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Secondary Education Expansion in Tanzania, 2004-2012: A Political Economy Perspective

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Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in Development Studies

2014

Department of Development Studies
School of Oriental and African Studies
University of London
Declaration for SOAS PhD thesis

I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination.

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Abstract

This thesis explores the policy of junior secondary education expansion in Tanzania between 2004 and 2012, implemented through a large-scale process of community mobilisation. It uses a political economy approach that defines education systems as social constructs, products of history, with material and ideological dimensions, embroiled in the politics and economy of a country and forged at the intersection of internal and external factors. The primary analytical vantage point is the elite. Four main dimensions of the policy are studied. First, the thesis sheds light on the politics of educational policy-making. The expansion policy is the outcome of intra-ruling class conflicts tied to competing modernisation philosophies. Yet, elites’ educational choices are also underpinned by a widely shared symbolic system, rooted in the ideological history of the country but entwined with contemporary global discourses. Second, the thesis investigates the budget for secondary education, pitting the stated desire of elites for quality secondary education for all against their actual financial effort. Donors’ interventions are also scrutinised to understand how they have contributed to shaping the policy and its narrow fiscal space. The thesis then examines local renegotiation of the policy at district level and unveils power struggles unleashed by its implementation in the local arena. Finally, this work studies the relationship between education and the economic sphere through an investigation of the textbook sector and documents the formation, at district level, of a politico-business complex around educational resources. The secondary education expansion occurred against a background of job scarcity, quasi-universal primary education and quality private education available to the wealthy. In this context, the thesis argues that under-resourced and under-performing community secondary schools may be interpreted as a renewed educational settlement to attempt to resolve the structural tension inherent in education systems between the integration of the youth and social differentiation.
Acknowledgements

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I dedicate this thesis to my parents, Colette and Michel Languille, and my uncle, André Languille; their enduring belief in the power of education and of social and political struggles to advance the cause of social justice has been a primary source of inspiration.
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<td>Local Government Capital Development Grant</td>
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<td>MoEVT</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Vocational Training</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>MTEF</td>
<td>Medium Term Expenditure Framework</td>
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<td>National Audit Office</td>
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<td>Other Charges</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Assistance</td>
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<td>Oxford University Press (Tanzania)</td>
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<td>PAF</td>
<td>Performance Assessment Framework</td>
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<td>Personnel Emolument</td>
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<td>PEDP</td>
<td>Primary Education Development Plan</td>
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<td>PER</td>
<td>Public Expenditure Review</td>
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<td>Public Expenditure Tracking Survey</td>
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<td>PFM</td>
<td>Public Financial Management</td>
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<td>Prime Minister’s Office – Regional Administration and Local Governments</td>
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<td>PO-PSM</td>
<td>President's Office - Public Service Management</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>RACEF</td>
<td>Resource Allocation Cost Efficiency Financing</td>
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<td>Sector Budget Support</td>
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<td>Secondary Education Development Plan</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>Tanzania Social Action Fund</td>
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<td>Tanzania Teachers’ Union</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UPE</td>
<td>Universal Primary Education</td>
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<td>URT</td>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
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<td>VAT</td>
<td>Value Added Tax</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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Map of Tanzania

Source: http://www.lhh.utexas.edu/maps/tanzania.html
Map of Lushoto District

Source: District of Lushoto
Chapter One

The Tanzanian ward secondary schools policy: An introduction

The 2012 edition of UNESCO’s *Education for All Global Monitoring Report* called for an international commitment to achieve universal lower secondary education (i.e., four years’ post-primary education) by 2030. This objective is likely to be integrated in the post-2015 agenda. After two decades of international focus on primary education, this attention to secondary education marked an important change in the global education agenda. In 2004, Tanzania, which had one of the lowest secondary gross enrolment ratios among developing countries, started its own journey towards mass secondary education. The Tanzanian government began the implementation of the Secondary Education Development Plan (SEDP) with financial support from the World Bank. But in 2006, the government, led by Prime Minister Edward Lowassa, decided to accelerate the expansion and to act on an electoral promise inscribed in the *Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)* Manifesto for the 2005 presidential elections: to build a lower secondary school in each ward (the administrative level between district and villages). This ward secondary schools policy called for a partnership between the state and communities: the latter would build the school infrastructures; the state would provide the roofing, teachers and running expenses. This decision unleashed a rapid expansion of lower secondary schooling of an extraordinary magnitude. Between 2004 and 2012, the number of secondary schools increased fourfold and the number of students enrolled at O Level increased by 348 per cent. The gross enrolment ratio for lower secondary education rose dramatically from 12.4 per cent in 2004 to 51.4 per cent in 2012. However, from a learning perspective, this movement brought adverse outcomes. Between 2007 and 2012 the failure rate in the Certificate of Secondary Education Examination rocketed from 9.7 to 56.2 per cent.\(^2\)

Why did Tanzanian authorities decide to expand secondary education at such a rapid pace, risking alienating international aid agencies and, in a context of scarce financial resources, to

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1. The Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) is defined as the total enrolment in a specific level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education in a given school-year.
2. The research focuses on Tanzania mainland. In primary and secondary education, Zanzibar is autonomous, only higher education is a Federation matter.
generate entirely predictable poor learning achievements? To tackle this empirical puzzle, the human capital framework, that exerts a hegemonic influence over the research agenda on education and development in sub-Saharan Africa, is analytically unsatisfactory: in rates of return studies or in macro-economic analyses of the growth-education link education policy-making and the politics of implementation remain ‘black boxes’. By contrast, this thesis uses a political economy approach to decipher an education policy that has profoundly modified the Tanzanian educational landscape in recent years. It defines education systems as social constructs, products of history, steeped in the politics and the economy of a country, with material and ideological dimensions and forged at the intersection of international and national dynamics.

This research can only cover some aspects of the policy. For instance, it does not address the implications of greater secondary school enrolment for the labour market and wage levels. It also leaves aside questions related to the social and pedagogical relations that have formed inside ward secondary schools and classrooms. Furthermore, it examines this policy chiefly through an elite lens, only touching on the role played by the rest of the population, parents, students, communities and civil society. Finally, it does not take a normative perspective on educational policy-making and does not formulate any policy recommendations. It is more interested in the question of ‘how development works’ than with the issue of ‘whether development works’. Nevertheless, the partial story it tells allows for an unpacking of important facets of Tanzania’s education system. It demonstrates how dominant discourses of education policy, sustained by populist politics and by references to economic theory, are in fact ideological and mask unequal material interests.

The remainder of this chapter describes key features of the ward secondary schools policy, exposes the research questions and presents the thesis outline.

1. An exceptional enrolment expansion

Between 2000 and 2012, the Tanzanian education system experienced major changes: the abolition of school fees at primary level in 2001 led to a dramatic increase in primary school enrolment (Figure 1.1), the setting-up of a cost-sharing scheme in higher education (with

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the creation of the Higher Education Students' Loans Board in 2005), and the expansion of pre-primary education with the decision to create a pre-primary stream in every primary school. In 2012, Tanzania was among the very few sub-Saharan African countries that were close to universal primary education (UNESCO 2012).4

**Figure 1-1: Primary school enrolment in Tanzania (private – public), 2000-2012**

The rapid expansion of secondary education within the Secondary Education Development Plan (SEDP) constituted another salient phenomenon. The growth in the total number of secondary schools – from 1,291 in 2004 to 4,328 in 2012 - was chiefly led by the construction of community (or ward) schools (Figure 1.2).

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4 In 2010 Tanzania received a Millennium Development Goal Award for sustaining a primary net enrolment ratio above 95 per cent for five years. However, the primary GER declined from 112.3 per cent in 2008 to 98.4 per cent in 2012.
The rise in secondary enrolment was equally impressive: the total number of students enrolled at O Level grew from about 400,000 in 2004 to more than 1,800,000 in 2012 (Figure 1.3).

The gross enrolment ratio for lower secondary education drastically improved from 12.4 per cent in 2004 to 51.4 per cent in 2012. The GER for upper secondary level (A Level) did not follow suit; it increased only slightly from 1.9 per cent in 2003 to 5.1 per cent in 2012. The dynamism of secondary education was accompanied by an expansion of higher
education enrolment that grew by 440 per cent between 2003 and 2011 (Figure 1.4). In sum, since the beginning of the 2000s, the Tanzanian education system has experienced a tremendous expansion, with the upper secondary level remaining the capacity bottleneck.

**Figure 1-4: Enrolment in higher education 2003-2011**

![Enrolment graph](image)

Source: the author, based on URT (2011b and 2012a)

By all comparisons, the rate of expansion of junior secondary education since 2004 qualifies as exceptional.

In the West, the expansion of secondary education, specifically at lower level, was a very gradual process. According to Briseid and Caillods (2004), in most European countries universal primary education was achieved before the end of the 19th century. However, these countries did not consider expanding secondary education before the 1940s/1950s and only implemented the expansion in the 1960s/1970s for lower secondary and the 1980s for upper secondary. Sweden took twenty-two years (1950-1972) to implement its education reform extending compulsory schooling to age 16. In France, a similar reform – extension of compulsory schooling and comprehensive lower secondary education – took 16 years (1959-1975) and mass expansion of upper secondary education started in 1985. The pattern of expansion in the USA was different. The ‘high school movement’ started much earlier: between 1910 and 1940, the total secondary GER grew from about 12 per cent to 72 per cent (Goldin 1997: figure 1). Qualified as a ‘swift’ and ‘spectacular educational transformation’ (ibid: 0), its rhythm of expansion did not, however, match the pace recently adopted in Tanzania.
Two Asian countries – South Korea and India - experienced a similarly progressive expansion of secondary education. India took 20 years to go from a 13 per cent secondary GER in 1965 to 35 per cent in 1985. Starting from a similar point of departure Tanzania (11.2 per cent in 2005) took 5 years to reach a comparable level. South Korea took 5 years to reach a GER of 36 per cent in 1955 albeit starting from a relatively high level of 20 per cent in 1950.5

Figure 1-5: Gross Enrolment Ratio at secondary level (all programmes) in India, South Korea, Kenya, Mauritius and Tanzania 2005-2010

Source: the author, based on UNESCO-UIS Statistical Year Books (several years)

One may also compare Tanzania’s secondary education trajectory with two other African countries: Kenya is the gauge against which Tanzanian development has always been assessed, both by the international community and by Tanzanians themselves; and Mauritius, a rare educational success in sub-Saharan Africa, also provides an interesting standard of comparison. Kenya took 15 years to reach a GER of 30 per cent in 1980 from 4 per cent in 1965. Mauritius, close to 100 per cent GER in 2010, recorded, like South Korea, a sharp increase in its secondary GER at the beginning of its economic take-off. Nevertheless, the rhythm of expansion was slower than Tanzania’s has been over recent years: Mauritius took a decade to go from a GER of 8 per cent to 35 per cent between 1950 and 1960.

5 The differences would be more striking if budgetary allocations and share of GDP dedicated to education/secondary education were factored in.
As noted by Goldin (1997: 10), ‘making cross-country, cross-time comparisons in schooling is not a simple matter’, not least because of various definitions of official entry age and diverse organisations of each education sub-level. However, these international comparisons are not intended to unveil a correlation pattern between educational and economic development paths; they are rather meant to underline the striking nature of the educational policy choice made by the Tanzanian government. But this education ‘big bang’ has led to a deep ‘learning crisis’.

2. **Ward secondary schools and the Tanzanian ‘learning crisis’**

In 2010, the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT) estimated that about 90 per cent of secondary schools required some form of rehabilitation, refurbishment or completion: in most cases, government construction standards for secondary schools were not strictly enforced (World Bank 2010: 3). The fieldwork in Lushoto and all accounts of the situation in other parts of the country confirmed the poor state of ward secondary school infrastructure.

The increase in the number of secondary schools was not accompanied by a commensurate expansion of the teaching force. While enrolment in secondary schools (O and A levels) grew by 253 per cent between 2003 and 2008, the number of teachers only increased by 42 per cent (Figure 1.6).

