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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE KURDISH QUESTION IN TURKEY: DE-DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN AND SOUTHEASTERN ANATOLIA

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Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in Development Studies

2014

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Declaration for SOAS PhD thesis

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Abstract

This thesis examines the linkages between economic development in the predominantly Kurdish provinces in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia (ESA) and Turkey’s Kurdish question. The study adopts a historical, structural, and political-economic approach, which entails that socioeconomic and political developments, structures and transformations in ESA are analyzed in juxtaposition with those of other domains within the context of the larger geographical area and political entity of which these territories have constituted a part: the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic.

The study is comprised of three main parts. The first part discusses the key theoretical foundations of the research: theories on Kurdish identity; theoretical perspectives on the Kurdish question in Turkey; and theoretical approaches to socioeconomic development in ESA. The second part explores the social, economic and political alterations, formations and events in Ottoman Kurdistan after 1514 when the bulk of the Kurdish territories largely located in ESA came under the administration of the Ottoman Empire. The final part deals with issues pertaining to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent foundation and evolution of the Turkish Republic and Turkey’s Kurdish question.

The central argument of this thesis is that there is a symbiotic relationship between the Kurdish question in Turkey and the peculiar form of underdevelopment witnessed in ESA, which is accurately captured by the notion of de-development. De-development is an economic process generated by a hegemonic power to ensure that there will be no economic base to support an independent indigenous existence (Roy, 1995). Underlying de-development in ESA as well as Turkey’s Kurdish question is the Turkish elite’s paramount political-national objective of maintaining Turkey’s national unity and territorial integrity.
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Abbreviations/Acronyms

A&P: Great Britain: Parliamentary Papers, Account Papers
AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
AMMU: Aşair ve Muhacirin Müdürlüğü-i Umûmiyesi (General Directorate for Tribes and Immigrants)
ANAP: Anavatan Partisi (The Motherland Party)
BDP: Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party)
ÇATOM: Çok Amaçlı Toplum Merkezi (Multi-Purpose Community Centers)
DEHAP: Democratic People’s Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi)
DEP: Demokrasi Partisi (Democracy Party)
DİSK: Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikalar Konfederasyonu (Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey)
DP: Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti)
DSİ: Devlet Su İşleri (Directorate of State Hydraulic Works)
DTP: Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party)
EC: European Council
ERP: Economic Recovery Plan
ESA: Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia
EU: European Union
FO: Great Britain, Foreign Office
FYP: Five-Year Plan
GAP: Güneydoğu Anadolu Project (Project of Southeastern Anatolia)
GAP-GIDEM: GAP-Girişimci Destekleme Merkezi (GAP-Entrepreneur Support and Guidance Centres)
GAP-RDA: Project of Southeastern Anatolia-Regional Development Adminstration
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GNAT: Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi)
GNI: Gross National Income
GNP: Gross National Product
HCPP: Great Britain, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers
HDI: Human Development Index
HEP: Halkın Emek Partisi (Peoples’ Labour Party)
İAMM: İskân-ı Aşâir Muhacîrîn Müdûriyetî (Directorate for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants)
IDPs: Internally Displaced Peoples
IEA: International Energy Agency
İHD: İnsan Halkları Derneği (Human Rights Association)
ILO: International Labour Organisation
IMF: International Monetary Fund
ISI: Import Substitution Industrialisation
JP: Justice Party (Adalet Partisi)
Kawa: Kurdish mythical figure and name of a Kurdish Political Party
KHRP: Kurdish Human Rights Project
KRG: Kurdish Regional Government (Iraq)
KSP-T: Kurdistan Socialist Party-Turkey (Partiya Sosyalista Kurdistan-Tirkiye)
NAP: Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)
NAPP: National Programme for Adopting the Acquis Communautaire
NF: National Front Coalition Governments
NGOs: Non-Governmental Organisations
NSC: National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu)
NTP: New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi)
NUC: National Union Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi)
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
OHAL: Olağanüstü Hal (State of Emergency)
PDRs: Priority Development Regions (Kakınımada Öncelikli Yöreler)
PKK: Partiya Karkarên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers’ Party)
RECH: Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths (Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları)
RPNP: Republican Peasants’ Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köyli Millet Partisi)
RPP: Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
SEE: State Economic Enterprises
SHP: Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi (Social Democratic People’s Party)
SPO: State Planning Organisation (Devlet Planlama Teşkilati)
TBB: Türkiye Bankalar Birliği (Association of Banks of Turkey)
TCBIM: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü (The maiden Turkish Statistical Institute)
TESEV: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
TKAE: Türk Kültürünü Araşturma Enstitüsü (Research Institute on Turkish Culture)
TMMOB: Türkiye Mühendis ve Mimar Odalar Birliği (Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects)
TOBB: Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği (Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchange of Turkey)
TPAO: Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (Turkish Petroleum Corporation)
TR: Turkish Lira
TRL: Old Turkish Lira
TRT: Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurulu (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation)
TRY: New Turkish Lira
TMO: Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi (Office for Soil Products)
TÜİK: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (Turkish Statistical Institute)
TÜSİAD: Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği (Turkish Industrialist and Businessmen’s Association)
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
US: United States
USARM : Union of Southeastern Anatolia Region Municipalities (Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi Belediyeleri Birliği).
VAT: Value Added Tax
WB: World Bank
WPT: Workers’ Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi)
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TO MY PARENTS
Map 1
The eastern and southern Ottoman world
Map 2
Map of Turkey
Introduction

This thesis is concerned with the role and impact of economic development in the predominantly Kurdish provinces in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia (ESA) on the rise and evolution of Turkey’s Kurdish question. As background to the exploration of these domains after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, this study traces the political and economic history of ESA. Thus, although the study focuses mainly on events that materialised after the establishment of the Republic, nevertheless it deals also, rather extensively, with broader historical issues germane to the subject matter of this investigation. The guiding research questions in this study will be the following: How developed or underdeveloped was ESA during the Ottoman period? What were the economic and social impacts of the institution and the suppression of the Kurdish polities in Ottoman Kurdistan? Is the relatively worse-off position of the predominantly Kurdish provinces a by-product of uneven capitalist development in Turkey? Or is it attributable to the lack of transformation in the inimical social structures in these domains? Alternatively, can the economic, social and political actualities of these regions be imputed to the discriminatory policies implemented by the Turkish state against Turkey’s Kurds? How has Turkey’s exposure to the forces and features of neoliberal capitalism influenced the Turkish state’s preoccupation with the Kurdish question and the issue of socio-economic development in ESA?

The concepts, theoretical debates and methodology utilised in this study stem in large measure from the nature of the subject and the motivation to study Turkey’s Kurdish question in the context of economic development and political change in the Ottoman Empire and modern-day Turkey. The relevant central concepts, theories and methodology for this thesis will be delineated and deliberated in the succeeding chapter, but it is worth at this early stage to elaborate on what the key issues are and to clarify how some of the central concepts will be mobilised by this investigation.
In this study, development denotes a qualitative process of widespread structural transformation at all levels of society: economic, social, cultural, and political. Development, therefore, necessitates augmenting the productive performance of the economy to meet essential human needs as much as it requires enhancing political liberties and the range of human choices via the abolition of suppression and dependence. Nonetheless, owing to the lack of longitudinal assessments of economic changes in ESA, and the implications of economic issues for socio-political manifestations and alterations in these domains, development, as measured by the degree of structural change, will be analysed largely through an economic lens.

Similarly, the thesis emphasises the multidimensional context of the Kurdish question. This issue is examined as a corollary of rather complex interactions, including concurrent and sequential operations of a diverse array of interacting social, economic, cultural and political factors. The socioeconomic disparities between the ESA regions and the rest of Turkey, the negation of the collective rights of the Kurds in Turkey, the popular mobilisation of the Kurds against the imposed Turkish identity and authoritarian political system with the desire for political pluralism and/or autonomy, and the Kurdish insurgency post-1984, are constitutive aspects of the Kurdish question in Turkey. Following Steven Metz and Raymond Millen (2004: 2), insurgency in this study connotes the following:

‘[A] strategy adopted by groups which cannot attain their political objectives through conventional means or by quick seizure of power….characterised by protracted, asymmetrical violence and ambiguity, the use of complex terrain (jungles, mountains, [and] urban areas), psychological warfare, and political mobilization—all designed to protect the insurgents and eventually alter the balance of power in their favour. Insurgents may attempt to seize power and replace the existing government (revolutionary insurgency) or they may have more limited aims such as separation, autonomy, or alteration of a particular policy.’
Even though it became a central theme of political debate in Turkey only after 1984 with the emergence of the Kurdish insurgency conducted by the Kurdistan Workers’ (Party Partiya Karkarên Kurdistan, PKK), the Kurdish question has been an incessant feature of Turkish politics throughout the twentieth century. The protracted armed struggle waged by the PKK is only the last and the most prolonged of a series of Kurdish rebellions instigated against state authorities. Hence, in order to apprehend comprehensively the roots and trajectory of this issue a terse analysis of the relevant events and policies that have surfaced pre-1980s is in order.

The transfiguration of a multinational (Ottoman) empire into a (Turkish) nation state involved a nation-state building process that necessitated economic, social and political reforms implemented by a Turkish nationalist elite bent on creating a ‘homogenous’, ‘secular’ and ‘westernised’ Turkish nation. Nation-state building in the post-Ottoman political space, as was the case in Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia and Africa, describes a twin process, where ‘nation-building’ implicated ‘the process whereby a sense of shared identity, patriotism, and loyalty to homeland develops’, while the notion ‘state-building’ entailed ‘the construction of governmental and political institutions’ (Bill and Springboard, 1990: 40). Moreover, as rightly observed by James A. Bill and Robert Springboard, ‘[t]he more the artificial the country, the more difficult are the challenges of nation- and state-building’ (ibid.: 40).

The delimitation of the national identity as solely Turkish and such that it outlawed the public countenance of minority cultural differences, as well as the construction of a unitary and authoritarian political system in Turkey, were offshoots of this process. As conveyed by the following unreserved speech by İsmet İnönü, Turkey’s second president, in 1925:

‘We are frankly [n]ationalists… and [n]ationalism is our only factor of cohesion. In the face of a Turkish majority, other elements have no kind of influence. We must turkify the
inhabitants of our land at any price, and we will annihilate those who oppose the Turks or ‘le turquisme’ [Turkism]’ (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 10).

The birth of the authoritarian Turkish nation state ensued the economic peripheralisation, territorial losses and demographic changes that befell the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These vicissitudes were to large extent repercussions of the growing influence of Europe in the Ottoman Empire and the reactions it occasioned in the Ottoman state and society. The European influence on Ottoman polity and people was felt in three different but interrelated spheres: first, the incorporation of the Ottoman lands into the capitalist world system, which began in the late eighteenth century and gathered pace in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Second, the expansion of the influence of the Great Powers of Europe (such as Great Britain, France, Austria, and Russia), as evinced with the British economic and political hegemony as per both trade and loans to the Empire after the imposition of the free-trade regime in 1838. Third, the impact of European ideologies of nationalism, liberalism, secularism and positivism (Zürcher, 1994: 11-94, Quataert, 1994: 759-934; Pamuk, 1-17: 2010 [1987]).

Following the conclusion of the war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in 1812, Sultan Mahmut II (1789-1839) began to implement westernisation and centralisation reforms, which were continued by his successors. Full-scale Ottoman restructuring was unleashed by the Imperial Rescript of 1839, which had determined the nature of the policies in the Tanzimat period (1839-76). This Rescript set out the following modifications: (i) ‘an orderly system of taxation to replace the system of tax-farming’; (ii) ‘the establishment of guarantees for the life, honour and property of the sultan’s subjects’; (iii) ‘a system of conscription for the army’; and (iv) ‘equality before the law of all subjects, whatever their religion (although this was formulated somewhat ambiguously in the document)’ (Zürcher, 1994: 53). These reorganisations were designed in order to modify the Ottoman political, administrative and
social structure in line with the prerequisites of the international capitalist system on the one hand and, as part of the central authorities’ strategy to recapture control over provinces and attenuate fiscal resources of the Empire on the other.

The administrative, social and political arrangements aimed at centralising the Empire and absorbing the Christian and non-Turkish populaces initiated the obliteration of local autonomy. Unsurprisingly, the fusion of centralist reforms and the spread of nationalism in the Empire set in motion a series of rebellions in Serbian, Greek and Lebanese Christian communities, as well as among Muslims in Ottoman Kurdistan who had been accustomed to varying degrees of self-rule (Özoğlu, 2004; Celil, 1992). Thus the promise – even if on paper – of equality with the Muslim majority did not inhibit the proliferation of ethno-nationalism particularly among the Christian communities; leading to the birth and sharpening of what came to be termed among foreign diplomats the ‘Eastern Question’. That is, the question of how to satiate vying Balkan nationalisms and the imperialist objectives of the major powers without engendering the demise of the Ottoman Empire or, if its destruction was inescapable, to dismember it without disturbing the balance of power in Europe and triggering a general war. In addition, the economic privileges granted to Europeans in order to maintain the flow of urgently needed loans were often extended to their non-Muslim partners too and consequently the Empire’s Christian bourgeoisie gained the most from Ottoman trade with Europe in the nineteenth century (Kasaba, 1988; Keyder, 1987).

These occurrences alienated the Muslim communities in the Empire and fostered trepidations amidst the Ottoman political leaders about how to maintain the Empire’s position and preserve its political and territorial integrity. The amalgamation of these consternations laid the groundwork for two significant phenomena on the eve of the twentieth century: the emergence of nationalism among the Muslim populace, and the formation of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1889. The CUP led the Young Turk Revolution
of 1908 under the banner of ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, and Justice’ and thus promised political pluralism and establishment of constitutional order. However, soon after the Revolution – for reasons discussed at length in Chapter 4 – the CUP reneged on both of these assurances and adopted an aggressive and exclusionist form of Turkish nationalism. This ignited successive Kurdish revolts in the Ottoman Kurdish emirates, some of which, like the Baban, Bitlis and Barzan revolts, were organised with pro-self-rule demands, and others were solely mobilised against the perceived injustices in the policies of the CUP administration explicated in Chapter 4 (Celil, 1992: 201-16, Burkay, 2008 [1992]: 457-69, Jwaideh, 1961: 295-97).

The belligerent pan-Turkist policies of the CUP coupled with the destructive ramifications of the First World War transformed ESA from imperial borderlands into imperial shatter zones. The widespread devastation that the Armenian and Greek communities experienced during and after the War substantially altered the demographic landscape of the Ottoman Empire. As a consequence of not attaining the autonomy promised to them by the European victors of the Great War in the Treaty of Sèvres – signed on 10 August 1920 between the Allies and the Ottoman government – which decreed independence to Armenia and administrative autonomy to Kurdistan, the Kurds were the only non-Turkish ethno-national community at the birth of the new Republic. Article 62 of the Treaty of Sèvres stated the following:

‘A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of three members appointed by the British, French and Italian Governments respectively shall draft within six months from into force of the present Treaty a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia, as defined in Article 27, II (2) and (3)’ (McDowall, 2000: 464).
Although this Treaty was superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923 – which formally established the currently existing borders and sovereignty of Turkey – as a result of the successful rebellion led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), the fret of Kurdish autonomy always weighed strongly on the minds of the rulers of the Turkish Republic. Put differently, at a time when a new regional system, based on two independent states (Iran and Turkey) and two mandatory states (Iraq and Syria) had been established, the autonomy promised to Kurds in the former Treaty ostensibly engendered a new ‘Eastern Question’ for the rulers of the Turkish Republic. And ever since there has been a tendency to assess the demands of the Kurds in Turkey along conspirative lines with persistent reference to the ‘Eastern Question’ and the Treaty of Sèvres.

After the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, Turkish republican nationalism or Kemalism, named after the founder and maiden President of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal, became the official state ideology and the source of an array of social, political and economic reforms. The social engineering projects implemented by the Republican People’s Party (RPP) during the single-party period (1923-1945) as expounded in Chapter 4, prompted the conflictual ties between the Kurds and the Turkish state and wrought socio-economic destruction to the ESA regions. The Kemalist centralist authorities had obdurately defended the doctrine of the unity and indivisibility of the Turkish state, its territory and its people. This dogma became the established reason for suppressing the linguistic, cultural and collective rights demanded by the Kurds because these demands were perceived as a threat to the unitary and uniform structure of the nation and the state.

The freedoms, albeit limited, granted by the 1961 constitution enabled Kurds to raise their demands and address some of their grievances through legitimate channels, as evinced with the ‘Eastern Meetings’ of the 1960s. The ‘Eastern Meetings’ were the pinnacle of Kurdish activism in that decade. Commencing on 13 August 1967 in Silvan, a sequential series of
protest were held against the underdevelopment in ESA in Diyarbakır on 3 September 1967, Siverek (Urfa) on 24 September 1967, Batman on 8 October 1967, Tunceli (Dersim) on 15 October 1967, Ağrı on 22 October 1967, and the finale took place in Ankara on 18 November 1967 (Beşikçi, 1992). These robust protests were directed against the traditional policies of the Turkish state and excessive power of the Kurdish clientele rural elite in ESA, and thereby threatened the rule of both the former and the latter in these domains. The political activism of the Kurds in the 1960s and 1970s enabled pro-Kurdish campaigners to make significant electoral gains. For example, in the 1977 municipal elections Mehdi Zana, a supporter of the Kurdish left-wing organisation Partiya Sosyalista Kurdistan-Türkiye (Kurdistan Socialist Party-Turkey, KSP-T), won the mayoralty of Diyarbakır, considered as the Kurdish cultural and political centre. However, with the arrival of the coup d’état in 1980, all of the gains, activism and organisations of the progressive left-wing movements, of which Kurdish activists constituted an important part, were suppressed, leading Kurdish campaigners to seek other avenues to address their demands.

The most vital and violent expression of this search has been the guerrilla warfare waged by the PKK in 1984. Thus, as rightly indicated by Hamit Bozarslan, ‘1980 is a turning point in Kurdish history in Turkey: all nationalist activity was suspended following the military coup, and the subsequent return to civil administration has been marked above all by a continuing guerrilla warfare’ (2003b: 15). The war between the PKK and the Turkish state has had colossal political, social and economic consequences, which will be explicated in Chapters 4 and 5. Despite the period of relative détente in Kurdish-Turkish relations, due to the significant reduction in the military activities of the PKK following the ceasefire declared in 1999 and the timid recognition of the Kurdish identity and cultural rights by the Turkish state in the past two decades, the Kurdish question is still awaiting a perpetual solution and the conflict is ongoing.
Unsurprisingly, the emergence of the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish army and the surge in the Kurdish nationalist movement in the Middle East from the 1980s on witnessed a parallel increase in scholarly studies and research on the Kurds. Overall, these works attempt to account for a multifarious range of issues and concentrate on varying periods and aspects of Kurdish society and politics. Nearly all of these scholarships either analyse the genesis and evolution of Kurdish nationalism in the Middle East\(^1\) or examine Kurdish nationalism and the political history of the conflict in Turkey.\(^2\) In comparison to the conflict analyses and political history literature, there are relatively miniscule studies synthetically investigating the economic and political history of the predominantly Kurdish areas of ESA.\(^3\)


The conflict analyses and political history literature readily accept that ESA constituted one of the least developed areas of the Ottoman Empire. In postulating causal explanations for the existence of the conflictual ties between the Turkish state and its Kurdish citizens, these studies, on the one hand, emphasise the role of socio-economic inequality and regional underdevelopment in fostering Kurdish discord in Turkey and on the other, highlight the significance of the Kurdish society’s urbanisation, migration, and contact with the wider world during the 1960s and 1970s in the political expression of Kurdish discontent (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997; Barkey and Fuller, 1998; McDowall, 2000; van Bruinessen, 2000; Gunter, 1990; Taşpınar, 2005; Ibrahim and Gürbey, 2000; White, 2000). However, none of these studies systematically analyse the economic history of ESA and/or the economic aspects of the Kurdish question.

Studies focusing on the economic features of ESA provide fragmentary accounts of the economic history of these territories and only study the years prior to the armed conflict between the PKK and the state (M. E. Bozarslan, 2002 [1966]; Jafar, 1976; Beşikçi, 1992 [1969]) or years just after the armed conflict (Z. Aydın, 1989; Sönmez, 1992 [1990]).

Relatedly, a methodical investigation incorporating the political and economic experiences of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian societies during the Ottoman and contemporary era is a desideratum. This is precisely why this thesis has decided to examine Turkey’s Kurdish question and the issue of economic development in ESA within a historical framework.

**Research Motivations and Contributions**

Evidently, this research agenda can be addressed in different forms and with manifold purposes. This research topic is of interest for a trinity of reasons. Firstly, although there are fragmentary accounts of the economy of the primarily Kurdish provinces in ESA, there has been no comprehensive and longitudinal investigation of this complex subject. This has

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resulted in political transformations within these regions being studied largely without a
detailed analysis of the pivotal economic changes. The paucity of research on economic
activities, relations and transformations in the predominantly Kurdish domains is due to a
combination of data-related issues, like the existence of miniscule historical archival
resources, and profounder ontological (i.e. how the Kurds are defined), methodological (i.e.
how the Kurds are studied), and epistemological (i.e. how knowledge about the Kurds is
produced) issues.

As expounded in Chapters 3 and 4, because of the minimal quantitative historical information
presently available on the economy of Ottoman Kurdistan, economic life in this Ottoman
borderland is the terra incognita on the Ottoman history map. David McDowall in the
Foreword to his highly influential study on the Kurds A Modern History of the Kurds,
highlights the lack of coverage in the historical archives of the economy of this Ottoman
frontier region and the resultant void it has caused to the study of this area with the
noteworthy observation that:

‘[P]erhaps the most important [void] were the process of economic and social change. I
cannot help feeling that if these were better documented and understood, many of the events
we do know about in Kurdistan would undergo re-evaluation’ (McDowall, 2000: xii).

Yet, the lack of historical archives on the economy of these regions is not the sole reason for
the aforementioned lacuna. The long-standing failure of the academic studies on the Ottoman
Empire to aptly analyse Ottoman Kurdistan and the Kurds coupled with the tendency of
recent investigations on this domain making political relations between the Kurdish rulers
and the Ottoman state the sole locus of their analysis (Özoğlu, 2004; O. Kıлич, 1999; Sinclair,
2003; Öz, 2003), have contributed to the absence of a systematic examination of the economy
of the primarily Kurdish provinces in ESA.
Mainstream academic research on the history and legacy of the Ottoman Empire often do not properly account for the incorporation of the Kurdish emirates into the Ottoman Empire and/or address the legacies of the Ottoman period in the remnants of Ottoman Kurdistan in contemporary Turkey. As pointed out by the erudite Armenian scholar, Stephan H. Astourian, up until very recently, ‘Kurds, for their part, [were] simply left out of Ottoman historiography altogether, although they constituted a plurality in the eastern provinces’ (Kaiser, 1998: ix).

To cite a few revealing examples, in spite of the momentous events that occurred during and after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire involving the Armenians and the Kurds inhabiting the ethnically heterogeneous Eastern provinces, L. Carl Brown in the Introduction to the oft-quoted Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East glosses over the legacy of Ottoman rule in ESA. More staggeringly, in the detailed list of ‘Dates and Duration (Number of Years) of Ottoman Rule by Country or Region’ outlined by the author, Ottoman Kurdistan is unstipulated (Brown, 1996: xiv-xvi). In The Shaping of the Modern Middle East, Bernard Lewis states that the Kurds are one of the remaining linguistic and ethnic minorities of any importance surviving in the central lands of the Middle East. Besides that, the Kurds are only alluded to very briefly as an obstacle to Arabism in Iraq (Lewis, 1994: 19, 94-5).

In other publications such as Anadolu’nun Tarihi Çoğrafyasına Giriş (An Introduction to the Historical Geography of Anatolia) authored by Prof. Tuncer Baykara, and published by the Research Institute on Turkish Culture (Türk Kültürü Araştırmalar Enstitüsü, TKAE)\(^4\), the very existence of Ottoman Kurdistan is openly negated, and the Kurds are defined as ‘Turkish people who live in the mountainous regions of Turkey’ (Baykara, 1988: 26). Baykara’s study is emblematic of the plethora of ‘scientific works’ produced by mainstream academics in Turkey from the 1930s onwards, demonstrating the ‘Turkish’ origins of the Kurds or, to

\(^4\) TKAE was established in 1961 by the then President, Cemal Gürses. This institution publishes journals and books exploring Turkish culture and history from a pan-Turkist perspective. For a systematic analysis of the TKAЕ, see: Landau (1995).
employ the official definition ascribed to Kurds in Turkey up until the late twentieth-century, ‘mountain Turks’. These Turkist studies attained their theoretical nourishment from the Kemalist mythomoteur of pre-Islamic Turkic civilisations as the source of all civilisations and languages, which came to prominence after the First Historical Congress of 1932 organised in Ankara under Atatürk’s direction. All of the above stated lacunae are inextricably linked to how knowledge about the Kurds and Kurdish-dominated regions have been produced by conventional Middle Eastern studies and the academic and research circles in Turkey. As accurately postulated by Colin Williams in Minority Nationalist Histography, historical and geographical accounts of a region or state is customarily analysed by the use of materials written in the languages of the dominant nations, rather than minority languages; thus the minorities’ ideas are meagrely represented, if at all, in scholarly literature. Put differently, historical accounts of an area or polity regularly ‘tell it from the victor’s angle’ (1988: 203-04). The Kurds, up until very recently, were marginalised in all their host countries, so their account of or role in history, were largely defectively covered or represented by mainstream researchers of the Middle East.

With restricted freedom of thought and expression, seeped in Turkish nationalism, academic science in Turkey has been made to conform to the ideological interest and policies of the state. Research produced about the Kurds within academic circles in Turkey is often aimed at producing applied knowledge. That is to say, they formed knowledge on the principally Kurdish regions and their population with the aims of buttressing the official discourse or state ideology on Kurds and laying the foundations for state interventions in these regions via

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5 This congress approved of the ‘Turkish Historical Thesis’, according to which Turks had been forced to migrate from Central Asia due to severe climatic conditions and thus with time this process created the world’s great civilisations in the Near East, such as the Hittites and the Sumerians. Congruently, the ‘Sun-Language Theory’ supported the thesis that all languages derived originally from one primal language, to which Turkish was the closest before its contamination by Arabic and Persian. For a detailed analysis of these theses, see: Ersanlı-Behar (1992) and Beşikçi (1977).

6 For a detailed study of Turkish nationalism and its relationship with higher educational institutions in Turkey, see: A. Arslan (2004: 58-159).
theorising on issues of population policies, modernisation, and territorial integration. On the other hand, studies that fell into conflict with the hegemonic ideology on Kurds were vilified within academic circles, and scholars that undertook heterodox research on predominantly Kurdish inhabited areas were removed from their academic positions. This was exemplified with İsmail Beşikçi’s academic profession coming to a swift expiration after authoring *Doğu Anadolu’nun Düzeni: Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Etnik Temeller* – first published in 1969 – wherein he committed an academic crime by formulating the unspeakable: the ethnic dimension of the predominantly Kurdish ESA regions.\(^7\)

The practice of producing, reinforcing and disseminating the official discourse about the Kurds began during the late Ottoman period. In accordance with the instructions of Talat Pasha to investigate Anatolia after the 1913 Unionist Coup, Turkist missionary ethnologists and sociologists such as Mehmed Ziya Gökalp\(^8\) (1876-1924), studied the Kurds and Kurdish tribes with the purpose of assimilating them into the Turkish culture (Dündar, 2002; Üngör, 2011). Throughout the Republican era too, social engineering specialists were sent to ESA to collate information and, in turn, produce reports about the social organisation, economic wealth and relations, and ethnic characteristics of the indigenous population. These field studies in East and South-East Turkey formed the basis of the plan of ‘Reform of the East’ in the 1920s (Bayrak, 1994). Similarly, in the multi-party period the ‘East Group’ within the State Planning Organisation (SPO) produced policy-oriented reports like ‘*The Principles of the State Development Programmes in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia*’, which was prepared in 1961. The common theme in these state-sanctioned reports was that the native

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\(^7\) For a concise exploration of the academic life, works and investigations of İsmail Beşikçi, see: van Bruinessen (2003-4: 19-34).

\(^8\) Ziya Gökalp was a sociologist, poet, and probably the most prominent ideologue of the CUP. He was born in Çermik, Diyarbakır, of a Kurdish mother and a Turkish father. Gökalp published inestimable articles in journals, founded the CUP branch in Diyarbekir and rapidly rose to become a member of the Central Committee of the CUP. He pragmatically reinterpreted Emile Durkheim’s theories into a distinct set of ideas that laid the ideological bases of modern Turkish nationalism. For an expanded political biography of Gökalp, see: Hyed (1979).
tribal social structure fostered the ‘backward’ nature of the Kurdish-majority regions and thus necessitated state intervention in these areas in order to transform the ‘primitive’ autochthonous structures and people. State interference in these domains involved ‘turkification’ of the local populace and deportation of the members of the disobedient Kurdish tribes, a subject matter fully discussed in Chapter 5.

Analogous studies on the primordial loyalties and structures in ESA continued from 1980s on, this time under the aegis of the state-led Project of Southeastern Anatolia (Güneydoğu Anadolu Project, GAP). Institutes working on the GAP were founded within universities. The academic research and surveys conducted by GAP Research and Practice Centres established in the Middle East Technical University and Dicle University in Diyarbakır in the 1990s, unswervingly highlighted the severity of the tribal structures and the pivotal role state initiatives employed under the GAP could adopt in order to resolve this issue and nurture modernisation and development. All of these reports at no time mention the ethnic component of the Kurdish question or the armed conflict between the state and the PKK (Özok-Gündoğan, 2005; Scalbert-Yücel and Le Ray, 2006).

These studies made the autochthonic tribes in ESA the central focus of their research and thereby postulated them as *explanans* (that which contains the explanation) for underdevelopment in the predominantly Kurdish populated ESA regions. This approach renders the tribal organisation as the determinate source of attaining knowledge about the Kurds and the principally Kurdish provinces and as immutable and fixed entities as though they are a fact of nature that unequivocally determines the behaviour of Kurds. In other words, the above-mentioned state-sponsored studies fail to account for the specific social, economic, and political conditions that mould and transform tribal identity and organisation, and, owing to the rural-centred analysis, overlook structures, activities and developments in predominantly Kurdish cities in ESA. As a result, mainstream ethnoagrnic and sociological
studies in Turkey have precipitated three pitfalls, which have hitherto devalued and obfuscated the undertaking of a longitudinal analysis of the economy of the principally Kurdish regions of Turkey: (i) depriving Kurds of their proper national and socio-economic characteristics; (ii) analysing Kurds without a diachronic and holistic perspective of their social, political, economic and territorial interactions, organisations and activities; and (iii) depicting the largely Kurdish regions as static ‘primitive regions’ on account of the persevering regressive social structures that are not conducive to economic development. For the purposes of systematically analysing the linkages between economic development in ESA and Turkey’s Kurdish question – free from the long-standing drawbacks of the dominant scholarships summarised above – one of the overriding aims and contributions of this study will be to provide a detailed account of the political and economic structures, relations and changes in these domains pre-and-post-1923.

The second reason for the pursuit of this research project is pertinent to the diminutive significance that scholars – particularly economic historians – have ascribed to the ramifications of a chilling series of violent events in ESA during and after the First World War on the economy of these regions in the years subsequent to the institution of the Turkish Republic. For instance, the economic historian Zvi Yehuda Herschlag in his widely cited *Turkey: An Economy in Transition* hypothesises that after the War private enterprise in Turkey was too weak, and the state had to act as the locomotive of economic life in the Eastern provinces (1958: 39-40). Herschlag’s oft-quoted postulation is made without any consideration of the issue of dispossession and uprooting of the indigenous entrepreneurs, especially – but not exclusively – Armenian and Kurdish, as part of the nationalist demographic policies implemented in ESA during the CUP period (1913-1918) and after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Correspondingly, more contemporary researchers of the Eastern economy such as Servet Mutlu in *Doğu Sorunun Kökenleri: Ekonomik Açidan*
(The Roots of the Eastern Question: An Economic Perspective), study the continuity of Eastern and Southeastern Turkey’s underdevelopment with minimal engagement with the wars, ethnocide and forced deportations experienced by the autochthonic inhabitants in these regions, as though they never happened and economic impoverishment was inexorable.

In this study, the notion of demographic engineering will be used synonymously with social engineering and population politics to denote ‘a series of coercive state measures in pursuit of population homogeneity’ (Bloxham, 2008: 101). As laboriously outlined by Milica Zarkovic Bookman (1997), states attempt to obtain homogenisation by means of implementing six different social engineering policies: (1) manipulation of the censuses; (2) natality policies that aim to obtain the numerical superiority of the dominant national core or group at the expense of minorities; (3) border alterations to attain total overlap between ethnic and political boundaries; (4) dragooning of the minority groups into the dominant cultural identity; (5) forced deportation to decrease the populace of undesirable sections of society in a particular area; and (6) economic and/or political incentives and pressures to leave the country. This study will concentrate on the latter three policies in illuminating how Turkist demographic policies implemented in the ethnically diverse ESA have shaped the economic decline of these territories.

The failure of scholars to overlook the repercussions of the pre-1923 violent encounters and actions on the Eastern economy runs the risk of producing an ahistorical economic analysis of these regions by rejecting all prior (Ottoman) history. This approach to the history of these regions is analogous to the Kemalist interpretation of Turkish history lucidly summarised with the following words of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk): ‘The new Turkey has no relationship to the old. The Ottoman Empire has passed into history. A new Turkey is born’ (Timur, 1987: 5). The epistemic value of assessments of the Kurds and the predominantly Kurdish regions that do not exhaustively scrutinise events, processes and state practices in the pre-Kemalist
period are dubitable. This is because, as pointed out by Andrew Mango, ‘[t]he ideology which has shaped the policy of the government of the Turkish republic towards its Kurdish citizens antedates Atatürk’ (1990: 10). Thus, the precondition of obtaining an accurate understanding of the evolution of political, economic and social structures and processes in ESA is to review the occurrences prior to 1923 in these regions.

One of the initial scholars to study the nationalist population policies was Îsmail Beşikçi, who analysed the 1934 Settlement Act and explained the deportations orchestrated by the Kemalist rulers (Beşikçi, 1991). Despite shedding much needed light on a hitherto under-studied area and instigating further research on the field of social engineering in Turkey, Beşikçi’s approach had two drawbacks. Firstly, he began his periodization in 1923 and resultantly glossed over the CUP deportations during the First World War. Secondly, he gave minimal importance to the economic ramifications of these forced displacement policies. Other researchers have investigated this matter further, contributing immensely to the widening of knowledge about demographic engineering policies. However, either they have researched nationalist population policies only during the CUP period (Dündar, 2002; Akçam, 2012) or until the end of the Republican period (1923-1950) (Çağaptay, 2006; Üngör, 2011), and resultantly the social engineering programmes actuated in post-1950 have not been deliberated. Considering that in the second half of the twentieth century, according to official figures, around one million Kurds had been forcibly displaced from their ancestral lands; it is of vast importance for any study dealing with socio-economic and political history of principally Kurdish regions to assess the deportation policies executed after the single-party period in Turkey.

The third and final motivation for this study stems from a strong element of dissatisfaction with the prevailing development paradigm concerning ESA, that is, underdevelopment. In light of the longitudinal data prepared for and analysed in this study, it is highly desirable to
revaluate this age-old and readily accepted heuristic device of regional underdevelopment. Put differently, the novel empirical facts germane to the Kurdish-dominated regions of Anatolia attained by this study necessitate a rethinking of the underlying assumptions of this prevailing theoretical approach. These are that the predominantly Kurdish provinces of pre- and-post-1923 Anatolia have been underdeveloped areas not conducive to capitalist development on account of several regional features: the dominance of feudal social relations, the lack of modern infrastructure, and ESA’s geopolitical position – far afield from both the former imperial capital, Istanbul, and the contemporary political capital, Ankara.

**Structure of the Chapters**

This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 presents a detailed critical examination of the main theoretical perspectives concerning the Kurds, the Kurdish question in Turkey and socioeconomic development in ESA, as well as outlining methodological resources that the thesis draws upon in conducting this research. Chapters 2-3 paint a picture of political, social and economic life in Ottoman Kurdistan. Chapter 2 looks at the political and economic events and changes in this Ottoman borderland in the years 1514-1800. That is, the period from the time when the Kurdish principalities were incorporated into the Ottoman Empire and the semi-autonomous Kurdish regimes were established, until the dawn of the suppression of these polities. Chapter 3 investigates the political and economic history of Ottoman Kurdistan in the years 1800-1914: the era during which all semi-autonomous regimes in Ottoman Kurdistan had been overthrown, the penetration of world capitalism into the Ottoman Anatolia had deepened and the First World War begun. The structures and changes in this region in these three centuries will be compared with those of the bordering Ottoman territories, which today constitute modern-day Turkey.

Chapter 4 deals with issues pertaining to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent formation and evolution of the Turkish Republic and Turkey’s Kurdish question.
In this chapter, socioeconomic and political developments, structures and transformations in ESA will be juxtaposed with those of other regions within the context of the larger geographical area and political entity of which it is a part: the Turkish Republic. There will be four separate sub-sections dealing with three successive periods under the following headings:

- ‘From the Mudros Armistice of 1918 to the Lausanne Treaty of 1928’
- ‘Society, Economic and Politics in the Republican People’s Party Era (1923-1950)’
- ‘Transition to a Turbulent Democracy and ‘Incorporation’ of ESA (1950-1980)’

Chapter 5 assesses how the neoliberal restructuring of the Turkish polity and economy in the years 1980-2010s has influenced Turkey’s Kurdish question and socio-economic development in ESA. Finally, Chapter 6 outlines the findings of this thesis and discusses the possible political and economic steps that could be taken to resolve the Kurdish question in Turkey and overcome the barriers to socio-economic development in ESA.
Chapter 1
The Kurds, the Kurdish Question in Turkey, and Economic Development in ESA: An Exploration of the Central Theoretical Debates and Outline of the Methodological Resources

1.1 Defining the Kurds

Kurdish ancestry, ethonogenesis, native land and language are matters of persistent scholarly debate. Different theories exist concerning the ancestry of the Kurds. Certain scholars claim that they were the people of ‘Gutium’ in ancient Sumeria (Izady, 1988, 1992). The most prominent hypothesis, particularly among Kurds, is that the Kurds descended from the ancient Indo-European people, the Medes, who established the Median Empire (728-550 B.C.) in the current areas of South-Eastern Turkey, Northern Iraq and Western Iran (Wahby, 1982; Kendal, 1996). Another line of thought conceives that the modern Kurds, while possibly descending from some or all of the above ancestries imputed to them, were formed as an amalgamation into a novel, ethnically distinct people (Bois, 1966). Other researchers, in the same vein as the aforementioned TKAE-affiliated Turkish nationalist scholars, vehemently dispute all of these views and instead maintain that they are a branch of the Turkic people, negating that the Kurds are a distinct people (Kırzioğlu, 1963; Türkdoğan, 1997).

However, what may be the least controversial definition is the degree of consciousness among Kurds in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria that they constitute one people. They brand themselves Kurds, even with the dissimilarities in their economic activities, political and economic development and modern history. Kurds and most researchers attempting to define them approve of this postulation.
However, the causality of this ethnic/national consciousness has been a source of controversy. Broadly speaking, there are two main streams of thought on this interminable debate: the primordialist or essentialist and the constructivist. The former argue that the nation is a natural and perennial entity that has existed since time immemorial and predates nationalism (Armstrong, 1982; Geertz, 1973). Thus according to the primordialist, the source of modern national awareness is the old and acutely felt ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural differences. In that vein, the Harvard academic of Kurdish origin Mehrad R. Izady posits that the period from the 5th century BC through to the 6th century AD ‘marks the homogenization and consolidation of the modern Kurdish national identity. The ethnic designator Kurd is established finally, and applied to all segments of the nation’ (Izady, 1992: 23). The Kurdish linguist Jamal Nabaz postulates a classic example of the primordial conceptualisation of the Kurdish identity and nationalism. Nabaz contends that the ‘Kurdayetî [Kurdish Nationalist] movement, as we see it, is not the construction of any class or group…Kurdayetî is a natural, dynamic, and perpetual movement. (Sheyolislami, 2011: 52). As correctly observed by Abbas Vali, ‘[t]he mainstream Kurdish nationalist…is “primordialist”’. For him/her the Kurdish nation is a primordial entity, a natural formation rooted in the nature of every Kurd defining the identity of people and community history.’ (2003b: 59).

Therefore, studies or individuals influenced by this dominant approach overlook the modern character of the Kurdish identity and the socially constructed nature of its features. The constructivists argue that nations are relatively recent and contingent entities generated over the last two centuries by the development of modern economic, social and political conditions. Within constructivism, there is a wide range of different approaches. Ernest Gellner (1992) emphasises the importance of industrialisation and the shift from pre-modern village communities. Benedict Anderson (1983) stresses the development of print culture or ‘print capitalism’ and of people who are conscious of a common identity. Marxist writers like
Eric Hobsbawm (1990), analyse the rise of national economies and social classes as the basis of nations and nationalism.

Anthony Smith (1986), who highlights that the pre-modern basis of nations permits for modernist change but on grounds of historic continuities, espouses a ‘third way’ stance between primordialist and constructivist approaches. In other words, Smith hypothesises that nation is the advanced version of ethnicity and the main difference between the two is that the latter does not have a common polity. Ethnic community or *ethnie*, according to Smith, is a historically specific segment of a country’s population that shares the following six features: collective name, a common myth of descent or *mythomoteur*, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, an affiliation with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity (1986: 22-32).

This thesis perceives the construction of the Kurdish identity and Kurdish nationalism from a constructivist perspective and recognises the vital role played by historical, international, socio-economic and political factors in the construction of national identities and nationalist movements. As cogently contended by Fred Halliday, the constructivist approach ‘need not rest on a narrow, industrial-society model: rather, starting from the rise of modern industrial society in Europe and the USA, it seeks to show how the impact of this society was felt throughout the world, in economic change and industrialisation certainly, but also in the political, social and ideological changes that accompanied the subjugation to this model of the world, in the two centuries 1800-2000’ (2006:15). Relatedly, Halliday proposes a constructivist framework for studying the history of Kurdish nationalism and the basis of Kurdish identity formation, applying four extensive processes of modernism: ‘War and conflict’, ‘nationalism and state building’, ‘ideology’ and ‘socio-economic transformation’ (ibid.: 15-8).

The concepts of the nation and nationalism as the sole and supreme focus of one’s loyalty is relatively new having only commenced in the latter part of the 18th century and specifically
during the 1789 French Revolution. After 1789, the nation became a way of legitimising the political domination of social classes of people by the new capitalist class – the bourgeoisie – and had fundamental ramifications for the process of state building. Skirmishes for participation in the state assumed confrontations between the feudal aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, whose interests were often represented by a parliament. The latter claimed to be the advocates of ‘the nation’ and in opposition to the former insisted they were the true espousers and defenders of ‘national liberties’.

During the 19th and 20th centuries, moreover, the concept acquired a cultural meaning, referring to a unique people with distinct identities. This change in meaning was as a result of the cultural understandings of community and power undergoing alterations following the economic changes, social and scientific innovations, and the expansion of communication, initially in Western Europe and subsequently elsewhere, after the 19th century. In other words, the concurrent expansion of capitalism, means of communication (particularly print materials) and the development of vernacular languages beside Latin, played a pivotal role in large groups of people perceiving themselves as distinct communities (Anderson, 1983).

Hence, the idea of the nation came to denote a community of people shaped by common descent, culture, language, aspirations, and history. Nationalism as both a modern ideology and a social or political movement aims at the formation and upkeep of self-government and/or the creation and reconstruction of collective cultural/national identity for a group who believe themselves to be a nation or proto-nation.

The percolation of the concepts of nation and nationalism in the minds of the Kurds, when compared to European nations, is comparatively newer. As posited by van Bruinessen (2000, 2003), H. Bozarslan (2003a) and Vali (2003a), the construction of Kurdish national identity and the birth of Kurdish nationalism are recent phenomena, dating back to beginning of the last century. Van Bruinessen rightly observes that under Ottoman rule, Kurds, analogous to
other people in the multi-religious and multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire, despite being aware of their Kurdishness, did not categorise themselves as an ethnic group or nation in the way they do today, because tribes were the main collectivity with which Kurds identified (2003: 43-45). Similarly, Dennis Natali espouses the view that ‘in both the Ottoman and Qajar [Persian] Empires the absence of an exclusive official nationalist project based on ethnicity prevented Kurdayetî from becoming salient or highly ethnicized’ (2005: 24). In other words, in the pre-20th century there were neither political nor socio-economic prerequisites in Kurdistan for the existence of any notion of the nation. Despite the Ottoman Empire’s centralisation policies and the infiltration of capitalism into Ottoman Anatolia post-1830s arousing nationalist proclivities amidstst Ottoman Kurds, most of the Kurdish movements were Ottomanist in outlook (H. Bozarslan, 2003a: 165-72) and this was a restricted process, encompassing exclusively the Kurdish elite (van Bruinessen, 2003: 55-6). Nevertheless, the Kurdish upper class encountering European notions of nationalism from the late nineteenth century onwards was vital for the pre-history of the contemporary mass Kurdish nationalist movement in the twentieth century (White, 2000; van Bruinessen, 1992).

Kurdish nationalism and the politicisation of the Kurdish identity were largely catalysed by four different factors. The first of these is the assimilationist policies stemming from Turkish, Arab, and Persian official nationalisms (Natali, 2005; Vali, 2006; van Bruinessen, 2000). That is to say, the exclusionary policies and monolithic understanding of society and state by the states that host Kurds impelled them to conserve their distinct identities, and thereby initiated a symbiotic development of Kurdish and Arab/Turkish/Persian nationalisms. The second factor that fostered Kurdish identity and nationalism is the uneven socio-economic and political development commonly experienced by the Kurdish societies in the modern Middle East. As rightly noted by Tom Nairn, nationalism has commonly ‘arisen in societies confronting a dilemma of uneven development…where a conscious, middle-class elite has
sought massive popular mobilization to right the balance’ (1977: 41-2). Michael Hechter also makes a similar and pertinent observation: ‘to the extent that social stratification in the periphery is based on observable cultural difference, there exists the probability that the disadvantaged group will, in time, reactively assert its own culture as equal or superior to that of the relatively advantaged core. This may help it conceive of itself as a separate ‘nation’ and seek independence’ (1975: 10). As these valuable annotations highlight, nationalism neither emerges erratically in the history of a populace, nor is it a perennial or romantic phenomena; it is a contingent phenomenon rooted in the socio-economic actualities of the modern age.

In addition, the spread of war between the Kurdish armed organisations and the states that host the Kurds post-1960 (i.e. Iraq: intermittently from 1960-2003, Iran: intermittently from 1980-present, Turkey: intermittently from 1984-present) has amplified the shared socio-economic and political problems experienced by Kurds, and, in turn, nurtured national awareness among Kurds, even with their territorial, linguistic and political fragmentations. These wars have engendered a constant movement of Kurdish populations, often to similar destinations, such as the metropolis of the hosting states or the megalopolis of Western Europe; enabling them to share experiences of struggle, displacement, poverty, and homelessness. The fourth factor that fuelled Kurdish differences and political subjectivity is the absence of the Kurdish nation-state (van Bruinessen, 2000; Yavuz, 2007). The non-existence of a Kurdish state, as accentuated by M. Hakan Yavuz (2007), has stimulated Kurds to constantly maintain and stress their differences in response to the perceived belligerent policies commonly pursued by the modernising regimes vis-à-vis the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria.
The emergence of the modern nation-state coincided with the rise of capitalism, a novel type of economic structure, ideology and political structure to that existing under feudalism. Under feudalism in Europe, for instance, political domination had been legitimised by reference to the divine right of the kings to rule. Theoretically, under capitalism notions of ‘popular sovereignty’ or ‘common will’ define the nature of political authority in the constitution of the nation-states. A chain of bourgeois revolutions gave an end to the feudal aristocracy’s rule and gave birth to the nation-states. The classic example of this is the above-mentioned French Revolution.

The existential and core principle of the nation-state is that all its citizens are members of a single political unit, regardless of their ideational dissimilarities. This principle habitually assumes an organic link between the dominant nation and the state. The construction of the nation-states in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, which began soon after the First World War, shared this ethos. Often, the cement of this unison is a form of national myth, which unites and defines the features specific to each nation. Put differently, most fellow-members of a nation will never know each other, but they will entertain the identical national myth. Thus the nation has been perceived as an ‘imagined community’, since the ‘image of their communion’ is instilled in the minds of each member of any given nation (Anderson, 1983: 6), unlike in pre-capitalist or traditional societies, where most members of society know each other. Kurds have also employed the appeals to ‘imagined community’ in mobilising national sentiment.

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Footnote 9: Feudalism in this thesis will denote a social and economic arrangement, characterised by an obligation laid on the producer by force and independently of their own volition to fulfil certain economic demands of an overlord, that is, the feudal superior, whether these demands take the form of services to be performed or of dues to be paid in money or in kind. This coercive force may be that of military strength, possessed by the feudal superior, or of custom backed by a juridical procedure, or the imposition of law.
The construction and deployment of a myth of origin tracing the origins of the Kurds to the first millennium B.C. to an ancient people, the Medes, and the Newroz myth in the political discourse of the Kurdish national movement have been highly influential in the awareness by Kurds that they constitute one people (Güneş, 2012; D. Aydm, 2014). As asserted by McDowall, these myths ‘are valuable tools in nation building, however dubious historically, because they offer a common mystical identity, exclusive to the Kurdish people’ (2000:4). In brief, real socio-economic and political problems commonly experienced by Kurds in the modern Middle East combined with the fictitious or constructive factors have shaped the process of national identity formation among Kurds.

The amalgamation and culmination of the fictive and real factors at the turn of this century, as observed by van Bruinessen in the mid-1990s, ‘have strengthened contact between the Kurds of Turkey, Iran; there is now a stronger awareness of belonging together than there was in the past. The wish for a separate state, uniting the various parts of Kurdistan, has also become stronger’ (2000: 62). The formalisation of the semi-independent Kurdish administrative unit in Iraq following the US-led invasion of this country in 2001, and in 2014 Kurds gaining control of the de facto autonomous region in Northern and Northeast Syria, validate van Bruinessen’s observation. However, these developments do not implicate that Kurds have transformed into a unitary, collective actor with common purposes and resultantly done away with all divisions, since there still exists diverse political agendas amidst Kurdish political actors. Yet what these contemporary political events germane to Kurds accentuate is that drawing on Miroslav Hroch’s model of nation-building, the

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10 The myth of Newroz narrates the toppling of the Assyrian King Dehak by a mass uprising led by Kawa the Blacksmith (Kawayi Hesinkar), who, on 21 March 612 BC initiated an uprising by the Medes, defeated the Assyrian Empire, annihilated Dehak and liberated the Medes (the supposed ancestors of Kurds) from years of oppression and tyranny. Kurdish nationalist construct the myth of origin around the Newroz festival (traditionally celebrated across the Middle East on 21 March, which coincides with the spring equinox, as a New Year festival) as a national festival date.

11 This model distinguishes between a maiden phase where activists commit themselves to erudite inquiry into the cultural, historical and linguistic features of their ethnic group; a penultimate stage where a new range of activists emerge, trying to gain the support of as many of their compatriots as feasible for the project of
majority of the Kurds have reached the final phase of nation-building and national consciousness has become the concern of the majority of the Kurdish population. However, in virtue of multifarious and complex international, historical, political and economic factors explored in the subsequent sections of this study, even with the recent Kurdish regimes established by Kurds in the twenty-first century, they have been unable to institute an independent state. Accordingly, the Kurds claim the status of the largest nation without a state of their own.

Language

The Kurds speak an Indo-European language, Kurdish, which is a branch of the Iranian language family. There are a number of dialects and sub-dialects of the Kurdish language. Kurmanji is the most widely spoken dialect by northern Kurds (in Turkey) and by western Kurds (in Syria) as well as by Kurds in ex-USSR (Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan). Kurds living in Iraq, or southern Kurds, mostly speak Sorani. Sub-dialects or local dialects include those mostly used by Kurdish-inhabited areas of Iran (eastern Kurds) of Kirmanshani, Gurani (Gorani) and Leki (Laki). A minority of northern Kurds also speak Zaza. There is disagreement however, about whether Zaza is actually a Kurdish language, because it is noticeably different, though not completely dissimilar, to Kurdish dialects, except Gurani (Gorani) (McDowall, 2000: 10). An additional problem is the different written scripts of the Kurdish language. It is written in the Arabic, Latin, and, in the case of Kurmanji in Armenia, Georgia, and the Azerbaijan republics, in the Cyrillic alphabets.12

Religion

The Kurds are overwhelmingly Muslim. The majority of the Kurds are Sunni Muslims who are a part of the Shafi‘i school of Islam unlike their Arab and Turkish Sunni neighbours who

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mainly adhere to the Hanafi school, and their Azeri and Persian neighbours who are Shi’ites. Most of the eastern Kurds living in the provinces of Kermanshah and Ilam are Shi’ite. Other Kurds observe heterodox and syncretistic sects ‘with beliefs and rituals that are clearly influenced by Islam but owe more to other religions, notably old Iranian religions’ (van Bruinessen, 1991: 7). Such sects include the Ahl-i Haqq (‘People of Truth or the Kaka’is), the Alevi (otherwise known as the Qizilbash) and the Yezidis. There are small communities of Kurdish Baha’is, Christians and Jews.\textsuperscript{13}

**Land**

It is generally agreed that the Kurds have lived in a geographical entity, namely, Kurdistan (literally, the land of the Kurds). However, owing to the various political, economic and social vicissitudes, the geographical extent of Kurdistan has varied significantly over the centuries and its territorial confines have been a matter of contention among its researchers. Indubitably, the following four core characteristics of Kurdistan have fuelled this debate (O’Shea, 2004):

(i) it is not, and never has been, recognised as an independent state;

(ii) it does not constitute an economically distinct area;

(iii) it is not, and at no time has it been, entirely ethnically, linguistically, or religiously cohesive as a region;

(iv) it lies on the major overland trade routes between Asia, Europe, Russia, and the Arab Middle East, as well as being home to rich oil and water resources, prompted outside powers to become involved in its fate.

The amalgamation of the aforementioned factors engendered the elasticity and the degeneration of the notion of Kurdistan over centuries.

In the 11th century, the Geographer Al Qashgari produced a stylised map of what he entitled *States of the East*, which built-in, along with all the ‘races’ acknowledged in the East, the land of the Kurds. This perhaps is the first map to include Kurdistan (O’Shea, 2004: 230).

During the 10th and 11th centuries, whilst part of the Arab Caliphate (7-11th centuries, CE), a number of Kurdish dynasties – the Shaddadids (951-1174, Transcaucasia), Hasanwaydhids (959-1095, Dinawar), Marwanids (990-1096, Diyarbakir), and Annazids (991-1117, Hulwan) – took control of their local matters, but were wiped out by the invasions of the Seljuk Turks (11-12th centuries, CE) (McDowall, 2000: 21-4; Hassanpour, 1992: 50). In the year 1150 CE, the Seljuk Sultan Sanjar created a province of Kurdistan, with the town of Bahar as its capital and it comprised of areas that are presently located in the predominantly Kurdish regions of contemporary Iraq and Iran, namely, provinces of Dinawer, Kermanshah, Shahrazur and Sincar (Kendal, 1996: 10). Yet, it was not until the 16th century that the geographical expression Kurdistan came into common usage to denote a system of Kurdish fiefs generally, and not merely the Seljuk-designated province.

The geographical extent of this definition grew immensely during the next three centuries owing to the instigation of a few interrelated processes from 1514 onwards: the incorporation of nearly all of the Kurdish principalities in or around Eastern Asia Minor into the Ottoman Empire, and the migratory movements of the Kurds. The aggrandisement of the territorial scope of Ottoman Kurdistan becomes apparent when the investigations of 19th century contemporaries on its territorial confines are surveyed. Probably the most detailed account of it is delineated in a little-known study of the Ottoman military scholar, Ahmed Cemal.

In 1895, Cemal, after having graduated from the Ottoman Imperial War Academy in 1892, with the blessing of the Meclis-i Maarif-i Askerriye (Council of Military Education) published a geography textbook titled *Çoğrafya-yi Osmâni* (Ottoman Geography) in an attempt to acquaint senior high school students with the topography of the Empire. It was
republished in 1900 and 1903, but in the ensuing years, possibly because of the political
developments during and after the CUP period outlined in Chapter 4, its educational role and
importance appears to have gradually diminished.

Çoğrafya-yi Osmâni divides Ottoman lands into three separate entities: Avrupa-yi Osmâni
(Ottoman lands in Europe); Asya-yi Osmâni (Ottoman lands in Asia); and Afrika-yi Osmâni
(Ottoman lands in Africa). Kurdistan, along with the Anatolian Peninsula, Arabian Peninsula,
Yemen, Hejaz and the Islands of Crete and Cyprus, is a constituent territory of Asya-yi
Osmâni, and it consists of the eyalets (provinces), sancaks (sub-provinces) and kazas (judicial
districts) displayed on Table 1.1. (Kürdoloji Çalışmaları Grubu, Kürt Tarihi Araştırmaları-I,
Osmanlı Kürdistanı, 2011).
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Cemal’s demarcation of the geographical extent of Ottoman Kurdistan is in accord with the detailed map of Kurdistan produced by Britain’s military attaché at Constantinople, Major F.R. Maunsell, in *Military Report on Eastern Turkey in Asia* as a consequence of his travels in 1892 (Map 1). Ever since the First World War, by virtue of the political and military affairs that had surfaced in the Ottoman Empire and the neighbouring polities at the dawn, during and after the War that are explored in Chapters 2-5, there is much debate, albeit with little consensus, on the issue of where the borders of Kurdistan lie.

Discussions pertaining to the territorial confines of Kurdistan are with regard to the political and social nature of the concept of Kurdistan, because in the wake of the First World War Kurdistan was divvied between the various countries of the Middle East. Today the bulk of the Kurds live in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and a tiny fraction within several republics of what used to be the Soviet Union (i.e. Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan and Turkmenistan), which had passed into these areas when territories were ceded by Persia in 1807-1820, and by Ottomans in 1878 (Meho, 2001: 4).

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14 Maunsell remained in this post until 1905, and was responsible for the War Office’s maps of the Middle East during the period prior to the First World War.
15 For other investigations of Maunsell on Kurdistan, see: F.R. Maunsell (1901: 121-41).
16 For a detailed exploration of the contentions surrounding the geography of Kurdistan from the onset of the First World War, see: O’Shea (2004).
Map 3
Map of Kurdistan by F.R. Maunsell, 1892
Population

The Kurds in Turkey constitute the majority of the population in ESA—see Map 2 below for the approximate distribution of Kurds in each of the provinces in these regions. These domains today consist of ethnically and religiously mixed provinces such as Malatya and Erzurum, with various combinations of Kurds, Turks, Sunnis and Alevi. This diversity has geared nearly all of the scholars to use the geographical designation of “predominantly Kurdish regions” rather than that of Kurdistan and this thesis will follow suit.

On account of forced displacements during the 1920s and 1930s and as part of the counteroffensive against the guerrilla insurgency by the PKK in the 1990s as well as due to voluntary migration throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Kurds currently populate all cities in Turkey. Moreover, since the 1960s, particularly from the 1980s onwards, there has been a rapid increase in the Kurdish immigrant communities in many of the West European countries.

According to the Turkish census data, the inhabitants of the Turkish Republic whose mother tongue was Kurdish were 1.4 million in 1935, 1.4 million in 1945, 1.8 million in 1950, 1.8 million in 1960, and 2.3 million in 1965. That meant Kurds constituted 9.2 per cent of the population in 1935, 7.9 per cent in 1945, 8.9 per cent in 1950, 6.7 per cent in 1960, and 7.7 per cent in 1965 (Heper, 2007: 36). It is apt to point out that such censuses do not equip one with the actual size of the Kurdish population in Turkey in the above stated years. This is for two main reasons. The first of these is—bearing in mind the suppressive political milieu in Turkey in the years 1935-1965—many Kurds were somewhat reluctant to stigmatise themselves by pronouncing their Kurdish identity. The other factor is that some of the enumerators may have ‘corrected’ their data in order to arrive at politically acceptable data (van Bruinessen, 2006: 22-3).
After 1965, the Turkish state abandoned and suppressed official censuses to establish ethnic distribution in Turkey. Resultantly, ever since 1965, there has been much speculation regarding the population of Kurds in Turkey. Commentators in the last two decades or so have given estimates as ranging from 7 million to 30 million. This study will employ the breakdown of the Kurdish population prepared by McDowall, which fall in the middle of range approximations (McDowall, 2000: 3-4).17

Table 1.2 Kurdish population estimates, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Kurds</th>
<th>% of Population</th>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>60,000,000</td>
<td>13,200,000</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>19,300,000</td>
<td>4,400,000</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>61,000,000</td>
<td>6,100,000</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Soviet Union</td>
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<td>500,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elsewhere</td>
<td></td>
<td>700,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>26,000,000</strong></td>
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17 For alternative studies regarding the size of the Kurds in Turkey see: Mutlu (1996: 517-41); and Sirkeci (2000: 149-75).
Map 4
Distribution of Kurds in Turkey
1.2 Differing Theories on the Kurdish Question in Turkey

The socio-economic disparities between the predominantly Kurdish ESA regions and the rest of the Turkish Republic, the lack of recognition of the collective rights of the Kurds in Turkey, their mass mobilisation around the demands of political pluralism and autonomy, and the PKK-led Kurdish insurgency, continue to be constitutive aspects of a thorny and multidimensional issue in Turkey: The Kurdish question. Although Turkey’s Kurdish question is today generally examined as an amalgam of complex problems, for many decades after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic this question was conceptualised and analysed in a rather static and unilinear fashion, largely dominated by the paradigms devised by the Turkish state.

Up until 1990, the Turkish state authorities denied the Kurdishness of the Kurds and the Kurdish question, or, put differently, they negated the existence of the Kurds as a separate people and the ethno-political component of the Kurdish issue, and generally controlled representations regarding this matter. This success in dominating characterisations of the Kurdish question was largely in virtue of three key factors: first, the Turkish state authorities’ ability to quell pro-Kurdish movements and with it encumber all alternative formulations and projections of the Kurdish question. Second, state-centric representations of the Kurdish question regularly attaining international acceptance and recognition, with the Turkish state being able to govern the Kurdish population in Turkey with very little international interference. Third, the poverty of knowledge on Kurds in Turkey because of the state ceaselessly bowdlerising publications and investigations on Kurds. As these features

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18 One of the earliest texts on the socio-economic and political structures of the Kurds, Şeref Han’s 1597 manuscript Şerefname on the Ottoman Kurdish principalities, was translated into Turkish for the first time in 1971. Upon its publication, the Public Prosecutors in Turkey immediately filed a case against the book on the grounds of it ‘making propaganda aimed at destroying or endangering [Turkey’s] national feeling on the basis of race’ (M. E. Bozarslan, 1990: unpaginated), and asking for its collection. Until 1980, the study by Basile Nikitine, Les Kurdes: Etude Sociologique et Historique, published in Paris in 1956, and Vladimir Minorsky’s subject entries for ‘Kurds’, ‘Kurdish’ and ‘Kurdistan’ in the Encyclopedia of Islam, both of which were translated
indicate, and as the exploration below will emphasise, the formulations and evolution of the Kurdish question is inextricably linked to political and socioeconomic events within and outside of the borders of the Turkish Republic and resultantly ever since 1920 the Kurdish issues has been both an international and transnational issue.

**The Kurdish Question as a ‘Question of Underdevelopment’**

From the establishment of the Republic up until the 1950s, the Kurdish question was formulated as an issue of perseverance of the feudal or backward structures, to be resolved by relevant modernising social reforms. Relatedly, the founders of the Turkish Republic portrayed the question as a clash between a progressive modern state and archaic reactionary structures. The unsuccessful revolts of the Kurds in the initial years of Republic – i.e. Şeyh Said Rebellion (1925), Ararat Revolt (1927-30) and Dersim Rebellion (1937-38) (see Chapter 4) – were portrayed as the work of the reactionary feudal leaders against a modern state structure that promised progress and prosperity. As rightly observed by Yeğen, this representation of the Kurdish question in Turkey is exhibited in the following speech of the chairperson of Court of Independence in 1925, which condemned the leaders of Şeyh Said Rebellion to death:

‘[S]ome of you used people for your personal interest, and some of you followed foreign incitement and political ambitions, but all of you marched to a certain point: the establishment of an independent Kurdistan [...] Your political reaction and rebellion were destroyed immediately by the decisive acts of the government of the Republic and by the fatal strokes of the Republican army. [...] Everybody must know that as the young Republican government will definitely not condone any cursed action like the incitement and political reaction, it will prevent this sort of banditry by means of its precise precautions. The poor people of this region who have been exploited and oppressed under the domination of sheikhs into Turkish, constituted the main sources on Kurds and Kurdish history unblemished by state-centric perspectives in Turkey.
and feudal landlords will be freed from your incitement and evil, and they will follow the
efficient paths of our Republic which promises progress and prosperity’ (2011: 69).
Because the problem was conceived as a socio-economic problem, rooted in the philistine
and pre-modern structure of the region, it was thought it could be fixed by Kemalist mission
civilisatrice. For example, the Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü, portrayed the Dersim Rebellion
as follows:
‘The Government has been implementing a reform program for Tunceli [Dersim] for the past
two years. It includes wide-ranging work…in order to civilise the region. Some of the tribal
chiefs of the region…have not welcomed the [governments’] program. [Nevertheless], the
program of reform as well as the civilising of Tunceli [Dersim] shall go on! (Beşikci, 1990:
82-3).
By the 1950s, armed Kurdish resistances had ended, but socio-economic disparities between
the predominantly Kurdish ESA regions and the rest of Turkey had widened and reached an
indubitable level. In this context, the state represented the Kurdish question as by-product of
socio-economic underdevelopment emanating from a lack of economic integration.
Accordingly, as accentuated by Yeğen (2009), the government programs during the 1950s
and 1960s promised to diminish the economic divergences between the principally Kurdish
regions and the rest of Turkey (159-70). For instance, the 1969 government emphasised the
issue of ‘the development of the eastern region’ and stressed the importance of ‘special
measures in the regions where backwardness is massive and acute’ (ibid.: 164-65). Some of
governments in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s also portrayed the Kurdish question as a ‘socio-
economic problem of underdevelopment enhanced by the feudal structure’ (Gençkaya, 1996:
94-101). Hence, after 1950 the question came to be entitled the ‘Doğu Sorunu’ (‘Eastern
Question’) and perceived as a socio-economic question by an increasing number of scholars
and researchers in Turkey.
The paradox of the representation of the Kurdish question as a problem of endurance of the traditional structure by nearly all of the governments in the years after the transition to multi-party democracy in 1946 laid in the continual alliance between the Kurdish rural elite and political parties leading these governments. Most of the mainstream political parties that came to power post-1950 successfully obtained a Kurdish clientele group that consisted of the receptive elements within the Kurdish landed and/or religious elites, who were able to garner a large number of votes. For example, Mustafa Remzi Bucak and Ziya Şerefhanoğlu - members of venerated Kurdish tribes - were elected as candidates of the The Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) in 1950. In the succeeding years, with the exception of the far-right Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party, NAP), all of the mainstream parties co-opted a section of the Kurdish propertied class, and had Kurdish representatives belonging to this segment in the National Assembly. As well as legitimising state rule in the predominantly Kurdish provinces in ESA, this integrative policy also revitalised the traditional structure in these regions and reinvigorated the power of the Kurdish rural elite - most of whom were deported during the single-party era (1923-1945) and were only granted the right to return with the rise of DP to power in 1950.

In the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, Kurdish activists and intellectuals played a key role in the discussions of the ‘Eastern Question’ and saw it as a conduit to raise demands of social and economic equality for the Kurds. The leading members of the new Kurdish politically active intellectual included Musa Anter, Yusuf Azizoğlu, Mehmet Emin Bozarslan, Faik Bucak and Sait Elçi, all of whom played a pivotal role in debates surrounding the Kurdish question in Turkey in the later years.19 M. E. Bozarslan authored a very influential study entitled *Doğu’nun Sorunları* (The Problems of the East) in 1966, wherein

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19 For more information on this period and the role of these leading members, see: Anter (1999); Edip Karahan (2005); and Güneş (2012: Chapters 3–4).
the socio-economic problems in ESA were addressed and possible solutions were hypothesised.

**The Kurdish Question as a ‘Natural and Instinctive Impetus for Liberation’**

At a time when the Kurdish question was mainly perceived through the lens of the ‘Eastern Question’ in Turkey, in Europe, particularly in France, Kurdish nationalists were circulating publications outlining the nature and necessity of the ‘national liberation movement’ of Kurds with a view to influencing the European communities (Scalbert-Yücel and Le Ray, 2006: 4-8). As a result, Kurds living abroad and writing in French made the first explicit reference to the ‘Kurdish question’. In 1930, in a book authored by Dr. Bletch Chirguh, the penname of Celadet Bedirkhan, published by the Kurdish nationalist organisation Khoybûn, described the Kurdish question as a political question, more specifically, as a question of ‘national liberation’. Chirguh in *La Question Kurde: ses Origines et ses Causes* (The Kurdish Question: Its Origins and Causes) posits that the Kurdish question consists of ‘the struggles that have lasted for more than three centuries and that have always aimed at national independence’ (1930: 3 in Scalbert-Yücel and Le Ray, 2006: 4).

