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IN THE CRACKS OF THE BIG CITY:

WHAT ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR PALESTINIAN-ORIGIN JORDANIANS OF EAST AMMAN SINCE 1989?

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Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in Development Studies

2015

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Declaration

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Abstract

This thesis examines the relationship between refugee-citizens and the state, through questioning the social citizenship rights that a fraction of disenfranchised Palestinian-origin Jordanians, living in East Amman, have been able to access since 1989. I analyse how state politics have rendered both refugee-citizens’ access to socioeconomic rights and their integration as citizens, as Palestinian refugees and as vulnerable class more challenging. The patrimonial relationship between the state and its citizens has strengthened the class stratification and widened the disparities amongst people from different classes and statuses, often nurtured by state power. The political economy of rentierism has enabled the state to distribute its resources, in what may benefit its own interest in terms of shaping of national identity and serving its political and economic concerns. In Jordan, the neoliberalisation era since 1989 has dwelled on this politics, ‘the politics of divisiveness’, and widened further the disparities between citizens.

Focusing on education and employment narratives of Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman, this thesis analyses the ways social citizenship rights have been accessed. It considers the ways the state seeks to manage its hybrid peoples and how they have influenced the access to rights and usurped the essence of citizenship. This work demonstrates that such politics has made marginal subjects of Palestinian-origin Jordanians struggling for livelihoods within peripheral places in inner cities. While studying the challenges to access better economic opportunities, the politics of the state in managing its peoples have been unfolding, seeking to understand the process through which Palestinian refugees, holders of official Jordanian citizenship, have become disaffiliated from the broader society.
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Acknowledgements

I am most grateful to the team of supervisors I had in the Development Studies department at the School of Oriental and African Studies-University of London: the academic support I received from my principle supervisor, Laura Hammond was not limited to listening to my dispersed ideas or to reading my many drafts but also stretched to involving me in the academic set up at the department in my specialty of forced migration, and giving me the opportunity to refine my work and my theories through the academic exchange of tutoring and lecturing. I appreciate the feedback I got from my second and third supervisors Gilbert Achcar and Adam Hanieh on my work in the first and last years. I sincerely thank Rex Brynen, at McGill University, who oversaw some of my drafts and guided me constructively.

Financial support, direct and indirect, contributed immensely to my progress in this phase: Thanks to the Abu Lughod Institute for International Studies -Forced Migration Unit at Birzeit University that funded my second and third years of study and thanks to Open Society foundation that funded my last year of write-up. Thanks to my two brothers, Khaled and Samer, who shouldered some expenses with me, and to my cousins who supported my accommodation: thanks to Jane and Sami Nabeel Nabulsi who hosted me during my first year in London and thanks to Mona and Donna Nabulsi who supported me during my last year and to Khalo Tahsin and Aunt Niveen for their constant support.

This thesis was almost aborted at its very beginnings. Professional academics read my work and pushed me to pursue without any hesitation. I am so grateful to Rex Brynen (McGill uni), Yazid Sayigh (KCL then), Anita Fabos (Clark University), Stephan Sperl (SOAS) and Laura Hammond (SOAS), who believed in my academic ability and supported my move out from Geneva to London where I chose to be back to SOAS.

I appreciate the time my professional colleagues had put in talking to me or even reading some excerpts from my work: thanks to Anis Qassem, Omar Razzaz, Ahmed Attiga, Ibrahim al Jazi, Samar Dudin, Khaled Hroub, Oraib Rantawi, Age Tithnes, Yusuf Mansur. Thanks to Geraldine Chatelard who supported me immensely to go for a PhD degree and spent time brainstorming with me shaping my very first drafts of proposal. I thank Khadija Dermame for sharing some of her maps on Amman. I am very thankful to Tim Morris who helped with editing some chapters.

I am thankful to all those busy, hardworking Palestinian-origin Jordanians living in East-Amman working in markets, workshops and in the streets who agreed to talk to me with honesty and shared with me their stories about their everyday economic struggle. I appreciate the Makhateer from Jabal al-Nadheef and Jabal al Naser who met with me and gave me of their very busy time. I thank gatekeepers who facilitated my access to more cases with impressive stories: thanks to Rajaa, to Kamleh, to Kholoud and to the lawyer Abdullat.
Not everyone understands really the challenges a PhD student goes through. It was always an issue answering questions of acquaintances wondering why this thesis is taking more than a year! Thanks for my school mate and dear friend Dana Sabbagh, to Rose Esber, Shirine Jurdi, Oriab Quabbaj, Yassmine Keilani, Eva Abu Halaweh, Mu’ayyad Mehyar, Elizabeth Frantz, Sura Barghouti, Izzat Darwazeh for being there as caring and supporting friends.

In this challenging phase, the moral and love support I received from particularly my family was motivating. The impetus I got from Khaldoun, my eldest brother, as I was coming out from Geneva to London made me persist. I do not think I would have made the move without him. Samer’s will to pursue his own studies was inspirational; we shared the hard moments of being students at a not young age! The strength and love my mum has given me over the years are major in my life. Being influenced as a young child by the charisma and the political thought of my late father, I never realised I have unconsciously followed the steps of my mother who, with her education in social welfare, sought to scratch subtle differences teaching us the value of giving.
Abbreviations

CSS: Center for Strategic Studies
DPA: Department of Palestinian Affairs
ESM: Economic Survey Mission
HUDC: Housing and Urban Development Corporation
ICRC: The International Committees of the Red Cross
IGP: Income Generation Programme
IMF: International Monetary Fund (IMF)
JD: Jordanian Dinar ($1.41 US Dollars)
PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organisation
QIZ: Qualified Industrial Zones
RNGO: Royal Non-Governmental Organisation
UDD: Urban Development Department
SPP: Social Productivity Program
UNDRP: United Nations Disaster Relief Project
UNCCP: United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine
UNGA: United Nations General Assembly
UNRPR: United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees
UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency
**Glossary**

*Al Nakba*: The catastrophe of the 1948 war that led to the dispossession of Palestinians from their historical Palestine.

*Al Naksa*: The setback of 1967 that saw Israel expand its occupation to what was left of historical Palestine, taking over the West Bank that was annexed to Jordan, the Gaza Strip that was annexed to Egypt, Sinai Desert from Egypt and Golan Heights from Syria. This led to another mass influx of Palestinians to the neighbouring countries.

*Diwan*: A family/tribal/village venue/club for social reunions.

*Falafel*: A popular and cheap rounded fried dough made out of chickpeas, fava beans and parsley.

*Fallahin* (the singular is *fallah*): Peasants (referring to those from rural areas and villages).

*Hay*: District- neighbourhood.

*Jabal*: hill (Amman was originally built on the hills all around the city. Today *Jabal* Amman, or *Jabal* Nadheef, or *Jabal* al Naser refer to areas/districts that have been created on hills.)

*Mukhtar* (the plural is *Makhateer*): In the old days, *Mukhtar* would mean head of the village. In the present time, it means the focal person in the *hay* who knows all the people in the neighbourhood, since he registers them upon their arrival to the district. In Jordan, this title is given to people who are assigned by the Ministry of Interior.

*Mushaa*: Undivided common property, usually owned by the state.

*Piastre*: a coin making 100\(^{th}\) of the dinar.

*Tawteen*: Settling Palestinians in host countries and denying their Palestinian identity.

**The Chart of the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES) has been used for Arabic transliteration.**
Time Line

These are key dates for Jordan and its relation with the Palestinian refugee issue:

- 1921: The creation of the Emirate of Transjordan.
- 1947: UN Res. 181 dividing Palestine into three zones: the Arab, the Jewish and the International.
- 1947 (Nov)-1948 (June): The expulsion of Palestinians from their homes and lands in historical Palestine.
- 1948 (May): Declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel and the Catastrophe (al Nakba) for the dispossessed Palestinians.
- 1948 (Dec): Jericho conference convenes in Amman (September) and in Jericho (December), during which Palestinian notables favourable to the Hashemite authorities – repudiate the All-Palestine Government (APG) and declare loyalty to King Abdullah I.
- 1949: Additional Law no. 56, which amended the original Citizenship Ordinance of 1928, stipulates the citizenship rights, duties, and obligations of all Jordanians allowing for the participation of refugees in the April 1950 special parliamentary elections.
- 1949: Passport Amendment Ordinance No 11 of 1949 passes and enables Palestinians to gain a Jordanian passport.
- 1950: A royal decree stipulates that the term ‘Palestine’ is to be expunged from official documents. The “West Bank” designates the region of Palestine located to the west of the River Jordan controlled by the Jordanian authorities.
- 1950: UNRWA, created by resolution 302 (IV) of December 1949 of the UN General Assembly, starts its humanitarian mission.
- 1954: Article 3, par. 2, of the Jordanian Nationality Law regularises the conditions under which Palestinians – i.e. people who formerly had Palestinian nationality – may acquire Jordanian citizenship.
- 1964: Birth of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation.
- 1970: Armed clashes between PLO militant groups and the Jordanian Army. ‘Black September’ results in the removal of the PLO’s military apparatus from Jordan.
- 1974: At the Rabat Arab League summit, unanimous recognition of the PLO as “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.”
- 1988: King Hussein announces severance of legal and administrative links between the two banks. This royal declaration is not constitutionally endorsed but is used to shape administrative regulations withdrawing Jordanian citizenship from Palestinians working for the PLO and those living in the West Bank.
- 1988: The Ministry of Occupied Land Affairs is dismantled and the Department of Palestinian Affairs is created. The latter is charged with monitoring and following up on issues related to Palestinian affairs inside and outside the
occupied Palestinian territories and providing assistance to the camps located in Jordan in parallel, and in coordination, with UNRWA.

- 1989: Devaluation of the Jordanian Dinar. King Hussein calls for elections based on a new election law and announces the liberalisation of the economy.

- 1990-1991: As a result of the Gulf War, some 350,000 people holding Jordanian passports return to Jordan, the majority being of Palestinian origin and including many refugees registered with UNRWA.


- 1994: Following the September 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians, Jordan and Israel sign the Wadi Araba peace treaty. Article 8, on “Refugees and Displaced Persons,” commits the two countries to “seek[ing] to resolve the human problems caused by the conflict in the Middle East in appropriate forums, in accordance with international law.”

- 1995: The Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) surveys opinion re Palestinian-Jordanian relations and finds that 65 percent of Transjordanians and 72 percent of Palestinian-Jordanians believe that there has been significant integration of the two peoples, while only 48 percent of a sub-sample drawn from the Transjordanian elite believes so.

- 1996: Prime Minister Kabariti launches the “White Revolution” to usher in reforms of public administration and the economy. Kabariti facilitates the resumption of relations between Jordan and the Gulf countries.

- 1996-1997: Jordanian authorities include the 13 refugee camps in its Special Productivity Program (SPP), an initiative designed to improve the physical infrastructure of impoverished regions.

- 1999: King Hussein dies and King Abdullah takes power.

- 2000: King Abdullah calls for socio-economic development.

- September 2002: Landmark recognition from Jordanian authorities as Prime Minister Ali Abu al-Ragheb declares that Jordanians of Palestinian origin constitute 43 percent of the total population. Many observers believe this is an under-estimate.

- 2003: Iraq War triggers flow of Iraqi refugees to Jordan.

- 2007: King Abdullah sets out priorities for comprehensive reform and modernisation - political, economic and social – needed to achieve the ultimate goal of improving living standards and providing the means for a decent life for every Jordanian family.


- 2010 Human rights watch reported that between 2004 and 2008, the Jordanian Authorities had withdrawn nationality from over 2,700 of its citizens of Palestinian origin.
These forgotten ones, disconnected from the social fabric, these outcasts, deprived of work and equal rights, are at the time expected to applaud their oppression because it provides them with the blessings of memory. Thus he who’s expected to forget he’s human he is forced to accept the exclusion from human rights that will train him for freedom from the disease of forgetting the homeland.

*Memory for forgetfulness*, Mahmoud Darwish, Beirut (1982)
Introduction

Palestinians in Jordan have been considered ‘the successful model of integration’ in the Arab region. ¹ A rough estimate of three million Palestinian refugees and displaced ² today in Jordan hold Jordanian citizenship and are entitled to, *de jure*, basic rights, state protection and social welfare. Jordan, thus, has been considered a paragon amongst the Arab neighbouring countries in the way it has treated the Palestinians since their arrival as refugees. According to United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)’s statistics, 42 percent of the Palestinian refugees who were dispossessed from their lands in Historical Palestine in the 1948 war during what is known as the Catastrophe of Dispossession (*al-Nakba*), sought refuge in Jordan. In contrast, other Arab countries have only given Palestinians travel documents and have not welcomed naturalising them or giving them citizenship rights, justifying this as safeguarding their Palestinian identity and protecting them from becoming enmeshed with other Arab nationalities of

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² This estimate includes 2 million registered refugees in the records of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) added to those who were displaced after 1967 War and fail to go back to the West Bank.
neighbouring countries. Jordanian citizenship, as agreed at the Jericho conference between King Abdullah I and some elite Palestinians in late 1948, was accorded to the residents of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (then living on both the West and East Banks of the River Jordan as shown in the map below). In that agreement, the right of return has been guaranteed to be safeguarded and claimed by their new host state Jordan, despite their acquired citizenship. They have become Palestinian refugee - Jordanian citizens who are legally recognised as part and parcel of the host society.

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3 This politics was taken against the Israelis, who did not recognise refugee rights and argued that Palestinians are part of the wider Arab world, speaking the same language, culture and religions.
4 These elite Palestinians led by Shaikh Mohammed Ali Ja’barai were pro-Jordanian calling for the annexation of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem to Jordan. They were opponents to Haj Amin al Husseini who created in Gaza Government of All Palestine.
5 Shiblak writes that “the de facto annexation by Jordan was never recognised by any member state of the League of Arab States or by the United Nations.” Shiblak explains this annexation using evidence from the new historian’s work Shlaim from his revision to the Zionist archives: the collusion across the River Jordan between the Israeli leadership with King Abdullah of Jordan at the time meant that “the eradication of Palestine as a political and national entity from 1948 was in fact a joint effort between Israel and Jordan. It was left for the successive state to determine the entitlement of Palestinians to nationality,” Shiblak, Abbas ‘Passport for what price, stateless among Palestinian refugees’ in Are Knudsen and Sari Hanafi, (eds.), 2011 Palestinian refugees: Identity, space and place in the Levant, Oxford: Routledge, p.114.
Despite having acquired citizenship rights, these Palestinian refugees - Jordanian citizens have not had the same rights and the same privileges equally as citizens. This has undermined the value of their citizenship and of their integration. The political economy of the state, over the years, shaped what I call in this work, politics of divisiveness, as a way to manage its hybrid population. This was done through class stratification, labelling the citizens as refugees or Palestinians, empowering those showing political allegiance and those sharing economic interests and sharpening the presentation of the Jordanian national identity. These measures obscured citizenship rights for some and privileged others.
To analyse the impact of these divisions and the way they have affected the access to basic citizenship rights, this research questions the economic opportunities that Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin, living in East-Amman, have been able to access since 1989, when neoliberal policies came into practice. This work thus seeks to disentangle complex variables that have today rendered socioeconomic opportunities difficult to access for a particularly disenfranchised group amongst the Palestinian-origin Jordanians.

To do so, this thesis studies the relationship between the state and its citizens (with their varied migratory trajectories), aiming to explain how the citizenship, in its three elements political, civil and social, as a resource of the state, has not been equally distributed. To understand the ways basic rights have been distributed, the politics of state management is thoroughly analysed through its ‘discursive’ measures to rule and to manage its people and, most importantly through the impact of this politics on the acquired rights of disenfranchised citizens. ‘Discursive’, that is used in this work portraying the state’s power, is defined by Foucault as “a disciplinary power exercised through invisibility”. Categorisation or labelling, as an example of discursiveness, as demonstrated in the coming chapters, has been used in a subtle way by the state to include or to exclude some of its citizens from accessing some of their basic rights. In this work, I argue that categorisation through using the ‘politics of divisiveness’ has made those of Palestinian-origin Jordanians with limited capital and power, appear as invisible citizens with overshadowed social, economic and political elements of their rights.

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6 In this work, I will be referring to the Palestinian refugees (with UNRWA refugee cards) who are holders of Jordanian citizenship and living in Jordan as “Palestinian-origin Jordanians.” I will also be referring to East Amman, the main geographic interest in this thesis, as the inner city. Jordanian tribes and peasants who used to live in East Jordan are referred to as East Jordanians in this thesis, although in some of the literature they are referred to as Transjordanians.

Different to the assumption that Jordanian citizenship has secured Palestinian refugees with rights and facilitated their integration, “the problems successfully documented refugees may face in terms of discrimination, service access, and other protection or welfare needs, or indeed their lack of problems and their positive contributions to the host and diaspora societies, […] become invisible.”8 This invisibility creates what Foucault calls “a particular brand of marginalisation, that effectively moves people from the gaze of the public and the government”.9 This thesis analyses, using ethnographic methods, this marginalisation and exclusion amongst citizens, living in East Amman and develops the variables that have affected the integration of Palestinian refugees as citizens of Jordan. The combination of the traditional patrimonial tribal East Jordanian organisation and the complex Palestinian dual allegiance (Jordanian and Palestinian allegiance) and the refugee status have placed Palestinian-origin Jordanian citizens, who were not in positions of power nor had financial capital or economic professional status, in a liminal condition, with political vulnerability, economic fragility and social instability

The externally induced flow of rent, whether aid or remittances, during the peak of the Gulf oil boom between 1968-1980s, “played a key role in national integration, knitting together an otherwise deeply divided population (Palestinians versus East Bankers; Bedouin, rural and urban populations; tribal rivalries) around the central core of the

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Hashemite monarchy”. The varied revenue structure dependent both on aid and remittances and private sector rent, permitted the state to live beyond its means, creating a dependent group on the state, through widening the enrolment in the public sector and through buying allegiance in the established patrimonial state-citizen relationship. The independent ones are those who did not fall under the public sector, counting on remittances flowing to them from abroad and dependent on their own income, generated from their small private sector enterprises.

Rather than addressing the gap between the dependent citizens on the state and the independent ones from the state, neoliberalism since 1989, has thrived in furthering disparities though channelling wealth to dominant classes and bypassing the subordinate ones in the Jordanian society as a whole. The highly praised reform process supported by the World Bank, represented in economic and political liberalisation since 1989, has in reality consolidated power in particular political, tribal and business classes and has had little impact on levelling the differences between existing social structures. The reform has failed to address sociopolitical factors that strongly influence economic performance.

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and shape its outcome.\textsuperscript{12} Most importantly, it has failed to curb tribal influence and power status, clientelistic practices, and the acquired rentierism-mentality which developed a sense of entitlement that has been very dependent on awards and resources allocated by the state.

In this thesis, the 1989 politics of liberalisation is examined empirically through experiences of individuals reflecting about the changes they encountered ever since accessing their social citizenship rights, which encompasses access to education and to economic opportunities, especially for those living in the heart of the urbanised capital. While questioning economic opportunities accessed by a fraction of the Palestinian-origin Jordanians, this work seeks to answer how these changes altered the access to basic citizenship rights such as education and employment and how the politics, of managing people has impacted the way Palestinian-origin Jordanians have sought to exercise their ‘socio-political’ rights and to ‘integrate’ as citizens.

\textbf{The Palestinian refugee experience}

Like any refugee experience, the Palestinian experience in Jordan has been varied; some have advanced economically, managed to grow and prosper at social and economic levels, benefiting, differently to many of their refugee peers in the world, from the legal

status they enjoy as citizens. Others have attained high political standing and have taken part in political decision-making in the country or have even become part of the closed entourage to the royal court. Socially, East Jordanians and Palestinian-origin Jordanians have married and partnered between each other.

There has also been a group amongst Palestinian-origin Jordanians who have had to contend with socioeconomic difficulties and poverty. Some, with refugee registration cards, lived in the thirteen refugee camps dispersed across the north, centre and centre-east of Jordan. Over the years, as their economy grew, they were able to leave the refugee camps and move physically in the cities. Others lived within the proximity of refugee camps, usually called fringes or urban settlements. I shall refer to these areas in this thesis as environs of the refugee camps. The environs are mainly informal settlements where the land is owned by the state. The present residents have constructed their own housing and settled upon arrival to these areas, yet have made sure to be close to government services and most importantly to refugee camps that are served by (UNRWA).

The literature on Palestinian refugees in Jordan focuses on studying UNRWA programmes and the refugee camps it serves, the socioeconomic conditions for refugee camp dwellers, and the constructed identity. Farsoun and Zureik in their work on the

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Palestinian refugee experience after the exodus and the historical, political, legal and socioeconomic implications, analyse the major changes affecting Palestinian society in each Arab host country that varied based on the politics and policies of the host state. Similarly, Don Peretz, while studying the implications of the war and the class stratifications generated, highlighted Palestinian refugees' survival mechanisms upon arrival in host countries, particularly as they regrouped and transferred with them their traditional values, customs, mores, and social patterns to rebuild communities. This allowed them to reassert their political aspirations in return and to develop transnational institutions to pursue their fight for the return to their homeland.

18 Farsoun 2005, pp. 239-40
Empirical studies have elaborated further, analysing the importance of cultural identity for the refugee community as examples of physical adaptation. According to the literature, both political instability for the first two generations of the 1948 war (al-Nakba) and lack of job security have affected the integration process. Yet the urbanisation process has been highly credited for accommodating the masses of rural Palestinians seeking refuge in newly established cities, which has enabled them to access new opportunities. The first generation had little education and sought employment through unskilled labour to secure an income and make a living after their dispossession. The second generation and the others which followed have been given the opportunity to access education and jobs through UNRWA.

Researchers from various disciplines whether sociology, anthropology and political science discuss success stories coming out of these camps and environs, especially the achievements between the 1960s-1980s because of the attainment of higher education and greater job opportunities in the local or regional market. The literature has demonstrated how education provided by UNRWA and the host states has enabled Palestinian refugees to be absorbed into the labour market. Quite a large number were able to secure employment in the Arab Gulf which enjoyed an economic boom between the 1960-1980s. The high income these Palestinians were making in the Gulf countries influenced

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their lifestyles and boosted the Jordanian economy. It also enabled some families, as their socioeconomic conditions improved, to move out from dire living conditions in camps or urban settlements and achieve upward social mobility. Others, were supported by relatives in the Gulf who enabled them to create businesses and get involved in the informal market. In 1987-1988 Abu Helwa and Birch\textsuperscript{21} conducted a survey among Palestinian refugee households in three refugee camps (al-Hussein, Wihdat and al-Naser) and their bordering environs in Amman. The aim was to examine how living conditions varied between the three main camps in the city and their bordering squatter areas. Findings indicated that demography, employment and educational characteristics of the refugees in the camps and their fringes have limited variation. Their survey indicated that education has had a significant influence on the kind of work and income refugees have been able to access. Improvement in schooling provision in camps and fringes has enhanced education opportunities for the young generation. In refugee camps, however, the rate of dropouts of schools remains high. Their survey notes that whilst most camp dwellers and environs residents work in jobs involving little skill, the professional jobs that need skills, were filled with Jordanians of Palestinian origin, “refugees who now live outside the camps, having been able to earn enough to allow them to escape from the poverty of the camps.”\textsuperscript{22}

In the mid-1980s labour opportunities were available in Jordan or in the Arab Gulf, whether in the formal or informal sectors. Majority of those living in camps and neighbouring environs, as Doan, De Jong and Tell reported based on their research work

\textsuperscript{21} Abu Helwa Mussallam and Birch Brian, 1993 ‘The demography and housing conditions of Palestinian refugees in and around the camps in Jordan’ in\textit{Journal of Refugee Studies}, Vol 6, No 4.
\textsuperscript{22} Abu Helwa and Birch 1993, p.406.
in 1990-91, were working in the informal sector. The vibrant economic markets, with a flourishing economy, permitted them to create their independent source of living. Their educational attainment was never a priority and the informal market secured quick income and had few requirements then. The informalisation of work has made this very poor class invisible to the state, fiscally, administratively, physically and politically.

This thesis builds on what has been studied in the literature and questions the continuum of integration of the Palestinians who have the refugee status, the Jordanian citizenship and living within East Amman (including official camps and unofficial camps) after the oil boom has dwindled. By focusing on Palestinian-origin Jordanians living at the lower end of the labour market, this work questions the possible job opportunities and social protection they have been able to secure after 1989 as part of their citizenship rights. This expanding class has been in control of its socioeconomic life, in non-regular job status, of casual workers, outworkers and agency workers. Its members have been disadvantaged by having little control over their skills development. This is part of a process of disaffiliation triggered by employment insecurity and dire poverty which creates, what Guy Standing calls, a sense of “alienation and anomie”.

Outline

This thesis examines to the complex relationship between refugee-citizens and the state aiming to highlight the politics used by the state to manage its population and to regulate

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23 Doan 1992, De Jong and Tell 1997
the resources out to its subjects. Citizenship is a resource that has been used by the state to exercise persuasion and cooptation on its subjects. Through questioning the right to access economic opportunities, this work disentangles the variables whether societal, political and economic, which have influenced the application of basic rights and usurped the essence of citizenship. This work also highlights the contradictory politics of better equal chances claimed by liberalisation policies and the *de facto* widening disparities and inequality for those beyond the panopticon of the state. This thesis seeks to unfold the discursive effects of state politics on Palestinian refugees with Jordanian citizenship with limited means and capitals who have been made liminal and marginal subjects struggling for livelihoods within peripheral places in inner cities, camps or semi-camps.

Chapter One illustrates the beginnings of Hashemite rule in Jordan. In a brief historical background, it outlines the established relationship between the newly born state and the people living in East Jordan. The arrival of the biggest flow of Palestinian refugees from historical Palestine, which almost doubled the Jordanian society with about 450,000 Palestinian refugees, transformed Jordanian society and the heterogeneous identity of the Jordanian people. I locate the Palestinian refugee-citizens of East Amman, the main case study of this thesis, after drawing the capital Amman and divide it into wealthy districts of the West and segregated districts of the East. After I position myself in this research, I explain the methodology I used in this work to test my hypothesis and to disentangle the causal relationship between the variables I am questioning about citizenship rights (through accessing educational and economic opportunities) and refugee integration.
Using a qualitative research methodology, I seek to provide an illumination and understanding of complex socio-political and economic issues.

Chapter Two establishes the theoretical framework which is centred on the concept of refugees’ integration in Jordan as citizens. This chapter defines and analyses integration in order to understand the ways the state of Jordan has managed Palestinians and their integration as citizens taking a role in the social and political institutions. This chapter defines integration from three perspectives in order to relate them to the way Palestinians of Jordan experience integration themselves: the academic perspective, the policy perspective, dwelling on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) definition of local integration and the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP)- United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) definition of economic integration. The third perspective is the one shaped in Jordan with the fine lines between integration, settlement (Tawteen) and assimilation and the way the political conflict ruled the way such a word is used. This chapter in its second part questions how Palestinians have been integrated as citizens drawing on the work of T.H. Marshall’s *Citizenship and Social Class* analysing the way the three rights of citizenship political, civil and social have been acquired in light of the challenging political reality and the state’s discursive politics. To analyze the discursive politics, this section elaborates further its analysis using the theoretical approach of class stratifications of Weber with its three elements: class, status and command/power. These elucidate the social divisions that have impacted integration and enjoyment of citizenship rights in Jordan. This chapter illustrates how the governance mechanism that underpins the management of a
people who are not only refugees but also citizens, is based on manipulation of citizenship rights, demography, labels and class/power.

Chapter Three studies the varied revenue structure in Jordan, which has been dependent on aid, remittances and private sector rent, and the way it laid the foundation for the economic dimension of the divisions in society, deepening the already socio-politically established one. This chapter demonstrates how the rent-induced economy has shaped the relationship between the state and its citizens during the years, as part of the established neo-patrimonialism within the status and class system. It studies rentierism as a key role in national integration and a tool to rule and manage the population through the exchange of allocations and state benefits for allegiance and loyalty. I argue that the rentier economy encouraged divisions along national origin lines, as if preparing the ground for further divisions that were widened by neoliberalist policies. The various financing sources over the years “exacerbated separations between the groups, allowing each to live detached from the other and adding an economic dimension to identity.”

Through an analysis of divisiveness politics, this chapter explains how basic citizenship rights and integration grounds have been jeopardised by several factors: the social structure; the economic structure - especially during the era of neoliberalism - and the political-identity divide. Since economic and political liberalisation in 1989 reform has failed to address the sociopolitical factors that have strongly influenced economic performance and shaped its outcome.

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26 Alissa 2007, p.9, Kanaan and Hanania 2006, p.144
Education and employment are two examples of empirical evidence that are studied in the following chapters to uncover the inequality and the factors that have rendered climbing the ladder for better opportunities harder for one group more than another. They explain how reform can be seen to be more of an operation of power and subjectification rather than an economic one which guarantees equality amongst citizens. In chapter four, I study the educational opportunities that had been possible for Palestinian-origin Jordanians before the liberalisation in 1989 and the way it enabled Palestinians to move forward and to economically integrate. The second part, in its two sections, demonstrates the impact of both discursive political measures and neoliberalist politics affecting the opportunities for the Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman to attend basic education or university education. This part demonstrates the changes that affected the attitudes and the ability of Palestinian-origin Jordanians to access education as a basic citizenship right. The unequal distribution and privileges favoured one group and excluded many others. This, as a result, jeopardised the chances and opportunities these Palestinian-origin Jordanians have been able to access. Both peoples perceived chances differently and also manoeuvred their capital to attain their self-sufficiency differently. This weakened the perception of education as a right and made it appear as a means that does not necessarily always secure forward mobility.

In chapter five, building on the educational outcomes and the various techniques of the state in managing educational chances, analyses the patterns of employment available to Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman since the late 1980s. The packages explained represent elements and qualifications that the politics implicitly sets as
conditions for candidates to be part of the formal sector or the informal sector. This chapter studies the possible opportunities in the formal sector and the informal sector, demonstrating the challenges perceived by the youths interviewed in East Amman.

Based on the limitations imposed, particularly on East Amman Palestinian-origin Jordanians, the informal sector appears to be the only possible venue for them to generate a regular income in a different regulatory set-up. This chapter illuminates the conditions required to be part of such a market and its risks and advantages. With no social protection and social welfare possible, this chapter sees the forming of an informal citizenship when basic social citizenship rights are unattained and an ambivalent status illustrates deeper causal and social dynamics of marginalisation. Discursive politics has undermined social citizenship rights given to Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman by law and by the rule of their affiliation.

This thesis concludes that the nation-state itself operates along dynamic lines of inclusion and exclusion; this is how the application of citizenship is fragmented. Categories of citizen and membership of the nation get shaped, and sometimes certain forms of institutionalised discrimination undercut this ideal. Within this apparatus, informal citizenship is where there is alienation from broader society and where social cohesion and loyalty to the political system is replaced with alienation. Discursive politics has managed, in this way, to create politically, economically and socially privileged citizens, which, in turn, means that other segments of the population enjoy fewer *de facto* rights and less power.
Chapter One: Unfolding East Amman

Throughout this thesis, studying marginalised Palestinian urban-refugee-citizens living in inner-city Amman, I contextualise them within the political economy of Jordan and the greater social stratification which in recent decades has shaped their chances. My analysis draws on the work of Bourgois who, in his ethnographic work on socially marginalised crack cocaine dealers in inner city New York, posits that the economic daily life of those striving to ensure a regular income and social protection for themselves and their families “needs to be contextualised” in the particular history and political relations, social pyramid and structural economic dislocation which they have encountered. ¹ In this chapter, I contextualise myself and my interviewees in the multi-layers of Jordan.

To analyse the way Palestinian-origin Jordanians experience socio-economic rights as citizens and to assess their possibilities to access economic opportunities and secure social protection, I chose two different areas which represent varied experiences for both Palestinian-origin Jordanians and East Jordanians in two areas of inner Amman: Jabal Al-Nadheef and Jabal Al-Naser. To test my hypothesis about their ability to access social citizenship rights and their integration as Palestinian refugees- Jordanian citizens in inner

¹ Bourgois Philippe, 2003 In search of respect, selling crack in El Barrio, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.17
Amman over the last seven decades, I interviewed sixty people selected from main communal groups in the areas in question. Cases were selected based on profession, age, country of origin and location. I evaluated the collected data and made deductions to confirm empirically, through the following chapters, the theories which guided me throughout the thesis.

The first part of this chapter traces the beginning of Hashemite rule from the time the British decided to create ‘East Jordan’ as a state. It explains the way the state started to function, to shape society and build state institutions. The newly born state expanded its land with the annexation of the West Bank to its territories, and doubled its population with the displacement of the Palestinian refugees from their lands in 1948. The second part of this chapter examines the experience of dispossession from historical Palestine and the consequences for the transformation of Jordanian society and the heterogeneous identity of the Jordanian people.

This section considers the arrival of the Palestinians in Jordan and the way they were made citizens soon after they arrived in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. I narrow the focus to explain why I chose East Amman and highlight the circumstances that divided the city into wealthy districts in West Amman and segregated districts in East Amman. Furthermore, I demonstrate how the refugee camps and the UNRWA presence helped encourage population growth around their environs (sub-districts) due to in-movement of

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2 Between 1948 and 1965, 19 refugee camps were established in the West Bank to accommodate dispossessed Palestinians from historical Palestine. Refugees comprise 42.5 per cent of the total Palestinian population of the West Bank (1967 OPTs) Rempel, Terry Palestinian refugees in the West Bank, Forced Migration on Line, (http://www.forcedmigration.org/research-resources/expert-guides/palestinian-refugees-in-the-west-bank-and-the-gaza/fmo043.pdf)
labour, local and forced migrants. I show how these areas became stereotyped as mediocre and the people as dependent, in need and poor.

To test my hypothesis about the causal relationship between the social, political and economic challenges and the full access to citizenship rights (through educational and economic opportunities) and refugee integration, I conduct qualitative research to study subjective narratives and attitudes of the selected interviewees in their two locations. I also analyse the various factors affecting their life chances and opportunities to grow and develop as fully-fledged citizens of Jordan. In the last part of this chapter, after I position myself in the field of research, explaining my background that matches that of my interviewees with the history of dispossession from Palestine and differs from them with the educational and cultural background of my parents and the geographic location in north-west Amman in which I was brought up, I explain how my interviewees were chosen, and how I was able to interview them using some guiding open-ended questions in order to understand implicitly their reflections and impressions about certain issues related to their citizenship rights and the fair distribution of opportunities.

In this thesis, I set out to show that generalisations about the studied sample are of relevance to the majority of Jordanians of Palestinian-origin within inner Amman, other Jordanian cities. I argue that the findings of these two groups can be inferred or generalised to other settings or contexts beyond the sampled ones here, what is called “the inferential generalisation”.3 The lived conditions and the encountered challenges

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may allow for inferences to be applied on other settings within Jordan amongst Palestinians who hold similar legal status living in inner cities.
1.1 The birth of the state of Jordan

Britain made two overlapping, and contradictory promises during World War I to two different parties. In the McMahon-Hussein correspondence of 1915-16, it promised to help the Arabs achieve independence from Ottoman rule. By 1916, The Arab Revolt- led by the self-appointed leader of the Arab revolt Sharif⁴ Hussein of Mecca⁵ and in alliance with Britain and France, fought against Ottoman rule and its discriminatory politics against the non-Turkish inhabitants. But in the Balfour Declaration of 1917, Britain, also, promised to help the Zionist Jews to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. At the end of the First World War, Britain and France set about implementing the secretly ratified Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, under which the Levant, Bilad el-Sham, was divided and administered as mandates – France was awarded that of Syria and Lebanon and Britain was given Iraq and Mandate Palestine.

Despite Palestinian Arab opposition, the Palestine mandate was also allotted to Britain in 1920. The mandate’s principle obligations included securing the Jewish national home, developing self-governing institutions and safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all Palestine’s inhabitants.⁶ In April 1921, the largest territorial portion of the original

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⁴ Sharif: a noble claiming direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad, enjoyed religious authority, political power and wealth.
⁵ The Sharif and Emir of Mecca from 1908 until 1917, when he proclaimed himself and was internationally recognised as King of the Hejaz. In 1924, when the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished, he further proclaimed himself Caliph of all Muslims in Fathi Schirin H., 1994 Jordan- an invested nation? Tribe-state dynamics and the formation of national identity, Deutsches Orient-Institut: Hamburg, p.85-87.
⁶ Based on earlier agreement in 1918 between Weisman, the leader of the Zionist Commission and Feisal (Brother of Abdullah I and sons of Sharif Hussein) to support an Arab Kingdom and Jewish settlement in Palestine, respectively, assuring that "the Jews did not propose to set up a government of their own but wished to work under British protection, to colonize and develop Palestine without encroaching on any
mandate Palestine became the Emirate of Transjordan, the precursor of the modern Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In the remainder of the Palestine mandate, the west bank of the Jordan River – the biblical Holy Land – direct British rule would continue.\(^7\)

Figure 2 Map of Mandate Palestine 1917-1922

Transjordan was thus a political creation by the British Mandate of the early 1920s,\(^8\) a section extracted from the Levant (Greater Syria) *Bilad al-sham*, and handed over to a

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non-indigenous Hashemite ruler, Emir Abdullah (Prince), the second son of Sharif Hussein bin Ali. The creation of Jordan was much “conditioned by the imperialist power-play: Britain was motivated by realpolitik and strategic interests, namely to maintain good relations with the French and the Hashemites, to provide a safe corridor between Iraq and Palestine and to guarantee imperial communications.” The corridor land given to the Hashemites was very poor – with few economic prospects, no natural resources and vast areas of arid land – with only six percent of the country consisting of arable land.

The assigned ruler Emir Abdullah, the commander in chief of the Transjordan Arab Legion, had ambitions to be the ruler of Greater Syria stretching from the Mediterranean to the Arab Gulf, but had to be content with what he got as a consequence of private negotiations between the British and the Jewish Agency on how to divide Palestine between the Zionists and Transjordan.

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8 “In August 1920, Sir Herbert Samuel, the British High Commissioner of Palestine, held a meeting in Salt with notables and tribal leaders of Transjordan. There he emphasised that the British did not want to incorporate Transjordan into the Palestine administration” in Fathi, Schirin H., 1994 Jordan- an invested nation? Tribe-state dynamics and the formation of national identity, Deutsches Orient-Institut: Hamburg, p. 87.

9 The League of Nations formally approved the British mandate in July 1922, which was followed by the Anglo-Transjordanian agreement of the 25th March 1923 that provided for an autonomous administration under Abdullah. The formal political system was not established until five years later, following the signing of the 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty. A number of laws were promulgated, including the Organic Law of 1928 of 1928 (in effect the constitution), the Electoral Law and the Nationality law of 1928 in Knowles Warwick, 2005 Jordan since 1989, A study in Political economy, London, I.B Tauris, p. 23

10 Fathi 1994, p.89


12 Esber 2008, p. 91
The events that followed shaped Transjordan greatly and increased its miniscule population (of 400,000 inhabitants) with the inflow of Palestinians. The state developed and survived, the notion of Greater Syria remaining elusive.

Figure 3  Map of Transjordan 1923-1947

Source: http://www.contenderministries.org/articles/israelhistory.php
1.2 The creation of a society

The Hashemite Emir Abdullah, elder son of Britain's wartime Arab ally Sharif Hussein of Mecca, was placed by the British on the throne of Transjordan – and his brother on the throne of Iraq. Transjordan was officially under the British Mandate for Palestine but enjoyed its own autonomous system of government. In 1928, Transjordan became nominally independent, with Britain retaining a military presence, control of foreign affairs and financial control. On 25 May 1946, the parliament of Transjordan formally changed the name of the country from the Emirate of Transjordan to the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan, with Abdullah becoming its first king. Britain retained considerable influence over the new state. The British general Sir John Bagot Glubb – known as Glubb Pasha – remained commander of the Arab Legion until 1956, recruiting Bedouins into the military and consolidating the institution which became the bulwark of the Hashemite state.\(^\text{13}\)

1.2.1 The East Jordanians

With the help of Britain, its main donor (between 1920-1950), Transjordan managed to flourish as a state with an established bureaucratic and executive infrastructure led by an executive political elite drawn from across the region (from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and

Palestine) “expressing Arab nationalist ambitions rather than narrow Transjordanian national interests”. To safeguard its newly created borders, it established a security infrastructure to suppress revolts of Bedouins against foreign Hashemite rule and against threats from neighbouring powers. By doing so, it prepared the state to be the cradle for the Jordanian society to-be, through “the detribalisation of the desert which allowed for the integration of the Bedouin into the state”. The Hashemite regime worked to improve the lives of the people in the nascent state and “to produce a centrifugal force radiating from [Emir] Abdullah I and Amman the capital aiming to gain their loyalties” using the financial means made available by the British system.” Land titles, education and employment in the public sector (civil and the military branches) were the three main tools deployed by the nascent government to establish its rule and to shape the livelihoods of the nomadic Bedouins and the Transjordanian peasants. Fischbach in his State, Society and Land in Jordan identified land ownership as the meeting point between the peasant and the state, which prevented rebellious acts: “In the process, both the shape of state-societal discourse and the conceptualisations of property and of Jordan itself were defined by the state, which was in turn constrained by its commitment to safeguard the cultivators’ land”. By protecting the interests of the country’s peasants majority with land, the state established its main pillars of stability and

15 “The Bedouins, usually hostile to the concept of centralised authority, initially were defiant, refused to pay taxes and pay allegiance to the new government in Fathi 1994, p.91.
16 Especially the nascent Ibn Saud tribe in the South, in Hijaz, the land from which Sharif Hussein migrated.
thus of authority over the land and the people. It also established the classic state functions of taxation, and settlement of land claims and individual ownership in most of the country. This involved a shift from a communal village mushaa tenure\textsuperscript{21} to land under the new system were “periodically reallocated among members of the village, an obvious deterrent to land improvement by a single individual”\textsuperscript{22} as a means to settle and sedentarise people. For Bedouins, the stability-allegiance exchange led to new forms of residence as sedentarisation projects from the 1950s aimed to give land to individuals to support themselves and increase their living standards. As the state gradually provided increased security and stability, Bedouins felt less in need of the camels on which they had relied to move quickly, to avoid troops, taxation, conscription and other threats. The state supported Bedouins to move from camel-herding to more sedentary sheep-rearing. Tribesmen improved their standard of living and involved themselves more closely in the market economy, selling wool, milk and dairy products and lamb and buying not only tea and sugar but more processed food.\textsuperscript{23} Some remained in the camel-sheep business but expanded their markets, bringing in herds from Turkey and selling them to Saudi Arabia. Eventually they established business networks enabling the slow transition to trading, especially in cars and in property. The example of Abu Kamel demonstrates this shift into sedentarisation;

Abu Kamel lives in Jabal al-Nadheef. He is an East Jordanian who migrated from Karak with his father in the fifties. He joined the Jordanian Army when he became 18 years old, while his father, a sheep trader,

\textsuperscript{21} Mushaa means the undivided common property owned by the state.

\textsuperscript{22} By the 1940s, this system had largely been replaced by individual ownership and Transjordan’s landholding system was perhaps the best system in the Arab Middle East. Iin Mazur 1979, p.6.

expanded his trading to Turkey and Saudi Arabia after relocating to Amman. After his father’s retirement, Abu Kamel took over the business, not limiting himself to herds but expanded into car trading (Case No 18, Jabal al-Nadheef, Feb. 9, 2012).

Trading opportunities drew a good number of Bedouins to move towards Amman in the 1940s. For camel or sheep trading between Iraq, Palestine, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, several Jordanian tribes migrated from their traditional areas, particularly those living in the arid areas of south and east Jordan.

World War II brought greater prosperity to Transjordan and particularly Amman. Amman was a transit centre for trade passing between Iraq and the Mediterranean through Palestine. Transjordan was also the main cereal exporter for Palestine. During the war in 1948, it benefited from very high grain prices and this also stimulated commercial activity. Most merchants were from neighbouring countries but the effect of this booming commercial sector (during conflicts) was nonetheless substantial on the growth of Jordanian economy. The example of Abu Maher’s father shows how some East Jordanian families expanded their inherited skills into a business that blossomed and incorporated them in the business class;

Abu Maher (47 years old, a retired East Jordanian military officer and currently the mukhtar of his tribe in Amman) moved with his father and three brothers from Qafqafa -Jerash to Amman in the early 1950s. His father used to make his living from sheep-rearing. He used to sell sheep to herders in Syria and managed eventually to establish commercial links with Iraqi merchants from whom he used to buy sheep Jordan and sell them to the West Bank of Palestine, then part of Jordan. His business which was in the city centre of Ras el Ein led him to settle in Amman/Jabal al-Naser with his four sons and buy four investment properties. When his eldest son turned 18 years old, he bought him a pick-

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24 Mazur 1979, p.8. The population of Amman grew phenomenally during the war, from about 20,000 in 1938 to about 60,000 in 1945 in Mazur 1979:14
up truck and got him to work as a driver between Jordan and the Gulf countries, selling Jordanian camels in the Gulf. His business permitted him to expand and to buy investment property in Qafqafa. (Case No 9, Jabal al-Naser, on Dec. 18, 2011).

The possession of land and the benefits of employment in the army (the security of job, income, housing and health care) encouraged many people to no longer feel threatened. The traditional Bedouin practice of ghazou (raid) was ended and the state provided access to land and livelihoods. Many came to cherish the strength of their growing relationships with the Hashemites and to accept their authority, reaping the fruits of their allegiance and support. Sedentarised Bedouin’s loyalty to the regime, to the Hashemites and to Jordan continues, as it now has for several generations, to be rewarded by prestigious positions, high social status and power. Jamal, in the following example, reflects the status and power he has gained through the job he has, his tribal affiliation and his loyalty;

Jamal S. (55 years old, a retired military officer and currently the mukhtar of his tribe in Amman) recalled that his work in the army helped him and his tribe to move away from the dry lands they had in the south. His military base in East Amman made him move out of Karak. Like many others from his city, he said, “they join the army for a period of time, they could be sent abroad to get further education and degrees, they come back then to access high ranking positions such as a Member of Parliament or a Senator, or become a professional in one of the ministries or one of the universities.” (Case No 1, Jabal al-Naser, on Oct. 20, 2011)

The urbanisation of Amman has pulled East Jordanians from their rural and desert locations to explore the opportunities of the capital. These local migrants benefited from

25 Before the establishment of the state institutions, the culture of Ghazou (raid) dominated and was led by nomad Bedouins, as a way to survive and to generate income and food. The established state secured East Jordanians with their basic needs of housing, lands and means to make a living through employment (mainly in the military).
the various incentives the state gave to incorporate them in the newly born state and to secure their allegiance and loyalty.

Figure 4 Map of Jordan showing main cities.
1.2.2 Shaping Amman: Forced, rural and labour migrants

In the late 19th century, the stream of water flowing down from Zarqa\textsuperscript{26} enabled life in the centre of the little town of Amman for Circassians and Chechens seeking safe haven. They sought shelter in 1878, fleeing religious persecution and atrocities of the Russians and the Balkan Wars. They gathered around the water and green fields of Amman’s Ras al-Ain (head of the water) valley and invested in agriculture and infrastructure. They became much involved in public works and in security, particularly after the Ottoman Sultan decided in 1902 to build the Hijaz railway to link Constantinople, the capital of the Caliphate, through Damascus and Medina to the holy city of Mecca for annual Haj pilgrimage.\textsuperscript{27} Amman, which in the early 20th century had around 300 families,\textsuperscript{28} flourished slowly with trade and movement of people and shaped eventually its urban identity. “Transjordan was the main corridor that linked roads horizontally and vertically from the Arab peninsula to Damascus and from Baghdad and Asia to the Mediterranean; following the route from Gaza-Hebron-Karak\textsuperscript{29} or Haifa-Nablus-Al-Salt”.\textsuperscript{30} A commercial network of Muslim Sunni urban bourgeoisie commuted between the main cities of the Levant as merchants travelled to deposit their money in banks in Syria or Beirut. This commercial relationship eventually was transformed through matrimonial...
ties established among the people of the Levant. There was also circulation of farmers and herders from Palestine to the East Bank of the Jordan River.

In 1921, Emir Abdullah I chose Amman as the capital of his Emirate which in 1946 became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The political stability of the newly established state and the new institutional apparatus of the administration attracted migrants from the region to explore the newly-born modern city and the economic opportunities, particularly from the West Bank of the Jordan River. The fact of the matter, Zionists arriving in Palestine since 1918 brought modern industrial and agricultural technologies. This affected the work of the Palestinians whether owners of manufacturing businesses or peasants and farmers who were often left in financial deficit. The British mandate’s agricultural bank “virtually prevented the fallah (peasant) from obtaining credit”, and hence was supporting these people to sell their businesses. As Sir John Chancellor, the high commissioner, explained in a letter to King George V in May 1930: “They (fellahin) are not free agents in the matter: they are distressingly poor and are heavily in debt to usurious money lenders….the Arabs have no alternative but to sell their land in order to clear themselves of their liabilities.”31 The economic pressures resulting from implicit British and Zionist policies led many to sell up and to go to Jordan in the hope of a better future in the new state. People from Palestinian cities thus began migrating to the Emirate of Jordan to work either in industrial projects – notably an oil transhipment pipeline from Iraq32 –or to work in the state administration of the new

32 The most important project was the construction of a pipe-line transporting extracted oil from Iraq. Samir al-Rifai fled Safad in Palestine amid family accusations of theft and arrived in Jordan to work for this major
government. Transjordan lacked enough educated people, resulting in dependence on minority populations – Chechens, Circassians and educated Iraqis and Syrians in addition to Palestinians.\footnote{These were professionals with university degrees such as architects, doctors and politicians. Highly skilled people were also invited from the region. Radi 1997, p.80.} Palestinian notables – those who represented important families in major cities and who had been employed as Ottoman administrators and tax collectors and as civil servants during the British Mandate – were offered with administrative and security functions in the new state.

Political inability in Palestine in the late 1930s (marked by the Arab revolt of 1936-39), brought more Palestinians to Transjordan not only to work for the state but also to engage in the underdeveloped private sector.\footnote{Ibid., p.82.} In turn, military bases on the outskirts of the capital Amman attracted local migrants from the desert who pledged loyalty to the new Hashemite regime.

\textit{Figure 5 Amman: the capital of Jordan}

![Map of Jordan with Amman highlighted](http://www.luventicus.org/maps/jordan/amman.html)

\textbf{The coloured part is the capital Amman}

\textit{source: http://www.luventicus.org/maps/jordan/amman.html}

project. He went on, like his son and grandson after him, to become Jordanian Prime Minister (Radi 1997, pp.79-80).
1.2.3 The Catastrophe: Al-Nakba, 1948

After the Zionist occupation of their villages and cities in historical Palestine in 1948, Palestinians fled in all directions away from violence, menace and fear. A large majority approached the river Jordan and sought safe haven to the east of the river. The population of Transjordan was estimated in 1948 at almost 400,000 but rose to around 900,000 by the end of the year as a result of the flow of Palestinian refugees. In December 1948, King Abdullah I, under the terms of the Jericho conference in agreement with some elite Palestinians, annexed what was left of historical Palestine that was not yet occupied by Zionist guerrillas, the West Bank of the river, to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. He granted Jordanian citizenship to all the residents of the expanded kingdom on both banks. The conference adopted a resolution according King Abdullah I sovereignty over the West Bank. It urged the return of all Palestinian refugees to their homes and properties and affirmed their right to receive compensation for all losses sustained. Jordan pledged to safeguard these rights of compensation and of return for the Palestinians. The legal

status given to Palestinian refugees in Jordan, *in theory*, laid the way for their socio-economic integration through acquisition of rights in education, higher education, health, employment, political participation and property.

The majority of the Palestinian refugees (almost 70 percent)\(^{36}\) came from rural settings. They were *fellahin* (peasants), agricultural labourers and share croppers\(^{37}\) and supplemented their earnings through off-farm employment.\(^{38}\) This permitted them, when they were living in Palestine, to rotate between agricultural and urban work. Very few of those who arrived in Jordan were able to remain engaged in agriculture, except for those who settled in the Jordan Valley.\(^{39}\) The great majority soon became a permanent urban labour force: a proletariat or ‘landless proletariat’ or ‘subproletariat’:\(^{40}\) a cheap labour corps of skilled and unskilled labourers, particularly involved in electricity, plumbing and construction.

The exodus generated new social classes in exile. While there were only two groups before the 1948 war: the Palestinians urban bourgeoisie and the peasants, after al-Nakba, a middle class Palestinian stratum was created in Jordan and other Arab countries. Jamil Hilal studied the ‘anomalous’ formation of the Palestinian middle class in the diaspora

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\(^{40}\) Farsoun 2003, pp. 222-4, Smith 1971, p.98
who had lost land and political representation.\textsuperscript{41} This class enriched itself not through investment in production and capital but through education and its activities in services, commerce and business.\textsuperscript{42} They entered the growing public sector and were engaged in public sector companies such as cement, phosphates and petroleum-based products.\textsuperscript{43} Palestinians who arrived with capital could invest in agriculture, industry, trade and finance and formed the Palestinian business class.\textsuperscript{44} Of all these groups and classes, 42 percent have been recorded as registered refugees (almost two million registered refugees today) as in the records of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). The enabling legal conditions, as per Jericho Conference, have rendered the Palestinian refugees as citizens in Jordan who enjoy their citizenship rights but at the same time safeguard their status as refugees.

1.2.4 Amman: East and West

Palestinian refugees-Jordanian citizens in majority settled in central and northern Jordan in what have become the most urbanised large cities in Jordan such as Irbid, Zarqa and the capital Amman. Those with limited means and resources resided in refugee camps established on the outskirts of central cities. The state made land available for UNRWA

\textsuperscript{41} Hilal Jamil, 2006 Al-tabaq\=a al wusta al filastiniyya, Bahth fil fawda el-hawiiyya wal marjiyya wa\thinspace\thinspace thagafa, [The Palestinian Middle Class – A research into the Confusion of Identity, Authority and Culture], Beirut and Ramalla: Institute of Palestine Studies and Muwatin.
\textsuperscript{42} Hilal 2006, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{43} Doan 1989, p. 2. These public sector companies in majority got privatised after the 1990s.
\textsuperscript{44} Some £10 million was estimated to have been transferred to Jordan in the form of bank deposits and cash in the early 1950s. The magnitude of such a sum can be gauged by the fact that this figure equalled the total amount of money in circulation in the Hashemite Kingdom at the time in Smith 1971, p.95.
to establish camps and provide services. Between 1949-1955 four camps were established: Al-Hussein and Al-Wihdat in Amman, one in Irbid (northern Jordan) and another in Zarqa (north-east of Amman).45 Until the late 1950s, registered refugees were accommodated in tents before those were replaced with permanent shelters/units ranging between 80-100 square metres.46 In most cases, the state owned the land or leased it from private landowners. UNRWA’s responsibility was limited to providing services (primary schools, health clinics, relief and social services). The predecessor body to the Department of Palestinian Affairs (DPA),47 a unit answering to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, oversaw camp security and administration and electricity, water and sewerage infrastructure.48

45 Al-Karameh was an emergency camp in the Jordan valley that received 21,990 refugees after 1948. The camp, at the borders of Israel, was vacated because of the continuous military attacks on it especially in 1968 (Brand 1988, p.151).

46 UNRWA/ PIO 2000: 5

47 The name of the Department of Palestinian Affairs has changed several times according to the politics and the tasks assigned (Ministry of Construction and Resolution, Executive Special Office, Ministry of Refugees, Ministry of Occupied Territories, High Ministerial Committee). Check http://www.dpa.gov.jo/MenuHistoricalindex.html

Those who failed to get housing units, despite their registration with UNRWA, lived within the proximity of the established camps, either in unregistered land owned by the state ("mushaa’") or in caves on the side-mountains of central Amman and very close both to the city centre of Amman and such commercial areas as Jabal al-Nadheef (being close to New Amman Camp/Wihdat), Jabal al-Jofeh, Jabal al-Nuzha, and Wadi al-Hadadeh (close to Jabal al-Hussein camp), as indicated in the map below.
Palestinians, whether registered refugees or not, holders of the Jordanian nationality were able since their arrival in Jordan to live wherever they want, depending on their means and abilities to afford buying or renting properties. Even those who lived in the refugee camps after the exodus, they have been able to leave the camps and live in the wider outskirts of urbanised Jordanian cities. The percentage of the registered refugees living in
refugee camps today does not exceed 17 percent of the registered refugees, as per the UNRWA yearly sheet.