**Figure 1-6: Enrolment and teaching staff in secondary education**

![Graph showing enrolment and teaching staff in secondary education](image)

Source: the author, based on URT (2011b and 2012a)
During the first years of implementation of the ward schools policy, the pupil-teacher ratio increased from 28:1 in 2006 to 44:1 in 2007; this general evolution concealed, however, greater deficits in specific disciplines like maths, sciences and English and the fact that many teachers were actually absent from school to continue further studies. The number of teachers required increased from about 24,000 in 2007 to 96,000 in 2009 (URT 2009a).

To address the teacher shortage the government introduced, as a temporary measure, a ‘crash programme’ or Induction Course: in 2006/2007, the government recruited 6,990 Form Six leavers, provided them with a one-month training course and posted them in new ward secondary schools.\(^6\)

These ‘licensed teachers’ continued their studies at The Open University of Tanzania as distance learners to get the required qualifications. In 2012, the ‘crash-programme’ was officially stopped but these teachers continued to be recruited by schools to fill the gaps in the teaching force, especially for maths and science subjects. The overall shortage of teachers has been further complicated by the fact that newly recruited teachers tend to shy away from rural schools and teachers are unevenly distributed, with the greatest shortages occurring in remote rural schools (World Bank 2011).

From a learning perspective, the secondary education expansion led to dramatic results. The pass rate in the Certificate of Secondary Education Examination plunged from 78.4 per cent in 2000 to 43.8 per cent in 2012. The decline was particularly acute for better grades, Division 1 to 3 (Figure 1.7): the share of ‘Division 4’ students among all ‘pass students’ rose steadily from 60 per cent in 2006 to 81 per cent in 2011.\(^7\)

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\(^7\) With a Division 4 grade, students cannot enroll in A Level schools.
Figure 1-7: Pass rate in Form Four Examination (CSEE) by division

Source: the author, based on URT (2011b and 2012a) (only total pass rate available for 2012)

This general decline in examination results concealed performance inequalities between school categories. Religious schools lie at the top of the quality hierarchy: they record the best results, followed by ‘old’ government-owned schools and non-seminary private schools. Ward secondary schools lay at the bottom (World Bank 2010a: 2).

A parallel decrease in quality indicators was recorded at primary level: the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE) pass rate decreased from 70.5 per cent in 2006 to 53.5 per cent in 2010 and the Uwezo studies conducted in 2010, 2011 and 2012 revealed Tanzanian children’s low level of basic skills in literacy and numeracy. According to the 2012 Uwezo Report only one out of four Standard 3 children can read a Standard 2 level Kiswahili story, only four out of ten have Standard 2 numeracy skills and less than one out of ten have basic English literacy skills (Uwezo 2013).

These indicators should be considered as simple proxies of a concept – quality education – which remains elusive; nevertheless, they can be seen as signs that Tanzania’s basic education system was not able to deliver ‘learning’ in a context of rapid expansion of mass education. These poor performances propelled a profound ‘learning crisis’ in the country, fuelling public debates in the media and Parliament. The 2012 Form Four examination

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8 The organisation of secondary education is detailed in Chapter 3.
9 Uwezo studies - an initiative by the NGO Twaweza - assess children’s literacy and numeracy performances across East Africa. They consist of household-based surveys carried out via tools developed in accordance with national curricula, to measure children’s ability to read (in English and Kiswahili) and to do basic arithmetic at the Standard 2 level (see http://www.uwezo.net/).
results were even nullified following an intense public row and the pass rate revised.\textsuperscript{10} ‘The Form Four results have left the nation shocked to the core.’\textsuperscript{11}

3. The ward secondary schools in historical perspective

3.1 Ward secondary schools: a rupture with the historical trajectory

From a national perspective, the decision to widely expand public secondary education was at odds with the trajectory followed by the country for more than four decades. A specific educational settlement was forged during the \textit{Ujamaa} period (1964-1985), within which secondary education occupied a particular position. The notion of ‘educational settlement’ is derived from the concept of ‘political settlement’ commonly used in political economy and referring to ‘the balance or distribution of power between contending social groups and social classes on which any state is based’ (Di John and Putzel 2009: 4). More precisely, for Khan (2010), a political settlement describes how a society solves the problem of violence and achieves the minimum level of political stability and economic performance for it to operate as a society. Following Melling who stressed that ‘social policies of the state formed part of a wider political settlement at key moments of development’ (1991 quoted in Di John and Putzel 2009: 4), the conditions of distribution of educational rights and entitlements across social groups may be considered part and parcel of this political settlement. An educational settlement corresponds to a specific organisation of the access/quality/equity nexus, traditionally central to educational policy-making. The concept leads to questioning or investigating the mechanisms by which the coalition of interests that determines resource mobilisation and allocation for public education evolves or is reproduced.

The patterns of educational enrolment at secondary level displayed in Figure 1.8 vividly illustrate the historical rupture provoked by the ward secondary schools policy. Its significance cannot be understood without a description of the post-independence educational settlement and its meaning in relation to the colonial legacy and within \textit{Ujamaa} as a broader political project.

\textsuperscript{10} ‘Tanzania: Row Over Form Four Failures’ \textit{AllAfrica} 17/05/2013 (http://allafrica.com/stories/201305170098.html, accessed 06/02/2014).
\textsuperscript{11} ‘EYE ON EDUCATION: If we don’t take action now, we’re doomed’, \textit{The Citizen} 15/03/2013.
3.2 Educational colonial legacy in Tanzania

In sub-Saharan Africa, formal education was first introduced by missionaries: the diffusion of elementary education was to serve the Church’s evangelising and civilising endeavours in the ‘dark continent’ (Sutton 1965). In the territory which was to become Tanganyika, educational activities conducted by Christian missionaries, present since the 1840s, expanded in the 1890s under the protection of the German colonial power (Buchert 1994). 12 Formal education was from the outset associated with imported ideas of ‘civilisation’ and ‘modernisation’. With the progressive involvement of the colonial power, secular purposes – to provide the colonial administration with indigenous auxiliary staff – became preeminent. 13

12 The Germans ruled over Tanganyika from the 1880s to the end of the First World War when the British took over under a Society of Nations’ mandate. Tanzania was formed in 1964 from the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, a British protectorate since 1890. The first government schools were created in 1890 but the colonial power did not really start to get involved in education policies until 1900.

13 Nevertheless, education never became a sphere reserved to the colonial power: mainly for budgetary reasons, the colonial administration discharged a large part of the African education burden on the Church. An enduring governmental habit - in March 2011, Tanzania’s President asked religious institutions to build secondary schools ‘to meet the demand’ (The Guardian 18/03/2011).
Over time, British colonial discourses assigned different purposes to education but, in practice, Tanganyika’s education system was largely modelled to comply with the colonial strategy of economic specialisation of Tanganyika’s territory and organised to fulfil the needs of the emerging capitalist group. Historically, schools – governmental and missionary – were implanted in cash-crop areas, zones of European settlement, trade hubs or industrialising areas (Samoff 1979a, Oketch and Rolleston 2007). The education system was also racially differentiated with a segment delivering an academic and elitist education to Indians and Europeans, mainly in government schools. The segment dedicated to Africans delivered mass education, mainly in missionary and ‘bush’ schools led by indigenous local authorities: only a few Africans could access the elitist education system. On the eve of independence, the education system was stunted and highly differentiated along racial, social and regional lines (Buchert 1994). As in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, the ‘struggle to counter or correct or to maintain such imbalances [would be] at the heart of post-colonial politics’ (Coleman 1965: 38).

3.3 The post-independence educational settlement and secondary education

After independence in 1961, the new authorities gave priority to post-primary education. Their ‘manpower planning’ strategy, in a clear continuation of the British ‘Education for Modernisation’, put the emphasis on human resource development to accommodate the needs of economic growth and the Africanisation of the civil service (Samoff 1993; Buchert 1994). This orientation was very much in line with the modernisation theory that dominated international thinking on development at the time.

In Tanzania, as with any other socialist project, the construction of an egalitarian society constituted a core objective of *Ujamaa* philosophy. Education was to play, ideologically and materially, a core role in the quest for social justice as well as national unity. In 1967, in the

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14 The promotion of ‘native interests’ and the improvement of the living conditions of the majority, under the ‘Education for Adaptation’ policy (1919-1945) followed by the transmission of democratic values to prepare Africans to conduct their own affairs, under ‘Education for Modernisation’ (1945 – 1961). See Buchert (1994).

15 Following the ‘indirect rule’ strategy, the British colonial power discharged the responsibility of managing local affairs to local indigenous authorities.

16 In 1956, 95 per cent of Indian school-age children were enrolled at primary and secondary levels against 80 per cent for Europeans and 8.5 per cent for Africans (Buchert 1994).

17 In 1959, there were only 4,132 students in secondary schools, 428 in higher education and 70 university graduates (Sutton 1965: 71).

18 In his famous model for economic growth, Rostow (1960) identified secular education as one of the pre-conditions for take-off.
Arusha Declaration, *Education for Self Reliance* was put at the heart of *Ujamaa*: education was understood to be the fundamental instrument for a radical social transformation (Samoff and Sumra 1994). The 1977 *Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania* guaranteed the right to education for all citizens ‘up to the highest level according to his merits and ability’; the ‘Government was made responsible for creating the conditions for realisation of this right’ (URT 1977). Thus, education was elevated to the status of a human right and the fulfilment of this right was a core duty of the state.19

During *Ujamaa*, primary education and literacy programmes were regarded as the chief instruments for social equalisation. According to Nyerere, ‘Primary education is to the education of our nation what Agriculture is to the economy – the pivot on which everything else turns. It is not called Primary education for nothing; it is the education everyone has’ (Nyerere 1984: 150). Primary education was conceived as an end in itself: it was to prepare children for their role within the community rather than to give them automatic entry ticket to upper education levels. Secondary education was deliberately construed as education for a few but meritocratic, free and of quality. For decades, access to secondary education was restricted to a small minority. Between 1966 and 1981, primary education enrolment grew sixfold and the literacy rate increased from 20 per cent to 90 per cent; in 1977 the primary gross enrolment ratio reached 97 per cent. In the same period, the transition rate from primary to lower secondary education fell from 35 per cent in 1962 to 2.6 per cent in 1981. ‘Tanzanian children (had) among the lowest probability of attending secondary school of all children in the developing world’ (Lassibille et al. 2000: 4).

Nyerere consistently reiterated his conviction about Tanzania’s secondary education problem. The main rationale for a distorted educational pyramid – broad base and tiny summit – lay in Tanzania’s narrow economic base. Tanzania, as a poor country, could not afford to expand secondary education: ‘[Secondary education] is not the right of all Tanzanians as Primary Education is’ (Nyerere 1984: 153). This 1984 statement echoed earlier ones in 1971 – ‘The poverty of Tanzania does not allow for the kind of expenditure which would be necessary for such universal services [post primary education], however we

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19 This commitment was reiterated in 2000 by E. Lowassa – then Minister of State to the Vice President’s Office: ‘Tanzania believes that providing social services such as education, safe water and health, including reproductive health services to the population is a fundamental obligation of the state and is a human rights issue.’ (Statement at the Social Summit, June 2000; http://www.un.org/socialsummit/speeches/276tan.htm).
would like them. Priorities have to be worked out and strictly adhered to’ (Nyerere 1971: 110) - and in 1967: ‘We cannot solve the “problem of primary school leavers” by increasing the number of secondary school places’ (URT 1967a: 78). The intrinsic contradiction between a right-based, egalitarian discourse on education and this restriction of the right to upper educational levels to a few privileged youth was pointed out by Nyerere himself: ‘Publicly provided “education for education’s sake” must be general education for the masses. Further education for a selected few must be education for service to the many. There can be no other justification for taxing the many to give education to only a few’ (URT 1967a: 79). Secondary education expansion was only legitimate in relation to its service to primary education and the rest of the economy, ‘in providing a reservoir from which we can recruit teachers, agriculturalists, health workers, engineers, and so on. We have no other justification for providing secondary school education’ (Nyerere 1984: 153). During Ujamaa, the prevailing manpower policy derived the number of seats available in government secondary schools and university from the projected needs of the economy.

