinitely. The police backed down, and then the Housing Ministry, the Mayor, the Municipal Council and Amidar came to negotiate. According to Siqsiq’s (2012) recollections87:

“They all came to sit with us, and we came to a very good agreement, that they (the Tel Aviv Municipality) would build 400 new units within a year, and that they would institute new policies to help support the Arab community to buy their homes. There was one condition, that we needed to remove all the people from these sealed buildings, and then they would start fulfilling their end of the agreement. And it was really hard on us, to go and take people out of the buildings, but this is what we agreed to, so we did it. But even though we kept our end of the agreement, the government didn’t keep theirs. They gave us 100 apartments from among those that already existed in the sealed buildings, and until now, we are still waiting for the other 300. And so we have no one we can believe anymore.”

86 They had already brought this list to the Housing Minister (MK Ben Eliezer), with no success in attaining a satisfactory response.
87 These have been corroborated by a number of first and secondary sources. See, for example, personal interviews with Abu Shehadeh (2011), Abed (2012), and Ilani (2011); and secondary accounts by Monterescu (2008), Wallerstein & Silverman (2007), and Payes (2005).
In fact, several schemes were begun in the aftermath of this event, including a ‘build-your-own home’ programme, that proved too expensive, and a neighbourhood development project, that was inevitably dropped by the municipality (Goldhaber, 2010; Ibrahim, 2008). At the end, the state failed to deliver on its promise, an issue every interlocutor to this case continues to lament. This brings a series of questions to the surface, as to how struggle can sustain its impact; as to its capacity to maintain the disarticulation of the Judaising project in the Mixed Space. These were also at the core of al-Rabita’s self-analysis, provoking the organisation to shift their methods again and become more integrated in the hegemonic sphere (Payes, 2005; Abed, 2012). Within months of the Housing Intifada, Al-Rabita launched its Arab-List, signifying their belief that in order to reverse the status quo for Palestinians, they needed to be in a position to make decisions on their behalf (Payes, 2005). It also signifies a deeper understanding of their position within the Mixed City’s peculiar colonial project, excluded and yet included, and dependant on the state’s own political and legal machinery to challenge the hegemonic logic that controls their lives.

The new border for transgression became the state institutions themselves, even as Jaffa’s culture of resistance is ever-grounded in its everyday occupation (and survival) in Palestinian spaces. The new wave of resistance, housed within the Popular Committee, still battles with this tension in its own tactics and strategies. In many ways, the Popular Committee exemplifies the way the struggle has changed in the last 2 decades. It oscillates between dependency on and integration with the state, on one hand; and on the other, using direct actions that protect the residents, and innovative practices that engage and provoke the internalised frontier, while carving out new Palestinian space within the neighbourhood.

The Fine Line between Hegemonic and Non-Hegemonic Tools

“There are many failures... Because all the laws of the state of Israel, Amidar, the development and housing authorities; the war with the laws and the authorities, we are outside it. It doesn't give us strength, it – the laws and policies and state – weaken us. We reject it at the end, but we are in the position where it weakens us...”

Busayna Dabit, Jaffa and Mixed Cities political activist, Personal Interview, 2012

Hegemonic tools are those in the resistance arsenal that use the logic, language and ethos of the hegemonic order, as a way to challenge its own practices and impacts. For example, the legislature, the court system, the planning institutions, civil society organisations, and the state bureaucracy, among others; all of which are entrenched in and contribute to the legitimacy of Judaisation and the ethnocratic settler-colonial regime. The main tension inherent in their use, as part of the resistance arsenal of Palestinian subaltern classes, is
expressed in a pointed comment from Sami Abu Shehadeh (2011) – who was Jaffa’s council representative to the municipality and a founding member of the Popular Committee – and which has been repeated in a repertoire of academic and advocacy materials on the topic:

“When the judge is your enemy, who can you complain to?” The crux of the dilemma is both practical and theoretical. The legal-democratic space, while contained by and within the state, offers the Palestinian community the opportunity to claim rights and services, as citizens. However, the regime has ordered the ‘liberal democratic’ system to create the conditions that privilege Jews over Palestinians, and colours Palestinian space grey and unseen, or other and threatening.

In the previous chapter, the role of hegemonic tools has already been debated and discussed, as it is a foundational and divisive issue among the Palestinian activist community, inside and outside of Israel. Within the Jaffa case, hegemonic tools have been deeply engrained in the community’s struggle for survival. They are inherent to the paradox of Palestinian ghettoization within the Mixed City, and are fundamentally tied to the dialectic encounter between this subaltern community and the hegemonic order, with which it shares a language, framework and space for action. From a theoretical perspective, there is no abstraction from the field of force. Thus, the tension that stems from the shared space has immense potential to transform the hegemonic sphere, although there is always a danger of reproducing and strengthening it. From a pragmatic perspective – a perspective that informs the majority of actions coming from the Popular Committee – it makes sense to use every tactic and strategy from within the shared social, civil, political and economic terrain to entrench the community within Ajami, against their removal.

With this context in mind, the question becomes how to use hegemonic tools without reproducing the order they represent; and if it is even possible to do so. In Tripp’s (2013) work on the topic – contextualised in the Middle East – resistance is discussed in light of a spectrum of time and space. Rather than see struggle in terms of its individual manifestations, he sees it as a collective of actions, evolving over time as part of a process, as opposed to a singular moment of social change. This thinking is similar to that expressed in the works of De Sousa Santos (2002) and O’Brian (1996), each of whom claims that hegemonic tools can

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88 As mentioned above, the Jaffa-List was first organised in the mid-1990s, and initiated by Al-Rabita. Abu Shehadeh was the fourth representative from the list to take a position on the Jaffa-Tel Aviv municipal council, but lost his seat in the 2013 October elections.


90 See Chapter One for more extensive dealings with this debate, in academic and practitioner circles.
be used unhegemonically, in so far as they are linked to other political spaces and/or integrate
the use of radical language and ideas into the hegemonic arena. Elian Weizman (2013), based
on her own analysis of the hegemonic functionality of Israeli Law, has a similar, if slightly
more critical and wary conclusion. She argues that a hegemonic tool – in her case, litigation –
should and can be used cautiously, as part of a larger ensemble of resistance.

At the same time, even if practically or theoretically sound, hegemonic tools can be
debilitating to Palestinian struggle, informing a clear moral and political need of the
Palestinian communities to situate their activism outside the language, structures and frames
of the settler-colonial state. Interlocutors to this study spoke extensively of their long history
with disempowerment, subject-hood and patronism, particularly when working with state
institutions, as well as with activists and organisations from the Jewish left in Israel. It is this
experience to which Busayna Dabit refers, in the quote, above. This is particularly poignant
in the Mixed City, where there is so little opportunity or possibility for Palestinian struggle to
orchestrate this kind of separate resistance, determined as it is by demographic and spatial
realities. These debates will be explored further below in the discussion surrounding the
Popular Committee and the current wave of struggle in Jaffa, as well as throughout this
thesis.

The Popular Committee

The Popular Committee is a focal point for these tensions, and the debates that evolve out of
them, as it functions both inside and outside; with tools that are ‘pragmatic and political’;
‘popular and professional’; ‘transgressive and contained’; ‘hegemonic and non-hegemonic’.

The Committee, formed through the call to arms by Ester Saba, started with an uncoordinated
network of Jewish and Palestinian activists, professionals and residents; all currently call
Jaffa home, but many of its founders and leaders do not have their roots there.

According to interviews with several interlocutors from the case, when they started, the
Committee’s members knew very little about how to combat the problem. They were still
unaware of the length and breadth of what they were dealing with. They inherited their

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91 Refer to the discussion of these terms in Chapter One, for a more comprehensive understanding for how they
fit into the debate on hegemonic tools; in particular, how subaltern struggles intersect with and challenge
hegemonic structures of power.
92 For example, Hana Amouri, who is from the Galilee and Fadi Shbayta, who is from the Little Triangle (in the
centre of the country); even Ester Saba is originally from the Triangle region, while her husband is a ‘true’
Jaffan.
93 See in particular the interviews with Hana Amouri (2011), Ester Saba (2012), Fadi Shbayta (2011), Yudit
Ilana (2011), and Sami Abu Shehadeh (2011); all of whom were integral to the founding of the Popular
Committee.
discourse, some expertise and a ready-made activist network from al-Rabita, but their methods, their creativity, and their impact, developed through the *praxis* of struggle, through the act of challenging the state and reflecting on that action (Schugurensky, 2002).

Ester Saba (2012) describes their beginning in this way:

“When we talk about it now, we know what to do, it’s obvious, but then, we didn’t know anything. When I found out about the eviction notice, many activists came to be with me. And there were people with all kinds of expertise willing to add to the collective tools we had. There were people who knew how to do campaigns and publicity, some who were lawyers, others who were journalists. And then we divided into working-groups, and everyone focused on their own group. When someone found out about an eviction, we would get the number and the address, and start working. Team One – the lawyer and case worker – would do their work with the bailiff and the court. Team Two would collect the activists and barricade themselves in the house, until things were fixed with the court... And we did amazing work.”

In their first year, the Popular Committee was in motion almost daily, with public meetings, demonstrations in the street, mapping the crisis, collecting information on potential different legal, political and public avenues for action, and raising awareness of the collective and systemic nature of the mass evictions among the community. However, their primary targets were the various arms of the Israeli authorities with the capacity – and responsibility – for orchestrating solutions to the crisis.

According to Yudit Ilani (2011), another key interlocutor and a case worker for the Popular Committee, their demands were two-fold: First, a solution to the immediate issue of the evictions, including a freeze on all eviction orders and associated legal actions; second, a systemic solution to the crisis. This solution, as Ilani (2011) explained, needed to include:

> “an end to any and all sale and auction of allegedly publicly owned land – meaning refugee and absentee properties – and entering a dialogue with the Popular Committee to implement a system that guarantees a long-term Palestinian presence in the city; and that enables youth and young couples to find affordable housing in the city, particularly in the Jabaliya and Ajami neighborhoods.”

The core motivating spirit of the campaign was the survival of Palestinian Jaffa, expressed through their slogan, ‘Jaffa for Jaffans’. The underlying focus of their work was “the need to wrest recognition of Jaffa’s Arab-Palestinians as a group with historic rights to the land and properties of the city.” *(ibid)* The recognition, according to Amouri (2011) and Ilani (2011), would come from the state; and the solutions – which would be implemented by the state – would be devised through consultation, negotiation, and consent of the community. The key targets, and the Committee’s key tools, were the state’s institutions, legal lexicon, planning authorities, city council and housing ministries, all of which were infused with the urban ethnocracy that caused the crisis in the first place.
However, this is not all the Popular Committee did and does. An array of transgressive actions were piled one on top of the other, particularly in the first year, when the threat of evictions were most acute. They barricaded homes against bailiffs. They picketed Amidar and the buildings up for auction, often inviting themselves on tours with the tycoons expected to bid for the properties, and frightening them away through threats of prolonged planning and bureaucratic interventions. They developed coalitions with Jewish organisations – and eventually whole neighbourhoods – and worked to spotlight the increasing vulnerability of the neighbourhood in Jaffa’s streets and public spaces.

One telling anecdote from this period is from the rush up to Land Day in 2007, a mere few weeks after the Committee was formed. According to Amouri (2011), the activists felt it was important to have the focal event in Jaffa that year, where things had been ‘quiet’ for more than a decade, while gentrification, under the guise of business as usual, developed all around them. The decision expressed more than just the need to spotlight what was happening in Jaffa. It re-opened the internal Palestinian discourse around land, and shifted its frame to include the urban space, in the centre away from the Palestinian politicised zones of the northern enclave. The Mixed Cities had been excluded from the radar of Palestinian politics for a number of years and the Popular Committee reintegrated them into the larger Palestinian struggle, pushing open the internalised boundaries on what constitutes contested space and contested communities. Besides the street protest planned to commemorate Land Day, a series of events and awareness-raising campaigns were planned, targeting the community and the wider Jewish public of Tel Aviv. One significant action, which Shbayta (2011) considers one of their most creative instalments of public political theatre, was a map the Committee created of the demolitions and evictions. The ‘rub’ was the fact that the map overlaid on top of a food-festival map produced by the municipality. Next to restaurant icons (like a fork and spoon), they added a bulldozer and a key that explained who was under...

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94 This was a particular specialty of Abu Shehadeh, who I joined for one such tour on Jan 1st, 2012. I witnessed him exploit his status as a councilman to explain to the property’s potential buyers his many technical avenues for making the project of development as close to impossible as he could.

95 For example, the Kfar Shalem and Tikva neighbourhoods of the Tel Aviv/central district; both targets for gentrification and the displacement of current (weak) populations by richer migrants from other parts of the centre. Both neighbourhoods are Likud (right-wing) strongholds.

96 In October 2000, every Arab locality organised their own solidarity protests in support of the Palestinians in the occupied territories, engaged in the Second Intifada. In Jaffa, there had been riots in the streets, brutal treatment by police and a long period afterwards of Jews boycotting Jaffa businesses. This period of ‘quiet’, referenced above, was a response to both the events of 2000 and its aftermath.

97 As is clear from a reading of the ‘Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs of Israel’, which only mentions Jaffa once, in a section about rediscovering Palestinian culture in the 1970s (The National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, 2006).
threat of eviction. They made it uncomfortable for a community of rich foodies from Jewish-Israel to sit in Jaffa behind the veil of reconstructed and rehabilitated space. They used the public space and events that celebrate it, engaging directly with the ‘map’ of the modern, developed city, and laid bare the hidden casualties of its gentrification project.

**Institutionalising the Movement – From Popular to Professional, Political to Pragmatic**

A division exists between the first year and later years of the movement. In the beginning, there was no organised system or address for dealing with the evictions. The Committee was innovative and mobile, situated outside particular ‘containers’ for transgressive actions. It worked in teams, with space for residents, activists and professionals to develop the campaign together and in parallel tracks. Without the limits of parties and organisations, they could be flexible, responsive and inclusive; in other words, a popular, grassroots struggle.

However, after about a year of constant acts of protest and court-based engagement, new thinking around how to evolve a more ‘systematic’ line of action, came to the fore, and became routinised. As the Popular Committee continued to collect names and map the problems, they devised a more organised way of dealing with them, and with addressing the state. As a result, *Darna*, the organisational/professional arm of the Popular Committee, was established, and became an avenue for further institutionalisation and engagement with the hegemonic order. Moreover, while members of the Popular Committee continue to differentiate between the two, in practice, their resources, activities and focus are entirely integrated, with Darna’s employees also key founders and leaders of the Popular Committee.

Darna took over the task of collating, tracking and organising the case work around the evictions. They link residents to available lawyers – through the state’s public legal aid system – and coordinate the type of litigation, mediation and direct interventions to be used in the cases. It took several years, but Darna has developed an organised system of working with the community, the lawyers and the officials from the state and Amidar, to generate a protective haven around the neighbourhood. So long as they have sufficient notice from the family at-risk of eviction, Darna is nearly always successful in preventing their removal (Ilani, 2011; Abu Shehadeh, 2011).

Over the past eight years, Darna/the Popular Committee have continued to deepen their engagement with the state in order to resolve the individual cases. They developed short-cuts through the bureaucracy, and organised bi-monthly visits from a public housing case worker,

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98 This sentiment was repeated by a majority of interlocutors to the movement, but most explicitly by Saba (2012), Amouri (2011), and Shbayta (2011).
to check on the status of the residents. They found human voices within the planning spheres and worked through them to map out better technical solutions for the community. They worked directly with Amidar to institute systematic support-networks against the removal of their most vulnerable tenants. They also found conspiratorial partners across the national divide, in poor Jewish communities (many of whom were part of the Mizrahi refugee communities instated in Palestinian homes in Israel’s urban centres the 1950s), who had better, more coordinated campaigns against the evictions. In 2010, the Popular Committee organised a year-long programme of roundtables, at which they sat with all stakeholders from the state, the municipality and Amidar, to develop joint solutions to the housing crisis. Finally, in 2013, they orchestrated a class-action suit against plans to turn Kedem street, the street that travels along the beachfront, into a highway; the action included transmitting 700 individual appeals to the courts on behalf of the affected families.

The Committee gained some genuine victories through this process, with the evictions almost down to a trickle in 2011 and 2012, when the primary interviews for this study were conducted (although new evictions have popped out of the woodwork in 2013 and 2014). Moreover, the state was forced to acknowledge that the housing crisis in Jaffa was collective and had particular implications for a specific, ethnic community (Amouri, 2011). However, as a result, the initial politicised discourse was, if not dropped, then dulled (at least in public) (Amouri, 2011; Abu Shehadeh, 2011). The more this process evolved, the more room there was to manoeuvre within the state’s institutions, which in turn galvanised more results for the community. This moved much of the action out of the street, and into hegemonic corners, and changed the circumstances through which Sumud is practiced and protected.

There are clear tensions in the dependence – and, thus, often silencing methodologies – of working with and through the state. In order to protect the community against eviction, the Committee/Darna often encounters the system without necessarily provoking it, without challenging it. Their goal is to keep the residents in their homes, using whatever tools are at it their disposal; politicised or pragmatic, direct or subversive, inside the system or outside. As a result, the individual cases are often fetishized, enabling the bureaucracy to articulate the shape and breadth of these actions and further distance the cases from the systemic, political issues they embody. Yudit Ilani’s (2011) description of one particular intervention offers a window into the conundrum Darna/the Popular Committee faces in their work, and the distance they need to go from political to pragmatic politics, in the process:
In one case I am working on – and truthfully I don’t know which direction it’s going: I mean in some cases, we just win. We manage to prove that the family actually lived in this house, that it has rights. If there are debts, we get a deal in which they pay the debt in monthly instalments, it’s finished. But this one is not so clear cut. It is an interesting case, where the family started out in a one-room apartment and over time, the family actually constructed 7 other rooms. And they were facing eviction, because, of course, these rooms were constructed illegally; but they needed it, because this was a very large family at the time. But in the meantime, the children have grown up, and now there is only the mother and one son, who suffers from mental retardation. Anyway, we managed to get a deal with the housing company that she has to demolish two rooms, but then she will become the legal tenant of all the other rooms. So instead of 1 room, she is left with 6 rooms – but this is a good deal, she stays in her house. It’s a pity she has to lose 2 rooms, but this is a good deal. It’s fair, she gets to stay and be a legal tenant of the house.”

This is not to say that this isn’t an effective method with which to place facts on the ground, to keep Palestinians in Jaffa and stay the flow of Judaisation. However, as Gadi Algazi (2011a), another key activist from the movement, explains, “the evictions have stopped, but the process of gentrification continues.” That said, in a second interview with Algazi (2011b), he further argues that “when we are dealing with real people and real problems, this is the only choice you can make.”

Overall, in the work of Darna/the Popular Committee, direct actions weave into hegemonic actions, and vice versa, continuing the legacy of al-Rabita before them. With the core focus on the state and Jewish-Israel, as key addressees, there is an inherent link being constructed between survival and the larger hegemonic arena in which they function; and one to which the state has begun responding, at least in terms of the individual cases. The system and its boundaries need to be engaged and encountered to evoke an unruly response; even if the political discourse is disguised within something more hegemonically digestible in the process (Yacobi, 2012). This is not to say that a multitude of actions and actors working from their space outside the hegemonic order, without utilising its institutions and networks, couldn’t inform a new boundary, nor inform systemic transformations. However, this is not the story of the Palestinian citizens, and particularly the vulnerable community in Jaffa. As Abu Shehadeh (2011) often reminded me, they, the Palestinian contenders for space, are not a multitude. They are a few hundred activists and in this context, demographics mean everything. Being so few, Jaffa’s constituents are dependent on the state and its institutions; they cannot divorce their actions from the system and the communities upon which they are dependent and to which they are so vulnerable.

The Popular Committee – and their cohorts in the struggle – express a strategic understanding of this dilemma. The majority embrace the need for a spectrum of actions – direct,
contentious, transgressive and hegemonic – and that these must be mobilised simultaneously for them to have an effect. What unfolds through this process is that it is not necessarily the arena for action but the boundaries transgressed through them, as part of a resistance repertoire that informs the disarticulating capacity of the struggle. This does not mean that the Popular Committee is not overwhelmed at times by the hegemonic/ethnocratic project, and its ability to reshape itself around the community’s struggle, often disempowering its modes and methods in the process. This is always a challenge, as the community seeks to carve out and embed a Palestinian space in Jaffa.

The Impact of the Mixed City – Carving out a Palestinian Struggle

“When I was a student, the language of responsibility and making present the Palestinian voice in an egalitarian political partnership was as foreign as Chinese to me, and I can imagine that for many Palestinian university students it still is. The words “move on” sounded to me at the time like a declared forfeit of memory, of the right to remember, of the voice that has been silenced by the aggressive naturalization process of Palestinian citizens of Israel, and for what? For nothing! It meant giving up what I am – because the Palestinian historic narrative is a part of me. How can we be separated? How can one possibly think we could be separated, and what would I be without it? What would I be outside it? The excruciating, catastrophic, bloodied memory is still the only way in which we perceive you, communicate and dialogue with you, the only way we perceive not only you but ourselves in order not to get lost amongst you. It is the only way to buffer ourselves from you. And we need this buffer in order to remind ourselves that we are we and you are you, that this we will never be you. Identity is the pre-condition for true dialogue – and develops from within it.”

Rajaa Natour, Dialogue Facilitator & Gemini Project Coordinator, Sadaka- Reut; From Tarabut-Hithabrut’s Website, 2013

As discussed above, the specificity of the Mixed City and the particular agents who have mediated its development give rise to a particular tension within the field of struggle in Jaffa. On one side, there exists the need for and development of a Palestinian-only space for resistance, and through it, a set of necessary barriers and protections from the Jewish space. On the other, there persists the ‘Joint’ resistance of Palestinian and Jewish activists, and the baggage of ‘co-existence’, dialogue and accusations of ‘Israelisation’ that come with it.99 This tension is tied to the socio-political history of this place, and the experience of struggling for a particular Palestinian identity within it, in relation to the hegemonic order seeking to

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99 These terms reference the ‘People-to-People’ trust-building and co-existence programmes, initiated during the ‘Oslo Years’ after the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993. Jewish-Palestinian ‘coexistence’ and ‘dialogue’ activities overtook the anti-Occupation movements within Israel, until the start of the Second Intifada. After 13 Palestinian citizens were killed during the October 2000 solidarity protests, mentioned above, the co-existence activities were seen to ‘normalise’ the occupation inside and outside ‘the Green line’ and from then on were boycotted by many Palestinian activists and political leaders. Today, when joint Palestinian-Jewish activities are organised, participants are wary of their predecessors and intentionally spotlight rather than eschew the asymmetric power relations present/produced in such actions.
erase it. That identity is tied to the physical presence of a Palestinian population, rooted in Jaffa’s last Palestinian neighbourhood. Survival and Sumud are pitted against Judaisation, and its evolving cycles of infiltration and containment, removal and replacement. However, the tools for this struggle take form in these two intersecting, sometimes clashing, sometimes mutually penetrating circles, as the need for a Palestinian space cannot separate itself from its proximity to Tel Aviv, to the “centre of the centre” and all it means for the hegemonic veil of a “Jewish-democracy”; nor from the significant fact that there are just too few Palestinians to hold the state at bay on their own (Karkabi, 2014). Housed within Jaffa is the tension between how to provoke change, to engage the system and to find subversive collaborators wherever they exist, and yet to retain the politics of being Palestinian in the Jewish settler-colony. While this is a core conflict for Palestinian struggle throughout the Mixed Cities – and to a lesser degree, the Palestinian peripheries of the country – it is especially poignant in Jaffa. As many interlocutors from the Popular Committee contend, the nature of the struggle cannot be isolated from the fact that Jaffa was once the great city of Palestine and is now a mere neighbourhood of the largest Jewish municipality; nor from the fact that Jaffa has been so overtly Judaised, with the bulldozing of its history and ongoing attempts to quietly ‘transfer’ its communities; nor from the fact that a Palestinian identity has been de-emphasized and de-legitimized as Jewish presence, Jewish narratives, Hebrew language and Hebrew culture have settled in Jaffa. The boundaries have been dissolved, and there is no distance or gap left within which to carve out a different space, preserved for Palestinian identities, symbols, language and culture. Thus, there is a craving for a purely Palestinian space and resistance. At the same time, the reality of where they are, of their audience, of the borders that now cross right through and over them, has informed and articulated the strategy of joint protest. The tension this evokes is similar to the debate presented above, as to when and how to use the hegemonic arenas of the state – and replayed in multiple online Arabic blogs, articles, facebook messages and community meetings. According to several interlocutors to this thesis as well as additional Palestinian activists writing on the topic, there is an inherent ambiguity in working within Jewish space and with Jewish activists (even those who label themselves anti-Zionists and call for the de-colonisation of Israeli-Jewish privilege). This

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100 For an example of this, see the debate on whether or not to join the mainstream J14 ‘social justice’ protests (see discussion below) between Shbeta and Halihel (2011), on www.qadita.net, an Arabic-language website devoted to discussions of Palestinian literature & culture.

101 See in particular Naamnih (2011), Ghantous (2012) and Karkabi (2014), from this thesis; as well as the writings of Alsaafin (2012) and Alsaafin & Hassan (2014).
ambiguity relates to the long history of Jewish activists speaking for and directing Palestinian struggle (Farah, 2011) and the dangers of reproducing the same power dynamics as those subsuming Palestinian Jaffa. As Natour mentions above, there is a fear of that which is gained being overshadowed by what is lost – the right to (and struggle for) a Palestinian space. However, engagement with this sphere has become a necessity of the housing protest. Moreover, Palestinian-only and joint-activism in Jaffa do not happen in diametric opposition. Rather, they share a spectrum of actions and spheres that come together to make up the community’s culture of resistance, and through these encounters, some of the most radical engagements with the spatial ordering of the Mixed City are cultivated.

The Palestinian-Only Struggle

The ‘Palestinian-only’ struggle is not exclusively related to the housing crisis, despite the fact that it is very much anchored in it. Much of its discourse and activities relate back to the essential goals of the Popular Committee, and many of its advocates are key leaders within the Committee. However, there is a new articulation for action, where the question is no longer about survival in itself, but the kind of community that would survive here. The carving out of a different, Palestinian space is not about the mere existence of Arabs in Jaffa, but the right to be Arabs inside Israel and keep their identity (Abu-Shehadeh, 2011). The space is reclaimed from the erasures of the Mixed City, in multiple articulations and configurations, and with a plethora of audiences. It is then about embedding this story in the public space, as an evolving, radical and intentionally provocative programme of ‘re-Palestinianisation’.

Insurgent Mapping

A key embodiment of this process of re-Palestinianisation can be found in what Sami Abu Shehadeh calls his ‘political-historical tour of Jaffa’; in essence, a walk through the still raw urban scars of the different neighbourhoods. My own experience of taking this tour with Abu Shehadeh (in November, 2011), helped shape my understanding of the community’s struggle, the space within which it is housed, and the order against which it clashes. This ‘walk’ has evolved as a political exercise, an insurgent mapping process that challenges the Judaisation practices shaping Jaffa, since the establishment of the state.

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102 The actual quote was in reference to the difficulties the activists experience with the Palestinian business elites in Jaffa, who feel that the best way to maintain a Palestinian presence in Jaffa is to keep quiet. This was his response: “Sure they (the state/the Jews) will let you stay here, but they will not let you live as Arabs.”

103 A map of this tour appears in the Appendices to this thesis, as Appendix 3.9.

104 ‘Insurgent Mapping’, as a concept, builds on the work of James Holston (2010), who conceives of a theory of ‘insurgent citizenship’ through his analysis of modern planning processes imposed on communities living in...
engagement with Jaffa’s map, he names the hegemonic order, unveiling its colonial language and its reproduction of ethno-national power dynamics. He then re-Palestinises its signs, its symbols, its neighbourhoods, and re-invests it with Palestinian narratives and memories. In Abu Shehadeh’s hands, each landmark, each mark on the map, each street sign becomes contested space; as he walks you through the history of how Jamal Basha Street became Jerusalem Boulevard (one of Jaffa’s main streets), or how ‘Clock Tower Square’ became ‘Hagana Square’, at the entrance to Jaffa (named for the pre-state Jewish militia that helped conquer Palestine in 1948), or how Palestinian-Jaffa was contained within the Ajami ghetto and the space was infiltrated by Tel Aviv’s development programme. He repeats the story to the multiple visitors and stakeholders who join his walk, and in so doing, Abu Shehadeh carves out Palestinian space from the Judaised version of it, in physical and material terms. Abu Shehadeh’s mapping practice leads through the present and historical terrain of Ajami’s struggle; sites of essential conflict that have already been emphasized, above. These include endless construction projects signifying the march of gentrification; the buildings that have been bought to house the settlers from the West Bank and their institutions; Park Ha Midron/Garbage Mountain; the neighbourhoods (like the Old City) that were emptied and replaced; and the monuments and public places that have been completely divested of any links to their Palestinian origins. However, there are also spaces of hope, interwoven into the walk as key sites of Jaffa’s political theatre: the grafittied walls of Amidar-managed buildings that claim Jaffa for its residents; several homes, whose families had been saved from eviction; several others that are up for auction and have become sites of contestation; the cafes and restaurants that act as havens for Jaffa’s political activists, as well as public spaces for staging political events and meetings; and the Clock Tower that stands at the entrance to Ajami, which itself has become the central site of Jaffa’s many protests and public demonstrations.

The tours have proliferated in the last decade or so since Abu Shehadeh began leading them. In 2014, there are not only multiple versions led by the local activist community, but versions that appear online, and in multimedia formats. In one example called “the Jaffa Project: Autobiography of the City” – a project directed by Muhammad Jabali, an activist, DJ and blogger – a virtual tour made up of interviews, images, maps and personal histories, take

Brazilia; and Avinoam Meir (2003, 2005, 2009), who conceives of the term ‘Insurgent Planning’ as a label for the Bedouins’ use of planning mechanisms to attempt to reshape the state’s imposed vision of the Naqab. For more details of Holston’s work, see further discussion in Chapter One; for more on Meir’s work, see Chapters Three and Four.
visitors through the city’s lost Palestinian memories, as a way to reclaim them. The insurgent map has become an integral component of building a Palestinian identity and transmitting it into the public sphere, where the main battlefield is still evolving.

**Reframing the Public Space**

Jaffa’s public space has been stolen by the state – at first it was the street signs and public monuments, but with the new ‘development’ and neoliberal renewal programme, the state is everywhere. It is in the new shopping arcades, the gentrified flea market, Park HaMidron, the new Jewish neighbourhoods and Jaffa’s Port; while Jaffa’s historical and Palestinian character are consistently erased from the streets. These spaces have thus become essential targets for reclaiming Palestinian-identity, and projecting a Palestinian claim on the neighbourhood.

According to Abed Abou Shhadeh (2011)\(^{105}\), a key activist from Jaffa’s Palestinian youth movement, this is the place to assert a Palestinian-voice. As opposed to the courts, the roundtables and the municipality, where he feels their politics are silenced, Palestinian political protest needs to be in the street. The main site is the ‘Clock Tower’, where the majority of Jaffa’s Palestinians live, and yet have been surrounded by a newly gentrified promenade. It is also where the local residents most often encounter *the other*, and the point at which Tel Aviv physically and symbolically meets Jaffa\(^{106}\). The significance of the protest space activates the border between two worlds.

The main and most antagonistic expression of this Palestinian presence is the public protest. Dozens of mass demonstrations are organised by the city’s Palestinian activists every year. These tend to be linked to an anti-Zionist, pro-Palestinian theme, e.g. Nakba Day, the Siege and ongoing bombardments of Gaza, the Political Prisoners, and the Housing Crisis; and from July through November, 2013, several ‘Days of Rage’ protests were organised, in which the Bedouins’ struggle in the Naqab was intersected with Ajami’s own struggle for recognition and right of place. The demonstration is the arena through which the Palestinians of Jaffa challenge the norms of ‘transfer’ and ‘transformation’, in public outcries that force the state to acknowledge their presence and their rootedness in the neighbourhood. For example, during the Land Day demonstration in March, 2012, one elderly woman explained, as she walked hand in hand with her daughter and grandchildren, that “this is not about

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\(^{105}\) As noted in the Introduction Chapter to this thesis, this distinct spelling of Abou Shhadeh (as opposed to Abu Shehadeh) respects the interlocutor’s own transliteration of his name into English.

\(^{106}\) In the eyes of the majority of Tel Aviv’s residents, Jaffa is still conceptualised as a separate, Arab city, at the edge of the Modern Jewish city.
winning. We probably won’t win here. But we will not leave without screaming as loud as possible, and forcing them to hear us; that this is our home and they can’t just take us out of it.” (Land Day March Participant, 2012)

This does not mean that Jews do not participate in the Jaffa demonstrations – there are many, and signs and slogans are more often in Hebrew than in Arabic; although this is also because their audience is not primarily in Jaffa, but in Tel Aviv, and includes the mainstream press and Jewish general public. However, it is clear that in many cases, the collective ‘voice’ is that of a Palestinian identity. The space itself is covered with Palestinian flags, the rhetoric is politicised and provocative, the themes are about Palestinian liberation, and the heroes are all Palestinian.

The demonstrations are the most overt example of a call for a Palestinian public space. However, it is the non-institutional, indirect but conscious and subversive activities that have become critical to the spectrum of actions that embed a Palestinian identity in Jaffa. These form a new kind of Sumud in the neighbourhood. One example is the bi-weekly youth group meetings (led by Abu Shehadeh), where many of the demonstrations and community activities are organised. These have become the space to discuss what it means to be Palestinian youth in Jaffa; where stories and ideas are shared and turn into plans (Jaffa Youth Group, 2012). The Youth Group focuses on finding and expressing a common identity among the fractured Palestinian communities of Jaffa. For example, the group hosted an Eid al-Fitr feast in 2012 in a Christian churchyard, to highlight the common loss of land by both Muslim and Christian local religious communities. They also formed a Dabke Dancing troupe (a Palestinian folk dance group), again in light of a lack of Palestinian cultural space in the ‘Mixed City’. It performs regularly at public events, and as much as possible on the streets of Jaffa; but it also performs in the Arab-Hebrew Theatre of Jaffa, and to mixed audiences. The troupe fits right into the nationalist music scene that is also beginning to take hold, as with the weekly electronic Arab music nights at Anna Lou Lou Bar, on Yefet Street107. There are also Palestinian theatre and poetry nights, public art and graffiti, online journals, blogs and newsites108. In this burgeoning space, the syntax and symbolism, discourse and movement is very much Palestinian, despite the fact that there are many Jews who take part.

On one hand, the ‘Palestinian-only’ struggle depicts the separate space of difference, inside which it seems possible to reclaim the Palestinian city. It enables the community’s push

107 While Anna Lou Lou celebrates Palestinian and Arab identities, music and activism, it is interestingly, a Jewish-owned club, and their parties are frequented by Jewish activists as well as Palestinian ones.
108 As an example, see www.yaffa48.com.
against the fixed borders of the state and reimagines them as processes that evolve in their contact with transgressive and radical acts of resistance; through alternative, untold and unseen Palestinian narratives, histories, symbols, art, architecture and most of all, people. On the other hand, this is not a ‘disengaged’, spatial haven for Palestinian identity or struggle, enclosed and distinct from the Jewish sector. As Natour (2012), quoted above, argues, these acts of radical Palestinian identity – the extreme other in the hegemonic order – offer a way for the victims of this history to engage with the Jewish space, through a necessary buffer. It makes it possible for them to encounter fellow activists in the joint space, without losing themselves; an experience opposite to the norms of their experience with Jewish society, of the market, of the bureaucracy, and of a powerful hegemony that has no room for indigenous Palestinians. As mentioned above, the nature of the Mixed City, and the bombarded, contained and tiny community of Palestinian-Jaffa, has made the ‘Palestinian-only’ arena unsustainable without the Joint Struggle. This culminates in the fact that there is no separate Palestinian space. However, it has cultivated a third space, where Palestinian politics, particularly those that engage the state – in the street as well as within the institutions – are promoted by both Jews and Palestinians.

The Joint Struggle

The ‘joint struggle’ and deep involvement of Jewish activists in the Popular Committee, is an essential and oft-touted strategy of the struggle for Palestinian space in Jaffa. Those involved, in addition to the Palestinian activists, are local residents, some of whom are descendents of those who were originally transferred into the neighbourhood in 1948 and who are also vulnerable to gentrification; and others who have moved to Jaffa in light of their political and social affiliations (several of whom are interlocutors to this study), which include living and struggling with Palestinian citizens of Israel. In addition, there is a spectrum of Jewish, non-residents who take part, including activists, human rights NGOS, community organisations and politicians. Actions play out in front of a Jewish, mainstream audience, before the national media, and increasingly, in partnership with other ‘peripheral’ communities. This is not new, as Al-Rabita constructed its campaigns from the 1980s onwards, in collaboration with Jewish NGOs and activists (Abed, 2012). However, many of

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109 See Belkind (2013) and Monterescu (2009) for a similar assessment of the mediations of the Mixed City on Palestinian politics in Jaffa, in which Palestinians identify with the Palestinian struggle for emancipation; while at the same time, an exclusivist Palestinian narrative is complicated by their daily struggle for survival and their everyday and constant encounters with the Jewish sphere.

110 See in particular Hakim (2013) and Ilani (2011), for details.
the newest actions include a politicised message that intersects the social with the political, arguing that what is happening in Jaffa, and thus in the Arab-Jewish neighbourhoods of Kfar Shalem (south Tel Aviv), Givat Shmuel (north Tel Aviv), and Old Katamon (West Jerusalem), and elsewhere, is systemic and ethnically motivated. The politicized, ethno-national discourse has also begun to appear in joint public events. For example, at a joint panel organised by a Jewish Human Rights NGO in Bat Yam (2012) – Jaffa’s almost exclusively Jewish neighbour to the south – Hana Amouri spoke about ‘the ethnic gentrification of Jaffa’ at a table she shared with Bat Yam’s Jewish mayor.

As can be imagined, there isn’t an overtly mainstream (Jewish) audience for articulation of the colonial hierarchies that have driven the exclusion and seclusion of various minorities within Israel. However, it is a discourse that is starting to appear in different public arenas, developed by and meant for joint consumption. Other predominantly Jewish activist-circles have also begun to reproduce the discourse of colonial and ethnic-privilege, as it applies to their own communities. One group embodying this rhetoric is Ha Maabara (‘The Transit Camp’), an activist group trying to protect the housing rights of poor North-African Jewish residents of West Jerusalem through Sumud-inspired actions. As well, The Committee for Public Housing, which is led by Jewish activists, appears at homes in Ajami to defend the community against Amidar’s henchmen, as often as they do in Jewish neighbourhoods. Darna even takes on cases of poor Jewish residents, who have also been targeted for eviction. There is also a joint youth movement in Jaffa, housed within a grassroots organisation called Sadaka-Reut. The group organises joint community-based actions that attempt to rattle dynamics of power, through a variety of forms and in multiple Jewish and Palestinian arenas. For example, every summer, the movement comes together, after a year of pedagogical and grassroots actions, for an intensive summer camp on the production of shared Jewish-Palestinian activism in Jaffa. In another example, members of the movement spent their New Years Eve (Dec. 31st, 2012), going from bus stop to bus stop in Jaffa, adding Arabic to signs which previously only had Hebrew on them. In September (2013), the group took over the Arab-Hebrew Theatre, for a night of shared learning and public performance, in which the entire Jaffa community – residents, artists and activists – took part.

111 This assessment also appears in articles by Allweil (2013) and Belkind (2013) in their studies of the Popular Committee’s reshaping of J14 discourses within Jaffa’s own tent encampment and public protest activities.
112 One of Ha Maabara’s key activities is enabling homeless families to squat in empty buildings, mirroring al-Rabita’s Housing Intifada of 20 years earlier.
At the same time, there is always the potential for problems in joint struggle and the rhetoric that goes along with it. When Palestinians and Jews share public, mainstream protest, the ‘Palestinian space’ is tempered by the need to articulate a joint movement, rhetoric or goal; which in turn reiterates the asymmetry of power relations, within the shared space. An explicit example of this can be found in the way Palestinian space had to be manoeuvred during the J14 Social Movement Protests (Allweil, 2013; Abou Shhadeh, 2012).

The J14 Movement is a campaign that ran from July to September in Israel, in 2011. It started with a few tents in Tel Aviv’s main boulevard (Rothchild), and evolved into a mass protest, that created tent cities in every major urban centre of the country, including Jaffa, and brought half a million mostly, but not only, Jewish citizens into the streets, to spotlight the problem of affordable housing for Israelis across the country. However, the Movement succeeded in its mass mobilisations by endeavouring to cut out politics – meaning the ethnic and Palestinian issues – from the arena of protest. As Belkind argues, they tried “to reshuffle the cards without challenging Zionist/Jewish hegemony (Belkind, 2013, p.333)”.

While many of Jaffa’s activists felt that what was happening in Rothchild had nothing to do with them – and were in fact offended at its intentional disengagement from ‘conflict politics’ – the Popular Committee chose not to ignore the opportunity, and many followed their direction. A tent encampment was established in Gan Hashnaim Park, in the centre of Ajami; and a mixed Jewish-Palestinian Jaffa tent was set up on Rothchild Boulevard. Through daily events and assemblies in the park, as well as joining in the conversations and rallies held in Tel Aviv, the Jaffa Camp attempted to reshape J14’s mainstream discourses, to highlight the inherently structural nature of the housing crisis. However, the Jaffa activists were limited in terms of their impact on the larger movement, and even found their own politicised space constrained by its participation in J14.

Jaffa’s own tent encampment became the axis and microcosm of many of the tensions inherent in the Mixed City struggle: Between a nationalist/Palestinian space and a ‘joint space’; between engaging and disengaging from the mainstream; between the Sumud of local residents, the popular struggle in the Street, and the pragmatic/professionalism of the Popular Committee. For example, according to Abou Shhadeh (2011) and Amouri (2011), a debate was held concerning the desire of some activists, primarily from the Palestinian youth.

113 The Jaffa encampment was primarily inhabited by Jaffa’s homeless population; the activists from the Popular Committee helped to organise rallies in this space, but did not ‘occupy it’ the way Rothchild was occupied by J14.
movement, to have a Palestinian flag in the camp. This raised the dilemma of the compromises to be made in the development of a shared and inclusive space, wherein the Zionist order is always present. It brought to the surface the question of how to balance pragmatism with the need for political articulation; how to balance the strategy of a common discourse of social justice, with the need to unveil and disarticulate the clearly ethnic and racial lines of poverty, to which the housing protest truly speaks. The Palestinian flag lost out in this argument, and it along with other Palestinian symbols were banned from the camp and during public demonstrations, for fear of alienating Jewish comrades in struggle (Amouri, 2011; Abou-Shhadeh, 2011; Allweil, 2013). However, at those same events, Hana Amouri spoke about ethnic gentrification; Sami Abu Shehadeh spoke about the Palestinian community’s right to remain in Jaffa; and System-Ali, a joint Jewish-Palestinian hip-hop group, performed songs about liberating Palestine. As Natour argues above, not everything is simultaneously lost or gained in the shared space.

**Inverting the Mixed City – Concluding Thoughts**

While the J14 example points to what may be lost when engaging in the mainstream, and in joint activities, it also underestimates much of what is gained in the new grassroots emerging within Jaffa. This joint grassroots space is intentionally and often overtly Palestinianised. It is always permeated by the politicised narrative and lived experience of Palestinian Jaffa; its memories, its symbols, its voice. Its messages and methods are increasingly innovative, and unruly; finding new ways of reclaiming the past, present and future Jaffa, as Palestinian, and as shared space. For example, a recent piece of online and public theatre was produced by members of Jaffa’s Jewish and Palestinian activist community. They created an “audio-walk” for the northern Manshiyya neighbourhood, which was swallowed by Jewish Tel Aviv, and is now home to endless lines of Jewish-owned hotels, restaurants and the tourists and millionaires who appropriated this space. The activist-musicians and actors re-enacted the stories of the old Jaffa neighbourhood, and publically launched them online, so anyone who walks here, can take the echoes of Palestine with them. In some ways, these actions, which target and attempt to dislocate the borders of the Jewish space, through a uniquely joint discourse about Palestinian space, are hyper-radical (Karkabi, 2014). They have to be, in order for Palestinian activists to maintain their legitimacy among their own communities.

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114 In addition, details of this argument are featured in Monterescu & Shaindlinger’s (2013) and Allweil’s (2013) articles on the Jaffa Encampment during J14.
elsewhere in the country; and in order to protect themselves from being overtaken by the 
hegemonic veil (*ibid*).

There is a necessary critique here of the joint arena as an imposition of the Mixed City, where 
Judaisation takes form through imbibing a physical, Jewish presence in Arab communities, 
encroaching upon their growth and development, and seeking to erase the echoes of their 
footprints (Echoing Yaffa, accessed 2014). In light of this, the joint actions may seem to be a 
mere reproduction of the hegemonic order in Jaffa, where Palestinians are bombarded by the 
Jewish space, as well as patronised and ‘protected’ by it. However, there is also room to 
consider Charles Tilly’s (1977) argument, in which the system of repression cannot 
necessarily control how that system evolves and is reproduced by its subjects (p.4-27). This is 
reiterated through Holston’s (2010) assertion that even that which is imposed clashes with 
and is penetrated by the ‘user’ in/of the space. In this reading, the space is re-constituted in a 
process of social relations, and is re-experienced and re-articulated in its spatial practice. This 
lens exists in contravention to the more orthodox assumptions that see Jaffa exclusively 
informing by the Zionist aesthetic, and the hegemonic grid being imposed on it, from inside 
and outside.  

Thus, while the Mixed City has been forced upon Jaffa’s remaining 
Palestinian residents, the community has reinterpreted it in the practice of their current joint 
struggle. The struggle for Palestinian identity in Jaffa, particularly expressed in the actions of 
the youth movement, the public demonstrations, the clock-tower protests and public displays 
of Palestinian symbols, and their ongoing celebration of their identity, are their buffer against 
the need to encounter the majority, even those in the radical-left, as the victim of their shared- 
history. They can work together because they do not lose their Palestinian space, even though 
that space does not survive on its own, there. 

This is not to say that this is always the case. As Dabit (2012), quoted above, explains, there 
are still many moments where the community is disempowered through their engagements 
with the state, particularly with Amidar; where the Palestinian space is encroached upon by 
the need to succeed in the court, in the clerk’s office, and in the public encounters between 
Jews and Palestinians. However, there are moments that bring hope: the Palestinian and 
Jewish youth who develop slogans and signs that challenge Judaisation in Jaffa, at Sadaka-
Reut’s activist camp; a jointly led protest in front of a building being toured during an 
Amidar auction; a Jewish-group taking part in Abu Shehadeh’s political tour; or even a 

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115 My argument here stands in opposition to much of the literature on the planning and aesthetics of new-old 
Jaffa, which sees it only in terms of the exclusions and impositions of the Zionist-Judaisation of space; see for 
example Yiftachel & Yacobi (2003); Hamdan-Saliba (2014); Levine (2005).
Palestinian-Jewish hip hop group, singing in Arabic, Hebrew, Russian and English, of Palestinian rights to this place; and especially a joint political movement of both Jewish and Palestinian activists, that embraces the idea of a state for all its citizens. There is evidence in this case that the agents of these movements have managed to invert the trajectories of the ‘Mixed City’, and determine a shared-space in Jaffa. Although it is small, Jaffa’s culture of resistance is truly ‘other’, an anomaly within the colonial practice of segregation, de-legitimisation and erasure.

Epilogue

I was told a story in the process of writing this chapter, about a growing community of Jewish and Palestinian residents/activists in Jaffa, who, for the first time, not only struggle together, but actually share a lifestyle (Hakim, 2013). This group of about 40 young people go out together, they live together; their political and social engagements have become completely intertwined, as one glance at their facebook page clearly elucidates. Jewish members are learning Arabic, not for their activism, but for their friendships. And when they stop and notice it, and then discuss it, often at the end of a night at the local bar where they just spent the last few hours dancing and drinking, they recognize “it’s unusual”; potentially, a radical practice of anti-normalisation that seems to transcend the lines drawn by a colonial and ethnic ethos of separation and inter-dependence. In a 972 magazine interview with ‘System Ali’, Muhammad Aguani, the band’s front-man, perfectly captures this sentiment:

“The situation in System Ali is the complete opposite from the misconception that everything is good and normal. The fact that Jews and Arabs sing together does not mean there is peace. Personally, I don’t believe in the peace process. The people in this band are partners. The band got together, first and foremost, due to its members, and it got together to say in all four languages spoken among us that there are problems here, there are things that we must not be silent about, no matter what language.” (quoted in Shezaf, 2013)

As my interlocutor and I agreed, it is unclear how we can understand this in light of the struggle for Palestinian presence in Jaffa; but there is something innately and powerfully radical in shifting the borders and lines between communities. Moreover, there is an interesting moment here, wherein the imposed merging of Jewish and Palestinian space is turned on its head into something new. At the same time, to quote Abou Shhadeh (2011), “I am not naïve enough to believe this changes anything.” While on one hand, there are integral

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117 As mentioned above, System Ali band members speak Arabic, Hebrew, Russian and English, in light of their different ethnic and national backgrounds.
and unruly transformations ongoing in this space, the state continues to assert itself, swallowing Ajami and attempting to efface any Palestinian claims to the neighbourhood.
Chapter 3: The Galilee – Struggle Within The All-Arab Enclave

There is a point in the struggle when citizenship, integration and equality are no longer the dominant goals, but are intertwined with efforts to create autonomous ethnic spaces of development and identity.


Map of Main Arab Localities of the Galilee

This map depicts the main Arab localities of the Central and Upper Galilee, many of which are featured as part of the discussion of Palestinian struggle in this chapter.

Source: The Arab Association for Human Rights, accessed 2014
The Legend of Yom al-Ard (Land Day)
Through the Lens of Muhammad Miari, a Land Day Founder

“For the first time, there was a struggle by the Arabs, not about a specific and limited point or spot, but opposing the confiscation of land as land. Not only the owners opposing confiscation of their own land, but the entire people; and the land here was not held as an economic value, but a national value. I think this is the development which happened.”

Muhammad Miari, Founding Member, Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands, Personal Interview, 2012

Land Day, March 30th, 1976, tells the story of a violent and oft-mythologised confrontation between Israel’s Palestinian citizens and the state’s military forces, in the Central Galilee. As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the day had been called as a general strike, in response to the ongoing appropriation of Palestinian lands and encroachment on the ever-shrinking Palestinian space. The conflict-site was a triangle of Arab localities in the Central Galilee, known as the Sakhnin, Deyr Hanna, Arrabeh corridor. These villages, targeted for mass land confiscations in 1976, became the focal point for a stand against the state that reverberated across the entire country. The government reacted by sending tanks and soldiers to the Palestinian street (Kanaaneh, 2010). By the time the dust settled, 6 young people from these villages were dead and Palestinian-citizen struggle within Israel reached a point of no return (Miari, 2012; Amouri, 2011; Satel, 2012; Shbeita, 2012; Zayyad, 1976).

The strike’s catalyst was the Prime Minister Office’s (PMO) announcement of its new development plans for the Galilee, part of which included the expropriation of 21,000 dunams of land and the re-spatialisation of the Galilee for the needs of the Jewish sector. The focus of these plans – approved in February, 1976 – were a conflation of settlement actions, with the intention of altering the demographic and spatial ordering of the Galilee, and using Jewish presence to interrupt the contiguity of the densely Palestinian space. These included the expropriation of land to existing Jewish townships in the larger Galilee region; the development of 15 rural-industrial villages ‘to create wedges between clusters of Arab settlements’ (PMO, 1975, p. 6; quoted in Yiftachel, 1992); and the creation of a closed military zone near Sakhnin, known as Area 9, where the bulk of the confiscations would take place.

The majority of this story was produced from my interview with Mohammad Miari (2012); and is supplemented by interviews with other Galilee activists and secondary resources, as indicated in the text.

Multiple plans had been released in the year(s) leading up to the approval of the PMO’s Development of the Galilee Plan, including the Ministry of Housing and Construction’s Paam Bagalil Plan, approved in 1977; and a plan for the distribution of industry in the Galilee, produced by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, and approved in 1976. See Yiftachel (1992), Hawatmeh (2005), Holzman-Gazit (2007), and Shoughry (2012), for more details, as well as the table in the Appendices to this thesis.
The intricacies of these planning mechanisms described a new frontier-development landscape, aimed at dispersing the demographic status quo, and the threat such a concentrated Palestinian space represented – and still represents today. In effect, it encouraged Jewish penetration into the Arab heart of darkness with an array of economic, demographic and geographic planning incentives, including tax-free zones, land and business grants, and other forms of support to the new communities (Hawatmeh, 2005; Zayyad, 1976; Holzman-Gazit, 2007). According to Yiftachel (1992), despite previous attempts to infiltrate the area, as with the confiscation of Arab lands that established the Jewish settlement towns of Migdal HaEmek (1953), Upper Nazareth (1954), Maalot (1957) and Karmiel (1964), these plans marked the “genuine beginning of the concentrated Israeli push for Judaisation of the Galilee.” (p.139)

Like any social movement spark, the story of Land Day has its antecedents in a network of pre-existing actions and activists. The burgeoning political terrain had been building since 1948 in the Galilee, and had been gaining in strength since the lifting of the Military Administration (in 1966). The new radical politics were housed primarily, but not exclusively, in the Communist Party and its local expression in municipal politics. Discussion of the range of political support systems that went into Land Day are beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is important to note the increasingly politicised and educated community that gave critical voice to the new movements. Miari (2012) specifically points to a build-up of community mobilisation throughout 1975 and 1976, beginning with a conference that inaugurated the Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands in October, 1975, and the promulgation of popular committees throughout the northern villages, soon after. Additionally, both Tawfiq Zayyad (1976), who became the mayor of Nazareth, in December, 1975; and Yisrael Koenig (1976), the Northern District Commissioner at the time, reference the Communist Party’s sweeping of local municipal elections, as having propelled the state’s planning apparatuses into action.120 In fact, in a memorandum Koenig (1976) wrote on the potential reverberations of the political actions leading to and from Land Day for Israeli state policy, he references the Nazareth elections as a wake-up call to the ‘ticking time bomb’ he saw brewing in the Galilee.