The 1967 Arab-Israeli war pushed more people towards Amman and other cities. The Israeli forces in June 1967 occupied the West Bank which used to be under the Jordanian rule then.49 The 1967 war resulted in bringing almost one-half of Palestinians under Israeli control. During this war more Palestinians were dispossessed: refugees who were displaced for the second time and West Bankers and Gazans (inhabitants of Gaza)50 who were made to leave their homes for the first time and were labelled displaced. The UNGA Resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 dealt with the effects of the 1967 war to ensure assistance for “inhabitants of the areas where military operations had taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities.” It further endorsed “the efforts of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and are in serious need of immediate assistance as result of the recent hostilities.” [Emphasis added].51

49 Since Jericho conference late 1948.
50 Gaza refugees have not been given the Jordanian citizenship. They had Egyptian travel documents when they arrived that were eventually replaced with Jordanian travel documents. They are about 250,000 in Jordan; they live in camps and in big cities. They have no rights to access public services.
51 UNGA res. 2252 (ES-V), and Takkenberg 1998, p.82.
As with previous influxes, people were dispersed according to their financial ability, social capital and social network, especially among those who had come earlier. The war displaced for the second time approximately 162,500 registered refugees from the West Bank. These were uprooted in 1948 from their homes in historical Palestine and had sought refuge in the West Bank. The Jordanian official figures a year after the war (15 June 1968) indicated that 354,248 Palestinian origin Jordanians arrived in Jordan as a result of the war. This included refugees displaced for the second time and West Bankers who were displaced for the first time.\textsuperscript{52} The newcomers had Jordanian citizenship and were classified as displaced because they were considered to have been displaced from one part to another within the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan (which then encompassed the West Bank). Refugees who arrived from Gaza Strip, exceptionally did not have the Jordanian citizenship. They numbered around 15,000\textsuperscript{53} refugees arriving from Gaza Strip which fell then administratively and militarily under the Egyptian rule and were holders of the Egyptian Travel Documents (TD). Almost 60 percent of the residents in Gaza in 1967 were refugees displaced during the 1948. When the 1967 war erupted, refugees and Gaza original people sought refuge in Jordan. By 1968, Jordan issued those who came from Gaza Jordanian TD which could enable them to be mobile but does not connote citizenship.\textsuperscript{54} Gaza refugees have had access to UNRWA services and live in refugee

\textsuperscript{52} Abu Odeh 1999, p.138.
\textsuperscript{53} Figures provided by Zureik 1997, p.196, about the Palestinian refugees from Gaza were 70,000.
\textsuperscript{54} The Jordanian citizenship law was applied on those living in Jordan between 1946 and 1954, thus the law does not apply on the Gaza refugees to call for citizenship. For political reasons, dwelling on the Israeli claim for Palestinising Jordan, Jordan has not welcomed naturalising Gaza refugees. Their status in Jordan is in limbo with limited accessed rights.
camps and in big cities. They have limited rights in Jordan such as right to ownership and right to employment in the public sector.\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{Figure 8: Time Line for Palestinians arriving in Jordan.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Legal Status</th>
<th>Uprooted from</th>
<th>Documentation in Jordan</th>
<th>Rough estimates in Jordan for 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Palestine Refugee</td>
<td>Historical Palestine (Coastal side)</td>
<td>Jordanian citizenship</td>
<td>2 million (as per UNRWA estimates for registered refugees)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Palestine refugees-displaced</td>
<td>Historical Palestine (Coastal side) in 1948 and from the West Bank in 1967</td>
<td>Jordanian citizenship</td>
<td>1 million (as estimated for the Peace Negotiations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Palestinian displaced</td>
<td>West Bank for the first time</td>
<td>Jordanian citizenship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Palestinian refugees-displaced</td>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
<td>Temporary travel document (no citizenship rights)</td>
<td>250,000 (150,000 was the declared official figure for 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Palestinian displaced</td>
<td>Gaza Strip for the first time</td>
<td>Temporary travel document (no citizenship rights)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNRWA established six new refugee camps to accommodate the newcomers, most of whom were 1948 refugees who had been registered in the West Bank, but also those

being displaced from the West Bank for the first time.\textsuperscript{56} As described by Razzaz in his account of urban settlement around Amman, “some 150,000 of these settled in Amman. While better-off Palestinians settled in central Amman and its western suburbs, most poor refugees occupied makeshift camps located primarily in the Eastern sectors of Amman.”\textsuperscript{57} New camps were created to receive the 1967 influx which generated urban pressure. Like the previous influx, those who were unable to get housing units in the established camps, sought to live within neighbouring areas including such as Jabal al-Akhdar, Jabal al-Marreekh and Jabal al-Ashrafieh in central Amman and close to the biggest refugee camp in the city (New Amman Camp/Wihdat). The government of Jordan administered three camps, which are not recognised by UNRWA, which hosted those who failed to secure shelters in official UNRWA camps. Jabal al Naser, Sukhneh camps were created by the state, as it built units and offered them to the new comers. The table below indicates the refugee camps and their years of establishment.

\textsuperscript{56} TUN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 addressed the effects of the war to ensure assistance for “inhabitants of the areas where military operations had taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities”. It further endorsed “the efforts of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and are in serious need of immediate assistance as result of the recent hostilities [emphasis added] (source: UNGA res. 2252 (ES-V), and Takkenberg 1998, p.82)

\textsuperscript{57} Razzaz Omar, 1993 Contested Space: urban settlement around Amman, in Middle East Report, No 181, p.10
**Figure 9**: Table of Camps established in Jordan to accommodate Palestinian refugees and displaced persons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camps created after the 1948 War (year of establishment)</th>
<th>Camps created after the 1967 War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zarqa 1949</td>
<td>Souf 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irbid 1951</td>
<td>Baqa’a 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jabal Hussein 1952</strong></td>
<td>Marka / Hittin 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amman New Camp 1955</strong></td>
<td>Husun / Azmi El Mufti 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madaba 1956*</td>
<td>Jerash / Gaza 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Talbieh</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sukhneh 1969</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Hennakeen/ Prince Hassan /Jabal Naser camp 1967</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Unofficial camps

Camps in bold are those administered by the Greater Amman Municipality.
Amid rapid political and economic change at local and regional levels by “the mid 1970s the metropolitan region was clearly divided into two socio-economically and geographically distinct parts: west Amman and its suburbs, characterised by upper income neighbourhoods, open space and good infrastructure; and east Amman, Ruseifeh and Zarqa, characterised by middle and lower income neighbourhoods, over-crowded living conditions and poor infrastructure”.  

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58 ibid., p.11
1.2.5 Amman: The push-pull migration

The economic boom in of 1960s-1980s driven by labour demand in the Gulf during the oil boom, opened employment markets for professionals, skilled and unskilled workers. A large number migrated, remitting considerable sums (exceeding US 4 billion dollars) which were often used to purchase property in Jordan. While flourishing the economy, this caused considerable distortions in the property market. Amman municipality estimated that the price of land rose fivefold between 1970 and 1976.\textsuperscript{59} Increased revenue available to the state from remittances and aid did not trickle down as average salaries of civil servants increased by only 50 percent. “The growing disparity between the means of lower income groups, and land and housing prices led to increased spatial segregation in the city: an ever more opulent, spacious and fashionable west Amman and western suburbs, and an increasingly crowded and stigmatised east Amman”.\textsuperscript{60}

The unexpected outbreak of the first Gulf War in the summer of 1990 widened the disparity and added to over-crowding in East Amman. Many working migrants in the Gulf were on summer holidays in Jordan or elsewhere in the region and found themselves unable to return to work and homes in the Gulf. About 350,000 Jordanian passport holders returned forcibly from Kuwait.\textsuperscript{61} Half of the returnees lost their personal

\textsuperscript{59} Razzaz 1996, p. 12
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid, p. 12
belongings and jobs which had paid significantly above average Jordanian salaries. As they sought to find new economic opportunities in Jordan and saw their disposable income shrink, many chose to reside close to their relatives in East Amman, especially as rents were much cheaper than in the centre or west of the city (which was becoming more modern hosting the main official bodies). A large number of returnees invested their savings in new ventures, helping create new neighbourhoods in Amman West (such as Gardens Street, Sweifieh, Abdoun and Khalda). The construction sector prospered and provided labouring opportunities. This led to a significant increase in population and also boosted the economy with the creation of more entrepreneurial jobs and high demand for property, skilled and unskilled workers. East Amman expanded further and new housing compounds were constructed to serve the lower-middle class – areas such as Alia, Nadi es-Sibaq, al Bnayyat and al Manarah.

East Amman gradually became known as not only the place where displaced Palestinians congregated, but increasingly also the hub for other refugees and migrants. Iraqis arrived in large numbers in various flows between the 1990s and 2006. Jordan became a place of transit for Iraqis fleeing the multiple conflicts and wars since the first Gulf War in 1991. By the time of the second Gulf War “Jordan was estimated to host between 250,000 and 300,000 refugees”, fleeing deteriorating living conditions caused by UN-imposed sanctions, Saddam’s brutal authoritarian regime, attacks on minorities and insecurity of daily life worsened by US and Coalition air raids. Refugee numbers in Jordan at least doubled between 2003 and 2006, Jordan having to accommodate almost 500-750,000

62 De Bel-Air 2007, p.9
Iraqis, transiting Jordan to seek asylum through UNHCR or to plan their next move for travel, investment or business. No refugee camps were created to host these Iraqis. “The settlement of Iraqi nationals on the Jordanian territory, in particular, was made relatively easy. Even though Iraqis are not considered refugees but temporary visitors (guests), measures were regularly taken to facilitate border-crossing procedures, allow purchase of lands and housing, business partnership and investment.” The Iraqi forced migrants, like earlier Palestinian refugees, have been financially heterogeneous: some had high capital and could quickly integrate into commercial life, invest in constructing high-end houses and in influential firms. These were concentrated in the new areas of West Amman, created in the early 1990s. Others with fewer resources and lower incomes moved to East Amman, particularly Al-Jofeh and Al-Hashemi, which became significantly inhabited by lower-middle class Iraqis.

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64 De Bel-Air 2007, p. 9.
Mohammed S., a Pakistani street vendor living in Jordan since 1970 and married to a Jordanian woman, told me about the many Pakistanis who used to live in Jabal al-Naser in the 1970s and 1980s. Several Jordanians I interviewed in Al-Naser market area and in Al-Naser refugee camp referred to the Pakistani community who used to make shopping baskets out of collected plastic bags and who lived on the slopes of Al-Naser.

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65 Case No 19, interviewed in Jabal al-Naser on the Feb. 15th 2012.
until the 1980s. Mohammed S. told me that “these were people who were looking for work opportunities when the economy in their country was very weak after the war, this was my own case that got me to Amman. I am now settled and married to a Jordanian woman from Ajloun, north Jordan”.

Today, very few are still living in East Amman, having moved to the Jordan Valley where they work in agriculture and the wholesale vegetable trade. Egyptians, since the mid-1970s- the peak of the construction and development boom of Amman, have continued to be the biggest labour migrant group in Jordan. The Egyptian labour force in Jordan was estimated at more than 216,000 out of a total of 313,962 foreign workers registered at the Ministry of Labour in 2011.

According to Egyptian consular statistics there were 525,000 in Jordan in 2012. They live in groups in rented flats and rented units in refugee camps. Rarely Egyptian labourers would live with their families. Their work is seasonal, remitting back to their families in Egypt whom they visit every year or two. Syrian workers, often skilled labourers, have also sought opportunities in Jordan since the early 1990s when skilled labour was in great demand at the height of the construction boom. They are usually more education and more skilled than the Egyptians. But both their rates per work are competitive which makes them more demanded in the construction market than the local Jordanians.

In 2009, the Ministry of Labour estimated there were 51,689 Sri Lankan and Filipino domestic workers. It is thought there is an equivalent number working clandestinely

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66 Ibid.
68 http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/migration_profiles/Egypt.pdf
without valid work permits who arrived to cater to the growing demand for labour from upper-middle class in West Amman. When they fall out with employers, such domestic workers typically end up in refugee camps, and in highly populated areas in East Amman where they hide from the police and other security forces. In camps and their environs, these migrants also live in clustered flats and units, creating their little community amongst other migrants.

Many urban settlements have grown illegally and informally on the slopes of the hills on which Amman is built. Not all residents have land tenure rights and infrastructure is often limited.\(^6^9\) Many of those in successive influxes of migrants have themselves found plots and built shacks on them. These urban informal settlements today accommodate those who could not access either places in recognised refugee camps or officially demarcated residential land. According to Jamal Al Daly, who works for the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDC), “the urban settlements exceed 40 of urban areas all over Jordan, inhabited by more than 100,000 people [each]” categorised as the poorest communities in urban areas.\(^7^0\) The population of Amman has increased tenfold within the last century due to both the flows of migrants and refugees and high rates of natural increase (more than four percent in 1950-1960, and 2.2 percent in 2009).\(^7^1\) This has increased demand for residential land and infrastructure in urban areas. Like any big city,

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\(^{69}\) Al-Daly, Jamal I., 1999 Informal Settlements in Jordan: Upgrading Approaches Adopted and Lessons Learned, unpublished document, Lund University, p.1. Some land is owned by either the state or private owners and used illegally mostly by refugees and migrants. Some land is owned by private owners who do not have land titles recognised by the state. Some land is owned by its occupiers but had very poor infrastructural services (ibid.)

\(^{70}\) Al Daly 1999, p.1.

\(^{71}\) Ababsa Myriam, 2010 ‘The evolution of upgrading policies in Amman’ paper to be presented at Sustainable architecture and urban development centre for the study of architecture in the Arab region (CSAAR), July. Unpublished, p.2.
the mobility is high in a place like Amman, with more young Jordanians travelling abroad looking for opportunities and more migrants coming in exploring their own opportunities especially with the opening market for international investors.

In these previous sections, I have drawn a structural picture which aims to unfold Amman with its two parts and the way it has evolved to become a capital with a large agglomeration of migrants from various destinations. Palestinian-origin Jordanians have been part of this wide migratory dynamic whether historic, demographic and socioeconomic. In the following section, I zoom the structural angle further in, to the two areas I choose to be the cases of my research and I explain how I was able to select the interviewees for my research and find them in their locations at work or at home in East Amman.

1.3 Field work in inner Amman

Jordan is a transit country with a high mobility rate of both locals and migrants. The estimated number of international migrants in Jordan for 2013 is around 2,925,780, representing 40.22 per cent of the total Jordanian population. The growth rate of the population in Jordan for the period 2005-2010 was 4.17 percent. This decreased in 2012

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to reach 2.2.\textsuperscript{73} The population of Jordan for 2012 is 6.318 million, \textsuperscript{74} and 7.504 million for 2015. \textsuperscript{75} The Greater Amman area had population of 2,842,629 as of 2010. \textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{75} source : http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/jordan-population/
\textsuperscript{76} World Bank Indicators 2012.
1.3.1 The two sites in East Amman

From East Amman, I have chosen two areas from East Amman to be the case study for my research:

Figure 12: Map of Amman municipality (indicating the two studied sites)

Source: Map by Khadija Dername (2006). The first area is in Ras Al-Ain noted here as Al-Nadif. The second area is in Al Nasser. Both areas are within a close proximity to the Centre Ville (city centre).
I. Jabal Al-Nadheef

Jabal al-Nadheef is a low-income district located in Ras al-A’in, the oldest of 27 administrative districts within Greater Amman Municipality. It is just a few kilometres away from Wihdat refugee camp, Amman’s largest refugee camp and close to a busy commercial area on a hillside near the city centre. Palestinians arrived to settle on this hill after 1948. As they were seeking shelter and assistance many stayed in caves in the area before starting to build their own houses in a piecemeal manner “as they took plots of land randomly as ‘Min Habash Asra’” [first come first served].

The owner of the land, Mohammad Amin Habajouka, a Circassian Jordanian, started negotiations with the government in 1962 in order to recover the land and to evict refugees settled there. At that time, a section of the hillside that used to have caves and where the majority of Palestinians were gathered was locally regarded as a refugee camp. Mohammed Amin Habajouka signed a lease, renewable every five years, allowing the government to use his land and to keep refugees residing on the area. The land all around the hillsides was eventually bought by private owners and got regularised, through issuance of land titles, by the municipality. However, the area remains informal and is still regarded as a camp area. Multi-storey houses have been built with alleyways too narrow for vehicular access.

In 1988, the Social Productivity Programme (SPP), a project primarily funded by the World Bank, aimed to refurbish poor areas in Jordan by providing better communal infrastructure.

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77 Interview with Mukhtar Farah Hasan Sabah Abu Tayeh in Jabal El-Nadheef, 17 Dec 2009.

78 Social and Economic Productivity Programmes (SPP) Unit designs and monitors projects execution directed towards increasing the productivity of targeted civilians and improving the living conditions of the poor in local communities.
services and infrastructure, reorganising dwellings and, where possible, compensating those whose shacks were demolished to create space between houses.\textsuperscript{79}

The area, despite the work of the SPP, continues to be steep and precipitous. Houses are built in a random manner that makes access during emergencies extremely difficult. The population in this area is estimated to be about 100,000 according to Parker and Debruyne.\textsuperscript{80} The mukhtar, Farah Abu Tayeh, told me that families are mixed, with some having come from Palestine in 1948 and others fleeing the 1967 war. They come from various hamouleh (clans) such as Daweimeh, Ananbeh and Barafleh. He explained how the people randomly occupied plots to construct their shacks as they arrived from Palestine.\textsuperscript{81}

Jabal al-Nadheef is known as a low-income inner-city marginalised area. I studied this area firstly because of its paradoxical status. While it is seen as a poor urban district, it is not specifically distinguished for being a centre of Palestinian refugees. Only locals in the area refer to the lower parts of the hill as the camp, emphasising the poverty of the refugee Palestinians but also implicitly referring to the danger of the slope. Narrow roads meandering between three to four storey buildings make it an ideal place to hide as police cannot readily drive into the area. Locals, especially taxi drivers, are cynical about the

\textsuperscript{79} Interview with Adel Basous, Head of SPP Unit at Ministry of Planning and International cooperation ( Sept 12, 2009, Interview with Ghaith El Qudat, head of Work Projects at Jordan River Foundation, who was overseeing the implementation of SPP in Jabal al-Nahdeef in 2002-2004, October 5, 2009)

\textsuperscript{80} Parker Christopher and Debruyne Pascal, 2010 ‘Reassembling the Political Life of Community’, Middle East and North Africa Research Group, Ghent University: Belgium, p.7. They were 54,166 in 2002 according to ZENID, 2002 Sustainable Livelihoods, al-Nadheef, Amman Governorate, report on field research carried out for the production of the second \textit{Jordan National Human Development Report}, Amman: Queen Zein Al Sharaf Institute for Development.

\textsuperscript{81} Field interview (Nov 30, 2009)
area’s name as al-Nadheef (meaning cleanliness in Arabic). They consider it populated by those with unclean records, perpetrators of criminal acts. The upper part of the hill includes a Circassian community but also some Palestinian-origin Jordanians who were able to leave the lower part and purchase property in the more salubrious parts of the area. There is also a concentration of Jordanians from Karak in southern Jordan, known as (Hay el Karakieh). Additionally, there is a small community of Palestinian-origin Jordanians who arrived in Jordan in 1967 but who are not of Arab ancestry; they are instead Romanis, calling themselves the Domani. They are found in their own small community, Hay el Nawar. UNRWA runs a boys’ school between the two areas of el-Nadheef and al Mareekh. The Department of Palestinian Affairs (DPA), the government body in charge of the thirteen refugee camps in Jordan, does not administer this area. An engineer who used to work at the DPA, Tahseen Barkawi, reported the hillside of Jabal al-Nadheef used to be known as Mohammed Amin Camp in the 1950s and that this is reflected in records in the DPA archives. According to him, the government in 1962 sought to build Jabal al-Naser camp, in order to host those refugees who were living in uncontrolled settlements in Nuzha and Mhata and al-Nadheef. “As the camp was being prepared to receive the refugees, the 1967 war erupted and the camp received new waves of people from the West Bank instead”.

Few development actors are involved in this area. In the mid 2000s, Al-Ruwwad, a private sector initiative focused on developing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), created a youth empowerment project to address the needs of the many adolescents who

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82 Interview with Tahseen Barkawi at the Ministry of Public Works (July 28, 2009) where he was relocated. He worked at the DPA for thirty years as an engineer overseeing construction permits in the refugee camps.  
83 *ibid.*
drop out of school and enter the informal sector. This business-led development project and empowerment initiative invites beneficiaries to engage in social work and provides at the same time gives material and financial assistance to needy members of the community. It has a component that supports students looking for university funding. The Musaab Khorma Scholarship programme supports students to study at university and to pay back with social work for the community centre during the years of study.

In addition, the Jordan River Foundation (a quasi-non-governmental organisation led by Queen Rania Al-Abdullah, the first lady of Jordan, providing economic enhancement projects for women and youth. An Islamic Brotherhood-supported association provides activities for youth, particularly orphans, women and the unemployed. The association provides extracurricular teaching for students during weekends as well as a health clinic and supporting needy families (mainly female-headed households) with a regular wage (this does not exceed 20 JDs- 50 JDs per household).

II. Jabal Al-Naser

Jabal Al-Naser is an area with a wide mix of people, (including Circassians, Jordanians, Iraqis, Egyptians and domestic labourers from the Philippines and Sri Lanka, with a total population around 150,000. It is divided into two parts: the commercial street and the police station area where there is a majority of East Jordanians from the south (Karak and

85 Jabal Al Naser consists of several districts: El Naser, Prince Hassan, Al Rabwah, Alia and Al Manarah. This is in addition to Al Salhieh and al-Qaryiah al Baida’a.
Tafileh), from the north (people originally from Jerash) and from the north-west (Salt).
The main commercial area is mostly owned by tribe members of East Jordanians
originally from Salt. Down the road towards the police station, the majority of East
Jordanians who resided there worked in the military. The air force base of Marqa, a small
military airport in the city centre that used to be Jordan’s main airport, was a work base
for Jordanians migrating from their villages and arid places.

The other part is locally known as Jabal al-Naser refugee camp, officially known as Hay
el-Amir Hassan camp (Prince Hassan camp). This unofficial camp (not recognised as an
UNRWA official camp)\(^{86}\) falls under Greater Amman Municipality. Located in the centre
of east Amman, it is a busy area for entrepreneurs and self-employed workers.
Established in the early 1960s, it is located five km. to the east of the capital with a total
population of approximately 9,500\(^{87}\) originally from Abbasiyeh, Halhoul, Beit Attab,
Hebron and other villages occupied in 1948 in addition to those displaced for the first
time in 1967. Most shelters have been constructed by the government and have concrete
roofing slabs. Only a few houses have makeshift roofing.

Infrastructure development and service delivery interventions in the 2000s’ still left
difficult living conditions in the densely populated refugee camp.\(^{88}\) Before 2000, there
were no basic services such as sewerage, clean water, electricity or maintained roads. An

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\(^{86}\) According to UNRWA information officer Mater Saqer, this meant that the land was not handed over to
UNRWA to establish the housing units. So UNRWA does not classify this camp as official in its records. However, UNRWA in this camp does provide basic health and education services.
\(^{87}\) Department of Palestinian Affairs publication, 2008: 64
\(^{88}\) Interview with Fawaz Masrawi, who was the director of the Islamic Association in the camp, Abi Thar el
Ghaffari centre 26 July 2009. He has now moved to the social development department in main offices of
the Islamic association in Amman.
Italian NGO, Institute for University Co-operation Onlus (ICU), targeted this camp in early 2000 for a house rehabilitation project which was followed by infrastructure rehabilitation done by the Housing and Urban Development Corporation through the Social Productivity Project. Furthermore, the DPA has funded the construction of a sports and culture centre which is currently under construction.

Unlike Jabal al-Nadheef, Jabal al-Naser refugee camp has only some, generally inactive local community actors and few outside agencies addressing development issues. In the late 1980s, Save the Children was the first development agency to address the needs of camp residents. They achieved greater successes when they merged their efforts with the camp’s Islamic association, the Abi Thar Al-Ghaffari Centre. Their projects had aimed to economically enhance the income of households by providing training and marketing assistance. They focused on building skills among youth and enhancing their chances to join the labour market. The Near East Foundation used to provide the training. The project supported income generation products by women including productive kitchens and embroidery. Today, however, the Abi Thar Islamic association has no projects supporting economic opportunities.

89 This is done through their INJAZ: project that focuses on Jordanian youth, to enhance their opportunities to join the job market as qualified employees and entrepreneurs. Started by Save the Children with funds from USAID, in 2001, it spun off to become an independent not-for-profit organisation. INJAZ brings various capacity building courses to classrooms in public schools, universities and community colleges around Jordan and offers students many programmes to enhance their leadership, business entrepreneurial, economics, problem-solving, communication, and soft skills. INJAZ works in full coordination with the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Higher Education, and King Abdullah II Fund for Development. Moreover, the large network of private sector partners gives essential leverage to INJAZ that is continuously promoting a new ‘culture’ in which the private sector plays a major and direct role in the development of the educational system. http://www.injaz.org.jo/
Save the Children created a children’s club that is today run by the Islamic association. In the 1990s, Save the Children was replaced by UNICEF which continued to work with the Islamic association. UNICEF’s project is focused on “community empowerment” aiming to bring local initiatives together, define society’s needs and to support the projects of individuals (whether for women or youth). Almost 500 metres away from Al-Naser, a royal NGO, the Jordan River Foundation, has its major child centre serving East Amman. It focuses on children and youth issues, seeking to improve family wellbeing and promote harmonious relations between family members. They hold training courses for parents on child-rearing and living with adolescents. UNRWA has four primary schools and a health clinic.

While this refugee camp is not an official UNRWA, it is served by UNRWA and is seen by the people as a refugee camps in a mixed area with southern Jordanians, Iraqis and Chechens. Abi Thar El Ghaffari Islamic association is the focal point of community organisation in the camp. In the absence of other community-based organisations with minimal state or UNRWA presence, the Islamists seem to be the galvanisers of humanitarian work.

The director of the Islamic association in Jabal al-Naser, Fawaz Mazrawi perceived that the strength of the Islamic brotherhood association is the charitable work, linking the donors’ networks with the needy people registered in their lists of beneficiaries. Their charity work focuses on giving extracurricular education to children, funding orphan children to attend summer camps and giving symbolic financial assistance to the mothers.
of orphan children.\footnote{Interview with Fawaz Masrawi, who was the director of the Islamic Association in the camp, Abi Thar el Ghaffari centre 26 July 2009} Studying this area permitted me to analyse how people, with the limited presence of external actors, adapt their strategies and make the most of the few opportunities.

1.3.2 Positioning myself as a researcher

To analyse the way Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman sought to acquire their social citizenship rights and to analyse the challenges they faced while trying to access economic opportunities since the late 1989, I conducted interviews from September 2011 and December 2012 in two different areas of inner Amman: Jabal Al-Nadheef and Jabal Al-Naser. In this research, I apply a deduction method whereby I test my theories, studying the inclusion and economic integration of Palestinians as protracted refugees and as citizens living in inner Amman over the last seven decades. I interviewed individuals, living and working in these two areas, choosing them based on their profession, work location, age and country of origin.

This field research was conducted on top of almost fifteen years of engagement with refugee issues in the Arab Middle East, particularly focusing on Palestinian refugees. My first exposure to Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan was in 1996 when I conducted interviews with people who were affected and eventually displaced by a development
project in central Amman. The creation of the Jordan Ring Road which passed through the second biggest refugee camp in Amman involved the relocation of dwelling units and compensation. As a journalist then, this was a springboard for me to seek information and learn about the livelihoods of Palestinian refugees who live in camps and hold Jordanian nationality.

Both the encamped people and I share the common identity of being second or third generation of expelled refugees from Palestine in 1948 and unable to go back, finding ourselves holders of Jordanian nationality, with a broadly similar ‘refugee experience’ in Jordan. However, our paths in exile varied. As my field research over the years proved, we know little about each other’s experiences living on other sites of the same city. Their poverty and dire need was the little I knew about them. Wealth and modern western life were stereotyped images they draw about us (Palestinian origin Jordanians of West Amman). “I never imagined that people in West Amman, left Palestine the way we did. I never thought I could talk to these people with lavish houses and cars of the other side of the city”, a young man from Jabal al Akhdar in East Amman told me. These have been the alienating distinctions which people in West Amman over the years drew to categorise people in the east of the city.

These distinctions have also created a confusion about the word ‘refugee’: Jordanians (both Palestinian origin and Jordanians) unconsciously connected the word with the geographic borders of the refugee camp and the poverty conditions. I often had wide eyes

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91 The project displaced a tenth of the camp dwellers, Palestinian-origin Jordanians who had been living in al Hussein camp, the second biggest camp in Amman, since the early 1950s.
staring at me as I would dare say that I, too, am a refugee. Legally ‘refugee’ refers to the internationally created category given to a first/second or maybe fifth generation refugee, who had descended from registered refugee male forcefully displaced from historical Palestine after 1948 and since failing to be able to return. In today’s common understanding ‘refugee’ has become a label, often a pejorative one, which connotes a socio-economic, a geo-cultural and, mostly, a political category. As put by Zetter, “the conceptual tools of bureaucratic labelling – [by] stereotyping, conformity, designation, identity disaggregation and political/power relationships”, have categorised people into a certain socio-economic class as poor and vulnerable, assessed in terms of their housing quality and classified as needy by virtue of their dependence on UNRWA. They are further assumed to be supporters of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), thus implicitly of dubious loyalty to the host regime.

Yet such pejorative labelling could not omit the commonalities I and my interviewees shared in the ‘refugee experience’ of our grandfathers and parents and the political, social and economic challenges they encountered at different levels while living in two opposing corners of Amman. When introducing myself as a refugee, the reaction of my Palestinian-origin interviewees of inner Amman was often surprising. They had internalised the pejorative labelling, making them forget that people from all categories and classes were expelled from one place regardless of their financial capital, all have become refugees. In short, presenting myself as a ‘refugee’ was key to gaining trust and being able to interact easily with their narrative and references to dates and places. I was

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asked about the village or town my family was expelled from and, for verification, I was asked if I was, like them, brought up in Amman. In addition to our shared origin and our grandfathers’ ‘refugee experience’, with a large number of those interviewed, we also had age in common as my target group was aged between 16 to 40 years old.

While my interviewees and I shared place of origin, added to our Jordanian nationality, our level of education/social class widely differed. Although I was in most cases able to follow their narratives and probe in events and dates they talked about, my interviewees were not always sure I was able to follow, emphasising the fact that we in West Amman, do not have the same impediments or even challenges. For me, this was a way of making me feel a stranger, alienating me as an outsider who is unable to put myself in their shoes and see things from their inner Amman perspective. For example, I approached a young man in his early 20s in Jabal Al-Nadheef. He was sitting in front of his shop which offered both Wifi and rental tents for large gatherings, parties and political campaigns. After I had approached him, introduced myself and my research project, I asked if we could talk and got his consent. When I asked where he was from, he glanced at me with a harsh look and questioned me back, “I am from Jabal al-Nadheef, is this not enough? Why do I need to think like ‘you’ about my origin and my class, I come from here, I am loyal to this city and I am happy to be part of this place!.” He considered the search for identity of people like me from West Amman as a luxury, a distraction that creates differences amongst people and categorises them. He simply felt he wanted to be

93 Even taxi drivers I had to use the first few weeks of my field work would ask me why I was going to such areas in Amman, or if I was sure I knew the area I was off to.
from one place where everyone is alike. He told me he considered my question “racist” (he meant discriminatory). This young man reflected in his reaction a social reality he has been living in a city that tends to label him – whether as a refugee, an East Ammanit or a dweller of the inner city where he lived in quasi-refugee camp conditions in an area known for hiding fugitives. My locality helped me to understand the way social institutions, cultural behaviours and power are defined and contested and the way the sense of self and subjectivity are constructed in inner Amman. This thesis seeks to disentangle these complex multilayered elements.

I also interviewed East Jordanians living in these two studied areas for my research. The encounter with this other group of East Jordanians was different. Upon introducing myself and what my research is about, I had to put up with numerous questions about my origin, my relatives and any potential known names in the bureaucracy amongst my relatives and if, by any chance, I was related to the East Jordanian El-Abed tribe located in Southern Marka, an inner district of Amman that has been inhabited by members of the El-Abed-Da’aja tribe since the creation of the city.

In East Jordanian mindset, it is the tribe and the status, gained through the discursive politics of the regime that matter (chapter three examines this thoroughly). I explained that I am originally Palestinian and do not belong to the tribe they referred to. I explained

94 Case 26, in Jabal al-Nadheef, April 10, 2012.
95 The area has mountains. On its slopes there used to be caves that have become now as slum houses. The little roads between houses and illegally built structures have made Jabal al-Nadheef an ideal area for hiding away from authorities and police. The Social Productivity Programme at the Ministry of Planning (conducted between 1998 and 2007) allocated funds to demolish some houses and widen roads. Road access has been greatly improved but parts of the area remain secret hides for runaway persons.
that my father arrived in Jordan with his family as refugees expelled from the town of Bissan in historical Palestine. The profession of my father and that of my family members – or rather, the male relatives including sometimes my brothers – was also part of my introductory background check. My father was an academic at the University of Jordan when he passed away in 1986, and my uncles have been merchants since their arrival in Jordan, owning clothing stores in the city centre of Irbid (a city in the North) and in Amman. This process of defining my status was the key to gaining their trust.

Despite my explaining to them that I am Palestinian originally and have refugee status, my West Amman upbringing made them focus on the differences between people like me and those living in East Amman whether in camps or in the environs (informal settlements). They did not, quite often, see the commonalities we share, rather considering me an alien to this Palestinian-origin poor class of East Amman. They spoke without hesitation, whether positively or negatively, about ‘these people’, as if oblivious to my relation to them. One mukhtar (a selected or elected member to represent a community) explained to me for example that the crime rate among “the Palestinian refugees” living in Jabal al-Naser is high because “these refugees are not educated and they cannot even learn how to behave, because they have no tribal origins, nor tribal social power/status and no roots”.96 Another East Jordanian mukhtar tried to explain to me why Palestinians do not work in the public sector by arguing it is not their nature to want disciplined jobs: “Palestinians are people who are used to street work, they are vendors and petty traders, that is why they cannot apply for formal work in the army or in

96 Case No 9, interviewed in Dec. 18' 2011 in Jabal al-Naser.
These comments emphasised on the Palestinian identity of people who are Jordanian citizens. They reflected the image of the past, the arrival of the vulnerable refugees who were looking for places to live in and for a source of income to strive. Almost seventy years of coexistence, the image continues to persist. The complex variables shaping these images are studied in this thesis.

I was able to understand and analyse the subjective views of the Palestinian-origin Jordanians of inner Amman concerning Jordanian institutions and the status quo in which they are embedded. I was also able to listen, observe and analyse the subjective views of East-Jordanian interviewees. I was glad that my Palestinian identity did not stop either group, with a few exceptions, from speaking their minds. My locality has put me in a reflexive position: “to be in a position of trans-formational reflective space is reflexive, because it prompts an examination of beliefs, values and identity:” where the constructions of the reality are no longer reinforced by the forces of the sociocultural world, a process that makes me as a researcher move from a state or position of reflection towards reflexivity.

1.3.3 Locating Interviewees

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98 I may say about two percent of my interviewed, held off speaking clearly because of my background, origin or even class.
100 Savin-Baden and Major 2013, p.76.
Two groups of two origins and two generations living in two areas were selected to conduct field interviews and to test my hypothesis. To study how Palestinian-origin Jordanians engage with the economy it is essential to also consider the ways East Jordanians of a similar socio-economic status do so. They too have relocated, migrated from a rural to an urban environment and are now neighbours to the Palestinian forced migrants. Interviewing East Jordanians as “subpopulation, provides a test of some hypothesis”\(^\text{101}\) and an understanding of how the ‘other’ citizen, from different origins and way of life living in the same area seeks economic opportunities. Savin-Baden and Major in the following quote synthesises this clearly:

> “The society does not exist in an objective world, observable form; rather, it is experienced subjectively because individuals give it meaning by the way they behave. Individuals, then, create and re-create a sense of the social system. Facts about behaviour may be established but those facts are always context bound and do not apply to all people at all times in all situations.”\(^\text{102}\)

This thesis in its following chapters shall explore the implications for this group and difference in acquired rights and privileges.

Interviews at both selected field sites were preceded by a social mapping exercise to identify key population groups to interview and also to gain initial insight into everyday life dynamics in the quasi-camps and their environs. In the two sites, I conducted 58 semi-structured interviews, 20 of which were with women. I held seven focus group meetings with Palestinian-origin Jordanians in the two areas and held 15 meetings with staff of official bodies, NGOs and local organisations working in the areas.


\(^{102}\) Savin-Baden and Major 2013, p.6.
I sought to locate Palestinian-origin Jordanian interviewees at various locations that I perceived as their socio-economic and “political containers, shaping and influencing their thoughts and actions”:¹⁰³ in Jabal al-Nadheef (which is an uncontrolled settlement) or in Jabal al-Naser (which is a non-recognised camp by UNRWA)¹⁰⁴ whether at their houses or at their work places (shops, stands, workshops, vegetable markets, community centres) or at places of post-work leisure such as cafes/clubs with coffee, tea and billiard tables or at shops selling falafel (a takeaway food common in the Middle East). The context in which the interviews took place made an effect on the way the interviewee expressed

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¹⁰³ Savin-Baden and Major 2013, p.309.
¹⁰⁴ Further information about the two areas in chapter two.
his/her thoughts and reacted to the existing reality: “a main question is evidently what
spaces matter, as the number is potentially infinite and any selection might seem about as
viable as any other. Another question…is how a space matters. A third question relates to
the dynamics of the space; how and when does it appear, and how does it evolve?”°105
There is no one single pattern. In group discussions, sometimes individuals were able to
probe in their talk and explain with little details, often reacting to other’s narratives or
trying to justify their responses. Other times, individuals would shy away from getting
into details when the interview is only one to one. With some females, I used to get more
reactions and more stories when meeting in a group rather than meeting individually.

I held interviews in the main commercial roads leading to each area. In both areas, these
had a mix of both Palestinian-origin and East Jordanians. The East Jordanians own the
shops and the lands meanwhile the Palestinian-origin Jordanians rent them and run
businesses in them. I interviewed people beyond the camp or the environs of Jabal al
Nadheef, in rented shops, community centres (whether religious/Islamist, political or
social) and in few cases in walk-in medical clinics (owned by East Jordanians and run by
professional Palestinian-origin Jordanians brought up in the refugee camps and assisted
by East Jordanian nurses). In some cases, especially to meet East Jordanians,
appointments were made in advance. Many of the East Jordanians who own the
properties (especially the commercial ones) for example, live either in West Amman or
on the expanding outskirts of the city. The majority of the East Jordanians I met were
retired military people who have their communal commitments or their tribal obligations
to attend to during the day. They have been assigned the job of Mukhtar by the Ministry

of Interior after their retirement from the military. Their social and tribal networks in the neighbourhood and their exposure to the professional work in the military have helped them to be selected for this title, which reflects status and power. For their busy schedules, appointments with fixed hours were set in advance taking into consideration their other social commitments.

I interviewed two generational groups: Generation One, the main focus group of this research, are Jordanian nationals (of both Palestinian and Jordanian origins) living within the inner city of Amman who have entered the Jordanian labour market for the first time (with no previous experience) since 1988. More precisely, I define the age group I studied based on the International Labour Organisation (ILO) definition of the working age population above 15 years old. Thus, the target group I studied ranges between those who were 16 years old and entered the labour market for the first time in 1988 (they are today 40 years old) and those who are currently 16 years old and have recently joined the labour force. Based on this, the range of age groups I studied is between 16-40 years old. This age group represents for my research the generation that has come of age during the years of change as liberalisation policies gradually ushered in a more ‘privatised’ and ‘competitive’ labour market. It is also the generation that have come into the labour market after the oil recession in the Gulf (1982) which was soon followed by the Gulf War in 1990 which affected the flow of revenue to Jordan and to households. The war brought many Palestinian-origin Jordanians back to Jordan, increasing local competition

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106 In the Key Issues in the Labour Market (KILM) report of the ILO, the labour force participation rate is calculated by expressing the number of persons in the labour force as a percentage of the working-age population. The labour force is the sum of the number of persons employed and the number of unemployed. The working-age population is the population above a certain age – ideally aged 15 and older – prescribed for the measurement of economic characteristics. ([http://kilm.ilo.org/manuscript/kilm01.asp](http://kilm.ilo.org/manuscript/kilm01.asp))
for jobs and initially demand for skilled and unskilled labour during the construction boom in Jordan. Gulf employment was gradually restricted to highly qualified graduates.

To be able to relate to the different experiences and opportunities encountered by the earlier generation, I interviewed some older people from what I shall call Generation Two, those who were actively working between the 1960 and the 1980s. The objective was to reflect upon their experiences in accessing job opportunities whether with the public, private or informal sectors or in the Gulf states in order to compare how economic opportunities increased or decreased with the economic and political changes brought in after 1989. Further, the input of Generation Two was important to reflect the effects of what Adnan Abu Odeh calls the “mopping up” politics or the Jordanisation politics of public sector employment and higher education to the detriment of a particular sector of the society. This generation reflected two points of view: some highly praised the opportunities they had been able to access during their own active working lives and how this enabled them to grow and progress when compared to the tightened circumstances being faced by their children. The other view supported restricting chances for those who are not part of the regime and are not trusted. They see marginalisation of the people who do not demonstrate allegiance as necessary to create a country that is safe and secure through the loyalty of its people.

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107 Abu Odeh 1999.
1.3.4 Clustering cases and gatekeepers

After deciding the areas and the age group of the two generations and the two groups to be studied as I explained in the introduction,\textsuperscript{108} I chose to use deliberate sampling, also known as purposive or non-probability sampling to hold the focus groups. This involved deliberate selection of particular groups/individuals from the two areas which constituted a sample which represents the people of inner Amman falling under the criteria I am studying in this research work. I clustered my cases into groups. Of the younger generation (16-25 years old) some were still completing secondary school, others had dropped out and were working as unskilled labourers, while others had finished secondary school and were working in skilled or unskilled work or had enrolled at university. To find these people I sought the help of sports and youth clubs and then invited a purposive sample of youth with the background I needed for my study to attend focus group meetings. In a few cases, I had a group of youth of this age group assembled close to a falafel shop. We started to talk and the circle spontaneously enlarged. We went into the falafel shop and started talking with randomly selected individuals (mainly of the same age group) and a focus group meeting was arranged spontaneously and lasted for more than two hours.

The working skilled labourers (26-40) in the sample were those with secondary or tertiary education working as shopkeepers, other forms of trade or running workshops. Some interviewees were at their shops whether inside the camps or outside. Others were met

\textsuperscript{108} See introduction.
through referrals as they were recommended by colleagues/acquaintances. I made sure that my selection covered different networks, education levels and labour market places.

Those without completed secondary school education had dropped out of school at a young age and have been working as skilled labourers, petty traders and street vendors. I selected members of this group in workplaces such as vegetable markets, workshops, and shops. Professionals in the 16-40 age bracket were those who had done well at school, sought tertiary education and managed to grow socially out of the camp and establish their own enterprises. I also interviewed a sample of those working in the public sector-the civil service, the majority working for Amman municipality.

I used two methods to find my interviewees: one depended on convenience sampling, as I used to go to the main commercial roads in the camps or adjacent areas and randomly select people with certain jobs such as petty trading, shop keepers, unskilled and skilled labourers. This method created sometimes a snowball (a network reference), as the interviewee would refer me to a colleague of his, doing the same work, or having attained a similar educational degree or having the same skills.109 The second method required the help of some gatekeepers, who were “professionals or administrators in charge”110 or “community members who protect the interest of their particular

109 “Snowball, or network, sampling is sometimes used to obtain a sample when there is no adequate list to use as a sampling frame. It is a method for obtaining samples of numerically small groups, such as members of minority ethnic groups. It involves contacting a member of the population to be studied and asking them whether they know anyone else with he required characteristics” in Sturgis Patrick 2009, ‘Designing samples’ in Gilbert, Nigel, *Researching social life*, third edition, London, Sage publications, pp.179-180. It is hence a network referral from one person to another when looking for particular characteristics in the persons to be interviewed.
organisations/community/ or vulnerable group in the society, ensuring that their particular
group or community is being represented in the best light. “111 Some of the gatekeepers
were social workers working for a project for the Ministry of Health and for UNRWA.
Others were political, cultural and sports activists with good contacts and able to refer me
to persons I needed to interview within the established criteria of selection. Their good
social connections helped ensure the validity and reliability of data collected from
interviews.

1.3.5 Conducting qualitative interviews

I used two qualitative methods with the two different generations. The first was face-to-
face interviews based on a semi-structured questionnaire that “attempt[s] to understand
the complex behaviour of members of society without imposing any a priori
categorisation that may limit the field of inquiry”.112 As a deductive research approach,
the questions were prepared along certain topics building on my analysed theories. The
themes I addressed in my interviews and discussions were: class and social stratification
(of the interviewee and that of parents /grandparents); educational attainment; economic
opportunities; formal and informal work opportunities both in the present and in the past
(before 1989 or in Palestine); entrepreneurial skills and funding; access to state/UN
benefits, social welfare and health care as citizens or as refugees; competition over
educational and employment opportunities; difficulties in accessing opportunities;

111 Reynolds Tracey, 2002 ‘On relations between black female researchers and participants’, in May, Tim
112 Fontana Andrea and Frey James H., 2003 ‘The interview: From structured questions to negotiated text’,
in Denzin,Norman K. and Lincoln Yvonna S. (eds) Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials,
impediments encountered and most importantly, the significance of their refugee status and how it affects their citizenship in Jordan.

These themes were prepared in a questionnaire to maximise the reliability and the validity of analysing key concepts while permitting at the same time some flexibility for the interviewees to bring in their own perspectives. This method was used with Generation One, those who range between 16-40 and have been economically active in the labour market. I took notes during the interviews. I did not feel it was well received at first when I tried to record interviews, so continued with written notes. This often permitted me to stop for few minutes, think about the issues raised and take the discussion to another level. The interviews used to take between one to two hours. Sometimes informants were fully focused on the questions and discussions but at other times interviewees were interrupted, especially when in a shop or workshop and dealing with clients coming and going. Upon returning home, I used to fill in a coding table indicating the main themes raised for the cases interviewed and the location. I numbered the cases, so the number of the cases and their location guide me back to the case. I used different names or nick names for the interviewees for respecting the privacy of their own names, tribal affiliation and social status in the community.

The same topics were used for focus group meetings. These were held to hear the perspective and the experience of Generation One and learn about the challenges they have been encountering. I held three focus groups with young people ranging between 18-24 and another three with men between 30-40, held in various locations. Sometimes
having people from Generation Two present was very enriching for the discussion, with the two generations debating opportunities and changes in their chances. Focus groups permitted me to build an understanding of why people have chosen a certain path of education or profession and to probe on their perceived reasons. This proved an ideal way for the elicitation of a wide variety of different views. I recorded the focus group meetings in addition to taking notes of issues raised.

The number of women present in my research was modest. With the help of the Islamic association and UNRWA, I was able to interview almost 20 women who were heading their households and taking benefits from these organisations. Very few of these women (six women only) had their own work that supported the income of their household. They worked as cleaners in private schools or for public sector bodies. One was working as a tailor from her own home. In addition to this, I interviewed few professional women (both East Jordanian and Palestinian-origin Jordanians) working as social workers, nurses, office managers and heads of community centres. In general, women constituted around a third of my overall interviewees.

1.3.6 Field challenges

Gaining trust, in the few hours of conducting each interview, was necessary for me to sense feelings and reactions towards my raised questions. This was not always easy especially when the interviewees had a desire or a need to project a certain image, and to safeguard one’s pride, in front of an outsider researcher like me. There were, for example, instances where sons were in prison or being prosecuted for criminal acts, including drug
dealing or when a husband, the breadwinner of the household, had more than one wife or when there had been a shameful incident involving a household member, the interviewee would not necessarily feel it is comfortable talking about these family members with their ‘socially shameful’ standing. I used to discuss with the gatekeepers such cases which I managed to meet on my own, or met them when I was at one of the service or community centres in the area and managed to interview them. Gatekeepers helped me most of the time, clarifying details about the family which were not mentioned to me, correcting some narratives and clarifying many details about living conditions. In few cases, gatekeepers were able to help me hold interviews or focus group meetings in their office premises leaving me with the interviewee on our own. Most interviews and focus group meetings were only with informants, lest the presence of gatekeepers should make them withhold information.

Locating Palestinian-origin Jordanian community members was easy because they live and work in groups in inner Amman. They are also known by the kind of work they do within the proximity of the camps. East Jordanians live close to the camps and have their own groups in new areas which have expanded from the camps as the city has grown. In both Jabal al-Naser and Jabal al-Nadheef I had to look for an East Jordanian gatekeeper to introduce me to fellow East Jordanians. In general, the number of East Jordanians working in the informal sector in inner Amman is much less than Palestinian-origin Jordanians. The majority work in the public sector either as civil servants or military personnel. So finding them in their houses during working hours was not evident and seeing them in the late afternoon was not a comfortable matter, especially that they
would be sleeping or running errands for their families. The gatekeepers used to arrange these meetings for me. As for East Jordanian property owners it was rare that I could find any in the main commercial road when meeting the tenants of the shops, mostly Palestinian-origin Jordanians. I had to arrange meetings with the East Jordanians owners either to meet in their shops (rented to Palestinian-origin Jordanians) or to see them in West Amman. Generally, it was not very easy. Some were sceptical about the real reasons for meeting so evaded me while others were happy to talk on the phone and apologised for not being able to see me in Amman. A few were kind enough to see me in Jabal al-Naser because they had their own reasons to come into inner Amman.

I used some personal social networks to introduce me to some East Jordanians based in al-Naser. Through a medical doctor who was brought up in Jabal al- Naser, I was put in touch with an East Jordanian (originally from Salt), who was preparing to run for municipal elections representing Jabal al-Naser. His network was helpful because he was busy preparing for his electoral campaign. He shared names of main tribes/social figures/representatives in Al- Naser and gave me the contacts of a female social worker working for a project with the Ministry of Health and a resident in the area. Originally from Karak, she ended up becoming one of my gatekeepers. He also introduced me to another woman who headed a small civil society organisation opposite the police station. She convened training and empowerment sessions for women (locals and Iraqi migrants) and was part of the local community board that meets regularly with the police and the Ministry of Interior to discuss security and social issues of concern in the area. It was through these two women that I eventually managed to get in touch in with East
Jordanians in Jabal al- Naser. The fact that the majority of men work in the public sector and the military did not make it very easy for me to meet with them the way I was able to meet with Palestinian-origin Jordanians.

In Jabal al-Nadheef, things were not much easier. I sought personal networks in West Amman who could connect me with East Jordanians and with Circassians living in the hilly area of the city centre. These had their own well-established houses and the generation I was able to interview of these Circassians, was Generation Two, retired and available at home. I was not able to meet Circassians of Generation One. I used a snowball amongst the network of the makhteer I met in al-Naser to connect me with their colleagues in Al-Nadheef. This snowball managed to connect me with few who started a new snowball in the new area. Trust was necessary to establish and this happened through answering all their questions, including personal ones about my family, my relatives, my work and whom do I know. It had surely taken longer time, but it was established and gatekeepers made the process of finding interviewees and reassuring them about my real research agenda easier for my work.

Statistics while conducting qualitative field research are needed and can be necessary to indicate issues qualitative research is limited from exploring, such as numbers of those working in the informal sector in Jabal al-Nadheef, or in Jabal al-Naser for example, or number of those who dropped out from school in East Amman and the percentage of those of Palestinian origin and those East Jordanian. The quarterly surveys issued regularly by the Department of Statistics (DOS) have been used in this research, despite
their general approach, that cover regions and districts in Jordan that do not answer exactly my questions in the smaller areas where I worked. Other statistics conducted by the Housing and Urban Development Corporation were published in 1998 when the Social Productivity Programme started in Jordan. The statistics were often inconsistent. The variables were not clear enough to be used. Such statistics were indicative of general issues but could not be used in this research to respond to the structured analysis. Most importantly, Palestinian-origin Jordanians in Jordan are Jordanian citizens. In statistics conducted by official bodies such as DOS or by universities or by Ministry of Labour or Ministry of Education, figures presented in their reports reflect data found about Jordanian citizens, regardless of their origin.

The Norwegian Institute for Applied International Studies (FAFO) has been conducting quantitative surveys in the Middle East region since the signature of Oslo Peace Process in 1993. In their role to support the peace process by identifying major issues inflicting Palestinian refugees in the region, they have been conducting regular studies in the refugee camps in the host countries of Palestinian refugees. The published reports studying the living conditions of Palestinian refugees in refugee camps have been also used and analysed in this thesis. In their work, they dwell on statistics and registration of refugees living in official refugee camps. In few reports, their figures did not include the nonofficial camps of Jordan such as Jabal Al-Naser.\footnote{Gilen et al. 1994, Finding Ways, Palestinian Coping Strategies in Changing Environments, Fafo report No 177, Oslo: Fafo, Hanssen-Bauer et al. 1998 Jordanian Society: Living Conditions in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Oslo: Fafo, Khawaja and Tiltnes, 2002 On the Margines: Migration and Living Conditions of Palestinian Camp Refugees in Jordan, Oslo: Fafo, Tiltnes and Zhang 2013 Progress, challenges, diversity, Insights into the socioeconomic conditions of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Oslo: Fafo.} Moreover, their work does not
cover the environs or the uncontrolled settlements such as Jabal Al Naser. Differently, their last survey which was shared with me before its official launch covered both these areas.\textsuperscript{114}

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, Palestinian-origin Jordanian of East Amman have been situated as citizens, on the territory where they have residing for over half a century since by side with their East Jordanian compatriots. While so doing, I reviewed the creation of the state and the strategised relationship between the East Jordanians and the state during the sedentarisation phase and the exchanged interests between the newly born state and the sedentarised citizens. This established relation, which reigns until today, has engendered the classes in the society and the status/power which are thoroughly studied in the next chapter.

Migratory trajectories of various peoples from various destinations, as demonstrated, have been vital to the expansion of Amman over the years. This has rendered the young capital a place for opportunities and new chances in the business and in the public sector (civil and military services). Palestinians, like others who migrated before and after them, with their Jordanian citizenship have become part of this dynamic in the growing city.

\textsuperscript{114} Tiltnes and Zhang 2013.
The methodology used in this research aimed to learn about, describe and explain the social world of the Palestinian-origin Jordanians from the perceptions of those involved in the interviews. The field research sought the perspective provided through the lenses of the individuals, their behaviour and choices as part of the wider context of the inner city. It is challenging to ensure the representativeness of a sample in a country with multi-layer politics and social classes. I tried to be pragmatic, aiming to have representative voices in the studied sites. The aim of conducting such qualitative research is to provide illumination and understanding of complex socio-political and economic issues and are most useful approach for answering humanistic 'why?' and 'how?' questions.

In this research I endeavour to use methodological triangulation by using multiple methods, hoping to overcome the weakness or intrinsic biases that may come only from interviewing a single group or a limited social class. In order to validate the results and the answers of my interviewees, my data collection combined observation, interviews, focus group meetings, meetings with officials and social workers, politicians and Islamists with studying documents, newspapers, statistics and secondary resources. In the following chapter I study the theoretical framework that this deductive research approach aims to support and validate.
Chapter Two: Integrated Palestinian Refugee–Jordanian Citizens?

Introduction

Refugees who have been given citizenship or granted permanent residency or have achieved local integration independently of host state policies appear to be the least priority in literature on forced migration.\(^1\) The assumption is when legal protection is secured, refugees have then adapted to the host society, and are able to enjoy citizenship rights; hence appear successfully integrated. Many questions remain un-addressed. What is meant by integration and how is it being measured? While citizenship assumes accessing basic rights, are these rights distributed equally and justly? Which group of refugee-citizens is being referred to as integrated? Is it those with means and professional skills or is it those who are poor and vulnerable? How has access to citizenship rights, including political, social and civil rights, impacted the Palestine refugee status? What are the interests of a host state to integrate refugees? The understanding of integration from these perspectives, shall explain the perception Palestinian-origin Jordanians have shaped vis-à-vis their own integration in Jordan, which is empirically studied in chapters 4 and 5.

This chapter defines integration from various perspectives academic, international based on the UN lenses and regional. It then seeks to analyse at the local level, the issues which have challenged the structure of citizenship and the participation in social and political institutions such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the demographic and national identity pressures. Soysal argued that the modes of inclusion exercised by nation states in relation to ‘foreign’ populations are keys to understanding the processes of citizenship and integration.\(^2\) To understand the integration of the Palestinian-origin Jordanians of a specific class and mostly holders of the refugee status, this chapter analyses theoretically the variables that have impacted the inclusion by the politics of the state.

In the following chapters, it will be seen how these variables have also affected the perception of the Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman towards integration. The legal integration, secured and made visible through the Jordanian nationality, is not what this research has aimed to question. Rather, this work questions the socioeconomic integration, accessed supposedly through citizenship rights and has often become invisible. Hammond has noted that “invisibility is a function of governmentality\(^3\) that has enabled inaction on the part of the stakeholders.”\(^4\) The visibility/invisibility of practiced politics has continued to be manipulated aiming to best serve the state’s interests in

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\(^3\) Governmentality, a concept developed by M. Foucault where he sought to explain the attempt of the government to shape human conduct by calculated means— as the conduct of conduct. Instead of coercion, the government operates by educating desires and configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs. When power operates indirectly and at a distance, people are not necessarily aware of how their conduct is being conducted or why, so the question of consent does not arise (Li Tania Murray, 2007 ‘Governmentality’, in *Anthropologica*, Vol. 49, No 2, p. 275).