Within a self-identified socialist regime aimed at reversing the colonial legacy, such blatant built-in elitism in the education system needed to be legitimised. It called for an ideological apparatus and organisational measures to make it acceptable to the vast majority who were barred from a resource critical for access to white collar jobs, power and wealth. First of all, a quota system assigned a specific number of places in public secondary schools to each region and to girls. In parallel, legal restrictions put on the expansion of private schools were meant to contain the distorted educational patterns inherited at independence (Samoff 1979a, Buchert 1994). Secondary schools also played a critical role in the process of the ‘reciprocal assimilation of elites’ (Bayart 1993): the fact that Tanzanian students attended secondary schools outside their region of origin forged within the elite a sense of national belonging that transcended tribal identities. This social blending process was a critical function that Nyerere attached to secondary schools.20 The implementation of Education for Self Reliance also implied critical changes in the curriculum aimed at inculcating students with a sense of serving the public and preparing them for their role as drivers of rural development. Work had to become an integral part of education and the secondary

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20 Similarly, according to Benedict Anderson, the posting of officials to different parts of their countries helped promote the ‘imagined community’ underpinning nationalism (Anderson 1991). In his recent memoirs, There Was a Country, Chinua Achebe recalled his youth and elite education in the heyday of Nigerian national identity formation (Achebe 2012).
education curriculum was ‘vocationalised’ so as to make it relevant to students’ future life in the community. The continuity between the colonial education system and Education for Self Reliance – the philosophy and its practice – has already been pointed out (Coulson 1982; Mbilinyi 1979). What has been less emphasized, however, is how much these mechanisms, working against the idea of wealth or tribal belonging as the source of individual advancement, inscribed meritocracy at the heart of secondary education and therefore social promotion.

Another facet of the Ujamaa secondary education model was ‘quality’, as acknowledged by many research respondents. A Member of Parliament stressed the quality of the Tanzanian former public secondary education system: ‘At that time, public schools were centres of excellence. All good teachers were teaching there. Both parents of rich and poor families had the opportunity to send their kids to school and get quality education’ (interview 83). This appreciation was shared by the international community. An education aid manager noted: ‘Back to the 1980s and 1970s, Tanzania used to have a high quality secondary education. The paradigm then, under Nyerere, was to produce very good graduates but there was no concern about numbers’ (interview 58).

The economic liberalisation of the 1980s initiated a process of erosion and remodelling of the nation’s educational settlement. The 1985-1995 decade marked an upturn in the national educational ideology relating to the place granted to private education. However, it did not provoke any major upheaval in the distinctive functions respectively attributed to primary and secondary education. During this period, the increase in the transition rate from primary to secondary levels was chiefly driven by the growth of the private sector but in 1995 Tanzania still registered a very low 5 per cent secondary GER; 55 per cent of secondary students were enrolled in private schools against an average of 30 per cent in African countries (Lassibille et al. 2000: 5). The 1995-2005 decade was a phase of mass primary education, marked by the return to the 1970s’ ambition of Universal Primary Education. In 2004, when SEDP was launched, the secondary gross enrolment ratio was still only 9.5 per cent, the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa, and the government had not built any new secondary schools since 1980 (World Bank 2004: 5). The transition rate between primary level and lower secondary was 22 per cent compared with 50 per cent in Uganda (World Bank 2004: 3). According to national Household Budget Surveys, in 1991/1992 only 3.9
per cent of the adult population had benefited from an O Level education, a figure that, at 4.6 per cent, was only slightly higher in 2000/2001 (URT 2009b: 20).\textsuperscript{21}

4. **The ward secondary schools policy: emancipation from international aid agencies?**

The post-independence history of relationships between Tanzanian authorities and the international aid community was characterised by a succession of ‘love’ and ‘hate’ phases (Languille and Dolan 2012).

During *Ujamaa*, despite the self-reliance rhetoric, donors supported the implementation of Nyerere’s education policies. SIDA, UNESCO and UNICEF, especially, were widely involved in the literacy and adult education programmes (King 1990). The World Bank supported the expansion of social services in accordance with its ‘basic needs’ strategy (Holtom 2005). Samoff and Sumra (1994) argue that the signing of the first structural adjustment programme in 1985 prompted a major shift in relations between Tanzanian education planners and aid agencies: now ‘priorities were set less by government and party leaders and more by what foreign government and their aid organisations were willing to finance’ (ibid: 33). Consistent with the World Bank and IMF’s recommendations, school fees were reintroduced in primary and secondary schools. The opening of private secondary schools, ‘earlier discouraged but tolerated’, was encouraged again by the government as of 1986 (ibid: 20). The cost-sharing measures had a major negative impact on education performance that only picked up again after the new *Education for All* drive (Oketch and Rolleston 2007; Galabawa 2001).\textsuperscript{22} The 1995 *Education and Training Policy*, largely drafted under external influences, constituted a clear formalisation of the neoliberal turn of the mid-1980s: the document formally inscribed ‘the promotion of private education providers’, the ‘liberalisation of services’ and the ‘decentralisation of education management’ at the heart of the organisation of Tanzanian education (URT 1995). The second half of the 1990s was a time of intense planning in which donors were heavily involved. In 1999, the World Bank reversed its position and promoted the abolition of primary school fees as a major measure to be included in Tanzania’s first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. In 2001 a SWAP programme, the *Education Sector Development Plan* (ESDP), was finalised and

\textsuperscript{21} Adult population being defined as 15 years old and above.

\textsuperscript{22} The primary GER decreased from 98 per cent in 1980 to 77 per cent in 2000 (Oketch and Rolleston 2007: 17).
subsequently translated into sub-sector plans: the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP), the Secondary Education Development Plan (SEDP) and the Higher Education and Development Plan (HEDP). The same year, the PEDP basket-fund, financed by a coalition of donors, was launched.\textsuperscript{23}

At international level, in signing the \textit{Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness} (2005)\textsuperscript{24} and the \textit{Accra Agenda for Action} (2008), aid agencies and international NGOs committed to improving aid management through the enforcement of fundamental principles: harmonisation of donors’ practices, alignment with the recipient countries’ poverty reduction strategies, systems and procedures; beneficiary countries’ ownership; result-oriented policies and capacity building initiatives. Aid instruments were also reshuffled to abide by these new precepts with budget support becoming the emblematic instrument of this new aid regime. Tanzania became internationally praised for its exemplary implementation of the \textit{Paris Declaration} through the invention of new aid management modalities.

Yet the actual secondary expansion recorded by Tanzania between 2004 and 2012 largely diverged from the enrolment growth projected within the SEDP I (2004-2009). This programme was planned by the Ministry of Education in collaboration with different aid agencies and became the basis for the World Bank’s own support of secondary education. With the ward secondary schools policy, Tanzanian authorities had stepped aside from the joint policy-making arena that had taken shape since the mid-1990s. This drive was led by the new government that came to power after the 2005 elections; contrary to the previous Mkapa regime, rather sympathetic to the international community, the new ruling coalition, led by President Kikwete and Prime Minister Lowassa, adopted a more nationalistic stance and a less conciliatory attitude towards donors’ demands.

5. Statement of the problems, research questions and dissertation outline

To summarize, four main characteristics of the ward secondary schools policy make it worthy of an in-depth study.

\textsuperscript{23} See Annex A for a historical mapping of the various education policies.
\textsuperscript{24} For the full document, see http://www.oecd.org.
i) First, the pace of expansion was exceptional, even from an internationally comparative perspective. What state/communities configuration and what funding arrangements (or fiscal space) made its tangible accomplishments – lower secondary schools spread all over the country and a dramatic increase in the enrolment figures – possible?

ii) Second, this policy meant a profound reconfiguration of the post-independence educational settlement, a shift from a quality, free, elitist and meritocratic secondary education to mass secondary education of poor quality. It was also in obvious contradiction to Nyerere’s educational prescriptions. In a context where Nyerere remains a figure of worship and a mandatory reference in political and policy-making spheres (Fouere 2014), how could a policy that so profoundly contradicts Nyerere’s teaching be enacted? What main factors may explain the Tanzanian elites’ decision to significantly alter the country’s educational organisation?

iii) Whereas, since the mid-1980s, education policy-making in Tanzania has largely been driven by the donor community, the ward secondary schools policy may qualify, at least in the first instance, as a home-grown educational policy. What does this policy, conducted against donors’ recommendations, reveal about power relations between the Tanzanian government and international aid agencies? At the same time, to what extent did donors contribute to shaping the ward secondary schools policy?

iv) Finally, while post-primary education and quality (under the ‘learning’ label) are given increasing attention in international debates, the specific access-quality-equity nexus that the ward secondary schools policy gave rise to provides an interesting opportunity to study critical challenges that the post-2015 global educational agenda may well face in practice. The ward schools movement provides a telling illustration that ‘schooling ain’t learning’ (Pritchett 2013).

Increasing resources for schools, improving teachers’ pay, working and training conditions, constructing infrastructures to decrease class size, providing textbooks and other learning materials or revising the curriculum have long constituted the core of educational policy-making. Yet, a global diagnosis of the learning crisis is currently under formation that challenges the relevance of these traditional policies. An influential international compact made of scholars, aid agencies and philanthropic institutions is advocating for an alternative intervention package consisting of: randomised controlled trials to identify policies that
work to deliver learning; standardised measurement of learning performance and the dissemination of results to induce citizens-clients’ demands for learning; teachers’ salary and school funding tied to performances and replacing/supplementing state by private provision, in decentralised and autonomous units, financed through publicly funded vouchers (for instance Pritchett 2013; Barnerjee and Duflo 2011; World Bank 2011a).

This research does not engage, systematically and thoroughly, with this emerging global learning agenda. As we will see, chiefly in Chapters 4 and 5, the international learning shift has had an impact in Tanzania at the very end of the research period; but donors’ interventions to translate the new strategic orientations mentioned above, on the ground and at secondary level, were at too early a stage to assess their impact in practice. Nevertheless, understanding how political economy factors have shaped the access-equity-quality problem in the context of the ward schools policy constitutes a guiding thread of the present work.

More generally, this research project was driven by six broad questions:

- What are the main driving forces of the educational policy choices made by elites? To what extent do labour market demands and economic considerations play a determining role (as predicted by human capital theory)?
- What strategies do governments adopt to maximize education aid while securing their decision making power over national education choices?
- What is the appropriate scale of the fiscal space and corresponding political unit to organise the funding of ‘public goods’?
- To what extent are education policies renegotiated through implementation at local level?
- What are the implications of an enrolment expansion for market-based production of educational goods?
- How do ruling class’ capital accumulation strategies interact with the education system?

The thesis is organised as follows:

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25 Chapter 2, however, provides a critical analysis from a conceptual perspective.
Chapter 2 describes the core tenets of human capital theory and its evolution from rate of return studies to the recent cognitive skills enriched model. It highlights its key limitations, particularly with regard to its ability to account for educational policy-making and implementation. It also traces the genealogy of the global education agenda – specifically in relation to secondary education – and demonstrates its direct lineage from human capital theory. This exposition justifies the choice of an alternative analytical framework.

Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework of the research and defines the key principles of the political economy approach adopted. It also accounts for various sources of theoretical inspiration in the sociology of education and the political economy tradition. The chapter also clarifies the meaning of two key concepts - ‘the state’ and ‘the elite’ - and provides important contextual information. Finally, it describes the methodological framework, mostly qualitative. The fieldwork, conducted in Tanzania between September 2011 and April 2012, encompassed about 180 in-depth semi-structured interviews with members of the elite at national level and in Lushoto district, the visit of 28 secondary schools and focus groups with parents, students and teachers.