Three decades after the publication of *La Question Kurde: ses Origines et ses Causes*, Kamuran Bedirkhan, in another study in French, *La question Kurde* (The Kurdish Question), defined the Kurdish question as:

‘[T]he fight of the Kurdish people since one century for its liberation. It is the natural and instinctive impetus of this people who wants to remain Kurd, to speak freely his language and preserve his national patrimony […] The Kurdish question consists in convincing the states that share Kurdistan to behave towards the Kurds in accordance with the judicial and moral principle universally acknowledged and inscribed in the United Nation Charter and in the

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20 Khoybûn (Independence) was formed in Bhamdoun, Lebanon, in October 1927 by Kurdish intellectuals living in exile. Leading figures of Khoybûn included Kurds of aristocratic background such as the Bedirkhan brothers, Celadet Bedirkhan and Kamuran Bedirkhan, scions of the princely family that once ruled the Kurdish emirate of Bohtan. Khoybun sought to establish a strong Kurdish national liberation movement. It instigated the unsuccessful Ararat uprising of the Kurds in Turkey in 1927-1930, discussed in Chapter 4.

As can be deduced from the quotation above, maiden formulations of the Kurdish question by Kurdish nationalists framed it as a question of ‘national liberation’ emanating from the perturbed relationship between the oppressive states and the oppressed Kurds. Moreover, these representations, akin to the aforementioned primordialist or essentialist studies on Kurds, considered the nation and national identity as a ‘natural and instinctive impetuses’ or, put differently, conceived of identity as a fixed entity assuming it to be an essentially unchanging quality. Despite influencing the views of particularly French researchers studying the Kurdish question like Joyce Blau and Gerard Chaliand (see: Scalbert-Yücel and Le Ray, 2006), the studies by the Bedirkhan brothers were not influential in Turkey at the time of their publication largely because of the aforementioned expurgation of studies regarding Kurds.

**The Kurdish Question as a ‘Foreign Conspiracy’**

The other prevailing conceptual framework intermittently used by the Turkish state to characterise the Kurdish question in Turkey, particularly at times of rising Kurdish discontent, was that it was a consequence of foreign provocation and thus, the issue was reduced to the state subduing the disorder incited by the foreign elements. Underlying this sporadically used characterisation for the Kurdish question is the ‘Sevres Syndrome’, a long-enduring trauma shared by the post-Ottoman rulers and society in Turkey owing to the ‘divisive’ promises made by the triumphant Allies or Entente Powers of the First World War to the Armenians and Kurds in the Treaty of Sevres (1920). Despite this Treaty overriding the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), the spectre of the past haunted and recurrently informed the state’s notion that foreign powers are provoking Kurdish rebellions in Turkey. This view is
exemplified by the judgment of a case in 1963, wherein prominent members of the Kurdish opposition of the time were sentenced:

‘During the Republican period […] some foreign states intended to cause trouble in Eastern Anatolia. As a matter of fact, the Sheikh Said, Ağrı and Dersim rebellions were due to the counter revolutionary actions of some tribes which were incited by foreign powers […] The content of foreign incitement at present [however] is not the same as that of the past. While previous foreign incitements […] were caused by the imperialists states which had interests in the Middle East, at present, these incitements are caused by communist activity. Today, […] the Kurdish ideal is entirely the product of incitement by international communism. (Yeğen, 2011: 72).

Mahmut Rıșvanoğlu’s extensive study, Doğu Aşiretleri ve Emperalizm (The Tribes of the East and Imperialism), published by Türk Kültür Yayınları in 1975, offers an emblematic defence of the ‘foreign incitement’ hypothesis. Rıșvanoğlu postulates that the Kurdish identity is a construct of Orientalist scholarship built to cater for the needs of international imperialism. According to him, initial studies on the Kurds by Russian scholars Vladimir Minorsky and Basile Nikitine who settled in Britain and France after the October Revolution (1917), served the interests’ of the imperialist countries to where they had migrated by inciting Kurdish unrest.

The Turkish state and pro-state researchers or academics laid the blame for the existence of Kurdish uprises and the Kurdish question on the foreign powers that they perceived as an external threat. The nature and the source of the peril to Turkey changed in accordance with who/what the Turkish state perceived as the enemy. Immediately after the War of Independence, the threat was the Western imperialist powers. During the Cold War, Turkey allied with the West and acted as eastern embankment against the spread of communism, thus the source of the Kurdish unrest in the 1960s and 1970s was the Soviets. With the end of the
Cold War, Kurds were portrayed as the agents of Greece, Israel, and the European Union (EU).

**The Kurdish Question as ‘National Liberation Struggle against Colonialism’**

During the 1970s and 1980s, Kurdish left-wing movements in Turkey – i.e. the Ala Rizgari, the Kawa, the KSP-T, and the PKK – emphasised the political nature of the Kurdish question and articulated it as an issue of national self-determination. Such a conceptualisation by Kurdish organisations in Turkey altered the question from being discoursed and theorised as a socio-economic problem to one of national oppression. All of the aforelisted Kurdish political currents, through appropriation of certain elements of Marxist and/or Leninist theory, espoused the notion that Kurdistan was a colony of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and began to look towards the anti-colonial liberation struggles in Asia and Africa.

In the 1978 manifesto of the PKK, the founder of the Party, Abdullah Öcalan, outlined the colony thesis with the following words:

‘In political terms, Kurdistan is under the rule of four colonialist states that collude with imperialism. Each of these states, in accord with its interests and the interests of the international monopolies, plays a central role in developing colonialism in the part it keeps under its rule’ (1992 [1978]: 100).

Deriving from such an analysis, Öcalan emphasised the importance of national liberation struggle in order to attain economic independence and political unity in Kurdistan:

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21 Dr. Sait Kırmızıtoprak (Nom de guerre Dr. Şivan) (1935-1971) initially formulated this thesis and the necessity of waging an anti-colonial liberation struggle against the Turkish state in the late 1960s. Dr. Kırmızıtoprak was from Tunceli (Dersim). He studied medicine in university. During Adnan Menderes' government's crackdown on Kurdish intellectuals in 1959, he was arrested and tried – this episode came to be known as the ‘49’ers Incident’ (see section 4.5 for further details). Dr. Kırmızıtoprak was one of the leading figures of the pro-Kurdish movement in the late 1960s. Kırmızıtoprak published articles in newspapers and magazines such as Akis, Forum, Vatan, Yön, Dicle – Fırat, Soyal Adalet and Milliyet. His published books include Ezen ve Ezilen Millieter Sorunu (The Problem of Oppressing and Oppressed Nations); Kürt Millet Hareketleri ve Irak ta Kürdistan İhtilali (Kurdish National Movements and the Kurdish Revolution in Iraq); Zimanê Kurdî (Kurdish Language) co-written with Kamuran Bedirkhan; and Ferheng Kurdî û Tırkî (Joyce Blau’s Kurmanji-English-French dictionary translated to Turkish by Dr. Şivan with numerous additions).
‘Economic independence could only develop in an environment where there are no exogenous imperialist intrusions and internally there is political unison. In Kurdistan these conditions have not materialised, and, in the present conditions, can only develop subsequent to the victory of the national liberation struggle’ (ibid.: 142).

KSP-T’s founder Kemal Burkay\textsuperscript{22}, in a conference in London in 1984, postulated a similar description of Kurdistan, and hypothesised that one of the reasons for socioeconomic underdevelopment in Kurdistan was its colony status:

‘The states that have divvied Kurdistan have reduced each part of it to a colony. When compared to Western countries, Turkey, Iraq and Iran are backward countries. Yet, within the last 40-50 years, important developments have taken place [in each of these countries]. Despite [these developments] there exist major developmental divergences between Kurdistan and the remaining parts of these countries. […] The vast natural resource wealth of our country [Kurdistan] is an important factor in its division and the poverty endured by our people [Kurds]. The states that have apportioned Kurdistan and their imperialist chiefs have aggressively plundered and scrambled the natural and mineral resources, reducing our country to a colony. We are yet to see a development policy from Turkey. (1999: 5).

Despite the similarity in their theoretical analysis of the socio-economic and political conditions and relations in ESA, the PKK, when compared to the aforementioned Kurdish left-wing organisations in Turkey, emphasised extensively and systematically the need for violent resistance in order to achieve the ‘national liberation of Kurdistan’ from the

\textsuperscript{22} Burkay and a few other authors quoted in this section of the thesis, by virtue of being both organic intellectuals and instigators of pro-Kurdish political activism in Turkey, have authored scientific and militant/political works. Since up until very recently scientific and militant/political works on the Kurds were heavily bowdlerised, it was common for both forms of publications to be jointly published. Thus, on account of these two factors, in the writings of these influential Kurdish authors it is not always possible to distinguish clearly between scientific and militant/political publications. That said, this study has carefully surveyed articles penned by these individuals and has cautiously quoted their works; that is to say, the thesis has given special care to avoid employing militant/political publications by these figures.
‘colonisers’ and bring about a ‘socialist revolution’. Moreover, Öcalan considered violent struggle as not only a means and necessity of national liberation, but also the very condition of individual manumission. PKK launched its guerrilla campaign on 15 August 1984.

From the mid-1980s on, the trajectory and perceptions of the Kurdish question in Turkey were to be determined by the success of the projections and actions of a constellation of actors. That is, the Turkish state, the PKK, pro-Kurdish legal political parties in Turkey, Kurdish clientelist formations, the Kurdish nationalist movements in Iraq, Iran and Syria, and global-imperial actors, most notably the US and the Western European powers, who played a fundamental role in the delineation of the political borders in the region throughout the twentieth century.

In the early 1990s, the increasing number of armed clashes between the PKK and state forces, the electoral success of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Labour Party (Halkın Emek Partisi, HEP) alliance with the Social Democratic People’s Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi, SHP) in the 1991 general elections, winning 22 seats in Parliament, and the Iraqi Kurds attaining de facto autonomy following the Gulf War in 1991, had made the negationist paradigms of the Turkish state regarding the Kurds and the ethno-political component of the Kurdish question unsustainable. Resultantly, in 1991, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel made an unprecedented speech in Diyarbakir wherein he declared that the state recognised ‘the Kurdish reality’, and within the same year, the Turkish Assembly enacted a law annulling the 1983 ban on speaking Kurdish in public.

The recognition of the presence of the Kurds, however, did not implicate or result in the recognition of their collective rights.

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23 For an extensive comparative study of the political manifestos and organs of the Ala Rızgari, the Kawa, the KPS-T, and the PKK, see: Güneş (2012: 65-100).
The Kurdish Question as a Question of ‘Separatist Terror’

The Anti-Terror Law of 1991 (Act No: 3713), enacted within the same year as the speech by Demirel, defined terror in an across-the-board manner: it included nearly all of the activities tied to the advancement of Kurdish rights and culture, and it has since been invoked to detain and imprison Kurdish activists, intellectuals and politicians (Güneş and Zeydanlioğlu, 2014: 13-4). The enactment of this draconian law was not only emblematic of the confines of the recognition policy of the Turkish state; it also was illustrative of the dominant paradigm that would replace the negationist model of discourse and theorisation of Turkey’s Kurdish question. That is to say, having acknowledged the ethnic constituent of the Kurdish question, the state throughout the 1990s would characterise the question as one of ethnic insurrection with a secessionist and divisive aim, which therefore necessitated military/security measures. Expectedly, as mentioned in the previous chapter, during the late 1980s and the 1990s the central focus of nearly all of the academic literature and discussions came to be to the political history of Kurdish nationalism and conflict analyses. Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s the focus of the discussion about the Kurdish question was the socio-economic features of the issue, from the latter part of the 1980s the political dimension of the question took precedence.

Because the political and cultural aspects of Turkey’s Kurdish question constitute the main source of contention or conflict between the pro-Kurdish actors and the Turkish state, since 1990, scholarly research and debates regarding this issue have concentrated on these two components, resulting in the economic constituent of the question being under-researched. As rightly observed by van Bruinessen, ‘[when compared to the political and cultural features of the Kurdish question] on the nature of the economic aspect of the question, there is broad range of agreement between Kurds and non-Kurds’ (2004: 5), which has been a contributing factor for the economic feature of the question attaining relatively little attention.
1.3 Alternative Perspectives on Economic Development in ESA

The central focus and vantage point of virtually all of the literature analysing the connections between economic development in ESA and the Kurdish question has been the hypothesis of regional underdevelopment. This said, there exists two opposite poles of thought with regard to the causality of underdevelopment in these regions. Some of the literature attempts to account for the thesis of underdevelopment by prioritising the role and impact of infrastructural, economic and social factors such as the level of regional infrastructure, the logic of capitalist accumulation, regional industrialisation, and the tribal structure in these regions (Z. Aydın, 1986; M. E. Bozarslan; 2002 [1966]; Boran, 1974; Özer, 1994; Sönmez, 1992 [1990]; Heper, 2007). Others instead have sought to understand and explain the postulate of underdevelopment via the binary and hierarchical state-versus-society model and thus have given pride of place to ethno-political issues as explanatory factors, i.e. the conflictual relationship between the state and the Kurdish population inhabiting these regions (Aytar, 1991; Beşikçi, 1992 [1969]; 2004 [1990]; Burkay, 2008 [1992], 1995; Bayrak, 1999; H. Yıldız, 1989).

The overview contained in this section seeks to map this theoretical field by providing an introductory presentation of the core assumptions of the main proponents of these differing perspectives, and then drawing on that, this study will account for the specific theoretical foundations and limitations of each perspective. The thesis has purposively selected literature from different periods and extremes of thought in order to exhibit the diversity, continuities and change regarding discussions on the correlation between the Kurdish question and economic development.

Contributions from the initial strand of studies commonly identify the dominance of the tribal social structure, the non-existence or inadequacy of modern infrastructure, and the
destruction of manufacturing after the nineteenth century, as factors that have played a central role in shaping social, economic and political processes and structures in ESA. Relatedly, the roots of underdevelopment in these areas are sought in the interplay of these factors.

The decision of the Ottoman state in the sixteenth century to recognise the political, legal and administrative autonomy of the tribal Kurdish lords in the provinces of Diyarbekir, Bitlis and Van in exchange for military obligation and regular payment of tribute to the state is regularly hypothesised to have constituted an incessant impediment to socioeconomic development in these areas, as well as a persistent factor influencing political events involving Kurds (Pamuk, 2010 [1987]: 98-9; Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 79-80; Heper: 2007: 5; Z. Aydın, 1986: 15-7). This agreement is alleged to have entailed the dominance of tribal rule by dint of which not only had the Kurdish notables accumulated excessive landed and fiscal wealth, but there had also been ‘minimal implementation of the governing timar system’.

Consequently, the Ottoman state had ‘never been able to become a powerful force in the Region’ (Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 79). Moreover, these studies habitually hypothesise that the centuries-long autonomy of the Kurdish notables ‘remained unbroken during the nineteenth century’ (Pamuk, 2010 [1987]:98; Heper, 2007: 5; Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 79). Since the enactment of the Land Code of 1858, which de facto recognised the existing land distribution, it is argued that large tracts of land continued to remain in the hands of the Kurdish rulers, who had not ‘been interested in increasing productivity in agriculture’ (Heper, 2007: 16). Thus, the centralisation attempts by the state during and after the 1830s are often recognised as hardly affecting the political, social and economic powers of the tribal elite in these regions, to the detriment of social and economic development in ESA (Pamuk, 2010 [1987]: 98-9; Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 86-8; Heper: 2007: 5).

24 In most of the publication on the Kurdish question and/or ESA, the term ‘the Region’ is used to denote the predominantly Kurdish populated provinces in ESA.
Additionally, the very inadequate and expensive means of transportation and the absence of railroads in ESA is consistently posited to have largely ‘secluded’ these territories from the transformatory changes goaded by the capitalist world market in the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Pamuk: 2010 [1987]: 97-9; Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 79-80). Owing to the absence of modern infrastructure up until the early twentieth century, the argument goes; the agricultural produce of these areas of Anatolia could not regularly be transported to long-distance markets (Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 105; Pamuk: 2010 [1987]: 97). Resultantly, ESA, when compared to other areas of the predominantly agrarian Ottoman Empire, was least affected by the world market-induced commercialisation of agriculture during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 79; Pamuk: 2010 [1987]: 97).

However, the unavailability of the indispensable modern infrastructure, it is further commonly contended, cannot be imputed to the policies of the Ottoman state, because firstly, the Western quarters of present-day Turkey were provided with railroads by the industrialised capitalist countries, which were interested in importing raw materials from this region; secondly, the rail line projects of the dominant Western countries in these regions, namely, the United States’ Chester Railway Project (1908-1913) and Germany’s Berlin-Baghdad Railway Project (1914-1989), had not materialised on account of exogenous events. The former was dropped by the U.S. state when the Mosul region remained in the hands of the British state who also blocked the Berlin-Baghdad Railway Project for it had it’s own eyes on Middle East’ resources (Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 104-06; Heper, 2007: 6-7).

Unfavourable agronomic conditions, largely emanating from the enduring supremacy of the Kurdish landed or propertied elite, are usually construed as being influential in the success of manufacturing in ESA:
‘the relative scarcity and poor quality of agricultural land and the low level of commercialization of agriculture may also have been an important factor in the flourishing of manufactures in these areas [Eastern Anatolia and Northern Syria]’ (Pamuk 2010 [1987]: 112).

The most important concentration of Ottoman textile manufacturing activity existed in Northern Syria, Southeastern Anatolia, and to some extent Eastern Anatolia during both the earlier and later parts of the nineteenth century. However, in the period after the first quarter of the nineteenth century manufacturing in ESA, especially cotton textile manufacturing had, as elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, met with immense competition from European imports, which on account of the Industrial Revolution in Europe had the advantage of rapid mechanised production. Such competition plus the tariff policies in the 1838 Anglo-Turkish Convention had initiated a ‘period of destruction’ of cotton textiles in the Eastern Anatolian provinces in the ‘latter part of nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries’ (Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 104-05).

Studies that have sought to elucidate regional underdevelopment by giving primacy to the obstructive role and impact of social, economic and infrastructural factors have, furthermore, regularly argued that, in spite of the remarkable advancements witnessed after 1923, these regions maintained their relatively worse-off positions in present-day Turkey. It is claimed this is principally because, even after the establishment of the Turkish Republic the feudal relations in these areas did not dissolve and ESA remained predominantly rural territories bereft of modern industry and infrastructure, which made it difficult to attract private sector investment to these regions. Most of these studies emphasise the destruction wrought by the armed conflict between the Turkish state and PKK after 1984 to the economy of these regions – i.e. the loss and/or removal of the local populace, stagnation of private investment,

Nonetheless, there are differing assessments on the question of why before 1984 the predominantly Kurdish-inhabited ESA lagged behind other parts of Turkey in social and economic development. Some of the literature correlates the paucity in development with the powers of the Kurdish tribal leaders and/or the absence of transformation in the social tribal structure (Heper, 2007; Özer, 1994; M. E. Bozarslan, 2002 [1966]). Others alternatively attribute underdevelopment to the uneven development of capitalism in Turkey (Boran, 1974; Z. Aydın, 1986; Sönmez, 1992 [1990]). Studies of the frequently quoted sociologist Ahmet Özer are exemplary of the former approach. Özer, who regularly conducted research for the GAP and SPO in Southeastern Anatolia, in his oft-cited GAP ve Sosyal Değişim (GAP and Social Change), published after two years of field research in the province of Urfa, has two inextricably linked conclusions: the first, the structure in these regions is traditional and has to be modernised; and, the second, the GAP regional development project is a socio-economic initiative that could play an instrumental role in modernising the age-old social structure as well as fostering socio-economic development in these regions (Özer, 1994: 88-9 and 150). Thus, the Kurds’ discontent and the underdevelopment of the predominantly Kurdish regions were hypothesised to have been engendered by perseverance of the social tribal structure and relations.

Additional studies on the question of development in modern-day Turkey have proposed an alternate account of the hypothesis of underdevelopment by attributing underdevelopment in these regions to the logic of capital accumulation and the uneven development of (Turkish) capitalism postulated by Karl Marx. According to Behice Boran, the underdevelopment in

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25 Behice Boran (1910-1987) was an immensely influential Turkish Marxist sociologist, author and politician. Boran, who was an associate professor at Ankara University, Faculty of Language and History-Geography, played a prominent role in shaping the views of many on the left on, among other things, the question of capitalist development in Turkey.
ESA is an inevitable consequence of the capitalist Turkish economy, the aim of which is to grow continually through investment in the areas where the highest rate of profit is possible. Investments, according to the same argument, are unequally distributed within Turkey because the factors determining the rate of profit are unevenly distributed. Consequently, Boran argues, ‘the people of the East do not experience differential treatment because of speaking another language, [differential policies concerning the East of Turkey] stem from the uneven development of capitalism [in Turkey]’ (1974: 189). Zülküf Aydı̇n in

*Underdevelopment and Rural Structures in Southeastern Turkey* (1986: 26-9) further develops the very general characterisation of regional underdevelopment posited by Boran by adopting Ernest Mandel’s theory on underdevelopment and applying it to the specific conditions of Turkish capitalism.

Aydı̇n claims ‘that uneven development and underdevelopment are basic features capitalism, and regional uneven development is the spatial juxtaposition of these two features of capitalism’ (ibid.: 26). Bourgeois states, in creating the national market, ensure the flow of labour from the underdeveloped to the developed regions. Underdeveloped regions are not only a source of labour for the developed regions; they are also an important market. For instance, during the early years of the Turkish Republic (i.e the étatist period) the state took advantage of the labour reserves in ‘the Region’ and by building railways connected the remote parts of ‘the Region’ with the developed Western regions of Turkey (ibid.: 29).

Deriving from such a causal theory of underdevelopment, Aydı̇n argues that the ‘Kemalist policy [in Eastern Anatolia] stemmed from the profit logic of capital, not from the fact that Eastern Anatolia was Kurdish’ (ibid.), since ‘capitalists are interested in accumulating capital; they are not concerned with the ethnicity of the people whose surplus product they appropriate’ (ibid.: 25). Accordingly, ‘the transfer of the surplus produced in the region’, states Aydı̇n, ‘is the prime reason of underdevelopment [in these regions]’ (ibid: 17). In a
similar vein, Sönmez (1992 [1990]) argues that the role of ESA in the regional division of labour in Turkey is to provide energy and agricultural products whilst being a market for the industrial West of Turkey. Consequently, the underdevelopment of these regions, above all, should be sought in the regional divisional of labour in Turkey (1992 [1990]: 247-48).

On the other hand, scholarship that has attempted to explain the economic, social and political features and processes in the predominantly Kurdish provinces in ESA by employing a binary model of state-versus-society has devised an alternative interpretative framework for the correlation between regional underdevelopment and the Kurdish question. The theoretical paradigm of underdevelopment formulated in these studies is based upon a critique of the causality of underdevelopment embodied in all of the above surveyed literature. Specifically, this body of literature classifies the causes of underdevelopment in the above-summarised studies (i.e. the social, economic and infrastructural factors) as the effects of the conflictual relationship between the Kurdish people and the Turkish state. The source of the perturbed ties between the central state authority and the Kurdish populace, as well as the underdevelopment of ESA, is habitually purported to lie in the ‘colonial’ and ‘assimilationist’ policies implemented by the rulers of Turkey (Aytar, 1991; Beşikçi, 1992 [1969], 2004 [1990]; Burkay, 1995, 2008 [1992]; Bayrak, 1999; H. Yıldız, 1989).

Advocates of this dualistic model customarily posit that long-standing issues pertaining to tribalism and inequitable land tenure are results of the Ottoman and the Turkish state policy of maintaining and consolidating the traditional Kurdish ruling stratum and of burgeoning divisions and enmities amidst territorially segmented Kurdish tribes in ESA since the early sixteenth-century. It is argued that the decision to incorporate the Kurdish principalities into the Ottoman Empire, derived from the strategic objectives of (i) making the predominantly Sunni Kurdish principalities Ottoman protectorates against the rival Shi‘i Safavid forces in Eastern Asia Minor; (ii) formalising and preserving the tribal kinship system; and (iii)
apportioning the Kurdish principalities on the basis of territorially and kinship ties (Beşikçi, 1992 [1969]: 128-29; H. Yıldız, 1989: 38-9; Burkay, 2008 [1992]: 279-82). The ‘differential’ and ‘ambivalent’ policies executed by the Ottoman state in ESA in accord with these aims are hypothesised to have nurtured tribalism and inter-communal rivalries, and thereby laid the foundations for the underdevelopment in ESA (Beşikçi, 1992 [1969]: 113-27; H. Yıldız, 1989: 37-41).

The advocates of this theoretical model commonly maintain that ever since the creation of the Turkish Republic, the Turkish ruling classes have pursued a policy akin to that of the Ottoman statesman and have resultantly preserved the traditional structures and hindered the reforms necessary for social and economic development in ESA. The ‘failed promise’ of a Land Reform during the single-party period (1923-1945) and the ‘institutionalisation’ of the ‘feudal hegemonic forces’ in the multi-party system post-1945 are regarded as quintessential examples of the enduring ‘cooperation’ between the Turkish state and the dominant ‘feudal forces’ in the predominantly Kurdish provinces of Turkey (Beşikçi, 1992 [1969]; Burkay, 1995).

Authors that employ the binary model of state-versus-Kurdish-society argue that the Turkish state inhibited socioeconomic development in these regions by infinitesimal public investment in infrastructure, and insistence on not recognising the Kurdish identity of the local populace:

‘The East has been neglected for centuries and as a result it became a zone of deprivation (mahrumiyet bölgesi). This negligence continued during the republican era. Regardless of their party belonging, every politician, in order to assimilate the people and the intellectuals of the East, systematically and purposefully, represented the East, to the world and Turkey, as an area full of fanaticism, ignorance and the enemy of civilisation’ (Edip Karahan, 1962: 4 in Güneş, 2012: 54).
In addition, it is hypothesised that the predominantly Kurdish areas are ‘colonised’ in order to cater for the needs of Turkey’s industrialised regions: ‘like most colonized regions, Kurdistan’s stores of raw material, its vast natural wealth in petroleum, copper, coal and phosphate, soil, forests, and water are exploited and marketed for industry’ (Beşikçi, 2004 [1990]: 19). Relatedly, studies informed by this theoretical viewpoint agree on the proposition that the state-sanctioned GAP project constitutes an archetype of the Turkish Republic’s ‘colonial’ policy in ESA. The GAP project was implemented as a regional project in 1989 and, it is argued, under the ‘façade’ of ‘regional economic development’ this project enables the ‘exploitation’ and ‘colonisation’ of ESA (Aytar, 1991; Burkay, 1995). The GAP initiative is therefore conceptualised as being ‘the new chain of exploitation and colonisation of natural and human resources in the Region’ (Aytar, 1991:7). This ‘feature’ of the GAP project is evinced, the argument goes, with the energy-oriented state investment in predominantly Kurdish populated provinces in South-East Turkey, which substitutes the exigent needs of the local dwellers for the requirements of industrialised Western quarters of Turkey (Aytar, 1991; Beşikçi, 1992 [1969]; 2004[1990], Burkay, 1995).

The Limitations of Existing Theories

Despite shedding light on issues that impede social and economic progress, the existing literature on the question of development in ESA merely enables one to understand the obstacles to development in these territories, but does not explain them. This is due to two common omissions of the current studies. The first of these is that they do not systematically account for the historical antecedents of Eastern Turkey’s economic development. Put differently, political and economic changes that have fostered or hindered development in ESA during the Ottoman period are not thoroughly examined in the current investigations of the question of development in these domains. The second lacuna in the development literature on these regions is that it fails to analyse comprehensively the relationship between
the Turkish state and the predominantly Kurdish populated regions of Turkey. A closer and critical exploration of these studies will help elucidate the above-mentioned explanatory limitations.

**Modernisation Theory**

Studies that correlate underdevelopment with the persistence of feudal relations and structures have constituted the bulk of the development literature on ESA. Some of the proponents of this hypothesis, like Özer (1994) Heper (2007), in the same vein as the aforementioned post-1950 government programmes, ascribe the endurance of these unfavourable economic conditions primarily to the perseverance of inimical and obstreperous primordial values and practices in these regions. They advocate the view that the question of underdevelopment and the Kurdish question hinge above all on modernising the traditional tribal structure in ESA.

Scholars characterising the difficulties and deficiencies of economic and social transformation from the above-summarised viewpoint borrow heavily from modernisation theory in that the prevailing traditional tribal organisations and ties are professed to having persistently conserved underdevelopment in these regions. The modernisation school of thought initially developed in the Cold War era of the 1950s and comprises a range of perspectives inspired by the sociological theory of Max Weber that follow the same basic argument. That is, nations remain underdeveloped when traditional customs and culture hamper individual achievement and kin relations dominate, thus the development of societies is dependent on the adoption of modern capitalist values and practices. Modernisation theorists attempt to explain the diffusion of Western styles of living, technological innovations and individualist types of communication as the superiority of secular, materialist, Western, individualist culture and of individual motivation and achievement (Lerner, 1958; Schramm, 1964).
Scholars influenced by the modernisation approach frequently construe the tribal social structure in ESA as persistently impeding the Kurds from partaking in Turkey’s modern social life and adjusting to latter-day lifestyles, as alluded to by Heper in *The Kurds and the State*:

‘In Turkey, as compared to those who live on the plains, the Kurds, who live in the mountains, have not intermingled with the Turks to any great extent. The tribal social structure of the area also rendered difficult the acculturation of the citizens’ (2007: 7).

However, the hypothesis that the tribal structure is the perpetual obstacle to structural economic changes in the principally Kurdish areas of Turkey is founded upon a deterministic and ahistorical conception of Kurdish tribes and tribalism. It depicts the Kurdish tribal identity and structure as an immutable and fixed feature of Kurdish society, devoid of wider processes of nation building, capitalistic property relations, urbanisation, and trans-border relations with other Kurds situated in neighbouring states. It is indubitable that tribes and tribalism have been features of Kurdish history, but that does not entail or validate an immutable and static conceptualisation of tribes, unaltered by economic and political transformations in or around the society in which it exists. In other words, tribes are not *explanans*, as they themselves need explaining.

As rightly pointed by Eugene Kamenka, tribalism - akin to national consciousness - is historically specific, reliant on ‘specific social and historical content, deriving from specific social and historical conditions’ (1973: 6). The Kurdish tribes *seems* to be permanent and unchanging due to its continued presence throughout different societies with different modes of production, but this is a *pretence*; the tribal entity of today is substantially different from its pre-capitalist descendants. Many examples exist of the changing nature of Kurdish tribal identity and structure throughout the history of the Ottoman Empire and the modern Middle
East, as alterations are made in accordance with economic and/or political changes\textsuperscript{26} (see Chapters 2-4). One of the many illuminating and relatively recent examples of the fluidity of the Kurdish tribal organisation and identity was witnessed after the transition to multi-party democracy when the traditional Kurdish elite in line with the Turkish states’ policy of incorporating landed and/or religious Kurdish rulers into the state apparatus was integrated into the Turkish political system. This policy resulted in the bulk of the old Kurdish elite, unlike their descendants, disavowing their Kurdish origin in order to become more closely integrated members of the Turkish ruling class. Villages controlled by the traditional Kurdish rulers became political fiefdoms of various rival mainstream political parties previously loathed by the local populace.

Studies that ascribe the lack of economic advancement primarily to the absence of transformation in the archaic customs and practices in ESA fail properly to account for the possible spillover effects of the cooperation between the traditional Kurdish elite and the Turkish state for the social, economic and political relations and structures in these domains. As a result, these studies avoid an exploration of the issue of how this collaboration might have maintained feudal relations in these regions by dint of the state not implementing the long-awaited land reform opposed by the co-opted traditional Kurdish elite and resultantly leaving the land tenure bequeathed from the Ottoman era fundamentally untouched. Besides, the possible connection between the Turkish state-Kurdish traditional elite alliance and Turkey’s Kurdish question is omitted. In other words, the likely links between the burgeoning socio-political and economic demands of the Kurds during and after the transition to multi-party democracy in Turkey, starting with the ‘Eastern Meetings’ of the 1960s, and the desire of the Turkish state to block these demands by preserving the feudal structure in these regions are not examined.

\textsuperscript{26} On the Kurdish tribes and their evolution, see: Bozarslan (2006: 130-47).
In addition, researchers that have sought to explain underdevelopment by, above all, imputing it to the persistence of feudal social organisation in the Kurdish society tend not to examine incidences and developments in the pre-Republican period (1923). In so doing, 400 years of Ottoman Kurdish history are overlooked, and the seismic social, political and economic changes during and immediately after the First World War are eluded. Consequently, these explanations of underdevelopment fail to assess the links between the uprooting and seizure of the resources or properties of the indigenous people in ESA after 1913 and the lack of capital and the absence of innovation or ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ in these regions.

Other investigations that have associated underdevelopment in ESA with the perseverance of feudal relations have sought to explain this anomaly with the enduring excessive powers of the Kurdish tribal and religious leaders (M. E. Bozarslan, 2002 [1966]). M.E. Bozarslan’s epoch-making work in the late 1960s, *Doğu’nun Sorunları*, has identified the absence of land reform as well as the lack of industrial development and infrastructural modern facilities in ESA as the main reasons for Kurdish tribal and religious leaders’ powers. The problem of underdevelopment in these regions or the ‘Eastern Question’ will be remedied, according to M.E. Bozarslan, with state sponsored industrialisation, the reform of the age-old land tenure, and adequate public investment, because these measures could play a catalytic role in dissolving the feudal structure and ties necessary for development.

Albeit illuminating pivotal issues overlooked in the works of the previously surveyed authors, most notably the negative ramifications of the collaboration between Kurdish *aghas* and the Turkish state for socioeconomic advancement, the influential study by M. E. Bozarslan (2002 [1966]) embodies nearly all of the inadvertences of the modernisation approach. More specifically, *Doğu’nun Sorunları* fails to analyse exhaustively the structures, processes and events before 1923, and thereby paints a rather unhistorical picture of ‘the East’ by treating the year 1923 as the ‘Year Zero’. This influential study also does not systematically analyse
the question of how the forced displacement and confiscation policies of the Ottoman state
and the Turkish state have influenced social, political and economic developments, or the
lack thereof, in ESA. In addition, underdevelopment in these domains is conceptualised as
solely a socioeconomic and cultural problem devoid of political components or demands, as
evoked in the following definition of development postulated by M.E. Bozarslan:
‘Development… is a multidimensional problem that does not have the possibility of being
realised from one dimension [only]. The development of a country, or a region, is also tied to
the industry and transportation as much as it is tied to culture. Because social, economic and
cultural matters are tied to each other…Development in the East [of Turkey] cannot solely be
attained by economic incentives, nor can it be accomplished by cultural activities; it can only
be attained by the combination of both [economic and cultural means]’ (2002 [1966]: 203).
In 2002, Doğu’nun Sorunları was republished with a revised preface wherein M.E. Bozarslan
in harmony with the aforementioned critique argued that what he described as being
exclusively socioeconomic and cultural ‘problems of the East’ in the 1966 publication of this
work were in fact germane to or spin-offs of the Kurdish question in Turkey. Consequently,
M.E. Bozarslan further argues, if he were to write a separate book about development, he
would entitle it ‘The Kurdish Question’ and not ‘The Problems of the East’ (2002 [1966]: 9-
14).

Dependency Theory
Studies that have accounted for underdevelopment in ESA by correlating it with the
economic and structurally asymmetric relationship between the overwhelmingly Kurdish
areas of Turkey and the Turkish state are largely informed by the theoretical paradigm that
arose as an alternative to modernisation theory, namely, dependency theory. The authors of
these studies regularly define the Kurds as a ‘dependent nation’ and draw heavily from the
national movements in the Third World context. Moreover, they emphasise the role of
‘national oppression’ to which the Kurds were subjected to Turkey in engendering the socioeconomic ‘backwardness’ of the predominantly Kurdish regions, which they believe to be the root cause of regional underdevelopment.

Dependency theory is a theoretical current that came to the fore in 1960 as a heterodox response to the politics of modernisation and its in-built bias towards capitalist-induced development. Architects of the dependency theory include Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Walter Rodney, and Immanuel Wallerstein. Dependency theorists commonly maintain that the inadequate development witnessed in ‘peripheral’ countries is the product of a process of impoverishment and distortion, or the ‘development of underdevelopment’ (Frank, 1966), which is an offshoot of subordinated participation in a polarised and hierarchical world system. The principal focus of the attention of the latterly mentioned theoreticians has therefore been on the mechanisms that generate dependent or peripheral underdevelopment.

Two types of mechanisms have been posited by dependency theorists to cause underdevelopment and the impoverishment of the ‘periphery’ to the advantage of the ‘core’. The first one consists in the systematic extraction of the surplus and resources from the periphery to the core through such means as plunder and unequal exchange. The other consists of the distortions introduced to the national political and economic structures of peripheral social formations as a consequence of their subordination – e.g. through the establishment of a ‘comprador bourgeoisie’ that earns its gains from collusion with the international extraction of the surplus rather than from ‘autonomous’ capitalist exploitation.

As often indicated by studies that characterise the Kurdish areas as a colony of the Turkish state, centre-periphery relations determine the relationship between the predominantly Kurdish ESA and the Turkish state, with the latter as the dominant ‘centre’ economy and the former as its ‘subordinated’ counterpart. The colonial policies of the Turkish state in the
primarily Kurdish populated ESA, the argument goes, is directed to meet the Turkish states’ requirements for natural and human resources. This lopsided relationship between the former and the latter not only obstructs the Kurdish regions from freely integrating with the world capitalist system, it also shapes underdevelopment in these regions. Additionally, the distortion of local political and economic structures by virtue of the incorporation of traditional landed and/or religious Kurdish elite into the Turkish state apparatus, according to the advocates of the colony postulate, preserves and exacerbates underdevelopment in these regions.

Burkay argued that colonialism constituted a major impediment to development in Kurdistan and hypothesised the persistence of feudalism in ESA as a corollary of colonial rule in these regions:

‘Capitalism [in Turkey], even if in an evolutionary form, has superseded feudalism to become hegemonic. In Kurdistan though, the feudal structure perseveres. This situation is undoubtedly fostered by the Turkish bourgeoisie’s colonialist mechanism in Kurdistan. Kurdistan’s raw materials (in particular oil, copper, iron, chrome, and coal) are being exploited; Kurdistan is the region that provides the cheap workforce for the west [of Turkey]; the capital accumulated in this region is flowing to the west; and Kurdistan became a very convenient market for the bourgeoisie to introduce its products’ (1995: 5)

Similarly, Bayrak in Kürt Sorunu ve Demokratik Çözüm (The Kurdish Problem and the Democratic Solution) through examining a range of state-sanctioned reports and policies after 1923 concerning ESA describes how the Turkish state has ‘colonised Kurdish lands’, and thereby nurtured underdevelopment in these areas (1994: 188-198). In spite of there being no definitional or critical exploration of the notion of colonialism, it appears that Bayrak conceives ESA as a colony based on the ‘continual seizure’ and ‘turfication’ of Kurdish lands in these regions by the Turkish state after 1923.
One of the most influential explorations of the colony thesis was posited by Ismail Beşikçi in his seminal work *Devletlerarası Sömürge Kürdistan* (Inter-state Colony Kurdistan) (2004 [1990]). Beşikçi described the history of colonialism and ‘colonial rule’ in Kurdistan with the following words:

‘The history of colonialism separates colonies into two main groups: full colonies and semi-colonies. Full colonies are societies which have not yet reached the stage of founding a state...Semi-colonies are societies which have a state founded on a traditional social order and possessing a long history...Kurdistan is neither a full nor a semi-colony. The political status of the Kurdish nation is far less than the status of a colony. The Kurds are a people the world wants to enslave, render devoid of identity, and wipe off the face of this earth...until every trace of Kurdish identity has been eliminated...Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, in addition to being collaborators with outside powers, are also occupation forces which have portioned and annexed Kurdistan’ (Beşikçi, 2004 [1990]: 18-9).

Recent scholarly publications on Kurds do also employ the colony thesis. For instance, Nader Entessar’s relatively recent publication, *Kurdish Politics in the Middle East*, brands the predominantly Kurdish territories of Turkey as an ‘internal colony’ of the Turkish state (2010: 7). Likewise, in the Introduction of another recent study, *The Kurdish Question in Turkey: New Perspectives on Violence, Representation, and Reconciliation*, Güneş and Zeydanlıoğlu characterise the Turkish states rule in ‘Kurdistan as an undeclared internal colony’ (2014: 18).

Based on the different descriptions of the ‘colony’ postulate it can be argued that there are two separate claims, namely, colonialism and internal colonialism, which are distinct.

Colonialism is the imposition of monopoly control by an alien state over the economic, political and social life of another land or polity. While in the case of internal colonialism –

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27 For a contemporary defence of this thesis, see the following interview conducted with Beşikçi: ‘The Turkish advocate of the Kurds – Dr. Ismail Beşikçi’ in *Kurdish Globe* (2013).
which is a process of exploitation of one group or groups of people by another within a state through structural arrangements – there exist the following conditions:

(i) a high degree of administrative and legal integration, between what is considered to be an internal colony and the rest of the polity;

(ii) all of the subjects are citizens of the same state;

(iii) the relationship between the colonial core area and the territory deemed to be the internal colony has a long history (Hechter, 1975: 32-3).

Based on this distinction, it would stretch the definition of colonialism to apply it to the relationship between the Turkish state and the principally Kurdish ESA.

Unlike many of the Third World formations described by dependency theorists, these territories do not comprise of a sovereign state or even an entity on its way to attaining self-rule. ESA is administratively and legally integrated with the Turkish Republic, and these territories are geographically contiguous with the rest of Turkey. Furthermore, the discriminatory policies of the Turkish state vis-à-vis the Kurdish people notwithstanding, the primarily Kurdish inhabitants of these regions are citizens of the Turkish Republic. Some aspects of the policies of the Turkish state in the years 1923-1990 vis-à-vis its Kurdish citizens, as comprehensively analysed in Chapters 3-5, could however, be placed in the realm of the colonial. The policies implemented by successive governments in Turkey during the seven decades after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic were intolerant of local cultures, were determined to impose a single hegemonic culture (i.e. Turkish culture), and they were accompanied by a large-scale campaign against those who refused to be browbeaten. Relatedly, internal colonialism is the only viable theoretical toolkit that can be used by the advocates of the colony thesis.

The explanatory value of the internal colony postulate in elucidating the relationship between the Turkish state and the Kurdish people is dubitable, since all of the applications of this
model are founded upon a unidirectional and static conceptualisation of the relation between ‘powerless and peripheral’ Kurdish areas and the ‘all-powerful and dominant’ Turkish state. Albeit shedding some light on certain features of the relationship between the latter and the former, this characterisation obscures many aspects of the relationship between the central state authorities and the Kurdish populace or regions because it fails to account systematically for the influence of the periphery over the core. For instance, the impact of the altering interests of the propertied traditional elite in these regions, and their project to woo Turkish statesmen in order to establish new networks of support so as to enhance their authority, particularly in the post-RPP era, in shaping the Kurdish policy of the Turkish state is not properly analysed in these studies. In addition, the mass migration of the Kurdish people to the industrialised metropolis of Turkey and its impact on the Turkish economy and society is not methodically investigated in publications that draw heavily from dependency theory.

The relationship between the Kurdish regions and the rest of Turkey extends the dependency bonds to one that acknowledges relations of mutual dependence. In order to analyse aptly this reciprocal tie it is essential to recognise that the social, the political and the economic in Turkey, as elsewhere, do not have one single centre, but many. Hence, it is necessary to analyse activities and deeds of a range of actors and dynamics, networks and interactions. As rightly highlighted by H. Bozarslan, Kurds are not mere ‘passive agents of a system imposed by Ankara. Various mechanisms of subordination, clientelism and participation link them to the center… [These] links imply negotiation and a constant game of legitimization between them and the center as well as the political parties. The terms of these negotiations and legitimization game are determined, among other elements, by army pressure, Kurdish radicalism and ongoing guerrilla warfare since 1984, evolution of clientelist groups and the transborder nature of the Kurdish issue’ (1996: 136).
It is also worth noting that the authors of the colony postulate do share some of the common deficiencies of the above-summarised alternative theoretical approaches on the question of development and underdevelopment in ESA. They do not thoroughly interrogate the ramifications of economic and political transformations in the Ottoman period for regional development, or lack thereof, in these territories. This is because they take for granted two interrelated postulations: (i) the dominance and manipulation of Ottoman Kurdistan via the divide and rule policy of imperial Istanbul, and (ii) the relatively worse-off position of ESA, when compared to other regions of the Empire, because of the fragmentation arising from the divisive policy of the Ottoman rulers with regard to Ottoman Kurds.

The protagonists of the colony hypothesis, moreover, do not systematically account for the population policies implemented in the years 1915-1990. Despite regularly referring to policies of displacement and seizure of Kurdish lands, they habitually only refer to policies in the single-party period. Consequently, the mass deportations and confiscation of immovable and moveable properties belonging to the indigenous dwellers of these regions prior to the establishment of the Turkish Republic and/or after the mono-party period is not adequately explicated.

**Traditional Marxist Perspectives in Turkey**

As displayed with the literature review above, studies that have analysed the question of development in Turkey based on a Marxist perspective agree on the hypothesis of underdevelopment in ESA. When compared with other regions of Turkey, the comparatively late interaction of these areas of Turkey with the transformatory changes induced by capitalism is a consequence of the uneven development of capitalism in Turkey. One of the merits of this approach is that it provides a valuable insight concerning certain aspects of the evolution of Turkish capitalism, which is often not detailed by the previously mentioned development literature swayed by non-Marxist interpretations of (under)development.
Nevertheless, their analysis of underdevelopment in ESA has commonly embodied a number of vulnerabilities. One of the central weaknesses of this interpretation is that it regularly presents a notion of development that is economistic – i.e. in analysing development and underdevelopment in Turkey, priority is given to economic relations, often without considerable regard to pivotal political, social, and cultural relations. This is demonstrable with the overarching role ascribed to the logic of capital accumulation or surplus appropriation when analysing (under)development in Turkey by Boran, (1974), Aydı̇n, (1986). This economistic conceptualisation of development is founded upon a deterministic and univocal interpretation of the relationship between the economic base and the political superstructure, which implicates a ‘vulgar materialist’ analysis of development avidly criticised by leading Marxist scholars amongst others. As rightly highlighted by the Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm, ‘economic development is not a sort of a ventriloquist with the rest of history as its dummy’ and neither are humans ‘exclusively money-making machines [...] immune to the political, emotional, ideological, patriotic or even racial appeals’ (62: 2002 [1987]). Thus, noneconomic factors that underlie social progress or its absence need necessarily to be systematically considered by investigations that make socioeconomic development their thematic concern.

The second drawback of this approach pertains to the diminutive role imputed to the national conflicts and struggle of the indigenous populaces of ESA in shaping the social and economic history of these regions. Since precedence is given to economic relations or antagonisms as explanatory factors for (under)development, economic issues or conflicts are conceived of as the dominant force of history, frequently with little regard for other questions or struggles, like national and cultural conflicts, which influence how history unfolds. As a result, socio-political issues of the Kurdish populace in these areas and the role of these problems in influencing the social and economic history of ESA have not been adequately analysed. This
deficiency in the historical accounts of the Marxists in Turkey cannot solely be understood by imputing it to their economistic approach; it is also a result of the influence of Kemalism on the political left in Turkey (Yeğen, 2007: 1208-36). Throughout the history of the Turkish Republic virtually all of the left, including most Marxist currents, in Turkey have been heavily influenced by the dominant ideology of the Republican elite, Kemalism. For instance, the leaders of the Turkish Communist Party (Türkiye Komünist Partisi, TKP) welcomed the Republican government by agreeing that the basic problem was to wage a nationalist struggle against the imperialist powers and feudalist social forces (ibid.). The paradoxical modus operandi of Marxists under the influence of Kemalism has been to approve the ethnic dimension of the Kurdish question, while distancing themselves from the secessionist ideas or struggles acknowledging national unity and/or delaying the resolution of the question to a future post-revolutionary socialist Turkey.

The other shortcoming of this perspective consists of what the Marxist scholar Jairus Banaji refers to as substituting ‘theory for history’ – i.e. reducing the investigation of the concrete ‘to programme of verifying ‘laws’ already implicit […] in the materialist conception of history’ (2010:47). A corollary to this, in the context of the discussion of development and underdevelopment in Turkey, consists of using the process of uneven capitalist development proposed by Marx as a necessary feature of capitalism in order to describe the underdevelopment of ESA as a by-product of this in-built predisposition of capitalism. This teleological form of analysing history inhibits a thorough examination of the role and impact of other intervening noneconomic factors or processes stated above that have played an influential role in prompting regional disparities in Turkey. In other words, it hinders an understanding of the concrete as the site of many determinations, requiring careful analysis as opposed to merely serving to validate a priori theoretical postulates. As suggested by Marx in
the following oft-quoted passage in *Grundrisse*: ‘the concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse’ (Marx: 1973 [1857]: 101). On account of deputising history for theory authors, like Boran and Aydın, have failed to adequately address the relations between uneven capitalist development in Turkey and the policies of dispossession and destruction of productive resources systematically implemented by both the late-Ottoman and Turkish polities in ESA. Another common shortcoming of these researchers is that they do not thoroughly investigate the repercussions of the rise and fall of over 300-year-old Kurdish polities on the social, economic and political developments, or lack thereof, in these regions.

The selective and problematic employment of certain features of Marxist theory in interpreting underdevelopment in ESA by the above-mentioned authors, however, do not annul the important contribution that the historical materialist approach formulated by Marx and Engels and other Marxist authors can provide to the study of historical development of societies. Once historical materialism is detached from deterministic and teleological interpretations or applications critically assessed above, it can offer useful tools for analysing development.

Scholarly analyses on the question of development in ESA surveyed above do converge along a number of lines that are particularly relevant for this study. All of the theoretical models surveyed above are founded upon a structuralist interpretation of development. Structuralist theories of development are those that regard development as a process of structural socioeconomic change whereby underdeveloped economies overcome specific structural barriers, by dint of which they are able to pursue a path of growth. Development is therefore understood as the qualitative growth-enabling process of overcoming those barriers. This thesis concurs with the structuralist interpretation of development.
All the theoretical explorations surveyed above, albeit on dissimilar and conflicting causal grounds, posit that two long-standing structural barriers engender underdevelopment in the predominantly Kurdish populated regions of ESA: (i) the dominance of the tribal elite in land ownership and tenancy patterns and (ii) the very low-level of industrialisation in the years ensuing the destruction of manufacturing in these regions after the nineteenth century. There is also scholarly unanimity regarding the unilinear continuum of inadequate development characterising the economic history of these regions.

In the following Chapters, by exploring the political and economic history of the ESA regions, these oft-postulated factors for underdevelopment and the paradigm of continual underdevelopment in ESA will be critically analysed in order to verify the veracity of these interrelated perspectives and to attest their relevance to the Kurdish question of Turkey. A central tenet of this research is that the question of development in ESA and the Kurdish question of Turkey are inseparable and can only be aptly comprehended in relation to the political, social and economic history of the polities of which it has formed a part, namely, the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. Hence, this study will examine the economic, political and social features of these regions within the context of the larger geographical area and political entity it has comprised since the sixteenth century. In doing so, this thesis has relied heavily on a historical and structural approach, which draws its principal insight from historical materialism.

As universally agreed in the development literature on the ESA, there has been relatively late and little contact with capitalist development in these predominantly Kurdish regions, compared to other regions of Turkey. This thesis will argue that this is on account of the development process initiated by the dominant forces in these regions in order to prevent the formation of an economic base for the autonomous existence of the non-Turkish autochthonic societies in ESA that could jeopardise the political-national imperative of maintaining
Turkey’s national unity and territorial integrity. De-development, as outlined by Sara Roy in *The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development*, is an economic process generated and designed by a hegemonic power ‘to ensure that there will be no economic base, even one that is malformed, to support an independent indigenous existence’ (1995: 4). This process consists of policies that not only hinder but also ‘deliberately block internal economic development and the structural reform upon which it is based’ (ibid.: 6).

Relatedly, contra to the scholarly wisdom apparent in the development literature reviewed above, this research hypothesises that continual inadequate development has not been a characteristic feature of ESA’s economy. Ever since the early 16th century, these regions have witnessed economic prosperity, followed by underdevelopment and de-development. De-development in ESA commenced as a product of the state policies implemented in these regions after the Unionist seizure of power in the 1913 coup d’état that differed greatly from those of the previous regimes. The CUP rulers, and their political and ideological heirs, the Kemalists, pursued ideological, political and economic programs – i.e. the construction and preservation of a Turkish national economy and state as well as the pursuit of population homogeneity based on Turkist ideals – that were qualitatively different from those of their predecessors. These objectives spurred policies of mass murder, deportations, expropriation and dispossession of economic resources, and the suppression of all forms of non-Turkish identities and cultures in the ethnically heterogeneous provinces in ESA. In addition to laying the foundations for the Kurdish question of Turkey these unusual features of state policy have also engendered de-development in these lands by not only distorting but also forestalling economic development, which deprived the ESA economy from its capacity and potential for structural transformation.

Underlying ESA’s peculiar form of underdevelopment as well as the Kurdish question of Turkey is the incessant political-national objective of constructing a strong Turkish nation-
state and maintaining Turkey’s national unity and territorial integrity. Turkish governments throughout the history of the Turkish Republic have incessantly adopted these objectives. Resultantly, the identity and the collective rights of the Kurds have been negated. In order to foil the capacity of autonomous existence of the Kurds, de-development policies - albeit with varying methods - have been pursued by successive Turkish administrations in the years following the transition to multi-party politics in Turkey.

A Summary of the Theoretical Foundations

Thus far, this study has presented introductory synopses of the key theoretical debates on its central themes: Kurdish identity, the Kurdish question in Turkey, and regional development in ESA. When outlining these debates, the presentation followed an analogous format: an overview of the main differing perspectives, followed by an elucidation of my views on those theoretical positions. The unifying approach linking the theoretical choices consists of the endorsement by the thesis of a structural, historical and materialist position. The study has argued that the most apposite form of investigating any social process is one that is constituent of these three approaches. First, it seeks to ascertain structural causes of any given social process, as opposed to treating it as a natural or perennial entity or impulse. Second, it draws on the premise that to a large extent, these structural causes consist of, or stem from, the dynamics of material reproduction of societies. Third, it employs a historical method when analysing social processes. In other words, it utilises historically and geographically concrete data when examining and making generalisations concerning social processes. Moreover, the thesis has recurrently criticised essentialist and teleological interpretations of the concrete by abstract notions. The concrete, being multifaceted and largely indeterminate, should not be used selectively to reflect a priori theory, but as the locus for evaluating the relational and contingent nature of abstract categories and theoretical discernments, making it possible to revise and improve those categories and discernments. Lastly, this investigation
asserts the primacy of political-economic factors in accounting for both the Kurdish question in Turkey and the regional de-development in ESA, and, at the same time, recognises the operation of a diverse array of other factors, including history, culture, and violence, in bringing about these interrelated issues.

1.4 Research Design, Methods and Sources

This study made use of interviews and archival investigation. Obtaining geographically concrete historical and contemporary empirical data constituted the prerequisite of investigating the role and impact of economic development in the predominantly Kurdish populated regions of ESA on the rise and evolution of Turkey’s Kurdish question. Relatedly, the empirical research of this thesis consisted of three main phases explicated below. These stages took place consecutively, and the information attained in each stage was used to prepare the subsequent phases and triangulated with the information that had previously attained.

Preliminary Stage of the Research: Surveying Existing Literature

The initial phase involved the survey of the secondary literature available through two main types of repositories: first, physical libraries, in particular at the School of Oriental and African Studies (London), the British Library (London), the London School of Economics and Political Sciences (London) and the Institut Kurde (Paris); and, second, electronic sources. Accompanied by the information provided by international organisations – i.e. the EU, the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) – and official Turkish sources, namely, the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK), the data obtained hitherto was used to prepare a background chapter presenting a synopsis of the relevant research issues and setting the groundwork for the consecutive phase of the empirical work: fieldwork.
Exploratory Phase of the Research: Fieldwork

The subsequent phase, which was essentially the exploratory stage, took place over a four month-long stay (March-June 2011) in ESA provinces of Diyarbakir, Urfa, Mardin, Van, and Gaziantep, besides Ankara and Istanbul, during the course of which 15 semi-structured interviews (listed in Appendix I) were conducted, additional sources were consulted and supplementary statistical data was obtained. The snowballing method\(^2\) was employed during my fieldwork. This method offers the opportunity to reach the most relevant information with least cost and time. One interviewee or document led to other interviewees, documents, and so forth. The primary aims of this part of the research consisted of collecting as much information as possible that would complement the previously acquired as well as make it feasible to identify relevant themes that had previously gone unnoticed.

The main systemic procedure consisted of a series of semi-structured interviews with key informants: academics; senior members of public agencies dealing with development, economic or statistical matters; politicians; executives of chambers of commerce; Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) sources specialising in regional development in ESA; and the local agents of multilateral organisation. These interviews were conducted to attain detailed information regarding the historical and current trends in ESA of the following topics germane for this study: agricultural and industrial production; commerce and trade; credit and banking facilities; voluntary and involuntary migration; public and private investment; and agrarian and labour relations. The list of interviewees and the capacity under which they were interviewed is given in Appendix I.

The interviews were semi-structured: a list of 8 to 12 questions was prepared prior to each interview in accordance with the interwee’s area of expertise. The interviews took between one and two hours, depending on the interviewees’ availability and the relevance of the

\(^2\) Snowball sampling is set within the link-tracing sampling methodologies (Spreen, 1992) which benefit from ties of identified respondents or documents to provide the researcher with an ample set of potentially relevant information (Thomson, 1997).
information they provided. All of the individuals were informed in advance of the identity of the researcher, the objectives of the research project, the purpose of the interview and the conditions under which the information obtained might be used. Some of the interviews were tape-recorded; others were documented in my notebook, depending on the consent of the interviewee. In all cases, the recording or notes were transferred onto my laptop within 24 hours. Content analysis methodology\(^\text{29}\) was used to analyse interviews.

Overall, the interviews were more useful in obtaining or accessing sources related to the contemporary and/or historical trends of the above-mentioned themes of research, than in providing information about these trends. I was thus able to attain very beneficial and rich publications produced by or kept in the libraries of the following organisations that previously were not available to me:

- GAP (Administration Regional Directorate) (Urfa);
- Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi Belediyeleri Birliği (The Union of Southeastern Anatolia Region Municipalities, USARM) (Diyarbakır);
- Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey (Ankara);
- T.C Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Müşteşarlığı (Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry State Planning Organisation) (Ankara);
- T.C Sanayi ve Ticaret Bakanlığı (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Industry and Trade) (Ankara);
- Diyarbakır Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası (Diyarbakır Chambers of Commerce and Industry);
- Gaziantep Sanayi Odası (Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce)

\(^{29}\) Content analysis denotes a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication (Rubin & Babbie, 2009). It is a technique from a local text to its social context in an objectified form (Bauer, 2000).
Discourse analysis methodology\(^{30}\) was used to examine the data provided in these publications. All of the information was used both directly – as one of the basis for writing Chapters 4 and 5 – and indirectly – in the context of the preparation of the subsequent phase of the research.

Moreover, these interviews and the collected secondary data that led to the following realisation that on economic and social phenomena in ESA – particularly industrial and agricultural production, commerce and trade, labour and agrarian relations, and voluntary and involuntary migration – there is a lack of longitudinal data and research. Nearly all of the existent data and analysis on economic and social activities and events in these territories covered the years after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic. There existed scant information on economic and social changes, structures and relations in Ottoman Kurdistan. Accordingly, I decided to collect data on social, economic and political structures, relations and changes in Ottoman Kurdistan, mainly by exploring the official British archival repositories. In addition, the thesis has also consulted the published Ottoman, Russian and German archival sources on Ottoman Kurdistan.

**Final Phase of the Research: Archival Investigation**

The final phase of the research took place over just under a year (October 2011- January 2012) and was conducted in London. The archives of the United Kingdom Foreign Office (FO) on Kurdistan, either stored in the Public Record Office (PRO) at Kew, or published online on the House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (HCPP) website, was the first port of call for data. These archival sources consist of reports prepared by British consuls reporting regularly on events in Kurdistan in the years 1850-1945. In the absence of systematic official Ottoman records in the 19\(^{th}\) and early 20\(^{th}\) centuries (see Chapters 3 and 4), and the non-

\(^{30}\) This methodology denotes a deconstructive reading and interpretation of a problem or text (Powers, 2001). In this technique, analysts are interested in texts *per se*, rather than seeing them as capturing some reality that is supposed to lie behind the discourse (Gill, 2000). Thus, instead of conceiving the texts as a conduit to some other reality, discourse analysts are interested in the content and organisation of texts.
existence of any other long-drawn-out official foreign reports on events in Ottoman Kurdistan, this documentation, as rightly pointed out by McDowall, constitutes ‘possibly the single most important historical archive on Kurdistan’ (2000: xii). The deficiencies and strengths of each of the archival resources employed in this research are discussed in the subsequent Chapters.

Naturally, a growing number of scholars researching the Kurds and Kurdistan have referred to the UK FO archives on Kurdistan. Nevertheless, thus far, almost all of these researchers have utilised these reports to analyse the political history of the Kurds and Kurdistan (Olson, 1989; McDowall, 2000; O'Shea, 2004; Özoğlu, 2004; Koohi-Kamali, 2003). This study made particular but not sole use of the understudied information provided in these records concerning economic activities, relations and changes in the 19th century and early 20th centuries in Ottoman Kurdistan. I have consulted the quantitative and qualitative data presented in the reports prepared by the British consuls or diplomats in the years 1857-1914 on commerce, on manufacturing, on agrarian relations and production, and on social structures in Ottoman Kurdistan and bordering regions. For purposes of triangulation, the data in these reports have been studied comparatively, where pertinent and available, with the data provided in the Ottoman official statistics (i.e. Population and Agricultural Censuses) and/or the influential studies of important scholars, most notably, Vital Cuinet, Vedat Eldem, Şevket Pamuk, Donald Quataert, Suraiya Faroqhi, and Ahmet Tabakoğlu, who have contributed immensely to our understanding of Ottoman economic and social history. The information attained from the archival repositories was used directly in Chapter 3 and 4. Unless specified, the translations of all of the materials in foreign language employed in this study belong to me.
Chapter 2

The Formation of Ottoman Kurdistan: Social, Economic and Political Development in
Ottoman Kurdistan before the 19th Century (1514-1799)

2.1 Overview

The pivotal events that materialised after the early sixteenth century played an immensely
influential role in the foundation and progression of the social, economic and political
structures in Ottoman Kurdistan and hastened the Kurds’ self-awareness as a distinct group.
Three occurrences in particular facilitated these interrelated processes: the battle of Çaldıran
in 1514, which determined the general pattern of political relations between the Ottoman state
and the Kurdish periphery for about the next three hundred years. The maiden unified vision
of Kurdish history presented in the Şerefname authored by Şeref Han (1543-1603), the
famous mir of Bitlis, in 1595. The utopia of Kurdish unison vociferously advocated by the
poet Ehmed-ê Khanî (1650-1706) in 1695 in his epic poem Mem à Zin. Khanî espoused
Kurdish unity against the perceived suppression of the Kurds after the first official division of
Kurdistan resulting from the Treaty of Zuhab (also known as Treaty of Qasr-i Shirin) in 1639
between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavids (H. Bozarslan, 2008: 333-37; Özoğlu, 2004:
21-40; McDowall, 2000: 25-36):

I leave it to God’s wisdom
The Kurds in this world’s state
Why are they deprived of their rights?
Why are they all doomed?
See, from the Arabs to the Georgians
Everything is Kurdish and, as with a citadel,
The Turks and the Persians besiege them
From four sides at once.
And they both make the Kurdish people
Into a target for Fate’s arrow.

After the battle of Çaldıran, with the exclusion of Kelhor, Erdelan, Baban, Şehrizur and Mukri, which had opted either to stay independent of both the Safavid and the Ottoman Empire or continued to recognise the former’ suzerainty (Özoğlu, 2004:49), the rest of the existing Kurdish principalities incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. The newly conquered province of Diyarbekir31 (1515) hosted all of the acquired Kurdish chiefdoms in return for their acknowledgement of Ottoman sovereignty. The formalisation of the Kurdish principalities occurred as a result of Sultan Selim I, when in returning from the battle of Çaldıran, on the advice of Idris Bitlisi32 (c.1455-1520), consented to gaining the support of the predominantly Sunni Kurdish chiefs and integrating the Kurdish principalities in Eastern Asia Minor.

As per the formalisation of the Kurdish structures, autonomous Kurdish hükümetts were formed and the terms and conditions of their independence were negotiated per se. Alongside these self-governing entities, two other administrative structures were instituted: Kurdish sancaks, governed by hereditary Kurdish rulers, and classical sancaks, which were centrally controlled by Ottoman officials appointed by the Ottoman central authorities (van Bruinessen, 1988; Celil, 1992; Özoğlu, 2004). As will be elaborated below, the number and boundaries of these Kurdish administrative units were in a constant state of flux due to the changing balances of power between the Kurdish rulers, central Ottoman government and local authorities in Ottoman Kurdistan. Ottoman rulers after the early sixteenth century also established nomadic peoples’ or tribal confederations, uluslar33, that were not subject to the

31 In some of the Ottoman official documents, the province was also designated as Âmid.
32 Idris Bitlisi was the son of a respected Kurdish religious figure, Şeyh Hüsameddin Ali-ül Bitlisi. He was a political official in the region who had the confidence of both the Kurdish chiefs and Sultan Selim.
33 See Table 1.1 below.
jurisdiction of the above-mentioned Kurdish polities (İnalcık, 1994: 34-8; McDowall 2010: 28-9).

The battle of Çaldıran, moreover, revised the boundary between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Empire as the border relapsed to the line marked by Sultan Selim after the battle of 1514 in Çaldıran, which is equidistant between Erzincan and Tabriz. This line attained official recognition with the signing of the Treaty of Zuhab (1693) and – despite disputes and invasions – it formally persisted until 1914. The battle of Çaldıran, the formalisation of the Kurdish principalities, and the Treaty of Zuhab rendered Ottoman Kurdistan to a zonal or border area between the two Empires, which had crucial political and economic implications for this region thereafter.

The events that materialised in Kurdistan post-1514 were largely initiated by the imperial objectives of the Ottoman Empire. By the early sixteenth century, the Ottoman state had established itself in Western Anatolia and Thrace and from then on embarked on the project of conquering ESA. The predominantly Sunni Kurdish principalities were conceived as protectorates in the newly occupied territory against the disobedient Turcoman and Kurdish tribes and the Safavid rival.

After conquering and formalising the Kurdish principalities, the Ottoman Empire had turned its attention further eastwards for territories such as Gilan and Shirvan, which were North Iranian centres of silk production. Consequently, the wars with the Safavid Empire began in 1578 and persisted alternatingly until 1639. The war with the Habsburg Empire was also ongoing between 1593 and 1606. These wars, particularly the wars for Azarbaijan, Shirvan and Gilan, were highly destructive, not only for the Turkish military structure but also for the Ottoman finances, as after 1590, the Ottoman treasury suffered huge deficits (İnalcık, 1994: 24).
Concomitantly, the penetration of the Ottoman Empire by the developed European countries by the use of trade had begun after 1580, which had devastating effects for the former. The ‘financial impact on the [Ottoman Empire]…of cheap and plentiful silver from the West was immediate and catastrophic’ (Lewis, 1968: 29). To deal with the sudden and devastating flow of European silver, the Ottoman currency, akçe, was devalued in 1584-86 (Barkan, 1975: 12). The judgment to debase the Ottoman asper occasioned a monetary and financial crisis. Owing to this calamity, the sipahis, or the mounted soldiers attached to the central government, in order to cover their loss of income, raised the rates of taxes and created novel forms of taxation. This decision of the sipahis deepened the deprivation of the reaya – i.e. the dominated groups, Muslim or non-Muslim, outside the tax-exempt askeri (military or religious) ruling elite, engaged in economic activities and thus subject to taxes – and formed the socio-economic background to the Celali rebellions organised by the Muslim reaya in Anatolia (Faroqhi, 1994: 433-38).

The rural populace in the Empire attempted to flee both the exactions of the Celali’ and those of the soldiers sent out to suppress them (Erder and Faroqhi, 1979: 323, Jennings, 1976: 39; Murphey, 1987: xix-xx). Most of the Anatolian towns by the middle of the seventeenth century experienced major difficulties. For instance, in the ‘1640s, compared to the 1570s and 1580s, Kayseri and Amasya had lost about one-half of their taxpayers’ (Faroqhi, 1994: 439). The devaluation of the akçe also formed the basis of the uprising of the Janissaries, which were paid in the ‘new debased currency’ (ibid.: 433). Overall, the Ottoman Empire of the seventeenth century was no longer the ‘vital empire it had been in the sixteenth century…the Ottoman asper was replaced by the European currency; and the [Ottoman] economy entered the orbit of the European mercantilists’ (İnalçık, 1994: 25).
The diversion of the route of the world trade to the sea routes, the Capitulations\textsuperscript{34} granted by the Ottoman Sultan to the European countries and the adverse consequences of the trade between the Ottoman Empire and the European states for the former, had austere repercussions for the Ottoman economy and increased Ottoman dependence upon these powers after the seventeenth century. After the mid-seventeenth century, on account of the foundation of British and Dutch trade establishments in certain parts of Asia, world trade was altered to river transportation. This shift had negative effects for Ottoman trade, because most of the trade hitherto was carried out using land routes due to the existence of a ‘small number of navigable waterways’ in the Empire (Faroqhi, 1994: 483). Such a development had, however, put Ottoman Kurdistan in an advantageous strategic position for trade, as the only navigable waterways ‘in all of Anatolia, Syria and Iraq’ on a regular basis was the ‘Euphrates-Tigres system’ (ibid.).