\(^4\) Hammond 2008, p.520.
Jordan, and has become an implicit tool of governmentality under which lies what Foucault calls the disciplinary power exercised through invisibility.\(^5\) Invisibility, as perceived by Hammond, is a process that permits us to understand how governmentality is used at the edges of state interest, among the most marginalised and dispossessed.\(^6\)

While Jordanian citizenship has *de facto*, enabled Palestinian-origin Jordanians to access extensive rights, acquire social and economic support and play a significant role in the Jordanian and regional economy,\(^7\) integration for Palestinian-origin Jordanians “remains very real and very sensitive”.\(^8\) On one hand, its theoretical definition has been amalgamated with the concept of assimilation (the background is explained in the UNHCR definition of integration in this chapter) and thus has been seen as part of the political fear of losing the right to return. On the other hand, the political definition of integration, at least locally, aimed to stress the message that Jordan has not become the alternative homeland for the Palestinians. This has permitted the state to manage political and socioeconomic rights to what serves its political interests.

This chapter explores Palestinians’ integration in Jordan in three parts: the first endeavours to define integration at three different levels: the academic, the policy- which is shaped by the United Nations and its resolutions and the Jordanian; and the local, drawing on the definition that was shaped by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and threatened the Jordanian sovereignty. Jordan has *de jure* integrated the Palestinians.

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\(^6\) *ibid.*, p.535.
\(^7\) To note that Palestinians who arrived in Jordan after 1967 war from Gaza, did not fall under the Jordanian citizenship law and thus were not given the Jordanian citizenship. After 1988 and the severed ties between the West Bank and the East Bank, many West Bankers remained in Jordan, but did not enjoy citizenship rights.
through citizenship. In the second part, citizenship is studied from two perspectives: one which defines the citizenship as a scarce resource that is used as a means of governmentality by the state, which regulates the relationship between the individual and the state and organises legal classes. While it accords rights, it also establishes the rules for participation in political institutions and access to public resources. This section defines citizenship in the western understanding and explains its double definition in the Arabic understanding. The second perspective is drawn on T. H. Marshall’s *Citizenship and Social Class*. It questions the inequality to access rights amongst citizens by examining how each of these elements, political, civil and social can be jeopardised by the social class in a patrimonial society like that of Jordan. Furthermore this section studies the theoretical approach of Weber’s class stratifications with its three elements; class, status and command/power. By so doing, this section endeavours to examine the divisions that impacted integration and enjoyment of citizenship rights in Jordan. The theories in this part aim to explicate what the interviewed cases studies presented of their own experiences and perception of integration.

The third part of this chapter considers the discursive politics of divisiveness which fluctuates using various labels: a citizen, a refugee or a Palestinian. The combination of the traditional patrimonial organisation, clientelistic structure, the political discourse of the state and the Palestinian complex double-allegiance have rendered Palestinian-origin citizens more vulnerable to “political uncertainty, economic dislocation and social instability”. This part studies the dynamics of power that have shaped the pyramid of

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9 Peretz 1977, p. 59
classes and stratified basic rights. This has often politically or economically excluded the Palestinians as refugees and as included citizens in Jordan.

This chapter examines the established relationship between the state and the citizens—whether of Palestinian origin or East Jordanian origin—and the state’s “techniques of achieving the subjections of bodies and the control of populations”.\(^\text{10}\) It aims to analyse the power dynamics that have shaped the understanding of citizenship using Foucault’s argument about bio-politics which falls under his definition of the art of ‘government’ and “the basis of the general tactics of governmentality” in controlling the population.\(^\text{11}\) Foucault’s biopolitics, is more than a disciplinary mechanism; it acts as a control apparatus exerted over a population as a whole, using the techniques of domination and the techniques of the self.

Empirically, Scott in *Seeing like a State*, theorises how the modern state constructs simplified and standardised categories, through labelling\(^\text{12}\) or categorising people to control its territory and population.\(^\text{13}\) Such institutional “purposefulness of categories”\(^\text{14}\) is studied in this chapter seeking to comprehend the micro-politics of certain kinds of categorisation and the politics of managing ‘invisiblised’ refugee-citizens. This analysis aims to demonstrate the useful instrument of bio-power,\(^\text{15}\) seen as an array of authorities

\(^{10}\) Foucault 1978, p.140.
\(^{11}\) Foucault 1991, p.103
\(^{12}\) Zetter’s (1991) five characteristics of bureaucratic labelling—stereotyping, conformity, designation, identity disaggregation and political/power relationships.
\(^{13}\) Scott 1998
\(^{14}\) Polzer 2008, p.3
\(^{15}\) Rainbow and Rose posit that biopower “entails one or more truth discourses about the ‘vital’ character of living human beings; an array of authorities considered competent to speak that truth; strategies for intervention upon collective existence in the name of life and health; and modes of subjectification, in
which shape modes of subjectification, the technology used by the state through citizenship to differentiate and regulate its populations.\textsuperscript{16}
2.1 What is integration?

2.1.1 The academic framework

The literature studying integration seems to confirm that ‘integration’ is a complex process that does not have one generally accepted definition;\(^\text{17}\) “There is no single, generally accepted definition, theory or model of immigrant and refugee integration. The concept continues to be controversial and hotly debated”.\(^\text{18}\) Integration involves various dimensions whether legal, economic, social or cultural and involves various actors. The perceived meaning for refugees, service providers or host country officials is different. It could mean different things to different people. Further, “variables such as the means and form of integration, the degree of independence afforded to refugees, the timing of integration measures, eligibility for support, [all these] mediate the process in significant ways.”\(^\text{19}\) Furthermore, integration is perceived differently from one social class to another, from one community to another as its understanding fluctuates according to lifestyle, values, ideas, social exposure and financial capital. “Thus for some, integration is about promoting social and economic cohesion, for others it is overcoming the barriers


of social marginalisation and exclusion which are endemic experiences amongst refugee and ethnic minority groups.”

Berry, in his paper on acculturation and adaptation in a new society, defines integration as a process by which individuals and groups maintain their cultural identity while actively participating in the larger societal framework. Castles et al. in their *Mapping the field, integration report (I)* define integration as “a two-way process: it requires adaptation on the part of the newcomer but also by the host society.” Elaborating on this, they note that “successful integration can only take place if the host society provides access to jobs and services, and acceptance of the immigrants in social interaction.” Integration, in a democracy as explained by Castles et al., presupposes acquisition of legal and political rights by the new members of society, so that they can become equal partners.” Bulcha elaborates further, looking at the social angle, by describing it as a “mutual ‘live and let live’ attitude based on tolerance of differences, solidarity and positive interaction.” Not excluding evidently, the possibility of conflict, which is “naturally part of relationships”.

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20 Zetter et al. 2003, p.120
21 Berry 1997, p.28
23 Castles et. al, 2002, p.13
24 *ibid.*
25 *ibid.*
According to Kuhlman, integration should look at the ability for the refugees to participate and take a role in their new society at the various level and domains of life, while maintaining their culture values at the same time. He puts it as follows:

If refugees are able to participate in the host economy in ways commensurate with their skills and compatible with their cultural values; if they attain a standard of living which satisfies culturally determined minimum requirements (standard of living is taken here as meaning not only income from economic activities, but also access to amenities such as housing, public utilities, health services, and education); if the socio-cultural change they undergo permits them to maintain an identity of their own and to adjust psychologically to their new situation; if standards of living and economic opportunities for members of the host society have not deteriorated due to the influx of refugees; if friction between host population and refugees is not worse than within the host population itself; and if the refugees do not encounter more discrimination than exists between groups previously settled within the host society: then refugees are truly integrated.27

Ager and Strang in their 2008 work on integration, identify elements central to perceptions of what constitutes ‘successful’ integration’- lined up in the table following.

Key domains of integration are proposed related to four overall themes: achievement and access across the sectors of employment, housing, education and health; assumptions and practice regarding citizenship and rights; processes of social connection within and between groups within the community; and structural barriers to such connection related to language, culture and the local environment.28

28 Ager and Strang 2008, p.170
Financial resources are necessary for refugees to co-exist, adapt and share the same economic and social capital with citizens. The failure of having available resources will create a conflict between the refugee and the host society, Barbara Harrell-Bond warns.\textsuperscript{30} Yet, having the resources in the host country does not “necessarily imply equality of access to resources”.\textsuperscript{31} There is always the risk of “exploitation of one group, or segments

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Markers and Means} & \textbf{Social Connection} & \textbf{Facilitators} & \textbf{Foundation} \\
\hline
Employment & Social Bonds & Language and Cultural Knowledge & Rights and Citizenship \\
\hline
Housing & Social Bridges & Safety and Stability & \\
\hline
Education & Social Links & & \\
\hline
Health & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textbf{Source:} Ager and Strang (2008)\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{29} Ager & Strang 2008, p.170.
\textsuperscript{30} Harrell-Bond Barbara, 1986 \textit{Imposing Aid, emergency assistance to refugees}, Oxford University Press, p.7.
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{ibid.}
of it, by another.\textsuperscript{32} This evidently places integration of people at various sub-segments at the social level. As I shall explain in the following sections, Palestinian-origin Jordanians have been legally integrated with their \textit{de jure} citizenship rights. The integration of the Palestinians living in the inner city has been challenged by cultural, economic and political factors. Different to what Castles \textit{et. al.} argued, the acquisition of legal rights in their case has not necessarily meant enjoying their political rights and socioeconomic rights equally with East Jordanians, as shall be explained in following parts of this chapter. Moving on from the academic definition, in the next section I highlight the different meanings of integration used by the UN bodies overlooking the refugee issue in general and the Palestinian refugee issue specifically.

2.1.2 Integration by the United Nations refugee organisations

\textbf{I. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)}

Local integration is used by UNHCR as one of the three forms of durable solutions to refugee situations:\textsuperscript{33} repatriation to the country from which the refugees fled, resettlement in third countries which have the capacity and willingness to take in the refugees and local integration in the host country by having “an opportunity of starting a new life, without having to forego their own cultural identity, and ensuring at the same time readiness on the part of host communities and public institutions to welcome

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{33} \url{http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c101.html}, visited on Dec 24, 2012
refugees and to meet their needs”. 34 This appears to be an operational definition that is “not formally defined in the principal legal instruments that govern policies: the 1951 Convention and the UNHCR Statute”. 35 It is worth noting that Article 34 of the Refugee Convention builds on integration by expecting that “the state of asylum shall facilitate the naturalisation of refugees”. 36 This, as mentioned earlier, explains the amalgamation in the Arab World between integration and assimilation through settlement, tawteen (as naturalisation in the host country).

For UNHCR local integration has three inter-related and quite specific dimensions, as part of a process leading to durable solutions. It is firstly a legal process. Refugees progressively enjoy a wide range of rights and entitlements that citizens already have. “These include freedom of movement, access to education and the labour market, access to public relief and assistance, including health facilities, the possibility of acquiring and disposing of property, and the capacity to travel with valid travel and identity documents.” 37 This also entails rights to family reunification and to eventually acquire the citizenship of the country of asylum. Local integration is secondly an economic process as refugees become integrated, seek to ensure sustainable livelihoods with a degree of self-reliance not simply dependent on state aid or humanitarian assistance. Thirdly, local integration is a social and cultural process “of acclimatisation by the refugees and accommodation by the local communities, that enable refugees to live amongst or alongside the host population, without discrimination or exploitation and contribute

35 Kuhlman 1991, p.3.
actively to the social life of their country of asylum.” This confirms integration to be a two way interactive process involving both refugees and nationals of the host state, as well as its institutions, aiming to shape a community that is diverse and open, regardless of differences.

II. United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP)

Failing to see repatriation as a choice, since the early 1950s, The United Nations has pursued “economic and social rehabilitation” and self-sufficiency for the Palestine refugees, to ensure cohabitation between the people of the Arab region. The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) was established not long after the 1948 al-nakba and the dispossession of about 700,000 Palestinians in what became Israel and their expulsion to neighbouring countries. Based on UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, the UNCCP was to “assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them” and to be in charge of the direct protection of refugees’ rights and interests and implementation of durable solution of repatriation, resettlement and

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38 ibid.
39 Peretz 1993, p.92 in Dumper 2007, p.86
40 The UNCCP replaced the United Nations Mediator for Palestine. This was led by Count Folke Bernadotte who made suggestions to Israel to return a number of refugees to their homes. In his report in September 1948, Count Bernadotte called for the return of Palestinians as a right: “From the start, I held the firm view that, taking into consideration all circumstances, the right of these refugees to return to their homes at the earliest practical date should be established” (http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/AB14D4AAFC4E1BB985256204004F55FA). Bernadotte recommended the General Assembly to establish a conciliation commission to supervise a final settlement of the claims of Palestinian refugees. Count Bernadotte’s mediation efforts ended when he was assassinated by the Zionist terrorist Stern Gang on 17 September, 1948, a day after he submitted his final progress report.
rehabilitation, meanwhile ensuring a peaceful settlement.\textsuperscript{41} To achieve these objectives, two committees were created: the technical committee and the Economic Survey Mission (ESM),\textsuperscript{42} charged with looking into more feasible and durable solutions specifically through ‘economic integration’ of Palestine refugees in the Arab region pending a political decision on their return to Palestine.\textsuperscript{43} The ESM, headed by Gordon Clapp, the Chairman of Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), sought to “facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees”.\textsuperscript{44} Palestine refugees were then perceived as the “most serious manifestation of ‘economic dislocation’ created by Arab Israeli hostilities”.\textsuperscript{45} The ESM thus called Arab host countries “to reintegrate the refugees into the economic life of the area on a self-sustaining basis within a minimum period of time; and to promote economic conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in the area [emphasis added].\textsuperscript{46} Khasan writes that “attempts were made by the UN General Assembly to encourage the neighbouring Arab states to accept and rehabilitate many refugees, and initially Jordan, Egypt, and Syria were willing to cooperate.”\textsuperscript{47} By the beginning of 1950, repatriation, whether a real goal or merely

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} A/RES/194 (III): http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/C758572B78D1CD0085256BCF0077E51A
\item \textsuperscript{42} The Technical Committee to study different aspects of the refugee problem such as the number of refugees, their origin and living conditions, and the Economic Survey Mission (ESM) to “examine the economic situation of the countries” affected by the conflict, and develop a structure to facilitate relief, resettlement and economic development. (United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine: Terms of Reference of the Technical Committee on Refugees, A/AC.25/Com.Tech/1, 14 June 1949). Their objective was to study the economic feasibility of settling Palestinians where they are, ESM was established in Aug 1949 as a subsidiary body under the UNCCP’s.
\item \textsuperscript{43} But repatriation of Arab refugees requires political decisions outside the competence of the Economic Survey Mission. Why do not the refugees go somewhere else? Why not resettle them in less congested lands? ... In these circumstances, the only immediate constructive step in sight is to give the refugees an opportunity to work where they now are” (in Takkenberg 1998, p.26).
\item \textsuperscript{45} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{46} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{47} In Dumper 2007, p.87
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
aspiration, was clearly a dead letter: “No state, including the Arab states, believed that repatriation was a realistic solution to the problem of the bulk of refugees.” The ESM’s objective to combine relief assistance and works projects was very much based on the assumption that relief would lessen with increased provision of work. This, as ESM argued, would eventually bring practical alternatives before the Palestinian refugees.

III. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)

UNRWA was created in December 1949 based on UNGA Resolution 302 to provide assistance for Palestine refugees with health care, food rations and housing, to invest in the education of the Palestine refugees and to integrate them economically in Arab host countries. The definition of a Palestine refugee has come to be “a person whose normal residence had been Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the 1948 conflict and who, as a result, had lost both his home and his means of livelihood.” This definition has been used an operation definition. UNRWA has issued registered Palestine refugee

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50 UNRWA has five fields of operations (Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). Over the last 62 years, it has also become one of the largest international agencies and the largest employer of Palestinian refugees in the region (about 22,178 Palestinian refugee educational staff as of June 2010).
51 Source http://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees. This definition encompasses the descendants (from the male side) of persons who became refugees. It has become a working definition, despite the fact that it has created humanitarian and inclusion problems. Whether it is the specified period of time (1946-1948), or the specification of losses, or the limitation of the refugee status to male descendants only; the definition has clearly many gaps which have excluded many who were supposed to be included as Palestinian refugees who cannot go back to their homes in Palestine.
cards to receive aid and UN services (basic and vocational education, health care and hardship relief). These cards not only signify being recipient of aid and services, they also signify “a temporary, unique status and a tangible representation of the UN commitment to affect their return to Palestine.”

UNRWA was created, according to Adelman, “to use economic integration as a method of settlement in the country of first asylum, and to provide a long term interim solution which would, in effect, be a durable solution, even if in many or most cases, political integration into the country of asylum cannot be achieved.” It was also “to make preparations to use the reintegration fund for the financing of as many varieties of projects as possible including not only direct reintegration projects (agricultural or urban) but also general economic development projects the realization of which would lead to an increase in the absorptive capacity of the host countries, thus facilitating indirect reintegration.” This economic, durable solution was to be implemented through economic development projects and to avoid treating refugees in isolation from the local population and economy.

Pollock, studying the work of UNRWA and how it sought to implement a durable solution- economic integration- uses James C. Scott’s concept of the high-modernist project to depict the first phase of UNRWA’s work with Palestine refugees, a phase that

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54 Ibid., p.302.
consisted of large scale experiments in social engineering that attempted to change the administrative order of nature and society. Despite the fact that the Tennessee Valley Authority model was a founding experience for UNRWA’s founders, the ‘utopian worldview’ failed to materialise and the works programme could not close down the relief programme or even reduce it. Major projects to build transport and irrigation infrastructure failed; both the absence of the necessary technical local expertise to oversee the projects and the financial difficulties of securing money for long-term big projects, affected progress. Palestinians’ suspicion of UNRWA was a principle obstacle. In fact, Palestinians perceived major projects as de-facto integration and thus permanent settlement away from the homeland. “Even the transition from tented accommodation to shacks and concrete dwellings was resisted for many years and refugees referred to their homes as malj’ (shelter) rather than bayt (home)”.

Their opposition was explained by fear that by accepting employment, they would lose their right of return to their homes or even to compensation. UNRWA established in 1953 a small grants project that supported by 1959, 714 small self-support projects in Syria and Jordan. They were made available to skilled craftsmen and technicians and were limited to tradesmen on the relief roll whose family was larger than five persons.

In 1959, UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld presented the findings of a study to determine whether a programme of capital investment to produce jobs could, in time,

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57 Viorst Milton, 1989, UNRWA and Peace in the Middle East, The Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C, p.37, and in Kaplan 1959, p.137. According to the interim report of 6 Oct. 1950, the work programme was most successful in Jordan where people did not have the same opposition against UNRWA as elsewhere in the region, in Kaplan 1959, p.173.
58 Pollock 1999, p.7
make the services of UNRWA unnecessary. This hinted at the role that could be played by the states in permitting the political integration of the refugees. This presentation provoked Arab delegates, leading them to dismiss any attempts at resolving the problem of Palestinian refugees through economic means.\textsuperscript{59} UNRWA in 1960 shifted its implementation of integration from major projects to social welfarism, seeking to build the capacity of its health, education and vocational education services.\textsuperscript{60} This period, between 1960-1987, was of ‘educational advantage’ for the Palestinians\textsuperscript{61} during which capacities and skills of the second generation were built. This advantage over other Arabs enabled them to swiftly enter the Gulf labour market and stimulated the Jordanian economy.\textsuperscript{62} In addition to basic primary education, UNRWA has been allocating scholarships for registered refugees to study in local universities.\textsuperscript{63} This was in addition to free education in its two training centres near Amman: Wadi Sir vocational training centre and Na’ur training centre (a community college providing students with technical degrees). UNRWA’s engagement with education and vocational training thus positioned the agency within a humanitarian-developmental nexus, implicitly seeking to integrate, economically, Palestinians in the Arab region.

\textsuperscript{59} Viorst 1984, pp. 38-9. Arab countries considered that the Palestinian refugee problem is an international responsibility claiming that the International community helped in the creation of Israel and hence should take the responsibility of the refugee plight until a solution is found.

\textsuperscript{60} Pollock 1999, p.8.


\textsuperscript{62} During this period, UNRWA assumed a protection role and emergency assistance in Lebanon in 1982 during the civil war and the Israeli occupation of Beirut, and in 1987 during the intifada in the West Bank. I am focusing in this short review of UNRWA’s development programme on what was relevant to Jordan and the economic opportunities of poor Palestinian-Jordanians.

\textsuperscript{63} In 2000, the university scholarship programme was funded by the Samir Hamadeh programme for Jordan. Other recent donors include Japan, the European Union, the Arab Gulf Programme for United Nations Development Organizations (AGFUND) and the Said Foundation (http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=90).
2.1.3 Integration from a Jordanian perspective

Jordan has had an open border policy towards forced migrants (not just Palestinians). This has made Amman, the safe haven or the “city of refugees.” Policy makers in Jordan have pledged to receive any refugee seeking a safe haven “to keep the borders open” and to provide ‘humanitarian’ support and to respect the non-refoulement. Forced migrants, Palestinians, Iraqis and Syrians have been an instrument of rent-seeking within the development agenda: Jordan has benefitted from the human capital, education, skills, and productive energy of forced migrants to help build the country. Jordan has additionally benefitted from aid flows to enable economic development and refugee integration. Those forced migrants arriving in Jordan did not have the same status or the same rights: some were made citizens, some were labelled refugees, or displaced, others were asylum seekers and a good number were ‘guests’. Labels have varied according to public policy practices and to political economy strategies of reception and of management. Labels represent a discursive act in which power is rationalised, drawing borders around who can be included within the process of subjectification and who shall be excluded. The concept of labelling, according to Wood “by examining who you are in relation to others, offers a way of understanding the frequent mismatch between ‘policy agendas’ and the way in which people conceived as subjects of policy are defined in ‘convenient images’.” Legally and institutionally, having not signed the 1951

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64 Al-Hamarneh 2000, p.172.
65 As Minister of Interior Ghaleb el Zubi commented in Badareen, Bassam, in al Quds Elarabi newspaper, August 7, 2012, http://www.alquds.co.uk/index.asp?fname=data\2012\08\08-07\07qpt957.htm&arc=data\2012\08\08-07\07qpt957.htm
66 Wood in Zetter 2007, p.173
convention, Jordan chose not to assume any obligations or responsibilities that would render it accountable with the kind of assistance/protection it will need to provide to forced migrants coming to its borders from neighbouring Arab countries. Integration, in light of this politics, has not been welcomed. Refugees, who are permitted to enter Jordan, are not necessarily given all basic rights. Other than basic education and health care in public services, refugees do not access other rights.

While maintaining welcoming ‘open borders’ policies to protracted and temporary forced migrants, Jordan has focused on its three key concerns; security, territory and population. Since the late 1980s, the emerging political, economic and social events at the national and regional levels, pushed the state to reconsider its politics towards the new comers and to revise its politics towards ‘integration’ of Palestinians. The new technology of power used by the state has shifted, as explained by Foucault in *Security, Territory, Population*, from a question of 'sovereignty over a territory' to the question of 'regulation of a population' using governmentality and the tactic of ‘conduct of conduct’.67 “The sovereign's concern is no longer territorial expansion, but the knowledge of the forces and resources that characterise a state at a given moment (i.e., 'statistics'), the development of the state's forces, and the preservation of a relation of forces in an open space of competition”.68 This section analyses the factors which have shaped its national security, demographic stability and economic prosperity and hence its interest and policies towards forced migrants.

68 ibid.
I. **Tawteen: Jordan is Jordan and Palestine is Palestine**

The Jericho conference late in 1948 shaped refugee-Palestinian-Jordanian citizenship in a way that ensured Jordanian citizenship rights to the Palestinians (arriving in Jordan between 1946-1954) while at the same time pledging that Jordan will safeguard the right of return for the new citizens. It has also been necessary for Jordan to keep the Palestinian refugees and the refugee camps ‘visible’ in some ways, even while making them invisible in others: for the Palestinians, they represent a symbol for their exodus and their protracted refugee plight and their belief in the right of return. For the government of Jordan, they represent a protracted ‘refugee plight’ that has been perpetuated by the international community. Jordan, as the other Arab countries consider it indispensable for the international community to be involved in supporting and funding this long-standing visible plight by sharing the responsibilities and by helping promote any viable solution. The camps, furthermore, represent, according to the regime’s official discourse, an Arab Islamic responsibility to support Arab brethren who had sought refuge at the Hashemite house. Building on his ancestral links to the Sherifs in Mecca of Bani-Hashem, the late King Hussein Bin Talal clearly demonstrated in his speeches how the hospitality and reception given to the Palestinian refugees recalled the forced migration of Prophet Mohammed and his supporters, the emigrants (*al muhajurun*), to Madinet Monawara and their reception there by *al Ansar* of the Prophet Mohammed (the supporters of Islam). The simplicity of their lodgings, their closeness to each other and to the mosque gave a
democratic dimension to the Islamic community [where there is no distance between the leader and ‘his people’]. With this emphasis on the unity created by the Islamic model provided by the Prophet Mohammed, King Hussein sought to prevent rupture /polarisation between the two peoples of Jordan, the East Jordanians and the Palestinian refugees. He highlighted the welcoming attitude of the Jordanians, the followers of the Hashemites, the descendants of Prophet Mohammed, to their Palestinian neighbours.

These unifying factors between the Palestinians, the Jordanians and the people of the Levant have been interpreted by the Zionist Israeli scholars and policy makers as a positive matter. Arab countries need to integrate all these Palestinian Arab, who can easily create a new home of any Arab hosting country, which would substitute the homeland for the Palestinians, al watan al badil in Jordan. In her work Dona Artz Refugees into citizens, she presents a plan for the dispossessed Palestinians to become citizens of the new countries to which they have arrived. Moshe Efrat argues in a published discussion paper that the economic integration of the Palestinians in the neighbouring Arab countries makes them a highly productive human asset for the economy of these countries and secures a homeland for the Palestinian refugees. Israeli Defence Minister Sharon noted in 1977 that, “Jordan is Palestine” having been the country that received that biggest number of Palestinian refugees. This was an alarming
message to Jordan that questioned its Jordanian national identity and misinterpreted the support it had given to the Palestinians and the way it has sought to integrate them. These Israeli allegations have been used to continue their ‘Transfer plan’ in evicting Palestinians outside historical Palestine.\(^{73}\)

**II. The Palestinian National Identity**

The conflict of power and representation of the Palestinians in Jordan between the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), created in 1964, and the Jordanian state triggered several political events. The divergence between King Hussein and the PLO represented by Arafat, impacted the Palestinian-origin Jordanians who started facing “discretionary barriers to full integration as citizens”.\(^{74}\) This is what Adnan Abu Odeh, a former minister and advisor to King Hussein, himself a Palestinian-origin Jordanian, described as “the divisiveness among Palestinians and Jordanians”.\(^{75}\)

The ‘conditional’ hospitality accorded the Palestinian refugees in Jordan is emphasised and used as a pretext to deny them a number of entitlements guaranteed, in theory, by their citizenship. Palestinians, whether holders of Jordanian citizenship since 1948 or holders of Jordanian travel documents,\(^{76}\) have been mostly affected by the policies of the state. While the political and legal status of the Palestinians holders of Jordanian

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\(^{73}\) Abu Odeh 1999 p 214


\(^{75}\) Abu Odeh 1999, p.212.

\(^{76}\) The displaced Palestinians from Gaza Strip in 1967 were not given the Jordanian citizenship upon their arrival in Jordan. They were granted Jordanian travel documents that do not connote citizenship rights. Palestinians of the West Bank (after the severance between the West and East Banks in 1988, had their Jordanian citizenship replaced with a provisional travel document that also does not connote citizenship).
citizenship was not officially affected, the ‘subtle’ policies of the state towards Palestinian-origin Jordanians since the early 1970s have, *de facto*, aimed at de-Palestinising the public institutions by reducing their ‘visibility’ and their presence.  

### III. Demographic Concerns

An editorialist in a Jordanian newspaper Yasser Abu Hilaleh wrote:

> The dispute over the percentage of Palestinians in Jordan, whether they are 43 percent of the population according to official figures or 60 percent according to Abu Odeh, appears to be a threat that may explode one day in Jordan. The threat is emphasized by Israeli newspapers because the Palestinians are surely the threat for them but not for Jordan or the Jordanians who are not the red Indians who fear disappearing.

Several national and the regional events have heightened concern about the demographic threat of the Palestinian-origin Jordanians. Democratisation and political reform in Jordan since late 1980s, did not rest in fair distribution of votes across all governorates. The risk of having a majority of Palestinian origin members of parliament or municipalities was crucial to the regime, especially due to the high concentration of Palestinian-origin Jordanians in urban centres as Amman, Zarqa and Irbid. Current electoral law allows one man one vote which permits the regime to manipulate the votes per community (e.g. a community of 200.000 voters are to vote for 10 candidates verses a community of 10.000 who are to vote for 20 candidates). The regime by this gerrymanders the political right for Palestinian-origin Jordanians to vote for a

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78 A former political adviser to King Hussein and an author of a book that was the first to reveal hitherto unstated aspects of Jordanian policies towards the Palestinians.
79 *Al Ghad*, Yasser Abu Hilaleh, November 1st, 2006.
representative. Abu Odeh explains this: “geography was used to emasculate Palestinian demography as a safeguard against the Palestinian Jordanians achieving political domination through democratic means.”

In successive parliaments most seats have been taken by elite tribal candidates and pro-government loyalists who support the government agenda. This has excluded several opposition groups: the Islamic Action Front (a party representing the Islamic brotherhood); smaller, less politically-connected tribes and Palestinian-origin Jordanians. This unfairness in distribution of votes is implicit, even justified to safeguard Jordan and its national identity against the risk of becoming the alternative Palestinian homeland.

The former Minister of Interior Habashneh justified it thus:

We in Jordan, have a strong message to pass to the world, Jordan is not a permanent settlement for the Palestinians; for this reason refugee camps are not given expanded political participation in the Parliament which is perceived as the mirror for politics and nationalism of the country. We want a Palestinian state to be on Palestinian territories. The Jordanian politics hence should be analysed in a holistic manner and not in parts.

It is also argued that unfair electoral distribution empowers remote areas and those known as the ‘less privileged’ (al aqal faqran) in order to help bridge gaps in living standards between these areas and densely populated urban areas where Jordanians of Palestinian origin reside. A prominent figure among the Jordanian political elite and a former prime minister, Abdul Salam al Majali, justified the gerrymander:

I do not agree that the number of seats for every constituency should reflect the size of the population. Geographical groups should be

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80 Abu Odeh 1999, p. 230
81 In a conference about the 2007 elections convened by the Al Quds Centre in October 20-21, 2004, in Al Rai, Novembre 22nd, 2004.
82 Al Quds Center 2009, pp. 40-41
represented. Otherwise the population of Amman which has increased tremendously in recent years would rule the whole country.\textsuperscript{83}

The tide sweeps more vigorously against Palestinian-origin Jordanians when Jordan is affected by an economic crisis. The crisis of confidence in 1989 was blamed on Palestinians withdrawing their financial assets as a result of King Hussein’s formal severance between the East Bank and the West Bank, thus causing inflation and devaluation of the Jordanian dinar. This was soon aggravated, with the sudden return of some 350,000 Palestinian-origin Jordanian labour migrants from the Gulf in 1990-1991 due to Arafat’s decision to support the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Gulf returnees, most of Palestinian origin, were judged as having dangerously pressurised the state’s budget and the country’s limited natural resources and to have generally worsened unemployment levels, strained state services and inflated food and house prices. East Jordanians generally failed to see the assets that were brought in by Jordanian national workers from the Gulf (considerable investments in finance and construction) or by their own human capital, skills and education. Some East Jordanians felt aggrieved by the burden their fellow returnees had added to a country with such limited resources.

2.2 Integrating as citizens: Rights and obligations?

The circumstances of flight and integration in the host country varied for each family, or even each person in the al-Nakba generation.\textsuperscript{84} For Palestinian refugees arriving in Jordan

\textsuperscript{83} Abu Odeh 1999, p.230.
circumstances depended on financial means, social networks, education and professional skills and background, work opportunities and their location, whether residents of UNRWA camps or self-settled in the urban cities. What mattered most was accessibility to Jordanian citizenship rights. With time, Palestinians have had to contend with two intrinsic states: the state of exile and refuge enshrined in the refugee camps and adjacent neighbourhoods and the state of fear and uncertainty in discursive legal categories and labels (given by the state) and practiced by the “act of state.” This is especially apparent when manipulating the three elements of citizenship rights (borrowing the categorisation of T.H Marshall): civil political and social. These elements may not be challenged, by the act of law, thus shape a particular status of citizenship of uncertainty. Based on the field interview and the themes that were brought up by the interviewees, I chose the work definition of Marshall to theorise citizenship from its three perspectives.

2.2.1 Jordanian citizenship and its elements

I. Citizenship, resources and rights

The highly praised ‘integration’ of Jordan was made effective through citizenship rights. This section explains the elements of citizenship and the way they were used by the

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regime to integrate and disintegrate. The understanding of citizenship I am using is indispensable to explaining the key principles of membership in a political modern state and the established power between the regime and its citizens and the “right for them to have rights”. In principle, “citizenship is a scarce public good that is distributed by the state, a source of collective identity and an instrument of political control”. It thus stands out as a “major institutional control mechanism that regulates the distribution of rights and obligations in a society including access to decision-making arenas and state-controlled economic resources.” More precisely, it regulates access to scarce resources:

Resources are primarily economic resources such as social security, health care entitlements, subsidised housing, retirement packages, or taxation concessions, but they also include access to cultural desirable ‘goods’ such as, within a traditional liberal framework, rights to speak one’s own language in the public arena or rights relating to religious freedoms. These resources therefore include not only the traditional economic resources of housing, health, income and employment, but also cultural resources such as education, knowledge, religion, and language.

The state has monopolistic control over coercive means within its jurisdiction to allocate these resources. No other authority structure in the society, be it based on the family, religious leadership, or tribal organisation, can legitimately in the eyes of the state, demand loyalty that contradicts obligations toward the state. “The modern idea of citizenship is that it supersedes all other patterns of authority and that this principle is a prerequisite for an all-inclusive and democratic citizenship: modernisation in this sense is

88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., p.4
the process of gradual integration of the inhabitants of the state whereby traditional and primordial authority patterns and contractual relations are replaced by legally codified universal rights and obligations”. An essential ingredient of citizenship is the egalitarian openness to differences and otherness: “Who gets citizenship clearly indicates the prevailing formal criteria of inclusion/exclusion within a political community, and how these resources- following citizenship membership, are allocated and administered largely determines the economic fate of individuals and families”.

The political community, in principle, is the benchmark of a nation state so “when individuals become citizens, they not only enter into a set of institutions that confer upon them rights and obligations, acquire an identity, and are socialised into civic virtues, but they also become members of a political community with a particular territory and history.” By this, it requires a special kind of bond with a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilisation. “It is a loyalty of free men endowed with rights and protected by a common law,” which has shaped national consciousness since the eighteenth century. Citizenship thus constitutes a major tool that regulates the relationship between the individual and the state and organises classes of legal persons. This is manifested in the contractual relationship: as it regulates the legal status of the included and excluded members of the state and establishes the rules for participation in political institutions and access to public resources.

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92 Turner 2000, p.38.
Citizenship, in western liberal democratic states, manifests itself as a recognised basic claim of the individual vis-à-vis the state of which he is a citizen, a right to equal access to the resources of the state, the civil resources of the state (e.g., the courts of law), power-political resources (e.g., voting and elections), social services resources (e.g., welfare and education) and such material resources as land and water.\(^95\) In 1948 Article 15 [1-2] of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR) stipulated that “Everyone has the right to a nationality and No one shall be arbitrarily be deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.” The relationship between citizenship and the state, as analysed by Uri Davis, is insufficient. He argues that post-UDHR there has been a distinction between nationality and citizenship: “It is just as possible for two individuals or two constituencies to be of the same nationality yet unequal citizens of the same state, as it is for them to be of different nationalities and unequal citizens of the same state.”\(^96\) He elaborates on this “reification” using the example of two states in the Middle East (Jordan and Israel), that had its legislators create large Palestinian constituencies “which can only be characterised by the surreal Orwellian designation ‘pretend citizens’ or ‘part citizens’: they are citizens (they have valid full term passports), but they have no rights or only partial rights”. This is reflected in Arabic political, administrative and legal language as it distinguishes between passport citizenship (*jinsiyya*) and democratic citizenship (*muwatana*). “The fact that one human being is classified as a citizen of a given state and another human being is also classified


as a citizen does not (in itself) make them ‘equal’ legal persons.” The three citizenship elements described by Marshall probe this further in understanding the constitutional and legal framework that shapes citizenship in Jordan.

Current Jordanian citizenship law of 1954, takes its points of departure from the earlier version of the Citizenship Law of 1928 which defined the Jordanian citizen in Article one:

All Ottoman subjects habitually resident in Transjordan on the sixth of August 1924, shall be deemed to have acquired Transjordan nationality.

Article 3 of the 1954 Citizenship Law determines who should be regarded as a Jordanian citizen. These categories include the following:

(a) Any person who obtained Jordanian citizenship or a Jordanian passport under the stipulations of Jordanian Citizenship Law 1928, and its subsequent amendments and Law Number 6, 1954 and this Law.

(b) Any person who was not Jewish and who had Palestinian citizenship prior to 15 May 1948 and whose ordinary residence in the period 20 December 1939 to 16 February 1954 was in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

(c) Any person born to a father who has Jordanian citizenship.

(d) Any person born in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to a mother who has Jordanian citizenship and a father of unknown citizenship, or stateless, or to an unknown legal father.

(e) Any person born in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to unknown parents and the foundling in the Kingdom will be regarded as having been born there so long as the contrary has not been proven.

This article hence explains how Jordanian citizenship included all Palestinians living since 1948 in both banks of the river Jordan under the umbrella of the Hashemite

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97 Davis 2000, p.55.
98 Last amended in 1987
99 Davis 2007, p.69.
Kingdom of Jordan (the nation state). As perceived by Marshall, citizenship has an “important integrating effect, or at least was an important ingredient in an integrating process.”\textsuperscript{100} Most importantly, it established a principle of equality whereby all citizens are capable of enjoying their rights. The following section analyses the way “pretend or partial citizens” have been shaped with discursive measures and politics over the years.

\textbf{II. Citizenship and Social Class}

“There is no effective citizenship in Jordan: I belong economically, culturally, socially, but not politically”, told me a young man 22 years old in Jabal Al-Nadheef studying medicine at the University of Jordan and volunteers at a community centre (FG 5, April 7, 2012).

In this work, I question the inequality in accessed rights amongst citizens, building on the work of T.H. Marshall with his classic article “Citizenship and Social Class” (first published in 1950) which appear to be the most relevant to my analysis of the acquisition of rights. In his work, he divided citizenship into three elements: civil, political and social rights, showing how rights have evolved beginning with civil rights in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century and then social rights in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century:

The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom- liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice (…). By political element, I mean the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. The corresponding institutions are parliament and councils of local government. By the social element, I mean the whole range from the right to modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according

\textsuperscript{100} Marshall 2009, p.151.
to the standards prevailing in the society. The institutions most closely connected with it are the educational system and the social services. ¹⁰¹

“Everywhere, as we pass from the ancient to the modern, we see what the fashionable philosophy calls differentiation”:¹⁰² In early times, rights were blended with political and civil institutions which did not permit drawing a line between the various institutions of the state and the rights it would oversee. In feudal society, the status had become the hallmark of class and the measure of inequality;¹⁰³ man’s social rights were part of this amalgam and were derived from the status which also determined the kind of justice one could get and where to get it and the way the person would situate oneself as a member of the community.

Marshall argues that the civil right dominant then safeguarded the status and aided capitalism and the free-market. It had, he explained, conferred the legal capacity to strive for the things one would like to possess but did not guarantee the possession of any of them. He elaborates how “the right to freedom of speech has little real substance, if, from lack of education, you have nothing to say that is worth saying, and no means of making yourself heard if you say it”.¹⁰⁴ By this, Marshall emphasised the lacuna of social rights. At that time, civil rights were evolving in a competitive market economy: the individual had the power to engage, as an independent unit, in the economic struggle but it was made possible for him to be denied social protection on the ground that he was equipped with the means to protect himself. This referred to the work contract: the contractual

¹⁰³ There was no principle of the equality of citizens to set against the inequality of classes.
element in feudalism coexisted with a class system based on status, and as contract hardened into custom, it helped perpetuate class status.\textsuperscript{105} In turn, modern contract marked a development out of the feudal contact; it consisted of an agreement between men who are free and equal in status though not necessarily in power. “Differential status, associated with class, function and family, was replaced by the single uniform status of citizenship, which provided the foundation of equality on which the structure of inequality could be built”\textsuperscript{106}. It was only when political and civil rights evolved in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, moving away from class prejudice and, unequal economic opportunities, public elementary education aided the emergence of social. By the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, social rights had expanded to encompass social welfare, security, education and social services. This has moulded social integration from the sphere of sentiment and patriotism into that of material enjoyment. This evolved affected by external forces:

A rise of money incomes unevenly distributed over the social classes altered the economic distance which separated these classes from one another, diminishing the gap between skilled and unskilled labour and between skilled labour and non-manual workers, while the steady increase in small savings blurred the class distinction between the capitalist and the propertyless proletarian. Secondly, a system of direct taxation, ever more steeply graduated, compressed the whole scale of disposable incomes. Thirdly, mass production for the home market and a growing interest on the part of industry in the needs and tastes of the common people enabled the less well-to-do to enjoy a material civilisation which differed less markedly in quality from that of the rich than it has ever done before.\textsuperscript{107}

Marshall studied the evolution of the three elements of citizenship rights, in light of the embedded conflict between citizenship and the capitalist class system in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century and the slowly modifying system away from the whole pattern of social inequality. Based

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Ibid.}, p.150.
\textsuperscript{106} Marshall 2009, p.151.
on this background, constructing social class and its relationship with citizenship rights, I shall proceed to exploring social stratification theoretically and empirically in Jordan so as to link it with the understanding of citizenship rights and whether social inequality has been eliminated.

2.2.2 Social stratification

By using Weber’s theoretical approach to class stratification, I here analyse the divisions that impacted the UN envisioned ‘economic integration’ and the enjoyment of citizenship rights. While conscious that those refugees who started off with greater economic, cultural, social and human capital have been able to accumulate greater amounts of these assets and to pull together judicious combinations of capital while in their refuge, I argue that class differences, in a tribal patrimonial country like Jordan, have played out in terms of negotiating rights and varied levels of integration among the various groups of Palestinians. Using Weber’s social stratification enables me to develop the elements that have impacted the upward mobility of Palestinian-origin Jordanians or the accessed ‘life chances’, and relate them, when and if possible to those East Jordanian (migrants) living in the same residential area/district. ‘Life chances’ as seen by Weber are the opportunities for acquiring or maintaining a characteristic range of material goods and life experiences. This section, using the lenses of class, status and power, aims to analyse

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the life experiences of Palestinian-origin Jordanians living in inner Amman and seeks to understand unequal divisions and categories that have come about in light of social interactions, economic policies, political events and struggles. This chapter analyses the portrayal of social reality in terms of life advantages or opportunities for the individuals in light of their social divisions, and “who has the power to create and maintain the situation in which inequalities persist”.

In order to illustrate the disparities between East and West Amman, studied in chapter 1, I incorporate in this section Weber’s analysis of society and his three dimensions of stratification to mark out social stratification and to analyse the differences in people’s share of resources (money, chances in health, education, jobs, and rights/entitlements) or what are called social inequalities. Weber highlights the importance of both non-economic factors, and economic factors, in determining life chances and setting patterns of social stratification. Stratification, thus, is not based purely on economic inequalities, but on other status and power differentials, each of which has a separate effect on the production of life chances.

I. Status

The three dimensions of social stratification according to Weber are class, status and authority (or command). The first differential of stratification, as Weber perceived it, is status relations, which originate from prestige or social honour within a community.

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110 Payne 2006, p.5.
Weber calls this ‘the style of life’, as how people judge one another as superior or inferior in relation to the values they hold in common. This involves specific types of dress, types and sizes of houses, areas of residence, clothing and accent.\(^{111}\) Status situations are the communal relations through which prestige is given to a particular lifestyle, which operates to determine life chances of individuals.\(^{112}\) While wealth is not necessarily the primary cause of status, it is generally associated. This could be in the shape of ‘old money’ that confers a greater status or rentiers, which usually, if compared to entrepreneurs, hold greater status because their wealth is less visibly connected to labour.\(^{113}\)

Weber's conception of status stratification involves the division of society into distinct communities, separated by social distance and mutual exclusiveness, perceiving the social systems to be stratified, at the level of individuals and social groups, by people doing much the same sort of work but with quite different levels of status and/or power.\(^{114}\) Weber outlines the way to analyse a coherent and operational concept of status and the possible (forward) mobility and changing social position between the social groups of each social stratum. Such mobility could occur intra-generationally (for instance through changing jobs) or inter-generationally (e.g. from father to son). The ‘status order’ represents social honour and this can be passed through sharing kinship

\(^{111}\) This is what is referred to in today’s understanding of class in Scott 2006, p.30
\(^{112}\) ibid.
\(^{114}\) Pyakuryal 2001, p. 16.
groups. This makes the analysis of class distinction and the inequality more complex and needs to be associated with particular occupations and groups of occupations.\textsuperscript{115}

In Jordan, tribal or familial lines are the bases on which the system of state resource allocation takes place. The \textit{shaykh} (head of tribe), engendering the patriarchal system, represents his constituency, the people of his own tribe/kinship. The state, to govern and rule while ensuring loyalty, supported the role of the \textit{shaykh}, not only for social representation but for political and administrative roles: being a \textit{shaykh} has become a state-endowed status. He is expected to help “his constituency handle all sorts of bureaucratic matters including lowering tax assessments, allocating licences and commercial concessions, securing jobs or promotions and places or scholarships in universities”,\textsuperscript{116} which very much shapes his life style and prestige, “as manifest in patterns of association and consumption”.\textsuperscript{117}

The patronage relationship between the regime and the East Jordanians was reflected in the status which the regime endowed to selective members. Palestinian-origin notables, a governing class dominating the peasant society, “who had [before arriving in Jordan] access to high positions in the Islamic courts, schools, and administration.”\textsuperscript{118} The \textit{effendis} represented the aristocracy of Muslim landowners who had served the Ottoman

\textsuperscript{115} Class continues to be an important factor of “life chances and shapes opportunities that people have for pursuing particular lifestyles, but it is less visible to people, who tend to define their positions in status terms in Scott 2006, p.49.
\textsuperscript{117} Shortell (NA), p.4.
authorities,\textsuperscript{119} and were “wealthy, well-educated and had acquired a Western sophisticated culture through extensive European contacts”.\textsuperscript{120} Their presence as a politically effective class was hindered by traditional rivalries between leading families and perturbed by the exodus that had exposed them to the political authorities of host states. It was their close relationship with the regime that moulded their powerful status in Jordan. The notables, for example, are locals representing major families in Palestinian cities, who were employed by the Ottoman administration as tax collectors and assumed other administrative positions and who subsequently helped cement the British mandate, particularly with administrative and security matters.\textsuperscript{121} The Hashemite regime sustained their status and incorporated them closely into the regime, perceiving them as representative of Palestinian families, particularly those coming from Palestinian cities. It should be noted, as mentioned in the earlier chapter, the majority of the dispossessed Palestinians in Jordan were peasants, coming from villages. Until today, ‘notables’, or ruling-elite Palestinians in high ranking official positions are hence not seen as representatives of the Palestinian-origin Jordanians as a whole, especially not those living in East Amman, the camps or in other big cities in Jordan. Thus elite families have forged strong ties with the Royal Palace\textsuperscript{122} and gained status and power, yet are not representative of the wider Palestinian constituency. Radi classifies four ‘elite’ groups amongst Palestinian-origin Jordanians whose status the regime has shaped: “the traditional notables of the West Bank, the King’s Palestinians, the members of the

\textsuperscript{119} Titles given during the Ottoman Empire rule.
\textsuperscript{120} Peterz 1977, p.50.
\textsuperscript{122} Carroll 2003, pp.113, Radi 1997, p.94.
militant Palestinian organizations, and the Palestinian businessmen”. In the following chapter, it will be explained how this very same group, benefiting from its status, shall occupy a new formed social class amidst the implementation of neoliberalism, that has become to be called the ruling elite.

**II. Class**

The “anomalous” formation of the Palestinian middle class, as put by Hilal, had this class lose in the diaspora its land and its political representation. Upon settling in the host state, this class enriched itself not through investment in production and capital but through its education and its activities in services, commerce and businesses. Others with connections, education and/or skills obtained good jobs in urban areas in Jordan’s major cities as they enjoyed a legal status as citizens that permitted them to be part of the growing public sector and public sector companies such as those involved with cement, phosphates and petroleum-based products. Palestinians who arrived with capital invested in agriculture, industry, trade and finance and formed the Palestinian business class.

Weber’s second differential is class and compromises around property and employment relations through which control over marketable resources is organised. Weber builds his understanding of class on that of Marx’ which originates from the overarching economic structure of capitalist societies. For Weber, the basic condition of ‘class’ lies in the

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123 Radi 1997, p. 4.
124 Hilal 2006, p. 3.
125 Doan 1989, p. 2.
unequal distribution of economic power and hence the unequal distribution of opportunity. Class relations, according to Weber, result from distribution of property and other resources in capital, product and labour markets. It is thus the possession or non-possession of economic resources that gives people a specific capacity or power to acquire income and assets and therefore, to enhance their life chances in a variety of ways. Three aspects of class according to Weber matter: “(i) a specific causal component of actors’ life chances (ii) exclusivity of economic interests and wealth, and (iii) representation under conditions of labour and commodity markets. The possession of material resources, accumulated by advantage in the marketplace, results in distinctive qualities in terms of the standard of living”.\textsuperscript{126}

Weber argues that there is a great variety of “class situations” in any society. The life chances hence can be accepted as a resultant from either the given distribution of property or the structure of the concrete economic order.\textsuperscript{127} Weber identified an array of fragmented class structures.\textsuperscript{128} Class structure, as explained by Schumpeter, is the ranking of individual families by their social value in accordance, ultimately, with their differing aptitudes. Classes hence rise and fall according to the nature and success with which they fulfil their characteristic function, the relative social significance of a function always being determined by the degree of social leadership which its fulfilment implies or creates.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{126} Shortell (na), p.3.
\textsuperscript{127} Weber 1953, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{128} A debate that has been discussed within the Marxists themselves (E.O. Wright cited in Payne 2006).
A refugee camp dweller argues that his *class has been imposed on him*; a belief in the inability to control one’s destiny-anomia-is likely to be associated with low social status, a feeling of alienation and distrust of the local political power structure, the prototype of which is government controlled by a powerful person and/or a tightly knit organisation.

The class membership of an individual, as Weber sees it, is a primary fact, originally quite independent of his will. This is exemplified in my research by a young man in a focus group saying that his class has been *imposed* on him. But that does not mean that he [the individual] would always confirm that allegiance by his conduct. A class thus does not in itself constitute a community, a status does. Weber, in fact, did not believe that class interests necessarily led to uniformity in social action. He argued that “neither communal nor societal action is the inexorable result of class interest.” Class situations emerge only on the basis of communal and societal actions and general cultural conditions, especially those of an intellectual sort. He emphasises the role played by the intellectuals: the extent of the contrast between the property owners and the property-less workers must become transparent to the workers in order for collective action around the issue of class to occur.

In Jabal al-Nadheef, locally, people drew the line between the upper class and the lower class differentiating between those who own property from those who do not. The ‘camp’ referred to the area that has hosted Palestinian refugees since 1948. Palestinians arrived in

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130 Referring to status.
132 Schumpeter 1953, p.44
133 Weber 1953, p. 23
134 Shortell, p.3
135 *Ibid.* , Shortell p 3. The function of the intellectual in this case is either to call attention to and explain these contrasts, or to obscure them—an argument raised as well by Gramsci in Hawley 1980, p. 587.
1948 and lived in the caves on the hill side when they were not able to get units from UNRWA in the nearby refugee camp. The upper side of the hill was seen as the area of the higher class: Circassians and East Jordanians who migrated from rural/desert areas and bought land on which they constructed houses with their families/fellow tribesmen.

Most importantly, Weber sees both class and status as causal components in life chances that operate interdependently. Weber attempted to make sense of the ‘rational basis’ of the choices of behaviour made by individuals in their daily lives. He analysed human behaviour at an individual level within the context of a clear sense of structural constraint. People in Jabal al-Naser camp did not for example accept being classified as being part of the poor class: Raed, an active civil society member in al-Naser considered that, “the camp has several classes, some make it out and others do not; we must not be seen as one group who are all unemployed or in need.”136 Parkin elaborates further on this, “an occupation, for example, involves both specific employment relations in the labour market and a particular level of occupational prestige.”137 Chances of accessing highly paid occupations are closely related to educational achievement, which, in turn, relates to class situation as measured by occupation. This will be further explained in empirical chapters 4 and 5, discussing status related to the tribal/familial social network used to secure a scholarship in a state university or a connection to get a job. Palestinian-origin Jordanian youth in East Amman, have realised that they fall out of this class-status loop:

Sami, a 30 year old mechanical worker who dropped out school education at the age 11. He is now married and has two children: If I cannot secure a job because I know I come from the camp and I am sure I cannot get a scholarship to enter the university because I do not make part of the financially supported quota, why do you expect me to pursue my education? What will the school degree do to me or my family? (FG No 2, in the informal youth club of Jabal Al-Naser refugee camp, 24 Oct 2011).

Entry to university has been a privilege available to the tribal families and those who work for the military, and those who live in remote- desert areas. Those like East-Ammani do not have this same advantage for competition and for selection. They considered the major hurdle that does not enable them to come out of their underprivileged class nor to gain a higher status through education.
III. Command (Power)

The third power differential according to Weber is authority or belief in the legitimacy of the exercise of power. Weber calls this “command situations”. He defines a command situation as a causal component in life chances that results from differentials of authority in formal organisation or a power group struggling for domination as the state is organised into modern social systems (including laws and regulations). Weber most importantly distinguishes between power as authority and power as coercion. For Weber, authority is the legitimate use of power. Individuals accept and act upon orders that are given to them because they believe that to do so is right. In coercion, on the other hand, others force people into an action, often by the threat of violence, and this is always regarded as illegitimate.

Weber saw the exercise of authority in three ideal types of domination: charisma, represented in the character of the leader; traditional authority (based on belief in the legitimacy of well-established forms of power, and rigid forms of social hierarchy including loyalty to the leadership) and thirdly, whose rational-legal authority where authority functions by means of obedience to the rules rather than persons. Rational legal authority is then a structure for making decisions, and the legitimacy of the structure is maintained by reference to a legal code. Bureaucracy thus is based on knowledge and experiences not on personality or custom.

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Whereas the genuine place of ‘classes’ is within the economic order, the place of ‘status groups’ is within the social order that is within the sphere of the distribution of ‘honour’. From within these spheres, classes and status groups influence one another and they influence legal order and are in turn influenced by it. This overall structure in a patriarchal system in Jordan has shaped “a mode of domination in which families [the royal one being only the most central and effective] serve as instrument and objects of power”. The regime, as analysed by Shryock and Howell in their study of the tribes in Jordan, uses “house politics” to manipulate citizens as targets of incentives, punishment and reward, as site and methods of recruitment to public office and as a means of exclusion from power. This puts these families, many of them Shaykh families representing tribes, in a particular status in the society and indirectly shapes classes with the power of authority. The sovereign, notes Agemben has the power to create laws and standards for a citizen’s conduct, as an evaluation of efficiency against chaos. It is an ‘act of ruler’ not ‘an act of law’ which is upheld or overturned, through its capacity of legitimising actions of last resort. The following section elaborates further on this.

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140 Citing Shryock and Howell in Alon, Yoav 2007, p.154.
2.3 What kind of integration: As Palestinians, refugees or citizens?

“Why cannot I be Palestinian and Jordanian? I do belong to both, is it really necessary for me to choose?” Questioned a young man studying at the University of Aal el Beit, in his second year and living in Jabal al-Nadheef (FG 5, April 7, 2012).

The social element of citizenship, when being manipulated by the apparatus of power, and the class structure, when priority in rights and service is given to those higher in the hierarchy, leads to the risk, according to Anis F. al-Kassim, of creating a “ghetto state”. Palestinian-origin Jordanians, he argues, “live with the perpetual fear of any interaction with the government bureaucracy which may revoke their legal status as citizens,” with reference to the passport withdrawal by the Jordanian authorities from some Palestinian-origin Jordanians which was taking place since early 2000. This section studies the state of fear and uncertainty enshrined in the discursive legal categories and labels exerted by the “act of state” that cannot be challenged or appealed to an international court, a system in which basic rights are revoked and social elements of citizenship.