Thus Land Day includes much more than the particular events that followed the announcement of new expropriations. It represents the culmination of long years of survival,

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120 Although Shoughry (2012) reverses the order, and indicates that the planning apparatuses propelled the communities into action.
of personal and community development, of Sumud and resilience, and the evolving
politicisation of Palestinian citizens of Israel. However, as Miari points out in the quote
above, it is also a moment that marks a qualitative change in Palestinian struggle for land in
the Galilee, and in the spatial relationship in which it has been housed. According to Zayyad
(1976), “the strike caused an earthquake that shook the state from end to end, and overturned
its policies and expectations.” (p.101)

The Lead-up to Land-Day

The “Day of the Land Strike” was called on March 6th, at a convention in Nazareth hosted by
the Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands (Koenig, 1976). It sparked a flurry of
mobilising actions focused around the national strike and the organising of mass
demonstrations across the country, including one in front of the Knesset. The Committee for
the Defence of Arab Lands went to work in the Arab localities in the north and south,
inspiring the establishment of popular committees tasked with mobilizing grassroots support.
With the land confiscations directly encroaching Sakhnin, Dayr Hanna and Arrabeh, their
local councils became the central headquarters for Committee actions and discussions.
However, additional pockets of protest appeared across the Galilee and the Naqab, wherever
a committee had been established. An activist currently among those at the helm of al-
Araqib’s land struggles, Nuri el-Uqbi, headed one such committee in Beersheba, and led the
Bedouin community in its first acts of solidarity with the rest of the Palestinian citizens of the
state. Demonstrations were also organised at all universities with an Arab-student
population, including Haifa University and the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. According to
Miari, Committee members went from village to village, building support and consensus for
use of the one tool they still had, although had yet to utilise, in the defence of their lands and
their rights: public, collective protest.

As strike-day neared, the state became increasingly aggressive, building an arsenal of
pressure tactics. First, it worked to contain those already entrenched within the institutional
matrix of the state. Just days ahead of the strike, on March 25th, the state called a meeting of
the Committee for the Heads of the Arab Localities in Israel (the ‘Arab Mayors’) in Shefa
Amr (Koenig, 1976; Miari, 2012; Shoughry, 2012). The Arab Mayors were jointly
coordinating the strike with Miari’s Committee, and several of its members were key
interlocutors of the action, particularly the Mayor of Arrabeh; and many of their networks
were integral to mobilising community participation (Miari, 2012). Using the Arab Mayors’

121 El-Uqbi’s committee was called the Association for the Support and Defence of Bedouin Rights in Israel.
more vulnerable position against them, threatening their municipal budgets, leadership positions and the safety of the communities, the state demanded they call off the strike. According to Miari (2012)\textsuperscript{122}, the larger group of Arab Mayors acquiesced, although the mayors of the towns directly affected by the confiscations continued to promote the action, alongside the Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands and the Communist Party. The state then moved from pressure on Palestinian leadership, to government employees, including teachers, whom they threatened with the label ‘agitators’ and the loss of their jobs for joining the strike. The authorities then directed their pressure to the communities, themselves, to whom they framed the organisers as a threat to the state, and thus to the safety and security of the villages. However, the plan continued to move forward. As the hours grew closer, at 6:00 pm on the 29\textsuperscript{th} of March, the larger villages of the Galilee were placed under a blanket curfew; and Sakhnin, Arrabeh and Dayr Hanna were directly targeted and surrounded by the Israeli military. More than 4000 officers, tactical units, and even a helicopter brigade were called to break the strike, and the struggle along with it. Clashes broke out between the activists and the military forces and before 9:00 pm on the evening of the 29\textsuperscript{th}, Arrabeh saw its first Palestinian casualty; and by the end of the strike-day, six others had died (3 girls and 3 boys). 300 more were gravely injured, and thousands arrested. March 30\textsuperscript{th} has been commemorated as ‘Yom al-Ard’ (‘Land Day’) ever since, and the political ramifications of the first national Palestinian-citizen action against the state still reverberate, today.

As Miari (2012) explains:

“This was a new stage in the relationship between the Arabs and the state, one we paid for in victims and in blood. The situation of the Arabs before and after Land Day was different. Yom Al-Ard became a national day of struggle for Palestinian people and Arabs inside Israel; and I even heard of some people who are not Arabs or Palestinians who celebrate it. It became a symbol, one that we accepted. But how to celebrate it and how to maintain its meaning is something we couldn’t resolve...”

Miari points to Land Day as a watershed in time, in consciousness, and in national imaginations. However, it also marks a physical encounter between state and citizens and a line drawn in the sand between Jewish and Arab space, as much as Jewish and Arab relations. Land-Day became a crossroads in the Palestinian experience of the state, as well as the state’s experience of its citizens, particularly in the way struggle and hegemonic structures of power have been shaped by spatial relations in the Galilee. This is most evident in the explosion of protests after Land Day, and the decades that followed in which the community refused to

\textsuperscript{122} This is alluded to in several sections of Koenig’s (1976) Report, as well (see p.197 & 198 for details).
acquiesce to state interventions on land jurisdiction and appropriation (Yiftachel, 1992; 1997). However, it is also evident in the way the story of Land-Day is told and re-told, as a moment bound-up in what came before and what came after. For 30 years, land, dignity and blood had been expropriated by the state, in direct actions against the Galilee’s Palestinian inhabitants. Land Day marks the first major collective drive against this process; a moment of direct struggle, evolving from decades of the community building its capacity to resist the state’s plans for the north.

**Yisrael Koenig and the New Judaisation Trajectory**

Prior to the 1976 plans, discussed above, the settlement focus had been on segmenting the internal Palestinian space, and severing its physical ties with the still volatile border areas, as well as establishing a territorial hold on those properties ‘emptied’ of their Palestinian inhabitants in 1948. The majority of these ‘human frontiers’ were established either on the borders, or inside areas already heavily populated by Jews, and previously outlined as part of the ‘Jewish state’ in the 1947 UN Partition Plan (Falah, 1989)\(^\text{123}\). Although, as discussed above, some Jewish development towns appeared within the core areas of Palestinian settlement in the 1950s and 1960s, the state’s primary focus was on segregation and containment; as well as entrenching the Galilee Palestinians’ political, social and economic dependence on the Israeli state (Sadi, 2003; Zureik, 1976; Raja Khalidi, 1988; among others). However, the same dense Arab demographic that had primarily kept the state at the ‘borders’ of the Galilee, had begun to promote a growing fear in Jerusalem. The increasingly confident northern leadership and their claims to Palestinian nationality and liberation was seen as an internal threat, with the space they inhabited a geopolitical link to the belligerent Arab states that surrounded a vulnerable Jewish territory (Kipnis, 1984; Koenig, 1976). The planning documents pay tribute to this fear – as does Koenig’s Memorandum – as the state attempted to reproduce the siege-methodology of bombardment, infiltration and erasures that had been imposed on the coast and the ‘Mixed Cities’.

‘Land Day’ forced the state to contend with a direct challenge coming from the Palestinian space; a challenge that for the first time seemed it would not be restrainable with pure coercion. As a result, the state temporarily withdrew, cancelling the planned expropriations and returning the lands intended for the new military zone, to their owners. In Koenig’s document (which was written in two parts, before and after the events of March 30\(^\text{th}\)), Land Day brought the ‘ticking demographic time bomb’ into sharp relief. In the second part, he

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\(^{123}\) For a map of the Partition Plan, see Appendix 3.1
begins to outline a new approach in the quest for Jewish penetration and dispersion within the Palestinian landscape. In his view, the state could no longer contain the political threat, just as it could not allow the demographic threat to grow, unchecked:

“The absolute unity of the Arab population that was attained on the ‘Day of the Land’ and the deep rift created between the Arab and Jewish sectors was a historic achievement for the organizers. This rift had and will have in the future grave expressions in the Arab and Jewish populations alike. Needless to say, it will be well exploited by a hostile factor.” (Koenig, 1976, p.199)

This document is striking as a first sign-post for how Judaisation would inevitably be shaped in the Galilee; and how the direct encounter with Palestinian dissidence directed this path. Koenig’s pre-Land Day sections continue to reproduce the thinking that created Karmiel and Upper Nazareth (where Koenig lived), wherein ‘infiltration’ was seen to be key to subduing “the agitators”. Post-Land Day, he promotes a policy to de-link the Jewish community from the Arab ‘sectors’, particularly Arab-labour, which he believes has made the state and Jewish society vulnerable to such actions. He says:

“a significant impression was felt in plants and services as a result of the strike by proving the dependence of the smooth operation of the economy on Arab hands. Parallel to that, dependency of the Jewish-run economy on them has been proven to the Arab population. Even this is exploited, and will be in the future, for the sake of feeding the "Arab back-straightening", which the Arabs of Israel must exploit.” (ibid, p. 199)

Koenig’s focus shifts from altering the Northern demographic order to marginalisation of the Palestinian political threat to the Zionist project. His ethos of segregation offers the first glimmer of what has become status quo, in a current reading of the Galilee map; he articulates what connotes a realisation that the Zionist hegemony would not be able to re-shape and re-articulate itself around or on top of the Palestinian space. Despite an ongoing rhetoric to transform the Arab space, Land Day evoked a very different encounter between ‘the Galilee’ and the state’s Judaising logic: the state no longer sought to outright conquer the frontier, but to cut it out from the hegemonic centre; to create a physical and political enclave that is separate from and yet completely surrounded by the Jewish core. Thereafter, the evolving Palestinian struggle for land and space in the Galilee clashes against the constriction of space, physically and politically, shaped more by an ever-increasing marginalisation of the Arab-Galilee than by the actual practice of Jewish infiltration into Palestinian space.

This argument is flushed out in the present chapter, despite the difficulty in peeling back the layers of rhetoric inherent in the land politics of both the state and the Galilee’s politicised

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124 See for example Ben Simon’s (2013) analysis of the state’s 2013 policy-plans for Jewish urban development in the Galilee for al-Monitor.
residents. Despite the state’s public charges of a demographic threat in the Galilee, and despite a Palestinian leadership pointing to life under siege, in practice, the Galilee tells a different story. Land Day changed the game, re-shaping the dialectic between struggle and power, in which resistance – even if more radical – is not in the street, and no longer acute, direct, jubilant and urgent; and wherein, state interventions, violence and force are limited to the borders and to an everyday domination that is remote, even if always present. The existential, popular struggle embodied in Land Day has been re-directed to other arenas and other discourses.

Today, Land Day is remembered in a series of annual events that include lectures, performances, art shows and public discussions in the days and weeks leading up to March 30th. Its focal event is a march along the highway that stretches from Dayr Hanna to Sakhnin. The walk takes you past the cemetery that houses the youths killed in 1976, as well as those murdered in October, 2000 at an all-too-similar protest action. On March 30th, 2012 (and again in 2013), I joined the march to Sakhnin. A simultaneous demonstration was set in the Naqab to link Land Day with the Bedouins’ struggle against the Prawer Plan; and another took place in Jaffa, the next day, to spotlight the expanding siege against the Mixed Cities (which I also attended).

As I walked the long stretch of highway between Dayr Hanna and Sakhnin, on Land Day in 2012, some of these thoughts about the ambivalent nature of the struggle had already begun to reverberate in my mind. Crossing from one village to the next with two activist friends of mine, through the lands that should have been expropriated in 1976, we walked alongside hundreds of others. The language of the road was Arabic; signs, banners, slogans and songs devoted to a Palestinian identity and place. The Palestinian flag was everywhere, even in the colours of faces and clothing, all red, green, black and white. However, we were silent, downtrodden as we walked. The energy, in general, was not electric, not celebratory, unlike what I was expecting. It wasn’t even sufficiently angry or righteous. Most people walked in silence, like my friends and I, and there was a general air of disillusionment (unlike the demonstration I would attend the next day in Jaffa). Perhaps this was because of the tensions that had been aroused that morning: A moratorium on partisan party symbols – an order that had been agreed on by the High Follow Up Committee, through the consensus of its members – had been broken as the Communist, Nationalist and Islamic parties turned up with flags and

125 Many of the 13 activists shot in the October 2000 events were from Sakhnin and the surrounding Arab localities. Further discussion of the significance of this event for Galilee Palestinians appears, below.
banners. The result was a schism, in which the Nationalists headed to Arrabeh, for the culmination of their march, and the rest were headed to Sakhnin. Or, perhaps it was because of the disappointment of the crowd in the increasingly low turn-out that these events inspired in the Galilee. Or even more likely, in line with the depiction given by one of my interlocutors, Suhad Bishara (2012)\textsuperscript{126}, a legal advocate and expert on the land and planning regimes in Israel, Land Day has become a symbol of what was lost; not the land, or the right to self-determination, but the direct act of struggle itself. As she put it, “I feel bad when I go to Land Day and sometimes I decide not to go because this is what we do; and the rest of the year we do nothing. And to me, this is not how you run the struggle, over your rights, your lands, even your memory.” (Bishara, 2012)

The Galilee – ‘Painting By The Numbers’

As is the case with all of Israel’s physical and political boundaries, the Galilee’s ‘borders’ are both elastic and fixed. They morph through the imaginations of the Palestinians who live inside, and the state, which sits primarily outside; but are also officially marked and organised according to master plans and jurisdictional lines. These evolving demarcations have made it difficult to determine which map constitutes ‘the Galilee’ for this research. This paradox has not been entirely resolved in this chapter, even as it offers important insight into the Judaisation logic at work here and to the relevance of ‘demographics’ to the trajectories of power and resistance in this space (and throughout Israeli-controlled territories).

The first clue can be found in Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), where there is a lack of disaggregated statistical data for the ‘Galilee’. Whereas the Galilee is considered one of 5 distinct natural regions, jurisdictions are drawn to conflate the multiple subdivisions of the Northern Region, making it difficult to analyse the area on its own. Israel’s Northern jurisdiction winds its way north from Acre to the Jordan Valley, and includes parts of the Upper, Western and Eastern Galilee, as well as the Golan Heights, the Hula Valley and the Western Coastal Area. Haifa, which sits on the western edge of the Galilee Mountains, is excluded from this configuration, although it is the regional urban and economic centre, in so far as the major industries and services of the region are located in Haifa\textsuperscript{127}. The region’s sub-districts – by which budgets, councils and plans are determined – diverge and converge the geographic zones and border-lines of the Galilee. Simply put, areas that are primarily

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\textsuperscript{126} Suhad Bishara works for Adalah, a human rights organisation that develops legal advocacy with/on behalf of Palestinian citizens of Israel.

\textsuperscript{127} As an interesting statistical aside, Haifa has been incorporated into the Haifa District, which includes the Wadi Ara region of the ‘Little Triangle’, an area with another dense Palestinian majority.
‘Palestinian’ are carved up, integrated with primarily Jewish districts to skew the demographic fact-sheet (Wesley, 2013; see also Falah, 1989 and Newman, 1984). The mapping and re-mapping of the Galilee, in conjunction with the land regime that has legalised this process, is orchestrated according to the fundamental Zionist colonial logic that anchors its legitimacy in territorial control. Thus, the establishment of settlements, municipal and regional councils, the outlines of towns and the infrastructure to connect and develop them, are ever-concerned with the need to establish Jewish sovereignty over space and over land; the traditional tools of which integrate the use of law and planning, with physical, territorial presence (Newman, 1984; Rinat, 2013; Ben Simon, 2013). However, the Galilee, particularly its centre-core, is a conundrum to Zionist geographers, planners and bureaucrats who must contend with the large concentration of Arabs inhabiting the region (43% of Israel’s Palestinian population live in the Northern District (CBS, 2014)). This has made it difficult to recruit and sustain Jewish presence and the fait accompli associated with permanent settlement; although not for a lack of trying (Falah, 1989; Kipnis, 1984). Such a concentration has been understood and treated as the essential demographic and territorial threat to the integrity of the Jewish state since Israel’s establishment (Pappé, 2011; Falah, 1989). With the failure to consolidate Jewish physical settlement in this space, other discursive and planning practices have been implemented to give off the illusion of the politically desired ‘demographic balance’, a ratio of Jews to Arabs that currently stands at 43 to 57 (CBS, 2014).

When we begin to unravel the statistical veil, a different – and confusing – truth is revealed. As Falah points out, in “taking only the natural areas associated directly with Galilee proper, one finds an Arab population of 270,300 in 1986, or 73 percent of the total population.” (Falah, 1989, p.70) Current statistics for the Central Galilee region to which Falah is referring, still incorporates a 75% Arab majority (Wesley, 2013). The area, which stretches from the border with Lebanon in the north, to the edge of the Jisreel Valley in the south (where the Little Triangle/Wadi Ara Region begins), and flanked to the West by Haifa and to the East by the Jordan River Valley, and includes the cities of Nazareth, Sakhnin, Tamra and Kafr Kanna, has no distinct jurisdiction attached to it. Instead it spans multiple sub-divisions of Israel’s northern territory, thereby giving much credence to assertions that a statistical

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128 See the map included as Appendix 3.7 to this thesis, for a clear depiction of the skewed statistical divisions of the Northern District of Israel.
129 As with most statistics on the Galilee, this number is inconsistent; for example, the Galilee Society (2006) claims that 53.7% of Palestinian citizens of Israel live in the Northern District.
illusion has been developed to skew the demographic reality (Falah, 1989; Newman, 1984; Kipnis, 1984; and Wesley, 2013). The state’s reasoning behind the misrepresentation can be further understood through the planning policies and changing Judaisation approaches to the area. The point of this seems to be to embed the immediacy of the Arab-demographic threat within the Jewish-national discourse; yet one that is containable through the mobilisation of Jewish settlement to the north (Falah, 1989).

This picture of the Galilee is inherent to the mapping of struggle in this chapter. The spatial matrix of this frontier is both fluid and fixed. Resistance to the Judaisation of land and space, likewise, exists in multiple places, and challenges multiple fixed and fluid lines. Unlike in the Jaffa case, there is no singular, cohesive story of struggle in the Galilee, making it difficult to decide what to include and what to exclude. However, collectively, these multiple resistances point to their battle with the boundaries drawn around life in the Galilee. These are best understood through the physical expression of the colonial geography of the northern region: There is a dense centre-core of Palestinian ‘rural-urban space’, dotted and primarily surrounded by Jewish settlements. The further out you go, the more Jewish the space, with the Western coast and Eastern regions of the Galilee inhabited by a near-total Jewish population, as with the towns of Safed, Nahariya, and Tiberias (CBS, 2014). Historical and present-day maps and plans for the area depict the reality of constriction and containment130. This is not an abstract policy and practice, exclusively devised and enforced from top-down. Instead, it has evolved as a particularised and localised response to Palestinian citizens of the Galilee and resistance against the community’s disbursal and enclosure. The case is therefore explored through an analysis of resistance within this core, as it comes into contact with the colonial map, in physical, virtual and imagined spaces. It is in these encounters, on the shared borders of Jewish and Palestinian space, where Palestinian resistance clashes with the structures of power; where hegemony may be unveiled and disarticulated, and struggle potentially becomes unruly, transgressive, and even transformative.

**The Galilee Ghosts**

The current story of Palestinian resistance in the Galilee is embedded in the legacy of the last 65 years, in a series of ghostly imprints that have inscribed the Palestinian enclave, as contained and excluded, dependent and subaltern, separate and surrounded. The first ghost, the Palestinian Nakba, was launched with a series of Zionist military campaigns between December 1947 and October 28th, 1948. These campaigns were implemented, primarily,
under the frame of *Plan Dalet*, an overarching military programme of conquest and destruction aimed at consolidating Jewish-Zionist control of the Northern coastal territory. The Plan, which was finalised by the *Haganah* in March, 1948, is considered a blueprint of the Zionist expulsion programme (Robinson, 2013; Pappé, 2006; Khalidi, 1988). Like many ambiguous components of Zionist hegemony, the plan did not give express instructions to ethnically cleanse the landscape. However, it directly instructed field officers to de-populate any villages that ‘resisted’ the invading armies, leaving it up to individual soldiers to determine what constituted resistance (Robinson, 2013, p.26). Implementation of the Plan ended with the capture of the Northern District and the abrupt emptying of 56% of the Palestinian population of the area, although still claiming the highest concentration of Palestinians, after the 1948 war (Falah, 1989, 2003; S. Jiryis, 1976).

The major urban centres of Haifa, Acre, Nazareth, Tiberias, and Safed, saw the largest exodus of their Palestinian residents (Falah, 1989). However, the focus of the state’s de-Arabization programme in the north was on the western, eastern and southern parts of the map. Of the 158 Arab towns and villages destroyed in the Galilee in 1948, only 9 were from the Central Galilee Mountain range (Morris, 1987; Wesley, 2013); and of the 70 Arab localities left intact after the war, 51 were from the Acre-Nazareth corridor in the Central Galilee (Kamen, 1987). On top of these destroyed and empty places, the state set about filling the vacuum of Arab-space with new, mainly agricultural, Jewish settlements. According to Falah (1989), 117 development towns and villages were created, “both to absorb as quickly as possible the influx of Jewish immigrants and to create a fait accompli that would prevent the return of the former inhabitants who had either been expelled from the new state altogether or were ‘homeland refugees’ inside the armistice lines.” (p.73) Thus, when the still ‘open wound’ of land confiscations are discussed in the Galilee, this is, in practice, a reference to the way Judaisation played out along this internal frontier.

The second ghost takes form in the military administration that lasted from 1949 to 1966, and its integration with the first physical markers of the Judaisation project in the Galilee. In the first decade, policy-actions were aimed at consolidating Zionist-land gains on the coast and the planting of Jewish settlements along the northern and eastern borders. Additional Palestinian villages were declared closed military zones, their populations emptied and transferred to other villages and urban centres. This explains how Nazareth, which lost 20%

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131 Nearly all interlocutors of this thesis paraphrase this conceptualisation of the Nakba and subsequent land-appropriations as a ‘still open wound’.
of its population in 1948, mushroomed from 14,000 in 1945 to more than 20,000 residents in 1951 (Palestine Remembered, accessed 2013). Each village was segregated and contained, with movement, development, and expansion expressly limited. As a result of the new land regime, any agricultural resources outside the newly segregated space were no longer accessible, and no longer belonged to them. The majority of the village residents were forced into wage-earning labour, encouraging the inevitable shift from peasant to proletariat-based economies in the north (Zureik, 1976). At the same time, the state constructed a planning ‘wall’ around the villages, similar to the ‘slum clearing’ label attached to Ajami. No new buildings, infrastructure or industries received permits, budgets or support from the state. While the population tripled in size, the boundaries remained unchanged.

The binding of Palestinian space remained intact, long after the lifting of the military regime, through increasingly sophisticated legal and planning policies, and through the internalisation and reproduction of those limits by the users of the space, themselves. As Zureik (1976) explains, the legacy of this period is both the colonial creation of village-ghettos, and the close-knit, self-reliant communities that survived the military regime. After the lifting of the military cordon, residents relied on these networks, retaining their homes and relations in the villages, despite finding work in Jewish and other Arab townships (Falah, 1989). While this can also be understood as part of the local practice of Sumud against the siege of Arab space, the retrenchment of internal refugees offers some different insights. Those who had resettled in other Arab localities in the region “were even less inclined to uproot themselves once again and migrate to urban centres.” (ibid, p.75)

These are the kinds of bonds that create dense, impenetrable living spaces, cultivating real networks of resilience, survival, and inevitably, resistance. These are the networks that bloomed in 1975 and 1976, leading to the first municipal election win by a non-Zionist party in Nazareth, and the capacity to organise a nation-wide strike on Land Day. Cut away from the outside world, these communities developed their own internal systems of survival. After 18 years, even the movement of Jews into this territory could not intervene in the creation of new geographic and political orbits, around which to direct their claims and alliances.

The third ghost is the shifting planning regime, and the cultivation of a new container for Palestinian growth and development to replace the military administration (Robinson, 2014). If the first decades after the establishment of the state were the years of “judicial land redemption”, in which the Zionist hegemony of land use and ownership were ordered and effected through the creation of new laws, then the years following the military regime could
be seen as a “first phase of planning and bureaucratic land redemption (Yiftachel and Kedar, 2006, p.14)”. The state’s intention was to construct a separate Jewish space within Arab-controlled territories; the seeds of which were sown with the establishment of the Galilee’s Jewish townships during the military administration. However, the Land Day backlash led both the state and the Galilee Palestinians to understand that large-scale expropriations and colonial transformations of the Arab space would no longer be acquiesced to; and would provoke direct, contentious responses from the community. Therefore, in the second wave of planning – post-Koenig – a new methodology for controlling the space came into being. The new plans focused on rapid settlement, in strategic and sensitive frontier areas. These were anchored in a new type of settlement programme based on the Mitzpe (Hilltop or Watch Tower) settlements, conceived on the basis of a plan devised by the Jewish Agency in 1978 (Yiftachel, 1992; Newman, 1984; Hussein and McKay, 2003). These small, partially developed and serviced settlements depended on anywhere from six to 20 family groups to claim physical control of large swathes of territory, in order to prevent and report on their ‘illegal usage’ by Palestinian citizens in the area. In the decade after Land Day, 28 Mitzpe settlements were planned and settled in the Central Galilee (Falah, 1989; Newman, 1984; Kipnis, 1984; Yiftachel, 1992; Abu Hussein & McKay, 2003).

These new settlements had settlers before they had infrastructure. They were created as temporary solutions, without the capacity for sustaining a demographic shift; but it appears as if ‘demography’ was no longer the target. As Newman (1984) explains:

“the planning region for this project was also limited to the central mountains, where the demographic and territorial conflict is sharpest. The outposts are all located on mountain tops, usually overlooking Arab villages and lands. Thus, physical control is exercised over the surrounding region, despite the small number of people involved.” (p.8)

Newman is here reinforcing the argument made above. Judaisation in the Galilee does not manifest in a colonial re-imagination of the internal space, because the state never physically managed to penetrate the space. As a result of this, it needed to develop a methodology for how to control the Galilee from the outside.

A fourth ghost took its shape alongside the Jewish infiltration projects, a complementary planning methodology intent on rigid control of Arab growth and development. The first phase, informed by the Planning and Building Law (1965), determined which space

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132 Further details of the Plan can be found in the table of relevant planning documents in Appendices to this thesis.
133 Expanded details of the Law can be found in the table on the Israeli Land Regime in the Appendices section of this thesis.
‘existed’ and which didn’t. The first National Master Plans, borne out of the new law, mapped and recognised the existence of 123 Arab villages and townships. However, it has been estimated that more than 100 others were left off the map (Payes, 2005). Planning zones were specifically determined and borders entrenched, thereafter, in order to curb any Arab expansion. No Master Plans were developed for these districts, and hence no infrastructure, no green space, no new industries or even new housing. The legacy of these ‘unplanning’ policies is articulated in the massive gap that exists between Jewish and Palestinian local authorities in Israel. For example, there are extensive asymmetries in municipal incomes (in 2006, these were 25% lower than their Jewish counterparts); spatial jurisdictions, wherein less than 2.5% of Israel’s land falls under the control of Palestinian local councils; the level of socio-economic strata, wherein all Arab localities in the Galilee sit in the lowest rung, whereas the majority of the Mitzpe settlements are situated on the 1st and 2nd levels; and in ‘urban’ services like post offices, national insurance offices, emergency services, leisure centres or maintenance of green spaces (Galilee Society, 2006; Banna et al, 2012). The list goes on, but the point is clear: de-development has been a focused programme of the state towards its Arab-spaces, particularly the Galilee. What could not be controlled through direct erasure and replacement was controlled through planning, through intervening in the natural growth of citizens, and through the creation of an urban marginality (Newman, 1984).

This lack of development is then layered into the uncontrolled and illegal construction patterns of the Palestinian inhabitants of the unplanned, unzoned townships. As in Jaffa, this grey-spacing was encouraged. It became yet another method for controlling the space from the distant political centre. As Yacobi (2009) explains, "policy-makers allow urban illegality because it provides an indirect and inexpensive rule of the ‘ungovernable’. The tactic is avoidance and containment from a distance, but the result is the condemnation of large communities to unserviced, deprived and stigmatized urban fringes.” (p.113) As an example, we should consider that there are currently upwards of 40,000 structures in the Northern

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134 According to the CBS survey of Arab citizens in 2008, there are currently 129 Arab localities in Israel; but this number does not include any of the Unrecognised Bedouin villages from the Naqab (CBS, 2009). It should also be noted that since 1948, the state has invested in the creation of over 700 Jewish settlements, whereas, except for the 7 Bedouin townships built to concentrate and remove Bedouin communities from their traditional lands, no new Palestinian settlements have been built since the establishment of the state (Yiftachel & Kedar, 2006).

135 This number refers to the percentage of lands controlled by Palestinian citizens throughout the state; it is not disaggregated for the central Galilee. See discussion below for detailed breakdowns of the Galilee.
By the mid-1980s, the ‘policy moment’ was fully inscribed with what Falah (2003) theorised as the push and pull of the state’s “enclaving and exclaving” project; a spatial apartheid that is maintained through tightening the bounds of Palestinian enclosures (“enclaving”), and segregating them further from their lands by increasing exclusive Jewish hold of their resources (“exclaving”). Two explicit examples speak to this phase in state policy: the creation of the Misgav Regional Council in the centre of the Arab-Galilee in 1982\(^{136}\); and the invention of the Interministerial Commission on Illegal Construction in the Arab Sector in 1985, also known as the Markovitz Committee, after its chairman.

The Misgav Regional Council was proclaimed on October 7th, 1982\(^{137}\). It covered approximately 150,000 dunams of land that had previously been without municipal status, about two-thirds of which was privately owned Palestinian land belonging to residents of 17 Arab villages that sit inside and on its borders (Yiftachel, 1992). The new administrative boundaries were supposedly set in order to create “some territorial contiguity” in the administration of land and services in the area (ibid); although on the Misgav Council’s Homepage, there is also mention of the council’s purpose to protect the land and region from over-urbanisation, a well-known euphemism for maintaining the Judaised frontier against encroachment by the surrounding Arab communities (Misgav Regional Council, 2007).

However, despite the fact that its jurisdiction covers lands that reach across dozens of Palestinian communities, including Sakhnin, Majd el Krum and Tamra\(^{138}\), these are not included in the 37 settlements that make up the council, nor do they have any share in its decision-making powers, budgets, or income-accumulation. The result of this was that an all-Jewish authoritative council gained jurisdiction over everyday and future usage of Arab-lands, and the local Arab owners have no say or representative status within its institutions.

The other side of this policy moment, the Ministerial Commission headed by Yaacov Markovitz, is infamous today for coining the term ‘Unrecognized’ villages. His report also created a new language for those structures built outside the planned zones, and sitting on the

\(^{136}\) A regional council is a unique aspect of Israel’s local governing scheme. They unite geographically dispersed small rural settlements and have jurisdiction over the entire territorial expanse that surrounds and includes those settlements (although the presence of other local authorities sometimes results in the regional council having expanses of territory that are not contiguous); but they function as local authorities, in light of the fact that settlements included within their boundaries do not have their own separate councils (Wesley, 2013).

\(^{137}\) For a map of the Misgav Regional Council, see Appendix 3.8 of this thesis.

\(^{138}\) Each of these localities are discussed as integral sites for the struggle over land and space in the Galilee, in this chapter.
margins of the legal, built space, which he called ‘grey buildings’. The Markovitz Report became a call to arms, geared towards controlling the unauthorized expansion of Palestinian villages. Moreover, in the case of Bedouin villages and neighbourhoods – of which there were dozens in the Northern District– it called for removing them altogether.139 The concerted efforts of the state in following the report’s recommendations (the demolition of all grey buildings in the Galilee), literally shook the Galilee from the late 1980s into the mid-1990s, with more than 1440 demolitions taking place between 1993 and 1996 (Payes, 2005)140.

These policies, combined with the government programmes, discussed above, begin to outline a clear picture of the legacy of the state in its contact with the dense Palestinian space: to control, contain and weaken Palestinian economic and political development, as much as possible, while bolstering Jewish infrastructure, jurisdiction and economic bases. Moreover, the trajectories of these policies continue to resonate in today’s Galilee. There are still massive gaps between Jewish and Arab localities in this region; there is deep retrenchment within the walls of the Misgav, to protect the land from Palestinian invaders; there are no Master Plans, minimal investment and almost no growth in the Arab sector, but Industrial Zones in the Jewish sector are flourishing. This is the essence of regional relations today, and the world in which and against which the current struggle is cultivated.

The fifth and final ghost is the particular internalisation of the October 2000 events - the community’s most violent confrontation with the state since Land Day – among the Palestinian public in the Galilee. The significance of October 2000 was not merely the death of 13 Palestinian citizens at the hands of the police, who fired live ammunition into demonstrations; or the violence of the attacks on them by their Jewish neighbours; or even their own community’s eruption as angst and anger drove them to riot in the streets. It was, ultimately, the system’s lack of justice that promulgated the community’s still unresolved anger and responding retrenchment, away from ‘state infused spaces’ (Naamnih, 2011; Cook, 2012a). The state’s investigation into the October events – outlined in an 831 page report by

139 The story of the Northern Bedouin villages is outside the scope of this thesis, as they have a very different trajectory to those of the Naqab. Their struggle became a cohesive campaign with the establishment of the Association of 40 in 1978. Their primary activities took place during the 1980s and their main goals were achieved by 1992: eight unrecognised villages in the North were recognised and many neighbourhoods and small localities were incorporated into Palestinian jurisdictions. For more details, see Yiftachel (1992) and Payes (2005).
140 This should be compared to the Naqab case, in which more than 1000 demolitions per annum have been reported since the Prawer Plan was announced in 2010; additional discussion of these demolitions is spotlighted in Chapter Four.
the *Or Commission of Inquiry*\(^{141}\) – led to almost no conclusive recommendations regarding the killings, and those seen as its main instigators – i.e. then Prime Minister Ehud Barak, then Minister of Internal Security, Shlomo Ben Ami, Commander of the Northern District, Alik Ron, and then Commander of the Border Police, Benzi Sau; as well as nine named police officers (out of a possible thousand) – were treated with relative impunity\(^{142}\) (Adalah, 2003).

While the Commission notes in the report that the police used excessive violence, acknowledging a long history of hostile actions by police against Palestinian citizens (Or Commission Summary Report, 2003), it also concludes that the police’s actions were “an inappropriate reaction to unprecedented riots” (Or Commission Report, quoted in Adalah, 2003), of being unprepared for a situation of extreme pressure and danger (Or Commission Summary Report, 2003); rather than seeing the riots as a response to the violence and pressuring presence of the police. Moreover, although the investigators saw a direct link between the ongoing marginalisation and discrimination experienced by the ‘Arab sector’ by the Israeli state and Jewish society, and the violent eruptions of the Arab communities in October 2000, blame for the event was placed on the shoulders of members of the Arab leadership. Specifically, Azmi Bishara (founder and then head of the National Democratic Assembly) and Raed Salad (head of the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement\(^{143}\)) were accused of catalysing and propagating violence among their constituencies, while instigating anti-Zionist political messages, “constituting a threat to Jewish citizens… and blurring the line more than once, between the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria and the Arab citizens of the state.” (*ibid*, p.2)

In this statement, the state articulates the schism it had constructed with its Arab citizens since 1948. The line they draw is between state and citizens, with Palestinians, inside and

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\(^{141}\) *The State Commission of Inquiry into the Clashes Between Security Forces and Israeli Civilians* (and the report it produced), which was appointed by then Supreme Court President Aharon Barak in November, 2000, was dubbed ‘the Or Commission’, after its lead investigator, Supreme Court Justice Theodor Or (Adalah, 2003). The Commission’s conclusions and recommendations were based on 92 public hearings, through which 435 testimonies were heard from 377 witnesses (some of whom were called to the stand more than once); 4,289 exhibits were brought before the court, and the protocol of the hearings is over 16,000 pages long (Ettinger, 2003).

\(^{142}\) Even those whom the Or Commission held responsible for the October events, and whom it recommended against their being able to hold future positions of command or attaining promotions still did so; for example Alik Ron, who the Commission said was responsible for live fire by sharpshooters in Umm al-Fahm and should be barred from holding any top administrative position (Or Commission Report Summary, 2003) joined the political ranks of the Centrist Kadima Party in 2010 (Hoffman, 2010).

\(^{143}\) The NDA (Tajamo, in Arabic; Balad, in Hebrew) was founded by A. Bishara in 1995 and attained its first Knesset seat in 1996 (as part of a combined list with other Arab parties). Its platform – to create a ‘State for all its Citizens’ - and political significance are discussed more comprehensively, below. The Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement, one of two branches of the Islamic political stream in Israel, is also discussed extensively below.
outside, an endemic physical and political threat to ‘Jewish citizens’ and to ‘the Jewish state’. As many interlocutors to this thesis explained, this moment informed the final shift, in which a new politics of disengagement fully takes hold. That said, it is clear from the imprints of the previous ghosts that this moment merely articulated a process that had been evolving for nearly six decades.

A. Bishara (2001), writes similarly, that the violence of the police, and the clashes between Jews and Palestinians, merely accentuated and highlighted the truth of the enclave. Not just in terms of the racism that was unmasked in the orders to kill Arab demonstrators, but in the experience and practice of a separate, alienated and territorialised entity. At the same time, while it may not have been sudden, like Land Day before it, October 2000 shifted the trajectory of struggle in the region. The tools, the language, the claims and even the political targets shift as the ghosts of 2000 cemented the gap between the Galilee – the all-Arab-space – and the Jewish-Zionist hegemonic order.

**The Matrix of Power and Struggle in the Galilee**

As discussed in previous chapters, the Zionist production of space is inherently violent. Its core ethos is the colonisation of indigenous space, through its de-legitimisation, erasure and replacement. Moreover, a particular history of persecution and migration has internalised what Yiftachel (2008) calls an “ethnic colonialism of survival”, a totalising mission in which all land, all territory, all space must be articulated as Jewish. Jewish monuments, maps, symbols, and bodies – legitimised through law, planning and its own hegemonic narratives – are used to ethnicize and establish complete sovereignty of the territory, without the presence of or disruptions by the native population. Palestinian space is, thus, a constant target, a frontier zone, ever under siege (Rabinowitz, 2001); to be penetrated, disbursed, transformed. However, looking at the Palestinian world within the Galilee today, the weakened, disempowered, de-legitimised subaltern is missing. Instead, we find a densely inhabited and, in demographic terms, nearly homogenous territory, with its own internal systems of governance and leadership. There is a strong civil society, driving a highly politicized and professional challenge to Jewish hegemony within the space. There is a growing economic sector and a middle class of intellectual and political elites. These elite are at the helm of calls for separation from and boycott of the Zionist state institutions, and of an aggressive campaign for international intervention in the system of occupation and oppression within the

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144 This argument is also supported in an array of secondary sources, for example in Bishara (2001), Jamal (2011), Ghanem (2010) and Pappé (2011).
state. Moreover, on the surface, at least in the central Galilee, we don’t see Jews. We don’t see their flags, their symbols, their heroes. We barely even see their language except on public-buildings and street signs, which are often graffitied over and replaced by hand-painted signs in Arabic. Judaisation, in its attempted siege of Palestinian space, seems to have receded, here. The goals of Judaisation – to establish a demographic majority, to appropriate all Palestinian land, to fragment Palestinian identity, to sever Palestinian ties and claims to the area, and even the isolation and control of Palestinian growth and development – have, in large part, failed in the Galilee (Falah, 1989).

At the same time, a deeper analysis reveals a planning regime that tightly controls the spatial and economic development of Arab villages and urban neighbourhoods (Falah, 1989; Yiftachel, 1992; Banna et al, 2012; Wesley, 2013). For example, the Nazareth municipality is engaged in an endless number of planning requests to expand beyond its current jurisdictions. Until 2012, every one of them had been refused, as buildings get taller and the congested space feels increasingly ghettoised and dense with human bodies (Jaraysi, 2012; Human Rights Lawyer, 2011)\textsuperscript{145}. There is also an abundant amount of illegal structures marking the greyed space of the northern localities; their ‘legality’ is unresolved and yet the state continues to collect fines that de facto accept their (non)existence. As mentioned above, there are few green spaces, almost no service-based infrastructure, and few leisure compounds - although the latter is changing, but not due to any increase in investment by the state or majority sector. Most main arteries, public transport infrastructure (trains) and public utilities (pipe lines) cross directly through Arab towns and agricultural lands; the contiguity of the space clearly and intentionally broken through the blatant misuse of the \textit{Acquisition for Public Purposes Law} (1964)\textsuperscript{146}, which allows the state to confiscate land for ‘the sake of the public good’. By an apparent coincidence, Palestinian lands are most often targeted for this purpose, whereas such public features physically circumvent, but still service, Jewish towns, regional councils and gated communities (Shbeta, 2012; Y. Jabareen, 2011; Manna, 2012).

While land ownership is no longer contested, and the majority of property is in fact owned by the Palestinians that live there, land is almost entirely controlled by the state. The significance

\textsuperscript{145} Yosef Jabareen (2011), a Palestinian academic, geographer and planner, discusses the problem of space in Nazareth, through a comparison with Upper Nazareth: In Nazareth, 80,000 people share 15,000 dunam of land (or less than a ¼ dunam per person); in Upper Nazareth, a population of about 40,000 share 40,000 dunam of land (or 1 dunam per person).

\textsuperscript{146} The Law referenced here is an amendment to the Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance, outlined in the appendices to this thesis, as a major contributor to the transfer of Palestinian-owned private lands to the state.
of this is discussed by Shadi Shbeta\textsuperscript{147}, in his explanation of what has happened to his own land, in Yafa an-Naseriyye, which was confiscated in the establishment of the Jewish Development Town of Migdal HaEmek, in 1953\textsuperscript{148}:

“I still have land here, on the Migdal HaEmek side. What does this mean? It means that if I want to build a house on the land, I can’t. I need permission from Migdal HaEmek. I can only use it for agriculture. But if Migdal HaEmek manages to take the land from me, they will probably turn it into an industrial zone. Anyway that I could put the land to use, to make money, is not allowed.”

In the Galilee, there is a large gap between possessing and controlling land. To own land is not enough, if you do not have the autonomy to develop or build on it. As Shbeta contends, the planning and land regime have been orchestrated specifically to prevent this. This is further highlighted in the jurisdictions of the Misgav Council; in the fact that 70% of land in the Galilee belong to the Mitzpe communities; and in the fact that Upper Nazareth’s Industrial Zone (Zipporit) was built on Arab lands expropriated for public use, and yet pays its taxes to the Upper Nazareth municipality (Wesley, 2013; Shbeta, 2012).

Adding to the control mechanisms, there are constant physical reminders of state-surveillance, albeit on the frontiers of local authorities and jurisdictions. The message is that of external control, on the periphery of Arab-space. This practice is highlighted in the fact that inter and intra village-violence, including ‘Price Tag\textsuperscript{149}’ actions in the area, rarely see police intervention or protection. However, this doesn’t prevent immense police presence – and often brutality – at political rallies and demonstrations, as these are perceived as threats against the state and its Jewish citizens\textsuperscript{150}; an act of violence that transgresses the ‘borders’ of Palestinian space. Moreover, while there is a dearth of Jewish numbers, there is no lack of Jews leading the planning councils, the regional and district authorities, state-level ministries,

\textsuperscript{147} As mentioned in the introduction, in addition to guiding me through the Central Galilee, Shbeta is the personal assistant of MK Hanna Swaid, a representative from the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE). The DFPE (Hadash in Hebrew) is an Arab-Jewish political party that was formed in 1977, out of a consolidation of the Communist Party and other, non-partisan groups.

\textsuperscript{148} Yafa an-Naseriyye is a small village situated on the periphery of Nazareth City.

\textsuperscript{149} The term ‘Price Tag’ (Tag Mechir in Hebrew) generally refers to acts of vandalism directed against Palestinian citizens and residents of Israeli controlled territories by Jewish extremists seeking retribution for state policies seen to be instigated against the settlement infrastructure in the West Bank and inside Israel. Examples include burning and cutting down olive trees, spraypainting Palestinian property with racist slogans, desecrating mosques and cemeteries, slashing tires, etc... For additional details, any number of media sources can be consulted, including Corbin (2012), Booth & Egflash (2013) and Hasson (2015). For more direct discussion of Price Tag attacks inside Israel (including the arson of a bilingual school in Jerusalem in 2014), see for example Prusher (2014), Hasson (2012) and Ashkenazi (2014).

\textsuperscript{150} This was the case with the November, July and August 2013 ‘Days of Rage’ against the Prawer Plan, throughout the Arab ‘enclaves’ of the country.
and the local councils that sit on the highest strata of Israel’s socio-economic ladder, behind walls that are institutionally protected against Arab encroachments.

The colonial geography of the Galilee seems to stop at the edges of Palestinian space, supporting Falah’s (2003) theorisation of ‘enclaving/exclaving’, mentioned above. His metaphor brings to mind the active and on-going practice of creating segregated, closed and confined spaces – a ghettoization of Palestinian communities within the territory of the Zionist-state. These enclaves are neither autonomous, nor are they part of the state. Wacquant (2007) describes the same process as the cultivation of an advanced marginality, concentrating the ‘unwanted other’ into isolated and bounded territories, the purgatories of the state. Far from acting as a protective shield, the Galilee is constructed as an alienated space, whose perimeter is paroled and maintained as a way to contain its violence. This is akin to what Zayyad (1976) called the state’s “Chinese Shoes Policy”; a policy whose central goal “is to impose retardation on Arab villages and towns, freezing their development, embittering and impoverishing their life, to weaken any influence they may have on the political or economic life of Israel.” (p.99)

In both Falah’s (2003) and Zayyad’s (1976) depictions of the enclaving process, the impact of the clash between the Judaisation project and the dense Arab space is underestimated; in this thesis, a different lens is incorporated. The process by which the enclave has been entrenched is inherently tied to the community’s struggle to retain and retrench a Palestinian place in the Galilee. As a natural paradox of the ethnicized hegemonic paradigm, in which the ‘other’ is always outside, always subaltern and always a threat, the community mobilised its own collective discourse, its own civil leadership and territorial grid. Despite efforts to subsume and reshape the Galilee as part of or at least subordinate to the Zionist project, an increasingly self-confident and politically organised Palestinian community has kept the state at bay (Falah, 1989, 2003; Swaid, 2012). Its resilience dislodged and dislocated the basic tenets of Judaisation: that the land, through settlement, is redeemed as part of the Zionist project; that the democratic infrastructure of the state enshrines the control of its institutions by a Jewish majority; that the Palestinian-minority can be ‘Israelised’ and the indigenous-identity erased from the space. Within this space, a new ‘geography of resistance’ (Y. Jabareen, 2011) is produced, away from the daily siege on Arab lives and symbols that occurs in other parts of the country. In this space, according to Jonathan Cook (2012a), a journalist living in Nazareth for the last 10 years, a new centre can be imagined, without the state, its institutions, its language and narratives.
At the same time, as Areej Sabbagh-Khoury (2011), a researcher at Mada al Carmel\textsuperscript{151}, explains, the construction of the enclave, whether from inside or outside, has suited the colonial outline, as it seeks to segregate Jewish and Arab spaces:

“If I write about space in Palestine, I would write about an apartheid system, because the space, when you go from a Jewish town to a Jewish town, without having to pass through an Arab town; this is part of the apartheid system. They are building more roads to connect the Jewish places, with no need to enter the Arab villages. In this way, the state can also split the Jewish consciousness, so the Jewish people don’t know what’s going on here. If you don’t see the Arabs, you conceal them. You ‘disappear’ them from the space.”

In Scott’s (2009) discussion of ‘ungovernable’ spaces, he argues that there are no naturally determined spatial-havens left in this world. Thus, the development of seemingly self-reliant spaces necessarily services the logic and governing needs of the state. In enclaving the all-Arab space, the state, and its hegemonic project, is protected from the link to a Palestinian threat, to its nationalist ideology, its claims, its narratives and its indigeneity. So long as this space is enclosed, separate, and segregated, it can be made redundant to the Zionist project.

As discussed above, it can be (and is) cut away from the centre (Cook, 2012a). However, as Ramiz Jaraysi\textsuperscript{152} (2012) explained to me, through his lens as (then) mayor of Nazareth, life in the Arab space is never autonomous. It is dependent on the state for its budgets, its plans, its permits. It is also vulnerable to the state’s laws and limits. However, this also implies that the hegemonic order is likewise connected, and thus penetrable. Hegemony is never safe from the threat of the other, which can engage and challenge its internal frontiers, of which ‘the other’ is always a part.

Thus, the struggle investigated in this chapter contends with both the problems of maintaining the space against Zionist intervention, and with how to challenge the hegemonic control of it. The cleavage and spatial alienation that each side has constructed becomes integral to a production of the colonial ethos in this space, but is also part of the paradox of survival and struggle in the grey periphery.

**Struggle in the Galilee – Reimagining the Hegemonic (b)order**

In the sections above, the all-Arab space has begun to take shape – through its ghosts, its bonds, its limits, and its resilience. The distance between the Galilee and the Zionist centre has become both a tool of the struggle – constituting the survival of Palestinian identity and

\textsuperscript{151}Mada al Carmel was founded by Nadeem Rouhana, one of the first and most influential Palestinian-citizen social scientists. The NGO he founded is a research institute that studies Palestinian society and politics, and provides a counter-space for Palestinian citizens to engage in non-Zionist research of the state and its citizens.

\textsuperscript{152}Ramiz Jaraysi (of the DFPE party) was the mayor of Nazareth from 1994 – 2013, when he lost his seat to his Deputy Mayor, Ali Sallam, who left the DFPE to establish his own non-party list, *My Nazareth*. 

space, separate from the Zionist imagination— and a product of the colonial-regime. Resistance within the Galilee feels empowered, as well as trapped, by the frontier borders, by their peripheralisation, their growing disengagement from the state, and, ultimately, by attempts to become autonomous within the Zionist field of force. This ambivalence of the northern Palestinian enclave has evolved a unique trajectory for the struggle over land and space, and for how the hegemonic grid is interpreted, experienced and lived, and accordingly, challenged and re-articulated.

The paradox is acutely expressed in the changing essence of the struggle; its tools and targets, needs and experiences. As many interlocutors of this case explained, the culture of protest in the Galilee is no longer a direct struggle for land, although land is still the open wound of every tale of resistance. In the Galilee, the majority have resigned themselves to the land issue being “settled, with the state taking what it took, the people owning what they own (S. Bishara, 2012)”. As a result, the political urgency and critical masses of the 1970s have dissipated. The ‘frontline’ has moved, into the more directly contested territories of the Naqab and the ‘Mixed Cities’ (as well as into the Occupied Territories), so the struggle is less tangible, less existential for most interlocutors of this case. There are still those who fight for the tangible return of land, but for the majority, it is more about ‘living space’, ‘equal or civil rights’, ‘community and economic development’ and ‘control of the space and the institutions housed within it’ (depending on who is speaking). Hanna Swaid (2012), who is an urban planner in addition to a member of Knesset, describes the changing struggle as follows:

“The soul of the struggle has shifted, has changed from direct confiscation of lands, direct Judaization, implemented by establishing settlements, to more a struggle regarding planning rights, as if the outcomes have been accepted. The existence of these settlements does not disturb me as long as I have equality, as long as I feel I have equal access to resources. It's not a problem of establishing the Misgav, but a problem of how much resources you give Misgav at my expense. This is the epicentre, the major idea of the struggle now.”