The Treaty of Capitulation between Ottomans and France signed in 1744, granted the citizens of the latter country the right to buy, travel and be exempt from all forms of taxation. Subsequently, Austria, England, the Netherlands and, later on, Russia, signed alike Treaties with the Ottoman Empire. In virtue of these agreements, more foreign nationals became exempt from taxes that Ottoman citizens engaged in similar activities were obliged to pay (Fisher, 1959: 299-303). As posited by Bruce McGowan, the value and content of trade between the European countries and the Ottoman Empire after the 1760s had unfavourable consequences for the Ottoman economy. The latter provided the former raw materials – particularly cotton – while receiving finished products in return. The decline in trade of glass, soap, sugar, gunpowder and paper – which up until the mid-eighteenth century had been the engine of trade between the Ottoman Empire and the European countries – also played an influential role in the intensification of the adverse nature of the trade between these

\textsuperscript{34} Capitulations were extraterritorial privileges granted by the Ottomans to subjects of foreign powers in commercial-economic and judicial areas. For detailed information, see İnalçık (1971: 1179-89).
dominions (McGowan 1994: 639). All in all, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had engendered the gradual and persistent disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and increased its penetration by the developed countries.

2.2 Political Structures and Relations in Ottoman Kurdistan in the 16 - 18th Centuries

As outlined in Chapter 1, the atypical autonomous administrative entities founded in Ottoman Kurdistan after the incorporation of the Kurdish principalities into the Ottoman Empire are commonly hypothesised to have given rise to a peculiar land holding regime that constituted formidable impediments to socio-economic development in ESA. In the ensuing part of this study, by analysing the nature and the evolution of the Kurdish polities in the Ottoman Empire as well as the economic revenues and resources of these structures during the 16 - 18th centuries, the study will attest the veracity of this regularly proposed and readily accepted proposition.

Classical Ottoman Administration

The Ottoman administrative system consisted of two components: the central government and the provincial administration. Dirlik is the Ottoman term for provincial administration and it designates the state revenues in a given locality allocated to officials, who were mostly military men. In the course of collecting those revenues from the Sultan’ subjects, the military official supervised on matters of cultivation and other economic activities as well as maintaining public order. The primary duty of the dirlik holders was to partake in the military operations or campaigns of the sultan, paying for their expenses from the proceeds of their dirlik.

Moreover, the provincial government traditionally consisted of two centrally appointed authorities to administer the sancak: the sancakbeyi, who was a member of the askeri, and the kadi, who was a member of the ulema and represented the legal authority of the sultan.

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35 Some of the scholarship uses the term timar - which is the smallest dirlik grant - interchangeably with dirlik and thus the Ottoman provincial organisation has been titled dirlik or timar system.
Alongside, the sancakbeyi and the kadi, each sancak had also a mufti who interpreted Islamic law and via his fetvas stated his view on legal matters. The kadi had been an adept in religious law, specifically, Sharia law.

*Kanunnames*, that is the statute books that laid the kanun (sultan’ rules), were prepared separately for each sancak, and they legislated on matters of taxation, tolls, the duties and privileges of officials and criminal laws. Numerous sancaks comprised an eyalet, which was administered by a centrally appointed vali or beylerbeyi. The vali or beylerbeyi was hierarchically superior to the sancakbeyis in the sancaks, but except for military expeditions, the latter officials were responsible to the sultan and not to the vali or beylerbeyi.

The Ottoman lands were divided into three categories: miri, state-owned lands; mülk, freehold ownership of land as opposed to state-owned land; and vakf, land granted for pious or charitable purposes, which remained or was revised at the sultan’s will. Income for the Ottoman state was attained solely from miri land, which had been apportioned or organised into three *dirliks* or administrative units: timar, zemmet and has. It is characteristic of studies on Ottoman history to classify *dirliks* in accordance with their yields: a *dirlik* with revenues up to 20,000 *akçes* was termed a timar; a zemmet was the title given to a *dirlik* with revenues from 20,000 to 100,000 *akçes*; and a *dirlik* with revenues above 100,000 *akçes* was entitled a has.

The *timar* was given to the hierarchically lowest-ranking military personnel, sipahis, in exchange for their services for the state. Higher-ranking military personnel, subaşı, were granted with the *zemmet*. The sancakbeyi were granted with the largest *dirliks*, specifically, the has. The *reaya* was dispensed to a timar, a zemmet, or a has, and contingent on which of the three forms of *dirliks* the *reaya* were cultivating they paid their taxes to the sipahis, the subaşı or the sancakbeyi. Nevertheless, the cizye (poll tax), paid by the non-Muslims, was directly transferred to the treasury of the central government.
The provincial proceeds held in the reserve for the sultan were termed havass-ı humayun – i.e. imperial reserve. Customs revenues of the most important ports and yields of all mining operations were reserved for the sultan’s has. Furthermore, in exchange for the dirlik yields and based on their income sipahis and sancakbeyis had to sustain a particular number of cebelis (cavalrymen) and upon appeal had to serve in the sancakbeyi’s military campaigns. All of the above stated details regarding the basic features of the dirlik system were specified in the kanunnames.

In the formalised Kurdish principalities though, administrative variations and peculiarities existed, which were attributable to two predominant factors. The first of these is the geopolitical feature of Kurdistan. Due to Kurdistan being located in a frontier region behind which there was the rival Safavid regions and state, the Kurdish elite of this region, especially in the early years of the incorporation of the Kurdish principalities into the Empire, were granted more autonomy than the sancakbeyis closer to the Ottoman centre. It is important to note here that such an administrative arrangement had not constituted a sui generis case: analogous provisions existed in other Ottoman borderlands. For instance, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the local families in Bosnia (kapitanes) had consolidated big timars and zeamets as hereditary prebends in their possession. Bosnia was the main defence region of the Empire against the Habsburgs and resultantly the Ottoman state often yielded to the pressure from these powerful families (İnalcık, 1994: 73-4). In addition, similar arrangements had existed in Turco-Mongol lands, such as North-Central Anatolia, where Ottoman rule had not been firmly established. Hence, it is not coincidental that in Amasya-Sivas-Tokat during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries there existed the divani-malikane or ‘dual ownership’ land system as a compromise regime between ownership rights of the – mostly Turcoman – local hereditary lords and Ottoman state ownership of land wherein the former and the latter shared the surplus of the peasant production (İslamoğlu-İnan, 1994: 62-70).
The second factor for the existence of the unconventional administrative structures in Ottoman Kurdistan is the incessant struggle between the Ottoman central state and the Kurdish local elites; vying to establish and maintain political domination so as to extract larger shares of surpluses in the form of agricultural revenues. Accordingly, the magnitude and level of autonomy of the Kurdish principalities varied depending on the balances of power between the central state, provincial governor and the ruling families in a province (van Bruinessen, 1988: 13-28; Özoğlu, 2004: 52-63)
Map 5
Location of the Kurdish emirates in the 16th century
Source: van Bruinessen, 1988: 15.
Ottoman Administration in Kurdistan

The Ottoman state, in contrast to the policies of the Aqquyunlu and the Safavid states prior to the sixteenth century, had initially aimed to govern Kurdistan by means of a dual policy. On the one hand, the Ottoman rulers in order to govern the fragmented Kurdish groups, introduced a policy of organising them into larger and more controllable administrative units – i.e. the all-encompassing province of Diyarbekir – above the tribal level and on the other, they reinforced and consolidated the traditional tribal Kurdish ruling stratum in order to attain their support. The quintessential example of the Ottoman policy in Kurdistan is the *ferman* (imperial decree) issued by the son of Sultan Selim I after his death, Süleyman I (1520-1566):

[Kanuni Sultan Süleyman] gives to the Kurdish beys who, in his father Yavuz Sultan Selim’s times, opposed the Kızılbaş and who are currently serving the State (Devlet) with faith, and who joined specifically in the Serasker sultan Ibrahim Pasha’s Iran expedition with courage—both as a reward for their loyalty and courage, and their application and requests being taken into consideration—the provinces and fortresses that have been controlled by each of them as their yurtluk and ocaklık since past times along with the places that were given to them with separate imperial licences (*berat*); and their provinces, fortresses, cities, villages, and arable fields (*mezraa*) with all their harvests, under the condition of inheritance from father to son, are also given to them as their estate (*temlik*). There should never be any external aggression and conflict among them. This glorious order (*emr-i celile*) shall be obeyed; under no condition shall it be changed. In case of bey’s death, his province shall be given, as a whole, to his son, if there is only one. If there is more than one son, they (the sons) shall divide the province contingent upon mutual agreement among themselves. If they cannot reach any compromise, then whomever the Kurdistan beys decide to be the best choice shall succeed, and through private ownership (*mülkiyet*) he shall be the holder
(mutasarrif) of the land forever. If the bey has no heir or relative, then his province shall not be given to anybody from outside. As a result of this consultation with the Kurdistan beys, the region shall be given to either the beys or beyzades [someone else from the beys family] suggested by the Kurdistan beys’ (Özoğlu, 2004: 53-4).

An often quoted kanunname of the eyalet of Diyarbekir alluded to by Evliya Çelebi36 (c.1611-1685), which is not dated but there is wide consensus in the relevant literature upon it being from the mid-sixteenth century, is commonly hypothesised to concretise the administrative peculiarities of the Kurdish principalities. Çelebi posits three different types of administrative units in Kurdistan. The first administrative category is the classical Ottoman sancaks. In these sancaks there existed timar, zemmet and has and they were governed directly by a centrally appointed sancakbeyi. The second category is the Kurdish sancaks. These sancaks were granted to the Kurdish rulers as yurultuk and ocaklık, which implicated that succession to office will remain within the ruling family. The sultan or the provincial governor could not oust the ruler of the Kurdish sancaks. The Kurdish sancaks like classical Ottoman sancaks, contained timar, zemmet and has, whose holders had the normal military obligations as those in the rest of the Ottoman Empire. The state did conduct fiscal surveys in these sancaks, which entails that a portion of their revenue was accrued to the central treasury. The third category is the Kurdish hükümet. In these administrative units, there were no timars and zemets, and the taxes levied by their Kurdish rulers were not passed on to the central treasury. According to the above quoted kanunname, the only obligation of these hükümet was to partake in military expeditions.

36 A diligent Ottoman traveller and author of Seyahatname, or Book of Travels; one of the most useful sources on the social, political, economic and cultural life of the Ottoman Empire in the 17th century. During 1655-56, Çelebi visited Ottoman Kurdistan and took extensive notes on almost everything he saw, all of which are outlined in the fourth volume of the ten-volume of his masterpiece, Seyahatname. His records in Ottoman Kurdistan are particularly rich in detail on the military and administrative organisation of the provinces of Diyarbekir and Van, particularly on the relationship of the self-governing Kurdish polities with the central Ottoman state.
However, available official Ottoman documents suggest that there are incongruities between the administrative autonomy and privileges set out in the above quoted *kanunname* and *ferman* and the veracities of the administrative structures in Kurdistan. Below, via describing and assessing the various documented official data on the administrative structures in Kurdistan between the early sixteenth and late eighteenth centuries, the study will trace the nature and evolution of the Kurdish polities.

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37 This study does make use of the *Defters*, which are the official Ottoman Administrative Registers, that are kept in the Topkapı Palace Archives, and the *Diyarbekir Şer'îye Sicilleri*, which are detailed records of Ottoman courts containing information on imperial administrations, on affairs in towns and villages, and on taxes and taxation regulations, price regulations, the *timar* system, agreement between guilds, theft, murder and other crimes.
### Table 2.1 Administrative division of the eyalet of Diyarbekir, 1527-1792

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1527</th>
<th>1540</th>
<th>1578-88</th>
<th>1626-37</th>
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**Major emirates**

- **Ardalan** — Not incorporated into the Ottoman Empire
- **Hakkari** — Not incorporated into the Ottoman Empire

**Imadiye**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Matter</th>
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**Bitlis**

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**Hisnkeyf**

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**Ceziye (Bohtan)**

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</tbody>
</table>

**Minor emirates**

- **Sohran**
- **Çemîşgêzek**
- **Mecengîrîd (Mazgirt)**
- **Pertek**
- **Sağman**
- **Eğil**
- **Palu**
- **Çermîkh**
- **Hazo**
- **Sasun**
- **Zirqan**
- **Gûrđûkan**
- **Ataq**
- **Tercîl**
- **Mihrani**
- **Hîzan**
- **Suveydi**
- **Hânçûk**
- **Genç**
- **Çapaçoçur**
- **Süleymani**
- **Qulp**
- **Mifariqîn**

---

38 Defter no.5246, Topkapı Palace Archives in Kunt (1978: 130-31).
40 Defter Kamil Kepeci no.262 in Kunt (1978: 162-64).
42 Diyarbekir Şer’iyye Sicilleri, No.310:62-63 in ibid.
43 Diyarbekir Şer’iyye Sicilleri, No.313:174 in ibid
44 Diyarbekir Şer’iyye Sicilleri, No.352:25-27;No.313:30; No.626:1-32 in ibid.;129-30
45 List of Kurdish and non-Kurdish chiefdoms as well as nomadic sancaks in this table was adopted from van Bruinessen (1988: 18-19).
46 Information regarding new eyalets is attained from ibid.
47 Not mentioned in the document.
### Sancaks that are not also Kurdish chiefdoms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Status 1</th>
<th>Status 2</th>
<th>Status 3</th>
<th>Status 4</th>
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<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
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<tr>
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<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Sancaks transferred to eyalet Sivas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabkir</td>
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<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Sancaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruha (Urfa)</td>
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<td>Bire</td>
<td>S</td>
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<td>S</td>
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<td>Cammasa</td>
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<td>Beni Rabi‘a</td>
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<td>made into eyalet Mosul</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ana ve Hit</td>
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<td>S</td>
<td>transferred to eyalet Raqqa</td>
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<td>transferred to eyalet Raqqa</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sincar</td>
<td>H</td>
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<td>S</td>
<td>transferred to eyalet Mosul</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aqçaqal‘e</td>
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<td>S</td>
<td>transferred to eyalet Mosul</td>
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<tr>
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<td>S</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Sî’ird</td>
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<td>S</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Sancaks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Masyum u Tur</td>
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<td>Sancaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahakis</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Sancaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaho</td>
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<td>--</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Sancaks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:**
- **H** = Hükümet
- **Y** = Yurtluk ve Ocaklık
- **S** = Classic Sancaks
- **--** = not mentioned in the document
- **H?** = not mentioned in the document but based on other historical records discussed in the thesis
- It is known to be a Hükümet.
As can be inferred from the summary of the administrative division of the eyalet of
Diyarbekir above, in the early years of the incorporation or formalisation of the Kurdish
principalities into the Ottoman Empire, the Kurdish administrative structures in these
principalities were in a constant state of flux. The bulk of the Kurdish administrative bodies
had evolved from initially being self-governing entities or hükümet in the sixteenth century
to centrally governed classical Ottoman sancaks or semi-autonomous administrative
organisations, yurtluks and ocakliks – wherein the governing dirlik or timar system was in
operation – in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
An indication of this transformation is the increase in the official revenues of the beylerbeyis,
or governor-general, of Diyarbekir in the seventeenth century when compared to their
sixteenth century counterparts. İ. Metin Kunt in an extensive study of the Appointment
Registers and Financial Registers of Diyarbekir arrives at the following illuminating
conclusion:
‘[T]he political position of a seventeenth century governor-general is much stronger
compared to his sixteenth century counterpart. The first and foremost obvious indication of
this is supplied by the dimensions of Ömer Paşa’s [beylerbeyi of Diyarbekir] official income.
In the sixteenth century, the official income allocated to a governor-general was in the
neighbourhood of one million akçes. In contrast, Ömer Paşa’s income for the year 1670-71 in
Diyarbekir exceeded sixteen million akçes. This increase in income cannot be explained
solely as a result of inflation which emerged after the middle of the sixteenth century…the
increase in the governor’s income was more than three time greater than the rate of inflation’
Congruently, the figures corroborated by the chancery clerk Ayn-ı Ali Efendi (Table 2.2)
suggest that in the late-sixteenth or early-seventeenth centuries the has’ of the beylerbeyis of
the provinces of Diyarbekir, Van and Erzurum, when juxtaposed with the bordering provinces of Karaman, Rum and Zülkadriye, were higher.

Table 2.2 The has’ of the beylerbeyis, late 16th or early 17th Century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Has’ of the beylerbeyis (in akçes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karaman</td>
<td>660,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zülkadriye</td>
<td>628,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rum</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbekir</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van</td>
<td>1,132,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>1,214,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cezar, 1986: 38.

The detailed description of revenues and expenditures\(^{48}\) of Ömer Paşa’s annual accounts for 1670-71 illustrate that the provincial ‘governor received a fee from all appointments within the province: all sancakbeyis, all dirlik holders, all central army troops stationed in Diyarbekir, and all guilds officials paid this fee, [which is] an excellent indication of the supreme power of governor in his province’ (Kunt, 1983: 92-3). The source of some of the incomes delineated in the annual accounts of the beylerbeyi of Diyarbekir in 1670-71 does shed light on the erosion of the autonomy enjoyed by Kurdish administrations. The incomes of Ömer Paşa were the appointment fees (tahviller) levied from timar and zeamet holders and fines (cerimes) that were imposed on the hüküums of Eğil, Palu and Hazzo (ibid.: 67). The provincial governor was acting within his jurisdiction with the collection of the former form of taxation, but the collection of the latter was an encroachment of the rights of the autonomous Kurdish rulers (van Bruinessen, 1988: 26). Such violations and interventions appear not to be atypical of the conduct of the centrally appointed governors or the Ottoman state in Kurdistan. In the early 1630s, Aziz Efendi in his Nasihatname, Treatise of counsel or advice addressed to the Sultan, outlined the incessant struggle between the Ottoman central

\(^{48}\) For a detailed and itemised version of this annual accounts see: Kunt (1981). An English version of these accounts is given in pp.39-48.
state and the local elites, the corroding self-rule of the Kurdish administrations, and the provincial governor ousting Kurdish leaders and appointing outsiders instead. Accordingly, Aziz Efendi suggested that the autonomous rights of the relevant Kurdish rulers should be reinstated (Özoğlu, 2004: 59).

Overall, the degree of autonomy the Kurdish principalities had in the early sixteenth century had gradually eroded and the majority of these Kurdish administrative structures had increasingly been dominated by and been very receptive to Ottoman demands. That said, despite the incessant struggle between the Kurdish local elites and the central state for political domination and control over the collection of the agricultural surplus, the Kurdish emirates reserved and conserved their infrastructure until the first half of the nineteenth century.

2.3 The Economy and Demography of Ottoman Kurdistan in the 16th-18th Centuries

Studies on the socio-economic and political structures and developments in Ottoman Kurdistan are nominal, and the existing works on this region are commonly devoid of a comparative analysis of the demographic, social and economic features of this territory with the other domains of the Empire (Bois, 1966; Burkay, 2008 [1992]; Celil, 1992). This common lacuna in the literature on Ottoman Kurdistan constitutes a pivotal impediment for attesting and understanding, firstly, the relative social and economic importance of this borderland for the Ottoman Empire, and, secondly, the evolution of the social and economic structures in ESA. Such an omission is largely due to two interrelated issues: i) the presence of trivial demographic\(^49\) and economic primary data\(^50\) for Ottoman Kurdistan; and ii) the over-reliance of the aforementioned studies on the Travellers’ estimates and observations for

\(^{49}\) The existence of minimal demographic information is attributable to the absence of a population census up until 1831 in the Ottoman Empire.

\(^{50}\) Because of the existence of minimal economic data on ESA, these regions of the Ottoman Empire have generally been excluded or left out of the studies on the economic history of Ottoman Anatolia. A prime example of this is the laborious work of Suraiya Faroqhi on trade, crafts and food production in Ottoman Anatolia between 1520-1650, which due to less comprehensive and scant nature of the documentation on Eastern Anatolia opts to focus the study on Western and Central Anatolia (1984:17-9).
demographic and economic data pertaining to the period between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. It is not feasible to base a comparative study on the annotations provided in these Traveller Books due to the existence of the descriptive information in these records and their being only one or two of these oft-quoted historical accounts dealing with any one epoch. Alternatively, by consulting studies on tahris and defter-i hakani of the sixteenth century and the avariz tax registers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the thesis will identify the size and spatial distribution of the population of Ottoman Kurdistan and Ottoman Anatolia. Subsequently, based on the exploration of central treasury “budgets" and icmal financial records, the study will analyse the provincial revenues and economic sources of these domains with the purpose of tracing the development and relative importance of the economic resources and local revenues of these territories for the general Ottoman economy.

51 The often quoted and employed Traveller Books for the 16-18th centuries are as follows: D’Aramon (1864 [1555]); Simeon (2013 [1612]); Tavernier (1677 [1630]); Çelebi, (1988 [1655]); and Niebuhr (1968 [1766]).

52 The ‘tahris defters are, in nature, and often referred to, as tax survey registers. The tahris were recorded and kept in the defter-i hakani (imperial registers) in Istanbul' (Demirci, 2009: 18). Tahris registers ‘until the beginning of the seventeenth century were carried out every 30 or 40 years’ and they contain a ‘listing of the empire’s adult male population; the entry for each person states his father’s name, his legal status, the duties and privileges of his economic or social position, and the extent of his land. These registers also give much information regarding land use…and the estimated sources of revenue' (Barkan, 1970: 163).

53 Not all surveys have survived; ‘in general two sets of surveys are available for most of Anatolia’ (İslamoğlu-İnan, 1994: 25-6) and they form the basis of the demographic data below: one dating from the reign of Süleyman I and the other from the rule of Murat III (1574-1595).

54 The avariz was an emergency or irregular wartime tax paid in kind which had been converted into money in the course of the sixteenth century. During the first half of the seventeenth century, it became an annual tax. ‘In principle, though not always in practice, avariz taxpayers were taxed according to their ability to pay, and therefore officially recorded as “wealthy,” “middling” or “poor”. In addition, taxpayers were grouped into units known as avarizhane (tax house), all of which were assessed the same amount of money. A ‘tax house’ consisted of 2-15 households, and was kept small if the component households were considered wealthy, while in the case of the poor people, the number of the households were augmented’ (Faroqhi, 1994: 532).

55 The “budgets” in the 16th-18th centuries differed from their 20th century counterparts. Ottoman “budgets” pre-Tanzimat was used as balance sheets for the revenues and expenditures of the Ottoman state already undertaken, often encompasning a full solar year or else lunar year. Due to Ottoman “budgets” during the 16-18th centuries recording revenues already collected and expenditures undertaken, they are conceived by Ottoman historians as ‘a reliable index for the general condition of the economy’ (İnalci, 1994: 78).

56 The icmal registers contained periodic financial summaries of the revenues and expenditures of the central Imperial Treasury and of the various provincial treasuries. They were used for verifying the veracity of internal accounting as well as simplifying and summarising a mass of information for final reporting to the Sultan in a synoptic form (Murphey, 1987: xvi).
**Provincial Population Figures in the Tahrir and Avarız Registers**

The pioneering scholar of Ottoman demography, Ömer Lütfi Barkan, in his extensive research based on tahrirs claims that they are ‘most precious possession of the Turkish archives of the surveys of population and taxable resources’ (Barkan, 1970: 163). Tahrirs of the sixteenth century, which at the time were used to obtain population and production figures in the Empire (Kunt, 1983: 15), are also construed by van Bruinessen to be ‘the best indications’ for a study of the populace of the province of Diyarbekir (1988: 32).

Nevertheless, these scholars do also acknowledge the inadequate demographic information provided by the tahrirs, because tahrirs only distinguish between Muslim and non-Muslims (see Table 2.3 below).
Table 2.3 Distribution of the population of Turkey, 1520-1535

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Household Population</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Anatolia⁵⁸</td>
<td></td>
<td>517,813</td>
<td>8,511</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>2,632,975</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karaman⁵⁹</td>
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<td>134,452</td>
<td>3,127</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>687,895</td>
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<td>Zülkadiiriye⁶⁰</td>
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<td>64,102</td>
<td>2,631</td>
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<td>333,665</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diyarbekir⁶¹</td>
<td></td>
<td>70,858</td>
<td>11,938</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>415,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rum⁶²</td>
<td></td>
<td>116,772</td>
<td>51,662</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>842,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arap⁶³</td>
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<td>113,358</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>571,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timar-holders</td>
<td></td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,733,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İstanbul</td>
<td></td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumeli</td>
<td></td>
<td>194,958</td>
<td>862,707</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>5,308,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timar-holders</td>
<td></td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,958,995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Population (Including the population not entered in the Tax registers)** 12 or 12.5 million


The above-tabulated populace data are of sedentary societies and thus the calculations are not inclusive of nomads. The nomadic societies, which were divided by the Ottoman administration into two large confederations, Boz-Ulus (Turcomans) and Kara-Ulus (Kurds), constituted an integral part of Eastern Anatolia during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (İnalcık 1994: 35-37; van Bruinessen, 1988: 35). The importance of tribal confederations is exhibited in Table 2.4 below with the recorded size of the nomadic societies and the taxation paid by these societies.

---

⁵⁷ Barkan, in his studies of the *tahrirs* employs the ‘coefficient of five’ (2000: 1411-12) to measure households or *hane*’s.

⁵⁸ Western Asia Minor.

⁵⁹ Liva: Konya, Beyşehir, Akşehir, Aksaray, Niğde, Kayseri and Iţili.


⁶² Liva: Amasya, Çorum, Tokat, Karahisar, Djanik, Trabzon, Malatya, Divriği, Dirende, Kemah and Bayburt.

⁶³ Liva: Damascus, Safed, Adjlín, Gaza, Jerusalem, Hama, Humus, Trablus, Ayintab, Birecik, Allepo, Adana, Uzeyir, Tarsus and Sis.
Table 2.4 Tribal confederations in Eastern Anatolia, 1540

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Household</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Total tax to be paid (akçe)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boz-Ulus</td>
<td>7,325</td>
<td>1,998,246</td>
<td>2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kara-Ulus</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şam</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other scattered clans in the province of Diyarbekir</td>
<td>273</td>
<td></td>
<td>14,806</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: İnalçık, 1994: 37.

The population figures designated in the avariz registers are an important means of obtaining an understanding of the demographic patterns and changes in the post-sixteenth century Ottoman Empire. Demographic studies on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have concentrated on the avariz registers, because the tahrir registers that were utilised to attain indication of the populace in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were seldom drawn up following the seventeenth century (McGowan, 1981: 113). The study below will report two different sets of demographic data of the tax-paying population in order to attain an understanding of the demographic patterns and changes between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Firstly, provincial avariz household data for the three Anatolian Ottoman zones – Eastern, Western, and Central Anatolia – based on a tax-farm register prepared in 1636. Secondly, avariz fiscal surveys for three Ottoman domains – Rumeli, Western Anatolia and Eastern Anatolia – for the years 1640-1786.

Murphey (1987) based on tax-farm Register Maliyeden Müdevver 7075 collates information on the number of tax-paying houses in the different districts in Western and Eastern Anatolia. This document has a pivotal importance for attaining an idea of the size and proportional distribution of the population in Diyarbekir and other areas surveyed by the registrars.

Register Maliyeden Müdevver 7075 was prepared in 1636 as a result of Sultan Murat IV
ordering the preparation of a detailed report on the state of financial resources of Anatolia (Murphy, 1987: xiii).

### Table 2.5 Provincial Avariz Household Data, 1636

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts of Western Anatolia</th>
<th>Household</th>
<th>Districts of Central &amp; Eastern Anatolia</th>
<th>Household</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hudavendigar</td>
<td>8,964</td>
<td>Halep</td>
<td>4,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydın</td>
<td>8,276</td>
<td>Sivas</td>
<td>2,678.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolu</td>
<td>7,484</td>
<td>Karaman</td>
<td>2,616.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menteşe</td>
<td>5,330</td>
<td>Diyarbekir</td>
<td>2,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suğla</td>
<td>4,962</td>
<td>Maraş</td>
<td>2,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kütahya</td>
<td>4,152</td>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>1,545.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saruhan</td>
<td>4,138</td>
<td>Trabulus-i Şam</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kastamonu</td>
<td>3,975</td>
<td>Trabzon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karesi</td>
<td>2,878</td>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamid</td>
<td>1,722</td>
<td>Rakka</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>1,458</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biga</td>
<td>1,386</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teke</td>
<td>1,333</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karahisar-i Sahib</td>
<td>840</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Çankırı</td>
<td>702.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultan Önül</td>
<td>550</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaiyye</td>
<td>325</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>58,184.5</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>19,003.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Moreover, McGowan based on a detailed study of ten avariz registers, which are hypothesised to ‘offer the best opportunity to follow demographic and other changes in a particular province’ (1981: 113), has produced a laborious comparative study of the populace data based on tax houses for Rumeli, Western Anatolia and Eastern/Central Anatolia during 1640-1786. Below in Table 2.6 are the figures inferred from nine of the relevant registers surveyed by McGowan.
Table 2.6 *Avarizhanes* in four Ottoman zones, 1640-1786

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Eastern/Central Anatolia</th>
<th>Rumeli</th>
<th>Western Anatolia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1640</td>
<td>27,773 (224)67</td>
<td>96,756 (159)</td>
<td>52,519 (275)</td>
<td>177,048 (658)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1650</td>
<td>21,291 (220)</td>
<td>110,901 (220)</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>132,192 (440)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1662</td>
<td>33,280 (219)</td>
<td>103,100 (234)</td>
<td>50,384 (284)</td>
<td>186,764 (737)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1677</td>
<td>18,822 (219)</td>
<td>92,274 (221)</td>
<td>51,292 (281)</td>
<td>162,388 (721)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1688</td>
<td>30,759 (232)</td>
<td>53,122 (154)</td>
<td>41,689 (279)</td>
<td>126,584 (665)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1698</td>
<td>18,822 (219)</td>
<td>92,274 (221)</td>
<td>51,292 (281)</td>
<td>162,388 (721)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755</td>
<td>11,975 (185)</td>
<td>43,345 (228)</td>
<td>30,373 (283)</td>
<td>85,693 (669)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1786</td>
<td>12,967 (209)</td>
<td>43,455 (232)</td>
<td>22,561 (291)</td>
<td>78,983 (732)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The veracity and efficacy of the above demographic information extrapolated from *tahrir* and *avariz* registers have been questioned by certain studies. A critical analysis of the methodological and empirical issues raised in these scholarships are beyond the scope and subject-matter of this research and therefore the thesis will only offer a terse description of the postulated voids relevant for the scrutiny of the records cited above. Leila Erder contends that certain sections ‘of the population may disappear from the record as they transfer from taxable to exempt status’68, and due to the *hane*69 or household being the tax unit it is argued that ‘individuals or families can rarely be identified from one survey to the next’ (1975: 291).

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64 Sivas, Amasya, Çorum, Bozok, Canik, Arabkir, Divriği, Konya, Niğde, Beşehri, Akşehir, Kayseri, Akşaray, Kırşehir, Içil, Adana, Trabulsı-Şam, Şam-ı Şerif, Haleb, Bire’tül Firat, Maraş, Malatya, Ayntab, Diyarbekir, Erzurum, Karahisar-ı Şark, Trabzon, Gönye.
67 The figure between brackets is the number of judicial districts or *kazas* in each *eyalet* or province.
68 Information regarding individuals that were exempt from taxes, like the *askerî* ruling elite, ‘were often, though not always, excluded’ from the tax surveys (Islamoğlu-Inan, 1994: 27).
69 In order to attain estimates of the total population for Ottoman territories, one of the prevailing approaches – as evinced with the above cited population figures by Barkan – have been to employ the household ‘coefficient’ or multiplier of five. However, neither Ottoman sources nor tax surveys contain any evidence concerning the actual size of the household. Resultantly, certain scholars have disputed the household coefficient or multiplier of five. For instance, a demographic study by Erder based on a survey of wide range of Ottoman tax and population registers, contends that the coefficient should be changed to ‘three or four’ (1975: 284-301). Hence, it is argued that the ‘Ottoman *hane*’ is ‘purely a fiscal convenience and is not geographically constant’ (İnalçık, 2003: 28).
69 Western Asia Minor.
Additionally, as argued by Lajos Fekete, the tax is paid collectively in some areas, thereby making it impossible to calculate the population (1947: 299-328). For the purposes of this thesis, it suffices to state that the above summarised criticisms do not totally disrepute the aim ascribed by this study to the avariz and tahrir registers. That is, attaining indicators for determining the size, the proportional distribution and the evolution of the populace of Ottoman Anatolia and its neighbouring regions between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Put differently, in the absence of Ottoman Censuses, the information in the tahrirs and the avariz tax surveys provide signifiers of demographic trends rather than unassailable and complete population figures.

**Provincial Revenues and Economic Resources of Ottoman Kurdistan**

The first official balance sheet of state revenues or treasury “budget” in 1527-28, takes account of the timar, vakf, mülk revenues and gives the total value of all revenues of the Ottoman Empire as 537.90 million akçes, which is equivalent to 9.7\footnote{In 1528, one gold ducat was equivalent to 55 akçes (İnalcık, 1994:78).} million of gold ducat. The state revenues consisted of 477 million, which constituted 89 per cent of the total revenue of the Empire (see Table 2.7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of Revenue</th>
<th>Value (in millions akçes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperial Hass</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Hass and Timar distributed</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vakf and Mülk properties</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>537</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The actual purpose of these “budgets” was to determine whether surplus has been realised, thus for an efficient “budget” Ottoman statesman had anticipated a surplus after expenditures so that those in receipt of a salary from the sultan’s treasury would not have concerns about
their income (İnalçık, 1994: 77). When the revenues and expenditures of the province of Diyarbakır are compared with other Ottoman Anatolian regions (see Table 2.8 below), which today roughly constitute modern-day Turkey, it becomes evident that the latter areas were operating under a budget deficit whilst the former yielded surplus revenue. This is despite Diyarbakır having the third lowest population density out of the four compared provinces (see Table 2.3 above).

Table 2.8 Balance of provincial revenues, 1527-28 (in million akçes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anadolu, Karaman,</td>
<td>294.85</td>
<td>322.13</td>
<td>-27.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rum and Zülkadiyye</td>
<td>21.46</td>
<td>20.10</td>
<td>+1.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Such a development was not unique to the “budget” of 1527-8, because more deficits were sustained from these regions – particularly Rumeli and Anadolu – in the later years of the sixteenth century as evidenced by the deficits incurred from the aforementioned provinces in the succeeding published “budget” of 1547-8. The expenditure of the central budget reached 171,997,449 akçes in 1546 and 111,997,449 akçes in 1547. The revenue the central treasury received from the provinces of Anatolia and Rumeli in the same years was 135,402,022 akçes in 1546 and 94,543,349 akçes in 1547. Consequently, the deficits of 36,470,335 akçes and 17,454,694 akçes were incurred. The surplus revenues deriving from the newly conquered provinces of Egypt, Syria, Diyarbakır and Baghdad covered these deficits (Sahillioğlu, 1970: 239-40). The surplus revenue transferred from Diyarbakır to the central treasury had arisen from 1.36 million akçes in the previous “budget” to around 5 million akçes in the “budget” of 1547-8 (Barkan, 2000: 891). In the only other published “budget” for the sixteenth century, the “budget” of 1567-68, the income revenues and expenditures for the province of Diyarbakır were not recorded in the form that it had been done with the latterly stated “budgets”.

124
The periodic irregularities and altered content of the “budgets” in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries make it highly difficult to systematically study the spatial sources of state revenues and expenditures during this period. Summary accounts of incomes and expenditures were not calculated for a long time in the seventeenth century. Hence, the “budget” of Tarhuncu (Grand Vizier 1652-3) possesses much importance and is generally looked upon as the first Ottoman budget of the seventeenth century (Sahillioğlu, 1970: 233).

In addition, in the eighteenth century summary financial or budgetary records were not collected regularly. With the exclusion of a few “budgets” in the first decade of the eighteenth century, there existed no accounts or “budgets” in the subsequent thirty six years (Tabakoğlu, 1985: 22).

More importantly for the purposes of this study, while sixteenth century “budgets” had registered revenues in accordance to their geographical origin, most of the published “budgets” in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries do not provide the geographical distribution of all the revenue sources. Ottoman accountants in the seventeenth century had begun to register revenues in accordance with the treasury offices71 in charge of their administration (Faroqhi, 1994: 539-40, Tabakoğlu, 1985: 21-25). The “budgets” during the two centuries after the sixteenth century mostly contained the total amount of income and expenditures of these treasury offices – see the published “budgets” for 1660-61, 1669-70 and 1690-91(Barkan, 1955-56: 193-347). Therefore, detailed information concerning provincial incomes and expenditures, which are necessary for a comparative study of the different regions of the Empire, were minimal compared to the sixteenth century. Another commonality of the Ottoman “budgets” in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were that, unlike its sixteenth century counterparts, they contained information concerning the imperial

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71 For more information on the role, functions and evolution of the different treasury offices in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Tabakoğlu (1985: 33-69).
hass revenues, which consisted to great extent of *mukataa*\textsuperscript{72} (tax-farm) and *cizye* revenues, thus information regarding the *dirlik* or *timar* revenues had not been accounted for (Tabakoğlu, 1985: 22-25).

These factors constitute insurmountable barriers to acquiring a complete analysis of all the provincial revenues and the fiscal or budgetary accounts of Ottoman domains in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. Nevertheless, as Ahmet Tabakoğlu posits in a trailblazing study of the Ottoman “budgets”, *icmal* and rüzname\textsuperscript{73} registers, provincial revenues in these two centuries – with the exclusion of Egypt – consisted of *mukataa* or tax-farm revenues administered by the *Baş Muhasabe* (Muhasebe-i Evvel) branch of the Imperial Treasury (1985: 168-69). Therefore, in order to attain an understanding of the evolution of the provincial revenues during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this thesis will make use of the documented data on *mukataa* revenues of Ottoman provinces.

One of the available official records from the seventeenth century is the aforementioned *icmal* accounts in the tax-farm register for 1636-7, Register *MM 7075*. This document gives an insight into the amount and sources of *mukataa* revenues in the early seventeenth century from the following regions and provinces of the Empire: ‘Western, Central, South-Central Anatolia (Anadolu, Zülkadriye, Karaman, Rum, Kastamonu and Bursa (Bolu))’; ‘Southeastern Anatolian (Diyarbakir)’; ‘Eastern Anatolia (Erzurum)’; and ‘Northern Syria and parts of South-Central Anatolia (Aleppo)’ (Murphey, 1987: 220).

\textsuperscript{72} In Ottoman fiscal practice, a *mukataa* had meant a source of revenue projected and entered into the register of the finance department, which included a host of revenue sources. Collection of such revenues had been farmed out under a specific tax-farm system to independent agents called *müftezim* or *amils*, or delegated to administrative officials such as the *emins* or *voyvodas.

\textsuperscript{73} Rüzname registers contained records of the day-by-day revenues and expenditures of the provincial treasuries and of various other government departments. For detailed information, see: Tabakoğlu (1985: 40-3) and Shaw (1969, 1-12).
Table 2.9 Provincial tax-farm revenues of Anatolia and the Coastal and Northern portions of Syria, early 17th century (in akçes)²⁴

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aleppo</td>
<td>24,106,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zülkadriye</td>
<td>30,911,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaman</td>
<td>2,390,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbekir</td>
<td>25,019,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rum</td>
<td>3,063,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damascus</td>
<td>15,382,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>16,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kastamonu</td>
<td>2,656,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursa (Bolu)</td>
<td>5,334,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anadolu</td>
<td>12,399,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The above given tax-farm revenues suggest that the provincial sources of income in ESA in the early-seventeenth century, when contrasted with the mukataa revenues of other Anatolian provinces, had attained a greater importance. Mukataa revenues in Diyarbekir alone had been almost equivalent to the mukataa revenues of the five bordering Anatolian regions, excluding Zülkadriye. The mukataa revenues in Erzurum had been triple the amount of revenues in the bordering Rum and Karaman province.

When the available data on the principle provincial revenues of Diyarbekir and Erzurum (Table 2.10), the custom and production revenues/data (Maps 6-8), and the major export products from the Empire (Table 2.11) are juxtaposed, we can reasonably posit the following conclusion. The revenue base of the provincial revenues of Diyarbekir and Erzurum in the seventeenth century consisted of the mine and mineral manufacturing and trade, sheep breeding and sheep trade, textile production and the custom revenues attained from long-distance trade passing from ESA. Concomitantly, as described in the preceding section, the gradual integration of the autonomous Kurdish emirates into the Ottoman administrative system in the seventeenth century facilitated the rise in the number of Kurdish emirates.

²⁴ There had been a four-fold increase in the exchange equivalent for one gold piece in circulating silver akçe coins in the period between 1526 (1 altun=60 akçes) and 1636 (1 altun=240 akçes) (Murphey, 1987: xxi).
becoming receptive to Ottoman demands. This can also be identified as another factor in the growth of fiscal yields or revenues. As noted by Hakan Özoğlu, ‘although by the end of the seventeenth century there were autonomous Kurdish emirates, they were, for most part, integrated into the Ottoman administrative system by increasing state authority […] [B]ut the degree of autonomy they [Kurdish emirates] enjoyed was reduced to the point that a majority of the emirates became very responsive to Ottoman demands’ (2004: 59).

Table 2.10 Principal revenues for the provinces of Diyarbekir and Erzurum, early 17th century (in akçes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Customs</th>
<th>Sales Tax on Cloths and Textile Production</th>
<th>Sheep Tax</th>
<th>Tax from Pastoral Peoples or Tribal Confederations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diyarbekir</strong></td>
<td>6,021,950</td>
<td>551,800</td>
<td>555,000</td>
<td>2,679,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Erzurum</strong></td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>3,182,650</td>
<td></td>
<td>84,252</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Map 6
Mine and metal manufactures and trade in Anatolia, 16th and 17th Centuries
Source: Faroqhi, 1984: 175.
Map 7
Trade in Anatolian sheep, 16th to 17th Centuries
Map 8
Location and revenues of Ottoman dye houses or boyahanes, late 16th century
Source: Faroqhi, 1984: 152.
Table 2.11 Principal English and French imports from the Levant, 1620-1789

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>English Imports</th>
<th>French Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1621-34</td>
<td>1700-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1663-69</td>
<td>1750-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1699-1701</td>
<td>1785-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1722-24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Imports</td>
<td>(in thousands of pounds per year)</td>
<td>(in millions of livres per year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw Silk</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>2,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohair Yarn</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton and Cotton Yarn</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galls</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>172</td>
<td>1,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>219</td>
<td>914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>274</td>
<td>1,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>170</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>488</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>853</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Imports</td>
<td></td>
<td>Textile Materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1785-9</td>
<td>Silk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cotton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mohair Yarn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Camel Hair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Galls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Textile Manufacture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,430</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The sources of income in the provinces of Diyarbekir and Erzurum maintained their relative importance in the eighteenth century. As exhibited in the summarised mukataa revenues in the “budget” of 1706-07 in Table 2.12 below, the tax-farm or mukataa revenues of the province of Erzurum and Diyarbakir had been nearly equivalent to the total revenues of the three major Ottoman Anatolian provinces: Anadolu, Karaman and Sivas.

---

75 Check the footnotes below for information regarding production Ottoman Kurdistan.
76 Much cotton was locally processed into yarns and cloth in the following localities in Ottoman Kurdistan: Ergani, Mardin and Diyarbekir. The red cotton cloth of Diyarbekir was very famous and in much demand abroad during the 17-18th centuries. So much so that, according to the Tavernier, half of the population in the mid-17th century had engaged in the production of this product and red Morocco leather. For more information, see: van Bruinessen (1988: 36-40).
77 All galls exported originated in Diyarbekir, Van and Mosul (Davis, 1970: 200-1; van Bruinessen, 1988: 40).
Tabakoğlu (1985), by collating *mukataa* revenues found in various Ottoman fiscal documents, traces the progress of the revenues of the ten prominent *mukataas* in the Empire between the late seventeenth and the mid-eighteenth centuries (Table 2.13). The findings of this study demonstrate that the provincial sources of revenue originating from ESA were vital sources of income for the Ottoman economy. *Mukataas* from Erzurum and Diyarbekir were among the most protuberant sources of income for Ottoman Empire.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Amount (in million <em>akçes</em>)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anadolu</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaman</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sivas</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trabzon</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Çıldır</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleppo</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maraş</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rakka</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damascus</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayda-Beirut</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbekir</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosul</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.13 Principle Mukataas, 1698/99-1748 (in million akçes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>1698-9</th>
<th>1700-1</th>
<th>1701-2</th>
<th>1706-7</th>
<th>1710-1</th>
<th>1716-7</th>
<th>1734-5</th>
<th>1748</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1698-9</td>
<td>1700-1</td>
<td>1701-2</td>
<td>1706-7</td>
<td>1710-1</td>
<td>1716-7</td>
<td>1734-5</td>
<td>1748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum Customs</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>13.978</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleppo Revenues</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rakka Mukataas</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayda-Beirut Mukataas</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli Mukataas</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbekir Voyvodalığı</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>13.579</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gümüşhane hasi’</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakız &amp; İzmir Customs</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eflak cizye</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İstanbul Customs</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


When the scale and sources of revenue of the most prominent mukataa of the province of Diyarbekir (Diyarbekir Voyvodalığı80) in 1797-98 (Table 2.14) is studied in tandem with the principal revenues of this province in the early seventeenth century (Table 2.10) and the total mukataa revenues in the early-and-mid-eighteenth century (Tables 2.12-13), we can arrive at two interrelated results. The first is that in the late eighteenth century, Diyarbekir increased its mukataa revenues. The second is that this province preserved the manufacturing and trade revenues base of the province, as is evident with the revenues yielded from customs, dye houses and market dues.

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78 This is the whole revenue of the eyalet of Erzurum.
79 This is the whole revenue of the eyalet of Diyarbekir.
80 The term voyvodalığ originates from a Slavic term: voyvoda. A voyvoda refers to a subcommander. During the sixteenth century, it was the title given to the civil governor of the Balkan states under the control of the Ottoman Empire. In the preceding centuries, the term had come to be used in northern Anatolia and Kurdistan for a class of officials who acted as intendants of tax farms. As a fiscal category voyvodalık denotes the stewardship of hası or sultan’s properties assigned to the administration of a voyvoda or, in other words, extensive lands administered as imperial estates under the supervision of state officials titled voyvoda. The voyvodalık as an eklâm (provincial bureau) was a provincial fiscal bureau that had the stewardship of a bulk of the state-designated wealth in a given province. Moreover, one of the primary duties of the Diyarbekir voyvoda was to administer the mukataa of the Diyarbekir Voyvodalığı. The mukataa of the Diyarbekir Voyvodalığı yielded the highest revenues in the province of Diyarbekir. In return for this service, the voyvodos attained an annual salary (Salzmann, 2003: 128-31).
Table 2.14 Revenues of the Diyarbekir Voyvodalığı, 1797-8 (in Kurş81)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Customs (Gümruk)</td>
<td>97490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dye House Dues (Boyahane)</td>
<td>35000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales Tax (Damga)</td>
<td>33550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Rent (Arsa)</td>
<td>34000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen’ Dues (İhtisab)</td>
<td>8344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>208384</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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81 In the years 1690-1844, 1 kurş equalled to 120 akçes or 40 paras (Pamuk, 1994: 967).
Chapter 3

The Transformation of Ottoman Kurdistan: Underdevelopment in Ottoman Kurdistan in the Age of Centralisation, Westernisation and Crisis (1800-1914)

3.1 Overview

During the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries, the economic penetration of Europe into the Ottoman Empire deepened, and the Ottoman state had increasingly diminished its relative international position as well as territorial possessions. Inevitably, these and other significant changes, which will be deliberated below, in the Ottoman social, economic and political life had major implications for the socio-economic and political structures and processes in Ottoman Kurdistan. In this introductory section, as background to the ensuing analysis of the social and economic manifestations in Ottoman Kurdistan, the thesis will briefly outline the pivotal events that surfaced in this region in the years prior to the First World War.

The nineteenth century was a time of astounding change in Ottoman Kurdistan. In the first half of this century, the age-old Kurdish administrative structures established in the early sixteenth century foundered. The abolition of the Kurdish polities, which hitherto preserved their infrastructure despite intermittently being suppressed by the Ottoman state in the preceding three centuries, was a derivative of the re-centralisation and westernisation policies unleashed by the reforms of Sultan Mahmut II and continued by subsequent Ottoman reformers: the Tanzimat statesmen, Sultan Abdülhamid II (1842-1918) and the Young Turks. The centralist restructuring policies, alongside a series of other political and military goals elucidated below, aimed to eradicate the increasing powers of the local notables, who accumulated fiscal or landed power because of the experiment in delegating tax collection and the levying of troops to local elites during the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire. The
concentration of fiscal and landed wealth in the hands of the locally powerful elements had forced the central government to recognise their power and to confirm formally their status. Relatedly, although the Ottoman state oversaw their functions, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the strong Kurdish emirates were almost in complete control of their own internal affairs. Such changes, as described by McDowall, were not only witnessed in the ‘further flung areas of the empire; all over the Anatolia, let alone in Kurdistan, local derebeys (or ‘valley lords’), themselves theoretically holding military fiefs, turned their fiefdoms into hereditary holdings failing to submit the requisite taxes to the capital’ (2000: 40) (See Map 9).

This process enabled locally powerful groups, comparatively free from the supervision of the central authority, to respond to increasing opportunities of commodity production for long-distance markets by carving out large estates for themselves and by escalating the exploitation of the dependent peasantry. The signing of the Sened-i İttifak in 1808 represented the zenith of local notables or ayan as the then Sultan, Selim III (1761-1808), was obliged to officially consent to devolution of state power to local potentates, among them the Kurdish notables, who derived their power from local sources.

The successor of Sultan Selim III, Mahmut II, recognised that in order to rescue the ramshackle Empire from further demise or collapse he would have to reform its institutions and oust the unreceptive elements of government. The centralist reforms implemented by Mahmut II and the succeeding Ottoman rules entailed the suppression of the local notables all over the Empire and occasioned the destruction of the Kurdish emirates. Local Kurdish hereditary rulers were ejected and the Kurdish territories were brought under direct Ottoman control. In other words, the toppling of the Kurdish polities and the suppression of the fiscal and landed power of the Kurdish notables went hand in hand.
Map 9
Provincial power-holders in Anatolia and the Balkans, 1790-1820
Reşid Muhammad Pasha\(^{82}\), and Hafiz Mehmed Pasha, who replaced Muhammad Pasha in 1836, played an active role in the eradication of Kurdish emirates (Jwaideh, 1961: 148-49, McDowall, 2000: 43-5). In 1834, Reşid Muhammad Pasha, formerly the Grand Vizier of Mahmud II and governor of Sivas at the time, mobilised a substantial army with the particular task of suppressing the Kurdish emirates. His initial target was the Kurdish ruler, Mir Muhammad of Rawanduz (1783-c.1840), who by the early 1830s established control and maintained a level of law and order that had been unknown for generations over a territory bounded by the Upper and Lower Zab Rivers, the Tigris and the Iranian border. As Rashid Muhammad Pasha entered Soran territory and approached the Rawanduz valley, forces from Mosul and Baghdad that were mobilised by the Vali of Baghdad, Ali Riza Pasha, and the Vali of Mosul, Muhammad Pasha Ince Bayrakdar, joined him. As a result, the powerful Pasha of Rawanduz was captured and removed to Istanbul.

In addition to ousting Mir Muhammad in 1836, Reşid Pasha’ campaign in Ottoman Kurdistan succeeded to put an end to the revolt in Mardin which began in 1833, suppressed the rebellious Milli tribal confederation\(^{83}\) in Upper Mesopotamia, and subjugated the Sasun-Motkan region within the same year (Jwaideh, 1961: 149-50). Yet, from the perspective of the Ottoman rulers, the most momentous achievement of this two-year campaign in Ottoman Kurdistan had been the suppression of the 300-year-old hükümts of Hani, Hazro, Ilicak and Silvan. Their inhabitants were burnt and their rulers were exiled (Aydin and Verheij, 2012: 31-2).

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\(^{82}\) Reshid Muhammad Pasha, who was of Georgian origin, held the rank of Marshal of the East in the Ottoman Army (Jwaideh, 1961: 148).

\(^{83}\) The milli were a confederation of Kurdish aşirets, divided in two branches. The Timavizade branch living around Viranşehir and a second branch inhabiting between Resulayn and Mardin. Millis were largely semi-nomads. The Timavizade also practiced agriculture. Aşirets are in this study (i) are specified by their regional or, to be precise, the Middle Eastern context and their pastoral-nomadic character, determined by the necessity of transhumance and (ii) is predominantly a construction on the basis of common political and economic goal and thus it is different to the ‘tribe’, which denotes kinship ties/groups of hunter-gatherers or agriculturalists in African American, Asian or Oceanic environments, to the extent that common descent is somewhat fictive (Aydin and Verheij, 2012: 16, 26).
After the defeat of the Mir of Rawanduz, the last supreme chief to present a stern challenge to the centralist Ottoman reformers was the ruler of the Botan emirate, Bedirhan Bey (1802-1868). Bedirhan Bey had succeeded to his principality in 1820-21. He was a member of the prominent Bedirhani family who descended from the ancient Azizan family mentioned in the Şerefname. The Bedirhani family enjoy a distinctive place in Kurdish history for producing numerous Kurdish nationalists after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, whom will be analysed below.

The power accumulated by Bedirhan Bey during his rule had surpassed the authority of many of the authorities in the region (Özoğlu, 2004: 70). At the peak of his rule in the 1830s, an American traveller with the following words described his power:

‘[Bedirhan Beys’ power] extend[ed] from the Persian line on the east to far into Mesopotamia on the west, and from the gates of Diarbekr to those of Mosul; and his fame was widespread […] Every chief in Northern Koordistan came to make their respects to him […] Even the Hakkary Bey, higher in rank, and once more powerful than he’ (Jwaideh, 1961: 183).

In virtue of his cooperation with the Ottoman authorities and owing to the influence he wielded in Kurdistan (McDowall, 2000: 45, Aydin and Verheij, 2012: 33), Bedirhan Bey avoided the suppressive actions of Rashid Pasha in this region during 1834-36.

The relationship between Bedirhan Bey and the Ottoman state remained relatively peaceful until 1842. The Emir of Botan, however, was very disconcerted by the new centralist administrative arrangements of the Ottoman administration in the following five years and revolted against the Ottoman state in 1847. According to the new system, the Botan emirate would remain in Diyarbekir Province, but Cizre, a subdistrict in the Botan emirate and the seat of the Bedirhan administration, would be attached to Mosul. Although it was an arduous

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84 A controversy does exist about the exact year of Bedirhan’s coming to power; some of the sources suggest that the year ‘was 1821’ (Jwaideh, 1961: 176) or ‘about 1820’ (McDowall, 2000: 45), while others claim the period between 1835-38 was the period he established himself as the emir of the emirate of Botan (Özoğlu, 2004:70).
task, a heavily armed Ottoman military was successful in defeating the revolt. Bedirhan was captured and sent to Istanbul in 1847. Subsequently, the campaign was described in the official newspaper of the Ottoman state, *Takvim-i Vakayi*, as ‘reconquering of Kurdistan’ (issue 345 in Kürdoloji Çalışmalar Grubu, 2011: 27), and a ‘Medal of Kurdistan’ was issued by the state to those who had fought against the Bedirhan Revolt (Özoğlu, 2004: 71). The official designation of the campaign neatly epitomises the rationale for suppressing the Kurdish polity in Botan and other Kurdish emirates.

As part of the task of ‘reconquering’ Kurdistan, the Ottoman state established a new administrative unit and entitled it *Kürdistan Eyaleti* (Kurdistan Province). As it is evident in the *irade* (imperial order) cited below wherein the idea of creating the *Kürdistan Eyaleti* was explicated, this new administrative formation was formed with the aim of establishing direct control over Kurdistan, rather than recognising Kurdistan as a political entity. The imperial order of 1846 contains a letter from the office of Grand Vizier on 6 May 1846 that reads:

‘The commander of the Anadolu army, illustrious Müşir Pasha, had some observations regarding the future of Kurdistan region, which was saved—perhaps reconquered—from brigands (*eşkıya*). To present the requirement to, and to request permission from, the Sultan, two days ago his excellency Serasker Pasha, Fethi Pasha, the above-mentioned Müşir Pasha, Nazır Efendi, and the undersecretary met in the grans vizier’s Residence (*Bab-ı Ali*). Müşir Pasha firstly stated that the village of Harput…although it is a suitable place to station the army, is peripheral to the headquarters of the army. On the other hand, Ahlat—which is located on the other shore of Lake Van, and has suitable weather and fertile soil, and is located at the centre of the Imperial Army (*Ordu-yu Hümayun*)—is, unlike Harput, close to the Iranian and Russian borders. *Ahlat provides better transportation and logistical support and is located in the heart of Kurdistan, where the Kurds can be better controlled with the iron fist (*pençe-i satvet*), which proves to be necessary.* Therefore, it is
suggested to the exalted Sultan that Ahlat should become the headquarters of the Anadolu army. The appropriate action should be taken pending the Sultan’s approval …

The second point of Müşir Pasha related to the administrative structure of Kurdistan. According to the pasha, the Kurdistan region was conquered to provide security and order to the region. Diyarbakir province (eyalet) and Van, Muş, and Hakkari districts (sancak) and Cizre, Botan and Mardin sub-districts (kaza) should be united under the name of Eyalet-i Kürdistan.  

The Sultan approved the request in 1847, and for the first time in the history of the Ottoman Empire the term Kurdistan, which up until then used as geographical expression, was baptised to an administrative unit (Özoğlu, 2004: 61). Eyalet-i Kürdistan was short-lived, however. In the Devlet Salname of 1867, the name ‘Kürdistan’ was substituted by ‘Diyarbakir’ (ibid.: 62).

From the time of the defeat of Bedirhan Bey in 1847 to the outbreak of the Turco-Russian war of 1877-78, there had not been a powerful Kurdish ruler in the region. This power vacuum within the Kurdish society, originating from the eradication of the Kurdish emirates, led to rise of the religious sheikhs belonging to Naqshanbdî and Qadiriyya dervish orders, or tariqas, as they virtually were the only figures to mediate between tribal leaders. Capitalising on their religious prestige to act as intermediaries in inter-communal clashes, as well presenting themselves as defenders of the Islamic order, resulted with the sheikhs accumulating extreme economic and political power (van Bruinessen, 1992: 210-32).

After the Turco-Russian war, Sheikh Ubeydullah (1831-1883) of the venerated Şemdinan family had filled the political and military vacuum and assumed Kurdish leadership not only

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85 B.A., Mesail-i Mühimme, 1310 translated by and adopted from Özoğlu (2004:60-1). The bold italics belong to me.
86 The Şemdinan family were one of the greatest Naqshbandi families in Ottoman Kurdistan. Their prestige and popularity was due to the religious genealogy prior to the nineteenth century: the Şemdinans belonged to the Khallidiyya branch of the Naqshbandi tariqa, which unlike some of the rival Sufi orders at the time had firm
in Ottoman Kurdistan, but also in Iran. His political rule extended over a vast region that was formerly controlled by the Botan, Bahdidan, Hakkari and Ardalan tribal confederacies, so much so that the sheikh was described by Henry Trotter (1841-1919), British consul-general at Erzurum, in 1880 as ‘the most influential man in Eastern Kurdistan’.\(^{87}\) The following critical and depictive verses of the late nineteenth century Kurdish poet, Hacî Qadîrê Koyî (1817-1897), is also testimony to the dominance, as well as negative ramifications, of Sheikhs and Sufi dervish orders in Ottoman Kurdistan after the fall of the emirates:

\textit{Khanaqah} and \textit{Sheikh} and \textit{Tekke} all\(^{88}\),

What is their benefit, tell me,
What is the benefit of teaching laziness,
And collecting treasure and lands,
They do not test them once,
Understand, its poison nay opium,
If you rub them [the Sheikhs] like gold,
You will come to know whether they are highwaymen or guides,
Don’t beg sheikhs and alike,
No one gives sustenance to another,
This one [The Sheikhs] is busy with symbolism, coyness and wishing,
While the science of Europe has reached the impossible.\(^{89}\)

The influential revolt led by Sheikh Ubeydullah in 1880\(^{90}\) typified the rise of the sheikhs to supremacy in Ottoman Kurdish society. Assembling 220 tribal leaders and their supporters in

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87 Great Britain: Parliamentary Papers, Accounts and Papers (hereafter, A&P) (1881), [Paper no. C.2851], [Vol.361], p. 16. (Henceforth all of the citations from A&P will be in the latterly stated format: session / paper number / volume number/ page number).

88 \textit{Khanaqah} and \textit{Tekke} denote venues used for gathering of dervish orders.

89 Hacî Qadîrê Koyî poem entitled ‘\textit{Udeba çak a}’ written sometime in between 1895-1897 in Bajalan (2013: 10).
Şemdinan, Ubeydullah formed the ‘Kurdish Tribal League’. In 1880, Sheikh of Nehri invaded the northwestern territories of Persia, allegedly in the name of the Kurdish nation. In the message he sent to William Abbot, the British Consul-General in Tabriz, the sheikh outlines the purpose of this incursion with the following words:

‘The Kurdish nation…is a people apart. Their religion is different, and their laws and customs are distinct…the Chiefs and Rulers of Kurdistan, whether Turkish or Persian subjects and inhabitants of Kurdistan, one and all are united and agreed that matters cannot be carried on in this way with the two Governments [Ottoman and Persian], and that necessarily something must be done, so that European Governments having understood the matter shall inquire into our state. We also are a nation apart. We want our affair to be in our own hands.’

As the phraseology of the epistle above exhibits, it was not merely in terms of religious leadership but also with regard to the explicit employment of nationalist discourse that this revolt diverged from preceding Kurdish upheavals. For this reason, the Ubeydullah revolts is conceived by some scholars such as Wadie Jwaideh, as the origin of Kurdish nationalist struggle. This viewpoint is, however, disputed by Özoğlu on the grounds that it was a ‘trans-tribal revolt than a nationalist revolt’ motivated by Ubeydullah’s desire to be ‘the ruler of Greater Kurdistan’ (2004: 76). Regardless of whether Kurdish nationalism was the prime instigator of the sheikh and his supporters, the distinctive aspect of this rebellion was that it drew upon the bourgeoning discourse of nationalism to appropriate and promote his actions; a sign of the permeation of capitalism and western ideologies in Kurdistan. All the same, Sheikh Ubeydullah’ militias were defeated by the joint operation of Persian and Ottoman

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90 The rebellion was organised partially in protest of the suppressive policies implemented by the Ottoman state as per its obligations under Article LXI of the Treaty of Berlin (1878): ‘the Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds’ (in Jwaideh, 1961: 282). And in part as a reaction to the perceived cavalier treatment of some of the tribal chiefs in the villages located on Ottoman-Safavid border by the local Persian authorities that had close links with Sheikh Ubeydullah (McDowall, 2000: 53).

91 FO 371/953, Barclay to Gray, 3/01/1910.
armies and upon his return to the Ottoman territories in 1881 the Ottoman authorities captured Ubeydullah. The Ottoman state exiled him to Istanbul and then to Hijaz. Thereafter, until the end of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman governors kept a close watch on Kurdistan and never allowed a strong Kurdish principality to emerge. Instead, particularly in the Hamidian period (1876-1909), the Sunni Kurdish aşiret or tribal forces were absorbed into the Ottoman military and the Kurdish nobility were largely resituated in Istanbul, where they could be controlled and manipulated.

Kurdish tribal sections were organised by the Ottoman state under the Hamidiya Cavalry (1891). The Hamidiya were an irregular mounted and proxy force in Eastern Anatolia initially created by Sultan Abdülhamid II from selected Sunni Kurdish tribes to provide bulwark against the Russian threat and incorporate the Sunni Muslim Kurds – who had constituted the majority of the Hamidiya – into the Ottoman state system. Sultan Abdülhamid also established Aşiret Mektepleri (Tribal Schools) in order to indoctrinate the children of Kurdish tribal leaders who remained in Kurdistan.

Inter-communal rifts and conflicts between the Kurds and the Armenians – which will be analysed in depth in the subsequent sections of this study – and between the Sunni Kurds and Alevi Kurds, reached its peak with the establishment of the Hamidiya force. The most notable example was the feud between the Alevi Khurmak and Sunni Jibrans. The former were a leading Alevi landowning family, while the latter were one of the strongest tribes of Kurdistan. The Jibrans had assassinated the Khurmak chief Ibrahim Talu in 1894 and his son 12 years later (McDowall, 2000: 185). After the overthrow of the Abdülhamid regime by the CUP in 1908, the Hamidiya regiments were organised under the ‘Tribal Light Cavalry Regiments’. Despite the change in appellation, the purpose imputed to Tribal Cavalry Regiments remained unchanged (Burkay, 2008 [1992]: 399-411).
As can be inferred from the above events, the suppression of the long-standing Kurdish polities wrought not only years of war to Ottoman Kurdistan, but also prompted a power vacuum and, in turn, a reduction in law and order in most parts of ESA. Besides fostering the removal of the Kurdish administrative units, violent encounters between the Kurds and the Ottoman state all over Kurdistan, stripped the Kurds of their indigenous political structures, empowered the traditionalist elements within Kurdish society, and fuelled unprecedented inter-communal conflicts in this region.

With the elimination of the Kurdish rulers and dissolution of the emirates, their constituent parts, tribal confederations and aşirets, became the most important political and social components in Kurdistan. Thus, rather paradoxically, in the wake of the modernisation reforms of the nineteenth century, a multitude of antagonistic Kurdish tribes were activated or empowered as political and social actors. Up to the second of half of the nineteenth century, in spite of their existence, tribal structures had a subsidiary position in power relations. After the Ottoman state’ policy of centralisation, however, according to the nineteenth century French traveller Ubicini, some ‘1,000 independent [tribal] entities’ (Celil, 1992: 121) replaced the few dozens of former autonomous or semi-autonomous Kurdish polities. In sum, modernisation policies gave birth to a period of immense insecurity in Ottoman Kurdistan and, ironically, deepened the feudalisation of Kurdish society.

The centralist reforms of Mahmut II led also to the destruction of the Janissary corps in 1826, which in addition to being an act with a political purpose – i.e. the removal of military opposition to military reform – also had economic and social significance. As rightly noted by Quataert, ‘[t]he sultan’s actions in 1826 disarmed the urban guildsmen and eliminated the most powerful and best-organized advocates of protectionism. Thus, the 1826 event paved the way for the subsequent evolution of Ottoman economic liberalism’ (1994: 764).
The Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1838 signed between the Ottoman government and Britain was the next step. In accordance with this Convention, British traders were permitted to import goods into the Ottoman Empire upon the payment of a five per cent ad valorem duty. As for exports from the Empire, traders were allowed to export Ottoman goods upon payment of a twelve per cent charge. The signing of this Convention had marked the beginning of a major increase in trade between the Ottoman Empire and Europe. British exports to the Empire, for example, ‘increased from about one million pounds sterling in 1827 to over two and half million pound sterling in 1849; the British imports from the empire consisted of agricultural produce and livestock products, such as mohair, wool, cotton, sheep, carpets, opium, raisins and figs’ (Jafar, 1976: 49).

The Convention of 1838 and the event of 1826 further integrated the Ottoman and European economies, and the 1839 and 1856 Reform edicts more closely aligned Middle Eastern polities with Western political structures as a result of the following major political-administrative trends in the Tanzimat period (Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 40):

1. the abolishment of the existing system of tax-farming and the creation of a monetised and rationalised system to levy taxes;
2. the secularisation and formalisation of education and of the administration of justice;
3. the functional differentiation of branches of government;
4. an increasing division of the powers of government leading to the establishment of an Ottoman parliament and an Ottoman constitution;
5. a differentiation of the means of physical force according to the separate realms of internal and external security;
6. the introduction of a new system of provincial administration.
During the re-centralisation and westernisation period, the Ottoman Empire felt one of the greatest threats from its ambitious northern neighbour, Russia, which in 1828, after inflicting a series of military and political humiliations during the second half of the eighteenth century, gained principalities as far as the Danube, and penetrated Eastern Anatolian as far as Erzurum in 1829. Kars, Erzurum and Bayazid were all returned to the Ottomans under the terms of the Treaty of Edirne (1829), but ‘the war had struck an entirely new note of danger [as] not only had the Ottoman Armenians assisted the Russian capture of Kars, but Muslim Kurdish tribes had also provided a regiment against the Sultan’ (McDowall, 2000: 39). Such threats from Russia and the novel alliances between the Kurds and the Russians had also been influential in informing the policies of the Hamidian period.