According to al-Kassim, the random and often unjustifiable revocation of Jordanian nationality from Palestinian-origin Jordanians, an act of the state, taking place in a subtle way since early 1988, “contradicts the written law and the constitution” and gives power and discretion to a junior officer to decide the fate of a citizen’s citizenship rights. This

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143 There has been an official discretion in withdrawing the Jordanian nationality from Jordanians (Palestinian origin). There is no clear pattern: sometimes they are labelled as West Bankers, or they are claimed to have been living abroad. Human rights watch and Jordanian centre for human rights reported on this.

very much relates to Agamben’s analysis that all citizens are subjected to the possibility of the sovereign ban to not only limit access to legal documentation but also be extended to those other citizenship rights and elements, commonly reported in the political debate and discourse “unacquired rights.”

By unacquired rights, it is meant revocation of political rights as the right to representation, or socioeconomic rights such as the ability to access public sector employment and secondary education on a par with an East Jordanian who meets the same entrance requirements. The regime has striven to integrate Palestinians into Jordanian society making of the people on both banks, the East and the West: the ‘indivisible people.’

The several political events instigated over the years have slowly shaped an understanding of the state politics vis-à-vis Jordanian citizens, whether East Jordanians or the Other, Palestinian-origin Jordanian.

The creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1964 was a clear political expression seeking to construct a Palestinian identity and emphasising a strong motivation to fight the occupation forces for the liberation of Palestine. This took place when the Jordanian regime was seeking to construct its own identity through building allegiances and loyalty to the new state of both the East Jordanians and the Palestinian-origin Jordanians. The creation of the PLO provided a concrete form of alternative attachment for many of the Palestinian-origin Jordanians (especially those who were

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145 This issue of identity and loyalty to Jordan was triggered when a senior government official of Palestinian origin who had held high ranking positions and been King Hussein’s political advisor talked about the Palestinian presence in Jordan and their “unacquired” rights as citizens. In an interview with the Al Jazeera satellite channel in 2007 Adnan Abu Odeh reflected views which he had already published in 1999 in his book, *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*. His reference to the undermined rights and under-representation of Palestinian Jordanians created a political furore, in Al Quds Center for Political studies 2009, p 34.
living in the West Bank) who had not yet made peace with the Jordanian regime.\textsuperscript{147} The PLO constituted a challenge for the Jordanian regime. It was not long before the 1970-1971 clashes between some of the East Jordanian Army and some of the PLO fedayeen erupted. The events fractured the ‘indivisible people’ and as a result the regime expelled PLO fighters, the fedayeen, and their leadership. King Hussein then quickly drew a line between the fedayeen whom he had expelled and the Palestinians in camps and in cities who had not taken part in the fighting.\textsuperscript{148} Although most Palestinian-origin Jordanians stayed away from the fighting in 1970, Carroll argues that “this distinctly Palestinian challenge to the Jordanian state could not but be a turning point in Transjordanian-Palestinian relations.”\textsuperscript{149} The event spurred those keen to assert the need for Jordanian national identity to reposition and separate itself from Palestinian identity. Transjordanian politician Wasfi al-Tall launched the “East Bank First School” as a reaction to the events.\textsuperscript{150}

The government took measures to remove those from the civil service and military ranks those thought to have supported the Palestinian insurgency. Abu Odeh notes that “The mopping-up policy soon developed into a process of Transjordanising the government, gradually phased the Palestinian-Jordanians out of the national consensus”.\textsuperscript{151} That was the beginning of the economic divide that has been nourished by political-identity tensions and justified to maintain the ‘hybrid’ unity of the Jordanian people. The 1970-71

\textsuperscript{147} Brand 1995, p. 51, Abu Odeh 1999, p. 111
\textsuperscript{148} Abu Odeh 1999, p. 177.
\textsuperscript{149} Carroll 2003, p.110
\textsuperscript{151} Abu Odeh 1999, p.191.
clashes drew the distinction for the domains where Palestinian-origin Jordanians are able to be involved, since the public sector was slowly being taken over by East Jordanians. Job openings in the Jordanian private sector, created by affluent Palestinian, and in the Gulf market, lessened the impact to some extent, yet alarmingly indicated cracks in the socio-economic integration of Palestinian-origin Jordanians, and in the unequal social citizenship rights that are not being equally and fairly distributed to all citizens.

The identity challenge was heightened once again between November 1973 and October 1974, the date of Rabat summit of the Arab League, as ‘fierce’ discussions took place between the Jordanians and the PLO on the issue of Palestinian representation. King Hussein suggested that the PLO accept being the ‘legitimate’ representative of the Palestinian people however not the ‘sole’ representative since more than half of Jordan's population (those living in the West Bank and the East Bank) was Palestinian. King Hussein claimed a representative role as well. Supported by all the Arab countries, the resolution of the Rabat summit emphasised “the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent national authority under the command of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in any Palestinian territory that is liberated”.

The King upon his return to Jordan addressed the nation with a speech that drew a clear cut line between Palestinian and Jordanian identities:

If some matters had to be readjusted in order to give substance to the Rabat summit resolution, Jordan will not cease to be the homeland of

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every Arab Palestinian who chooses to be one of its citizens, with all the rights and obligations of citizenship without prejudicing his or her natural rights in Palestine. Those who choose the Palestinian identity will be dear Arab brethren enjoying whatever rights [residency] Arab citizens enjoy in this genuine Arab country.\textsuperscript{154}

The King’s speech moulded the separation with the emphasis he had put on the host (referring to East Jordanians) and the guest (referring to Palestinian-origin Jordanians) and precipitated a rupture between the two communities.\textsuperscript{155} He also gave the choice, for those who would not want to have allegiance to his regime, they can choose to become Palestinians and thus lose their Jordanian citizenship and acquire the right of residency like any other Arab visitor. Abu Odeh identifies three key themes: it had “inadvertently nurtured divisiveness, albeit short of polarisation: the distinction between Palestinian-origin Jordanians and Transjordanians, the temporariness of the guest-host connotation (...), and the implicit notion that Jordan was doing the Palestinians a favour (Jordan would be the homeland of any Palestinian who so chose)”.\textsuperscript{156} The Jordanian identity has encountered several subsequent threats: both from those who suggest changing the name of the state after: ‘the Jordanian option’ to ‘Palestinian East Jordan’, but mainly from those who supported the claim advanced by Israeli Likud party in 1977: “Jordan is Palestine”.\textsuperscript{157}

Negotiations on possible partnerships between Jordan (which was overseeing, administratively, the West Bank from historical Palestine) and the PLO, with a view to a

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item In Abu Odeh 1999, p.211.
\item Abu Odeh 1999, p.212.
\item Abu Odeh 1999, p.213, Tell 1994, p.203. The Jordanian option (Labour Party slogan) or Jordan is Palestine (the Likud party slogan) indicates that Israel would negotiate with Jordan a solution to the West Bank and maybe Gaza within the context of an overall Arab-Israeli peace settlement (Braizat 1998, p.175).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
confederation, fell apart in 1985. Not long after the outset of the first Palestinian uprising, Intifada, in 1988, King Hussein decided to disengage from the West Bank, permitting the PLO to lead its people in the West Bank. This move clearly redrew the borders and cemented the separation between a Palestinian political identity and a Jordanian identity. To maintain the Jordanian national unity, the King reiterated that the Palestinians who chose to remain in Jordan would remain equal citizens.\footnote{Carroll 2003, p. 112, Abu Odeh 1999, p.225.} King Hussein acknowledged the wish of the Palestinians to secede and renounced Jordanian sovereignty over the western part of the Kingdom. This disengagement decree became a law by virtue of the statement made by Jordanian Prime Minister, Zeid El Rifai on August 20, 1988. Anis Kassim depicted that ‘act of state’, (the extra-constitutional and extra-legal revoking of Jordanian nationality) thus: “Although in 1949 the Palestinians woke up to realize they had become Jordanians; in 1988, they woke up to realize they had become stateless. Without ever being asked anything.”\footnote{Anis f. Kassim, International lawyer, in Jamjoum 2013.}

Hussein’s speech introduced territorial criteria into the definition of Jordanian citizenship as West Bank residents became Palestinians. King Hussein noted in a speech on July 30\textsuperscript{th}, 1988:

\begin{quote}
Of late, it has become clear that there is a general Palestinian and Arab orientation toward highlighting the Palestinian identity in full in all efforts and activities that are related to the Palestine question admits development. … It has also become obvious that there is a general conviction that maintaining the legal and administrative relationship with the West Bank … goes against this orientation. (…) Since this is the orientation that emanates from a genuine Palestinian wish and a strong Arab willingness to promote the Palestinian cause, it is our duty to be part of this orientation and to meet its requirements.\footnote{In Abu Odeh 1999, p.226.}
\end{quote}
The 1988 severing of ties with the West Bank, combined with the unprecedented opening of Jordanian public life in 1989 (through political liberalisation), unleashed the first serious public discussion of Jordanian identity.161 Jordan explained its desire not to allow Israel to make the tendentious claim that Jordan should be seen as the Palestinian homeland. The disengagement permitted Jordan to work intensively on the international stage to assert that “Jordan is Jordan”. In pursuit of this, the Hashemite authorities put their energies into developing the East Bank of Jordan and its own people and to ensure its institutions reflected Jordanian national identity.162 The decision also shaped the Jordanian citizen as the person holding a five-year Jordanian passport:163

Those living permanently in Jordan, remained as Jordanian citizens holding a five-year passport and enjoying their full rights of citizenship and all its obligations. [...] it is to be understood in all clarity and without any ambiguity or equivocation that our measures regarding the West Bank concern only the occupied Palestinian territory and its people. They naturally do not relate in any way to the Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. They all have the full rights of citizenship and all its obligations, the same as any other citizen irrespective of his origin. 164

At the empirical level, the decision to sever ties was never formally promulgated in Jordan’s Official Gazette and thus it does not have the constitutional legitimacy and remains to be a speech by the ruler that was made into policies and regulations. Although never promulgated, many legal provisions were based on it – including amendments to

162 ibid., pp. 90-94.
163 which in the year 2000 was given a national identity number to differentiate between the travel documents not connoting citizenship and rights and the Jordanian passport connoting citizenship and Jordanian nationality.
the electoral laws: as a result of the unity of both Banks which is enshrined in Jordan’s constitution, the decision to “separate” the West Bank from the kingdom is – as many critics contend – unconstitutional and therefore illegal.¹⁶⁵

Changes to electoral law in 1986, for example, reduced the number of representatives from refugee camps, which undermined the electoral chances of ideological candidates and favoured candidates relying on kinship [tribal] ties.¹⁶⁶ The parliamentary elections since 1989 have clearly showed an imbalance in representation.¹⁶⁷ The Multi-Member Majority System electoral law of 1989 was the most democratic – but was judged to be unconstitutional. The Islamists who won 36 seats in a parliament of 80 seats in 1989 (due to their stance against the peace process negotiations with Israel in 1991 and their representative role to bring out issues related to Gaza refugees in Jordan and their demands for better livelihood conditions in Jordan), could only secure 21 seats in 1993 elections which used a different electoral law to regulate and control the votes and the allocated seats. The ‘One Man-One-Vote’ system, many believe, was introduced to minimise the weight of the Islamists, especially after the success they had achieved in the 1989 elections and to give further power and presence to remote tribal families. In 2001 the provisional electoral law based on ‘One Man- One Vote’ was reviewed. The number of constituencies was raised from 21 to 45 (by increasing the number of voting districts)

¹⁶⁶ Greenwood 2003: 253, Robins states (in Greenwood 2003: 253): the districts had clearly been chosen in order to ensure that an important kinship group dominating the area should have an almost automatic place in the chamber. One member of the original drafting committee was frank about the motives. The creation of such constituencies would ensure that tribes like the Bani Hamida, who are to be found around the town of Dhiban, would return a deputy from amongst their number.
and the number of parliamentarians was raised from 80 to 104.\textsuperscript{168} The new electoral law did nothing to redress the under-representation of the residents of major cities where most Palestinian-origin Jordanians reside.\textsuperscript{169} As one commentator noted:

\begin{quote}
The government appears to have sent a clear message that it would continue the same policy of keeping Jordanians of Palestinian origin (more than half of the population) under-represented.\textsuperscript{170}
\end{quote}

In late June 2012, two new amendments were passed as a way to reform, make a change and abide by the wish of the citizens to have a parliament that is more representative. “First, it adopted a mixed electoral system that allows Jordanians to vote for the first time for a closed national list of 27 seats (18\% of the total seats), in addition to the 108 seats reserved for Jordan’s 12 governorates. Second, it increased the women’s quota from 12 seats to 15 seats. The three additional seats have been reserved for women from Bedouin areas. In total, the size of Parliament increased from 120 seats in the last election to 150 seats.”\textsuperscript{171} The results of the 2013 elections were very similar to the previous ones. The fact the law has only slightly been amended indicates the state continues its exclusive policies with planned under-representation of Palestinian-origin Jordanians.

\textsuperscript{168} \textit{Al Arab El Youm}, July 24th, 2001. \\
\textsuperscript{169} Al-Quds Center 2009, p.37 \\
\textsuperscript{170} Quoting Francesca Sawalha in George Allan, 2005 \textit{Jordan – Living in the Crossfire}, London, Zed Press, p.178. \\
\textsuperscript{171} \texttt{http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/jordans-election-law-reform-or-perish} (visited Feb 16\textsuperscript{th} 2013).
2.3.1 Excluding the included

This section analyses how dynamics of power manipulating basic rights to exclude Palestinian-origin Jordanians as citizens and as refugees. They have been excluded from certain elements of the citizenship rights while being still included in law-making (as citizens). “The [Jordanian] constitution, adopted in 1952, states that citizenship is a matter to be regulated by a law”. However, the way procedures take place and rights get denied are indicative of how the law is being ignored or intentionally ignored in order to manage the population. Against the power that is given to the Council of Ministers to revoke Jordanian nationality and against the authority given to the King to ratify, the administrative regulations are able to make citizens, stateless people: “The nation-states soon discovered that the way to deny odious people any or all of their sacred and inalienable rights was not to discriminate against them within political life, but to sequester them from its altogether". This is seen in revocation of citizenship practiced since 1988, after the administrative severance between the East and West Banks, and in denial of equal rights to higher education, employment or political representation. Social Rights in higher education, employment or political rights such as that of representation have been applied unequally to various categories and groups of the state. What Anis Kassim calls “the hyphenated Palestinian-Jordanians, who are regarded as Jordanians for all legal purposes”, are in reality hyphenated with its comes to acquisition of their rights, their basic citizenship rights as fully-fledged citizens. “When you forfeit a

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172 Anis F. Kassim in Jamjoum 2013  
174 Kassim in Jamjoum 2013  
175 About 200,000 have access to the West Bank (through family reunification)- and are holders of yellow crossing cards.
Jordanian’s citizenship and keep him in Jordan because you don’t have the power to send him to Palestine - because the Israelis of course refuse - you will end up with over a million stateless Palestinians within your borders, and who have nowhere to go”.

Jordanian citizenship held by Palestinians, in theory, gives them access to all rights. However the state with its practiced bio-power of exclusion and population management politics has excluded people from the bigger apparatus in which they are included; their refugee status and their Palestinian identity have resulted in their being denied their rights by the sovereign who decides to exclude them. Key to understanding modern political power and means of control is to understand inclusive-exclusion. This happens with the technique of biopower as used by Foucault to refer to the practice of modern states and their regulation of their subjects through "an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations".

Hussein in his late 40s, lives with his wife and four children in Jabal Nadheef. He at a Gas station and makes a very modest wage. He has no medical insurance or social security. He does not vote for any political representative, he does not believe this is something that would make any difference in his life. Seeing his Palestinian peers in the Arab neighbouring countries, he is content with the status he has. “I have Jordanian nationality and this is surely a privilege”. The Friday weekly protests (which were triggered by the Arab Spring calling for better socioeconomic living conditions, usually taking place close to where he lives, do not mean anything to him. For him, “we are different in our needs and demands. We have a respectable passport and that is all what we need.” One of his brothers few years ago, had his Jordanian passport withdrawn although he had never been to the West Bank and has not been politically active. His sister, Raja’, is married to a Syrian. By Jordanian laws, she (as a Jordanian citizen) cannot pass on her Jordanian nationality but was able to benefit from her refugee registration card to give them access to UNRWA educational and health services in the nearby refugee

176 Kassim in Jamjoum 2013
177 Foucault 1978, p.140.
camp of Wihdat. Her husband has not been able to get Jordanian nationality, despite having lived in Jordan for more than 15 years (Case 24, Jabal al- Nadheef, March 23, 2012).

Hussein’s case highlights several layers of exclusion as an included citizen. The technique of domination is not by forcing people to do what the regime dictates, but the integrated technique individuals take upon themselves, what Foucault describes as ‘the conduct of conduct’; the power to self-govern as a result of the implicit state regulating politics.

Hussein’s needs in calling for better conditions, which fall under his legitimate social citizenship rights of welfare and protection, do not seem to be a priority. His legal status, within the invisibilisation politics of the state makes him better than those Palestinians in neighbouring countries who do not have legal citizenship (with a recognised passport). It thus puts him in a stronger position than those foreigners who live in Jordan and have no access to public services (such as his Syrian brother-in-law). While included as a citizen, he has been excluded as an active citizen, whether in his political, civil (contractual employment) or social rights. His modest education, financial capital and limited means and power (through social networks) makes him indistinguishable, an outsider to the system, failing to claim his basic rights as an included-Jordanian with citizenship. The case of Hussein and others of Palestinian-origin Jordanians living in the refugee camps or the inner city represent the ultimate ‘bio political’ subjects; meaning those who can be regulated and governed at the level of population in a permanent ‘state of exception’ outside the normal legal framework. Foucault himself interprets the biopolitics, as “biopolitics is the form of government taken by a new dynamic of forces that, in
conjunction, express power relations that the classical world could not have known.”

He puts it thus: “Society’s control over individuals was accomplished not only through consciousness or ideology but … it was biopolitics,” to stress the productive capacity of power dedicated to inciting, reinforcing, monitoring and optimising the forces under its control. Foucault sought to interpret a new process of political creativity, of emergence of a multiple and heterogeneous power of resistance, proposing a new ontology that begins with the body and its potential which regards the political subject as an ethical one, against the prevailing tradition of Western thought which dealt with the individual as a subject of law:

A number of phenomena that seem to be quite significant, namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, or a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the 18th century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species. This is what I have called biopower.

The emphasis on the protection of life and on the regulation of body and on the production of other technologies of power is what justifies, according to Foucault, the use of biopower.

**Conclusion**

This chapter illustrates how the governance mechanism underpinning management of people who are not only forced migrant-refugees but also citizens is based on

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178 Lazzarato Maurizio, 2002 ‘From Biopower to Biopolitics, in Pli 13, p.100
179 Foucault 1978
180 Lazzarato 2002, p. 99
182 The state is seen as a "body" and the use of state power as essential to its "life"
manipulation of citizenship rights, demography, labels and class/power. By this, I have sought to unfold the discursive effects on Palestinian refugees with Jordanian citizenship of East Amman to integrate. They have been made liminal and marginal subjects struggling for livelihoods within peripheral places in inner cities, camps or semi-camps.

I argue that the discursive limitations on social, political and legal rights which restricted the ability for forward mobility of Palestinian refugees, holders of official Jordanian citizenship, have created what can be drawn as a virtual camp within the wider physical camp or inner city. Labelling or categorising have been used as ways to separate refugees from hosts or to exclude a group from society who can then be more easily controlled and their citizenship rights more easily denied. This process has constructed “convenient images” or labels or hyphenated statuses, that Zetter saw as “not just a highly instrumental process, but also a powerful explanatory tool to explore the complex and often disjunctive impacts of humanitarian intervention on the lives of refugees.”

Jordan’s discursive politics, with the various labels and legal/political categories given to Palestinian-origin citizens have rendered their integration one of uncertainty and fear. Amidst the invisibilisation politics led by the state, Palestinians of Jordan, as described by Agamben can be situated within civic ‘black holes’ wherein the unwanted are sequestered as utterly available victims. He calls them all “camps,” including many camp-like spaces of modernity such as airport transit lounges or urban ghettos, in the absolutism

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183 Zetter 2007, p.173
184 Burtchael 2000, p.626
of ‘camps’. These entities, whether virtual or physical, represent, borrowing Malkki’s critical theorisation of how refugees face “a technology of ‘care and control’…a technology of power entailing the management of space and movement- for ‘peoples out of place’”.¹⁸⁶ This is to permit an articulated and detailed control as seen by Foucault: “to render visible those who are inside it; in more general terms, an architecture that would operate to transform individuals: to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them.”¹⁸⁷

In this chapter, I have challenged the idea of integration as conceived of by different actors and at different levels. I have demonstrated how the understanding of integration has been feared at the political level which has been dominated by the Israeli wish to melt the Palestinians in the neighbouring Arab countries. The fear is that integration may threaten the claim for the right of return. At the local domestic Jordanian level, integration of Palestinians was perceived as a concern against the construction of the Jordanian national identity. The understanding of integration at the social level, in a patrimonial society with social stratification has been galvanised with capital and power by the regime. As a result of all these concerns, citizenship, as a de facto, right for Palestinian-origin Jordanians has been affected and not all the elements of citizenship have been accessed. The following chapter will study the political economy factor and the way it further affected the access to citizenship rights by Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman.

¹⁸⁶ Malkki in Hyndman, Jennifer 2000, p.120
¹⁸⁷ Foucault 1977, p. 172
Chapter Three: The political economy of Jordan: Another integrating factor?

This chapter contextualises the political economy of Jordan since the 1948, when Palestinians arrived to the kingdom and became its citizens. This builds on the theoretical analysis of integration studied earlier of the state, refugee-citizen, class stratification, management politics of people and the way a fraction of citizens, those studied in this research, have become excluded. The economic integration of Palestinian refugees, strategised by the Economic Survey Mission (ESM) in 1949 had become possible after al Nakba due to the flow of financial assistance from the international community which pledged to help the Arab region to develop economically in order to incorporate the Palestinian refugees in their urbanisation process and economic development. Moreover, the oil boom in the Gulf countries since the early 1960s was well timed with this economic development process; it generated economic opportunities for large masses from the Arab region (including the Palestinians) to migrate for labour opportunities and benefit themselves and their families living in host Arab countries. In a country with a rent-induced economy like Jordan, this Oil Gulf boom was advantageous especially after the difficult years of state and nation building in the 1950s and 1960s due to political tensions caused by wars (1948, 1967 and 1968), by the mass flow of Palestinian refugees
and displaced (which caused pressure on the limited infrastructure), and by the fluctuating levels of aid.¹

It was until the 1970s that the socioeconomic and political conditions improved. Jordan and its citizens had been able to live beyond their means due to the flow of aid and rent: “Between 1973 and 1980, foreign assistance accounted for almost 55 per cent of government revenue, while government expenditure in turn represented more than 68 per cent of GDP (the real GDP growth was 10 percent)”.² Western aid had bailed Jordan out from the dire economic situation it had in the early 1950s and ensured that some level of economic development was sustained. Aid from the Arab Gulf countries was significant and was often in the form of grants rather than cheap loans. It was channelled into development of infrastructure projects and defence spending. This was in addition to the flow of remittances, which reached almost US$ One billion between 1973-1981 that was increasing with more Jordanians working in the Gulf.³

This financial flow of rent and remittances had impacted positively the livelihood of Jordanians’ educational levels, property ownership, and economic opportunities. The public sector was expanding and enrolling more citizens, allocating benefits and social welfare: Brynen posits that “by 1986, almost half the entire labour force worked for the

¹ A sharp increase in the level of aid (over 40 percent) is found between 1957 and 1958, with the USA becoming the major donor to Jordan for the first time. In the years 1966-1968, the level of aid declined as a result of Jordan’s involvement in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The level of Arab aid increased strongly in 1968 and 1969, when Jordan stood as a ‘front line state’ in the Arab League. The outbreak of the civil war in 1970 saw a clear drop in aid (26.6 percent) (Knowles Warwick, 2005 Jordan since 1989, A study in Political economy, London, I.B Tauris, p.30)
² Brynen 1992, p.79
state in some capacity.” The state, with its Keynesian economic led politics then, was able to provide net benefits to large segments of the population which was a direct co-opting mechanism of traditional notables and tribes, emerging bourgeois and professional elites. This neo-patrimonial extension of the traditional practice through subsidising allied elites and representatives of constituencies served to reinforce the status and the social power of such people whilst rendering them increasingly dependent on state resources. At a slower rhythm, the private sector was also growing, with small and medium scale entrepreneurs benefiting from the emergent economy and the flow of rent. These years of ‘plenty’ gave birth to two groups in Jordanian society: one that is dependent on the state, the biggest employer, and one that is dependent on generated remittances abroad and the other dependent on its own gains away from the state in Jordan. This latter represented in the modestly growing private sector and those involved in the entrepreneurial market. It was mostly composed of Palestinian-origin Jordanians of two the well-established ones who were able then to create their own private sector firms and one composed of those who depended on their own vocational training and entrepreneurial skills to open their shops providing needed services for the expanding cities of Jordan.

Escalating events at both the local and regional levels between 1988 and 1991 brought in new elements to the political and economic scene in Jordan and to the socioeconomic livelihoods of people. It was not until late in 1989 with the severe economic crisis that

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4 *ibid.*, p.81.
5 The most important driving force in an economy is when economic output is strongly influenced by aggregate demand created by households, businesses and the government and not the dynamics of free markets. This theory further asserts that free markets have no self-balancing mechanisms that lead to full employment. The public sector is expected to lead during this phase, through public policies that aim to achieve full employment and price stability.
6 Knowles 2005
Jordan had to make the slow shift away from its state-led economy and the Keynesian state-intervening practice, the then dominant economic ideology, to a liberalised, private export-led one, changing the role of the state and the expectations of citizens with their various classes and statuses. The economic reform process, with the support of the IMF-Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), sought to achieve macro-economic relief aiming to stabilise Jordan’s economy and make Jordan engage slowly in trade, financial liberalisation, privatisation and achieving high GDP growth.\(^7\) This accomplishment, highly praised by the World Bank (WB) and IMF has, however, failed to trickle down and meet the socioeconomic needs of those who have been affected by the increased prices and the decreased state subsidised services and social welfare.\(^8\) The disparity between the two pre-existing groups widened, creating further groups competing for the distribution of the state’s benefits and allocations.

This chapter elucidates the varied revenue structure in Jordan, which has been dependent on aid, remittances and private sector rent, and the way it laid the foundation for the economic dimension of the divisions in the society, deepening the already socio-politically established one. In its first part, this chapter studies the economy in a rent-induced state and the way it shaped the relationship between the state and its citizens during the years of plenty, as part of the established neo-patrimonialism within the status and class system. It argues that rentierism is a key role in national integration and a tool to rule and manage the population through the exchange of allocations and state benefits


\(^8\) Saif and Choucair 2010, Alissa 2007
for allegiance and loyalty. The class of Palestinian-origin Jordanians in East Amman as will be demonstrated in the following chapters have fallen out of this rent allocation. In this chapter, the process that widened further the social stratifications is studied over time. The first part of this chapter deals with the fluctuation in the economy, the plenty and lean years of rentierism, demonstrating the effects of the state’s role in distributing allocation in creating a clear fracture in the society and in slowly distancing those who were able to economically be independent from those who were not. The second part examines the age of neoliberalism, 1989 onwards, and the circumstances that led to this major economic and political reform and the way it shaped the social structure, with new dimensions, engendering inequality and limiting access to new opportunities.

This chapter studies the discursive actions of the state in distributing the exogenous rent to selective beneficiaries which shaped the status and the power amongst its citizens. Most importantly, despite the fact that Jordan is but a semi-rentier country with extremely limited natural resources, the rentier mentality, relaying on the distributed allocations and rewards, has become strongly embedded in the culture as a function serving both the interests of the *allocative* state and the recipients. Neoliberalism is explained in light of this background as a ‘discourse’ that constitutes practices, institutions and identities. This chapter demonstrates that the era of neoliberalism, with the coinciding events of the late 1980s, has accentuated a ‘continuum of deservedness’, one which favours some groups in their economic and social forward mobility within their limiting social enclosure while inhibiting access to other citizens, creating further marginalisation. The class of
Palestinian-Jordanians of inner Amman, studied in this thesis has fallen under the latter category, as excluded from the privileges and the allocations.

3.1 The political economy of rentierism

The term ‘rent’ is reserved for income derived from “the gift of nature”: a source of income that is generated from natural resources. The Arab Gulf countries, for example, have black oil, as the gift of nature. This external ‘gift’ also relies on incomes derived from exogenous sources like foreign aid, remittances, transit fees, or other rents. Adam Smith was the first to draw a distinction between rent as a reward for the ownership of natural resources (including lands and minerals) and rent from other incomes (wage and profit). Rent, therefore, differs from normal income because it does not link to work/production with reward. Rentier, by this definition, can be seen as a social group sharing in production without contributing to it. This very point is what makes it important to study the political economy of rentierism. It is indispensable to examine the social culture, not only the economic one, of members in a special group who do not participate actively in the economic production but receive, nevertheless, a share in the production and at times a handsome share. “The distinguishing feature of the rentier”, as put by Beblawi in his work studying The Rentier State in the Arab World, “resides in

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10 Knowles 2005, p. 5
11 Beblawi 1990, p. 86.
the lack or absence of a productive outlook in [its] his behaviour”.\textsuperscript{12} This has had an important effect on the relationship between the state rentier and its citizens (particularly those with social class, origin and status), as it serves to strengthen state consolidation and survival - especially in a patrimonial society that is structured based on exchanged and conditional benefits and interests (e.g. an exchange of job and high ranking position for allegiance). It thus tends to privilege one group of citizens by favouring it with rent distribution and allocations, which contributes to instability in the economic and political systems and ultimately increases inequality amongst citizens. The one group of citizens, as explained in the earlier chapter, encompassed those who respond to state’s interest, of certain social class, tribe, status and social division. “Rentierism and citizenship do not meet”, posits the former Jordanian Foreign Minister and current vice president at Carnegie Institute for peace Marwan Mouasher, highlighting the inequality in citizenship rights that could be nourished by rentierism: “it [rentierism] has favoured one group, with the pretext that it is necessary for safeguarding the nation, forgetting that the less privileged, [who better deserve the allocations] have no race, religion or geographic location”.\textsuperscript{13} The “less privileged” include amongst others, the group of Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman who also have limited capital and power. Additionally, analysing rentierism can explain the kind of established relationship between the donors’ community and aid recipient countries and the imposed political agenda and interests. This dependency, especially in a semi-rentier state like Jordan, reflects the volatile nature of rent that risk being reduced, diverted or stopped.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ibid.}, p.87.
\textsuperscript{13} Mouasher, Marwan (2013) ‘Between rentierism and citizenship’ in \textit{Al Ghad newspaper}. 

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The oil producing Gulf States are typical rentier states through the fact that they are extremely dependent on the export of one single resource. A second feature making them classic rentier states is the fact that the income earned from petroleum exports derives not primarily from the size and productivity of the oil industry itself, but from external economic rents generated by the vast gap between the cost of production and the high price of oil on the international market. Connected to this second point, only a small proportion of the population, those in the rule, is directly engaged in the production and distribution of this wealth.\textsuperscript{14} Knowles conceptualises the rentier state into three sub-sets of economies: The pure rentier state economy, primary based on oil rent; the induced rentier state economy, primarily based on aid; and the private sector rentier economy, primarily based on remittances.\textsuperscript{15}

A country like Jordan is a semi-rentier state, different to those benefiting from the oil gift, and fits with Knowles’ last two sub-sets of economies which represent more than half of the GDP.\textsuperscript{16} The characteristics of Jordan’s rentier economy, as synthesised by Brand:\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{quote}
It is heavily dependent upon unrequired transfers in the form of expatriate worker remittances and economic aid, the vast majority of which come as a direct or indirect result of the areas’ oil wealth. A second characteristic of a rentier present in Jordan is that of a major disequilibrium in the trade balance. The third characteristic (…) is its large budget deficit (…) Fourth, the rent income has for years permitted a level of consumption and investment well above what the country’s GDP could sustain. Finally, there is the obvious weakness of indigenous economic productive forces.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{15} Knowles 2005, p.1.
\textsuperscript{16} The aid percentage on the GDP was 6.6 for the year 2002: calculated on the basis of data on ODA from OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), Development Assistance Committee. 2002. DAC Online.
This semi-rentier culture has a paramount importance, cutting across the whole of the social fabric of the economy affecting the role of the state in the society: “the economic power thus bestowed upon the few would allow them to seize political power as well, or else induce the political elite to take over the external rent from them without major political disruption”.18 So only the few are engaged in the generation of this rent, while the majority are only involved in its distribution or utilisation. The allocation of rent often gets presented as a “royal favour”19 to exhibit the regime’s benevolence in distributing benefits and favours (as well be discussed in the two following chapters with educational and employment favours). Different layers of beneficiaries (including East Jordanians and selective Palestinian-origin Jordanians) are thus created, building a pyramid of statuses seeking to capture a part of the distributed rent: cutting the society into slices of social, economic and political powers. “Patron-client relations and tribal, sectarian and other ethnic cleavages may actually be reinforced by the neo-patrimonial distribution of resources to loyal social constituencies”.20 This is derived from the tribal origins of the state: “A long tribal tradition of buying loyalty and allegiance is now confirmed by an état providence, distributing favours and benefits to its population.”21

In this environment, economic reward-income or wealth-is not related to work and merit achieved through production; rather, it is related to chance and situation. Citizenship with loyalty/allegiance becomes the individual’s single most important

19 Ibid.,p.91.
21 Beblawi 1990, p.89.
economic resource, representing a form of economic entitlement to employment, social welfare supports and other economic rewards distributed by the state. The state in such a set-up is also the major and ultimate employer in the economy, so every citizen has a legitimate aspiration to be a government employee, making part of the biggest employee in the country (the public sector). Productivity amongst civil servants, in such dependent economy, is known to be low, based on the criteria of recruitment and the understanding of productivity: the GDP (real growth rate in Jordan is 2.8 percent for the year 2013).

The economy based on this creates a specific mentality: a rentierism mentality which “breaks the conventional work/risk/merit and reward causation found in the production economy, with the result that getting access to the rent circuit is a greater pre-occupation than reaching productive efficiency”. The risk of the rentier mentality is that it is not only limited to getting access to the rent circuit but it also incites those with the available resources to attempt to gain control of the rent.

The distribution of state benefits (statutory or otherwise) has overshadowed the importance of productive employment within society and the importance to uphold their obligations as citizens towards the state by paying taxes. In fact, with the allocative role of the state, taxes are not religiously paid nor imposed. “The consequent assumption is that the state is held less accountable by the citizenry for its policies because it does not use the people’s money”. This makes citizens more focused on the gains and far less

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22 Knowles 2005, p.10
23 ibid.
24 Luciani uses the term allocative or allocation state. So rather than extracting revenue from the population, the state allocates rent to the population Luciani Giacomo, 1990 ‘Allocation vs. Production States: A theoretical Framework’, in Luciani, Giacomo (ed.) The Arab State, London : Routledge.
demanding in terms of political participation in a venue for voicing needs. This, implicitly, manages to magnify the political legitimacy of the state and supports neo-patrimonial authoritarianism.

The following sections show how the way rentierism, whether in plenty or lean years, in the patrimonial society has engendered class stratifications as a means used by the state in managing its hybrid citizens with their multiple origins and societal statuses. The gift of exogenous resources has permitted the government to govern using discursive, and not coercive, practices that “quite often tactfully court[s] the rent earners”26 and to consolidate the state’s power and survival. This analysis seeks to explain the way rights of education, employment and social protection have been impacted by these embedded politics limiting the opportunities for the Palestinian-origin Jordanians to go up the ladder of education and employment.

26 Beblawi 1990, p. 98
3.1.1 Gaining momentum: The economy after the war years

The 1948 al Nakba war increased the territorial size of the Kingdom of Jordan by one third, while expanding the population three fold, as a result of the Jericho conference that unified the West and the East Bank of the River Jordan and offered Palestinians citizenship rights. While Britain had been responsible for 100 percent of the external economic assistance to Jordan since its creation in 1921, the United States of America and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) soon became the new involved as a donor in Jordan’s budget, aiming to help Jordan establish its solid infrastructure in order to expand and incorporate the new-comers into the growing new state. The economic ideology of the state was following that of Europe at that time, which was Keynesian thinking with the provision of welfare policies and state intervention in the economy. It was the politics then that located the state in the centre of development and infrastructure in control of the budget and the allocation of resources.

Not long after the arrival of the Palestinians in Jordan, the economy changed from being agriculture-oriented into service-oriented. The influx of Palestinian refugees brought into the country large segments of artisans and farmers whose skills would benefit the newly-established state contributing to the modest economy until 1967. The war expanded the population and their quality, and also expanded the kingdom with

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27 The subsidy was in two forms: budgetary support (mainly focusing on the maintenance of the governmental administration) and establishing and maintaining the Arab Legion (Knowles 2005, p. 24)
additional arable land for farmers, principally on the West Bank of the Jordan River.\textsuperscript{29}

Notwithstanding the flow of aid from the three donors, the economic situation in the early 1950s remained weak with an acute unemployment rate that was as high as 40 percent.\textsuperscript{30}

The labour supply exceeded the domestic demand due to the inability of the economy to absorb large numbers of newcomers to the labour force, which aggravated the unemployment problem,\textsuperscript{31} “only 153 small-scale establishments existed and the economy still suffered from a lack of capital, a small domestic market, and political instability”.\textsuperscript{32}

Although Palestinian-origin Jordanians bearing capital and entrepreneurial skills stimulated the housing and service sectors, establishing an “industrial elite”,\textsuperscript{33} during this period the Palestinians were perceived as a burden on the underdeveloped Jordanian economy: “there was no desire amongst a large number of Palestinians to be integrated because no real framework existed”.\textsuperscript{34} There was a fear of settlement and the refugees, at first, refused to participate and take a role in a settlement plan that was not clear to them and in many ways was moving them away into new direction. Only a few of those who arrived in Jordan were able to remain in their domain in agriculture and farming, except for those who settled in the Jordan Valley.\textsuperscript{35} The majority had to become part of the permanent urban labour force upon arrival in Jordan and negotiate their social, financial and human capitals in securing economic opportunities. A Ministry of Refugee Affairs,

\textsuperscript{29} Piro Timothy J., 1998 \textit{The Political economy of market reform in Jordan}, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield publishers, p.27.
\textsuperscript{32} Piro 1998, p.30
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid.}, p.29: this industrial elite comprised landlords, wealthy merchants and real estate owners.
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 28
\textsuperscript{35} Van Aken 2003
headed by the former mayor of Jerusalem Ragheb al-Nashashibi, was established in 1949 to deal with the economic hardships of Palestinian refugees and a Ministry of Social Welfare was also established with development, welfare and employment agendas, which “reflected Amman’s attempts to extend its authority over the population in the new territories”.36

A sizeable number of refugees found employment in the years immediately following the partition of Palestine. UNRWA, most of whose employees were refugees, itself provided employment. Other refugees found opportunities for farming in the underdeveloped Jordan valley. An UNRWA survey places the number of refugees employed in 1953 at about 77 thousand, of whom only 13.5 percent were employed full time. (…) surprisingly, unemployment rates among residents of refugee camps were lower than among non-camp refugees.37

Only in the late 1950s did the economic situation improve. The second generation of Palestinian refugees with their Jordanian status were getting opportunities for education and training in government and UNRWA schools and vocational centres and were able to join the ranks of the public sector or work with UNRWA. UNRWA’s economic input to this small and poor newly created country was large; aside from educational and health programmes and employment opportunities, UNRWA was motivating people to move out from their tents and to settle in houses within its integration scheme, called ‘rehabilitation projects’ for better reception and acceptance. It had a budget to fund refugees in creating their own housing units and undertook works of public utility such as

water supply and schools. Enrolment in this rehabilitation project was sometimes perceived as ‘conditional,’ extorting the cancellation of the ration card.\textsuperscript{38}

Other than those who got into the formal market, a large number of first- and second-generation unskilled Palestinian-origin Jordanians seeking livelihoods and coming from needy households, particularly the peasants (who come from a rural background back in Palestine), had to find opportunities in the informal market. Some were called on to participate in the resettlement projects which eventually got them in to the labour market as construction workers, hired on a daily basis, or as drivers and other low-level service jobs.\textsuperscript{39}

A Palestinian-origin Jordanian from al-Naser, Samir, who is today 62 years old and has just retired from the public sector not long ago, summarises his generation’s trajectory in simple words “We are the generation of al- Nakba, the generation that endured the results of al-Nakba and dispossession and I had to work with my father as we arrived here to establish the base and the family. Younger brothers and sisters at the time had better chances than us [his generation]. They could afford going to school but we had to work and make the money to feed the family members” (FG 1, Jabal al-Naser, in the local camp committee building, Oct, 17, 2011).

Farsoun\textsuperscript{40} sees that Palestinian refugees, seeking to adapt to the urbanised life away from their rural village background, had become (since the early 1960s) the ‘proletariat’ of the Middle East or, as Smith labels them, ‘landless proletariat’.\textsuperscript{41} a cheap labour force of skilled and unskilled labourers in electricity, plumbing and construction. This is what

\textsuperscript{38} Suspicious refugees were reluctant to accept this and feared that gradual integration would jeopardise their entitlement to return. Plascov 1981 pp. 64-65
\textsuperscript{39} Doan 1989, p.7.
\textsuperscript{40} Farsoun 2003, p.222-4.
\textsuperscript{41} Smith in De Jong and Tell 1997, p.213.
Peretz calls the process “depeasantisation”, resulting from refugees having lost their agricultural skills and capacities but failed to acquire new non-farming occupational skills.

Abu Kamel, a refugee from the first generation, Palestinian-origin Jordanian in his mid 70s, a board member of a charity organisation in Jabal Al-Nadheef, talked about their arrival in Jordan; “We were trying to settle somewhere, whether here in Jordan or going back to Palestine. We left [in 1948] our village Qibya (Hebron governorate) to the closest refugee camp in Hebron. The situation was bad. In 1953 we arrived in Fuhais- Jordan. I became a truck driver. I was then 18 years old and did not attend school during the years when my family was moving from one area to another. In 1958, we moved to Amman for better access to work and settled here in Jabal al-Nadheef. By that time I started to look for a wife and to create a family!” (case No 17, Abu Kamel, Jabal al- Nadheef, Feb. 9, 2012).

For some refugee Palestinian-origin Jordanians of first and second generations, it was the temporary nature of their stay that shaped the way they sought to establish themselves in Jordan, whether to seek education or to wait until they are returned back home.

“Nevertheless, education”, according to Fathi, which was made available by the state and by UNRWA, “has been the single most decisive factor in cross-cutting divisions in Jordanian society and providing channels of upward mobility”. Cities were growing with an increasingly-urbanised population, from both forced migrants arriving from Palestine and rural-desert migrants of East Jordanians building a positive environment for human capital to grow and develop the urban cities of the nascent state.

Fathi posits that “education fulfils several functions: From the point of view of Jordanian policy planners, human capital has become a major export commodity that helps to pay the bills for the country’s imports. Further, it provides a key resource in building a service economy at home….education [serves] as a transmitter of social values and concepts towards the homogenisation of society, and ultimately nation building.

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42 Peretz 1977, p.58.
43 Fathi 1994, pp.168-9
Education has been a key government tool for promoting the idea of a Jordanian national identity, disseminating elements of a shared national culture and integrating various segments of the population.\textsuperscript{44}

Educational opportunities greatly facilitated the growth and development process: basic education, vocational education and higher education opportunities were made available by both the state of Jordan and UNRWA. As Jordan was establishing itself as a state, UNRWA was growing its services and geographic spread, establishing itself as the ‘Blue State’ after the emblematic UN blue flag.\textsuperscript{45} Accordingly, the Agency’s allocation grew, and its share of responsibility for refugees living outside the camps increased, thereby enlarging both the Government’s economic reliance on it and UNRWA’s dependence on the Government for facilitating its continued relief operation. This pattern of interdependence was indispensable for consolidating the process of integration, as analysed by Plascov.\textsuperscript{46} UNRWA needed to work closely with the government in order to justify its continued operation to its subsidisers. And it would have been impossible for the state of Jordan to be involved in such direct settlement of the Palestinian refugees on its territories without the UN’s support.

Tonini is his work studying international donors, UNRWA and Palestinian refugees looks at the UNRWA budget and how that budget destined to relief and social services grew with the natural increase in the number of refugees, the money allocated to education was substantially augmented as from 1960 (and continued to raise until recent years): while in 1953-54 one seventh of what was spent on aid was given to education (2.800.000 US$ as opposed to 22.700.000), in 1964 the respective sums were 13-800.000 and 17.400.000 US$. In the 1970s the money spent on education

\begin{footnotes}
\item[44] Ibid p.167
\item[46] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
was more than that for emergencies (38.200.000 US$ as against 36.800.000 in 1974).\footnote{Tonini Alberto, 1999 ‘International donors, refugees and UNRWA: France, Britain and Italy as case studies 1950-1993’, in UNRWA, A History Within History, Cermoc research programme, International Symposium, 31 August- 1,2 September, Dead Sea- Jordan: CERMOC , p.10.}

The 1967 war brought in more refugees and displaced and increased the demand on the country's limited resources.\footnote{About 350.000 Palestinians were displaced for the first or the second time and were all holders of Jordanian citizenship, except for the Gazans who arrived from Gaza through Hebron, holding Egyptian travel documents.} The aid flow from the USA was stopped in retaliation for Jordan’s attack on Israel as part of the war. So funding came down to zero, when it used to be US$10 million dollars.

From Knowles who writes on this: while USA funding to Jordan started out on a low-key basis but funding increased rapidly to JD 2.73 million in 1955, 18 percent of aid. in 1957, USA grant to Jordan was JD 3.57 million (US $10 million), followed by a further US $ 10 m. for the army and also US$ 10 m for budgetary support.\footnote{Knowles 2005, pp.28-29}

It was not long; however, before the Arab states called a Summit at Khartoum in Sept 1967 and agreed to support Jordan, with Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait promising to bail Jordan out in its new crisis. Moreover, Arab bilateral assistance grew from zero in 1969 to US $35.4 million in 1970.\footnote{Knowles 2005, p.29}

Palestinian-origin Jordanians who arrived from the West Bank were able to apply for job openings in the government. Civil servants who used to work in the West Bank were able to transfer to the East Bank within the same ministries and departments. Because of the rapid growth Amman was experiencing, artisans and skilled labourers arrived from the West Bank to Jordan, especially Amman which was experiencing a rapid growth of
market and economy, and became involved in the new constructions.\textsuperscript{51} Palestinian-origin Jordanians, owing to their education and concentration in Amman and Zarqa, dominated a large share of jobs in the public sector such as departments of finance, communications, education, and tourism.\textsuperscript{52} This was only possible until the 1970’s when politics vis-à-vis Palestinian origin Jordanians rendered them less dominant and weaker than the East Jordanian social network in supporting one another and privileging each other in possible opportunities.\textsuperscript{53}

3.1.2 The 1970s onwards: Another divide

The clashes of 1970-71 between some Palestinian \textit{fedayeen} and some members of the Jordanian army backfired at first on the Palestinian-origin Jordanians and East Jordanians, who were believed to support the \textit{fedayeen}. The government took measures to “purge Palestinian public sector employees, even at elite levels”.\textsuperscript{54} As seen by Abu Odeh, a Palestinian-origin Jordanian and a former policy maker in the ranks of the Royal Hashemite Court, “the mopping-up policy soon developed into a process of Transjordanising the government, gradually phased the Palestinian-origin Jordanians out of the national consensus.”\textsuperscript{55} Jordanian nationalists meanwhile supported that

\textsuperscript{51} Abu Odeh 1999, p.111
\textsuperscript{52} Cunningham and Sarayrah in De Jong and Tell 1997, p.205, Fathi, 1994, p.168-9
\textsuperscript{53} De Jong and Tell 1997, p.205, Abu Odeh 1999, p.191
\textsuperscript{54} Carroll 2003, p.110
\textsuperscript{55} Abu Odeh 1999, p.191
Palestinian-origin Jordanians should henceforth be “subordinate to Transjordanians”\textsuperscript{56}. This was to widen the rift between the already created classes dependent/non-dependent on the state: a wider economic divide was nourished by political-identity tensions and was justified to maintain the ‘hybrid’ unity of the Jordanian people. \textsuperscript{57} It also “provided impetus to associate that new geographic territory more fully with transjordanianism.”\textsuperscript{58}

To further strengthen the divide between the Palestinian-origin and East Jordanians, the rentier state, with the decreased flow of aid during this period, particularly from Arab states, continued to nourish the patrimonial society, (analysed earlier), through strengthening the divide, some with status and power and other with employments and properties. At first glance the ‘self-made man’ continued to be a symbol to push people to excel. But, at the practical level, other factors mattered when seeking to access rights as citizens.

\textsuperscript{56} Carroll 2003, p.111.
\textsuperscript{57} Hybrid, as explained by Laurie Brand (1995) is the essence of which would encompass commitment to the monarchy, Arabism, Palestine, and the unity of the two peoples.
\textsuperscript{58} Carroll 2003, p.110.
3.1.3 The years of plenty

The buoyant economy concealed growing social disparities and most importantly averted political tension. In the early 1980s about 40 percent of the Jordanian labour force worked outside the country, and remittances formed the largest component of the national income.

“The domestic coalition holding together Jordan’s economy in the 1970s and 1980s consisted of the state’s public sector managers, the commercial and financial elites of the private sector, and Jordanian-Palestinian expatriates working in the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf”.

In 1981, for example, remittances were estimated at more than US$ one billion, making around one third of the GNP (Gross National Product), and by 1989, these exceeded US$ three billion. This economic growth trickled down to all classes of the Jordanian society. The growth of Amman in the services and construction sectors also made it possible for people working in all sectors, including the self-employed in the informal sector, to benefit from this growth. It sped up the process of social change, especially consumerism and urbanisation, and added to the growth of ‘bureaucracy’ and the empowerment of technocrats.

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59 Knowles 2005
64 Doan 1989, p. 2.
The period between the 1970s and 1987 witnessed developments in the Jordanian labour market that reflected the boom in Jordan and in the Arab Region. This was seen in the size of the workforce in Jordan, which “increased from 332.8 thousand workers in 1973 to 420 thousand in 1980, to 630.1 thousand in 1990 and then to 1142.3 thousand in 2000. Hence, the total participation rate in the past years has increased from 19.83% to 20.24%, 21.5% and to 26.4% respectively, while the unemployment rate has seen a marked fluctuation during the period (1973-2000) and reached 11.1%, 3.5%, 16.8% and 13.7% respectively.”\(^{66}\) The number of the ‘Jordanian’ expatriates “rose from a mere 5% of the labour force in 1968 to at least 30% by 1980… of which 85% were employed in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait..and were able to remit significant sums back to Jordan, increasing from less than JD 15 m. in 1973 to JD 381.9 m. in 1982, almost 23 % of GDP”\(^{67}\).

New classes emerged away from the traditional social structure, drawn from the urbanites, *fallahin* (peasants) and Bedouins, with new modes and relations of production and was considered a great change to the traditional socio-political system engendered by clientalism, favouritism and personalism. The traditional middle class, the one that had been shaped by the government, got a new shape in this era, one that can be called “salaried new middle class” or “new administrative- professional class,”\(^{68}\) formed from a newly independent class of workers in both public and private sectors. Those in private businesses and industry and even small entrepreneurial initiatives were able to develop independently of each other, in contrast to state -induced rentierism that increases dependency on the state.

\(^{67}\) Data from CBJ in Knowles 2005, p.33.  
\(^{68}\) In Fathi 1994, p.171.
As a matter of fact, this period of time permitted the private sector to develop independently of the state, depending instead on remittances.\textsuperscript{69} It consequently “accentuated the longstanding disequilibria in the social composition of the bureaucracy and army on the one hand, and the merchant class on the other hand”.\textsuperscript{70} And, while the East Jordanians were using social networks and patrimonial lineage for securing jobs, the tradition of family businesses and hiring within the family reinforced the Palestinian nature of the private sector. The Palestinian-origin Jordanians had come to dominate the private sector (middle and micro scale), while the Jordanians, representing tribes from all over the country,\textsuperscript{71} continued to staff the apparatus of the state such as the civil service and the army.

The externally induced ‘rentier money’ permitted Jordan to increase its expenditure on infrastructure and expand its public sector institutions and enterprises, which strengthened its position as the largest employer in the country. East Jordanians were the

\textsuperscript{69} “The availability of external resources allowed the state to avoid taxation of the private sector or the Jordanian citizenry commensurate with its spending. In 1988, tax revenue contributed 57 percent of government revenue, with grants and aid contributing 33 percent, and external borrowing 10 percent. This situation has evolved as a result of reform efforts and changing external factors. By 1998, the share of tax revenue in government revenue had increased to 88 percent, before declining to 72 percent in 2004 (Alissa 2007, p.2).

\textsuperscript{70} Chaudhry in Knowles 2005, p.17.

\textsuperscript{71} The private sector has been known to be dominated by the Palestinians. A study conducted by the Centre for Strategic Studies in 1995 showed the participation of Palestinian-Jordanians in the country’s economy amounted to 82.6 percent of the capital, while Jordanians participation amounted to 11 percent (CSS 1995, p.15). Reiter (2004), in a study analysing the effect of political development in Jordan since the 1970s, argues that the Jordanians society was shaped into two conflicting ethnic groups, with the Jordanians dominating the public sector and the Palestinian-origin Jordanians considered a political minority while constituting a slim demographic majority and yielding economic strength through dominance in the private sector. In his study, he examines data on the 500 largest economic ventures in Jordan for 1995-1996 and classified companies according to ownership and management: 60 percent of companies are owned and managed by Palestinian-origin Jordanians, 31 percent of companies are owned and managed by East Jordanians, including government companies, and 9 percent are under joint partnership between Palestinian-origin and East Jordanians (Reiter Yitzhak, 2004 ‘The Palestinian-Transjordanian Rift: Economic Might and Political Power in Jordan’, in The Middle East Journal, Vol 58 No 1, p.75)
strongest candidates to be enrolled in and benefit from the safety net package of public sector jobs. The state subsidised services and provided people with their basic needs. This strengthened the patrimonial relationship, from the state to the elite or tribe representatives, then down to the constituencies and local communities. The distribution of state benefits within the patrimonial status quo overshadowed both demands for redistribution and the importance of productive employment within society. The ruling elite and the loyalist Jordanians (this, as explained earlier, included Palestinian-origin Jordanians and East Jordanians) benefited from the distributed awards led by their individually-sought interest in the state. Palestinian-origin Jordanians continued to work in the public sector, despite the Jordanisation politics. No figures or statistics could prove how their numbers have been decreasing. The process since the 1970s continues to be slow and implicit, yet there has been a clear prioritisation for East Jordanians to assume leading positions.

During this period the state was the main player in promoting economic development. This encompassed allocation and management of resources and welfare subsidies as well as expansion of public sector institutions and enterprises. This shaped the “rentierism mentality” a way used by the regime to purchase its political legitimacy through special benefits and rewards. “Social and political elites in Jordan often received direct rewards from the state. Some of these rewards were used by the elites to provide services to their

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73 Several authors writing about Jordan and the socioeconomic divide noted that while Palestinian-origin Jordanians (who are mostly employers and/or employed in the private sector or workers in Gulf countries) pay state taxes, Transjordanians (mostly employed in the bureaucracy and the military) consume them (Massad 2001, p.268, Abu Odeh 1999, p.215, Hamarneh et al. 1997, p.8) and pay them back as being loyal to the regime. (Alissa 2007, pp. 2-3, Baylouny 2008, p.278)
local communities and constituencies”\textsuperscript{75}. Over the years this underscored the role of these elites, often representing tribes, in their local communities, and played a significant role in buying loyalty from the local communities for elites and, indirectly, for the state. Thus a patron-client relationship has been nurtured amongst tribes, ethnicities and cleavages and reinforced loyal social constituencies. This mentality has engendered a growth in individually-sought economic interests which “typically favours personalism,”\textsuperscript{76} creating a distortion in the concept of work and production.