Chapter 4 sheds light on the politics of educational policy-making through an exploration of elite narratives. The Tanzanian state is not a homogeneous entity: the ward schools policy has been the outcome of intra-ruling class struggles, especially between politicians and technocrats. Nevertheless, in 2011-2012, elites deployed a homogeneous discourse to legitimize this education policy with controversial outcomes. Education – transmission of knowledge – was not the core concern of elites; youth domestication was their primary objective. Three main discursive resources were consistently mobilised: the policy was a response to a ‘social demand’, to the ‘youth ticking bomb’ threat and to the knowledge economy imperatives. This specific formulation of the equity/access/quality nexus resonates with global education discourses while being profoundly rooted in the country’s history: an instance of hybrid discursive construct. The growing consensus among donors and domestic elites about the inescapable demands of the global market – quality education defined as English, skills and sciences - built on shallow empirical evidence, conceals mechanisms of social reproduction at play within the education system.
Chapter 5 investigates internal and external political economy factors that, beneath the technicalities of the budget, have moulded a negligible budget for ward secondary schools. Trapped within a global agenda focused on primary education, donors did not provide additional resources to support secondary education expansion, their own creature in many respects. Their effective response to the learning crisis – at the end of the research period - fell short of the enormous fiscal challenge. On the other hand, elites’ egalitarian claims to legitimize the ward secondary schools did not provoke a realignment of their budget preferences. With a narrow budgetary room for manoeuvre, they favoured ‘productive sectors’ over education and higher education over basic education; resources were never ring-fenced for ward secondary schools. The social order imperative was revealed as a prominent parameter in elites’ budget decisions and prevailed over welfare considerations. Since 2009/10, donors and domestic elites’ converging concerns over quality have allowed marginal budgetary adjustments in favour of secondary education and quality-related inputs. The budget remained, however, the favoured locus for domestic elites to assert their sovereign power: within the asymmetrical power relations that characterise aid relations, they persistently and successfully deployed mechanisms to curtail donors’ attempts to structurally alter their budget preferences.

Chapter 6 is dedicated to the politics of implementation in Lushoto District, in North East Tanzania, where the expansion was particularly dramatic. The policy was grounded in a ‘self-help’ ideology and anchored to the decentralisation process: this chapter challenges this model of expansion, congruent with donors’ good governance agenda. The initial ‘social contract’ between communities and the state turned into a ‘fool’s game’: the state did not honour its part of the contract; peasants and parents, via consent or through coercion, bore a large share of the costs of the reform. All segments of the local elite, as brokers of the central state, played a pivotal role in the mobilisation of communities: they deployed coercive measures, ideological discourse and patronage practices to gain communities’ consent. At the same time, these community schools turned into a major political battlefield between members of the elite: spatial politics has been the main engine of the expansion, local politicians using the construction of new schools as a privileged route to prestige and power. Their opportunistic translation of the central state policy into a ‘village school policy’ led, however, to a hyper-fragmentation of the local policy space. Two specific local arenas - the district budget and school boards – are of particular interest in deciphering...
competing interests among various segments of the elite and the process of power reconfiguration that the implementation of the ward schools policy unleashed.

Chapter 7 explores the interactions between the textbook industry and secondary education expansion, at a time when Tanzania’s textbook sector was on the verge of collapse. The chapter examines Tanzania’s textbook publishing and distribution infrastructure and its historical embeddedness within political-economy dynamics. The opening of Tanzania’s textbook market (starting in the mid-1980s), imposed by donors, promoted Western publishing corporations’ interests but was not based on any evidence of a comparative lack of efficiency of the state-owned textbook publishing complex. Aid agencies’ practices – their direct support of Western publishing companies, their procurement procedures, the prevalence of the ‘transparency imperative’ and their utilitarian definition of quality education – have contributed enormously in shaping the Tanzanian textbook sector. The sovereign project of building an indigenous private publishing industry (as a substitute to a state-owned industry) has also been hampered by a specific distribution of power within the Tanzanian state. Finally, the chapter explores elite accumulation strategies harnessed to the textbook trade and unpacks intricate distributive networks woven around education resources, in national and district arenas.

The ward schools movement occurred in a context of job scarcity, quasi-universal primary education and quality private education available for the wealthy. In conclusion, Chapter 8 argues that, in this context, under-resourced and under-performing ward secondary schools can be interpreted as a renewed educational settlement to resolve the structural tension inherent in education systems between the integration of the youth and social differentiation. Despite its break with the past, the ward schools policy also displayed elements of continuity: its modes of legitimation and implementation were profoundly rooted in the country’s history. Donors’ ideology, funding and policy choices significantly influenced the shaping of this policy and its narrow fiscal space. New aid modalities currently under consideration completely evade the structural question of the fiscal space for quality basic education for all and obscure the responsibility of domestic and international elites to fund it. Far from sites of human capital accumulation, these public ‘business’ secondary schools offered members of the elite a major site of power and capital accumulation. Yet, the functionalism of elites’ educational policy choices or the
homogeneity of the state and the donor community should not be overstated: educational policies and budgets are forged through conflict-ridden historical processes, underpinned by more or less unstable balances of power. Finally, the chapter sketches out a future research agenda that would tackle critical issues not covered in this research: the relationship between education and the labour market; the growth of private education provision; and the role of various actors – teachers, parents, students, teachers’ trade union or civil society organisation - in shaping, transforming or contesting the ward secondary schools policy and the educational settlement they embody.
Chapter Two

Secondary education, human capital theory and the education aid agenda

In her review of the state of research on comparative and international education, Stromquist (2005: 29) noted ‘we know relatively little about policy formulation and subsequent implementation in developing countries […] Most policy analyses concentrate on the policy itself and give limited consideration to the historical and political context in which the policy functions’. While literature on education in Africa is abundant, the political economy of education reforms in sub-Saharan Africa has barely secured any research attention and secondary education policies even less so. As pointed out by Heyneman (2003: 506), ‘so much attention in research and policy literature has been paid to basic and higher education that the middle part, secondary education, has seemed like a relative orphan.’

This truncated research agenda is largely the result of the hegemonic influence of human capital theory. For the last three decades research on education in developing countries has been overwhelming influenced by this specific economic school and its underlying assumptions: individuals’ choice, ‘rates of return’ and education production functions. More recently, human capital literature has shifted the research agenda towards the role of cognitive skills in economic growth and their measurement. These analytical emphases have led to an evolving global education agenda: from a focus on access to primary education within the Millennium Development Goals framework to a recent emphasis on ‘learning’. The specific position of secondary education within this trajectory – from disregard to a renewed centrality as privileged purveyor of marketable skills – has directly reflected these evolutions.

This chapter pursues two aims. First, it highlights key limitations of human capital theory in relation to its ability to account for educational policy-making and implementation. This exposition will justify the choice of an alternative analytical framework to study the recent Tanzanian experience of secondary education expansion (Chapter 3). The second objective
is to trace the genealogy of the global education agenda – specifically in relation to secondary education – and demonstrate its direct lineage from human capital theory. This exercise of deconstruction provides the background for analyses that, in the rest of the dissertation, explore aid agencies’ specific interventions in Tanzania.

The first section describes the core tenets of human capital theory from its inception in the 1960s to the formulation of a cognitive skills enriched model at the end of the 2000s. The second section is dedicated to a critique of this theoretical framework. Three main issues are pointed out: its underlying utilitarian conception of education, its ‘one-size-fit all’ institutional model and its inability to account for the relationship between education and the economy. The third section focuses on the international education agenda and its treatment of secondary education. This vantage point provides an interesting lens for the examination of the direct lineage between human capital theory and the current global education agenda, that remains however a site of ideological battles.

1. Human capital literature 1960-2012: core tenets and main alterations

1.2 The core theoretical framework: the fathers of the theory

The roots of human capital theory can be traced to classical political economists who were, during the 17th and 18th centuries, already concerned with education and labour skills (Hanushek 2006). More recently, Schultz (1961), Mincer (1958) and Becker (1962, 1964) formalised the contribution of human capital to economic growth and the formation and distribution of individual earnings.

Becker defined human capital as ‘activities that influence future real income through the embedding of resources in people’ (Becker 1962: 9). Human capital is not restricted to formal schooling; it also comprises ‘on-the-job training, medical care, vitamin consumption and acquiring information about the economic system’ (ibid). But subsequent literature mainly focused on formal education, professional experience, training within the firm and migration. From a macro-economic perspective, human capital theory was developed to explain the residual factor of growth, i.e. to account for the evidence that ‘the growth in capital per capita explains only a small part of the growth in per capita income’ (Becker
From a micro-economic perspective, human capital theory departed from the traditional economic tenet that differences in the amount of physical capital retained by individuals would explain differences in individual economic wellbeing.

Chronologically, Mincer (1958) showed that individuals are characterised by different propensities to invest in education in order to occupy qualified jobs: the skewed distribution of earnings reflects a skewed distribution of education levels. Schultz (1961) demonstrated that individuals can improve their productivity through voluntary investments. Becker (1964) developed the theoretical framework: human capital is considered in the same terms as physical capital and their dynamics are both driven by the ‘rate of return’. The return to education investment, a notion central to human capital theory, is measured by the difference between all costs of education (direct and indirect, i.e. foregone earnings when studying) and future earnings. Mincer (1974) derived the effect of education investments on individual earnings: he modelled a relationship between earnings and years of schooling, which could be empirically tested. His earnings function determined the extra lifetime earnings an individual would be paid as a result of an extra year of schooling. Later, Woodhall (1987) introduced the distinction between private and social rates of return as measured by the difference between aggregated private earnings and total (private and external) costs. At the end of the 1980s, endogenous growth theory formally met human capital theory: Lucas (1988) showed that Solow and Denison's neoclassical growth model could not account for cross-country differences in levels and rates of income per capita. He proposed an enriched model, which incorporated Becker’s and Schultz’ human capital concept: the acquisition of skills enhances workers’ productivity, induces additional investment in physical capital and thereby promotes economic growth.

These early works have given rise to an abundant literature that has added to the sophistication of the original human capital analysis while remaining faithful to its core components: individuals’ rational choice, investment in education driven by rates of return to education and an education production function.
1.2 Rate of Return studies or the elusive quest for scientific criteria for education resource allocation

Following Mincer’s standard formulation, a vast amount of empirical work has been conducted, initially on developed countries. Myriad so-called ‘Mincerian regressions’ were carried out to empirically test the relationship between investment in education - as measured by school attainment - and its outcome - individual earnings. Variables were introduced to control for the potential effects of other possible determinant factors of earnings: individual ability as measured by IQ (Griliches and Mason 1972), family background (Leibowitz 1974) and school characteristics and environment (Hanushek 1986).26

Rate of Return to Education (RORE) studies were then extended to developing countries in a quest to identify criteria that would scientifically ground policy choices for education resource allocation. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) provided an extended review of RORE studies, covering 73 countries, which revealed worldwide patterns. They confirmed several classical results already discussed in Psacharopoulos (1994): rates of return to education fall when levels of economic development and education increase (diminishing returns); they would be higher in sub-Saharan Africa than in any other region, investments in primary education would yield the highest return to investment; and, finally, private returns would be higher than ‘social’ returns.27

As exposed by Johnston (2011), this ‘rates of return literature’ has been widely criticized and its classical patterns challenged. First of all, studies used in Psacharopoulos’ reviews of ROREs (1994 and 2004) revealed divergent patterns. For instance, studies conducted in Tanzania over the last thirty years, summarised in Al-Samarrai and Reilly (2008), tend to refute the universality of the pattern proposed by RORE orthodoxy. Mason and Khandker (1997), using the 1991 Labour Force Survey data, showed that the private rate of return for Tanzanian males was 7 per cent in primary, 12 per cent in junior secondary, 2 per cent in senior secondary and 12 per cent in higher education. Knight and Sabot (1981, 1990) used data from the 1971 and 1980 surveys of manufacturing sector employees and found a 2.1

26 For a comprehensive review see Schultz (1988).
27 The authors acknowledged that this latter result was largely due to heavy subsidization of education and the difficulty of factoring in social externalities in the equation.
per cent rate of return for primary education and 7.3 per cent for junior secondary education.