At the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century, the Crimean War (1853-56) broke out between the Ottomans and the Russians. The former, in order to meet its mounting military expenditures, contracted a number of loans with various Western European countries. The terms of these loans were very harmful to Ottoman finance and economy. In 1854, the first of these loans of three million pounds sterling was set at a six per cent annual interest rate. In 1855, 1858, 1860, 1862, 1863, 1865 (two loans), 1869, 1870, 1871, 1872, 1873, and 1874, new loans were contracted on similar terms to the one of 1854 (Lutsky, 1969: 319). By 1874, the total sum of these loans was 212 million pounds sterling, of which the Ottoman government actually received only 120,480,000 pounds, that is, 56.8 per cent of the nominal value of these loans (ibid.). Sixteen years after the first loan in 1854, the Ottoman state found itself completely dependent on foreign loans, while debt servicing consumed one-third of its treasury income (Zürcher, 1994: 67-8). Increasing integration in the

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92 In 1769, Russian forces pushed across the Danube, occupying Bucharest and destroying an Ottoman army at Kartal in 1770. The subsequent year, Russia destroyed the Ottoman fleet, leaving the entire Eastern Mediterranean seaboard undefended. In 1774, it occupied Crimea, gaining access to the Black Sea. These mortifications were set out in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, 1774. Although Russia withdrew from the Danube provinces and both parties recognised the independence of the Khanate of Crimea, it was clear that these two regions now fell within Russia’s orbit. Crimea was directly annexed in 1779 (McDowall, 2000:48).
capitalist world market, based on the disadvantageous terms of trade for the Ottoman economy and unsuccessful attempts to reform the financial administration of the Empire led to the fiscal crisis in 1870s. Following these turbulent events, the intra-Ottoman struggle between protectionists and pro-free trade forces continued while, as accentuated by Quataert (1997: 762-65), the basic commitment of the Ottoman polity to integration with the European economy remained intact until the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. The Ottoman state accepted the Public Debt Administration in 1881, which assured Western investors that the integration process would ensue without risking their investments. The Public Debt Administration was established as a result of the negotiations following the Ottoman fiscal crisis in 1870s, when the Ottoman states ability to pay its international loans was in doubt. Hence, the Ottoman leadership had it to agree to the rescheduling of these debts and to the formation of the Debt Administration, which represented the European creditors, for their collection. Moreover, the 1908 Young Turk Revolution provided a different kind of reassurance to their European counterparts. The 1908 Revolution entailed more than solely a reaction to the absolutism of Sultan Abdülhamid and territorial losses, because the emerging bureaucratic and military cadres launched their coup against a background of mounting social unrest: the taxpayers’ revolt and numerous labour strikes, among others, the 1908 strike at Ergani Copper Mine in Diyarbekir, and violence during the half-decade prior to the revolution.93 The Young Turks ‘seized power and prevented the spread of social revolution; thus, they circumscribed the kind of changes that would occur’ (ibid.: 1994: 765). However, in the years between the 1908 Young Turk Revolution and the First World War, the proponents of a protected ‘national economy’ finally triumphed over the advocates of free trade, a theme explored in-depth in the succeeding chapter.

93 For an exploration of the labour disputes in this period, see: Yıldırım (2013) and Zürcher and Quataert (eds.) (1995).
3.2 Social Structures

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the European provinces held the majority of the population but thereafter, as demonstrated by the Ottoman population figures tabulated in Table 3.1, the share of the European provinces gradually contracted. Owing to the rapid territorial losses in the last quarter of the century, the Balkans’ share of the total Ottoman population fell drastically, which gradually shifted the demographic centre of the Empire steadily towards Anatolia. For instance, during 1844-56, the Balkan lands contained forty three per cent of all Ottoman subjects (Table 3.1), whereas in the last census of the Empire in 1906, the Ottoman government found that only twenty three per cent of its citizens resided in Europe: 4.9 of a total 20.9 million (Karpat, 1985: 35).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Balkan</th>
<th>Anatolia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1844-56</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>40.0—without Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872-74</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>29.0—without Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40.0—without Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>29.0—without Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20.9—without Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>21.0—without Egypt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The majority of the Ottomans lived in the countryside and resultanty, rural dwellers constituted around 80 per cent of the total population. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the relative urban-rural distribution changed. Between 1840 and 1913, the proportion of Ottoman urban dwellers had risen from seventeen to twenty two per cent (Quataert, 1994: 780-81, Issawi, 1980: 33-5). As argued by Quataert, the domestic market for Ottoman agriculture products increased commensurately and, to some extent, so did that of local manufacturers (1994: 781).
As the figures tabulated in Table 3.2 exhibit, during 1830-1912, Izmir and Istanbul increased in size. These port towns owed their demographic growth to the European trade. The expansion of the port communities in turn helps explain the expanding proportion of Ottomans living in the coasts. On the other hand, other cities, such as the predominantly Kurdish Diyarbekir in Anatolia and Edirne in Europe, as observed by Issawi (1980: 34-5) and Owen (1981: 24-5), respectively fell some 20 to 25 per cent over the same period owing to wars and/or secular shifts in trade route.

A demographic development that is often undetected in the scholarships on urbanisation in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century is that, with the exclusion of Diyarbekir, other cities in ESA, such as Bitlis, Muş, Erzurum, Urfa and Van, had increased their population more than other Eastern and Southeastern domains of Trabzon, Samsun and Adana (see Table 3.2). Additionally, populace figures for towns prepared by Vital Cuinet (1833-1896) based on Salnames94 and additional population estimates95 (Table 3.3), suggest that provinces in or on the borders of Ottoman Kurdistan, namely, Diyarbekir, Mamûratüllâzîz and Halep, when compared with other provinces in Anatolia, such as Adana, Trabzon, Kastamonu and Konya, had similar urban population densities during the late nineteenth century.

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94 Salnames are state and provincial yearbooks published by the Ottoman State between the years 1847-1918.
95 Cuinet does not specify the sources of his figures, however, it is postulated that he has made use of a ‘wide variety of sources’: various ‘Ottoman Provincial Salnames’ and ‘population censuses’ for the year 1300’ (1881-1893) (Behar, 2003: 45).
Table 3.2 Population of selected Ottoman towns, 1830-1912 (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town/City</th>
<th>1830s-40s</th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1912</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edirne</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izmir</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursa</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sivas</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samsun</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trabzon</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbekir</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urfa</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitlis</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antep</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muş</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.3 Population estimates of selected Ottoman towns, 1890 (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konya</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbekir</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamüretülaziz</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halep</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trabzon</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kastamonu</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cuinet, 1890.

When compared with the minimal official demographic data in the pre-nineteenth century

Ottoman Kurdistan, owing to the existence of the censuses from 1831 onwards, there is more

information regarding the populace of this region of the Empire in the nineteenth century.

The utility and veracity of the demographic details provided for Kurdistan in these official

sources are highly questionable, however. The maiden 1831 ‘Census’ did not include

principal provinces of Diyarbekir, Erzurum and Van (Behar, 1996: 23-5). Similarly, the
contemporaries had received the data in the Ottoman Census of 1844 – which has been habitually employed to attain estimates of the populace of this region in the early nineteenth century – with scepticism. For instance, in 1870, the British Consul John George Taylor reporting from the Consular District of Kurdistan, refers to the following deficiencies of the Census of 1844 and, alternatively, outlines the invaluable findings of his eight years long research in Kurdistan, which provide a comparatively more accurate and detailed demographic picture of this region:

‘The data I give are merely the results of constant travel, careful inquiry, and research, noted day by day during an eight years’ residence in the viallets of Erzeroom and Diabekr, composing the Consular district of Koordistan…The imperfect Turkish Census of 1844, as quoted by M. V. Heuschling, an official of the Belgian Ministry of the Interior, in his “Empire de la Turquie”, published in 1860, gives, as the population for the district of Erzeroom, Diabekr, Kharput, 1,700,000 souls. From all I have been able to collect, the actual amount in 1868 was 2,314,000, namely—

In the Erzeroom Vilayet…1,230,700
In the Diabekr Vilayet, including Kharput…1,083,000

Divided into the following races and creeds:

Table 3.4 The Ethnic and Religious Composition of Diyarbekir, Erzurum and Harput according to the Consul Taylor’s figures in 1868 (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/District</th>
<th>Turks</th>
<th>Kurds</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Yezidis</th>
<th>Qızılbaş (Kurds)</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
<th>Chechens</th>
<th>Terrek Iman (A Shiah Sect)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbekir</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharput</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>442</strong></td>
<td><strong>848</strong></td>
<td><strong>649</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>200</strong></td>
<td><strong>118</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: A&P, 1871, ‘Report on the Condition of Industrial Classes’ in Kurdistan), C.414, LXVIII, p. 794.\(^{96}\)

\(^{96}\) The table is part of the text cited above and ends the quote.
Official Ottoman statistics – as it is apparent with the data attained from the 1881/82-1893 Census that is tabulated in Table 3.5 below – had classed Kurdish, Turkish and Arabic-speaking Muslims together. Consequently, it is not always possible to extrapolate the proportional distribution of the different ethnic groups of the Muslim populace from the data provided in the official sources. Moreover, it is also not feasible to infer from the below summarised Ottoman censuses the figures of nomads and the individuals who are associates of the heterodox sects: Alevi (Qızılbaş) and Yezidi. In spite of these shortcomings, the data from the Ottoman Census of 1881/82-1893 does provide us with an estimate of the populace in Ottoman Kurdistan on the eve of the twentieth century.

Table 3.5 The ethno-religious composition of various provinces of Ottoman Kurdistan, Ottoman Census of 1881/82-1893

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Greek</th>
<th>Armenian</th>
<th>Bulgarian</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Foreign Nationals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbekir</td>
<td>289,591</td>
<td>1,166</td>
<td>46,823</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>9,793</td>
<td>1,051</td>
<td>4,021</td>
<td>16,552</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Registered Population: 369,070</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>445,548</td>
<td>3,356</td>
<td>101,138</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>6,630</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,940</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Registered Population: 558,925</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitlis</td>
<td>167,054</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>101,358</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>4,948</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Registered Population: 276,998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van</td>
<td>59,412</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>60,448</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Registered Population: 119,860</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elazığ</td>
<td>360,636</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>72,378</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>1,915</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,371</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Registered Population: 381,346</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Employment and Trade Data

The aforementioned extensive research by Consul Taylor in Kurdistan also provides a unique compendium of the occupations and trades of the inhabitants in the three predominantly Kurdish Eastern provinces of the Empire during the late nineteenth century. According to the findings of the British consul (Table 3.6), the agriculturalists constituted, like in other parts of the Empire, the bulk of the labouring classes in this region. At the time, their labour formed ‘more than one-half the sum derived from every source of taxation or impost’ in the provinces of Diyarbekir, Erzurum and Harput. Agriculturalists, in order of density, were followed by the pastorals, small traders, hand-loom workers (i.e. silk and/or cotton weavers), artisans (i.e. carpenters, masons, smiths, tanners and dyers), government employees, millers and Jewish peddlars.

Table 3.6 Occupations and Trades of the inhabitants of Diyarbekir, Erzurum and Harput according to the Consul Taylor’s figures c.1860

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Able-bodied Man exercising Trades</th>
<th>Working Adults helping the same</th>
<th>Remaining Members of Family, and Women and Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hand-loom Works</td>
<td>11,700</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>52,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millers</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisans</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jew Pedlars</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in Government Employ</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mollas, proprietors, Shop-keepers, and Small traders</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>98,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculturists</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastorals</td>
<td>109,800</td>
<td>109,800</td>
<td>439,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>365,500</strong></td>
<td><strong>318,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,494,200</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As rightly emphasised by Quataert, owing to the non-existence of an empire-wide ethno-religious division of labour, ‘neither agriculture nor industry were confined to areas of Christian, or for that matter Muslim, demographic predominance’. Christians, Jews and Muslims were present in all sectors and classes, and social stratification in Ottoman society was devoid of a coincidence of social class and ethno-religious origin. Thus, despite nineteenth century contemporaries habitually ‘reserving diligence to the Christians and aloof indifference to Muslims, these stereotypes do not bear close scrutiny; instead, we find
enterprising Muslim and Christian cultivators and manufacturers everywhere’ (Quataert, 1994: 783). Or, to put it somewhat differently, the oft-cited truism – particularly with regard to the Eastern provinces – that the Muslims were nomads or farmers whilst the Armenians were entrepreneurs or manufacturers, is misleading as it does not posit an accurate observation of the multifarious nature of the provincial and empire-wide economy and social classes. Consequently, in the Eastern quarters or elsewhere in the Empire, ‘we search in vain, if we seek religion (or ethnicity) as the key to Ottoman economic activity’ (ibid.).

As cogently expounded by Hilmar Kaiser (1997), the origins of the ‘Ottoman ethnic division of labour’ hypothesis lies in the essay of a German journalist/propagandist, Alphons Sussnitzki, entitled ‘Zur Gliederung wirtschaftlicher Arbeit nach Nationalitäten in der Türkei’ (On the division of labour according to nationality in Turkey), published in Archiv für Wirtschaftsforschung im Orient in 1917. In brief, this essay has two main contentions regarding pre-First World War Ottoman Empire: i) professions were each largely dominated by members of one racial group; and ii) Armenian and Greeks, through usury and the exploitation of foreign imperialist protection, had abused Turkish tolerance and controlled nearly all trade and obstructed the development of other nationalities (Kaiser, 1997: 29-31). In other words, Sussnitzki’s analysis, as accentuated by Kaiser, ‘integrated a number of the familiar stereotypes: that Armenians were the political allies of Germany’s enemies and that they played a negative role within the Ottoman economy. Accordingly, the author stressed the basic convergence of Ottoman Turkish and German interests’ (ibid.: 32). In this study, following Quataert (1996, 1994) and Kaiser (1997), it will be argued that in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Ottoman Empire, there was no ethno-religious division of labour, and the representative of all nations and religions were present in all sectors of employment and trade.

\[98\] For a critical exploration of this thesis, see: Kaiser (1997) and Quataert (1996).
3.3 Agriculture

From its birth to its demise following the First World War, the Ottoman Empire had been an agrarian empire. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ‘four-fifths’ of the Ottoman population lived on the land and drew some portion of their livelihoods from the soil (Eldem, 1970: 44). In an Empire where agriculture was the dominant form of economic activity, the control of the land as an important means of production can naturally be conceived as one of the most important factors affecting the relations of production, class structure, and the mechanisms of the articulation of the local structures with the larger structures. This explains why the role and influence of the Kurdish notables over agricultural land and surplus in the predominantly Kurdish provinces in ESA is commonly set as one of the central themes of enquiry by scholarships investigating socio-economic and political developments in this region.

The prevailing view in these scholarly articles is that the centuries-long autonomy of the Kurdish rulers remained uninterrupted during the nineteenth century, despite the centralisation policies of the Ottoman state. As neatly summarised by Heper, common scholarly wisdom has held that ‘since the enactment of the Land Code in 1858, large tracts of land were concentrated in the hands of a few local notables, particularly in the east and southeast of Turkey, [who] have not been interested in increasing productivity in agriculture’ (2007: 5). Therefore, alongside transportation or communication barriers, which are discussed extensively in the subsequent section of this study, the unbroken autonomy of the ‘disinterested’ Kurdish notables, as well as the pervasiveness of the lord-peasant bond, during and after the nineteenth century is generally accepted to have hindered the i) expansion of agricultural productivity and ii) economic development of this region. Owing to minimal industrial development during the Ottoman period, agricultural resources and productivity are the main source and measure of economic development. Below, by examining the evolution
of patterns of land ownership in Ottoman Kurdistan during 1800-1908, the correlation between patterns of land ownership, agricultural productivity and economic development in this region of the Empire will be explored.

The Limitations of the 19th Century Ottoman Land Statistics

Prior to analysing the data pertaining to the land regime and agricultural activities in Ottoman Kurdistan, it is worth noting that during the nineteenth century land statistics and quantitative information regarding agricultural production, unlike the previous centuries, were irregularly and poorly recorded and kept. We are made aware of this lacuna in the below quoted consular report drafted in 1869 by the British consul, Consul William Gifford Palgrave (1826-1888), whose reports have often been utilised by the academic literature dealing with agriculture in Ottoman lands:

‘Land statistics were formerly not ill-kept in the Ottoman Empire, and from what has been preserved of them in history and treatise, we are able to form tolerably clear idea of the conditions of land tenure, cultivation, proprietorship, serfage, and the like…in the anarchical condition of Constantinople during the troubled reigns of Seleen III and Mustapha IV (A.D. 1789-1808), the State records of the Empire were ill-kept, perished, or were dispensed beyond recovery, and the reforms of Mahmood II and Abd-el Mejeed did little to fill up the gap. Even at present, though personal statistics receive some degree of attention, land statistics are neglected; what little is accurately kept remains unpublished.’ 99 Due to the aforementioned deficiencies and limitations of the Ottoman sources, the ensuing assessment of agriculture in nineteenth century Ottoman Kurdistan will largely be based on the data presented in the consular reports prepared by British diplomats who had regularly reported on events from different parts of Kurdistan from 1850s onwards. The data recorded in the British

consular report make it very valuable, and at times the only source of information for understanding manifestations in the sphere of agricultural in nineteenth century Ottoman Kurdistan. This said, the information in these reports rather than been treated as definite reflections of the agricultural patterns or trends in this region, will be taken as rough indicators of the actualities in this sphere.

However, after the turn of the nineteenth century, Ottoman statistics regarding Ottoman agriculture became available. The Ottoman Agricultural Census of 1913 and 1914 for what comprises the present-day Turkey followed the maiden Ottoman Agricultural Census of 1907/09. For the purposes of this study it is worth noting that the statistical information in these official documents, which generally constitute the quantitative basis of most studies and research regarding Ottoman agricultural productivity and economic development, do not provide a complete coverage of the predominantly Kurdish regions of the Empire. More precisely, the 1909 Census does not cover the Kars region. In addition to Kars, the census of 1913 did not cover the areas of Ağrı, Erzincan, Erzurum, Hakkari, Muş and Siirt. The census of 1914 omitted, along with the latterly mentioned areas, Bingöl, Bitlis, Urfa and Van (Güran, 1997: xxi). In consequence, when comparatively studying the state of agricultural production and yields in Ottoman Kurdistan with those of the other regions of the Empire on the eve of the First World War the thesis will not solely rely on the findings of the latterly mentioned censuses, but will also make use of alternate studies or research of Ottoman Agriculture.

**Agriculture in Ottoman Kurdistan, 1830-1876**

As described above, the centralisation policies of the Ottoman state during and after the 1830s had not only occasioned the obliteration of the semi-autonomous Kurdish administrative bodies, but had also resulted in the expropriation of large holdings of land that up until that point had been *de facto* properties of Kurdish notables. Contrary to what it is
habitually argued, the confiscation of large holdings of land from the Kurdish landed elite appears to have had unfavourable consequences for agricultural productivity in Kurdistan, and resulted in this region being relatively less affected by the world-market induced commercialisation of agriculture in the next four decades, predominantly because of two interrelated factors. The first of these factors is that after 1830s many of these confiscated lands were uncultivated owing to the neglect of these lands by the central state. The second factor is related to the inadequacies of the poverty-ridden peasants; with the absence of state support, peasants were not able to meet the demands of running the small estates/farms that they attained as result of the very partial distribution of land to small peasants after 1830.

The initial consular reports prepared by the British consul, Consul Willam Richard Holmes (1822-1882), in Ottoman Kurdistan during the 1850s, track the latterly mentioned changes in the ownership of land and highlight the negative ramifications of the centralist policies of the central state on the agriculture of this Ottoman domain. The dates of these reports, 1857-58, is particularly important; coming nearly two decades after the confiscation of large land holding and on the eve of the Land Code of 1858. In 1857, in a consular report on the conditions of Kurdistan Consul Holmes, who at the time was based in the province of Diyarbekir, notes the following informative changes:

‘The condition of the peasantry in general is extremely poor, and they seem on this account quite unable to cultivate the lands themselves. They therefore seek advances of money from the wealthier individuals of towns and villages...Land in this Pashalic [Kurdistan] can scarcely be said to have any value, as without artificial irrigation nothing can be produced, except wheat and barley, which are sown in the autumn or the very early spring. Formerly, the country was extensively irrigated, and covered with villages and cultivation, under the government of certain native Koordish families, who for years had ruled it...
Land in this Pashalic either belongs to the State...the Church, or to private individuals. That belonging to the State was acquired when the country was taken from Koordish Begs, by the confiscation of their possessions...Of these three categories of land freehold property is always the most flourishing...whereas the Crown and Church lands, particularly the latter, continually deteriorate.'100

In addition, in a survey on the land tenure in Kurdistan in 1858 on the eve of the Land Code of 1858 summarises the alterations that have taken place in this region of the Empire during the after the 1830s with the following words:

‘I. What are the different kinds of tenure of land and in what proportion are they, respectively, in use in your district?

About 20 years ago this part of Koordistan, which had previously been more nominally than really in the hands of the Turkish government, was wrested from the Koordish Beys, and the whole of the land, with the exception of some few parts the ownership of which was confirmed to its ancient proprietors, was confiscated to the Crown. Since then a portion has been sold and become private freehold property, a considerable portion is let as short leases of a year or two, a great deal has become Church property or “Vakouf”, but the greater part remains the property of the state and is waste and uncultivated…

III. What is the condition of vakouf and other public lands as compared with that of freehold property?

Every individual takes care of his own private property to the best of his ability but the vakouf and crown lands are entirely neglected…Consequently freehold property is usually in a much better condition than any public lands…

XI. Are large estates or small holdings predominant, and what are the causes which most affect the distribution of land?

Small holdings predominate.101

Erudite studies on the land tenure in the Ottoman Empire habitually hypothesise that the enactment of the Land Code of 1858 marked a watershed moment in agrarian relations and land ownership in the Empire. As universally agreed, the intended purpose of this code had been two-fold: a) the recognition of private ownership of land, and b) the demand by the central state that individuals possess a title deed to have legal use of miri land and thus to achieve complete registration; the state intended to survey all lands and give title deeds to those who controlled them. Scholars analysing the Land Code of 1858, nonetheless, have diverging views on its actual impacts. Some maintain the view that the code had been an instrument of the Ottoman government to reassert its fiscal domination over the peasantry (Baer, 1966; Jorgens, 2000). Others have insisted on its character as a facilitator that had transformed miri land into private property (Batatu, 1978). As outlined in Chapter 1, with regard to its implications on Ottoman Kurdistan, the latter view has been prevalent (Heper, 2007; Pamuk, 2010 [1987]; Sönmez, 1992 [1990]). The code’s role in facilitating for large tracts of land to be concentrated in the hands of the local notables in Ottoman Kurdistan and resultantly not being able to interrupt the autonomy of the Kurdish notables is dubitable. As can be deduced from the centralist policies of the Ottoman state, by the mid-nineteenth century the central authorities had toppled all of the existing semi-autonomous Kurdish emirates one after another, and thereafter kept a close eye on Kurdistan with the aim of preventing the creation of new autonomous Kurdish polities and elite. The Ottoman state was successful in achieving this aim through employing a trinity of complementary and sequential policies:

i) Establishing a supersized administrative entity, Eyalet-i Kürdistan, through which it had asserted direct control of this region;

ii) Suppressing any potential rivalry and demand for autonomy from the Kurdish notables, as evinced with the way it dealt with Sheikh Ubeydullah in the 1880s;

iii) Promoting small peasant production, since the peasant households were easier to tax than large landowners were, and the latter were more prone to posing political problems for the Ottoman state.

The information provided by the British consular, Consul Palgrave, regarding the land tenure in the Asiatic provinces\textsuperscript{102} of the Ottoman Empire in 1870 offers quantitative data for doubting the role of the Land Code of 1858 in enabling the Kurdish notables and other landlords in these regions to retrieve large holdings of land. The date of this report, 1869, is vital: it is prepared three decades after the seizure of large land holdings, and just over a decade after the Land Code of 1858. The extensive survey conducted by Palgrave in Kurdistan, Anatolia, Syria and Iraq forms the basis of this survey.

According to the measurements provided by Consul Palgrave, the Asiatic provinces had a total surface area of 1,219,762 square kilometers or 121,976,200 hectares – a hectare is equivalent to ‘2.5 English acres.’\textsuperscript{103} Half of this land was considered as being unreclaimed and around two-thirds of it had comprised of forests and pastures; leaving as cultivable land a total of 50,740,083 acres or 21,662,000 hectares.\textsuperscript{104} As can be concluded from the figures prepared by Consul Palgrave that are tabulated below (Table 3.7), of all the cultivable land seventy per cent had comprised of mülk or private property, around 25 per cent belonged to vakıfs (endowments) and the remaining five per cent had been miri or state land. Yet, around 85 per cent of the private or mülk land around was under small holdings whilst the remaining 15 per cent had been under large holdings. Around 75 per cent of all the cultivable land, that

\textsuperscript{102} The report deals with the Land Tenure in the provinces of Kurdistan, Anatolia, Syria and Iraq. Hereafter, the term Asiatic provinces denotes these four regions.


\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
is, mülk, miri, vakif lands, in these regions of the Ottoman Empire had been 50 acres or under and only about twenty per cent of it had comprised of estates exceeding 50 acres.

Table 3.7 Land ownership and distribution in the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire c.1869

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total superficies in question:</strong> 304,440,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Mubah” or unreclaimed land: 152,200,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Metrookah” or common, forest, and pasture: 101,480,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivated land: 50,740,083</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the cultivated land:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Vakıfs” or endowment lands: 12,685,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Miri” or government property: 2,537,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Mülk” or private property: 35,518,058</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of Mülk or private property:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Larger estates, cultivated by tenancy or by hired labour: 5,074,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small estates, cultivated some by their peasant owners, some by “Muraba’s” [sharecroppers]: 30,444,050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of Vakf, Miri and Mülk property:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total of land divided into estates exceeding 50 acres, whether State property, endowment, or private property; and cultivated partly by tenancy, partly by hired labour: 12,685,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of land divided into estates from 50 acres and under, cultivated by the owners themselves, or by “Muraba’s”: 38,055,062</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Consul Palgrave’s assessment of the centralisation policies implemented during the Tanzimat era for the agriculture of the Asiatic provinces of the Empire is parallel to that of Consul Holmes delineated above. Palgrave contends that during this era as a result of the four main factors – i.e. i) sub-division of estates on land proprietorship; ii) overweight of excessive taxation on land and its produce; iii) official spoliation of land by the state for public works without any compensation for the landowners; and iv) the ‘forfeit of 10 per cent. ad valorem
by the State from any proprietor’ enacted by the Land Code of 1858\(^{105}\) – the agriculture of these region had in general suffered gravely:

‘The agricultural or land conditions of Eastern Turkey before and after the “Tanseemat” [Tanzimat] of the Sultans Mahmood II. and Abd-el-Mejeed [are] as follow:

The tendency of the former period was to the security, permanence, and accumulation of land tenure; that of the latter to insecurity, change and disintegration.

The tendency of the former period was to encourage agriculture, and to raise the value of land; that of the present, to discourage the former, and to depreciate the latter.

The strength of the former period was in the permanence of large estates and numerous tenants; the weaknesses of the latter, in the multiplication of small estates and numerous landlords[…] That in such a state of things no advance, economic, social, moral, or intellectual, can be expected from the agricultural population, whether landlords or tenants, and that, none, in fact, exists; on the contrary, that cultivators and land are alike deteriorating.’\(^{106}\)

**Agriculture in Ottoman Kurdistan during and after the Hamidian Era, 1876-1914**

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, there appears to be a significant rise in the concentration of the land controlled by certain sections of the Kurdish notables. More specifically, as the findings of the Ottoman Agricultural Census of 1909 suggest, Southeastern Anatolia – i.e. Diyarbekir, Bitlis and Van – had been second to the Adana region in terms of inequalities in the distribution of farm sizes within the below tabulated core regions\(^{107}\) of the Empire (Pamuk, 2010 [1987]: 98).


\(^{106}\) Ibid.:287

\(^{107}\) Definitions of core regions as defined by Pamuk (2010[1987]: 96): Northern Greece (Salonica, Monastir), Thrace (Edrine), Western Anatolia and Marmara (Izmit, Biga, Hûdavendigar, Aydın (İzmir), Eastern Black Sea Coast (Trabzon), Central Anatolia (Kastamonu, Ankara, Konya, Sivas), Eastern Anatolia, Central Tier (Erzurum, Mamuretülaziz), Eastern Anatolia, Southern Tier (Diyarbakir, Bitlis, Van).
Table 3.8 Distribution of farm sizes c. 1900 in the core regions of the Empire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Distribution of farm sizes (% of farms)</th>
<th>Average Farm Size (dönüms)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under 10 dönüms</td>
<td>10-50 dönüms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Greece and Thrace</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Anatolia/Marmara</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Black Sea</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana Central Anatolia</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Anatolia</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Tier</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Tier</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Eastern Anatolia*

Source: Pamuk, 2010 [1987]: 96

This change in land distribution and ownership in the Southern tier of Eastern Anatolia coincides with the policies implemented during the Hamidian period (1876-1909). As mentioned previously, in the course of this period the Kurdish tribal forces in Ottoman Kurdistan were absorbed into the Ottoman military and political structure with the dual purpose of securing the eastern frontier districts from the real and perceived threats from Russia and Iran and integrating Kurds into the Ottoman state system. Thus, within Ottoman Kurdistan the Hamidiya became a channel for the power relationships between the Sultan and the Kurdish rulers, operating as a tool for tribes to gain influence, and for the Sultan to extend imperial rule over this region of the Empire. The data from the late nineteenth century indicates that, particularly after the creation of the Hamidiya Cavalry (1891), the Kurdish religious and landed elite, with the active support of the Ottoman administration, attained vast amounts of land in ESA by the use of both economic and extra-economic means.
A case in point is the vast amount of power and land accumulated by the tribal chiefs and urban notables in Diyarbekir during the Hamidian era. The data passed on by Mark Sykes (1879-1919) in Journeys in North Mesopotamia (1907), and the present-day studies by Ali Arslan (1992) and Joost Jongerden (2012), shed much valuable light on the aggrandisement of the politically co-opted elite in this province throughout and after the Hamidian period.

In the initial years of his career as regimental leader, Milli Ibrahim Pasha (?-c.1908), Chief of the Milan confederation of tribes, had authority over a region extending from Viranşehir to Siverek, and Diyarbekir to Derik. At the peak of his power at the turn of the twentieth century, he had control over a much-extended region: the provinces of Diyarbekir, Mardin and Urfa. Relatedly, in 1902 following a visit by Milli Ibrahim to Sultan Abdülhamid II in Istanbul he was awarded the rank of Pasha (Brigadier-General), and all three of his sons, Abdulhamid, Halil, Mahmut and Temur, attained the rank of Kaymakam (Lieutenant Colonel). The power accumulated by Milli Ibrahim Pasha enabled him to establish advantage over the land and villages as well as controlling the trade routes in and out of the above-mentioned regions (Jongerden, 2012: 63; Sykes, 1907: 383-86). Similarly, Arif Pirinççizade (1853-1909) a prominent notable in Diyarbekir, who was also the maternal uncle of Ziya Gökalp, had considerable wealth and power. After resigning from the Diyarbekir Gazette in 1877 as a journalist, Pirinççizade had concentrated on agriculture and trade. By the turn of the century, he became a large landowner, possessing around thirty villages near Diyarbekir, and was elected to Parliament in 1908 as an independent candidate for the district of Diyarbekir (A. Arslan, 1992: 52; Jongerden, 2012: 66).

108 Mark Sykes was an English traveller, officer, honorary attaché and Conservative Party politician and diplomacy adviser known best as the co-author of the Sykes-Picot agreement (16 May 1916), a secret agreement between the governments of the UK and France, with the assent of Russia, to divide the provinces of the Ottoman Empire into spheres of British and French control. Sykes traversed in the Asia Minor both during and after his post as the honorary attaché to the British Embassy in Constantinople, in the years 1905-07, but also in the later years of 1908-09 and 1913.
The state encouraged the aggrandisement of the acquiescent Kurdish elites in order to strengthen their position in the provinces in Southern and Central tiers of Eastern Anatolia vis-à-vis the Armenians who had occupied key positions in trade and business in certain quarters of these regions. For instance, in the province of Van during the late nineteenth century, Armenians held 80 per cent of the agriculture, 20 per cent of the livestock breeding and, out of the 50 moneylenders, 30 had also been Armenian (Issawi, 1980: 67). One of the common practices of the Ottoman authorities during this period was to settle in Armenian villages Hamidis, i.e. tribal Kurdish forces serving in the Sultan’s irregular force, who, as pointed out by the Russian vice-consul in Bitlis in 1902, with time became the owners of these villages:

‘These men [Hamidis] enjoying the protection of the administration dispensed justice and handed out punishment and, advancing to the every-needy Armenians funds secured by livestock, horses, and crops, gradually became the owners of the village or Aghas, and the Armenians, performing all their work for them…were unable to deliver themselves from the weight of their debts’ (ibid.).

Concomitantly, the Kurdish notables with the backing of the Ottoman authorities employed economic means to increase their wealth and land as they bought land of the Armenian inhabitants. Thereafter, in return for payment in kind to the landowner, the Armenian peasants worked on the majority of these lands. In addition, the landowning Kurdish notables provided cash and grain to the peasants in ESA on advantageous terms, which were repaid in kind at harvest time. These loans were at the time known as selef. The selefdars or the lenders soon became wealthy, by taking the land of the defaulting debtors. Russian Vice-Consul in Van, Consul Termen, described the exploitative consequences of the selef during the early years of the twentieth century with the following words:
‘Thanks to this [selef] the whole village passes into the hands of the Kurds; the Armenians starting as miribe [maraba]—i.e. they receive from the Kurd seed and livestock for working the fields, giving in return half the crop—end up by losing their land and become simple laborers, i.e. the serfs of the Kurds’ (ibid.: 64)

The selef was an important mechanism for the enrichment of the Kurdish elite. Based on the findings of the Archives of the Foreign Policy of Russia in 1908, Lazarev states the following telling cases:

‘The Armenian village of Haskei, in valley of Muş [Bitlis vilayet], lost through the selef 208 fields, 24 houses, and 6 mills, all of which had passed into the hands of the Kurdish selefdars. In the formerly prosperous village of Arench, in the kaza of Adilcevaz, out of the 115 houses only 70 remained in the hands of the local inhabitants; of these, however, only 55 were held in ownership, the other were being miribe [maraba]’. In the village of Marmuss (vilayet of Van) the Kurdish Bey seized all the land belonging to Armenian community and reduced the Armenian peasants to sharecroppers’ (ibid.).

**Agricultural Productivity Data**

The Ottoman Agricultural Censuses prepared in the early twentieth century enable us to obtain information regarding agricultural output in these years. Owing to the minimal amount of recorded production figures, however, agricultural taxes, namely, tithes (aşar) and animal taxes (ağnam), and the revenues attained from these taxes continued to form the main means of measuring agricultural output. As outlined in the introductory section of the 1909 Census, unlike the agricultural censuses of most other countries in the modern era, the Ottoman agricultural production levels were estimated first on basis of the tithe revenues and the cultivated areas were estimated afterwards (Güran, 1997: xxi). After the Tanzimat Decree of 1838, tithes were fixed at one-tenth of the gross agricultural output. This was paid partly in kind in the earlier period with a larger proportion repaid in crude money later on in the
century. During the years of lower agricultural prices, the tax collectors routinely pressed for
and received tax payments in cash. In addition, 10 per cent rate was likely to escalate to 15
per cent, as it did in 1868, whenever the budgetary deficit of the state deepened. The practice
of the tithe along with other forms of agrarian taxation, like the ağnam, meant that as much as
a quarter of agricultural output was taxed (Pamuk, 2010 [1987]: 89). However, it is worth
noting that agricultural tax revenues only provide rough and indirect indications of the
agricultural output, as they are dependent on the state’s ability to tax and collect the taxes.
Hence, the agricultural tax revenues cited below should be treated as rough indicators of
output patterns.
The volume of annual gross agricultural production in the Empire is estimated to have
doubled between the early 1860s and the First World War (ibid.: 83). In 1914, according to
an educated guess, agriculture is believed to have comprised 56 per cent of the Ottoman
“national” income (Quataert, 1994: 845). Agricultural taxes had thus remained the most
important source of imperial revenues. By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century,
moreover, Anatolia had overtaken the European provinces by becoming the leading
contributor of the agricultural taxes.
In 1910, the Anatolian provinces had contributed 57 per cent of all the Ottoman tithes and
animal taxes. The European provinces, which during the nineteenth century had contributed
the bulk of the Ottoman agricultural taxes, provided 25 per cent of the total in 1910. Syria
contributed 11 per cent, while Iraq yielded 6 per cent and Hejaz provided 3 per cent of all the
agricultural tithes in the Empire. The available data regarding actual production are very
similar to those suggested by the tithe data. Agricultural output statistics for 1913 suggest that
the Anatolian provinces contained 55 per cent and the European provinces held 24 per cent of
the total estimated value of Ottoman agricultural production (ibid.: 845-47).
The contribution of the Eastern Anatolia region to the Ottoman agricultural tax revenues in 1910/11, just before the Balkan War, had been around 8.5 per cent, and the population of this domain at the time had constituted just under 9 per cent of the Ottoman population (Eldem, 1970: 86-7). When the agricultural tax revenues of Eastern Anatolia region are compared with other Anatolian areas, the relative importance of the tax revenue contributions of this region witnesses a decline. In the face of forming the second most populated area of Anatolia, Eastern Anatolia had only been the fourth biggest contributor of the agricultural tax revenues in 1910 (see Table 3.9). Similar results also arise when the agricultural revenues of the year 1913/14 are comparatively analysed as is demonstrated with the figures tabulated in Table 3.10.

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109 The value of agricultural tax revenues for 1910/11 is based on the figures attained from the statistics of the Ottoman Treasury Department or Maliye Nezareti Ihsaiyat Mecmuaları for the years 1909-10, 1910-11 and 1911/12, which are derived directly from Eldem (1970).
Table 3.9 Population and agricultural output measured by tax revenues of Anatolia, 1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/Region</th>
<th>Population (thousands)</th>
<th>Revenue (million kurus)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>İstanbul, Çatalca</td>
<td>1134</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hudavendigar, Karasi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izmit, Biga</td>
<td>2128</td>
<td>1068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydin (İzmir)</td>
<td>1703</td>
<td>806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konya</td>
<td>1254</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sivas</td>
<td>1197</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maraş, Antep</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kastamonu, Bolu</td>
<td>1109</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trabzon</td>
<td>1265</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarıbekir, Mamuretelaziz,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urfa</td>
<td>1036</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van, Bitlis</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.10 Population and Agricultural Production Measured by Tax Revenues of the different regions of Anatolia, 1910/11 and 1913/14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas/Regions¹⁰</th>
<th>Population (thousands) 1910/11</th>
<th>Population (thousands) 1913/14</th>
<th>Revenue (million kurus) 1910/11</th>
<th>Revenue (million kurus) 1913/14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>İstanbul</td>
<td>1134</td>
<td>1238</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marmara</td>
<td>2128</td>
<td>2204</td>
<td>1068</td>
<td>1188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegean Coast</td>
<td>1703</td>
<td>1761</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Anatolia Region</td>
<td>3611</td>
<td>3636</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>1749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Eastern</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea Coast</td>
<td>2374</td>
<td>2410</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Anatolia</td>
<td>2488</td>
<td>2574</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>878</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


¹⁰ The areas/regions are defined according to the geographical distinctions employed by Eldem (1970): Central Anatolia (Ankara, Konya, Sivas), Eastern Anatolia (Erzurum, Mamuretelaziz, Diyarbakir, Urfa, Van,Bitlis), İstanbul (İstanbul and Çatalca), Aegean Coast (Aydın (İzmir)), Mediterranean Region (Adana, Hatay, Maraş, Antep), Marmara (İzmit, Biga, Hüdavendigar), Eastern Black Sea Coast (Trabzon, Kastamonu, Bolu).
The details outlined above elucidate the limitations and drawbacks of imputing agricultural productivity levels and land tenure in Ottoman Kurdistan to the ‘unbroken autonomy’ of the Kurdish notables. Since this linear explanation does not fully account for the implications of the following pivotal political events on the agricultural output and the forms of landownership in Ottoman Kurdistan during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: i) the suppression of the Ottoman Kurdish polities; ii) the confiscation of land from the Kurdish notables; and iii) the policies of the central state during the Hamidian era. Contrary to the commonly advocated correlation between the dominance of the Kurdish notables over land and agricultural unproductivity in Ottoman Kurdistan, the available data from the nineteenth century suggests that agricultural productivity in Kurdistan had begun to decline with the demise of the Kurdish emirates and expropriation by the Ottoman state of land owned by the Kurdish notables.

Despite this deterioration, the recorded data from the early twentieth century on agricultural output levels of certain parts of Ottoman Kurdistan – i.e. Diyarbekir, Mamuretülaziz and Urfa – indicate that the agricultural output levels had been akin to provinces in Central Anatolian and the Eastern Black Sea Coast regions: Sivas, Kastamonu, Bolu, Trabzon, and Ankara (see Table 3.9). A reasonable explanatory factor for this development in the early twentieth century is that the aggrandisement of the politically receptive Kurdish notables during the Hamidian era enhanced agricultural productivity in these domains by dint of ownership of large estates and acceleration of the exploitation of the dependant peasantry.
3.4 Transportation

As outlined in Chapter 1, the academic literature on the economic and social history of ESA, alongside the ‘unbroken autonomy’ of the Kurdish notables, frequently identify the absence of railroads and the expensive forms of transportation in these regions as playing a determinate role in the underdevelopment in these areas. In other words, the transportation barriers are hypothesised to have ‘secluded’ ESA regions from the rest of the Ottoman Empire and the European markets throughout the nineteenth century and thereby delayed the destruction of the self-sufficient nature of the rural economies, the commercialisation of agriculture, and the rise of demand for imported manufacture.

Nearly all of the scholarships on this region share the following interconnected claims made by Pamuk regarding transportation in Eastern Anatolia:

‘Because of the absence of railroads until the early 1910s, agricultural produce of this region [Eastern Anatolia] could not be directed towards long-distance markets…In general, barriers posed by transportation costs isolated Eastern Anatolia from the rest of the Empire and the European markets throughout the [nineteenth] century…A limited amount of mohair constituted the major export commodity of the region during this period (2010 [1987]: 97).’

The list of prices and profits pertaining to the wheat trade at Diyarbekir, Urfa, and Aleppo, summarised by the British consul in Kurdistan in 1866, is illustrative of the high prices of transportation referred to by Pamuk:

**Diyarbekir:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One Quarter of Wheat at Erzurum</td>
<td>13s.6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses to Diyarbekir, 150 miles off</td>
<td>£1.4s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling Price at Diyarbekir</td>
<td>£2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit</td>
<td>2s.6d.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Urfa:

One Quarter of Wheat at Erzurum 13s.6d.
Expenses to Urfa, 258 miles off £1.16s.
Selling Price at Urfa £3.12s.8d.
Profit £1.3s.2d.

Aleppo:

One Quarter of Wheat at Erzurum 13s.6d.
Expenses to Aleppo, 120 miles off £2.14s.
Selling Price at Aleppo £4.1s.9¾d.
Profit 14s. 3¾d.


However, expensive transportation costs were burdensome in almost all regions of the Empire throughout the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries, to the extent that high carriage fees had made it unprofitable to carry bulk goods like grain, over anywhere but the shortest distances by land within the Empire. The effects of high transport costs in the nineteenth century were so severe that the British Consul General in Istanbul, Consul Alison, thought it ‘unbalance[d] Turkey’s trade, since most of its imports were light and valuable while its exports were bulky and cheap, and were also severely restricting the zone in which its profitable to grow exports crops’ (Issawi, 1980: 179). Strikingly, ‘the cost of transporting one tonne of wheat from central Anatolia to Istanbul in 1924 was $8.8 whereas it was only $5 from New York to Istanbul; and, hence, it seemed more rational to feed the population of Istanbul from Iowa rather than Ankara and Konya and let the peasant vegetate in subsistence farming’ (Boratav, 1981: 165). The above data, explains to a certain extent why ‘75 per cent of all crops grown’ in Ottoman lands throughout the period 1800-1914 are estimated to have remained within the Empire (Quataert, 1994: 834).
**Railroads**

The issue of high transportation costs in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century is attributable to the Empire arriving comparatively late to the railroad age. Up until 1859, not a single track was laid in any soil or area of the Empire. The first railway in the Ottoman Empire was built in 1859-60, between Chernavoda and Constanza, and was followed in 1863-68 by the Varna-Rustchuk line. The Oriental Railway Company, found by Baron Hirsch in 1878, built the main European lines. This company built 1,312 kilometers (km) of railway lines, and by 1888 Istanbul was connected to Vienna. Other major railroad lines were the Salónica-Constantinople Junction Railway and the Salonica-Monastir Railway, both of which were completed at the turn of the twentieth century.

As can be inferred from the above-described railway projects, the European provinces took the lead and by contrast, the Anatolian provinces in 1890 contained only 900 km of railroads whilst the Arab provinces contained none at all. In the second half of the nineteenth century, mainly after 1890, Ottoman territories acquired 7,500 km of track (Quataert, 1994: 804). The increase in Ottoman rail-laying activities in a sense coincided with that in many other countries, but was significantly more modest in scale. For instance, railway lines in the Habsburg Empire extended ‘to nearly 23,000 km by 1913, over three times the Ottoman level’, and former Ottoman territories in the Balkans, namely, the independent states of Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, ‘together built about 8,000 km of track, or slightly more than in the empire itself” (ibid.: 805). Some scholars have construed the relatively slow pace of rail-laying activities in the Empire during 1800-1914 as ‘a measure of low degree of development of the Ottoman Empire; in 1914, its 1,900, 000 square kilometers had only 5,991 kilometers of railways’ (Issawi, 1980: 147).

The exact share of all the amount of goods transported by the Ottoman railways during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries cannot be accurately deliberated since animal-back...
traffic cannot be calculated with any certainty because of the scant research and records left behind by the transporters (Quataert, 1994: 812, 821). Nevertheless, below are estimate figures for goods and passengers transported on various Ottoman railways during 1891-1910, which have been prepared by Quataert (1994) based on the information provided by Hecker in 1914. As the Tables 3.11-12 below indicate, only after the turn of the century transportation of goods and people via Ottoman railways gained prominence, which is instructive of the limitations of explaining the ‘seclusion’ of the predominantly Kurdish provinces in ESA regions throughout the nineteenth century on the absence of the railroads.

Table 3.11 Goods transported on various Ottoman railways (thousand tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>1891</th>
<th>1895</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1910</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ankara-Konya</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izmir-Konya</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydin</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mersin-Adana</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damascus-Hama</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hejaz</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.12 Passengers transported on various Ottoman railways (Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>1891</th>
<th>1895</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1910</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ankara-Konya</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izmir-Konya</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydin</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mersin-Adana</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damascus-Hama</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hejaz</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overland Transport System

During 1800-1910, the overland transport system—the roads, highways, wagons and caravans—was used for ‘one-half of all goods shipped overland in Anatolia and Syria’ (Quataert, 1994: 818). This was despite the shortcomings of the overland transport system owing to the poor quality and maintenance of the roads, which was largely due to the Ottoman central state allocating transportation too few resources throughout the nineteenth century (Issawi, 1980: 150; Owen, 1981: 246). In 1858, the British Consul of Kurdistan, Consul Holmes, described the poor maintenance of the Ottoman roads, and its repercussions on daily life and commerce within the Empire with following illuminating words:

‘One of the greatest drawbacks to the advancement of civilisation and commerce in Turkey, is the want of properly constructed roads; and the Pashalic of Diabekir [Diyarbekir] is in no better condition in this respect, than the rest of the empire.’\(^{112}\)

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman state took extreme action with the hope of improving the poor quality of the roads in the Empire. In 1865, a law was enacted to oblige all males aged 16-65 to work four days a year on local roads or pay a substitute tax; however, even such compulsory measures had minimal effect on improving the roads in the Empire and resultantly in 1910, it was replaced by mandatory cash payments (Eldem, 1970: 150; Issawi, 1980: 150). A British Consular report in 1878 summarises the severe conditions of the highways in the Empire, even after the enactment of this piece of legislation, by stating that the Beirut-Damascus road was the ‘only road in the whole of the Turkish Empire which is kept in good order’ (Issawi, 1980: 150). Furthermore, the overland transport system in Ottoman lands in the early years of the twentieth century does not appear to have improved. In 1904, the entire Ottoman Empire had only 24,000 km of roads, ‘three-quarters of these

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were within the borders of modern Turkey, poor in quality and badly maintained’ (Quataert, 1994: 818).

Animal-back transport was more common than wheeled transport in most areas, because Ottoman roads were suitable only to animal-back transport; shipment by wagon often damaged the transported goods. Hence, caravans provided most of the overland and non-mechanised links within and between the different regions of the Empire (Issawi, 1980: 146, Quataert, 1994: 819). Alongside the shorter and more frequent routes of Alexandretta-Diyarbekir and Diyarbekir-Erzurum (Quataert, 1994: 818) there also existed long caravan routes, with hans\(^\text{113}\) built at suitable intervals, the mains ones were (Issawi, 1980: 146):

1. the Trabzon-Erzurum-Beyazıt route leading to Tabriz (Iran);
2. the Samsun-Amasya-Zile-Tokat route to Sivas, at this point it bifurcated, one route passing via Kayseri and Cilician gates to Tarsus and the other to Delikliğaş, Harput and Diyarbekir, and thereafter to either Mosul, via Mardin, or Aleppo, through Urfa;
3. the Izmir-Bolu-Tosya route, touching the second route at Amasya;
4. the Bursa-Akşehir-Konya-Tarsus route leading to Syria.

The actual volume of goods handled by caravans, which is difficult to measure, appears to be very substantial. As described by Quataert (1994: 817-19), in 1812, horses carried most of the goods from Salonica north towards the German lands and some 20,000 animals were used. In the mid-nineteenth century, caravans from Baghdad to Damascus were carrying Iraqi, Persian and Indian goods and in the reverse direction, Damascus sent local textiles as well as cloths from England and Germany. During the 1860s, the Tabriz-Erzurum-Trabzon caravans annually transported as much as 12,000 tons, requiring 48,000 pack animals. Moreover, in answer to a questionnaire of 1863, the British consul in Salonica stated that horses and mules transported most produce and that the ox-drawn carts had been used in the plains. Similarly,

\(^{113}\text{Han: housing’ merchant entrepôts and craftsmen’s shops, usually grounded around a courtyard and accessible by a single gate (Faroqhi, 1984: 343).}\)
the Consuls in Izmir and Trabzon reported that camels carried the majority of transit trade, while horses and mules were used only for transporting lightweight produce to the cities (Issawi, 1980: 177).

**Sea Transport**

Whilst the overland transport system maintained its importance throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sea transport, sailing vessels and steamships, had also been increasing in number well into the late nineteenth century. In the early years of the nineteenth century, sea transport in the Empire had been very insignificant. For example, around 1800, it is reported that France – which was then the most important foreign trading partner of the Empire – had annually sent ‘150 ships’, and in ‘many areas’ of the Empire sea traffic is reported to have been ‘light’ (Quataert, 1994: 799). However, after the entrance of the steamships into Ottoman waters in the 1820s the volume of shipping had experienced a considerable rise (Table 3.13). The introduction of steam implicated a dramatic increase in the size of vessels. Ships calling at Trabzon averaged an ‘eightfold rise in size between 1830 and 1888’, and ‘steamships calling at Istanbul in the 1830s ranged between 130 and 530 tons but in the late nineteenth century averaged over 1,250 tons’ (ibid.: 800). Steamship travel on the Euphrates and Tigris, which was navigable from Diyarbekir downwards to Mosul, Baghdad and the Persian Gulf, had begun in the late 1830s.

**Table 3.13 Shipping tonnage entering main Ottoman ports, 1830-1913 (thousand tons)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port</th>
<th>1830</th>
<th>1860</th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1913</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basra</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izmir</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trabzon</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transportation in Ottoman Kurdistan

The available official data regarding custom duties remittances collected by the Diyarbekir Gümrük\(^{114}\) (Custom House) indicates that up until early 1830s the trade routes located in Ottoman Kurdistan were frequently used for the movement of goods (Table 3.14).

Information regarding the custom revenues of Diyarbekir has seen daylight as result of the extensive archival work on the tax-farm records of the provincial fiscal bureau, or Diyarbekir Voyvodalığı, by Yılmazçelik (1995).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.14 Custom Revenues Collected by the Diyarbekir Voyvodalığı, 1797-1834</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1797-1798(^{115})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1804-1805(^{116})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1805-1806(^{117})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1822-1823(^{118})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1824-1825(^{119})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1833-1834(^{120})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is worth noting here that the jurisdictional range of the province of Diyarbekir during 1780-1845 had been such that it encompassed the vast majority of the Kurdish lands incorporated into the Ottoman Empire after 1514 (See Map 7 below). In the early decades of the nineteenth century, the province of Diyarbekir had in its jurisdictional boundaries vast areas of land; extending from Malatya to Mosul. During 1847-1867, as mentioned above, Diyarbekir was renamed Kürdistan Eyaleti and it comprised of parts of the provinces of Bitlis and Van. At the end of the nineteenth century, the province remained impressive in size, as it

\(^{114}\) After 1760-61, the central authorities handed over the management of the Gümrük (Custom House) of Diyarbekir to the Diyarbekir Voyvodalığı. The revenues of the Diyarbekir Gümrük during the 1820s accounted for 43.76% of all the incomes of the Diyarbekir Voyvodalığı and up until the 1830s; it was by far the richest source of income of the Voyvodalık of this province (Yılmazçelik, 1995: 285, 314-315).


\(^{117}\) Ibid.


embodied the following provinces in present-day Turkey: Batman, Elazığ, Mardin, Siirt, Şanlıurfa and Şırnak. Thus, up until the twentieth century, the bulk of the above-described overland trade routes situated in Ottoman Kurdistan were located in the provincial boundaries of Diyarbekir, which explains the importance of the custom revenue records kept by the voyvodas of this province for attaining an understanding of the trade to and from Ottoman Kurdistan.
Map 10
The jurisdictional boundaries of the province of Diyarberkir, 1700-1847
Map 11
Transportation routes in Ottoman Kurdistan
The data consulted by this thesis also accentuates the following features of Diyarbekir, which is crucial to highlight in any investigation on transportation in this province:

i) It was a meeting point for caravans from Samsun, Aleppo, Baghdad and Erzurum;\(^{121}\)

ii) It was a gateway for merchants entering the Empire from Iran and Dagestan heading towards Istanbul, Aleppo and Baghdad (Yılmazçelik, 1995: 314).

In virtue of these attributes, the British consul in Kurdistan described Diyarbekir as ‘nearly equidistant west and east between the capital and Busreh, north and south between Erzurum and Aleppo—[Diyarbekir] is admirably calculated for a great commercial central depôt.’\(^{122}\)

Throughout the nineteenth century, merchants from a wide range of other locations – Van, Manastır, Gümüşhane, Rakka – very frequently visited and stayed in the different hans of Diyarbekir (Yılmazçelik, 1995: 314-15). Information regarding the Ottoman hans\(^{123}\) provide a valuable source of information for transportation of goods and commerce – in particular for Anatolian cities that were linked by overland trade routes – because starting with the sixteenth century in the big hans of any of the urban business centres, merchants conducted negotiations that led to the formation of caravans (Faroqhi, 1984:51-3).

Because of being located on an important crossing point for international and domestic trade, Diyarbekir – alongside, Aleppo, Bursa, Erzurum and Tokat – was one of the few provinces that had tax farms incorporating custom duties and other transportation related duties.

Custom duties or resm-i gümrük were levied on all goods transported to and from Diyarbekir in accordance with the varying tariffs laid in the “Customs Tariff Book” (Gümrük Tarife Defterleri) (Yılmazçelik, 1995: 288).

\(^{121}\) FO 195/799, Trade and Agriculture of Kurdistan for 1863, enclosed in Taylor at Diarbekir, 13/07/1864

\(^{122}\) A&P, 1873, ‘Commercial Report for Diyarbekir’, C.824, LXVII, p. 682

\(^{123}\) For a detailed analysis regarding hans see Faroqhi, 1984: 1-104, and for a detailed description of the hans in the province of Diyarbekir, see: Yılmazçelik (1995: 23-74).
When the custom revenues in 1833-34 are studied in conjunction with those of the preceding three decades (see Table 3.13), it becomes apparent that there had been a remarkable fall in the early years of the 1830s. The extensive historical details provided regarding Ottoman Kurdistan in the report from the British Consular District of Kurdistan in 1863, which hitherto has been overlooked by the existing scholarships on Ottoman Kurdistan, indicate that the sizeable reduction in the custom revenues in 1833-34 was a corollary of the military campaigns of Rashid Pasha against the Kurdish emirates:

‘Though repeatedly taken and plundered; by Persians, Arabs, Saljooks [Seljuks], Tatars, Soofees [Sufis], and Turks it [Diyarbekir] always seems to have soon regained its riches and prosperity as history hardly records one of its many sieges and captures, without at the same time detailing the rich booty that fell a prey to the enemy. In more modern times its commercial activity does not seem to have sensibly diminished; and I cannot trace its real decline any further back than thirty years ago, immediately subsequent to Rasheed Pasha’s successful campaign against the Kurds in these regions. But from that time, as the merchants inform me, marked falling off took place and each succeeding year has been more unprofitable than the last.'

Other foreign officials based in Ottoman Kurdistan during the nineteenth century have made similar observations in relation to the negative repercussions of the military activities of the Ottoman states in this region. In 1835, a few years after Rasheed Pasha’s campaign commenced, the British Consul, James Brant, reports of two destructive results of the military assaults in Diyarbekir. The first of these relate to the demographic demolition: the number of houses found in the Diyarbekir town had reduced from ‘40,000’ to ‘8,000’, and the second devastation pertains to the ‘severe damage’ to the trade of Diyarbekir (Brant, 1836: 209-10).

Correspondingly, the German Field Marshall, Helmhut Carl Bernhard von Moltke (1800-

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124 FO 195/799, Trade and Agriculture of Kurdistan for 1863, enclosed in Taylor at Diarbekir, 13/07/1864. Emphasis belongs to me.
1891), who partook in the Ottoman army in Ottoman Kurdistan under Hafiz Pasha, makes parallel observations vis-à-vis the ramifications of the military campaigns to social and economic life in Hasankeyf and Cizre (Moltke, 1968: 251). The above relayed information not only oppugns the validity of postulate that the predominantly Kurdish regions of ESA was secluded from the local and foreign trade throughout the nineteenth century, but it also indicates that the military operations of the Ottoman state after the early 1830s in Ottoman Kurdistan created long-term constraints for the commerce of this Ottoman borderland.

3.5 Commerce
The commerce of Ottoman Kurdistan in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is an area awaiting systematic examination. The nominal documented data presently available on the commerce of this region, and the readily-accepted truism that EAS regions had throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries been ‘secluded’ from the rest of the Empire and the European markets, are two long-standing impediments to the materialisation of this intricate task. While the currently existing quantitative evidence on the commerce of Ottoman Kurdistan in no way enables a complete understanding or analysis of the nature and scale of the commercial activities in this domain, it nevertheless does equip us with valid grounds to doubt the prevailing static assessments regarding the trade of this region. The data surveyed by this investigation suggests that the trade of Ottoman Kurdistan during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had undergone decline, recovery and growth. These different trends in the trade of this frontier region appear to be very closely tied to political factors that surfaced in the years 1800-1914. Prior to analysing the commercial activities in Ottoman Kurdistan, it is apt to offer a terse description of the nature and limitations of the Ottoman trade statistics.
Limitations and Deficiencies of Ottoman Trade Statistics

As the Consular reports written by British diplomats frequently remind us, accurate and regular Ottoman statistics regarding the trade of Ottoman Kurdistan during the nineteenth century were extremely uncommon. In 1857, the British Consul in Kurdistan, Consul Holmes, in one of the initial consular reports sent from the British Consulate in Kurdistan summarised the non-existence of clear-cut official trade data in the first half of the century with the following words:

‘I found it utterly impossible to obtain any satisfactory details of imports and exports [of Diyarbekir], for the simple reason that no correct account of them exists. The Custom House is the only place where any sort of account is pretended to be kept, but as regards to exports, a considerable amount of the produce is sent from the province, without passing through the town, direct to Aleppo, where it pays duty, and as with regard to imports, no note is taken of that which arrives having already paid duty at Aleppo, little or nothing is known, event at the Custom House, as to the real amount of the trade of this place.’

Correspondingly, the consul in Erzurum, Sir Robert Alaxender Osborn Dalyell (1821-1886), just before leaving his post in the mid-1860s made the following informative remarks regarding commercial bookkeeping:

‘Up to the period at which I left Erzeroom [Erzurum] it was impossible to get definite commercial information, no regular books being kept at the custom-house; but in consequence of late alterations of [the] system in the administration of the custom-houses of the Empire, it is now to a certain degree possible.’

All of the above stated lacunae regarding Ottoman trade records validate the following observation conveyed in 1870 by the then British Consul in Kurdistan, Consul Taylor, in a

consular report entitled the *Conditions of the Industrial Classes in the Consular District of Kurdistan*:

‘In this country, statistics…and official returns are so negligently and loosely compiled as to render them perfectly useless for the purpose of judging of, or guiding the wealth of the nation.’\(^{127}\)

Deriving from the above assessment of Consul Taylor, one can conclude that the aforementioned limitations were not unique to trade statistics of Ottoman Kurdistan. As the findings of a range of scholarly studies (Eldem, 1970; Pamuk, 2010 [1987]; Quataert, 1994) that examined the existing Ottoman official statistics illustrate, Ottoman trade statistics for the nineteenth century had been minimal and deficient. For the purposes of this study, it is apposite to summarise the findings of these pivotal studies, since they elucidate the deficient nature of the official Ottoman trade statistics.

No information is presently available from Ottoman sources regarding Ottoman foreign trade before 1878, with the exception of estimated custom revenues for each year, which are available from the budgets that were first prepared in the 1860s. The efficacy and veracity of the official Ottoman trade statistics for the years after 1878 is questionable, though, due to the following deficiencies identified by Pamuk (2010 [1987]: 153-54). Official Ottoman trade statistics until 1907 provided figures only for general trade; therefore, transit trade was not distinctively covered. The distinction between general and special trade is vital, argues Pamuk, since the transit trade through the Empire, which mostly consisted of European-Persian trade, was far from insignificant, particularly in the late 1870s and 1880s. The lack of distinction between special and general trade between 1978 and 1907 engendered an ‘upward bias of the order of 3 to 5 per cent for imports and exports’ of the Ottoman Empire (ibid.: 153).

\(^{127}\) A&P, 1871, C.414, LXVIII, p. 793.
The other deficiency of the Ottoman trade statistics post-1878 stem from the incomplete coverage of traded goods. Imports of arms and ammunition, agricultural and industrial machinery and all materials for railways and factory construction were not recorded in the official Ottoman statistics. Thus, Pamuk ascertains that ‘the exclusion of these items introduces a not insignificant amount of downward bias to the Ottoman imports for some years’ (ibid.). Lastly, the existent official Ottoman trade data for the years after 1878 present grave problems for establishing the country of distribution of Ottoman trade. Until 1910, ‘the destination/country of origin definition employed in the Ottoman statistics specified the country with which trade was conducted as that from which goods were directly received to or to which goods were directly sent’ (ibid.: 154). Therefore, whenever Ottoman trade with a country was carried out through ports of the third countries, it was not possible to determine the magnitude of Ottoman trade with that country on basis of Ottoman statistics.

In addition, Eldem rightly points out that the varying political and administrative statuses or structures of the different provinces in the Empire, along with the inexperience’s of the state officials responsible for collating the statistical data, made it very difficult to generate uniform sets of statistical data for the whole of the Ottoman Empire (1970:13). These two problems identified by Eldem render a comparative study of the trade of Ottoman Kurdistan with other Ottoman regions for most part of the nineteenth century a near impossible task. Furthermore, as exemplified with the constantly changing borders of Diyarbekir, the administrative boundaries of ESA Ottoman provinces (i.e. Diyarbekir, Erzurum, Harput and Van) had been in a state of flux throughout the nineteenth century, making it highly difficult to track and undertake a longitudinal study of the trade of localities situated in Ottoman Kurdistan.

Owing to the aforementioned drawbacks of the official Ottoman trade statistics, the ensuing assessment of the trade of Ottoman Kurdistan will mainly be based on the trade data
accumulated from the British Consular reports for this region penned in the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These reports contain invaluable information regarding the local trade of the two predominantly Kurdish provinces in ESA, Diyarbekir and Erzurum. Where available the thesis will transmit data concerning other provinces in these regions—i.e. Van, Bitlis and Hakkari. Up until the 1880s, the trade figures for these three areas were either recorded under the trade data of the provinces of Erzurum and Diyarbekir or not recorded at all.

In this section, a particular emphasis will be given to the trade reports drafted by Consul Taylor who, unlike his predecessor and successors, had the unique opportunity to study comparatively the Custom House archives of the provinces in ESA with those of the bordering provinces, such as Aleppo and Baghdad. Resultantly, he was able to attain a clearer picture of the state of the trade of Kurdistan:

‘During my residence I had, under Vizirial orders, ample opportunities for examining the Custom-house archives, that establishment being then not formed but under the control of a paid officer under the Aleppo Nazir or Chief now, which enabled me to obtain a clearer view of local trade, whether native or British, than my predecessors had.’

The General Trends in Ottoman Trade

Prior to analysing the trade of Ottoman Kurdistan, as background to the analysis of the commerce of this region in the nineteenth and early-twentieth century, based on the formulations or findings of Quataert (1994: 827-30), a brief description of the general trends in Ottoman trade during 1800-1914 will be presented. Until 1820, trade within the Ottoman Empire and with Russia was more important than that with Western and Central Europe. However, by the end of the century, Britain, France, Germany, Austria and Italy accounted for over three-quarters of total Ottoman international trade. Between 1780 and 1830, a period

of recovery and then growth had been experienced in international trade, Ottoman-European trade augmented at an annual rate below 1.5 per cent. After this period of recovery, foreign trade grew very swiftly between the early 1840s and 1870s. Imports and exports each annually increased at compound growth rates of 5.5 per cent, nearly doubling in each successive decade. For example, during the mid-1870s, exports were about 6 to 8 per cent of estimated Ottoman Gross National Product (GNP), about double the proportion of the 1840s. Stagnation followed boom in 1870s as fiscal crisis and government bankruptcy coupled with the famine and the Russo-Turkish War had hampered international trade. Between the late 1870s and 1890s, imports and exports had increased at annual rates of 2.6 per cent or, in other words, half the rate of the three previous decades. However, within a decade after the international depression had ended (1906-7), Ottoman exports are reported to have risen by 3.4 per cent as imports rose by 4.8 per cent. Subsequently, even in the face of major territorial losses suffered in the Balkans Wars, exports in 1913 equalled and imports surpassed, by 2.5 per cent, the level of 1907.

In 1914, perhaps one-quarter of total agricultural production was exported; exports overall formed nearly 14 per cent of the gross national product and the ratio of imports to GNP was around 18 per cent. Deriving from these developments, Quataert contends that, despite the relatively important and substantial changes in international trade in the nineteenth century, domestic commerce continued to surpass foreign trade and ‘foreign trade remained a minor factor in Ottoman economic life’ (1994: 830).

Until c.1870s, textiles, in particular cotton, constituted the main form of imports to the Empire, but after the 1870s the relative share of the foodstuff imports gradually increased. By the end of the nineteenth century, wheat, flour, rice, sugar, coffee and tea formed ‘about one-third’ of all imports (ibid.: 832). Yet, Ottoman agricultural products, such as cereals and animal products, constituted the bulk of the exported articles, usually around ‘90 per cent’
After the 1860s, however, the nature of the exported items had diversified in virtue of variations of foreign demands from Ottoman lands. In the second half of the nineteenth century, significant quantities of opium, raw silk, raisins, wool, cotton, tobacco, hides and manufactured carpets as well as raw silk were exported.

**Table 3.15 Ottoman foreign trade, 1830-1913 (annual average, in millions of pounds sterling)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>f.o.b. exports</th>
<th>c.i.f. imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1830s</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840s</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850s</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860s</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870s</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880s</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890s</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900s</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-13</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pamuk, 2010 [1987]: 149.

**Commerce of Ottoman Kurdistan**

The only currently available regularly recorded data of the commercial activities in Ottoman Kurdistan for the first half of the nineteenth century is the tax-farm accounts of the provincial fiscal bureau, or *voyvodalık*, of Diyarbekir. For reasons outlined in the section on Transportation in Ottoman Kurdistan, the records of Diyarbekir *voyvodalık* is an important lens though which we are able to detect the commercial trends in Ottoman Kurdistan.

As alluded to by Faroqhi, in the absence of regular and accurate data ‘for figures concerning the volume of urban economic activities and particularly of trade, our best and usually only guide consists of tax-farming accounts’ (1984: 16). However, as it can be concluded from the information provided in the introductory pages of this Chapter, after 1839, due to the centralist reforms in the *Tanzimat* era, the tax-farm system had been transformed. Therefore, the availability and utility of the tax-farms accounts after the third decade of the nineteenth
century is moot, which is why the study will only make use of tax-farm records up until the mid-1830s.