Remittances and foreign aid helped Jordan to accomplish social and economic development with the aim of responding to population growth.\textsuperscript{77} Those working in the entrepreneurial-private sector or the informal sector, or those living in the Gulf, depended on their own resources generated through their income or through remittances sent by family members based in the Gulf, which provided them with a safety net of welfare that was channelled into funding projects and studies that the state did not provide to them,\textsuperscript{78} establishing their own self-funded independency. According to Abu Odeh, the migration of the Palestinians to the Gulf rendered those who remained in Jordan less dependent on the state, creating their own networks of support and focusing more on the then-modest private businesses and industry and even small entrepreneurial initiatives.\textsuperscript{79} As explained by Piro, because the state was at the centre during this period, there was very little space possible for other sectors, beyond those overseen by the state, to grow;

\textsuperscript{75} Alissa 2007, p.3
\textsuperscript{76} Brynen 1992, p.74
\textsuperscript{77} Until 1990, there were 605,000 Jordanians and Palestinian migrants working in the Gulf countries. (UNESCWA 2007, p.11)
\textsuperscript{78} Shami in Baylouny 2008, p.290
\textsuperscript{79} Abu Odeh 1999, p.191
The effect of accumulated petrodollar financing was threefold: 1. The private sector became more dependent upon the state for imports and informal market economies grew, 2. Less money was invested in private sector manufacturing industries and structural unemployment became a more severe problem, 3. the import consumption cycle increased, thus augmenting the power of public sector managers.\textsuperscript{80}

Over these years of plenty labour and capital have shifted from small industry and agriculture to services, leading to Jordan’s ‘Dutch Disease’, reflecting mismanagement of the increased exogenous resources (of aid and remittances) which had serious repercussions on important elements in the economy, that led it to the years of lean, explained in the following section.\textsuperscript{81}

### 3.1 Liberalisation: Further divides

Events accelerated by the early 1980s, leading Jordan into the years of lean. The beginning of the Iran-Iraq war caused disruptions in regional trade and finance; that also coincided with the decline of oil prices in international markets, which led to a decline in the regional markets and a drop in oil-state liquidity. The US, reacting against Jordan for having not joined the peace process agreement signed between Israel and Egypt in 1978, had decided to cut aid to Jordan altogether. In a short period of time the budget in Jordan, with its development plans, was hit. The government endeavoured to save its economy by

\textsuperscript{80} Piro 1998, p. 67.

\textsuperscript{81} The mechanism is that an increase in revenues from inflows of foreign aid will make a given nation's currency stronger compared to that of other nations (manifest in an exchange rate), resulting in the nation's other exports becoming more expensive for other countries to buy, making the manufacturing sector less competitive.
focusing on trade, banking, industry, and investment, in order to stimulate greater
domestic private investment, attract foreign investment, cut inefficiencies through
mergers, cut certain subsidies, and ease banking regulations to help develop industries.
“Nevertheless, the record shows that what had kept the Jordanian economy going over
the years was not a lively and productive private sector but rather, the state sector, most
notably through the expansion of government services”.

The public sector expenditure had activated the national economy. In fact, between 1981-1987 the economy
experienced a growing deficit, triggered from decreasing external grants and decreasing
remittances as a result of the oil prices. The external grants used to make one third of the
state expenditure had fallen to one sixth. Meanwhile, remittances from workers in the
Gulf dropped by 38 percent: from more than $1.2 billion in 1984 to around $900 million
in 1988.

Domestic politics aggravated this economic weakness. In 1985 a new provision in the
election law, responding to a demand by the people, increased the seats of the
parliamentarians, including those within the West Bank (which at that time was part of
the Kingdom). The provision was interpreted as if the regime were not only acquiescing
in the status quo (West Bank occupation), but was, in fact, institutionalising the
difference between Jordanians of East and West Bank origin. In fact, the new electoral
law gave Palestinian refugee camps on the East Bank one formal representative in the
legislature, and undermined the representative right for refugee camps on the West Bank,
claiming that this could favour ideological candidates. “The aim was to under-represent

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82 Brand 1992, p.179
84 Alissa 2007, p.3
the West Bank and over-represent the East Bank in the legislature. With this new provision the Palace was to offer better electoral opportunities to its traditional East Bank supporters while minimizing the ability of the affiliates of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to influence Jordanian electoral politics.\textsuperscript{85} Moreover, the new law created smaller electoral districts and reduced the number of seats in each district, which served to undermine the electoral chances of ideological candidates and favour candidates relying on kinship ties.\textsuperscript{86} In light of these changes and political stances, in 1986 political tensions exploded in an academic venue (Yarmouk University) during demonstrations against the recent changes held by students and some local politics of the university. The state took certain repressive measures to control the tension.

Less than one year after the events of Yarmouk the state lost control over its people once again. This time it was the Palestinians in the West Bank. The first Palestinian uprising exploded in November 1987 in the West Bank against the Israeli occupiers. The Jordanian regime had no power over it, especially since it was led completely by the PLO leadership. This had the King sever the unity between the East and the West Banks, handing the responsibility over to the PLO. On the one hand, the move aimed to shuttle the Uprising’s (\textit{Intifadah}) concerns and security matters away from Jordan and, on the other hand, to decrease the over-pressured budget by cutting off US $60 million annually on salaries and development projects in the West Bank.\textsuperscript{87} This, however, triggered

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{87} Knowles 2005, p. 79.
“tremendous anxiety among East Bank Palestinians regarding the security of their presence and their property as Palestinian citizens of Jordan”.  

This political anxiety had unexpected effects on the Jordanian weak economy: “the anxiety created among Palestinians by the disengagement decision reportedly led to the withdrawal of substantial Palestinian reserves from Jordanian banks [capital flight of US $ 250 million in foreign currency], thereby further weakening the already ailing dinar and setting the stage for the final plunge to half of its former value.” The devaluation of the Jordanian Dinar by 48 percent got the economy in a series of fiscal crises known as ‘Black Mondays’:  

‘Black Mondays’ demonstrated that the state-private sector symbiosis was a double edged sword for Jordan. The crises illustrated how, initially, state and private sector interests converged in a mutually beneficial fashion. But years of petrodollar financing through official aid packages and remittances had overvalued the country’s currency, weakened the private sector and brought the economy to the edge of collapse.  

As a result, the state fuelled-subsidies were withdrawn, causing a significant increase in the prices of basic commodities. “The prices parachuted highly, of basic needs such as bread, sugar and vegetable prices, while the salaries remained the same”, (Case 38, Jabal al-Nadheef, Aug 18, 2010).

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88 Brand 1992, pp. 183-184  
89 Ibid.  
90 The Central Bank of Jordan unsuccessfully attempted to stabilise the dinar but only succeeded in reducing the level of foreign reserves to less than two weeks cover of imports. On the 15th Oct. 1988 the dinar was floated, and by March 1989, in a series of Black Monday devaluations, the official rate was 540 fils to the dollar, a 48 percent fall. Knowles 2005, p. 79.  
The economy, which had been cushioned by the flow of rent and aid, unravelled after this capital flight and currency devaluation. The regional economic situation could not have bailed out Jordan from its serious financial crises at such a critical time in its own finances. Jordan had to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with its conditional measures of the structural adjustment plan, aiming to restore growth and reduce economic imbalances.

The government pledged increases in administered prices and specific taxes along with cuts in subsidies to reduce the budget deficit. At this initial stage, the aim was to reduce inflation through cutting public spending and raising interest rates. This balanced growth was made to go hand in hand with a reduction in the budget deficit and an improvement in the Kingdom’s foreign currency reserves, which necessitated an open environment for savings and investment, disciplined by laws and regulations. “It aimed at transforming the economic structure of the country to one that generates self-sustaining international activity, making the Jordanian economy more competitive at the regional and international levels and integrating it with the world economy”.

These measures affected almost everyone, particularly those who most felt the price increase as subsidies on basic goods were removed. The middle class, that was considered to be relatively large in Jordan, diminished greatly during the economic transformation. East Jordanians viewed structural adjustment policies as benefiting ‘Palestinians’ at the expense of East Bankers, since these policies were taking the

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92 Alissa 2007, pp.5-6.
economy towards the private sector, which was dominated by Palestinian-origin Jordanians.93

In April 1989 riots expressing discontent and a rejection of the imposed measures erupted in the southern Jordanian cities of Ma’an and Karak and eventually spread to other parts of the Kingdom.94 Demonstrators expressed discontent with the government, which, for them, was to be blamed for the economic burden the Jordanian people had to bear. The regime was indirectly blamed, by the nationalist South Jordanians, for strengthening one group amongst East Jordanians and ignoring the others. The messages called for the end of corruption and for the renewal of the relationship between the Hashemite Monarchy and the East-Bank/Bedouin communities. Rath observed that “the seriousness of the riots and the broad popular support for democratization made the leadership reconsider its previous policies, and it opted to embark on a cautious programme of political democratisation.”95 By May 1989, a ‘New National Charter’96 was proposed by the King, aiming to redefine state-society relations, as requested by the people, and provide the framework for the further liberalisation of the political process. The King promised that

94 There is a claim of power amongst the tribes in the south of Jordan; they consider themselves the backbone (to the survival) of the Hashemites as they hosted Sherif Ali Ben Al-Hussein in 1916 on his route to Istanbul to liberate the Arabs from the Ottoman rule.
96 The National Charter outlines general guidelines for constructive dialogue between the executive and legislative organs, as well as between decision-makers and political and Intellectual elites concerning questions of authority, rights and responsibility. It enunciates the terms under which political parties can operate—namely, within the framework of the Constitution and free of foreign funding—and also emphasises broad agreement on the need for the political reflection of Jordan’s cultural pluralism. Perhaps most importantly, the Charter has given Jordanian leaders a sense of direction, an insurance policy against outbidding by unrestrained groups, and a degree of predictability in political affairs. It has also eased concerns about the consequences of unbridled freedom of expression. The National Charter, along with the Jordanian Constitution, provides a compass for the national debate on fundamental issues.
there would be more “freedom of the press, increased freedom of expression, and greater freedom for Jordanians to engage in political activities”.  

The events perturbing the political and economic stability did not stop. The return of more than 350,000 migrant workers, a majority of them Palestinian-origin Jordanians, from the Arab Gulf countries after the Gulf War I in 1990-91 increased the burden on the budget. Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq, invading Kuwait, and the promises he gave to help the Palestinians in liberating Palestine, incited enormous support from Palestinians and Jordanians (of both Palestinian and East Jordanian origins). This popular stance provoked the Arab Gulf countries that were supportive of Kuwait and its liberation.

Soon after the invasions all the Palestinians and Jordanians living in the Gulf were expelled; this also included migrant labourers from other nationalities who fled the war in Kuwait to Jordan. Remittances as a percentage of the GNP fell from 1989 to 1990 before coming back strongly after 1992. The pressure on Jordan, with an exacerbated economy, modest natural resources and limited infrastructure, was enormous. The Jordanian economy was hardly able to integrate the abrupt demographic pressure on food, water, land and services.

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97 Greenwood 2003, p.254. The Palestinian West Bankers were eliminated and the number of seats increased for the East Bank to eighty.
98 The drop in 1989 was JD 358.03 m and in 1991 it was JD 306.03 m.
3.2.1 The Peace and its promises

The return of Palestinians from the Gulf coincided with the onset of multilateral peace talks among the Arab countries surrounding the borders of historical Palestine and Israel. The prospect of peace following the Madrid conference in 1991 raised hopes and expectations of a return to Palestine among Palestinian refugees in countries of the Middle East. It raised hopes at the Jordanian local level, aspiring for major development of the Jordanian economy, benefiting the state with multinational investments and creating job opportunities for local Jordanians. At the international community level, it also raised hopes that their funding for the protracted refugee plight represented in their financial support to UNRWA would switch towards supporting state-building in Palestine. The international community, as a result, reduced its funding to UNRWA, leading it to cut down on recruitment, relief programmes, and training of teachers and employees.99

Although this period started off with high hopes and aspirations, it did not take long before it turned into a period of apprehension especially for Palestinians in Jordan: a decrease in UNRWA services and employment opportunities, along with the continued policy of de-Palestinianisation in state-controlled institutions, the limited possibilities to

work in the Gulf, the collapse of peace efforts, and predicaments encountering Palestinian state building.

For Jordan, the peace treaty with Israel starting in Madrid in 1991, which later led to signing bilateral peace agreements between Jordan and Israel in 1994, had the Jordanian regime further organise its domestic politics and to reprioritise its political and economic interests, thereby resituating the Palestinian-origin Jordanians and shaping the Jordanian national identity beyond the Palestinian dimension. As analysed by Nasser, “in the case of the Palestinians in Jordan, Jordan has incorporated [included] both human (Palestinians) and material (land) elements and claimed them to be theirs. Through this process of transformation into Jordanians, the Palestinians as people and land have become invisible and excluded.” This politics widened the fracture between the two peoples and impacted on Palestinians acquiring basic rights as citizens and as refugees. This eventually affected their social and economic life.

Most importantly, the peace treaty opened new doors for international aid and replaced, to a certain extent, the Arab oil money with US money. The peace also raised high hopes for bilateral projects between Jordan and Israel aiming to enhance the economic growth and to assist Jordan with the increasing unemployment rate. A series of agreements were signed between Jordan and Israel in areas such as tourism, transport, air service, environmental protection, textile and garment making (the Qualifying Industrial

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Zones)\textsuperscript{101} and trade.\textsuperscript{102} The peace was also to open up the markets of the Palestinian National Authority (which Israel controlled), through bilateral agreements with the hope of gaining up to US $500 million trade annually.\textsuperscript{103}

Part of the international efforts to normalise the peace and to incorporate Jordan at the globalised level, involved Jordan into the EU-Mediterranean dialogue in Barcelona in November 1995, with the aim of creating a free trade zone between the EU and eight Arab countries (including Jordan). Jordan also became a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 1999. Such agreements moved the country firmly in the direction of an open economy and acceptance of the global norms of economic decision making, thereby reducing the economic options available to the state and increasing the globalised opportunities and investments.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{101} The Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) project establishes garment factories in twelve governorates in Jordan creating work opportunities for local Jordanians in their various locations. The input of Israel has been conditioned to be 13 percent of the product. To reward Jordan for its peace agreement with Israel, the US administration supported Jordan in establishing the (QIZs) two years after signing peace. The QIZ arrangement in Jordan was ratified in the US as an amendment to the already existing US-Israel FTA Implementation Act of 1985 to include exports from geographically circumscribed areas in Jordan- tax free (Kardoosh, M., 2005‘The Aqaba Special Economic Zone, Jordan: a case study of Governance’, Bonn: Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung, p. 8).

\textsuperscript{102} Knowles 2005, p. 82.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
3.2.2 Privatisation

Three major changes pushed Jordan to reconsider its economic strategies by the early 1990s: the end of the Cold War (the two pole donors), the end of the large dollar surpluses of the Arab oil-exporting countries, and the consolidation of the orthodoxy of economic liberalisation. Jordan had to widen its chances in attracting rent through means other than the traditional ones. The intensive efforts of the state through conventional economic reforms since the early 1990s, in stabilising the economy and managing the transition from a state-dominated model to one that is private export led, has failed to find long-lasting solutions to major social and economic challenges facing the country.\(^{105}\)

Most importantly, while neoliberalism called for a lesser role of the state in management and a bigger governance role, “the reality shows the opposite; the government continues to be very big and is dominating almost 45 percent of the GDP including that of public institutions,”\(^{106}\) says Jawad Anani, a former Minister, “it is also a major employer, being the employer of almost one third of the actively employed in Jordan”.\(^{107}\) The dichotomous Palestinian-private sector versus East Jordanian public sector domination had to change and the entrepreneurial culture dominating amongst the Palestinians had to expand to the wider society, in the aspiration of re-moulding the ‘rentier mentality’ that had become embedded in the past decades.

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\(^{105}\) Alissa 2007, p.1.

\(^{106}\) Beiberz, Samah ( 2011) Economists: neoliberalism was not implemented according to its economic definition, in *Al Ghad newspaper*, Market and Money, Sept 26, 2011.

\(^{107}\) *Ibid.*
Until then, the private sector was a homogenised and modest sector. Only a small group of top businessmen, including Shouman, who used to lead the Arab Bank until recently, dominated the Palestinian wealth in the Jordanian economy.\textsuperscript{108} According to estimates, almost 90 percent of intermediate and small commerce was controlled by Palestinian-origin Jordanians.\textsuperscript{109} This is seen in ownership of real estate and commerce. As reported by Reiter, Palestinian-origin Jordanians in the 1990s who returned from Kuwait during the Gulf crisis were the major purchasers of real estate in the large urban centres and the immediate rural periphery (this included lands and lavish houses, \textit{qusur}).\textsuperscript{110} These returnees had a fairly high educational level\textsuperscript{111} and higher entrepreneurial skills if compared to East Jordanians. Upon their return, they realised that the local salaries were low and that the state was unable to secure jobs for them. A relatively large number of them invested their savings in new ventures. About half of these were in commerce that created new neighbourhoods in Amman. Eleven out of 13 private universities established since 1991 are owned by Palestinian-origin Jordanian investors.\textsuperscript{112} Moreover, the building sector prospered with high demand for intermediate goods and for labourers. Estimates consider the flourishing industrial investment to have been stimulated by the capital of the returnees: “the Chamber of Industry, which had recorded an average of 450

\textsuperscript{108} The Arab Bank until 2013, used to be owned and created by Abd’ al Majid Shouman. He is known to provide financial support both for Jordan at the national level and for the Palestinians. In periods of economic distress, for example, he has helped the Jordanian government with loans or by taking action to stabilise the Jordanian Dinar, On the other hand, in February 1969 he founded the Palestinian National Fund and has donated money to Palestinian NGOs such as the Geneva based Welfare Association, which finances Palestinian grassroots organisations in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and within the Arabs Palestinians in Historical Palestine. Reiter 2004, pp. 82-83.

\textsuperscript{109} Reiter 2004, p.78.

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Ibid.}


\textsuperscript{112} Reiter 2004, p.78.

Despite the difficulty encountered by the state upon the return of Palestinian-origin Jordanian migrants, their capital enabled them to quickly ‘integrate’ to the economic life establishing their own private sector firms and to contribute to the increased economic activities with the creation of a wide range of new private sector employment. As Palestinian-origin Jordanians were little dependent on the state they formed “extensive networks of reciprocity and distribution” following the common culture of *wasta* (nepotism), this time among the Palestinian-origin Jordanians and their different classes. Moreover, the change caused by the reduced oil prices and by the private sector culture, which was new to Jordan, demanded new educational skills and generated new professions with the proliferation of software, computer, and internet businesses.  

Other than the momentum created by individuals in the private sector, the state accelerated its privatisation in the late 1990s. The public sector reached out to the private sector (selling state’s assets to local or international investors), for developing and maintaining the infrastructure and setting up major productive projects such as minerals (cement, potash, phosphate), telecommunications, water, electricity, transport - Royal Jordanian (the national airline) - and industrial investments bringing to the market foreign

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113 Central Bank of Jordan in Le Troquer and Al-Qudat 1999, p.43.
115 *Wasta* is part of the exchanged negotiated interests, which was shaped by the patrimonial culture.
direct investments (FDI) to take shares in such service-oriented companies. Slowly the economic adjustment programme and self-reliance by the state started paying off. The private sector has taken a stronger share in the Jordanian economy. The growing entrepreneurship of many Jordanian businessmen and the Jordanian business elite and investors in and out of Jordan have been developing hand in hand with burgeoning economic, social, legislative and regulatory responsibilities of the government. Rather than creating a competitive market, the privatised shares have been sold to selected people with certain capital, status and origin. Furthermore, the international donor agencies have played a major role in helping Jordan increase the share of the private sector in the economy through promoting advocacy skills and creating a business community able to push forward a new agenda of market-oriented policies and practices. This was monopolised by those who have been very close to the regime and who have a clear interest in sustaining the status quo, minimising the distribution of interests to their limited circles. Foreign partnership in multinationals has brought in expertise, new management and operational approaches and has demanded professional skills updated with modernity and accelerated change. The state adopted policy measures to address structural defects in the public sector (monetary and fiscal) and endeavoured to create an enabling environment for private sector participation. Jordanian government companies and the foreign partnership in service oriented firms limited the influence of the Palestinian-origin Jordanian in the private sector, redressing a balance of power.

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118 The US Agency for International Development (USAID) had set a budget to promote this agenda through AMIR (Achievement of Market–friendly Initiatives and results): The AMIR Program is an innovative economic opportunity project funded by the (USAID) implemented in partnership with the Jordanian private sector and government.
between the two parties. The formal private sector has continued to grow slowly and many regulations are yet to be addressed to bring in more investors but also to make this sector a generating engine for job opportunities, which has not yet been the case.

The World Bank in a 2005 report indicated that the private sector accounts for less than 70 percent of GDP in Jordan. “Private sector activity is concentrated in a small number of large firms that have benefited from protective policies, along with a number of microenterprises that account for much of employment but have little access to formal finance, markets, or government support programmes”. The opening up of the Gulf market, by 1996, paid off well with offering labour opportunities, this time, for professional labour migrants who could respond to the globalised markets in the Gulf. The changing market mentality also invited Gulf investors to Jordan, contributing to sustainable economic growth and social development.

This economic liberalisation, which is built on an already existing political and economic rift, has created a “continuum of deservedness”, one which favours some groups in their economic and social forward mobility while inhibiting access for others. The political economy element brought in by the Washington Consensus underlined the need to see the state as a powerful interest group in itself rather than an institution separate from society. “This implied that the actors concerned [the ruling elite and business

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119 Reiter 2004, p.78.
120 World Bank 2005, p. 54.
community] could take advantage of the rents associated with highly interventionist policies, with self-maximising politicians and bureaucrats using their powerful position in society through various forms of corruption”. Meanwhile the aim of neoliberal structural adjustment was to end the excessive intervention of the state in the economy and to overcome rent-seeking and corruption. The liberalisation process in Jordan aimed to undermine the effectiveness and legitimacy of state institutions without seeking to create an accountable apparatus, thus creating a vacuum and producing an environment within which widespread corruption could flourish. "Markets have been transplanted to alien worlds, governed by different norms and rules, and lacking the supporting institutions that took decades or even centuries to develop organically in their original contexts."

Most importantly, institutions of regulatory capitalism were forming: with enforcement of property rights and contracts, the regulations of monopolies, termed by Babb ‘institutions of civil citizenship’ (corresponding to T.H. Marshall): institutions which tax citizens to finance social programmes and public education and regulate firms to guarantee workers’ safety. Further, neoliberal policies, including deregulation and privatisation, managed to transfer power towards private capital (often the monopoly business of the ruling elite) which was concerned primarily with furthering opportunities for accumulation and enhancing economic efficiency and international competitiveness. In light of this, citizens and governments fall into a disadvantaged bargaining position with respect to private and foreign investors: “this is the premise underlying the famous ‘race to the bottom’ so often cited by global justice activists: in their view, today

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124 Onis and Senses 2005, p.269.
125 Babb Sarah, 2005 ‘The social consequences of structural adjustment: recent evidence and current debates, in Annual reviews, No 31, p.204.
governments are competing among themselves to attract foreign investors by providing the lowest taxes and the least stringent labour and environmental regulations". 126 To respond to this at the empirical level, in their report on ‘Job growth without unemployment reduction,’ Razzaz and Iqbal consider that it is the combination of structural reforms and continuing distortions127 that has generated incentives for employers to invest in sectors which are relatively low-wage jobs. They end up being taken by foreign migrants instead and not local labourers.128 Rather than formulating policies to ensure full employment in the private sector and an inclusive social welfare, neoliberalisation added to the general insecuritisation, the destruction of social bonds and the conditions for social cohesion.129 In principle, the ostensible reason for implementing liberalised economic reforms was that they would generate growth, development and a convergence of incomes. In practice, incomes have been dragged down by large external debts (which are the fault of governments, not really Open-competitive markets) and economic growth has failed to trickle down to all citizens and has thus affected the social structure.

3.3 Neoliberalism: Inequality and insecurity

Before 1989, Jordan had little poverty and unemployment. “The inevitable economic collapse dumped 17 percent of the Jordanians into poverty and rendered 20 percent of the

126 Ibid., p.206. – a reference to see http://www.aboutglobalisation.com
127 Labour regulations, tax distortions, remittances, National Aid Fund, etc.
129 Lazzarato 2009, p.11
labour force unemployed”. Although the policy discourse suggested that it was only through liberating market forces that problems such as underdevelopment, poverty and unemployment could be addressed, the implemented economic reforms ignored several aspects of socio-economic dislocation, such as higher costs of living, rising poverty levels, and unemployment. The state, surprisingly, over the last two decades achieved high GDP growth and has been praised for the ‘successful’ reform progress. In August 1996, Dr Al Erian, the Acting Director of the IMF’s Middle East Department, stated that “Jordan continues to make impressive progress under its structural adjustment macroeconomic and structural reform policies, the Jordanian economy has registered a high rate of economic growth, low inflation and increasing foreign exchange reserves”. This acclaimed progress can be justified for two reasons, as explained by Saif: “either that growth was not employment-intensive or the economy was creating jobs that were not in line with the skills and preferences of the Jordanian’s labour force.” Both factors managed to create what is called “jobless growth”.

In light of this, the growing private sector has not been able to become the primary engine of job growth. “Despite the apparent improvement in minimum wage, it has not been respected in practice, and employees are left with little room to manoeuvre or

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131 Alissa 2007, p.7
132 Alissa 2007, Saif and Choucair 2010, Baylouny 2010
135 Ibid.
These jobs are characterised by unacceptable working conditions and a lack of social security or arrangements that safeguard workers’ rights. The probability to work in the private sector as a result is much lower than that in the public sector, despite the lower wages it offers. According to the World Bank report of 2005 on *Oil boom and revenue management*: “the public sector remains a major source of job creation. It is estimated to account for almost a third of employment in the Arab Region.”137 Moreover, the report indicates that public sector employment in Jordan makes up 44 percent out of the employment share;138 meanwhile the wages and salaries make 27.5 of the share of current expenditure.139

The retreat, however, of the Jordanian state from the provision of social services, due to the privatisation of state-owned enterprises and the decline in available jobs, has led to unemployment. Today, unemployment is claimed to be between 12.9 percent at the national level140 to 25 percent (unofficial figure). The highest unemployment rate is among the young generation between 20-24 years old, estimated at 28.7 per cent. These rapidly increasing numbers of young people fail to find matching opportunities for new entrants in the labour market. Those with secondary education who do not go on to higher education represent the greatest problem, followed by those with a high diploma and

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136 Saif and Choucair 2010, p.145.
138 “Historically, Jordan has been a big government country where public institutions and state-owned corporations were the largest employers of the workforce. The old social contract was characterised by state provision of economic security in return for political autonomy and legitimacy from a relatively acquiescent population that had a stake in maintaining the centrality of the state”. (Saif 2007 in Saif, Ibrahim and Tabaa, Yasmeen, 2008 ‘Economic growth, income distribution and the middle class in Jordan (2002-2006), Center for strategic studies Papers, Jordan University , p. 7).
140 DOS 2011
bachelor graduates, accounting for 26 percent of the unemployed.\textsuperscript{141} The growth in the GDP has had no effect on unemployment levels, pushing the unemployed to resort to their informal network. “This process is normally mediated by key notables or influential figures within their society, normally MPs, former ministers or senior bureaucrats.”\textsuperscript{142}

The rise in unemployment and poverty has persisted until today. This has built a positive correlation with poverty and increased inequality that also has amplified in Jordan during the last two decades (at least 15 percent, and possibly up to 30 percent of Jordanians live below poverty line).\textsuperscript{143} For 2008, the Jordan Department of Statistics showed that the percentage of Jordanians living below the poverty line was 13.5, set at JD 553 per capita annual income level, which keeps going up for a population that is today about 6 million.\textsuperscript{144} Using the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality, the improvement in the national distribution of income changed from 0.379 in 1997 to 0.355 in 2006 and to 0.338 in 2008 and 0.354 in 2010, despite economic growth.\textsuperscript{145}

It is worth noting that inequality and poverty are not evenly spread within Jordan. The World Bank study in 2009 indicated, for example, that the poverty rates in governorates such as Mafraq, Karak and Tafihle (desert cities in the south ) are highest; meanwhile

\textsuperscript{141} Saif and Tabbaa 2008, p 6.
\textsuperscript{142} Saif and Choucair 2010, p.147.
\textsuperscript{143} USAID assistance budget for Jordan, found at \url{http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/ane/jo.html}
\textsuperscript{144} \url{https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2046.html}
\textsuperscript{145} World Bank Gini index \url{http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI}. The Gini co-efficient is derived from the Lorenz curve which gives a pictorial representation of inequality through plotting cumulative proportions of the populations or of households, from the poorest to the richest, against the proportions of total income or wealth they hold. The greater the Gini co-efficient, the greater the degree of inequality. A Gini co-efficient of zero represents perfect equality and at the other extreme a co-efficient of one represents maximum inequality (Kirby, Peadar (2000) ‘The Social Impact of Economic Liberalisation: Evidence from Latin America’, in \textit{Trocaire Development Review}, Dublin, p.77).
they are lowest in Amman, Madaba and Irbid (main big urban cities with high density of population, mainly refugees and migrants).\textsuperscript{146} “Priority in development projects is to be put in governorates, those in Amman and other urban cities already have their opportunities”, commented the Jordanian minister of planning Jaafar Hassan in 2011 during a lecture on Development and Inequalities. It is estimated that 19 percent of the rural population is poor, compared to 12 percent of the urban population. Ibrahim Saif, analyses this disparity, explaining that correlation between poverty incidence and demography. This situates the Palestinians studied in this thesis:

> Although few of the residents of Amman are poor, there are more poor people in Amman than in other governorates due to the high population concentration in Amman. In fact, the three governorates with the largest share of poor people (Amman, Irbid and Zarqa), all have low poverty incidence.\textsuperscript{147} Moreover, because the Jordanian population is largely concentrated in urban areas, three quarters have lower poverty incidence than rural areas.\textsuperscript{148}

These three urban big cities have been the main magnet for investors, especially the FDI, which is argued by the state to have made them cities able to generate more jobs and recruit more employees. It has not, however, been mentioned that such multinational firms demand new educational skills and generate new professions with the proliferation of software, computer, and internet businesses.\textsuperscript{149} The chances/opportunities claimed to be generated are either offering very reduced wages, as reported earlier by Razzaz and

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{146} In Saif 2012, p. 73

\textsuperscript{147} Incidence of poverty (headcount index): This is the share of the population whose income or consumption is below the poverty line, that is, the share of the population that cannot afford to buy a basic basket of goods. An analyst using several poverty lines, say one for poverty and one for extreme poverty, can estimate the incidence of both poverty and extreme poverty. For non-monetary indicators, similarly, the incidence of poverty measures the share of the population which does not reach the defined threshold (e.g. percentage of the population with less than 3 years of education).

\textsuperscript{148} Saif, 2012, p.73.

\textsuperscript{149} Le Troquer and Al-Qudat 1999, p.48
\end{footnotesize}
Iqbal, or selecting a certain criteria of people who have acquired, through affluence, certain skills and abilities.

By this, the reform or “neoliberalism has transformed society into an ‘enterprise society’ based on the market, competition, inequality, and the privilege of the individual”. The instrument for enterprise society, Lazzarato argues, is the financialisation of risks and systems of protection through individualising techniques, leaving the individual at the mercy of the market. It is a trend that is ‘unequalising,’ which appears to be the characteristic of the new phase of growth, at least for the foreseeable future. The significance of inequality in a society is the association between an individual’s economic status in the broadest sense of that term and his/her class standing. In common parlance today, as explained in the previous chapter using Weber’s class stratifications, class has been associated with income and wealth differentials, as if being reduced to monetary differentials. Profound disparities are thus scored amongst people who have differences in the quality of life associated with quantitative wealth and income inequalities. Furthermore, purchasing power mirrors existing quantitative disparities of wealth and income. This is another important element, as a form of power, to add to the understanding of the ‘unequalising’ characteristics of today’s neoliberal economic growth.

150 Lazzarato 2009, p.109, Kirby 2000, p.64.  
To synthesise, power, affluence and economic status (usually gained through wealth) are intertwined. This triad, when unattained, ultimately produces “a situation of permanent insecurity and precarity, conditions necessary for the new apparatuses to work”. As shall be elaborated in chapter 5, studying employment and social protection, neoliberalism has widened the gaps between classes and implanted a culture of fear and insecurity amongst people, but especially amongst economically vulnerable classes. Precarity, the very root of the social question of the 21st century as claimed by Castel and Bourdieu, refers to the spread of insecure working and living conditions.

**Conclusion**

The widening gap between economic growth and income distribution, the decline of living standards and increasing inequality, poverty, unemployment and the retrenchment of state intervention (as the big employer) have been features of the last two decades. The structural change which coincided with the reduced flow of rent money altered educational and socioeconomic characteristics of the society.

In this chapter, I argued that the rentier economy depending on aid and remittances encouraged division along national origin lines, as if preparing the ground for further divisions that were widened by neoliberalist policies. The various financing sources over the years “exacerbated separations between the groups, allowing each to live detached

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154 The original meaning of the word precarious is revocable, uncertain or shaky.
from the other and adding an economic dimension to identity.”\textsuperscript{156} Basic citizenship rights and integration grounds have been jeopardised by several factors: the social structure studied in chapter 2; the economic structure especially during the era of neoliberalism; and the afore-explained political background. Reform since economic and political liberalisation in 1989 has failed to address the sociopolitical factors that have strongly influenced economic performance and shaped its outcome.\textsuperscript{157} Most importantly, it has failed to curb tribal influence and power status, clientelistic practices, and the acquired rentierism-mentality over the years. Like an enshrined ‘social contract’ for trading political rights for economic security\textsuperscript{158} that the reform has feared to challenge. Jordan thus sought to maintain patron-client ties with the people: “this expansion of the opportunities for patronage is especially important because of the declining ability of the state to provide the economic benefits that citizens had become dependent upon in the past”.\textsuperscript{159} With little transparency, and no clear emphasis on social equity and unequal distribution of benefits, a strategic alliance between communities of shared interests was formed during the economic adjustment including existing business elites, public officials (politicians or powerful bureaucrats) and quasi-business elites.\textsuperscript{160} The effects of the economic growth were hence manipulated by the ruling elite (of both Palestinian origin and East Jordanians) who benefited from the status quo and sought to consolidate their power through the reform measures.\textsuperscript{161} Thus, rather than trickling down the benefits of growth to the population as a whole, the reform in Jordan was used as a tool to

\textsuperscript{156} Baylouny 2008, p. 281.
\textsuperscript{157} Alissa 2007, p.9, Kanaan and Hanania 2009, p.144
\textsuperscript{158} Baylouny 2010, p.278, Saif and Tabbaa 2008, p.7
\textsuperscript{159} Greenwood 2003, p.251
\textsuperscript{160} Saif and Choucair 2010, p.127
consolidate power and strengthen the legitimacy, shaping a “nepotism-ridden economy”,\textsuperscript{162} that was referred to earlier as \textit{wasta}.

In Jordan, the economic reform made the socioeconomic divisions even worse. The middle class, shaped by the big government employer, was badly squeezed, the rich became richer through the monopolised politics and the suffering of the bottom was palpable, as social protection was weakened with a safety net that was almost non-existent. Stiglitz considers, in his most recent work, \textit{The Price of Inequality} that “one of the darkest sides to the market economy that came to light was the large and growing inequality that has left the social fabric and Jordan’s economic sustainability fraying at the edges: the rich were getting richer, while the rest were facing hardships”.\textsuperscript{163} In such conditions, the sting of inequality is greatly lessened by the very real prospect for every individual of ‘moving up the ladder’ whether between generations or within one generation. “Thus not only is the ‘length of the ladder’ increasing as the degree of wealth and income inequality rises, it is also getting harder to climb the ladder as mobility both upward and downward is decreasing”.\textsuperscript{164} Education and employment are two themes that are thoroughly examined in the following chapters to uncover the inequality and the factors that have rendered climbing the ladder harder for one group more than another.

\textsuperscript{162} Andoni 2000, p.85
\textsuperscript{163} Stiglitz 2012: Preface
\textsuperscript{164} Schutz 2011, p 5.
Chapter Four: A Conduct Effect: What Chances for Education?

4.1 Managing population

David Harvey, in his *Brief History of Neoliberalism*,[^165] writes that a fundamental feature of neoliberalism is the disciplining and disempowerment of the working class; these are the subjects formed by the bio-political dynamic of political-economic transformation. The government, to manage its population within an established power apparatus of domination and subjection, utilises an ensemble of techniques and procedures (e.g. inequality, financial allocations) to direct the conduct of men in order to take account of the probabilities of their action and their relations. Foucault posited that the “government is a strategic relation between governors and the governed whereby the former try to determine the conduct of the latter, and whereby the latter develop practices in order to avoid being governed to minimise being governed, or to be governed in a different way according to different procedures, principles, technologies and knowledge or else in order to govern themselves.”[^166] Both, Harvey in his analysis of the bio-political dynamic of disempowerment and Foucault in his explanation of the impact of the regime’s politics on disempowering subjects, draw an imagined topography of stacked, vertical levels of


power where the state is reaching down into communities in a ‘top-down’ manner to manipulate or plan society -a vertical encompassment that becomes embedded in the routine practices of state bureaucracies.\textsuperscript{167} By this top-down approach, civil society is recruited, implicitly, to serve in the neoliberal transformation of the social.\textsuperscript{168} Education, employment and unemployment are at the intersection of different forms relating to the ‘government of conduct’, its strategies and the encounter /confrontation at both the individual and collective levels: “This outline of cartography of dispositifs\textsuperscript{169} of power provides us with an overview of the domains where different forms and strategies of government are exercised through various technologies.” \textsuperscript{170}

Based on this, neoliberalism can be seen as a discourse, as put by Springer: \textsuperscript{171} “a mutable, inconsistent and variegated process that circulates through the discourses it constructs, justifies and defends.” In his interpretation of neoliberalism as governmentality, Springer acknowledges a procedural character where neoliberalism’s dialogue with existing circumstances emerges via endless failures and successes in the relations between peoples and their socially constructed realities as they are (re)imagined, (re)interpreted, and (re)assembled to influence forms of knowledge through ‘the conduct

\textsuperscript{167} Ferguson, J., & Gupta, A., 2002 Spatializing states: toward an ethnography of neoliberal governmentality. \textit{American ethnologist}, 29(4), p.983

\textsuperscript{168} Civil society here is not the space where autonomy in relation to the state is produced, but the correlate of techniques of government. Civil society thus is part of the modern technology of governmentality, in Lazzarato 2009, p.116.

\textsuperscript{169} Foucault’s term dispositif indicates the set-ups or apparatuses of knowledge-power-subjectivity that conditions, shapes, and constrains everyday actuality, in Hamann Trent H., 2009 ‘Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and Ethics’, in \textit{Foucault Studies}, No 6, p.43.

\textsuperscript{170} Lazzarato 2009, p. 114

of conduct.’¹⁷² This understanding implies that power has a complex, yet very specific form centred on knowledge production via an ensemble of rationalities, strategies, technologies, and techniques, all concerning the mentality of rule that allows for the de-centring of government due to the active role of auto-regulated or auto-correcting selves who facilitate ‘governance at a distance’.¹⁷³

Foucault, within this apparatus of neoliberalism, perceived that every individual is considered to be “equally unequal”: “exploitation, domination and every other form of social inequality is rendered invisible as social phenomena to the extent that each individual’s social condition is judged as nothing other than the effect of his or her own choices and investments”.¹⁷⁴ The following empirical examples in this chapter and the following one, of both education and employment narratives of Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman, provide an empirical analysis of this neoliberal subjectivation by the wider apparatus on the supposedly ‘freely’ chosen practices based on their assumption of responsibilities for themselves. Thus, within the same neoliberalist claim of freely chosen practices, the subject is made accountable for his failure, Hamann posits that:

“An individual’s failure to engage in the requisite processes of subjectivation, or what neoliberalism refers to as a ‘mismanaged life’, is consequently due to the moral failure of that individual. Neoliberal rationality allows for avoidance of any kind of collective, structural, or governmental responsibility for such a life even as examples of it have been on the rise for a number of decades. Instead, impoverished

¹⁷² Ferguson & Gupta, 2002
¹⁷⁴ Hamann 2009, p.43
populations, when recognised at all, are often treated as ‘opportunities’ for investment”.  

According to this, the model neoliberal citizen is one who manages to adapt the entrepreneurial mind-set and strategies among social, political and economic options/chances: “neoliberalism strives to ensure that individuals are compelled to assume market-based values in all of their judgments and practices in order to amass sufficient quantities of ‘human capital’ and thereby become ‘entrepreneurs themselves’.”

In this chapter, I will demonstrate how politics of neoliberalism cornered—and not really encouraged — Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman, the case study of this thesis, into engaging in self-forming practices of subjectivation, by making them abide by the implicitly imposed rule of the regime through processes of social subjectification or what can be seen as self-regulation. The aim is to understand how the various techniques, of the governor and the governed, are articulated and how these different types of knowledge work within the range of dispositifs and the wider operation of power.

The first part of the chapter will study the educational opportunities that were possible for Palestinian-origin Jordanians in former times. This will demonstrate the elements that encouraged Palestinians to focus on education and on upward mobility in order to develop and to economically integrate. In this section, the stages of the educational

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175 Ibid., p. 44. The investment refers to the high interest rates increasingly attached to micro-credit issues to poor ‘entrepreneurs’ in the developing world.

176 Ibid., p.38
system in Jordan will be reviewed, showing the main actors providing education for the
refugee-citizens.

The second part, in its two sections, demonstrates the impact of both discursive political
measures and neoliberalist politics affecting the opportunities for the Palestinian-origin
Jordanians of East Amman to pursue basic education or upgrade to university education.
This part demonstrates the changes that affected the attitudes and the experience of the
Palestinian-origin Jordanians towards education as a basic citizenship right. Both
regional and local politics in the early 1990s played a major role in articulating the
conduct of Palestinian-origin Jordanians, especially those with limited means and capital.
This shifted their perception towards education from being a basic right to a privilege
reserved only to certain social classes. Economic liberalisation further shifted education
into a new phase, that of commodification, whether that of school or university education.

The third part disentangles the chances /limitations that have been addressed by the
Palestinian-origin Jordanians and relate them to the way East Jordanians living in the
same neighbourhoods perceived them in their upward mobility. Both peoples perceived
chances differently and also manoeuvred their capitals to attain their self-sufficiency
differently. This weakened the perception of education as a right and made it appear as a
means that does not necessarily always secure upward mobility.
4.2 Education: Still possible?

In an article written in 1973 about *Educating a Community in Exile: the Palestinian experience*, Ibrahim Abu Lughod argued that “despite dismemberment of Palestine and the eviction of its majority, the Palestinians seem to have continued to make progress educationally and ultimately to make contributions to themselves as a people and to the Arab World in general.”\(^\text{177}\) He elucidated four main reasons that enabled Palestinians to attain remarkable educational records: 1. The way Arab countries facilitated access to educational facilities as they were expanding their own facilities; 2. The “objective alteration in the *milieu*” which situated a majority of Palestinians in urban environments, positioning them within reach of the more available and more attractive urban educational facilities and opportunities; 3. Education, for Palestinians, had become the single most important avenue for sustainable progress and ultimately, for social and economic mobility, after losing their territorial power in Palestine and their normal institutions; 4. The realisation that they needed to compete for employment positions within the Arab market pushed them to stay longer at school to achieve as high a level of education as possible.\(^\text{178}\) Abu Lughod supported his argument with some estimates indicating that “two thirds of all Jordanians until 1967 were Palestinians residing either on the West or the East Bank”.\(^\text{179}\) He went on to elaborate that the ratio amongst Palestinians, before and after 1948, was higher in school attendance amongst Palestinians in Jordan.


\(^{178}\) Ibid.

\(^{179}\) Ibid., p. 98
Education has been a major agent for empowering the Palestinian people in exile in three ways: through preserving and safeguarding their national identity, through sustaining the functional role of the society, and through protecting the social structure. Over the years, and supported by the factors enumerated by Abu Lughod, there has been a positive correlation between education and personal/professional development; individuals take advantage of accessible education, especially when education can enhance occupational mobility. The impact of education is not only limited to professional achievements, it is also seen in the quality of life and the establishment of aspirations to grow and access superior occupations.

In contrast to the years of plenty and economic growth which have much benefitted Palestinians for forward thrust addressed earlier by Abu Lughod, in this chapter I will study the times when financial and political circumstances changed. The enabling environment was no longer dominant and, as shall be shown in the following sections, people with limited resources and social capital had to re-prioritise their everyday strategies in order to adapt to the needs and the opportunities of the market. Moreover, political events hindered the support given to the Palestinian refugees’ education, decreased the financial assistance to UNRWA and affected the quality of the services provided.
4.2.1 Education in the good old days

Since its establishment Jordan invested highly in education and the development of human capital to drive its economy and to compensate for its poor natural resources. As a result, enrolment rates amongst Jordanian citizens have improved significantly across all socioeconomic groups and gender. Palestinian-origin Jordanians as citizens have benefitted from this type of politics, gaining rights to access basic and secondary education at the government schools. In addition, their refugee status has given these Jordanian citizens more options to choose from, especially when the schools are within the proximity of their households - whether government or UNRWA schools.

The educational role played by both UNRWA and the Jordanian government has been vital in facilitating a transformation in the educational and occupational profiles for second and third generation Palestinian-origin Jordanian citizen-refugees of both genders, whether in basic school education, secondary education, vocational education, or post-secondary/tertiary education (such as junior teacher training). During the years of plenty (1960-1980s), it enabled generations of young Palestinian refugee-citizens to achieve what Rosenfeld calls an “educational advantage” over their peers in the Arab host countries, an advantage which persisted for several decades. This advantage enabled them to grow, seeking to integrate in the wider economy beyond the borders of Jordan, especially with the expanding opportunities in the Gulf labour market. This ultimately

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180 Kanaan and Hanania 2006, p.147.
stimulated the Jordanian market. The advantage was not limited to education services; it also applied to scholarships made available by UNRWA to study in local universities. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation also played a major role in supporting education. The following case of Ghazi K., with his simple reflections on the past, is a good example of this.

Ghazi K., who was brought up in al-Wihdat refugee camp and then al-Naser refugee camp, is today an affluent and well-established owner of a commercial publishing firm and date-farm owner. He is 50 years old and talks about his educational past and his failure. He admits that he was not much into formal education and he grades were always bad. It was the vocational training at UNRWA Vocational Training Centre (VTC) that managed to build something of his hobby in calligraphy and shape his artistic skills:

“It is due to the German trainers at UNRWA’s VTC- industrial branch whom are credited for teaching me how to work with wood and calligraphy (…) In the old days [the years of plenty], because of its expatriate staff or its refugee staff who were trained abroad, UNRWA educational level was much higher than the government schools and much more renown in supporting students to compete at the national level. The teacher/trainer then had power and strong presence in the classroom, he also felt accountable to the Palestinian plight in his teaching mission, and was surely paid more than the public school teachers. This mattered lots in the quality of education I got, today this professionalism and belief are almost non-existent” (Case no 2, Mqablein (work place), Nov 17, 2011)

In Jordan, in addition to public government and private schools all over the governorates of the Kingdom, UNRWA schools have provided basic education (only 10 school years) applying the same Jordanian curriculum as the government schools. UNRWA schools are all over the main big cities in Jordan, usually serving dwellers of refugee camps, whether registered Palestinian refugees, or Palestinian displaced. They have also been present in

182 In 2000, the university scholarship programme was funded by the Samir Hamadeh programme for Jordan. Other recent donors include Japan, the European Union, the Arab Gulf Programme for United Nations Development Organizations (AGFUND) and the Said Foundation (http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=90) accessed 13 May 2010.

183 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), during the cold war, used to support the PLO granting scholarships for Palestinians, mainly affiliated with the PLO, to get their higher education in the various countries of the USSR.
areas known to have received high numbers of registered refugees (Jordanian citizens) such as Jabal al-Nadheef and Jabal al-Mareekh, Bayader Wadi El Sir, and other areas dense with Palestinian refugees-Jordanian citizens. Students attending UNRWA schools until the 10th grade are expected, after they finish their basic education, to continue to secondary education by joining government schools or private schools for academic branches, or by joining vocational centres. These latter are provided by both the government and UNRWA (Bayader Wadi el Ser VTC that is vocational-oriented for two years after basic education).
Fadia, 54 years old, Gazi K. eldest sister who works now with her brother in the business, taught for thirty years at UNRWA after having had her teaching diploma from Naour teachers training centre, “which was a boarding school then, where I spent two years 1974-1976 away from home (which then was Wihdat refugee camp). Accommodation, food and transportation (every weekend to go and see the family), were all provided for us by UNRWA. Today, the centre cannot afford to host students with the budget constraint. The college has been transformed into a university

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184 Naour teachers’ Community College used to be only for girls preparing them with specialized diplomas in school teaching. It was not long ago that it was licensed to become a university and to provide University degrees.
college that awards a bachelor of education degree after four years of studies.” Fadia recalls positively the experience of boarding education, the chance that was given then to refugee women through education and employment opportunities that empowered her to be a major partner in financial contribution within the household. She was not only able to support the household with her regular salary but also with her retirement compensation from work, that enabled her to support her son to open a business after having failed his high school exams in public school. (Case no 2, Mqablein (work place), Nov 17, 2011)

Figure 16: Gross Enrolment Rates in Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Education 1971-2011

The economic boom of the 1960-1980s trickled down to everyone in the society. The state was investing heavily in education that was shaping up the human capital of the working generations-to-be. Remittances sent back improved living conditions and were also invested in education, especially higher education, at the micro-household level. The middle class had hence widened as a consequence of the welfare state, economic growth and the service-oriented national economy.\(^{185}\)

\(^{185}\) Saif Ibrahim and Tabaa Yasmeen, 2008 ‘Economic growth, income distribution and the middle class in
Because of financial support from his father who went to Saudi Arabia since the early 1960s who used to send the family money that provided them with good quality of life, Hisham, today 42 years old, was able attend primary school education at UNRWA, moved then to secondary government school to get his Tawjihi and later attended university education. “I was not asked by my family to quit school and to work and provide for the family, like many young men in the camp, who did not have another source of income and had to leave school to work and generate money to eke out a living.” Talking to Hisham, he sees himself as a successful product of the refugee camp of al-Naser. “I think we had dreams and worked hard to achieve them, meanwhile the current young generation in the camp are but an example of failures! (.....) We used to live in Jabal al-Naser and today we live in Khalda.186 My brothers and I got our university education and we are into business (....) It was never easy for us to make it, we failed sometimes and made it most other times. I had a jewellery shop in Jabal al-Naser commercial area in mid 1990s but lost my investments with a bad partner. I had to start all over again and bought a shop where now I sell mobiles and related services.” (Case 54, Jabal al-Naser, June 11, 2011)

During the years of plenty, as explained in the earlier chapter, citizens in Jordan benefitted from the opportunity of the Oil Boom, the state also benefitted from the flow of aid. The case of Hisham reflects the impact of this flow of money on him and his brothers and their ability to move up the ladder and to grow professionally and socially in the society away from the refugee camp.

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186 A new residency for middle-upper class created at the aftermath of the Gulf war and the invested revenues.
4.2.2 Education: A class issue

Since the early 1990s, “education has become a class issue, not anymore obligatory as it is claimed to be,” commented a young man in his early 30s in the camp. The “educational advantage” of the Palestinian refugees over their peers in the Arab States and over non-refugee Palestinians, during the years of the 1960s and 1980s, declined gradually as the economy turned sour. Several factors perturbed the education-employment-social mobility advantage nexus formed in the earlier years: International and regional events by the late 1980s-early 1990s had strongly impacted the financial aid supporting Palestinian refugees, whether through UNRWA or through the PLO. The Gulf War in 1991 did not only halt the flow of aid money from the Arab Gulf countries but also closed an important labour market for Palestinian-origin Jordanians. The return of migrants from the Gulf as a result of the Gulf War that forced 350,000 migrants back to Jordan created a demographic pressure; not only on the state but also on UNRWA as a result of the increased numbers seeking to enrol in its schools. These financial factors were detrimental to the quality of UNRWA educational services especially with the peace process prospects which had put hope to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and thus diverted aid money to the Palestinian nation-building. So while UNRWA services were in deterioration, there was massive investment by Arab Governments in basic, secondary and higher education at that time, which gave rise to a consistent improvement in

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187 FG 3, Jabal al-Naser, Oct, 24, 2011
educational attainments throughout the region and slowly increased average enrolment rates.

The continuous decrease in the financial resources made available to UNRWA by the international community “prevented the Agency from developing and upgrading its education facilities and forced it to confine expenditures almost only to teachers’ salaries and maintenance, thereby yielding a standstill and even retrogression in educational achievements”. 188 In a September 2013 interview with Addustour daily newspaper in Amman, the Director of the Department of Palestinian Affairs, Mahmoud Akrabawi, explained that the yearly budget of UNRWA for the Kingdom was 75 million dollars during the years 2012 and 2011. The Jordanian Prime Minister’s pressure on some donor countries from the international community managed to increase the budget for the year 2013 to 122 million dollars. “Of such a budget, 80 percent would be allocated to salaries of employees which exceed 7500 administrative staff, 5500 teachers and only 20 percent is put on services and relief.”189

The deterioration in the quality of UNRWA education has been reflected in all its services including the training of teachers, reductions in their salaries and an increase in the class sizes (classes often exceed 55 students). Due to budget constraints UNRWA had to shift into yearly basis contracts (to avoid paying employee retirement). This further weakened the quality of teaching and permitted a high turnover amongst staff, especially

188 Rosenfeld 2010, p.316
189 Addustour daily, September 23, 2013, Interview with the Director of the Department of Palestinian Affairs in a discussion with Addustour: ‘Akrabawi: the Hashemite care is the only way to safeguard Al-Aqsa Mosque from destruction and judaisation’, page 12.
with the apparent salary difference with employees working in the government and private sectors.

The short-term recruitment of teaching staff and the reduced salaries (that were no longer as competitive) worked against the pupils and their educational attainment. The demotivation of school teachers and headmasters by the salaries that hardly cover their living costs have resulted in the continued deterioration in the attainment level of students. By this, “UNRWA’s capacity to advance the educational achievements of Palestinian refugee children and youth is being constantly eroded. The bifurcation of the Agency’s services into ‘regular’ and ‘emergency’ channels, both completely dependent on voluntary contributions from international donors, and therefore both vying for increasingly limited funding sources, further undermines UNRWA’s ability to sustain and develop its education services”.

The educational attainment of Palestinian refugees – Jordanian citizens residing in camps, according to a quantitative study conducted by Fafo (Institute for Applied International Studies) in 1996, was lower than that of Jordanians residing elsewhere in Jordan (whether of Palestinian origin or not) and while almost all children started school, irrespective of refugee status, children in camps more often finished their education at a lower level. In their quantitative research conducted for 2002, Fafo posited that while at a national level 58 percent have completed basic education or less, 76 percent of the camp residents

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190 Rosenfeld 2010, p.289.
have not extended their education beyond basic schooling.\textsuperscript{192} The chart below based on Fafo’s recent survey shows that enrolment (for 2012-13) was at the highest for children aged seven to nine, as close to 99 percent of children in this age group attended basic schooling. Children start dropping out of school from age ten \textsuperscript{193} and then this increased rapidly from the age of 12.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Chart Current school enrolment amongst Palestinian-origin Jordanians in refugee camps and surrounding areas, by age. Percent of all individuals aged 6-24}
\end{figure}

Source: Tiltnes and Zhang 2013

The weak basic educational system at UNRWA indicates the strikingly widened gap of the illiteracy rate in 2013\textsuperscript{194} between the camp refugee children enrolled at school or not enrolled at school. “Close to 90 percent of refugee children aged 6-9 not in school were unable or had difficulties to read or write, while only 29 percent of same age group of children currently enrolled in schools reported so. Furthermore, 60 percent of 10-12 years


\textsuperscript{194} As functional illiteracy, that is unable or difficult to read or write.
old and 35 percent of 13-15 years old camp refugee children not enrolled in school were reported to be functionally illiterate, compared to a range of 7 percent - 2 percent of same age groups of children in school who had difficulties to read or write.\textsuperscript{195} In their earlier survey for 2002, Fafo marked the relationship between illiteracy and poverty indicating a general trend amongst poor not to send their children to schools or to cause them to drop out school education at a younger age.\textsuperscript{196}

The following is a breakdown from the Jordanian Ministry of Education indicating the number of schools in Jordan and number of enrolled students. Only the breakdown of UNRWA schools would reflect the number of registered Palestinian refugee children who could also be holders of the Jordanian nationality or could only be holders of a temporary travel document- not connoting citizenship (the case of the West Bankers and the Gaza refugees). The figures of enrolment in public and private schools indicate Jordanian citizens (this encompasses holders of Palestinian refugee status, and East Jordanians).

\begin{itemize}
\item The Ministry of Education (MOE) reports that in 2007/2008 there were 3,053 basic education schools, of which 2,137 under MOE, 16 under other governmental authorities (such as the Ministry of Defence), 176 run by UNRWA and 724 in the private sector. A total of 1,904 schools were co-educational, 782 were schools for boys and 367 were girls’ schools. The total enrolment was 1,297,905 students (664,174 boys and 633,731 girls), of whom 914,937 students in schools administered by MOE, 246,545 in the private sector, 122,068 under UNRWA and 14,355 students in schools run by other governmental authorities. In 2008/09, the net enrolment ratio at the basic education level (age group 6-15 years) was estimated at 97.6 percent (97.5 percent for boys and 97.7 percent for girls). The survival rate to grade 5 was 99 percent (98.8 percent for boys and 99.2 for girls) in 2007/08. Basic education drop-out rates are minimal (an average of about

\textsuperscript{195} Tiltines and Zhang 2013, p. 160
\textsuperscript{196} Khawaja and Tiltines 2002, pp. 77-78
0.4 percent) (Ministry of Planning 2010). According to the World Bank, the transition rate to secondary education was 79 percent in 2005-2006. 197

I. Why drop out of school?

In three different focus groups held with young men ranging between 20 and 40 years old in the refugee camp of Jabal al-Naser, more than half did not finish basic education (FG 1,2,7). As reflected by them, the general impression upon leaving school, whether UNRWA or government schools they attended in East Amman, was the quality of education, the lack of follow-up concerning the progress of pupils/their attendance and the violent atmosphere created between teachers/headmasters and pupils. So while UNRWA schools have been affected by the reduced budget, government schools in East Amman have been affected by neglect and marginalisation. One saw that “the school is like a juvenile prison (islahieh)”, 198 describing in short the violence brought in by the pupils in crowded classes and the aggressive educational staff. Young men at the focus groups talked about the anxiety such educational set-up was offering to them: “There was a problem literally every five minutes in the class.” 199

Some in the focus group stated that “being at school would mean being exposed to dangers and to violence that would either make you get involved or be reserved and run away”. 200 Another young man claimed “although I went to UNRWA school until the age


199 FG 6, Jabal al Naser, May 25, 2010
200 Ibid.
of 12, until I clashed with one of the teachers and I dropped out of school, I can barely today read and write”, indicating that the school teachers were unable to control the high numbers of students in the class, and to follow up on their achievements and progress, each according to his/her ability.