Bennell (1996a) underlined some major methodological flaws of RORE studies. They omit, or treat inconsistently, variables with potentially independent effects on earnings (i.e. individual ability or family income background); they assume that primary education opportunity costs are as good as nil whereas the reality of African rural societies is that children commonly contribute to family income. Also, most studies reviewed by Psacharopoulos use very old data and consider age-earning profiles as stable in time, failing to take account of structural characteristics of sub-Saharan labour markets. Since the 1980s, labour market conditions in the region have recorded dramatic transformations: an increase in the level of wage employment in absolute terms albeit slower than the growth in the labour force; a reduction in the proportion of public sector wage employees and a rapid growth in the share of the ‘informal’ sector in total employment (Kingdon et al. 2005). In Tanzania the 2006 Integrated Labour Force Survey confirmed these trends: between 2001 and 2006, the country achieved a labour-intensive growth - the number of individuals employed grew by 4 per cent a year - but the informal sector (12 per cent of employment in 2006) contributed an estimated 27 per cent of the employment growth (URT 2007). In this context, the over-reliance of RORE studies on earnings data in the formally recorded sector undermines their validity. In his critique of Knight and Sabot’s (1990) comparative study of rates of return in Kenya and Tanzania, Samoff (1992) points out that drawing general conclusions on the productivity of the entire labour force from results based on a sample of ‘an atypical segment of economically active adults’ - urban industrial workers - is questionable.

A more recent wave of RORE studies attempted to improve the earnings equation and account better for both independent variables and the structure of sub-Saharan African labour markets. As reported by Johnston (2011), these studies (Schultz 2004 on Ghana; Lassibille and Tan 2005 on Rwanda) confirmed a changing pattern of RORE in sub-Saharan Africa. Contrary to the orthodox pattern, higher education levels would yield the

28 Kingdon et al. (2005) analysed changes in labour demand between 1995 and 2005 in five sub-Saharan countries including Tanzania. For this country they used data from the 1991 and 2000 Labour Force Surveys. Data on labour markets in sub-Saharan Africa should be treated with caution (Cramer 2009).
highest private returns. A similar pattern was found for Tanzania in Al-Samarrai and Bennell (2007), corroborating the results on this country found in previous studies.

The relationship between education and growth has also been revisited and the macroeconomic benefits of education reassessed (Johnston 2011). Bils and Klenow (2000) challenged the sense of the relationship between both variables as explained by the growth literature. The empirical relationship documented by Barro and others may partly reflect the impact of growth on schooling but also omitted other factors which need to be further investigated. Other empirical investigations questioned the very correlation between education (measured by school attainment) and economic growth. Famously, Pritchett (2001) asked ‘Where has all the education gone?’ as he found no relationship between the two variables; physical capital was more strongly correlated with growth outcomes. This lack of association between growth and education has been especially true for sub-Saharan Africa (where the rate of return to education ought to be most influential): between 1960 and the mid-1980s, this region experienced the fastest education expansion in the world but on average only sluggish economic performance.

To overcome shaky empirical evidence on micro and macroeconomic benefits of education, the human capital literature has recently taken a new strategic direction, focusing on learning.

1.3 The cognitive-skills enriched human capital model or the shift to ‘learning’

A new body of literature has put ‘learning achievements’ at the heart of economic research on education. In a seminal article Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) emphasised the importance of education quality (as measured by cognitive skills acquired) in order to evaluate the relationship between education, distribution of individual earnings and economic growth.30

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29 Endogenous growth literature has found a positive relationship between schooling and the growth rate in GDP per capita across countries. Barro (1991) found that the 1990 primary and secondary school enrolment rates were positively correlated with 1960-1985 growth in real GDP per capita for 98 countries.

30 This seminal article was followed up in subsequent publications (Hanushek and Woessmann 2011 and 2012, Hanushek 2013).
From a micro-economic perspective, they provided a review of existing studies of the link between cognitive skills and individual earnings in developing countries, mostly in Africa: all concluded that higher cognitive skills yield higher private returns. The relationship would be even stronger in developing countries, in line with the classical result of diminishing returns to education investment as the level of economic development increases. Boissiere, Knight and Sabot (1985: 1029) had already showed that in Tanzania and Kenya ‘cognitive achievement [was] the main determinant of the structure of earnings’, far more than school attendance; differences in cognitive achievements between primary and secondary completers accounted for the largest proportion of wage gaps.

The expanded coverage of international student achievements tests also allowed Hanushek and Woessman to examine the macroeconomic relationship between learning achievements and growth over a long period (1960 – 2000) for fifty countries. They confirmed findings from earlier studies (for instance, Hanushek and Kimko 2000): quality, rather than access, would be the key element in accounting for the impact of education on economic development. ‘One standard deviation increase in student scores on international assessment of literacy and mathematics competencies is associated with a 2 percent increase in annual growth rates of GDP per capita’ (Hanushek and Woessmann 2008: 32). The effect was significant in both developed and developing countries but skill deficits in developing countries were larger than generally derived from just school enrolment and attainment.

While the methodological flaws of rates of return studies have already been analysed, the next section further exposes three major critiques of the human capital literature, from a political economy perspective. These critiques address both the older and the more recent ‘learning enhanced’ version of human capital theory.
2. A critical reading of human capital literature and its institutional policy prescriptions

2.1 Utilitarian and atomistic education

Human capital theory rests on a one-dimensional and utilitarian view of education: the value of education is entirely subsumed in individual earnings derived from its acquisition. The value of knowledge and skills are merely economic. Human and physical capitals are similar: ‘investment in education behaves in a more or less similar manner as investment in physical capital’ (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004: 118). Both neoclassical and endogenous growth theories are infused with this utilitarian conception of education. For Lucas (1988: 31), the ‘accumulation of human capital involves a sacrifice of current utility’ in the form of ‘a decrease in current consumption’ or ‘a less desirable mix of consumption goods’.

As stressed by Rose (2005: 163) ‘Schultz and his followers do not deny the importance of the “cultural purposes of education”’. For Schultz (1961: 5) ‘it is altogether proper that people should prize highly the cultural contributions of education’; knowledge of economic returns to human capital investments ‘should not be the exclusive basis for public policy decisions in making expenditures for education’. His main concern was that the economic contributions of education be recognised and explored. Becker (1962) also acknowledged the complexity of the satisfaction procured by education: earnings encompass both monetary earnings and ‘psychic earnings’; however, the latter need to be translated into a ‘monetary equivalent’. ‘Social returns’ or ‘social externalities’ are admitted but they are both difficult to measure and the aggregate outcome of individual decisions. Endogenous growth theory concedes that human capital accumulation is a ‘social activity, involving groups of people, that has no counterpart in the accumulation of physical capital’ (Lucas 1988: 17). However, social benefits ‘spill over from one person to another’: externalities are an aggregation of individual outcomes (ibid: 40).

One could consider the new focus on quality as an important shift towards a more holistic understanding of education. However, it still relies on a purely economic conception of education as geared towards the needs of economic competition. Education is defined as
the transmission of cognitive skills which go beyond literacy and numeracy to encompass problem-solving and teamwork skills (Hanushek and Woessmann 2008: 627-628); problem-posing skills are not considered. From this perspective, ‘quality’ is a matter of enhancing the efficiency of the investment, the productivity of capital.

By focusing on individual cognitive achievements, the learning-based human capital model transforms education into an individual journey where ‘innate abilities’ overshadow social factors in shaping educational achievements. Beyond measurement, the model ignores the mechanisms by which quality education contributes to the entrenchment of social inequalities in sub-Saharan Africa. Recent analyses that exploit Household Budget or Demographic and Health surveys have documented the unequal access to upper levels of education according to levels of income in sub-Saharan Africa. In Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe, the completion of senior secondary and university-level education is limited to middle- or upper-income households (Al-Samarrai and Bennell 2007). In Tanzania, Lewin and Sabates (2012) show that richer groups have benefited more than less privileged groups from the primary enrolment expansion in the 2000s: children from privileged households improved their enrolment rates and reduced their likelihood of being over age faster than those in poorer households. However, these quintile-based studies conceal the social or racial differentiated access to quality schools and the role of private education. They also do not say much about the politics and structural factors that contribute to shaping these unequal patterns.

Recent developments in the ‘new political economy’ might seem to allow mainstream economics to transcend the individualistic conception of education embedded in the human capital tradition. General equilibrium models, developed from historical empirical evidence of Western countries, were designed that mathematically formalised the role of elites or class in the transformation of educational systems. The complex relationship between industrialisation, democratisation and education expansion that characterised Western history between the late 18th and the beginning of the 20th centuries has also been proposed as a model for developing countries. Yet the underlying analysis of education ‘politics’ in developing countries remains simplistic and rests on a reductionist vision of

‘rent-seeking’ elites who prevent any reform. For instance, Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) argue that democratisation in the West, granted by the elite under the threat of revolution, resulted in major educational reforms which economically benefited the elite. In developing countries, however, education expansion decided upon by the elite to profit from its economic externalities might nurture their fear of a ‘democratic revolution’ and lead to more repressive regimes. The authors fail to ask why the oligarchy in developing countries would not be able, as their 19th century European counterparts were, to lead a successful political transition to democracy and mass education. ‘Strictly monitored and targeted’ (ibid: 308) aid by international agencies would constitute the unique prospect to set in motion a virtuous democratisation and growth process through human capital accumulation.

This literature could be praised for providing a political economy reading of education policies and their related distributive conflicts. Education policies are no longer driven only by aggregated individual earnings; they are also a site of political and social struggles. This literature also dwells upon findings from other social sciences, mainly history and sociology. However, it is difficult to see where their added value really lies beyond the rising mathematical sophistication of their models. These attempts to account for ‘politics’ are made within a fundamentally unchanged model; they still rely on methodological individualism, which ‘precludes the endogeneity of social forces, structures and relations, whether these be economic or otherwise, unless derived from aggregation over individuals’ (Fine 2000: 252). Nevertheless, this ability of neoclassical economics to absorb elements of ‘politics’ – understood as the mechanisms underlying the distribution of resources and power - raises major challenges for an alternative thinking intended to exist outside this framework.

2.2 Human capital theory and the employability paradigm

A second major critique of human capital theory concerns its failure ‘to contextualise the relationship between education and the economy’ (Fine and Rose 2001: 161). Specifically, Amsden (1997, 2010) convincingly points out the fallacy of the ‘employability’ paradigm that explains un- or underemployment in sub-Saharan countries as the result of the inability of education systems to provide quality education. Human capital proponents conceptualise the relations between education, the labour market and economic growth
through a Say’s law approach. However, this neoclassical view that the production of skilled workers will automatically create its own demand and generate activities to use these skills does not correspond to economic realities. ‘Jobs do not necessarily make an appearance simply because the supply of qualified job seekers improves (...). The demand side must also be improved’ (Amsden 2010: 60). Johnston (2011) similarly argued that for the macroeconomic benefits of education to occur, the education policy should be closely tied to an active state industrial and trade policy geared towards job creation.