Table 3.16 Revenues of the Diyarbekir Voyvodalığı, 1797-1834 (in kuruş)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Gümürük (Customs)</th>
<th>Boyahane (Dye House Dues)</th>
<th>Arsa (Ground Rent)</th>
<th>İhtisab (Craftsmen’ Dues)</th>
<th>Damga (Sales Tax)</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1797-1798</td>
<td>97490</td>
<td>35000</td>
<td>34000</td>
<td>8344</td>
<td>33550</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>208384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1804-1805</td>
<td>86505</td>
<td>19726</td>
<td>23153</td>
<td>10742</td>
<td>30078</td>
<td>23121</td>
<td>193325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1805-1806</td>
<td>72248.5</td>
<td>21946</td>
<td>29868</td>
<td>12000</td>
<td>32519.5</td>
<td>12067.5</td>
<td>180798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1822-1823</td>
<td>86388</td>
<td>31515</td>
<td>37697</td>
<td>4090</td>
<td>8671</td>
<td>30000</td>
<td>198361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1824-1825</td>
<td>93847</td>
<td>39872</td>
<td>51198</td>
<td>9613</td>
<td>11854</td>
<td>8956</td>
<td>214440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1833-1834</td>
<td>36199</td>
<td>8483</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>10297</td>
<td>74063</td>
<td>129042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As outlined in the preceding section, the year in which Rashid Pasha’s military venture in Ottoman Kurdistan (1833-34) commenced was identified by the contemporaries as the point at which the decades-long decline – which is believed by the contemporary observers to have lasted until the 1860s – in the commercial activities in this region begun. This observation is supported by the data attained from the records of the fiscal bureau of the paradigmatic Kurdish province of Diyarbekir summarised above. One of the first things we realise when we look at the figures tabulated in Table 3.16 is the vast decrease during the 1830s in the second most important source of revenue of the Diyarbekir Voyvodalık: Boyahane (Dye House) dues remittances. This drop is redolent of the fact that production of and trade in textiles was sorely affected by the military operations in this province. The other glaring fact is that there is no record of the Arsa (Ground Rent) levied from external goods kept in the

131 Ibid.
135 FO 195/799 Trade and Agriculture of Kurdistan for 1863, Taylor in Diarbekir, 13/07/1864.
warehouses of Diyarbekir. According to archival research by Yılmazçelik, this void was because after the early 1830s this form of taxation was conjoined or ‘noted under the Gümrük [custom revenues]’ (1995: 288) by the voyvoda personnel. This change in the records reinforces the above-discussed drastic fall in Diyarbekir’s custom and trade revenues immediately after the military activities of the Ottoman state in Kurdistan in the early 1830s. Furthermore, Damga (Sales Taxes) intakes, when compared with the figures during 1797-1806, witnessed a severe reduction. The concurrence of these negative fluctuations led the total revenue of the voyvodalık to decrease, when compared to the revenues of the selected years in the preceding three decades, by around half in 1833-34. After sixteen years of sporadic war in the different parts of ESA, the Ottoman state had been successful in suppressing the Kurdish emirates and the rebellions in Ottoman Kurdistan, but with tremendous negative repercussions for the economic activities in this region.

The data pertaining to the commercial activities in Ottoman Kurdistan during the second half of the nineteenth century suggests that between the 1860s and early 1870s, with arrival of relative security to this domain, the commerce in this region witnessed a gradual revival. In 1871, the British Consul in Kurdistan, based on his own previous trade reports and the archival research conducted in the relevant Custom Houses of the Empire, conveys the following information regarding the principal items of production and trade in the constituent sancaks of the consular district of Kurdistan during late-1850s and early 1870s:

‘The important [foreign] trade that does actually exist…is in the hands of the residents native agents at Erzeroom[Erzurum], Diarbeker[Diyarbekir], and Kharput [Harput], whose principals have their head-quarters at Constantinople, Trebizond, or Aleppo…

Local industries consist:

At Erzeroom [Erzurum sancak], brass, iron, tin ware, and swords for home exports

At Van, thick woollen stuffs used by the natives for trousers, cloaks, jackets, and leggings
At Bitlis, cotton cloths in lengths and pieces, died red, with madders and plain
At Erzingan [Erzincan], fine bath cloths and Turkish towels of cotton, and stripped nankeens
At Diabeker [Diyarbakir], silk in lengths, silk, and mixed silk and cotton—cotton piece
goods of patters, woollen cloaks, and dyed moroccos of colours
At Mardin, dyed moroccos of colours, woollen cloaks, shallees of mohair—and silver and
gold jewellery
At Deh and Eyruh, fine shallees, in different coloured stripes and colours, made of mohair…
All of the above goods are largely exported to the interior provinces of Russia and
Constantinople
Local production are, in the northern districts, rye barley, wheat, and some mohair. In all the
others the usual kind of grain, beside millet, Indian corn, sesame, castor oil seed, tobacco,
hemp, flax and cotton.
At and about Erzeroom: sheep and cattle exported to Syria, Egypt, and Constantinople; raw
skins and entrails to Europe; jerked meat, soap, tallow, and bone ash.
At Van: salt fish from the Lake, alkali, mohair, silk—worm seed from about that town and
Hakkaree [Hakkari]. Sheep are largely exported to Syria and Egypt. Pack horses.
At Bitlis: madders, wax, honey (most superior), and walnut oil.
At Saert [Siirt] and Jezireh [Cizre]: mohair, wool, gall-nuts, wax, tallow, madders, scammony
(oil made from the “pistachio terenbinthus”), goat hair, different from the fine mohair, coarse
and rough for sackings.
At Deyrsim [Dersim]: galls, valonea, acorn cups, all used in tanning.
At Mardin and Diabeker: wool, silk, gall-nuts, raw skins, cotton, sheep, clarified butter, and
camels exported to Syria and Kaiserieh [Kayseri]; horses…
At Hini: first quality flour, equal to the best English, though at the half price.
Minerals: silver, copper, lead, tin, iron, and orpiment, fine yellow in flakes.\textsuperscript{136}

In 1857, the consul in Kurdistan, Consul Holmes, estimates in tons the annual production and exports in the province of Diyarbekir as tabulated in Table 3.17 below. Although due to the meagre Custom House records in Diyarbekir during the 1850s the information given by Consul Holmes is limited, it nonetheless gives us an idea regarding the profile and scale of the exported and produced articles in the province of Diyarbekir in the mid-1850s.

### 3.17 Annual Amount of the Produce of Diyarbekir Province 1855 (in tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Galls</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>Chiefly exported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool</td>
<td>441</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>404.5</td>
<td>Consumed in local manufactures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>Consumed and exported in equal quantities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madder Roots</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gum</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoof\textsuperscript{137}</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Consumed in the local tanneries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sesame</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Consumed and exported in equal quantities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wax</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Chiefly exported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats-hair</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Consumed in local manufactures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olive Oil</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>Chiefly consumed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>Consumed and exported in equal quantities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallow</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>367.5</td>
<td>Consumed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather (pieces or skin)</td>
<td>112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1864, in a separate British consular report prepared by Consul Taylor, a distinctively in-depth examination of the trade of the province of Diyarbekir for 1863 – which at the time was the central administrative unit of Eyalet-i Kürdistan – is given. According to the 72-page elaborate trade and agriculture dossier, Diyarbekir’s general trade in this year –including the


\textsuperscript{137} A fungus of the gall oak used in tanning.
transit trade which was worth around £200,000\textsuperscript{138} – stood at £532,949. As it can be inferred from the trade figures tabulated in Appendix II, in 1863, the total value of the goods exported to foreign lands and interior (Ottoman) regions – after deducting the items that have been imported and re-exported – was £325,174. The aggregate value of goods imported from foreign countries and domestic regions totalled to £187,224.

Unlike most consular reports for Kurdistan in the nineteenth century, Consul Taylor gives a comprehensive list of all the imported and exported articles with their sums (see Appendix II). In view of the details transmitted in this report, as well as the trade data provided in separate British Consular reports for Diyarbekir referred to below, it appears that the major export product of this province throughout the nineteenth century was not restricted to ‘a limited amount of mohair’. Alongside mohair; wool, cotton and galls, which from the 1860s onwards had been in demand by the foreign trading partners of the Ottoman Empire, constituted the greater part of Diyarbekir’s export trade in the 1860s and the early 1870s. In 1863, the amount of raw cotton, galls and wool exported had been higher than mohair. Additionally, when the values of wool and galls exported in 1863, tabulated in Appendix II, are analysed in conjunction with those exported in 1860, which are outlined in a separate consular report\textsuperscript{139}, it becomes evident that there had been a considerable rise in the export of these two commodities.

The amount of wool exported in Diyarbekir increased from £23,300 in 1860 to £74,999 in 1863. Similarly, the total value of galls exported in Diyarbekir augmented from £8,000 in 1860 to £34,893 in 1863. Exports of mohair, gall, and wool from Diyarbekir continued thereafter. Just the amount of these staple native products transported to England had been £50,000 in 1871.\textsuperscript{140} In a British consular report on Kurdistan’s trade in 1872, the consul in Kurdistan had reported that ‘the competitive demand for mohair, raw hides, and galls in

\textsuperscript{138} FO 195/799, Taylor at Diarbekir, 13/07/1864.
Jezireh, Saert, Mardin, and Diarbekir, raised the price of all those articles, and increased the annual aggregate amount hitherto exported to Europe.¹⁴¹

The export destinations of these products implicate the antithesis of the generally held postulation that ESA had been ‘isolated’ from the rest of the Empire and European markets throughout the nineteenth century. Goods produced in the Diyarbekir province were exported to a wide range of localities, from foreign countries to afar provinces in Northern and Central Anatolian, as well as all of the bordering provinces. For instance, the foreign exports of cotton, wool, galls and mohair in 1863, which amounted to over £185,000, constituted nearly half of all the trade of Diyarbekir. In the same year, the manufactures of Diyarbekir sent to Northern Turkey and Baghdad comprised the bulk of the interregional or interior exports. In addition, according to the export data provided by Consul Taylor in a subsequent report, a further £32,816 worth of manufactures from Diyarbekir had been exported in 1865-66.¹⁴² All of these figures are illustrative of the industrial capacity and importance of this province for particularly the Ottoman market.

Based on the findings of Quataert in the seminal work *Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of the Industrial Revolution* we learn that the use of British yarn in the textile manufacturing industry at the Diyarbekir province had overall ‘quadrupled or quintupled between the 1860s and late 1880s and, by mid-1890s, had doubled again’ (1993: 69). Contrary to the suggestions of the destruction of the manufacturing sector in the second half of the nineteenth century (Pamuk, 2010 [1987], Sönmez, 1992 [1990], Jafar, 1976, Burkay, 2008 [1992]), Quataert establishes that ‘aggregate textile production around Diyarbakir was stable, at c. 200,000 pieces, between the 1860s and 1903’ (1993: 70). Accordingly, Quataert argues, ‘despite the loss of Diyarbekir’s international markets during the eighteenth century…the Diyarbekir

The region continued as one of the most important Ottoman textile production centers’ in the nineteenth century (ibid.: 66).

The gradual revival witnessed in the trade of Diyarbekir during the 1860s was replicated in the province of Erzurum. The consul in Erzurum, Consul Dalyell, estimates the aggregate value of Erzurum’s trade in the years 1862-5 as £615,071. In 1871, according to Consul Taylor’s figures, Erzurum province’s total value of imports and exports was £515,000. Due to the dominance of subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry in Erzurum, cattle, sheep and goats, alongside native galls, mohair, wax and hides, had constituted the best part of the export trade of this province. Whilst manufactured goods, cotton and silk from Europe and other regions of the Empire dominated the imports to Erzurum.

The available documented data on the trade between Erzurum and England tabulated below, as well as bearing witness to the expansion of trade in Erzurum in the 1860s and early 1870s, does also ascertain one of the important sources of this increase. During this period, the main articles of exports from Erzurum to England had consisted of native produce, such as skins, galls, mohair and dried entrails. Whereas imports from England to Erzurum composed of woollen and cotton yarns, silk threads, grey cloths, sheet iron, and tin in sheets, copper and tea.

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143 For an exploration of manufacturing and manufacturers in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia between c.1800-1914, see: Quataert (1993).
### 3.18 Trade between the Province of Erzurum and England, 1863-71 (in sterling pounds)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>135,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>176,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>47,500</td>
<td>100,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>95,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>96,000</td>
<td>215,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: A&P 1872 & 1873

The gradual revival and progression of commerce in Diyarbekir and Erzurum throughout the 1860s and early 1870s was followed by stagnation and regression in the second half of the 1870s. Alongside the fiscal crisis and government bankruptcy in 1875 and the famine in the 1880s, the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) and the Sheikh Ubeydullah Revolt (1880), both of which took place in the borders of or in close proximity to Erzurum and Diyarbekir, severely hampered production and trade in these provinces between c.1875 and 1890.

In 1886, the acting consul of Kurdistan, George Pollard Devey, described the negative ramifications of the political instabilities in this region for manufacturing and commerce in Kurdistan with the following words:

‘Some industries have altogether died out, as that of swords and dagger making. The manufactures of cotton, woollen, and silken stuff is much less than in former years […] There can be no doubt that the death blow to Erzeroum[’s] trade and industry was the war of 1877-78, followed by three years of famine, since this period trade has remained at the lowest point.’

The British Consul at Diyarbekir, Thomas Boyajian, in the same report transmits the following bleak manifestations:

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During the period from 1880-85, as compared with the preceding 15 years, export trade has, with the exception of opium, diminished. Imports have increased in volume but decreased 30 per cent. in value […] This town in former years could reckon 1,500 silk and cotton looms, and carried trade with the remotest parts of the empire […] The value of silk alone manufactured in 1865 was £35,000, that of 1884 £7,500 […] In the absence of trade returns of former years, I am not in a position to state precisely the difference of exports of the period 1880-85 as compared with the 15 previous years, but the following table of one or two of the chief items of export will suffice to prove the statement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value 1860</th>
<th>Value 1884</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohair</td>
<td>65,450</td>
<td>14,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool</td>
<td>23,300</td>
<td>14,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galls</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>96,750</strong></td>
<td><strong>30,600</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: A&P, 1886, C.4715, XXI.231, p.796

Although the nonexistence of trade records for Diyarbekir and Erzurum make it impossible to estimate the exact nature of the decrease in the export trade, we nevertheless are able to attain an idea of the nature of the deterioration by juxtaposing the trade data from the early 1880s with that of the previous two decades. The trade figures tabulated in Tables 3.19-20 below are in harmony with the dismal state of the Eastern Anatolian economy relayed by the British Consuls cited above.

148 The table is part of the text cited above and ends the quote.
3.19 Imports and exports of Erzurum, 1871-1884 (in sterling pounds)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>215,000</td>
<td>515,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>356,160</td>
<td>83,560</td>
<td>439,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>268,570</td>
<td>99,070</td>
<td>367,640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: A&P 1872, 1884 & 1884-85

3.20 Imports and exports of Diyarbekir, 1863-1884 (in sterling pounds)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>187,224</td>
<td>325,174</td>
<td>512,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>129,850</td>
<td>118,150</td>
<td>248,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>132,980</td>
<td>108,838</td>
<td>241,818</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FO 195/799 & A&P 1884 & 1884-85

The relatively abundant quantitative data after 1890 on Ottoman Kurdistan’s trade regularly transmitted in the Commercial Reports prepared by the British consuls based in Diyarbekir and Erzurum – some of which have been tabulated below – specifies that commercial activities in these provinces had recorded an impressive recovery during 1890-1914. In more concrete terms, the paradigmatic Kurdish province of Diyarbekir and the

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150 Export figures of only items exported to Europe and the interior regions, not including Persia and Russia.
156 Tables 3.21-22 express the trade balance in ESA during 1891-1913 in nominal terms. This limitation is due to the existent and prevalent Consumer Price Index (CPI) – which used to calculate inflation and thus enumerate real (inflation-adjusted) growth – employed to understand and analyse price trends in the Ottoman Empire is based on prices indices in Istanbul (see Pamuk, 2004). Owing to the fact that throughout the lifetime of the Empire prices, as well as wages, in the imperial capital differed substantially with that of the other regions of the Empire, the utility and veracity of using this CPI to work out the real growth in Ottoman ESA is highly dubious. That said, when we bear in mind the following two actualities it becomes apparent that the trade expansion in ESA posited by this study cannot be oppugned: i) exchange rate of the British pound sterling against the Ottoman lira remained constant during the years 1850-1914 (i.e. 1 British pound sterling = 1.10 Ottoman lira) and ii) change in the CPI in Istanbul in the years 1891-1913 was not of a very substantial (i.e. CPI in 1891= 282.91 and CPI in 1913=317.10.) (Pamuk, 2004).
province of Erzurum in 1913, when compared with that of 1891, had witnessed a near fourfold increase in nominal terms (see Table 3.21).

### 3.21 Imports and exports of Diyarbekir, 1890-1913 (in sterling pounds)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>151,184</td>
<td>145,282</td>
<td>296,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>169,885</td>
<td>193,338</td>
<td>363,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>216,636</td>
<td>179,181</td>
<td>395,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>287,000</td>
<td>275,000</td>
<td>562,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>436,560</td>
<td>445,049</td>
<td>881,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>478,500</td>
<td>510,000</td>
<td>988,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>648,000</td>
<td>455,400</td>
<td>1,103,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>693,960</td>
<td>503,300</td>
<td>1,197,260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: A&P.

### 3.22 Imports and exports of Erzurum, 1890-1913 (in sterling pounds)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>294,400</td>
<td>202,950</td>
<td>497,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>230,015</td>
<td>209,300</td>
<td>439,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>231,690</td>
<td>164,700</td>
<td>396,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>194,110</td>
<td>157,300</td>
<td>351,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>214,030</td>
<td>167,660</td>
<td>381,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>639,200</td>
<td>303,750</td>
<td>942,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>650,250</td>
<td>360,700</td>
<td>1,010,950</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: A&P.

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159 A&P, 1897, C.8277, LXXXIX, pp. 4200-1.
161 A&P, 1911, 5465, XCVII, p. 1877
162 Ibid.
163 A&P 1914, 7048-187, XCV, pp. 6-12.
164 Ibid.
166 Ibid.
170 A&P 1914, 7048-187, XCV, pp. 6-12.
171 Ibid.
Based on the details provided in the Commerce Reports cited above it becomes apparent that around 40 per cent of all the items exported from Diyarbekir during 1890-1913 had consisted of wool, silk, mohair, Valonia oak and hides that had been sent to foreign countries. The remainder had consisted of industrial products and agricultural produce, such as butter, rice, sheep’s and camels, which had been exported to various regions of the Empire. The trade data for the province of Erzurum in the same period indicates that the bulk of all the trade had been with interior domains and had consisted of commodities and agricultural produce similar to that in Diyarbekir.

Although the level of inter-regional trade in native goods had varied in these provinces, it nonetheless had been a very important component of the trade of provinces in and around Ottoman Kurdistan during 1890-1913. Quataert deriving from the trade data attained for Diyarbekir, Harput and Mosul – all of which had been constituent parts of the central province of Diyarbekir in the early nineteenth century – during the 1890s arrives at the following revealing conclusion:

‘In some cases, the value of a district’s inter-regional trade in goods of Ottoman origins vastly exceeded the value of its exports to foreign countries. At Mosul, in some years, the ratios were nearly three and four to one. During a typical year in the 1890s, Diyarbekir, Harput and Mosul together inter-regionally sent goods worth more than one million pound sterling… (Total Ottoman exports abroad during the 1890s averaged 18 million pound sterling)’ (1994: 837).

All of the data presented above is indicative of the vibrant atmosphere and positive fluctuations in the spheres of commerce and production in Ottoman Kurdistan and bordering regions after 1890. Moreover, contrary to the prevalent static conceptions of the commerce in predominantly Kurdish provinces in ESA, the information above, despite the lack of
longitudinal data, draws a picture of constant flux in manufacturing and commerce in
Ottoman Kurdistan in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

3.6 Population Income Levels

In regard to the general income levels in Ottoman Kurdistan, we are able to attain an idea
from the comparative study of the income levels in the different parts of the Empire
undertaken by Eldem (1970) based on the income data available in the official Ottoman
sources from the first decade of the twentieth century (302-08). According to the results of
this study, in 1907, there were discernible regional disparities in the levels of income,
particularly between the Anatolian and European provinces. This income disparity is
illustrated by the graph below that specifies the estimate levels of income per person in the
different areas of the Empire. The levels of income in the bulk of the latter provinces were
nearly double those of the former provinces, which constitute the chunk of present-day
Turkey.

When we comparatively analyse the income levels given for the Anatolian provinces it
becomes apparent that with the exclusion of the Adana region, the overall majority of the
Anatolian region, i.e. provinces in North, Central and the predominantly Kurdish Eastern
Anatolia, were not too dissimilar. As the income levels per head in the great majority of the
latterly mentioned Anatolian regions were estimated at 600-700 kurus and a minority of the
Anatolian provinces, like Konya, the income levels had been approximated at 700-800 kurus.
Map 12
Income per person in 1907 in the Ottoman Empire as measured in kurus.
Chapter 4

The Deformation of Ottoman Kurdistan and Bordering Regions: De-development in ESA from the First World War until the 1980 Coup (1914-1980)

4.1. Overview

The mass violence that accompanied the formation of nation-states in Europe during the nineteenth century erupted in the Ottoman Empire in the first two decades of the twentieth century. The succession of wars and revolutions, ferociously crushed rebellions, forced population exchanges and deportations, as well as ethnocide, massacres and genocide only partially concluded in 1923 with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. It was not enough to have redrawn territorial boundaries, since the sustenance of the nation-state necessitated the consolidation of the social, economic and political foundations of modern Turkey that was born out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. This chapter assesses the economic, political and social ramifications of the profound changes that have taken place on the eve of and during the eight decades following the establishment of the Republic in the predominantly Kurdish populated regions of ESA.

The signing of the Turco-German Treaty of Alliance on 2 August 1914 opened a new chapter in Ottoman history. In virtue of this secret pact, the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers to form the Triple Alliance, namely, Austria-Hungary, Germany and the Ottoman Empire. As part of her unavoidable commitment to prepare for war, on 29 October 1914, the Ottoman navy, without a formal declaration of war, shelled the Russian Black Sea ports of Odessa, Sebastopol, Novorossisk and Feodosia. Within a week of this pre-emptive bombardment, the Entente Powers comprising of Britain, France and Russia declared war on

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172 For the terms of this Treaty, see Primary Documents-Turco-German Alliance-2 August 1914, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/turcogermanalliance.htm
the Ottoman Empire and from 5 November on, the Empire was officially at war with the Triple Entente powers (Keegan, 1998:217).

During the First World War, the Eastern borderlands of the Ottoman Empire were a major theatre of operations between the Ottoman Empire and Russia as well as being the epicentre of Turkish-nationalist demographic engineering programs implemented by the Young Turk regime on account of short-term war exigencies and long-term ideological objectives explored below. As consequence, the War plunged Ottoman Kurdistan into greater chaos than at any time since perhaps the Battle of Çaldıran (1514) with austere and long-lasting social, economic and political implications. The Great War not only changed the social and economic fabric of the ethnically diverse Eastern and Southeastern Ottoman provinces, it also had a deleterious impact on the economic developments witnessed in Ottoman Kurdistan between 1890 and 1913. The events that had taken place in the build-up to and during the War, moreover, had crucial implications for the pre-history of Turkey’s Kurdish question, and the radicalisation of the then nascent Kurdish national movement. As exemplified by the occurrence of the influential Bitlis, Barzan and Baban revolts, which were organised in 1914 with the demand of regional autonomy for Ottoman Kurdistan.

The escalation in the political activities of the Ottoman Kurds was inextricably linked to the suppressive policies implemented by CUP government after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. Once the CUP leadership was directly confronted with secessionism, European intervention (e.g. annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Habsburg Empire in October 1908) and the counterrevolutionary activities of a diverse group of anti-CUP forces (i.e. the short-lived counterrevolution of April 1909); they steered away from political pluralism and consequently reneged on one of the main promises with which they had come to power in 1908: re-establishing a constitutional order in an “ideal” fashion by giving freedom of expression to all the ethnic groups in the Empire (Karpat, 2001: 349-50).
In other words, the Turkist proclivities of the CUP\textsuperscript{173}, which had been in existence since 1902 (Hanioğlu, 2001:295-302), had gained momentum because of the Young Turks regime experiencing exogenous and endogenous threats to its rule. A quintessential example of this is the following incisive and unequivocal conceptualisation of an ideal society outlined by one of influential members of the Central Committee of the CUP, Dr. Mehmed Nazım (1872-1926), in a letter to Zionist leaders in November 1908:

‘The Committee of Progress and Union wants centralization and a Turkish monopoly of power. It wants no nationalities in Turkey. It does not want Turkey to become a new Austria [-Hungary]. It wants a unified Turkish nation-state with Turkish schools, a Turkish administration, [and] a Turkish legal system’ (ibid.: 260).

Despite pan-Turkism not becoming a defining feature of the Ottoman state identity until after the \textit{coup d’état} of January 1913, in the wake of the counterrevolution of April 1909, the CUP began to implement in a piecemeal fashion nationalistic and centralist policies\textsuperscript{174}, which instigated the indiscriminate suppression of a range of non-Turkish Ottoman citizens, including the Ottoman Kurds (Jwaideh, 1961: 295-7). A case in point is the Law of Association (1909) that forbade the formation of associations that had an ethnic basis or national name (Ahmad, 1969: 61-2). With the enactment of this legislation, the leadership of the Kurdish organisations, which hitherto were in alliance with the Young Turks in opposition to the Hamidian regime during the preparatory years of the 1908 Revolution, were forced to swallow the bitter pill of betrayal.

Ironically, one of the first organisations to be proscribed in 1909 was the maiden Kurdish political society, Kurdistan Taali ve Terakki Cemiyeti (The Society for the Rise and Progress

\textsuperscript{173} For in-depth and differing interpretations of the evolution of Turkish nationalism, see: Hanioğlu (1995, 2001); Karpat (2001) and Ahmad (1969).

\textsuperscript{174} In 1909, legislations circumventing the power of the sultan were approved. Consequently, the Sultan’s role in the appointment of ministers was reduced to the choice of the Grand Vizier. Moreover, the Young Turks tried to centralise and empower the government with legislative powers such as the Law on the Press and Printing Establishments and Law on the Public Meeting which prohibited the liberty to expression and protest (Barlas, 1998:76-7)
of Kurdistan) (1908) which had up until then supported the 1908 Revolution (Elphinston, 1946: 94). The two founding leaders of this society, Amin Ali Bedirhan and Şerif Paşa were condemned to death and had to flee the country. Amin Ali’s eldest son, Sürreya Bedirhan, who had resumed the publication of the initial and influential Kurdish nationalist journal *Kurdistan* (1898-1909) after returning to Istanbul in 1908, had also shared the same destiny as his father and had it to seek refuge in 1909. Similarly, the newly established Kurdish cultural and educational organisations, like Kurd Nashri Ma’arif Cemiyeti (Society for the Propagation of Kurdish Education), had also been forced to suspend their activities (Jwaideh, 1961: 297-99).

The implementation of the unanticipated authoritarian policies by the Young Turks, as well as the ideas of nationalism that had gained prominence throughout the Empire percolating into Ottoman Kurdish minds, severely deteriorated the relationship between the CUP government and its Kurdish subjects. In May 1912, numerous Kurdish organisations joined forces and convened the first Kurdish General Assembly, which unanimously agreed to create a Kurdish political party to defend the rights of the Ottoman Kurds (Celil, 1992: 202). The conflictual ties between the Young Turk regime and the Kurds reached its lowest ebb immediately after the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 primarily because in the wake of the calamitous defeats – which resulted with the loss of the richest and most advanced core areas of the empire (Macedonia, Albania and Thrace) – the CUP government had endorsed three highly controversial policies: a) the implementation of the agonising 20% rise in the profits tax (*temettü vergisi*) paid by the merchants and artisans; b) the doubling of the Custom dues; and c) the rise in the *ağnam* tax. These much-reviled policies had been the last straw in the worsening relationship between the Ottoman state and its Kurdish subjects as they set in motion Kurdish uprisings all over Ottoman Kurdistan. Sixteen consecutive Kurdish revolts had taken place all over Kurdistan between 1913 and 1914. These rebellions culminated in
the major rebellions led by the leaders of the Kurdish principalities in Bitlis, Barzan and Baban on the eve of the First World War with clear nationalist demands, including the rights to regional autonomy (Celil, 1992: 201-16, Burkay, 2008 [1992]: 457-69).

The outbreak of the War, however, interjected the contestations of the Kurdish nationalist movement. This was due to two successive events orchestrated by the ruling CUP, which after the January 1913 coup d’état regained complete control of internal political affairs (Zürcher, 1994: 15-6). The first is the genocide of the Armenians (1915-16), which marked a new shift, pushing many Kurdish tribes and a considerable number of urban notables and religious sheikhs into alliance with the Ottoman authorities (H. Bozarslan, 2008: 337). The other is the forced deportation of a substantial number of Kurds from their ancestral homes subsequent to the massacre and expulsion of the Armenians in 1916.

In sum, the pro-Muslim and Turkist sentiments of the Ottoman rulers intensified during the Balkan Wars, and reached its peak with the eruption of the First World War. This was largely a consequence of the humiliating defeats endured during the former war, the heightened existential fears, as well as the corresponding imperative to save the Ottoman state, from the CUP leadership at the onset of the latter war.

The successive defeats in the Balkan Wars resulted not only in the mortifying loss of almost all the remaining European provinces, but also in the humiliating forced expulsion of the Balkan Muslims. By 1914, the Ottoman rulers, having seen the Empire shrink from approximately 3,000,000 sq. km. in 1800 to 1,300,000 sq. km., dreaded the imminent loss of the Empire’s entire territory with the fear-provoking possibility that the reform agreement of February 1914 signed by the Russians would be implemented. According to this agreement, Armenians were to partake on an equal basis in the local administration of the six Eastern provinces (i.e. Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Mamuretülaziz, Diyarbakir and Sivas) where they were living in dense concentration. The parties involved in the negotiation of this reform
agreement conceived this as a building block for the creation of an independent Armenian state (Akçam, 2012: xvii-xviii).


The above summarised events and eventualities constituted the basis of the ideological shifts among the late Ottoman political elite from pan-Ottomanism to pan-Islamism and, later, to pan-Turkism. The swing to pan-Turkism or Turkish nationalism at around the same time as the outbreak of the First World War had entailed a dialectical process; involving not only destructive social engineering and economic policies targeting the non-Turkish citizens of the Empire, but the nationalist reorganisation of the Ottoman lands. In other words, during and immediately after the War, CUP’s nationalist demographic policies aimed at homogenising the multi-ethnic landscape of the Empire, which mainly targeted the Armenians and the Kurds in the ethnically heterogeneous Eastern provinces, concurred with the radical reforms that laid the groundwork for Turkish capitalism and the unitary Turkish nation state that ascended from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire.

This helps to explain the jubilation of the nationalist cadres of the CUP at the outbreak of the War; as exhibited with the following words from an article penned by a leading Young Turk journalist, Hüseyin Cahit Yağlıç (1875-1957), published in the party organ of the CUP, Tanin, under the headline of ‘The Awaited Day’:

‘[The war] had come like a stroke of good fortune upon the Turkish people, who had been certain of their own debility. The day had finally come…the Turks would make an historical reckoning with those…whom they had hitherto unable to do so.’

175 For detailed analysis of the nature and implications of the nationalist spatial policies in the late-Ottoman era and the Republican era of the Turkish Republic in Eastern Anatolia, see: Jongerden (2007); Ülker (2005) and Öktem (2004).

176 The CUP also targeted other communities like the Christian Syriacs during this period. For a detailed study of the policies towards other Christian communities in Eastern Anatolia, see: Gaunt (2006).

With the anticipation that a Europe at war would not be able to enforce its will on the Ottoman rulers, the CUP implemented far-reaching administrative reforms once the war began. The Ottoman Porte between 1908 and 1914 had already designed some of these restructurings but they could not pass as law because of the vetoes of the European embassies. The European diplomats perceived these measures as an infringement of the ‘treaty rights of the foreigners’, since these blocked reforms had aimed to annul the regime of Capitulations (Ahmad, 1993: 40-1). In 1914, the much-loathed Capitulations were unilaterally abrogated, which facilitated the Porte to raise tariffs on imported goods, and the tasks of both the Public Debt Administration and the Ottoman Bank were overturned, enabling the Porte for the first time to undertake a monetary policy in printing paper money. After 1913, more importantly, the CUP abandoned the English liberal model of economic development modelled on the laissez-faire liberalism and began to embrace the economic model of ‘national economy’ centred on the ideas of the German economist Friedrich List. This shift in policy enabled the Unionists to combine the principle of state control over the economy with preferential treatment towards the Turkish/Muslim bourgeoisie.

List, in brief, contended that the liberal theories of the British economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo suited the national interest of England because of her industrialised economy and imperialist policies, but the model of development advocated by these economists could not be universalised. According to List, if laissez-faire liberal ideas are adopted by countries that do not have the large-scale industries akin to that of England, they would end up being reliant on England (List, 1856).

One of the prominent theoreticians of the CUP, Ziya Gökalp, paraphrased these concerns in the early 1920s. Gökalp maintained that the ‘Manchester economics is not at all a cosmopolitan doctrine, it is nothing but the national economics of England which stands for big industry and, thus, derives only benefit from the freedom of exchange abroad and suffers
no loss from it’ (Gökalp, 1959: 307). Deriving from this premise, Gökalp argued that if countries that do not have the industrial base and scale of England implement the ideas of the Manchester school they would inevitably become ‘economic slaves to industrialized nations like England’ (Gökalp, 1968: 123).

For List, the ability of states to engender productive power enables them to participate in world trade on a ‘value-adding’ basis: through producing goods that represent relatively high levels of skills and command relatively high prices on international markets. The lack of productive power in an economy dooms a country to importing goods of higher value than those it exports, leading to debt and underdevelopment:

‘The causes of wealth are quite a different thing from wealth itself. An individual may possess wealth, that is to say, exchangeable values; but if he is not able to produce more values than he consumes, he will be impoverished. An individual may be poor, but if he can produce more than he consumes, he may grow rich (List, 1856: 208).

Relatedly, the CUP with the purpose of nurturing the indigenous industry undertook fundamental economic measures (Toprak, 1982: 25-33). One of the core aims of these policies was the creation of the Turkish/Muslim bourgeoisie to supplant the existing non-Muslim/Turkish-commercial class, which was content with the role of being the commercial intermediaries in an Empire that served as a market for Europe’s industry. The historian Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935), who alongside the sociologist Gökalp had laid the theoretical foundations of the ideological shift to Turkish nationalism (Karpat, 2006: 374-407), believed that the fostering of the Turkish national bourgeoisie was an existential prerequisite for the ‘national economy’ (milli iktisad) that would sustain a Turkish nation state, as manifested in the following postulation by Akçura:

‘The foundation of the contemporary states is the bourgeoisie; the modern prosperous states came into existence on the shoulders of the artisan, merchants and banker bourgeoisie. The
Turkish national awakening can be a platform for a Turkish bourgeoisie in the Ottoman state and if natural growth of the Turkish bourgeoisie continues without damage of interruption, we can guarantee the solid ascendancy of the Ottoman state.’ 178

In 1914, with the intention of developing national production, the CUP government enacted the Law for the Encouragement of Industry (Teşvik-i Sanayi Kanunu). The following year, under tutelage of the CUP, the Muslim businessman founded the Tradesman’s Association in order to take the domestic market under their control. In 1916, the Lower House of Ottoman Empire, namely, the House of Deputies of the Ottoman Empire (Meclis-i Mebusan), approved a customs law and ruled that all trade related business should be conducted in Turkish (Ahmad, 1993:39-46; Barlas, 1998:78-9).

However, the repercussions of the First World War and the project of building a ‘national economy’, which concealed a Turkist agenda that was entirely a novel feature in Ottoman history, were double-edged. Ethnocide, forced migration and the demolition of moveable and immovable property had become the destructive components of the policies implemented in the Ottoman Empire during the War. The examples of the recorded atrocities committed in the initial stages of the First World War sheds much light on the devastations it had wrought to Ottoman Kurdistan and neighbouring Ottoman regions. For instance, when the Russian armies infiltrated beyond Doğubeyazıt-Alaşkirt region in Northern Kurdistan in December 1914, it is reported that only ‘one-tenth’ of the predominantly Kurdish population of the area survived the vehemence of the Armenian units, some of whom were ex-Ottoman citizens, attached to the Russian Army (Jwaideh, 1961: 363). In January 1915, when the Ottoman Army moved to capture Urumiya and Tabriz, most Armenians and Assyrians had fled in panic as the Russian armies stationed in Iranian Azarbaijan had at the time retired northwards. The Christian population who remained in these and surrounding areas was

subjected to acts of savagery at the hands of the Turkish troops and Kurdish auxiliary forces (McDowall, 2000:103).


Based on an archival study of the deportation orders issued by the CUP government, Fuat Dündar discerns that the deportation of the Ottoman Armenians had commenced in February 1915. The ‘fifth and final stage of the deportations’ is said to have begun after the leader of the CUP, Talat Pasha, on June 21, 1915, ordered the deportation of ‘all Armenians without exception’ who lived in ten provinces of the Eastern and Southeastern regions of the Empire, including Diyarbakır, Sivas and Mamuretülaziz (Dündar, 2011: 281-83). Within a year or so after the initiation of forced deportation of the Armenian from their ancestral homelands, according to a report of a United Nations human right subcommission, ‘at least one million’ Armenians perished (Hovannisian, 1999: 15).

The removal and the subsequent destruction of the Ottoman Armenians had severe social and economic consequences.\(^{179}\) Prior to 1916, The CUP’s ‘national economy’ targeted mainly the Armenian and the Greek communities in the Empire, and after 1916, it targeted the Kurds. The Ottoman Interior Ministry, in a circular on 2 November 1915, confessed to the occurrence of ‘an economic vacuum arising from the transportation of Armenian craftsmen.’\(^{180}\) Owing to the fact that the bulk of the Armenians, like the Ottoman Kurds, lived in the Eastern provinces, the largest destruction was meted out to this region. A French report from Diyarbekir observed that ‘the mass exodus of Christians, most of whom were artisans and merchants, had created a major economic crisis in this region’ (Tachjian, 2004: 206).

\(^{179}\) For a detailed examination of the social and economic repercussion of the Armenian Genocide of 1915, see: Üngör and Polatel (2011).

\(^{180}\) Başbakanlık Odası Arşivi (BOA), Dahiliye Nezareti Şifre Kalemi (DH.ŞFR) 57/261, Interior Ministry to all provinces, 2 November 1915 in Üngör and Polatel (2011:93).
After the forced expulsion and massacre of the Armenians, the CUP had designed and implemented a range of forced deportation policies targeting the Kurds. The settlement politics of the CUP entailed on the one hand, the deportation of Kurds from their homelands for resettlement in Central and Western Anatolia in accordance with the ‘5 per cent rule’: ensuring that the Kurds constituted no more than 5 per cent of the total population in their new places of settlement. And, on the other hand, settlement of Muslim immigrants, or *muhacir*, from lost territories, such as, Albanian Muslims, Bosnian Muslims and Bulgarian Turks, in Eastern Anatolia, where they were not allowed to constitute more than 10 per cent of the local population (Akçam, 2012: 43-50; Jongerden, 2007: 178-79).

The mass forced deportation of the Ottoman Kurds began with the following order issued, subsequent to the deportation of the Armenians, on 2 May 1916 by the then Minister of the Interior, Mehmed Talat, to the governor of Diyarbekir:

‘It is absolutely not allowable to send the Kurdish refugees to southern regions such as Urfa or Zor. Because they would either Arabize or preserve their nationality there and remain a useless and harmful element, the envisioned would not be accomplished and therefore the deportation and settlement of these refugees needs to carried out as follows.

- Turkish refugees and the turkified city dwellers need to be deported to the Urfa, Maraş, and Anteb regions and settled there.
- To prevent the Kurdish refugees from continuing their tribal life and their nationality wherever they have been deported, the chieftains need to be separated from the common people by all means, and all influential personalities and leaders need to be sent separately to the provinces of Konya and Kastamonu, and to the districts of Niğde and Kayseri.

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181 The deportation of the Ottoman Kurds was supervised by the Directorate for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants (*İskân-ı Aşâir Muhacirîn Müdûriyeti*, IAMM), renamed *Aşâir ve Muhacirîn Müdûriyet-i Umûmiyesi* (General Directorate for Tribes and Immigrants) (AMMU) in 1916.
- The sick, the elderly, lonely and deprived women and children who are unable to travel will be settled and supported in Maden town and Ergani and Behremaz counties, to be dispersed in Turkish villages and among Turks.¹⁸²

Orders with similar contents were also sent to the provinces of Sivas, Mamuretülaziz and Erzurum and to the provincial districts of Urfa, Maraş and Antep on 4 May 1916 (Akçam, 2012: 45-6). Another telegram sent to the province of Mosul on 6 May even listed each step of the policy of forced deportation of the Kurds:

‘ (1) In order to reform the Kurdish element and transform it into a constructive entity it is obligatory to immediately displace and send then to the assigned places in Anatolia mentioned below; (2) The areas of resettlement are: the provinces of Konya, Ankara, and Kastamonu, and the provincial districts of Niğde, Kayseri, Kütahya, Eskişehir, Amasya, and Tokat; (3) In the place of resettlements the sheikhs, leaders and mullahs will be separated from the rest of the tribe and sent to different districts, either before or after the [other] member [of the tribe], in other words, to places from which they will be unable to maintain relations with the other members.’¹⁸³

The statistical data prepared by the Ministry of the Economy indicate that there were ‘well over a million’ Kurdish refugees and deportees in this period (Üngör, 2011: 117). Figures pertaining to the actual number of Kurdish deportations are non-existent, however. The common consensus in scholarly studies on this issue is that approximately 700,000 Kurds were forced to flee their homelands; around half of whom are reported to have perished before reaching their various destinations (Jwaideh, 1961: 369; Safrastian, 1948: 76).

As briefly mentioned above, the deportation policy was a dual-track policy; along with the forced deportation of the Ottoman Kurds from their native lands, the CUP had ordered the

¹⁸³ BOA, DH.ŞFR no. 63/215, Coded telegram from the Interior Ministry’s IAMM to the Province of Mosul, 6 May 1916 in Akçam (2012: 47).
settlement of non-Kurdish Muslims who had fled from the lost Ottoman territories in Kurdish lands. As evinced, for instance, in the following instructions sent by the İAMM in 21 May 1916 to the province of Mamuretülaziz:

‘The Turkish refugees who surpass the province’s absorptive capacity will be sent to the areas of Urfa, Zor [Der Zor], Maraş and Ayuntab via the Ergani-Diyarbekir, Siverek route, while the Kurdish refugees will be sent to Kayseri, Yozgat, Ankara and Canik via Malatya-Sivas-Tokat, and then via the route Malatya-Darende-Şarız-Aziziye.’

Despite the scarcity of data concerning the settlements of non-Kurdish Muslim settlers, the existent official records regarding the non-Kurdish Muslim settlers reveals that they resided in and worked on the ‘abandoned properties’ (**emvâl-ı metrûke**[^185]) left behind by the Armenians and the Kurds. The precise number of the confiscated properties is not known, however, since Turkish state officials allege that the registers of the 33 Abandoned Properties Commission (**Emvâl-ı Metruke Komisyonu**) are ‘lost’ (Üngör and Polatel, 2011: 72).

In 1924, an important report written by a research commission chaired by a leading CUP member, Cavid Bey, concluded that the new proprietors of the ‘abandoned properties’, who had possession of these properties as a result of ‘extraordinary permissions’, lacked ‘economic education’ and resultanty wasted the wealth through ‘squander and dissipation.’[^186] This important report not only validates that Turkish and/or Turkophone migrants possessed the confiscated properties of the Armenians and the Kurds in the Eastern and Southeastern provinces, but it also indicates that these appropriated properties were not put to efficient use by their new occupiers. Thus, dispossession of land and properties, as well

[^184]: BOA, DH.ŞFR no. 64/93, Coded telegram from the Interior Ministry’s Office of Tribal and Immigrant Resettlement to the Province of Mamuretülaziz, 21 May 1916 in ibid. (43-4).

[^185]: The term ‘abandoned properties’ had been designated by the CUP as an euphemism employed to veil and legitimatise the confiscated possessions of both the Armenians and the Kurds. Thus, in this study this term will be interchangeably used with confiscation and dispossession.

as resulting in the pauperisation of the Armenians and the Kurds, had burdensome negative repercussions for regional productivity and prosperity.

Overall, by the end of the war the Ottoman economy shrunk by around 50 per cent and its GDP fell by 40 per cent. The destruction caused by the war in the different sectors of the Ottoman economy are succinctly summarised by the following figures pertaining to the declines experienced during the war: mineral production fell by 80 per cent, coal production by 75 per cent, cotton textiles by 50 per cent, wheat production by 40, and sheep and goat by 40 per cent (Eldem, 1970: 73-9).

Life for the population in Ottoman Kurdistan that had survived the War had been reduced to abject misery and destitution as famine and bacterial diseases like typhus and typhoid, took their toll. Due to the destruction of the Eastern economy during the course of the First World War, the famine that began at the end of 1917 struck the Eastern and Southeastern provinces more acutely than elsewhere in the Empire (McDowall, 2000:108-09).

4.3 From the Mudros Armistice of 1918 to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923

Istanbul signed the Mudros Armistice on 30 October 1918. Owing to the defeat of the Ottoman forces in Mesopotamia and Syria in the period leading up to the Mudros Armistice, it was unavoidable that the map of the Middle East would be redrawn; with inevitable spillover effects for Ottoman Kurdish lands. The details of the Anglo-French plan for the Middle East, the Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 1916), which had been exposed by the Bolsheviks a month after the October Revolution (1917), revealed how the Allied victors proposed to redraw the map of the Middle East. This agreement projected that most of Anatolia be taken from Ottoman control and the Russian Empire be rewarded with the Eastern provinces and the Straits, Greece with the region around Izmir and Italy with South-West Anatolia (Fisher, 1959: 369-70). After the October Revolution, however, the Soviets had stated their opposition to this imperialist plan, and the void created by their withdrawal
was proposed to be filled by the British by endowing to Britain as ‘zones of influence’ the ‘Cossack territories, the territory of the Caucasus, Armenia, Georgia, and Kurdistan’ (McDowall, 2000: 115).

This decision triggered the Ottoman and British scramble for Kurdistan. For the former the key objective was to preserve what remained of the Empire, and the loss of the strategic and naturally rich eastern provinces would have been a major setback. For Britain the issue of Kurdistan had been secondary to the main territories she had been interested in, namely, Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Syria, but it unavoidably partook in the decision making process regarding the future of Kurdistan because of its strategic position in Mesopotamia. The following words of Arnold Wilson in 1919, Acting Civil Commissioner in Baghdad, deftly summarises the objectives of Britain:

‘The whole basis of our action as regards Kurds should be in my opinion the assurance of a satisfactory boundary to Mesopotamia. Such a boundary cannot possibly be secured, I imagine, in the plains, but must be found in the Kurdish mountains […] [and that] entails a tribal policy.’\(^{187}\)

With the latterly mentioned apprehension concerning the Eastern provinces in Ottoman minds, the recognition of the Kurdish claims appeared prudent to the Ottoman statesmen in order to dissuade the Kurds from making common cause with the Armenians. Accordingly, both components of the (dual) state power that emerged in the years between the end of the First World War and the establishment of the Turkish Republic – i.e. the palace-backed government in Istanbul and the new government led by Mustafa Kemal in Ankara – acknowledged the previously suppressed demands of the Kurds. The *Amasya Protocol*, a document signed in 1919 at a time of accord between the Istanbul government and founders of the Ankara Assembly and later the Turkish Republic, testifies that both of these

\(^{187}\) FO 371/4192, Memorandum by Wilson, 12/09/1919.
constituents had recognised that the Kurds would be granted ethnic and cultural rights in order to warrant their free development (Yeğen, 2011: 68).

In a public interview held immediately before the proclamation of the Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal stated:

‘In accordance with our constitution, a kind of local autonomy is to be granted. Hence, provinces inhabited by the Kurds will rule themselves autonomously […]

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey is composed of the deputies of both Kurds and Turks and these two peoples have unified their interests and fates’ (ibid.).

Besides these assurances, Mustafa Kemal making Islam the linch-pin of the Kemalist struggle against the ‘Christian invaders’, promising to conserve the caliphate and pledging to liberate the province of Mosul from British occupation, played a determinate role in persuading the mainstream Kurdish leaders to coalesce with Ankara during the War of Independence (1919-22) (H. Bozarslan, 2008: 338; McDowall, 2000: 187).

This collaboration, however, had been threatened by the Kurdish uprisings that began in Dersim and spread to various other parts of Ottoman Kurdistan between 1921 and 1922 by Kurdish notables who were discontent and fearful of Ankara’s headship. Colonel Alfred Rawlinson (1867-1934), a British liaison officer in Anatolia, conveying the general perception and attitude of the Kurds vis-à-vis the Ankara government in one of the Foreign Office Memorandums in 1922, notes the following observations that sheds much light on the growing disgruntlement of the Kurds towards the end of the War of Independence:

‘the Kurds are left enormously in the majority in the eastern districts of Anatolia and all Turkish posts there being very weakly held at the mercy of the local Kurds…the principal Kurdish chiefs are entirely dissatisfied…and extremely antagonistic towards Turks.’

188 FO 371/7858, Memorandum by Rawlinson, 4/03/1922.
Despite these conflicts, the Kurds were unable to create a unified and effective opposition, because of their inability to develop a cohesive idea of Kurdish identity owing to being fragmented by tribal and religious allegiances as well as by language and socio-economic activity. This disunity amongst Kurds had been evident with the differing approaches to the question of Kurdish autonomy on the eve and during the War of Independence.

At the onset of the War of Independence, the Kurdish national movement that had organised around Kurdish societies re-emerged. The official representative, Şerif Paşa, of the most influential Kurdish society, Kûrd Teali Cemiyeti (Society for Kurdish Advancement) (1918), started negotiations with the Armenian delegate, Bughos Nubar, for the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920) to assure the independence of the two countries. The negotiations concluded with a Kurdo-Armenian accord. In a joint declaration on 20 November 1919, both parties affirmed that they agreed on an independent Kurdistan and Armenia, only to be rejected by a sizeable section of Kurdish leaders because of their bitter memories with the Armenian troops and their willingness to ally with Ankara due to the promises made by Mustafa Kemal. The majority in Armenia who were in favour of the Armenian case for six eastern provinces also opposed this accord (Jwaideh, 1961: 376-78).

The only major Kurdish revolt against the Kemalists during the War of Independence had been the Koçgiri revolt, which took place in 1921 in the predominantly Alevi Dersim area. This revolt had endangered the Kemalist-Kurdish alliance as the rebel leaders had the following demands:

i) Acceptance by Ankara of Kurdish autonomy as agreed by Istanbul as per the Sevres Treaty;

ii) The release of Kurdish prisoners in Elaziz (Elazığ), Erzincan, Malatya and Sivas;

iii) The withdrawal of all Turkish officials from areas with a Kurdish majority;
iv) The withdrawal of all Turkish forces from the Koçgiri region in West Dersim, which because of lying west of the Euphrates had been excluded from the area formally designated at Sevres as part of an autonomous Kurdistan.

Aside from being badly organised, the revolt had not been able to mobilise sufficient support from the Sunni Kurds since they perceived it as an Alevi uprising. Predictably, the Turkish forces defeated it by April 1921 (Olson, 1989, 26-33).

On account of the successful War of Independence, the Sevres Treaty (10 August 1920) was superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923). This new Treaty carved up Kurdistan and annulled the possibility of its independence and autonomy. The only protection it offered to the Kurds was the safeguarding of their linguistic rights under Article 39:

‘No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings. Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the courts’ (McDowall, 2000:142).

4.4 Society, Economics and Politics in the Republican People’s Party Era (1923-1950)

Consolidation of the ‘National Economy’ and the ‘Reform’ of the East (1923-1929)

With the proclamation of the Turkish Republic (29 October 1923) the aforementioned Kemalist-Kurdish alliance collapsed, and many Kurdish notables followed the path of the Alevi Kurdish rebels in Dersim. This rupture stemmed largely from three principal factors. First, after the Armistice in October 1923, Turkish nationalism had become Turkey’s official and hegemonic ideology. This new ideology conceived national and linguistic differences as existential threats to the Turkish Republic and for that reason ruthlessly repressed them. Second, the promises made by Mustafa Kemal to the Kurds before 1923 were reneged on with the foundation of the Republic. After the proclamation of the Turkish Republic the
existence of the Kurdish identity was negated, the caliphate was abolished (3 March 1924) and the vilayet of Mosul in southern Kurdistan was not liberated from British occupation as promised under the National Pact (*Misak-i Milli*) in 1920.

Third, the Lausanne conference produced a major problem: the future of the vilayet of Mosul. Kemalists were alarmed by the apparent willingness of Britain to offer the Kurds in Mosul a certain degree of local autonomy during the Lausanne negotiations, because of the possible spillover effects of such a Kurdish polity for the Kurds on north of the border. In other words, the Turkish officials were fretful that an autonomous Kurdish political entity would foster autonomist tendencies amongst the Kurds living in Turkey; in the same way that the successful revolt led by Ismail Agha Simko in 1920 established a short lived independent Kurdish state in eastern Kurdistan (Arfa, 1966: 48-64, Koohi-Kamali, 2003: 66-83, McDowall, 2000: 141-42).

The predominantly Kurdish ESA were the only domains in Turkey not to be turkified at the inception of the Turkish Republic; therefore, in the eyes of the Kemalist rulers these territories were areas wherein potential secessionist threats could originate. The perceived risk of Kurdish self-rule by the Republican rulers informed the discriminatory Kurdish policies during the single-party period (1923-1945), which led to neglect and further peripheralisation of these primarily Kurdish regions of the new Turkish nation-state, a theme explored below. This perhaps explains why the alteration in the Kemalist attitude towards the Kurds had overlapped with the Lausanne Conference, which was held in two sessions, from 20 November 1922 to 4 February 1923 and then from 23 April until 24 July 1923.

**The Izmir Economic Congress**

The major change of policy vis-à-vis the Kurds took place at the Izmir Economic Congress (17 February-4 March 1923). This Congress convened during the interval in the deliberations

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of the Lausanne Conference, with the attendance of 1,135 delegates (İnan, 1972: 12) mostly from the dominant classes, i.e. big landowners and the merchant bourgeoisie, as well as from the labouring classes (Boratav, 1982: 14-8). When Mustafa Kemal’s speech to this Congress was published all references to the Kurds had been excised (McDowall, 2000: 191), which implied a fundamental shift in the policies of Ankara towards the Kurds in Turkey. Such an alteration was not adversative to the purpose and principles of the 1923 Congress of Economics, as this Congress espoused to consolidate the foundations of the Turkish ‘national economy’ envisioned and set out by the CUP during the First World War as the basic strategy of the new Turkish nation-state. The principles adopted in the Izmir Economic Congress pertained to the preparation of: a property regime, an institutional structure required for the operation of a modern market economy, and special incentives designed for the enrichment and development of the indigenous bourgeoisie. Specifically, the Congress decided to encourage domestic production, prohibit the import of luxury goods, and permit foreign direct investment if the investors refrained from seeking political concessions. Other important decisions included the abolishment of the tithe and its replacement with a tax on soil produce, establishing an industrial bank, which would provide credit to the industrialists, and adoption of the Law for the Encouragement of Industry (Boratav; 1982; Toprak, 1983, Yalman, 2009).

After this Congress, and throughout the Republican era (1923-1950), one of the central objectives of the Kemalists was, in the words of an official report of the ruling Republican Peoples Party’ General Secretariat in 1939-40, to ‘dismantle the territorial unity of Kurds’ and ‘Turkify the Eastern population’ (Bulut, 1998: 185-89). The rulers of Republican Turkey did not hold back from openly propagating their plans for the Kurds in Turkey. Quintessential

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190 For the speech by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to the İzmir Economic Congress, see: İnan (1982: 57-69).
examples of this are the exchanges the Foreign Minister of the Turkish Republic, Tevfik Rüştü Aras (1883-1972), had with the foreign diplomats in 1926-27.

Aras, in 1926, stated to the British administrator of Iraq, Sir Henry Dobbs (1871-1934), that the central governors of Turkey were ‘determined to clear out the Kurds of their valleys, the richest part of Turkey to-day, and settle Turkish peasants there’, and averred that ‘the Kurds would for many generations incapable of self-government’. Consequently, the forthright Foreign Minister made plain to the representatives of the international community that the Kemalist governors of the Turkish Republic were adamant to forcibly displace the Kurds from their ancestral lands, and encumber any form of Kurdish self-determination or polity. In 1927, the Turkish Foreign Minister had in the presence of Sir George Clerk (1874-1951), the British Ambassador to Turkey, reiterated similar policy objectives based on social Darwinian premises:

‘They [Kurds] will die out, economically unfitted for the struggle for life in competition with the more advanced and cultured Turk, who will be settled in the Kurdish districts. After all there are less than 500,000 Kurds in Turkey to-day, of whom as many as can will emigrate into Persia and Iraq, while the rest will simply undergo the elimination of the unfit.’

In order to ensure the ‘elimination’ of the so-called ‘economically unfit’ Kurds, moreover, Fevzi Çakmak (1876-1950), the first Chief of the General Staff of the Republic of Turkey and an architect of the Kurdish policy of the Turkish state during the Republican era, had around the same time argued that the predominantly Kurdish provinces of Turkey should deliberately be kept underdeveloped. Marshall Çakmak suspected that ‘economic development and wealth would accelerate the level of consciousness and thus lead to the development of nationalism among the Kurds’ (A. H. Kılıç, 1998: 97). Put differently, the influential Marshall maintained that in order to nullify the probability of the existence of a Kurdish polity it is necessary to

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192 FO 424/266, Clerk to Chamberlain, 4/01/1927.
forestall social and economic development in areas predominantly populated by Kurds, namely, ESA. Thus, the denial of economic opportunity for Kurds, which could potentially provide the economic base of an indigenous Kurdish state, was construed as the best possible shield against the ostensible separatist threat, as well as increasing the strength and viability of the Turkish state.

The avowals by the two senior figures of the RPP government indicate that since the foundation of the Turkish Republic the Kemalists sought to procure the densification and power of the dominant ethnic group, the Turks, at the expense of the Kurds in ESA; with the anticipation that the latter will gradually extinguish or become a powerless ethnic entity. The cornerstones of this strategy were threefold: a) the forced deportation of the Kurds from their native lands; b) the assimilation of the Kurds into the Turkish identity; and c) the underdevelopment of the areas predominantly inhabited by the Kurds.

The Republican rulers aim of ‘turkifying’ the heterogeneous Eastern provinces and, in turn, extinguishing the Kurdish identity or rendering the Kurds a feeble entity had played a determinate role in the creation of a chaotic atmosphere in the predominantly Kurdish southeast of Turkey in the early years of the Turkish Republic. During the first two decades of the Republic, there were twenty-seven Kurdish revolts, and only one out of the eighteen Turkish military expeditions during the years 1924-38 transpired outside of Kurdistan. Three of these revolts, namely, the Şeyh Said revolt (1925), the Ararat revolt (1930) and the Dersim revolt (1936-38), had a distinctive influence on the evolution of the RPP regime and its Kurdish policy.

Şeyh Said Revolt and the 1925 Reform Plan

The Şeyh Said revolt had taken place against the backdrop of increasing hostility between the Kurds and the Kemalist state largely due to the contested decisions taken by the latter between 1923 and 1924. During the election of the new Grand National Assembly in the
summer of 1923, Kurdish deputies were denied the right to return to their constituencies and candidates selected by the government replaced them. In the same year, the Kemalists had also abolished the caliphate, which was interpreted by the Sunni Kurds as an attack on their collective and religious identity. Furthermore, in March 1924, despite Article 39 in the Treaty of Lausanne, the Turkish state had officially prohibited the use of Kurdish in schools and law courts and insisted on the use of Turkish in official domains – traditional Kurdish clothing and music were also banned.

The 1925 revolt, led by a Kurdish religious dignitary, the Naqshbandi Sheikh Mehmed Said of Piran\textsuperscript{193} (1865-1925), was initially organised with the aim of establishing an independent Kurdistan by the leadership of the Azadi (Freedom) Committee composed of Kurdish intellectuals and officers who had been arrested in September 1924 after the failed mutiny attempt. The Şeyh Said uprising truly threatened the Kemalist state to the extent that Ankara mobilised 52,000 soldiers, spent around a third of its annual budget, proclaimed martial law in almost all of the predominantly Kurdish provinces and negotiated with the French authorities to gain use of the southern railways in order to supress it. These measures by the Turkish were not to no avail as the revolt was crushed in spring 1925 at the gates of Diyarbekir (renamed Diyarbakır) (Olson, 1989: 91-127; McDowall, 2000: 192-96; H. Bozarslan, 2008:339-41).

Subsequent to the Şeyh Said revolt, Atatürk, on 8 September 1925, authorised the creation of the Reform Council for the East (\textit{Şark İslahat Encümani})\textsuperscript{194} in order to devise concrete policy prescriptions to deal once and for all with any potential separatist threat from the Kurdish society. Pursuant to this, on 24 September 1925 a special report entitled the \textit{Şark İslahat

\textsuperscript{193} For a biography of Sheikh Mehmed Said of Piran, see: Aras (1992).

\textsuperscript{194} The then Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü (1884-1973), chaired the Reform Council for the East. Major positions in this body were held by the following senior military officers and government bureaucrats who had attained experience in the field of policy making as CUP officials: Chief of Staff Marshall Mustafa Fevzi Çakmak, Interior Minister Lieutenant-Colonel Mehmet Cemil Uybadın (1880-1957), Lieutenant-General Kazım Fikri Özalp (1882-1968), Şükri Kaya (1883-1959), Mahmud Celal Bayar (1883-1986), and Mustafa Abdülhalik Renda (1881-1957) (Bayrak, 1993: 481).
Raporu (Report for Reform in the East) was prepared and presented to the Turkish Assembly. This secret report, which saw daylight as a result of a series of official reports published by Mehmet Bayrak (1993, 1994) in the 1990s, made the following critical recommendations:

i) Preventing the Kurdish political and social elite from reviving as a ruling class;

ii) Clearing persons, families, and their relatives whose residence ‘in the east the government deems inappropriate’;

iii) Reuniting and governing all of the provinces located on the East bank of the Euphrates River via the military administrative unit of ‘Inspectorates-General’ by martial law for an unspecified period of time;

iv) Emphatically prohibiting the use ‘of all non-Turkish languages’ and the ‘employment of the Kurds in even secondary offices’;

v) Allocation of seven million Turkish Lira (TL) in order to finance the settlement and the livelihoods of the Turkish refugees and transportation of the Kurds (Bayrak, 1993: 481-89).

Consequently, a series of deportation laws were implemented between 1925 and 1927 actuating the recommendations in this report. On 10 December 1925, the ruling RPP government led by Prime Minister İsmet İnönü had passed law number 675, titled ‘Law on Migrants, Refugees, and Tribes Who Leave Their Local Settlements Without Permission’. On 31 May 1926, the government enacted the ‘Settlement Law’. This piece of legislation permitted the Interior Ministry to identify:

(i) ‘Individuals who do not fall under Turkish culture, those of infected with syphilis, persons suffering from leprosy and their families, and those convicted of murder

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195 The Inspectorates-General (Umûmî Müfettişlikler) were regional governorships whose authority prevailed over all civilian, military, and judicial institutions under their domain in large areas of the Turkish Republic. During the 1920s and the 1930s, four of them were established in ESA provinces. On 1 January 1928, the RPP government established the First Inspectorate-General (covering the provinces of Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Van Hakkari, Muş, Mardin Urfa and Siirt), and appointed Dr. İbrahim Tali Öngören (1875-1952) as its first Inspector-General. For a detailed study of the Inspectorates-General, see: Koçak (2003).
except for political and military crimes, anarchists, spies, gypsies, and those who have been expelled from the country’ (the appendix to this law considered the ‘Pomaks, Bosniaks, and Tatars’ in the Turkish culture);

(ii) ‘Migratory tribes in the country and all the nomads’, with the aim of ‘transporting [them] to suitable and available places’ (Üngör, 2011: 138).

This was not the last of deportation orders. The RPP government on 10 June 1927 passed the ‘Law Regarding the Transportation of Certain Persons from Eastern Regions to the Western Regions’. This new deportation law was akin to the expulsion orders of 1915-6. In the words of the British Ambassador Sir George Clerk, it empowered the government to ‘transport from the Eastern Vilayets an indefinite number of Kurds or other elements…the Government has already begun to apply to the Kurdish elements…the policy which so successfully disposed of the Armenian Minority in 1915.’ Despite the lack of factual data according to the figures cited by contemporary Kurdish authors, from 1925 to 1928 more than 500,000 people deported of whom some 200,000 were estimated to have perished in the abovementioned provinces (Bedirkhan, 1958: 52-3).

The Law on the Maintenance of Order 1925-29

The 1925 Revolt was a catalyst for more than the suppression of the Kurdish national movement as it led to the implementation on 4 March 1925 of an extraordinary law entitled The Law on the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükün Kanunu), which remained in force until March 1929. The Law on the Maintenance of Order marked the end of political pluralism and free press in Turkey. This piece of legislation was used within the first few months of its enactment by the Republican government to outlaw the opposition party, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Progressive Republican Party), and the only publications

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196 FO 371/12255, Clerk to Chamberlain, Istanbul, 22/06/1927.
not banned were the government publication, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (National Sovereignty), as well as the pro-establishment national paper, *Cumhuriyet* (Republic).

The Law on the Maintenance of Order empowered the government to enact a wide range of legislations in order to attain a top-down transformation of society according to the Western model, which the Kemalist perceived as the universal model of civilisation and progress as well as a precondition for economic progress (Ahmad, 1993: 79-93; McDowall, 2000: 198-202; Zürcher, 1994: 179-84). The direct and indirect effects of these new acts, which will be elucidated below, are commonly held in the literature on the initial years of the Turkish Republic to have stimulated modernisation and capitalist development in Turkey (Ahmad, 1993; Z. Aydın, 1986; Hershlag, 1968; Issawi, 1980). In other words, despite the economic restrictions agreed to as per the economic concessions appended to the Lausanne Treaty197, the new acts implemented during the lifetime of the Law on the Maintenance of Order are commonly thought to have instigated important socio-economic changes. These pivotal developments were the fostering of the indigenous capitalist class, the nurturing of a legal and institutional structure that provided the conditions for capital accumulation, and the transformation of society in accordance with norms of the idealised Western civilisation.

During the period between the enactment and repealment of the Law on the Maintenance of Order, the Gregorian calendar was adopted (1 January 1926). Within the same year, the Islamic code of law, *sharia*, was annulled. Subsequently, the government introduced a civil code patterned on the Swiss Civil Code, followed by a Penal Code based on the Penal Code of Mussolini’s Italy, and a Commercial Code centred largely on the German and Italian codes (Ahmad, 1993: 79-80, Issawi, 1980: 367).

According to the 1927 Census, Turkey had 65,245 industrial enterprises, the overwhelming majority of which had been small workshops. The enterprises with more than five workers

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197 These concessions compelled Turkey to free its custom tariffs at the 1916 rates, with prohibitions on differential rates for imported and locally produced goods, and remove quantitative restrictions on foreign trade until 1929.
constituted only 8.94 per cent of these registered industrial firms (Hershlag, 1968: 54; Zürcher, 1994: 204). Relatedly, in 1927, the state implemented the Law for the Encouragement of Industry. This new piece of legislation made state lands available to entrepreneurs, exempted many essential materials from import duties and reduced freight charges and taxes. One of the indicators of the impact of this Law during the 1920s is the fact that out of the 1,473 industrial enterprises which reaped the benefits of the Law in 1932, only 342 had been established before 1923 (Hershlag, 1968: 54-5, Thornburg, 1949: 24-5).

In 1928, the Kemalist state replaced the Arabic script with the Latin in the writing of Turkish (Ahmad, 1993: 80-2). In addition, after the mid-1920s, for purposes of accelerating economic development and maintaining political control, the Turkish state had set as one of its central aims the task of modernising transportation. In accordance with this objective, the state nationalised the foreign concessions in this sector and embarked on the development of an extensive transport network in order to cover the country with a dense network of railways and roads, stretching to the distant regions of Anatolia. Railway projects in particular absorbed high state investments during the first decade of the Republic. Eight hundred km of track were laid between 1923 and 1929, and in 1929, another 800 km were under construction (Barlas, 1998:89-92, Hershlag, 1968: 231-36; Rivkin, 1965: 63-4).

In order to overcome one of the main drawbacks of the nascent national industrial enterprises, that is, adequate initial capital, great importance was imputed to banking facilities, in particular to the İş Bankası (Business Bank) established in August 1924 (Ahmad, 1993: 96; Hershlag, 1968: 56-7). Its nominal capital was raised in 1927 to 4 million TL. The short and long-term deposits held in this Bank increased from 8,061,377 TL in 1925 to 43,839,567 TL in 1929 (Hershlag, 1968: 56).

The role of the Ziraat Bankası (Agricultural Bank, established in 1889) underwent magnification by the Kemalist state after 1924 to granting of loans, purchase and sale of
agricultural produce, purchase of land, participation in companies dealing with agriculture and dealing with the materials needed by the peasants. The augmentation in the role and capabilities of this Bank in the early years of the Republic was uneven and not attuned to the actual needs of the peasantry, since it did not overcome the overreliance of the peasantry on the usurers and big landowners (Z. Aydin, 1986: 31-7; Hershlag, 1968: 48-9).

In line with the newly defined roles, there had been an increase in the outstanding credit limit of this Bank: from 53% of the paid-up capital during the War of Independence to over 100% after 1924. Resultantly, a drastic rise in the level of loans handled by this Bank: from 928,000 TL in 1922 to 25,880,000 TL in 1929 (Hershlag, 1968: 48-9). Such expansions are believed to have played an influential role in the recovery and development of the agriculture in Turkey after the mid-1920s (Issawi, 1980: 367). The main beneficiaries of the thrust of agricultural policies between 1923 and 1929 were, however, the large commercial producers of exportable cash crops, concentrated in the Aegean and Mediterranean regions (Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1987: 273).