A comment from one young man illustrated the deteriorated management at UNRWA: “The school day would sometimes have one or two classes and then we go home, due to teachers’ absence”. The two shifts, imposed as a result of UNRWA budget cuts, rendered the hours of each shift to be limited only to five in the morning and five in the evening (including breaks and pauses between classes). According to Tamer, “the quality of teachers/managers of schools accounts for 10 percent of the drop out reasons.” The quality of services, broken desks and hygiene was also brought up in their complaints about UNRWA and government schools. Raghda B., a former director of a community centre in Jabal al-Nadheef, expressed her concern about the use of batons and metal sticks by the teachers in both UNRWA and government schools in that area to regulate the over-crowded classes: “evading school in such circumstances becomes normal and acceptable!” said Raghda in Jabal Al-Nadheef.

Boys tend to drop out of basic schooling earlier than girls, and their enrolment rates are generally lower than the enrolment rates for girls. The main reasons reflected by the two Fafo surveys of 2002 and of 2012 are lack of interest that is linked with failure, dis-

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203 Ibid.
204 Interview: Jabal al-Nadheef, July 28, 2009.
satisfaction because of bad treatment / violence at school, and poverty, which is linked to
domestic duties/responsibility to support family and social restrictions (e.g. parents not
wanting their girls to go to school and be exposed to the street dangers). The drop out
age for females is usually higher than males: While boys drop out at the age 12-15 years
old, girls drop out at the age 14-17 due to domestic responsibilities, social restrictions and
marriage.

Financial means were also perceived as a major impediment to pursue secondary
education in government schools. After finishing basic education from UNRWA and
getting upgraded to government secondary schools, two financial issues usually take
precedence: the yearly school fees, that do not exceed 3 Jds (US$5) but are considered to
be a burden, and the transportation fees, especially when secondary schools are not within
close proximity to the residence.

After finishing basic education (age 16), students are expected to get
enrolled in secondary education. Jamil 39 years old now, car mechanic,
had to drop out of school after finishing his basic education because “my
father could not secure 15 piasters (US 50 cents) for my transportation
every day to school. The only government secondary school in Jabal al-
Naser was burnt just a year before finishing my basic education. I had thus
to go to the secondary school in Jabal Al Taj, about 15 km away from
Jabal Al-Naser. To pay for a service car return trip daily,205 when the
financial income of my father was very unstable during the first intifada,
made the idea of going to secondary school almost impossible.” His father
is a service car driver taking passengers to the Bridge between the East
Bank and the West Bank on the River Jordan. “It was the most stagnant
time for us in the family during the first Intifada. There were no
passengers going to Palestine, except for rarely and we had thus no income
coming from the service taxi.” (FG 2, 24 Oct. 2011 Jabal Al-Naser.)

205 Service cars are taxis that serve more than one passenger. They are like buses, in that they have a tariff
and routes assigned to them by municipalities. In Amman, they usually circulate in centre and East
Amman. The projected cost in a service car is much cheaper than in a taxi.
The quality of education in UNRWA and government schools has been a concern. The dense classes in both schools and the minor attention paid to the way teacher treat their students have demotivated young students from pursing their education. The proximity of the government schools, whether for basic or secondary education, as an alternative to UNRWA has been another issue of concern that deterred young students from education.

Financial conditions, poverty and the need have pushed these young men into the labour market as soon as they were able to assume responsibility for the household with whom they were living. The table below, from Fafo quantitative study for 2013, indicated the financial status of the household and the way it influences enrolment to schools.
Figure 18: Profile of children in camp aged 6-15 not in school, by gender, household income and education of household head.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Not in school</th>
<th>In school/ completed basic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boy</td>
<td>53,7</td>
<td>51,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girl</td>
<td>46,3</td>
<td>49,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual per capita household income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest income</td>
<td>42,1</td>
<td>34,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low income</td>
<td>23,0</td>
<td>26,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle income</td>
<td>18,0</td>
<td>21,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income</td>
<td>11,5</td>
<td>12,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest income</td>
<td>5,4</td>
<td>5,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of household head</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not complete any schooling</td>
<td>30,5</td>
<td>11,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>26,6</td>
<td>18,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory/ Basic</td>
<td>29,3</td>
<td>38,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>7,9</td>
<td>11,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-secondary education</td>
<td>5,7</td>
<td>19,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiteracy rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-9 years old</td>
<td>88,8</td>
<td>29,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12 years old</td>
<td>59,9</td>
<td>6,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-15 years old</td>
<td>35,4</td>
<td>2,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>2292</td>
<td>46495</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tiftnes and Zang 2013.

In another focus group discussion with young Jordanian men of Palestinian-origin ranging between 18 and 22 years old, some who had failed school, others who were still trying, there was a dominant view that appreciation of education is a culture that they lacked, especially in East Amman where studying or going to school is not supported by
surrounding family members nor by the employment prospects ahead of them. One commented rationally about his reality within East Amman; he is 21 years old:

“We simply have no mentor, no guidance: our fathers are not educated having had to work since they came to Jordan with their parents after the war [the generation of al-Nakba], the education for them has not been a priority. The teachers at schools are not even related to the educational role they are assuming and are very ruthless. I had to drop out school and go to work …. and I regret it and I admit this was a wrong decision, but who could have guided me to the right decision when I was only 14 years old?” (FG3, Jabal al-Naser, Oct 24, 2011).

The Fafo 2013 survey proved the strong correlation between the head of the household and the education of the children, the one who could be a role model to advise the child and put direct explicit pressure on them to pursue their education. “The children with uneducated parents were more likely to drop out of school early. As many as 57 percent of the camp refugee households with children aged 6-15 not in school had a household head not completed basic education, while among the families with children in school, 70 percent of the household head completed basic or higher education, 20 percent completed post-secondary education.” Gassan, interviewed in the high street of Jabal al-Naser camp, despite his success and ability to progress, succeeding in his high school exams and getting an average as high as 92 (out of 100), Gassan chose to be in the market to make a living rather than pursuing his higher education.

A 36 year old vegetable vendor in Jabal al-Naser, Gassan decided to join the labour market and not to continue his education. Today, a father of two children enrolled in private schools and married to a woman with a high school degree, argues that “our parents have a retarded mentality, having lived the harshness of poverty and dispossession, they hence saw that we,
the young generation, should take over their roles, as bread-winners, in work as soon as we grow” (Case No 36, Jabal al-Naser, Aug.17, 2010).

Educational levels and awareness amongst young men interviewed in Jabal al-Naser who were interviewed in their coffee-shops, camp improvement committee and clubs, have been different to those of young men interviewed in Jabal al-Natheef in community centres. The latter group had been affiliated since a young age with a cultural and social community centre in their district. Al-Ruwwad is a community centre created through a social responsibility cooperation initiative addressing social, cultural and financial needs for the youth. Al-Ruwwad community centre, with its multiple activities has been able to create a discussion environment which enables analysis and self-critique amongst the young. Over the years this has created a healthy atmosphere where the affiliated students seek to do something different, trying to enhance their life chances in a variety of ways. While both young men interviewed for this research, come from quasi-similar economic conditions and similar parental educational backgrounds, the community centre at Jabal al-Natheef has implicitly shaped dreams amongst its affiliates, making them appreciate the effects of education on the way they deal with everyday life. Most importantly, the scholarship component in Al-Ruwwad, the Musaab Khorma scholarship scheme for university education has surely given a boost to students to excel and to compete for the available scholarships given on an early basis for exceptional students with university acceptance. At Jabal al-Naser area, grassroots or NGO work is almost non-existent. In contrast, young men are usually immersed in the everyday economic hustle and bustle of the busy markets.
II. Education: Priorities and chances

Easterly argues that “in a stagnant economy without incentives to invest in the future, students will goof off in the classroom or sometimes not show up at all, parents will often pull their children away to work on the farm and teachers will while the time away as overqualified babysitters”. As shown earlier, the case of the Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman reflects the impact of deteriorated educational systems in a stagnant economy where education stops being seen as a chance to grow upward and to develop, especially in the absence of a motivation factor and a mentor. Students, as a result, have shied away from education and diverted their interests towards making ends meet through generating money the quickest way possible in order to secure extra income. Moreover, the constraints of an economy in a society with structured divisions of class, status and origin, as explained by the majority of the young Palestinian-origin Jordanians of inner Amman, annihilates any incentives to see the future through an educational path. So education stops being an investment for a better future and becomes a waste of time and money. When they consider the impediments they will encounter when seeking new opportunities and the competition with people with higher chances to study and to secure work through the existing clientelistic system, particularly in the formal sector, these young people, do back off.

A majority of young men interviewed in Jabal al-Naser and al-Natheef of Palestinian-origin Jordanians strongly believed their educational degree will not pay off. The time, money and effort will be wasted and the end result will be for them to be in the informal sector.

Salem left school at the age 10. He had a violent fight with his school teacher and left school. His father has been a car mechanic and has had a garage in al-Wihdat (the industrial part on the fringe of the al-Wihdat refugee camp). He chose to work with the colleague of his father who has car painting garage near his father’s shop: “My father and I could not work in the same shop because this would mean no money to both of us when the market is down and there is not enough clients for one shop. He helped me hence to work with his colleague”. Salem does not regret quitting school and does not see the use of attending school. “I am a professional car painter today. I make 500 Jds (US $ 700) a month if the season is well provided that there is work every day. Sometimes my income can come down to JD 300 (US $ 423) because of the competition in the market and the low season”. He even feels bad for those who attended school, he says “the school teacher, Mureed M. (who was with us in the FG and the only educated person with a university degree) makes 350 JD (US $500) a month and has some incentives (medical insurance and social security). But, because of his limited network, he has been sent to a remote school in a governorate outside Amman where half of his salary is spent on transportation”. The freedom of time and choice, according to him is a ‘bless’ the educated ones do not enjoy. He also feels bad for his sister who studied at a community college and spent seven years moving from one private school to another being paid between 90-120 Jds in West Amman. “The money would not cover transportation for her to go and come back from work”. She used to quit every time she would realise that her finances are so limited. She is now married and the choice of work is eliminated from her mind” (FG 2, al-Naser, Oct 24, 2011)

While education in the years of plenty was available for every citizen on an equal basis within the state welfare apparatus, the situation changed when the economy worsened; the quality of UNRWA education continued to deteriorate, while the government school
education, despite the fact that it witnessed a large investment in upgrading its educational system, does not seem to have better structure in East Amman areas. A widening disparity built up. Despite neoliberalism which claimed equality and generating more opportunities, education has been used as a subtle tool to practise the politics of divisiveness, not only between the West and the East of Amman but also between schools within the one area, especially after the 1990s. The quality of education was widening amongst different schools at a time when private sector schools were making their ways slowly through. These “quality differences among schools are not merely random, but mainly a direct function of differences of income and wealth of the families of students attending.”

Most importantly, as these changes were happening, the living expenses slowly increased and the financial burdens in each household increased. As a result, households were exploring their chances for higher income and basic social welfare.

Mamdouh (40 years old) left school when he was 9 years old and started working with his father. He is now married and has five children. He has a major lump in his leg so he is quite weak to work on his own. The work he does involves his wife and the rotation of his two eldest kids 7 and 8 years old to sell the prepared food. At 4 am, his wife sets off to prepare the dough and to fry the thin dough, making light rounded fried crackers. At 6 am, the first box of crackers must be ready for Said, 8 years old to take it and stand in front of schools in Al-Naser to sell it to early morning-shift pupils. The father takes another box to sell it at the camp amongst vegetable vendors in the main road of al-Naser camp. During the school morning shift Said will need to be completely available for selling at schools (UNRWA and government schools in the camp and outside), then at the traffic lights, especially that there is a main junction connecting several main roads and have heavy traffic. His brother Rami would then be attending the morning shift. By 1 pm, they would swap, with Rami taking over and Said going to school. “It becomes really serious when sometimes both kids are put in one shift. I need always to go to the headmistress to explain to her this is not possible because I need one of the boys to help

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me with work. The problem is that by law, they are not permitted to work and the headmistress does not accept that I have them work with me. This last month for example, she has put the two boys together in the afternoon shift. I asked them to stop going to school completely because this headmistress does not understand our priorities.” (FG 2, Jabal al-Naser, Oct. 24, 2011)

Education, for quite a large number of those I interviewed among Palestinian-origin Jordanians in East Amman, does not appear to be a major priority. For Mamdouh, education, as long as it does not contradict with work, is acceptable. The moment it creates a challenge for his work, his income and his dignity, rather than go and plead with the headmistress for understanding the need for one of the children to do out of school shift working, he simply chooses to have them drop out of school.

Education, as perceived by the young students interviewed, is part of a package that requires certain ingredients: education-employment-social mobility that has exigencies beyond their limited financial and social capitals. Their limitations and lack of attention to their deteriorated educational status have shaped their conduct by restricting their mobility and immersing them in the reality that exceeds their ability to resist the bigger apparatus. These limitations have restricted them from focusing on their own ability to encounter the marginalisation and the politics of their invisibilisation. Their rights as citizens have been blurred by limitations and politics; as these “successfully integrated refugees seem uninteresting to many academics and practitioner institutions because they ‘don’t need help’”. 209 Their legal status as citizens have obscured their social citizenship rights which in reality have been accessed with hurdles.

209 Polzer 2008, p.477
In addition, the educational system has been an important institution of cultural power which suggests that it is implicated in sustaining the class system. Even if the connections seem less obvious, the education system is not disconnected in its operation from the larger system of class power, providing a stratification of quality, of classes and of embedded politics. This variation, of government schools, of private schools (especially established after the 1990s) and of UNRWA schools (which have been majorly affected by the budget decrease) - (see chart below), has been an indicator of differences in class and status. It is like if the society has been divided into circles and districts, with each having access to certain educational services, with the aim of shaping the children of each district into a certain professional path. Only exceptions, in this kind of apparatus, would stand out, proving themselves against the majority others. The case of Amer is a clear example:

Figure 19 : Chart: Schools by Authority of Supervision, 2010-2011 (DOS 2011)

57% Ministry of Education, 1 % Other Government, 3 % UNRWA, 39% Private Education

Source: Tiltines and Zang 2013
Amer, 17 years old, in Jabal Al-Naser, today a distinguished student in the Jubilee school, a school that seeks dedicated gifted distinguished students on a yearly basis from UNRWA and government schools all over the kingdom. “I have been dreaming to become a vet since I was at UNRWA schools. Yes, there are lots of aggression and a violent environment at UNRWA schools in the camp, but I used to distance myself and mind my own business.” His high grades and studious work have paid off in him being selected to be part of the Jubilee School. He believes it is not the quality of school that would matter in shaping aspirations for education, it is what the person wants to make out of himself: “regardless if we live in the refugee camp or we live in the wealthy part of the city, it is our dreams that can take us where we want.” (Case 56, Jabal al-Naser, Aug. 17, 2012).

Amer is a hopeful case in the middle of a gloomy environment that does not see education as an exit option. Amer has a further year to finish his high school exams and look at his university options—funding and competing over university seats- to become a veterinary physician. He is confident about himself, his objectives and what he wants to do. His mother is illiterate and his father is a retired school teacher. He sees he has been working on his own to make his dream come true. “It is my hard work at home” that matters in his attainment and he believes he will set the score that will permit him to compete for a university seat. He does not think about funding for his higher education, but he believes so strongly in his own ability to face the limitations with his hard work and perseverance.

Amidst this class system, the Jubilee school and some private schools have played a major ‘motivational role’, creating chances for those with limited venues for upward mobility. The Jubilee school, a government school established since 1972 to mark the silver Jubilee of King Hussein’s accession to the throne, aimed to provide for gifted students at the secondary school education stage. Students from all schools with
distinguished performance and grades are selected to get enrolled in this school. The objective is to support those gifted students giving them chances in an enabling educational environment in order to excel and prepare themselves for higher school education. Private schools, keen to market themselves as distinguished schools in their educational services and in the accomplishments of their own students, tend, on yearly basis, to shop for unique students at UNRWA schools with remarkable attainment. The objective is to enable these distinguished students to excel in better educational-private school environments during their secondary education and to develop academically while establishing a name for the school, marketing it as having a strong potential environment for successful students. Like Amer, some students had the motivation to work hard to gain sponsorship from either the Jubilee school or one of the private schools. Abu Omar, a father of a 22 years old son in Jabal al-Nadheef said, “Such sponsorship and support have given my son a momentum to work seriously and to be distinct, most importantly, not to look at the majority around him who have no idol nor are they dreaming to go up the scale and to prove themselves.” (Abu Omar, case 31, Jabal al-Nadheef, March 4th 2010).

In 1994 basic compulsory education was expanded to ten years. The politics of divisiveness and limitations, however, impeded many from perceiving education as a means for improving their living conditions. Local and regional circumstances have affected particularly those in East Amman, who depend on UNRWA’s educational

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210 In 1964, the basic compulsory education was for nine years, encompassing six years primary and three years of secondary in UNESCO 2011, World Data on Education 7th edition 2010/2011.
system that has been deteriorating as a result of the decreased budget. Albeit implicitly, especially in the age of liberalisation, the societal circumstances prioritised those coming from an enabling environment, whether from households where parents support education and appreciate the impact it would have on their upward mobility or from the wider community that motivates the youth to excel and further their education and apprenticeship. Economic circumstances have been detrimental. The ability to join school education or to drop out has been greatly influenced by the economic ability of the households to afford this higher education, in such challenging impediments, becomes even more limited to this class of people.

4.2.3 Why higher education: Better economic opportunities?

The last school year of secondary education has an official high school examination (known as tawjihi) which is marked, with covered names to prevent bias and subjectivity, by official committees at the Kingdom level. The grades scored by students in this exam determine the higher education venues they are able to compete for, whether community college or university. This high school exam screens the ability of students in all the subjects within the specialised branches studied in the last year of school. There are seven branches in secondary education (attended for two years after basic education): scientific, literary, commercial, Intermediate Technology, industrial, agricultural and vocational. The average score attained, of grades for all subjects, is in principle, critical. It is the grade that shall permit the student to compete, amongst other colleagues, to get a place at
university. Failing to make it in this competition, the student would then need to downgrade his /her application to a community college level or to apply to a private university (known for its high fees). Editorials and articles in Jordanian newspapers are written every year about the tension this exam causes in households where the future of students is decided based on the attained score.

Getting a seat in government universities happens through what appears to be fair competition. The average score for admission to scientific departments usually ranges between 80 -95 percent.\textsuperscript{211} The average for admission to other departments (social sciences and physical education) ranges between 65- 85 percent. The lowest average score that can be admitted to a public university is 60 percent, as per the Ministry of Higher Education’s decision in 1997.\textsuperscript{212}

Competition to get seats at the public universities in practice happens at two levels: the first is through free competition, which permits everyone, in all the governorates in the Kingdom to compete based on established criteria of averages in every department and field of study. Palestinian-origin Jordanians in the 1970s were estimated to make up 90 percent of the admitted students with their ability to get high grades in their high school exams (regardless of where they live)\textsuperscript{213}. As explained earlier by Abu Lughod, Palestinians perceived education as compensation after having been dispossessed from

\textsuperscript{211}It varies based on the highest attained grade, which is not necessarily the same every year.

\textsuperscript{212}Reiter Yitzhak, 2002 “Higher Education and the Sociopolitical Transformation in Jordan”, \textit{British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies}, Vol. 29, No 2, p. 152

\textsuperscript{213}It is said that schools around the refugee camps in Amman used to bring out the highest scores at the kingdom level: schools such as Al Hussein College (for boys) and Sukayna bint al Hussein School (for girls) both within the close proximity of Al-Hussein Refugee camp in Amman.
Palestine. As a result of this ‘imbalance’ dominating by one single group, a quota system has been activated since the 1970s. This aimed to create a parallel competition system to that of the free competition, amongst students coming from closer circles at a smaller level, in order to make the competition criteria amongst them less difficult, taking into consideration the peripheral conditions they come from. This system creates a competition to public university seats through ‘university admission quotas’ which are divided into two: one that is called makrumat malakiyya (King’s favours) that is given to students through the Royal Court. Their numbers, their criteria and the seats reserved for this quota is unknown. The second part of the quotas is divided to certain sectors as explained by Reiter in the following:

Some 20 percent of the places in every department in public universities is earmarked for those serving in the army or security forces whose studies are paid for by the state; 5 percent of the places are designated for children and grandchildren of officials and retirees of the ministries of education and higher education; 2 percent of the places are set aside for students from the remote villages or from weak schools; and another 10 percent for Jordanians who graduated from high schools abroad (mughtaribin). In addition, about another 2,000 students from weak schools (aqall hazzan) - [usually in villages/towns that are remote from main cities] in which less than 40 percent of the students passed their high school exams. These are exempted from tuition fees for certain professions vital to the economy (communications, agriculture, engineering, education – males who study teaching and females from remote villages).  

The quota system is a clear discursive politics that “unofficially amount[s] to affirmative action for Transjordanians at the expense of Palestinians.” Both Reiter, in his article in 2002,  and Elwan, in his policy report in 2012 studying the politics of public university admission in Jordan, indicate that at least 80 percent of students accepted to public university admission in Jordan, indicate that at least 80 percent of students accepted to

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214 Reiter 2002, p.151
215 Reiter 2002, p. 151
216 Reiter 2002, p. 153
universities are awarded scholarships and university seats as part of the reserved quotas for certain groups in the society.\textsuperscript{217} Royal court affiliates, children of military/army and police officers, people resident in northern, western or southern deserts (remote areas) and poor areas (poverty pockets). Only 20 percent, according to Elwan’s report, are able to compete freely based on their high school exam average. Such an exclusionary closure has been moulded by the biopolitics of the state which represents the use of power in a ‘downward’ direction because it necessarily entails the creation of a group, class, or stratum of legally defined inferiors.

According to a nationalist economist interviewed by Reiter in 1997, El Fanek “feels that because of the quota policy for the Transjordanians, they now constitute a majority (about 60 percent) of the students in public universities.”\textsuperscript{218} In his work, packed with revealing interviews held with policy makers coming from the heart of the regime, Reiter argues that there has been a clear academisation of the tribal populations in Jordan through a transformation strategy that expanded their social and economic mobility.\textsuperscript{219} There is a clear absence of statistical data on this implicit exclusionary way of Palestinian origin Jordanians. Researchers in their research work are able to analyse attitudes and to hear trends and unwritten regulations or strategies. Interviews I conducted for this research and for earlier research collecting perceptions of Palestinian-origin Jordanians about their integration revealed the subtle knowledge of everyone about these policies. Accordingly, personal decisions are taken based on this ‘understanding’ about the discursive politics of

\textsuperscript{218} Reiter 2002 p.154
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid.
the state. This has been reflected earlier in attitudes towards school education but has also
been well stated by Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman in answers when asked
about university education.

Ghassan (36 years old, vegetable vendor) got 92 in his high school exam
in scientific branch. Although he was accepted at Aal el Beit public
University in Mafraq under the quota reserved for the refugee camps, he
was unable to take the seat. The cost of travel to Mafraq (about three hours
away from Amman in public transports), added to the fees of the
University and the everyday expenses were seen beyond his ability. “I
could not pay the fees, nor would I be able to afford the accumulating
expenses. While almost the majority of those who compete through the
quota system get a seat at a public university and a scholarship, the quota
that is reserved for the refugee camps does not entail a funded
scholarship.” (Case 36, Jabal Al Naser August 17, 2010)

In 1999, during a visit of the King to Baqaa refugee camp, the establishment of a special
quota of 100 seats in the public universities for the refugee camps was announced. This
eventually expanded and today it has become 350 seats which permit the camp dwellers
to compete within their enclosed circle.\textsuperscript{220} The quota, however, as well explained by
Ghassan, does not give the students any scholarships. During my interviews, I came
across several students in Al- Naser and Al- Natheef who have scores as high as 97 and
98 percent and were unable to get to university because of funding issues.

The father of Amal and Rana frustrated told me that Rana, whose score of
last year [referring to 2010] was 98 percent in Tawjihi, has been at home
since he was completely unable to secure any funding for her. He tried to
approach some private sector companies asking them for funding but in
vain. The camp had no community centre to support at any level and the
father, an old man of 70 years old and very modest job as a service taxi
driver, does not have the financial or the social capital to help his
dughters. His daughter Amal for the year 2011, when I talked to him had
get 97 percent in her Tawjihi and has also lost the possibility to join the
university. He was disturbed about his financial inability to support her or

\textsuperscript{220} Interview with Mahmoud Akrabawi, the head of Department of Palestinian Affairs, Amman for
September 23, 2013 in Addustour daily newspaper ( Jordan).
The study by Reiter in 2002 manages to bring out some figures but mostly some unspoken policies from decision makers who seem to have had no problems speaking with honesty to this foreign Israeli researcher about the “fair policy”\textsuperscript{221} strategised to create the balance between the two peoples of Jordan. Dr El Fanek, in the interview he held with Reiter, considered that “the policy of affirmative action for those of Jordanian origin from the periphery is fully justified. He notes that residents of the south feel that even the current rate of the quotas is insufficient and want a higher rate of preference because they are associated with the regime.”\textsuperscript{222} The politics, while being fair to the people, who are loyal and affiliated to the regime, living in remote areas (desert areas), poverty pockets (which completely excludes people living in the main big cities), has excluded those “included” citizens, of Palestinian-origins, banning them in a certain social stratum; Agamben discussed the possibility of inclusive exclusion when the person is banned and is not only outside the law and made indifferent to it but also abandoned by it, in life and law, and is rendered indistinguishable.\textsuperscript{223}

In light of this politics, with a socio-political re-structuring of the social tissue, the estimation is that there is less than 50 percent on average of Palestinian-origin Jordanians in public universities as students and academics. As put by Abu Odeh, the government preferred lecturers of Jordanian origin over Palestinian ones and the lecturers who were

\textsuperscript{221} In Reiter 2002, p. 154: Dr Billa, a regime appointee of the Royal Scientific Society, who is one of the shapers of higher education policy in Jordan does not accept the charge of a lack of open competition in student admissions.
\textsuperscript{222} Reiter 2002, p.154.
members of a Palestinian organisation did not receive tenure.\textsuperscript{224} The social element of the citizenship rights using such discursive politics seems to have been disregarded, leaving the Palestinian-origin Jordanian, with limited financial and social capitals, to look into other alternatives.

\textsuperscript{224} Abu Odeh 1999, p. 215.
I. Public–Private Universities

In this apparatus of power and divisiveness, the 51 community colleges and the establishment of the private sector universities became the possible exit option only for those who have the ability to work through the upward mobility and afford to pursue the higher education. Higher education noticeably varies in quality, not only between private and public but also public institutions. So higher education has been stratified by creating graduate-school-quality universities, graduate-school-high fee universities, and two year remedial-quality community college. “Is the real function of the latter to provide a second chance for those who have ‘made mistakes’ in high school - or is it instead the case that remediation, ‘the cheap alternative’, is the only higher education actually available to most lower-income young people?”

“It has been cost effective and prestigious!” said Ali, 44 years old, who runs a supermarket at the entrance of Jabal Al-Naser- the camp area. “I am the only one amongst 13 brothers and sisters who managed to get a degree. No one pursued their education as no one believes we can make anything with these degrees. I decided to apply for hospitality management degree at Ammoun College for Hospitality studies in Amman. The university fees were high and would last for four years. The college was much affordable for my family then. So I got my degree in 1985, of course supported by my elder brothers who paid for my studies and my daily commute to the city. Ever since, I was able to work; for thirteen years in hotels and restaurants due to this degree, then I decided to create my own business as I had made some money.” (Case 3, Jabal al-Naser, Dec 4, 2011).

Jordan University, the first public university, was established in the capital Amman in the year 1962. Its location in the heart of the capital managed to attract Palestinian origin citizens, particularly those living in Amman, who then consisted of almost 95 percent of

225 Schutz 2011, p. 129.
its academic staff and students. Slowly, over the years, the state invested highly in educational reform and most importantly invested highly in setting incentives for Jordanians in their higher education. This was not only done through scholarships and competitive quotas, but also through establishing universities in each governorate, in order to permit communities living in the periphery, such as Bedouins (in the desert of the north, centre or south), or people living in remote areas, to have easier access to higher education.

Today, the number of public universities as a result has reached 10, where almost each governorate in the country has a university, even if the population and the number of eligible students is low. To respond to the pressure from people who want to get university education at public universities two additional programmes were added: evening studies and parallel private education within the public university. This latter was created for students who had failed to be accepted in the normal free competition range. They would as a result be able to compete in the parallel private education created within the public universities known as Mouwazi (translated as parallel- to the public education in the same university), paying double the fees.

The private section within the public education permits students to compete over seats at the public universities with others, although they would pay double the fees that are paid by the students who were accepted through free competition. Elwan, in his report, describes it as “a private university within the government university”. By this, the

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226 Reiter 2002, p. 139.
227 Elwan 2012, p.1
public university has become a recipient of students from multiple strata: those entering with the support of *makruma malakya* (royal favours), those entering as part of the quota system (both of these two groups are granted seats and scholarships, so do not pay fees), those entering under free competition (they pay normal fees per hour/per term), those entering under the parallel educational system *mouwazi*, (they pay double the fees) and those entering for evening studies – usually they are postgraduate students (paying the fees of postgraduate studies). The list below shows the distribution of public universities all over Jordan serving students in the north (Irbid), the east (Zarqa and Mafraq) and in the south (Tafileh, Karak and Maaan), added to the capital Amman.
Besides the 51 community colleges (both private and public), there are 17 universities that are private, added to the World Islamic Sciences and Education University. This progress in numbers of universities was accompanied by a significant increase in the number of students enrolled to study in these universities who are not from Jordan, but also from all neighbouring Arab countries. With these multiple alternatives and the rising costs of higher education at all levels have meant “that the cost differentials among all the varieties of colleges and universities are that much more critical in “sorting out” students by income and wealth class”.229

229 Schutz 2011, p. 129.
Ghassan who was unable to get a scholarship to study at a public university despite his average that was 92. He was offered by a wealthy Palestinian-origin Jordanian who knows his uncle, to join the private university in which he has shares. The university is located on the Airport road, which was quite a big burden for him concerning transportation. Upon enrolment, he realised he is unable to fit in the social structure of the university: a part of the students were emigrant Jordanians who were brought up in the Gulf countries and have come back to Jordan to attend higher education. The other group of students were from the Gulf States. Both groups have been able to access these private universities based on their financial abilities to afford the high fees of these universities. “While I had to struggle every morning to change three to four buses to be able to make it to the university, I would arrive to a place that looks like a car showroom with all the recent brand cars and models you would think of, with car plates indicating where their owners come from in Arab Gulf countries.” Ghassan was grateful that he was given a free university seat at the private university, but this was not enough. “Added to the burden of transportation, I was unable to keep going to the university wearing the same jeans and old shoes! I simply could not afford to dress up like the others and I could not afford also to appear like the poor person in this set-up of people with wealth and capital.” Ghassan dropped out his study after being enrolled for two months. He chose to come back to the camp, work in a vegetable shop for few years, until he was able to make his own shop (Case 36, Jabal Al Naser August 17, 2010)

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230 Private universities, as will be explained in the following section are like business corporates with shares.
The list below shows the distribution of private universities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>List of Private Universities</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amman Arab University – Amman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East University – Amman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jadara University – Amman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al - Ahliyya Amman University- Salt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applied Science University – Amman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philadelphia University – Jerash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isra University – Amman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Petra University- Amman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan – Amman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarqa University – Zarqa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irbid National University – Irbid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerash University – Jerash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princess Sumaya University for Technology - Amman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan Academy of Music – Amman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan Applied University College of Hospitality and Tourism Education (JAU) – Amman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea Institute of Cinematic Arts – Aqaba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American University of Madaba – Madaba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajloun National Private University – Ajloun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Banking &amp; Financial Sciences - Amman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is noticeable that, in contrast to the distribution of government universities, the majority of private universities have been established in Amman and the cities surrounding it, such
as Madaba, Jerash and Salt, focusing on the people with means and financial capital living in the main urban cities (not remote governorates) and are implicitly excluded from free competition and the privilege to access public universities. Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman are excluded from these universities, unless offered, like the case of Ghassan, a grant from one of the shareholders at one of these private universities.

As explained in chapter 3, Palestinian-origin Jordanians have sought to become entrepreneurs and self-dependent since the 1970s. Several reasons engendered this independence and moulded the image of Palestinians as businessmen and entrepreneurs in the private sector.\(^{231}\) In light of the social-political stratification, the higher education structure, is split into two parts: students whose education is funded regardless of their merits and accomplishments) and students who pay for their education (regardless of their merits and accomplishments). Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman, fall out from the two and fail to access both educational systems.

\(^{231}\) Carroll 2006
II. Neoliberalism: ‘commodification of education.’

The educational system, as an important institution of cultural power, has simply been implicated in sustaining the class system and a tool for shaping a closure strategy and legitimating the exclusionary process,\(^{232}\) which entails the creation of a group, class, or stratum of legally defined inferiors.\(^{233}\) Guy Standing classifies this phase of education in the era of neoliberalism as the “commodification of education”;\(^{234}\) “The neoliberal state has been apparently transforming school systems to make them a consistent part of the market society, pushing education in the direction of ‘human capital’ formation and job preparation”.\(^{235}\) In reality, this market society has been pushing people into the margins.

“In primary and secondary schools, family income and wealth differentials mean that parents have greatly different capacities for voluntary contributions of time and resources [and ability, in the case of Jordan] to their children’s schools. And in lower-income secondary school districts, disproportionate numbers of students drop out before finishing their diplomas—either to supplement their families’ incomes, or else because they see little in their environments that suggest that finishing school will yield decent job opportunities”.\(^{236}\)

Surprisingly, government public expenditure on education continues to be top priority in the state funding. It came first during 2010-2011 and was 11 percent (out of 23 percent

\(^{232}\) Schutz 2011, pp.129-132
\(^{235}\) *Ibid.*, p.68
\(^{236}\) Schutz 2011, p.129
total government expenditure on economic and social rights), this took about 722,081,500 JD (US $1,019,149,088.23) - (out of 6,837,490,300 JD total government budget- US $987,983,1.59). Yet, at the same time, commercialisation and privatisation have been encouraged by the state and by financial agencies (such as the World Bank). This has generated major repercussions in education, engendering the class disequilibria and the inequality while citizens are seeking to acquire their basic right in education. This is what is called a Market Citizenship, which has characterised the neoliberal state by overshadowing rights’ claims derived within social citizenship (that were previously taken for granted during the Keynesian policies and welfare state commitment).

Market Citizenship “regulates and pathologises the person in need (interpreting needs to be burdens on society) while promoting the notion that one must build up one’s own human capital, albeit not recognising the systematic disparities which contribute to the production of need.”

This hence redefines the line between those who support the state’s policies best by becoming “entrepreneurs of the self” and have a status and those who lag behind: the central aim of neoliberal governmentality is the strategic production of social conditions conducive to the constitution of individuals who are compelled to assume market-based values in all of their judgments and practices.

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238 It should be noted that 69 percent of the expenditure is spent on salaries. [Link](http://www.moe.gov.jo/MenuDetails.aspx?MenuID=29) (accessed in June 5th 2013)

239 Smith-Carrier and Bhuyan 2010, p. 4

Furthermore, Market Citizenship has become a tool to shape the conduct of subjects, whereby the citizens could have the possibility to respond, to act, and to refuse the exercised power of the government on them or simply succumb. Citizenship rights hence are instituted by the government, which “is a strategic relation between governors and the governed whereby the former try to determine the conduct of the latter, and whereby the latter develop practices in order to ‘avoid being governed’, to minimise being governed, or to be governed in a different way according to different procedures, principles, technologies and knowledge, or else in order to govern themselves.” This is what Foucault calls ‘counter-conducts’: when the governed open up processes of autonomous and independent subjectivation, that is, possibilities for the constitution of oneself.

Neoliberalism calls for less government, problematises the state and is concerned with specifying its limits through the invocation of individual choice. It also involves forms of governance that encourage both institutions and individuals to conform to the norms of the market. The citizen is then re-specified as an active agent both able and obliged to exercise autonomous choices. These choices could reflect one of the three scenarios of counter-conducts, processes of subjectivation and abandonment with varied ways of action or reaction, whether flight, deflection, ruse, or attempts to overturn the situation of domination, direct confrontation with the dispositifs of power.

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241 This is what Foucault calls the Government of Conduct
242 Lazzarati 2009, p.114
Sinan, a car painter who left school at age 10, argued for example that he chose not to continue his school education after a violent encounter between him and his teacher. He refused to pursue his school education because he believes opportunities will become limited and less lucrative. So he chose to be in the informal market at an early age, as part of strategies relating to government of conduct and the refusal to be directed, or relating to the desire to govern oneself, at individual and collective levels. Yet, the exercise of biopower, by training implicitly the actions of people, as demonstrated in his narrative below, reflects that his claimed counter-conduct risks producing an excluded individual confronted with constraints by the sovereign power of the state.243

Sinan is 30 years old; he dropped out school at age 10 and has been working ever since. After having been trained, he runs his own workshop. “One of my clients at the garage, a powerful officer in the Jordanian Army, asked me to apply to the army because they needed someone with my car painting skills for their own cars. I went through the whole process of selection, I even shaved bald preparing to take the job. When I went to finalise the paper work, I was told I am Palestinian from the West Bank—which is true because it is my father’s origin. Given this reality, why do you expect me to do any effort to study or to look for opportunities away from the camps? And how can I see the situation will differ for my children? I’ll save them the trouble of testing the reality. I see them also dropping out school because it is useless.” (FG 2, Jabal al-Naser, Oct 24, 2011)

The hierarchical structure of the society combined with the implemented neoliberal policies have rendered the Weberian class stratification a determining factor for acquiring and enjoying rights of citizenship and to exercising its duties. Foucault studied the

citizen-state relationship beyond the traditional citizenship and allegiance, to think about the politics (political, economic and societal) and the strategic necessities of the state (to manage the population) which produced further fractions in society and shaping a state of domination. Domination is the basis on which it is possible to identify ‘elites’ (with positions of dominance) and the various sub-types and stratifications in a social analysis of domination. Moreover, Foucault explained that “the biological traits of a population became pertinent elements in its economic management, and it was necessary to organise them through an apparatus that not only assured the constant maximisation of their utility but equally their subjectification”. The case of the young students below reflects the way they are reacting against the subjectivation of their parents seeking to liberate themselves as *polis*:

Kamal (23 years old, studies medicine at the University of Jordan and has a scholarship from the community centre) in FG discussion in Jabal al Nadheef argues that he often wishes to be “a *de facto* citizen where I am able to enjoy all my rights whether economic, cultural, social and political, without feeling that I have a problem being originally Palestinian. According to this group of young students holding scholarships and studying at universities, there is an embedded culture that draws the line between the person who comes from a tribe and the other who comes from Palestine. “The problem is that our parents were brought up in a time of marshal laws, so they feared everything and they taught us to be afraid of talking about the reality, the red line of talking about Palestinian origin, Islamists, and politics. Lamees, a student studying engineering and lives in Jabal al-Nadheef, questions how can the tribal identity be eliminated so that we all manage to enjoy equal rights, especially in acquiring educational opportunities? Could it be right that the origin of the person gives them privileges? She wonders. (FG 5, Jabal al-Nadheef, April 7th 2012)

The discursive politics of the state stratified the society into classes, origins and statuses. These young students see themselves being challenged and *cornered*—questioning the rights to acquire equally as citizens despite their Palestinian origin as a fourth generation in exile. In their questions and reactions, they are rejecting the self-forming practices of subjectivation. They seek to understand the ways various techniques, of the governor and the governed, have been articulated to make them abide by the imposed rule of the regime and its discursive measures through processes of social subjectification and self-regulation.

### 4.3 What really matters: Life chances? Status situations? Tribal social capital?

These Palestinian-origin Jordanians have exercised their choices, their constrained choices as citizens. Their narratives reflect limitations: one constructed by the governing regime, a second constructed by the social structure, backed up by the apparatus of power resulting in the social stratification. A third constructed by the financial restrictions that were aggravated by the liberalisation and the moulded market citizenship. Their chances, as a result, have been constricted. In Weber’s terms, life chances are one of the characteristics defining a social class and an aspect that determines the social class into which an individual is placed. Dahrendorf elaborated further on Weber’s life chances by defining life chances as the social conditions that demarcate how much individuals can realise their full potential, while recognising that people do not and cannot choose the
conditions they have to work under and that life chances will be unequal and that the opportunities to succeed may unfairly be shared.\textsuperscript{245} Life chances in Jordan can be impeded or advanced as a result of governmentality, status and class.

The chances as a result vary. The experiences reflected by some East Jordanians, for example, living in the same neighbourhoods of East Amman, differ. While Palestinians are clinging to the limitations, some of the East Jordanians interviewed were negotiating their upward mobility building on these very same limitations which they were using as an asset:

My nephew failed his high school exam, but we, the support of the tribe, had him join the military for few years. He worked as a fence guard. After having settled in a family with children, got some support from the military (the loan to build a house). We helped him to get recruited at Royal Jordanian. He is now manager of cargo. I have no worries how my children or my nephews will secure jobs. My other nephew had 64\% in his high school exams. So we had him attend private university since he was not able to compete on the quota seats. After he was done from his bachelor degree, he applied for a scholarship at the Ministry of Higher Education to study in Germany. He came back with his PhD degree and he is now a lecturer at the University of Al El-Beit (public university) especially that my cousin works there and was of a good help to recruit him (Jamal S., Case No 1, Jabal al-Naser, Oct 20, 2011)

Jamal is a mukhtar (a selected head of neighbourhood by the Ministry of Interior) in a district at al- Naser area. He comes originally from Karak in the south of Jordan from a known tribe with some influential figures in the cabinet. In his talk, he situates himself as a voice of the tribe, referring always to the ‘We’, putting emphasis on the social capital asset he owns as part of the tribe and stressing the close links and supportive role they play to each other. Weber, in his work on life chances, analyses the importance of the

\textsuperscript{245} http://neilstockley.blogspot.co.uk/2009/06/lord-ralf-dahrendorf-1929-2009.html
established ‘social closure’ and ‘the monopolisation of specific, usually economic opportunities’ attempted by one group in the society to secure for itself a privileged position at the expense of some other group through a process of subordination.\textsuperscript{246}

One of Jamal’s children joined the military school, went to Kuwait for three years for military education after his military service. As he came back, he joined the University of Mou’ta (military University in Kerak) and today he is growing in his position. I expect to see him soon a minister or a prime minister. According to him the case of the Palestinians in these camps and camp-like [referring to Al Naser camp and the housing areas all around] is very different and cannot even be compared to him or his children: “The camp person [\textit{ibn el mukhayam}] does not serve the state, he simply works in his shop and is busy making some money. He would not deserve a scholarship!” (Jamal S. Case No 1, Jabal al-Naser, Oct 20, 2011).

By social closure, Weber means the process by which various groups attempt to improve their lot by restricting access to rewards and privileges to a limited circle, closing access to this to ‘outsiders’.\textsuperscript{247} In traditional societies, like in the case of Jordan, the most effective way to form this social closure is to employ the criteria of descent and lineage (of tribal linkages) and to maintain enclosed social groups using two exclusionary devices, according to Perkin:\textsuperscript{248}

First, those surrounding the institutions of property; and second, academic or professional qualifications and credentials. Each represents a set of legal arrangements for restricting access to rewards and privileges: property ownership is a form of closure designed to prevent general access to the means of production and its fruits; credentialism is a form of closure designed to control and monitor entry to key positions in the division of labour.\textsuperscript{249}

\textsuperscript{246} Parkin 1979, p.45
\textsuperscript{247} Parkin 2002, p.100
\textsuperscript{248} Perkin 1979, pp.47-48
\textsuperscript{249} Perkin 1979, pp.47-48
On ‘credentialism’ Weber considered the educational system “as an especially refined instrument for guarding and controlling entry to the charmed circles”.⁵⁰ It is through the inflated use of educational certificates which are acquired, as explained in earlier sections with a preference to the charmed circles, through the university admission quota system. These degrees become a means of monitoring entry to key positions in the division of labour, particularly white collar occupations, to attain the status of professions.

“The development of the diploma from universities, and business and engineering colleges, and the universal clamour for the creation of educational certificates in all fields make for the formation of a privileged stratum in bureaus and offices. Such certificates support their holders’ claims for intermarriages with notable families…, claims to be admitted into the circles that adhere to ‘codes of honour’, claims for a ‘respectable’ remuneration rather than remuneration for work well done, claims for assured advancement and old age insurance, and above all, claims to monopolise social and economically advantageous positions.”⁵¹

In a patrimonial society like the Jordanian, this ‘social closure’ has engendered status situations granted through social honour and awards, associated with a tribal name, or a particular occupation or ownership of property and land. A large majority of the East Jordanians interviewed for this research moved to Amman in the early 1950-1960s, either for work in the markets of the urban city or to work in the military basis in the south/east of the capital. The range of choices, as expressed in the interviews, appears to be wide, with no fear or insecurity. As studied in chapter 2, class and status become blurred, which makes the analysis of class distinction and the inequality more complex. These status

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⁵⁰ Parkin 2002, p.101  
⁵¹ Weber in Parkin 1979, p.54
situations become like a prestige that shapes a particular lifestyle, which operates to
determine life chances of individuals.\textsuperscript{252}

Financial factors, “as a result of the chances that are made available for its citizens”, do
not seem to be a major concern. “Chances are there, only for those who deserve them
and who work hard to get them!” explained Jamal from Al-Naser.\textsuperscript{253} Education,
particularly higher education, was not brought up as a concern when talking to the East
Jordanians. In most interviewed cases with East Jordanians higher education was possible
because of the availability of scholarships (the various quotas: military or remote areas or
poor governorates). For those interested in pursuing education, the higher education
chance has been secured. This does not mean there are not East Jordanians who are
excluded from accessing higher education. With lack of statistics about the two groups
(the Palestinian origin and the East Jordanians) it is difficult to generalise. Yet, based on
the interviews conducted in East Amman for this research, the proportion of Palestinian-
origin Jordanians of East Amman who cannot pursue higher education is much higher
than that of East Jordanians living in East Amman.

The ownership of land granted to them by the regime then bought by his ancestors in East
Amman, made Khalil from a known tribe in Salt, sees that education and professional
careers are possible for all the members of his tribe as a result of the financial power they
have. His tribe members, originally from Salt, the north of Jordan, today own the main
commercial road leading to Al-Naser camp and the land plots all around that road.

\textsuperscript{253} JS Case No 1, Jabal al-Naser, Oct 20, 2011
The financial capital according to KA permitted lots of members from the tribe to buy land in Amman- Jabal al- Naser from the Circassian families who were then resident in Jabal al-Naser. Added to their economic power, tribal status, KA sees that the social power gained from the close intermarriages his family members had with the Palestinians “permitted us to learn how to become independent from the state, as either professionals or merchants.” The members of the tribe live and work in West Amman, but have rented their shops and lands in the main market area in Al-Naser. “Different from many Jordanians [East Jordanians], members in my own tribe are more inclined to getting professional degrees, as doctors and lawyers, having their own firms, instead of being part of the army or the military sector” (Case 16, Al- Naser, Dec. 27, 2011).

Along with economic capital, social capital is a valuable mechanism in economic growth. The economic power gained through the close connection H.R. tribe members have with the royal family permitted them to establish three fuel stations on the main boulevard leading to the royal palace. Today, the majority of the siblings of this tribe work in the fuel distribution, selling or marketing. While education was possible, it was not a priority.

Abu Raed, who is today a retired military person in the al-Naser area and a member heading a district in the neighbourhood, regrets the way his good years of youth were spent. He feels he lost chances of pursuing his education and in establishing himself a business.

I did not try to pursue my education after I finished the high school exam (Tawjihi), I was pushed by my family, in the 1980s, to go for the military sector because it secures stability, a regular salary and all the benefits of health and social security. I was watching all these Palestinians in the neighbourhood getting into business, profiting from the various events that inflicted the region. During the Gulf war, lots of people expanded their work whether in construction, car repair or in the vegetable market. The number of people increased enormously and this enabled these simple Palestinians with their small shops to expand and make lots of money. Education was another mistake I failed to pursue. I blame my parents in Jerash who never appreciated the value of education, and like everyone in our village in Jerash, the military sector at the age of 18, was the quickest venue to secure an income.” With this mindset, the children of Abu Raed are today in vocational education and the two working children are in car
repair workshops and not in the military. (Case 9, Jabal Al-Naser, Dec. 18, 2011).

Abu Raed’s nephew came to the interview and he himself does not see any use of getting education while his tribe, represented by close and distant relatives within the tribe, have the means to move upward in the social and economic scale because of their own business and their own ability to negotiate their chances, referring to the social capital within members of the tribe.

Sami upon finishing his basic school education, went for vocational training education for two years. He was trained at Audi mother company and worked for them for few years. Ever since the Gas Stations were created by his tribe, he has been working as a driver, having some ownership over the commissions he makes from selling Diesel in the tank he drives. “It is not the education that could have mattered ever for me. I have my own work and I am also medically insured because of my father and my brothers who are in the military sector. (Case 9, Jabal Al-Naser, Dec. 18, 2011).

As if unconsciously, these subjects reflected the logic of economic reason stemming from the market citizenship where the principal focus is to promote the autonomous, responsible choice-making citizen who supports the state best by becoming entrepreneurs of the self. Foucault summarised this conduct as “the moulding of subjects into greater approximations of the idealised citizens, incites a variety of knowledge used to shape the conduct of subjects, maximising certain capacities whilst minimising particular risks, whilst at the same time instilling appropriate norms of self-reliance and autonomy to individuals- obliging unproductive subjects to be good, contributing citizens.” 254 The case

254 Ong 2003 in Smith-Carrier and Bhuyan 2010, p. 5
of Nadim from the same H.R. tribe, which I came across few months after the first interview, explains the conduct analysis of Foucault perfectly well:

Nathem H. sees that neither him nor his brothers were supported by the family to pursue their education. His father since he left Mafraq used to work in stone cutting. Nathem left school after his 6th elementary, worked in stone cutting like his father but did not like it, worked as street vendor and then worked in the farmers’ market that was created by the Municipality in the area. He then realised he can make use of his tribal power and connections in becoming a guard of the farmers’ market at night time (since the market has no doors- being an open area with only a roof of cloth on top). He, with his two cousins from the same tribe agreed with the vendors at the daily farmers market to become the Guards. “Yes, we agreed to collect from each vendor 1/2 Jd per day from the 90 stands for protecting their goods and stands/shelves. We have close connections with the police station who support us when we need them to intervene”. Nathem and his cousins have licensed arms and have most importantly the support of the police station to use a gun in case. The farmers fear him as they need him in their market. Rather than being a risk as a gang in the streets, the energy of this young man, with modest education and little social refinement has been invested in guarding other (Case 22, Jabal Al-Naser, Feb 15, 2012)

Governmentality characterises both the management of individuals in the state and extends to the self-regulation of one’s own subjectivity as a production of ‘technologies of the self’. With this, individuals are more concerned about their entrepreneurial ability to secure their rights and their self-sufficiency rather than acquiring their rights as citizens. Education becomes for them an opportunity, only if it enables them to secure self-sufficiency.

Rather than seeing education as part of the social right of citizenship, Munger perceives citizenship as a contract; “this contractual approach debunks the myths that all residents, or even citizens, have equal access to social entitlements. Social rights, as put by Munger,
are available to select citizens who can effectively demonstrate their worthiness along ideological lines (i.e. self-reliant worker, heteronormative family formation)”.

The following chapter studying employment builds on these perceived chances and the way governmentality, status, class and the politics of divisiveness matters in their choices and in shaping their upward mobility and in exploring their chances.

Conclusion

Education as a right has been studied in this chapter to analyse the change which rendered it a difficult right to access for some classes in the society. Through the experiences of Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman and through their encounters seeking to access education as a basic citizenship right, this chapter has demonstrated how this right was used as a tool by the Jordanian state to stratify further the society. Both state’s discursive politics and neoliberalist approaches strengthened one group with privileges supporting their forward mobility and marginalised others, from different status and different class.

Enjoying the right to education in the good old days (1960-1980s) was a major element that enabled Palestinian refugees-Jordanian citizens to easily integrate, regardless of their

\[255\] Munger 2003 in Smith-Carrier and Bhuyan 2010, p. 9
financial means, their status and their class. The politics of the state while shaping the
Jordanian national identity and defining its demographic power, managed its peoples,
with their different categories, though the elements of citizenship. Education, a social
citizenship right, as a result has been jeopardised. Using its discursive measures, the right
to education as illustrated by a group of young residents of East Amman, has not been
seen as an opportunity. They perceived the education as part of a package of exigencies
that are beyond their ability. Starting with the limited chances to get scholarship for
higher education, then the limited network they have to access formal sector employment
and the limiting environment in which they are living that is also impeding their progress.
Work in the informal sector, has become for them an exit option to encounter the
demanding package that is led by education.

Both the state politics and neoliberalist measures have accentuated the disequilibria in
the social composition of Jordan, putting emphasis on market citizenship and a sense of
agency while manipulating basic citizenship rights. The individual, dominated by the
apparatus, of neoliberalism and by that of the ruling regime, has been considered as a
result equally unequal. In addition, the social stratification and politics of divisiveness
have shaped the conduct of the Palestinian-origin Jordanians, limiting them in their
geographically contained spaces, through partial access to their basic citizenship rights.
The following chapter examines the opportunities that have been available for this class
of Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman, with their modest educational
attainment.
Chapter Five: Whither Employment?

Thus far, I have sought to disentangle the circumstances that have shaped the economic opportunities for Palestinian-origin Jordanians living in East Amman. Since late 1989s, political economy dynamics, at the local and regional levels, have inflicted a series of cultural, social and economic transformations that have inevitably changed patterns of employment and introduced new actors to the market. The changing patterns of employment and the different requirements of the newly created jobs have over time from the years of plenty to the years of lean, shuffled the social stratification and widened the disparities amongst classes. Both the politics towards Palestinian-origin Jordanians and the politics of liberalisation have posed a challenge to the complex relation between the state and the realisation of citizenship rights. “Identity, affiliation and access to resources are defined by one’s place within a class structure and social order that is largely constituted by the ascribed relationships of family, kinship, caste and so on, the ‘communities of birth’”,

Naila Kabeer puts it, have become grounds where citizens do not enjoy equal rights and duties.

Education for Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman, as explained in chapter 4, with the deterioration at the basic level, especially of UNRWA services, marginalisation of public schools, and the tightening measures at the higher levels, has tacitly shaped the quality and quantity of educated people with school and university degrees and moulded their conduct from a distance by “educating their desires and configuring habits and

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aspirations and beliefs.” This governmentality has affected access to basic citizenship rights amongst those Palestinian-origin Jordanians in East Amman with no political voice and limited ability for socioeconomic negotiations. Most importantly, this politics triggered socio-political transformation in citizens’ attitudes and gradually trimmed their access to social protection and employment security. This has coincided with the expansion of the informal economy that has had a significant impact on socio-political state-citizen relations. This chapter, building on the educational outcomes studied earlier, and the various techniques of the state in managing educational chances, endeavours to analyse the range of *dispositifs* which studies the operation of power in the labour market.

In its first part, this chapter unfolds the patterns of employment that have been available for Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman since the late 1980s. The packages explained represent the requirements, considered by the interviewed Palestinian-origin Jordanians, indispensable to have in order to secure an economic opportunity, particularly in the formal sector that provides protection and social security. This part examines the possible opportunities in the formal and the informal sectors demonstrating the challenges, as perceived by youth from East Amman who were interviewed for the study.