Relentless references to the ‘Asian tigers’ as a model of economic growth driven by high-skilled human capital have often been anchored in a romanticised vision of their development path and an equally myopic view of the role of education and high-skilled labour in their ‘miracle’. The Asian developmental trajectory was originally mostly based on a technology copying strategy and low skill-based export manufacturing (Amsden 2001). Similarily, Mauritius, which has been internationally praised and singled out among all African countries for its quality education system, grounded its economic take-off on low skill-based export manufacturing that enabled the country to economically absorb a large proportion of its youth population (Livingstone 1989). Even ‘rates of return’ specialists who have, in recent years, tried to quantify the earning premium associated with different education levels in Tanzania ignore one core tenet of the knowledge-economy narrative - the technologically-driven instability of labour market skills requirements. When specifying their Mincerian regression, they assume a constant technological function (Söderbom et al. 2006: 265). A recent international IFC study also raises questions with respect to claims of a fundamental skill mismatch in sub-Saharan Africa. In low and medium income countries, ‘lack of skills’ does not feature as an impediment to business; electricity and finance constitute the top constraints faced by formal private firms (IFC 2013). McKinsey’s 2012 report Africa at work confirms that finding workers with appropriate skills and work experience is not seen by business leaders in Africa as the most prominent obstacle to
growth (unlike macroeconomic conditions, political stability and access to finance) (McKinsey 2012: 7).

In their exploration of skill formation in newly industrialised economies of East Asia - South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore - Ashton et al. (1999) point to several political economy factors that conditioned governments’ abilities to successfully translate investments in human resources into enhanced levels of education and skills. They underlined the importance of a trade and industrial policy, mechanisms that link trade and industrial policy to education and training provision, a high centralisation of control over education policy and maintaining these linkages through time. For these authors, ‘part of the distinctiveness of the Asian newly industrialised economies is not just the level and type of investment in human resource development, but their achievement in linking that investment to the requirements of the economy at different stages of economic growth’ (ibid: 136).

With the encounter between human capital and new institutionalism, however, education is not seen as an insulated domain. But a ‘one-size-fits all’ educational and economic blueprint is defined by which market-oriented efficient education institutions – based on ‘choice, competition, decentralisation, autonomy of schools and accountability for outcomes’ (Hanushek and Woessmann 2007: 16) - interact with well-functioning market-friendly economic institutions constituted of ‘established property rights, open labor and product markets, participation in international markets’ (ibid: 20).

2.3 Human capital theory and educational policy prescriptions

The third major critique that can be formulated against the human capital literature concerns its policy prescriptions. In the recent history of the human capital reform agenda, two moments need to be distinguished: input-based educational interventions in primary education and the institutional reform agenda.

RORE studies were explicitly designed to provide guidance for policy design and to set priorities in allocating funds between education sectors. ‘Allocative decisions have to be made within education and rates of return have been used as guides to such decisions’

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Empirical findings about supposedly universal RORE patterns led to two key policy recommendations. Primary education had to receive the highest share of education investment and in higher education, cost-sharing schemes were required. In parallel, regressions of education production functions were to guide resource allocation between various educational inputs: classrooms, textbooks, teacher recruitment and teacher-training.

Fields (2007) underlined the limitation of ‘Mincer rates of return’ to guide policy decisions. ROREs answer a micro-level question: they account for the increase in the individual earning of an individual who gets additional schooling. They cannot allow any assessment of the social benefits and social costs of investments in education. They cannot inform policy decisions on whether to invest additional social resources in education: ‘policy suggestions emanating from such research are less than believable’ (ibid: 58). Bennell (1996b) also stressed that due to their methodological weaknesses, aggregate RORE studies for sub-Saharan Africa could not drive any decision-making on education investment priorities. This critique did not imply that major investments in primary education were no longer necessary but that they could not be justified by reference to conventional RORE analyses.

Traditional input-based policy prescriptions were also subject to vigorous critiques by mainstream economics. Hanushek (1995, 2003) summarised the findings of 96 studies on the estimated effects of resources on student performance in developing countries. Results showed that the role of class size, teachers’ education, teachers’ experience, teachers’ salary, expenditure per pupil or facilities appeared inconclusive: little evidence was found of a close relation between higher expenditures and student outcomes. Similarly, Pritchett and Filmer (1999) showed that education production functions lacked any analytical power to explain decisions on allocation of education resources. Education budgets and policies are not determined to maximise the education output but through a political process; common recommendations to spend more on a certain input cannot meaningfully inform decision-making.

Against these damaging critiques, renewed policy prescriptions have been formulated that mark the productive encounter between human capital and new institutionalism. Within
this framework, the source of inefficiencies in education systems is the absence of ‘built-in performance incentives’ (Hanushek 1995: 242). Education reforms should therefore aim at radically changing the structure of incentives within education systems. Three institutional features are supposed to induce significant improvements in students’ learning achievements: ‘choice and competition’; ‘decentralization and autonomy of schools’; and ‘accountability’. In the context of the ‘learning shift’, and given the magnitude of quality challenges in developing countries, the need for deep institutional changes has become even more pressing (Hanushek and Woessmann 2008).

To support these reforms, political economy is called on in order to better understand the strategies of those who resist the prescribed changes. Bureaucrats and trade unionists are the main impediments to the instillation of performance incentives and innovation within education systems. For Pritchett and Filmer (1999: 224) ‘the enormous inefficiencies in education spending’ are due ‘to high spending on teachers inputs’. The low cost-effectiveness of education expenditures is the direct outcome of ‘government failures’ fuelled by incompetence or corruption. Besides, government cannot resist teachers’ ability to defend their welfare through powerful unions. Teachers exploit their better knowledge of the education production function to maximise their utility to the detriment of students and parents’ interests (ibid). According to Hanushek (1995: 242), ‘public employee unions that resist the individual differentiation of workers’ reinforce the careless attitude towards performance and outcomes that characterise government agencies. Tactics or devices must be crafted to mitigate resisting agents’ power.\textsuperscript{35} The explicit goal assigned to educational institutional reforms is therefore to ‘re-engineer’ the state and to ‘discipline’ teachers. Efficient public schools need to be run with private sector methods.\textsuperscript{36} Setting up outcome-oriented institutions, including performance-based teachers’ pay, should become the main goal for education policy-makers (Bruns et al. 2011, World Bank 2010c).

This radical programme of systematic structural changes is, however, only supported by flimsy scientific evidence.

\textsuperscript{35} ‘It is unrealistic to assume that the staff will automatically adopt new policies that increase the risks of unemployment, that eliminate some of the implicit benefits in their current employment and that potentially require new techniques and more work (...) Either these people must be brought into the process of change or mechanisms must be developed to ensure that they do not sabotage any changes’ (Hanushek 1995: 243).

\textsuperscript{36} This set of institutional reforms is not confined to developing countries. For instance, Ball (2012: 30) identified two core dimensions of what he called the neoliberal ‘curriculum of reforms’: privatisation/parental choice and the reconfiguration of the state education system along managerial rules borrowed from the private sector.
Two major components of the new institutional education agenda have so far achieved ambiguous results. UNESCO (2013: 260-264) insists that there is a lack of conclusive evidence on the benefits of performance-pay for teachers. To set up evaluation systems for teachers has intractable practical challenges;\(^{37}\) in some instances, such schemes have induced competition between teachers that has adversely affected low achievers; in others performance mechanisms have encouraged teachers to teach to the test, thus undermining the broader learning goal. Besides, performance-based pay is often promoted as a way to tackle teacher absenteeism while the structural causes of this critical phenomenon that impedes quality education are hardly investigated.\(^{38}\) UNESCO (2013: 272-274) also challenges the claims of the intrinsic capacity of ‘low cost private schools’ to deliver quality. Context-specific conditions that underlie private schools’ actual better achievements are in need of scholarly investigation.

More generally, for Fine and Rose (2001: 156-157), ‘human capital theory offers no insights on education as such from an analytical view […] at its core, the theory is simply an assessment of a stream of costs and benefits, whether borne or accruing to individuals or to the economy’. It essentially begins without any understanding of education processes. Even within the cognitive skills enriched model, key assumptions have not altered and education has remained an ‘unopened black box’ (Fine and Rose 2001). The model does not explain the complex pedagogical process that underpins the production functions, the mechanisms that translate inputs into outputs (learning achievements). Within this framework, education is not a specific domain, it is a-historical and its organisation is not seen as the result of specific national economic and political forces: market rules are universal and they apply to education as to any other sector in any national context. Therefore, there is no need to demonstrate, analytically, the link between prescribed institutional reforms and education outcomes. ‘Not many examples of operational, large-scale attempts at competition [in the education sector] have been evaluated. Nonetheless, the benefits of competition are so well documented in other spheres of activity that it is

\(^{37}\) According to UNESCO (2013: 262), ‘assessing teachers for performance related pay relies on sophisticated analysis that is difficult to undertake even in more advanced systems’.

\(^{38}\) Tanzania is badly affected by teacher absenteeism: according to AERC/World Bank (2011) on average, 25% of primary teachers are absent on any given day and 25% are in school but not in the classroom. As a result, primary school students are taught for just 2 hours a day. Typically, this report does not explore the root causes of the phenomenon nor does it call for further research on the matter.
quite inconceivable that more competition would not be beneficial for schools’ (Hanushek and Woessmann 2008: 73).

Human capital economists fully admit their ‘fundamental ignorance’: ‘we cannot describe what makes a good or a bad teacher or a good or a bad school’ (Hanushek 1995: 236). ‘Uncertainty exists about the best set of policies’ (Hanushek and Woessmann 2008: 659). And while they distinguish teachers as the key factor in achieving quality, Hanushek and Woessmann (2007: 161) recognise that ‘it is difficult if not impossible to identify aspects of teachers that could form the basis for policies and regulations encouraging good teachers in the classrooms’. To them this ignorance is not seen as a critical obstacle to progress: ‘we should learn to live with (the) fact that we won’t be able to describe the educational process very well in the near future’ (Hanushek 1995: 236). This implies ‘finding policies that acknowledge and work within this fundamental ignorance’: experimentation and innovation should help overcome this lack of understanding (ibid).

This call for more experiments to identify efficient education institutions echoes the rising number of randomised controlled trials (RCT) conducted in education. Various strategies to encourage school attendance or improve learning achievements have been tested: providing deworming medicines to children (Kremer and Miguel 2004), conditional and unconditional cash-transfers, vouchers, classroom reorganisation, remedial education and cameras in classrooms to try to reduce teacher absenteeism (Banerjee and Duflo 2011). Pritchett (2013) draws on a series of RCTs to substantiate his claims regarding the intrinsic lack of relevance of traditional educational interventions such as higher pay for teachers, higher qualification requirements for teachers, the supply of textbooks or reduction in class size.

The RCT literature has increasingly influenced mainstream development economics and aid agencies. Nevertheless, RCTs have not gone unchallenged: their internal validity, ethical dilemmas, supposed ideological neutrality and fallacious utility to inform policy-making have all been thoroughly contested. Within an RCT framework, schooling trajectory

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39 This type of empirical research has developed in a context of growing scepticism about aid effectiveness: external assistance rests on ‘wishy-washy’ evidence of cross-country regressions and case studies rather than ‘hard evidence’ (Banerjee 2006), which leads to a major waste of resources and a weak impact on development. Gathering evidence on what does and does not work would help decision-makers to design more effective policies.

40 See, for instance, Cartwright and Hardie (2012); Barrett and Carter (2010); Labrousse (2010), Deaton (2009); Ravallion
would be solely determined by individual choices, for good or ill: ‘all those people who drop out somewhere between primary school and college and those who never start school, many, perhaps most, are the victims of some misjudgement somewhere: parents who give up too soon, teachers who never tried to teach them, the students’ own diffidence’ (Banerjee and Duflo 2012: 95). Individual educational success would be critically determined by ‘patterns of belief and behavior’ (ibid). The systemic, historically grounded nature of education, inserted within a complex set of social, political and economic relations, is being denied. The onus of tackling educational failures (access and learning) is being shifted to the poor.

Cartwright and Hardie (2012) have demonstrated that ideal (i.e. internally valid) RCTs can indeed show whether or not an intervention worked somewhere, in a specific setting and population (‘it worked/did not work here’). But because they are not grounded in a robust analytical account of causal principles and support factors they cannot forecast whether or not the intervention ‘will work there’. For Deaton, randomised evaluations of projects are useful to assess their average effect but lead to a ‘narrowness of scope’: the focus of the evaluation becomes ‘too narrow to tell us “what works” in development, to design policy or to advance scientific knowledge about development processes’ (Deaton 2009: 3). Besides, RCTs tend to circumvent political deliberation. As argued by Cartwright and Hardie (2012: 161&164), ‘because they allegedly embody an infallible route to the truth’, even ideal RCTs ‘attempt to impose structured, rules-based procedures, where success depends on a process we call thinking or deliberating’. RCTs tend to provide policy makers with a pre-set, ready-made and often ideologically grounded solution to ‘fix’ an education crisis.