The tools of the struggle have also been transposed. This is no longer a resistance culture under siege, but, as Sabbagh-Khoury (2011) explains, a slow, incremental and on-going “struggle over life; for how to live a better life in the squeezed places.” These tools are primarily housed in civil society institutions and led by professional resisters in law, planning, media, economics, and social science research; although there are still popular committees for the defence of land and space in every Palestinian locality of the north. The

153 As shall be discussed further below, these have primarily been organised to fight off a new series of Master Plans being imposed on the individual localities of the Galilee (see S. Bishara, 2012; Y. Jabareen, 2011; Banna et al, 2012, for details).
political parties have their own methodology and agenda, often divorced from the daily 
struggle for space and survival in the periphery, which is often left to the local committees 
and local authorities. There are extra-parliamentary movements that function to de-legitimise 
the state by refusing to participate in its institutions, but many are likewise removed from the 
daily struggle for space. As discussed more comprehensively, below, the Islamic Movements 
are exceptions to this, but their focus has primarily drifted south and away from the 
Galilee.\footnote{There are two Islamic Movements in Israel, a Northern and Southern branch, each with distinct politics vis à vis their relations with the state. They shall be discussed more comprehensively, below.}

That said, a protest culture of demonstrations and public actions still exists in the north. It is 
hyper-political and keenly articulate of the colonial project. It is aggressive in its demands 
and its mandate to live as equal citizens in the state, as a national and indigenous Palestinian 
minority (Bishara, 2012; Zahalka, 2012; Ghantous, 2012). Its most active participants are 
generally young, well-educated and part of the growing elite and middle classes. Much of it 
takes place on Haifa’s ‘shared’ university campuses, as opposed to the streets of Sakhnin, 
Shefa Amr or even Nazareth.\footnote{There has been one exception to this rule, during the progress of this research. Nazareth became a site of action in July 2014, during ‘Operation Protective Shield’, in which Israel bombarded the Gaza Strip and killed over 2000 people. After violent clashes a few days earlier during a demonstration in Haifa, between anti-war activists – many of whom were Palestinian citizens – and police, as well as pro-war Israeli-Jewish protesters (Hovel, 2014; Hasson & Kubovich, 2014), the Palestinian communities held a separate anti-war protest in the relatively safer, separate space of Nazareth, with 20,000 participants (Sherman, 2014).} In fact, the streets of the Galilee localities are generally quiet, 
except of course on course on Land Day (and sometimes Nakba Day).\footnote{Nakba Day is an annual commemoration of the Nakba, and its ongoing impact on Palestinian lives.} This is because the target – the 
state and its policies – has been displaced from the villages, even if the colonial geography is 
ever-present in the landscape, through hegemonic maps, plans and laws. Thus, the ‘politics’ 
of the street have receded as well, looking to entangle the structures of power, elsewhere.

These changes can only be understood in light of the ‘enclaving’ process and the cultivation 
of increasingly entrenched borders. The tight boxes that seek to surround and segment the 
Palestinian Galilee, marginalising it from the centre and from the rest of the Palestinian-
citizen space, cultivate a struggle within and against the frontier. It is a struggle ever in 
tension with a border that is both imposed from without and protected from within. The 
stories and movements of this case are therefore a window into the dynamic encounters with, 
against and beyond the hegemonic lines that order Palestinian space.
Struggle for Living Space – Challenging the Internal Borders

“The state is controlling people’s lives, controlling the space. I don’t know what the Palestinians can/should do, because the patterns of control are overcoming every site of their lives... The link is that people are struggling over the space, they want space to live in.”

Areej Sabbagh-Khoury, Personal Interview, 2011

The first ‘borders’ are the internal frontier, implemented through a matrix of laws initiated since 1948 to segment the inner threat and define its physical limits. The failures of the regime to ‘Judaise’ the space shifted the focus to control, as discussed above: control over resources, development, and income; control over the right to expand and the space within which to do it. At the same time, the communities continue to build, grow, and develop. As Shbeta (2012) explained, you cannot contain an explosive force forever. Both innately and intentionally, the communities challenge the limits imposed on the space. Some directly engage the institutions of the state, demanding access to space and resources, including new plans, new budgets, new industrial zones and new neighbourhoods. Others circumvent and encroach the lines, in direct actions that attempt to ‘move’ the borders without formal permits, or, more often, naturally moving beyond them, to alter the demographic geography of the remaining Judaised spaces in the Galilee. In all cases, the process of ‘enclaving’, from top down and bottom-up, is inherent in how struggle is performed, and the lines that are targeted and, at times, transformed.

Struggle Against the Outlines

The first layer of actions can be described as direct challenges against the Planning Regime. These have taken shape as professional (primarily NGO-led) and community struggles in three main arenas of action: The first group reject and resist the newly imposed Master/Outline Plans for the Galilee villages and districts, none of which have been developed with the communities, and none of which sufficiently resolve their planning problems (Galilee Society, 2006; Banna et al, 2012). The second group is made up of collective, community-based actions negotiating against the implementation of national projects ‘for the public good’, and yet which do not serve the Arab public. The third group constitutes activities that seek to circumvent the long-standing policy to prevent development within or expansion beyond the enclosed space. These actions, which are often fragmented, bureaucratic and sadly unsuccessful, directly clash with the imagined and yet very real wall enclaving the villages. As soon as there is a request to be made of the regime – a permit, a plan, a service – the distance between the periphery and the core dissolves. The control mechanisms are brought into the light, and unveil where the structures of power are sitting.
According to Swaid (2012), the struggle within the planning regime is innately political. There is potential to criticise his statement, given the discussions in previous chapters, as to the use of the ‘Masters’ Tools’ to challenge the ‘Master’s Regime’ – and there is no more ‘colonial’ a tool, than the planning mechanisms of the colonising state. This is particularly evident in the similarities that exist between the individual legal cases that proliferate in the Ajami case, and the planning actions in the Galilee. The majority of wins are small, the language used is depoliticised and the arena of action is hyper-professional and contained within hegemonic institutions of the state. At the same time, planning advocacy directly spotlights the hegemonic and colonial containers that target the encroachment and enclosure of Palestinian space by challenging the way space is re-ordered and controlled through the planning arena. S. Bishara (2012) comes to a similar conclusion:

“You know what planning is, right? Planning is the way I want to live. It’s everything, it’s my house, it’s how I want my public space, it’s economic infrastructure, it’s services. I tell you why. In Israel, planning runs everything. It controls private land, it controls public land. It decides where you can cultivate, where you can build; everything. And people are restricted; they cannot put two stones on top of the other. And since we’re talking about one type of community, planning is considered one of the main tools to control them. It’s why people feel so threatened by it, all the time. And people feel they need to struggle against it, all the time...”

According to Yosef Jabareen (2011), an urban planner and academic at the Technion University in Haifa, the repertoire of activities in a ‘planning struggle’ follows a particular trajectory in the northern all-Arab peripheries that is repeated across cases. As a window into the shape and scope of such actions, Y. Jabareen shared an example from his own experience, challenging the National Railway’s attempt to appropriate village lands for a storage facility in Jaljulye, in the Little Triangle, just south of the Central Galilee. First, an ad hoc committee is formed and a protest tent set up. It becomes a shared, public space where the community can discuss their needs and expectations, their strategies and plans for protecting their lands. Experts come to the tent to give lectures, and other residents of the area come to sit in solidarity with the village, along with members of the local and national political leadership. Y. Jabareen’s description of the protest tent is reminiscent of the analysis of street and community ownership described in the works of Bayat (2010) and Harvey (2012). He describes the tent-space and popular committee as belonging ‘to the people’, and as filling a gap that should but doesn’t come from the local authorities, in their capacity to engage and

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157 While Y. Jabareen is referencing his experience with a village in the Triangle, according to him, as well as R. Khouri (2011) and S. Bishara (2012), this pattern is replicated throughout the Galilee.
negotiate with the state. Representatives from the High Follow-Up Committee join the tent space as well, bridging the local with the national, although participation is primarily limited to the local space in which the case is happening. In parallel time, the planning professionals – lawyers, urban planners and critical geographers – are brought in to negotiate directly with the planning authorities. Their discourse focuses directly on the plan, its detrimental impact on the community, and potential alternatives. In the example Y. Jabareen described, the case was won at the Planning Authority. The Planning Committee sided with his assessment that there was no need to appropriate village land for the project. The National Railway was forced to seek a different home for its trains, the protest ended and the tent that housed the struggle, came down.

Despite Swaid’s and S. Bishara’s assertions to the contrary, the limited, local and contained nature of such struggles need to be acknowledged. As Y. Jabareen’s example implies, in most cases of planning activism, the focus of activity is not the protest tent. Instead, the localities, their committees, and the local and national NGOs that support them, protest on bureaucratic paper at the different Planning Committees and Ministries, and, as needed, in district courts. Moreover, they each develop their campaigns, alone (R. Khouri, 2011). The state has constructed a planning discipline and language that situates each village inside a particular outline, its jurisdiction fetishized and atomised within the new (and old) Master Plans (Shneydor, 2012; R. Khouri, 2011). When the national institutions come as delegates of the colonial programme, their focus is on a particular piece of the grid and their language is professional and neutral. This neutrality is often challenged among planning activists, who do make links between the Judaising project and the practice of planning and controlling Palestinian space. However, these are often couched when these same activists are directly negotiating with the Planning Authorities; which means they never officially disarticulate the legal and planning discourses, even if they change the facts on the ground.

While there are some limited attempts at collective organising across the Popular Committees, the main defences and negotiations of the communities tend to be segregated and atomised (S. Bishara, 2012). Needs are defined, determined and mediated within the individual villages. Majd al-Krum, a village 5 km west of Karmiel, and one of those whose

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158 This is another example of differential spellings of surnames: Raja Khouri is the director of the Arab Center for Alternative Planning (ACAP), and should not be confused with Areej Sabbagh-Khoury, who is a researcher at Mada al Carmel, or Jack Khoury, a journalist with Haaretz, whose name appears below, and throughout the remainder of this manuscript.

159 For more details on Israel’s planning mechanisms and how they function, both as mechanisms of control and neglect, see Yiftachel (1994, 2006), Yacobi (2009), and Banna et al, 2012.
lands were confiscated to establish the Jewish settlement there, acts as a case in point. Over the past year, the lands of Majd al-Krum have been targeted for yet another Israel National Railways project. A tunnel will be blasted through their mountains to make room for the new express line between Acre and Safed. With the exception of Karmiel, the line has been planned without the infrastructure to service the dozens of villages that stretch between them; supporting Sabbagh-Khoury’s conclusion that the line is part of the expanding project to bypass Arab space. Majd al-Krum’s residents orchestrated their own negotiations with the Railway, some choosing to agree to compensation, others refusing and forcing changes to the route of the track. However, based on past experiences with such projects, the villagers came to the consensus that if they try to stop the line, they would lose. In light of this, they shifted their battle, not against confiscation of land, but against the lack of services to the local communities. They are fighting to build a station in Majd al-Krum, a struggle that is still ongoing, although there is no public fanfare, campaign or protest tent to spotlight the new line cutting through and circumventing the Palestinian enclave.

This ‘battlefield’ is integrally tied to the Structural Master Plans that organise Palestinian space, and Palestinian life; and through which “the powers that be” can demolish a home, or invest in the building of an industrial park. Even Nazareth isn’t immune, and is in constant battles with the state over the expansion of a neighbourhood, the right to build beyond the city limits, even the decision to construct a new building. The discrimination in policy and practice was deeply apparent in my tour of the area, with Shbeta (2012) pointing out multiple new construction projects in Jewish gated communities and the ever-expanding neighbourhoods of Upper Nazareth. There are moments where a town succeeds in extending its jurisdiction, defeating a demolition-order, or protecting its space against encroachment. However, when the state seeks to flex its muscles, to remind the northern residents of its leering presence and power, it succeeds. This was the case in July 2009, when the Transport Ministry reassigned Hebrew names to every road, village and landmark in Israel. Even the Arabic on road signs became a transliteration of the Hebrew name for a place.

In another example, in 2008, the state completed construction of a new tunnel to connect the Lower Galilee and the centre of the country. The point of the tale is not the familiar trope of the appropriated Arab lands, but rather the name chosen by Ministry officials behind closed doors. The place is called the *Rafael Eitan Bridge*, after an ultra-right, ultra-nationalist political and military figure, well-known for his policies on transfer as solutions to the Palestinian-citizen ‘problem’ (Cook, 2012c). Both examples act as semiotic reminders that
while there are diminishing attempts to commandeer Palestinian space from the Central Galilee, the state is not simply ‘gone’. It lives on in the borders, which it paroles and maintains against encroachment; and in the stifling of Palestinian voices and identity, growth and development. The more nebulous and distant the state seems, the less the struggle seems to find those lines.

At the same time, the majority of the new signs were spray-painted over with the original Arabic name; and no one within the Arab localities calls the bridge by its official name (Cook, 2012c). On the ground, in the everyday experience of the local space, the residents refused to accept the re-mapping of their homes as Jewish space; and reclaimed it, if not officially, at least symbolically.

**Crossing the Internal Borders**

A new phenomenon is evolving and outpacing the direct struggle for living space, demonstrating that the rigidity of jurisdiction lines cannot root people in place. As discussed, village space is becoming increasingly congested and expensive, and a growing middle class is seeking new economic opportunities and breathing room. As a result, there is a growing trend of migration into those few places in the Galilee that do not have limits to their expansion, their green spaces, their services and economic opportunities: the Jewish agricultural communities, the Mixed Cities of Haifa and Acre, and the Jewish settlement towns of Karmiel and Upper Nazareth. For a variety of reasons, there are no accurate statistics available for these movements. The residents themselves often move without changing their addresses, in order to maintain their right to vote in their own localities, or in order to continue to send their children to schools within their villages, because there are no Arab schools in the Jewish towns (Yacobi, 2012; Chomsky-Porat, 2011). On the side of the Jewish municipalities, there is resistance to reporting accurate statistics that might change their status to ‘Mixed’, and force them to take responsibility for ingesting the space with Arab language signs, Arab schools and Arab cultural and religious centres, as required by national law (Chomsky-Porat, 2011)\(^{160}\). Even without full statistical evidence, anecdotes and newspaper articles tell us more about the influx of Arabs and the surge to protect Jewish space against this invasion\(^{161}\).

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160 A City becomes ‘Mixed’ when its Palestinian population is higher than 10%. Both Karmiel and Upper Nazareth have far-exceeded the demographic limits for ‘Mixed’ status, but neither space reflects this change, in terms of services and infrastructure.

161 See for example Ashkenazi (2013b), Caller & Traister (2013) and Gapso (2013) as part of a range of articles appearing in Israeli media in the run-up to municipal elections in October 2013. This shall be discussed further below.
According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, 19% of Upper Nazareth’s population is Palestinian (CBS, 2014); although MK Jamal Zahalka, the current head of Tajamo, quoted a figure of 30% during our interview. Four years ago, it was 15.2% (Ashkenazi, 2013a), indicating that the phenomenon is increasing. Lands that once belonged to the local villages are being re-inhabited by Palestinians. Shbeta (2012), during my tour with him, described multiple neighbourhoods in which the majority of space is newly de-Judaised; and according to Jafar Farah (2011), the head of the Palesitnian-citizen media advocacy organisation Mossawa, there is a case to be made that these actions, which alter the borders of Arab and Jewish spaces, are redefining shared and segregated space in the Galilee. However, Ayema Manna (2012), an activist and resident of Majd al-Krum, who also works at Mossawa, sees this ‘encroachment’ as a failure of the struggle, and as part of the new geography of the enclave:

“And what happened on Land Day, 1976? People at the end, they struggled, they went to the streets, and they didn’t have any problem to die for their lands. Now you feel that people, when they have nowhere to stay, nowhere to go, they just leave. They are going and renting houses in Karmiel; or they are buying the land, demolishing old houses, and building their own villas. Some of the people I meet from Karmiel say that they are ‘returning to our lands’. But that’s a privilege that not many people can afford.”

In other words, segregation of space is still enforced for those who make up the lower strata of the economy, as is the case for the majority of Palestinians living in exclusively Arab localities in the Galilee (Galilee Society, 2006). Moreover, when people do move, the representative space does not in fact reflect the changing demographic; a reminder of which system and which sector is still in control of it (Lefebvre, 1991). This seems to reiterate the semantic messages mentioned above, indicating who designs the signs and landmarks, regardless of who lives in the space. In Upper Nazareth, not a single Arab kindergarten can be found within the city limits. There are no Arab representatives on the Karmiel council, and only 2 on the Upper Nazareth council. It took a national campaign, led by high-profile NGOs and a court decision by the Supreme Court to force Upper Nazareth to open its first Arab school; a decision publicly challenged by the Jewish mayor (J. Khoury, 2013). In fact, this same mayor – Shimon Gapso – won the 2013 municipal elections on a campaign he ran on the basis of the following statement:

"Upper Nazareth will be Jewish forever; no more shutting our eyes, no more grabbing on to the law allowing every citizen to live where they want. This is the time to defend our home.” (quoted in Ashkenazi, 2013a)
If Gramsci is correct in arguing that in politics, the siege is always reciprocal and the ruler musters all its power to respond to its greatest threats (as implied in the quote that begins Chapter One to this thesis), then we should take a closer look at the meaning of such overt reactions to the migration phenomenon. It would seem that the Zionist project musters all its resources to defend itself from these encounters with ‘Palestine’; and with the prospect of ripples in the hegemonic order that seeks to contain the Jewish ghetto against shared, permeated space. In the next section, the reciprocal siege is analysed more concretely in a case that exemplifies the threat the Zionist project – or at least some of its agents – sees in the transgression from Arab space to shared space in the Galilee, even though some of it has already been ‘reclaimed’.

**The Rakefet Case**

The *Rakefet Case* has come to embody the current struggle against spatial apartheid in the Galilee. The case is captured and nearly always told in two parts: through an individual family’s clash with the land regime and through the principal issues this individual story encapsulates. As a first layer, *Rakefet* tells the personal story of a young, middle class Palestinian couple from Sakhnin who, like those migrating to Karmiel and Upper Nazareth, were seeking a way out of the ever-shrinking space of their tightly contained Arab village and had the means to do so. The story has been retold in the same way, in dozens of sources (newspaper articles, court depositions, press releases and interviews). The couple, Fatima and Ahmed Zbeidat, both architects and graduates of the highly respected College of Architecture at *Bezalel Academy of Arts and Design* in Jerusalem, filed an application to live in the community town of Rakefet, one of the 35 villages that fall under the jurisdiction of the Misgav Regional Council, and sits less than 2 miles from their home. Regulations applicable to small community associations, such as Rakefet, required that the couple pass an ‘acceptance test’ orchestrated by the regional selection committee, and administered under the jurisdiction of the Israel Lands Authority. The committee, composed of the deputy head of the Misgav Regional Council, a representative from the Jewish Agency and a representative of the Rakefet Absorption Committee, rejected the Zbeidats’ application on the grounds that they were not “socially suited” to the fabric of life in Rakefet. This test took place in 2006; the legal battle – which they won – played out over the next five years. This first layer is told and repeated in clichés, because the plaintiffs in the case – which include five high-profile human rights organisations, led by Adalah – want to make it clear to their audiences the meaning behind ‘social unsuitability’, and what it is that the Zbeidats
threaten by trying to become part of the Rakefet social fabric. That is, they are Arabs, and therefore unfitting to the Zionist colonial logic the settlement represents. Rakefet, founded in 1980, was part of the Mitzpe settlement programme. As discussed above, the small settlements were strategically deployed to control the space, until a Jewish majority could take hold in the Arab peripheries (Cook, 2012b). While the numbers were never forthcoming, the statistics of land holdings tell a very different story. According to Adalah (2007b), selection committees operate in 700 agricultural communities in Israel. These localities are home to about 5.2% of the state’s population, and yet they exercise control over approximately 81% of the country’s land. The communities include less than 400 households and, as mentioned previously, comprise much of Israel’s highest economic strata. The streets are wide and tree-lined, houses are beautiful, space is plentiful; and the faces are primarily white (Cook, 2012b). Other than this, they have few community values or communal practices to ‘protect’ from outside incursion (Manna, 2012). Rather, it is land, and the laws used to redeem Jewish space, that fall under the jurisdiction of these committees. Thus, the couple’s clash with the racist demographic of Rakefet was in fact a clash against a deep-seated practice of colonial segregation that brought the hegemonic boundaries into the light. It also became a vehicle through which to challenge the larger problem of ‘Admissions Committees’ and the exclusionary process they protect.

While the extensive level of interest the case provoked among its different stakeholders suggests otherwise, this isn’t the first case of its kind. The first such ‘transgression’ into protected Jewish space was the Kaadan family’s attempt to attain land in Katzir, a Kibbutz established in 1982 by the JNF in the Wadi Ara region of the Little Triangle. The Kaadan case seemingly made Israeli legal history in 2000 (Cook, 2012b), when then Supreme Court president, Aharon Barak, pronounced in his decision on the case that it is “impermissible to discriminate against an individual and prevent him from living in a communal village on the basis of his not being Jewish (ACRI, 2010)”. The case is often problematized in critical legal circles in Israel. For example, Barzilai (2000), Shamir (2000) and Dalal (2000) argue that while the Court did rule against the Selection Committee’s decision to reject the family’s application, it did not directly articulate what actions the state must take on behalf of the

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162 Yacobi & Tzfadia (2010) paint a more ethnically coloured picture of the same statistics, applied explicitly to the central Galilee: 60% of land in this region belongs to Ashkenazi (Jews of European descent) controlled regional councils, although only 6% of the population is Ashkenazi. 20% is controlled by jurisdictions primarily housing Mizrahi-Jewish communities, who make up 24% of the population, although the majority of these do not live in the small agricultural communities; 16.1% of the area is under Palestinian controlled local councils, despite making up 72% of the total population.
Kaadan family, nor acknowledge the historical circumstances that led to the situation of unequal land distribution and access in the first place. The colonial history that confiscated Palestinian lands, the containment of Palestinian space and the segregation of Jewish and Palestinian communities, is sidestepped in the judgement, as it focuses in on the individual rights of the Kaadan family. The court’s lack of direct relief for the Kaadans enabled Katzir more than a decade of manoeuvring, in its attempts to circumvent the judgement; it took another seven years to force Katzir to accept the Kaadan application and an additional four years before the house was built and the Kaadan family could move in (Cook, 2012b).

Moreover, the decision left open a loophole, as multiple authors have pointed out. It calls on the state to consider the petitioners' request to purchase land in Katzir while “taking into consideration factors relevant to the matter-- including the factors which relate to the Agency and the current residents of Katzir -and including the legal difficulties entailed in this matter.” (H.C.J, Decision 6698/95, 2000, p. 16). It is this open space that the new criterion on ‘social suitability’ was created to fill.

By the end of 2007, the District Court had already ordered the ILA, the Misgav Regional Council and Rakefet Committee to ‘rethink’ its decision regarding the Zbeidats; the case was then bounced back and forth in appeals, before reaching the Supreme Court in 2011. Based on a reading of the legal documents, the case was heavily couched in ‘liberal’ language, leaning heavily on the discourse of ‘citizenship’, ‘human rights’, ‘discrimination’ and ‘the right to choose one’s living space’; subsuming the open wounds of dispossession, settler-colonialism and the Judaisation of Arab-space at the heart of the case (H.C.J. 8036/07, 2007; H.C.J., decision 8036/07, 2011; H.C.J. 2504/11). However, the petition and deliberations during the case also focused explicitly on the construction and maintenance of the dominant group’s power (meaning the Ashkenazi elite), through its control of the ‘Admissions Committees’ and the lands under their jurisdiction. The petitions further pointed out that the Committees are a veil for denying access to land to those already traditionally excluded, based on ethnic, religious, racial and class hierarchies in Israeli society, linking the story of these different social and political groups within both the individual case, and later in a principal petition. Moreover, at a hearing during the Zbeidat case, Justice Dorit Beinish, then Supreme Court president, is quoted asking the Rakefet Committee members if the real

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163 For details of the case and the Supreme Court’s decision on it, see H.C.J (High Court of Justice), Decision 6698/95, 2000. Additional discussion and criticism of the limits of the court’s decision can also be found in Barzilai (2000), Dalal (2000), Shamir (2000), Abu-Hussein & Makay (2003) and Dalal (2000).

164 See in particular Barzilai (2000), Shamir (2000), and Dalal (2000), among many others.
The intention of this term ‘social unsuitability’ “is that an Arab couple is unsuitable for this community.” (Glickman, 2011) That said, the Supreme Court decision in the Zbeidat case does not mention any of the substantive, constitutional issues of the case, but refers only to procedural issues that prevented the couple from accessing land that should effectively be open to all citizens. This is in part because, before a final decision was reached, the ‘respondents’ retreated and changed their position, negating the need for the Court to insert a precedent into the legal books. However, something was clearly shaken in this process – enough to provoke a more direct intervention by the state’s representatives in protecting the power of these elite communities.

In 2009, the Prime Minister’s Office proposed an Amendment to the Community Associations Law to enshrine the decision-making powers of the Admissions Committees. It was passed in March, 2011, just ahead of my first interviews. Several of my interlocutors saw in this law the passing of the first overtly apartheid law by the Knesset, despite the fact that the language of the Law, itself, is carefully constructed so as not to belie the true colour and shape of individuals to be excluded from the tree-lined streets of places like Rakefet. This feeling is linked to their experience of 66 years of land expropriations, the denial of equal citizenship and deep spatial, economic and political discrimination against the Galilee’s residents. It is borne of absolute frustration but also clarity as to the nature of the colonial legacy of the project (Shbeta, 2012).

In this Law, the methodology of spatial control is institutionalised, highlighting two intersecting arguments of this thesis: first, that in the all Arab periphery, it is not demographics but the hegemonic ordering of land and life that bolsters Judaisation of Israeli-territory – turning gates into borders; roads and public works into frontiers; jurisdictions into enclaves. Or, as Sabbagh-Khoury (2011) eloquently put it, by making Palestinians disappear from Jewish lived experience and consciousness. Second, the Law emphasises the idea that the key to maintaining hegemonic order is the division of space and communities. As Koenig claimed in 1976, it was Jewish dependency on the Palestinian-citizen public that informed the

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165 The principal petition responds directly to the new Admissions Law, although it also incorporates the details of the Rakefet case, in order to link the principal argument to the intentions and potential impacts of the Law on vulnerable, non-elite communities, in particular Palestinian citizens (H.C.J. 2504/11, 2011).

166 In one example, the Law mandates the absolute control of the state’s land resources to a group almost devoid of elected officials; the five committee members are made up of two from the community in question, a member of the ‘movement’ to which the community belongs, a member of the Jewish Agency or WZO, and a member of the regional council. There are also no clear criteria for who can be excluded from such a community, giving the Admissions Committee members near-exclusive autonomy (H.C.J. 2504/11, 2011; Law to Amend the Cooperative Societies Ordinance (No. 8), 2011).
‘shock’ of Land Day on Jewish political and economic life; and the only way to protect Jewish spaces against Palestinian encroachment is to separate the two ‘sectors’ as much as possible. This is exemplified in statements like those by MK Israel Hasson, who helped to formulate the Law, who argues that the Law embodies “the state’s commitment to the achievement of the Zionist vision in the Land of Israel” (Sofer, 2010).

As discussed above, Judaisation in the Galilee has internalised the bifurcation and segregation of space; a reciprocal set of actions, in which enclaves, ghettos and peripheries are normalised in the essential practices of the state and its Jewish and Palestinian residents of the Galilee. It is important to note that the legislation only came into being when the separated space, and thus the resources the gated communities control, was directly threatened. Thus a foundational, but unarticulated assumption about the spatial order in the Galilee was challenged through the struggle for living space; through everyday, bureaucratic and legal tools, a spectrum of colonial borders were activated and then reified in law. These, in turn, became new, clearer and more coercive boundaries, against which the Palestinian political community in the Galilee have continued to fight.

The story only has a partial happy ending. Although the Zbeidats inevitably were awarded land in Rakefet, the principal petitions launched against the Amendment to the Associations Law were dismissed in September, 2014 (Adalah, 2014). Five out of nine judges on the panel voted to uphold the Law, claiming in their decision that they “could not determine at this stage whether the law violates constitutional rights (ibid)”.

The Right of Return – the Tangible Struggle

“There are two sides to the issue of return: Palestine, and the refugees. Both exist and will continue to do so, and thus return cannot be merely symbolic, formal or figurative. The right and the content thereof are clear: what the Palestinians must do is to reformulate the components of the equation of the Right of Return, based on Palestine the land, and Palestine as refuge.”

Haneen Naamnih, The Two Sides of Return: Palestine and the Refugees, 2009, p.2

Naamnih, an activist and (then) a lawyer working for Adalah, is responding to the 2009 Land Reform Law that had legalised the selling of 800,000 dunams of Palestinian refugee land (mentioned in Chapter Two). This property has supposedly lived in limbo, held by the Development Authority as a temporary phenomenon of a state whose future and borders are still elastic and undecided; despite the fact that the land has been appropriated and used for

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167 A second petition was launched by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), in 2011 (Zarchin & J. Khoury, 2012).
Jewish settlement for more than 60 years. In the Galilee, Cook (2012b) sees the 2009 Land Reform as one of the impetuses for the New Admissions Law, a formal way of standing guard against Palestinian-citizen access to state-lands, opened through these new tenders for Jewish space on the free market. However, in her critique of the Reform, Naamni (2009) also points to the Law’s formal reproduction of the now-internalised hegemony, expressed by both Palestinians and Jews, over who owns this space.

Naamni’s argument has particular significance in the Galilee, where, as discussed above, there is a general consensus that land is no longer contested and the hegemonic ordering of space is near completion, including its partition into separate enclaves. This situation persists, despite the fact that approximately 12.8% of Palestinian residents of the Galilee (88,000 people) are members of communities that were displaced in 1948, or later (Badil, 2009). It is for this reason that Sabbagh-Khoury (2011), among a plethora of others, suggests that the struggle for land in this place – and thus the struggle for return – is today almost exclusively housed in the right to remember and commemorate; in the right to share one’s personal and collective narratives and to inform the public discourse around what really happened in 1948.

The struggle for Return has been removed from the material, daily struggle for living space, and is articulated primarily through Land Day and Nakba Day marches, in annual visits to the destroyed villages and in abstract projects that ‘imagine’ the Return of refugees, without tangible actions to see it happen. In a sense, the ‘border’ surrounding expropriated Refugee lands has become official, seemingly permanent and impenetrable.

Naamni’s suggestion is, therefore, a glimmer into an unruly politics; a challenge to what has become fixed in space and in the Palestinian imagination. George Ghantous, an activist and “expellee” from Birim, a village whose residents have been fighting for return since their lands were expropriated in 1948, says something similar: “If you talk about a law as being

168 For a more detailed discussion of properties held by the Development Authority, see Chapter Two.

169 Details of the New Admission Law are expanded on in the table on Israel’s Legal Land Regime that appears in the Appendices to this thesis.

170 The internal Palestinian refugees throughout Israel number 250,000, or 15% of the Palestinian population in Israel. The largest concentrations of internal refugees live in the Naqab (the Bedouin Arabs displaced through the Nakba, as discussed in Chapter Four).

171 A counter-mapping project being led by Zochrot, in which ‘Return’ is imagined, conceived and mapped by a group of Jewish activists and Palestinian internal refugees from villages erased in 1948, is one example of these practices (Manoff, 2011). Zochrot is an Israeli-Jewish NGO, founded on the idea that without remembering and acknowledging the Nakba within Israeli-Jewish discourses, there will never be an end to the conflict.

172 The term ‘expellees’ is used by activists on the ground, who see the Israeli rhetoric of ‘Present Absentees’ or the international humanitarian/human rights lexicon of ‘Internally Displaced Persons’ as missing an important political analysis of a responsible party for the act of expulsion. ‘Expellees’, as a term, better understands the catastrophe of 1948 as an active project, in which one group did the expelling and the other was expelled. See Ghantous (2012), for more details.
undemocratic, where you use ‘democracy’ to show that a law is racist... then this is a tool that shows the law’s true face, but it is not a tool to go back.” (Ghantous, 2012) Through this prism, the battlefield for Return is radical in and of itself, regardless of the arena in which it is fought. The struggle to reclaim land is a direct transgression against the hegemonic lines that have determined Palestinian Refugee lands a lost cause, and seek to erase the history that links all Palestinians to Zionist ‘redeemed’ space (Cook, 2012a). It is, therefore, a powerful and subversive struggle in the colonial geography, and worth investigating more concretely, even if it has been truncated into a fractured and limited set of resistance practices.

Today, the main tool for attempting to articulate the internal Palestinian return is primarily bureaucratic173. These cases directly and intentionally engage the ‘state’ in the process toward reclaiming refugee lands; in contrast to the cases of natural growth and encroachment discussed above, as with the re-Arabisation of Upper Nazareth and Karmiel. At the same time, they stay away from official, precedent-setting proceedings, and are clearly limited by the arena in which their actions take place.

These bureaucratic actions have orchestrated several ‘success stories’. Two examples are discussed here, one of which has already been mentioned, briefly, above: The first is Yafa an-Naseriyye (Shadi Shbeta’s home town), located within the Nazareth metropolitan district; the second is Tamra/al-Ruways, located 14 km east of Acre. Heads of each locality have been negotiating with the state, through the Ministry of Interior, various planning authorities, and in the case of Yafa, its neighbouring Jewish locality, to expand into territories that had been confiscated in 1948. In the case of Tamra, the lands in question actually belong to al-Ruways. The village was destroyed in 1948, and the majority of those dispossessed became refugees in Tamra. I visited Al-Ruways with expellees from the village, as part of a tour organised by Zochrot on Land Day, 2013174. Its ruined buildings remain scars on the landscape, and were never re-appropriated for Jewish settlement. However, as Tamra has grown, the urban sprawl has begun to encroach and blur the lines between the destroyed and the inhabited Palestinian spaces. As a result, the Tamra municipality began procedures to expand its jurisdiction into

173 There is also a new trend of using a legal loophole in the Law of Acquisition for Public Purposes (1964), which considers the return of appropriated lands to private owners, if they have not been used for their intended purpose. The statute of limitations for claiming return of properties through this avenue is limited to 25 years; placing a border around all refugee properties expropriated by the state during the Nakba, or the years of military administration, which is when the majority of properties in the Galilee (and elsewhere) were absorbed by the state. Known cases using this tool are situated outside the Galilee, and, thus, further discussion of them are beyond the scope of this chapter, although further details of the Law itself are discussed in the table on the Legal Land Regime, in the Appendices to this thesis.

174 An essential component of Zochrot’s work is the organisation of tours to villages destroyed in 1948, such as the one I joined to al-Ruways.
these areas. According to a speech delivered by Tamra’s mayor, Aadel Abo Elhega, on Land Day, 2013, the negotiation has been successful (although the agreement is tentative, and as of writing, is yet to be finalised). That said, the agreement hinges on the condition that nothing new will be built in al-Ruways; the land will not be reclaimed by living on it.

The lands that constitute the core of the Yafa case were slated by the British Mandate for Yafa’s use pre-1948. After the Nakba, the state appropriated these lands and inevitably used them to establish Migdal Haemek, a Jewish development town, in the area, in 1953. The village filed an appeal to the Supreme Court immediately following the confiscation, and it sat there, in limbo, ever since. The village won back its lands through negotiation with Migdal HaEmek and state prosecutors, in 2012.

In Shbeta’s telling of Yafa’s story, there is a similar ending to that of Tamra’s absorption of Al-Ruways. While Yafa has negotiated the return of some of its lands, the agreement took place in back rooms, off the record. Moreover, their status and development still rely on mechanisms of bureaucratic control, i.e. the state. As a result, Yafa’s local council has not, at the time of writing (September 2014) managed to obtain permits to build on or expand into the returned lands. They are still waiting in limbo.

As an observer, it is difficult to see either win as something more than a win on paper, as neither village exerts autonomous control of the new jurisdictions, nor truly shifts the discourse around return, at least not in official channels. However, then again, I witnessed the speeches in Tamra last Land Day and visited al-Ruways with the descendants of its displaced community. I saw the children spell out the word ‘Palestine’ in Arabic with rocks painted red, green and white. So maybe it does mean something.

**The Stories of Birim and Iqrit**

The stories of Iqrit and Birim serve as unique examples within the ‘Tangible Return’ advocacy landscape. They are not contained within hidden, backroom and technical negotiations. They express direct, overt claims for Return, with national and international support-systems (among Jewish and non-Jewish constituencies), and a series of legal, administrative and political exceptions that have been incorporated into the case, since the campaign began. Their stories have been treated together in this thesis and in multiple sources on the cases, because they share a similar trajectory, with similarly loaded repercussions for the expellee struggle and for the state.

175 These stories are primarily following George Ghantous’ (2012) testimony on Birim, Joseph Ryan’s (1973) detailed description of both cases and Jonathan Cook’s (2013) discussion of Iqrit. Other sources, and specific quotes from these resources are referenced, as indicated in the text.
Sitting nine miles apart, both villages straddle the Lebanese border with Israel. Their residents and descendants are from different sects of the Catholic Church and neither one fought with the Palestinian or Arab armies during the war. In fact Birim’s story includes the villagers’ decisive siding with the Jewish Haganah, and their housing and feeding of the soldiers coming through the village (Ryan, 1973)). Both villages were captured in the October 1948 march northwards by the Haganah (discussed as part of Plan Dalet, above); and in November that year, both communities were asked to move to neighbouring villages for a number of weeks in preparation for a series of counter-offensives in the area. The people of Iqrit were driven in trucks to Rameh, about 30 km south (Cook, 2013); the people of Birim were taken to Jish, which is just seven km east of the village (Ghantous, 2012)\textsuperscript{176}. All were promised a swift return to their homes. However, weeks became months and then years, and the villagers are still waiting.

In 1949, the first requests to the Prime Minister were made; and multiple promises of return were given. Representatives of the villages also sought and gained attention from their religious leadership, internationalising their plight among Archbishops and eventually the Vatican, who all assured the villagers of their impending return. In 1951, the first court cases were petitioned before the High Court of Justice, first concerning Iqrit, and then Birim. In July of that year, the Court recognized the Iqrit villagers’ rights – not as refugees but as Israeli citizens – to their lands and their right to return to them. According to Ryan (1973), the decision was explicit in cultivating the ‘exceptional’ circumstances of the case, distinguishing them from the threat of Palestinian return to the Zionist project. The Court’s decision claimed that the village lands “had not been abandoned and could not be placed, like other deserted Arab property, under the Custodian of Enemy (Absentee) Property.” (ibid, p.61) In spite of this, the military, in contempt of court, continued to prevent their entry to the village, even issuing expulsion orders after the fact to the residents and criminalising their attempts to re-enter the village boundaries and work their lands while they waited for the state to legalise their situation.

On Christmas Day, 1951, the military dropped fire bombs on Iqrit, destroying every structure, except the church and graveyard. And still, the villagers continued to haunt the courtrooms for the next 60 years. On the issue of Birim, the judgements were more ambiguous. The Court upheld the military orders in 1952, and yet argued that the villagers should be allowed

\textsuperscript{176} In the first years after the expulsions, several families from Birim also headed north to Lebanon, where they remain to this day (Ghantous, 2012).
to return in a decision made in September, 1953. Then, as with Iqrit before them, on September 16th, 1953, Birim was also bombed. Today, a Kibbutz and national park sit on Birim’s lands; but, like Iqrit, the villagers continue to visit, continue to pray at their Church and continue to bury their dead among their ruins (Ryan, 1973; Rosen, 2013).

The story has a long narrative, with attempts by the state to resettle and compensate the villagers in the 1950s and 1960s without returning them to their lands, but the communities have never conceded (Ghantous, 2012). In the 1970s, the popular struggle was reignited, this time with a media campaign to accompany the ongoing court cases. Iqrit and Birim were spotlighted in the US and Europe, and the international community, including its Jewish communities, once again joined the call for the return of the villagers – in their exceptional case – to their lands (Ryan, 1973). All the while, the state made promises and then broke them; up to and including a decision by Yitzhak Rabin’s (1992) government to set aside lands in Iqrit for the re-building of the village (Cook, 2013).

In 2001, then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon forever shifted the political and legal landscape concerning the villages. In an affidavit he submitted to the Supreme Court, Sharon rejected any claims by the evacuees, warning that, in light of the current political arena, it would set a precedent for other Palestinians seeking to reclaim their land and right of return (Benvenisti, 2003; Jamal, 2011). The Supreme Court followed suite, and, on the basis of the state’s recommendations, administered the final blow in its rejection of last of the villages’ five legal appeals. There ended the ‘exceptionalism’ of the case as far as the state was concerned; but not the exceptionalism inherent in their struggles, which have continued their battles, on the ground and in the public sphere.

The struggle for Return is inherent in the villagers’ lives, language and politics. Its tangibility is kept alive in the narratives of the families, in yearly summer camps in the villages, in regular visits with the village elders, in returning to work in the fields and in monthly services at the Church. To the village-descendants, Birim and Iqrit are not ‘living memories’ or symbols of what was lost; the struggle is ongoing and material. As Ghantous (2012) explained to me:

“...People from Birim, every child was raised to be from Birim. Wherever you were born, you say I’m from Birim; this is the first identity we have. This is my land. The Zionists took the land and I want my land back. I want to return there. I want to raise my children there... This

177 For additional details in the chronology of the cases, see the Iqrit community website (www.iqrit.org) and Jamal (2011).

178 For additional details of the court’s decision and the legal arguments in the case, see H.C.J. 840/97 (2003). See also Benvenisti (2003) and Haaretz Opinion (2001) for additional details.
was always the language, the discourse that shaped my relationship to Birim... but there was always the going there, spending summer in camps living in the village, visiting with my grandfather. There was also a material relationship with the land, to work there, to have your experience there as a child, an adolescent, as a mature person, as an activist. It’s somehow, until now, all the people, no matter what the age they are, they talk about the land...”

In August, 2012, after the annual summer camp ended, the young people of Iqrit, bypassing the hegemony of law and state, moved back in. A year later, a group of activists from Birim did the same. Since then, in both villages, the returnees have been taking turns living on the edges of the Church yards. They live off the grid, with no running electricity or water. They grow their own food, collect timber for fire, tend to the village ruins and lands. In Iqrit, they even developed a physical plan for the entire community’s return, mapping the space, the buildings and the necessary infrastructure to see it happen. The state raided Iqrit in June, 2014, destroying anything that had been built beyond the limits of the churchyard; but the villagers continue to squat on their lands. In Birim, the activists celebrated “366 days of return” on July 30th, 2014 (Birim’s ‘Anouncing Our Return’ Facebook Page, 2014). Birim was then raided on August 11th, 2014; but this didn’t stop them from returning to the site to begin the countdown anew on August 12th. It seems that, for now, the state remains ambivalent about how to deal with these communities, beyond the occasional sweep of the premises.

Despite an empowering story for the communities, these small ‘moments’ of activism seem to be just that: they are small, surveyed, kept under check. Moreover, considering the violent reaction to such actions taking place concurrently in the Naqab, in particular in al-Araqib, there is some indication that other areas and villages do not produce the same ambivalence. Thus, in addition to the way Iqrit and Birim seem to have been abstracted from the general story of the Internal Palestinian Refugees, we should consider the space within which their tangible struggle has taken place. Situated deep within the Palestinian enclave, at the edge of the frontier-zone, this act of return is practiced spatially, institutionally, and publicly off the grid. Unlike in the Naqab, there is no attempt to work through the system to gain rights to water, building permits, electricity, or anything else that would stipulate the communities’ rights and recognition, through the state. There is also little attempt to work through the Israeli-Jewish media to gain attention or recognition. The act of return feels contained and

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179 Testimonies from Iqrit mirror Ghantous’ depictions of the Birim. See for example interviews with Iqrit villagers in F. Jiryis (2012), Cook (2013) and Matar (2013a), for examples.
separate, an act that seeks to circumvent the state. Thus, the state does not seem to feel a threat to its hegemonic ordering of the space.

At the same time, in reclaiming Birim and Iqrit, the habitus of power is, at least to some degree, disrupted. This is an act of struggle that re-imagines Judaised lands as the frontier, a space to be battled over, and reclaimed. It is an act that clashes against the internalised hegemony over land, and the right to return to it. As Mohammad Zeidan, head of the High Follow Up Committee, claimed at the time of Iqrit’s return:

“This really is a historic moment for the Palestinian community… For the first time, we are acting rather than just talking. The villagers are not waiting for Israel to respond to their grievance, they are actively showing Israel what the return would look like.” (quoted in Cook, 2013)

Ghantous takes this a step further, seeing the struggle to return as the struggle to redeem control over one’s life. He told me, “I am not just asking for my return, I am asking for my freedom, for my future. I want to be the person who decides my future, not just told, not just contained.”

**The Struggle for Autonomy – Living within the Boundaries**

Throughout this chapter, the Galilee is presented as an enclosed space, oscillating between Falah’s ‘enclave’ and what Yacobi & Tzfadia (2010) have called ‘the periphery’. These metaphors imply different, albeit complementary, things: an enclave describes the bounded, closed spatial and social relationship between state and Palestinian subject. The periphery still implies a connection to the core, even if distant and increasingly disengaged and alienated. Perhaps the difference depends both on the prism through which you see and experience the ‘border’. From the perspective of the state that seeks to encircle and constrict Palestinian space, as well as those that seek shelter within it as far as possible from the centre, the enclave seems a more appropriate metaphor. For those that must continue to engage with the state, and encounter their increasing marginalisation, for example, as the mayor of Nazareth, this is the periphery. However, in both theoretical frames, the state is the traditional unit of analysis.

In so far as Palestinians re-imagine and reposition their marginal space and status on the edge of Israeli society, they are agents as opposed to mere objects of this process. As argued in the quote by Yiftachel (2009) that introduced this chapter, margins created and initiated by the state in response to the resilience of the community become the basis for an alternative politics, in which the new centre is localised within the Central Galilee; wherein, Nazareth takes the place of Tel Aviv, or even Haifa (Cook, 2012a; Y. Jabareen, 2011). Because of this,
the space both shrinks – away from the edges of Jewish space – and grows: The limits are no longer individual villages, which are restrained by the ‘blue jurisdiction outlines’ of the state’s Master Plans; but, rather, the southern and eastern borders, the imagined dotted lines of the Judaised map. The new phenomenon of migration to Jewish towns and neighbourhoods, discussed above, seems to highlight this fact; as does the community’s disengagement from the frontlines of the Zionist siege on Palestinian land and space. What begins to unfold is what life and struggle look like, as they increasingly disentangle themselves from the Jewish spatial order and begin to entrench and retrench a Palestinian space that is separate, independent, and disengaged; at least in theory – in reality, this is always the periphery.

**The Daily Struggle – Active Disengagement**

In some ways, the progress towards disengagement is expressed unconsciously; an internalisation of the enclave, in ordinary and everyday life. At the same time, in many ways, it is very conscious and intentional – and particularly acute in the aftermath of the October events, even when it is expressed individually, in one’s personal choices and actions; and is being articulated in the aesthetics and practices of a ‘different space’.

After 2000, the Israeli flags were stripped from Nazareth (Cook, 2012a; Tabari, 2002). In general, people stopped visiting Jewish or even Mixed Cities for their shopping and entertainment. They also stopped watching Israeli television and switched to Al-Jazeera and Egyptian satellite channels (Y. Jabareen, 2011; Kashua, 2006; Rouhana, Suhel & Sultany, 2003). More and more girls began to wear the hijab (Cook, 2012a), and the discourse in homes and in public space shifted even further towards Palestine and the practice of Islam (Rosmer, 2012). The political language – on Facebook and in social gatherings – turned to concepts like ‘boycott from within’, ‘normalisation’ and ‘the de-Israelisation’ of Palestinian identity and experience (Cook, 2012a; Ghantous, 2012; Sabbagh-Khoury, 2011). However, mostly, ‘disengagement’ is expressed in daily practices of avoidance, to keep one’s personal space safe from the state. Sabbagh-Khoury’s (2011) testimony to life ‘in the squeezed places’, quoted above, portrays this as a natural reaction to daily life in struggle; to life as a Palestinian in Israel. Y. Jabareen (2011) sees something similar:

“*Coming back to the daily practices, the small things... I used to listen to Galei Tzahal[^180] or Reshet Beit[^181], to Israeli news, on the radio in my car, every morning. And now I am*”

[^180]: Galei Tzahal is the Army Radio Channel
[^181]: Reshet Beit is a Jerusalem-based, national radio station
overwhelmed. I can't do it anymore. I can't listen to Lieberman\textsuperscript{182}, to racist laws, to racist news anymore. I stopped opening Israeli TV and got a satellite in my home. Because I can't. I need my own space – of freedom, of respect. This is what people are looking for. You avoid the state to be a normal person. And you build your daily resistance in many different ways. In the economy, and even where you spend your time. At one time, many people came to the Carmel, here\textsuperscript{183}, to spend their money. Today you don't see anybody... there is something like a great disengagement happening. I think it's part of the protest.”

The material infrastructure and social environment in which these personal escapes take place are now catching up. In Nazareth, new shopping plazas, chef-restaurants, coffee houses and bars are popping up to soak up the dollars and leisure time of the still growing middle class. New music scenes, outdoor parties and festivals, situated in the Galilee countryside have replaced the once common (pre-2000) Friday night excursions to the Jewish centres. This scene, brimming with nationalist, Palestinian lyrics, sounds and talent, has been cultivated as an exclusive Palestinian haven in the North (Maira, 2013; Karkabi, 2013). Finding its centre in Haifa in recent years, it is closed off from the Jewish-owned clubs and bars, cultivating a safe place for fun and play, distinct from politics and separate from the state’s watchful eyes (Karabi, 2013)\textsuperscript{184}.

This phenomenon is also being replicated in the centre of Haifa, with a growing line of Palestinian-owned bars and restaurants along Ben Gurion Boulevard, adjacent to the refugee neighbourhood of Wadi al-Nisnas, and serving an almost exclusive clientele of Palestinian NGO activists and other professionals\textsuperscript{185}. These are not grey-spaced slums on the margins of the city, or the margins of the state. These are not poor, weak members of the Palestinian-citizen community, although they, too, carve out their own space and survival, away from the Jewish centre. These are the middle and upper classes, the university students, the politically active and professional success stories. As Karkabi (2014), a resident of Haifa studying the new ‘scene’ of separation, suggests, the northern communities have begun to circumvent their dependence on the other, for their survival, for their economic successes, and for their popular cultural icons. As Yiftachel (2009) suggests, the Galilee Palestinians have turned inwards, towards new geographic and social markers; made all the more possible because of

\textsuperscript{182} Y. Jabareen is referencing MK Avigdor Lieberman, head of the Yisrael Beiteinu right-wing party, who is famous for his plan to transfer the main concentrated areas of Palestinian citizens in Israel to the Palestinian Authority, in exchange for the settlement blocs of the Occupied Territories, as part of a peace agreement.

\textsuperscript{183} By the ‘Carmel’, Y. Jabareen is referencing the centre of Haifa, where we were sitting for coffee.

\textsuperscript{184} The same party-organisers have also increasingly pushed the boundaries eastwards, into the open spaces of the West Bank as a way to transcend the imposed divisions between the different Palestinian occupations (Karkabi, 2013)

\textsuperscript{185} This is the same main thoroughfare that hosted the Days of Rage Protests in 2013, and the anti-war demonstrations in June, 2014.
their internalised and externalised segregation from Jewish spaces, at least so long as they don’t need to encounter the state, and the boundaries that surround them.

**The Official Politics of Autonomy**

These personal struggles for separation, distance, survival and difference seem to mirror a process on-going in the Palestinian-citizen intellectual, political and religious leadership. As implied above, these trajectories are not new. Rather, they are explicitly tied to the spatial and social entrenchments of the military regime, and the state’s early retreat from the borders of the Central Galilee\(^\text{186}\). However, as discussed in the works of Ghanem (2001, 2010), Rouhana \textit{et al} (2003), Jamal (2011) and Pappé (2011), this process has been explicitly evolving since the fault lines articulated on Land Day, and is exemplified in the proliferation of Palestinian nationalist and anti-Zionist movements, discourses and actions produced by Palestinian citizens in their political encounters with the state. These same authors, along with Bishara (2001), Cook (2012a), H. Jabareen (2013) and Rouhana & Sultany (2003) point to October 2000 as the watershed moment for the drive towards a separate Palestinian politics, in response to a new and expanding ‘hostility’ against the Arab minority (Rouhana \textit{et al}, 2003). That said, the emphasis of this section (and those below) is not so much the constructions and achievements of an autonomous politics, but of the ambiguities inherent in the evolution of a ‘separate’ and yet entangled political landscape.

**The Umbrella of National Leadership**

In the aftermath of Yom al-Ard, the ad hoc popular committees were tunnelled into the first internal Palestinian coordinating committees, and then into a generation of increasingly nationalist and almost exclusively Palestinian parties. Pappé (2011) marks the initiation of this chronologically with the (1981/2) establishment of the High Follow-Up Committee\(^\text{187}\), which was the result of attempts to consolidate the coordinating bodies that sparked Land Day (i.e. the Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands and the Committee for the Heads of the Arab Localities) (Pappé, 2011). The first High Follow-Up Committee was chaired by then mayor of Shefa Amr (and chair of the Committee of Arab Mayors), Ibrahim Nimr Husayn, and included 11 heads of the largest Arab localities (\textit{ibid}). Its first headquarters was in Shefa

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\(^{186}\) One expression of this is the voting patterns and political affiliations of large segments of the Palestinian community in Israel, which continue to follow clan, traditional leadership and kinship relations in the place and community in which the voter lives (A. Bishara, 1996; Jamal, 2011; Ghanem, 2000; and Rouhana \textit{et al}, 2003).