In the second part, this chapter studies the informal sector as the only viable exit option since the 1990s. With few chances for educational development and established beliefs about their limited access to formal sector opportunities, the informal sector appears to be the only possible venue to generate an income to eke out a living. This chapter considers the challenges encountered by Palestinian-origin Jordanians in this sector, illuminating

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257 Li 2007, p.3.
the risks and advantages involved. These ‘depeasantised’ Palestinians, with their fourth or fifth generation, have been accessing precarious economic opportunities. They remain ‘encamped’ though; not necessarily in refugee camps, but encamped by their limited educational opportunities, economic mobility and communally stigmatised grouping and residential clustering within inner cities.

The last section of this chapter analyses the concept of social protection and social welfare as a basis for social citizenship understanding. It discusses the ambivalent status of those living in inner Amman: with their socioeconomic rights as refugees and as citizens being ignored. It aims to study the established relationship between the state and the inner city residents in light of their political and economic status. These limitations have restricted them from focusing on their own abilities to challenge the marginalisation and the politics of their invisibilisation.

5.1 What economic opportunities?

The educational and employment opportunities that were available before the 1980s have changed, and the dynamics of employment, have encountered new challenges: “they include sluggish labour demand, high rates of joblessness among youth and women, prevalence of skills mismatches, stagnant labour mobility, high rates of informal employment and lack of formal employment networks.”

Expectations of both job seekers and employers varied with regards to educational requirements, acquired skills,

work conditions, production, incentives and paid wages. Interviews in both Jabal Al-Naser and Jabal Al-Nadheef sought to enquire about the chances, perceived by the youth of East Amman, for settled jobs with regular income. To understand this, interviewees talked about their educational experiences, the way they see the link between education and employment, their understanding of their own abilities and skills and social networks which made them ultimately choose their employment. In challenging and competitive market, the mature analysis of the youth to their realities and their abilities, was noticeable, recognising their strength and identifying factors that play against them such as their social class and their educational gap.

5.1.1 Which package is needed to find an economic opportunity?

I synthesise in this section the perceptions youth in Jabal al-Naser and Jabal Al-Nadheef shaped about employment and economic opportunities as ‘packages’. They consider that employment is possible only if other elements existed: these are basic education degree, higher education and social network. This will be studied in the next section.
I. Basic Education and On-the-job-training Package

Against the standard or the traditional nexus of ‘Education-employment-social mobility’ which entails attainment of an educational level in order to secure a professional job (with a good salary) and good status, Omar argues that education is not needed, if one can take over the work of his aging parent:

For Omar, a 23-years old vegetable shopkeeper in the commercial road of al-Naser camp, who is preparing to get engaged, it is the income that matters: “I failed my tawjihi and I did not bother to repeat it. I joined my father in his vegetable shop and it has been very lucrative for me with a good income. My two friends who passed their tawjihi, studied nursing at the community college and failing to find good paid work with their degree, they are working in different fields. What is the use then for us to study?” (Case no 5, Jabal al naser, Dec. 4, 2011).

Alaa, 24 years old, who has been working with his uncle in his restaurant, argues that he has got the work and the salary that pays for his cigarettes and his outings. He also has failed his tawjihi but says he believes that such an educational degree means nothing to secure an income or a job, but only gives a certain social prestige, “in fact, it is a key degree to show that we have some educational background. But to make it well in real life, it is the vocation that matters, not the degree,” he says.259

“I have been working with my uncle who has a restaurant in Jabal al Taj [another area in East Amman],” said Alaa, who is sitting for tawjihi for the fifth time. “I will want to create my own little food shop when I am done with this exam. I am slowly preparing my network for this project, but I need to pass my Tawjihi first. It is important for my status when doing the paper work for any project I would want to create in the future.” (FG 3, Oct. 24, 2011).

The perception of this degree for women, such as their sisters or their wives to be, was not better. Young men and parents argued, it is a key degree for marriage seeing that “this basic educational degree become useful for marriage prospects in order to appear as a good potential mother who is not illiterate and can take care of her children.”

A traditional divorcee mother, Khadeeja, who has her own sewing machine and generates income from her own work, does not see a degree beyond Tawjihi for her four daughters is possible.

“Theyir place is to be at home, not to be out going from one place to another. I will want them to be married and would not want them to be exposed to the dangers in the streets and the everyday life”.

Khadeeja, like other parents, has a fear about her children from the street in Jabal al Naser and Jabal al-Natheef. There are many young men, unemployed roaming around the streets. There are lots of suspicions about them and about the underground work they do. While parents considered this a reason to over protect their children, the youth considered this a reason that plays against them when searching employment in West Amman: “we live in a place that is labelled and known to be a place for delinquency, poverty and refugees, whether we had a tawjihi or not, what kind of work will recruit us knowing where we come from!” Labelling, as put by Zetter, is “not just a highly instrumental process, but also a powerful explanatory tool to explore the complex and often disjunctive impacts of humanitarian intervention on the lives of refugees.”

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Ibid.
Case No 46, Aug. 29, 2010, Jabal Al-Nadheef
FG5, Jabal al Nadheef, April 7th, 2012.
their citizenship status, they have been made to feel the inequality with their living circumstances which implicitly impeded some from challenging these discursive labels.

II. ‘Postgraduate education’ package

Contrary to this, others react to this reality differently as they seek to prove their own abilities, beyond labelling and state institutions, seeing themselves as agents with a purpose and seek to achieve their objectives as part of the formal labour market.

Salem W. repeated the tawjihi four times. He believed, as a father, he needed to have a degree that can provide him and his family with a better living quality. “I am able to generate some money from this shop I am running [in the main commercial street of the camp], but my current master’s degree will enable me to become an employee in a private sector firm, avoiding the financial ups and downs of the market that affect my work in the shop.” Salem, was married at the age 20 with a woman who had succeeded her Tawjihi. He then had failed his and was already involved in the market making money to support himself and his family. Today he is 34 years old. He had sat for the Tawjihi in several branches and failed four times. The last time, he did it as part time student, and succeeded with distinction, he was even ranked top at the kingdom level in the agricultural branch. He was as a result able to do his community college degree and got a diploma. “My financial abilities, despite my high score in Tawjihi, could not permit me to apply to university.” From the money he was making in the shop, especially the seasonal high demand on food products, his revenue increased and he pursued his studies, he bridged the community college diploma to a university degree. “I could not stop with only a Bachelor’s degree, I am now doing a part time master’s degree, evening shifts” (Case 37, Jabal Al-Naser, Aug. 17, 2010)

Salem represents the significant positive correlation between education and labour market participation. Similarly, Rakan, a young man funded with scholarships through Ruwwad community centre in Jabal al-Nadheef, considered that “education refines one’s mind, I mean intellectual minds, permitting us to have a mature vision, different to that of our
parents, and to search for employment at a higher level, beyond the geography of Amman”

264. According to him, however, the package necessary to securing a job and grow professionally, must consist of ‘a postgraduate education’. While believing in the importance of education these young students argue that the package, today, cannot only consist of a basic bachelor’s degree in a very competitive market with a large number of people who hold a bachelor’s degree. “To find work in this challenging labour market, one would need to have either masters or PhD degree. The bachelor degree has become in these days like the tawjihi, it does not permit us to compete for jobs, especially if we aim to enter the private sector and to get upgraded in our positions.”

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According to the Department of Statistics for the year 2012/June the unemployment rate amongst holders of a first university degree was 15.9 percent (compared with 16.1 percent for the year 2010). A recent Fafo survey for 2013 in the refugee camps and some parts of East Amman also confirms this. The labour force participation rate, according to Fafo’s survey, is around 70 percent for men with basic and secondary education. 266 These end up taking low-skilled jobs with limited pay, limited contracts and no social protection. This percentage falls for men with education beyond secondary. “Some men with post-secondary education have given up hope of finding a job that is commensurate with their qualifications and hence, since they are no longer actively looking for work, they are excluded from the labour force”

266 Tiltnes and Zhang 2013, p. 180

267 Ibid.

264 FG 5, Jabal Al-Natheef, April 7th, 2012.
265 Ibid.
266 Tiltnes and Zhang 2013, p. 180
267 Ibid.
In recent years Jordan has successfully attracted Multinational Corporations (MNC) and has at the same time invested heavily in private sector companies, often constituting majority ownership. This has generated new opportunities for candidates with competitive qualifications and skills responding to the new environment: “the combination of structural reforms and continuing economic distortions has generated incentives for Jordanian employers to invest in sectors which feature relatively low skill-low wage.” For job seekers to compete for higher salaries they would need higher education and the acquisition of many other skills such as Information Technology (IT), languages and specialised diplomas. The challenges in securing a job in the labour market were voiced by the majority of young men and women I interviewed. They said they worried about the competition awaiting them: on the one hand, they were concerned about the number of graduates flooding the labour market on a yearly basis from ten public universities and more than 17 private universities, all expecting to find work mostly in the formal sector at both the local and the regional levels. On the other hand, they are aware of the privileges, given through the quota university admission and the *makrumat malakiah*, that have made it possible, through discursive politics, for lots of people to gain a first university degree, bypassing the standard accumulation principles of credentials and merits; as a result, “employment at the public sector, is not for people like us! It is a vicious circle, from being able to go to university without a major effort into getting a job without needing to compete fairly and equally. This has only been possible

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268 As explained by Baylouny, the fine line between private and public during the privatisation process was often confusing and even “effectively blurring the private-public distinction,” Baylouny 2008, p. 285.  
269 Razzaz and Iqbal 2008, p. 1
for those who are East Jordanians,” as perceived by the young men working in vocational jobs in Jabal al-Naser. With the structured divide, through politics and economy, studied in earlier chapters, these young men cannot even compare their work opportunities with those of their parents, the earlier generation. Almost a quarter of these focus group participants had parents working in the public sector. They perceive their opportunities differently in both the private and the public sectors.

Abu Omar, 60 years old, worked for twenty years in the private sector. He arrived in Jordan from Cairo, where he did his BA as an accountant, “work for me and people from my generation was not a difficulty, the market was not as competitive and the people with university degrees were not as many as we have today.” His eldest son, a distinct student in his studies and grades, finished a degree in pharmaceuticals was unemployed for three years in 1995 until he found a very low level job at a firm to his speciality. “I worry about them all [he has five children], I worry about work they can access in such a challenging market.” His second son is studying musicology. He was able through the community centre Al-Ruwwad to get a grant. He has been introduced through his specialised department to firms looking for potential candidates to work with them. He has secured a job for after graduation (Case 31, Jabal al-Natheef, March 4, 2010).

It is estimated that there are 17,540 annual university graduates expecting to find job opportunities (8,390 are female). Furthermore, the labour market competition becomes more challenging when selected specialisations do not necessarily match the needs in the labour market. There are 230,000 students (of whom 120,000 are female) admitted every academic year in all Jordanian universities. This has created highly saturated

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270 This is a typical stereotype which built up as a result of the Jordanisation politics. As shown in this thesis, there are further layers that matter other than the origin only, including class and status.
273 Ibid.
274 Note, public universities absorb 70 percent of all the students registered for Bachelor degrees, making 162,000 of students. EU (2011) Higher Education in Jordan, p.4 [http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/tempus/participating_countries/overview/jordan_tempus_country_fiche_final.pdf](http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/tempus/participating_countries/overview/jordan_tempus_country_fiche_final.pdf)
markets with graduates specialising in certain degrees such as medicine and engineering who fail to find jobs in the labour market. As per statistics, out of the graduate students there are about 13,054 students (74 percent of the total) applying to study for their master’s degree. A lesser percentage seek to go for a Higher Diploma (one year after the first degree) making about 2,370 students (14 percent of the total) and 2,116 (about 12 percent of the total) have applied for a doctoral degree.\footnote{Ibid.}

Figure 22: Table: Based on data from Jordan Department of Statistics’ employment and unemployment survey 2009

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Indicator} & \textbf{2000} & \textbf{2009} \\
\hline
\textit{Labor force participation rate (age 15+)} & & \\
Male & 66.0 & 64.8 \\
Female & 12.3 & 14.9 \\
Youth (ages 15-24) & 27.8 & 28.0 \\
Total & 39.4 & 40.1 \\
\hline
\textit{Unemployment rate} & & \\
Male & 12.3 & 10.3 \\
Female & 21.0 & 24.1 \\
Youth (ages 15-24) & 26.7 & 27.0 \\
Total & 13.7 & 12.9 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Jordan Labor Market Indicators, 2000 and 2009}
\label{tab:jordan_labor_market}
\end{table}

Source: Jordan Department of Statistics 2010.
A striking feature in Jordan is female youth unemployment where only 14.9 percent of Jordanian women participate in the labour force; this has been considered the lowest in the Arab countries. For example, youth unemployment rates are 28.0 percent for males

276 Angel-Urdinola et al. 2013, p.75.
and 43.2 percent for females. The ILO country studies reveal that a large proportion of the young unemployed people are educated at least to secondary level. Students in focus group discussions confirmed this when talking about the limited chances they have with a first degree university. Those later would not accept low pay or weekly wages with no social security and medical insurance. Moreover, students also perceived that the chances for women with a first university degree are higher than they are for men:

“Women can secure basic employment with their BA degree, but not necessarily the same applies to men.”

Thus, female labour force participation increases according to educational attainment, with the most significant jump in economic activity for those who have attained a post-secondary degree. Although women tend to be more highly educated, according to the DOS for 2012 unemployment rate amongst female holders of first university degrees is much higher than that of men, about 24.3 percent. The traditional conservative society, the protective mentality over the women, and the stereotyped image of the woman as a housewife and a mother are some reasons which have limited work opportunities for them. Kamleh’s narrative is very different to this reality:

Kamleh B. from Karak was married at the age 18. Her score at Tawjihi was high. After having had her first four children, she stopped and decided to go for some training courses and then joined a community college where she got a diploma in Society Education. Meanwhile she was doing social voluntary work for some projects with a royal NGO, River Jordan, in the district and with an association funded by the municipality. During the Gulf War, her retired husband who lost a working opportunity in the Gulf because of the war, got unemployed for five years. Her work was necessary at the time to support the family and pay the rent of the house. Her husband eventually got better paid jobs. She has now seven children, works in two jobs, the morning job is with a public health initiative funded

278 FG 5, Jabal Al-Natheef, April 7th, 2012.
by UNICEF and in the afternoon, she runs the administrative matters for a private clinic for a young General Physician in al Naser (Case 10, Jabal Al-Naser, Dec. 18th 2011).

Women’s work in the Arab countries has been impacted by several factors religious, cultural, social and familial to say the least. Conditions of women in Jordan are not identical. Some could be restricted for religion or social limitations meanwhile others could be supported by educational and social openness. In the case of Kamleh, it was her supportive husband that enabled her to take a role in the labour market and assume responsibility as a sharing partner in the household. Rajaa, similarly, has had a supportive husband who welcomed her wish to support the household with another income. Being a woman, amongst few who compete with her, in that area of East Amman and in that kind of job as a social worker conducting regular visits to households, enabled her to develop and grow in her job, despite the fact that she has not passed her high school exams.

Rajaa (45 years old) lives with her Syrian husband and three children in Jabal Al-Natheef and works as a social worker in the health project funded by UNICEF, at a branch for the Ministry of Health within East Amman. Despite the fact that she did not pass her tawjihi and did not pursue her education, she has been appreciated in her work since she started her first work experience with Save the Children in Jabal al-Natheef where she learnt how to do the work and was recommended to get a position at River Jordan, then at the ministry. “I have failed my tawjihi, so I have been very lucky that my work progress has not been correlated to my educational achievements.” Her role in the household is essential. Her husband is a construction labourer and his income per day does not exceed 7 Jds. Her refugee status, as she puts it, has helped in the household expenses: “The children [four children] attend UNRWA schools making use of the refugee status I have for their school education at UNRWA. This may also help later for them to apply to UNRWA Naour College.”279 (Case 24, Jabal al-Nadheef, March 23, 2012).

279 Her expressed concern is because the Jordanian laws do not permit the Jordanian mother to pass on her nationality to her children. It was only in 2006 that rights were given to the Jordanian women to let her children in public schools. The same law was also applied to the refugee women. Refugee status, according
In general, I was able to interview fewer women in the two studied areas. Some work from home, they are not easily seen as working women. I was able to meet few through introduction and assistance of the Islamic Centre in Jabal Al-Nadheef. Others do not work and are content to be dependent on assistance given to them by the Islamic centre and UNRWA (hardship cases programme). With the help of gatekeepers, I was introduced to few working women in the formal sector (public and private) and I was able to arrange appointments to meet them after their working hours in their homes or at their work place.

**III. ‘Social network’ package**

The effective package needed to secure a settled job and to grow professionally is centred on the social network. In a patrimonial society, social connections and exchanged allocation are critical. The ‘wow card’ refers to *wasta*, or what locally is also known as *mahsubiyya*, meaning nepotism: the pursuit of short term profit from organisations or people connected with politics (or with the apparatus of power). The ‘wow card’ has a significant effect in getting a job or in securing an economic opportunity, bypassing required qualifications or fixed amount of money. *Wasta* means ‘mediation,’ referring to the linkage created by a mediator between the one in need of help/service and the one giving the help or playing the mediator’s role to someone in a position of power.

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to the administrative definition of the Palestine refugee, is only passed through a male descent and not through female.
Mahsubiyya reflects the bonding with persons who have access to power. It means that the person in power is liable for those relating to the tribe, whether siblings, relatives or friends. The role of social networks in a tribal society like Jordan has a heavy weight and importance. It is part of the patrimonial structure that was revised in chapter 2, with a thorough analysis of the status element of the Weberian class stratification. Jordan’s tribes, families and clans depend on each other to defend and serve their mutual interests. Both Palestinian-origin and East Jordanians use these social networks, using and exploring their connections to attain their objectives.

“It is a known prescription, why do I need to beat around the bush and waste my energy, or waste my time studying if I do not have a secured wasṭa for a job later on”, one young man in his 30s explained, “it is the wow card that one needs in order to secure a possible university education but also to ensure a job with all advantages and security. (FG 3, Jabal Al Naser, Oct. 24, 2011).

Rampant nepotism and influence have become the main elements needed in the package to secure a job. In a book entitled The Declared Secret, the phenomenon of wasṭa, as per a survey conducted by the two authors of the book Sakijha and Kilani, is postulated as a result of maladministration /bad governance, corruption, and the absence of transparency and free democratic ruling institutions.280

Wasṭa, according to the sociologist Hisham Sharabi, is a traditional tool linked to the affiliation to one family, tribe, clan, or sect in order to attain mutual interests and benefits. In this relationship, three parties reap benefits: the one who solicited the favour, the one who mediated (who enhances his reputation in the eyes of his tribe or community) and the one who provided the favour. This third party is the one who has power. By bestowing favours, he strengthens his social standing and has people indebted to him. He can subsequently use this to further the interests of himself or his relatives. Wasṭa can be classified as a measure of social

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capital which refers to connections among individuals-social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trust-worthiness that arise from them.\textsuperscript{281}

Candidates running for municipal or legislative elections for example sought to promise voters for support in accessing university seats, scholarship, or getting recruited. The \textit{wasta} serves their needs in securing voters to get elected in the parliament or the municipal council. At the same time, it serves the needs of Palestinian-origin Jordanians in securing themselves a scholarship, a stable job with benefits. Several Members of Parliament (MPs) and members of municipal councils were named as having promised and also helped young men - Palestinian-origin Jordanians living in al Naser or Al Nadheef - with jobs at the municipality if they get elected and make it to the council or to the parliament.

Abu el Abd, from Diwan Oumwass (the family meeting club for people from the village of Oumwass/Palestine), considered it a fair deal. During electoral campaigns, he prepares files of candidates looking to work either in military jobs or in the municipality. “We hold electoral meetings to these running candidates in our \textit{maqrar} (premises) so that they market their electoral programme and tell as many people as possible from the district. We expect, as a result of the bonded relationship with the candidates, that this would permit us to ask them for help (wasta) in securing jobs and scholarships for our young men.” He said, it usually works well and it has happened with several candidates (Case 12, Jabal al Naser, Dec. 26, 2011).

The ‘Family-Welfare package’ is another dominant package which falls under the social network umbrella. It is used by the young men interviewed. Ghazi K. brought up in the refugee camp firstly of Wihdat and later of al Naser, managed to build his wealth with his brothers and sister, and today they have their own advertising company and a farm producing dates for export. His capital exceeds several millions Jds today. “Like a little

\textsuperscript{281} In Sakijha and Kilani 2002, p.24
kingdom, more than 35 of my relatives have been funded by our business to finish their university education. More than half of them work in the businesses we own and the rest have been able to secure work opportunities in places they wanted in private sector.\textsuperscript{282}

He represents the ‘self-made man’ - the supported approach since the 1990s to achieving high status via social mobility rather than the dependence approach on the status of the tribe.

Another example is the Ash. family in Jabal al Natheef, who have a chocolate and biscuit factory in East Amman. In their discussion about work in al Natheef, young men would often mention this family as a potential recruiter particularly for people from Jabal Al-Natheef.

“They are very well and they understand well the challenges the young men in this area encounter to secure work” Abu Murad told me. He praised the Ash. family, whom I was unable to meet, but I came across when one of their sons came to buy vegetables when Abu Murad was talking to me. “This family has been able to build its wealth since the 1980s. They have always been able to support many young people in the camp through jobs. They are however not highly paid.” (Case 25, Jabal Al Natheef, April 8, 2012)

Abu Murad has a vegetable shop in the area. He was able to grow his business, establishing this shop and the one opposite his shop as part of a compound building he constructed with the support of his brother who lived in Kuwait in the 1970s and 1980s.

“The money my brother was able to make in Kuwait, enabled me to build this building, where we have two shops in the first floor, two flats in which we live and two flats which we rent.” All the children of Abu Murad and his brother have a university education and the revenue from these businesses supported them. The choice of working in public

\textsuperscript{282} Case 2, Muqablain, Nov 17, 2011.
sector jobs was almost out of consideration. “The opportunities, as a family, we can make in our business, cannot be compared to jobs with regular limited salary one would make in government work.”

The views about opportunities in public sector or private sector varied. Some talked about the opportunities in their entrepreneurial work that enabled them to grow their businesses, expand their houses or move up in social class, and the financial gains because of a particular opportunity that was well timed with their action. Others talked about the many losses they suffered which make them perceive stable public sector jobs as better for them.

Salam has a shop in the main street in the camp. During the Gulf War in 1991, he was able to gain financial profits which helped him in his life plan, whether that of marriage, children and going back to studying. “Do you remember the emergency measures Jordanians were asked to take curing the war in 1991? Jordanians were asked to equip their houses in case the war will have its ramifications on Jordan: people were asked to buy reserve food, Gaz lanterns and candles, Gaz masques and tape their windows. I personally acted quickly with a warehouse I used to rent and bought the Gaz lanterns in big numbers. That war, albeit its hard moments on all of us, made me a fortune. These are chances that only people like us in this free market can benefit from.” (Case 37, Jabal Al-Naser, August 17, 2010).

Several elements in reality affect the way economic opportunities are perceived: the amount of income; the regularity and security of that income; the stability of the job; legalisation of the job (through contracts); the working hours; and the benefits, mainly health, education, loans and retirement pensions. These elements vary in their importance according to educational level, the way rights of citizenship are understood and practiced.

283 Case Jabal al Nadheef, 25 April 8, 2012
geographic location in Jordan, social class and social status. The table below is an indication of how salaried job are mostly sought for their multiple benefits. When a social network is available access to these formal institutions is possible.

![Figure 24: Percentage distribution of employed Jordanians (age 15+) by employment status and sex for 2012.](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Status</th>
<th>The Kingdom</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salaried employee</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>81.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid family worker</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid worker</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DOS - June 2013.

5.1.2 Public (military and civil) or private sector?

1. Military employment

The integration scheme of the Jordanian state in the 1950s sought to incorporate Palestinians into the army. “The Palestinian presence denoted integration and cohesion, but its real value resided in the opportunity to defend the kingdom, while prohibiting them entry into the Army Officer Corps and presenting a threat to the military status quo,
since the majority of Palestinians were allocated to administrative and technical positions.”284 Palestinians were sent to work for both the Arab Legion *el Jeish el Arabi* and the Jordanian National Guard. In May 1956 the guards and the army, ‘The Arab Legion,’ were combined as an elite regular force of Bedouins, tribesmen and Transjordanian peasants with a territorial frontier force consisting wholly of settled Palestinian agricultural peasants and a few townsmen. The Jordanian government had its fears regarding arming the Palestinians; it worried that arming the Palestinians would not mean protecting the kingdom but rather placing it in further jeopardy. But it was impossible to treat them as mistrusted half citizens.285

This integration process within the ranks of the Arab Legion “brought credence to the suspicion within the Jordanian society.”286 In the midst of the integration process, an Army Lieutenant Colonel, Ali Abu Nowar, formed the Fourth Infantry Brigade, composed almost exclusively of Palestinians. While it appeared to be a simple military division it was in reality a “military nucleus primed for a coup d’État, concurrent with a group of Free Officers as the base for a future regime. The coup attempt of April 1957 ultimately failed due to the loyalty of the King’s Bedouin ground operational units who upheld the status quo”.287 Thus, the National Guard had failed to ‘Jordanise’ the Palestinians and to gain their trust.288

284 From an interview with a Jordanian Official cited by Gandolfo 2012, pp.11-14
288 In 1964, the discontented Jordanian government found a greater medium to impart their restlessness and realised the threat to internal stability through the PLO. The emergence of an organised, external leadership in Palestine altered circumstances considerably, providing dispossessed Palestinians with a vociferous, united voice. This had shaken the state with its political foundations, “engulfing in its progress the futile militaristic bids to integrate the Palestinians during the previous decades.” Gandolfo 2012, pp.11-14.
Ever since Palestinian-origin Jordanians cannot assume high ranking positions in the military, nor can they assume positions in very critical positions, but they can be recruited as guards, cleaners, or as middle-low ranked officers in limited tasks and services. No figures or detailed information are available on such a specific matter. The rough estimate, undocumented, is that Palestinian-origin Jordanians working in the military are about 2 percent. These jobs are mainly the gendarmerie, civil defence and the police department.

Working in the military has lots of advantages: guaranteed employment; steady income; healthcare and social security for the entire family; state-subsidised (essentially free) higher education (for employees of the military and their families through university admission quotas); and government-subsidised housing. “The military itself was seldom a life-long career. Upon retirement around age 30 [or 40], former army personnel were free to seek other employment while continuing to receive a pension.” Despite reform and liberalisation, this military part of the public sector does not seem to be affected and it continues to grow.

Retired military officers (East Jordanians) living in areas such as Jabal al Natheef or Jabal al Naser, where there is a heavy presence of the Palestinian-origin Jordanians, ‘make a service’ for their Palestinian neighbours by getting them jobs in the military branch of the

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289 Oral communication with a diplomat in the British Embassy, June 2011.
290 Emergency loans – employees could take advances on earnings which constituted the main form of loans in Baylouny 2008, p. 288.
292 Baylouny 2008
public sector. This service, as seen by Abu el Abd, becomes their “retirement part-time job” that usually ranges between 200-400 Jds per person.

Abu Yazan, East Jordanian from Salt, 55 years old, is an owner of plots of lands and buildings in Jabal Al-Naser. He rents almost the majority of his property to Palestinian-origin Jordanians. He invests in his contacts and relatives in the Army to help “Palestinians,” living in the area in al Naser or simply Palestinian friends, to work in al-Darak Forces (Gendarmerie). “Palestinians will simply not be accepted to apply on their own.” Currently, as a retired military person, this assistance for Palestinian-origin Jordanians to work in military forces, takes a big part of his time. (Case 16, Jabal Al Naser, Dec. 27, 2011)

Palestinian-origin Jordanians seeking settled jobs have an interest to work in the Jordanian Army. The benefits represent social security for them and for their families.

Abu El Abd, who is originally Palestinian from Oumwas/Palestine, being the general secretary of the community’s Diwan (Family club) in Jabal Al-Naser, had to pay 200 Jd to an East Jordanian retired officer from the police to be the wasta in order to employ one of his sons in the police department. “The officer lives in Al Naser and comes originally from Karak. He is retired from the police department and his job at the present time is to connect us [Palestinian-origin] with his friends or colleagues or relatives who work in the various military branches. He charges a certain amount of money. His help was useful. Today my fifth son works with the police department having a regular job. But he still does not have all the benefits of the regular job in the security services: he for example does not have social security.” (Case 12, Jabal al Naser, Dec. 26, 2011).

In addition to this ‘military’ oriented service there has been a new initiative, led by the military in a partnership with a French company, which aims to train young men in ‘construction oriented services’ under the umbrella of the Jordanian Armed Forces. This includes three months of military training and six months of vocational training,

293 Note how he referred to the Palestinian-origin Jordanians as the Palestinians.
including construction, mechanical, wood- and metal-related professions. During training the trainees are paid a regular salary (not exceeding 200 Jds) and are given the benefits of public sector employment. The advertisements in newspapers (shown on the following page) calling for candidates to apply (whether to the military or the construction services of the military) establish a selectivity criterion that includes a question about the origin of the father with a birth certificate indicating his place of birth (Category W. in the ad, f. in the translation).

A very professional car mechanic in al Wihdat, R. was offered to get a regular and stable job in the military by one of his clients. As all his papers were ready and approved and he was ready to assume the job, “they discovered that my father was born in Palestine- the west bank which was then part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The day I went to take the papers for the job, I was refused.” (FG 2, Jabal Al-Naser, Oct. 24th 2011).
Figure 25: An advertisement in the local newspapers by the Jordanian Armed Forced calling for candidates to apply to the National Company for employment and training (the construction service)
The National Company for training and employment by the royal ordinances

The Jordanian armed forces announce the beginning of registration for the second and third group that encompass 10,000 trainees. Training will be on one of the skills mentioned below.

The trainee will be paid a salary starting from 191 JDs added to distinguished benefits: Health insurance, social security, food and accommodation, transportation, diploma of the attained skill. The training period will be deducted from the obligatory military service.

For those applying to work in government and official departments, or have applications in the Civil Service Bureau, their applications will be halted upon coordination with official bodies in charge until the training finishes.

Those who receive social security will be excluded

Conditions to apply:
  a. To be a Jordanian national.
  b. Not to be below 18 years old and not to exceed 30 years old, according to the kind of work in the application form.
  c. To pass the medical test.
  d. To have a security clearance and not to be convicted of a crime or an act of dishonour.

Needed Documents:
  a. Valid Certificate of security clearance [usually available from the court].
  c. Copy of birth certificate.
  d. A copy of the National Identity card with the national identity number on it.
  e. Copy of attained degrees/studies and copy of work experiences (if available).
  f. Copy of father’s death certificate, if deceased, on which his place of birth is noted.
  g. One personal photo.
  h. Copy of the National Aid Fund card, if available.

Skills are mechanical, construction labourer, stone builder, carpenter, painter, blacksmith, electrician, mechanic for heating and air conditioners, etc.
The criteria for application to any military branch is rendered even more difficult when
the applying candidate is expected to provide proof of not having been convicted of any
criminal act (‘Adam Mahkumyeh) or not having been accused by any security or military
act - security clearance (husun syreh u soluk) (Category D of the conditions in the ad).

Abu Khalil, who has a falafel shop in Al-Naser refugee camp, sighed that
his young 23 year old brother cannot enter in a job opportunity that can
discipline his life and give him some stability. “My brother was once put
in prison for three months for having been aggressive and violent in a fight
between him and another two young men in Al-Naser who are originally
East Jordanian. He was to be blamed and he got his punishment. The three
months in prison got him to meet young men, his age, who were much
involved in selling a kind of drug, known as kabat [this is Captagon]. As
he came out, he started working with them in selling the kabat. He was
also taking it. He has been going to prison on and off very regularly. This
last year, I have been stopping him from being in touch with these bad
people. I tried to rent the shop nearby so he serves food for clients coming
to buy Falafel, making a sit-in area. The rent was too high for me to afford
and I could not make money to pay two rents [for his current shop and the
other sit-in area]. I simply wish I can have him join the army. This will
make our lives and his life much better. But his file now does not permit
him to apply to any job, in the formal sector: since he can never get the
‘adam mahkumyeh nor husun syreh u soluk!’” (FG 6, Jabal Al-Naser May
25, 2010).

Young men in the two areas I studied expressed their frustrations about their inability to
apply for any of these opportunities within the armed forces due to the many
impediments. “I tried to apply to this military training for construction with the army and
I was hopeful to make it but I realised that the company also expects us to have a
guarantor who has a minimum of 5000Jds in his/her account to be held off until I

Captagon, medical name Fenetylline hydrochloride, is an amphetamine that causes euphoria and numbs
pain, used as a hallucinogenic drug by young men in refugee camps.
graduate. That made it very difficult for me. Since that became difficult, I dropped out the whole idea.”

II. Civil service employment

Despite the measures implemented under liberalisation decreasing the size of the public sector, employment in the public sector continues to be a preferential choice. According to Saif, in 2012 “the public sector remains a key employer accounting for 37 percent of total employment.” In addition to job stability and regular income, public sector employment provides social security, healthcare and access to emergency loans. Despite the fact that salaries are lower in the public sector than elsewhere, it continues to be ranked highly because of the stability it provides.

Employment in the civil service is regulated by the Civil Service Bureau (CSB) which was established by royal ordinance in 1955. The CSB is mandated to organise and develop public services on the basis of principles of justice, equality, and transparency. In reality, “the system of social and familial responsibility within the bureaucracy reproduced itself through hiring based on wasṭa and the state’s concerns about tribal and geographic representation,” making by this as claimed by Abu Odeh “the public sector off-limits for the Palestinians.” Field interviews did not see it an “off-limit”. Some argued it is like anything else, with a wasṭa and a strong connection, all would work easily. Others saw it takes a long time for them, because they have no “push” to fasten the application: “It is a long turn, but we can make it eventually,” one person from one

296 Saif 2012, p. 78.
297 www.csb.gov.jo
298 Carroll 2006, p. 113.
focus group meeting commented, based on the experience of his sister with a *Sharia* (religion) degree who waited seven years after her graduation in order to make it through to become a teacher of history at a primary school education.\textsuperscript{300} Another participant in another focus group talked about his sister, who had a community college diploma, who waited four years after graduation and, when she got accepted, she was assigned to work in a village, Dhlail, in Zarqa (a city towards the East of Jordan). “It was not worth it for a salary that will only cover her transportation.”\textsuperscript{301} She never took the job. “It needed a *wasta* to help us move her to Amman,” said her brother.\textsuperscript{302} Mostly, the qualifications needed to apply for any civil sector job do not seem much easier for the East-Ammani-Palestinian-origin Jordanians with limited social networks and modest educational attainment, to fulfil.

Other than application to the CSB to work in the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health (as noted by the interviewees) there has been a remarkable number of young men interviewed in the two areas studied who work for Greater Amman Municipality as street cleaners, guards, messengers (for internal mail distribution) or service people (in pipe-repair, sewerage check visits and other tasks).

“It was easy to get the job, because it did not need necessarily qualifications, it really needed the favour of someone who my father knows to bring me in,” said Hamdi. “My father, who used to work at the municipality since the 1960s, was easily able to bring me in, through his contacts, as a plumber. Although I dropped out of school at age 15 and never got training in plumbing, I had to learn through practice.” The importance about the municipality job is that it is a public sector job with all the benefits of health insurance and social security. Because it is mainly service oriented, the employee does not need to be in the office all the

\textsuperscript{300} FG 2, Jabal al Naser, Oct. 24, 2011.  
\textsuperscript{301} FG 6, May 26, 2010, Jabal Al Naser.  
\textsuperscript{302} *Ibid.*
time. Hamdi, for example, considered it a relaxing job, since he goes early in the morning to sign in and goes later in the afternoon to sign out. This permits him to run errands for the family in the morning hours and to help his father in his shop, “since my father retired from the municipality, he rented a shop in the camp to sell food [small supermarket], I help him especially in the morning hours when he would be in the wholesale market buying new products. “The salary permits me to have my own pocket money (transportation to and from work, cigarettes and outings). I am not sure if this will be enough if I want to marry,” he said, and went on to indicate that he was considering looking for another job. (FG 6, Jabal al-Naser, May 25, 2010)

Most young men interviewed (East Jordanians and those of Palestinian origin) argued that the jobs at the municipality are mostly service-oriented, and thus there are no difficult qualifications for them to meet. This makes it possible for these young men with their limited educational attainment. Most importantly, applying to the municipality jobs has been possible because it falls part of a clientalistic deal: the support given to an MP or a municipality council representative during his /her electoral campaign is rewarded back by recruiting the young men to service jobs in the municipality.

Palestinian-origin Jordanians tend to be more present in service oriented ministries such as health, education and Awkaf (religion) ministries. But, in a very subtle manner, according to observations and daily encounters in ministries and public government offices, their numbers, proportionate to their demographic presence, have been diminishing. As noted earlier in chapter 1 there are no official statistics ever released comparing the Palestinian-origin Jordanian portion to the East Jordanian portion.

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Carroll also confirms this based on her work studying the employment divide: “as there is no formal classification of who is and who is not a Palestinian in Jordan, there is no definitive proof of the Transjordanian public sector-Palestinian private sector divide or of changes in it.”  

While on paper all job opportunities are open to all citizens equally, the ‘subtle’ policies of the state towards citizens from different origin, economic class and status (power) since the early 1970s have, *de facto*, aimed at de-Palestinising the public sector by reducing the “visibility,” as put by Abu Odeh, and the presence of Palestinian-Jordanians. State employment started, as of the 1970s, to be perceived as a “defining characteristic of East Banker identity,” writes Laurie Brand, a political scientist who studied thoroughly Jordan with its East Jordanian - Palestinian-origin Jordanian paradox and the definition of communal identities in Jordan. This policy was (and continues to be) implemented as a form of “non-official and un-transparent affirmative action,” which has reduced the rate of Palestinians working in the civil service, the army, the political sphere, the media and higher education (both faculty members and students).

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304 Carroll 2006, pp 113-114.  
305 Subtle because policies have been implemented through classified administrative regulations and have not been made public.  
306 Abu Odeh 1999, pp. 214-216, p. 191  
a. **Private sector employment**

The private sector, as mentioned in chapter 3, has been mostly concentrated with its new investment, especially FDI since the 1990, in Amman and central-northern cities. This has obviously generated new job opportunities in the private sector. These jobs have targeted highly educated and often internationally educated graduates from a certain class and status, with certain qualifications, skills, abilities and sometimes professional networks.

Young Palestinian-origin Jordanians in East Amman consider these new jobs difficult to access: They are “very little paid that could hardly cover my cigarettes, transportation fees and my pocket money,” commented Awad, 33 years old, who worked as a driver in a big factory run with capital from the Gulf. After he resigned he worked in a taxi office for a private owner: The pay is less but “working with small firms is better manageable, at least we have some liberty and we are not made like slaves.”

Saif, in his recent work studying employment and poverty effects, stated that 75 percent of the jobs that were created in the private sector over the period 2000-2007 originated in small firms mainly employing one to four people, and some in large firms. “However, small firms do not confer protection or offer such benefits such as social and health insurance.” Private foreign investments which increased dramatically in Jordan since 2001, generated low skill-low wage jobs “that were filled by foreign workers rather than

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312 Saif 2012, p.78.
by Jordanian nationals”, as reported in a World Bank report by Razzaz and Iqbal.

“Domestic workers have relatively high reservation about wages, based on expectations of obtaining public sector or foreign jobs and of income support from families”, the World Bank researchers report.

Apart from the big investment, the small and medium enterprises seem to be more of interest for the residents of East Amman. With limited start-up capital, job creation is possible, but cannot be highly paid because such small firms are hardly able to make ends meet with an inward focus on the local market and weak linkages between the rest of the economy and job creation. “This group account for nearly 42 percent of the jobs that have been created in the private sector over the period of 2002-2008.” Employees in these enterprises do not exceed 50 persons, by law, registered with the social security but do not necessarily have medical insurance.

The main characteristic of this sector is ‘exploitation,’ ‘mustaghalin’ that was loudly put by one participant who is 30 years old in a focus group discussion. This is seen in long working hours that could range between 45 and 48 hours a week. Depending on the size of the firm, some of the workers are paid daily and the range of payment, as noted by Fafo, is 1.28 Jd outside the camp and 0.96 Jd inside the camp. Improved education mattered and paid off better in the private sector, up to 1.92 Jds. The range of salaries mentioned during focus groups and interviews ranged between 90 and 280 Jds maximum.

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313 Razzaz and Iqbal 2008, pp.1-2
314 Ibid.
315 Saif 2012, p.78.
316 Tiltines and Zhang 2013, p. 201
The majority of the small firms would not provide non-pay benefits. However, as Titlnes and Zhang pointed out “such benefits are vital in supplementing monetary payments and some also strengthen people’s economic security.” According to a Fafo survey of 2013, for example, few people both outside and inside camps reported entitlement to overtime pay, paid or unpaid maternity leave, subsidised or free transportation and housing. Job security in such conditions is quite fragile and, as a result, the turnover becomes quite high. “Having a work contract is not considered a guarantee against being laid off.”

There does not seem to be a preference amongst people I interviewed about work. Some considered work in the formal sector, for the benefits and security it provides, as an ‘aspired dream’: An aspiration for stability and social protection for the present and the future. Those who work in the formal sector, both in the military and the civil branches and the private sector in turn, were critical of ‘regular’ low pay, compared to the opportunities those in the informal sector are able to grasp because of their availability and their freedom.

For the Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East-Amman, the upward mobility, whether professional or socioeconomic, does not always materialise in these limited private sector jobs. It further triggers an increase turnover in labour: a move away from more secure employment to short, insecure contracts. Greater insecurity of employment goes together

317 Ibid., p. 205
318 Ibid.
319 Ibid., p. 210
with deceleration of the rate of growth of employment. This kind of employment does not always appear on paper and in unemployment statistics.

5.1.3 The informal sector

Lewis, in the 1950s, developed a theoretical model of economic development, the classic ‘Patterns of development,’ assuming that surplus labour will be absorbed as the modern industrial sector grows.\(^{320}\) In his analysis he identified the informal sector, referring to the type of employment that falls outside the modern industrial sector in urban areas. It was later, in the early 1970s, in Keith Hart’s first ILO mission to Kenya studying income opportunities and urban employment in Ghana that the informal sector was recognised as persistent and was even reported to be expanding. Hart considered formal salaried jobs and informal self-employment as possible economic opportunities. His work demonstrated the dynamism of self-employed entrepreneurs, whose activities went well beyond “those of shoeshine boys and sellers of matches.”\(^{321}\)

The picture of the informal sector has thus evolved from being that of an excess labour reserve to a dynamic entrepreneurial market run by people who lack capital resources but have motivation and energy. De Soto, in his analysis of informality, perceives it as “an excess to regulation of the economy”, as it is a response that breaks down the legal


barriers and restrictions of the formal economic market.\textsuperscript{322} The informal entrepreneur is not, from this perspective, seen as a low-productivity marginal actor, rather as “an economic hero who manages to survive and even prosper despite state oppression.”\textsuperscript{323}

Informal entrepreneurs usually follow a diverse and often complex life strategy. They can be compared to hedgehogs and foxes as when Archilochus said that “the fox has many ideas but the hedgehog has one big idea.”\textsuperscript{324} In contrast to full-time employees in the formal sector who are hedgehogs with one big idea and a single source of support, as explained by Robert Chambers, informal sector workers are “those poor people often powerless, desperate or exploited, who have or can have but one survival strategy are the same - slaves, bonded labourers, outworkers tied to single supplier-buyers, beggars, some vendors, prostitutes and some other occupational specialists”.\textsuperscript{325} The case of Abdel Hameed represents an example of Chambers’ foxes in seeking livelihood chances.

Abdel Hameed (40 years old, married and has three children) interviewed at the municipality’s vegetable market in Jabal al-Naser: “Since 1989, I have been working in construction. I was then 16 years old. My father passed away when I was two (he has seven brothers and three sisters. His eldest brother was imprisoned for 7 years for violence, his second brother works like him and he is the third in his big family). I had to get into the market and work to help my family. I used to work in anything related to construction (stone brushing). I was working with another person who knew the market. I used to make 5 Jds a day when I started. The market grew so widely after 1992 [the construction boom created by the returnees from the Gulf]. I started working alone and I was making 15-20 Jd a day. Everything was in abundance. [There was] Lots of work and lots of money. I was able to grow also a network of clients in West Amman and

\textsuperscript{322} De Soto Hernando, 1989 The Other Path: The informal Revolution, New York: Harper and Row.
\textsuperscript{323} Portes and Schauffler 1993, p.40.
\textsuperscript{325} Ibid.
they were running after me for their projects. I was able to save money. This was invested with money made by my other elder brother in building three floors on top of our family’s unit in al-Naser Camp. Although the law of the Department of Palestinian Affairs (DPA) does not permit us to exceed two floors in the camp, we built four and we split the first floor (the original unit we were brought up in) into two parts, one for my mother, who is living on her own now, to use as her small residence and one, we made as two shops which get us a high rent because they overlook the main commercial road in the camp. In 1995, the market slowed down and the work was not making me an income. I applied to the municipality to work in any of the possible jobs, such as in security or as coffee/tea maker or as an administrative messenger. It did not work out, because I do not have any wasta, despite the support I did to the recent MP during his election campaign. Coming to the market of vegetables was the only possible way left for me to make a living.” (Case 7, Jabal al-Naser, Dec 5, 2011).

The informal sector, as studied in the dual labour market theory, is composed of those people who are unable to access primary (regular wage jobs that are taxed and regulated) or secondary work (lower wage jobs in the service sector). According to a recent report studying the informal sector in Jordan about 44 percent of Jordan’s workforce in 2010 operated in the ‘shadow economy’. Considering the fact that 56 percent of the total labour force works in the formal sector (34 percent in the public sector and 22 percent in the private sector), the study showed that 26 percent of informal work was done in the informal sector.

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326 The houses in the camps are known as units, since they were originally units of lands, divided into 100 sq. metres each and given out to refugees and displaced Palestinians.
327 The informal sector is increasingly being referred to as the informal economy to get away from the idea that informality is confined to a specific sector of economic activity but rather cuts across many sectors. “Informal economy” also emphasises the existence of a continuum from the informal to the formal ends of the economy and thus the interdependence between the two sides in Becker Kristina Foldman, 2004 ‘The Informal Economy’, Fact Finding Mission, No 3630 Sida- Department of Infrastructure and Economic Co-operation, SIDA, p 8.
328 Dual economy is a distinction between modern firms that were understood to be larger, organised bureaucratically, profitable and privileged versus informal firms which were viewed as small, simplistically organised, minimally profitable and marginal or dependent on their more privileged counterparts. (Peattie in Roever Sally Christine, 2005 Negotiating formality: Informal sector, market and state in Peru, PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley, p. 15)
329 Ministry of Planning, UNDP, EU, 2010 Informal Sector In Jordan, MOP, Amman
workers were from the private sector, 17 percent were self-employed and 1 percent worked (in family businesses) without wages.\textsuperscript{330} Informality, as per the Jordanian political economy and the status of the Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman, thus triggers several images: unregulated activities in the market, an inability to grow economically on an equal basis with peers, marginalisation and no social protection. From an economist’s perspective informality focuses on the unregulated economy and its power to generate cash exchanges. From a social-anthropological perspective it focuses on whether the informal sector has reinforced social inequality and viable economic opportunities for those who are unable to make it otherwise. The legal-political perspective focuses on the right to work and secure economic protection and a social safety net as per Article 23 of the Jordanian Constitution, which states that “work is the right of every citizen, and the state shall provide opportunities for work to all citizens by directing the national economy and raising its standards.”

The increasing dependence on informal work and goods, in reality, exacerbates the economic crises and the socio-political cleavage that pushed people in that direction, excusing the state from providing more adequate social welfare services and creating jobs in the formal sector.\textsuperscript{331} Because of its many risks, this type of work may further lower the life chances of those at the bottom of the economic ladder.\textsuperscript{332} State Policies, neoliberal measures and the dominating power of the patrimonial society have all, tactically and gradually, made Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman believe that their work

\textsuperscript{330} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{331} Schutz Eric, 2011 \textit{Inequality and power, the economics of class}, London Routledge.
\textsuperscript{332} Ibid.
opportunities in the formal sector are limited. This has made them shy away from education and explore their only possible and viable resort in informal sector to make ends meet.

The informal economy is defined as a process of income generation that is unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are regulated. According to Castells and Portes, the absence of state regulation from above implies a “lack of explicit, active intervention of the state in the process and outcome of income-generating activities, on the basis of a set of enforceable legal rules.” While the formal economy is based on market-oriented and hierarchical forms of exchange, the informal sector substitutes these forms with socially monitored transactions, based on household and personal relations. The informal economy is service-oriented and less directly affected by state policies. Thanks to its cheaper informal goods and services, it increases the consumption ‘yield’ of formal wages, allowing working class households to make ends meet within the constraints of paltry salaries. Thus the relationship between the formal and informal sectors is very close, with the informal economy dependent on the modern capitalist economy of the regulated sector. In this way, East Amman as a vibrant informal market, despite the expansion of capital to new areas with globalised services. It continues to be a central service hub for West Amman and continues to compete via its services (crafts and repairs) and its cheap prices.

334 Ibid., p13
335 Portes and Schaufler 1993, p. 48.
336 This contradicts with De Soto’s conceptualisation of the informal sector as an independent sector on its own.
Concerning the percentage distribution of informal sector by economic activity, the activity of "wholesale, retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles" employed (32.2%) of the total informal labour, followed by the "transport and storage" (14.8%) and then by the "manufacturing" (14.7%). On the other hand, in the formal sector, the "public administration, civil defence and social security" employed (40.0%) of the total formal labour, while the "education" activity came second (19.9%), and then the "manufacturing" activity (10.3%) in which this activity stands as a common employer for both formal and informal labour.337

The report of the Ministry of Planning indicates that the labour force is divided almost into two equal portions between the formal and the informal sectors and both have their share in the economy and the GDP growth.

I. Disaffiliation and informal citizenship

Much of the literature on economic liberalisation and employment addresses the increased economic inequalities and deepening levels of social exclusion documented in the 1990s: “Neoliberalism produced a situation of permanent insecurity and precarity, conditions necessary for the new apparatuses to work.”338 They depict the new emerging class as a result of liberalised policies with different labels: La classe dangereuse, with references to the industrial Revolution, ‘negative individualism,’ ‘handicapology,’ and

337 MOP et al. 2010
‘disaffiliation,’
these authors all argued that this young generation of youth in the age of globalisation, ‘Generation Y,’
have come into the labour market and fallen “within the framework of a problematic of social integration, or in its absence, of anomie.”

Precariousness is not only about Jordan nor about the Palestinian-origin Jordanians studied in this research, it is a global trend in recent history, “that is in contradiction to the progress of the social state and democracy,” which does not come from employment insecurity but from “lacking an occupational identity.” This, with time, creates a sense of ‘alienation and anomie’ that shows itself in a passive model of lifestyle run by the youth. Lazzarato considers that “the construction of the precarious worker, of the poor, the unemployed and low income workers (...) is part of the amplification and deepening of individualisation and aims to weaken both individuals and differentially, the overall job situation.”

The flexibility of working time and the atypical forms of employment have engendered individualisation and distorted the standard employment conditions.

Castel argues that informality is a process of disaffiliation that should be tracked within a historical trajectory to reconstruct its dynamics and understand its limitations. 

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339 Castel 2003, 2000  
340 Standing 2009  
341 Ibid  
342 Castel 2000, p.520  
343 Appay 2010, p.23  
344 Standing 2009, p.112  
345 Ibid., p.113  
346 Lazzarato 2009, p.119  
347 Castel 2000, p.520
limitations include “one, the axis of integration/non-integration through work - in other words, the relationship to the means by which individuals succeed (or do not succeed) in reproducing their existence on an economic level; the other, an axis of integration/non-integration into a social and family network - in other words, involvement in (or breakdown of) a system of relationships, within which they can reproduce their existence on an emotional and social level.” This model illustrates the economic insecurity that becomes destitution and fragility and ruptures the bonds with the society.

In this thesis, a third axis is suggested, the axis of integration/non-integration through citizenship rights - in other words the socio-political structure and the state’s discursive politics which have led to the emerging of what Schoburgh defines as informal citizenship. Informal citizenship is a status acquired through an individual’s membership in a sub-structure/sub group as the legitimate collective that is associated and attached to formal citizenship: “It resides in that realm of citizenship status where particularistic needs (political, economic, socio-cultural) are either un-met or under-met and where a subordinated social system assumes these functions”. This understanding of citizenship focuses on the experience of the individual seeking to fulfil his/her needs through informal legitimate contexts/groups or collectives. The informal economy, in light of this, has played counter-balancing roles in the creation of citizens and their expectation from the state: “it provides participating agents/individuals with a first-hand

348 Ibid.
350 Ibid., p.15.
experience of the inability of the formal institutions to meet their needs and guarantee those benefits to which they are entitled through social membership and participation in the wider political economy.”

Turner, from this perspective, analyses the citizenship as “set of practices (juridical, political, economic and cultural) which define a person as a competent member of society, and which as a consequence shape the flow of resources to people and social groups.”

Citizenship, as a result, is proven, on the basis of one’s socioeconomic experience and the quality of an individual’s participation in the labour market as well as the nature of the productive activities in which one is engaged. These are critical prerequisites for connection to a social space. When they are not met the conditions are created that can lead to a sense of social exclusion pervading interactions between the citizen and the state and the wider society.

By this, the informal economy has become a reminder of the functional gaps in the operations of the formal economy; the nature of the provision of public services is an indicator whether the state succeeds/fails to fulfil the rights of citizens with its three elements: political civil and social. This has been illustrated in the alienation and anomie as a result of precariousness. “The socio-political effect of this individual is instrumental and thus guides his behaviour towards self-interested ends.” This moulds his motivation and shapes his conduct and behaviour locating himself in a socioeconomic status in the fringes of the society. The case of Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman is an illustrative example of informal citizenship where needs, such as political, economic, and social, are either not met or are under-met, and where a subordinated

[351] Ibid., p.12
[352] Ibid., p.15
[353] Ibid, p. 16
social system, represented in the informal economy, has assumed these functions. Using the example of employment it has been possible to explain the complexities that are inherent to contemporary social membership.

II. Characteristics of the informal economy and its workers

The informal sector is situated amidst various forms of precarious employment concentrated in urban areas to denote the exclusion of the masses, particularly Palestinian-origin Jordanians of poor areas, from the modern urban economy. According to an informal sector study of Jordan, the concentration is in the retail, wholesale and vehicle repair sectors (30 percent), followed by the manufacturing (18.6 percent), transport and stocking (11.7 percent) and construction (11.1 percent). An array of terms is used in the literature: ‘underemployment,’ ‘hidden employment,’ ‘visible and invisible underemployment,’ ‘urban marginality,’ ‘underground economy,’ ‘black economy,’ ‘shadow economy,’ and others. These various terms underscore the vagueness and plurality of definitions of the informal economy. Most importantly, though, is that they indicate that these activities are simply not governed nor regulated: the state is ‘intentionally’ not intervening in an explicit, directed and even institutionalised way. These activities are often run by informal workers, characterised as atomised, individuated and unable to organise, who, as Kenneth Roberts puts it, have “ambiguous class identities, malleable political loyalties and lack of autonomous

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354 Portes and Schauffler 1993, p. 38.
355 MOP et al., 2010
Better clarified, in light of the discursive politics studied in this thesis, the workers in the informal sector have been taught to believe that they are not part of the wider formal market and disciplined society with their inability to accomplish education or to access formal sector jobs. Their ambiguous identity is but a reflection of the marginalising politics conducted by their schools, society and state.

In the vegetable market, one vendor, Mohammed, 34 years old, who left school at age 11 and started to work in a small shop as a helper, was sentenced to prison at age 29 for life, having been accused of being involved with terrorists plotting against the state. After one year and nine months in prison, he was let out. He said, “this has been my life and I do not see that I have had other options to make it better; I was not really plotting against anyone. I was accused unjustly. I have not been able to choose work chances, since I was obliged to get to the market at an early age. I have neither been able to choose people and acquaintances who could not harm me.” Today he has a criminal record, “that does not permit me to think about any ‘respectable’ job [referring to formal sector jobs].” (Case 8, Jabal al-Naser Dec.5, 2011).

The informal economy is heterogeneous. There is no one shape or one type of it. “It can be micro-enterprises, family businesses, and own-account operations. Workers in the informal economy are sometimes actual employees of informal enterprises, but more often than not they are domestic workers without regular contracts, casual workers without fixed employers, temporary workers who get paid through an agency, part-time workers for fixed employers, and unregistered workers.”