The next section situates the specific and evolving place of secondary education in donors’ education discourse, with a specific focus on the World Bank. It shows how evolutions in the global education aid agenda have directly reflected the trajectory of human capital literature as discussed above. It also illustrates the continuing ideological tension within the international community.
3. Secondary education and the global education agenda

3.1 The World Bank and secondary education: from neglect to the promotion of ‘public-private partnership’ for mass secondary education

In the 1960s-1970s, donors’ education interventions largely favoured post-primary education: the World Bank particularly, guided by its manpower strategy, promoted the diversification or vocationalisation of secondary education and development of higher education in sub-Saharan Africa (King 1990, Heyneman 1985). The World Bank’s vision of education at that time was not confined to its economic benefit. Its social dimension was clearly recognised: ‘the individual economic payoff is often illusory’ but ‘they are important social benefits and (...) education is essential to maintain one’s relative position in the social order’ (World Bank, 1971: 6).

However, since the late 1980s, the World Bank’s education agenda and interventions have been progressively reshaped to reflect the human capital/RORE main finding: primary education would be the most profitable investment. The proportion of World Bank funding allocated to primary education increased from 22.9 per cent of total education lending in 1980-84 to 37.8 per cent in 1995-1999 (Mundy 2002). The rising influence of the World Bank, converted to the ‘rates of return’ prescriptions, contributed to shaping a global education agenda – Education for All, Millennium Development Goals, Fast Track Initiative – almost entirely dedicated to primary education. This primacy of primary education was achieved after a battle between the World Bank and UN agencies, advocating for a broader definition of ‘basic education’ beyond primary education. This competition was underpinned by an ideological antagonism between the World Bank’s human capital framework and the UN agencies’ rights-based approach (Bermingham 2011). The priority given to primary education clearly skewed government and donor investments away from other education levels, especially secondary education (Johnston

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41. In that period, some donors, notably SIDA, UNESCO and UNICEF, supported non formal education and literacy programmes in developing countries, particularly in Tanzania.
42. Rose (2005) provides a detailed account of the construction, between the 1980s and the end of the 1990s, of the World Bank’s hegemony in education, which has prompted the ‘triumph of human capital’. Its rising analytical power went hand in hand with an increasing financial pre-eminence.
43. For an exposition of the right-based approach see Tickly and Barrett (2011) or Jones (2007).
OECD-DAC statistics vividly illustrate this international shift. From the end of the 1990s, when donors globally committed to the EFA-MDG compact, overseas development assistance (ODA) to secondary education declined sharply over the next decade (Figure 2.1).

**Figure 2-1: Shares of education sub-sectors in the total ODA to education, 1998-2011**

Nevertheless, the World Bank, which had been instrumental in forging the international primacy of primary education, also played a ground-breaking role in recognising the detrimental effect of the exclusive focus on primary education and the need to reinvest in post-primary education. In 2003 it established its Secondary Education in Africa (SEIA) initiative ‘to assist countries to develop sustainable strategies for expansion and quality improvements in secondary education and training’ (World Bank 2008: ix). In 2005, it published its *New Agenda for Secondary Education* that acknowledged the ‘historical neglect’ of secondary education and called for ‘mass secondary education’ (World Bank 2005: xi& xii).

Mamdani (1993) critically analysed the role of the World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes and primary education focus in the decline of African universities.
The World Bank’s renewed interest in secondary education has been firmly grounded within the ‘global knowledge economy’ narrative. The need for secondary education expansion is justified by the successful expansion of primary education within the EFA-MDG context. But at the same time, this educational level, at the interface between primary education, higher education and the labour market, is also meant to respond to ‘the economic challenges presented by globalization, and the dizzying pace of the knowledge-based economy’ (World Bank 2005: xiii). The path towards mass secondary education implies a break with the traditional significance of this education level. Developing countries need to arrange a fundamental shift in the content of secondary education in order to address the fundamental ‘skill mismatch’ they experience. The curriculum needs to be reshaped away from an exclusive academic orientation geared towards the preparation of a small elite for higher education; it needs to incorporate new competencies and skills to enable students to integrate in the labour market.

In terms of funding and management, the World Bank’s vision for secondary education entails two fundamental dimensions. First, the Bank recognises the fiscal conundrum posed by the prospect of mass secondary education. It suggests a three-pronged strategy: a broad public-private partnership that encompasses families, communities and the private sector; substantial contributions by aid agencies; and the submission of public secondary education to a new public management regime based on ‘incentives and accountability mechanisms’. The path towards mass secondary education should propel a fundamental reconfiguration of the role of the state, from education provider to mere regulator of market-based provision.

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45 ‘There is a gap between what is currently being taught in secondary schools and the knowledge and skills required if countries, firms, and individuals are to be competitive’. (World Bank 2005: xxi).
46 The argument here is not to deny any relation between education and the labour market. Rather, the intent is to point out the risks of mis-framing the research agenda and policy debate on this theme, under the hegemonic influence of the human capital paradigm. This is all the more important than education systems across the world are being profoundly reshuffled on the ground of alleged demands of the labour market while, as discussed in previous section, the relationship between the economy and education remains, within the human capital framework, a complete black box.
47 ‘Many developing countries will have serious problems bearing the full financial burden of expanding access and improving quality in secondary education.’ (World Bank 2005: xxi).
48 The World Bank recognises a difference between lower and upper secondary education: ‘governments are expected to finance the compulsory phase of secondary education, families and communities should play a more active role in financing the post-compulsory phase’ (World Bank 2005: xxi).
49 ‘Significant changes in the economic and political conditions that once framed government action have cleared the way for new forms of interaction between the state, communities, and markets in the provision of secondary education. The changes have not made the state’s presence in secondary education less significant. On the contrary, governments are increasingly being required to play a leading role in steering, monitoring, and supporting service delivery’ (World Bank 2005: xxi).
The perfect correspondence between this agenda and the human capital/new institutionalism policy prescriptions criticised in Section 2 appears evident. Despite their fragile scientific base, the human capital employability paradigm and menu for educational reforms have exerted a profound influence on the World Bank’s discourse on secondary education. Until quite recently however, within the international community, the World Bank has remained quite solitary in its secondary education endeavour. As argued by the agency, ‘the constituencies and champions for the subsector appear to be weak or non-existent’ (World Bank 2005: xix). Nevertheless, the years 2010-2012 marked a turning point when conditions materialised for an extended international coalition to support post-primary education in the context of a renewed attention to quality education. The World Bank’s 2011 Learning for All Strategy and Education for All Global Monitoring Reports 2012 and 2013/4 embody, with some divergences, the reversal in the global education agenda.

3.2 The ‘secondary education-quality-skills’ shift and the international community’s competing agendas

The publication of the World Bank’s 2011 Education Strategy for 2020: Learning for All - Investing in people’s knowledge and skills to promote development was an influential moment in the recent history of international aid for education. The concern for quality is not new in the Bank’s education strategic documents. The Bank started its ‘search for low cost quality’ in the late 1970s (King 1990). But the 2011 Strategy represents the exact translation, in a programmatic document, of Hanushek and Woessman’s academic work on the relationship between cognitive skills and economic growth and their rejection of traditional input-based education policies.

Education, reframed under the label ‘learning’, is mainly valued in relation to its impact on economic growth. Education systems should aim at providing children and youth with ‘the knowledge, skills, or competencies necessary to adapt to a competitive and increasingly globalized economy’ (World Bank 2011: 17). The strategy admits that little is known about the mechanisms conducive to quality education: ‘the debate on what is an effective learning environment and how to achieve it is ongoing’ (World Bank 2011: 29). Nevertheless, a programme of systematic institutional changes is proposed to achieve better learning.

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50 The African Development Bank, the World Bank’s sister, being an exception.
outcomes. Developing countries are advised to instil performance-based incentives for teachers, set-up results-based financing mechanisms, strengthen the autonomy of and competition among schools, develop information systems to document results and set-up cash-transfer or voucher mechanisms. The *Strategy* also calls for more impact evaluations while recognising the difficulty of using randomised controlled trials to deepen the understanding of education quality and sector wide education reforms (World Bank 2011: 40). They may, however, be useful to find the ‘right incentives’ and organisational forms that ‘work’. These are systematically pre-identified in relation to the market such as ‘school-based management, teacher incentives, information for accountability and leveraging the private sector’ (World Bank 2011: 41 and 64).

The systematic deployment of this apparatus, geared towards a methodical re-engineering of the state, has become the core of the World Bank’s education agenda. Suggested policy interventions are less concerned with education or learning processes than with a reshuffle of institutions to make them more efficient in transforming available domestic and international resources into ‘results’ that simply have to be measured. Following Jones (1998: 152), it can be argued that this set of institutional pre-conditions for ‘successful educational policy and practice override any views about educational processes the Bank might wish to promote’.

The World Bank is not the only institution shaping the global education agenda but without doubt it is the most influential. Its ‘learning turn’ has been widely embraced by the international community as shown by discussions about a ‘learning goal’ in the context of post-2015 negotiations (United Nations 2013). There is today a wide recognition of the necessity to address issues of quality. However, beyond this consensus over the diagnosis, the *2013/4 Education for All Global Monitoring Report* (GMR), dedicated to ‘quality’, vividly demonstrates the existence of competing ‘learning’ agendas within the international community. Its policy recommendations, centred on teachers, largely depart from the World Bank’s new public management agenda applied to quality education. Teachers and their unions are not castigated here as rent-seeking agents who block reforms geared towards quality and whose incentives hence need to be restructured. A comprehensive approach to the teaching profession is proposed, where the ‘teacher question’ is not addressed in isolation from issues related to curriculum and assessment systems, where
better pay, existence of a career path, suitable pre-service training and professional support, as well as appropriate responses to teachers’ misconducts, may critically serve the learning agenda (UNESCO 2013: Chapter 6).

In the context of the international learning shift, a consensus has simultaneously emerged regarding the necessity of expanding the global education agenda to post-primary education. In 2010, the Fast Track Initiative Board decided to broaden the organisation’s mandate to cover all six EFA goals (Bermingham 2012: 566) and to alter their definition of ‘basic education’ to ‘early child development and primary and lower secondary education’. The 2012 EFA Global Monitoring Report, which calls for ‘universal lower secondary education by 2030’ (UNESCO 2012: I), has unambiguously reflected this new strategic orientation. The document, entitled Youth and skills also wishes to ‘put education to work’; it is specifically concerned with the linkages between education and the labour market. In conflating the two themes, the document implicitly posits the primordial role of secondary education in the relationship between education and the labour market. It recommends extending the coverage of formal junior secondary education, in particular via the abolition of school fees; improving the relevance of upper secondary education to labour market needs and developing skills training schemes for disadvantaged youth: the new interest in secondary education is coupled with renewed considerations for vocational education and training (VET).