\(^{187}\) It was first established as ‘the Supreme High Follow-Up Committee but was eventually overtaken by the \textit{Follow-Up Committee on Arab Education in Israel}, a body that initially worked under the Supreme Committee.
Amr, but it is currently housed in Nazareth; in a sense reflecting the moving geography of Palestinian politics in Israel.

By the 1990s, representatives to the council included the directors of many national civil society institutions, the heads of the Palestinian-led political parties, both inside and outside the Parliament, mayors of the local Palestinian localities and Palestinian council members from the Mixed Cities. The Committee’s membership is representative of Palestinian leadership throughout the state. However, in a reversal of the core-periphery relationship, the majority of participants are situated in the north. This is also the case of the main offices of the political parties and the headquarters of most of the Palestinian NGOs in Israel. This has meant that – at least until recently – the Committee’s spotlight has been fixated on the north, on the problems of ‘living space’, on discriminatory budgets, on the issues of land-jurisdiction, and other problems of the Palestinian enclave (Miari, 2012). While there has been a shift over the last few years to focus on the siege on Arab space in the Mixed Cities and the Bedouin unrecognised villages, it is still possible to argue that the Committee’s struggle is primarily infused with the political discourses of the north. In other words, it functions to protect and enshrine the all-Arab space, in effect carving it out, against and away from the state. Zeidan (2012) looks at the Committee’s potential in this way:

“The state is trying to divide us, but in general we are working towards being a collective body against this state, against the policies of the state. The High Follow-Up Committee is creating an autonomous leadership to stand in front of the state and its policies. To create a strong body that can challenge the state’s treatment of the Arab people.”

Zeidan sees the collective umbrella, and its ability to consolidate the Palestinian leadership into a coordinated, national body as essential to establishing Arab autonomy vis à vis the state. He continues, “because this is the organisation that represents the rights of all Arab Citizens of Israel. It gives us strength.” (ibid)

The Committee works via consensus, attempting to bridge the various factions, the secular and religious, the Christian and the Muslim, the extra-parliamentary and parliamentary groups (Mustafa, 2012). According to Mohanad Mustafa (2013), whose research focuses explicitly on Palestinian Nationalist and Islamic politics in Israel, this methodology for negotiating agreement across the spectrum of Palestinian leadership has contributed to the cohesion of the Committee; a sentiment many of my interlocutors confirmed. However, its decisions are not binding and the Committee has never quite exceeded its status as ‘a coordinating body’ (Pappé, 2011). For this reason, several of its members have called repeatedly for the Committee’s reform through representative elections (Mustafa, 2012a); a
call that has failed to achieve consensus across the different political factions. In a more
critical tone, Jamal (2011) discusses the members’ deadlock on democratic mechanisms and
decision-making processes within the High Follow-Up Committee as having led to its
paralysis; downplaying its leadership role for Palestinian citizens.
Continuing from this critique, as Mustafa (2013), Miari (2012) and Zeidan (2012) have each
explained, rather than work to strengthen the internal systems and structures of Palestinian
society in Israel, the Committee has been forced into a narrow political terrain that seems to
exclusively focus on the state. Its campaigns reflect this mission, as it builds committees to
struggle against state policies on the control of Arab education, Arab economic arenas, Arab
jurisdictions, and most acutely, on Arab lands (ibid). To its credit, it articulates a Palestinian
resistance politics against the limits imposed by the state. However, this has meant that its
main actions are determined and perpetuated by the borders it encounters with the state, as
opposed to the inward running of Palestinian society and the cultivation of a different,
Palestinian space, independent of this relationship 188. Despite the fact that the state is forced
to negotiate with the Committee in situations of emergency 189, it has no official capacity to
organise Palestinian life, and respond to the needs of the community. In many ways, the
Committee embodies the ambivalence of being Palestinian inside Israel: articulating a new
Palestinian discourse in contravention to state policies and practices, and yet contained within
the Judaised lines of spatial and social control.

The NGOisation of Autonomous Politics

There is a long-standing debate among researchers and practitioners of struggle, surrounding
the capacity of civil society, in particular its proliferation into NGOs and professional activist
networks, to politicize Palestinian space within the Israeli state 190. The debate is anchored in
concern for the absorption of the political struggle – for land, for space – into professional
practice; with good reason. These NGOised practices get bogged down and atomised within
the fetishisms of law, human rights, planning, budgets and bureaucracy, because of the nature
of the arena in which they each function (Yacobi, 2009; Sfard, 2009; Roy, 2004). At the same
time, as discussed in previous chapters, this does not negate the extensive evidence of
Palestinian civil society, including its NGOs, challenging the boundaries of Zionist

188 Perhaps one clear exception to this was the fact that the High Follow-Up Committee was key to initiating one
of the three Future Vision Documents, discussed more extensively below.
189 For example, during the events of 2000, efforts to contain the riots inevitably forced the state to negotiate
directly with the High Follow-Up Committee (Or Committee Report, 2003; A. Bishara, 2001)
190 See Chapter One for more details of this debate.
hegemony, and deeply engaging in the politicisation and radicalisation of Palestinian struggle. These debates are important, in large part, because they feature prominently among the community (S. Bishara, 2012; Ghntous, 2012; Shbeta, 2011). However, the focus of this discussion is not the efficacy of civil society and NGO activism in their engagement and challenge of hegemonic boundaries. Rather, what is relevant to this research is, as Jamal (2011; 2008) argues, how the NGOisation of Palestinian politics participates in retrenching and reshaping the borders of Palestinian space in Israel. In addition, it is important to highlight the fact that the location of these actions are shaped and situated in the northern enclave, where the majority of Palestinian professional, political and civil society institutions are situated.

It has been written elsewhere that NGOs and civil society, in general, have taken the place of political parties and movements in culling the intellectual and political elite of Palestinian-citizen society. This was confirmed in several interlocutor-interviews, which pointed to the organisations as an alternative to the marginal space Palestinians hold within state political institutions. However, the NGOs also provide a new professional alternative to working for Israeli-Jewish organisations, even those that work within the peace and democracy camps in Israeli political society. For example, in Farah’s (2011) ‘origin’ story, he left the field of journalism and founded Mossawa, because his Jewish editor demanded he be more objective in his coverage of the demolition of Arab homes, in the 1990s. Hassan Jabareen left the Jewish-led human rights organisation, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, to found Adalah, as a separate and autonomous space for the litigation and articulation of Palestinian-citizen rights (H. Jabareen, 2000).

The NGO ‘revolution’ mushroomed in the 1990s as thousands of NGOs were publicly registered in the Oslo years (Payes, 2005). Farah (2011) links this evolution of civil society to the ‘Great Divorce’ with both the Jewish-left and the Palestinian state-building project in the occupied territories (after the Oslo Accords). A. Bishara (1996, 1997) argues similarly that Palestinian-citizen politics reach a turning point by the mid-1990s, culminating with the elections that established his own party, the National Democratic Assembly (NDA), as part of the Knesset in 1996. He calls it the end of the process of ‘Israelisation’, when Palestinian-citizen society reached a critical juncture in their engagement with Israeli society and the state. This process of ‘Israelisation’ and ‘Palestinianisation’ marks a significant shift in the political landscape of the Palestinian territories, as Palestinian citizens seek to define their place within Israeli society and the political processes that shape their daily lives.

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191 See in particular Payes (2005); Haklai (2005); Jamal (2011) and Pappé (2011).
193 For A. Bishara (1996), ‘Israelisation’ takes form in the failed attempt by Palestinian citizens to find the balance between two discordant identities, ‘Palestinianisation’ and ‘Israelisation’; between their position as...
citizens begin to redefine what it means to be an Israeli, “with their rejection of the idea that Israel has to be a Jewish state.” (A. Bishara, 1997, p.77)

Farah (2011) explains further:

“After 1993, 1995 there was this euphoria that there would be peace and we can now deal with our own business. You know, many of the organisations, the structures that had been built before, to promote peace... and all the political game in the Arab community had been changed. We were busy in rebuilding our institutions, and in this process, many of the intellectuals in the Arab community divorced the Jewish left. The elites of the Arab community said we will not beg you (the Jewish left) to support us. The whole relationship for the future will be different. We will rebuild our institutions and come back as your partners. If you want to live in co-existence, we work with you, not for you. This was the new discourse that was created. And it was also part of the period. It was also a result of the PLO saying ‘you are not part of the peace-building deal’.”

Farah’s articulation of the separate Palestinian-citizen sphere is mirrored in the charters, actions and politics of the Galilee NGOs that became interlocutors of this study: Adalah, the Arab Association for Human Rights (AHR), Mada al Carmel, The Mossawa Center, the Arab Center for Alternative Planning (ACAP), the Galilee Society, and endless others, promote a separate Arab space – a microcosm of life in the Galilee. Their workers are almost exclusively Palestinian. They are directed by members of the Palestinian leadership (many of whom are active in the High Follow-Up Committee and with the Arab political parties), and focused exclusively on Palestinian needs and sites of struggle. When they create advocacy campaigns and legal coalitions against the state, they tend to partner with one another. Although they will work with their more radically politicised Jewish peers, the cooperation will be on a project focused explicitly on the needs of Palestinian citizens, and led by the Palestinian partner. As Karkabi (2014) also explained, in the ‘North’, the structures for cross-community engagements are highly pre-conceived, superficial, limited and tightly controlled, to prevent any descent into the ‘co-existence’ framework that previously dominated the sphere. This is very different from Jaffa’s Popular Committee, which functions

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194 Both Payes (2005) and Haklai (2005) describe similar phenomena in their analysis of Palestinian NGOs in Israel.

195 There are some individual Jews working for some of the organisations (i.e. one of Adalah’s founders, Rina Rosenberg), but they are highly politicized and they are not the norm. As Rania Lahab-Grayeb (2011), the deputy Director of Mossawa told me, they hire exclusively within the Palestinian community, as part of their commitment to creating professional opportunities for Palestinian citizens, and contributing towards building their capacity as independent and strong communities.

196 This is discussed more extensively below, through the analysis of the Future Vision Documents.
as part of a joint struggle and joint campaign against the removal of Palestinians and poor Jews from the municipal centres. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that despite a seemingly common language and consciousness regarding the state and the position of Palestinians within it, we should not assume uniformity among the politics, practices, tools and interests of the Palestinian NGOs, or the constituencies with whom they work (Jamal, 2011). There is ongoing fragmentation of NGO-based Palestinian-citizen resistance, stemming from and reproducing the matrix and ghosts discussed above. This is further enhanced by the organisations’ dependence on and competition over limited funds from international donors (ibid; Payes, 2005).

It is also relevant to emphasise the state’s role in promoting the alienation of the Northern Palestinian civil leadership, as part of the hegemonic practice in which bifurcation of space and people is the norm. However, the enclaving of Palestinian “ethnic civil society” also evolved from the inside (Haklai, 2005), as part of a process of self-empowerment; reinforcing the argument articulated above that Palestinian space in the Galilee has evolved through a process of mutual segregation and enclaving. An increasingly educated Palestinian minority, frustrated with the system, have left to lead their own Palestinian institutions, businesses and localities. They have created alternative services and opportunities within their own spatial borders, in search of their own voice. The NGOs, in particular, enable the increasing distance from Jewish politics and priorities, even if the majority of their work, like the High Follow-Up Committee, engages directly with the state. The argument here is not that this changes the centre of power. The state ultimately controls the material functions of the space, in so far as it still controls the budgets, the land-access, and the permit-infrastructure. Moreover, discrimination along these lines will always be inherent to a system of ethnic hierarchies and Jewish privilege (H. Jabareen, 2013). However, we can also argue that this sphere of ‘disengagement’ has been a necessary and powerful instrument of Palestinian empowerment, distinct from its capacity to re-articulate the field of force in which it operates. It is, as Yiftachel (2009) connotes, a potentially alternative politics, essential to the shifting geography of the new margins and borders of Palestinian space inside Israel.

As mentioned above, for many years, the community was silenced in Jewish spaces, where they were dependent, subjugated and marginalised. Much as bell hooks (1994) advised in her work on transgressive and transformative pedagogies in the African American context, it is within this separate space that the Palestinian community could create and articulate its own collective discourse, as an independent and distinct political group; one that reflects the
ambiguities of Palestinian citizenship in Israel. It is within this enclave that it could recognise and politicise its own trajectory, within the Jewish state, as an autonomous, indigenous community with collective rights (even if its politics are always determined in its encounter with the limits and borders of Jewish space). The most comprehensive expression of this is in *The Future Vision Documents*, published in 2006 and 2007 by three different collectives from Palestinian civil society.\(^{197}\) ‘The Future Vision’, as Farah (2011), who took an integral part in their development, explains:

“...was a statement of where we want to go, where we want to be in the future. And this is related to our ability to build a university, to build our own institutions, our ability to decide what we want to do with our agriculture, our land, with the Jewish population, what kind of cooperation we want to build with the Jewish population, or the relationship we want to have with the rest of the Palestinian communities; which kind of relationship and culture we want to have. So it is a new discourse.”\(^{198}\)

These documents represent the first attempts by a cross-section of Palestinian political and civil society to collectively and publicly express the experience and needs of their community, as a Palestinian entity surrounded and informed by their position within Israeli society (H. Jabareen, 2013).

Despite their articulation of evolving ideas emerging from within Palestinian political and civil society since the 1990s (exemplified in the work of Bishara, 1993), the documents were initiated as an “urgent reaction” to the political arena in which the Palestinian-citizen leadership found itself in the early 2000s (Jamal, 2011, p.166). The project was sparked as a response to currents within the Israeli-Jewish mainstream leadership – in both official and unofficial circles – calling for new constitutional models for the Israeli state (Journal of Palestine Studies, 2007; Rouhana, 2004; Jamal, 2011)\(^{199}\). Starting with a baseline assumption that the Israeli state is both ‘Jewish and Democratic’ (Waxman, 2006; Rouhana, 2004), the Israeli-Jewish organisations and coalitions behind the constitution-building projects either

\(^{197}\) The three documents to which the ‘Future Vision Documents’ refer are: 1) The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, produced by The National Committee for the Heads of Arab Local Authorities in Israel; 2) The Haifa Declaration, produced by Mada al Carmel; 3) The Democratic Constitution, produced by Adalah: The Legal Center for Minority Rights.

\(^{198}\) This sentiment is repeated across the spectrum of interlocutors to this study, and in literature devoted to an analysis of its implications. See in particular Jamal (2011) for an in depth discussion of the documents, and the new discourse they represent of “an alternative model of co-existence” with Jewish-Israelis, in which Palestinians are equal citizens of a democratic state (p.166).

\(^{199}\) Examples include the Israel Democracy Institute’s (IDI) ‘Constitution by Consensus’ (2007), the Committee for National Responsibility’s (organised by the Rabin Center) ‘Kineret Declaration’ (2005), and the Constitution, Law and Judiciary Committee of the Knesset’s (unsuccessful) project to produce an Israeli constitution. Further details of these projects are discussed in Jamal (2011), Rouhana (2004) and Waxman (2006). See also IDI’s website ([www.idi.org.il](http://www.idi.org.il)), for a draft copy of their document.
directly excluded the participation of Palestinian stakeholders, or (through their hegemonic rhetoric) disregarded Palestinian citizens’ positions within these discussions. Moreover, the documents were developed without acknowledging the surrounding political upheavals and violences of the state towards the Palestinian Intifada, the still open wounds of the events of October 2000 and the increasing securitisation of Palestinian life inside Israel (Jamal, 2011); by contrast, all of these were pervasive issues among the Arab constituency at the time (Rouhana, 2004).

What began as an idea within Mada al Carmel in 2002 (Jamal, 2011), the Future Vision Documents represented months – sometimes years – of consensus-building and roundtables, with many of their contributors participating in two or even three of the fora that led to the published documents. Together, they unpack the story of an indigenous national minority, whose Palestinian identity is anchored in their experience of living in the Jewish state. From this platform, the documents explore the vision they hold for their future relationship with (in) Israel and with the entire Palestinian people, albeit from different, complementary perspectives. The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, the document coordinated by the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities (2006) breaks down the community’s key encounters with the state, looking at the historical trajectory of the Palestinians’ marginalisation within Israel, since the Nakba. The Haifa Declaration, the document published by Mada al Carmel (2007), speaks in the collective voice of the Palestinian citizens of Israel as a declaration of independence and self-determination. The Democratic Constitution by Adalah (2007c) integrates the research and vision from the other two documents, into a conceptualisation of what an equal, democratic state for all its citizens could look like. Overall, the documents (collectively and individually) come to the conclusion that Zionism has been an illegitimate colonial enterprise. Therefore, an equitable future is dependent on the decolonisation of the system constructed on this basis. In effect, they are calling for a bi-national state that represents the needs, claims and interests of all citizens.

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200 The Constitution, Law and Judiciary Committee actually included one Arab MK, but his voice was primarily silenced by the content of the programme and the views of his fellow participants (given that the other members did not contradict the idea of a constitution that conceptualised Israel as ‘Jewish and Democratic’) (Rouhana, 2004).

201 In the case of the Haifa Declaration, the process took more than 4 years to complete.

202 The Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities, is also referred to above as ‘the Arab Mayors’.
Delving deeply into these materials is beyond the scope of this chapter; and moreover, a wealth of literature covers their meaning, implications and articulations. Rather, they are treated briefly here as a lens through which to see an essential turning point in Palestinian politics in Israel; and to provide insight into the main drivers and agents of these new politics, as well as the limits of the space in which they are housed. As discussed in Jamal (2008, 2011), the Future Vision Documents, while reflecting on and expressing a general will and discourse on Palestinian life in Israel, also disclose key problems of mobilising a cohesive political program within the spatial, social and political fragmentations of the Palestinian-citizen communities in Israel. According to Jamal (2011), the fact that there were multiple publications is a window into the internal conflicts and fragmentations of Palestinian-citizen civil and political streams (discussed briefly above). Despite their clear similarity in tone and complementary content, their individual organisers were unable to orchestrate a consensus that would combine the projects. Jamal (2011) also argues that one of the key reasons the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities initiated their own document (a process led by then chairman of the High Follow-Up Committee as well as the Arab local authorities, Shawki Khatib), was in order to include the multiple political actors excluded from the Mada al Carmel process. Moreover, none of these projects included the participation of members of the Islamic civil society in Israel, speaking to the existence of a clear schism between the secular and religious Palestinian-citizen leaderships (ibid). Thus, we should assume that a gap exists between the ‘vision’ and the ‘reality’ of a collective Palestinian political and social space in Israel as described within the documents.

Overall, however, as argued in Jamal (2011) and H. Jabareen (2013), even with their limitations, the documents represented a new oppositional consciousness, aroused among Palestinian citizens in the Oslo and post-Oslo period. The burgeoning articulations within the documents have since become central to the present-day ‘separate’ politics of the enclave (Rekhess, 2007a). Reproduced in the ordinary, everyday disengagements (discussed above), and in the disengagement discourses of some members of the political leadership (discussed more thoroughly, below), they embody a way of thinking that cannot be extrapolated from the distinct space the intellectual elite has built; moving the Palestinian ‘centre’ away from

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204 In most writings on the documents, they are discussed in terms of their cohesion and collective voice; see in particular H. Jabareen (2013), Journal of Palestine Studies (2007) and Ghanem (2007).
the state and the frontier lines it controls, and further activating and entrenching the borders between them.

In Jamal’s (2011) final critique of the documents, he describes them as “a safe space of protest”, balancing on the edge of what the Israeli control system can and can’t tolerate (p.168). Perhaps we can extrapolate further, arguing that the ‘Arab sector’ and this example of creative disruption, were contained physically, politically and socially by the boundary-lines that surround their spatial practice: as discussed above, the NGOisation (and alienation) of Palestinian politics has turned civil and political action in the North into heightened professional practice and abstract political discourses. These maintain the NGOs’ political space vis a vis the state\textsuperscript{205}, but also isolate them from ‘street politics’ and the needs of everyday Palestinian life (Algazi, 2011), preventing their contribution to any large-scale transformations of Palestinian protest. Then again, the extreme, adverse reaction of mainstream ‘Jewish-Israel’ to the documents are a clear sign that they – and the practices of Palestinian-citizen NGOs more generally– are more than the articulation of ‘safe politics’\textsuperscript{206}. They exemplify a genuine disarticulation of Zionist hegemony, which ultimately changed how the Palestinian leadership (and to some degree its constituencies) expressed their situation inside Israel, and resulted in changing how the state and its publics saw them. Since then, the path taken by Palestinian-citizen NGOs (and Palestinian-citizen society more generally) seems similar to the High Follow-Up Committee. Their construction of an increasingly ‘autonomous space’ from which to practice a uniquely Palestinian-citizen politics, while bolstering a bifurcation of spatial relations, at the same time functions to challenge the state’s hegemonic boundaries, and clashes with its vision of and programme for a dependent, under-developed and weak Palestinian ‘minority’.

\textit{The Inside and the Outside}

The NGOisation of Palestinian politics describes a paradox inherent in the struggle for autonomy. In a sense, this process speaks to the evolution of an autonomous politics, from

\textsuperscript{205} While the NGOs are regulated through Israel’s \textit{Law of Amutot} (1980) (‘Law of Non-Profit Associations’), their funding and political mandates are heavily supported by international donor institutions; as a result of which, they function somewhat, although not entirely, separate from the state. That said, they are also heavily monitored by the Israeli Security Services, and their leadership is often threatened (H. Jabareen, 2012). There are even cases of members of the Palestinian-citizen civil society leadership being imprisoned, as was the case of Ameer Makhoul, who was the director of \textit{Ittijah}, an umbrella organisation for all Palestinian NGOs in Israel, and chairman of \textit{the Popular Committee for the Defense of Political Freedoms} (Abdu & Makhoul, 2010).

\textsuperscript{206} These ranged from an ‘anguished’ open letter to ‘Israeli Arabs’ by IDI’s then-president, Arye Carmon (2007) to the direct condemnation of Palestinian-citizens as a fifth column throughout mainstream Israeli-Jewish media and public fora (Rekhess, 2007b).
below; as institutions attempting to gain their distance from the state, that are increasingly entangled in a border-skirmish over Palestinian space with the state’s hegemonic forces. A parallel process is ongoing among the different political streams, movements and parties that helm Palestinian politics, as they likewise eek out a Palestinian space that is at the same time entrenched in the Zionist production of the Israeli social, political and physical landscape.

Despite their physical and ideological locations in the all-Arab peripheries of the Galilee and Triangle Regions, each is embroiled in the same ‘inside-outside’ problem of being Palestinian inside Israel, notwithstanding the different locations, discourses, tools, ideologies and participants with which they construct their programmes. As national leaders, with the responsibility and capacity to unify their constituencies across Israel’s invented cantons (Bishara, 1996), there is no possibility for genuine disengagement from the state. Each of the streams discussed below attempt different ways of resolving the ambiguity, while challenging the containers in which Palestinian politics are held.

Three main streams historically make up the Palestinian-citizen political map: the Communist, the Nationalist and the Islamist\(^\text{207}\). The ‘Communist’ is the oldest stream to take part in articulating a ‘Palestinian-citizen’ politics\(^\text{208}\); and, as Ghanem (2001) argues, has played a critical role in disrupting Zionist hegemony over Palestinian political discourse. In 1948, the stream was housed within the Israeli Communist Party (known by its Hebrew acronym Maki). Its main ideologies were initially, and, to a degree, continue to be bound to

\(^{207}\) We can also consider a forth stream, which Ghanem (2001) calls the ‘Israeli-Arab stream’ and Rekhess (2007a) calls ‘the Moderate Camp’. This stream – which Rekhess (2007a) discusses primarily in terms of its predominance during the Military Regime – has a voting history with the Zionist parties and their satellite Arab lists, until these disappeared from the political scene in 1984 (by which time the majority of the Arab vote had shifted to the Communist and Nationalist Streams). It is discussed in Ghanem (2001) as an ideological stream that seeks rights for Arab citizens, without questioning the structures of the system within which they are positioned. However, Rouhana \textit{et al} (2003) de-link these votes from their ideological significance, and see them as being cast on the basis of “parochial identifications” (p.221). The political party most associated with this stream is the Arab Democratic Party (ADP), founded in 1988 by Abdul Wahab Darawshe to fill the gap left by the Arab lists. Today the ADP is part of the United Arab List (known for its Hebrew acronym Ra’am), which is currently helmed by the head of the Southern Islamic Movement (discussed below) and also shares a joint Knesset platform with the Arab Movement for Change (known by its Hebrew acronym Ta’al). In the 2013 Knesset elections, there was still a significant percentage of the Arab public that voted for Zionist parties (Rudnitzky, 2013; Ghanem, 2013). At the same time, as Ghanem (2001) and Rekhess (2007a) both argue, the different Arab parties (including the ADP) are increasingly converging, with common demands regarding the Palestinian public in Israel. A more in depth discussion of this stream is beyond the scope of this research, but can be found in Ghanem (2001), Rekhess (2007a), Rouhana \textit{et al} (2003), and Jamal (2011), along with further discussion of those featured in the main text, above.

\(^{208}\) The Communist Party began to organise in Palestine before the establishment of the state. While relevant to the evolution of its early influence in Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian-citizen politics (particularly its split along ethno-national lines in 1944, and then its reunification in 1948), a discussion of its pre-1948 history is beyond the scope of this thesis, and can be found in Ghanem (2001, 2010), Jamal (2011), Kaufman (1997) and Rekhess (1993).
Marxist-Communist thinking around social redistribution, inter-community equality and workers’ rights. However, it was also the first party to challenge the Zionist make-up of the state, call for a Palestinian state alongside Israel, campaign for the return of the Palestinian refugees, and cultivate a joint constituency of Arab and Jewish members (Ghanem, 2010). The party split in the mid-1960s, with the majority of its Palestinian members forming the New Communist List (known by its Hebrew acronym Rakah). At the same time, joint membership and a vision for ‘co-existence’ with Israel’s Jews have remained a core ideological platform and strategy for the party (Ghanem, 2001, 2010).

During its heyday of the 1970s and 1980s – when it held more than 50% of the Arab vote (Rouhana et al, 2003) – Rakah was active at multiple levels of Palestinian resistance in Israel. In addition to securing seats at the Knesset – beginning in 1977, leading the DFPE (Hadash) coalition – party members pursued municipal leaderships (winning the Nazareth election for the first time in 1975), published mandates and strategies in public platforms, organised a growing number of strikes and protests, and, as discussed above, were integral to the organisation of Land Day and the committees that stemmed from it (Rekhess, 2007a; Ghanem, 2001, 2010; Jamal, 2011; Pappé, 2011). However, with the shifting political arena of the 1980s and 1990s, and in particular, the formation of new Arab parliamentary parties in the Oslo years, Rakah lost hold of its position as primary representative of the politicised Palestinian-citizen constituencies.

The lines activated by the Communist Party have always teetered on the compatibility of promoting a national Palestinian identity, while emphasising the community’s ongoing civil relationship with (in) Israel (Rekhess, 2007a; Ghanem, 2001). According to Rouhana et al (2003), while Rakah played a central role “in entrenching the demand for civil equality and the concept of equal citizenship” (p.220), it did so without reshaping the politics and political meanings of such a demand. Thus, at multiple points in the party’s history, it gave form to new, more insurgent nationalist movements that sought to cross these boundaries. By the 1990s, the reshaping of these lines through movements that prioritised Palestinian identity

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209 The remaining, more Zionist-oriented activists, disappeared from the political landscape by 1969, when Maki failed to gain a seat in parliament (Ghanem, 2010).

210 Although in practice, there is only a few thousand Jewish members left in the DFPE (Noy, 2015) and only one Jewish MK in the 2013 Knesset (MK Dov Khenin). With Khenin living in Tel Aviv and promoting a strong, equality-based platform in the urban and peripheral contexts of poor Jews in Israel, there seems to be minimal everyday engagements between him and his fellow Arab party representatives (although he also advocates for equal rights and access for Palestinian citizens, and has consistently challenged the laws and structures of the state that determine their separate and detrimental treatment). See Dov Khenin’s facebook page for details of his platform and activities.
and autonomy, siphoned off a large portion of the Communists’ political base (Ghanem, 2001). It can therefore be argued that the Nationalist Stream has always had a home within the Communist Stream, and has grown out of it; in some ways in a radical departure from the Communists’ civil and political locations, in some ways reproducing them. In other ways, the new discourses of the later manifestations of the Nationalist Stream have also shifted the language and ideology of the Communist Stream. The first formal (and separate) articulation of the Nationalist Stream occurs in the 1950s, with the al-Ard Movement (the Land Movement). Born from within the Communist Party, inspired by then President of Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arab movement, the party was banned in 1964 for its direct challenge to the Zionist nature of the Israeli state\(^\text{211}\). After the split between Rakah and Maki, and with the regional shift after the 1967 war\(^\text{212}\), the nationalist forces re-organised themselves, pushing at and reshaping the boundaries that housed Palestinian-citizen politics. These first take hold with the creation of Abna al-Balad (the Sons of the Country) in 1973, an extra-parliamentary movement that sought to challenge the Communists’ strategy of working with and within Israeli institutions, and what they saw as the Party’s legitimisation of Zionist hegemony. They saw Palestinians in Israel as indistinct from the larger Palestinian people, whose self-determination could only be realised in a Palestinian state (Rekhess, 2007a). While their anti-legitimisation platform from the 1970s onwards has focused on the boycott of Parliamentary elections – working instead towards galvanising public protest – they consistently mobilised for and attained seats in local councils (until their movement stagnated in the 1990s) (Ghanem, 2010; Agbariyeh, 2012; Ghanem, 2012).

As discussed above, situated within Rakah, itself, the Nationalist Stream gave form to the Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands (which helmed Land Day) (Miari, 2012). As discussed above, post-Land Day, the Committee’s key leadership worked to further embed the nationalist programme in the Galilee, with the political reshaping of the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities and the institutionalisation of a national coordinating body, the High Follow-Up Committee (Pappé, 2011). This same group later divested entirely from the


\(^{212}\) As is discussed in multiple texts, the 1967 war changed the playing field for Palestinian nationalism, inside and outside Israel. For further discussion of the impact of these new geopolitical realities on the Palestinian citizens of Israel, including their reconnection with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, the birth of the PLO and the end to Nasser’s Pan-Arab Movement, see for example, Ghanem (2010), Pappé (2011), Jamal (2011) and Bishara (1993), among many others.
Communists in the creation of a new political party, the *Progressive List for Peace* (PfP) in the early 1980s (Rouhana *et al.*, 2003; Miari, 2012). Led by Mohammed Miari, the PfP ultimately disappeared from the political map by the 1992 elections. However, their legacy lived on as some of their members were part of the collective that helped to found the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) (*Tajamo/Balad*) in the mid-1990s. Led by Azmi Bishara, in coordination with large tracts from Abna al-Balad, the PfP and other left-wing Nationalist groups (Ghanem, 2001), the NDA became the axis for a new discourse for unsettling what they saw as the false balance between Palestinian identity and citizenship in the Jewish state (Ghanem, 2010).

As A. Bishara (1993, 1996, 1997) explains, the new political arena after the end of the Intifada demanded a distinctly Palestinian-citizen politics, which would not be associated with the PLO or the International Communist Party. It would specifically target the Israelisation of Palestinian-citizen life, and attempt to carve out a distinct space to be Palestinian in Israel. The core of this programme balanced on two pillars, equal citizenship and the Palestinianisation of the Arab minority. As mentioned above, A. Bishara’s (1993, 1997) vision for articulating these dual prongs required the redefinition of the Jewish state to reflect its binational polity, and the institution of particular protections for maintaining the autonomy of the national minority, with collective rights to and control over their cultural, economic and religious institutions. His programme, articulated by his Party as a call for ‘A State for All its Citizens’, has since become a central fixture across the fabric of Palestinian politics in Israel (as is clear from the tone and rhetoric of the Future Vision Documents). In light of this, Jamal (2011) considers A. Bishara to be one of the most influential political actors and thinkers in the history of the Palestinian-citizen community; and Ghanem (2010) argues that the NDA is the most organised expression of the Nationalist Stream.

In the current (2014) political arena – as the state has enhanced its siege on Palestinian political space – new Nationalist forces are brewing again. These are re-emphasising the

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213 Rouhana *et al* (2003) claim that this was in part a result of the party’s over-emphasis on national identity at the expense of civil equality, at a time when a new political process was emerging that demanded both.

214 There is also extensive discussion in A. Bishara’s writings on the creation of a bi-national or confederate state throughout Palestine, as a way to bridge the territory and people on both sides of the Green Line. As further discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this thesis, see A. Bishara, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2003, for details.

215 In A. Bishara’s writings, there is discussion of the need for Palestinian citizens to have autonomy over their ‘cultural’ institutions. However, in reading this work (1993, 1997), we understand that to A. Bishara, culture implies a wide sphere which includes autonomy over the institutions that tell Palestinian history, devises their education, determines their religious practices, and informs their economic relationships.
questions raised by Abna al-Balad, as to the legitimate arena for engaging in anti-Zionist, nationalist Palestinian politics in Israel. However, before contending with this issue, we turn now to the third stream, the Islamists. The Islamist Stream begins taking shape inside Israel in the 1970s (Rubin, 2014), organising itself around the protection of Muslim holy places, strengthening the Palestinian and Muslim identity of the Arab citizens of Israel, and protecting their rights as citizens of the country (ibid)216. Many of its initial founders were educated in the West Bank and Gaza Strip’s religious institutions, which only became available to Palestinian citizens after 1967 (Bishara, 1993; Ghanem, 2010). Its first leader, Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish, who began his political activism in the Communist Party (Rubin, 2014), initiated the new Islamic politics in his home village of Kafr Qasim in the Triangle Region, which remains a core base for the Movement’s present-day activities.

From the beginning, the Islamic Movement – which is today divided into two conflicting streams, the Northern and the Southern Branches217 – evolved its arena of struggle in the everyday and grassroots arenas of what it saw as the ‘othered’ Muslim communities in Israel (Mustafa, 2013; Rubin, 2014). Their tactics stand in opposition to the Nationalists and the Communists (both of which are deeply secularist), whose targets have always been the hegemonic arenas controlled by the state, on issues of land, political access, development infrastructure and budgets. The Islamists had and have a very different approach, and one that has since infiltrated the political fabric of the other two streams (Mustafa, 2013). They built their institutions from below, working with, and developing the religiosity of communities that had been left out of both Jewish and Palestinian structures of class and power (Ghanem, 2010). On this basis, they mobilised a network of ‘self-reliant systems’ to respond to the needs of the poor, dislocated and newly proletariat communities of the North and Centre (many of whom were located in the Triangle, away from the power centres of the enclave in the Galilee). They built their base with those who were most vulnerable to the neglect of the state and the increasingly abstract political discourses of the Palestinian leadership (Rosmer,

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216 Ghanem (2010) distinguishes between different periods in the foundations of the Movement, with a more militant movement taking shape in the 1970s, and Darwish’s movement taking shape in the 1980s. However, Rubin (2014) pinpoints the founding of Darwish’s movement in 1971, when he returns to Israel from his religious education in Nablus.

217 The labels ‘Southern’ and ‘Northern’ are a confusing misnomer. The distinction is based on the fact that the ‘Northern’ Branch (led by Sheikh Raed Salah) has its head office in Umm Al-Fahm, while the ‘Southern’ Branch (initially led by Darwish; and today led by Shaykh Hamad Abu Daabes) has its head office in Kafr Qasim, approximately 15 kilometres south of Umm Al-Fahm.
2012; Mustafa, 2013). The Movement created its own civil and religious institutions, and mobilised funding and volunteers from within the community, to build the sites that house them (Ghanem, 2010). They established hundreds of schools, situated throughout the region, independent from the state curriculum, although these are closely monitored by the state’s security apparatuses (Edres, 2013). The different branches of this stream also held and continue to hold annual work camps in different parts of the country, as a collective act to strengthen communities in need. Over the last five years, the majority of this work and volunteerism have been in the Naqab, in the unrecognized villages. However, its foundations stem from the period following Markovitz’s (1985) Report and the crackdown on illegal structures that spanned the late 1980s and early 1990s (Mustafa, 2013). While the Communists and Nationalists protested the home demolitions and campaigned for new laws, the Islamists went into the villages and rebuilt the destroyed homes and communities (ibid). Parallel to their grassroots mobilisations, the Islamists progressed quickly from outside to inside, working through the municipal arena to gain hold of the governing systems of Palestinians in Israel. In 1984, the Movement contested and won the mayoral election in Kafr Bana (also in the Triangle); then, expanding its efforts in 1989, it won 45 seats and five mayoral positions, including in Umm al-Fahm (held by Raed Salah until 2001), the second largest Arab city in Israel. Today, different factions of the Movement still hold mayoral and council positions throughout the country (Rubin, 2014).

In 1996, the Movement, inspired by a similar set of political attunements to A. Bishara’s Nationalist Stream, sought to enter the Parliamentary arena (Rubin, 2014; Ghanem, 2010; Mustafa, 2012b). This decision split the Islamist Stream, with Salah seceding with what thereafter became known as the ‘Northern’ faction. The Northern Branch saw participation in parliamentary politics akin to recognising the legitimacy of the Zionist project, its ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian people, and the state’s ongoing colonisation of Palestine. It mobilised its constituents around a boycott of all Israeli institutions and called for the Movement’s autonomous control of Islamic sites, lands, institutions and symbols, in particular the al-Aqsa Mosque (Mustafa, 2012b; Salah, 2007). For its part, the ‘Southern’ Movement has since been deeply integrated into the national political arena, with a similar mandate to the other parties of the Knesset: to protect the collective and individual rights of

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218 See also Payes, 2005, p. 157-161, for more on this.
Palestinians in Israel (particularly the Muslim population). It currently leads the United Arab List and sits on a Knesset Coalition with the Arab Movement for Change. Known collectively as Ra’am Ta‘al, in the 2013 election their combined list held the largest percentage of the Arab national vote (Rudnitzky, 2013).

The distinct paths taken by the two branches return us to the conundrum of the various streams and movements within Palestinian politics. Each of the streams is dealing with a methodological-political question of how to protect Palestinian space, whether in direct and constant contestation with the Israeli state, or as a distant and disengaged space, functioning (as much as possible) autonomously from the structures of hegemonic power. The conundrum, as alluded to above, is anchored in the ambiguity of the eternal inside-outside paradox. For example, Salah, even as he purports to divest his Movement of any connection to the state (Rosmer, 2012; Salah, 2007), sat at the head of Umm al-Fahm’s Municipal Council for more than 10 years, and as deputy-chair of the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities. As A. Bishara (1997) argues, the municipal leadership is embedded in the governing structures of the state, through their dependence on the state for budgets, permits and jurisdictional authority.

The Islamic Branches’ intra-movement conflict also persists at the heart of political debates among the Nationalists, and between the Nationalists and the Communists. These have caused new rifts and alliances that seem to dilute the borders between the ideological streams, depending on where they practice their politics. Within the Nationalist Stream, there are those who see parliamentary politics as the epicentre of Zionist hegemony, a space from which there is no escape from the language, history and culture of the oppressor and coloniser of Palestine. For instance, this is the political discourse of present-day Abna al-Balad activists, like Ghantous (2012) of Birim, who argues that the Israeli state cannot be both the cause and the solution to the problems of the Palesitnian people. As mentioned above, this has also become a popular platform for several new grassroots movements, seeking alternative spaces to promote and provoke social change. These groups – inspired by the Arab Uprisings – seek to function outside both Israeli state institutions and those promulgated by their own traditional leaderships, particularly the political parties, whether inside or outside the system.

219 That said, despite the clear similarities in rhetoric and practice to the other parties in the Knesset, the Southern Islamists are often depicted as conformists to the political system, as opposed to direct challengers (Ghanem, 2010; Mustafa, 2012b; Rosmer, 2012). With the large rifts between the secularist and the Islamist political streams (Ghanem, 2010), this may have less to do with actual political practice than ideological positions, and perhaps the popularity of the Southern Movement with ‘the Arab street’ (Rudnitzky, 2013).
This is the story behind the al-Hirak al-Shebabi (the Independent Youth Movement), a collective of Palestinian citizen activists from across the political-ideological spectrum, who led the anti-Prawer Movement in the North. This is also the rhetoric of the community behind the nationalist alternative music and arts scene, mentioned above, and discussed extensively in the work of Karkabi (2013) and Maira (2013), which likewise appeals to young Palestinians from across the different ideological networks.

At the same time, those Nationalists – in particular the NDA – who work within the system, do not see the state as any more legitimate than their extra-parliamentary counterparts.

Instead, they participate in parliamentary politics because they see this as a necessary arena in which to nationalise the community, and break down the divisions inherent in the spatial alienations orchestrated by the settler-colonial state (Bishara, 1996). They also claim to participate in order to activate new borders and antagonisms with the state; to sit in its field of practice, using its tools and institutions, in order to unveil its violences and contradictions.

As Zahalka (2012) explained to me:

“... there is a paradox. Our voice is heard more because we are in the Knesset. And because we are in the Knesset, we can give a voice for our community. So, the question is not ‘to go or not to go’ to the Knesset, but what you do in the Knesset. Do you dance to their music or just make them nervous... For the Israelis, if you 'play in their square', they can tolerate it, but if you go out of the square, they don't like you and they try to ban you. We are making problems. If we are dancing with them, then we don't have the right to be there; we are just serving them.”

In this statement, Zahalka is framing the politics of being inside and outside, of claiming a space to be Palestinian within the very institutions that seek to silence his community.

Whereas some of the extra-parliamentary movements are seeking a false retreat from the state – as indicated in the discussion above of the Northern Islamic Movement – the NDA seems to be seeking out an encounter, to provoke it into responding to them. This seems very different from Palestinian-citizen advocacy within the other hegemonic arenas discussed in this thesis.

In the courts or planning arenas, stakeholders attempt to play the rules of the game in order to win it. When working in these institutional fields, they often subdue the politics of a case in order to attain rights for their Palestinian-citizen constituents. In contravention, the Nationalists within the Knesset – and more and more often, all Palestinian Party MKs – use

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220 Al-Hirak al-Shebabi is an activist umbrella network of Palestinian youth from across multiple geographic, ideological and political affiliations, and does not represent any one faction, party or identity group. The main organisers of the anti-Prawer solidarity actions outside the Bedouin community in the Naqab, were Palestinian citizen members of this organisation. Additional details can be found through multiple websites and social media pages, including the al-Hirak al-Shebabi’s (2013) facebook page, and Stop The Wall’s (n.d.) website.
this arena as a mouthpiece; to make the state uncomfortable, as it makes increasingly violent and debilitating decisions affecting Palestinian life inside Israel. This was the case when the Arab party representatives each physically destroyed Prawer’s Draft Law to Regulate Bedouin Settlement, calling it an act of apartheid in the midst of the Knesset plenum in June, 2013 (Yagna & Lis, 2013); or when Zahalka was expelled from an Interior Knesset Committee meeting in June 2014, when he condemned the occupation of East Jerusalem, and the violence of the police against Palestinian demonstrators challenging the state’s control of the al-Aqsa Mosque (Lis, 2014). Rather than reproduce the logics of Zionist hegemony, by entering the Knesset, these parties force the state to contend with a community it has done its best to contain and excise from its ‘consciousness’.

The provocation has worked. The state has consistently responded with increasingly detrimental results for the Palestinian parties. For example, in 2002, the Knesset introduced a new amendment to the Basic Law: the Knesset, that gave the power to the Central Elections Committee to ban a political party if it challenges the ‘Jewish and Democratic’ nature of the Israeli state. This has enabled the Committee to attempt to ban the NDA from standing in parliamentary elections, ever since; although the Supreme Court has also overturned the ban, every time (Jamal, 2011; Gross, 2015). The same law also allows the Committee to ban individual candidates from standing in elections. This turned A. Bishara into a constant target, beginning with the 2003 elections, until the state shifted its tactics into a more direct campaign for his expulsion from politics: in 2007, A. Bishara was accused of “betrayal and cooperation with the enemy in time of war”, and forced into permanent exile (A. Bishara, 2007c).

The Knesset Law, along with an additional 2002 amendment to the Political Parties Law, which states that “support for an armed struggle of an enemy state or a terrorist organisation against the state of Israel” is grounds for prohibiting a Party list from registering for elections (Jamal, 2011; Gross, 2015; Rouhana & Sultany, 2003), continue to be used in the current political arena. Moreover, since 2013, Haneen Zoabi has become the Elections Committee’s newest target, first for taking part in the Mavi Marmara protests, and again, in the latest elections run in 2015, for statements she made against Israel during its last war in Gaza221.

221 Additional details regarding the vilification of Zoabi since the summer 2014 Gaza Incursion and the political actions taken against her, can be found in Gross (2015).
A potential final assault on Palestinian space within the Knesset was launched by Avigdor Liberman in 2014, with his successful campaign to raise the electoral threshold for a party’s entrance into the Knesset from 2% to 3.5%. With the new threshold higher than the individual electoral base of any of the Arab parties, it is understood by many to be a direct move by the right-wing political parties to excise them from the Knesset (Isacowitz, 2014). Interestingly, this has provided the necessary incentive for a “historic” unification, between the Islamist, Communist and Nationalist streams inside the Knesset (Zahalka, quoted in Noy, 2015)\textsuperscript{222}. Then again, while this may be the first formal articulation of a unified parliamentary politics, as discussed above, the parties have long-since shared their language and practice – informed by a constant, oppositional encounter with the state – at least within the Knesset’s walls (Ghanem, 2010).

That said, the Knesset is not the only ‘frontline’ with which to engage the state. A boycott of the state’s institutions does not necessarily mean disengaging from the realm of politics, nor a reproduction of the spatial apartheid that produce the segregated enclave. Ghantous (2012) explains the boycott methodology of the popular and extra-parliamentary movements as shining a mirror up to the state from the outside:\textsuperscript{223}

“Boycotting the parliament is about alienating ourselves from the state. It’s about building our identity as being part of the Palestinian people. It emphasises our identity and gives us our immunity from Israelisation. Because, being alienated, you are not part of this. And if you are included as part of this, your identity becomes shattered. The state doesn’t want us, doesn’t want us to feel like its people, to return, doesn’t want us to be free. Good. So, on the principle side of this, we say we are not Israelis. We don’t want to be part of the system. We need to maintain our community, so we need to sometimes engage with the state, and if we get something, this is also our right to get it. But we don’t want to give the state legitimacy. We don’t want to give it a good name...”

To Ghantous, there is no room for Palestinians inside the Jewish state, and the only way to transgress its borders is to disentangle themselves from it; to sever their actions from a shared hegemonic language, and from its inherent restrictions. At the same time, this does not mean that the movement advocates disengagement from the borders, nor from direct provocations. For this reason, Ghantous and his cohort protest in shared public space, on the street in front of the Knesset, in the middle of Haifa’s main boulevard and at Haifa University; as part of a larger Palestinian movement that no longer sees the state as defining the limits to Palestinian

\textsuperscript{222} It is also important to note that, despite the participation of the DFPE, there is only one Jewish MK in the top 12 slots of the new United Arab List (Dov Khenin, of Hadash, is number eight on the slate); which continues to speak to a politics of separation along ethno-national lines.

\textsuperscript{223} This sentence was repeated by multiple activists from the extra-parliamentary parties, whom I interviewed for this study. See in particular, Naammih (2011), Cook (2012a), Zuabi-Omari (2012), and Agbariyeh (2012).
space. In practice, this has meant a focus on protest-activities divorced from the needs of daily life in the Galilee, while at the same time promoting the rights and tangible return of refugees to their lands. For example, the majority of grassroots public activities in the north over the past two years – until 2013’s Days of Rage demonstrations – have been on the issue of political prisoners or the siege on Gaza, as opposed to the control of jurisdictions, plans or community development. Moreover, these actions are increasingly produced as a separate Palestinian space, distinct from the activities of Jewish organisations and activists. Interestingly, the rhetoric to which the boycott movements speak, is somewhat similar to the separate sphere Farah (2011) advocates, within the NGO and professional spheres that work with(in) state institutions. For both, it is about being Palestinians, and disrupting the cycle and norms determined by the state. These should, therefore, be considered complimentary, as opposed to contrasting politics, which together construct a spectrum of actions through which to challenge the Israeli colonisation of Palestinian space (Elia Weizman, 2013). However, for Farah and Ghantous the borders are very different; as well as the tools with which to challenge them. The following section concludes this chapter with a discussion of the new border, from the perspective of these different voices that share the Arab-space.

Re-imaging the border – Concluding Thoughts

In each of the struggles discussed above, there are alternate conceptualisations of where the border is vis à vis the hegemonic project; and each contributes to spotlighting the cracks and crevices inherent in it (Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004). In the personal and political struggles for living space, the ‘line’ is the constriction of space, development and growth. As Sabbagh-Koury (2011) argues, “this is not only a struggle over land; this is a struggle for the very details of your life.” Thus, its ethos is about choosing where you live, how you live, where to work, where and with whom you spend your time and money, which narratives to share, which flag to raise, and so on. It is a struggle to live, and thus defy at least the basic project of Judaisation, which came to usurp Palestinians of their lands and their identities, and ultimately to physically remove and replace them.

In the struggles for return – the last tangible struggles for land in the Galilee – the line cuts through an essential hegemonic assumption of the Zionist project: that the battle for land has been settled, that Eretz Yisrael belongs to the Jews, and that the colonial project, while still unfinished, is a fait accompli. The politics of Palestinian return, direct and hidden, clash directly with this narrative, and the legal and political regimes that support it. With the spotlight on 1948, their actions immediately bring into question the way the state was
established, the accuracy of its hegemonic narratives and the legitimacy of the legislative framework that was built to protect the Zionist state from the internal-external threat.

In the struggles for autonomy and ‘difference’, the ‘line’ is the link to the core; to the state’s definitions and determinants of Arab space. The struggle thus shrinks back from the state, and its control over Palestinian life and politics, but not necessarily from provoking and targeting the regime. While the tools are debated, the focus is on how to reimagine the border. They work to define a new geographic centre, independent of the Zionist programme. This is perhaps only possible because the Palestinian space in the Galilee has been cut out from the hegemonic centre, and daily life can be lived distant from the state. The struggle for autonomy revels in that distance, which empowers and entrenches the community against the erasures and impositions of the state.

The state, for its part, contends with the different aspects of land struggle in the Galilee by reshaping itself around these threats to the political order; reconstructing the trajectories of Judaisation through containment, segregation and marginalisation. To keep it from impacting the state, the Palestinian space must remain an enclave, albeit under constant surveillance and tight control. Herein lies the paradox of the separate space, in its dialectic relationship with the colonial and ethnocratic ethos, within which it is housed. The enclave is both strengthened by and trapped within the boxes the state created to separate and fracture relations between the different Palestinian communities, and their varying threats to the territorial project, inside and outside the country. However, as the boundary-lines of the Northern struggle shifts, some of those boxes begin to break down; the borders and the threats becoming diffused as part of this process.

Several interlocutors of this case spoke explicitly of a re-spatialisation of the Palestinian struggle, pushing the boundaries of these boxes. However, to circumvent the internal borders, as exemplified in the various cases discussed above, it has been necessary to disentangle the struggle from the fight for land, in and of itself. This dislocates and disconnects the struggle from its anchor in this space, in the daily needs and daily lives of the Palestinian inhabitants of the Galilee. Farah (2011) sees this as a positive development, arguing that so long as there is a struggle over land, the Palestinian community merely reproduces and projects the colonial programme. He says:

“They keep us in a situation of struggle over land, while they invest in education and technology. The gaps are not only based on land. There is enough land between Beersheba

See in particular S. Bishara (2012), Ghantous (2012), Cook (2012a), and Farah (2011) for more details.
and Eilat, there’s enough space for 5 million more people. So, why did the state create this struggle with the Bedouin community (in the Naqab)? To keep controlling them, to keep them under constant pressure so they can’t develop, can’t increase their education and become more productive communities. Promoting this (the struggle for land) as a nationalist mission and making it so that every Jew has to promote this was a part of the state’s propaganda, and somehow we (the Palestinian citizens) adopted it. And we start to behave as if it will succeed. I don’t think it was successful, I don’t think we disappeared. The Palestinian community in the Galilee continues to develop itself, continues to challenge itself. There is development, even if the government is discriminatory – and it is, in housing, in land – but if you look at the Koenig document and his plan in 1976, that we will leave, we will emigrate. So, if you take his plan, and evaluate his plan, and our reaction, and the results, the community is here, and it (the state) has failed...

Farah (2011), in this statement, speaks of a reclaimed Palestinian space; of borders that have been imposed upon and re-defined by the communities that live away from the state and beyond the struggle over land. He speaks of a new language, a new rhetoric and a new lens for struggle and survival; to live a life truly separate from the colonial ethos and limits of the state. That said, according to Cook (2012a), Ghantous (2012) and S. Bishara, as well as several other interlocutors to the thesis, the struggle for a separate, genuinely autonomous Palestinian space does not end with disengagement from the state or its colonial trajectory; its focal practices move beyond the limits and borders the state has created to confine the community. This new struggle is about re-connecting the ‘boxes’, and re-imagining the relationship between the different ‘trapped’, internal Palestinians, as well as the Palestinians outside.