**Uneven Post-War Recovery**

Between 1923 and 1929, the Turkish economy recovered, and by 1929, it appeared to have regained its pre-war level. For instance, per capita GDP in 1923 was 40 per cent below its 1914 level, but by the end of the 1920s, it had attained the levels prevailing prior to the First World War (Pamuk, 2008: 276-77). Besides, as illustrated by Table 4.1 below, when compared to the pre-war Ottoman levels, considerable developments had taken place in the sphere of education and in transport.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1 Indicators of development, 1913-1928</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Trade (million dollars)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (1948 prices Turkish Lira)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Production (millions of liras 1940 prices)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial production (millions of liras 1948 prices)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat (million tons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco (thousand tons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton (thousand tons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal (million tons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refined Sugar (thousand tons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement (thousand tons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity (million kWh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways (thousand kilometers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students in schools (thousands)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Issawi, 1980: 368.
However, the predominantly Kurdish provinces\textsuperscript{198} in ESA (Beyazit, Bitlis, Diyarbekir, Elaziz (Elazıg), Erzincan, Hakkari, Kars, Malatya, Mardin, Siirt, Urfa and Van), which in 1927 were home to around a quarter (14.6\%) of the general population of Turkey (13,660,275\textsuperscript{199}), did not develop in parallel with the rest of the country. These regions had been the least affected quarters by the post-war recovery witnessed in the Turkish Republic between the years of 1923 and 1929. Despite the aforementioned transport infrastructure projects, by 1930 there were no railroads constructed in these provinces.\textsuperscript{200} In 1927, only 900 of the 14,000 schools in Turkey were located in these domains.\textsuperscript{201} In the whole of ESA, furthermore, by 1930 there was only one bank, namely, the Elaziz İktisat Bankası, established in 1929, which had a nominal capital of 50,000 TL.\textsuperscript{202} Thus, obtaining loans were virtually impossible.

According to the official data from 1927, when compared with the nine designated agricultural districts in Turkey, each of which was composed of 5-9 provinces, the districts comprising of the predominantly Kurdish provinces in ESA, i.e. districts five and six, contained the least amount of agricultural tools and machinery. Only 119,665 out of 1,413,509 of the necessary agricultural tools and machinery were to be found in the provinces located in these regions.\textsuperscript{203}

In the late 1920s, as evinced by the following figures demonstrative of the calamitous imbalance between the unproductive and productive sectors in the predominantly Kurdish towns in 1927, the productive sector in these provinces had been in a dismal state:

\textsuperscript{198} Mustafa Abdüllahik Renda, one of the co-authors of the aforementioned Report for the Reform of the East, in September 1925 traversed the Eastern provinces/districts of Gaziantep, Urfa, Siverek, Diyarbekir, Siirt, Bitlis, Van, Muş, Genç, Elazıg, Dersim, Ergani, Mardin, Malatya and Maraş in order to identify ‘where the Kurds live and how many they are’. As a result of this field research, Renda discerned that out of the 1,360,000 registered population in the east of the Euphrates in 1925, 993,000 were Kurds, 251,000 were Turkish and 117,600 were Arabs. Moreover, Renda, subsequent to an elaborate socio-economic analysis of the Eastern provinces, concluded that the Kurds had been in a ‘dominant economic position’ in this region of Turkey (Bayrak, 1993: 452-67).

\textsuperscript{199} TCBİUM, Annuaire Statistique, 1928: 24-5.

\textsuperscript{200} Ibid., 1932: 359.

\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., 1928: 28-9

\textsuperscript{202} Ibid., 1934: 305.

\textsuperscript{203} Ibid., 1933: 188-89
45,863 soldiers (this figure is solely of the soldiers stationed in these in this region and therefore it is not inclusive of the armies mobilised to deal with specific military tasks in the region) and 1,841 magistrates as against 25,327 merchants, 32,496 artisans and workers and 21,095 in various other unclassified professions. This was at a time when 1,400,209 active people were unemployed in this region, which accounted for over 16 per cent of the total number of unemployed people in Turkey.204

Although there are no official regional trade statistics to cite, the following report from the British consul in Trabzon in June 1926 indicates that the trade in the mid-1920s in the Kurdish provinces was a shadow of what it had been during the First World War:

‘Travellers report having seen great numbers of Kurds with their families and cattle being driven along Erzurum-Erzinjan [Erzincan] road presumably bound for Angora [Ankara] and Western Anatolia. Whole villages are deserted, and trade is at a standstill over a large area.’205

The policy of deporting the Kurdish political and the economic elite, moreover, adversely affected the trade and wealth creation in this region of Turkey, as revealed by the following observation of a British traveller in the summer of 1929:

‘One of the main weapons employed was the deportation of the rich and powerful Kurdish families…in the process they have lost all their belongings, and there is not, so I was told, a single wealthy or powerful Kurd in Turkish Kurdistan to-day.’206

204 Ibid.: 64-5.
205 FO 371/11528, Knight to Lindsay, Trebizon, 16/06/1926.
206 FO 371/13828, Clerk (Istanbul) to Henderson (London), 15/07/1929.
The Great Depression, Etatism and the Resettlement of Kurds (1929-1939)

The year 1929 was a critical year for the Turkish Republic. On the one hand, the economic restrictions agreed to in the Lausanne Treaty ended. On the other, the negative impacts of the world economic crisis began to be felt by Turkey, and the Kemalist regime were, yet again, facing a rapidly growing Kurdish resistance led by the pro-self-rule Khoybun (Independence) Committee. By the autumn of 1929, Khoybun had dominated an area from Ararat as far south as Khushab, south of Van, and pressed for Kurdish autonomy. Within a year or so, by means of massive military expeditions, in close alliance with Iran, the Ararat rising was supressed by the Kemalist forces (Alakom, 1998; van Bruinessen, 1992: 376-393). Whereas the negative ramifications of the 1929 Great Depression had kept aggravating.

The initial effects of the economic crisis were to be seen in the fall in the prices of agricultural produce: the principal source of income of the population of Turkey and the lion’s share of Turkish exports. Agriculture was by far the largest sector, it accounted for approximately half of the GDP and employed three-fourths of the labour force (Pamuk, 2008: 279). For example, compared to 1925, agricultural prices in 1932 and 1933 fell by one-third, and, in turn, the value of exports declined vastly. Turkey had received over 1 million TL for around 14 thousand tons of wheat exported in 1926. In 1931, it was in receipt of the same amount for almost 26 thousand tons (Barlas, 1998: 81).

The year 1929 saw the greatest deficit, amounting to 101 million TL, with imports at 256 million TL and exports at 155 million TL (Hershlag, 1968: 66). The economic situation in Turkey worsened with a corresponding depreciation of the Turkish lira against the sterling pound (Ahmad, 1993: 96-7; Zürcher, 1994:205). Consequently, the cost of paying public debt rose very sharply to the extent that the state was forced to suspend payments to foreign creditors in 1930 (Ahmad, 1993: 96).
Turkey’s reaction to the Great Depression was similar to that of America and Western European countries. It implemented protectionist trade policy and increased government activity in the sphere of economy. This was done with the aim stabilising the economy and strengthening the national industry, a target set in the 1920s but the implementation of which thus far proved slow due to the economic restrictions appended to the Lausanne Treaty. Accordingly, between 1929 and 1931, the state ratified a wide range of measures in order to attain stability and promote the indigenous industry. A new tariff policy, Tariff Regulation of 1929, came into effect at the beginning of the Depression in order to protect the local industry. This policy was followed by the introduction of foreign exchange controls in December 1929, after a very high demand for foreign currency for large imports in that year. It was this excess in demand that initiated the abovementioned depreciation of the Turkish lira. In addition, a system of import quotas and restrictions on the import of certain commodities were implemented by the Turkish state as of November 1931 (Hershlag, 1968: 66-7).

**Etatist Turkey**

Despite the steps towards implementing étatist policies when the Great Depression took its toll on the Turkish economy, it was not until the third congress of the RPP (10-18 May 1931) that the ruling Party formally adopted étatism\(^\text{207}\) (devletçilik) as a new economic policy and made it one of the pillars of Kemalist ideology (Boratav, 1982: 59-60). Étatism in this study will denote the direct intervention by the state in the economic life of capitalist society, by way of nationalisation, by the administration of prices, and control of wages, as well as social welfare legislation. After its official adoption at the RPP Congress, étatism, along with the other five principles or ‘arrows’ (i.e. Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Secularism and

\(^{207}\) For detailed and differing interpretations of Etatism in Turkey, see: Boratav (1982); Hale (1981: 53-85) and Hershlag (1968: 61-122).
Revolutionarism) adopted at the same Congress, was officially inscribed as Article 2 of the Turkish Constitution in 1937.

In the party programme of the RRP, moreover, étatism was described with the following words:

‘Although considering private work and activity a basic idea, it is one of our main principles to interest the State activity in matters where the general and vital interests of the nation are in question, especially in the economic field, in order to lead the nation and the country to prosperity in as short time as possible.’

The central feature of this new economic policy was to protect and strengthen the national private sector by assisting and carrying out economic ventures that the private sector was unable and/or unwilling to carry out (Ahmad, 1994: 100; Hershlag, 1986: 73). With this aim in mind, the Five-Year economic plan was drawn up in 1933. The anonymous authors of this plan had stated that the top priority for Turkey had to be nationalistic industrialisation:

‘Despite the political and economic disagreements between them, the powerful industrial countries are essentially in agreement in reducing agricultural countries to a status of primary producers and in dominating their internal markets. To this end, they will eventually use their political influence to prevent the present movement in the agricultural countries. Some agricultural countries may accept this situation in return for minimal concessions. This reality, in particular, drives us to establish the industry we need without any delay’ (Boratav, 1981: 186-87).

Consequently, the Five-Year Plan, which was approved by the Government on January 9, 1934, aimed at establishing twenty industrial plants, with a special focus on setting up import substituting industries in textiles, sugar, cement, paper and mining (İnan, 1972: 15; Tezel, 1982: 141). As outlined in Table 4.2 below, almost all of these plants were to be located in

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208 The quoted passage is an excerpt from the official translation of the abovementioned party program, reproduced in Barlas (1998: 103).
Central and Western Anatolia. Only two factories had been situated in ESA (i.e. the textile factories in Iğdır and Malatya), which is considered to be one of the main drawbacks of the Five-Year Plan (Kuçük, 1978: 248-49).

With Soviet technical assistance and loans of 8 million dollars, the first quinquennial plan had been launched in May 1934, and between 1934 and 1938, it was put into operation. The loan attained from the Soviet Union covered a small portion of the total investments, which stood at around 100 million TL by 1938 (Hale, 1981:56; Hershlag, 1968:81). In order to finance and control the operation of the projects in the Five-Year Plan important agencies were established during the 1930s.

The state bank, Sümerbank, which replaced the Türkiye Sanayi Kredi Bankası (Bank for Industry) and the Devlet Sanayi Ofisi (State Industry Office) in June 1933, became a pivotal institution in the field of industrialisation throughout the Five-Year Plan. It took on the role of planning and establishing new enterprises, operating state-owned factories, and carrying out banking functions (Barlas, 1998:96; Boratav, 1982:197-98; Hale, 1981: 57). A second state agency, Etibank, was established in 1935, with the development of mining as its main function. The law that had established Etibank, moreover, attributed a wide range of roles to this bank; from the purchase and sale of mines of minerals to establishing or participating in the foundation of trade organisation in the mining sector and dealing with all kinds of banking transactions (Hershlag, 1968: 92-3; Hale, 1981: 57). Hence, both organisations, which acted as state-owned holding companies with banking functions, unified investment and financing activities.

The number of large private firms benefitting from the Law for Encouragement of Industry reached 1,397 in 1935. The investment in these establishments rose from 63 million TL in 1935 to around 266 million TL in 1939. At the same time the value of net output in these
enterprises rose from 104 million TL in 1935 to 266 million TL in 1939 (Hershlag, 1968: 106).

**Table 4.2 Industrial plants established under the Five-Year Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Type/Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>Artificial Silk (Gemlik)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Semicoke (Zonguldak)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attar of roses (Isparta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sulphuric Acid (Izmit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Superphosphates (Izmit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chlorine and caustic Soda (Izmit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Textiles</td>
<td>Yarn and Cotton Fabric:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bakırköy, Kayseri, Ereğli, Nazilli and Malatya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yarn:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iğdır</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthenware</td>
<td>Ceramics (Kütahya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Glass and bottles (Paşabahçe-Istanbul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hemp</td>
<td>Kastamonu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>Karabük</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and Cellulose</td>
<td>İzmit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponge</td>
<td>Bodrum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulphur</td>
<td>Keçiborlu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worsted</td>
<td>Bursa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The state had also intervened in the agricultural sector during the 1930s. A case in point is the action taken by the state in 1932 to rescue the farmers from plummeting world prices\(^{209}\) by authorising the Agricultural Bank to regulate prices via building up and selling off stocks of wheat – a duty transferred in 1938 to the newly established Office for Soil Products (Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi, TMO) (Ahmad, 1993:98; Zürcher, 1994: 207). Moreover, during the ètatist period, the state had also taken the following noteworthy measures to support and encourage agriculture: increasing and promoting agricultural credit, setting up research and training.

\(^{209}\) The price index for wheat, one of Turkey’s principal exports, fell from 100 in 1929 to 32 in 1931.
schemes, forming small irrigation programmes, reducing rail transport rates by 50-75 per
cent, and importing machinery and modern implements (Margulies and Yıldızoğlu, 1987:

As it can be inferred from the overview of the ètatist decade above, significant developments
had taken place in this brief period. It is estimated that GDP and GDP per capita grew at
average annual rates of 5.4 and 3.1 per cent respectively during the 1930s (Pamuk, 2008:
278). Moreover, during the ètatist period the process of industrialisation was accelerated and
resultantly the share of industry in the GNP grew from 10 per cent in 1927 to 16 per cent in
1938 (Yerasimos, 1987: 90). This is despite the stagnation or decline in wages, and the
severely deteriorating working conditions on account of the implementation of a Labour Law
in 1934, which forbade forming unions and partaking in strikes as well as lockouts (Boratav,

During the ètatist period a massive expansion of cultivated land was also witnessed as the
total amount of cropped area, which amounted to 4.86 per cent of total area in 1927, reached
12.25 per cent in 1940 (Margulies and Yıldızoğlu, 1987: 274). Relatedly, agricultural output
is estimated to have increased by 50-70 per cent during the 1930s (Pamuk, 2008: 279).
Relatively significant developments were also recorded in the sphere of education and
transportation (see Table 4.3). In the course of the same period foreign trade recovered, too,
in spite of the fact that over 80 per cent of Turkey’s trade was conducted under bilateral
agreements, around 50 per cent of which in the years before the Second World War was with
Germany and her allies (Hershlag, 1986: 115-17; Tezel, 1982: 124-34).
Table 4.3 Indicators of development, 1933–1938

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1938</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong> (millions)</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Trade</strong> (million dollars)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP per capita</strong> (1948 prices Turkish Lira)</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural Production</strong> (millions of liras 1940 prices)</td>
<td>2,490</td>
<td>3,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Industrial production</strong> (millions of liras 1948 prices)</td>
<td>1,019</td>
<td>1,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wheat</strong> (million tons)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tobacco</strong> (thousand tons)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cotton</strong> (thousand tons)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coal</strong> (million tons)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Refined Sugar</strong> (thousand tons)</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cement</strong> (thousand tons)</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electricity</strong> (million kWh)</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Railways</strong> (thousand kilometers)</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Students in schools</strong> (thousands)</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Issawi, 1980: 368

1934 Settlement Act: Third Wave of Kurdish Deportations

The influence of Nazi Germany in the 1930s had not been limited to trade, because the RPP government had embarked on social engineering policies that at the time had currency in Germany. Put differently, during the 1930s the RPP government implemented ètatist policies in conjunction with nationalist population policies, which is a dark feature of the 1930s that is often glossed over, if not ignored, by the economic historians analysing this period (Hershlag,
The operation of the practical expression of etatism, the Five-Year Plan, had coincided with the implementation of the draconian 1934 Settlement Act\textsuperscript{210} (Law No. 2510), which facilitated the third wave of deportation of Kurds from ESA and was a contributory factor in the upsurge of socio-economic problems and political turbulence in this region, as exhibited with the Dersim Uprising (1936-38). The execution of this new Settlement Act hindered the overwhelmingly Kurdish provinces in ESA from reaping the aforementioned benefits of etatism in Turkey.

For purposes of tracing the evolution of the population policies targeting the Kurds and making sense of the causality of the 1934 Settlement Act, it is worth remarking that this piece of legislation was ratified a few years after the Turkish Foreign Minister, Aras, had informed the British representatives to the League of Nations in Geneva in November 1930 of the ‘possibility of a future intense Turkish colonization in order to smother the Kurds in a considerable mass of Turkish population’.\textsuperscript{211} On the day when this new Settlement Act came into force, 14 June 1934, the points raised by the then Interior Minister, Şükrü Kaya, in the deliberations of this law in the Turkish Assembly made crystal clear that what had been alluded to by Aras as a possibility was now set as a project of demographic engineering by the Kemalist state.

During this parliamentary debate the Interior Minister not only espoused the task of the RPP government to be to ‘render the Turk the master of the soil’ in the East, but also stated that ‘there are around two million pure Turks abroad in our near environs. It is somewhat mandatory for them to come to the homeland in a piecemeal fashion…It is then our obligation to settle them in accordance with the social and economic principles necessitated by the science of settlement’ (Üngör, 2011: 149). Kaya, during these discussions did also express the ethno-territorialist nationalist nature of the new Settlement Act in the most plain

\textsuperscript{210} Iskan Kanunu, Nr. 2510, 13/06/1934 in Resmi Gazete, 21/06/1934, Issue No. 2733.
\textsuperscript{211} FO 371/14578, Drummond (Geneva) to Cadogan (London), 18/11/1930.
way possible: ‘This law will create a country speaking with one language, thinking in the same way and sharing the same sentiment’ (Ulker, 2008: 5).

Notwithstanding the relatively meticulous nature of the 1934 Settlement Act, the new Settlement Act was directly modelled after the abovementioned deportation orders and laws. In other words, this new Settlement Act akin to the deportation decrees and laws put into effect over the past two decades had intended to assist: a) the deportation and assimilation of the Kurds, and b) the resettlement of the non-Kurdish Muslim settlers. The latter included migrants from the lost Ottoman territories and Turkish peasants that had been relocated from most densely populated areas of the country, like the Eastern Black Sea littoral.

In order to determine the criteria for the identification and the selection of the deportees and the settlers, the first article of the new Settlement Act stated that ‘the Ministry of Interior is assigned the power to correct…the distribution and location of the populace in Turkey in accord with affiliation to Turkish culture’. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Kurds in Turkey, as exemplified with the 1926 Deportation Law, were commonly described by the Kemalist statesman as ‘people who do not share the Turkish culture’ or as a ‘tribal populace that do not speak Turkish’ and so were one of the main targets of this law.

Pursuant to the criteria outlined in Article 1, in Article 2 of the 1934 Settlement Act, under the rubric of ‘Settlement Regions’ Turkey was divided into three zones (Articles 12, 13 and 14):

Zone 1: Localities in which it was deemed desirable to increase the density of the culturally Turkish population or set aside for ‘populations who share the Turkish culture’.

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212 For differing and detailed accounts and discussions of the 1934 Settlement Act, see: Beşikçi (1991); Kökdemir (1952); Jongerden (2007) and Üngör (2011).
213 The Report on Reform in the East of September 1925 had authorised the resettlement of the inhabitants of Rize and Trabzon provinces in the Murat river valley as well as in the Lake Van basin (Bayrak, 1993: 483). Accordingly, on 5 November 1933, the RPP government decided to resettle ‘9, 836 landless peasants from Trabzon and Çoruh’ provinces around lake Van (Çağaptay, 2006: 71), which under the provisions of the 1934 Resettlement Act had been located in the Zone 2 area wherein Kurdish settlement were prohibited.
214 Iskan Kanunu, Nr. 2510, Resmi Gazete, 21/06/1934, Issue No. 2733, p.4003.
215 Ibid.: 4004-4005
Zone 2: Regions for the ‘relocation and resettlement of population which are to be assimilated into the Turkish culture’.

Zone 3: Areas, which for ‘spatial, sanitary, economic, cultural, political, military and security’ needed to be evacuated, and settlement forbidden.\(^{216}\)

Under the provisions of this law, the Turkish state was vested with full powers to:

a) settle immigrants of Turkish origin or culture in Zone 1, which as outlined in Article 12 was synonymous with the eastern provinces;

b) forcibly deport Kurds to Zone 2, which for the most part were Turkish areas in the western regions of Turkey, where they were never to form more than 10 per cent of the local population and had to stay a minimum of ten years in their new homes;

c) prohibit the re-settlement of non-Turkish speakers in Zone 3, that is, localities where there was previously active Kurdish opposition to the Turkish state and vicinities where there were railways, highways, transit roads and natural resources in Southeast Turkey.\(^{217}\)

In order to attain the aim resettling Kurds in Zone 2 areas, Article 9 of this the new Act authorised the resettlement of ‘nomads, who do not share the Turkish culture, by dispersing them to Turkish towns and villages.’\(^{218}\) The subsequent Article specified that the Ministry of Interior ‘disperse tribal members, who were Turkish subjects and who were not affiliated to the Turkish culture, to Zone 2’, and, furthermore, laid down that all the properties belonging to the tribesmen be surrendered to the state, which would redistribute it to various settlers.\(^{219}\)

The measures outlined in these two articles were analogous to the procedures delineated in the previous deportation laws that aimed to diminish the size and influence of the Kurds in ESA by breaking up the Kurdish society, by deporting their leaders and by dragooning the members of the Kurdish society into the Turkish culture. To this end, during the 1930s

\(^{216}\) Ibid.: 4003.
\(^{217}\) Ibid.: 4003-06.
\(^{218}\) Ibid.:4003.
\(^{219}\) Ibid.
Kemalist social engineers prepared confidential reports about the Kurdish tribes in the Eastern provinces in which they scrutinised the relationship of these tribes with the Turkish state (i.e. whether they were ‘loyal’ or ‘disloyal’), as well as their relationship with each other. These reports were augmented in the 1970s, and published in book form in 2000 (Aşiret Raporları, 2000).

Judging from the appraisals outlined in a report presented to the ruling RPP’s General Secretariat in 1939-40, the 1934 Settlement Act, aside from the administrative glitches, was commended and seen as an effective instrument of ‘assimilation and internal colonisation’ and ‘dismantling the territorial unity of the Kurds’ by the Republican rulers of Turkey. The report is, moreover, a testament to the Kemalist zeal for nationalist homogenisation during the 1930s. The anonymous author of this document not only called for the continuation of ‘widespread’ deportation of the Kurds, but also vociferously argued for the furtherance of settling Turks ‘in their [the minorities] richest and most fertile villages at a rate of at least 50 per cent [of the local population]’. In order to ‘Turkify’ successfully the Eastern provinces it was deemed necessary to complement ‘deportation measure’ with ‘incorporeal measures’ or, in other words, assimilative cultural policies. The expansion of formal education and the construction of a modern transportation system in this region were seen as the ‘backbones’ of assimilation or ‘Turkification’ (Bulut, 1998: 185-99).

The demographic repercussions of the new Settlement Act were significant. Based on the recorded deportation figures in the official sources, throughout the 1930s the total number of Kurdish deported to the Western provinces was 25,381 people in 5074 households. Despite the lack of detailed and firm factual information regarding the total number of settlers in ESA, based on existent official counts for the provinces of Diyarbekir and Elaziğ, it is known that from 1928 to 1938 at least 1988 households were sent to the Diyarbekir province, and another 2143 households were expected to the settle there in 1938. In addition, from 1932 on,
1571 households were settled in the neighbouring province of Elazığ. Almost all of the non-Kurdish Muslim settlers from Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia and Syria were peasants, and they settled rural areas (Üngör, 2011: 162).

The dual-track policy of settling non-Kurdish migrants and deporting Kurds in the 1930s, however, further deepened the socio-economic and political problems from which the Eastern provinces had been suffering from since the First World War. In the 1930s, owing to poor planning by the state, and inefficient use of land by its new occupiers, the settlement of the migrants in the rural areas of ESA had negative implications for the agricultural productivity in these regions, which, in turn, had inauspicious consequences for the well-being of the settlers toiling on the land allocated to them. In an internal report in 1935 Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü confesses to the existence of these issues with the succeeding informative remarks:

‘There have been efforts to settle immigrants from everywhere. A population of about fifteen hundred work on every fertile and water-rich terrain. There are three groups of immigrants with a gap between them of three to five years…Almost all of them complain to government officials about their conditions…The people are needy, destitute, the fields have not yet been productive. The pastureland has been distributed poorly.’

A year later, under the instructions of Atatürk, then Economic Minister Celal Bayar had embarked on an expedition to survey the state of the economy in the Eastern provinces. At the end of this mission, Bayar prepared a secret report wherein the seasoned state official bewailed the collapse of the economy in ESA and described the underdeveloped nature of the Eastern economy in the most unequivocal form possible: ‘this is an entirely primitive economy without markets and production beyond what is necessary for personal use’ (Bayar, 2006: 69). At this point, in order to understand the level of regression that befell these

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regions, it is worth going back about forty years and comparing the bleak picture painted by Bayar with that of the vibrant ESA between 1890 and 1910. These regions had gone from inter-regionally sending goods worth more than one million pound sterling in a typical year in 1890s to self-sufficient domains in the late 1930s.

Moreover, since the Kurdish tribe was, in the last analysis, a site of reproduction of Kurdish identity, the Republican rulers, as part of their policy of rendering the Kurds a feeble ethnic entity, aimed to liquidate tribal structures by means of relocating the Kurdish kinfolks. The policy of resettling the Kurdish tribes in the 1930s, which, in the words of the contemporary British consular Thomas Henry Matthews (1869-1941), had been conducted by the RPP government ‘in a manner which resembled the operation against Armenians in 1915’\textsuperscript{221}, wrought more disorder and destruction to ESA. A prime example of this is the events that had been staged in the latter part of the 1930s in the defiant Dersim region, which since the 1921 rebellion had remained tranquil.

The 1936-8 Dersim Uprising started after the Tunceli Law of 1935 (Law No. 2884). This legislation aimed at the removal of this ‘abscess’ by forcibly deporting the Kurdish Alevi population and replacing it with a Turkish population. As early as 1926, in a report prepared by the Ministry of Interior for the Turkish Assembly, Dersim had been described ‘as an abscess on the Turkish Republic which must be removed, for the sake of the country’s well-being’ (Beşikçi, 1991: 29).

The Dersim rebellion was led by Kurdish intellectuals such as Dr. Nurî Dersimî (1893-1973)\textsuperscript{222} and the Alevi dignitary, Seyid Rıza (1863-1937), who, after the commencement of the military operation in the spring of 1937, alongside other chieftains in the region pleaded with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations in a letter sent on 20 November 1937 with the following words:

\textsuperscript{221} FO 371/14580, Matthews to Clerk, Trebizond, 15/11/1930.
\textsuperscript{222} For Dersimî’s memoirs, see: Dersimî (1992).
‘The tyrannies of the Turkish government against human rights and the Kurdish nation, of which the ethnic and national existence has been recognised by diplomatic conferences and by international conventions, are incompatible with the essence and entirety of the inspiring and liberating principles of your organisation…In order for the League of Nations to be able to take various apposite measures to prevent the continuation of these tyrannies and the total extermination of the Kurdish nation, it needs,…to infiltrate the thoroughness of these tragedies. To that we will reply: it suffices to send onto our soil and international commission of inquiry.’

But the people of Dersim – which as a result of the Tunceli Law of 1935 was redesignated as a province, to be known by the Turkish name Tunceli – were never to receive any external assistance against the resolute Kemalist military offensive, which continued until Dersim was occupied in 1938. The contemporaries estimated that by the end of 1938 some 40,000 Kurds perished in this province (Rambout, 1947: 39). The Tunceli Law, which was originally to last till 1 January 1940, remained in force until 1 January 1947. The ramifications of this law are deftly summarised by a report sent by Osman Mete, special correspondent for the Turkish daily Son Posta, who visited Dersim in 1948:

‘I went to Tunc Eli, the old Dersim. The place was desolate. Tax collectors and policemen are still the only state officials the people have ever seen. I tried to meet the people, to get to know their way of life, their spirit. But unfortunately very little remains from the period before the revolt. There are no more artisans, no more culture, no more trade. I met unoccupied people whose life now seem to revolve around a flock of hundred goats…There are no schools, no doctors. The people don’t know what “medicine” means. If you speak to them of the government, they translate it immediately as tax collector and policemen. We

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give the people of Dersim nothing; we only take. We have no right to carry on treating them like this’ (Kendal, 1982: 72).

The Second World War and the end of the Republican Era

During the Second World War, all of Turkey’s neighbours either were at war or occupied by one or other of the belligerents. Turkey succeeded in not participating actively in the war though was faced with the constant risk of invasion. Thus, full-scale mobilisation was maintained throughout the war. The maintenance of an army of more than one million placed massive strains on the economy. Under these circumstances, étatism was gradually pushed aside.

In the course of the Second World War, Turkey’s GDP declined by 35 per cent and the wheat output dropped by more than 50 per cent (Pamuk, 2008: 280). Concomitantly, per capita income fell by around a quarter. On account of financing defence expenditure via monetary expansion the RPP government encouraged inflation, which, in turn, triggered hardship for large segments of society: the cost-of-living index rose from 100 in 1939 to 350 in 1945 (Issawi, 1980: 369). The implementation of the 1940 National Defence Law (Milli Koruma Kanunu), through which the government could confiscate ‘idle economic resources’, and the 1942 Wealth Levy (Varlık Vergisi), which was applied in a disproportionate and confiscatory manner on non-Muslims and ethnic minorities (Robinson, 1963: 122), only rubbed more salt into wounds of an impoverished nation.

The defeat of Germany and the non-renewal of the Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union after the war224 pushed Turkey towards the United States. In accordance with its long-term objectives the US wanted Turkey to be a part of the US-dominated world order that was in

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224 In 1945, the Friendship Treaty with Turkey had come to an end, and the Soviet Union had formulated a number of important conditions which would have to be met by Turkey before a new friendship treaty could be signed: a) retrocession to the Soviet Union the provinces in north-eastern Anatolia, which had been under the control of the Russians between 1878 and 1918 (i.e. the provinces of Kars and Artvin); b) the establishment of joint Turco-Soviet defence installations in the Straits; and c) the revision of 1936 Montreux Convention, governing access through the Straits, in favour of the Soviet Union. Despite the Soviet Union dropping these demands in 1946, as a result of the firm refusal of Turkey, a new Friendship Treaty was not signed.
the making, and to act as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in the Cold War era, as outlined by the following US National Security Council statement in 1949:

‘Turkey’s independence and the maintenance of her status as a buffer against expansion of the Soviet Union into the Mediterranean and the Middle East is of critical importance to the Security of the US.’ (Yalman, 2009: 183)

In light of the strategic importance imputed to Turkey, she was permitted to benefit from the military assistance provided as part of the Truman Doctrine, which stipulated that US would help defend ‘free nations’ whose existence were threatened by foreign forces or by radical minorities inside their borders. Additionally, Turkey was allowed to take advantage of the economic aid granted by the Economic Recovery Plan (ERP), better known as the Marshal Plan, even though Turkey had not been actively involved in the Second World War. However, if the strategic significance of Turkey was a determinate factor in shaping US-Turkish relations in the post war era, another was the imposition of a specific role to the Turkish economy by the US within the context of the Marshal Plan outlined below:

‘Turkey’s primary role in the recovery program will be to augment its production of essential commodities in conformity with European and world requirements…Since Turkey is predominantly an agricultural country in its economy and in its exports, the anticipated gains in agricultural output will be of greater importance to the recovery program as whole than increases in industrial output.’ (ibid.: 182)

Relatedly, after the Second World War, the quandary facing ruling politicians in Turkey was how to reconcile post-war adjustment (i.e. re-integrating the Turkish economy into the world economy in agreement with the liberalisation of international trade relations as espoused by the architects of the new world order) with industrialisation (i.e. maintaining the objective of nationalistic industrialisation which was the *sine qua non* of the ‘national economy’ and national development). Therefore, in the post-war years, the restructuring of the political,
economic and legal architecture of Turkey necessitated by the intensified incorporation of Turkey into the world capitalist system created thorny predicaments for the governors of the Turkish Republic in all realms of government.

Despite the two world wars and the Great Depression, per capita levels of production and income in Turkey were 30-40 per cent higher at the end of the Republican era in 1950 than the levels on the eve of the First World War (Pamuk, 2008: 280). Per capita income in Turkey in 1950 was at ‘US$ 1,620 constant or inflation adjusted’, which ‘was equal to 24 per cent of the per capita income capita of the high-income countries and 188 per cent of developing countries’ of Asia, Africa and Latin America (ibid.: 270). In addition, Turkey’s GDP growth rate between 1929 and 1950 was 83 per cent – relatively high when compared, for example, with other developing countries such as India, Egypt, Yugoslavia and Greece for the same period: 21, 59, 30 and -12 per cent, respectively (Tezel, 1982: 450).

However, when the focus of development economics is shifted from GDP per capita to a more comprehensive measure in the form of human development index (HDI)\(^\text{225}\), a less remarkable picture emerges. That is to say, when the HDI of Turkey in 1913 and 1950 are compared with those of the other developing countries with similar levels of GDP in Eastern Europe, Latin America and East Asia, it becomes apparent that Turkey’s human development measures had been lagging behind developing countries with similar levels of income (see Table 4.4 below).

\[^\text{225}\] Human Development Index, first used by the United Nation in 1990, is a broader measure of development based on three components: education as measured by a weighted average of adult literacy and schooling; health as measured by life expectancy at birth; and income as measured by GDP per capital.
Table 4.4 Changes in the human development index, 1913-1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1950</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>0.580</td>
<td>0.707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>0.643</td>
<td>0.774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>0.345</td>
<td>0.694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0.403</td>
<td>0.607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>0.511</td>
<td>0.526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td>0.484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.388</td>
<td>0.603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.382</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pamuk, 2008: 272

Note: Regional or continental averages are measured by the population of the individual countries. The maximum possible improvement in HDI is 1−(HDI in 1950).

The comparatively feeble performance of Turkey in HDI is considered a by-product of two central issues that have haunted its development since 1923. The first is the large regional disparities between the predominantly Kurdish ESA and the rest of the country. The second is the gender inequalities – i.e. Turkey falling behind developing countries with analogous levels of income in indices aiming to measure gender equality and the socio-economic development of women (Pamuk, 2008: 272-73).
The available data\textsuperscript{226} on living standards demonstrate that from the promulgation of the Republic up to the end of RPP rule, the improvements in living conditions in the ESA provinces had been considerably inferior to that of the other parts of Turkey, as exhibited with the figures tabulated in Table 4.5 below.

\textbf{Table 4.5 Indicators of regional differences in living standards, 1923-1950}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions/Provinces</th>
<th>Population (1,000)</th>
<th>7+ Literacy Rate</th>
<th>The number of doctors per 100,000 population 1950 (1)</th>
<th>The number of land vehicles per 10,000 population 1950 (2)</th>
<th>The number of radios per 10,000 population 1950</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir</td>
<td>1,180</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>+28</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana, Bursa</td>
<td>2,637</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>+35</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Provinces (3)</td>
<td>7,322</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>+28</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Provinces (4)</td>
<td>9,341</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>+17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:
(1) The number of doctors is inclusive of dentists, and the figures are attained from the statistics for the year 1953
(2) Land vehicles comprise of automobiles, lorries, buses and jeeps
(3) Zonguldak, Bolu, Eskişehir, Konya, Hatay and the provinces to the West of these provinces, excluding Istanbul, Ankara, Adana, Izmir and Bursa
(4) Provinces to the east of Hatay, Zonguldak, Bolu, Eskişehir and Konya


The policies implemented during these 27 years did not narrow, but deepened the gulf between ESA and the rest of Turkey. In concrete terms, the difference in the literacy rates

\textsuperscript{226} It is apposite to state here that prior to 1968 statistical information on the geographical distribution of income and wealth in Turkey had been non-existent. The maiden statistical study on the spatial distribution of income and wealth based on direct observation in the form of income surveys was undertaken in 1968. For a detailed analysis of the nature and historicity of studies on the spatial distribution of income and wealth in Turkey, see: Hansen (1991: 275-87) and Karaman (1986).
between the Western provinces (excluding Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa and Adana) and the Eastern provinces (to the east of Hatay, Zonguldak, Bolu, Eskişehir and Konya) went up from 4 per cent in 1927 to 15 per cent in by 1950 (Tezel, 1982: 460-61). Similarly, regional disparities in industrial development had further widened in the RPP period (1923-1950). It is worth remembering here that changes in the regional distribution of industry reflect both the character and the results of the development programs conducted under the Republicans. Industrialisation, throughout the RPP era, was not only considered to be the dominant technological economic force with the potential of reshaping the socio-economic and political structures in the country but also was conceived as the precondition for regional and national development.

In 1927, 17.8 per cent of the industrial enterprises in Turkey were located in ESA. In 1939, this figure dropped sharply to 8 per cent. By 1955, only 7.7 per cent of the industrial enterprises in the country were based in these regions. In contrast, the percentage of the industrial enterprises situated in the Western Aegean region augmented from 17.9 per cent in 1939 to 19.8 per cent in 1995. Likewise, the proportion of industrial firms sited in the Northwestern Marmara region increased from 29.6 per cent in 1939 to 47.8 per cent in 1955. The comparatively low level of industrialisation witnessed in ESA provinces made agriculture virtually the sole source of income.
Table 4.6 The regional distribution of industrial enterprises, 1927-1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1927(1)</th>
<th>1939(2)</th>
<th>1955</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marmara</td>
<td>19,170</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegean</td>
<td>11,550</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Anatolia</td>
<td>10,220</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Black Sea</td>
<td>7,947</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern &amp; Southeastern Anatolia</td>
<td>11,448</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
(1) Figures include the small industrial enterprises
(2) Only includes industrial enterprises benefiting from the 1927 Law for Encouragement of Industry

Source: Serin, 1963: 147.

The findings of a study in 1949 by the then Director General of Central Statistical Office, Şefik Bilkur, indicates that disparities between the ESA regions and the rest of Turkey also widened in the agricultural sector. Irrespective of the estimated 30 per cent increase in national per capita agricultural income between 1935 and 1943, the agricultural income of the rural populace in ESA was found to be less than half of the national average agricultural income in 1943. More specifically, 34 TL per hectare was verified by the abovementioned research as Turkey’s average agricultural income per capita in 1943, the agricultural income per head was at its lowest level in ESA where the income per hectare was 16 TL and reached its highest point in the Western Aegean region where it rose to 51 TL. The ‘remaining regions [of Turkey] were situated between these two limits’ (Bilkur, 1949: 11).
4.5 Transition to a Turbulent Democracy and ‘Incorporation’ of ESA (1950-1980)

Economic Integration of the Kurdish Region and the Revival of the Kurdish Aghas and Sheikhs during the Democrat Party decade (1950-1960)

On 14 May 1950, the first democratic elections in the history of the Turkish Republic took place. The electorate inflicted a humiliating defeat to the RPP, giving the Republicans only 39.5 per cent of the overall votes whilst their rivals the Democrat Party (DP) – which was officially established on 7 January 1946 – received 52.7 per cent of the votes. In the new Assembly, DP had 408 seats against RPP’s 69. The 1950 elections had taken place five years after “National Chief” President İsmet İnönü’s famous speech of 19 May 1945 in which he indicated that the time was ripe to move in the direction of democracy.

The judgment to do away with the single-party regime had been taken in light of significant domestic and international factors. On the home front, the different social classes became highly disillusioned with the single-party regime. Owing to the wartime inflation, taxes and confiscations, as well as the controversial decisions taken since the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, disfranchisement amongst the peasants and other sections of the labouring masses reached a critical level. Therefore, in order to prevent a social explosion, the multi-party electoral regime was seen as a viable option to channel public discontent.

Moreover, the Turkish bourgeoisie became increasingly apprehensive of authoritarian rule and lobbied for political pluralism. Despite the substantial benefits of the policies implemented during the RPP era, the multi-party system was regarded by the bourgeoisie as a safety net against dependency on a single party. The root causes of this anxiety were the Wealth Levy of 1942 and the Land Distribution Law of 1945, which the RPP wanted to implement in order to regain its waning public support. International factors were also influential in shaping the political architecture in Turkey after the Second World War. The
post-war adjustment policies designed by the US as the dominant world power entailed adhering to a liberal economic model and political system, which necessitated a shift from the one-party dictatorship.\footnote{For a detailed account of the transitional years, 1945-50, see: Karpat (1959) and Lewis (1968).}

The transition to multi-party rule, however, did not lead to a qualitative shift in the Kurdish policies of the Turkish state, principally because the Democrat Party government (1950-60) did not sufficiently detach itself from the hegemonic Kemalist ideology and failed to deal with the legacy of RPP rule in the ESA provinces. During the decade in which the DP was in power, not a single implementation and/or crime from the RPP era was debated, let alone punished. This is unsurprising considering that the four defecting RPP deputies who launched the DP when the government pushed for the Land Distribution Law in 1945, in spite of their steadfast opposition, were long standing Kemalists\footnote{The four seasoned ex-Republican politicians who founded the DP were Celal Bayar (1883-1986), the banker and confidant of Mustafa Kemal; Adnan Menderes (1899-1961), a prominent landowner from the Aegean region; Fuad Köprülü (1890-1966), a historian and a professor of Turcology; and Refik Koralan (1889-1974), a veteran bureaucrat.}.

Their loyalty to Kemalism was reaffirmed when establishing the DP with the adoption of the ‘six arrows’ of Kemalism, albeit declaring that they would not intransigently practice them but would interpret them according to the needs of the Republic. Indeed, they did not dogmatically pursue the ‘six arrows’. In harmony with the advice of ERP, from its inception the DP government, headed by Menderes, replaced étatism with liberal free-market economics and substituted the industry-oriented model of development for the agriculture-led model at a time when agriculture continued to be the dominant sector. In 1950, agriculture accounted for 54 per cent of the GDP and its share of total employment was 80 per cent (Pamuk, 2008: 268-9). The DP also gave an end to the dichotomy of state versus the traditional institutions, which had been a major source of the frustration amongst those who opposed the top-down Western-centric modernisation policies implemented during the
Republican era. In other words, the DP pragmatically accommodated traditional institutions, structures and ways of life.

**Incorporation of the Kurdish Elite**

The Democrat Party government allowed the bulk of the Kurdish deportees, including the tribal chieftains and religious figures, to return, and, in turn, akin to the policies of Sultan Abdulhamid, it incorporated the traditional Kurdish elite into the Turkish political system. Despite the suppressive measures during the single-party period, the old landowning elite (be it aghas, large landed families or sheiks) still held title to the lands in their ancestral provinces, as the new Civil Code in 1926 confirmed private land from the Ottoman period.

The most notable example of the DP co-opting the traditional elite was the promotion of Abdülmelik Fırat (1934-2009), the grandson of Şeyh Said, to the prestigious position of deputy of the National Assembly. Thus, the agriculture-led development strategy during the Democrat decade marked the beginning of two interrelated processes: the economic incorporation of the Kurdish region into the Turkish economy, and the co-opting of the old Kurdish elite into the Turkish political life. As an offshoot of these changes, a new breed of Kurdish propertied elite developed. Unlike their predecessors, the new elite repudiated their Kurdish origin, and exploited their relationship with the peasants not as a means to semi-independence from the centre as in the Ottoman times but in order to become more closely integrated members of the Turkish ruling class.

**Agriculture-led Growth**

The strong emphasis placed on agriculture enabled the agricultural output to more than double from 1947, at the time when pre-war levels of production were already attained, through 1953 (Pamuk, 2008: 281). This increase was largely due to the drastic enlargement of the acreage under cultivation – from 14.5 million hectares in 1948 to 22.5 million in 1956, far

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229 For a biography of Abdülmelik Fırat, see: Kaya (2005).
exceeding the population growth (Zürcher, 1994: 235) – and the rapid commercialisation of agriculture. These developments in agriculture were engendered by the following three complementary government policies: a) providing cheap credit to large landowners; b) distribution of state-owned lands and open communal pastures to peasants with scarce or no land; and c) the maintenance of high prices for agricultural products through TMO, the government-buying agency.

The DP government used Marshall Plan aid to subsidise the importation of agricultural machinery, particularly tractors, whose number soared from 1,756 to 43,727 in the years 1948-56 (Margulies and Yıldızoğlu, 1987: 281). The Menderes-led administration began to distribute about 1.8 million hectares of land to around 360,000 families between 1947 and 1962, but as few as 8,600 were taken from private landlords; nearly all lands distributed belonged to the state and were already in use for grazing (Aktan, 1966: 325). Agricultural producers also immensely benefitted from the high world market demand for wheat and other export commodities, in virtue of American stockpiling programmes during the Korean War (25 June 1950-25 June 1953) (Hansen, 1991: 338-44).

**Pauperisation of the Kurdish Peasants, Aggrandisement of the Landlords**

The distribution of land and the extensive use of agricultural machinery, however, did not lead to improvements in the living condition of the peasants, because, as the Kurdish novelist Yaşar Kemal recounted, ‘the peasant was again share-cropping on the lands distributed by the government; he provided the land, the ağa provided the tractor.’ A significant number of peasants, who acquired land, were forced to sell off their lands to the tractor-owning ağas or large landowners because of not being able to fund the hiring costs. This process increased

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230 For a detailed analysis of the commercialisation of agriculture during this period, see: Margulies and Yıldızoğlu (1987: 269-92).

231 Between 1950 and 1962, $831.8 million in total grants was tendered by the U.S. economic assistance, and when we include loans and sales under PL 480 programs involving soft currency payments by the US during this period, the total amount of US economic assistance amounted to $1,615.9 million (Rivkin, 1965: 97).

232 *Cumhuriyet, 23/06/1955* (Yaşar Kemal’s italic)
the number of landless peasants, as well as triggering migration to local towns and/or large metropolis in Western Turkey. The proportion of landless peasant families in Turkey increased from 5.9 per cent to 30.7 per cent between 1950 and 1960, and the annual rate of urban population growth during 1950-55 stood at 55.6 per cent in Turkey (Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 144-45). As a result, the gradual mechanisation of agriculture that commenced in the 1950s further intensified social differentiation in the countryside and accelerated rural migration into towns (Karpat, 1973: 58).

The rise in the number of landless peasant families between 1950 and 1960 in the predominantly Kurdish provinces far exceeded the national average (see Table 4.7). This was largely predicated on the more extensive use of agricultural machinery in ESA, to the extent that small and tenant farmers with plots that could not afford tractors would hire them from the large landowners in return for a proportion of their crop (Beşikçi, 1992[1969]: 195-8; McDowall, 2000: 398-9).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950 (%)</th>
<th>1962-68 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urfa</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbakir</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bingöl</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardin</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siirt</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunceli</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elazığ</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ağrı</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzincan</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kars</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adıyaman</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sönmez, 1992 [1990]:144.
The increase in seizures and purchases of land by the landowning class concurred with the raising of the upper limit of land ownership from 500 dönüms, as specified by the 1945 Land Distribution Act, to 5000 dönüms by the National Assembly in 1950. These developments resulted in the Kurdish ağas or prominent landowning families accumulating more land as well as reducing the lands available for distribution. Consequently, the overwhelmingly Kurdish provinces in ESA constituted one of the important exclusions to the owner-cultivated smallholdings, which had been the predominant unit of agrarian production in Turkey during the Democrat period, as observed by Hershlag in the 1960s:

‘The present land tenure system can be roughly classified into four major categories: 1) old feudal land ownership devoid of modernisation—in the south-east; 2) the modern management type of large absentee ownership, under wage-relations—in the west and north-east; 3) small and medium ownership, with a growing tendency towards large ownership—in central Anatolia and in the Adana region; and, 4) small, fractioned and poor villages, the chief reservoir of rural wage-earners. The total number of families was estimated in the early 1960s at 3 million. Of these, 2 million were full land-owners, mainly of mushroom units, while another 1 million were partial owners, share-croppers, tenants and landless’ (1968: 209).

According to the first modern agricultural census in Turkey, Agricultural Census of 1950, 1.5 families owned 25 per cent of the total cultivable land; the remaining 98.5 per cent owned 75 per cent of cultivable land. Additionally, 72.6 per cent of all holdings were owner-cultivated, and a further 21.5 per cent were partly owned. The findings of the Agricultural Census of 1963 suggest that owner-cultivated smallholdings persisted to be the main form of land tenure, since 68.7 per cent of all the holdings were 5 hectares or under and 85.3 per cent of all land was under owner cultivation.233

233 Derived from Istanbul İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi (1973: 47-8).
However, data pertaining to nine of the fourteen predominantly Kurdish provinces in ESA collated in the Autumn Survey of 1952, which uniquely gives a detailed statistical data concerning land distribution amongst families, demonstrated the dominance of family-owned large holdings in this area. Two per cent of families in these provinces owned 30.5 per cent of the total cultivable land, while 59.5 per cent of the families owned only 18.6 per cent of the cultivable land. The findings of the 1960 The Village Inventory Studies of the Ministry of Village Affairs, which cover 56 of the then total 67 provinces of Turkey, certify that concentration of land in the hands of large Kurdish landowners continued throughout the Democrat decade, as increasingly more villages became the private property of aghas or prominent landowning families. For example, in Urfa, out of the total 664 villages, 51 were owned by aghas, 72 by wealthy landowning families. In Diyarbakir out of the 663 villages, 70 were owned by rich landowning families, and in the province of Siirt 11 aghas and 21 families owned in total 32 villages (Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 142).

These villages operated as political fiefdoms of one of the rival mainstream parties, depending on the partisan affiliations of the landowning class. The incorporation and aggrandisement of the landed elite during the 1950s fostered an axis of mutual reliance between the political parties in Ankara and the Kurdish landed elites that yielded a block of votes. The much-sought-after communal votes were exchanged for top positions in the regional parties. When DP came to power in 1950 a significant share of its votes in the ESA provinces were from the wealthy landowning families or large tribes, as a result of which the following leading members of these tribes and families attained seats in the National Assembly: Edip Altınakar (Sürgüçüzâde tribe-Diyarbakır), Mustafa Ekinci (Seydan tribe-Lice), and Mehmet Tevfik Bucak (Bucak tribe-Siverek).
The ‘49’ers Incident’ and the End of the ‘Period of Silence’

In contrast, a section of the well-educated children of this traditional rural class along with other Kurdish students from less affluent backgrounds constituted the nucleus of the new generation of Kurdish organic intellectuals who played a focal role in the public debate of the Eastern Question: the socio-economic underdevelopment in ESA. In the late 1950s, Kurdish university students from prominent landowning families, like, Yusuf Azizoğlu (1917-1970), alongside their peers from less well-off backgrounds, such as, Musa Anter (1920-1992), who were handpicked by state officials and sent to university in order to be made into ‘good Turkish citizens’, spearheaded an alternative and progressive movement. This movement centred on raising awareness and promoting the socio-economic development of the neglected Kurdish provinces. Despite avoiding an explicit campaign demanding national rights for the Kurds and concentrating on socio-economic issues, for instance tackling drought and encouraging government investment, they could not evade the suppressive measures of the DP government. Soon after its birth in 1959, the activities of this movement were halted.

The Kurdish rebellion that had surfaced across the border in northern Iraq with the return from exile of the influential Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani (1903-1979) after the Iraqi Revolution in July 1958 played a significant role in the government clampdown of this movement. Turkish state officials were fretful that it might incite Kurds in Turkey to take similar forms of action (Tan, 2010: 323-34). On 17 June 1959, 49 leading Kurdish intellectuals, including the two mentioned above, were arrested. President Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes wanted the 49 hanged, but the prospect of hostile international reaction made them renege on their decision. The ‘49’ers episode’ let the Kurdish genie out of the bottle, and the two decades of silence that had followed the 1936-8 Dersim rebellion came to an end (Ekinci, 2011: 60-6).
In Ankara and Istanbul, alongside the small but highly active Kurdish intellectuals, there were a growing number of migrant Kurdish workers, who became members of the new expanding urban proletariat of Turkey. As briefly alluded to above, a sizeable segment of the landless Kurdish peasants in ESA sought employment in one of the local towns, and, if not successful at their first port of call, they moved to industrial cities mainly in Western Turkey. In 6 of the 14 predominantly Kurdish provinces the annual rate of urban population growth during 1955-60 surpassed the national average of 49.2%: Elazığ (62.4%); Siirt (76.4%); Van (49.6%); Erzincan (87.7%); Hakkari (64.4%) and Tunceli (50.9) (Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 145). And of those migrants who moved beyond local towns, around 41 per cent went to Istanbul, 18 per cent to Ankara, 15 per cent to Adana and 4 per cent to Izmir (McDowall, 2000: 401). Eventually the migratory process made the Kurdish question a perceptible reality for people living in Ankara and Istanbul, hundreds of miles away from the predominantly Kurdish provinces.

The movement from the countryside to towns and cities was not *sui generis* to the Kurdish provinces, as the 1950s witnessed mass migration from the rural to urban areas all over Turkey. Over a million people had left the countryside and by the end of the decade, the major cities were growing by 10 per cent a year (Zürcher, 1994: 237). Surplus labour began to flock to the cities, where employment was more readily found (Karpat, 1973: 191). The economic boom years of the DP government ended in 1953; the ensuing deteriorating economic conditions were a major push factor for rural-to-urban migration.

**Crisis of Agriculture-led Growth**

With the end of the Korean War, international demand decreased and prices of export commodities began to decline. Economic growth fell from the average rate of 13 per cent per annum in the ‘golden years’ (1950-1953) of the Democrat decade to 9.5 in 1954, and as a result the trade deficit in 1955 was eight times that of 1950 (Ahmad, 1977: 135). These years
were followed by years of spiralling inflation (1956-9). During these years, prices rose around 18 per cent a year (Boratav, 1969: 186), because, regardless of slackening international demand and decline in prices of export commodities, the DP government continued with investment programmes and initiated a large price support programme for wheat, financed by increases in the money supply (Pamuk, 2008: 282; Hershlag, 1968: 146).

In 1958, Western foreign allies announced that they would ‘rescue’ the Turkish economy and Menderes government by agreeing to provide Ankara with a loan of $359 million and the consolidation of the $400 million debt (Hershlag, 1968: 147). The OECD and IMF-backed economic programme introduced in August 1958 imposed certain ‘stabilising measures’, the most significant of which was the de facto devaluation of the lira from TL 2.80 to TL 9,025 to the dollar (ibid.).

The deteriorating economic situation combined with Menderes’ increasingly authoritarian style of government, to the extent that in his 21 September 1958 Izmir speech he openly threatened ‘an end to democracy’ and brought the country to the brink of chaos. The trend towards totalitarianism by the government representatives was based on the fear of being toppled, which was instilled by the January 1958 rumours of a military conspiracy and aggravated because of the July 1958 revolution in neighbouring Iraq as well as the rising popular unrest at home. The robust anti-government demonstrations – some of which were encouraged by the RPP – towards the end of the 1950s severely undermined government authority. The most resilient popular movements were the student rallies and large street demonstration on 28 April 1960 – first in Istanbul and then in Ankara – which continued virtually uninterrupted until the military takeover by the thirty-eight officers of the self-proclaimed National Unity Committee (NUC), on 27 May 1960.234

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The 1960 Coup

The coup involved more than a change of government. On the very day of the military takeover, the NUC, headed by the former commander-in-chief of the land forces, Cemal Gürses, set up a commission under the leadership of then the rector of Istanbul University, Professor Siddik Sami Onar, to rewrite the constitution and provide recommendations for the restructuring of Turkey’s institutions. The junta’s decision to engage five distinguished law professors from Istanbul University, who on 28 May 1960 through their initial report justified the coup on the basis that the DP had governed unconstitutionally, enabled it to portray the 27 May movement as more than a mere coup: as ‘a revolution of the intellectuals’ (Ahmad, 2008: 240).

On 12 June 1960, the NUC set up an interim government legalised by the professors with a provisional constitution enabling the NUC to rule until a new parliament had been elected. Undoubtedly the most important enactment of the interim government, which had governed the country until the first RPP and JP coalition government (10 November 1961- 30 May 1962), was the 1961 constitution. The new constitution signalled NUC’s readiness to return to a civilian rule, albeit under the guardianship of the military, and demonstrated its proclivity to incorporate large segments of the population into the political system and the domestic market through liberal constitutional readjustments and institutional reorientations.

The 1961 Constitution

The 1961 Constitution brought about further developed the existing quasi-parliamentary system by introducing a bi-cameral parliament, with a lower house (National Assembly) elected by proportional representation, and an upper house (Republican Senate), consisting of 150 members, some elected and others appointed by the president. Both chambers constituted the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT). The new Constitution as well as separating
the executive from the judiciary did also create the Constitutional Court, which vetted the legislations of the parliament.

Furthermore, the novel Constitution established two central state institutions, namely, Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council, NSC) and the SPO. For the first time in the history of the Republic, Article 3 of the 1961 Constitution gave the military a constitutional role by setting up the NSC, which was composed of the chief of the general staff, representatives of the armed forces and government minister. The NSC’s function was to assist the cabinet on matters vaguely defined as ‘national security’, which encompassed virtually all issues pertinent to running the state, and in March 1962 an additional bill increased the powers of this body by permitting it to interfere in the deliberations of the cabinet. Thus, the military was made the custodian and partner of the new regime.

Having recognised that Democrats’ aversion for drawing up and applying long-term plans of economic development had played a pivotal role in the economic downturn in the late 1950s (Hale, 1981: 117, Pamuk, 2008: 283), Article 129 of the new Constitution stipulated the establishment of the SPO\textsuperscript{235} so as to initiate the development of the country on a planned basis. In other words, the coup denoted a shift from free market economics approach to a planned economy. Accordingly, four consecutive Five-Year economic development plans were designed by the SPO (1963-67, 1968-72, 1973-77, and 1979-1983\textsuperscript{236}).

**Long Period of Import Substituted Industrialisation (1963-1979)**

The economic policies of the military rule and the civilian rule that followed in the 1960s and 1970s aimed, primarily, at the protection of the domestic market and industrialisation through import substitution (ISI). In order to achieve the ISI objectives, governments made abundant use of a restrictive trade regime, investments by State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) and subsidised credit.

\textsuperscript{235} The SPO was in charge of proposing and implementing plans for economic, social, and cultural development under a High Planning Council.

\textsuperscript{236} The fourth Five-Year Plan was delayed by the foreign exchange crisis of 1977-79 (Hansen, 1991: 352).
Akin to the ètatist period during the long period of import substitution, not only were SEE
imputed a central role in attaining set economic goals, but the public and the private sector
were also seen as complementary and not mutually exclusive or antagonistic components of
the Turkish economy (Barkey, 1990). The private sector, moreover, was provided with a
wide range of state incentives in order to enhance capabilities. For instance, private
manufacturing and distribution companies, in addition to being provided with cheap inputs
produced by the SEE, were also permitted to borrow from the Treasury at much lower rates
than inflation (Aydin, 2005: 37). Resultantly, by the 1980s, large corporations, big family
holdings and banks were in far stronger positions than at the beginning of the 1960s (Pamuk,
2008: 283).

In order to safeguard the enlargement of the domestic market for the sustainability of the ISI,
large segments of the society were incorporated into the internal market by means of the
fundamental rights and freedoms granted under the 1961 Constitution. The new liberal
Constitution vowed freedoms of thought, expression, association and publication, and
promised social economic rights and the freedom to work. Trade unions were granted the
right to strike and partake in collective bargaining, and the dominated classes even
established a political party, Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Workers’ Party of Turkey, WPT).

**Systematic Denial of the Kurds**

The interim government led by the NUC, in juxtaposition to the liberal dispensations granted
by the 1961 Constitution, gave an end to the political overtures of the 1950s and adopted the
suppressive Kurdish policies reminiscent of the RPP era. Turkey’s Kurdish policy of the 1960
coup was philistinely expressed in the following words of the new national chief, General
Gürsel, which he uttered standing on an American tank in the overwhelmingly Kurdish city
of Diyarbakir: 'There are no Kurds in this country. Whoever says he is a Kurd, I will spit in
his face' (Muller, 1990: 177).
The disclosure in 2008 of a special report, titled ‘The Principles of the State Development Programmes in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia’, prepared in 1961 by the SPO under the instructions of the NUC, revealed details of the policy prescriptions authorised by the new guardians of the Republic for the predominantly Kurdish provinces. A working group within the SPO, namely the ‘East Group’, which had toured the region on 8, 10, and 16 February 1961, drew up this report in early 1961. The junta-sanctioned ‘East Report’ comprised of three core policy recommendations in order to ‘fill the power vacuum [left by the state and] occupied by separatists, ağas and sheiks’ and give an end to the previously witnessed ‘separatist activities’ threatening the ‘unitary structure’ of the country.

First, ‘transforming the existing social structure’ in ESA by ‘assimilating those who feel they are Kurdish’. Pursuant to this aim, a set of complementing tools of assimilation was advised by the ‘East Group’: a) wide circulation of existing and/or novel ‘sociological and anthropological research’ which posit that Kurds are of Turkish stock; b) ‘cultural propaganda’ on radio; and c) building more schools in the region in order to train ‘missionaries’ to spread the Turkish language and culture.

Second, ‘changing the population structure’ in this region by procuring the ‘densification of Turks’ so that they could gradually ‘outweigh those who feel they are Kurds’. The numerical dominance of the hegemonic nation in this region could be achieved, the report argued, by means of transferring the ‘excess Turkish population in the Black Sea littoral’, settling Turks migrating from overseas and by giving ‘economic incentives to those who feel they are Kurds to move’ where ‘the sons of the Turks’ are predominant. Lastly, ‘increasing the income of the region and appropriately redistributing it’ in order to overcome the ‘neglect of the region by previous governments’ and end the ‘endurance of the backward social structures’. This

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237 This secret report was kept in the personal archives of the veteran statesman Bülent Ecevit (1925-2006) who received this report when serving as the Minister of Work in the first RPP and JP government. The report came to light in the process of preparing Ecevit’s biographical documentary by two influential journalists in Turkey, Can Dündar and Rıdvan Akar. For an extensive version of this report, see: Dündar and Akar (2008).
shift in policy with regard to augmenting public investment in the predominantly Kurdish regions of Turkey was advised by the ‘East Group’ with the objective of earning the loyalty of the Kurds who thus far were neglected by the state.

The interim government led by the NUC and the successive civilian governments actuated the assimilationist recommendations put forward in this report. In the early 1960s, as sanctioned by Law No. 1587 (1960), Kurdish place names were systematically changed into Turkish ones, and Turkish radio stations were set up in order to propagate the ideas set out in the East Report as well as discouraging listening to broadcasts in Kurdish from neighbouring countries (Nezan, 1993: 65). Additional measures taken by the state involved granting the registrars the right to refuse to record Kurdish names on birth certificates as well as establishing increasingly more regional boarding schools in the overwhelmingly Kurdish ESA with the specific aim of assimilating Kurds (McDowall, 2000: 405). By the end of 1960s, of 70 boarding schools in Turkey, 60 were located in ESA (Beşikçi, 1992 [1969]: 551-53).

On the other hand, the other two policies advocated by the ‘East Group’ were either not adopted or not thoroughly implemented by governments that came to power after 1961 in light of the changing circumstances and/or priorities of the Turkish state. The ambitious task of gradually ‘turkifying’ ESA did not materialise, as the envisioned dual-track policy of resettling Turks in these regions and deporting Kurds from these regions through economic incentives had not been put into effect. The Forced Settlement Law No. 105 appended to the Settlement Law No. 2510 on 19 October 1960\textsuperscript{238} by the interim government in order to deport 55 of the 485 most prominent Kurds detained immediately after the coup, was annulled on 18 October 1962\textsuperscript{239} by the second coalition government which comprised of the RPP, New Turkey Party (NTP) and Republican Peasants’ Nation Party (RPNP). With the

\textsuperscript{238} 	extit{Resmi Gazete}, Issue No.10638, 25/11/1960.
\textsuperscript{239} 	extit{Resmi Gazete}, Issue No.11239, 23/11/1962.
implementation of the First Five-Year Plan in 1963, the Turkish state prioritised the policy of ‘absorbing’ the region over that of ‘dismembering’ it, espoused by the former Republican rulers, and thus the assimilationist programmes summarised above were preferred to the previously implemented social engineering policies advocated by the ‘East Group’ in a relatively mild form.

**Restoration of the Status Quo Ante and the Failed Promise of Land Reform**

The annulment of the Forced Settlement Law of No. 105, moreover, permitted the deported ağas to return to their old place of residence and reinstated all their land and property (Ahmad, 1977: 216-17). Accordingly, the state restored the order existing before the coup in the Eastern and Southeastern provinces. Despite the recurrent theme in the official rhetoric of the successive governments in the 1960s and 1970s of the need to ‘break up the backward structure’ in ESA (Yeğen, 2011: 71), the ‘feudal land ownership devoid of modernisation in the south-east’ existent at the beginning of the 1960s remained intact in the ensuing two decades. The failure to implement the much needed root and branch land reform implicated the endurance of the traditional land tenure patterns and agrarian relations.

The junta’s promise of land reform in 1960 like the promises of the various elected governments of 1961-9 succeeding it failed to materialise (Ahmad, 1977: 276-78). It was not until June 1973, during the period of semi-military rule, that a new land reform was passed, which in May 1977 the Constitutional Court nullified. In the lifetime of this law, as little as 23,000 hectares of land was distributed to 1,200 peasant families (Hale, 1981: 185-86). Thus, the landed property of the large landowning families remained virtually untouched. In 1980, 8 per cent of the families in ESA owned over 50 per cent of the cultivable land, while 80 per cent of the families were evenly matched between those holding up to 5 hectares and those who were landless (McDowall, 1997: 243).
The continuity in the concentration of land in the hands of wealthy landlords during the 1960s and 1970s was, furthermore, an indication of the preservation of the alliance built in the 1950s between the co-opted traditional (tribal/religious) landed Kurdish elite and the Turkish state. The collaboration between these two parties had openly manifested itself with the harsh measures authorised by the state to suppress the occasional peasant revolts that took place in the 1970s. When the peasants occupied the land belonging to the agha and demanded that it be redistributed they were on each occasion confronted by the military who would not shy away from using heavy-handed tactics to remove them and give the land back to the owner (Nezan, 1980: 91).

The Kurdish peasant actions in the 1970s came about against the backdrop of a period of political mobilisation spearheaded by the previously mentioned mass demonstrations in 1967: ‘Eastern Meetings’ (Beşikçi, 1992). By 1969 one of most important left wing Kurdish groups, the Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları (Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths, RECH), was formed. The RECH provided the kernel for a large number of other revolutionary Kurdish groups, including the PKK. Alongside economic concerns, political factors, like the aforementioned regeneration of the Kurdish revolt in Iraq after the 1958 coup, and the development of a robust left-wing movement in Turkey, which by advocating social justice and equality became a point of attraction for the Kurds, had a tremendous effect on revival of Kurdish activism in the 1960s and the 1970s Turkey. Consequently, from 1960s on, the conservation of the state-landed Kurdish elite’s alliance was grounded on the shared objective of maintaining the prevailing economic and political order increasingly opposed by large segments of the Kurdish society in Turkey.

240 For an expanded study of the influence of the RECH on the establishment of PKK, see: Marcus (2007: 21-30).
Intensification of Regional Inequalities and Massive Underdevelopment of the Kurdish Region

One of the factors fuelling the disillusionment and dissent of the Kurds in this period was the immense underdevelopment of the largely Kurdish ESA. Relatedly, the programs of the 1965, the 1969 and the 1970 administrations contained pledges to undertake ‘special measures’ in an attempt to overcome the socio-economic disparities between regions and encourage the development of the ‘Eastern regions’ (Yeşen, 1999: 163-67). Yet, as outlined in the program of the 1969 administration, the aim of the ‘special measures’ was not to ‘initiate the formation of privileged regions, but to forge integration’ (Yeşen, 1999: 164). Put differently, as rightly pointed out by Yeşen, the overarching aim of the ‘special measures’ was to incorporate the ESA provinces in accord with the requirements and necessities of the domestic market, and not to privilege or prioritise the exigent needs of these lagging and long-neglected provinces (1999:164). Hence, in the 1960s and the 1970s, despite the main economic development strategy centred on ISI successfully bringing about significant economic growth, the underdevelopment of the predominantly Kurdish Eastern and Southeastern provinces deepened.

When the period of planned import substitution of 1961-63 to 1977-79, is compared to that of the Democrat decades of 1951-53 to 1961-63, the GDP growth rate increased from 4.9 per cent to 6.4 per cent, with an equally robust increase in the Gross National Income (GNI) growth rate from 4.4 per cent to 6.3 per cent. In addition, GDP growth per capita increased from 2.1 per cent to 3.9 per cent, with GNI growth per capita income increasing from 1.6 per cent to 3.8 per cent. Thus, the growth of per capita income more than doubled, which compared well with that of the industrialised and developing countries. The average growth of GNP per capita for the period 1960-77, as set by the World Bank, for middle-income
countries was 3.6 per cent, for industrialised countries 3.4 per cent, and for low-income
countries 1.4 per cent (Hansen, 1991: 354).