In Doan’s work on informality in East Amman, she identified workers in the informal sector as a separate class position: self-employed workers, petty traders and petty

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357 Roberts 1995, p.86
358 ILO, 2001
producers who have small amounts of capital available for investment.\textsuperscript{359} These different groups within the informal economy have a very invisible linkage with the formal economy, they both need one another as the former becomes subcontractor for the latter. The dynamism of informal enterprise and its manifold connections with larger firms are central issues which are entirely missed by a simplified analysis that perceives it as consisting of survival activities engaged in by a surplus labour force.\textsuperscript{360} The ILO categorises the informal economy as work one may be involved in as either working for someone else or being self-employed\textsuperscript{361}:

\textsuperscript{359} In Doan 1992, p.29.
\textsuperscript{360} Portes and Schauffler 1193, p.51.
\textsuperscript{361} adapted from ILO 2002 (2002)
There is no line that can be drawn between workers in the informal sector and the formal sector. They could alternate between different forms of employment or combine them during the same workday.

Awad, a 36-year-old man, has a food stand in the municipality’s vegetable market of al Naser: “The top priority is to make money for a decent living (...) I worked for 7 years in a private firm which gave me a modest salary but I had medical insurance and social security. I quit the job in the firm and worked for a few years in car trading. At first it was rewarding and paid much better than the private firm then I clashed with my business partner and started to work as a taxi driver using a car (with the licensed stamp as a taxi). I became tired from this job, especially that I was supposed to pay 20 Jds to the car owner daily, 10Jds for the fuel. That was a burden regardless if I managed to make this amount of money daily. The daily revenue for me would not exceed 5 Jds. I left. I am now a vegetable vendor, with a capital of 50 Jds” (Awad, case 21, Jabal al Naser, Feb. 15, 2012).
Informal entrepreneurs and unregulated small artisans and merchants engage in the provision of everything from cheap clothing and footwear to auto and residential repairs, transport, cleaning, and the sale of second-hand appliances. Their cheap work also entails repair services of all kinds, construction and production of garments.

Um Ibrahim got a sewing machine from the Council of Churches in Wihdat camp. She makes mass product garments, T-shirts, skirts and dresses for women wearing head-scarves. “I have my market. I go to people and I also sell to some shops.” She does the work at her ease, so she is not obliged to provide quantities by deadlines. The income of this work enabled her teach her three children. “The three have university degrees. Only one was able to get a scholarship. I paid for the other two.” The husband has kidney problems, but was working as a blacksmith. “He worked for people who had the equipped workshops, he never had his own workshop” (Case 50, Jabal Al Nadheef, Aug. 29, 2010).

Although the informal sector activities have been seen as traditional, in reality, the market appears to be quite up-to-date in terms of technology and their markets. The activities of garbage pickers (who collect plastic products and cans), “in appearance the most marginal of workers, but are connected with the modest capitalist production.” Car mechanics and carpenters are more competitive than the private sector due to their modern technology, often using second-hand machines and improvising with their skills.

Rami, who is 32 years old and left school at age 10, challenges whether anyone can tell the difference between the cars he paints and those painted at original car companies. “The Jordanian military cars, are brought to me to paint and I know what I charge is tenth of what original car companies would charge” (FG 2, Jabal Al-Naser, Oct. 24, 2011).

Notwithstanding the irregularity of the informal economy, the state has been trying to regularise the markets to make it easier for vendors and for clients. In East Amman, state regulations and municipal fines have placed restrictions on unregulated food stands on

362 Portes and Schauffler 1993, p.51
the side-walks and in the middle of residential areas, particularly the camp area, a matter often addressed in daily newspapers and media venues where street vendors question where can they display their products to sell and make a living, while shop keepers complain that unregulated food stands prevent clients from entering their shops and lower the prices of their own goods by attracting clients with their cheap prices since they do not have incremental of shop rental, taxes and water and electricity bills. 363

The municipal council, to try and organise this irregular market, decided to prepare the ground for a vegetable market on a piece of land it owned at the entrance of Jabal al Naser area. Similar wholesale vegetable markets have been implemented in several areas of East Amman. The aim has been to better organise the market for the vendors and to take the pressure away from the main commercial road of the refugee camp and off the main commercial road of Al Naser area. The municipality installed metal poles on the land and created stands. For vendors to get a stand in this market ‘regulated’ by the municipality, certain documents have to be provided: security clearance - *Husun syreh w suluk* (for those condemned, a clearance is possible to obtain five years after being sentenced), a certificate providing no criminal record - *‘adam mahkumyeh*, and 360 Jds fees for issuing a licence for the stand, that can be paid in portions of 46 Jds monthly.

Fouad, who has a vegetable stand himself, explained how this market has been organised. “The land has been rented by the municipality in agreement with the agricultural union. The whole idea was a *makrumeh malakyeh* (a royal favour) in 2008, so selling is easier for people. The problem is that all that the municipality has done was putting up the poles and imposing money on us. There are no toilets, no roof, no door, no fence to this market. So we had to buy the cloth that is covering the market, with

363 Morning radio talk show (Besaraha ma’ al wakyl), and daily newspapers.
lots of holes because of the wind and the snow that tore it. We have 90 stands, where each stand is 3 meters by 3 meters. At first, thieves used to come at night and take our vegetable boxes. Each stand owner pays the three men, who have arms and are connected with the police to guard our stands. Each one of us pays half a Jd daily for these three guards who are relatives from one East Jordanian tribe (originally from Karak). I do not understand what has been the role of the municipality except for taking money from us in grouping us between these metal pillars” (Case no 6, Jabal al Naser, Dec. 5, 2012)

Licences imposed by the municipality are but a mechanism to control crowding in strategic commercial areas. “Licensing and authorisation requirements help officials enforce other policies that attempt to formalise vendors,”364 and limiting authorisation, sometimes to those who can activate their social networks or show a record of financial capital, also aims to control the entry of newcomers to already crowded streets. While the municipality endeavours to formalise the market, it is indirectly empowering the vendors when charging a tax for use of public space. “Granting vendors this right [to use the public space] can embolden them to resist additional policy measures that interfere with that right.”365 These taxes, as perceived by one vendor, are in principle for a service given in return: “we are taxed but we provide all the basic services to ourselves, including buying water to drink and wash!”366

As part of the municipal regularisation to the market, shops in the main commercial road of the camp or in commercial roads in the east part of the city must also be licensed and must pay the yearly taxes. To do so, the entrepreneur is expected to get a license from the Chamber of Industry and Commerce for his/her shop and the kind of product it sells. Like

365 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
366 Jabal al-Naser municipal market, Dec 5, 2012
the formal sector, getting the licence can be made easier if the entrepreneur knows someone, a *wasta*, to facilitate the paperwork procedure: the social network persists as an indispensable element while seeking to secure an economic opportunity.

Mustafa, 40 years old, has two shops overlooking the main commercial road of the camp. I met him in one of the shops as he was repainting it. The two shops are a section of the family house. Mustafa was in prison for seven years. Now he is trying to make a living out of these two shops. His criminal record does not permit him to get a licence for the shops. Under the law, he is renting the shops illegally. Worse even, the utilities of the shops are taken from the main hub of the house. Legally, this is not acceptable. “I have asked the MP who ran during the last elections to help me. I cannot get the commercial electricity and water licence, unless I get the license for the shops. This costs 125 Jds for each shop.” Of course, his profile is not helping. “I have been fined several times and these fines are building up. I cannot pay them anymore. I told the MP of the area, who promised to help. My two neighbours down the street do not have license for their shops, but they have no problems. I do not know who is their *wasta!*” (Case 4, Jabal al Naser, Dec 4, 2011).

The way entrepreneurs have negotiated the regularity and the irregularity varies. Each has sought a different method to bypass the impediments that could affect their gaining better incomes. Pierre Bourdieu argues that individuals exercise agency but within social predispositions, conventions, values and sanctions. In his *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Bourdieu viewed the relation between practice (what is done) and the field (the larger parameters of power relations) as intrinsically linked. Bourdieu’s methodology for analysing structured practice is an examination of “the internalisation of externality and the externalisation of internality.” The agent internalises relationships and expectations for operating in the field. These internalised relationships and habitual

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expectations and relationships form, over time, what he calls “habitus:” a set of dispositions resulting in particular practices, improvisations and gestures, non-discursive aspects of culture that bind individuals to larger groups.\(^{369}\) This habitus is acquired through a series of “structural apprenticeships,” often discursive, by the apparatus of power, which become unconscious, where various forms of capital exist such as prestige or financial resources. The informal sector can thus be a potential source for generating income and employment for the urban poor, as analysed by the developmentalist approach.\(^{370}\)

Some such informal businesses may experience internal growth, changing into larger, more formalised establishments. Ghazi K. 50 years old, started his work in the informal economy using a business card to tell people about his talent in calligraphic writing. “During the Gulf War, when new commercial areas were created and shops were opening, I used to walk in each shop, as they were still being established and offer to make them the sign of their shop for a very cheap price.”\(^{371}\) Today, he and his brothers own a business that is valued with millions. Here is another successful experience of someone engaging in informal income generating activities, who is today a doctor running his own private clinic at al-Naser and practising as an employed doctor in a private hospital:

Nader S. is a 33 year old General Physician who was brought up in Al Naser before his family moved out to a new area in West Amman. His seven brothers and sisters all attained their higher education at various universities. His father worked as an accountant in a private firm and at

\(^{369}\) Burris 1980, p. 89.
\(^{371}\) Case 2, Muqablain, Nov. 17, 2011
the same time had a shop for roasting/grinding fresh coffee. Upon finishing his high school exams N.S. went to Ukraine to study medicine. His father funded his studies. “I used to save every month a part of the money my father used to send to me. In my third year of studies, I was able to buy a car. I got a taxi license for it and recruited a taxi driver and considered it as an extra source for me to make money. I never told my father. A year later, I asked my father to buy me a coffee roaster and to ship it to me in Ukraine. I opened a shop to sell fresh ground coffee. I was importing coffee from different countries.” When he finished his studies, he sold the taxi but kept the shop which is still running and getting him revenue. In Jabal al Naser, he opened a clinic. In the morning, he works in a private hospital as GP and in the evening he comes to the clinic, which is a family and emergency clinic. “When I was agreeing with Abu Yazan, the owner of the building to rent the first floor for the clinic, I realised that he also owns the shops opposite the clinic to be. I rented two shops from him as well. I made it a big supermarket. The back side of it has the coffee grinding section, where I took the coffee roaster that used to be in my father’s shop and I am using it in this supermarket opposite my clinic.”

His father is now retired. His eldest brother took his shop and bought modern machines. The way he learnt to roast the coffee beans from his father, he teaches the workers for him how to do the job. He is known in the area, with a very busy clinic from the moment he parks his latest model Mercedes in front of his clinic, as a sign to tell people in the area that the clinic is open. The smell of the roasted coffee in the street, shows also how he is making it as a businessman (Nader S. Case 15, Jabal al-Naser, Dec. 27, 2011).

This alternating between formal and informal sectors falls in line with Weber’s emphasis on the role of individuals and the negotiated relationship with power; Weber, by this, rejected the idea that terms such as “society” or “group” could refer to any reality other than that of individuals and their actions.\footnote{Aston, Ben, ‘What is structure and agency? How does this framework help us in political analysis?’, http://benaston.com/downloads/politics/What%20is%20structure%20and%20agency%20in%20political%20analysis.doc (accessed 24 April 2010), Callinicos 1985, pp.133-135)\footnote{These resources include land, capital, social respect, physical strength, and intellectual knowledge.}} By this he referred to the entrepreneurs who are willing to take risks in the wider market using their ‘social resources’.\footnote{Aston, Ben, ‘What is structure and agency? How does this framework help us in political analysis?’, http://benaston.com/downloads/politics/What%20is%20structure%20and%20agency%20in%20political%20analysis.doc (accessed 24 April 2010), Callinicos 1985, pp.133-135)\footnote{These resources include land, capital, social respect, physical strength, and intellectual knowledge.} This gives them the entrepreneurial function and all chances to share directly or indirectly in return for capital. Nader, using his available resources, represents Weber’s ‘capitalist
entrepreneur’ who is able to invest on all his resources, with his knowledge about the bureaucracy and the administration, to increase his income as an individual.

III. Easily accessible?

The informal economy can be also perceived, from its dark side, as a subordinate form of production within the capitalist mode of production. It is exploited by the formal sector and unable to accumulate capital to any significant extent. Yet for some it is the only possible venue to explore economic opportunities and to make a living. This shadow economy depends on the availability of resources and manpower. It also depends on the way state regulations can be manoeuvred. For example, the daily life of vegetable vendors usually starts at 4 am since they need to go to the central wholesale vegetable market in order to buy their vegetable boxes. In the central market, the transaction happens either directly between the farmer and the vendor or it happens through mediators: more informal workers. “We are able to buy all what we need and can pay for after two weeks. So we need to establish trust, either with the farmer, or with the mediator. Running away from our debts is almost impossible,” a vendor in the municipality market told me. After collecting the products on rented pick-ups, they arrive at their stands, whether in the market (regularised), the commercial roads or the side of the street, and they display the food so that by 8 am they are able to sell their products in

374 Hosier 1987, p.384
375 MOP 2010, p.8
a very competitive environment, side by side with other vegetable vendors. Their day usually finishes at 9 pm and starts again at 4 am the next morning.

There are no toilets, no water to clean or wash and no heaters in the open market. I held most of my interviews in autumn and winter and so I witnessed the harsh working conditions. The work happens in open air and on very cold ground. The requirements to enter this market are thus financial resources to start the transaction, even if it is not in cash money, but there must be a certain amount of money to begin with. “The amount varies from 50 Jds to 500 Jds. This depends on the social network you have in the central market. Not all mediators or farmers, especially the new ones, would accept selling food products without getting the money in cash,” explained Jamil who works with Awad in the Municipality Market. “I try to deal with the same wholesale vendors or farmers most of the time. So when my budget is tight, and I cannot pay on the spot, I am able to take a provisional debt from the farmer or the mediator. It is a good deal for him as it is for me. The market is very big, but we all know each other. This [trust] relationship takes time.”376 In this economy, one teaches the other, and at the same time, one passes on the social networks to the other, so that entry to the market becomes easy and possible.

The essential elements to make it in the informal sector thus seem to be social networks, financial resources, energy and social intelligence. This ‘package’ is established in a structured hierarchal apparatus of power. Different to the social stratification dominant in the society, in the informal market, there are no titles, no family-tribal names, no class nor wealth. There is power dominance and it is gained through violence. It is a structure

of bargains, which determine the kind of exchange that takes place in gaining access to resources. To explain, the case of Ghassan is an example which illustrates these relationships and transactions.

Ghassan, 32 years old, after having worked as an assistant for three years on a vegetable stand in the commercial road of the camp, decided to rent his own shop in the main road of the camp. He sought the help of Maher to lend him 4000Jds. Maher is known in the camp as the ‘human mobile bank’ in Al Naser Area. He is about 45 years old, and was imprisoned for several criminal acts. The longest period he spent in prison was 13 years. He has a fearful appearance with many scars of his face. Regardless of this, he seems to be very popular. People seek his help with money and he is always ready to lend the needed amount. Some people told me he is connected with the police, hence people are cautious dealing with him. Others believe he is very violent, having tried to kill several times, so when dealing with him, people are keen to abide by the agreement they have with him, to avoid any trouble. “I took the money and we agreed that I’ll be giving him every day 5 Jds.” The deal is clear, and he will not want to take extra money. I make sure every day when he comes to collect the money to give him of every food item I have in a bag.” The interest rate is thus taken by Maher as fruits and veggies from my shop. Maher is also approached by people who need items for the house such as washing machine or fridge. He buys people anything they need with reduced prices. “He has bought my mother a washing machine and took only 100Jds from her,” Ghassan told me. One of his clients in the shop, as he heard him telling me this, laughed. “He bought your mother a washing machine from the Thieves Market, Suk el Haramye, that would mean that the original price was even less, because this machine was most probably a stolen one.” (Case 36, Jabal al-Naser, Aug. 17, 2010).

The deal established with Maher is similar to that established with any bank. The bank takes interest rates and Maher also takes his interest rates, in an indirect manner. In this informal economy, what matters most is the kind of profit and gain one is able to make.

Ali M. in Jabal al Nadheef helps to buy people what they need, at the same time, he

377 In the city centre of Amman there is a market called Suk El Haramye. It is known to be a cheap market for second hand pieces and devices. Some people claim that the market is cheap, because thieves bring in their stolen goods and sell them in this market for reduced prices.
makes indirect profits for himself. Ali M. has his own shop for electrical machines but at the same time does voluntary work for a local association in Jabal al-Nadheef. His work as the general secretary of the charitable association is to collect money from the well-established Palestinian-origin Jordanians in West Amman, in order to buy items required for people in need in East Amman, particularly in Jabal Al-Nadheef. As a wholesale vender, he is able to buy the machines required at reduced prices while charging the donors the full price. The difference builds up his budget. While some people are critical of him and of his indirect ways in making money, to others he appears to support those who are in need in the community with his initiative and time.

Some of the entrepreneurs talked about applying for loans. The easy ones with no constraints seemed to be for women. Rakan, a carpenter in Marka (the southern side of Al Naser), in one of the focus groups I held in with entrepreneurs working in and outside Al-Naser area, “applied for a 450 Jds loan to buy machines for my carpenter workshop through the Women’s Union for small projects. These are easy and their conditionalities are not difficult to meet. They serve women only, but we were able to shape a simple proposal using my wife’s name for a project, the money we took was invested in my own workshop.” He never paid back the loan and his wife was never questioned about the project for which she was funded. The entrepreneurs believe that “everyone in the camp resorts to loans [referring mainly to the entrepreneurs in the market]. This is how people

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are able to live.” 380 So while everyone seeks ways to get money to start a project, securing a regular revenue does not seem to be easy.

Basma, 33 years old, divorced and living with her four children and elderly mother, does Palestinian embroidery on cushions and charges 2-5 Jds per piece; she is able to make 4 Jd per month. “The money I make hardly covers our everyday food. I simply cannot afford sending my children to school. So they are home with no education.” (Case 48 Jabal al-Nadheef Aug. 29, 2010). Um Ramzi, 36 years old, widowed with ten children, makes frames and mirrors with beads. The revenue of what she produces covers the rent of the flat in Jabal al-Nadheef where she lives with her children. “I make the pieces and the shop keeper comes to collect what I produce. He only pays me after he sells the pieces (what is called Rasm el Bai’ - after making the profit of selling). This often makes me borrow money to pay the rent.” (Case 49, Jabal al-Nadheef Aug. 29, 2010). Um Mohammed, 42 years old abandoned and has three girls and one paralysed son, makes wool jackets, selling each for 3-5 Jd. The three ladies are able to produce but cannot market their products. Um Mohammed knows one shop in West Amman that only pays her 3 Jds per piece (made of wool). “I do not have a choice, I accept the little the shop owner gives me” (Case 44, Jabal al-Nadheef, August 29, 2010).

The case of the ladies with their handcraft work is similar to the cases of men in construction. While lots of effort is invested to produce the work, the job owner or the mediator to the market has the power to exploit them. The competition in the market plays against these workers. The Syrian and the Egyptian labour migrants seem to be a concern. “My rate as a construction worker is one Jd per meter in construction. The price of Egyptian labourer is 60 piasters per meter. My daily rate is 12 Jd, their daily rate is 5 Jd,” explained Abdul Hameed who moved to the vegetable market because he could not compete with the cheap prices of his competitors (Case 7, Jabal Al Naser, Dec 5, 2011).

The seasons fluctuate. Competition varies according to supply and demand, when their

380 Ibid.
income could even exceed that of salaried workers in regular jobs. Like foxes, always seeking to find other opportunities and new chances to pile up their paltry finances.

Informal market opportunities have requirements and are as demanding as other formal sector jobs: financial capital is needed, social network and wasa seem to be necessary and human capital, not necessarily seen in education and academic degrees but rather in human skills and endurance is a must. The challenges in this sector are in the security and the social protection which makes its opportunities risky and precarious.

5.2 Social welfare and social protection?

5.2.1 Social security and health insurance

While insecure, low paid Palestinian-origin Jordanians have always been in the labour market, their numbers continue to increase and not decrease. This class of citizens, Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman, is not in control of its life; it “comprises a disparate group in non-regular statuses, including casual workers, outworkers and agency workers.”381 Their common characteristics are: labour insecurity, lack of entitlement to mainstream protection (e.g. social security and health insurance), and disentitlement to social transfers. They work as short-term or casual work with no employment contract, which denies them labour law protection, by virtue of social and educational status, by precariousness and by discursive constraints limiting their upward mobility.

381 Standing 2009, p.110
Abdul Hameed, 40 years old, dropped out of school at age 15 and is now a vegetable vendor, after having rotated several jobs. “The first work I did was working as a stone cleaner. I was 16 years old. To do this, I used to use a manual machine that would clean the stones of constructed building with the pressure of sand. The problem was that the sand used to come back to my face after hitting the stone. I used to wear a glasses and a cloth on my face when working, but that affected both my eyes and my breathing. Four years in this job, I decided that it was dangerous. Both the sand emission and the risky hand-made rope-steppers we used to make ourselves could jeopardise our lives. I still remember the Egyptian labourer who fell off the stepper when we were working on a four story building. It could have been me” (Case No 7, Jabal Al Naser, Dec 5, 2011).

Most importantly, “they are also disadvantaged by having no control over skill development, at least not in jobs they are doing. And they lack voice- representation security- because they are denied the opportunity to join unions or because they are either ‘in service’, subordinated in precarious labour, or ‘providing services’, where associational-bargaining is constrained. In short, they have no occupational security.”

The case of Hussein, a 47-year-old subordinate off-the-book worker in the private sector exemplifies this situation:

The owner of the gas station where Hussein works evaded his liability towards his workers. He claimed he had less than 5 workers and thus never registered anyone at the social security scheme. In reality, he had 4 workers in the morning shift and 4 workers in the evening shift. When Hussein had a car accident and injured his foot, he was admitted to hospital for three months and had to pay the fees himself at the government hospital. He is now back at work, making 210 Jd a month for 12 working hours, and says he is grateful that his employer was kind enough not to have sacked him despite his interrupted work. “I have children I need to feed. The important thing is that I have this opportunity. I tried other jobs but each one had its problems. The last one I did was maintaining aluminium windows, it was tiring and I lost money more than I gained. At this job, I have no work contract, no social security no health insurance, but I have a regular income at least. Maybe the situation will change now with the new regulations of the social security which obliges owners of firms in the private sector to register all workers in the social

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382 Ibid.
security scheme. Hoping that the owner may need to include all his employees in the social security scheme. (Case 24, Jabal Al Nadheef, March, 23, 2012).

Hussein, and many of the other Palestinian-origin Jordanians, as citizens have access to the Jordanian government’s health service, whether hospitals, comprehensive or primary clinics providing services for chronic illnesses and minor ailments, antenatal care, physiotherapy, laboratory services, or radiology. The prices in the government hospitals are much cheaper than private hospitals. A citizen is able to see a general physician upon a payment that does not exceed 3 Jd. Those Palestinian-origin Jordanians with UNRWA refugee cards also have access to UNRWA services. In Jordan the UNRWA runs 121 medical facilities dispersed in the refugee camps and various districts with Palestinian refugee density. UNRWA clinics provide preventive, curative and basic support services through an integrated primary health care approach. It also provides family planning, prenatal services, immunisation, and childcare. Palestinian-origin Jordanians with refugee cards, needing hospitalisation are transferred to government-run or private institutions. 383

Civil servants have health insurance through their work, which makes them only pay 20 percent of their medical fees at government health services. For military servants, there are military hospitals and clinics serving this group. They, along with all members of their families, are covered by the medical insurance they have. In 2007 senior citizens were included in the civil health insurance program; like civil servants, they have subsidised access to government services, paying only 20 percent of the fees. A study conducted in 2010 by the Department of Statistics and the Higher Health Council

383 Al Quds 2008, p.76
revealed that 69.6 percent of Jordanian citizens are medically insured. This entails 39 percent who have civil insurance, 27 percent who have military insurance, 8.5 percent who have UNRWA insurance and only 6 percent who have private insurance.

Furthermore, the study indicated that 85.2 percent of the Jordanians in the south are covered medically, 83.2 percent in the North are covered medically, and meanwhile only 61.1 from the centre are covered medically. The centre connotes Amman and Zarqa where there is a larger informal economy and greater Palestinian-origin Jordanian density. 384

None of those I interviewed in the field made any reference to social security, to health insurance or to pensions. The focus is limited to the daily income that is already difficult to secure with the varied challenges. Only one or two people mentioned having been part of the social security scheme when they worked with private firms since a part of their salaries was deducted monthly to pay for their share. Soon as they left the formal employment, they gave up their membership and took the collected money for them back. The idea of buying social security themselves made no sense for those working in the informal economy. “When I make between 150 and 300 Jd a month, depending on the market, how can I put about aside 20 Jd monthly to the social security? I do not have this luxury at all!” said Kareem, who is a carpenter in Wihdat camp and lives in a rented flat in Jabal al Naser with has two children.385 Participation in social security would mean receiving a pension after reaching the legal age for retirement. It would also mean

384 Al Ghad, ‘A study, 70 percent of the Jordanians have medical insurance’, Sept. 21, 2011.
receiving illness /handicap support provided the member had paid for at least 60 active allotments. And it also secures protection for the children of the worker after his death.386

Early in 2012, the Social Security Corporation announced to workers who are not covered by their work places, to purchase their own social security membership in the scheme, which is decided according to their income. The social security law was issued to guarantee employee pensions, disability, life insurance and to cover medical expenses and/or any harm the employee incurs during his duty and/or any career-related illnesses. Employers with more than five workers were obliged to register in the social security scheme in order to cover their employees. Not long ago, in 2012, the regulations were amended and employers even with one worker were obliged to register and to ensure social security for the working employees. To cover the benefits listed in the Social Security Law number 19 for the year 2001 5.5 percent of the employee's salary plus a contribution from the employer equivalent to 11 percent of the employees' monthly salaries shall be deducted and paid to the social security department at the beginning of every month, according to the employee list provided to the social security department by the employer. These payments shall be made within fifteen days of the end of each month; any delay will make the employer liable for fines and interest.

Notwithstanding the claim that 58 percent of workers in Jordan are covered by the Social Security Corporation387, and that there has been an increase of 25 percent amongst those who applied to the voluntary social security scheme since the new decision went through,

386 Addustour newspaper, Oct. 23, 2012
387 Al Ghad newspaper, June 15, 2011.
there is a significant absence of social security coverage amongst a great majority of Palestinian-origin Jordanian residents in East Amman. Even those working in the private sector made little reference to social security benefits. A study conducted in 2011 by the General Union for public services and entrepreneurial work declared that 85 percent of those working in popular take-away food shops were not included in the social security scheme, including labour migrants.\textsuperscript{388} The study indicated that 75 percent of those workers had no work contract and thus employers easily managed to evade their responsibility. They were paid daily wages for almost 15-18 working hours, according to the report, which was far below the minimum rate of payment assigned by the Ministry of Labour (which is 190 Jds monthly). In the formal-informal interface, the direct hiring of workers off-the-books amounted to “the avoidance of legal regulations that increase labour costs and decrease managerial flexibility.”\textsuperscript{389} To become a participant in the social security-voluntarily individualised scheme the minimum salary per month had to be 190 Jds (as per Ministry of Labour’s minimum rate of payment). Almost none of those working in the informal sector have been able to confirm their regular income to be 190 Jds. This automatically excludes them from this scheme and its benefits.

While health care and social security were rarely mentioned as important resources during labour, the National Aid Fund (NAF) and Islamic Centre charity have been a main source of income to quite a large number of people. Women I met talked about receiving assistance from several bodies (and they often overlap): UNRWA or the Islamic Centres, National Aid Fund (NAF) and local charity associations in the district.

\textsuperscript{388} Al Ghad newspaper, ‘A study: 85 percent of workers in restaurants are not covered by the social security, Dec. 14, 2011.
\textsuperscript{389} Portes and Schauffler 1993, p. 49.
According to the Ministry of Social Development, NAF, which is a department within the Ministry, provides assistance to more than 80,000 families in need in Jordan with a budget of 82 million Jds.\textsuperscript{390} NAF provides cash support to a variety of groups such as the poor, elderly, divorced women, families taking care of orphaned children (below 18 years old), families with disabled members, and families of detained prisoners, foster families, young women, Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians, humanitarian cases, abandoned women, people receiving assistance and rehabilitation loans, families of seasonal workers, families of missing and absentee fathers, people receiving handicapped care aid, and other candidates who have received approval based on their special cases.

The Fund provides the beneficiaries with monthly cash transfers ranging from JD 40 to JD 180 depending on income, assets, and family circumstances. Despite the fact that people with an income below the abject poverty line are eligible to receive the benefit, in general (with certain exceptions), only people without income qualify for the programme. Income-producing property, arable land, or possession of a car (unless used by a disabled member of the family) are all considered to be disqualifying factors. Any income received by one of the family members decreases the benefit received by 25 percent of the income amount up to the level when it is eliminated.\textsuperscript{391} When families suffer from accidents or unexpected events such as imprisonment of the main breadwinner, loss of assets due to fire, or acute illness of a family member, they are eligible to receive emergency assistance. Eligibility is limited by an income ceiling of JD 250 per month. The benefit is a one-time lump sum payment ranging from JD 100 to JD 1,200 depending on the circumstances and is decided on a case-by-case basis. The benefit may be paid

\textsuperscript{390} Al Ghad Newspaper, ‘Barakat: NAF gives assistance to 80,000 case in need’, January, 5, 2012.

\textsuperscript{391} http://www.ilo.org/dyn/illosi/ssimain.viewScheme?p_lang=en&p_geoaid=400&p_scheme_id=1665
only once in a year to the same family, which means that families subject to multiple shocks will not receive assistance more than once.\textsuperscript{392}

Palestinian-origin Jordanians with refugee registration cards are also eligible for relief assistance from UNRWA’s Special Hardship Cases programme (SHC) which provides in-kind commodities (sugar, rice, milk, mixed pulses, and oil), cash assistance to needy families facing exceptional difficulties, and shelter rehabilitation. Eligibility for this assistance is for Palestinian refugees whose: 1) income is less than two-thirds of the lowest remuneration of an UNRWA Grade 1 staff member; 2) has no household member who is an able-bodied male between the ages of 19 and 60 who is able to work and membership of an approved category – female-headed households, older people, those medically unable to work, dependents of prisoners, and orphans. As of January 2011 there were 55,466 SHCs in Jordan.\textsuperscript{393}

The Islamic centres, that are located in more than 60 locations in the kingdom, are connected to the Islamic Brotherhood association. Other than cash not exceeding 25 Jds they provide extra-curricular support for children, particular orphan children. In a meeting with Faris M, who used to head the branch in Jabal Al Naser and has become the head of social development unit, he said that “the development vision is very limited in the Islamic centres and we are limited in our services.”\textsuperscript{394} Faris M. was very critical of the dependency culture that has been created, particularly amongst women who need constant support not only from the Islamic association but also from other bodies which

\textsuperscript{392} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{393} UNRWA in Figures, January 2011. \url{http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/pdf/uif-june08.pdf}
\textsuperscript{394} FM, HDQ of Islamic Association, March 14, 2010.
give financial support. “We know there are overlapping in receiving aid, as women who come to us, also go to NAF and go to UNRWA.” Although he heads the development department he perceived that it is a wishful thinking to enable both the people in the Islamic centre and those recipients of assistance to become independent. The Islamic centre also provides assistance, in cash and in support of orphaned students helping them to assume responsibility. At the moment cash support to each household is usually 25 Jds, with some imposed conditions for women and children to attend weekly religion classes. The amount of assistance, given to households by the different bodies, whether UNRWA, Islamic Centres or NAF, has been modest and does not meet the needs of families. Moreover, conditions imposed on the households to receive the welfare are very rigid. For UNRWA and NAF for example assistance is not given to a household that has a young man of the age 18 years old. It is argued by these bodies, that a young man at this age is able to work and fend for his family, implicitly, pushing away youth from pursuing their education or from trying to move out, with education and professional employment away from their limited precarious environment.

Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated deeper causal and social dynamics of marginalisation. It has disentangled the complex processes that lead to social exclusion amongst workers who fail to secure settled employment amongst Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman. The work highlights the identity- and class-based forms of deprivation arising from
discriminatory practices embedded in the society. They undermine rights, social citizenship rights given to them by law and by the rule of their affiliation.

This chapter, building on the chapter 4, has sought to demonstrate a pattern of social stratification, explaining the way the ‘politics of divisiveness’ - through cleavages of class, origin and politics - distorts acquisition of basic citizenship rights – particularly through employment and formal economic opportunities. Social mobility tends to favour those citizens with more education and experience, or a better social and professional network, or higher social status. Those with less education and limited social capital are more likely to work in the informal sector with no rights and no social protection.

Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman, with their modest educational achievements, despite their citizenship, have been unable to find employment in formal enterprises and hence, sought to survive through invested marginal jobs. Although plausible /complex on the surface, this straightforward interpretation confronts a number of conceptual and empirical anomalies. By examining the work at the informal economy, I have sought to explain how this form of work develops over time into a stratified set of jobs that simultaneously offers opportunities to certain people who would not have them in the formal economy, even while it further exploits other segments of the population.

The state has operated along dynamic lines of inclusion and exclusion; this is how the application of citizenship has gotten fragmented. Categories of citizens have been shaped through discursive institutionalised politics which undercuts the ideal of citizenship.
Within this apparatus, informal citizenship is where there is alienation from broader society and where social cohesion and loyalty to the political system is replaced with alienation. Discursive politics managed, in this way, to create politically-economically and socially privileged citizens, which in turn means that other segments of the population enjoy fewer *de facto* rights and less power.
Conclusion

In this thesis, I questioned the economic opportunities accessed by Palestinian-origin Jordanians living in East Amman since 1989. The question sought to unpack four aspects: firstly, the access to citizenship rights Palestinian-origin Jordanians have been enjoying since 1948 in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Secondly, the economic integration of Palestinian refugees, who have become citizens, in Jordan and their ability to grow up the ladder. This is questioned based on the United Nations Economic Survey Mission’s recommendation to economically integrate refugees as a solution for the Palestinian refugee problem. Thirdly, class and status are questioned. Those Palestinian-origin Jordanians studied in this research represent a group of a particular class, the disenfranchised one, living in the eastern part of Amman known to host the middle-lower class. Fourthly, the research question has specified a time, the year 1989, that dates the beginning of the political and economic liberalisation which very slowly sought to create new circles of actors whose political or economic interests pair with that of the state. The disparities, that existed earlier in Jordan, widened, bringing in limited beneficiaries who have been reaping the fruits of liberalisation and open economy. The case study in this thesis, the Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman, has been impacted by these aspects and, as hypothesised, have been vulnerable to political instability, economic fluctuations and social divisions.

To analyse these aspects and the ways they have affected the case study group of this research, I studied, throughout the work, two essential foundations to understanding
Jordan: the first is the state-citizen relationship since the formation of the state and the way the state has managed its citizens with their different classes, statuses and origins. Categorisation of citizens, as argued in this work, has tended to obliterate the rights of disenfranchised Palestinian refugee-Jordanian citizens living in the East part of the capital Amman. Categories, while sometimes functional, risk marginalising those labelled away from the gaze of citizenship, whether refugees, Palestinians or East Ammani. As has been proven in this thesis, categories or labels connote a process of exclusion and social inequality, where basic rights stop being secured. Most importantly, is to understand the way categorisation has impacted the perception of the disadvantaged people for their own rights, through subjectification. As demonstrated in the empirical work, people established different beliefs about their own basic rights, while taking into consideration the political challenges affecting their dual identity and their Jordanian citizenship.

The second foundation that guided the analysis is the political economy of the state and the way this has shaped the political, demographic, economic and social divisions in the society over the years. Jordan is a semi-rentier state and the flow of aid and remittances continue to play an important role in its politics. In this work, the political economy of rentierism has been reviewed since the creation of the kingdom which was soon affected by the mass influx of Palestinian refugees as a result of the Catastrophe in 1948. The shift Palestinian refugees, in majority from rural background experienced into being Jordanian citizens within an urban setting did not only shape a new socioeconomic livelihood for the new comers but created new urbanised cities with a wide range of economic opportunities for the whole Jordanian society. The 1960-1970s brought in political
tensions which sculptured the Jordanian identity and defined clearly the Palestinian one. The economic boom that followed soon after, overshadowed the fractures of the 1970s and generated wide opportunities at the local and the regional levels, enabling people to grow and to benefit from the provided educational and employment opportunities. The late 1980s, brought in several economic and political events that distorted the financial stability in Jordan. With the IMF bailing Jordan out, neoliberalisation has been slowly brought to the political, economic and social structures of Jordan. Political and economic liberalisation since 1989 have engendered the politics of domination and stratification, creating a social closure of social collectives that seek to maximise rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunities to a limited, privileged circle.

This politics of domination and stratification has been perpetuated by regulating access to social citizenship rights – particularly access to higher education and economic opportunities. The empirical evidence and the narratives of Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman about attaining basic and higher education and accessing employment provide an example of subjectification within the wider apparatus of power. In addition, the apparatus of neoliberalism since 1989 has designed what Foucault called the “equally unequal” through exploitation, domination and every other form of social inequality. This neoliberal perspective blames the individual for his/her own deeds and choices in their supposedly ‘freely’ chosen practices, particularly in an urbanised set-up, since they are to believe they were responsible for themselves. This thesis has questioned the opportunities that Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman have been able to access under such a discursive apparatus of choice and rights.
This research work has been structured based on a deductive research methodology, building on the narrative and experiences reflected by the interviewed members from two neighbourhoods in East Amman, Jabal Nadheef and Jabal Al-Naser. The field work covered both communities living in their areas, Palestinian-origin Jordanians and East Jordanians who have been arrived in East Amman in the early 1950s. Based on their answers and the themes they discussed when answering questions about their economic opportunities since 1989, the theoretical framework of this work was designed.

C.1 What economic opportunities?

The educational system, as an important institution of cultural power, has been implicated in sustaining the class system and has been used as a tool for shaping a closure strategy and legitimating the exclusionary process. With the decreased government allocations and reduced donors funding for UNRWA’s educational system since 1989, the chances to access basic education and pursue one’s studies have become limited for Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman. Compared to their peer East Jordanians, the possibilities of getting scholarships for higher education have become limited. The ‘commodification of education’ has pushed the educational process to the market society and rendered education unaffordable. The disenfranchised Palestinian-origin Jordanians of inner Amman, in light of this reality, have been pushed into the margins. This politics as a result has triggered a socio-political transformation in citizens’ attitudes and gradually trimmed their access to formal sector employment, social protection and employment security.
Since the late 1980s political economy dynamics, at the local and regional levels, have brought in a series of socioeconomic transformations that have inevitably changed patterns of employment and introduced new actors to the market. Changing patterns of employment and the different requirements of the newly created jobs have shuffled the social stratification and widened the disparities amongst classes. In a patrimonial society like the Jordanian one, certain requirements (what this thesis has called packages) have been indispensable to secure work and economic opportunities and this included high education degrees, social connections (in such a clientelistic structure) and financial capital. The opportunities and their entitlements vary, whether in the formal or informal sector and whether the job is secured with social welfare and health insurance. These elements have been prioritised differently, as analysed in this thesis, according to educational level, the way rights of citizenship are understood and practiced, the geographic location in Jordan, and social class and to social status.

Work opportunities in the formal sector for Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East-Amman have been a challenge due to the cumulative factors that weakened their ability to go for public sector jobs. These factors include their weak educational attainment, the socioeconomic needs that oblige them to work at an early age and the implicit politics of ‘Jordanisation’ at higher education level and at job applications in the public sector (civil and military). These consequently have rendered the Palestinian-origin Jordanians less visible in the public sector. Private sector jobs, which often have low pay for those with modest competitive skills failing to respond to the demands of the opening up market, have had a high turnover in the labour force. This class of Palestinian-origin Jordanians
has moved away from more secure employment with little pay, to short and insecure contracts or informal jobs with better pay. Greater insecurity of employment goes together with deceleration of the rate of growth of unemployment.

Economic crises and the socio-political cleavages, as studied in this thesis, have pushed people towards informal opportunities, excusing the state from providing more adequate social welfare services and creating jobs in the formal sector. Yet this type of work with its risks and insecurities has further lowered the life chances for those at the bottom of the economic ladder. State policies, neoliberal measures and the dominating power of the patrimonial society have all, tactically and gradually, made Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman believe that their work opportunities in the formal sector are limited. This has made them shy away from education and explore their only possible and viable resort in the informal sector to make ends meet.

**C.2 Citizenship**

Citizenship, as examined in this thesis, is a scarce resource that has been used as a means of governmentality by the state; it regulates the relationship between the individual and the state and organises legal classes. While it accords rights, it also establishes the rules for participation in political institutions and access to public resources. Several factors have enabled the state to blur rights by marginalising citizens through using the politics of invisibilisation.
C.2.1 Political interest: Social citizenship rights

In the Jericho conference of 1948, Jordanian nationality was given to all Palestinians residing on the Jordanian territories. It was also pledged, that Jordan will safeguard the right of return for Palestinian refugees. In this thesis, citizenship rights have been analysed at three levels. These have been based on the perspectives discussed by the interviewed Palestinians-origin Jordanians of East Amman. Marshall’s citizenship theoretical analysis has been hence used in order to disentangle each element and to analyse how each one was perceived by the interviewees of East Amman. Although Palestinian-origin interviewees recognised that they are not able to access certain social citizenship rights, the fact of having a legal status represented in the Jordanian nationality has been very important. This ‘act of state’ has been justified to safeguard the right of return, confirming that Jordan, as a host for more than 40 percent of Palestinian refugees, has not become a substitute homeland for the Palestinians, as per the claim of the Zionist Israelis.

Despite the fact that the right of return, as a basic human right, does not contradict with citizenship rights in Jordan, the politics of the state vis-à-vis Palestinian refugees and their integration through accessing all their citizenship rights, has been reflective of the state’s political concerns. The state holds back from integrating Palestinians locally with fully-fledged rights, fearing that this could be interpreted as settling the Palestinians (tawteen) and forgoing their Palestinian identity. As a result of such fears the concept of integration (indimaj) has been mixed up with the concept of assimilation (tathweeb).
Moreover, Jordan feared that, with Palestinians fully integrated, Jordanian national identity would be forsaken.

Social citizenship rights as a result have been obliterated, as discussed in the education and employment narratives of Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman. Both the neopatrimonial state-society relationship and the rent-induced economy enabled the state to manage the ‘resource’ of citizenship with its elements to shape constituencies who are pleading loyalty and allegiance. This, as has been discussed empirically, empowered some groups to access better educational or employment opportunities and strengthened others in their social and political status, excluding, as a result several other groups including the interviewees of Palestinian-origin of East Amman.

In higher education, the resource of citizenship, as a result of politics and state interests, has become a privilege. The geographical location, the social status and the social class mattered in deciding how the higher education quota system would be distributed. The state, by categorising its citizens, distributed resources of citizenship unequally. This politics, subjectified, Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman with their limited means, by withdrawing away from pursuing education, failing to perceive this as a social citizenship right. Employment opportunities as a result were not widely possible for them to compete for. The public sector in its civil branch gave priority for those with education to take part in the service providing sector, while the military branch was limited to citizens from certain geographic boundaries and social status. These implicit conditionalities responded to the state’s interest in supporting and empowering certain
groups. The chances for Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman as a result have been modest.

The private sector did not open wider opportunities either. With the opening up of the economy since 1989, and the welcoming politics to multinational companies and Foreign Direct Investments, the private sector at the macro and micro enterprise level, have been seeking to attract qualifications which many of the subjectified Palestinian-origin Jordanians in East Amman, as drawn by the foucauldian analysis, were not able to acquire. The informal sector, with its limitations, risks, has become their only opportunity. Disenfranchised, often in exploitative work conditions and with no social protection, they have failed to grow up the ladder.

C.2.2 Economic interest: Market and informal citizenship

The benefits of economic liberalisation have been indirectly limited to the ruling elite and the business community during the era of economic austerity. As Saif and Choucair argued, the concentration of power was just moved from political power resources to economic power resources,\(^ {395} \) illuminating by this how the reform process overlooked the effects of liberalisation on the socioeconomic conditions of the people not in power.

Privatisation, aiming to bring in more competitive investors to the market, has generated major repercussions in education, engendering class disequilibria and inequality while

\(^ {395} \) Saif and Choucair 2010, p.141
citizens seek to access their basic rights in education. Most importantly, it has moulded a “partial citizenship” limited to a “market citizenship” that has obliterated rights’ claims derived within social citizenship. This “market citizenship”, which has characterised the neoliberal state, promotes the notion that one must build up one’s own human capital. This redefines the state’s policies best by becoming “entrepreneurs of the self.” It is based on the neoliberal ground that calls upon individuals to excel away from the state, benefiting from the competitive private sector.

The state, led two parallel politics towards its citizens: One that privileged one group that served its interests through educational grants, employment security and social protection. Another one which appeared to support the neoliberal ideology, by expecting more from its citizens to excel and to be independent away from the state. The majority who were expected to fend for their own living away from the state, have been represented among the interviewed Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman.

The reforms, as a result, have marginalised many sections of the Jordanian population. The decline in resources for living, increased prices of everyday products and imbalance between income and spending greatly impacted upon the various social classes that used to be the majority of society during state welfare. The limitations established around the formal sector have pushed Palestinian-origin Jordanians to the informal sector.

Liberalisation brought in another form of “partial citizenship”, which can be named as the informal citizenship concept, where needs (political, economic, and social), are either not
met or are under-met, and where a subordinated social system assumes these functions instead. The informal sector has become the social system for the Palestinians of East Amman, creating economic opportunities for them and enabling them to generate money and shape their livelihood mechanisms. As a result they continue to live in their stigmatised residential areas, with their mediocre education and professional skills.

C.2.3 Rent-seeking interest: Economic development and burden-sharing

Since its creation Jordan has had a rent-induced economy dependent initially on aid and later on remittances. In 1948, upon receiving the biggest flow of Palestinian refugees, added to Britain and the USA which were the two main donors supporting its budget, UNRWA became a third major donor in Jordan’s budget in order to help the newly born country in establishing a solid economic infrastructure to incorporate the new comers from Palestine in the economic development of the country to economically integrate the Palestinian refugees. UNRWA has also been assigned with relief and works project in support of Palestinian refugees. This materialised through funding economic development projects of the host countries hand in hand while funding the relief and works operations for Palestinian refugees.

Despite the difficulty of the early years after receiving the Palestinian refugees, the new comers had eventually generated economic development projects, invested their human capital in the country’s infrastructure and grew hand in hand with their peer East
Jordanians who were benefiting from the prosperity and booming economy. The role played by UNRWA in funding the economic infrastructure and then in equipping the human capital of Palestine refugees with education, vocational and entrepreneurial skills supported not only Jordan by providing services to its refugee-citizens but also to the individuals themselves by empowering them to seek their own work benefiting from the training given to them.

While the mass flow of refugees to Jordan creates a major burden on a country with modest resources, limited natural wealth and growing population; the role that has been played by the aid agencies, UN bodies and international community has enabled Jordan to benefit from the flow of refugees, especially during the Iraqi refugee and the Syrian refugee crises in order to strengthen its infrastructure to better accommodate the demographic density. The allocated money has continued to support service provision, providing education and health care and relief programmes. It does not address the integration of the new comers nor their legal status. It rather looks at ameliorating the economic and physical infrastructure of Jordan while at the same time feeding in the financial needs of the country.

Since early 2000, the political and economic crises at the international level have however perturbed the rent-induced economy of Jordan, often leading it to contingency plans. The open border policy of Jordan to receiving refugees has continued albeit the burden sharing role of the international community that could not keep up with the constant demand. This has proven to risk the quality and quantity of services and
assistance for refugees. UNRWA’s deteriorated budget since the 1990s, has been clearly reflected in the narrative of the interviewed young refugee –citizens of East Amman. The quality of education and its educational staff has been proven in surveys conducted by Fafo to be a reason for drop out of school education, seeking better chances in informal work. The situation of the Other refugees in Jordan, whether Iraqis or Syrians, has not been better. Services are reduced when money flows get depleted. The refugees are the ones who pay the price, mainly in their health and educational chances.

C.3 Politics towards other refugees

This work has studied the case of Palestinian refugees who have become Jordanian citizens since their arrival in Jordan. This has been a unique case if compared to their peer Palestinians in the region but also to the other refugees who have arrived in Jordan in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. This work has sought to analyse the state-refugee/citizen relationship in order to understand the politics used by the state to manage its peoples, with their varied origins, classes and social statuses. This background has become essential to understand how the new comers, pushed by the new conflicts in the Middle East region, have been treated in Jordan.

Jordan has a strategic geopolitical location in the heart of the Levant. While it received the biggest influx of Palestinian refugees in 1948, it ranks second in receiving Iraqi refugees since 2003 and the fall of the Baath Party in Iraq, estimated by official sources to be about 500,000. The Syrian conflict since 2012 continues to push Syrians into seeking a safe haven in neighbouring countries and Jordan’s borders have in most cases
been open for receiving the newcomers. At the time of writing this thesis, there were 597,328 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan.\(^{396}\)

As a non-signatory country of the 1951 Refugee Convention, categories or labels given to ‘forced migrants’ arriving to the Jordanian borders have varied according to public policy practices and to political economy strategies of reception and management. The labels given to forced migrants, whether Palestinians, Iraqis or Syrians have differed: some have been made citizens, some have been labelled ‘refugees’ or ‘displaced’, others have been termed ‘asylum seekers’, and a good portion of them have become ‘guests’. Such labelling strategies represent a discursive ‘act of state’ in which power is rationalised, drawing boundaries as to who can be included within the process of subjectification and who shall be excluded. The concept of labelling offers a way of understanding the ‘policy agendas and the interest of the host state in the refugee issue and the rent-seeking agenda and the way its helps the host country in its economic development projects or in funding its budget.

C.3.1 Palestinian refugees from the Gaza Strip

Palestinians, the case study of this thesis, have been considered an exceptional case in the region, as mentioned earlier, with the Jordanian citizenship rights that Jordan has given them since 1948. Arab countries hosting Palestinian refugees (e.g. Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq) did not accept naturalising Palestinian refugees. The justification is to protect Palestinian identity and not give Israel the opportunity of believing that Palestinians can

assimilate in the neighbouring Arab countries with whom they share a language, culture and religion. This makes Palestinians in Jordan a unique case in the region but also unique in Jordan itself since refugees arriving hence after *al Nakba* have been treated differently.

Palestinians who arrived in Jordan in 1967 were composed of Palestinian refugees and displaced from the West Bank (which was then part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan), and of Palestinian refugees and displaced from Gaza Strip. The first group arrived in Jordan had Jordanian citizenship, which they had acquired since 1949 when the West Bank and the East bank were unified.

The second group arrived from Gaza with Egyptian travel documents which had been given to them since 1949 by the Egyptian government which was then overseeing the military and administrative rule of Gaza Strip. Failing to go back to Egypt, Jordan issued the Gaza refugees, who numbered then 15,000,^397^ Jordanian travel documents. These travel documents do not connote citizenship rights. Gaza refugees in Jordan since 1967 access their basic rights through UNRWA services and public sector services such as basic school education and health centres, paying small fees for the public sector. Since 1967, they have not been given the right to ownership and the right to employment in the public sector. Working in the private sector is possible upon providing a security clearance with a clear record, which usually takes time to be issued. The government of Jordan justifies the situation of more than 250,000 Gazans^398^ as a political stance against

^397^ El-Abed 2009a
settling Palestinians (tawteen). Several elements matter in the way the state of Jordan distributes rights: the host state’s political interests, the demographic concerns of a country whose half of its population are of Palestinian origin, and the identity concerns. These have been detrimental to the state’s politics towards this group of Palestinians.

C.3.2 Iraqi refugees

Politics of receiving forced migrants in Jordan has varied. This illustrates how governance mechanisms in Jordan underpinning forced migration management over the years have been based on the state’s interests and the way the state protects its borders preventing the conflict from infiltrating its borders. Iraqi refugees arriving in Jordan in different waves were also treated differently over the years. While the refugees who used to arrive in Jordan in the 1990s, running away from the fear of coalition air strikes and the hunger of food sanctions, were given the right to reside and to work without any obligations to register with the UNHCR, the Iraqis who arrived in 2003 after the fall of the Baath party were welcomed as guests. These were given temporary residency rights and were not permitted to work. The label “guest” had then suited the state’s politics and approach towards the conflict, as it gave them the least responsibilities and presented the state with the utmost hospitality image. State interests changed towards Iraqis in 2006, after the execution of Saddam Hussein, the former president of Iraq and head of the Baath party, by Shiite Muslims. Fearing that the conflict would come through to its territories and aware of the potential danger that could be caused by the half million Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites living as self-settled in its cities, Jordan then imposed visa requirements on Iraqis wanting to enter Jordan and agreed with the UNHCR to give registered Iraqi
refugees the status of temporary protection until the end of the conflict in Iraq. In ten years’ time the labels given to Iraqis shifted from guest (coming with open borders) to tourist (with a visa permit needed) to temporary refugees under the care and protection of UNHCR. Iraqis in Jordan were provided services, health and assistance, through local and international NGOs which were funded by the UNHCR. They were given limited access to public services with requested payment of fees (e.g. to attend public schools upon payment of a certain fee).

The Jordanian government had learnt lessons from its experience with the Iraqi refugees and sharpened its politics. While rent-seeking strategies and labelling were decided based on the events and the number of fleeing Iraqis to the borders, the politics of invisibilisation was used throughout the conflict, assuming by this less responsibility allowing the UNHCR to play its role and permitting, implicitly, the Iraqis to fend for themselves in the big cities. Invisibilisation politics permitted the state to manipulate, in tandem with its political agenda and rent seeking strategy, refugee numbers on its territory according to what suits its financial needs. The risk of the self-settled – invisibilised refugees, however, was felt during the Amman bombings in 2005, when three Iraqis living in Jordan bombed three hotels in West Amman. The security element has become as important as rent-seeking and management of refugees.

C.3.3 Syrian refugees

During the Syrian conflict, which continues today, it has been clear that the state managed its priorities and its abilities better. With a security-oriented interest, the
authorities have only permitted Syrians with passports and some financial capital to self-settle in the cities of Jordan. Other refugees, the majority coming from rural areas, have been encamped in newly created refugee camps by the Eastern borders, funded by the UNHCR and the international community. Services for the self-settled Syrians were given to them through government premises with Jordanian citizens. Rather than allocating the refugees to separate services, the funds from UNHCR have been given to the government of Jordan to provide services through its already existing premises. Jordan, a state with a rent-induced economy, has benefitted significantly by using its forced migrant population as an instrument of rent-seeking, to fund its development agenda which enforces its management of its own population through the continuum of distribution of resources. The state has strategised its politics vis-à-vis forced migration and managed them as marginal subjects, whether in peripheral places in inner cities, in camps or in semi-camps to serve its interests.

Forced migration in a country with limited natural resources, like Jordan, is a concern. On the one hand the concern is a demographic one, with the risk of increasing pressure on its infrastructure, budget and services. This also risks impacting citizens’ access to public services, which is part of their acquired rights. As a result, upheavals could trigger against the state or negative attitudes could be expressed, in different manners, towards the refugees. Hosting forced migration, on the other hand, with a building up of budgetary debt in Jordan, could increase the support of the international community responding to the pressure affecting Jordan, the host country.
The state has operated along dynamic lines of inclusion and exclusion towards citizens and towards forced migrants. Categorisations have been shaped through discursive institutionalised politics which undercuts the ideal of citizenship, but also undercuts the principle of ensuring basic human rights for forced migrants. Within this apparatus, informal citizenship subtly takes the place of social citizenship rights and manages to motivate Palestinian-origin Jordanians of East Amman to fend for their everyday lives, away from the classical and traditional protected routes of education and formal sector employment. Social cohesion, state protection and loyalty to the political system become replaced by alienation and invisibilisation.

Self-settled forced migrants do not choose paths other than these two either. Alienation and invisibilisation are chosen in order for them to be included in a state that has not managed to include everyone on its territories. Discursive politics has managed, in this way, to create politically, economically and socially privileged citizens, which in turn means that other segments of the population, citizens and non-citizens, access fewer de facto rights and have less power.

Although plausible on the surface, this straightforward interpretation brings up a number of conceptual and empirical anomalies. This work presents a model of managing populations in one country with different titles and rights through using different approaches which put the least responsibility on the state to be accountable. This thesis,
in its chapters, has examined the way the interest of the state shapes the conduct of its subjects and makes them accountable for their acts.

In addition, this work has sought to demonstrate a pattern of social stratification, explaining the way the ‘politics of divisiveness’ – through cleavages of class, origin and politics – distorts the acquisition of basic citizenship rights – particularly through education, employment and formal economic opportunities. Social mobility, in such an environment, tends to favour those citizens with more education and experience, or better social and professional network, or higher social status. Those with less education and limited social capital are more likely to work in the informal sector with no rights and no social protection. This work invites further research to study the politics of divisiveness and cleavages amongst East Jordanians, those living in desert remote areas where the state’s development projects and funding have been trickling in very slowly.
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