This is evident in the growing number of Palestinian activists from the Galilee225 who challenge the ‘Two State Solution’, and call for ‘One State’ between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. It exists in the re-alignment with the Palestinians in the occupied territories, alluded to in Abna al-Balad’s protests on behalf of the political prisoners and in the mass protests of July 2014, against the state’s siege on the Gaza Strip. It persists in the discourses around the Nakba, the internal and external refugees, and the links being made between colonial and apartheid actions on both sides of the Green Line. It is exemplified in the shifting methods and addressees of the struggle; in the fact that the language of Palestinian-citizen politics is increasingly in either Arabic or English – as expressed in social media; that partners in the struggle are found in international solidarity movements, as opposed to Jewish-Israelis; and that they are seeking deeper connections to their Arab and Middle Eastern neighbours and by-passing Jerusalem in the process, as journalists, as

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225 This spectrum of transgressive political discourses is not exclusive to Galilee activists; but its largest and most vocal proponents are housed within the Northern enclave.
political activists, and as academics. It lives in the discourse about boycott and the increasing and intentional distance being cultivated between the Galilee’s Palestinian political communities and their Jewish counterparts, who are discouraged from sharing either political or social spaces in the north\textsuperscript{226}.

Understanding the impact of these shifts on the internal borders is beyond the scope of this thesis. As Cook (2012a) explains, it will take some time until we can analyse their resonance for spatial relations in Israel/Palestine. Instead, this chapter points to them as a dynamic of struggle in the all-Arab enclave. However, thus far, one thing is clear: The active struggle for land and space is leading us away from the Galilee, away from the struggle for its constituents’ everyday needs, and across previously distant peripheries, to where land is still under siege, and thus the struggle for it is significant and existential.

**Epilogue – the Return to ‘Land’ as Unit of Struggle**

Over the last three years, I have watched as the Galilee’s key NGOs, political parties, general leadership (in particular the High Follow-Up Committee) and grassroots activists have slowly re-adjusted their lenses southward, to the Naqab and the newest threat to Bedouin space, embodied in the Prawer Plan. Adalah opened an office in Beersheba in 2010, when Prawer first came into being\textsuperscript{227}. By July, 2011 (when I began my field-research), the first Northern Steering Committees emerged in the south to work with local leaders on organising their campaign against the state. From 2010 to 2014, hundreds of documents, policy papers, reports, expert opinions, articles, panels and interviews have been written and presented by the main NGOs, political parties and grassroots activists from the north, whereas there had been almost none previously. In 2012, the High Follow Up Committee organised a Beersheba-based Land Day commemoration, as the main event that year. Since 2011, representatives from the northern NGOs and political parties have travelled to advocate the Bedouin case before the UN Human Rights Committees and Councils, the European Parliament, the US Senate, and South African Parliament. As mentioned previously, The High Follow Up Committee announced a National Strike Day on July 15\textsuperscript{th} and *al-Hirak al-Shebabi* took up the mantle of protest and brought the campaign to the ‘street’ with the

\textsuperscript{226} This is acutely expressed in the fact that *al-Hirak al-Shebabi* discouraged any cooperation with Jewish activists in the organisation of the Days of Rage protests. For more details, see the concluding epilogue to this thesis.

\textsuperscript{227} Although Adalah had been working with several villages on cases of dispossession and education since 2006, the length and breadth of their involvement increased exponentially since the drafting of the Prawer Plan.
‘Prawer Shall Not Pass’ campaign, and the first mass-solidarity demonstrations, since Land Day.

This shift from North to South shines a light on the historical fragmentation of the enclave from other Palestinian spaces inside Israel; and the new attempts to repair it. The ghosts of 1948 had left their mark, de-linking the communities and places of the Naqab from the North. The participation of the Galilee players exemplifies (at least for them) the new links being defined as part of the new alternative, Palestinian politics. However, it also describes a search for new frontlines. With the state so far removed from this place, there is a vacuum within which to practice resistance in tangible, practical and direct actions. To these Northern stakeholders, the battle for the Galilee is over; and the struggle for the Naqab has become their opportunity to continue to articulate their losses.

Through this prism, the story of the Bedouins has become the transposed and essential seat of the colonial project; experiencing the same policies, the same system, the same Judaisation blueprints that they – the Northern residents – did (S. Bishara, 2012). Moreover, the Galilee activists deal with the story with the same tools as they have developed for struggling in the north: through the NGOs, through addressing the international community, through de-linking the struggle from the space within which it happens and linking it to struggles throughout the Palestinian sphere. In the words of many of my interlocutors, they have brought “the capacities of the north to the communities of the south.” (Cook, 2012a; Y. Jabareen, 2011; Ali, 2013) Moreover, after so many years in which the links were severed, they have (allegedly) Palestinianised the struggle, turning the localised Bedouin movement for their rights into the “Last Palestinian Stand for Land” (Swaid, 2011; Ali, 2013; Cook, 2012a; S. Bishara, 2012). These sentiments were reproduced among almost every activist and interlocutor I spoke with from the north; whereas interlocutors from the South tell a much more complex and rich story, as is demonstrated in the chapter to follow.

Finally, as I have watched the struggle move southwards, one more thing becomes clear. The Palestinians of the Galilee, as elsewhere, are forever entangled in a dialectic relationship with the settler-colonial state; they are surrounded and permeated by this relationship, which has constructed the Palestinians as challengers to/on their shared territory. Thus, despite Farah’s (2011) claims to the contrary, there is no getting away from ‘land’ as the essence of Palestinian protest and the key to their collective and unruly mobilisations.
Chapter 4: The Naqab – Bedouin Struggles In Grey Space

**Insurgent Map of the Naqab Bedouin**

A map devised by the Unrecognised Villages of the Naqab to show the history and present-day existence of Bedouin localities, erased by the Israeli state. The area outlined in blue (by the author) is the region currently under siege by the Prawer Plan/Law, and home to the 35 villages at the heart of the case of struggle discussed in this chapter.

Source: Regional Council for the Unrecognised Bedouin-Arab Villages of the Naqab (RCUV) (2006)
The Symbol of the Struggle – The Story of Al-Araqib

“If we let go of our land, so who are we, where is our identity? If I let go of the cemetery where my father and grandfather were buried, then who am I in this country? The land defined me, defined my identity, who I am, who I was.”

Sheikh Sayah al-Turi, key activist and leader of al-Araqib, Personal Interview, 2011

On July 27th, 2010, representatives from the Israel Lands Administration (ILA), accompanied by 1300 police officers, a cavalry of bulldozers, and a helicopter brigade, razed the ‘Unrecognised Village’ of al-Araqib to the ground: Homes, businesses, animal pens, electricity generators, water tanks, and more than 850 olive trees were wiped clean from the desert landscape (J. Khoury & Yagna, 2010). Al-Araqib’s 500 residents were helmed into the cemetery that hosts the graves of their ancestors to watch the destruction; its chain link fence acting as a barrier between them and the demolition forces that had come to execute the Knesset’s newest plan to ‘settle’ the problem of unruly and ungovernable Bedouin communities in the desert. This Plan – the Prawer Plan mentioned in previous chapters – or more officially (since it received approval by the PMO office in 2012), the Draft Law to Regulate Bedouin Settlement in the Negev, had been building for decades, through various legal, political and geographic clashes over land claims in the Naqab. Prawer’s Plan was initiated to resolve what the state views as ‘spontaneous Bedouin settlement’, and to prevent the ongoing Bedouin practices of invading and overtaking State Lands, with official permissions. The Plan’s legal status is currently stalled at the Knesset, due to a variety of actions that include the Days of Rage Protests and the resignation of Benny Begin, the official who was mandated to turn Prawer’s Plan into law. However, the state has already

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228 This story is based on testimonies from a long list of interlocutors from al-Araqib, as well as other stakeholders involved in their struggle; these include, but are not restricted to, Sheikh Sayah al-Turi (2011a, 2011b), Azez al-Turi (2011, 2012), Awad Abu-Freih (2012), Yosef Ziad (2012), Nuri el-Uqbi (2013), Oren Yiftachel (2011, 2012), Gadi Algazi (2011a, 2011b), Atef Abu Rabia (2011, 2012a, 2012b) and Mansour Nasasra (2012). Specific quotes are attributed to their individual sources.

229 According to activists, lawyers and residents of al-Araqib, in the 1970s, the village residents had petitioned the Supreme Court to protect the cemetery from demolition (Sfard, 2011; Sayah al-Turi, 2011a; Algazi, 2011). According to these sources, this is the reason it was left intact and became a temporary home for many of the families after the demolitions began, until their cemetery’s immunity was rescinded in June, 2014 and all structures within it were destroyed (as recorded on the Negev Coexistence Forum’s facebook page on June, 12th; see also Couzin et al., 2014, and Cook, 2014, for details).

230 Details of the Prawer Plan can be traced back to 1975 and the first committee (headed by Plia Albeck) to develop systematic recommendations to ‘deal’ with Bedouin settlements. However, its closest predecessor was a report developed by Supreme Court Justice Eliezer Goldberg in 2008, in which he recommended recognising as many villages as possible in order to rectify the conflict over land claims (Goldberg, 2008). Prawer was meant to implement Goldberg’s recommendations, and (ex)MK, Ze’ev Binyamin (Benny) Begin was given official mandate to turn the ‘Prawer Plan’ into Law.
begun implementing its vision in the Naqab. Not unlike other ‘Plans’ discussed in previous chapters, the demolitions were initiated before any official approval was sought or given\textsuperscript{231}. Al-Araqib – which sits 8 km north of Beersheba, the metropolitan ‘capital’ of the Naqab – could be seen as a preview for how and where the Plan would be enforced, as well as a test to see if there would be any outcry among Israeli-Jews against the demolition and subsequent expulsion of the village residents (Weingarten, 2011). However, with the exception of a small community of supporters, organisations and activists, as well as a few articles by local journalists, there was no widespread response \textit{(ibid)}. July 27\textsuperscript{th} ended with the dust settling on empty space, just as the state had imagined and mythologized the Naqab since it began its settlement project in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century (Nasasra, 2012). Even the rubble was carried away with the community’s possessions.

However, the symbolic power of al-Araqib does not stem from the totality of its destruction by the state, but from the act of collective agency with which the residents responded. By the morning of July 28\textsuperscript{th}, the first tents had already been erected outside the gates of the cemetery. A week later the new shelters were demolished again, and this time arrests made, using additional forces and violence. The next day, the residents, and their encampments, returned to the site. The tents were torn down again a week later, then rebuilt, then torn down, over and over again. The cycle has continued unabated ever since. A protest tent was constructed on a hill a few steps beyond the cemetery gate and the space it inhabits is never empty. A resident member of al-Araqib – usually the village Sheikh, Sayah al-Turi – is always present, rooted against the village’s removal and replacement; along with a seemingly never-ending string of local and international visitors. The Sheikh and his family have become the voice of the struggle that now epitomises the phenomenon of ‘Sumud’ – of resilience and steadfastness – in the desert.

The resistance-story unfolding in al-Araqib since July, 2010, exposes the essential violences of the state, as the boundary lines constructed to protect and segregate the Zionist paradigm in the desert are increasingly challenged, revealed and disarticulated. This has moved the struggle beyond the village to become a central symbol of Palestinian resistance. Like the case of Ester Saba in Jaffa, al-Araqib has become the catalyst for a new wave and approach to a long-term struggle for Bedouin lands, the survival of the Unrecognised Villages, and Palestinian land struggles, in general.

\textsuperscript{231}For example, the ‘Jaffa Slopes’ project discussed extensively in Chapter Two, which was pre-emptively implemented 30 years before a version was officially approved in 1995.
The Unrecognised Context

“Do you know what is the meaning of an ‘Unrecognised Village’? You don’t recognise the people, you don’t recognise the village. You are saying to citizens of the state... ‘I don’t recognise you’.”

Dr. Awad Abu Freih, key activist and resident of Al-Araqib, Personal Interview, 2012

Al-Araqib’s ‘narrative’ is both similar and dissimilar to that of the 34 other Unrecognised Villages that persist off the maps and grids of official state plans for the Naqab. The daily life of al-Araqib residents – at least until 2010 – mirrored the survival practices of the others, all maintaining their villages without electricity, access to water, rights to government services, public transportation, schools or formal infrastructure; and living with an ongoing fear of state retributions in the forms of demolitions, evictions and hefty fines. Like the others, al-Araqib is situated outside the norms and practices of laws that do not recognise the Bedouins’ histories, their legitimacy, or the spaces they have each carved out for themselves. Also, like the others, there is no common ground with the state’s conceptualisation of their village as non-space, and the set of legal, bureaucratic and policing apparatuses used to frame al-Araqib residents as trespassers on state lands (Amara, 2008; Algazi, 2010; Sfard, 2011).

While the details are particular to each village, all Unrecognised Villages share a narrative and living experience that challenge the Zionists’ self-imposed proprietorship over Bedouin spaces. This narrative has become a core piece of the communities’ resistance arsenal, and one that is regularly shared with local and international visitors to the region, through political tours devised for this purpose – much like Sami Abu Shehadeh’s tour in Ajami. This chapter was conceived in part through the author’s own participation in such tours, and their power to reveal and contradict Zionist colonial practice. It is therefore relevant to share it, as part of the Bedouins’ struggle. However, because the state’s comprehensive razing of Al-Araqib points to an acute clash with the hegemonic order, it is their narrative that will be emphasised here, as part of the larger Bedouin story.

The Zionist version of Bedouin history begins with the retroactive construction of the Naqab as ‘legally empty’. According to several Israeli-Zionist researchers, the communities found in the Naqab during the 1948 war had migrated “recently” in the 18th and 19th centuries “from the deserts of Arabia, Transjordan, Sinai and Egypt”, and therefore held no indigenous claims to the territory (Yahel, Kark & Franzman, 2012, p.3). Economic and ecological determinants informed their nomadic movements across the desert, as opposed to proprietorship over specific territories and resources. Maps, travelogues and surveys by visitors to the region in the 19th and 20th century, as well as land and tax ordinances in place since the Ottoman
period, confirm that no Bedouin permanent settlements outside of Beersheba existed prior to
the establishment of the state (B.D.C. (Beersheba District Court), Decision 7161/06/06/07/08,
2012). Accordingly, in the immediate aftermath of the 1948 war, the entire Naqab was
expropriated to the state, following Land Ordinances initiated by the Ottoman and British
Regimes (Shamir, 1996). These open territories were appropriated under the legal
categorisation of ‘dead lands’ (known as Mewat in the Ottoman Land Registry) (ibid). Dead
lands have no owners, no development or cultivation history and no private legal claims
attached to them. They were deemed state lands during previous colonial regimes, and have
continued to maintain this status under the Israeli regime.
By contrast, according to interlocutors of this thesis, the Bedouins of the Naqab “were always
here”, as part of the tribal communities indigenous to the entire Sinai region (Marx, 1967).
Their once fluid tribal boundary-lines became fixed with the increasing interest of the
Ottoman Empire in the region, in light of the influx of foreign powers and the opening of the
Suez Canal in 1867, which brought with it new tax systems, land registries and the
establishment of military outposts in Palestine (ibid). Kedar, Yiftachel & Amara (2012),
critical legal and geographic scholars actively involved in the Bedouins’ struggle, trace the
Naqab communities’ shift towards subsistence farming and semi-nomadic settlement to this
same period; and maps prepared by the Ottoman authorities in 1917 confirm the rooting of
the different tribes within specific geographic locations of the region (Marx, 1967). The tribes
passed their lands from one generation to the next, establishing residential camps that
inevitably evolved into mud and then stone houses in the 20th century, clustered around their
permanent cultivation areas (Kedar et al., 2012). By the time the Zionists came crashing
through the desert in 1948, it was through lands already settled, cultivated and organised,
along traditional and living systems of Bedouin land holdings (Bailey, 2009; Falah, 1989).
Approximately 91,000 Bedouins, from 95 different tribes, inhabited the entire area of what is
termed today the Beersheba Sub-District, an area consisting of more than three million
dunams of land and equalling 62% of the total area of the Israeli state (Marx, 1967; Falah,
1985; Bishara & Naamnih, 2011232).

232 Figures regarding the number of Bedouins living in the Naqab prior to the establishment of Israel are
contested, ranging from 65,700 (Marx, 1967) to over 95,000 (Falah, 1985). Throughout this thesis, the figure of
‘91,000’ is used, as it was repeated in a majority of interviews and texts.
The War of 1948 brought with it the end of the Bedouin Naqab. As was the case on the Northern coast\(^{233}\), the military’s path through the desert resulted in the consolidation of Jewish territory, to a large degree along the perimeters of the UN Partition Plan; according to which, the majority of the Naqab, excluding Beersheba, had already been slated for the future Jewish state. They destroyed villages and tent encampments, and – in some cases – forced entire villages to march towards the new borders with Egypt and Jordan (Neumann, 2011; quoted in Zochrot, 2011\(^{234}\)). When the first censuses were taken after the Nakba, only 11,000 Bedouin-Arabs, from 19 tribes, were recorded; their communities severely fragmented and fractured by the new Armistice Lines (Falah, 1985; Marx, 1967).

The Bedouins who remained were concentrated into an area of approximately 1000 square kilometres in the north eastern Naqab, designated as the Seyag or ‘enclosure-zone’, by the Israeli military\(^{235}\). Marx (1967) furthers the metaphor of the contained space and the life of those within it, labelling it ‘the Bedouin Reservation’. As Marx (1967) explains, the Bedouins’ containment within the “compact and easily accessible reservation in the Eastern Beersheba plain, facilitated the policing of these ‘unsettled’ people (p.40)”, and, in particular, prevented their use of lands the state sought to consolidate for its own territorial project.

According to Swirski & Hasson (2006), two thirds of those inhabiting the Seyag in 1960 had been dispersed from elsewhere in the Naqab. Today, the communities are still haunted by the divisions imposed on them through their enclosure, with status and inter-family relations still accorded on the basis of land holdings. The categories have essential reverberations in present-day social-spatial relations, with those who held lands in the Seyag prior to 1948 continuing to live on their lands, albeit without recognition of their official ownership claims; those who lost their lands in the Western Naqab, and were forced to lease lands from the state; and those who were landless labourers (the fellahin) and were also given access to leasing agreements after the establishment of the state.

Except for a small pocket of land north-west of Beersheba (today home to Rahat, the Bedouins’ largest township), the Seyag looks like an upside-down triangle. It is flanked by Beersheba in the west, Dimona in the south, and Arad in the east. Its north eastern boundaries

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\(^{233}\) See discussion in Chapter Three on Plan Dalet and the method by which the state constructed the border between Jewish and Palestinian space in the North of Israel.

\(^{234}\) Amnon Neumann’s testimony about his participation in the Nakba, as a Palmach (Zionist pre-state militia unit) soldier, was filmed for a project initiated by Zochrot. According to Neumann (2011), his unit burned down villages and forced the Bedouins they encountered, to march to the borders at gun point, in order to “clear a path” through the desert.

\(^{235}\) The word Seyag is a Hebrew term, meaning ‘fence’, and was the military’s official name for the enclosed zone that housed the Bedouin after 1948. A map of the Seyag can be found in Appendix 3.3 to this thesis.
are situated on the Armistice Lines that cut through the south-Hebron hills of the West Bank; and its western limit is Highway 40, the north-south crossway that connects the centre of the country with Eilat, Israel’s most southern city. The Highway also acts as the border between the Bedouins and the rest of Israel (Abu-Freih, 2012; Prawer, 2011). It frames the bounded and shrunken territory in which Bedouins, citizens of Israel since 1954, exist, separate from, secured and controlled by the state. The Prawer Plan officially marked the division, but it has been entrenched in both Jewish and Bedouin societies through more than 60 years of urbanisation and relocation policies, land expropriations, planned erasures and movement restrictions. No villages and land claims east of Highway 40 will be recognised under the new Law. Al-Araqib sits on the southern edge of the small north western pocket, a few kilometres east of the Highway; just outside the official Seyag zone.

Until the state arrived in al-Araqib, the community’s presence on its lands could be traced back centuries (S. al-Turi, 2011; Nuri el-Uqbi, 2013; Michael Sfard, 2011). Evidence of their continuous geographic cultivation of at least a majority of the land has been found throughout the claimed territory; along with ancient building-ruins, long-standing wells and since 1914, the dates on the tomb stones in their cemetery. Al-Araqib also holds Ottoman tax and registration documents that date back to at least 1905, further tax documents from the British Mandate, dating back to 1917, and land purchases conducted between Al-Araqib land-owners and Jewish organisations from the turn of the 20th century (Sfard, 2011; B.D.C., Decision 7161/06/06/07/08, 2012).

The army’s displacement of village residents in 1951 shares a set of familiar tropes to the stories of Birim and Iqrit, discussed in the previous chapter; as well as countless other villages (S. Abu Rabia, 2012; Nasasra, 2012). The villagers were told that the area in which they were living, was a security concern, and had been marked as a military zone. Al-Araqib lands would be ‘closed’ for six months, but once the region was stabilised, the community would be able to return. In the meantime, the residents were transferred to the Seyag and scattered among its settlements. However, before they could return, the area was allocated to the Development Authority, sharing the fate of the majority of cultivable lands in the Naqab and throughout the new state. However, unlike Birim and Iqrit, the state expunged al-Araqib

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236 See Appendix 3.4 for details.
237 The Draft Law also implements tighter borders to the south and to the west, along Highway 25 and Highway 80, respectively; both more than 10 km inside the original Seyag lines. A map of these limits is included in the appendices section of this thesis.
from the formal record, as if it never existed; as if there was nothing to which they could return. For over 60 years, the residents – like so many other victims of the state’s policy – have been trying to find a lawful path to reclaim their village. For more than a decade, village leaders directed letters to the authorities in Beersheba and Jerusalem, including the Prime Minister, trusting they could convince the officials that a mistake was made (el-Uqbi, 2013; Nasasra, 2012). When the state introduced the 1969 Land Registry to systematically engage with the question of Bedouin land claims, al-Araqib’s land-owning families registered their lands and continued to appeal to the state through endless legal and bureaucratic chains, including contesting the transfer of their lands to the JNF and to Jewish settlements in the late 1990s. In 2006, a new set of private land claims were initiated by the el-Uqbi family against the state. These are, at the time of writing (July 2014), being adjudicated at the Supreme Court.

At the same time, there are several families who continued to cultivate their lands and circumvent the military order to maintain their homes in the village. Awad Abu-Freih, another leader from the current struggle, was born in al-Araqib in 1962, from a family that never relocated (Abu-Freih, 2012; Algazi, 2011). Many others, also without state permission, returned after the end of the military regime; and others still, after another 20 years of rejections, returned in the 1980s and late 1990s (Nasasra, 2012). Sheikh Sayah al-Turi, who by then had been re-settled to Rahat, was among this more recent wave of returnees, arriving back in al-Araqib in 1999. In S. al-Turi’s words:

“I’ve been waiting for more than forty years to be allowed to return to my land, but this dream has never come true. As a consequence, we decided to return to our native land and to build shacks and houses without obtaining the permission of the Israelis. This is our land, and I will live here forever, and I will not wait for the Israeli authorities to defraud us any longer.” (2009 interview with S. al-Turi, quoted in Nasasra, 2012)

238 In other areas of the country, such as the Galilee, Israel respected Palestinian private ownership, based on British documentation. However, almost no such land rights were respected in the Naqab (Yiftachel, 2006). That said, as discussed in Chapter Three, an extensive spectrum of laws and planning policies were implemented to expropriate private Palestinian lands in these other regions.

239 See Bishara & Naamnih (2011) and Nasasra (2012) for additional examples.

240 The el-Uqbi family’s claims have been through a legal rollercoaster. The Magistrate and District Courts in Beersheba supported the state’s argument (see for example, B.D.C., Decision 7161/06/06/07/08, 2012); but in the ongoing case at the Supreme Court (H.C.J. 4220/12), the state’s request for automatic transfer of al-Araqib lands to its name was denied (Aslosoroff, 2012; Sfard, 2011). In addition, in June, 2014, the Court requested the two sides enter into mediation (NCF Website, 2014; Jahalin Association Website, 2014; Keller, 2014) (a proposal which, according to Yiftachel in a personal communication in July, 2014, the state rejected). The other families, including al-Turi, have also submitted legal petitions to settle their claims, but as yet, none have reached the court.
S. al-Turi’s emphasis on ‘Return’ is key to al-Araqib’s entanglement with the hegemonic order, and its differential position within the state’s land lexicon. As will be discussed more comprehensively below, the Unrecognised Villages of the Seyag primarily fit into one of two categories: They were either settlements that existed prior to 1948, but have no official status; or they were created by the state, through on-going displacement from outside and within the enclosure zone and are, nevertheless, still excluded from the future vision of the region. The struggle for the villages’ collective and individual recognition weaves together several strategies and discourses that attempt to connect both kinds of cases. These include indigenous claims to property based on continuous presence and cultivation of lands; private ownership rights, based on traditional systems of customary law; rights of citizens to choose where and how they live; and the rights of all people to lives of dignity and respect. These clash directly with the state’s narratives, and with the logic that determines unredeemed – un-Judaised – land, a threat to the Zionist project, and to the plans and maps that have made claims to Bedouin space. However, until al-Araqib, the challenge had been contained by the lines imposed on the reservation. While many Bedouins lament the loss of their lands and their right to return to them (S. Abu Rabia, 2012), their present demands are bound to the places they currently inhabit. Al-Araqib intersects the ‘right to recognition’ – and thus to ‘legal’ existence within/through the state – with the ‘right to return’ – the right to reclaim refugee lands expropriated by the state during the Nakba. In so doing, it constitutes a challenge to the boundary-lines of the Reservation and cultivates a new frontline through which to engage the state’s hegemony over the Naqab.

**Wars of Attrition – Creating the New Border**

The state responded to al-Araqib as if under siege, slowly escalating the confrontation from surreptitious to increasingly direct and violent attempts at evicting the community. Until the late 1990s, the state maintained control of the lands via bureaucratic distance; expropriating lands on paper, rejecting the legal appeals but making no direct move to colonise the area (Algazi, 2014). Then, in 1998, the al-Araqib family-holdings (primarily el-Uqbi and al-Turi lands) were transferred to the Jewish National Fund (JNF) for forestation purposes. On this basis, a court order was instituted in 2000 with the first set of evictions. When the families didn’t leave, in 2002, then again in 2003 and 2004, the state sent crop-dusters filled with pesticides to destroy their fields and fauna. Thousands of trees and plants, and hundreds of animals died as a result (Yiftachel, 2006; al-Turi, 2011; Algazi, 2011). Still, the village remained, leading to partial demolitions in 2005, while the state worked towards
implementing a new development plan to hasten investment and Jewish migration in the south (Yiftachel, 2009a). In the meantime, the state approved and settled Kibbutz Givot Bar in al-Araqib territory, while the courts consistently rejected the community’s objections (Or Movement; Jewish National Fund, 2004).

Today, the structural and direct violence instituted as part of the Prawer Plan is just another reconfiguration in this war of attrition. Under the guise of the new Plan, the village was demolished 65 times between July 27th, 2010 and June 12th, 2014. In addition, the state has charged the Al-Araqib activists with criminal offenses, sued them for damages and costs of the demolitions, and vilified them in the Jewish public arena. During the 55th demolition-day, on August, 25th, 2013, the police arrested 4 leaders of the struggle – all members of the al-Turi family – for their ‘illegal’ occupation of the site (Tarabut-Hithabrut, 2013). The release of the detainees was initially conditioned on their never again being able to step foot on al-Araqib lands; an attempt by police to circumvent on-going court cases on the question of land ownership and de facto recognition of the community’s rights to their village. They refused, and with the support of lawyers, activists, family members and intensive international pressure, managed to thwart the restraining order. However, the state still would not concede. On the day of the 65th demolition, the cemetery compound was invaded by demolition forces. The array of structures built since 2010 to hold together life in al-Araqib were torn down and the last haven of resistance destroyed. A final evacuation order, promising the removal of all people and belongings from the village-site, was delivered on July 12th, 2014; however, at the time of writing (August, 2014), had yet to be implemented.

Al-Araqib, in turn, has entrenched itself in Israeli space, against increasing programmes of erasure. Before 2010, acts of Sumud and survival strategies helped to carve out and demand space beyond the Seyag line. After 2010, in addition to continuously rebuilding the village, residents have evolved a range of advocacy tactics to spotlight their struggle, in public, legal and legislative arenas. An international campaign primarily targeting JNF funders and the international Jewish community, which exposes the JNF’s forestation and colonisation of al-Araqib lands, has been led by residents of the village and promoted by several local Jewish

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241 The OR Movement (established in 2002) is a Zionist-settler movement, seeking to forward the Judaisation programme in the Naqab and the Galilee; Kibbutz Givot Bar is one of their projects.

242 For an example of the rhetoric used to discredit al-Araqib and the Bedouins’ claims for recognition, see Franzman (2014); Yahel, Kark & Franzman (2012); Tal (2013); Segev (2010); and B.D.C., Decision 7161/06/07/08, 2012.

243 There is currently an injunction from the Supreme Court, protecting the villagers from their ‘final’ eviction until a decision is made on the issue of land ownership.
NGOs; the Negev Coexistence Forum (NCF), Rabbis for Human Rights (RHR) and Tarabut-Hithabrut are its main partners in these activities. However, many other Jewish and Palestinian organisations have developed their own al-Araqib solidarity campaigns. The public campaign runs parallel to the legal campaign for private property rights, litigated by Michael Sfard, one of Israel’s most prominent human rights lawyers. Through the case, the community has mapped the extensive physical and legal evidence that exists to corroborate the claims of a continuous indigenous presence and rights to this land. Al-Araqib activists have linked their protest to the ongoing work of Palestinian and Jewish NGOs seeking to ‘legalise’ all Bedouins’ claims; they have propelled the northern Palestinian activists and politicians to initiate collective action, on their behalf, and informed the critical geographic, legal and political research of multiple local and international academics, exemplified in the work of Nasasra (2012) and Kedar et al (2012). Their politics have also extended to the public street, with residents organising almost weekly demonstrations at the “Lehavim Junction”, at the point where Highway 40 reaches the entrance to Beersheba; and with their leaders taking the helm of multiple demonstrations in Beersheba and Jerusalem. They have shared their story with countless outsiders, and their narrative has appeared in thousands of articles, human rights reports and public fora, inside the country and across the globe. They have developed several platforms through which to speak directly to their Jewish/Israeli audience, seeking justice and recognition of their rights through the courts, at the Knesset and in the mainstream media (el-Uqbi, 2014). Most significantly, they have held onto the mourners’ protest tent, without interruption, since the first demolition day; although since the June 2014 eviction of the cemetery, the al-Turis hold the space without the tent, on mats, underneath the night sky.

When I began mapping the Bedouin case in 2011, a human rights lawyer warned me against spotlighting Al-Araqib in my research (Human Rights Lawyer, 2011). She explained that the case is an exception that harms the larger legal campaign of the Unrecognised Villages; many of its residents were relocated and given plots of land elsewhere, which implies that they gave up their land claims in the move. Within the restrictions by which Israeli law has

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244 NCF, located in Beersheba, was founded to cultivate Jewish and Palestinian co-existence in the Naqab and has become a major resource on village demolitions, as well as key actors in the anti-Prawer campaigns. Tarabut-Hithabrut is a joint Jewish-Palestinian grassroots activist organisation (sitting under the umbrella of the DFPE), seeking social and political justice for all who share the territory between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River; Rabbis for Human Rights is an international Jewish (Rabbinic) organisation, whose mandate in Israel is the protection of all vulnerable communities.

245 This kind of statement can be harmful to the lawyer’s reputation; although she consented to the use of her real name, it is not given here.
contained the Bedouin struggle, in accordance with a deeply ethnocratic and colonial hegemony, there is little chance of their success. However, it is for precisely this reason that this case is crucial to a study of resistance; an unruly and transgressive component of the spectrum of actions to retain and protect Bedouin space. It is also the reason so many of those interviewed for this study are inspired by the case, many pointing to the fact that Sheikh Sayah has a home in Rahat, and yet chooses to live and fight in a protest tent in al-Araqib. Al-Araqib, which is reclaiming land outside the reservation, which has proof it existed prior to 1948, which seeks recognition and return, has forced the state to define and defend its limits. It has become the contentious outsider, disarticulating the hegemonic order as others engage and reshape the discourse from within more sanctioned, albeit grey lines and spaces.

**Dynamics of Power and Resistance**

“We should transform the Bedouins into an urban proletariat in industry, services, construction, and agriculture. 88% of the Israeli population are not farmers. Let the Bedouins be like them. Indeed, this will be a radical move which means that the Bedouin would not live on his land with his herds, but would become an urban person who comes home in the afternoon and puts his slippers on... This would be a revolution, but it may be fixed within two generations. Without coercion but with governmental direction ... this phenomenon of the Bedouins will disappear.”

Moshe Dayan, (then) Minister of Agriculture, Haaraetz interview, July 31\(^\text{st}\), 1963 (quoted in Ben-Amos, 2013)

“The objective of the formalization of the settlement is to provide an opportunity to Bedouins in the Negev, and particularly to their children, to leap within a few years to a better future through integration in the economic prosperity expected in the Negev in the coming decade, and the ending of a situation in which a large population resides in homes that were built illegally. The need for the development of the Bedouin settlements derives from this objective; from it derives the need for planning regulation and from it derives the need to settle land ownership claims.”


These two statements are separated by 50 years, like book ends to the evolution of the state’s plan for the Bedouin residents contained within the Seyag zone. The time in between them frames the dialectic that positioned the Bedouin as outsiders, and their struggle for recognition ‘inside’ the hegemonic order. It starts with Dayan’s vision for Bedouin urbanisation and ends with Begin’s schematic for integrating the Bedouin community into ‘the future prosperity’ of the Naqab. Their shared rhetoric articulates the Bedouin communities as a problem for the development of the Jewish state; their spatial and social relations antithetical to the modern, colonial settlement project. Their shared solution is configured through the state’s legal and planning frameworks, through which contentious populations can and should be controlled and re-ordered to fit the development needs of the
national programme. Although, contrasting with Dayan, Begin’s document proposes a process of dialogue with the Bedouin communities, it works to impose a solution that functions with the same logic as that of his predecessor, and ultimately holds the same result: “to move the Bedouin off their lands and to continue to control them as aliens, refugees or simply unseen in their own homeland.” (Abu Kafr, quoted in Yiftachel, 2006, p.208)

Despite the difference in language and approach, the prism with which Begin and Dayan each shaped their policies remains the same: the state, its lands and its institutions belong exclusively to the Jewish people; and sovereignty is established primarily on the basis of physical presence and conquest of territory, through demographic, jurisdictional or symbolic control. The Zionist-project is enshrined in the material and spiritual ‘redemption’ of land, based on Jewish ethnicity and the purity of the space (Yiftachel, 2006). Through this lens, the indigenous Palestinian has no claim, no legitimacy, and no place, despite their factual presence in the midst of Israeli territory (Piterberg, 2008). The Judaisation project, for which each of these lawmakers is at least partially responsible, seeks to entrench this ‘truth’, through ongoing segregation and exclusion of Bedouin communities from the state’s political, social and spatial organisation; leading to their removal, replacement and redemption by Jewish spaces.

The distance between Dayan and Begin is informed by more than time. It speaks to the clash between state hegemony and Bedouin frontier resistances, causing a long-term stalemate in the state’s attempts to forcefully reorganise Bedouin settlement in the Seyag zone (Yiftachel, 2006). The shift in trajectory is expressed in Begin’s acknowledgement that some of the Bedouins were expelled to the Seyag; in his support for settling Bedouin land claims according to their historical rights, even if he negates their legal rights; in his understanding that Bedouin spatiality needs to be respected; and in his commitment to recognising some of the unrecognised villages (Begin, 2013). Dayan sought to remove any evidence of a Bedouin presence in the Naqab by encouraging their ‘transfer’ and absorption into ghetto-enclosures within the Mixed Cities. He had no intention to maintain the Seyag; to create separate Bedouin localities, which would require services, infrastructure and support from the state; or to recognise Bedouin space or history (Yiftachel, 2006).

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246 When Jaber Abu Kafr made this statement, he was the chairman of the Regional Council of the Bedouin-Arab Unrecognised Villages of the Negev (RCUV). The RCUV acts as a collective leadership council for the Unrecognised Villages; more details of which shall be discussed below.

247 Until the establishment of the Bedouin planned townships in the 1970s and 1980s, many of the non-land-owning Fellahin Bedouin migrated to Bedouin neighbourhoods in the central and southern Mixed Cities to find work at the lowest rungs of the Israeli economic strata (Khadra Elsana, 2011).
The enclave was imposed from above as a colonial construction, and reshaped from below by those upon whom it was imposed; entanglements that have prevented Dayan’s prophecy from coming true. The state devised physical and ideological boundaries through a two-pronged methodology, intersecting myth and law on one hand, planning and punishment on the other. However, the state’s limits and encroachments evolved in dialectic encounters with a border entrenched by the Bedouin community, in their resistance against erasure.

**Dead Spaces**

The legal-mythological frame with which the state approaches the desert is an evolving practice, performed as an ongoing and unabated expropriation of Bedouin space – an ongoing Nakba. The erasure begins with the Zionist pioneer dictum, in which the Naqab was the empty landscape that would house the Jewish refugees. It encapsulated the romance of the ‘frontier’; a land without people for a people without land, to be conquered, tamed and settled by the Zionist project (Kark, 1981). The Bedouin communities were incorporated into the myth, as nomads without competing legal claims to what became State Lands. At the same time, the violent events of 1948 were whitewashed in the Judaisation of native names, places and symbols (Benvenisti, 2000), and legitimised in the long-term nation-building project that developed in their aftermath.

Key to this process was the official untying of the Bedouin people from their lands, first by displacing them and then by denying the existence of village names and geographic markers (al-Asem, 2011). Bedouin identification cards include tribal affiliations, where there should have been an address; as is the case in all official state documents. As of 1949, there were no more Arab ‘villages’ in the Naqab. As Abushbeikh (2011), a Bedouin activist and ex-fieldworker for the RCUV, explains:

“In my ID, it says that I am from the tribe of Abu-Grinat, although I am from al-Bat village*. They put my address according to my tribe, because a tribe can be anywhere, but a village is something that exists in a place. The state does not want us to have a hold on the village. If the state writes that my address is ‘Al-Bat’ then it means that it recognizes this village... In Israel, there isn’t a single map with us on it. Only tribes – and tribes aren’t geographic places, they’re just tribes.”

The empty space myth was further facilitated through legislation and policy; what Kedar *et al* (2012) labelled the ‘Dead Negev Doctrine’ (DND), in their collation of the various legal, planning and policing methods used to efface Bedouin land claims on either side of the Seyag

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*An unrecognized village*
The state then created a legalese for erasing Bedouin ownership claims, in accordance with their categorisation as primarily *Mewat Lands* that had never been registered under the *Ottoman Land Ordinance* (1858) or British legal regime’s *Mewat Land Ordinance* (1921), mentioned above. The Land Regime was entrenched in the cultivation of the reservation as a frontier border, a holding place for the ‘Bedouin dispersion’ (*Hapsura*, in Hebrew; the state’s official term for the Bedouin inhabitants of the Naqab) that could be controlled, monitored and regulated. The empty spaces were enforced through laws that limited over-grazing and cultivation outside ‘recognised’ land holdings; and further checks to Bedouin movements were orchestrated through tribal leaders, appointed by the state to funnel resources to their newly dependent and trapped communities (Marx, 1967; al-Haj, 1993; Cohen 2010). Water, land-access, work and travel permits were transmitted as part of a system of punishment and reward, nepotism and co-optation, bargaining and negotiation (Cohen, 2010; Marx, 1967). In parallel, a Military Unit – known as Unit 101 – was established to intimidate and coerce Bedouin communities into acquiescence and forced sedentarisation (Falah, 1985; Swirski & Hasson, 2006). Aside from daily acts of harassment, Unit 101 was responsible for the destruction of encampments, the killing of herds, and, in 1953, the massacre of women and children from the el-Azazmeh tribe (Falah, 1985).

The containers marked by the military regime were made official in the Planning and Construction Law (1965), and the evolution of the central planning mechanisms upon which consecutive District Plans have excluded and negated Bedouin claims. It paved the way for resolving the ‘Bedouin question’ through a second mass transfer of the population, from ‘spontaneous’ and, according to the state, illegal agricultural clusters on large swathes of land.

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249 For further details of the Law, see the table on the Legal Land Regime, in the Appendices to this thesis.
250 The *Ottoman Land Ordinance* (1858), upon which the Israeli Land Law (1969) is based, determined several land-categories for according ownership; *Mewat*, which refers to uncultivated/dead lands more than 1.5 km from the closest ‘permanent’ settlement, was one of them. The British Land Ordinance prohibits the acquisition of *Mewat* land through cultivation; although legal possession could be obtained within two months of promulgation of the order in 1921 (Falah, 1989). The Israeli state utilised the two ordinances and the lack of registered land titles as evidence that the Bedouin had no official claims to Naqab lands. For more in-depth discussion of the ‘doctrine’, see the table in the Appendices to this thesis, as well as Kedar et al (2012); Shamir (1996); Falah (1989); and Swirski & Hasson (2006).
251 The ‘Dispersion’, a rhetorical tool that effaces the idea of a rooted and settled Bedouin community, is discussed more comprehensively below.
252 For example, the ‘Black Goat Law’ (1953) was set to prevent Bedouin goats from grazing on land appropriated for forestation or Jewish settlements. For more details, see Falah (1985)
253 To discuss the breadth of actions used in the first decades of the state to ‘divide and rule’ the Bedouin communities of the Naqab is beyond the scope of this thesis. For further details, see Cohen (2010) and Marx (1967).
into condensed, urban arenas. The state established seven ‘Planned’ Townships in the Naqab: Tel el-Sab/Tel Sheva (1969), Rahat (1971), Shaqib al-Salam/Segev Shalom (1979), Ararat an-Naqab/Arara Ba Negev (1982), Kuseife (1982), Lakiya (1985) and Hura (1989). These could be seen as the state’s first major concessions to Bedouin resilience, as a majority of communities resisted the move to Mixed Cities, and re-oriented themselves to live within the reservation. However, the towns also represent a darker reality that further entrenched the “spatial isolation” of the Bedouin peripheries and the border between worlds (Yiftachel, 2006, p.201). In addition to the ghetto experience of the townships, which were built without the economic or social infrastructure to sustain them, all space outside them mirrored the nothingness of Zionist mythology. The unplanned areas of Bedouin settlement were either left blank on maps and regional plans, or designated for public uses such as sewage plants, forests, industrial zones, and, in the case of the Unrecognised Village of Assira, an airport (Yiftachel, 2006). In parallel, the state reconfigured the DND to apply to the Seyag, as well. New legal precedents were concretised in the 1970s and 1980s (beginning with the 1974 decision in the el-Huashlia case), as Bedouin communities sought formal avenues through which to prevent their forced displacement to the new urban centres. These early cases continue to provide the state with legal justifications for denying land rights in current legal actions.

The slow, evolving intersection of myth, law, planning, construction and destruction has produced a near-impenetrable hegemony. It hides the purposeful ordering of an ethnically pure Jewish state inside the Zionist colonial prism, which cannot ‘see’ the native, and has constructed its framework in the Naqab on this basis. Shamir (1996), in his review of the first Bedouin legal cases, argues that “law plays a crucial role – through its distinct logic of ordering and its techniques of surveillance – in turning the Zionist vision into a taken-for-granted objective reality.” (p.7) Yiftachel (2006) and Falah (1985, 1989) make similar arguments concerning the Planning regime’s spatialisation of the Naqab to support Jewish control and disbursement. Benvenisti (2000) unveils this process in the state’s re-mapping and re-writing of the Naqab, in the first decades of the state. The result, according to Sultany

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254 On Israeli maps the Hebrew names are used (i.e. Tel Sheva as opposed to Tel el-Sab). They are mentioned here for clarity, but henceforth only the Arabic names will be used.
255 According to Swirski & Hasson (2006), more than 235,000 dunams of Bedouin lands have been appropriated within the Seyag, since 1948, for the sake of public works, industrial development and Jewish settlement.
256 For extensive analysis of the initial legal precedents, see Shamir (1996); Kedar (2003); and Sultany (forthcoming, 2014). For discussion of the relevance of the legal precedents in present day cases, see B.D.C., Decision 7161/06/06/07/08 (2012); and Kedar et al (2012). See also Begin’s (2013) report, p.10, for his allusion to legal precedents that negate the legality of the Bedouins’ claims.
(forthcoming, 2014), is the construction “not of a mere binary between nomad and ‘western’
perceptions of property (p.16)”, but of a methodology that in and of itself has determined
where and how Bedouin live; and is “part and parcel of the ongoing dispossession of the
Bedouin from their lands *(ibid)*". Within this frame, the Bedouins cannot win. Regardless
of official documentation, expert testimony or physical evidence to the contrary, Israeli legal,
geographic and planning arenas have constructed a ‘dead-zone’ where once there was
Bedouin life.

At the same time, Bedouin life persists, cultivated as external to the hegemonic order;
‘unseen’ in official terms, but key to the relations of space that have produced ‘the Naqab’
since 1948. The critical legal and planning scholars discussed in the previous paragraph posit
the evolution of Bedouin subalternity as the result of the ‘dark side of planning’, legal
ethnocracies and intentional neglect and marginalisation*. They see Bedouin space
primarily in terms of its victimisation, with informal space considered an essential tool of the
planning landscape as a way to contain ungovernable populations (Yacobi, 2009; Yiftachel,
2006). Accordingly, Bedouins exist in ‘non-space’ – unrecognised space – because the
hegemonic frame excludes them; enabled by the fact that there is no ‘legal’ mechanism
through which to contest or threaten state ownership of the Naqab. However, it is also
possible to consider the same processes as unruly resistances that are difficult to remove; the
line in which they are contained as evolving, mediated in the dialectics of power and struggle.
The Bedouins, in entrenching themselves in the margins, behind the border, negotiate a
complex paradox. They become complicit in the segregation and marginalisation of their own
communities, and the hegemonic ordering of the Naqab without Arab space; similar to what
we have seen in the state’s treatment of the northern border zones. At the same time, the
Bedouins have reclaimed their lands from the erasures of Zionist hegemony, carving grey
spaces out of dead ones.

**Grey Spaces**

“... *In our rightful Sumud, we have no choice but to break the law... because the law and its
plans came to this place and tried to erase it many years after we were here... our community
belongs to this place, and the place belongs to our community... even if our houses are*

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*Sultany’s (forthcoming 2014) analysis, citing Shamir’s (1996) work, is based primarily on the logic of legal
hegemony. However, it is relevant to geographic and planning discourses as well, and is included here in
reference to all forms of hegemonic ordering in the Naqab.*

*These terms – developed by Yiftachel & Yacobi (2003), Kedar (2003), and Yiftachel (2009) – have appeared
throughout this thesis, in discussions of the contained localities of the Galilee in Chapter Three and the
gerettoization processes at work in Ajami, in Chapter Two. They have also become the essential frame through
which Bedouin spatial politics are discussed in academic and non-academic circles, today.*
“demolished again, we shall remain on our land... we cannot ever accept the plan that destroys our only community.”

Attiyeh al-Athamin, council leader for the Unrecognised Village of Chasem Zaneh at a public hearing in Beersheba, 2008 (quoted in Yiftachel, 2009a)

As mentioned in previous chapters, the starting point for the theorisation of grey space is within the work of Oren Yiftachel, in which he conceives of the Unrecognised Villages as enclaves positioned “between the lightness of legality/approval/safety and the ‘darkness’ of eviction/destruction/death.” (Yiftachel 2009, p.243) Grey spaces are “neither integrated nor eliminated… and exist outside the gaze of the state authorities and city plans (ibid)”.

Accordingly, Bedouin grey spaces function outside the state. They survive because they live off the map, separate from the system of power. Grey space thus implies a mutual ‘bargain’, in which the state contains the threat of dissonance and disarticulation in this othered, external frontier; and those that inhabit it, in a sense, comply with and entrench themselves within these limits. However, while it is relevant to understand the evolution of Bedouin struggle in light of Yiftachel’s theory – encircled and yet excluded, developing in the shadow of the state’s darkened lenses – this is not the whole story of this case. The Bedouins use their position in non-space to engage the internal borders; while the state continues to isolate, delegitimise and remove that which breaches its hegemony over ‘dead’ and ‘living’ spaces.

Throughout this thesis, ‘grey space’ has been discussed in reference to nearly all Palestinian space, which is marginalised in its exclusion and segregation from the social, political, economic and living spaces of Jewish society. By the same token, such an analysis resonates with the experience of all marginalised peoples, particularly indigenous groups in settler-colonial settings; wherein the space they occupy is always ‘grey’, whether or not they are sanctioned as part of the map that is devised by colonial geographies. All Bedouin geography functions according to the same logic, determined as peripheral space within the Zionist landscape. However, there are shades to ‘grey’ that are particularly relevant in the Bedouin case. These are reinforced in the sub-divisions of Bedouin spatiality, ‘recognised’ versus ‘unrecognised’, ‘planned’ versus ‘spontaneous’; divisions which are imposed, on one hand, via mass forced displacements, and on the other, by debilitating anti-development policies.

The state’s intention is to close in on the ungovernable spaces, developing the conditions by which they can be regulated, controlled and manoeuvred as needed, and ultimately segregated and erased from Jewish space. The gradations of grey contribute to this process, as the state paints some Bedouin space as illegal, and some permissible, often in conjunction with a community’s acquiescence to different ‘transfer’ policies (Raanan, 2011; Shamir, 1996).
Bedouin space is categorised in one of three ways in the Naqab: There are seven Planned Townships, 11 Recognised Villages and 35 Unrecognised Villages (RCUV, 2006). The Townships are formally included on maps and in the Beersheba Metropolitan plans, but little attention or budget allocations have been afforded them (Abu-Saad, 2008). The ‘Recognised Villages’ were previously ‘Unrecognised Villages’ that gained their status, most in 2004-2006, through mechanisms introduced by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2003, to regulate Bedouin settlement; to some degree, these were established in response to the refusal of a majority of the communities to relinquish land claims outside the townships. The Unrecognised Villages are those villages without any status, boundaries or permanency in the eyes of the state.

The lines between these categories are largely elastic, with many of the townships acting as home to unplanned and unrecognised neighbourhoods; and with the Recognised Villages still having no formal plans that can legalise housing situations, infrastructure development and municipal services. Many of the buildings are still under demolition orders, and the communities are as vulnerable as before Recognition. Even their representation in two new District Councils – founded explicitly to govern the needs of the newly recognised localities – has not evolved into formal, elected bodies. Their residents still have little to no control over the space and the lives lived within it. That said, it is important to carve out a distinct analysis for the Unrecognised Villages, and the type of resistance that is formed through/inside the legal-political bubble in which they exist: un-addressed, un-seen, and “suspended in space” (Shamir, 1996).

The Bedouins’ darkest spaces – resilient and rebellious, a counter-point to the colonial and allegedly modern order of Judaised territory – are articulated, first, in physical and aesthetic terms. Nili Baruch (2011), an urban planner from Bimkom: Planners for Planning Rights, who worked with the Unrecognised Villages to create an ‘Alternative Master Plan’ (2012) to the official state version, explains: “The state plans as if there’s nothing here. But there is

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259 In the state’s lexicon, the Recognised Villages are referred to as ‘State-Established Villages’ (RCUV, 2006).
260 In January 2003, Sharon’s ‘5 Year Plan’ for the Naqab, known as the Sharon-Livni Plan, was approved. The plan sought to recognise an additional seven Bedouin villages in exchange for relinquishing claims over additional lands. Some saw this plan as a breakthrough of the Bedouin lobby, particularly since it resulted in an additional four villages being recognised, bringing the grand total to 18. However, nearly 40% of the plan’s 1.8 billion shekel budget was allocated to “law enforcement”, a well-known euphemism for home demolitions; particularly since the remaining Bedouin communities would be “relocated” to the newly recognised villages or planned townships, in exchange for some monetary compensation, and tracts of land within the recognised areas. See Swirski & Hasson (2006) and Yiftachel (2006) for a more detailed discussion of the Plan.
261 A Map depicting the Plan and its ‘vision’ for the Unrecognised Villages of the Seyag can be found in Appendix 3.5 of this thesis.
something here, and the way the space is planned and used by the community has a function”. Bedouin spatiality, like Bedouin systems of law, grows and develops as it is lived, according to community relations in space (Karplus & Meir, 2014). For example, in a traditional Bedouin village – a model reproduced in the majority of the Unrecognised Villages – the family units are marked by clusters of houses; tribal relations linked in concentric circles. They grow out of each other, and yet each unit is segregated, private and protected from intrusion (Raanan, 2011; Baruch, 2011). According to Yeela Raanan (2011), a Jewish anthropologist and RCUV case-worker, there is nothing in the Israeli planning model that looks like this, and there is nothing in the Israeli hegemonic order that can accommodate this. The Bedouin village space reflects and is produced by deep ties to land and family identities, and the continuation of a lifestyle that is independent from an urban reality. Moreover, it has become a particularly distinct alternative to the modern grids, condensed space, and increasingly impoverished havens for drugs and criminal activities, that have become pervasive in the planned townships.