Even with this impressive economic performance, the socio-economic disparities between
different geographic zones inherited from previous decades intensified during 1960-80, to the
detriment of ESA, as conceded by the SPO in 1979:

‘Ever since the 1st Plan [First Five-Year Plan] the issue of regional imbalances have been
addressed and within all three of the [Five-Year] Plans a range of policies have been
designated to overcome this issue. Despite all efforts and policies, regional imbalances have
exacerbated….With the exclusion of the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions in all of
the other regions the share of national income have been similar to the share of total
population’ (SPO, 1979: 75).

Throughout the long period of planned import substitution, the national income share of the
17 Eastern and Southeastern provinces continually decreased: in 1965, it was 10.39 per cent,
in 1975, it reduced to 9.56 per cent and by 1979, it further dropped to 8.17 per cent (USARM,
2009: 18). This persistent decline in the national income share of these provinces was in spite
of the constant increase in their proportion of the total population during the 1960s and 1970,
as demonstrated by the census figures tabulated in Table 4.8 below.
Table 4.8 Population of ESA, 1950-1970

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>20,947,188</td>
<td>27,754,820</td>
<td>35,605,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia</td>
<td>3,528,932</td>
<td>4,713,101</td>
<td>6,178,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia’ Share in Turkey (%)</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Thus, income disparities between the ESA provinces and the rest of the country did not reduce in the heyday of the period of planned import substitution, that is, the years before the first oil shock of 1973-74\(^{241}\), and persisted until the end of this period because of the incessant decrease in the national income share of the former provinces.

**Derisory Public and Private Investment**

A significant causal factor for the perseverance of the regional income disparities between the ESA and the rest of the country was the relatively low and inadequate level of public and private investment in the latter domains during the long period of planned import substitution, which was nowhere near enough to counterbalance the past years of neglect and massive underdevelopment. It is worth noting that state investment during 1960-80 is estimated to have constituted more than 50 per cent of the overall investment in Turkey (Aydin, 2005: 35). Despite the SPO designating the whole ESA as ‘Priority Development Regions’ (PDRs) as of 1968, between the First Five-Year Plan and the Fourth Five-Year Plan, public investment in the provinces situated in this part of country decreased by 40 per cent. In total 40 provinces were classified as PDRs, that is, provinces in need of extra investment and incentives: all 18

\(^{241}\) The first oil shock quadrupled the price of oil in the international market further deteriorated the balance of trade and balance of payments deficit of an oil-dependent Turkish economy; a natural predicament for a rapidly industrialising economy that was not export-orientated (Hale, 1981: 203-6; Zürcher, 1994: 280-81).
of the provinces in ESA, plus 22 other provinces located in the Black Sea littoral and Central Anatolia. The share of public investment for ESA provinces in the four consecutive Five-Year Plans was as follows, respectively: 11.85, 11.90, 7.11 and 7.20 (Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 158). The share of public investment in the Western Marmara region, on the other hand, increased from 11.70 per cent in the First Five-Year Plan to 15.70 per cent in the Fourth Five-Year Plan (ibid.).

From 1962-63 to 1974-78, private investment in Turkey increased from 8.8 per cent to 11.2 per cent (Hansen, 1991: 369), but private sector investment in ESA provinces remained nominal, owing in part to the comparatively little effort put in by the state to encourage private investment in this area. From 1968, in order to encourage private investment in the PDRs, the SPO introduced state-sanctioned incentive schemes, which involved exemption from financial tax and stamp duty. Albeit the provinces in ESA accounting for almost half of all the PDRs in Turkey, only 5.8 per cent of the total 5918 incentives approved by the state during 1968-1980 were for these provinces (Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 188).

**Unbalanced Sectoral Distribution of Public Investment**

The other factors fuelling the disparities between ESA and the rest of Turkey during the long period of planned import substitution emanated from the following two perennial features of public investment in these regions: a) unbalanced sectoral distribution and b) prioritisation of the needs of the industrialised western economic centres over that of the primary and immediate requirements of ESA. The heavy investments in the energy and mining sector, which, with the exclusion of the Third Five-Year Plan, constituted the main part of the public investment in the four quinquennial plans in East and South-East Turkey, exemplify both of these aspects (see table 4.9). As it will be explicated below, very little, if any at all, of the production in the energy and mining sector was locally used. These minerals were exported overseas and to other areas in Turkey. The earnings from these were retained mainly by the
Turkish state as well as the private sector based outside of ESA. In consequence, the region has had very little benefit from the flow of its resources, as these potential investments were not available for its further development.

Table 4.9 Sectoral distribution of the public investment in ESA, 1963-1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


During 1965-75, one of the major investment projects in ESA was the 900 Megawatts (MW) Keban Dam scheme on the Upper Euphrates, which opened in 1975 (Hale, 1981: 205).

Within the first five years, the Keban hydroelectric power plant was generating 504 MW of electricity (i.e. 56 per cent of its total generation capacity), 400 MW of which was transmitted to Western Turkey. When the Keban hydroelectric power plant operated at its full capacity, it had the potential of generating a quarter of the total electricity produced in Turkey in 1980 (Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 157-160). Six other hydroelectric power schemes in ESA provinces that received large amounts of government investment during and after the Second Five-Year Plan were Elazığ-Hazar II, Van-Engil, Van-Erçiş, Elazığ-Hazar, Mardin-Cağ-Cağ and Kars-Kiği.

Between 1960 and 1980, the other main area of public investment in ESA was Turkey’s largest and one of the world’s richest chrome mines situated in the Eastern province of Elazığ: Güleman chromite (chromium ore) deposits operated by the state-owned Ertribank

242 Five-Year Plan (F.Y.P)
Chrome ore production statistics indicate that Turkey’s chrome output was 22,183,406 tons between 1942 and 1979 (Engin et al., 1982: 1), 30 per cent of which was produced in the Güleman area, and the remainder came from a number of smaller mines in various different parts of Turkey: Bursa, Eskişehir, Fethiye and Antalya (ibid.).

Since the 1960s, chrome exports from the Güleman mines accounted for the greatest foreign exchange earnings among Turkey’s mining exports (Europa, 2003: 1142). For instance, in 1967, chrome exports from the Güleman area were worth $7.2 million and in 1972, it increased to $17.5 million (Jafar, 1976: 68). Yet little chrome was processed locally; almost the entire chrome output was exported (Europa, 2003: 1142).

Moreover, the Second Five-Year Plan (1968-72) included projects to enhance the production of copper, zinc and lead mined in Elazığ by Etibank. The set output targets were as follows: a) augmenting the output of Elazığ’s Ergani copper mines to 1,200,000 tons/year; b) increasing lead production to 8,000 tons/year; and c) expanding zinc production to 6,000 tons/year (Jafar, 1976: 68-9). Systematic or longitudinal statistical data on the actual amount and value of production and/or exports for zinc, lead and copper production in Elazığ in the 1960s and 1970s are hard to come by. Nevertheless, the available data from 1969 indicates that production of blister copper (or raw copper) by Etibank in the country’s oldest copper mine, Ergani copper mines, amounted to around 24,000 tons, 16,000 tons of which were exported to the USA, United Kingdom and West Germany. These exports were worth $17 million in foreign currencies (Europa, 2002: 1130).

The petroleum sector had been the other main beneficiary of public investment during the period of planned import substitution (Aytar, 1992: 62-8). Petroleum in Turkey was discovered in 1950 in ESA, and all successive discoveries have been in these domains (Europa, 2002: 1130). Thus, provinces located in ESA were the sole producers of petroleum during the 1960s and the 1970s. From the mid-1950s to early 1970s, owing in part to the state
investment, there was a noticeable increase in petroleum production: from 178,000 tons in 1955 to 3,500,000 tons in 1973 (ibid.). Between 1955 and 1972, production of petroleum is estimated to be worth $27 million (Jafar, 1976: 68). Up until 1980, it maintained the same level of production as 1973 (Europa, 2002: 1130). The great majority of the petroleum production was exported, since only 6 per cent of the total petrol refining capacity was located in ESA in the 1970s, and the proceeds attained from the petroleum exports were 'seldom re-cycled into the Region’s [ESA] economy' (Jafar, 1976: 68).

In juxtaposition to the sizable state investment in the energy and mining sector in ESA, there was comparatively little and insufficient investment in the manufacturing industry, especially in the first two Five-Year Plans, considering the exceptionally low level of industrial development witnessed in this area during the Republican and the Democrat era. As a result, the stunted industrialisation of ESA deepened in the Planned Period.

Stunted Industrial and Agricultural Development

Even in the face of the value added by the manufacturing industry precipitously increasing from 6,636 million TL in 1963 to 148,014 million TL in 1977 (Hale, 1981: 197), Eastern and Southeastern provinces share of the value added in manufacturing decreased from 7.8 per cent in 1968 to 4.0 per cent in 1974 (SPO, 1979: 75). It is worth noting that the SPO’s calculations of the share of value added in manufacturing for these provinces take into account the crude oil output in the Batman Refinery\(^{243}\). In 1968, 34.3 per cent, and in 1974, 42.3 per cent, of the total share of valued added in manufacturing in ESA was generated by the Batman Refinery (ibid.). The Batman Refinery accounting for the bulk of the valued added in manufacturing generated by these provinces is indicative of the dismal state of the manufacturing industry in ESA.

\(^{243}\) Batman refinery is the first refinery built in Turkey in 1955 with a capacity of 330,000 tons/year. Due to increasing demand, the capacity of the refinery was increased by Debottlenecking Project to 580,000 tons/year in 1960. Crude oil processing capacity of Batman refinery, which was continuously being upgraded with modernisation studies, reached 1.1 million tons/year with commissioning of a new crude unit in 1972.
According to the 1978 data tabulated in Table 4.10 below, the share of manufacturing industry in the GDP of ESA regions was 10.5 per cent, while agriculture accounted for nearly half of the regions GDP. Whereas in the Western Marmara region manufacturing industry accounted for 33.7 per cent of this regions GDP, and agriculture contribution to the regions GDP was a mere 7.9 per cent. Therefore, ESA continued to be a predominantly agrarian region in the 1960s and 1970s.

Table 4.10 Sectoral breakdown of GDP in ESA and the Marmara Region, 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>ESA (%)</th>
<th>Marmara Region (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Services</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


During the period of planned import substitution, agricultural productivity rates in ESA witnessed a downward slide. In 1960-62, the ESA provinces accounted for 17.01 per cent of the total cultivated area and 17.10 per cent of the total crops produced in Turkey. In 1978-80, despite the share of these provinces in the total cultivated land rising to 19.89 per cent, the share of these provinces in the total crops produced decreased to 14.61 per cent (Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 164). The decrease in output is believed to be inextricably linked to two region-wide issues: i) the inefficient irrigation system deprived of modernisation, and ii) the limited availability and use of chemical fertilisers (ibid.: 162-63).

During 1965-79, because of the stunted growth of agriculture and industry, with the exception of Diyarbakir and Bingöl, the GDP share of all the ESA provinces descended. Out
of the overall 67 provinces, the 17 Eastern and Southeastern provinces, with a few exemptions, were the lowest ranked provinces in the national GDP rankings.

Table 4.11 The GDP share and rankings of the ESA provinces, 1965 and 1979.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th></th>
<th>1979</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share (%)</td>
<td>Ranking</td>
<td>Share (%)</td>
<td>Ranking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kars</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urfa</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elazığ</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malatya</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbakır</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siirt</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardin</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzincan</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adıyaman</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ağrı</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muş</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitlis</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunceli</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bingöl</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakkari</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In each of the successive four Five-Year Plans, the investment in education decreased (see Table 4.9). Therefore, the low level of literacy and schooling inherited from Republican era could not be overcome in the Planned Period. Illiteracy and non-schooling rates of individuals aged six and above remained far above the national average in almost all of the provinces in ESA in 1985 (see Table 4.12). Inadequate state investment in education, coupled with formal education being in a language foreign to the majority of the inhabitants in this region, played a pivotal role in the persistence of low level of literacy in the predominantly Kurdish ESA in the two decades after the single-party era. In other words, unlike other regions of Turkey, large sections of the populace of these regions were taught to read and
write in a language other than their native language, Kurdish, which unsurprisingly constituted additional linguistic or literacy barriers.

\[
\text{Table 4.12 Literacy and educational attainment data for ESA for individuals aged 6 and above, 1985}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Population Aged 6+</th>
<th>Illiteracy Rate</th>
<th>Non-schooling Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adıyaman</td>
<td>341,248</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ağrı</td>
<td>326,893</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bingöl</td>
<td>190,508</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitlis</td>
<td>231,520</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>70.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbakır</td>
<td>739,419</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>65.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elazığ</td>
<td>408,607</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzincan</td>
<td>257,212</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>703,872</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakkari</td>
<td>138,266</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>69.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kars</td>
<td>592,916</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malatya</td>
<td>559,586</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardin</td>
<td>502,747</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muş</td>
<td>260,757</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siirt</td>
<td>398,505</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>68.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunceli</td>
<td>126,248</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şanlıurfa</td>
<td>627,269</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>68.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van</td>
<td>416,891</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>68.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>43,112,337</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 263.

In summary, the preconditions for economic development in ESA, that is, adequate public investment oriented towards the exigent needs of these long-neglected regions, land reform and the resultant removal of the ağa class, as well as the introduction of Kurdish-medium formal education, could not be implemented because all of these measures were antithetical to the Turkish state’ policy of controlling the overwhelmingly Kurdish regions. Thus, the transition from a one-party autocracy to a multiparty political system, which was temporarily suspended by military intervention in 1960-61 and 1971-73, did not lead to a qualitative alteration in the Turkish state’s perception of and preoccupation with the Kurdish question; largely because none of the regimes post-1950 sufficiently de-Kemalised or dealt with the
legacy of the Young Turk rule. Resultantly, by the end of the 1970s Turkey remained locked in contradictions created by the Kemalist shibboleths on the Kurdish issue and the predominantly Kurdish provinces in massive underdevelopment borne of state negligence and paranoia.
Chapter 5

Turkey’s Kurdish Question in the Era of Neoliberalism: From the 1980 Coup to the AKP’s Kurdish Overture (1980-2010s)

5.1 Overview

In the late 1970s, Turkey found itself in one of the gravest political and economic crises since the establishment of the Republic; prompting a military coup and the authoritarian implementation of a structural adjustment programme as well as a shift to export-led growth from 1980 on. In other words, in the wake of the economic crisis and political turmoil of the late 1970s, Turkey abandoned the ISI policies and instead adopted the neoliberal strategy focussed on the long-term objectives of export-oriented trade, development strategy based on the neoclassical principle of comparative advantages, and a more market-directed system of resource allocation. After a brief overview of the pivotal events in the late 1970s, this chapter will evaluate the implications of the political economy of post-1980 Turkey on the Kurdish policy of the Turkish state and the socio-economic issues in the predominantly Kurdish ESA. Turkey had a persistent balance of payment and balance of trade deficit throughout the 1960s and the 1970s as a result of Turkey’s ISI giving birth to new labour-intensive industries which were not only heavily dependent on foreign subsidies244, manufacturing inputs and technology, but also not export-oriented245 (Keyder, 1987: 165-196). Put differently, increasing import bills coupled with meagre exports led to rapidly increasing trade deficits that had to be financed by foreign funds. The decline in the profits of the SEEIs during the 1970s, resulting from the mismanagement of these state-owned enterprises by fragile and

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244 Foreign subsidies in the form of aids and loans, particularly from the US. After the Second World War the Turkish state was able to persuade the US, supranational organisations and the funding agencies that the development of capitalism in Turkey should be subsidised externally largely because of the geostrategic importance of Turkey, as discussed in the previous chapter. Relatedly, between 1960 and 1974 American loans and aid constituted the principal mode of covering the trade deficit as it covered ‘about one-third’ of the deficit up until 1974 (Keyder, 1987:180). From 1970 on, however, workers’ remittances from Europe gained prominence: remittances ‘peaked in 1974 with a total of $1.426 million’ (Zürcher, 1994: 280).

245 The export sector’s share in ‘GDP averaged less than 4 per cent during the 1970s, and about two-thirds of these revenues came from the traditional export crops’ (Pamuk, 2008: 284).
short-lived political coalitions with short-term horizons (Richards and Waterbury, 2008: 218-19) and the oil crises (1973-4 and 1979-80) only exacerbated the difficulties. As a result, the strategy of ensuring satisfactory profits for industrialists while also creating and sustaining an internal market resulted with a dismal failure.

In less than a decade Turkey’s debt grew almost five-fold: increasing from $3.3 billion in 1973 to $15.3 billion by 1980. Since rising budgetary deficits were met with monetary expansion, inflation jumped to 90 per cent in 1979 (Pamuk, 2008: 285). The second oil price shock in 1979-80, which depleted one-third of foreign reserves of the Central Bank, compounded the problems in the country. Oil for industry and electricity generating became increasingly limited, so much so that by 1979 power cuts of up to five hours a day were the rule, even in winter (Zürcher, 1994: 281). Unemployment rose officially from 600,000 in 1967 to 1.5 million in 1977, though the unofficial figures was much higher as each year only 40 per cent of new entrants to the labour market could find employment (McDowall, 2000:411). Moreover, the number of days lost to strikes rose from 323,220 in 1970 to 2,217,347 in 1979 (Işıkli, 1987: 325). The economic crisis fuelled political instability as increasingly more people, especially the youth, were being disenfranchised by the existing system. Economic crisis, combined with political instability and violence, brought Turkey to the verge of civil war.

Radical left-wing groups, which were driven underground when the political left was proscribed after the 1971 military coup, clashed with extremist right-wing groups, most notably Idealist Hearths or Grey Wolves: the youth organisation of the Nationalist Action Party, a constituent member of the National Front coalition governments. The latter were

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246 After the coup, one of the top priorities of the generals was the ‘restoration of law and order’, and that meant the elimination of the political left, which was seen as a threat to the status quo, and all of it organisations such as the TİP, Dev-Genç (The Federation of the Revolutionary Youth of Turkey) and DISK (Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Unions).

247 There were two successive National Front coalition governments. The First National Front governed the country from 31 March 1975 until 5 June 1977 and composed of four parties: JP, National Salvation Party,
given unhampered freedom and protection to act as vigilantes against their ideological rivals. The number of victims of these clashes arose rapidly from around 230 in 1977 to between 1200 and 1500 in 1979 (Zürcher, 1994: 276). Thus in the second half of 1970s political violence plagued Turkey.

In addition to university campuses and the shanties of Ankara and Istanbul, Eastern and Southeastern provinces that were overwhelmingly Kurdish and/or ethnically mixed, like Maraş and Malatya, became the focus for these conflicts. By the end of 1978, 20 to 30 were being killed daily in these provinces. The Grey Wolves organised pogroms against Kurdish and Turkish Alevis, who generally supported the political left. There was a major outbreak of violence in Malatya in April 1978. In December of the same year, the Maraş massacre occurred wherein, according to official reports, the Grey Wolves left 109 people dead and seriously wounded 176 individuals as well as destroying 500 shops and houses. The victims were largely Alevi Kurdish slum-dwellers (McDowall, 2000: 412-13). The political turmoil in these regions was in part due to the Turkish nationalist shibboleths on the Kurdish question advocated by the National Front coalition governments, which openly articulated ‘the need to Turkicize these [Kurdish] inalienable regions of the Turkish nation’ (Kendal, 1993: 86). And in part due to politically co-opted ağas who feared the social and economic challenge of the leftists.

The draconian measures of particularly the Second National Front coalition government in ESA were so brutal and indefensible that on 31 December 1977 Demirel, the leader of the coalition government, failed to win the vote of confidence when twelve JP deputies who had

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As noted by Zürcher, “the struggle between right and left was an unequal one. During the ‘Nationalist Front’ governments of 1974-7, the police and the security forces had become the exclusive preserves of [Alparslan] Türkiye’s NAP, and even under Ecevit’s government of 1978-79, they remained infiltrated by right-wing extremists who shielded and protected the Grey Wolves” (1994: 276).
resigned voted against the government on account of the ongoing violence and oppression against the Kurds in these provinces (Ahmad, 2008:253). The Second National Front coalition government was succeeded by a RPP government led by Ecevit from January 1978, which immediately responded to the disorder in ESA by putting the whole of these regions under martial law. It is in this political climate that the Ankara University student Abdullah Öcalan founded the PKK in November 1978, with the aim of establishing a socialist Kurdistan.

After taking office, the other important step taken by Ecevit’s government was to begin negotiations for new credits with the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD. Owing to the radical ‘austerity measures’ demanded by the creditors, the talks dragged on. Turkey finally bowed to the impositions of the creditors and in July 1979, an agreement was reached which would release $1.8 billion in new credits, dependent on the Turkish government executing reform packages including: cutting government expenditure; cutting subsidies; abolishing import and export controls; and freeing interest rates. This agreement put the RPP government in a perturbed position, as it neither gave an end to the downhill slide of the economy nor did it the curb the mounting political unrest (Schick and Tonak, 1987: 351-52).

After suffering a humiliating defeat at the by-election of 19 October 1979, Ecevit resigned. Following his resignation, a JP minority government took office on 12 November.

On 24 January 1980, the new government announced a new stabilisation programme akin to the reform packages announced by the preceding government. The architects and advocates of neoliberalism, however, alleged the 24 January programme, to be a turning point in the history of Turkey, since they conceived it to be more than a standard stabilisation programme on account of it seeking to attain structural adjustment by changing the development strategy that Turkey hitherto followed (World Bank, 1983). In other words, the IMF-inspired 24
January measures were emblematic of Turkey’s full embracement of the neoliberal development strategy.

The new programme involved, among others, the following critical measures: greater liberalisation of the trade and payments regime; a devaluation of the lira against the dollar by 33 per cent and the limitation of multiple exchange rate practices; increased competition for SEEs and abolition of most government subsidies; promotion of foreign investment; additional promotional measures for exports; and draft legislation for tax reform (OECD, 1980: 25). Income policies in the form of restraints on union activities, collective agreement and wage freezes were also on the agenda (Hansen, 1991:383). The task of overseeing this programme was given to the US-trained under-secretary for economic affairs in charge of planning, Turgut Özal (1927-1993).

By the spring of 1980 it became apparent, however, that there was widespread opposition to what was depicted as the ‘Chilean solution’ – named after the policies General Pinochet had launched in Chile after the coup against President Allende. The inexhaustible activities of the left and the unions, particularly DİSK, made it impossible for Özal to execute the neoliberal economic package. Resultantly, the rulers of Turkey opted for the ‘Chilean solution’, as in 12 September 1980 the self-styled military guardians of the Republic staged a coup and took power again. The rising tides of political unrest in addition to the failure of Demirel’s coalition to implement economic liberalisation policies were major factors in convincing the generals to act on 12 September 1980. The military regime that came to power endorsed the neoliberal economic policies and made a point of keeping Özal in the government, as the deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs. Özal thereafter became a towering figure in Turkish politics. During 1983-1987, he became the Prime Minister of Turkey and was later elected Turkey’s eighth President (1989-1993).
5.2 Authoritarian Neoliberal Restructuring of Turkey and the Emergence of the Armed Conflict between the PKK and the Turkish State

After the coup of 1980, the suppression of the Kurdish identity intensified and the regional inequalities between the predominantly Kurdish ESA and the rest of Turkey persisted. Two interrelated issues that came to dominate Turkey’s agenda as the years wore on, were the rights of the Kurdish people and the massive underdevelopment of the overwhelmingly Kurdish ESA.

The authoritarian neoliberal restructuring of Turkey during the military regime (1980-83) and the transition period to multi-party politics under Özal’s Motherland Party government (1983-87) put into place a stringent regime in the ESA provinces, revitalised the policy of denying the existence of the Kurds in Turkey and neglected the sector on which the predominantly rural Kurdish regions was heavily dependent: agriculture. The most detrimental change for the agricultural sector as a result of the neoliberal economic reforms was the virtual eradication of subsidies and price support programmes after 1980, which combined with the trends in the international market to create a severe deterioration in the sectoral terms of trade.

Intersectoral terms of trade ‘turned against agriculture by more than 40 per cent until 1987’ and the agricultural sector ‘showed the lowest rates of output increase during the post-war era, averaging only 1 per cent per year from 1980’ (Pamuk, 2008: 288). Moreover, Boratav, commenting on the fate of farmers growing crops that are found in the predominantly Kurdish South-East, i.e. cotton and tobacco, points out that ‘for these two commodities, the rapid depreciation of the Turkish lira during the 1980s has been beneficial to the exporters, but not to the farmer’ (1990: 215). Consequently, peasant farmers were faced with ‘increased and even extreme indebtedness to cover costs’ (ibid.: 217). The conditions of the labourers employed in sectors other than agriculture were no better, as real wages during the same
period dwindled by as much as 34 per cent (Pamuk, 2008: 288). Strikes were declared illegal and a Supreme Arbitration Board was set up to settle all pending collective agreements and issued guidelines for future agreements – this Board was only abolished in April 1987 (Hansen: 1991: 386-87). This in part explains why the Turkish capitalism as a whole was prepared and willing to trade off the economic and political problems of this period for ‘restricted democracy, ideological hegemony, and a disciplined labour force’ (Keyder, 1987: 225).

The reticence of the rulers of Turkey to leave behind policies of forcible assimilation based on a mono-ethnic conception of the nation state compounded the problems experienced by the Kurds, as well as sharpening the Kurdish question of Turkey. After the military intervention, ‘two-thirds of the Turkish army’ were deployed in ESA (McDowall, 2000: 414). The authoritarian 1982 Constitution did not only strengthen the power of the president – giving him the right to disband the Assembly and to rule by decree – and reduce the Assembly to a single chamber, but it also, under Article 14, restricted the freedoms of individuals and organisations and prohibited political struggles based upon language, race, class and sect. Alongside targeting Marxists and Islamists, this provision was directed at the activities of the Kurdish nationalist.

More importantly, in October 1983, the military government introduced Law 2931 proscribing the use of Kurdish. By 1986, under Law 1587, 2,842 out of 3,542 villages in Adıyaman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Urfa, Mardin and Siirt had been renamed in Turkish to obliterate the Kurdish identity (McDowall, 2000:425). The PKK insurgency was one of the alleged causal factors stirring the reassertion of state authority in the 1980 coup, but it was not until 1984 that the PKK armed struggle commenced in earnest.

In October 1984, the PKK followed up its initial August attack first by killing three members of a unit in charge of guarding the President Kenan Evren at Yüksekova, and then
ambuscading and killing eight soldiers in Çukurca, Hakkari. The PKK’s methods were violent, and those perceived as cooperating with the state, including the government-sponsored Village Guard militia, ağas, civilian state employees such as teachers, were specifically targeted.

In April 1985, the Village Law was revised to allow for the maintenance of the state-sponsored militia employed to fight the PKK: Village Guards. The Village Guards were reminiscent of the Hamidiya Cavalry of the late 19th century analysed in Chapter 3. As with the Hamidiya, the Turkish state was quite willing to make use of Kurdish tribes and to work in close cooperation with its local intercessors, the ağas, to attain the manpower for the guards; individual village guards did not necessarily receive their salary since the ağas collected the wages of the guards on the state payroll. Analogous to the Hamidiya chiefs, a section of the ağas manipulated their position to dispossess the weak or minority groups in ESA. Under the banner of Islam, the dominant tribal chieftains forcibly drove Assyrian and Yezidi villagers from their land in Mardin; others did the same to Alevi villagers near Maraş (ibid: 422). In 1985, Turkey recruited 62,000 village guards to fight the PKK (Sarıhan, 2013: 94).

In juxtaposition to clans affiliated with the Right, the Far Right or in conflict with the PKK, voluntarily offering village guards to the state, the state also obliged the rural Kurdish community to provide volunteers to prove their loyalty. If villages failed to come up with volunteers for the Guards, they would risk being perceived as PKK adherents. Thus, the Kurdish villagers were stuck between a rock and a hard place since they could become village guards and chance being attacked by the PKK, or refuse and risk becoming victims of state security operation.

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249 For detailed exploration of the Village Guards, see: Aytar (1992).
250 As reported by McDowall, ‘in autumn 1992 Sadun Seylan, chief of the Alan tribe in Van, who owned 26 villages, fielded 500 village guards, a force he could increase six-fold if necessary. For these 500 men, Seylan received $115,000 monthly’ (2000: 422).
In July 1987, under Decree 285 (Olağanüstü Hal Bölge Valiliği İhdası Hakkında 285 Sayılı Kanun Hükümünde Kararname)\(^{251}\), a governor-general was appointed over the eight overwhelmingly Kurdish provinces in ESA (Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Tunceli and Van) in which a State of Emergency (OHAL) was declared. Thereafter, the regime and the region came to be identified as the OHAL, up until its annulment in November 2002. The governor-general was given the task of coordinating the different bodies fighting against the PKK guerrillas, the army, gendarmerie, police and village guards. He was equipped with a wide range of powers, including the forced evacuation of villages and pasturage where it was deemed necessary. By the end of 1989, the number of forcibly evacuated hamlets and villages had reached around 400 (McDowall, 2000: 426) and, as will be demonstrated below, many more followed the same in fate in the 1990s.

5.3 Gradual Democratisation Efforts and the Timid Politics of Recognition

After the referendum of 6 September 1987 on the question of whether to permit the old mainstream politicians/parties proscribed under the 1982 Constitution to take part in politics, which resulted in the restoration of the political rights of the veteran politicians, the transition to a more open and competitive political system had begun. The seasoned leaders Demirel, Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan and Türkeş, and the representatives of the bourgeoning working class movement outside of the Assembly, which culminated into 1989 “Spring Actions” partaken by around a million workers (Özuğurlu, 2006: 273), albeit for dissimilar ends, instigated a vociferous criticism of the aforementioned repression of wages, deterioration of income distribution and significant rise in corruption and embezzlement, all of which came to be considered a direct legacy of the Özal era (Öniş, 2004).

In response Özal reverted to the short-term ‘deceptive populist policies’ of his predecessors (Boratav, 2003:169) at a time when the economy was sluggish with very low growth rates:

\(^{251}\) The Decree 285 was published in Resmi Gazete on 14 July 1987, Issue no. 19517, and came into force on 19 July 1987.
the growth rates plummeted from 4.6 per cent between 1981-85 (Hansen, 1991:390) to 2.1 per cent in 1989 (Yeldan, 2006: 49). After 1987, public sector wages, salaries, and agricultural incomes saw an increase (ibid.: 49-50). Real wages ‘almost doubled from their decade-low point in 1987 until 1990’ (Pamuk, 2008: 289). In addition, as result of the scheme of high support prices for agricultural producers Özal poured around $2 billion into the countryside (Waldner, 1995: 39). Such policies sharply increased the budget deficit from 10.1 per cent of GDP in 1990 to 12.1 per cent in 1993 and also renewed inflation, which jumped from 30 per cent in 1983 to 60 per cent in the years 1989-93 (Yeldan, 2006: 50). In 1989, partially to help finance the deficit and in part to attract short-term capital inflows or hot money, Özal fully liberalised the capital account and eradicated the obstacles to international capital inflows, which made the Turkish economy extremely vulnerable to sudden outflows of international capital and external shocks in the 1990s (Pamuk, 2008: 289).

From 1989 onwards, the ANAP government in unison with President Özal embarked on further constitutional reforms. In April 1989, a number of amendments were announced, the most crucial being a decrease (from 15 days to 24 hours) in the length of time individuals could remain in police custody without being charged. A year later, Özal gave hints of a new Kurdish policy at the meeting of the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği, TÜSİAD), which perhaps is indicative of the existing dissatisfaction and the influence TÜSİAD wielded over the Kurdish issue. In this meeting he made public that the government was ‘engaged in a quest for a serious model for solving the Kurdish problem in a manner that goes beyong the police measures’ (Gunter, 2011:88). In early 1991, the cabinet introduced a package of constitutional restructurings which in part dealt with the political system (direct presidential elections, lowering the voting age to 18, enlargement of the Assembly), but partly dealt with human rights (Zürcher, 1994: 305).
Pursuant to this, at the government’s requests, the Turkish Assembly revoked the 1983 ban on speaking Kurdish in public and annulled Articles 141, 142 and 163, which proscribed politics on the basis of class and/or religion as proscribed by the Penal Code. The latter amendment led to, among other things, the repealing of the ban on the DİSK trade union confederation after 11 years. The reforms undertaken in 1991 constituted a quintessential example of the inextricable link the Kurdish question has to the democratisation of Turkey. Demirel, who became Prime Minister in the 1991 elections, extended the liberal dispensations in relation to the Kurdish issue of Turkey, as in a historic speech in Diyarbakır he declared that Turkey recognised ‘the Kurdish reality’. In the meantime, President Özal was trying to sway the opinion of the bureaucrats and the public alike to support a PKK amnesty (Yeğen, 2011: 74). Overall, the early 1990s led to the abandonment of the hitherto dominant state discourse that the Kurdish question was devoid of an ethnic dimension. The causality for the shift in the Turkish state’s perception of the Kurdish issue and its methods of engaging with the question should be sought in the increasing discontent of the Turkish and Kurdish masses with the conventional nationalist arguments employed by the successive governments owing to damaging consequences of the clashes between the PKK and the armed forces. By the early 1990s, the militarised conflict not only attained a serious dimension as it claimed around 2,500 lives, but it also made it extremely difficult for the state to cling to denial politics in relations to the Kurdish identity.

The first major blow to the orthodox Kemalist position came with the 1991 election results, which relayed the growing dissatisfaction of the masses in Turkey. In alliance with the SHP, the pro-Kurdish People’s HEP, founded in 1990, won 22 seats in Parliament. By 1990, a qualitative transformation had also taken place in the nature of the Kurdish discontent, as for first time since 1984, families of the PKK martyrs dared to collect the corpses for burial from the Turkish authorities and organised public funerals in which popular resentment against the
states’ Kurdish policy was exhibited. On 20 March 1990, 10,000 Kurds took to the streets in Cizre (Siirt) and the state imposed a curfew on 11 towns in Mardin and Siirt (McDowall, 2000: 427).

In sum, the modification in the Kurdish policy of the Turkish state was necessitated by the untenable nature of the Turkish nationalist dogmas on the Kurdish question. The politics of recognition was brief though, as after the early 1990s the Turkish state insisted on drawing the wrong conclusion from the right premises. In other words, the state acknowledged the existence of the Kurds, but reconceptualised the Kurdish question as a question of ‘separatist terror’.

The Politics of Oppression and the Fourth Wave of Kurdish Deportations

The Turkish state revisited the politics of coercion with regard to the Kurdish question between 1993 and 1999. Having recognised the ethnic dimension of the Kurdish issue the state now portrayed the conflict as an ethnic Kurdish rebellion with divisive aims that required military measures. As a result, during these years the Kurdish issue sunk increasingly into the grip of securitisation. A bloody and relentless war was waged against the PKK guerrillas and the public who were perceived to sympathise with them. According to Turkish official figures, out of 31,000 Turkish Security Forces, civilians and PKK guerrillas who lost their lives during the first period of conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state (1984-1999), 27,410 died between 1992 and 1999 (Sarıhan, 2013: 94).

Ostensibly as part of its bid to crush the PKK by routing its networks of support in the Kurdish countryside, the Turkish state forcibly evacuated more villages in ESA on a temporary and permanent basis. These deportations were outlined in a leaked February 1993 memo, which deals with the methods of solving the Kurdish issue, from President Özal to Prime Minister Demirel:
‘Starting with the most troubled zones, village and hamlets in the mountains of the region should be gradually evacuated…[and] resettled in the Western parts of the country according to a careful plan…Security forces should immediately move in and establish complete control in such areas…To prevent the locals’ from return[ing] to the region, the building of a large number of dams in appropriate places is an alternative’ (K. Yıldız, 2005: 79).

Analogous to the preceding three waves of deportations, the states alleged aim for mass forced evacuations – i.e. having overall control of ‘troubled zones’ – is only partially true because a closer inspection of the patterns of forced deportations or evacuation exhibits a multifarious collection of aims alongside confronting the PKK’s support base in the Kurdish countryside. As observed by Kerim Yıldız, the Executive Director of the London-based Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP) who has closely monitored the internal displacement policies of the Turkish states, ‘[v]illages and other settlements were routinely ‘cleansed’ of their civilian Kurdish inhabitants, often as a form of collective punishment for refusal to join the state-sponsored civilian militia, the Village Guard’ (K. Yıldız, 2005: 77). In 1995, the Turkish Human Rights Association (İnsan Hakları Derneği, İHD) published an important survey in relation to those displaced by these evictions. Overall, over 90 per cent of the evacuees confirmed they had come under direct pressure from the Turkish security forces to leave their homelands and 88.7 per cent believed they were targeted solely because they were Kurds (İHD, 1995).

The mass internal displacement or forced deportation policies, as openly stated by Özal in the memo quoted above, were implemented in accordance with the long-term and wider strategy of banishing the Kurds from their ancestral homelands by the construction of dams, which is an integral part of GAP. A fact-finding mission by KHRP and the University of

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252 KHRP is an independent human rights organisation founded in London in 1992. It has been involved in influential fact-finding missions as well as publishing extensively on the issue of forced internal displacement in Turkey, see: KHRP (1996, 2002 and 2004).
253 For an overview, monitoring and specific case studies, other than the ones listed above, of this scheme, see: Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Watch (1994).
Galway, Ireland, in August 2004 found that this project would displace many thousands of local people; the pending İlusu Dam project alone would have 78,000 individuals forcibly displaced (KHRP, 2005).

Moreover, the security forces aimed to change the social and economic fabric of the predominantly Kurdish ESA by blazing houses, pastures and forests, slaughtering livestock and denying the villagers the opportunity to recover their possessions (Göç-Der, 2004). Hence, the wealth and lands accumulated by the Kurds in these regions were directly targeted with tragic social and economic consequences. According to a report by the National Assembly, of 5,000 settlement units that existed prior to 1985, 3,848 were evacuated by 1999. It is estimated that around 3 million people were displaced during this period (K. Yıldız, 2005: 78). Disagreements exist with regard to the amount of those forcibly displaced, however, as the findings of a relatively recent research by the Hacettepe University, Ankara, suggest that between 950,000 and 1,200,000 were compulsorily deported (HÜNEE, 2006). Because of such discrepancies, it is reasonable to assume that at least 1 million people were unwillingly removed from their homelands.

Mass village evacuations were multi-faceted processes and involved more than the professed aim of combatting the PKK. They formed part of the Turkish states’ enduring desire to break up the Kurdish communities in the predominantly Kurdish ESA provinces and consolidate control in Kurdish heartlands. In addition, disseminating the Kurdish population would not only advance the longstanding goal of assimilating Kurds into the dominant Turkish culture and attenuating the Kurdish identity, but it would also exasperate calls for autonomy.

Political rights of the Kurdish citizens were systematically violated. Two pro-Kurdish parties, HEP and the Democratic Party (Demokrasi Partisi, DEP) were banned by the Supreme Court in 1993 and 1994. In the latter year, parliamentary immunity for eight Kurdish deputies was
revoked; four of whom, Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Doğan and Selim Sadak, were arrested and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. Other DEP leaders fled to Europe.

Another longstanding and preferred tool of assimilation employed by the Turkish state in the 1990s was state funded boarding schools in the predominantly Kurdish regions. As before, these schools were set up in overwhelmingly Kurdish regions with the purpose of educating Kurdish pupils away from their families and outside of their normal cultural contexts. According to the figures provided by the Ministry of National Education, of 299 boarding schools 155 are located in ESA provinces.

5.4 A New Phase in the Kurdish Questions Post-1999: The End of the First Period of Conflict

The late 1990s marked a shift in the Turkish state’s Kurdish policies. A policy of recognition and engagement was substituted for that of securitisation and suppression on account of four pivotal developments: a) the erosion of the hoary claims in relation to alleged separatist ideals of Kurds; b) the growing frustration of the important institutions and circles in Turkey with both the prevailing perception of the Kurdish question and the methods of dealing with the issue; c) the capture of the PKK leader Öcalan; and d) Turkey’s candidacy for European Union (EU) membership.

The 1990s were the most problematic period in the post-Second World War era for Turkey. Özal’s decision to fully liberalise the capital account and abolish the barriers in the way of international capital inflows in 1989 exposed the country to sudden outflows of capital and external shocks, which led to the crises of 1991, 1994, 1998 and 2000-1. Concurrently, public-sector deficits widened in the 1990s and it was a period of very high inflation – jumping to 100 per cent in 1994 and remaining above 50 per cent each year through to 2001 (Pamuk, 2008: 289-90). In spite of the GDP per capita continuing to rise during the era of economic liberalisation, it was still at a lower rate than the former period: GDP per capita in
the years 1980-2005 grew at a pace of 1.9 per cent whilst during 1950-80 it was 2.6 per cent (ibid.: 267).

There were two major factors for the persistence of public debt during the 1990s. The first of was the ‘deceptive populist policies’ implemented by Özal after 1987. The second was the costly war waged against the PKK on which the Turkish state spent some $2 billion per annum during 1984-1999 (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 168). In addition to the large fiscal burden of this conflict, the conventional methods of engaging with the Kurdish question were increasingly viewed as a barrier to Turkey flourishing economically and socially by the dominating classes in Turkey. Growing discomfort in Turkish business circles initiated gradual but adamant calls for alternative means of addressing the Kurdish question.

In 1995, the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, TOBB) published the results of a controversial survey\(^{254}\) prepared by Professor Doğu Ergil, a political science professor at Ankara University, which exposed three principal factors regarding the Kurdish issue that were hidden from the public view. First, 61 per cent of those polled favoured amelioration of the cultural, political and economic rights of the Kurds (Ergil, 2009: 52) and only 9.4 per cent preferred secession (ibid.: 54), thus falsifying the hitherto propagated assessment by the state officials that the conflict was motivated solely by secessionist or separatist objectives. Second, Kurdish identity was more widespread than the portrayal of the Turkish state officials, since 90.8 per cent of those surveyed identified themselves as Kurdish (ibid.: 38). Third, based on these and other findings, one important and uncomfortable conclusion of this survey was that the ‘PKK was not the cause, but a product of the Eastern Question’ (ibid.: 54). The publication of the

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\(^{254}\) The survey, entitled Doğu Sorunu: Teşhisler ve Tespitler, consisted of interviews with 1,256 people in three predominantly Kurdish Southeastern provinces (Batman, Diyarbakir and Mardin), and three provinces in various different of Turkey to which Kurds migrated (Adana, Antalya and Mersin). For the complete findings of this research, and other studies by Prof. Ergil on the Kurdish Question, see Ergil (2009).
findings and conclusions of this investigation caused uproar and a court case was filed against Prof. Ergil from which he was later acquitted.

TOBB’s research was followed by another contentious and influential report by TÜSİAD. In January 1997, TÜSİAD commissioned a report, authored by the prominent constitutional lawyer, Bülent Tanur. It called for an end to the NSC in its present form as well as suggesting the removal of all barriers on the Kurdish language, for freedom of Kurdish expression – including the freedom to form political parties that could represent Kurdish concerns – and for cultural freedom in relation to the naming of places and persons (TÜSİAD, 1997). TÜSİAD’ report indicated that the business circles in Turkey were growing ever more wary of the mechanisms employed to resolve the conflict and thus demanded an alternative, liberal approach to the Kurdish question, the foundations for which were provided by the capture of Öcalan and the decision from the EU Summit in Helsinki in 1999.

PKK leader Öcalan was apprehended in Kenya in February 1999 and was flown to Turkey to stand trial, where he was convicted of treason and sentenced to death on 29 June 1999. The capture of Öcalan brought, albeit temporarily, the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state to an end, since following his capture and imprisonment he declared a ceasefire, asked for the withdrawal of the PKK guerrillas from the bases in Turkey and reneged on the PKK’s initial objective of establishing an independent Kurdistan.

In December of the same year, the European Council (EC) declared Turkey a candidate for membership of the EU. This decision was conditional on Turkey making satisfactory progress with meeting the EU’s Copenhagen political criteria, which explicitly included: ‘the stability of institution guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’ (EC, Conclusions of the Presidency, Copenhagen, 1993: para. 7 A (iii)). The pressures and prospects of EU conditionality spurred the then existing coalition government – the constituent parties of which were Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol
Parti, DSP), NAP and ANAP – to implement immediate reforms in the field of minority rights. The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) that came to power in 2002, particularly, in its heyday of reforms from 2002 to 2004 continued these reforms.

On 3 October 2001, in accordance with the ‘National Programme for Adopting the Acquis Communautaire’255, the coalition government led by Ecevit adopted a series of thirty-four amendments to the 1982 Constitution, which removed prohibitions on the use of languages other than Turkish. These amendments paved the way for the AKP government to introduce a sequence of harmonisation laws implemented in order to align the legal situation in Turkey with those of the EU standards. Resultantly, numerous restrictions on freedom of expression and association, which were despised by Kurds, were abolished. New legislations implemented by the AKP permitted limited broadcasting in Kurdish in 2002 – the state-run television channel TRT began broadcasting in Kurdish for 30 minutes per week – and in 2004 allowed private schools to offer Kurdish language courses. Moreover, yet again following the previous coalition government, the AKP government completed the gradual lifting of OHAL in November 2002. Within the same year, the National Assembly abolished capital punishment, sparing the life of Öcalan in the process. All of these important steps raised hopes that the protracted and brutal conflict with the PKK might at last be entering a more peaceful and productive phase.

5.5 The Second Period of Conflict and the AKP’s Kurdish Overture

The hopes of a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish question in Turkey, however, came to an abrupt end in the first half of the 2000s. The proclamation of the hitherto de facto Kurdish

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255 Assistance for candidate countries is determined by the accession process and the need for candidate countries to harmonise with the EU. Their legislation needs to be aligned with the acquis communautaire, the substantial body of administrative, economic, environment and social EU law. The accession partnership has set out the road map for the alignment process and progress is monitored annual in the Regular Report which reviews the process chapter by chapter.
polity in Iraq (established in 1991) after the collapse of the Saddam regime by the US-led invasion of 2003, the cessation of the reforms pertaining to the Kurds in Turkey, and the PKK revoking the ceasefire observed since 1999 on grounds of ongoing state military operations against the guerrillas, were all influential in preventing a peaceful conclusion to this long-simmering question of Turkey. These successive events reignited the tinderbox of nationalism.

Akin to the Kurds across the border, it was argued that Kurds in Turkey are preoccupied with secessionist aims harboured by the US and the EU. In 2004, in response to European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso’s call ‘to ensure both cultural and political rights for the Kurdish people of Turkey’, General İlker Başbuğ, the then commander of Turkish Land Forces, claimed the following:

‘nobody can demand or expect Turkey to make collective arrangements for a certain ethnic group in the political arena, outside of the cultural arena, that would endanger the nation-state structure as well as the unitary state structure’ (Yeğen, 2011: 77).

Başbuğ’s statement in a sense signified the beginning of the end of the liberal overtures in relation to Kurds, as from 2004 up until late 2009, the politics of rapprochement and reform halted (Faucompret and Konings, 2009: 167-70; Bahcheli and Noel, 2011: 108-114). The politics of securitisation and discrimination was revisited.

One of the other influential reasons for the politics of reform losing ground is linked to the uncertainty concerning the EU’s effectiveness as an instigator of reforms with regard to the Kurdish question in the years after the formal accession process in 2005. The EU made an important positive start in 1998 by amenably naming the Kurdish issue and citing its resolution as a requirement to Turkey’s attainment of EU membership, as evinced in the European Commission’s 1998 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession:
'A civil, non-military solution must be found to the situation in south-eastern Turkey, particularly since many of the violations of civil and political rights observed in the country are connected to in one way or other with this issue’ (European Commission, Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, 1998: 53). As time wore on, however, references to Kurds in EU documentation have become increasingly more subdued, and the European Commission has promoted the expansion of individual rights rather than collective rights for the Kurds and abstained from promoting an explicit political solution for the Kurdish question. This becomes evident when we compare the European Commission’s analysis in relation to the Kurdish question cited above with those that are more recent. For example, in the 2005 Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, the European Commission shares the following oblique observations with regard to the Kurdish question: ‘Turkey continues to adopt a restrictive approach to minorities and cultural rights. Although there is a growing consensus on the need to address the economic, cultural and social development of the Southeast, little concrete progress has been made and the security situation has worsened’ (ibid., 2005: 42). A similar restrained tone and analysis is pursued in succeeding European Commission Reports (see ibid., 2006: 22-3; ibid., 2007: 23-4; ibid., 2008: 25-6 and ibid., 2009: 30-1). As noted by Nathalie Tocci, ‘EU actors have paid only sporadic attention to the Kurdish question’ and ‘have become far less outspoken on Kurdish collective and territorial rights’ (2006: 135). However, by far the most important illustration of Turkey’s shift in relation to the Kurdish question was the judgment that the foundation of a Kurdish political entity in the form of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq would incite the perceived secessionist desires of the Kurds in Turkey, as unequivocally argued by Başbuğ:
'the KRG] brought a political, legal, military and psychological power to the Kurds of the region…this situation may create a new model of belonging for a segment of our citizenry’. 256

In a similar vein, on 2 November 2008, the then Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdoğan, subsequent to refusing to shake the hands of elected deputies of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DPT), declared in the predominantly Kurdish province of Hakkari that those who opposed the motto ‘one nation, one flag, one motherland, one state’ should leave the country.257

This hostile outburst by Erdoğan did not repress long-held collective sentiments of the Kurds; if anything, it prompted Kurds in the ESA to support the pro-Kurdish DTP in the local elections of 29 March 2009 and contributed to AKP’s relatively poor performance among Kurdish electorates in the predominantly Kurdish regions. The victor in the ESA was by a clear margin the DTP, which increased its share of votes and attained a majority of the mayoralities in these regions, whilst AKP support decreased by more than 15 per cent. The haemorrhaging of Kurdish votes in the local elections automatically raised grave doubts concerning whether the AKP could retain its 2007 electorate support among the Kurdish voters in the general election of 2011.

Such fears of the AKP as well as the relentless misgivings and resistance of the Kurds against the revisited politics of securitisation in relation to the Kurdish question led the governing party to devise judiciously a Kurdish reform agenda around the notion of individual rights and general minority rights instead of Kurdish collective rights. In the summer of 2009, Prime Minister Erdoğan unveiled a ‘Kurdish Overture’, which later came to be retitled as the ‘Democratisation Overture’ and then redesignated as a ‘National Unity Project’, that heralded

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a new approach and process. At the time of writing this thesis, the full extent of this overture remains unclear and the process is still ongoing.

5.6 The Economic Balance Sheet of ESA in the Era of Neoliberal Capitalism

As the assessments in this study regarding the regional aspects of socio-economic development have thus far demonstrated, the predominantly Kurdish ESA have been the least developed regions of the Turkish Republic. Neoliberal policies implemented since 1980 have not been able to overcome the persistent and large regional inequalities between these two regions and the rest of the country, as ESA continued to be most disadvantaged areas of Turkey post-1980.

During 1993-2001, the average GNP per capita in these regions was about one-third of the country’s average (TESEV, 2006: 14). A relatively more comprehensive picture of regional disparities can be addressed by using the UNDP human development indicators of GDP per capita at PPP, life expectancy, adult literacy and combined school enrolment ratios for the year 2000, shown in Table 5.1. Out of the 20 least developed provinces, with exclusion of Yozgat and Gümüşhane, 18 were located in ESA. In other words, by 2000, unlike any other region of Turkey, 85 per cent of the ESA provinces constituted the most underdeveloped cities of Turkey. Resultantly, the two predominantly Kurdish regions were the only parts of the country which had an average HDI below that of Turkey’s average.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth (years)</th>
<th>Adult Literacy rate 14+ (%)</th>
<th>Combined first-second gross enrolment ratio (%)</th>
<th>Real GDP per capita (PPP$)</th>
<th>Human Development Index (HDI) value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Şırnak</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>1816</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muş</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>1587</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ağrı</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>1803</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitlis</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bingöl</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>2331</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakkari</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>2445</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>2447</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şanlıurfa</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>2847</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iğdır</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>2556</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siirt</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>3062</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardin</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>2519</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batman</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>3410</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kars</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>2882</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adıyaman</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>2736</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzincan</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>3348</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ardahan</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>2315</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>3178</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yozgat</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>2736</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbakır</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>3701</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gümüşhane</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>3263</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REGIONS**

- **Aegan-Marmara**
  - 70.4
  - 89.9
  - 92.2
  - 7820
  - 0.79

- **Mediterranean**
  - 65.8
  - 87.3
  - 84.1
  - 5545
  - 0.74

- **Central Anatolia**
  - 64.6
  - 87.4
  - 79.9
  - 5328
  - 0.72

- **Black Sea**
  - 65.9
  - 85.5
  - 83.2
  - 4940
  - 0.72

- **East-Southeast Anatolia**
  - 62.8
  - 73.8
  - 73.9
  - 3024
  - 0.64

**TURKEY**

- 65.8
- 83.5
- 82.2
- 5194
- 0.72

‘Emerging Euro Tiger’ and the Perseverance of Regional Disparities

Following the 2001 crisis Turkey enjoyed a period of rapid economic growth and increasing financial profits amidst the global upswing, which led the World Bank Country Director, Andrew Vorking, in 2005 to euphemistically declare the country as an ‘emerging Euro Tiger’. Turkey’s rise to ‘emerging Euro Tiger’ status has not narrowed the persistent regional inequalities in the country, however. In 2005, as in 1995, out of the 35 OECD member countries, Turkey had the highest Gini index of GDP per capita or, put differently, it displayed the greatest regional disparities in GDP per capita (OECD, 2009: 91).

Figure 5.1 Comparison of regional disparities in OECD countries (Gini Index for GDP per capita), 1995-2005

![Bar chart showing regional disparities in OECD countries (Gini Index for GDP per capita) from 1995 to 2005.]

Note: The Gini index looks at not only the regions with the highest and the lowest values but also at the differences among all regions. It ranges between 0 and 1; the higher the value, the larger the regional disparities.


Before analysing the regional socio-economic disparities in any further depth, a brief overview of the general economic development in the 2000s is apposite. On account of the 2000-1 crisis, Turkey for the 18th time sought the assistance of the IMF. In 2001, the DSP-NAP-ANAP coalition government invited Kemal Derviş to leave his post at the World Bank
and take up the job of Economy Minister. Under IMF supervision, Derviş developed a
programmed centred on fiscal discipline and large budget surpluses. The Turkish economy
has since witnessed a notable recovery. After falling by 9.5 per cent in 2001, Turkey’s GDP
increased by about 35 per cent during the next four years. By the end of 2005, annual
inflation fell to less than 8 per cent, a level not seen since 1960s (Pamuk, 2008: 291). Thus,
the recovery that began under the fragile coalition government, was continued by the single
party majority government of the AKP from late 2002 onwards, as can be deduced when the
figures tabulated below for the compound annual average growth rate of GDP in the years
2002-2011 (5%) are compared to that of years 1989-1995 (4%) and 1996-2001 (1%) (See,
Figure 5.2). Needless to say, the generally favourable international economic environment,
with low interest rates for developing countries, also helped.

**Figure 5.2 Compound annual average growth rate of GDP (%), 1970-2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Growth Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002-2011</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-2001</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-1995</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1988</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1979</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from World Bank, World Development Indicators: 2014a

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258 In Figure 5.2, the thesis employed compound annual average growth rate of GDP for the years 1970-2011 in
order to enable a comparative understanding of annual average growth rates before and during the neoliberal era
in Turkey. Moreover, the longitudinal data provided in this graph was preferred because it facilitates an
understanding of the growth performance of the Turkish economy at economic turning points such as the
structural adjustment programme 1980, the liberalisation of capital accounts in 1989, and the post-2001 crisis
restructuring.
Turkey’s public sector debt decreased from 74 per cent of GDP in 2001 to 38 of GDP in 2010. While the Turkish economy has been growing steadily, private debt and living standards have increased significantly: private sector debt increased from 15.1 per cent of GDP in 2001 to 47.1 per cent of GDP in 2010 (World Bank, World Development Indicators: 2014b). The GDP per capita increased from the level of US$ 5,952 in 2002 to US$ 7,834 in 2010 (see Figure 5.3).

**Figure 5.3 Turkey’s GDP per capita (Constant 2005 US$), 1970-2011**

It is worth noting that Turkey’s noteworthy economic performance in the 2000s was however, accompanied by a continuously mounting current account deficit (see Figure 5.4). As commented on by the OECD, Turkey’s account deficit in this period reached ‘unprecedented levels’: in 2010 the country’s deficit widened to just under 10 per cent of GDP (9.8 per cent), nearly 70 per cent more than what it had been in the 1990s (on average
3.10 per cent of GDP) (OECD, 2012: Figure 1.1). By 2012, Turkey had the world’s third-largest current account deficit.

Turkey's high deficit reflects structural issues related to the country’s heavy dependence on imported intermediate inputs and energy, which constitutes the bulk of the deficit, low saving rates, and trade composition (Clark et al., 2012). In particular, Turkish exports in textiles, steel, automotive and other manufactures, which fuelled the rise in exports from less than $3 billion in 1980 to $70 billion, or 20 per cent of GDP, by 2005 (Pamuk, 2008: 291), are heavily dependent on imported industrial inputs (USARM, 2009: 11-2). As a result, exports and imports tend to move hand in hand making it difficult for Turkey to rely on exports to lower its current account deficit.

**Figure 5.4 Turkey’s current account balance as % of GDP, 1980-2011**

![Graph showing Turkey’s current account balance as % of GDP, 1980-2011](image)


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259 Turkey’s oil import dependency rate rose from 84.8 per cent in 1990 to 93.3 per cent in 2012, and its natural gas import dependency rate increased from 93.9 per cent in 1990 to 98.6 per cent in 2012 (International Energy Agency (IEA), 2014: 447). Iran was the largest supply source of crude oil with 39% of the 2012 total, followed by Iraq (19%), Saudi Arabia (15%) and Russia (11%). In 2012, refined product imports came from Russia (19%), Italy (12%), Greece (9%) and India (8%) (ibid: 453). In 2012, ‘Russia was Turkey’s largest [natural gas] supplier, representing 58% of total imports followed by Iran (18%), Algeria (9%) and Azerbaijan (7%)’ (ibid: 459).

260 According to official figures, Turkey paid about $54 billion in 2011 and $55.9 billion dollars in 2013 for energy imports, thus 56 per cent of Turkey’s current account deficit in the latter year had stemmed from payments it made for energy imports (Hazar, 2013: 1). For an in-depth and longitudinal study of Turkey’s current account deficit and the importance of energy imports, see Bildirici and Kayıkcı (2012: 83-93).
Before considering other features of the Turkish economy, owing to the fact that energy imports constitute the greater part of the current account deficit of Turkey, it is apt to elaborate on Turkey’s energy woes. Energy-related issues have come to occupy increasingly the agenda of the Turkish Republic in the neoliberal phase of Turkish capitalism with the adoption of the export-oriented industrialisation strategy and the resultant ever-growing energy demands of Turkey\(^{261}\). So much so that, Turkey’s reapproachment with the KRG governing the hydrocarbon-rich Iraqi-Kurdistan\(^{262}\) – alongside the traditional Turkish foreign policy of expanding its regional political influence, and America’s encouragement of cordial relations between Turkey and Erbil – is based on Turkey’s large energy demands and its need for KRG’s hydrocarbon reserves (Charountaki, 2012: 194-202). In 2010, the then Prime Minster of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, validated this in a speech wherein he avowed that Turkey ‘will build a very solid bridge in bilateral relations between Iraq and Turkey and between the Kurdistan Region and Turkey especially. We [Erdoğan and the President of the KRG Masoud Barzani] will be in touch. The two countries also engage in economic cooperation. We will act together on energy and infrastructure’ (ibid.: 199). Turkey sees the KRG and Iraq as an important part of the solution to its energy woes. Ankara wants to decrease its dependence on Russian and Iran, long unreliable energy suppliers that the US and EU sanctions are making more so. Iraq and its Kurdistan region are one way out of the bind.

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\(^{261}\) Turkey’s oil demand rose from 447 thousand barrels per day (kb/d) in 1990 to 670 (kb/d) in 2012, and its natural gas demand increased from 3.468 cubic meter per year (mcm/y) in 1990 to 45.254 in 2012 (mcm/y) (IEA, 2014: 447).

\(^{262}\) With ‘23 rigs drilling exploration wells in mid-2012 (more than double the number from early-2011), the KRG area is now one of the most intensive areas for oil and gas exploration in the world, reflecting high expectations of significant discoveries in the heavily folded and faulted subsurface of the northern Zagros foldbelt. The regional government has awarded around 50 contracts with international companies to explore for and produce oil, and has stated its ambition to raise the region’s production to 1[million barrels per day] mb/d by 2015, based on existing discoveries, and to 2 mb/d by 2019, based on existing and expected discoveries.’ (IEA, 2012:60).
According to a 2012 IEA report, Iraq will play a pivotal role in world oil markets in the coming decades and could produce up to 8.3 million barrels a day in 2035, but only if ‘a resolution of differences over governance of the hydrocarbon sector…opens up the possibility for substantial growth also from the north of Iraq.’ (IEA, 2012: 83). The Maps of oil and gas infrastructures below not only exhibit the pivotal role of the ESA regions for meeting Turkey’s energy requirements they also reveal the importance of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline\textsuperscript{263} for satisfying this demand, which carries a total maximum annual capacity of 1.4 (mb/d) (IEA, 2014: 455).

\textsuperscript{263} Kirkuk-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline ‘runs from Kirkuk, Iraq, to the Ceyhan Oil Terminal on the Mediterranean Sea and has been active since 1976. A second pipeline parallel to the first was commissioned in 1987… In September 2012, Iraq and Turkey agreed to extend the carriage of Iraqi crude oil import through the pipeline by 15 years. In 2011, this pipeline brought 163.3 mb of crude oil from Iraq to Turkey.’ (IEA, 2014: 455).
Map 13
Oil Infrastructure of Turkey (Source: IEA, 2014: 449)

Map 14
Gas Infrastructure of Turkey (Source: IEA, 2014: 450)
As well as the current account deficit, unemployment remained high throughout the 2000s (Yeldan, 2009: 146-56). Unemployment in a country hailed as the ‘emerging Euro Tiger’ rose from 6.5 per cent in 2000 to 10.7 per cent by the end of 2010 (Eurostat, 2014). In 2010, Turkey’s employment rate was 46.3 per cent, much lower than the crises-ridden euro-area average of 64.1 per cent (ibid.). In addition, despite the rise in the GDP per capita witnessed in the 2000s, the major income gap between the poor and rich persisted.

The income of the richest 10 per cent of people in the mid-2000s was, on average across the OECD countries, nearly nine times of the poorest 10% (OECD, 2008: 3). In Turkey, the richest 10 per cent in the mid-2000s had incomes of more than 17 times those of the poorest 10 per cent, and, in Mexico, the ratio was 25:1 (ibid.). This trend appears to have continued in the latter part of the 2000s, since, according to the OECD data pertaining to the late-2000s, Turkey had the third highest Gini index for GDP per capita (see Table 5.2).
Table 5.2 Income inequality league from low to high inequality in OECD Countries, Late-2000s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gini Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As briefly raised above, previously existing socio-economic regional disparities persisted throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, as exhibited by the persistence of the long-standing large discrepancies between the predominantly Kurdish ESA provinces and the rest of the country. In May 2003, the SPO published the results of a study, entitled İllerin ve Bölgelerin Sosyo-Ekonomik Sıralaması Araştırması (Researching the Socio-Economic Development Ranking of Provinces and Regions), shedding more factual and detailed light on the enduring regional divergences in Turkey pre-and-post-2001 crisis.

In brief, this research, using the SPO’ Socio-Economic Development Index (SDI), ranked provinces and regions in accordance with their level of social and economic development from 1 to 5: ‘1st level developed provinces’ being the most developed and ‘5th level developed provinces’ being the least developed cities. The SDI is employed to measure the social and economic development level of provinces based upon 58 socio-economic variables, including employment, education, health, infrastructure, manufacturing and construction\textsuperscript{264}. Unlike any other region in Turkey, all of the provinces in ESA, with the exclusion of Malatya and Elazığ, were ranked as 4th or 5th level developed provinces (see Map 15). In parallel with the latest country report for Turkey prepared by UNDP quoted above, 17 (out of the total 21) provinces in ESA constituted the least developed domains in Turkey (SPO, 2003: 56).

With the country average at 0, the Marmara region at 1.7 was the most developed region. The Aegean and Central Anatolia region were the next developed regions at 0.48, followed by the Mediterranean region at 0.02. The Black Sea region was just below the national average at -0.51, while Southeastern Anatolia and Eastern Anatolian regions fell far below the Turkey’s average at -1.01 and -1.16 respectively (SPO, 2003: 78). Moreover, as pointed out by the SPO, when the findings of this study are compared with that of 1996, it becomes apparent

\textsuperscript{264} For a full list of the variables, see: SPO (2003: 45).
that virtually nothing had changed regarding the socio-economic levels or rankings of the seven main regions in Turkey, as displayed in Table 5.3. Thus at the peak of the armed conflict in 1996 and four years into the ceasefire in 2003, the predominantly Kurdish ESA could not rid itself from the shackles of being of the most underdeveloped regions of the country.

Table 5.3 Socio-economic development index, 1996 and 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1996 SDI Index</th>
<th>2003 SDI Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marmara</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegean</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Anatolia</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Region</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea Region</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeastern Anatolia</td>
<td>-1.03</td>
<td>-1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Anatolia</td>
<td>-1.13</td>
<td>-1.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Map 15
Categorisation of Provinces According to the Socio-Economic Development Index
Between 2001 and 2010, TÜİK, without any explanation, ceased to produce statistics pertaining to the regional distribution of the national income, thus the actual magnitude of spatial income disparities in the 2000s was not made public. In January 2010, however, it gave an end to this practice by only publishing the national income data for 2004-06. The long awaited figures revealed that: a) the national income share of the ESA regions which host 15 per cent of the total population of Turkey, typically decreased, and b) the ESA had the lowest average per capita income in the country.

During the era of economic liberalisation in Turkey, analogous to the preceding ISI period, the predominantly Kurdish ESA witnessed an incessant decrease in their fraction of national income. In 1979, these regions accounted for 8.2 per cent of the national income, in 2001, this figure fell to 7.7 per cent, and by 2004-06, it further reduced to 6.9 per cent (Sönmez, 2012: 122). Consequently, by 2006, the national income share of the 21 provinces located in this part of Turkey was less than half of their share of the total population. It is worth noting that this was at a time when Turkey’s national income recorded a swift and remarkable growth from $181 billion in 2002 to $400 billion dollars in 2006 (USARM, 2009: 13).

The ESA regions had the lowest per capita income in the country, as the average income in these regions was around 54 per cent less than Turkey’s average and, more strikingly, approximately 70 per cent less than that of Istanbul’s (see Table 5.4) (Sönmez, 2012: 123). It would be fair to say that neither the cessation of the militarised conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state between 1999 and 2004 nor the significant economic growth of the ‘emerging Tiger’ post-2001 crisis were efficiently utilised to remedy the economic underdevelopment of the ESA. Resultantly, Turkey could not shake off the notoriety of being the OECD member state with the highest level of regional income disparities in the mid-2000s (see Figure 5.1.)
Table 5.4 Average per capita income, 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Average Income (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>10.352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeastern and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Anatolia</td>
<td>3.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>6.684</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Another indicator of the increasing poverty in the predominantly Kurdish provinces in the ESA, and the persistence of the regional income variations between the regions and the rest of the country, is the comparatively high rate of Green Card holders in these areas in the late-2000s. The Green Card (Yeşil Kart) Programme, initially set up in 1992 and replaced in 2011 with a General Health Insurance System, was a non-contributory health programme that ensured the provision of health services to individuals whose family earned less than 1/3 of the minimum wage. In 2008, according to the data obtained by the USARM from the Health Ministry, the total number of Green Card holders in Turkey was 9,362,249, just under half of whom (4,290,996) lived in the ESA. While in the 21 ESA provinces Green Card holders accounted for 38.4 per cent of the regional population, in the remaining 60 provinces this figure was 8.5 per cent, as demonstrated in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5 Green Card Holders in Turkey, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Green Card Holders</th>
<th>Average Green Card Holders %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 Southeastern and</td>
<td>11 186 951</td>
<td>4 290 996</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Anatolia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 Provinces</td>
<td>59 399 305</td>
<td>5 071 253</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>70 586 256</td>
<td>9 362 249</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Health figures cited in USARM, 2009: 27.

The massive underdevelopment of ESA and the consequential persistence of regional disparities between these regions and the rest of the country are inextricably linked to three
principal factors. First, the regression of agriculture in the predominantly agrarian ESA regions emanating from the negative repercussions of the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state as well as the economic liberalisation policies implemented after 1980. Second, the derisory and relatively low level of public and private investments in ESA, which is nowhere near enough to counterbalance the long-standing underdevelopment and/or to minimise the destruction of the war in these domains. The third factor is the top-down developmentalist policies and vision of the Turkish state in relation to these regions that has thus far resulted in it paying minimal attention to the actual and urgent needs of the local populace in ESA.

**Armed Conflict and Economic Liberalisation: Stunted Development**

As discussed extensively in the preceding chapters, owing to the relatively low level of industrialisation in ESA during the years after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, these regions were heavily dependent on agriculture. For instance, by 1988, according to a survey by the SPO, there were only 41,411 workers in all of the manufacturing establishments in the two regions. Of these, 30,777 (74.32 per cent) were in public manufacturing enterprises and only 10,634 (25.68 per cent) in private establishments (Kutbay & Çınar, 1989: Table 5).