This image of a ‘different’ living space is then punctuated by a lack of schools, infrastructure, electricity, even water. Homes are built out of temporary materials, mirroring their temporary status. The villages do not appear on the state registry; as a result of which there are no addresses through which to register one’s identity, and thus no right to local services, government representation or for their residents to run for governmental positions. Demolitions and evictions are an ongoing and recurring reality, constructed as part of Bedouin lived-experience in their grey-zoned space. The villages have continued to survive here at a high cost, consciously, intentionally; not a mere by-product to being forgotten or excluded victims of the ethno-colonial mythology of dead, empty space, but produced and embedded through struggle.

The villages evolved as enclaves against an endless series of urbanisation policies, compensation schemes, and registration programmes set to encourage, then coerce and finally force the Bedouins into the townships. At first, relocation policies were orchestrated through the offer of extensive subsidies and compensations to all residents who gave up their traditional land claims. The Bedouin Land Registry (1969), mentioned above, was initiated to collate and track the claims, and facilitate the new mechanisms in place for transfer and compensation. For their part, the Bedouins used the Registry as a method through which to legalise their land holdings, establishing their first mass attempts to cultivate recognition within and through hegemonic tools of the system. More than 3000 individual memoranda
claims (on behalf of more than 12,000 claimants) were registered, in reference to 990,000 dunams of land; a puzzle that fit together to cover the spectrum of Bedouin territory, inside and outside the Seyag (Bishara & Naamnih, 2011; Swirski & Hasson, 2006; Sfard, 2011)\(^{262}\). After five years, the state closed the Registry, and left the claims to sit in bureaucratic limbo for 30 years, while orchestrating its own counter-claims and using a multitude of para-legal actions to build its own facts on the ground (Sfard, 2011; Swirski & Hasson, 2006). When the courts finally began adjudicating the claims in 2005, after years of lobby by the Bedouin communities, the DND precedents and planning mechanisms were reaffirmed. Out of the 200 that finally reached the courts, all have been decided in the state’s favour.

Within the 30 year gap in legal mechanisms, the enclosure of the Seyag and increasing isolation of the communities were an essential response of the state to its unruly populations. Ties were severed with the centre of the country, and the communities were ordered through proxy institutions established in Beersheba. At the pinnacle, sits the Bedouin Development Authority, the local arm of the ILA in the Naqab (Swirski & Sasson, 2006). Established in 1986, the Authority’s initial mandate was to conduct negotiations with the Bedouin who submitted land-title claims. However, over the years, its jurisdiction has expanded to include all services, planning, construction and policing of the Bedouin Recognised Villages; and to deal with any hindrances to these processes (ibid; S. Abu Rabia, 2012). It has been responsible for the creation of such organisations as the Green Patrol, a descendent of Unit 101 with a similar mandate to uphold agricultural and environmental policies initiated to contain Bedouin “unregulated grazing” and land-cultivation, through any means necessary. It also inaugurated the new Authority for the Regulation of Bedouin Settlement, charged with implementing the Prawer Plan/Law and recruiting a new, expanded military unit (called ‘Yoav’) to enforce it.

Alongside the institutions, more direct acts of harassment constructed the boundaries of recognised and unrecognised living situations. Direct violence initiated by The Green Patrol was a mainstay of the 1980s, through which over 900 Bedouin encampments were destroyed and over 100,000 goats killed (Falah, 1985). House demolitions became the central policy for coercion following the publication of Markovitz’s (1985) report on illegal construction and

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\(^{262}\) The amount of land to which the claims refer varies, in accordance with different sources. In addition to the amount quoted above, the Land Settlement Department statistics offer a figure of 776,856 dunams (Falah, 1989). Begin quotes 559,000 dunams as registered through Bedouin claims (Begin, 2013), and the highest approximations mention 2.4 million dunams claimed by Bedouin communities (Falah, 1989).
grey buildings\textsuperscript{263}; and since the late 1990s/early 2000s, whole villages began receiving eviction orders. The demolitions have escalated along with the number of evictions, throughout the 2000s – up to and including the razing of Al-Araqib; with yearly numbers reaching the 200 mark or higher since 2007, and peaking at more than 1000 demolitions each year since 2011, when the Prawer Plan was approved (Yiftachel, 2009a; Adalah, 2013; Negev Coexistence Forum, 2013). Although it should be noted that every time a home is torn down, the villagers – through support from the RCUV and the Islamic Movements – rebuild it (Yiftachel, 2009a; al-Asem, 2011; Mustafa, 2013).

Still, a more surreptitious stick remains the key frame for enforcing the border between white and dead space; and slowly encroaching and removing the grey ones. For those who have refused to move, the state set up a clear contrast between the ‘modern’ townships and the unregulated settlements. Yiftachel (2009) has labelled this process ‘creeping apartheid’; where no formal division of rights and communities has been accorded through the law, but in practice the segregation is exceptionally clear. The state orchestrated a blanket negation of the right of the unrecognised residents to any state services, benefits or protections; and then rationalised the division, explaining that it is only by containing Bedouin settlement within the townships that the state can ensure the Bedouins receive benefits and the support they need to acclimatise to ‘modern life’\textsuperscript{264}. Interlocutors to this thesis – both Bedouin and Jewish – consistently describe this policy in contrast with the differential treatment for Jews in the Naqab, whose single-family farms receive state services, and thus approval and legitimacy. Despite these pressures, only half the Bedouin population of the Naqab – approximately 100,000 of 190,000 – have moved to the townships, and of these, the majority were either\textit{Fellahin}, which had no traditional land holdings and sought to reverse their status within the Bedouin social infrastructure; or were among those whom had lost lands outside the Seyag. Moreover, only 30,000 dunams out of nearly 1 million have been ‘settled’ through the legal machinery. This points not only to the state’s prolonged stagnation of the claims process, but to decades of resistance to the systematic ‘resolution’ of the Bedouins’ (non)place within the hegemonic order (Abu-Saad, 2008).

\textsuperscript{263} The Markovitz Committee Report (1985) is discussed more fully in Chapter Three, in reference to the policy of home demolitions it initiated in the Galilee region.  

\textsuperscript{264} See the Bedouin Development Authority’s (2006) letter to Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), for an outline of their policy on Bedouin relocation, subsumed within a response to PHR’s request for information on water installation for the Unrecognised Villages.
The Unrecognised Villages represent a key encounter, in the interplay between the hegemony of empty space and those who inhabit it. They encapsulate a physical arena through which the capacity and desire to resist the state continues to evolve by living without it; by surviving its aggressions and cultivating relatively autonomous social and political relationships; and by living outside the parameters of what can be assimilated by the state, and is, instead, bordered and contained. However, the Bedouins’ grey-spaced resistance is neither limited nor protected by their position on the margins. In contravention to the segregated peripheries in the north, which are to some degree protected by a stronger and more concentrated Palestinian demographic, their ‘borders’ have not produced paradoxical havens from the state.

In maintaining a ‘rightful Sumud’, as al-Athamin calls it, the Bedouins directly contravene the Judaising logic that seeks to swallow Arab space (in the Naqab and throughout the country), and a range of activities have developed out of this ‘steadfast resilience’. Many of their resistance practices were orchestrated on the basis of the villages’ exclusion and expulsion from the hegemonic order. For example, the Bedouins have produced alternative maps, plans and political organisations from their position in non-space and of non-recognition. However, the Bedouins’ engagement in the struggle to recognise, plan, organise, own and develop the villages pits them directly against the boundaries that have determined their outsider status. Framed as a struggle for recognition, from outside-in, the clash between Bedouin grey space and state space have revealed, activated, breached and disarticulated the borders between them. The remainder of this chapter will be focused on these issues.

**The Bedouin Struggle – Engaging the Lines**

In the Bedouin case, there are multiple ‘struggles’ occurring simultaneously, weaving in and out of each other, sometimes in conflict and sometimes in concert with one another. There is a struggle for indigenous land rights, which challenges both the colonial and ethnic logics of the Zionist regime. There is a struggle to plan and order life, in accordance with a slowly evolving Bedouin spatiality, that can be simultaneously modern, in terms of modern infrastructure and economic opportunities; and traditional, in terms of agricultural space, lifestyles and social relations (Abu-Freih, 2012; Baruch, 2011). There is an anti-hegemonic struggle against the state’s tools of erasures, maps, plans, legal infrastructure, colonial narratives and historical mythologies. There is also a struggle against the ongoing limbo and vulnerability of grey space by citizens that seek their rights to be part of the state, without giving up their identity, their connection to the past, and their capacity to develop in the
future. These pieces intersect to form a comprehensive, existential struggle, against a siege on Bedouin space that negates their past, present and future in this place. According to Khalil el-Amour (2011), a founder of the RCUV and resident-activist from the Unrecognised Village of Assira, if the state is successful:

“it will eliminate the Bedouin lifestyle. If they succeed, and force all of us to relocate to the towns and cities, there wouldn’t be any more Bedouins in Israel… If it will happen, this will be our next disaster. We had one disaster in 1948, with the loss of 90% of our population. Now, no one will stay outside. Everyone will be concentrated into these concentration camps, and will need to survive there. To be or not to be, this is the issue.”

Hence, the struggle, which has been framed by interlocutors to this thesis as ‘a last stand over land’, has evolved as a symbol for all Palestinian resistance against their erasure in and by Israeli territorialisation.

Each element of the above begins in the same place, outside the hegemonic order, in the dark, blank spaces of the Zionist colonial map. Yet each is shaped by constant interactions, engagements and negotiations with the state, its frontiers and its limits. While Bedouin space is re-claimed, redrawn, and re-visibilised through struggle – in particular through the creation and maintenance of grey spaces – recognition is, ultimately, awarded from top-down. The following sections unpack the trajectories of these engagements and permeations in the Naqab. The discussion follows two key anchors of Bedouin resistance, which intersect and build on one another; particularly since the Praver Plan came into being and fixed the border between them.

The first of these is the case of the initiation and development of the RCUV; the second, to which we have already been introduced, is that of Al-Araqib. The RCUV, founded nearly 20 years ago, set the frame for Bedouins’ radical contentious politics. While it has constructed its resistance arsenal within the arenas of the political system, mirroring the state’s language, professionalism, governance structures, maps and plans, it works from outside them; in large part because they have been excluded from all formal systems within the state. Al-Araqib uses many of the same methods, language and tools as the RCUV, but, at the same time pushes the frontline further, as it directly protests the physical and political ‘lines of apartheid’ drawn by the Seyag zone (Abu-Freih, 2012). Together, these case-examples are a window into the evolution – and explosion – of Bedouin struggle, in dialogue with the state’s increasing assault on their communities. They also unveil the different types of hegemonic

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265 This sentiment is repeated throughout my interviews, by all interlocutors to this thesis.
boundaries activated and challenged by Bedouin resistances, and the resulting disarticulations and re-articulations of black, grey and white spaces on the colonial map.

**The Regional Council for the Unrecognised Bedouin-Arab Villages of the Naqab**

“The RCUV is made by the community for the community. The community created this on its own.”

*Ali Abushbeikh, Personal Interview, 2012*

The RCUV, like the Popular Committee in Jaffa, was established through a spark that shifted the shape and collective capacity of the various campaigns for Bedouin land rights (Raanan, 2011; el-Amour, 2011, al-Asem, 2011). In the 1970s and 1980s, as the Land Registry, compensation schemes and forced urbanisation became failed solutions to the state’s “Bedouin problem”, rumblings from the community were dismissed by the state’s claims that ‘The Bedouin have no leaders; no one to negotiate with’. The community saw many of their traditional leaders as vassals of the state, through whom benefits and punishments were distributed and whose protections could not hold back the rampant home demolitions and mass transfers. As the elders flailed, a burgeoning young leadership arose to engage the state and the repercussions of its new plans for the Seyag. Many of this young leadership were among the first to attain higher education, to challenge the state on Bedouin land rights and to join the larger Palestinian political infrastructure that slowly infiltrated the desert during and after Land Day, in 1976.

A small, but viable network was in place by 1995, when one of their members, Dr. Amer al-Huzeil, organised a conference to discuss the future of the “Bedouin Dispersion”, in light of increasing pressures from the state to relocate. The conference theme is significant to the transformative nature of this origin story. The Bedouins referred to settlements outside the townships in the same way the state had, as part of a “dispersion”. This linguistic mechanism perpetuated the legal mythologies of empty lands and nomadic Bedouins, and defined the communities’ concentration and sedentarisation within the Seyag, as a spontaneous act that inherently denied their land claims. This framed the spectrum of resistances until this point, containing the Bedouins’ demands within individual settlements and families, either through more formal arenas, like the Land Registry or at the court system, or through informal, everyday actions that put facts on the ground, like rebuilding demolished homes and

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266 The story of the RCUV struggle is pieced together from multiple interviews, in particular Khalil el-Amour (2011), Yaela Raanan (2011), Ali Abushbeikh (2012), Atiyeh al-Asem (2011), and Atef Abu Rabia (2011, 2012, 2013). In addition, multiple documents and secondary sources have been surveyed for a full picture of this history. Quotations are sourced, appropriately, as needed.

267 The first of which, the Association for Support and Defence of Bedouin Rights in Israel, was organised by Nuri el-Uqbi in 1976.
continuing to survive outside the planned-zones (Abu Rass, 2011). It was at this meeting that a truly collective struggle – and thus collective recognition – was conceived, through their (self) articulation of the Unrecognised Villages. Raanan (2011) describes the moment like “a bang”:

“And they were in this meeting, about how to re-do the leadership, and that’s how the idea of the villages came up. It was electrifying. Somebody said, I don’t belong to a tribe, but I live in a village. Because their IDs said they belonged to this or that tribe, and the government called them ‘dispersed’, ‘the dispersion’. And they said no, we are not ‘the dispersion’, we are villages. And they went around the room, and just started asking where people were from, what was the name of their village. And then they re-Christened their villages with their names.”

According to Attiyeh al-Asem (2011), the first chairman of the RCUV, the leadership group concretised the existence of the villages, confirming to themselves that they were fixed, in a particular geographic place, with historic resonance that could be claimed not by tribes, but by residents. Over the next two years (and beyond), they sent out geographers, planners and case-workers to determine the boundaries and re-claim place-names erased by the Judaising project. Their work involved talking to their fellow villagers, sharing the idea and creating an insurgent process from the ground up that has since been embedded in the communities; evolving as a shared struggle for self-recognition and self-democratisation. As Abushbeikh (2012) remembered in our interview:

We went to talk to the elders, to young people, to everyone in the villages and asked them, what is this village called? And they would say, ‘this is Rahame’, or ‘Assira’ or ‘Wadi al-Naam’. And (we asked) ‘where are the borders?’ And they would show us, and say here is where it starts, here is where it ends. And we did this over and over again…This helped us to be able to organise ourselves, the fact that we knew what and where each village was. Then we put the symbols on the map and we recognized them.”

The RCUV came into being with the recognition of the villages and with the creation of the map Abushbeikh references. This map, in keeping with discussions from previous chapters, is much more than an ‘alternative’ to the state’s hegemony over cartographic imagery. It is a physical expression of the Bedouin’s reclamation of the space, in its direct clash with and disarticulation of the state’s hegemony over Bedouin territory, before and after 1948. This was further reinforced in the fact that as each new village joined ‘the map’, the RCUV put up

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268 During field-visits to Assira and Wadi al-Naam in 2012, in which I spoke to ordinary residents of the villages in group fora, this understanding of the process and experience of self-recognition, as well as the significance of the map and alternative plan in cultivating their collective struggle, was reiterated.

269 As discussed in Chapter Three, much of the discourse around counter-mapping is limited to this idea of an ‘alternative’, something often discussed in the abstract as a way to entrench memories and narratives in a physical representation. For an example of how counter-mapping is implemented more typically, see Fenster (2004) and Zochrot (2012).
a sign-post and paved a gravel road to the entrance to mark the space (Payes, 2005). The initial map started with 45 villages, collected through the participatory process described above. However, successive and increasingly radical maps have been developed to describe a more comprehensive Bedouin story. These maps now include the more than 60 destroyed villages that once existed beyond the Seyag, differentiating between those established before and after 1948, and pointing to the multiple transfers suffered and survived by many of these communities. They also distinguish between the Planned, State Recognised and still Unrecognised Villages, compare Jewish and Arab jurisdictions and population densities, and incorporate a highly politicised discourse. In the 2006 version that introduces this chapter, the townships are called ‘concentration townships’. It also directly points out the state’s attempt to absorb the campaign by calling the Recognised Villages, “State Established Villages”, on official district plans and maps.

The map represents a complex documentation of past and present, of unequal development and ethnic discrimination, of recognised and unrecognised space; and of the narrative discussed at the start of this chapter. According to Abushbeikh’s (2012) analysis it helped shape the Bedouins’ own understanding of their relationship to the state, to their neighbours and to their own villages. It was “the most important thing (they) achieved (ibid),” constructing the lines against and around which they organised their resistance.

The mapping process also shaped who would be included in a collective struggle for recognition; wherein recognition was not about individual property rights – a battle that continues alongside it – but a collective right to justice. Communities became bound to a particular name, and thus, a particular place. This gave the founding activists the idea of establishing a representative council, a democratic body that could intervene on the Unrecognised’s behalf. This body became the RCUV.

**Insurgent Methodologies – Working From Outside-In**

The RCUV has four main strategies, each evolving a set of methodologies that attempt to force recognition from the state (Payes, 2005; el-Amour, 2011; Raanan, 2011; Abushbeikh, 2012). Each strategy stems from a place from which the Bedouin have been erased or completely left out: the creation of a governing body; developing an alternative plan for the villages; empowering their communities; and visibilising the struggle in national and international platforms. With each layer, the practical reality of being ‘Unrecognised’ has

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270 This number refers to all Bedouin villages in the Naqab, excluding al-Araqib and the Planned Townships. The 34 other Unrecognised Villages, discussed previously, are part of this group, as are the 11 that have been recognised since the RCUV began its campaign.
been, to some degree, chipped away, unbinding the limits of grey space, as the struggle activates and crosses over the hegemonic borders imposed by the state.

The first recognition strategy evolved as the RCUV organised itself into an alternative governing body, cultivating their position as the ‘frontline’ for negotiations with the state. The RCUV functions like any other regional council in Israel (Payes, 2005). Each of its member-villages elects its own community council, which acts as an address through which to resolve internal issues within the villages and to articulate their needs and interests with the regional body (RCUV, accessed 2013; Abu Gharbiyeh, 2012). The head of the community council becomes the village’s representative to the RCUV. In 1997, when it was first founded, 22 villages sent representatives to the council. Today, all 35 still Unrecognised Villages, including al-Araqib, are members. Their goals, according to el-Amour (2011) have remained unchanged: to achieve recognition for all the Unrecognised Villages and attain the services and infrastructure that allegedly accompany legitimacy. This ethos of ‘recognition’ has transformed the struggle, integrating the villages’ demands of the state with their communities’ development as a (somewhat) cohesive collective, with joint legal rights and indigenous claims. Other than its registration as an NGO, the state has never accorded the RCUV official status. However, as the RCUV became more organised and more vocal, the State was forced to contend with them.

The work on the Map evolved into two additional tactics, as part of the strategy to carve out recognition through the state. First, they sought to negotiate with the central planning bureaucracies that define the infrastructures, services and development of Bedouin spaces, akin to the central planning mechanisms that negate growth and development of Palestinian communities in the Galilee and Jaffa. Second, they began to implement these alternative plans through legal arenas. In both cases, the intention was to create an alternative discourse and counter-reality to the Planning Ministry’s long-term invisibilisation of Bedouin settlements and their “development needs”; as well as to challenge the logic and inevitability of the District Master Plan for the Beersheba Metropolitan Area (14/4), upon which the Prawer Plan and Draft Law are based. The Metropolitan Plan has been under development since 1995. In its current iteration, it expands the district plan for Beersheba eastward deep into the Seyag, swallowing the main drag of Unrecognised Villages between Arad and

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271 See Chapter Three’s discussion of the Misgav Regional Council, for clearer depictions of how official regional councils function within the Israeli governance structures.

272 Further details on the Beersheba District Master Plan can be found in the table of relevant Planning Documents in the Appendices to this thesis.
Dimona. It includes a budget for the establishment of 10 additional Jewish settlements, which will replace the Bedouin villages to be displaced by the new Law (Swirski & Hasson, 2006; Mair, 2008; Bishara & Naamnih, 2011).

In Meir’s (2005) study of the RCUV, he chronicled the organisation’s development of a methodology he labelled ‘insurgent planning’. The process took form in the development of an “Alternative Plan”. It utilised the professional tools and criteria with which the state had planned the region, in order to create the conditions through which Bedouin space could be made ‘visible’ in official, hegemonic channels. The Bedouins’ counter-vision was then fed back into the establishment, through hearings with the Planning Councils, lobbying at the Knesset, presenting the Plan in a variety of national public arenas, and working with local and international media (ibid). The document, *A Plan for Development of a Municipal Authority for the Unrecognised Bedouin Arab Villages of the Negev* (published by the RCUV in 1999), was coordinated by al-Huzeil in collaboration with the spectrum of RCUV constituents, like the Map before it. The plan is a concrete articulation by the Bedouin communities of what their space could and should be. As alluded to above, in 2012, after two years of field-based consultations, al-Huzeil’s plan was updated and expanded in a new configuration, jointly produced by the RCUV, Bimkom (through a team led by Nili Baruch and Oren Yiftachel), and *Sidre*, a women’s empowerment organisation in Lakiya. The *Alternative Master Plan for Bedouin Villages in the Negev* (published collectively in 2012) builds upon the first plan, but then takes the professional planning process further. It contributes a full district plan for all 46 Bedouin villages in the Naqab, and incorporates specific models for planning the villages according to both traditional living space and the evolving needs of the community, as part of a modern state. This includes plans for how to connect the villages to public services and infrastructure; how to develop their industrial potential; and how to expand their open and green/leisure spaces.

The legal stream was a complementary funnel through which to embed the Plan within hegemonic arenas, and expand the boundaries within which Bedouin spaces are recognised. The RCUV worked with several lawyers and organisations, including *Adalah, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), and Physicians for Human Rights in Israel*

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273 See discussion in Chapter Two on ‘insurgent mapping’ for additional analysis and applicability of Meir’s (2005) framework.

274 The 2012 plan produced some key tensions in the community when it was launched in 2011, as al-Huzeil challenged some of its findings; but after it was carefully vetted by a Palestinian planner hired by the High Follow Up Committee, at the request of Bedouin representatives to this body, the plan was approved and signed by all 46 communities included within it.
(PHR-I), a medical rights association, to create a methodology for ‘backdoor recognition’ through human rights litigation in Israeli courts. These were called ‘creeping recognition’ cases, based on the idea that if the state recognised a village’s right to water, education or other integral services, it was akin to recognising the right of the village to exist and giving it physical form within Israeli territory. The majority of cases are advocated through the lens of citizen rights and policy discriminations, with the issue of Bedouin territorial justice hidden and subsumed within the court-room transcripts. However, despite – or, rather, because of – the lack of direct political challenge, the tactic often works, with the villages receiving the technical right to access public water grids and build schools. At the same time, the state often neglects to implement the courts’ decisions, or finds ways to circumvent them.

Darijat – situated 20 kilometres north-East of Beersheba – which was recognised in August 2004, offers a direct window into how these strategies and processes converge to exploit the cracks in the Israeli system (Yiftachel, 2006). Darijat was the first Bedouin village to be recognised; and the first non-urban Bedouin locality to be incorporated into the official state map, breaking through the lingering legacy of Dayan’s policy of forced urbanisation (ibid). Its resistance arsenal incorporated the spectrum of actions discussed above, primarily using the courts and appealing to the planning infrastructure. Working within the system, the villagers negotiated the more direct ‘recognition’ route, producing evidence that documented their presence on their lands since long before 1948; as well as the back-door route, building and then receiving permission for establishing social facilities for the community, including a school and health clinic. Then again, the timing of the village’s recognition coincides with Sharon’s 2003 plan (The Sharon-Livni Plan, discussed above); and Darijat is one of the 11 that were recognised through its mechanisms.

Parallel to the work outside – on the frontlines with the state – the RCUV worked on the inside, to cultivate a concrete resistance with(in) the villages themselves. The resilient networks and survival mechanisms of the villages became sources of empowerment; and their residents became integral constituents in the implementation of the Alternative Plan and essential to their third recognition strategy. As Abushbeikh (2012) explains, the RCUV worked with the different leaders, including the tribal sheikhs and traditional leaderships, as well as council representatives, on developing the autonomy of the different villages, and enhancing their capacity to manage them as grey spaces, off the grid and beyond direct

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275 See Adalah’s website for multiple examples, as with: H.C.J. (High Court of Justice) 5108/04 (2004); C.A. (Civil Appeal) 9535/06 (2006); C.A. 2541/12 (2012).
control of the state. They taught them how to ‘find’ electricity and water; how to survive the pressures of life without state services; and how to share their story with the media and general (Jewish) public. They also worked directly with the constituent communities themselves, “to empower them in order to be able to live under such difficult conditions. We went from community to community, working with them to understand the Plan; to learn it for themselves and to get them to agree to it; to understand how to work with the state and the media; and to help them manage the daily life in the villages.” (ibid) A conscious and radical Sumud has evolved out of these activities, and are exemplified in the paved roads, solar panels and generators that exist in every village; the olive groves that are planted in just the right spot, to collect water running down from public water utilities in the area; the mobile schools and health clinics that are constructed before the court-based efforts to legitimise them; and even the sign posts that signify the geographic entitlement of the villages.

The RCUV’s fourth strategy seeks ‘recognition’ beyond the Seyag, and beyond the lines of the state. This has been organised through the RCUV’s spectrum of public actions, geared to spotlight the Bedouins’ story to national and international platforms, and to prevent their erasures from going unnoticed and unchallenged. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the RCUV has organised an endless number of protests, in Beersheba, in the recognised villages, at the edge of the different highway junctions, and in Jerusalem, outside the Knesset276. They have either initiated or contributed to hundreds of reports, missions, public campaigns and media articles, often in collaboration with local and international human rights organisations277. Then there are the tours, led by different RCUV members and community leaders. As mentioned above, the community sees the ‘tour’ as a direct and radical challenge to the state’s rhetoric on Bedouin histories, memories, identities and above all, Bedouin spaces. They are an active expression of all that was consolidated into the Map and the hopes of the Alternative Plans: of self-recognition and self-mobilisation, resilience and survival. The tours have become central in articulating the Bedouin narrative to the rest of the world, and reclaiming their story from the mythologies of the state.

276 One such series of protests, which culminated with a sit-in, in front of the Knesset, led to the establishment of the Goldberg Committee in 2007 (Noach, 2011; Algazi, 2011).
277 Examples include Human Rights Watch’s (2008) Off the Map; the 2012 Country Report on Israel to the UN Council for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ECOSOC); Adalah’s (2011) Nomads Against their Will; the Adva Center’s (2006) documentation of government policies toward the Bedouin called Invisible Citizens; position papers by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel & Bimkom (2012, 2013); campaigns by Rabbis for Human Rights (see www.rhr.org) and Jews for Justice for Palestinians (see www.jfjfp.com); articles in Israeli media (see for example Curiel, 2009; J. Khoury, Rinat & Rosenberg, 2011; and Jacobs, 2013) and international media (see for example, White, 2010; Humphries, 2007; and Sherwood, 2011).
There is a long list of local partners that have been enlisted – or enlisted themselves – in mobilising their publics in solidarity with the Unrecognised Villages, an in depth discussion of which is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is worth mentioning the most relevant, which includes those mentioned above, the Negev Coexistence Forum, Rabbis for Human Rights, Tarabut/Hithabrut, as well as AJEEC, a joint Jewish-Arab organisation that has been providing monetary and infrastructure support for Bedouins since its establishment in 1998; and Adalah, which has developed an international advocacy campaign against the Prawer Plan and litigated multiple creeping recognition cases and collective recognition/eviction cases, including Assira and Umm al-Hieran (which are discussed below). Another constant partner has been Shatil, the advocacy arm of the New Israel Fund (NIF) charity, a progressive international Jewish organisation, which works with the Unrecognised Villages to develop services, programmes and human rights advocacy. It is worth mentioning as well, the extensive community of predominantly Jewish legal and academic experts that have become part of the struggle; the extensive support system that has been mobilised among Jewish communities locally and abroad; and the fact that both groups’ participation pre-dates and dwarfs the mobilisations initiated by the Palestinian northern advocacy organisations and political parties until the establishment of the recent anti-Prawer movement. The Northern and Southern Islamic Movements are the exception, as each, according to Mustafa (2013) have been directly involved in supporting the Sumud of the villages and rebuilding demolished structures for more than a decade.

The previously missing Palestinian support systems highlight the historical divisions between the north and south, as discussed in the previous chapter. The boxes imposed to fracture Palestinian struggle since 1948 has concentrated Bedouin struggle within its internal boundary lines, much like they have kept the Northern struggles contained and localised within the Galilee enclave. Thus, the significance of the expanding number of Northern and external Palestinian solidarity movements over the last four years refers also to their capacity to reconnect the different land struggles, and disarticulate the border that has enforced their separation.

At the same time, the participation of so many Jewish – and even Zionist – activists and organisations brings to the fore multiple questions about how the Bedouins’ struggle for recognition has been absorbed, interpreted and reframed to fit within the hegemonic spheres of the state. These intertwine with debates forwarded in the Jaffa and Galilee cases regarding the power of the hegemonic project to reshape itself around rhetoric and practices that do not
directly counter its legitimacy and territorial control. The RCUV has developed an extensive and effective array of practices with which to carve out space for the villages inside the state: 11 villages were officially recognised since the establishment of the RCUV; the state has been forced to contend with the council leadership and with the narrative they have shared with the world; and the communities, recognised or not, have entrenched themselves physically within space the state claims is dead, empty and open for Jewish settlement. They have even changed how the state negotiates and deals with the communities. As Begin’s (2013) report confirms, they are ‘Unrecognised Villages’, as opposed to disbursed tribes. In his language, they are an impoverished and disadvantaged community, deserving of rights, that will not just disappear into the state, as Dayan once suggested. At the same time, ‘recognition’ – and the spheres through which it can be achieved – is and always has been determined by the state, which enshrines the limits and lines it has defined to protect itself. The limits of the ‘recognition discourse’ have particular reverberations in the various hegemonic tools utilised by the RCUV. One example of this is the overly professional language of the 2012 Alternative Master Plan, which outlined a methodology for recognition on the basis of the state’s own planning frame, without directly questioning how space is designed or imposed.278 Another example can be found in the court cases, in the way they either limit the legal petitions and claims to the ‘erroneous’ application of Mewat to village lands, or to a recognition of citizens’ rights without tackling the political history that creates empty maps, plans and unrecognised settlements, in the first place. Even when a village succeeds in winning its collective eviction/recognition case, the limits of the hegemonic frame are maintained. For example, the Beersheba District Court denied the state’s request to evict the residents of Assira, el-Amour’s village. However, the Judge’s decision still supported the legality of the state’s appropriation of Bedouin lands under the Land Appropriation Law (1953), while at the same time arguing that evicting Assira’s 350 residents would serve no public purpose (B.D.C, Decision 62341-01-12, 2014). Moreover, the same logic enables the state to displace a village, when this act does serve a ‘public purpose’. This is the reasoning given in judgements surrounding the collective recognition/eviction case of Umm al-Hiran, which, according to the Beersheba Metropolitan District Plan, is to be replaced by a new Jewish settlement, Hiran. Umm al-Hiran was displaced from the Western Naqab in 1948, and despite documented evidence that the current

278 See the Regional Strategy, Integration of Villages into Metropolitan Plan, included in the Appendices to this thesis, for an articulation of the problematic usage of planning tools, without questioning the frame within which they are implemented.
settlement was designated by military order, the residents are considered invaders of State Lands (Bishara & Naamnih, 2011). Moreover, the Court’s decision, which accepted the argument that Umm al-Hiran was given permission to settle in the Seyag, still claimed that the state has the right to revoke its ‘permission’ at any time (B.M.C. (Beersheba Magistrate Court), Decision, 3326-04; 3341/04, 2009).

Altogether, the RCUV sits in a precarious position, in which it cannot escape its dependency on the state. As Begin’s (2013) report on the Draft Law reminds us, there are no legal mechanisms through which the villages can be recognised, and so an extra-legal framework (i.e. the Prawer Plan) must be devised to resolve the ‘problem’ of the Bedouins in the Naqab. This has made it possible for the state to hold the communities’ futures hostage, while villages are bulldozed in the present; or for planning mechanisms to be left in bureaucratic limbo for all the Bedouin villages and townships, until the land claims are resolved. It has also left the RCUV vulnerable to the manipulations of the state, which targets its strongest leaders and holds ‘recognition’ ransom. In several cases, chairmen of the RCUV have been pressured to accept recognition deals for their own villages in exchange for leaving their posts. In parallel, the state has worked to strain ties between the communities represented by the RCUV, negotiating with some, while ignoring or demolishing others (Raanan, 2011). The result of this has been a slow hollowing out of the RCUV, until, in 2012, it almost collapsed279. Despite this, the RCUV’s cultivation of Sumud within the different villages has sustained the autonomy of the individual councils, and their ongoing resistance to the Prawer Plan. These have rallied around different leaderships and established new alliances that include networks within the Recognised and Planned Townships, and the Northern Palestinian NGOs, political parties (including the Islamic Movements) and grassroots activists, as well as their Jewish counterparts (Abushbeikh, 2012)280.

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279 Tensions discussed above regarding the Alternative Master Plan became a turning point for the RCUV; a few months after the document was signed, the RCUV split into two factions. Its then chairman, Ibrahim al-Wakili, had been accused of various acts of corruption and yet refused to step down as leader of the RCUV. With the resulting loss of faith and support from the larger council and community, several of the organisations, activists and academics involved in the struggle, stepped in. They negotiated the return of Attiyeh al-Asem, who had been the first leader of the RCUV, to the position; and Raanan (2011), who had left the RCUV during al-Wakili’s term, returned in order to support him (Yiftachel, 2014). At the time of writing, the RCUV is still in limbo, and, despite Abushbeikh’s (2012) assertions, quoted above, its future is clearly uncertain (A. Abu Rabia, 2013; Yiftachel, 2014).

280 In 2011, these groups organised themselves, together, into a ‘Follow-Up Steering Committee’ that includes the RCUV; but it is only an umbrella group for coordinating activities and has no ground-based traction within the communities themselves (A. Abu Rabia, 2012; Raanan, 2011). At the same time, as Raanan (2011) and Abushbeikh (2012) both explained, they have organised several effective protests, and became an important unit of solidarity for the villages.
The efficacy of the RCUV’s struggle comes from the grey space it has helped reclaim from the dead zones of the hegemonic project; as outsiders, their encounters with state infrastructures informed by colonial and ethnocratic logics, are innately insurgent. At the same time, their reliance on these hegemonic structures ultimately enables a set of discourses and practices that continue to contain them and can be understood as the source of their integral demise. The concrete expression of this can be found in the Prawer Plan’s entrenchment of a border (Highway 40) to surround and segregate the Seyag, formally and permanently. In so doing, the state is able to limit discussions of ‘recognition’ to the reservation – and not even to all of it – concurrent to legitimising the laws that created the Seyag and the empty lands outside and inside it, in the first place. The border, produced through 60 years of struggle, is now being used to formally sever ties to any land claims beyond the Seyag. Thus, the Bedouins’ physical connection to the Nakba’s ethnic cleansing of non-Jewish territory is also being institutionally severed; as well as to the other Palestinian communities which lost their lands and rights through the establishment of the state.

However, the binary the state is seeking to enforce – between the Seyag and the wider Naqab, between unrecognised and legitimate settlements, between Bedouin and Judaised space, and between the Bedouin and other Palestinians – has cultivated a new frontline; one that was provoked and then targeted by the struggle’s evolution in al-Araqib.

And Then, Along Came Al-Araqib

Al-Araqib has become the lead protagonist in the Bedouins’ struggle. It resonates as both a symbol of what Prawer’s Plan has in mind for the residents of unrecognisable settlements and the efficacy of stubborn, unruly and steadfast resilience in reclaiming land from dead spaces. It is also the provocateur that does not allow the state to contain Bedouin struggle within its legal-mythologies, as spontaneous settlements that have invaded Zionist territory. This is because al Araqib is calling for return, alongside recognition; the nexus of which has expanded and exploded the RCUV’s methodology for insurgent resistance.

Much of al-Araqib’s arsenal replicates and grows out of those used by the RCUV. They come from outside, and seek to be included inside. As discussed above, they have produced several private legal land claims against encroachment by the state, the JNF, and their neighbouring Jewish settlements. They use the DND frame and multiple forms of ‘evidence’ and documentation to prove their continuous presence and rights to their lands; and have been incorporated into the Alternative Master Plan and Alternative Map, as one of 46 localities calling for their full recognition and integration into the state’s official planning and legal
There are weekly vigils and large-scale mobilisations alongside official reports, political tours, expert opinions, journal articles and public information sessions. They have also promoted a campaign that directly calls on local and international Jewish audiences to support the village and the rights of Bedouins to their lands, and stand against the state’s racism and discrimination against its own citizens. Where tactics begin to differ is in the fact that al-Araqib never developed its own ‘creeping recognition’ cases; in light of the fact that the village has no legal avenue to manoeuvre through the state’s ‘back door’ (Human Rights Lawyer, 2011). Moreover, al-Araqib’s primary activism since 2010 is not Sumud – although residents maintain the land through their presence on it – but direct Protest; in so far as they are no longer trying to survive without the state, but to survive the state, itself. They are not quietly working through the hegemonic tools at their disposal – although this is part of their struggle – but are intentionally direct, vocal and transgressive. When al-Araqib refused to accede to their victimisation by the Prawer Plan, they became the symbol for all anti-Prawer advocacy. Inevitably, they also became the portal through which the northern activists joined the struggle in the Naqab, and the spark for the new collective politics transcending the internal borders.

Thus, al-Araqib’s disarticulations are situated inside and outside the ‘Apartheid Line’ Prawer, and all those who have come before and after, devised to maintain hegemonic order in the Naqab (Abu Freih, 2012). The village is fixed just west of the physical border that is enclosed, separate and peripheral to the Zionist story of a land without people for a people without land. As a result of this, it has never been complicit in the boundaries that seem to keep the rest of Israel’s enclaves – Jewish and Palestinian – in place: those that inherently concede the war over land is over, and the winner (the Zionist state) has entrenched its hegemony over these territories. Al-Araqib has forced the struggle from grey space into black space, articulating a clear zone of illegal activity to be bombarded and emptied. However, because it is still part of the RCUV, part of the collective struggle, and still forwarding a legal and public battle for recognition that utilises the state’s hegemonic infrastructure (the

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281 Interestingly, according to one of Bimkom’s field workers, the inclusion of al-Araqib posed a difficult obstacle (Ben Arie, 2014b). The Plan was designed within the limits of the Metropolitan District Plan, and the borders of the Seyag. In order to circumvent these limits, and in essence, prevent opening the Pandora’s Box of Bedouin land claims beyond the Seyag, the Plan’s designers linked al-Araqib to another village, Karkur, which appeared on the original 2001 RCUV Alternative Map.

282 See for example Blumenthal, 2014, in which S. al-Turi is quoted, pleading his village’s case, “to all Jews who believe in equality, and who believe that Jews and Arabs can live together.”
Knesset, the court system, the Jewish activists and the media), it is not so easily isolated, contained, erased or forgotten.

**The Limits of Recognition – Concluding Thoughts**

“We didn’t choose to live life this way. The state put us in this situation, where you can’t see us as human beings. We wanted to be participants in the Plan, to plan our own villages, to plan all the things we as a Bedouin community might need, our culture, our way of life; all of this should be included in ‘the plan’. Instead, the state plans according to its own criteria.”  
*Abushbeikh, personal interview, 2012*

This chapter has focused in on the dialectic that produced the spatialities of Bedouin struggle in the Naqab: the encounters and entanglements between legal mythologies of empty/dead space and the material presence and determination of the Bedouin communities. These embedded and rooted the unrecognised villages within the colonised and contained ‘reservation’; a paradox of bounded, spatial apartheids that keep the Bedouin in and away from the hegemonic centres of the state, and yet enabled their survival. The ‘boundaries’ have been intrinsic to the evolution of the Bedouins’ ‘rightful Sumud’, and to carving out a Bedouin frontier inside the state. This has produced limitations, a border which the RCUV has reinforced by working within the state’s legal, planning and political arenas and accepting the rhetoric and framing that situates their minimal rights to the Seyag zone. At the same time, the state never intended to concede ownership of the Seyag to the Bedouin, nor any ‘State Lands’, for that matter. The battle now taking place, inside and outside the hegemonic rhetoric of ‘recognition’, would not have been possible without the Unrecognised Villages – through the RCUV – drawing their own lines in the sand.

Al-Araqib seems to embody an evolutionary moment in Bedouin resistances, moving from individual to collective action, from grey-spaced struggle within the borders to direct contestation and provocation of those lines; and scaling up from localised to national and international protest. However, it is important to recognise that this is not a linear process, but a spectrum of practices that fit together to produce transgressive struggle against an increasingly opaque container. Bedouin resistances are and always have been complex, including actions that are acquiescent as well as antagonistic, passive as well as intentional. The Bedouins oscillate between working with the state’s machinery and working to dismantle it. Rather than seeking to disentangle themselves further from the Zionist state, they negotiate with and through the Jewish public, hegemonic tools and the rhetoric of state recognition. Al-Araqib produced a new frontline along which to fight for recognition; one that breaks down the divisions between the Seyag and the rest of the Naqab, and perhaps pushes the state
furthest in revealing its violences, the chasms and fractures inherent in the ethnocratic/settler-colonial project. However, they are still vulnerable to the plans and policies of the state, and ultimately, will need the state to accept them and incorporate them into its map.

**Epilogue**

On December 12th 2013, Benny Begin stepped down from his position and devolved himself from implementing the Prawer Plan (Aderet & Lis, 2013). Begin’s announcement came days after he publicly admitted that the Plan had been devised without consultation with or agreements from the affected Bedouin communities (*ibid*). His statements came during second-round discussions by Knesset committee members, and within days of the penultimate ‘Days of Rage’ protest (November, 30th, 2013). The various Movements against Prawer, caught up in the enthusiasm of the moment, called this an end to the Law and a success for Bedouin/Palestinian struggle (Adalah, 2013, among others).

As an observer from a distance, having watched the protests and community reactions to Begin’s announcement in the media, the excitement and feeling of triumph was contagious. It seemed as if the subaltern struggle had, indeed, galvanised enough strength and collective power to push the state into submission; and the links made through the Days of Rage solidarity movements encouraged the sense that this was a collective and potentially transformative Palestinian win against the Zionist state.

However, as time passed has passed, our scepticisms have returned. A battle was won, but the state did not concede. The Law – and the hegemonic formulation it represents – is not gone. It has merely been stalled, with responsibility for its implementation passed onto the Minister of Agriculture, Yair Shamir. There are new rumblings in the media that describe more direct negotiations – and thus direct pressures – on tribal groups to agree to compensation deals with the state; as well as Shamir’s continuation of “carrot-stick methods” of compensations and demolitions, in his imposition of order on the Naqab (Ben Solomon, 2014). Moreover, since Prawer was allegedly frozen, dozens of homes were demolished in the Naqab, hundreds of dunams of crops were destroyed, and al-Araqib, in addition to witnessing multiple demolitions and the destruction of its cemetery, is awaiting its final eviction to take place.

Yet, there is still a residual hope produced through al-Araqib, as its residents continue to maintain the space (albeit now on mats and under tarps, instead of inside a canvas protest tent); and mobilise for their weekly protests in the Lehavim Junction. On July 27th, 2014, the villagers celebrated their fourth anniversary of the struggle, with a community feast on their
lands. As al-Araqib continues to challenge the binaries of the Zionist hegemonic landscape, it is resilient, resistant and unruly, to the end.
Chapter 5: Understanding Ordinary and Extraordinary Resistances – A Concluding Comparative Framework

An Act of Unruly Politics – Reclaiming Palestinian Space

Jaffa Activists Re-Palestinianise Ajami’s Zionist Street Signs
Rehov Shivtei Yisrael was transformed into Naji al-Ali Street by a group of anonymous Palestinian activists in Jaffa on January 20th, 2014.
Source: Facebook Friend’s Page, January 21st, 2014
Carving Out Palestinian Resistance

On January 20th, 2014, a series of photographs spread across Facebook, as Jaffa residents headed out into the street that morning. The photos captured a small act of guerilla politics, a moment of unruly disarticulations, in which street signs that normally highlight a Zionist and Jewish-Israeli historiography in Jaffa were removed and replaced with the names of Palestinian heroes and symbols. Rehov Shivtei Yisrael (‘The Tribes of Israel Street’) became Naji al-Ali Street, named for a Palestinian cartoonist, whose work is highly critical of the Israeli regime; and Rehov Olei Tzion (‘Returnees to Zion Street’) was changed to Mahmoud Darwish Street, whose namesake was originally a Palestinian citizen of Israel and a cultural icon for nationalist Palestinian poetry. Within days, the majority of street signs were taken down, but not before multiple news sites in Hebrew and Arabic recorded the act283.

Moreover, not before the clear lack of Palestinian symbols – and the reason behind it – were spotlighted in Israeli public discourse. As discussed in previous chapters, the Zionist appropriation of street names was a concrete method for erasing pre-1948 Palestine from Israel’s urban centres. In this small moment, this group of activists attempted to reclaim the streets of Jaffa284.

This act of subversive cartography has become a common practice of Palestinian subaltern resistances; marking public spaces that have been Judaised with the language, memory and praxis of Palestinian communities. They intersect with the spectrum of actions that seek to physically entrench Palestinian space within the fabric of the Jewish state, and thus expose, and even transgress, the Zionist hegemonic order that seeks to erase and sequester itself from the Palestinian story in and of this place. As an essential repertoire of Palestinian-citizen resistance, we have seen this practice in multiple variations, across the different case studies of this thesis. In the Bedouin case, it takes form in actions that carve out Bedouin space from the “empty” desert: The RCUV’s Alternative Map of the Naqab, the political tours in the desert, and the sign-posting of Unrecognised Villages on roads built by the villagers themselves. We have seen the practice evolve in other aspects of the Housing Protest in Jaffa. For example, the maps the Popular Committee produced that denote hundreds of homes targeted for eviction, to be shared with Jewish audiences from Tel Aviv; and Sami Abu Shehadeh’s political tour of Ajami, which reintegrates Palestinian lived experience into the

283 See for example Spingold (2014) and Ehna-TV (2014).
284 The activists are rumoured to be from Jaffa’s Palestinian youth movement, although no one has taken credit for the act, for fear of retribution.
ethnically gentrified urban space. From the Galilee Case, the acts of Return by Birim and Iqrit offer yet another example, as actions directed at unveiling the hidden geography of the indigenous landscape and disarticulating the map upon which the state established its legitimacy.

There is a clear pattern that emerges across these different stories of resistance, as to where and how the Palestinian internal frontier is cultivated and entrenched within the Zionist state; and how the border, determined in the clash between power and resistance, is unveiled and activated. As discussed in Chapter One, together, they form a methodology for disruptions to what Charles Tripp (2013) calls “the norms and habits of power” (p.3)\textsuperscript{285}, as disarticulations of the boundaries that were created to contain and constrain them. The pattern takes us back to questions that inaugurated this study, regarding how dialectics of power and resistance encounter and transform one another; how the perpetual struggle of Palestinian-citizens, which is both inside and outside, integral and external to the Zionist political order, engages, impacts, produces and reproduces the field of force that surrounds it; and how Zionist geographies are reshaped and rearticulated in its confrontations with Palestinian-citizen struggles over land and space.

The opening chapters to this thesis attempted to produce a conceptual frame for analysing Palestinian-citizen resistance. They begin by exploring the construction of the Palestinian other, and the struggle that stems from their subaltern relationship \textit{vis à vis} the hegemonic productions of the Israeli state. The locus of this relationship is the Palestinian citizens’ paradoxical positioning as ‘present and absent’ in the structures, systems and spaces of Zionist Israel (Piterberg, 2001). Through laws that incorporated Palestinian citizens into the political structures of the state (as citizens) while at the same time denying them access to its material and ideological productions, these Palestinians are included and excluded, inside and outside. There is no room for the indigenous Palestinian within the Zionist state’s dual rationales of ethnic-nationalism and settler-colonialism. However, there is, nevertheless, an ongoing encounter between the Zionist state and subaltern Palestinian-citizen that is essential to the shape and journey of both.

\textsuperscript{285} As mentioned in Chapter One, Charles’ Tripp (2013), in his study of the politics of struggle in the Middle East and North Africa, develops an analysis of how ‘power’, normalised in the daily practices of life, is unveiled and disrupted through public acts of resistance. The clear link between Tripp’s analysis, Gramsci’s (1999) theorisation of hegemony and Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977, 1984, 1990) conceptualisations of \textit{habitus} are also discussed. For further discussion see Chapter One (which also points to additional literature on this topic), and the variegated uses of this language and thinking (articulated as the habitus of hegemony, power and bifurcated spaces) in the case chapters.
For all its attempts to segregate the Palestinian other from its story, the state has outlined its limits and frontiers, as much as its methods, plans and narratives, in dialectic relation to the colonised Palestinian demos in its midst (Piterberg, 2008). This has resulted in the construction of a highly segregated and stratified society, in which the ethnic other, and the space they inhabit is endlessly and necessarily targeted for de-legitimation, removal and replacement. An ethno-colonial ethos of de-Arabisation and Judaisation has evolved as the foundation of the state, internalised in its political, material, social and symbolic landscapes; because it cannot escape its encounter with the other.

However, through the lens of struggle, as told through the cases of Ajami/Jaffa, the Galilee and the Naqab’s Unrecognised Villages, we see a pervasive Zionist hegemony clash with a real, contextualised, material history; with a Palestinian community surviving, resisting, antagonising and engaging the structures of power. This encounter produces the particular story, the particular space, in which both are housed, the lines and boundaries of which are articulated and disrupted through unique spatial relations. This implies that while each case is an expression of the evolving ethno-colonial project in Israel/Palestine, each space is not a mere reproduction or microcosm of the colonial map. To extend Lefebvre’s (1996) thinking on cities to include a multiplicity of spatial relations, each locale of struggle featured in this thesis is a “mediation among mediations” (p.101); each is distinct in its depiction of how Zionist hegemony is experienced and transformed, in light of its particular entanglement with Palestinian struggle. Such an analysis has informed a new way of understanding the lived experience of Palestinians trapped within the colonial state, while negating a spectrum of social and political research which analyses the state and the communities who live there, exclusively through a Zionist tautology286. It, moreover, challenges the idea that the colonial act of Judaisation determines all social and spatial relations; and the idea that the structures of the state, and the Palestinian space and position within it, are pre-determined, permanent and unchangeable.

As discussed in Chapter One, my theory of resistance has evolved on the basis of the idea that hegemony is disarticulated and rearticulated through perpetual struggle (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Roseberry, 1994; Haynes & Prakash, 1991; Chalcraft & Noorani, 2007). Rather than obtuse, the hegemonic order is constantly changing and evolving in its encounter with its other; and thus struggle should be analysed in light of its entanglements with lines of power,

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286 See in particular Rabinowitz (1997); Martieu (2009); Naamnih (2013); Molavi (2013); Hamdan-Saliba (2014); Pappé (2011); White (2009); and Sabbagh-Khoury (2013), for examples of the opposing argument.
as a likewise changing and evolving process. The case chapters give further form to the idea that power is negotiated, transformed, and reshaped, through slow processes of encroachment and creative, unruly moments that unveil the hegemonic order. This does not simply imply that ‘resistance’ and ‘power’ impact one another, but that they each evolve and transform the other; not as cause and effect, but as a dialectic, ongoing process. Thus, struggle that is authentic, impactful, and transgressive seems to exist in the clash, in the moments of conscious and unconscious exchanges between the powerful and the subaltern.

In Elian Weizman’s (2013) article on the efficacy of protesting discriminatory Israeli litigation through the use of legal channels, she articulates a methodology through which struggle can disrupt and reshape the hegemonic outlines of the Israeli case. She argues that only an ensemble of resistance that acts simultaneously inside and outside the system, constructing and disrupting, building and dismantling, can effectively counter the hegemonic structures of the state, exposing its weaknesses and contradictions. In this thesis, wherein the dialectic of power and resistance is analysed through the ‘mediations of space’, her conclusion is taken a step further. Each case spotlights the very different trajectories of these encounters, and the resulting space specific boundary lines that inform very different modes and methods for disruption and transformation. Thus, what is inside and outside, what reveals and dismantles, disarticulates and re-articulates the hegemonic order is different for different groups and different places. It is this point with which this final chapter will grapple, as an attempt to collate and understand the evolution of struggle in multiple spatial, and thus, social relations, contained within the overall frame of the Zionist state.

**Border Lines**

Zionist hegemony functions to perpetuate Jewish control over the Israeli state (institutions, bureaucracies and legislature) and Israeli space (spiritual, symbolic and physical representations). The cultivation of the Palestinian as other, as threat, has been integral to the project; informing the problematique of the incorporation and containment of the minority of Palestinians who became part of the new state. Accordingly, the paradox of this ‘inclusion’ turns on processes of ‘exclusion’, in accordance with the ethno-colonial logics of the state (Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2003; Piterberg, 2001; Robinson, 2013). Entrenched through internal

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287 See James Holston’s (2010) discussion of insurgent citizenship, evolving in Brazilia against the imposition of modernist (utopian) planning, for a supporting analysis of how space is shaped and reshaped through a clash between that which comes from above and that which exists and persists from below (which in turn is a re-framing of Lefebvre’s (1991) initial theory of spatial differences; both of which are discussed in Chapter One).

288 In this case, the Nationality and Entry Into Israel Law (temp. order), which denies family unification between Israeli citizens and residents of the occupied Palestinian territories (excluding East Jerusalem).
borders that are veiled in the norms of a sophisticated legal-planning regime, these processes are normalised as the common sense of life in Israel. The frontiers constructed in this habitus of segregation have become the key to sustaining the hegemonic order, in so far as they attempt to erase the Palestinian encounter with and genuine impact on Jewish-Israel. This section spotlights the moments when Palestinian struggle clashes and permeates these ‘borders’ (which are constantly changing and reforming themselves), within each case; to understand where they are, how they are activated and where there is potential for dismantling and transforming them.

**Jaffa/Ajami**

Ajami is the nexus of an alleged “binational contact zone” (Monterescu, 2011, p.272), where the gaps between ‘Jewish’ and ‘Arab’ Jaffa have been almost completely eroded; and the neoliberal ‘State of Tel Aviv’ – supported by infiltrations from the nationalist-settler movement – has shifted the aesthetics of Jaffa’s last grey, Palestinian space. The struggle by Ester Saba and her fellow Amidar residents to retain their place in the neighbourhood, point to the methods by which the state has attempted to build the border there; and how the Popular Committee’s (non)movement – building upon previous waves of resistance – has activated it and made it visible. We see in this case the trepid marking out of a Palestinian ‘territory’ in response to a long-term siege and bombardment of Palestinian space. The lines were drawn in the initial (1948) containment of the leftover Palestinians within the newly Mixed City, and the overt incompatibility of this space with the Zionist project, which survives by cutting out, constricting and marginalising its other; a process that cannot be sustained in the face of daily encounters. The ‘border’ between Ajami and Tel Aviv is still marked by Wallah’s (2010) urban scars of empty parking lots, dilapidated buildings, graffitied concrete and forgotten spaces. The frontier was etched into the neighbourhood, with resident-Palestinians staying on ‘their side’, building their own survival networks, empowering their own religious and community leaders, and establishing their own internal, enclaving mechanisms. Concurrently, the state sought to permeate, encroach, and mark this space as its own, in order to subordinate and erase the impact of a Palestinian presence within the Mixed City (Monterescu, 2011).

The construction of a subaltern Palestinian space in Jaffa-Tel Aviv evolved in response to a set of intertwining and ongoing practices of Judaisation: first, erasing Palestinian claims to this place by physically removing evidence of the community’s entrenchment within Ajami; then, concretely imposing Zionist propriety over the space, in the everyday and overarching
structures that determine the shape and culture of ‘Jaffa’. The onslaught is not only on the borders, which are reinforced through a multitude of ghettoising processes, as depicted in Ester Saba’s story: Absentee properties, Absentee status, “protected” rental contracts, and planned slum clearing zones, converge with the destruction of names, signs and even buildings that communicate a Palestinian past or present in the city. Then, working from inside-out, the state infiltrated itself into Jaffa’s social relations and networks, through Jewish bodies (first refugees and now gentrifiers and settlers); economic and material resources, through acts of de-development and then ‘planning’; and political and local governance structures, through absorption into and dependence on the municipality of Tel Aviv. In Jaffa, there can be no escape, no safe enclave from the state that sits inside and outside, present and absent; a mirror to the Palestinian internal frontier, which is separate and integral, marginal and central to the Zionist project. Paradoxically, this has become essential to the culture of protest that has evolved here, and has produced the spectrum of tensions and contradictions now endemic to this case.

The state sought to establish the Palestinians of Ajami (as elsewhere) as rootless; vulnerable to the Judaisation project, on this basis. Thus, it is on this point that the fault lines appear, where the Popular Committee and resident resistances clash with and reveal the hegemonic ‘lines’ of an urban ethnocracy that seeks to contain, remove, and replace. For example, in al-Rabita’s confrontation with the Jaffa Slopes Plan (which resulted in the Mountain of Garbage); in the Housing Intifada’s collision with neoliberal privatisation and development planning schemes of the 1990s; in the Popular Committee’s campaign to expose ethnic gentrification and community transfer policies; and in the unruly street politics and insurgent mapping that seek to reclaim Palestinian history from its 1948 erasures. Palestinian struggle in Jaffa is, at its core, about cultivating permanence and anchoring the community against the state’s construction of the Palestinian citizen as subaltern, transient and disconnected, in symbolic and material terms. It functions as a struggle for survival, in multiple forms and modalities, or to use a term clearly familiar in the context of Palestine – and in this thesis – as Sumud. Moreover, as exemplified in the spectrum of actions discussed in Chapter Two, it is a Sumud that is direct, conscious and active in its struggle for material change to systems of ownership, privilege and displacement.

The multi-layered legacy of Sumud-style resistance in Palestinian Jaffa is rooted in two intersecting and often antithetical frames, reproducing the position of Palestinian citizens in Israel, and yet reshaping and rearticulating it through living experience and struggle. On one
hand, they are carving out a community of difference against a colonial, ethno-national ethos, rooted in the physical space of Jaffa. In other words, Ajami’s residents/activists are using the hegemonic imposition of ‘otherness’ to articulate a distinct material, aesthetic and ideological sphere, thus producing a Palestinian identity in the middle of and separate to Jewish space. As discussed in previous chapters, this construction of a different and rebellious space is infused with the capacity to unveil the spatial order, even challenging the hegemonic modes that ultimately disenfranchise citizens from engaging their rights to conceive, produce and control the space in which they live. On the other hand, this ‘enclave of resistance’ is part of the Mixed City. Moreover, it is not part of just any Mixed City, but Jaffa, where the pressures of neoliberal Tel Aviv have directly infiltrated Palestinian space. This ‘othered’ space is ever in contact, ever under siege, ever dependent on the state, even if alienated, marginal and grey. Thus the community’s Sumud is cultivated and articulated from inside and outside, contained within state structures of power, and yet crashing against them.

The Galilee

In the Galilee, the ‘borders’ – and thus the fault lines – seem clearer, marked as they are by distinctly ethno-national divisions; the outlines of which were entrenched in the ‘clash’ of March 30th, 1976. In this first major politicised encounter between Judaisation, in the form of bureaucratic plans, and the democratically dense and politically active Palestinian core, in the form of a national strike, an explosive bifurcation of Palestinian space and the Jewish state came into being. The new border traced lines embedded since before 1948, with the UN Partition Plan influencing military and administrative actions that emptied the coastal plains and enclosed the Carmel region; and, since 1948, with the military regime that concentrated the leftover Palestinian land-owners and internal refugees into an Arab-periphery, contained, segregated and divested from the trajectories of Zionist hegemony. As mentioned in the chapter, these ‘ghosts’, in turn, produced the grey space that cultivated new Palestinian leadership, subaltern arenas for action, and the strong networks needed to collectively erupt and interrupt the state-building project. Land Day revealed the line that had been evolving since the establishment of the state. This line kept the state out and Palestinians in, and, thereafter, informed the mechanisms by which the Galilee would and could be colonised.

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289 See in particular, Chapter One’s discussion of ‘different spaces’, as conceptualised by Lefebvre (1991) and Harvey (2012).
290 This term appears in the work of Yael Allweil (2013), as a way to conceptualise the spaces in which resistance flourishes outside and separate from the structures of the state. In this thesis, the concept is used, instead, to understand Palestinian space as being carved out of the ethnocratic urban space, but is still entangled within it.
although it took another decade for their activation and implementation. Rather than Jaffa’s story of Jewish penetration and the overwhelming of Palestinian material and symbolic propriety over the landscape, the state was forced to retain its place outside, patrolling the borders, keeping to the edges that still enabled its control of Palestinian movement, development, advancement and expansion. Land Day became the watershed moment, after which the Palestinian enclave became a dialectic goal of both ‘power’ and ‘resistance’; and the border surrounding it, the new target of unruly politics. The Galilee case unravels an array of examples in which Zionist hegemony is consolidated in response to the presence and power of the other, and their resistances to encroachment and removal, to being Judaised and replaced. Confronting a demographic and territorial wall, the state constructed the excluded frontier through a series of spatial apartheid, expressed through and integrated into legal, planning, bureaucratic, and security arenas (Falah, 2003). Primarily following the post-1948 contours, jurisdictional lines were orchestrated to cut through, fragment and limit Palestinian social and spatial relations – between villages, between Palestinians inside and outside of Israel, between the Palestinian Galilee and Jewish space, inside and outside the area.

The parameters were then infiltrated without the need or capacity for Jewish ‘return’ or ‘redemption’, but through multiple dynamics of control. The chapter describes myriad examples of how this system functions, as with the creation of the Misgav Council, whose decision-making powers over the Sakhnin corridor’s open agricultural lands exclude representation from the Palestinian localities that share this space. The new industrial zones, which are built on private Arab Lands and yet pay taxes exclusively to Jewish municipalities, are another example. The creation of the Mitzpe settlements, which have evolved into the gated protectorates at the heart of the New Admissions Law, also exemplify this method of instituting and expressing control of the landscape; as does the use and abuse of Public Ordinances to appropriate and fragment Palestinian land. A final, key dynamic of control is the structure of local, district and regional governance structures, which ensure that decision-making power over land and planning is situated in the Jewish councils and extra-parliamentary parties. This is due in part to the convoluted outlining of regions and districts, which skew statistics and limit the powers of Palestinian local authorities, and are maintained in the lack of Master Plans for dozens of localities in the region. As Falah (2003) argues, hegemonic order was inscribed on the Galilee through the “enclaving” of Palestinian space, while “exclaving” control of its resources and capacity for
growth to a sprinkling of Jewish settlements. The structural norms of a separate, but still dependent Galilee, are expressed in the designing of roads and train lines that bypass Arab towns, and limit the region’s ties to Jewish-Israel. They are expressed in the negation of permits for expanding neighbourhoods and development of new construction projects; the demolition of Arab homes; and, most violently, in the events of October 2000 and the Or Commission that came afterwards. This was then mirrored in the main resistance methodology of the all-Arab space, in which the construction of internal border lines are rearticulated as limits to the entry of Jewish-Israel, and protects the space in which a strong, unapologetic and politicised Palestinian community evolves its own centre and its own margins, inverting those imposed by the state. These are embodied in the chapter’s discussions of everyday disengagement, the circumscription, circumvention and replacement of Jewish spaces, services and networks, and the localisation of governance structures and extrastate political institutions to the north. However, a paradox emerges as a somewhat unique production of space in the Galilee. Here, the ethno-colonial rationale is reproduced, not through engagement with the arenas of power, but in the mutual retrenchment of the frontier border that separates one from the other. Therefore, conversely to the Jaffa case, the carving out of a seemingly separate, but bounded Palestine, does not necessarily crash against the lines, but ambiguously follows them; at times convoluting the spatial hegemonies in the north, rather than unveiling or challenging them.

At the same time, within the excluded periphery, an additional paradigm for resistance has evolved in light of the state’s removal from the everyday material, cultural and symbolic arenas of the Centre Galilee. These struggles seek out the hegemonic order that dances on the edges, and maintains the frontier from the outside. They seek to provoke the state’s ‘true nature’ – its violence, its colonial structures, its ethnic discriminations – in the places where it is still present, and its foundations are still threatened. In these clashes, new frontlines are formed and reformed, just beyond the internalised borders of the all-Arab space. These are the lines engaged by the cases of Birim and Iqrit; the legal actions against the New Admissions Law and gated territories; the conscious and unconscious infiltrations of Jewish-settlements that sit on Arab Lands; the reclaiming of the streets and public life in Haifa; and so on. In the chapter, these stories of struggle became the central focus, because they revealed both kinds of borders: those that normalise and reinforce spatial apartheid and those that disarticulate and attempt to reshape them. However, as shall be discussed more concretely below, these struggles are borne out of and could not exist without the strength garnered in
the separate space, behind the border that enables the articulation and celebration of Palestinian language, culture, identities and politics, in contravention to the forces of Judaisation.

The Naqab

In the Naqab, the Bedouins’ land-struggles have clashed against and thus revealed some of the most pronounced of Israel’s internal borders. These borders, articulated in the Beersheba Metropolitan Plan, in the Prawer Plan/Draft Law, and in the daily demolitions in the Naqab, have become permanent markers to the Bedouin-Arabs’ acute position on the outside. As discussed in the chapter, the Naqab Bedouin were erased in the Zionist myths of empty space, Jewish indigeneity and the hegemonic legitimacy of the new nation state. The modern land regime institutionalised the process. Moreover, Bedouin attempts to reclaim their land within ‘modern’ frameworks further embedded their rootlessness in official, legal doctrines, entrenching the Bedouins as nomads into the hegemony over land and space in the Naqab. The result has been the externalisation of Bedouin narratives, experiences, memories and traditional social and spatial relations, from Judaised territory.

Unlike in the case of the Palestinians of the Galilee, the hegemonic project managed to segregate, control and absorb what was left of the scattered Bedouin communities after the Nakba; carving out an enclosure (the Seyag) in 1948 that ultimately became a permanent dividing line between Judaised and Bedouin space. The line was – and still is – ‘policed’ through colonial governorates in Beersheba. It has always been patrolled by violent strains of military and police units, to contain the communities and prevent their cultivation of lands that were emptied during the war and afterwards. The Seyag has since been infiltrated with new and constantly changing grids, marked by Jewish settlements, JNF forests, military bases, an airport and chemical factories that further constrain Bedouin land-usage, access and development; and encourage the ongoing displacement and transience of an increasingly vulnerable and neglected community. These intersect with the planning of reservation-like townships to further concentrate Bedouin space, and the spectrum of carrot-stick policies that make up the state’s urbanisation programme. These include forced migrations to the cities, unfair compensation schemes, and the transformation of traditional land holdings into what the state calls spontaneous dispersion and illegal settlement. The Prawer-Begin team merely revealed the Naqab’s legacy of spatial segregations and apartheid limits; which were formed,

291 In the 1950s, it was Military Unit 101; from the 1970s onwards it was the Green Patrol; today it is the Yoav Unit.
in turn, in response to the resiliency of tens of thousands of Bedouins against forced urbanisation. In maps, laws and public platforms, the Bedouins’ historical claims to the territory were made invisible and replaced with ethnocentric caricatures of nomads, trespassers and criminals, appropriating state lands. Then the lines were made indelible, along the contours of Highway 40 and surrounding the planned townships, determining the tight parameters for Bedouin living space on the margins of the Israeli state and Jewish society. The concentric circles of struggle discussed in the chapter – in particular, the campaigns of the RCUV and Al-Araqib – clash against the multiple boundary lines produced in this relationship; one from inside the Seyag, the other from outside, but both as subaltern to the hegemonic construction of the state/space. The RCUV struggles to re-write the limits of Bedouin space within the border. It works as a mirror of local council structures, in dialectic relation with the ‘white’ spaces of law, institutional decision-making, and central planning bureaucracies. As it develops its Alternative Maps and Plans and creates a legal language to visibilise Bedouin land claims, it cultivates an alternative political landscape to that imposed by the state. In so doing, the RCUV struggles to unveil the arbitrariness of the lines between “recognised” and “unrecognised”, and to remove them, and thus carve out a Bedouin spatiality that reflects the community’s living experience in/of this place, within the Seyag.

Al-Araqib, from its place beyond the boundary line, struggles to re-position the border altogether. Consciously and unconsciously, Al Araqib pushes at the enclosure, attempting to force the state to acknowledge Bedouin land claims beyond the ‘reservations’, while disarticulating the legitimacy of these lines and the state’s right to define them. Their different positions on either side of the Seyag-zone has produced a physical binary in space – not between white and black, inside and outside, but between grey and black, subaltern and alien. Both are already outside. It is just a matter of shade and gradation.

However, through the lens of the state, the internal grey space can be contained, negotiated and thus controlled within the hegemonic order, as has been the case for most of the last 60 years in the Naqab, and throughout the state’s Arab enclaves. The black space – which demands recognition of the Nakba, the right of Return, and the right of Palestinians to share space with the Jewish state – engages the foundation of that order, and, in turn, becomes an impending target for erasure. This is exemplified in the fact that Al-Araqib has been

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292 As discussed throughout the thesis, critical urban studies look at the cultivation of grey space as an intention of modern planning, as opposed to an accident (Yacobi, 2009); the maintenance of Bedouin communities in unrecognised villages, much like the maintenance of Arab grey space in the north and in Jaffa, informs the weakness, dependence and governability of these areas, ensuring their subalternity to the hegemonic project.
demolished 65 times in four years. These two spaces and struggles – both insurgent and radical, both outside and thus provocative – function together, each attempting to reshape what the state can accept and legitimate as ‘white’ space. Together, they pronounce the fault line; crashing against it to reveal the essential violence of state power and the nexus of land to the Israeli hegemonic project.

**Struggle as the Unit of Analysis: What Happens to ‘Struggle’ within the Borders of Each Case?**

In each case, the intricacies of subaltern struggle can be framed and understood vis à vis the fault line frontiers, discussed above. In Jaffa, the struggle to anchor Palestinian space inside the Mixed City reproduces the spatiality of a community inside and outside, on the margins and yet in the centre. In the Galilee, the all-Arab enclave has produced a struggle for separate space, sometimes by engaging the border, sometimes limited within its boundaries, sometimes by disentangling itself from them. In the Naqab, the Bedouins struggle from the outside, clashing with the material and ideological foundations of Zionism in order to be recognised inside and through the institutions of the state. The following section spotlights the mediations of these ‘borders’, in the spatialities, lived experiences and material histories that participate in the cultures and practices of resistance. As the particular trajectories of struggle unfold within each case, the dialectic encounters between power and resistance are unveiled, and more clearly understood.

**Inside and Outside – The Struggle in Jaffa**

The struggle in Jaffa is informed by a conundrum of dualities, tied to the paradox of a Palestinian unruly space that is maintained through its direct dependence and use of the state, its tools, and its rhetoric. This is due, in part, to the fact that the right to housing, the planning of space, and the limits and lines of legality are all determined by the state (Kallus & Law-Yone, 2002), even if responsibility for Judaisation has been divested to the ‘open market’; and the targeting of Palestinian Jaffa is through individual criminalisation and de-legitimisation under these terms. However, it is the production of struggle within the specific physical and ideological context of the Mixed City/Jewish Metropolitan Centre that dissolves the gaps between transgressive street politics, direct or ordinary resistances and the sanctioned zones and practices for policy-based campaigns. In Jaffa, this has produced key tensions, as activists struggle to radicalise the space in which their politics are automatically contained and constrained. In practice, this is transcribed in the multiple debates for action discussed in Chapter Two and elsewhere in this thesis, i.e. hegemonic versus non-hegemonic
tools; professional versus popular politics; joint (Jewish and Palestinian) versus Palestinian-only struggle. Each contends with the ambiguity of Jaffa’s Mixed City spatiality, and the need to construct difference from inside and through engagement with the boundaries of the hegemonic order.

If we break down some of the particular stories of struggle, the ‘inside-outside’ analogy becomes increasingly pronounced in the pragmatisms, methods and outcomes of the housing protest. For example, the actions that promoted the end of the Jaffa Slopes project began with the collective mobilisation by al-Rabita, which sat – at the time – completely outside the formal political system. Al-Rabita coordinated two streams of action, both underscored by the need to retrench Palestinian space within the ghetto. The first set of tactics enlisted the support of Jewish activists and organisations, and utilised the Supreme Court, the planning arena and the Jewish public space, including the media and the streets of Jaffa-Tel Aviv, to spotlight the Plan’s detrimental impact on the community and the space they inhabit, to the state; whose representatives would ultimately make the decision. As a second layer of tactics, al-Rabita worked with the community to reinforce its survival networks and resist their removal, outside the parameters of the law. Illegal and condemned buildings were strengthened, new infrastructure and services were developed; streets were cleaned, residents received monetary support, and the capacity for Sumud was established alongside the courtroom appeal. Al-Rabita gave the community the tools to retain the Arab space, which the community had already refused to leave. The court, through a technicality, then, merely, formalised the presence of grey space in the midst of the White City, without repairing its vulnerabilities.

The Housing Intifada provides a second provocative example of the tensions of Mixed City struggle. The action itself was situated outside the sanctioned modes of protest contained within the hegemonic order. The tactics were illegal. Al-Rabita activists broke down sealed walls, reattached condemned buildings to the water and electricity grids and moved in dozens of families to take illegal possession of these sites. The campaign’s rhetoric directly engaged the norms of power in Jaffa, linking the housing crisis to 40 years of ghettoization processes, which include the demolition of most of the neighbourhood’s public housing and then failing

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293 As discussed in the case chapter, al-Rabita remained on the outside of official institutional bodies until the municipal elections in 1996. At which point, the League organised the ‘Jaffa List’ in coordination with the same mayor – Roni Milo – against whom the Housing Intifada was initiated (Payes, 2005).

294 Although such acts have since become part of the normal repertoire of direct struggle, adopted by present-day radical Jewish housing protests in Israel, e.g. HaMaabara in Jerusalem.
to replace them. The act of squatting also embodied a direct solution to the crisis, peeling back the motives and impacts behind the Tel Aviv municipality’s newest plans to privatise ‘the problem’ of the Arab ghetto, by gentrifying the space and replacing its ‘weaker’ demographic.

At the same time, al-Rabita was tied to negotiations with the Interior Ministry, the municipality, the police and with Amidar, in order to attempt to bring real change to the neighbourhood. The agreement that removed the squatters – to build and/or unseal 400 housing units – ultimately depended on state structures to contribute to the permanency of Palestinian residents in the city, and disrupt the normal trajectories of the Judaisation project embedded in Mixed Space. This dependence has been a key obstacle to shifting the lines around which decisions are made, as evidenced in the fact that the state, unsurprisingly, did not fulfil its promise; in the fact that budgets were found to turn the Mountain of Garbage into Park Ha Midron, as opposed to addressing the crisis; and in the continued practice of putting up public buildings for auction on the Free Market, rather than making them liveable for the community.

A third example – the Popular Committee’s defence against the evictions – offers a more comprehensive window into the increasing intersections of the dual strategies. A collation of tactics was introduced in the chapter, through Ester Saba’s own catalytic story and the evolution of practices ongoing since the Committee’s establishment. These include the emergency practices of going to court, barricading homes and negotiating with the bailiff, in addition to Darna’s ongoing mapping of the crisis and the legal case work, which it develops in collaboration with the public attorney system. The list continues, with Darna developing short cuts through the bureaucracy, and organising support networks within state institutions and with Amidar, to protect the most vulnerable tenants from lapsing in their court-imposed agreements. On top of these direct actions, the Committee worked with planning professionals to analyse the structural issues facing the neighbourhood and to develop an alternative plan to the officially sponsored ones. At the same time, these tools became caught in the ‘technical-professional’ arena in which they are used. They reveal the myopia of the development plans and their lack of concern for the vulnerability of ‘protected’ tenants, without challenging the framework within which their vulnerable positions are created and cultivated. These hegemonic tools of the resistance arsenal play out alongside the unruly politics discussed at the start of this chapter; the acts that reclaim the right to name and reclaim the streets and historicise the destruction of Arab Jaffa. The Committee organises
public rallies, political tours, and cultural events within Jewish and joint-arenas, and sends teams of activists to Amidar auctions, who protest inside and outside these buildings while potential buyers tour the premises. These actions then intersect, again, with the language, logic and rationales of the state, as exemplified in the Popular Committee’s initiation of round-table discussions in collaboration with all of the ‘Public Housing Stakeholders’, in 2010.

The direct actions that protect against individual evictions have become indivisible from the protest actions in the street and the policy work with the state authorities, mirroring the closing gaps and disappearing border between Jewish and Palestinian space. The Housing Protest works with and within the system; and the system is reshaped to incorporate the (non)movement. This negotiation in space offers a new clarity to this thesis’ early discussions of ‘resistance’ as part of the field of force, as evolving from inside the hegemonic system, paradoxically sharing and producing its spatiality, its language and its tools, through its clashes with it. Rather than retreating to the margins, the Palestinian space is being rooted in Jaffa-Tel Aviv, through the system.

The interactions between radical, Palestinian-only resistance and the culture of joint struggle in Jaffa offer a final window into the complexities of the Mixed City. The Palestinian-only struggle constructs a space to be Palestinian through promotion of culture, language, history, and lived-experience; a rebellion against Jaffa’s Judaisation. It seeks out the street, in insurgent maps, demonstrations, public performances, and night-time guerilla activisms and is immediately radicalised by its innate challenge to the Jewish-only space. However, it does not protest or protect the constructions of Arab space, without the joint movements. The vigils at the clock tower for Palestinian hunger striking administrative detainees; the Days of Rage against Bedouin evictions; the walk through Manshiyya with the ‘Echoing Yaffa’ project; the public events celebrating Palestinian music and cultural expressions of struggle: these are always jointly organised and jointly attended by Jewish and Palestinian activists in the neighbourhood. Moreover, they are always focused on the Jewish public and institutional arenas, where decisions over their lives are made. As discussed in the chapter, some argue that this is a problem of numbers and the lingering legacies of previous phases of co-existence struggles (Karkabi, 2014; Shbayta, 2011). I see it more as a casualty of the immediate presence of Tel Aviv inside Jaffa, and the fact that their ‘frontline’ is inside their living space.
Enclaving and Exclaving – The Struggle in the Galilee

Stories of struggle from the Galilee – whether they seek out or retreat from the state – collectively reveal the ongoing process of determining the frontier and its inhabitants as other; mirroring and yet, in many ways, reshaping the state’s production of the subaltern northern margins. It is from this position that Palestinian protest against Judaisation engages or disengages, threatens or reproduces the norms of Zionist power and privilege in and surrounding this place. It is through this lens that the centre and periphery seem inverted; and concentrated Palestinian space seems protected from encroachment and engagement by the state and vice versa. Thus, the spectrum of land struggles, contrary to the other two cases, aims to expand and bolster a separate Palestinian space without the state, as opposed to reshaping the Zionist hegemony to include them.

As discussed above, the culture of struggle in the Galilee is most clearly exposed through its entanglements with(in) the border-zones; in spaces where the state is still present, dominant and more easily unveiled. ‘The Rakefet Case’ and the ‘Tangible Acts of Return’ to Iqrit and Birim are two concrete and complementary examples of this. In both cases, the spatial and material contentions between the state and the Arab enclave are revealed, albeit in different ways; disarticulating the norms through which the border is produced and reproduced. In the Rakefet Case, the lines that protect Jewish space – and thus hegemonic proprietorship – in the Galilee are forced to contend directly with Palestinian presence. Given the bifurcation trajectory since Land Day, through this case, the border that contains Palestinian encroachment and maintains the system of spatial apartheid is challenged and laid bare. The case also exposes the mechanisms that determine the locus of control, domination and power, which include the illusion of an autonomous Palestinian enclave. Moreover, Rakefet provokes these boundaries through its engagement with the courts, the Knesset, the district council bureaucracies, and the norms of practice within the community, itself. The case encounters and clashes with the hegemonic order at multiple intersections, through the state’s own language, on its terms and in its own gated spaces.

In the cases of Iqrit and Birim, in addition to the direct acts of re-settling the villages in 2012 and 2013, the long struggle for return activates, reveals and challenges additional borders: those that protect the hegemonic order from the ghosts of 1948; those that corroborate, at least in practice, the resolution of land contentions in the north; and those that prevent the internal refugees from enacting their own right to return. However, this story also begins to reveal the elasticity of the hegemonic order, at which point and in which spaces it bends or
breaks. The construction of the villages’ exceptional status through the courtroom battles, negotiations with the state and the public opinion campaigns, has leaked into their exceptional act of return; as a space that exists off the grid, in grey space, and importantly, carved out behind the walls of the Palestinian enclave. This seems to contradict what is happening in the Naqab, where the Bedouins’ radical acts of self-recognition and return – which transgress similar lines of containment and control – have exploded the norms of the hegemonic order, provoking the state into extreme acts of violence. The implication being that the separate arena in which the villages are situated, to some degree, determines the limits of the encounter with the state and its capacity or interest in intervening.

Following from this train of analysis, the clashes on the borders outline more than just how or where to engage the state, but also spotlight where the state is missing. The stories of internal migration – to Upper Nazareth or Karmiel – do not seem to instigate a response from state-representatives, until the Arab residents begin to make claims on the space (e.g. to open an Arab-language kindergarten; or to include Arab representatives on the municipal council). The state is no longer provoked into violence by Land Day or Nakba Day demonstrations by Palestinian citizens, particularly those that take place deep inside the Galilee boundaries, as they are now normalised in annual iterations, far from Jewish public space. The real clash occurs when the marchers occupy Jewish or shared public spaces, as exemplified during the 2013 Days of Rage demonstrations in Haifa, which provoked extensive police violence and arrests of Palestinian activists (Activestills & 972 Magazine Staff, 2013; Matar, 2013b). This was again the case in July, 2014, when anti-war demonstrations on Haifa’s Ben Gurion Boulevard were attacked by both police and Jewish mobs (Hovel, 2014; Hasson & Kubovich, 2014), whereas the 20,000 participants in Nazareth’s protest, two days later, were left comparatively – although not entirely – unscathed (Sherman, 2014).

Similar conclusions stem from analysis of the (missing) battle for living space. To some degree, the Galilee has been reclaimed – enhanced by post-2000 personal and political disengagements from the state – through creating independent economic ventures and professional opportunities, new leisure and retail spaces, and separate, often nationalised, music and cultural scenes. The conscious and unconscious entrenchment of a separate Palestinian Galilee only faces its limits in attempts to expand beyond its jurisdictions, as the state persists in bureaucratic and technical arenas that are abstracted from and yet always present in the space. For example, when Nazareth seeks to open up new neighbourhoods or
expand its industrial park; when the localities attempt to design their own Master Plans; and when new construction projects, budgets, or services are needed anywhere in the region. The boundaries also disappear when the state sees fit to intervene and impose itself, by appropriating and segmenting village lands ‘for the public good’ (meaning the Jewish sector); or by assigning Zionist names to the junctions, tunnels and highways, in order to disrupt the aesthetics of a Palestinian-only space. When these lines are challenged – as with the cases of Majd al-Krum, Yafa an-Naseriyye, or Tamra/Al-Ruways, discussed in the chapter – their effect is often swallowed by the bureaucratic, legal and planning arenas in which they are housed; isolating the communities’ successes and further incising their impact on the hegemonic order.

The lived spatial practice of the Galilee enclave constructs a sense of autonomy within its boundaries, in which a strong, resilient and separate Palestinian arena flourishes. However, limiting encounters and entanglements beyond the border makes it possible for the state to continue to abstract Palestinian presence from the national consciousness, build highways and railroads that circumvent Palestinian space, and control Palestinian life without having to encounter it.

This is somewhat compounded in the disappearance of mass constituent-based politics and street protests, in favour of professional struggle and NGOised social movements. However, this shift has also allowed Palestinian politics to seek out the state, in increasingly distant arenas; again exposing where the state is and isn’t, and pushing the protest space and the enclave, outwards. Unlike in the cases of Jaffa and the Naqab, this struggle is increasingly far removed from the activists’ own living spaces. The ‘borders’ are transplanted to the state’s hegemonic platforms, into the Knesset, the Supreme Court, academia and civil society. As exemplified in the legal land cases developed by Adalah, the collective articulation of Palestinian identity in the Future Vision Documents, the call for institutional boycotts by Palestinian academics and local leaders, and contentious, anti-Zionist provocations by Palestinian political party representatives, this style of protest is hyper-politicised in an attempt to circumvent Zionist enclosures and systems of control on the ground. Rather than attempt to win the Master’s game with his own tools – a debilitating and disempowering exercise – these actors seek to hold a mirror up to and reveal the settler-colonial, ethnocratic DNA of the state, from within its hegemonic spheres (Zahalka, 2012). They also move the protest to international arenas, to Palestinian space outside the country, or into the other Palestinian internal frontier zones. In some ways, their engagement beyond the Galilee
clearly expands the boundary within which Palestinian people, memories, experiences and national symbols are privileged. However, the ambiguity of this practice also continues to reinforce the essential paradoxes of the Galilee, where the state – as everywhere else in Israel – is always present, even if distant from and hidden by the enclave.

**Struggle From the Outside-In – The Bedouins and the Unrecognised Villages of the Naqab**

To quote from my interview with Avinoam Meir (2012), the Bedouins’ stories of struggle are most often measured in metrics of ‘recognition’, in the number of unrecognised villages recognised by the state; in the number of water-access points, mobile schools and electricity generators claimed and accepted through the courts; in the number of homes and living situations legalised by the governorate-institutions and district plans from Beersheba. Like the Galilee, the Naqab’s Arab space is segregated from the centre and intentionally constructed outside and separate from the hegemonic core. However, the production and articulation of Bedouin space in the Naqab faced a different trajectory of colonial prisms that did not include the Northern demographic protections, inclusion in the plans for partition, registered private land holdings (recognisable in local and international legal frameworks), or direct links to the external Palestinian threat. As official maps clearly demonstrate, the Bedouins – and their pre-48 histories, their roots, as well as their subject-hoods – were made *invisible* in the process of Judaising the Naqab, as opposed to *othered*. To some degree this has begun to change, as Bedouins evolve their land struggles in direct contrast with the spatial apartheids of the desert. However, as a result of the particular forms of erasures in the Naqab, much of the Bedouins’ efforts have been focused on making their stories, their experiences, and their rights *visible* within the Israeli hegemonic context – to its legal system, its Jewish publics, and its civil and political leaders. As well, they have been directed at legitimising Bedouin space as part of the hegemonic ordering of the state, even as the struggles stemming from both sides of the Seyag – and in particular Al-Araqib – reveal the impossibility of this task.

The case chapter describes several key lenses through which to understand the formulation of a struggle that has evolved from ‘outside’, determined by the lines that have externalised and further constricted the Seyag, and seeks to be ‘inside’. The first is the RCUV, and its development of a series of mirrors to hold up to the state’s production of space in the Naqab. The ‘mirrors’ are not a mere reflection of Zionist reality. Instead, they embody what Foucault (1997) conceptualises as the ‘heterotopic mirror-space’. A ‘heterotopic space’ is akin to
Yiftachel’s grey space. It is a counter-space that transcends or inverts the dichotomies that create borders and divisions, between legal/illegal, planned/unplanned, recognised/unrecognised, and white/black. For Foucault, the mirror is a perfect depiction of a heterotopia. It – or at least the reflective space inside it – is simultaneously there and not there; real and unreal; a perfect expression of ‘other spaces’ (*ibid*). The RCUV, and the Bedouin villages they represent, struggle from their position within the ‘non spaces’ of the Zionist map; there and not there, physically present and completely absent. Their space and their struggle function in material and metaphoric arenas that exist counter and alternative to the Zionist paradigm. They then work to embed their ‘other spaces’ within the Zionist landscape.

For example, the RCUV founders organised themselves around the idea that their communities are rooted in particular geographies, anchored in living historical traditions and land rights. The state organised and still conceptualises the Seyag around the idea that the Bedouin are nomadic tribes, a dispersion of illegal and spontaneous settlements easily transferred and replaced. As a result, Bedouin territory was a blank slate for Zionist settlement practices. The RCUV then plotted their Map to recognise all Bedouin villages, those still present but unrecognised, and those that had been de-populated during and after the Nakba, and then institutionally erased in the post-1948 Judaisation projects and the 1965 Planning and Building Law. On the basis of their map, the RCUV developed an Alternative Master Plan to the official Planning document (the Beersheba Metropolitan District Plan). The Alternative Plan accords the Bedouins the right to control how and where they live, in opposition to the forced urbanisation policies of the state that negate the legality and legitimacy of Bedouin living space. The RCUV mobilised the community as a collective, a counter-operation to the state’s previous ‘carrot-stick’ dealings with their tribal and family leaders. They did so by developing a council of representatives to navigate the political arena on behalf of those the state had left off the grid; without addresses, without the right to vote, without access to decision-making arenas.

On one hand – similar to the practices of the Jaffa Popular Committee – the RCUV carves out its alternatives by using the language, structures and arenas of the state. It utilises the same outlines and institutions that helped to construct the borders of the Seyag, the urbanisation programme and the grey margins that contain the village residents. The RCUV frames its recognition claims as Israeli citizens, their plans according to professional criteria and their legal cases according to the liberal framework that houses them. Even in the unruly politics of
street demonstrations, in protest tents outside the Knesset, in the political tours for outsiders, and in the practice of Sumud, they maintain this rhetoric. On the other hand – and this is unlike Jaffa, whose activists and residents have retained Palestinian space within the Mixed City – the RCUV encounters the state, not only without common ground or shared narratives, but from empty space, as if they don’t exist. When the Unrecognised Villages articulate themselves inside and as part of the spatial order of the Naqab, they force the state to reconcile itself with them. These evolve as insurgent clashes between what can be reshaped as part of the state and what cannot. This is clearly expressed in the legal actions for ‘creeping recognition’ and those that confront the Dead Negev Doctrines; the campaigns to unveil the policies of creeping apartheid; and the acts of dissonance that directly dismantle the efficacy of imposing the Prawer Plan/Draft Law. As a result, even when the RCUV, in practice, consents to the limits and hegemonic lines that confine and segregate the struggle to the Seyag, its activities, at the very least, unsettle the norms by which the Bedouins were made invisible, and succeed in constructing a limited space in which they can be seen.

Al-Araqib provides the second case through which to understand resistance from ‘outside-in’, albeit further along the heterotopic, other-space spectrum. In analysing the practices and discourses of al-Araqib, we see the RCUV’s repertoire of tactics being used, with the same intended consequences; that is, to force the state to recognise the community’s claims to the land and to their right to live on it. As with the other villages, the residents initially lived off the grid, in grey space. Their struggle is grounded in the active practice of carving out their living-space, without state permission or support. The community’s leaders manoeuvred the village’s incorporation into the RCUV’s Alternative Map in 2006, and the 2012 version of the Alternative Master Plan, utilising the same professional criteria that recognises the other 34 villages. Their lawyers constructed the el-Uqbi family land claims and court cases with the same evidence-based DND semantics as those used by Assira and others to expose and challenge the colonial prism. However, as al-Araqib’s stakeholders forced themselves into the recognition discourses, they opened a set of boxes that could not be contained physically or ideologically within the hegemonic order of the state, in part because of their geographic location, in part because of the story of return intertwined with their continuous presence on the land. When the Prawer Plan determined Highway 40 as the absolute limit of Bedouin recognition, it intentionally established al-Araqib as incommensurate with that order and created the conditions in which the use of extensive force and coercion is legitimate. Much the same as in the Galilee in 1976 and 2000, al-Araqib became separate, other and
threatening; and the Seyag – or rather pieces of it – became, to a degree, negotiable space. This, in turn, produced the unruly and ‘uncontainable’ practices of the Al-Araqib protest; and the increasing institutional and direct pressures of the state to put an end to their claims, as expressed in the 65 demolitions of the village and the 65 attempts of the village to rebuild itself. It also transformed al-Araqib into a symbol of struggle for the Naqab Bedouins and Northern Palestinians, around whom a collective ‘last stand’ over land has been constructed. At the same time, while new fault lines are produced in al-Araqib’s escalation of the struggle for recognition, it is still a struggle for visibility, legitimacy, and legality within the Zionist space. This is not the Palestinian enclave seeking to reclaim its othered space from the Zionist project, in order to disentangle itself from it. It seeks out the state – from outside, from the other side of the mirror, from the non-space – in order to be included within it. The radical impact of this act should not be underestimated; in order to accommodate al-Araqib – and to a slightly lesser degree the Unrecognised Villages – the state will need to fundamentally change its story (Sfard, 2011).

**Disarticulations and Re-articulations – How Struggle Reshapes the Borders**

The essential ‘borders’ activated and disarticulated in the different cases are those that attempt to suffocate and segregate Palestinian space from the hegemonic order; borders that cultivate the state’s capacity to remove and replace Palestinian roots, histories and/or control over land and space. A dialectic entanglement with the Zionist project thus produces the antithesis to its intended erasures: the carving out and reclaiming of a Palestinian space that cannot be contained or effaced. This Palestinian space is borne out of tangible acts of contention, inside and outside the system. It is articulated through hegemonic and non-hegemonic tools, in the professional arenas of “the state” and the popular arenas of “the Street”, in joint and separate (Palestinian-only) actions, through ordinary and extraordinary resistances, in everyday lived-experiences and in the catalytic moments that challenge and unveil the norms of power. As discussed above, at times this spectrum of resistance practice is ambivalent in its confrontations with the Judaisation programme; while changes often occur in the minutia of social-spatial relations, the ethno-colonial ethos continues to assert and entrench itself. However, each case also points to how borders are negotiated, articulated and reshaped. Thereby, highlighting the fact that trajectories of power are fundamentally

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295 This is exemplified in the recognition of some of the villages, as well as the rights of some of the communities to stake claims to their own lands and ways of life. As examples, we can consider the case of Assira’s court-based win, or the official recognition of Darijat, both discussed more extensively in Chapter Four.
transformed through struggle, through the clashes, permeations, and entanglements between
the state and its subjects, who are subaltern and yet central to the hegemonic project.
Beginning this time with the Naqab, the reshaping of Bedouin space vis à vis the state is
articulated in the production of ‘visible spaces’— or as discussed above, ‘recognised spaces’—
within the hegemonic order. The fundamental struggle and transformations of spatial-
relations stem from how the communities see and represent themselves, forcing the state to
respond to the villages as entrenched within the spatial order of the Naqab. They approach the
hegemonic arenas that plan, map, legalise and legislate space, from this rooted position, as a
collective that recognises its own history, its own geographic legitimacy, and hence its rights
to the land. The struggle engages the physical articulation of space in the everyday act of
Sumud, established in direct contravention to the urbanisation policies; in the Map the RCUV
created to recognise their physical presence; and in the Alternative Plan that envisions the
Bedouins’ future in this place. It engages the public sphere – traditionally controlled by the
state – through the tours and advocacy campaigns that bring outsiders into their story and
directly challenge the Zionist colonial erasures (even right-wing members of Knesset have
been to al-Araqib and on a tour of the Unrecognised Villages). In addition, the discourse the
state has constructed to ‘deal’ with the communities has shifted, through the villages’
entanglements at court, which evolved from individual recognition to ‘creeping’ recognition
and now to collective recognition; and in the Knesset, where the RCUV informed and then
challenged Sharon’s (2003), then Goldberg’s (2008) and now Prawer’s Plan (2011). Rather
than spontaneous and easily transferable settlements in Israeli space, the villages have
become collective and entrenched fixtures with which the state needs to contend. Even when
a case is lost, as with Umm al-Hiran, the new language and politics of the villages are
absorbed into the state’s collective treatment – and, sadly, punishment – of the residents.
There are positive results of these entanglements, as already discussed at length, above and in
the chapter, which we can consider as ‘evidence’ that the space has changed: Since the
RCUV was founded, 11 villages were recognised. The Knesset Plans and Committees have
increasingly been forced to acknowledge some aspects of Bedouin victimisation by the state;
and recognise formal rights to land and space for some Bedouin communities, even if limited
entirely to the Seyag. Moreover, the fact that the villages are still present, resistant to direct
and surreptitious acts of displacement and encroachment, is inherent to reshaping the
territorial legacies of the hegemonic order in the Naqab. However, the struggle of the RCUV
and the Unrecognised Villages is still bounded by the enclosure zone within which they have
been contained; in a sense, reproducing the narrative that limits Bedouin land claims to the areas in which they have lived since 1948. Even if this narrative has forced the state to reshape the ‘non-spaces’ that previously housed the Bedouin community, it still, in a sense, negates the experience of those Bedouins displaced to the Seyag during and immediately after the War; as if these communities have no memories nor hopes of returning to their ancestral homes.

With al-Araqib carving out a place for itself within the ‘struggle for recognition’, the border, in both time and space, became visible, entrenched, then challenged and deconstructed. The clarity of Prawer’s ‘Highway 40’ finalised the ongoing spatial apartheid[s constructing Jewish and Bedouin, grey and black, negotiable and non-negotiable spaces. The al-Araqib protest, in turn, unveiled and targeted the ethno-colonial lines that contain and segregate Bedouin space from the Zionist order. The state was confronted with a new border, and sadly, but not unsurprisingly, has responded with ongoing demolitions, arrests and acts of brutality. At the same time, the Draft Law – albeit only in official circles – has been frozen; and Al-Araqib continues to resist the village’s removal from the landscape and increasingly inspires others through the region to do the same.

In the Galilee, the dialectic relationship of the ‘struggle for separation’ and the state’s containment of and disengagement from the enclave has transformed the foundational shape of the Judaisation project and its spatiality in the north. This entanglement has informed two intersecting ‘borders’: one that determines the fabric of control inside the Galilee, and one which establishes the limits to Palestinian(ised) living-space inside Israel. Both are anchored in the fact that the Galilee is home to a large concentration of Palestinian citizens, who have evolved their identities, their politics and their struggle as the ethnic frontier; truncated but cut off from the impositions of the Zionist project, because the hegemonic centre could not comprehensively infiltrate the area. This has been the cornerstone for establishing a resistance arena, in which Palestinian language, symbols, memories, narratives and rights are emphasised; in which the Future Vision Documents, political and social autonomy and claims on the space and state are made possible. Such a project does not inherently challenge the spatial apartheid[s constructed to maintain the hegemonic order, which still posits control over land in the hands of the state; but it informs the capacity of the internally colonised to do so, in the Galilee and throughout the country.

As opposed to the other two cases, the ‘borders’ do not challenge the right to a Palestinian space, but rather entrench the limits to it. Thus, reconfigurations to the Galilee-space must
always confront those limits, which still exist, even if hidden within the guise of mutual
distance and disengagement; and forgotten in the lack of popular and grounded struggle in the
Galilee. The direct acts of return have been key in unveiling these limits. However, the less
visible, professional negotiations directed at the planning bureaucracies have physically
changed the lines articulated by municipal jurisdictions. The migrations into Jewish
communities and towns (sparking formal and informal acts of segregation by the state and its
representative bodies) have moved the boundaries upon which spatial-struggle in the north is
performed, from Palestinian space into Jewish space and now into Mixed spaces. The Rakefet
case – building from the legacy of Katzir – is the pinnacle of this process, but Karmiel, Upper
Nazareth and Haifa are integral to this shift. The movement into the Jewish sector is further
(re)produced in the increasingly politicised campaigns that entangle the state on issues of
land rights, citizenship and democracy within the hegemonic arenas of the state, exemplified
in Adalah’s court cases; Balad/Tajamo’s provocations within the Knesset; and the
strengthening of NGO-based advocacy within Israeli public and political arenas. They have
reshaped the spaces in which the battle over the Galilee takes place and, as discussed above,
enabled the production and transcendence of new frontlines and frontiers.

In Jaffa, contrary to the Galilee, there are no lines that mark the beginning and end of Jewish
or Arab spaces. The boundaries are convoluted in the infiltration, absorption and attempted
erasures of Jaffa. They are then further confounded by the ongoing, physical presence and
resilience of Ajami’s Palestinian community. The Popular Committee has engrained the
neighbourhood against Amidar’s eviction policies by entangling itself into the multiple
bureaucratic, political, planning and legal spheres that previously sought to remove them. Its
leaders and other Jaffa activists attempt to reclaim the histories that positioned and
marginalised this community within the Mixed City. They perform grassroots and other
street-based activities that counter-map and counter-sign Jaffa explicitly for the Jewish
public. Their resistance practices aim at unveiling and disarticulating the norms and
discourses that ignore and erase Palestinian claims to the city. These same stakeholders
organise demonstrations and performances that emphasise Palestinian identity, but then
ensure both Jews and Palestinians are present, as participants and audiences.

Embedded, surrounded and besieged by the Jewish centre, Palestinian space – through the
various struggles in and for Ajami – is carved in as well as out of the Mixed City. This has, at
least in some ways, produced a new spatial order in Jaffa. In it, Amidar tenants are to some
degree protected, hundreds of evictions have been halted, Ester Saba is slowly winning her
rights to her home, and the state acknowledges the housing crisis and partial responsibility for creating and resolving the problem. In Jaffa, it has also become possible to construct and embed a Palestinian identity in the street, to share and produce a joint public space where Palestinian voices are pronounced and strong; and through which the state cannot escape its encounter and intersections with Palestinian Jaffa. The incumbent losses and limits to this ‘carved-in’ space have been discussed above and throughout this thesis. It hasn’t forestalled the gentrification process nor protected against the new influx of settlers who seek to purify the Zionist landscape, nor against the distribution of new eviction notices. Moreover, the struggle’s dependence on the joint and Jewish arenas has mediated the politics, rhetoric and demands of the movement. However, it is still arguable that the conjoining of the Palestinian and Jewish arenas in Jaffa have informed the capacity of the community to open, reinterpret, and reappropriate the Judaised space, thereby pushing the borders of the hegemonic order further outward. Moreover, the community’s incremental, provocative and unruly practices of resistance offer some hope for the re-articulation of Israeli space, and the social relations housed therein.

Theorising Palestinian-Citizen Resistance – Culminations and Conclusions
The collective story of this thesis unveils power and resistance in dialectic relation, intimately engaged, mutually, if asymmetrically, impacting one another. Through the lens of particular struggles over land and space, the clarity of this interaction is increasingly pronounced, as it manifests in the production of a living context in which each is mediated and informed by the other. This shared production of space is incommensurate with the logic and normalisation of the hegemonic project, which can only contain the subaltern other in so far as it is positioned in the ‘non-space’, a ‘minority group’ intentionally externalised from the core paradigm. Thus, the unruly location of the subaltern – which is always inside and internal to the structures of power – is essential to its capacity to reveal, dislocate, and disarticulate the hegemonic order. It is in the shared contexts, along common borders and frontiers that we see change occur; in the unfinished and evolving trajectories formed in and through the dialectic encounters between power and resistance.

However – despite the disruptive capacities of subaltern struggle – the dialogue that unfolds is to a large degree uneven. The ordering of space is shaped in the shadow of the hegemonic project, wherein the lines, the lens, and the arena in which their relationship plays out contends with an overarching field of force that is dominated by the system of power; even if that system evolves through its encounter with its other. Resistance, constructed as ‘the
other’, is inherent and constant, but the structures of power function primarily to control its impact. For this reason, so much of the literature focused on this relationship is confounded by dichotomies, conforming to the physical and ideological containers produced by the hegemonic paradigm, without seeing how they are activated through struggle. It is also why, in practice, there is a desire and need to disentangle Palestinian-citizen struggle from the Israeli space in which it happens.

This thesis was borne out of my own biases, as an Israeli-Jew and a pro-Palestinian/non-Zionist activist seeking ways to change the structures of the Israeli state; and for ways in which power can shift and be reshaped by the struggle of the subaltern other. Through this lens, the encounters that unveil and then redefine the boundary lines, that disarticulate and rearticulate the space in which power and resistance engage one another, became the most salient and hopeful sites of analysis. That said, the bottom line does not change. The Palestinian internal frontier is embedded in the Zionist construction of space. The enclosures that mark the state’s attempts to contain, segregate and exclude the other, which is also inside and included, have become the foundational expression of the ethno-colonial project; not because of an innate Zionist trajectory, but as an evolution of Zionist hegemony in its clash with Palestinian resistance. To maintain control over the insurgent enclave, the heterotopian spheres, and the shared margins, the state retrenches itself behind protective lines. These have been cultivated to enable the state to erase the Palestinian historic, symbolic and material proprietorships over land and space inside Israel, and the threat this produces for the Zionist project.

The acts of struggle studied here seek to carve out and protect Palestinian space through challenging and transforming their borders and frontiers with(in) the hegemonic order. They articulate how power is entangled, produced and transformed through struggle that is both inside and outside, included and excluded, absent and present; and offer an acute lens as to how struggle is shaped by the same conditions. This project is an attempt to spotlight the intersecting journeys of Zionist state and Palestinian citizen, because they have evolved in dialectic relations that cannot be abstracted from one another. Even in their mutual attempts to cut out, disengage and erase one another from their seemingly separate norms of practice and daily experience, they are still connected in the space and borders they share. The fact that Palestinian-citizen struggle seeks out those borders is innate to the condition of its living-space, surrounded and bombarded by the paradoxical logics of the Zionist project. Thus its most extraordinary resistances – whether they exist in ordinary moments or catalytic events –
will persist in the contact-zones; and attempt to transform the containers that truncate Palestinian life in Israel.