It is apt to point out here that the above cited workforce figures collated by the SPO, albeit demonstrating the very low level of industrialisation in ESA, does not account for informal employment in ESA, making it extremely difficult to ascertain the precise extent of employment in the non-agricultural sectors in these domains. This statistical lacuna was not unique to ESA: TÜİK in the 1988 Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS) officially articulated the informal sector concept for the first time, and, as elaborated below, it was only after 2001 that TÜİK defined and researched the informal sector in line with the internationally recognised standards (Bulutay and Taş, 2004: 6-7; Kan and Tansel, 2014: 2-
Thus, up until the 2000s, data limitations and heterogeneity have constituted major barriers to measuring informality (TÜSİAD, 2006: 44-53).

Keith Hart (1973) coined the term informal sector to designate self-employment, casual labour and small enterprise activities of the reserve army of urban unemployed and underemployed. The maiden internationally agreed definition was adopted at the 15th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) in 1993. According to this definition, the informal sector denotes employment and production that take place in unincorporated small or unregistered enterprises (e.g. less than five employees) (International Labour Organisation (ILO), 1993). In the ensuing years, this enterprise-based definition was criticised for failing to capture the increasing variety of informal employment forms, in particular marginal micro-scale informal activities, which are often unreported by individuals (Hussmans, 2005). Resultantly, in 2003, a broader informality specification relating to an employment-based concept, namely, informal employment, was adopted at the 17th ICLS. Informal employment referred to all employment arrangements that leave individuals without social protection through their work, whether or not the economic units they operate or work for are formal enterprises, informal enterprises or households (ILO, 2003). This study concurs with this broader definition and hence employs the notion of informality to refer to ‘all forms of... employment without contracts (i.e. covered by labour legislation), worker benefits or social protection – both inside and outside informal enterprises.’ (Chen, 2005: 7).

In Turkey, although informality has been an issue for a long time, the size of the informal economy has grown rapidly since the 1980s. The development paradigm centred on a state-led import substitution regime had reached its limits by the 1970s and was unable to engender sufficient regular employment (Pamuk, 2003). Additionally, the 1980 coup d’état dramatically shifted the balance between employers and employees (Öngen, 2003). Real wages declined by 40 per cent between 1980 and 1988 period (Özar & Ercan, 2004). As the
The economy was liberalised under a series of structural adjustment programs, employers were able to informalise employment relations furthermore (Boratav et al 2000; Erkan, 2004). From 1990 to 2003, the share of informal employment in non-agricultural employment increased from 25 per cent to 31.5 per cent, accounting for 47 per cent of job growth outside of agriculture (Erdem, 2004: 104). Informality is particularly widespread in small enterprises with low productivity and unqualified labour, but larger enterprises also engage in underreporting in order to save on labour costs and to avoid taxes and regulatory responsibilities (Peker, 1996).

Data on the unincorporated and tax related characters of the informal sector are not included in any of the HLFS’s in Turkey in the years prior to 2000 (Bulutay, 2004: 7). Relatedly, based on the findings of the HLFS’s in Turkey after 2000 – which are employed by ILO on informality – we are able to attain an approximate picture of this phenomenon. Based on the HLFS’s for the years 2002-09, informal employment in Turkey is discerned to account ‘for a little bit more than 50% of total employment during the years 2002-2005 and it went down to less than 50% in the period 2006-2009’ (ILO, 2010: 9). During the years 2000-09, informality in the agricultural sector was around 90 per cent, while informal employment labour in the non-agricultural sector was around 30 per cent (ibid). These figures exhibit clearly the prevalence and persistence of the informal sector not only in Turkey, but also, more importantly for the purposes of this research, they highlight the importance of informality for the predominantly agrarian economy of the ESA regions.

The climate of violence, mass evacuations of villages and hamlets in ESA coupled with the aforementioned unfavourable conditions for the agricultural sector in Turkey in the neoliberal era – i.e. repression of agricultural incomes, decrease in agricultural subsidies and the sectoral terms of trade turning against agriculture – had detrimental results for the cultivation of crops.

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265 The 2009 HLFS in Turkey is employed in one most the most detailed studies on informality in 47 countries, see: ILO and WIEGO (2013).
and raising of livestock in these predominantly agrarian regions. In the first half of the twentieth century, agriculture accounted for just over 80 per cent of employment and more than 50 per cent of the GDP in Turkey; in the early-2000s this stood at 35 per cent and 10 per cent respectively (Pamuk, 2008: 292). More specifically, in 1970, stock rearing, the single most important activity in ESA, accounted for 12.3 per cent of Turkey’s GNP, whilst in 1997 it had dwindled to 2.2 per cent (McDowall, 2000: 448). Alongside the neglect of the agricultural sector by the successive governments of the 1980s and the 1990s, village evictions and the prohibitions on grazing in the summer pastures in the ESA, particularly in the 1990s, played a decisive role in the sharp decline of agricultural output in these regions. In 1994 alone, the agricultural loss of ESA, on account of the escalating violence, the mass evacuations of villages and hamlets, was estimated to be $350 million. In the province of Diyarbakir it was estimated that livestock numbers were reduced by 50 per cent, stock rearing by 30 per cent and forested area by 60 per cent (ibid.: 440). In the 1990s, the contributions of the 21 ESA provinces to the national GDP continued to fall. In 1991, these areas accounted for around 6.40 per cent of Turkey’s GDP and in 1995; this figure fell to 5.70 per cent, whilst by 2000 it dwindled to approximately 5.50 per cent (USARM, 2009: 18). Thus, the contributions of the two regions to the country’s GDP diminished from 8.54 per cent at the dawn of the neoliberal era in Turkey in 1979 to 5.50 per cent two decades later. By the beginning of the twenty first century ESA, which accounted for 15 per cent of Turkey’s population, contributed less than 6 per cent to the country’s GDP. According to the findings of a report published by the pro-Islamist Fazilet Party (Virtue Party) in June 1999, the armed conflict combined with the austerity policies of the consecutive governments after 1980 severely decreased the average income in ESA: ‘in western regions of Turkey the per capita income is $4,000-$5,000, while in the east and south
east it is only $600-$900. 266 Concomitant to the relatively low level of income, individuals in the Eastern and Southeastern provinces have very low levels of savings and credit use. In 2000, average per capita bank deposits in Turkey were around TRL 266 200 (million), in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia it was approximately TRL 70 (million). Likewise, in the same year, average per capita bank credits in the country were about TL 400 (million), while in the South-East it stood at TL 120 (million) (TESEV, 2006: 46).

The remarkable economic growth witnessed in the post-2001 crisis years does not appear to have triggered an increase in personal savings and the availability of bank credit in these regions. In 2005, according to the figures of The Association of Banks of Turkey (Türkiye Bankalar Birliği, TBB), bank loans provided to individuals and enterprises in ESA constituted a mere 3.1 per cent of the total bank loans in Turkey, and per capita bank deposits in all 21 provinces in this quarter of Anatolia was far below the national average of TRY 3207 (Sönmez, 2012: 219). Although the volume of both deposits and credit are in ESA compared to the rest of Turkey (see Table 5.6), the ratio of credit to deposit in certain provinces in these regions, such as Tunceli and Elazığ, is higher than the national average, which is an indication of a higher level of indebtedness in these areas.

266 Turkish Daily News, 4/06/1999.
267 The Old Turkish Lira (TRL) was replaced with the New Turkish Lira (TRY) on 1 January, 2005. One TRY is equivalent to 1000000 TRL.
**Table 5.6 Bank Deposits and Credits, 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>per capita Bank Deposits (YTL)</th>
<th>per capita Bank Credits (YTL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adıyaman</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ağrı</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bingöl</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitlis</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbakır</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elazığ</td>
<td>1.106</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzincan</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakkari</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kars</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malatya</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardin</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muş</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siirt</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunceli</td>
<td>1.485</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şanlıurfa</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TURKEY</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,207</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,751</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Paltry Public and Private Investments**

The insufficient and relatively low public and private investment in ESA, far from minimising the negative repercussions of the armed conflict and the austerity measures of the IMF-inspired economic programmes, played a pivotal role in the persistence of the longstanding large socio-economic disparities between the these regions and the rest of country in the neoliberal era. In spite of the continuance of the state-sanctioned incentive scheme of Priority Development Regions (PDRs) Programmes introduced in 1968, discussed in Chapter 4, private investment in the predominantly Kurdish ESA provinces remained trivial in the years of high levels of armed conflict (1992-99) as well as in the period of relative tranquillity (1999-2004). In the years 1995-2004, ESA had the lowest and third bottommost average proportions of subsidised investments respectively, as displayed in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7 The regional breakdowns of subsidised investments in Turkey, 1995-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Average Shares of Subsidised Investment %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marmara</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Anatolia</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegean</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeastern Anatolia</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Anatolia</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiregional</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TESEV, 2006: 45.

On 29 January 2004, Law 5068 was approved in order to augment private investment by offering additional financial incentives to employers and investors. The AKP governments aim to bolster investment from the private sector through a wide range of incentives, which included, among other things, investment credits, tax relief, postponement of the Value Added Tax (VAT) and assistance with energy-related issues, appears to have primarily benefited the parts of the country that are more industrialised and better equipped with infrastructure facilities. In 2006, only 5.78 per cent of the subsidised investments went to ESA regions, and more strikingly, the combined subsidised investment in the years 2002-06 for the 21 ESA provinces was lower than that of the province of Bursa. Bursa’s share of subsidised investment in 2002-2006 stood at 4.45 per cent whilst the combined shares of the cities in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia were 4.44 per cent (USARM, 2009: 35-6).

An important research commissioned by TESEV-UNDP- The Open Society Foundation (OSIAF) in the early 2000s explored, among other things, the reasons as to why entrepreneurs in Turkey were historically reluctant to invest in these regions. They found that along with the armed conflict, the inadequate public sector investment in the South-East played a decisive role in dissuading representatives of the private sector to invest in these regions. Members of TOBB who partook in this study stated that their enduring hesitance to
invest in ESA was ‘in part due to the security reasons’ and partly because of ‘problems pertaining to the recruitment of a well-equipped labour force as well as the lack of sufficient infrastructure in these regions’ emanating from years of scarce state investment. Without the removal of these substantial obstacles, business executives argued that state-induced incentives would play a ‘minimal role’ in enthusing private sector investment in these lagging regions (TESEV, 2006: 19).

Indeed, public investments, or lack of them, have been a major problem in ESA, more noticeably in the 1990s. From 1990 to 2001, ESA received on average TRL 3000 million public investment per capita, while the remaining five regions of Turkey attained TRL 8000 million public investment per capita (ibid.: 28). Similarly, in the years 2002-2007, the halcyon days of the Turkish economy following the 2001 crisis and prior to the global crisis of 2008 under the stewardship of AKP, the total amount of government expenditure in the ESA regions ranked the lowest among all seven regions of Turkey (see Table 5.9). In addition, unlike the other region that performed below Turkey’s average in SPO’ Socio-Economic Development Index (i.e. the Black Sea region), in ESA public expenditure per person was below the national average, as demonstrated by Table 5.9. In other words, with the exception of these predominantly Kurdish regions, other lagging regions received preferential treatment in the sphere of public investment, so much so that the Black Sea region had the second highest per capita public investment in the country (see Table 5.9).
Table 5.8 Regional comparisons of public investments per capita, 2002-2007 (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Anatolia</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marmara</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Anatolia</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegean</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeastern Anatolia</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In terms of the sectoral distribution of the public investment in these regions, we see that very little has changed from the ISI period. State expenditure in these regions continues to be driven by exogenous factors, and minimal financial attention is imputed to the exigent local needs of the populace in the ESA provinces. From 2002 to 2007, the biggest beneficiary of public investments in ESA was the energy sector (see Table 5.10), which, on account of the lack of industrialisation in these regions and the low level of employment opportunities generated, has nominal value or use to these regions. In 2006, 69 per cent of the electricity generated in ESA was used outside of these regions, yet, only 17 per cent of this energy was locally consumed (USARM, 2009: 43).
Table 5.9 Sectoral distribution of public investment in ESA, 2002-2007 (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In spite of the infrastructural deficiencies in ESA, which prevent the local population enjoying the necessities of modern day life and hinder private sector investment in these regions, only 8 per cent of the state expenditure in these regions was spent on communication. In addition, the total public expenditure on health and education (28 per cent) in these regions was not substantially different to that of the combined investments in the energy and mining sectors (22 per cent), which to an extent explains the reason behind the large and persistent socio-economic disparities between ESA and the rest of the country.

The lack of attention to the local needs of these regions is by no means unique to the above covered five years, because state planning and investments in these regions in the neoliberal era, parallel to previous periods in Turkey, have largely been in disregard of the socio-economic needs and demands of the their people. The two operational codes of the state programmes and funds in these regions have thus far been political control as well as orientation towards meeting the requirements of the economic demands of the rest of Turkey, particularly the ever-growing energy needs of the country. Both of these conventional facets of the Turkish state policy in the predominantly Kurdish and naturally rich ESA are
embedded in the socio-economic engineering project born at around the same time as the arrival of neo-liberal policies in Turkey: GAP.

**GAP: A Paradigmatic case of Developmentalism from Above**

GAP at present comprises of 13 massive irrigation and energy projects and 22 dams including the Atatürk Dam, the sixth largest of its kind in the world. It covers an area of about 75,358 square kilometers, which represents 9.7 per cent of the total area of Turkey, spread over nine Southeastern provinces: Adıyaman, Batman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, Şırnak. The GAP region’ total population is around 6.1 million, which constitutes just under 10 per cent of the total population.

The origins of the GAP go back to a plan of the Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (Devlet Su İşleri-DSI) on hydraulic energy and irrigation, which was prepared in 1977. By the second half of the 1980s, the Kurdish insurgency, as well as the increasing regional disparities between the South-East and the rest of Turkey, shifted the emphasis of the GAP to ‘integrated regional development’ that aimed not only to efficiently utilise the water and energy resources, but also to address the socio-economic underdevelopment and poverty in this region. A new plan, the GAP Master Plan (1989), was prepared and a bureaucratic reorganisation was decreed which resulted in the establishment of the GAP Regional Development Administration (GAP-RDA). The GAP-RDA defined the objectives of GAP as: a) generation of hydroelectric power; b) developing regional agriculture through irrigation; c) development of a regional agro-industrial base; and d) providing better social services, education and employment to control migration and attract qualified individuals to the area (GAP, Master Plan, 1990).

The low financial realisation (40%) and the limited economic impact of the GAP led to the 1998 decision of the Council of Ministers to revise the Master Plan. GAP-RDA was assigned with the task and to ensure its completion by latest 2010. Accordingly, a new regional
development plan was devised in co-operation with the UNDP. This novel plan incorporated the newly adopted principle of sustainable human development and resultantly pursued the following aims: a) social sustainability and the development of social services; b) optimum and sustainable utilisation of natural resources; c) human settlements; d) agricultural sustainability and development of agricultural productivity; and e) local entrepreneurship and industrial development for economic viability.\textsuperscript{268}

Owing to limited success in meeting these set targets, the completion date of the GAP has constantly been revised. The current set date for completion, according to the present GAP Administrator Chairman, Sadrettin Karahocagil, ‘of all main and sub-projects is the end of 2017’.\textsuperscript{269} One of the factors, if not the main factor, for its continual postponement is the limited success in attaining the set objectives in areas other than the energy projects. That is to say, even after the systematic shift within GAP from dam-building or hydroelectric production project to a multi-sectoral and sustainable socio-economic regional development program, the overriding concern has been electricity production. The ‘hydro-imperative’ aspect (Kolars, 1986), as well as the enduring aim of controlling Kurdish heartlands, has thus far largely ignored the long-term and most beneficial facets crucial for the development of the South-East: irrigation; agricultural training; crop breeding; industrial development; education; and improving health services.

By the end of 2006, nearly two decades after the commencement of GAP, only 14 per cent of the projected irrigation investments materialised, while 74 per cent of the planned hydroelectric energy investments were realised. Eight hydroelectric power stations were in operation – in 2006, the GAP accounted for 48.5 per cent of Turkey’s total hydroelectric electricity production (USARM, 2009: 42). As of 2007, the monetary value of the energy obtained from the GAP region, $17.9 billion, was near equivalent to public investments made

\textsuperscript{268} For detailed and differing analyses of the evolution and objectives of GAP, see: Kolars (1986); Mutlu (1996); Unver (1997) and Çarkoğlu and Mine (2005).

\textsuperscript{269} Today’s Zaman, 17/09/2013.
for the project up until that point, $18.9 billion. The great majority of the electricity generated in the Southeast was, however, consumed outside of this region: in the mid-2000s, in spite of electricity consumption per capita in Turkey being 202 kilowatt-hour (kWh), electricity usage per capita in the GAP region was 78 kWh (ibid.: 66).

The large and persistent socio-economic disparities, as exhibit above by the UNDP HDI of 2000 as well as the SDI of the SPO in 1996 and 2003, confirm that GAP project objectives concerning sustainable regional development and minimising regional discrepancies between the ESA and the rest of the Turkey have largely stayed on paper. Likewise, there is a gap between the Turkish state’s alleged aims of minimising migration and promoting human settlements in the region and what it applies on the ground in the Euphrates-Tigris basin.

As briefly alluded to above, the construction of dams as part of GAP – Keban (1974), Ataturk (1992), Birecik (2000) and the pending Ilisu Dam – have resulted in the forced displacement of people and evacuation of villages in ESA, augmenting the total number of forced migrations from the South-East. Estimates in relation to the number of Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) arising from the construction of the dams vary. The number of IDPs was 197,732, according to the DSI in 1999. Other sources do not authenticate official Turkish sources with regard to the number of deportations. Based on a report from a fact-finding mission in Southeastern Anatolia, The Corner House in the UK in the year 2000 claimed that the forced migrants ranged from between 150,000 to 200,000 people (The Corner House, 2000). Comparatively, in 2004, individual resources reported that around 350,000 people had been displaced by the GAP project (Morvaridi, 2004: 729). Based on the different estimates, it is safe to suggest that the IDPs produced by GAP range from between 200,000 to 350,000 people, which raises the total number of forced deportations in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries from ESA to around 1.5 million.
In light of the disclosure of the memorandum in 1993 from the then President, Özal, to Demirel, then the Prime Minister, advocating the construction of large dams in order to prevent the return of the local deportees back to the South-East, dam-related forced displacements have naturally raised major doubts regarding the actual purpose of GAP from the local population. In 1998, according to a poll conducted by the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları, TMMOB), only 42 per cent of the local population perceived GAP as a development project, and a mere 11 per cent had either short or long term expectations of GAP (McDowall, 2000: 448).

Other factors fuelling the suspicions of the largely Kurdish population in the South-East with regard to GAP are closely associated with the shortcomings of the 28 sub-projects launched in the third or sustainable development phase of GAP\textsuperscript{270}, like the Multi-Purpose Community Centers (Çok Amaçlı Toplum Merkezleri, ÇATOM)\textsuperscript{271} and the GAP Entrepreneur Support and Guidance Centres (GAP-Girişimci Destekleme Merkezi, GAP-GIDEM)\textsuperscript{272}. By 2004, eight years after the inauguration of GAP-UNDP sustainable development programme, only 1.3 million dollars of the 5.2 million dollars raised for this programme had been spent on the 28 sub-projects. This low level of investment is not only indicative of the limitations of transforming GAP into a sustainable development project, but also lays bare the rationale for the Turkish state pursuing the fashionable sustainable development strategy advocated by prominent international developments agencies: to raise funds from a wide range of international institutions like the UNDP, UNICEF and the EU. In addition, the local inhabitants have also questioned the motives of the some sub-projects such as the ÇATOM.

The perception of some of ÇATOM’s services – like the birth control training as an effort to

\textsuperscript{270} For a full list of these mentioned projects, see GAP (1997).
\textsuperscript{271} ÇATOM started in 1995 and aimed to ensure the participation of women in the following services: literacy courses in Turkish, health education, housekeeping courses, maternal education, knitting and weaving courses and poly-clinical services.
\textsuperscript{272} GAP-GIDEM was founded in 1996 and is financed by EU grants aimed at providing consultancy services to businesses and promotion of private sector investments in the GAP region.
‘contain’ the rise of the Kurdish population or the literacy courses in Turkish as an assimilation strategy (Çarkoğlu & Eder, 2005: 179) – is symptomatic of both the local populaces’ estrangement from GAP and the immense influence the Kurdish question has over GAP.

Another issue closely connected with Turkey’s Kurdish question as well as the socio-economic development of the South-East, which to date has largely been ignored by GAP, is the unequal distribution of land ownership and the consequential perseverance of the traditional relations of production and social structure in the GAP region. Contrary to the avowed ‘urgent’ need of land reform in the GAP Master Plan (GAP, 1990: 23), the traditional land tenure system as well as the disproportionate power of the co-opted Kurdish landed elite in the Southeastern Anatolia region remained untouched by successive governments responsible for implementing GAP.

In 1990, within the GAP Region 8 per cent of farming families owned over 50 per cent of all land, while 41 per cent held between 10 and 50 dönüms and another 38 per cent held no land at all. Of the large landowning families, significant portions were absentee, content to allow ineffective farming with the proviso that they attain a satisfactory income from their lands (McDowall, 2000:434). Relatedly, without a land reform it was implausible that the majority of agrarian population could benefit from GAP. The unequal distribution of land ownership system inherited from the late-Ottoman period and tenaciously preserved ever since the single party period remained devoid of a fundamental reform, nonetheless.

According to the latest Agricultural Census of 2001, in the Southeastern Anatolian region there is in total 264.361 agricultural enterprises. Of these, 2.7 per cent are large-sized enterprises (i.e. farms over 500 hectares), owned by the wealthy landowning families, account for 33.2 per cent off all land, while 56 per cent are small-sized enterprises (i.e.

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273 According to official statistics pertaining to the mid-1990s, average fertility in the East and Southeast is 4.37 per cent, while this figure is 2.65 in other regions of Turkey. Relatedly, almost 35 per cent of the whole in these regions is under 15 years of age (GAP, 1998).
holdings less than 50 hectares) and they only account for 9.7 per cent of all land. In
Diyarbakir, more strikingly, 3.3 per cent of the large-sized enterprises owned by the
traditional landowning class, account for 41.2 per cent of all land in the province. And in
Şanlıurfa 1.5 per cent of the large-sized enterprises controlled by the wealthy landowning
class, accounted for 28.7 per cent of all land (USARM, 2009: 33).
Despite such inequalities in land ownership, the issue of land reform went unmentioned in the
latest GAP Action Plan (2008-2012) launched by the then Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdoğan,
in Diyarbakir in 2008 in order to ‘complete’ GAP (GAP, Eylem Planı, 2008). As a result of
which, Erdogan, like his predecessors, indirectly assured the pro-government Kurdish landed
elite that their wealth, and the immense political power yielding from it, will be conserved.
Thus, yet again, the long-simmering issue of land reform, like other exigent prerequisites for
the development of the region, has been substituted for political concerns of the ruling
classes, in this context, the maintenance of the convenient alliance between the co-opted
Kurdish landowning class and the governors.

Pursuing the goal of electoral gains as well as controlling Kurdish heartlands through the co-
opted propertied Kurdish elite perpetuates the status quo, which hampers the necessary socio-
economic transformation and development of ESA. So long as the local intercessors of the
Turkish state own most of the land in these regions, even the positive features of GAP, such
as the much-need irrigation projects, will only enhance the exploitation of the local peasantry
and perhaps aggravate their mass resentment. This comes to show that the success of GAP as
well as economic development in these regions hinges, above all, on a political resolution of
the Kurdish question.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

The evidence in the preceding chapters of this study on economic, political and social life in the predominantly Kurdish regions of ESA necessitates a reconsideration of the role and impact of economic development in ESA on the rise and evolution of the Kurdish question. An appropriate way of starting this reassessment, as well as summarising the findings of this study, can be by returning to one of the initial research questions set by this investigation: how economically developed or underdeveloped were the predominantly Kurdish domains of the Ottoman Empire?

At this point, it is worth recalling that, albeit on differing causal grounds, the development literature on the primarily Kurdish territories of ESA converges on the postulate that a unilinear continuum of underdevelopment has characterised the economic history of these regions, as outlined in Chapter 1. The findings of this study challenge this prevailing interpretation. The analysis of the vicissitudes in the primarily Kurdish provinces of ESA within the last four centuries, outlined in the previous sections of this study, paints a non-stagnant picture of economic life in these regions, which has important implications for the study of the link between economic development in these localities and Turkey's Kurdish question.

Hitherto, for manifold reasons expounded in Chapter 1, studies on the primarily Kurdish areas of ESA have either overlooked its Ottoman past or analysed Ottoman Kurdistan solely in terms of its political relations to the Imperial capital. This resulted in the failure of a proper analysis of the historical antecedents of the principally Kurdish provinces of Eastern Turkey. Such neglect was hazardous chiefly because it gave birth to a stationary understanding of economic (under)development in the predominantly Kurdish provinces of ESA. When the changes in Ottoman Kurdistan and its modern remnants in present-day Turkey are
concurrently considered, a new periodization for economic history of these regions emerges. The periodization is no longer centred on a unilinear continuum of inadequate development. Rather, there are three distinct periods: the first of these begins from the early sixteenth century and ends with the arrival of the third decade of the nineteenth century, characterised by economic development. The second period commences c.1830 up until the first quarter of the twentieth century, and the major theme of this period is economic underdevelopment. The final period is an age of economic de-development, beginning from around the first quarter of the twentieth century, and continuing through the early 2000s.

As the data in Chapters 2 & 3 delineates, between the early sixteenth century and the early nineteenth century, the two paradigmatic Ottoman provinces predominantly inhabited by Kurds throughout the Ottoman period, Diyarbekir and Erzurum, were economically burgeoning areas, and constituted important sources of income for the Ottoman central treasury. The sheep breeding and sheep trade, textile production and trade, mining and mineral manufacturing and trade, as well as the international and interregional trade passing through Kurdistan, played an important role in the economic expansion of these regions. Up until the early nineteenth century, the revenues attained from these sectors of the local economy constituted the bulk of the provincial revenues of Diyarbekir and Erzurum. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the provincial revenues in these two provinces grew at a rate faster than that of the bordering Anatolian regions of which modern-day Turkey comprise, and were among the principal revenues of the Imperial Treasury.

The exploration of the economic and political history of Ottoman Kurdistan outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, besides challenging the hypothesis of continual underdevelopment in this region, also oppugns the causal underpinnings proposed by scholarly studies for this postulate. The autonomous administrative structures founded in this region after 1514 are commonly thought to have occasioned the ‘minimal implementation’ of the governing timar
or *dirlik* system and facilitated the ‘centuries-long unbroken autonomy’ of the ‘economically disinterested’ Kurdish rulers. The peculiar land holding regime put in place after the incorporation of the Kurdish principalities in the early sixteenth century is habitually seen as constituting a formidable and obstinate impediment to economic development in the predominantly Kurdish regions of ESA, by incessantly preserving the feudal relations of production in these domains after the nineteenth century. The findings of this study suggest quite the reverse.

The degree of autonomy enjoyed by the Kurdish rulers was gradually eroded by the Ottoman state in the years following the incorporation of the Kurdish principalities into the Ottoman Empire. As charted in Chapter 2, in the period between the early sixteenth century and the late seventeenth century the degree of autonomy enjoyed by almost all of the Kurdish polities was reduced to the extent that the majority became very responsive to Ottoman demands. Consequently, in almost all of these administrative structures the *dirlik* or *timar* system was in operation. However, as explained in Chapter 3, during the eighteenth century, in virtue of the tax farming policy in the Ottoman Empire, certain Kurdish notables, despite the Ottoman state overseeing the function of the Kurdish administrative units, gained immense fiscal and landed wealth. Indeed, some of these governors, such as Mir Muhammed of Rawanduz and Bedirhan Bey of Botan, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries enjoyed de facto autonomy.

Nevertheless, because of the centralisation policies implemented by the Ottoman state within the first half of the nineteenth century, long-standing Kurdish polities were eradicated and by 1847, there was not a single Kurdish administrative unit in existence. The fully-fledged suppressive centralist reforms implemented in Ottoman Kurdistan after 1834, as revealed by the empirical evidence in Chapter 3 had severe economic and social ramifications. Ottoman state expropriation of land previously owned by Kurdish notables governing the Kurdish
administrative units was an indispensable part of the centralisation process. During the late eighteenth century in Ottoman Kurdistan, as in other parts of the Empire, tax farming facilitated large-scale private ownership of land by the notables and engendered the gradual dissolution of the dirlik or timar system. This steady process enabled locally powerful groups, comparatively free from the supervision of the central authority, to respond to expanding opportunities of commodity production for long-distance markets during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries through possessing private ownership of large estates and by escalating the exploitation of the dependent peasantry.

The domineering policies of the Ottoman state after the third decade of the nineteenth century instituted a major barrier to the expansion of commerce and export trade by inhibiting the development of export-oriented agricultural production in Ottoman Kurdistan. Put differently, economic underdevelopment in Ottoman Kurdistan after the 1830s was directly related to barriers to the penetration of market-induced commercialisation of agriculture in this region, which was closely connected to the negative repercussions of the centralisation policies of the Ottoman central authorities on regional agricultural production.

After the early 1830s, as the accounts of the contemporaries in Ottoman Kurdistan outlined in Chapter 3 emphasise, the central authorities seized almost all the lands previously owned and cultivated by the Kurdish notables, and, more importantly, large tracts of these repossessed lands remained uncultivated for a long period after their appropriation. Three decades after these lands were seized from the Kurdish notables, the greater part of the confiscated lands were either abandoned or were not resourcefully allocated to peasants by the Ottoman state. Such ill use of land, as well as the three decades of sporadic violence in this region had inauspicious consequences for agricultural output and trade—as evinced by the relatively low-level cultivated land and production data in Ottoman Kurdistan in Chapter 3—and augmented the pauperisation of agrarian labourers previously working in these lands. The
British and Russian consular reports from Ottoman Kurdistan referred to in Chapter 3 convey that after 1830s the impecunious peasants in Ottoman Kurdistan, in absence of state guidance and support, turned to usurers for financial support. Considering the very high rate of interest on loans during the nineteenth century in Ottoman Kurdistan, most peasants gave large sections of their agricultural yields to the moneylenders or ended up losing their land on account of defaulting on their debts. Furthermore, unsurprisingly, after the third decade of the nineteenth century, commerce in this region also suffered a huge blow. During 1833-1860, the trade of native products in Ottoman Kurdistan, as well as the transit trade passing through this region, which was an important source of the provincial revenue and economic vibrancy, witnessed a steep drop. In sum, the destruction of autonomous Kurdish polities and the decline in economic development in this region went hand in glove.

Moreover, the intrusive policies of the Ottoman state in Kurdistan after the 1830s triggered major social and political changes in this Ottoman borderland. A large section of the Ottoman Kurdish notable families and merchant elites both voluntarily and involuntarily resettled in Western Anatolia, particularly in Constantinople, far from Kurdistan, during the time of the Tanzimat and the initial years of the twentieth century where they became increasingly integrated into the Ottoman state, language and discourse. This process is exhibited with the participation of émigré Kurds in the CUP and their support for the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.

Relatedly, the eradication of Kurdish administrative structures, by instigating a power vacuum in Kurdistan, created fertile conditions for the strengthening of tribal frameworks and deepened the feudalisation of Kurdish society. It is not a coincidence that with the obliteration of the Kurdish emirates tribal confederacies occupied the central stage in Kurdish society and politics thereafter. Consequently, there was a significant rise in the number of tribal rifts, resulting in less law and order, particularly in the Kurdish countryside. Thus, the
centralist modernisation policies implemented in Ottoman Kurdistan after the 1830s, on top of having damaging consequences for the means of production and relations of production in this region, paradoxically enhanced the feudalisation and fragmentation of society. The concurrence of these factors engendered socio-economic underdevelopment in this region. In light of what has been summarised thus far, it might seem plausible to explain the socio-economic underdevelopment that befell Ottoman Kurdistan after the early 1830s through the binary and hierarchical state-versus-Kurdish society model outlined in Chapter 1. However, such an analysis does not enable us to attain an adequate understanding of the underlying causes of political change and economic underdevelopment in this period. The reforms during and after the early nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire surfaced against the backdrop of the Ottoman leaders’ increased awareness of the necessity for transformation and reform of the ancien regime to preserve the Empire, on the one hand. On the other, these reforms were shaped by the conflict among the Great Powers and their increased penetration into the Empire. Accordingly, the elimination of the Kurdish polities by the Ottoman state in the early nineteenth century was part of the general process of overthrowing semi-independent local potentates to enhance the efficacy and the centrality of the regime, as well as to extricate the Empire from the weaknesses that bogged it down since the 18th century. At the same time though, as outlined in Chapters 1 and 3, this elimination process materialised as a result of the increasing incorporation of capitalism into the Empire and the imperialist conflict between Britain and Russia, against the background of the Ottoman defeats in wars against Russia, and the mounting tensions among the Muslim and the Christians in Ottoman Kurdistan.

The impact of political transformations over economic and social life in nineteenth-century Ottoman Kurdistan summarised above do also suggest that underdevelopment in this region cannot be adequately explained by the ‘isolation’ of Ottoman Kurdistan from the
transformatory economic changes caused by the increasing incorporation of capitalism into the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Because of the absence of railroads and efficient transportation infrastructure in Ottoman Kurdistan, it is commonly hypothesised, that this region, more than any other part of the Empire, was secluded from the changes invoked by the penetration of the capitalist system throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The seclusion of Ottoman Kurdistan from the Ottoman and the European markets is often posited as a prime example of this phenomenon. As findings of Chapter 3 uncover, up until the early 1830s, commercial activity in Ottoman Kurdistan was as vibrant as it was in the late eighteenth century. In the years 1833-60, the commerce of this region witnessed a swift decline. From c.1860 up until the outbreak of the Turco-Russian War of 1877-8, even in the face of transportation barriers, with the arrival of relative stability to the region, commerce to and from Kurdistan did recover. Between 1890 and the outbreak of the First World War interregional and intraregional trade reached new and important heights.

These developments in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries coincided with the Hamidian Period (1876-1908). In this era the politically co-opted (predominantly Sunni) Kurdish tribal elite, like Milli Ibrahim Pasha (Chief of the Milan confederation), with economic and extra-economic means largely designated by the Ottoman state, accumulated immense landed wealth, reinvigorated the lord-peasant bonds, and aimed to minimise the economic fortunes of the Christian community in Ottoman Kurdistan. Such factors did not only enable the aggrandisement of the politically receptive Kurdish elite; they also provided fertile conditions for commodity production and export orientation in the local economy by enabling the possession of private ownership of large estates and by accelerating the exploitation of the dependent peasantry. As outlined in Chapter 3, the rise in urban population in most of the provinces in ESA in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries,
coupled with the above-mentioned favourable factors for commodity production and export orientation, was highly influential in the rise of intraregional and interregional trade in ESA during the latter part of the Hamidian era. Yet the growth in the local economy was not a harbinger of structural change and nor was it long-term. In other words, the expansion in trade was not accompanied by a transformation of the relations of production, since it was based on usury and extraction of rent payments from direct producers. The combination of the outbreak of the First World War in addition to the destructive population policies had a deleterious impact on all of the previously recorded economic expansion in this region.

The politically integrated Kurdish rulers were neither autonomous nor did they request autonomy from the central state, because the nature and the maintenance of their power and wealth were grounded in the support provided by the Ottoman state. This helps explain why, in contrast to the Kurds in the Ottoman metropolis who were largely in support of the 1908 Revolution, the clientele Kurdish elite in Kurdistan, vehemently opposed the notions of ‘nation’ and ‘society’ adopted by the Ittihadists Ottoman reformers in place of the ‘umma’, and were very hostile to the 1908 Revolution (McDowall, 2000:96). Following the First World War, when the map of the Middle East was being redrawn, these schisms amidst Kurdish society played a pivotal role in the void of a leadership that could fill a role akin to that held by the Hashemite emirs in Hejaz in the emergence of the Arab national movement and the development of Arab nationalism during and after the Great War.

On the eve of World War I, as explicated in Chapter 4, the Young Turk regime adopted ideological, political and economic programs that were substantially different from those of previous Ottoman administrations. After the 1913 coup d’état, the late-Ottoman rulers abandoned economic liberalism and, alternatively, embraced the economic model of ‘Millî İktisad’ (National Economy), and concomitantly an ideological shift from pan-Islamism to pan-Turkism occurred among the political elite in the Empire. The economic development
and ideological paradigms espoused by the Young Turk rulers were inherited by their Kemalist heirs and formed the basis of the policies implemented in the Turkish Republic throughout the Republican era.

In the years 1913-1950 the two operational codes of the state programmes in the residues of the Ottoman Empire was the construction and preservation of the Turkish national economy. This entailed the protection and elevation of the Muslim/Turkish bourgeoisie and the Turkification of the ethnically heterogeneous demographic landscape. These objectives of the Turkist rulers after 1913, at a time when the Empire was largely reduced to its Anatolian heartlands, entailed policies of genocide, forced migration, confiscation of economic resources, and the suppression of all forms of non-Turkish identities and cultures in the ethnically mixed ESA provinces. These novel features of state policy persistently implemented in these regions during the first half of the twentieth century unleashed a unique and new economic process of de-development, proactively created by state policies geared towards precluding the possibility of an economic base to support independent indigenous existence. This process came to fruition in ESA by policies that not only hindered but also deliberately and assiduously blocked internal economic development and the structural reforms upon which it is based.

De-development in ESA commenced as a result of the state policies implemented by the Young Turks and their ideological heirs, the Kemalist, centred on the objectives of nationalist demographic (i.e. turkification) and economic (i.e. Turkish National Economy) reorganisation. These state programmes differed greatly from those of the previous regimes. Prior to the first decade of the twentieth century, at no point in the history was ethnic nationalism a notion that struck a chord with the Ottoman political leaders. The Ottoman political establishment was above all occupied with preserving the territorial and political integrity of a multi-national Empire. The heterogeneous character of the Ottoman Empire
recurrently informed the policies of the Ottoman political leaders and there was no predisposition towards formulating a nationalist agenda, which would have been antithetical to the prevalent aim of holding the multi-cultural domains together.

Turkish nationalism essentially emerged as a reaction to imperial disintegration, in a political milieu where imperial and multi-ethnic projects failed to stimulate a sense of Ottoman patriotism. The dismal image of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, powerless to reverse the secessionist dynamics and fighting for existence, weighed heavily in the minds of the Kemalist rulers, and it was the lessons drawn from this century that gave Turkish nationalism its most durable characteristics. For instance, the Kemalist tendency to analyse the Kurdish question along conspiratorial modes, with frequent reference to the ‘Eastern Question’ and the Sevres Treaty, is prototypical illustration of this deeply rooted survivalist feature of Turkish nationalism.

Pursuant to what has been explained above and the findings of Chapters 4 and 5, it would be a mistake to confine Turkish nationalism exclusively to the post-Ottoman era, to trace the barriers to economic development stemming from the nationalist reorganisation of ESA only as far as 1923, and to perceive the obstacles to economic development in these regions as derivatives of the uneven development of capitalism in the Turkish Republic. Such inaccuracies result in the inability to identify the peculiar obstacles to economic development in ESA, as well as to detect the policy roots of the de-development programmes in ESA, and to discern the link between the Kurdish question and de-development in Turkey.

Existing development theories fail to account comprehensively for the deliberate economic and social extortion and destruction witnessed by the Kurdish and other autochthonic peoples of ESA, which this study argues is a constituent and indispensable feature of de-development in these Anatolian territories. The Turkist demographic engineering policies systematically implemented all over ESA during the CUP period and the Republican era instigated de-
development in these regions by, above all, mass murder, uprooting the indigenous population from their ancestral habitat, confiscating their moveable and immovable properties, and assimilating them into the Turkish nation and culture. Consequently, there was an indivisible and organic link between the economic and noneconomic aspects of dispossession or disarticulation in the state policies in these regions.

Between 1915 and 1950, in light of the figures given in Chapter 4, the non-existence of actual and definite statistics notwithstanding, ESA witnessed a depopulation of no less than three million, at least half of which perished. Bearing in mind that the Armenian Genocide (1915) and the first wave of forced deportation of Ottoman Kurds in ESA (1916) accounted for around two million of the deported and massacred, the greater part of these killings and banishments occurred prior to 1923. Reducing the acts of the Young Turk government in ESA after the spring of 1915 to ‘mere’ mass murder and deportation would curtail its complexity and downplay the long-term repercussions for these regions.

The Armenian genocide and the ensuing mass expatriation of Kurds consisted of a set of coinciding processes that geared into each other and together engendered a deliberate and coherent system of destruction in ESA. As outlined in Chapter 4, these processes were expropriation, massacre, deportations, forced assimilation and construction of a destitute region. The overall aim of obstructing the possibility of autonomous existence of the indigenous populations in ESA within separate polities, which would have imperilled the Turkish nationalist reorganisation projects embarked on by the Young Turks, tied these processes together.

These atrocious engagements of the Young Turk government aimed to rescind the prospect of an independent Armenian state within the relics of the Ottoman Empire, which was ushered by the reform agreement of February 1914. Besides, the CUP targeted the territorial and cultural unity of the Kurds, the other autochthonic community densely populated in ESA,
through mass deportation to Turkish populated regions to thwart them from ‘preserving their nationality’ and ‘becoming harmful elements’. Heedless of the Ottoman Interior Ministry’s circular in November 1915 that accentuated the economic debilitation created in ESA by the clearance of the Armenian community, the Young Turk administration zealously continued with their nationalist demographic policies in these domains by evacuating the Kurds en masse in 1916. This disregard to economic life in ESA by the CUP government is a clear indication that the hegemonic forces conceived economic devastation as a means of inhibiting even the possibility of independent existence of the non-Turkish populaces in these regions, which with the exodus of Armenians was vastly inhabited by Kurdish. Resultantly, by the end of 1917 ESA was a famine region.

Following the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, the Kemalist rulers unremittingly implemented nationalist population policies in ESA, reneged on their promise to recognise the collective rights of the Kurds, denied even the basic linguistic rights granted to them in the Lausanne Treaty, and systematically hindered economic development in ESA. These concurrent decisions of the rulers of the Turkish Republic gave birth to the Kurdish question of Turkey and prolonged de-development in ESA. Thus, while the modernisation policies of the single-party regime integrated Turkey into the capitalist world economy and fostered remarkable economic development, the predominantly Kurdish regions of Turkey continued to endure economic de-development.

The nationalist demographic policies adroitly and meticulously implemented by the veteran Turkist demographic engineers during the Republican era constituted an important policy tool of protracting economic de-development in the predominantly Kurdish regions of ESA. These policies consisted of forced deportation of the Kurdish populace from their homelands and the dragooning of the Kurds into the dominant Turkish culture. The Kemalist rulers by means of these repressive social engineering objectives aimed to mutilate the territorial and
cultural unity of the Kurds and exile the politically and economically prominent Kurdish families in line with the objective of obstructing the Kurdish elite ‘from reviving as a ruling class’, as instructed in the 1925 Report on the Reform of the East. Therefore, it was not by happenstance that by the late 1930s, at around the same time when the then Economic Minister Celal Bayar’s report testified both the collapse and the ensuing birth of a self-sufficient Eastern economy, foreign observers in ESA reported that there were no wealthy Kurdish families to be found in these regions. Policies directed against the wealth owning Kurds prevented capital accumulation in these regions and played a key role in the creation of an ESA economy wherein production beyond that of personal use was non-existent. As a result, the state of the economy of ESA during the Republican era was inferior to what it was in the 1890s.

The other policy that nurtured economic de-development in this region is the paucity of state investments dispensed to the predominantly Kurdish ESA throughout the Republican period. According to Heper, a staunch defender of the Kemalist policies, ‘in the early decades of the Republic, Chief of the General Staff Field Marshall Fevzi Çakmak had hampered investments in border areas…because it would have been difficult them’ (2007: 6). The rationale offered by Çakmak for the derisory state investments in ESA, delineated in Chapter 3, suggest that the state during the RPP era had allocated infinitesimal investments in the predominantly Kurdish regions in order to retard economic development. The seasoned politician posited that by hastening the level of cognizance of the Kurds economic development and wealth creation in ESA, this would endanger the policy of extinguishing the Kurdish identity and stimulate the development of Kurdish nationalism. Put differently, economic de-development was conceived by the Kemalist officials in the early decades of the Republic as an indispensable means of foiling the possibility of autonomous existence of the Kurds and fostering the turkification of Kurdish lands. Such an outlook precipitated major social and
economic divergences between the ESA and the rest of Turkey in the years 1923-1950, demonstrated in Chapter 4.

Relatedly, the peculiar policies of the Turkish state in the predominantly Kurdish ESA during the single party period were not motivated by economic projects—like surplus appropriation and labour integration—per se as argued by Aydin and Boran, but by political imperatives of assimilation, sovereignty and territorial unity of the Turkish Republic. In order to safeguard these interrelated political-national aims and to encumber Kurdish nationalism, economic development in the overwhelmingly Kurdish regions was deliberately blocked. Hence, the overriding political objectives of the Kemalist rulers in this dictatorial era played a determinate role in the minimal contact these regions had with capitalist development and the formation of the long-enduring features of the Kurdish question in Turkey. The systematic denial of the Kurdish identity, the negation of the collective rights of the Kurds as well as the profound socioeconomic disparities between ESA and the rest of Turkey were all corollaries of the tyrannical RPP rule in the remnants of Ottoman Kurdistan.

As the findings of Chapter 4 exhibit, in the years after the one-party dictatorship and before the outbreak of the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state in 1984, the hegemonic forces in Turkey discarded the project of ‘dismembering’ the predominantly Kurdish ESA regions and instead opted to ‘incorporate’ these domains of Turkey. The increasing incorporation of the Turkish Republic into the liberal world order in the years after the Second World War initiated major readjustments in the Turkish political and economic system that resulted in the gradual erosion of the then existing structure in the country. The other influential factor in this policy alteration with reference to ESA is the incessant rise of Kurdish radicalism from the 1960s onwards through multifarious means, among which were, mass protests and electoral advances of pro-Kurdish candidates in ESA. The end of the ‘period of silence’ in Kurdish politics compelled the Turkish political elite to seek alternative
modalities of suppressing Kurds. One of the underlying reasons for the institution and conservation of ties of all the post-single-party period administrations with the Kurdish clientele propertied class was to substitute and repress the radical Kurdish challenge against the Turkish state.

The policy oscillation from ‘destruction’ to ‘incorporation’ of the predominantly Kurdish regions did not implicate the recognition of the Kurdish identity and neither did it involve the modernisation of the ancient land ownership and large-scale investment in land, human resources or physical equipment in ESA necessary for structural change. By hampering land reform and investments, the state facilitated the endurance of economic de-development because such negligence rid the ESA economy of its capacity and potential for structural transformation by engendering four inauspicious factors for development.

The first of these is the insufficiency of modern infrastructure and industry, both of which are necessary for capital accumulation and private investment. By 1988, despite the long period of planned import substitution industrialisation (1963-1979), according to a survey by the SPO, there were merely 41,411 workers in all of the manufacturing establishments in ESA. Of these, 30,777 (74.3%) were in public manufacturing enterprises and the remaining 10,634 (25.7%) in private establishments (Kutbay and Çınar, 1989: Table 5). As evinced with the composition of the four quinquennial plans in ESA during 1963-1983, investments in modern infrastructure, particularly transport, were negligible. The pre-modern infrastructure in these regions played a pivotal role in the near absent private investment throughout 1968-1980.

Overall, despite the remarkable development in Turkey in those years, the predominantly Kurdish regions witnessed inhibited industrial development.

The second factor hindering development is the preservation of the landholding regime bequeathed from the Ottoman period devoid of land reform. In the second half of the twentieth century, the predominantly Kurdish regions were—and still are—the only domains
in Turkey bereft of modernisation of the ancient land regime. After 1950, the banished Kurdish landed rural elite returned to their homelands, the land they or their ancestors held from the Ottoman period were reimbursed, and a sizeable section of them were politically incorporated into the political system. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the inaction of the state over the much-needed land reform, besides occasioning the aggrandisement of the ağas, the pauperisation and the resultant emigration of the peasants, also played a pivotal factor in stunting agricultural development. The archaic land ownership and relations of production in the predominantly Kurdish provinces inhibited agricultural productivity and the expansion of commodity production in agriculture.

The third factor that inhibited development is the occupational reorientation of the labour force away from the local economy mainly to the industrial metropolis of Turkey, which further weakened the local productive capacity and dependence on sources of income outside of the Eastern economy. During 1960-90, the predominantly Kurdish regions had the highest rate of landless peasants in Turkey and, unsurprisingly, one of the uppermost mass migrations to the major cities mainly in Western Turkey.

From the early 1980s through to the initial years of the 2000s, as the findings of Chapter 5 lay bare that the predominantly Kurdish provinces of ESA continued to endure stunted economic development, which, in turn, yet again, denied the economy of these territories the aptitude and prospect for structural transformation. The destruction wrought by the war between the PKK and the Turkish state, resulting in the forced displacement of large numbers of civilians and the destruction of Kurdish villages, along with adverse conditions for the agricultural sector created by the neoliberal policies, and the preservation of the antiquated land regime, played a vital role in the continuance of stunted development. Another important factor for arrested economic development is the failure of the GAP to fulfil promises of industrial development, irrigation, agricultural training, crop breeding, education and improving health
services. Ever since its birth, GAP has been a strategic energy project. Despite official claims to the contrary, it has not promoted sustainable socio-economic regional development in the GAP region.

As outlined in Chapters 4 and 5, the ESA, alongside hosting vital international and national oil and natural gas pipelines, constitutes the most hydrocarbon-rich areas of Turkey. Resultantly, these domains have unceasingly met the bulk of the energy demands of Turkey, particularly in the neoliberal era wherein persistent industrial development – almost all of which has occurred outside ESA – has engendered an ever-growing requirement for energy. The state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation (Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı, TPAO), which regularly realises over 70 per cent of the oil production in the country, relays the following illuminating datum pertinent to this phenomena: ‘72% of our [TPAO] total oil production is from Batman Region, 27% is from Adıyaman Region and 1% is from Thrace Region’ (TPAO, 2014). In other words, ESA accounts for 99 per cent of crude extracted in Turkey. Concurrent to this extraction, the gargantuan twin Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipelines from Iraq to the Mediterranean snakes its way through the Kurdish mountains, transporting 1.6 million barrels of oil every day (see Map 11). Moreover, in late 2012, ‘Royal Dutch Shell Plc and TPAO started exploring for shale gas in Diyarbakir’s Saribugday-1 field…[t]here may be 13 trillion cubic meters of shale gas reserves [in Turkey], 1.8 trillion cubic meters of which is recoverable, Ismail Bahtiyar, chairman of the Turkish Association of Petroleum Geologists.’ (Ersoy, 2012).

However, the energy sources of ESA has functioned as a resource curse rather than as resource wealth, thereby deepened, and protracted the de-development of these regions. Specifically, as the findings of the two preceding Chapters elucidate, the bulk of the public investments in ESA have chronically been energy-oriented and directed towards meeting the continually increasing energy demands of industrial Turkey. Put differently, the biggest
recipient of the public investments in ESA, i.e. the energy sector, has nominal benefits or use to these predominantly agrarian domains and overshadows the exigent needs of the populace of these areas, e.g. transport infrastructure, which are essential for socio-economic development. Additionally, demands for political pluralism, enhanced socio-economic rights and/or autonomy by the Kurds were, and largely still is, unremittingly negated by the Turkish state because it has incessantly conceived these long-standing appeals as tantamount to or as a building block of secessionism and the resultant loss of these hydrocarbon-blessed ESA provinces.

Between the mid-1980s and the early years of 2000s, socio-economic divergences between the predominantly Kurdish regions and the rest of Turkey deepened, and the radical challenge of the Kurds against the exclusionary and assimilationist tendencies of the Turkish state entered its most vibrant and violent stage. As accentuated by the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 outlined above, neither the Kurdish question nor the peculiar form of underdevelopment in ESA owe their existence to the years of the armed conflict. The Kurdish question and the economic de-development in ESA pre-dates the years of war and are corollaries of the denial, by the dominant state ideology, Turkish nationalism, of differences in general, and the Kurds’ existence, issues, and rights in particular. The monist and monolithic understanding of society and nation – invariably as Turkish – by the hegemonic forces in Turkey resulted in the economic de-development in ESA after 1913 and triggered the Kurdish question after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic. Economic de-development policies in ESA after 1923 have become a means of protecting this monist and monolithic understanding of society and nation, as lucidly exhibited in the preamble of the current constitution of Turkey, which exemplifies much of the general tenor of the core ideology of the state:

‘In line with the concept of nationalism and the reforms and principles introduced by the founder of Republic of Turkey, Atatürk, the immortal leader and the unrivalled hero, this
Constitution, which affirms the eternal existence of the Turkish nation and motherland and the indivisible unity of the Turkish state, embodies the principle of the indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its state and territory, Turkish historical and moral values or the nationalism, principle, reforms and modernism of Atatürk. Hence, there is a symbiotic relationship between economic de-development and the Kurdish question and until the Kurdish question is resolved; the peculiar form of underdevelopment in ESA will endure.

**The Kurdish Question in the 21st Century**

After the turn of this century, as discussed in Chapter 5, the intersection of five pivotal events within and outside of the border of Turkey necessitated all of the relevant stakeholders in the Kurdish question to re-evaluate their conceptualisation of and preoccupation with the issue. These were, first, the recognition of Turkey as a candidate for EU membership in 1999, conditional on its adequate progress in meeting the EU’s Copenhagen political criteria, which specifically include democratisation and safeguarding of minority rights. Second, the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 and his subsequent replacement of the project of establishing an ‘independent Kurdish state’ by means of a ‘national liberation struggle’ with that of ‘democratisation of Turkey’ and ‘democratic self-government or autonomy’ for Kurds. Third, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the ensuing formalisation of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as well as the desire of the US for Turkey to support the

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275 For a detailed exploration of the spillover effects of Turkey’s EU Accession on Turkey’s Kurdish Question, see: K. Yıldız (2006).

276 In the political writings of Öcalan after his capture and imprisonment in Turkey, which set the ideological framework of the PKK after 2000, the project of democratisation of the Turkish Republic denotes the disassociation of citizenship in Turkey from Turkish nationalism. The idea of democratic autonomy for Kurd twinned to the idea of democratic confederalism refers to the right of Kurds to determine their own economic, cultural, and social affairs (Öcalan, 2008). These projects are elaborated in the ‘defence texts’ submitted to the Turkish courts and to the European Courts – the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Grand Chamber in 2001 and a court in Athens in 2003 concerning his expulsion from Greece. These ‘defence texts’ was translated and published in English under the From Sumerian Clerical State towards People’s Republic I-II (2001), The defense of Free Man (2003), and Defending a People (2004).
political stability of Iraq and patronise Iraq Kurds. Fourth, the rise and dominance of the majority government of the AKP in Turkey and its search for neoliberal pro-Islamic politics in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Caucasus. AKP’s pursuit of such politics has necessitated the reorganisation and normalisation of the Turkish political system in accord with liberal democratic polity and attempts to eliminate long-simmering issues like the Kurdish question (Bahcheli and Noel, 2011; Çiçek, 2014). Lastly, the consolidation of pro-Kurdish politics in Turkey, and the recurrent electoral success of pro-Kurdish candidates and parties, particularly in EAS regions. The pro-Kurdish candidates from 1999 onwards have subsequently won the Municipality of Greater Diyarbakir, regarded as the Kurdish political and cultural centre by the pro-Kurdish political actors. In the 2003 municipal elections, the number of overall municipalities won by the DTP, sympathetic to the PKK, astonishingly rose to 54. In 2009, it climbed to 99. Moreover, in the general elections held on June 12, 2011, Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP), the successor to the then banned DPT, succeeded in getting 36 candidates elected to the National Assembly (Çandar, 2013).

These manifestations engendered the re-evaluation of the Kurdish question by the two main adversaries on this issue, namely the PKK and the Turkish state, and crystallised the limitations of their traditional approaches to the decades-long problem. That is to say, just as the latter recognised that it was unable to eliminate the Kurdish identity and its political expressions through decades of negationist notions and brute force, the former realised it had been unable to materialise its project of overthrowing the ‘colonial’ state system by means of a ‘national liberation movement’. Hence, both parties revised their ‘default positions’, and presented differing ‘democratisation initiatives/projects’.

The PKK and the legal political parties/actors sympathetic to it re-conceptualised the Kurdish question, as outlined in almost all of the ‘defence texts’ by Öcalan, which over three million
Kurds see as their ‘political will’\textsuperscript{277}, in accordance with the two main democracy projects: democraitisation of the Republic of Turkey and democratic autonomy for Kurds in Turkey. Essentially, as announced by Öcalan in 2009, these projects entail the recognition by the Turkish state of the collective cultural rights of the Kurds, disassociation of citizenship in Turkey from the uniform Turkish national identity, and regional self-governance for the Kurds\textsuperscript{278}.

For the state authorities, as exhibited with the series of ‘democratisation packages’ proposed by the AKP government as of 2002, ‘democratisation’ entailed the removal of suppressive measures implemented during the 1980s and 1990s and the recognition of certain limited individual rights for Kurds. Thus far, the following steps have been implemented as a result of these ‘democratisation packages’: the removal of the OHAL in the Kurdish region; assisting internally displaced Kurds to return to their former homes and properties; the launching of TRT6, the first official Kurdish TV channel; optional Kurdish courses in private schools; the right of villages to return to their original names; and the right of establishing institutions for living languages. The leading actors and supporters of pro-Kurdish politics have seen these steps, as emphasised by Bahcheli and Noel (2011), Çandar (2013), Çiçek (2014), as ‘piecemeal and half-hearted’ or ‘too little, too late’, and more importantly, falling short of their persistent demands of cultural recognition and some form of self-government.

As a prerequisite for the resolution of the Kurdish question, this thesis proposes the ‘Democratic Autonomy Project’, launched by the Democratic Society Congress, a broad platform that brought together Kurdish NGOs and intellectuals in Diyarbakir in December 2010. The ‘Democratic Autonomy Project’ set forth the restructuring of the Turkish political

\textsuperscript{277} In a signature campaign, started on 18 August 2005 with the slogan of ‘Öcalan is our political will’ on the extended geography where Kurds live in Middle East and Europe, was ended on 20 October 2006 after the collection of 3 million 243 thousand signatures. 2 million and 243 thousand were collected in Turkey. Subsequent to the campaign, the sympathisers of the PKK branded Öcalan the ‘Kurdish people’s leader’ (Çandar, 2012: 45).

\textsuperscript{278} Ö zgür Gündem, 27/11/2010.
and administrative system as a precondition for the resolution of the Kurdish question. This restructuring involves the following pivotal six elements:

(a) The drafting of a new constitution which would introduce a more pluralist concept of citizenship, (one that is not based on an ethnocentric understanding of Turkishness);

(b) The removal of all barriers to cultural expression of diversity, including the use of languages other than Turkish, in the public sphere, education and politics;

(c) Decentralisation and the institution of regional assemblies responsible for providing services in the areas of education, health, culture, social services, agriculture, and industry, among others, leaving the conduct of foreign affairs, the economy and defence to the central government, and assuming shared responsibility for judicial services;

(d) The allocation of part of local revenues to regional assemblies;

(e) Unconditional return to villages evacuated by the Turkish military during the fight against the PKK;

(f) Purging previously inhabited areas of land mines, and compensation to those affected by forced deportation;

(g) Removal of the Village Guard System;

(h) The creation of a peaceful atmosphere, which above all necessitates the cessation of hostilities, in the process that leads up to a new constitution.

A nationwide survey conducted after the declaration of the ‘Democratic Autonomy Project’ by the well-regarded public opinion research and consultancy company KONDA, in 59 provinces with 10,393 people confirms that the Kurdish population at large generally endorse this project. The result of this survey suggests that most respondents expressed their support for policies that entailed the constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity, education and broadcasting in the mother tongue, decentralisation and economic development of regions.
where the Kurds are concentrated, and the abolition of the 10 per cent threshold for parliamentary representation (KONDA, 2011: 83-150).

The restructuring of the Turkish political and administrative system is an urgent and necessary step, but it is not sufficient for the resolution of the Kurdish question; it needs to be accompanied by a comprehensive regional development strategy that can remedy the long-standing socio-economic issues in the regions. Both domestic (i.e. GAP) and international experiences (i.e. the EU, UNDP) prove that top-down development plans devoid of the participation of local actors are unlikely to be successful (TESEV, 2006). In order to identify accurately the needs of the ESA regions, the participation of the locally elected administrative bodies, like Metropolitan Municipalities, and the local NGOs in the preparatory phase is necessary. Moreover, regional development programmes should incorporate the economic, social, environmental and cultural aspects of development.

Investment policies are among the most important tools of development for regions that have witnessed decades long neglect. The devastating result of neoliberalism in ESA outlined in Chapter 5, steers this thesis towards recommending a public sector-led development policy. Employment-oriented investment should be the top priority of the public sector-led development programme. Creation of long term and unionised employment is vital in order to overcome the long-enduring problem of high unemployment in these regions and to increase the income of the local citizens. The creation of new and sustainable jobs is also necessary to prevent the occupational reorientation from these regions to other parts of Turkey and to prevent the ‘brain drain’.

In accordance with enhancing human development, investments in all sectors of education should be increased and education should be free. These investments should not be seen as an instrument of cultural assimilation: education should be in both Kurdish and Turkish.

Investments in the health sector are also vital for human development, so health investments
should be multiplied, and health should be free at the point of use. Investments in transportation and communications should also be enhanced and prioritised.

In order to be able to subsidise these investments the income generated from local resources, such as the energy revenues from GAP, should be kept by the local administrative bodies, and, if need be, a diametric fund transfer from the developed regions to these regions could also be considered. These funds could partly be used to subsidise cooperatives that provide public credit support for the purchase of machinery and equipment for the peasants in the predominantly agrarian ESA, which will furnish the impeccable peasants with the necessary resources as well as enhance agricultural production in these domains.

Beside large-scale public investment, another important apparatus of development in ESA is root and branch land reform, without which the archaic relations of production and the resultant dependency of the landless peasants will persevere. In order to prevent additional inequitable land ownership, small-sized family enterprises should be encouraged instead of larger agricultural enterprises, which conserve and promote concentration of land.

The irrigation projects of GAP need also to be concluded forthwith. Thus, all irrigation projects of GAP need to be prioritised, and the project should be completed by the newly set date of 2017. Alongside the execution of irrigation projects, GAP should train farmers to enrich their knowledge and skills in agricultural production. This training is also crucial to avoid ill-use of irrigation and prevent salinization.

Historically, the weakest link of the ESA economy has been the industrial sector. Growth of this sector is necessary for decreasing the dependence of these regions on other parts of Turkey and/or foreign dependency as well as for the complementation of the different sectors. Natural and mineral resources of ESA should not be processed outside, but within these regions. Large-scale investment in industry is critical for the expansion of industry in these regions.
The account of the Kurds in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic in this thesis underlined the linkages between the social, political, cultural and economic factors and life. The suppressive and/or negationist policies of the ruling elites in both of these polities regarding the Kurds have not only fettered economic development in ESA but also targeted the cultural, political and social progression of the Kurds. Nevertheless, the inexhaustible struggle of the Kurds against oppression, assimilation, and destruction has played a defining role in countering the imperialistic objectives of the dominant classes, in exhibiting the brute policies of the hegemonic elite in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, and in asserting the need for a peaceful resolution to Turkey’s Kurdish question as well as for the thorough democratisation of the Turkish Republic in the 21st century.
Appendix 1- List of Interviews undertaken in the explanatory phase of fieldwork

1) Mr. Dirk Verbeken, European Commission, Lead Economist – Desk Officer for Turkey.

2) Mr. Özsür Altınoğlu, Sector Manager for Infrastructure and Small and Medium Enterprises Programme, Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey.

3) Mr. Mesut Kamiloğlu: Head of Department for the General Directorate of Regional Development and Structural Adjustment Department of EU Economic and Cohesion, State Planning Organisation (SPO), Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry.

4) Mr. Mehmet Aydin: Head of Centre for Regional Competitiveness Programme Coordination and Implementation Centre, Ministry of Industry and Trade.

5) Mr. Yusuf İzzettin İymen, Deputy Secretary General of Gaziantep Chamber of Industry.

6) Mr. Hasan Baran Uçaner, EU & Foreign Relations Representative of the Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce.

7) Mr. Mehmet Galip Ensarioğlu, former Head of Diyarbakır Chamber of Commerce, currently AKP Diyarbakır Member of Parliament.

8) Şahismail Bedirhanoğlu, President of Southeastern Industrialists and Businessmen Association (GUNSIAD).

9) Mr. Hasan Kılıç, GAP, Lead Economist for Regional Development.

10) Mr. Ahmet Türk, former Chairman of the Democratic Society Party (DTP), currently Mayor of Mardin.

11) Mr. Şeyhmuş Diken, Advisor to the Diyarbekir Metropolitan Municipality.

12) Mrs. Nurcan Baysal, former member of the United Nations Development Programme, currently a Social Worker in Diyarbakır.
13) Mr. Hasan Maral, Development Specialist at the KARACADAĞ Development Agency in Diyarbakır.

14) Mr. Osman Baydemir, former Mayor of Diyarbakır and President of USARM.

15) Mr. Ahmet Çakır, Member of the Executive Committee of the Diyarbakır Branch of General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSİ).
Appendix 2- Diyarbakir Commerce, 1863

Table 2.43 Foreign Exports of Diyarbekir, 1863
(In pounds sterling)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of Articles</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Madder Roots</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>92,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool 1st Quality</td>
<td>64,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool 2nd Quality</td>
<td>10,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohair White</td>
<td>8,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohair Red</td>
<td>1,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohair Black</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polecat Fur</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffalo Skins</td>
<td>6,337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Re-exported: from Baghdad)

| Buffalo Skins         | 2,112  |

(Re-exported: from Russia)

| Cows Skin             | 492    |
| Galls Best Blues      | 17,549 |
| Galls White 1st Sort  | 5,991  |
| Saltpetre             | 908    |
| Orpiment in leaves    | 491    |
| Orpiment Red          | 67     |
| Orpiment Lust         | 45     |
| Wax                   | 27     |
| Gum                   | 2,374  |

Total 217,529

Table 2.44 Home Exports of Diyarbekir, 1863
(In pounds sterling)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of Articles</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Madder Roots</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>Sent to Bitlis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olive Oil</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>Sent to Sivas and Kharpot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olive Sesame</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>Sent to Sivas and Kharpot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactures</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>of Aleppo sent to Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactures of Diyarbekir</td>
<td>71,511</td>
<td>Sent to Northern Turkey and Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fox &amp; Wolf Skins</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>600 pieces Fox, 200 Wolf sent to Aleppo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather dyed Red</td>
<td>5,813</td>
<td>Diabekir works sent to Aleppo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather dyed Yellow</td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td>Diabekir works sent to Erzurum and Treibizon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather dyed Red</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>Mardin works sent to Aleppo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather dyed Yellow</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Mardin works sent to Erzurum and Treibizon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather dyed Red</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>Saert work sent to Aleppo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather dyed Yellow</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Saert work sent to Erzurum and Treibizon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galls White 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Sort</td>
<td>2,770</td>
<td>Sent to Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galls White 2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Sort</td>
<td>8,583</td>
<td>Sent to Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hantoof</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>Sent to Aleppo and Orfa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orpiment in leaves</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>Sent to Aleppo and Orfa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orpiment Red</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>Sent to Aleppo and Orfa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orpiment Lust</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Sent to Aleppo and Orfa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallow</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>Sent to Aleppo and Orfa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarified Butter</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>Sent to Aleppo and Orfa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dried Fruits</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Sent to Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pales and Rafters</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Sent to Baghdad and Mosul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>4000 in number, for Aleppo and Damascus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camels</td>
<td>9,100</td>
<td>2000 in number for Kaiseriah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saltpetre</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>Sent to Aleppo and Orfa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>128,174</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of Articles</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coffee via Aleppo</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>of the West Indies from England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee via Baghdad</td>
<td>2,325</td>
<td>of the East Indies from Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar Leaf</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar Crushed</td>
<td>900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar Candy</td>
<td>1,625</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pepper</td>
<td>408</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sal Ammoniac</td>
<td>435</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>306</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin Sheets in boxes</td>
<td>727</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Window Glass in boxes</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>812</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron English</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron Russian</td>
<td>812</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>727</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spelter</td>
<td>871</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigo</td>
<td>5,042</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timbeki Isfahan [Tobacco]</td>
<td>681</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timbeki Shiraz [Tobacco]</td>
<td>454</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk Persian</td>
<td>3,130</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alum</td>
<td>1,530</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochineal</td>
<td>2,110</td>
<td>from France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffalo Skins Russian</td>
<td>4,116</td>
<td>via Erzeroom from Erivan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spices</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardware</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthenware</td>
<td>1,325</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Manufactures</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>via Aleppo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundries</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>from France and Switzerland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**                  | **113,587** |

Source: FO 195/799 Trade and Agriculture for Kurdistan for 1863, pp.74, enclosed in Taylor at Diarbekir, 13/07/1864.
Table 2.46 Home Imports of Diyarbekir, 1863
(In pounds sterling)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of Articles</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soap Aleppo</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap Orfa</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>from Eggil in small pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk</td>
<td>10,338</td>
<td>from Amasia and Bursa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffalo Skins</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>from Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cow</td>
<td>1,067</td>
<td>from Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orpiment in leaves</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>from Hakkari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orpiment Red</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>from Hakkari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orpiment Lust</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>from Hakkari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactures</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>of Aleppo similar to those of Diabekir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanne</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>from Persian coast via Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specie</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>from Aleppo and Damascus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>73,657</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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