**Epilogue – One Last Story**

On the last ‘Day of Rage’ (November 30th, 2013) a series of protests were organised in urban centres throughout the country and around the world, as a culminating moment in the campaign to ensure that ‘Prawer Would Not Pass’. While a general consensus existed as to the goals of the protest, the intricacies of how each event played out, speak to very different modes and contexts within which each took place. In the North, the main protest was held in Haifa, with more than 2000 people gathering on Ben Gurion Boulevard. The event was organised by *al-Hirak al-Shebabi*, without political party representative support, without the necessary permits normally attained for public demonstrations and without Jewish co-coordinators. These operational decisions were based on the fact that the organising committee wished to circumvent the mechanisms that institute state control over their dissent and dependence on the Jewish sector for legitimacy (Ali, 2013). Their Day of Rage was a Palestinian struggle against Zionist occupation and colonisation of Palestinian lands; the space had been appropriated from the state for a brief moment in time, and there was no room for its representatives here. The Palestinian flags and symbols that decorated Haifa’s main thoroughfare reinforced this fact. There were no hidden transcripts in the spectrum of signs, slogans and speeches that focused on the link between Palestinian dispossession in the Galilee – and elsewhere in the country – and that of the Bedouins in the Naqab; and the pinpointing of the Prawer Draft Law as the latest expression of apartheid and ethnic cleansing by the Jewish state. By nightfall, riot police had rampaged the site, ending the radical takeover of downtown Haifa with extensive violence.

The event in the Naqab took place on the edges of the recognised town of Hura, and participants included Bedouin-Arabs, Non-Bedouin Palestinians, and Jews. The Southern demonstration was negotiated with police permission, and its main coordinators

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296 Details of the various protests were collated from a range of interlocutors and secondary sources. These include, Nijmi Ali (2013), Eldad Zion (2014), Abed Abou Shhadeh (2014) and Eran Hakim (2013), as well as various local social media postings and coverage of events by journalists and bloggers. Specific quotes are attributed to their individual sources.

297 According to Ben Arie (2014a), in his research on protest-spaces in Haifa, the site was chosen for its visibility, but also because it has been transformed into a safe space for Palestinian protest and activism.

298 According to Nijmi Ali (2013), a Palestinian activist from the DFPE and an active participant in the anti-Prawer campaign, Jewish activists were encouraged to organise their own demonstrations and actions; but separation was a key and recurrent theme throughout the Days of Rage (which began on July 15th).

299 It is important to note that the Bedouin-Arab youth-movement activists were against securing permits from the police, but the older activists overruled this decision. Moreover, while younger activists were raging against
encouraged a joint rhetoric and joint representation with Jewish organisations and activists. Both decisions were made in disregard of recommendations by the northern activists (with whom the events in the Naqab were jointly developed), who wished to ‘protect’ the Palestinian character of the protest and its demands. Palestinian flags were present but less prominent in Hura. The key ‘target’ was the Draft Law, itself: its impact on Bedouin-Arab lives in the Naqab and the anger of the communities most affected, as opposed to its links to other Palestinian struggles over land in the region (although this rhetoric was still present even if out of the spotlight). The Naqab protest, like the demonstration in Haifa, hosted a violent clash between the police and the demonstrators. In both cases, the police treated participants as it did those demonstrating throughout the West Bank; as enemies to be contained, with whatever ‘tools’ deemed necessary. Protesters were brutally beaten, water cannons and tear gas were used to disburse the crowds, and more than 50 protesters were detained, with several appearing the next day in court with bruised and broken body-parts (Adalah, 2013).

In Jaffa, the protest occurred later that night in front of the Clock Tower, jointly attended and orchestrated by Jewish and Palestinian residents. Signs and protest slogans were in Hebrew, English and Arabic. The action was spontaneous, erupting primarily as a response to the day’s brutalities. Slogan themes volleyed between ‘recognition of Bedouin rights in the Naqab’, release of the protesters detained during the day and more radical political rhetoric, including signs calling for a ‘boycott of Apartheid Israel’ (Schwarczenberg, 2013). The protest numbers swelled with the return of those protesters who had been in Hura and Haifa earlier in the day. Frustrated and angry, they moved into the streets, walking from the Clock Tower to Jerusalem Boulevard, and back to the Clock Tower (Abou Shhadeh, 2014). No permits were obtained for the march through the public sphere, and yet no police showed up in riot gear, even if the Saturday evening crowds were disrupted and disquieted by this piece of political theatre.

In collating the stories of this day of action, the production of space as an encounter between power and resistance continues to reveal itself. The highly politicised and hyper-nationalised northern protest describes the moving Palestinian frontline, to the Mixed City of Haifa, where

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300 28 protesters were arrested in Haifa, 27 were arrested in Hura, including one Jewish activist.
301 While no protest was organised for November 30th, several demonstrations were held in Jaffa, in the lead up to the final Day of Rage, including one on November 28th, in which streets were also blocked by participants without provoking a violent response from the police (Abou Shhadeh, 2014).
the state is still present. The southern demonstration spotlights the increasing tension between the Bedouin community’s struggle for recognition – negotiated with and inside the state – and their evolving struggle as the Palestinian other – which is separate, outside and discordant with the hegemonic order. Jaffa’s protest illuminates the safe haven they have developed for radical, joint actions in the midst of the Jewish enclosure. Looking from the other side, at the state’s violent treatment of the Arab enclaves versus its approach to the joint/Jewish space, there seems to be some credence to the idea that the state is seeking to further marginalise, contain and incise Palestinian space; while Jaffa’s protest-space is, or at least seems to be, somewhat protected in its mediations from within the hegemonic centre. Taken together, these moments of deep contention point to the assumption that sparked this study and its theorisations of dialectics of power and resistance: the foundational clash between Palestinian citizens and the Zionist state is and always will be over land. This is the material reality that enforces Zionist hegemony over Palestinian space, and thus becomes the essential contact-zone between the state and its Palestinian citizens. It is the line around which the state will enforce its best defences; and around which the Palestinian-citizen community will mobilise its largest repertoires of resistance. Thus, engagement with this ‘border’ is always the key to disarticulating, reshaping and transforming the hegemonic order inside Israel.
“Welcome to al-Araqib”

After several months in which even the protest tent has been outlawed, the villagers put up this signpost at the entrance to their lands, on a road they themselves paved. The sign says, in Hebrew and Arabic, “Welcome to al-Araqib”. The fact that Hebrew is used first, imitating the style of official signs in Israel, fits into the ongoing discussion of hegemonic tools as potential containers/constrainers to the unruly creativity of subaltern struggle. However, the sign also acts as a final reminder of the complexities of Palestinian citizen resistance, and spotlights one of its main achievements: to recognise, carve out and embed Palestinian space against Zionist colonial erasures.

Source: Friend’s Facebook page, September 6th, 2014
Appendices

Appendix 1: The Legal-Land Regime

Selected Israeli Statutes and Planning Policies Informing Palestinian-Citizens’ Struggles For Land and Space

I. Israeli Land Statutes

The Main Blueprints of the Israeli Land Regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Statutes</th>
<th>Key Points of Relevance to the Cases</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Abandoned Areas Ordinance (1948)</td>
<td>This was the first law enacted to provide a legal basis for seizure of Palestinian lands (Holzman-Gazit, 2007). It was a temporary order that enabled the government to assume control over lands either abandoned by their inhabitants, or captured by the Jewish armed forces. It gave the government the right to declare any area or property ‘abandoned’; and to enact any regulation it deemed to serve public security, defence of the state, or supply of services. This was among the emergency regulations used to transfer Arab properties to the state until it was replaced by permanent legislation (see Absentees’ Property Law, below).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Regulations (Cultivation of Waste Lands) Ordinance (1949)</td>
<td>This emergency order gave the Agricultural Minister the power to take possession of lands in cases where the Minister feels the land is not being effectively or appropriately cultivated. According to Yiftachel (1992), the ordinance was used to expropriate Palestinian lands during the chaotic first years of the state. Holzman-Gazit (2007) and Lustick (1980) each point to the fact that the Law was used in conjunction with emergency regulations that empowered military commanders to close areas for security reasons. The closures would prevent Arab cultivators from reaching their lands, and enable the state to accord ‘waste status’ to said lands, to be expropriated as part of the “general land reserve for Jewish settlement.” (Lustick, 1980, p.178)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency Land Requisition Law (1949)</td>
<td>This law enabled the state to take control over land for reasons of defence, public security, maintenance of essential supplies or public services, the absorption/settlement of immigrants and the rehabilitation of ex-soldiers and ‘war invalids’. Initially, the Law was used for temporary (and immediate) requisitions; but later amendments to the Law allowed the state to hold onto and occupy requisitioned properties for extensive periods, which they could then pass onto ‘benefitted tenants’, who then gained statutory status, under the order (Holzman-Gazit, 2007).</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Absentees Property Law (1950)</td>
<td>According to Yiftachel (1992), this is the most important statute in terms of transferring Palestinian lands to the state (p.313). It assigned status to both properties and people, with ‘Absentee’ referring to any land-owner who had left his ‘ordinary place of residence’ during the “period of emergency” (November 29th, 1947 to 19th May, 1948). The property was then appropriated to the state, through the ‘Custodian’. The Law forbids the sale of Absentee Properties, but may be transferred to a ‘Development Authority’, which was established under the ‘Development Authority (Transfer of Property) Law, 1950 (see below). Through the Law, the Custodian/Development Authority was empowered to award tenancy contracts and building permits; and to confer demolition and eviction orders to those in breach of their contracts. According to Abu Hussein &amp; McKay (2003), 40% of all lands owned/claimed by Internal Palestinian Refugees (the Present Absentees) were appropriated under this law, as part of a total of 4.6 million dunams of Absentee Palestinian Properties that became state Lands (p.135-136).</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Land Acquisition</td>
<td>The legal mechanisms that pre-date this law (from 1948-1952), enabled the</td>
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<td>(Validation of Acts and Compensation) Law (1953)</td>
<td>state to take possession of territory/property, while the previous Arab landowners retained official title to them. This law created a procedure by which lands appropriated for “essential development”, “settlement” or “security” and were still required for these purposes, would be officially transferred to state ownership. At the same time, the Law granted the right of compensation to the land’s previous owner. In practice, the Law was passed in order to retroactively legitimise and regulate the massive land transfers of this period, which were often chaotic and uncoordinated and included lands to which Palestinian citizens claimed ownership (Yiftachel, 1992; Lustick, 1980; Holzman-Gazit, 2007; Abu Hussein &amp; McKay, 2003). It also prevented any legal attempts by Arab residents to reclaim access/ownership to the previously appropriated lands through legal loopholes that existed in previous statutes (ibid).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance (1943)</td>
<td>This Ordinance was part of the body of law inherited from the British Mandate period. It enables the confiscation of privately owned land for the sake of ’public interest’. It remains one of the most effective tools in place to expropriate Palestinian lands (although Jewish private land holdings have also been affected by it) (Abu Hussein &amp; McKay, 2003; Kretzmer, 1990). It gives the state wide powers to appropriate any land deemed “necessary or expedient for any public purpose”. While it includes a section on compensation, the issue of compensation need not be settled before the land is appropriated. In other words, the land is confiscated with or without consent, and agreement is then inferred through an automatic transfer of compensation. From the 1950s onwards, the Ordinance became a major tool of Judaisation in the Galilee. Lands used to establish Upper Nazareth, Karmiel and Maalot were appropriated on the basis of this ordinance. It was also this Ordinance that gave legitimacy to the land appropriations (approved in the Galilee Development Plan) that sparked Land Day in 1976 (ibid).</td>
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<td>Prescription Law (1958)</td>
<td>This Law required all private land owners to demonstrate unchallenged and uninterrupted possession of their land for at least 15 years, for lands whose titles had not yet been settled; and 25 years for lands whose titles had been settled. This meant that land owners/cultivators needed to produce records and proof of their continuous cultivation of their lands from the Mandate period or earlier. A majority of these documents either did not exist or had disappeared in the chaos of the war. An amendment to the Law in 1963, extended the period of continuous ownership/use to 20 years. Although there is no direct stipulation within the Law as to its target populations, it was used to survey and appropriate lands in areas where large concentrations of Palestinian citizens held, cultivated and owned land (Abu Hussein &amp; McKay, 2003). According to Kretzmer (1990), one source (Sabari, 1972) claims that 205,000 dunams of lands were expropriated to the state through the effects of the Prescription Law, but he was not able to corroborate or refute this figure.</td>
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<td>Basic Law: Israel Lands (1960) (see also Israel Lands, 1960)</td>
<td>This Law asserts that all lands categorized as ‘Israel Lands’, which includes Lands held by the state, the Development Authority and the JNF and constituting approximately 93% of all land in Israel, “cannot be transferred either by sale or in any other manner”. Through this Law, land ownership is effectively frozen, and can only be leased for use. The Laws mentioned below, which place control of Israel Lands under the auspices of the ILA (whose statutes grant shared authority over Israel’s lands to the JNF and the Jewish Agency, whose own policies demand exclusive land-usage by Jews), effectively restrict Palestinian citizens’ access to a majority of the state’s public lands. Yiftachel (1999) argues that the combination of these statutes places approximately 80% of Israel Lands off limits to Palestinian citizens of the state. This Law was the focal point of Aharon Barak’s Supreme Court decision on the Kaadan case (discussed in Chapter Three), in which he</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning and Building Law (1965)</td>
<td>This Law provides the formal legal framework for planning in Israel and orchestrates a central, coordinated system for all development and planning authorities in the state (which had previously operated independently). The Law created a three-tiered system of planning bodies, comprised of the National Planning Board, six District Planning Commissions and 110 Local Planning Committees (Yiftachel, 1992). The pyramid system it devised operates as a hierarchy in which permits and plans must be approved first at local, then district and finally at national levels; and all local (authority) outline plans must fit into the outline schemes of the upper levels. It provided a system by which building permits would be regulated, again in accordance with this hierarchy of planning; and any development/building not in compliance with the Law/planning outlines could be demolished, and its owner fined and/or arrested. Moreover, the Law stipulates that the local planning commission can expropriate any land deemed necessary for public purposes, under any planning scheme. As discussed throughout the thesis, this Law became the main ‘container’ by which development, growth and land-access of Palestinian citizens is held in check. Uncoincidentally, its approval coincided with the end of the more direct, coercive violence of the Military Regime. It devised a spectrum of spatial controls, which were then used to devise planning schemes that erased Palestinian localities and created tight jurisdictions for the rest. It is on the basis of this Law that the 1985 Markovitch Commission criminalised all ‘grey buildings’, which led to the demolition of thousands of homes in the north and south; the fact that northern localities cannot expand their infrastructure or neighbourhoods; and the fact that the Unrecognised Villages were left off the map in the Naqab and the Galilee.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ottoman Land Code/Ordinance (OLC) (1858)</td>
<td>These two Ordinances were used as the essential framework through which to create the retroactive erasures/dispossessions of Bedouin land claims, discussed as the basis of Bedouin land claims (Kedar et al, 2012). First articulated in the Allbeck Commission (1975) and then entrenched in a series of precedent-setting Supreme Court cases, beginning in 1974 (both mentioned in Chapter Four, on the Bedouin case), these Ordinances determined the categories by which land could be owned or sold in the Naqab. The OLC defined five categories by which land-titles could be registered: These were <em>Mulk</em> (fully privately owned land, rare in Ottoman Palestine); <em>Muwaqfa</em> (land set aside for religious use, elsewhere known as ‘Waqf’ lands’); <em>Matruka</em> (public lands set aside for shared, common use); <em>Miri</em> (public land transformed into private land through long-term cultivation by individuals or family-groups); and <em>Mewat</em> (uncultivated/dead lands, applied to any uncultivated lands more than 1.5 km from a ‘settled area’). The majority of Bedouins did not register their lands under the OLC, and the state uses this as part of its legal mechanisms for denying systematic cultivation, possession, or settlement of the Naqab, before the British Mandate. While the 1969 Land Law repealed these separate categories, they are still used in areas where settlement of title has not been registered.</td>
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<td>British Mewat Land Ordinance (1921)</td>
<td>The British Ordinance was designed to regulate and limit the acquisition and cultivation of State Lands, although it left a window of 2 months (after promulgation of the order), during which anyone who had ‘revived’ Mewat Lands (i.e. through cultivation) could register their ownership rights; although in practice, the Mandate authorities tended to recognise possession of lands without title deeds, even after 1921. In Israeli law and policy-</td>
</tr>
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</table>
practice, 1921 became the final date by which Bedouins needed to have registered their land claims.Israeli interpretations of the Ordinance stipulate that without official certification recorded by this day, land claims are considered nullified (Falah, 1989; Kedar et al, 2012; Abu Hussein & McKay, 2003).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel Land Law (1969)</td>
<td>The Land Law sets out the terms by which private property can be ‘owned’, transferred, used and shared (i.e. in cooperative settlements or buildings). Its significance to this thesis is its repeal of the Ottoman and Mandate Land Ordinances, related to private lands. In particular, it cancelled the separate land categories outlined in Ottoman Law, and collapsed them into a single form of ownership. At the same time, the Law reinforces the fact that public lands (Israeli Lands) are non-transferable.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel Land Administration Law (Amendment No 7) (2009) (The 2009 Land Reform)</td>
<td>The significance of this Amendment to the Land Administration Law is its introduction of new mechanisms for privatisation of Israel Lands that repeal the absolute prohibition of the transfer of public property, as outlined in the ILA Law (1960), Israel Lands Law (1960) and Israel Land Law (1969), discussed in these appendices. According to an analysis developed by Adalah’s urban and regional planner, Hana Hamdan, and attorney S. Bishara, the majority of properties affected by the amendment were expropriated to the state from Arab communities, and held in trust by the Development Authority as Absentee Properties (S. Bishara &amp; Hamdan, 2009). The Amendment also gives further decisive powers to the JNF within the Israel Lands Council (which directs the ILA) and orchestrates a series of land exchanges with the JNF that further entrench restrictions on Arab-ownership of lands meant to be administered by the state. The Land Reform it introduces is, according to Naamnih (2011) and S. Bishara &amp; Hamdan (2009), intended to sever the claims of refugees to these properties. It is discussed in this thesis as part of the privatisation processes underlying the gentrification and ‘transfer’ of Palestinians from Ajami/Jaffa (see Chapter Two). As well, the Law is discussed in Chapter Three as one of the impetuses for the New Admissions Law (see below).</td>
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| The Law to Amend the Cooperative Societies Ordinance (No. 8) (2011) (Discussed throughout this thesis as The New Admissions Committee Law) | This law grants formal and legal legitimacy to the use of ‘Admissions Committees’ to review applicants for membership (meaning applicants for property/land leases) in a ‘cooperative society’, with less than 400 family-units in the Naqab or Galilee regions of Israel. The Law impacts approximately 700 small community towns, which collectively control access to 81% of the country’s total land space but act as home to only 5% of the population (Adalah, 2007b). The Law details the Committee’s membership, which must include at least one member from the Jewish Agency or World Zionist Federation. It also outlines the criteria by which an applicant may be rejected, which includes the amorphous category of ‘social unsuitability’ to the fabric of community life; and the procedures by which a rejected applicant can appeal the Committee’s decision. While the Law is careful to stipulate that a candidate cannot be rejected on the basis of race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or political opinion (among others), according to interlocutors of this study, the Law, functions explicitly to restrict applicants on the basis of their racial, social and religious ‘difference’ and reinforce current hierarchies of class and ownership, constructed through Israel’s settler-colonial/ethno-national legacies (Algazi, 2011; S. Bishara, 2012; Sbeta, 2012). Israel’s ‘cooperative societies’ are part of the privileged inheritances of the upper echelons of Israeli Ashkenazi (settler) society. The Law enshrines their continued control of land, not only against Palestinians, but against all Israeli communities, outside this elite group. This law is part of the story of the Rakefet Case (featured in Chapter Three), and acts to circumvent the Supreme Court’s past decisions in the Kaadan (2000) and Zbeidat (2007) cases, which stipulate
that discrimination against non-Jews in the use of and access to public lands, even lands of the JNF/WZO, is illegal. The Law was upheld by a panel of Supreme Court judges on September 17th, 2014, when Adalah’s and ACRI’s principal petitions on the cases were dismissed (Adalah, 2014).

The Draft Law to Regulate Bedouin Settlement in the Negev (2013)

(The Prawer Law)

The Law articulates a plan for resolving the Bedouins’ ownership claims and regulating Bedouin settlement in the Naqab. According to its own articles, the Draft Law has been orchestrated for the development of the Naqab for the benefit of all its residents, and offers a “necessary and needed solution to the problems currently facing Bedouin settlements.” It outlines the boundaries within which Bedouin land claims will be dealt, which areas will be set aside for Bedouin use and settlement, the type of compensation (monetary or land exchanges) to which the different communities are entitled, and sets out compensation options for those communities living outside areas relevant to the compensation scheme. It also establishes the ‘Authority’, which will be responsible for negotiating compensations and land allotments, as well as implementation of the plan, i.e. through the demolition and evacuation of the villages.

As discussed in Chapter Four, the Draft Law constructs the framework through which the Bedouins will be dispossessed of their lands. It outlines a two-sided coin for the regulation of the space: by physical enforcement and compensation – a stick and a carrot. The compensation scheme is designed to finalise a solution to the Bedouins’ land claims, while reinforcing the logic underlying the Law: that the Bedouins have no legal-historical claims to the Naqab, and any lands/compensation they receive is ‘ex-gratia’, through the benevolence of the state.

The Draft Law passed its first round reading in the Knesset on June 24th, 2013; but was then tabled when Benny Begin recommended its withdrawal and stepped down from his post, on December 12th, 2013. Responsibility for re-drafting the Law has been passed on to the Agricultural Ministry, and MK Yair Shamir, head of the Ministry, has taken on the duty to turn the Prawer Plan into law.

II. Additional Statutes

Another Layer of the Land Regime – Determining who Owns, Controls and Administers Israeli Space

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Statutes (Chronological Order)</th>
<th>Key Points of Relevance to the Case</th>
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<tr>
<td>The Law of Return (1950)</td>
<td>This Law establishes the right of all Jews to immigrate to the state of Israel, on the basis of ancestry or religious affiliation, in contrast with policies that intentionally deny the same right to the Palestinian refugees. It also changed the status of all Jews already present in Israel, at the moment when the state was established; all of whom became immigrants to give them the same rights as those who came after the promulgation of the Law. Quoting Robinson (2013), the Law created a separate legal category, “one above and beyond citizenship”, by which to distinguish the Jewish polity from others that might call Israel their homeland; and through which, create a legal hierarchy in which the ‘Jewish national’ has greater rights to Israel than the ‘Israeli Citizen’ (p.97-98). Kretzmer (1990) underlines the fact that it is one</td>
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302 While this Law is still in draft form, its impact on Palestinian struggle and state retribution is extensive. Moreover, the state has already begun implementing its basic framework, without official legitimisation through the Law. Progressive implementation is evident in the ongoing demolitions of al-Araqib, the closing and relocation of mobile schools to the recognised villages, as well as the recruitment and deployment of the Yoav Unit for enforcing the boundaries formalised through the Plan.
of the only laws in Israeli legislature to explicitly distinguish the rights of Jews from non-Jews. The Law contributes an integral layer by which Israeli hegemony veils Jewish/settler-colonial privileged ownership of the state, its institutions, and territories, within the liberal rhetoric of its ‘democratic’ regime, which maintains a neutral discourse around equality for all citizens. It expresses a cornerstone of the Zionist project – the ‘ingathering of the (Jewish) exiles’ – and is woven into the entire spectrum of laws that legitimise the dispossession and replacement of Palestinian people and space, throughout the area controlled by Israel.

| Development Authority (Transfer of Property) Law (1950) | This Law establishes the Development Authority as the body which will manage refugee lands expropriated to/by the state, in place of the ‘Custodian’ alluded to in the Absentees Property Law (discussed above). The Law stipulates the Development Authority’s responsibilities and powers regarding these lands (to lease, buy, build, settle, etc). All property under its auspices is ‘public’ (Israel Lands), and cannot be ‘sold’ or otherwise ‘transferred’, except: back to the state, to institutions settling Arab internal refugees, or to local authorities, so long as the WZO be given the first option to purchase the land. The Law determines the mechanisms for control of Arab property and space and has had extensive ramifications for Palestinian citizens living in public property, particularly in urban spaces, as with the Ajami case. |
| World Zionist Organization (WZO) - Jewish Agency for Israel Status Law (1952) | The first line of the Law articulates its significance for Palestinian-citizen struggle against the (hegemonic) boundaries of the Israeli state: “The state of Israel regards itself as the creation of the entire Jewish people, and its gates are open, in accordance with its laws, to every Jew wishing to immigrate to it.” It gives legal legitimacy to the WZO/Jewish Agency, as the body empowered to absorb and settle Jewish immigrants and to coordinate all Jewish institutions within the country; effectively giving a para-state organisation, whose mandate is exclusively geared toward Jewish access and control of Israeli space, a share of State powers and territorial control. This law, in combination with the Law of Return, enables the state “to colonise land and property without violating its obligation to serve as the neutral arbiter of its citizens. The state transferred the land it confiscated during and after the war, along with the responsibility for settling immigrants on that land, to technically private, or (Jewish) national agencies whose boards it stacked.” (Hussein & McKay, 2003, p.111) |
| Nationality Law (1952) | The Nationality Law stipulates the terms by which one can acquire Israeli citizenship: By way of ‘Return’ (in accordance with the Law of Return); residence; birth; or naturalisation. As only Jews have the ‘Right of Return’, the Law effectively accords different rules for Jews and non-Jews. The effects of these distinctions are revealed in the Law’s application, in 1952. According to Kretzmer (1990), all Jewish residents of the country were granted citizenship automatically (by way of Return); whereas Arab residents acquired citizenship only if they could prove their residence or right to family unification (p.36-45). Moreover, as discussed above, the Law is part of the legal lexicon that determines separate categories of privileges in and rights to the Jewish state. |
| Israel Lands Administration Law (1960) | The Law establishes the Israel Lands Administration – later re-named the Israel Lands Authority in the 2009 Reform Law, discussed above – to administer ‘Israel Lands’, which constitutes 93% of all territories under the control of the Israeli state. The Law connotes a unified policy for the management of public land (13% of which is controlled by the ‘Development Authority’; 13% of which is controlled by the JNF; and 74% of which is controlled by the state), through the establishment of an ‘Israel Lands Council’ (ILC). The Law reiterates the stipulations in the Basic Law:
Israel Lands (1960) that prohibit the transfer of ownership of public land, and repeals the right of the Development Authority to sell property without express permission of the ILC. A 1961 covenant between the state and the WZO (which also established the JNF), outlined the conditions by which the WZO’s lands would be administered under the auspices of the ILA. Half the ILC governing board (minus 1), which sets all Israeli public land policy, would be made up by members chosen by the JNF (Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael/Jewish National Fund, 1961).
## Appendix 2: The Spatial Order

*Selected State Plans/Policies, Affecting the Struggle to Reclaim and Determine Palestinian Spatiality*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Documents</th>
<th>Key Points of Relevance to the Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The New Development Plan for the Galilee (1975)</strong></td>
<td>This was the Galilee’s first formalised Development Plan, published by the Prime Minister’s Office in 1975, and fully approved for implementation by the Israeli Knesset in February, 1976. The document – building on a set of recommendations by the Jewish Agency (1973) – marks the renewed commitment of the state to the Judaisation of the Galilee (Yiftachel, 1992; Holzman-Gazit, 2007; Hussein &amp; McKay, 2003). Its main goals include: orchestrating massive Jewish settlement in the region, strengthening industrial and economic capacity in the region, expanding already existing Jewish settlements and establishing 15 new rural-industrial villages to interrupt the territorial contiguity of the slowly expanding Arab-village spaces in the area (Yiftachel, 1992, p.138). Its key significance was its spark of the new political movements around land (e.g. the Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands) and Land Day, itself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paam Bagalil (1976) &amp; The Plan for the Distribution of Industry in the Galilee (1977)</strong></td>
<td>Two additional plans were produced in quick succession, as part of a triad of planning schemes, discussed in the Chapter Three. Paam Bagalil was an innovation of the Ministry of Housing and Construction. It offers alternative sites for key development to the 1975 PMO Plan, looking at urban expansion – in Karmiel, Safed and Upper Nazareth – as opposed to the establishment and development of rural villages, as a way to encourage demographic transformations in the Galilee. The Ministry of Industry and Commerce produced its plan as a compliment to these other two. The Plan proposes future industrial sites for the region (allocated to Jewish settlement areas), alongside a strategy for encouraging private industrial development in the region. This plan became a blueprint for the creation of the Zipporit/Upper Nazareth Industrial Zone, discussed in the Chapter. See Yiftachel (1992) for detailed discussion of these plans, and other components of the planning mechanisms in the Galilee; see Wesley (2013) for their resonance in the economic and industrial development of the region, thereafter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jewish Agency Mitzpim Plan (1978)</strong></td>
<td>The significance of this Plan is its conceptualisation of the Mitzpe settlements, as a strategic solution to the “threat” of the Palestinian territorial enclave (Yiftachel, 1992). As discussed in Chapter Three, these were small (6-20 families), hilltop or look-out settlements – also called outposts – used to claim lands in the area, for prospective future Jewish settlement; although their potential as sites of permanent settlement was less important than the immediacy of the land grab (Newman, 1984). The plan specifically advocates the settlement of areas essential for protection of state lands against Arab infiltration and “illegal” encroachment (Jewish Agency, 1978; quoted in Yiftachel, 1992). In 1979, the plan was approved by the Settlement Committee of the Israeli Government and became a basic mechanism for settlement planning in regions of the country where large concentrations of Palestinian citizens reside. It also became a planning tool in the occupied Palestinian territories, discussion of which is beyond the scope of this thesis. It further demonstrates the relevance of para-state planning bodies in influencing and infiltrating planning policy in Israel. In the Galilee, 52 Mitzpe settlements were established during the 1980s.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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303 Mitzpim is the plural of the word Mitzpe (Hilltop Settlement) – discussed extensively as part of the spatial reorganisations of the Galilee in Chapter Three.

304 This statement is quoted in multiple texts, including Abu Hussein & McKay, 2003; Holzman-Gazit, 2007; Wesley, 2013; but these, as well as most others, refer back to the Yiftachel text. Two exceptions are Falah (1991) and Newman (1984), who each source the original materials.
including the village of Rakefet. There are clear intersections of the Mitzpim, the New Admissions Law and the colonial logic of the ongoing battle for Judaisation of Arab space; all of which are discussed extensively in the thesis.

Ajami, Local Master Plan No. 2660 (2001)

This Plan outlines the trajectory for development and rehabilitation of the Ajami neighbourhood. According to the planning document, the plan aims to rehabilitate the buildings and communities living in Jaffa. Whereas interlocutors from the case, as well as Wallerstein & Silverman (2009), Shehadeh & Shbayta (2009) and Goldhaber (2010), argue that the plan’s focus on economic enterprise, low building density and privatisation informs the mechanisms through which to orchestrate the social-demographic transformation of the neighbourhood. Following the same methods the municipality employed in turning Jaffa’s old port into an artist’s colony, the Plan’s map for gentrification and urban renewal has been geared to increase rents and slowly ‘transfer’ out the poor Palestinian communities that live in Ajami.

Jaffa Slopes, Local Master Plan No. 2236 (1995)

The significance of the Jaffa Slopes Plan has been discussed extensively in Chapter Two as the spatial expression of the Judaising project to erase and replace Palestinian Jaffa; and as a watershed moment for mobilising collective protest among Ajami’s residents. First submitted for approval in 1965, it covers what the Plan refers to as ‘Southern Jaffa’, constituting the area known as ‘the Jaffa Slope’ (the area west of Kedem Street, down to the sea) and the Ajami and Jabaliya neighbourhoods. Its prescriptions to rehabilitate the neighbourhood involved what Goldhaber (2010) called a brutal “evacuation-construction” project, typical of modernist planning in the 1960s and 1970s (p.53). The overarching vision for the Jaffa Slope was the creation of a 5-star resort area on the coastal borders of Jaffa. The intention was to reclaim additional coastal territory from the sea, using the rubble from the destroyed buildings of the Ajami and Jabaliya neighbourhoods (Rajagopalan, 2002). While the ‘evacuation’ component of the plan was implemented, the ‘construction’ was not. Over a 20 year period, 3127 building units were demolished; with the rubble piled up onto the Jaffa Slope, along with a ‘Mountain of Garbage’, causing land to erode and sink, making construction impossible (Abu Shehadeh, 2011). Today, the new Park HaMidron stands in its place.

The 1995 Plan that replaced the original version from 1965, incorporates a more ‘participatory’ and ‘progressive’ planning process, in which Jaffa’s buildings are to be preserved and rehabilitated and the demographic “strengthened” (Goldhaber, 2010).


The Plan was first approved in 1995, but multiple appeals have informed extensive changes to it. The Plan sketches the development trajectory for Beersheba and includes the region that constitutes the Siyag. As expected, the Unrecognised Villages are not incorporated into the Plan’s development vision. Instead, the Plan outlines the most heavily concentrated areas of Bedouin settlement for ‘industrial’ use – including chemical plants and mineral extraction – or for ‘recreation/forestation’ sites. Each of the Plan’s amendments since 2007 has set aside space for the establishment of 10 new Jewish-only settlements. These include ‘Hiran’, a settlement which will displace the communities of Atir and Umm al-Hieran to Hura (see Chapter Four for additional details). In the Prawer Law and in Begin’s Consultation Report on the Law, the Metropolitan Plan acts as the basic frame for devising policy and as the foundational document for negating Bedouin space in the Naqab.


The Sharon-Livni Plan was a 5-year plan initiated by then Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, to finalise a solution for Bedouin settlement and land claims in
The Plan to Regulate Bedouin Settlement in the Negev (2011) (The Prawer Plan)

The Prawer Plan, named for the head of the governmental commission that devised it – then head of the Prime Minister’s Head of Policy and Planning Division Ehud Prawer – was initiated as a policy response to the recommendations of the Goldberg Committee. The Goldberg Committee was appointed in 2007 to develop, in consultation with the Bedouin communities of the Naqab, a plan for formalising Bedouin settlement that included a cohesive policy for resolving the contested land claims issue. Goldberg’s report recommendations, which included the recognition of as many unrecognised villages as possible within the framework of the Beersheba Metropolitan Plan, were then passed on to Prawer’s Committee, for the purpose of implementation and to develop it into a legislative document. The main components of the Plan include (in order of discussion), a schematic for ‘Compensation for Land Ownership’; a plan for how to formalise Bedouin settlement, focusing on the absorption of the communities into the already existing localities; a time frame for implementation; enforcement; the establishment of an Authority in Beersheba to regulate and formalise Bedouin settlement, as well as a special committee within the PMO to oversee implementation; and an economic and development plan for the Naqab. As discussed previously, the Plan specifically draws the boundary line for Bedouin settlement along Highway 40 (see Map “Addendum to the Draft Law”, in the following appendix for more details). This plan became the foundation for the Draft Law discussed above.
Appendix 3: Additional Maps

I. UN Partition Plan 1947

The UN Partition Plan acts as a blueprint for understanding how the Jewish pre-state militias – the Palmach and the Haganah – organised their campaigns. They worked initially to consolidate the territories where Jewish settlements were already present, and the future Jewish state had already been planned. The Naqab and coastal plains became the sites of the largest number of Palestinian de-populated villages; whereas areas with large concentrations of Palestinians were surrounded, constricted and contained (Morris, 1987; Kamen, 1987; Wesley, 2013).

Source: Fawzi Asadi, “Geographies of Conflict”, 1976, p.80
II. The Bifurcation of Space

This map is an expression of the spatial apartheids described throughout this thesis. Israeli space is segregated and stratified, according to ethnicity, nationality and class, with the lack of ‘Mixed’ Space an intentional outcome of land and planning mechanisms in place since the establishment of the state. The map delineates which regions are ‘Jewish’ and which are ‘Palestinian’, and indicates how Palestinian space is physically contained and surrounded by Jewish settlements.

III. The Seyag Zone

This map depicts the Seyag Zone and includes the different Bedouin localities – planned, recognised and unrecognised – and the main sites of conflict discussed in Chapter Four: the Beersheba Metropolitan Plan boundaries, lands deemed contested through the Land Registry, and the Forestation Plans for the area. ‘Forestation’ has been a key tool of the JNF and the ILA to colonise space in which recruitment for Jewish settlement has been difficult.

Source: Bimkom: Planners for Planning Rights (accessed 2014)
IV. Addendum to the Draft Law – Mapping the Borders

The map denotes the area to which the Draft Law refers; in particular, land that will be considered for compensation or as an allotment in exchange for other lands expropriated through the Law. The ‘Blue Line’ reproduces the border discussed throughout this thesis, determining the limits to Bedouin space and its segregation from the rest of Israel. The western outline is Highway 40 – a close look at the image reveals that this is one of very few geographic markers emphasised by the map’s designers. In the document itself, the Law further delineates additional limits to land allocation, within the sphere marked by this blue line, in accordance with the needs of the Beersheba Metropolitan District Plan, and areas set aside for national parks, forests, agricultural use or future development of the area.

This is a planning sketch from the Alternative Master Plan (2012). In this map, the plan’s designers integrate their ‘vision’ for the Bedouin localities of the Seyag into the Beersheba Metropolitan District Plan. It exemplifies the ambiguities of ‘planning advocacy’, which necessarily works within the hegemonic lines of official planning schemes. It does not challenge the plan’s basic shape (which is limited to the Seyag), nor draw attention to lands previously appropriated by the state. It continues to incorporate the new military base, the industrial areas, the airport and roads that are part of the state’s plan for the development of the Naqab. However, the logic of how space is used is immediately challenged in the inclusion of all Bedouin localities in planned, recognised space, including al-Araqib. See Chapter Four for further discussion of this topic.

Source: RCUV, Bimkom & Sidre, *Alternative Master Plan for the Unrecognised Bedouin-Arab Villages of the Negev*, 2012; ‘Highway 40’ marker, author’s addition
VI. The Prawer Plan for Transfer

This map depicts the same region, as above in the ‘integrated’ metropolitan plan. In this version, the map describes the expected framework for transfer if Prawer’s Plan is implemented. In truth, the Draft Law went even further, outlining even larger arenas of land and people for transfers and appropriations. However, it is still uncertain what the final map will look like.

Source: Bimkom: Planners for Planning Rights, 2012
This map outlines the northern natural regions, emphasising the areas with majority Palestinian populations and the district boundary lines that cut through them. It also describes the way space is bounded and contained, with the concentrated Palestinian regions surrounded and cut off by concentrations of Jewish districts. It is included here as a reference to the discussion in Chapter Three, on the skewing of borders and statistics to inform spatial controls in the Galilee.

This is a map of the area under the jurisdiction of the Misgav Regional Council in the Central Galilee Region. The Misgav controls 183,000 dunams of land (Challenge, 1999), and is home to 22,000 people, comprising 37 community settlements; 30 of these are Jewish, 6 are Bedouin and one is a mixed Bedouin and non-Bedouin Arab community (Misgav Regional Council, 2014).

The areas of the map shaded green are lands that are administered by the Misgav; the localities marked by purple dots are included in and represented by its council. The Jewish settlements are all ‘collective communities’, affected by the New Admissions Law (2011), and nearly all of them were established as Mitzpe settlements in the 1980s.

The areas in white – as well as the localities signified by the green dots – are outside the control and responsibility of the Council. It should be noted that the Misgav surrounds the Sahnin-Arrabeh-Deir Hana corridor, where the Land Day expropriations were supposed to have taken place. The Misgav Regional Council is discussed extensively in Chapter Three, in its exemplification of the shifting spatiality of the Judaisation project after 1976 in the Palestinian Galilee. It is also the site of the ‘Rakefet Case’ and the struggle of the Zbeidat family for entrance into its gated landscapes.

Source: Misgav Regional Council Website, 2007
This is a map of the Ajami neighbourhood, marked by the main sites of conflict depicted in Chapter Two, as the essence of Jaffa’s Housing Protest. The blue line follows the route of the political tour I took through the neighbourhood with Sami Abu Shehadeh, in November 2011. Titles and shapes in red highlight discussions from the case chapter.

Map Design: Author, based on political tour, multiple visits to the neighbourhood and interlocutor interviews
This map depicts the area and boundary lines of Jaffa and Tel Aviv, in 1948, just before the Nakba. It helps to situate past and current relations in space, pinpointing the boundary lines that existed to segregate Jaffa and Tel Aviv. It also spotlights the borders that were constructed since 1948 to contain Ajami and erase the neighbourhoods that once constituted the City of Jaffa.


365 This is a direct quote, used by Golan (2009) to describe the map.
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<th>Position/Organisation</th>
<th>Date of Interview(s)</th>
<th>Case(s)</th>
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<td>Founding member, al-Rabita</td>
<td>March 23rd, 2012</td>
<td>Jaffa</td>
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<td>Abu Al-Qiaan, Salim</td>
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<td>June 28th, 2012</td>
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<td>Abu Rabia, Atef</td>
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<td>Abu Rabia, Rawia</td>
<td>Lawyer; Head of Naqab-Bedouin Programme, Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI)</td>
<td>July 6th, 2011</td>
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<td>March 26th, 2012</td>
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<td>November 2nd, 2011</td>
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<td>Assira Group Interview</td>
<td>Residents of the Unrecognised Village of Assira; In a Village Home</td>
<td>June 28th, 2012</td>
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<td>Badran, Amir</td>
<td>Lawyer; Activist, Jaffa Popular Committee for the Defence of Arab Land and Housing Rights</td>
<td>July 1st, 2012</td>
<td>Jaffa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baruch, Nili</td>
<td>Urban Planner, Bimkom: Planners for Planning Rights</td>
<td>November 10th, 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ben Ari, Ronen</td>
<td>(Ex) Urban Planner &amp; Field Worker, Bimkom: Planners for Planning Rights</td>
<td>May 26th, 2014</td>
<td>Galilee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bishara, Suhad</td>
<td>Lawyer, Head of Land &amp; Planning Section, Adalah</td>
<td>June 30th, 2011, March 22nd, 2012</td>
<td>Galilee, Naqab</td>
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<td>Bronstein Aparicio, Eitan</td>
<td>Founder, Zochrot</td>
<td>July 1st, 2012</td>
<td>Jaffa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chomski-Porat, Chassia</td>
<td>Co-Director, Shared Public Space Project, Sikkuy – The Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality</td>
<td>November 7th, 2011, December 30th, 2011 (Political Tour, the Mischav Regional Council)</td>
<td>Galilee</td>
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<td>Cook, Jonathan</td>
<td>Journalist/Blogger, Nazareth</td>
<td>June 29th, 2012</td>
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<td>Dabit, Busayna</td>
<td>(Ex) Mixed Cities Project Coordinator, Shatil; Activist, Jaffa Popular Committee for the Defence of Arab Land and Housing Rights</td>
<td>March 23rd, 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>El-Amour, Khalil</td>
<td>Founding Member, RCUV; Resident &amp; Activist, Unrecognised Village of Assira</td>
<td>November 2nd, 2011</td>
<td>Naqab</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elsana, Amal</td>
<td>Founder, AJEEC-NISPED, the Arab-Jewish Center for Equality, Empowerment and Cooperation – Negev Institute for Strategies of Peace and Development</td>
<td>July 12th, 2012</td>
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<td>Elsana, Hanan</td>
<td>Activist, Unrecognised Villages; Staff Member, Sidreh</td>
<td>July 2nd, 2012</td>
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<td>Elsana, Khadra</td>
<td>Director, Sidreh – Lakiya Negev Weaving; Activist, Unrecognised</td>
<td>November 3rd, 2011</td>
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<td>Villages</td>
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<td>Naqab</td>
<td>El-Uqbi, Nuri</td>
<td>Founding Member, the Association for the Support and Defence of Bedouin Rights in Israel; Resident &amp; Activist, al-Araqib</td>
<td>September 23rd, 2013</td>
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<td>Galilee</td>
<td>Farah, Jafar</td>
<td>Founder, Mossawa Center: The Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens of Israel</td>
<td>November 9th, 2011</td>
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<td>Galilee</td>
<td>Haider, Ali</td>
<td>(Ex) Director, Sikkuy – The Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality</td>
<td>December 22nd, 2011</td>
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<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>Hakim, Eran</td>
<td>Activist, Jaffa Popular Committee for the Defence of Arab Land and Housing Rights</td>
<td>June 19th, 2013</td>
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<td>Galilee</td>
<td>Hamdan, Alaa</td>
<td>Activist, Acre Popular Committee; Co-Director, Shared Regional Tourism Project, Sikkuy – The Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality</td>
<td>March 22nd, 2012</td>
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<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>Hliwah, Fatmeh</td>
<td>Activist, Palestinian Youth Movement; Palestinian Director, ‘Community in Action’ Project, Sadaka-Reut</td>
<td>June 29th, 2012</td>
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<td>Galilee</td>
<td>Ighbarieh, Umar</td>
<td>Group Facilitator &amp; Landscape &amp; Space Project Coordinator, Zochrot</td>
<td>March 29th, 2012</td>
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<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>Ilani, Yudit</td>
<td>Activist &amp; Founding Member, Jaffa Popular Committee for the Defence of Arab Land and Housing Rights; Darna Case-Worker</td>
<td>December 29th, 2011</td>
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<td>Galilee</td>
<td>Inbari, Itamar</td>
<td>Journalist/Specialist in Islamic Movements in Israel</td>
<td>March 20th, 2013</td>
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<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>Izhaki, Anat</td>
<td>Board Member, Sadaka-Reut; Activist, Jaffa Popular Committee for the Defence of Arab Land and Housing Rights</td>
<td>July 5th, 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<td>Jabareen, Hassan</td>
<td>Director &amp; Founder, Adalah</td>
<td>March 22nd, 2012</td>
<td>Galilee</td>
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<td>Jabareen, Yosef</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Architecture and Town Planning, Technion –</td>
<td>November 4th, 2011; December 25th, 2012</td>
<td>Galilee</td>
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<td>Jaffa Tent Encampment</td>
<td>Residents of the Gan Hashnaim (J14) Tent Encampment; In Their Tent</td>
<td>December 31, 2012</td>
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<td>Jaffa Youth Movement</td>
<td>Activists from the Jaffa Youth Movement; On a Rooftop, in Jaffa</td>
<td>July 1st, 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamal, Amal</td>
<td>Professor, Department of Political Science, Tel Aviv University</td>
<td>April 9th, 2012</td>
<td>Galilee</td>
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<td>Jaraysi, Ramiz</td>
<td>(Ex) Mayor, Nazareth</td>
<td>June 26th, 2012</td>
<td>Galilee</td>
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<td>Jisr al-Zarqa Group</td>
<td>Residents of Jisr al-Zarqa; At Jisr al-Zarqa Beach</td>
<td>June 30th, 2012</td>
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<td>Kada, Samira</td>
<td>Activist, Jaffa Popular Committee for the Defence of Arab Land and Housing Rights</td>
<td>December 28th, 2011</td>
<td>Jaffa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karkabi, Nadeem</td>
<td>Doctoral Student, Department of Anthropology, School of Oriental &amp; African Studies; Participant/Organiser, Haifa Music Scene</td>
<td>February, 27th, 2014</td>
<td>Galilee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kedar, Alexandre (Sandy)</td>
<td>Professor, Legal History &amp; Critical Legal Geography, Law Department, Haifa University</td>
<td>November 9th, 2011</td>
<td>Naqab</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khouri, Raja</td>
<td>Director, the Arab Center for Alternative Planning (ACAP)</td>
<td>December 21st, 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kohn, Orna</td>
<td>Lawyer, Adalah</td>
<td>June 6th, 2011</td>
<td>Galilee, Naqab</td>
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<td>Lahab-Grayeb, Rania</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Mossawa Center: The Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens of Israel</td>
<td>November 9th, 2011</td>
<td>Galilee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manna, Ayema</td>
<td>Activist, Majd el Krum; Blog Manager.</td>
<td>March 22nd, 2012</td>
<td>Galilee</td>
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</table>

306 H. Jabareen did not sit for a full interview. He is included in this list because he is quoted in the thesis, as speaking to his persecution as a leader of the Palestinian community in Israel. H. Jabareen refused to sit for the interview in light of this persecution by the state, and the danger to which he and the organisation is exposed when he gives an interview. He asked that this statement be attributed to him, and is discussed here for this reason.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
<th>Date/Region</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meir, Avinoam</td>
<td>Professor, Department of Geography and Environmental Development, Ben Gurion University of the Negev</td>
<td>March 26&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2012, Naqab</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miari, Muhammad</td>
<td>Founding Member, Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands</td>
<td>March 25&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2012, Galilee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mohsen, Salah</td>
<td>Arabic Media Coordinator (Current Position) &amp; Jaffa-based field researcher (2007/2008), Adalah</td>
<td>December 22&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;, 2011, Galilee, Jaffa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mustafa, Mohanad</td>
<td>PhD/Academic Expert, Islamic Movements in Israel</td>
<td>March 28&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2013, Galilee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Naamnih, Haneen</td>
<td>(ex) Lawyer, Adalah; Activist, Abna al-Balad</td>
<td>June 30&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2011, Galilee, Naqab</td>
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<td>Nassar, Shahin</td>
<td>Journalist; Activist, Wadi al-Nisnas Housing Protest; Activist, Haifa J14 Movement; (Ex) Web Manager, Mossawa Center: The Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens of Israel</td>
<td>March 22&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;, 2011, Galilee</td>
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<td>Noach, Haia</td>
<td>Director, Negev Coexistence Forum</td>
<td>July 4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2011, Naqab</td>
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<td>Raanan, Yaela</td>
<td>Anthropologist; Case-Worker, RCUV</td>
<td>November 8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2011, Naqab</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rawan Bisharat</td>
<td>Palestinian Programme Director, ‘Building a Culture of Peace’ Project, Sadaka-Reut; Activist, Jaffa Popular Committee for the Defence of Arab Land and Housing Rights</td>
<td>March 26&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2012, Jaffa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saba, Ester</td>
<td>Activist &amp; Founding Member, Jaffa Popular Committee for the Defence of Arab Land and Housing Rights</td>
<td>March 25&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2012, Jaffa</td>
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<td>Sabbaghy-Khoury, Areej</td>
<td>Project Coordinator, Mada al Carmel</td>
<td>November 9&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2011, Galilee</td>
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<td>Sallam, Ali</td>
<td>(Ex) Deputy Mayor of Nazareth (As of March 2014: Current Mayor of Nazareth)</td>
<td>March 28&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2012, Galilee</td>
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<td>Saifi, Johayna</td>
<td>Activist &amp; Founding Member, Tarabut-</td>
<td>November 6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 2011, December 23&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;, 2011, Galilee, Jaffa</td>
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<td>Name</td>
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<td>Hithabrut</td>
<td>Founding Member, Acre Popular Committee</td>
<td>(Political Tour, Acre Old City) March 30th, 2012</td>
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<td>Satel, Abed</td>
<td>Chair, Darna; Activist, al-Rabita</td>
<td>March 28th, 2012 Jaffa</td>
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<td>Sfard, Michael</td>
<td>Human Rights Lawyer; Lead Legal Advocate, al-Araqib land cases</td>
<td>December 25th, 2011 Naqab</td>
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<td>Shbayta, Fadi</td>
<td>Founding Member, Jaffa Popular Committee for the Defence of Arab Land and Housing Rights</td>
<td>June 19th, 2011 Jaffa</td>
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<td>Shbeta, Shadi</td>
<td>Personal Assistant, MK Hanna Swaid (DFPE)</td>
<td>June 29th, 2012 Galilee</td>
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<td>Siqsiq, Omar</td>
<td>Founding Member, al-Rabita</td>
<td>March 29th, 2012 Jaffa</td>
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<td>Swaid, Hanna</td>
<td>Member of Knesset, DFPE; Urban Planner; Founder, Arab Center for Alternative Planning</td>
<td>March 27th, 2012 Galilee</td>
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<td>Tourk, Rifaat</td>
<td>(Ex) Israeli National Football Team Player; (Ex) Deputy Mayor/ Council Member, Tel Aviv Municipality (Meretz List); Jaffa Resident</td>
<td>December 29th, 2011 Jaffa</td>
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<td>Wadi al-Naam, group interview</td>
<td>Residents of the Unrecognised Village of Wadi al-Naam; In a Village Home</td>
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<td>Waxman, Dov</td>
<td>Professor of Political Science, International Affairs and Israel Studies, Northeastern University</td>
<td>February 2nd, 2012 Galilee</td>
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<td>Weingarten, Miri</td>
<td>EU lobbyist, Coalition of Israeli Human Rights NGOs</td>
<td>April 18th, 2011 Naqab</td>
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<td>Tawat, Hasan</td>
<td>Principal, Jisr al-Zarqa High School</td>
<td>June 30th, 2012 Galilee</td>
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<td>Yacobi, Haim</td>
<td>Lecturer, Department of Politics, Ben Gurion University of the Desert; Urban Planner &amp; Architect; Founder, Bimkom: Planners for Planning Rights</td>
<td>June 13th, 2012 Jaffa</td>
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<td>Zahalka, Jamal</td>
<td>Member of Knesset &amp; Party Chair, Tajamo</td>
<td>March 27th, 2012</td>
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<td>Chair, High Follow-up Committee; Director, Arab Human Rights Association</td>
<td>June 26th, 2012</td>
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<td>Zion, Eldad</td>
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<td>August 26th, 2014</td>
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