The 2012 GMR provides another striking piece of evidence of existing pluralistic educational approaches in global spheres. For instance, according to the report, job

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51 The EFA goals are: i) expand early childhood education; ii) provide free and compulsory basic education for all; iii) promote learning and life skills for young people and adults; iv) increase adult literacy; v) achieve gender parity and gender equality and vi) improve the quality of education.
52 https://www.globalpartnership.org.
54 There is no place here to discuss the extensive literature on vocational training in sub-Saharan Africa. In a famous article, Foster (1965) pointed to the vocational training ‘fallacy’ in sub-Saharan Africa; the questionable effectiveness of formal vocational training programmes has been widely documented (King 2009; Angel-Urdinola et al. 2010). However, McGrath (2012) deplores the general scepticism over VET in the academic literature; he revisits from a theoretical perspective the relationship between VET and development and considers ‘VET as a means of human development’. For an extensive discussion see various articles in International Journal of Educational Development Volume 32, Issue 5, September 2012 ‘Skills and Development’.
55 World Development Reports occupy a similar place in the international development landscape. As an example, the WDR 2004 ‘Making services work for poor people’ - a document that has, for many aspects, prefigured the World Bank’s 2011 Learning for All strategy - recognised education as a multifaceted process and explicitly admitted the role played by education in a nation’s social fabric. ‘Quality’ education implies the encouragement of creativity and the successful diffusion of values. These divergences may reflect competing thinking within the Bank, with an education department
creation is not the developmental priority; young people are trapped in subsistence work because of a lack of skills, not a lack of jobs, and if imparted with appropriate ‘entrepreneurial’ skills, they can use self-employment as a route out of poverty. Yet, this employability paradigm coexists with a call for a state-driven skill development strategy tied to an industrial policy, following the South Korean model. The report also identifies three types of ‘skills’: ‘foundation’ (including literacy and numeracy), ‘transferable’ (including creativity, leadership, and entrepreneurial capabilities) and ‘technical and vocational’ (UNESCO 2012: 14). Although these categories coexist with the World Bank’s own typology ‘cognitive/ non-cognitive/technical skills’ (UNESCO 2012: 83), there has been no analysis of the concurrence of these two sets. This may well reflect the unresolved tensions within the ‘education community’ between behavioural views of education, unambiguously adopted by the World Bank, and more constructivist approaches. The report obviously constitutes a synthesis between various – contradictory - bodies of literature.

Finally, to achieve the Education for All agenda, as extended to quality and junior secondary education, the 2012 and 2013/4 Global Monitoring Reports’ funding strategy diverges from the ‘value for money’ paradigm. ‘Spending more matters’ (UNESCO 2012: 9): governments and the international community are called upon to provide additional funding. Both reports systematically challenge alternative solutions advocated by the new institutionalist current, which prioritise more efficient use of available resources: the ‘considerable risks’ of performance-based aid, under consideration by the World Bank and DFID, are highlighted (UNESCO 2012: 154); scepticism is expressed about ‘low cost private schools’ (UNESCO 2012: 77; UNESCO 2013: 272-274) and cash transfers; and a commitment to public schooling as ‘the best way to reach the poorest’ is asserted (UNESCO 2012: 77).

faithful to an orthodox human capital perspective and other departments, in charge of the WDR, driven by a more pluralistic approach.

56 ‘Creating more jobs will not fix the problem if a sizeable proportion of young people do not have the skills needed to fill them’ (UNESCO 2012: 15).

57 ‘Another route out of subsistence work is self-employment. Many young people in urban centres in the Arab States and sub-Saharan Africa see this as a viable option. In 2008, a survey in Egypt revealed that about 73 per cent of young people would be happy to become entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial skills, however, are lacking among poor urban youth’ (UNESCO 2012: 28).

58 ‘Non cognitive skills’ are assessed through questions that ‘capture traits, behaviours and preferences, and tries to distinguish more stable personality traits from more malleable non-cognitive skills’ (UNESCO 2012: 83).
The international community does not constitute, in the education sector as in any other sector, a monolithic block (Rose 2005, King 1990, 2007). Even within the World Bank, different influences compete within a dominant theoretical framework (Jones 1992; Psacharopoulos 2006). Despite this diversity, the current aid regime has provoked a convergence of discourses and practices; donor specificities have eroded (Mosse 2005). Even UNESCO, despite its commitment to a right-based approach, seems to embrace the human capital doctrine. In January 2008 the organisation took part in the World Economic Forum where it advocated for a greater involvement of the private sector and for Public Private Partnerships to achieve EFA (Verger and Novelli 2008). In this context, one may argue that the 2012 and 2013/4 *EFA Global Monitoring Reports*, as hybrid intellectual objects, testify to the enduring ideological battle, within the global education policy-making sphere, between the human capital model and a more pluralistic line; they constitute attempts to contest the World Bank’s hegemonic project in education.

Against these frictions, a consensus has however emerged regarding the need for indicators and targets to monitor post-2015 junior secondary education and learning goals. The last part of this chapter critically examines past international experiences in managing education by numbers.

### 3.3 Managing quality secondary education by numbers?

Policy use of international educational data is not a recent phenomenon (Torres 1999). Since its establishment, UNESCO has produced comparable statistics to help its member states plan their national education programmes (Cusso and D’Amico 2005). In the 1960s its regional conferences agreed a target of achieving universal primary education by 1980, as an instrument to mobilise financial resources (Jansen 2005, King and Rose 2005a). In this earlier phase, however, international education statistics were chiefly used to support educational policy-making and assessment in relation to nationally defined objectives. Since the 1990s, they have increasingly fulfilled a much more normative function and contributed to the diffusion of standardised policies (Cusso 2012).

The human capital / new institutional turn, in promoting a ‘one-size-fits-all’ educational model and a managerial imperative, has driven a fundamental reformulation of the role of
the international educational statistical apparatus. In the context of the definition of the
EFA-MDG agenda at the end of the 1990s, the World Bank designed a model of optimum
educational expenditures based on international best practices, that prescribes, in particular,
optimal budgetary shares for the education sector and primary education, most appropriate
level of teachers’ salaries, recommended percentage of private education and most suitable
pupil/teacher ratio (Bruns et al. 2003, Cusso and D’Aminco 2005). By replicating this
model, developing countries would allegedly be able to achieve the MDG education target
– universal primary education by 2015. This benchmarking logic directly informed the
design of the Fast Track Initiative and its ‘indicative framework’ (Bermingham 2011; Rose
2005b) and has remained a core tenet of the Global Partnership for Education: to access
external funds, countries need to prepare ‘sound and sustainable’ Education Sector
Development Plans compliant with externally defined and standardised criteria.59 The
indicative allocation of GPE funds to various countries is also determined on the basis of
‘country scores’ derived from a composite index that incorporates countries’ ‘institutional
performances’, as calculated by the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional
Assessment score (GPE 2012b).60

Moreover, in recent years, the World Bank has set up its System Assessment and
Benchmarking for Education Results (SABER), ‘a comprehensive tool for system
diagnostics to assess the characteristics and effectiveness of education systems (...) against
global standards, best practices, and performance of comparator countries’ (World Bank
2010d: 28).61 The Bank acknowledges that analyses based on ‘a case-by-case basis’ have the
‘advantage of being tailored to the specific needs of each country’ but the drawbacks of
‘being time-consuming, duplicating work and lacking comparability’ (ibid). ‘Benchmarking’,
‘global standards’ and ‘best practices’ have become critical engines of the international
educational policy reform agenda.

59 ‘Benchmarking’ is among the nine guiding principles of the initiative (GPE 2012a: 3).
60 The CPIA has been developed by the World Bank to determine the amount of IDA resources a country receives. This
composite indicator allows a ranking of countries according to the quality of their policy and institutional environment as
assessed by the Bank’s staff against a set of criteria. In their analysis of the ‘uses and abuses of governance indicators’,
Arndt and Oman (2007) highlight methodological issues raised by the CPIA’s construction, among which the likelihood
of correlation of errors among the 37 sources from which the composite indicator is constructed and its lack of
comparability over time. Van Waeyenberge (2009) provides a critical analysis of the tool, both a device to allocate aid and
a normative benchmarking. She argues that the CPIA ‘seeks to promote further the adoption of the World Bank’s
traditional (neo-liberal) reform agenda’ and because ‘the selective allocation of aid flows on the basis of the CPIA implies
the imposition of a set of conditions to be put in place by a country prior to the receipt of the aid flows, the tool
performs a strong disciplinary role with regard to a recipient country’s policy space (ibid: 806).
61 http://saber.worldbank.org/index.cfm (accessed 05/04/2014). The tool was recently rebranded as ‘Systems Approach
for Better Education Results’: benchmarking with a more human face.
Over the last two decades, international surveys of students’ learning achievements, such as PISA, have also come to occupy a prominent place in international and national debates on education policies. These surveys have mostly concerned developed and emerging countries but similar exercises have also been conducted in sub-Saharan Africa - by SACMEQ in Southern Africa and PASEC in West Africa. A learning indicator has also been added to the FTI indicative framework (Birmingham 2012: 566). The ‘cognitive skills turn’ has lent a new impetus to the search for global comparability. In 2013, in the context of post-2015 negotiations, the OECD launched its ‘PISA for Development’ initiative aiming at the full incorporation of developing countries within the global educational ranking. The G20 initiative has also asked a group of major international organisations – the World Bank, the OECD, ILO and UNESCO - to create internationally comparable skills indicators with ‘particular reference to low income countries’ (UNESCO 2012: 83).

Millennium Development Goals indicators and targets have had unintended effects. They contributed to a narrow focus on primary education (Colclough 2005) and to the dropping of quality and equity issues from the global education agenda (Unterhalter 2013; King and Rose 2005a; Jansen 2005). In the case of the FTI ‘indicative framework’, Rose (2005) argues that the targets unduly constrained national policy-makers’ room for manoeuvre, despite claims of flexibility and adaptability to national specificities. More generally, international targets, incorporated in national PRSPs and tied to budget support disbursements, may be understood as ‘new, perhaps more oblique forms of conditionality for developing countries’ (King and Rose 2005b: 97). In the case of Burkina Faso, Samuel (2013) stresses that, once FTI funds were obtained, international policy prescriptions, perceived as imposed conditionalities, met with internal resistance and were only partially

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62 Programme for International Student Assessment. The development of these surveys occurred against the background of the conflict between UNESCO and other agencies (the World Bank, the OCED and the EU), the former resisting pressures to reorient its statistics to accommodate alleged demands of the globalised economy. UNESCO ‘never published classifications, or indices, explicitly comparing performances of countries, especially in the area of students’ learning achievement’ (Cusso 2006: 534). This reluctance partly derived from the organisation’s historical commitment to countries’ cultural diversity. UNESCO eventually aligned with other agencies at the end of the 1990s, a sign of its loss of leadership (Cusso 2006).

63 The Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium to Measure Education Quality and Programme d’Analyse des Systèmes Educatifs de la CONFEMEN.

64 http://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisafordevelopment/. Another global research initiative – the Learning Metrics Task Force, implemented by the Brookings Institution and UNESCO Institute of Statistics with the support of about 30 organisations (international aid agencies, NGOs, philanthropic foundations and multinational publishing companies), aims at forging a global consensus around ‘what learning is important globally?’ and ‘how it should be measured’ (http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/universal-education/learning-metrics-task-force/about).

65 The intent is to export to developing countries the experience of the EU reference framework of eight competencies that combine knowledge, skills, and attitudes. For a critique of this framework see Bruno et al. (2010).
implemented. At the same time, the Education Sector Analysis – a detailed system diagnosis based on a standardized framework - conducted by international experts to insert the Burkinabe education system within the FTI benchmarking logic, produced vague, contradictory and opaque numbers. Despite claims of precision, this allowed for fiction, rather than evidence, to be installed at the heart of educational policy-making. According to an FTI evaluation, monitoring of indicators on financial allocations to education was difficult because of ‘incomplete data on both domestic and aid investments in the sector’ (Bermingham 2012: 567). Eventually, this technology of quantification, described as if ‘governed by the rules of science, not politics’ (Samoff and Stromquist 2001: 647), contributes to the curtailment of locally driven innovations; ‘African educators are urged to (...) eschew radically new ways of thinking’ (Samoff 2007: 498).

These critiques invite speculation on the possible consequences of subjecting quality and secondary education to a similar technology of quantification. Managing quality secondary education by numbers may well help galvanise international and national forces around two themes that have been neglected for two decades. An agreement on a global indicator to monitor financial commitments, as suggested by the GMR 2013/4 (UNESCO 2013: 8-9), may help crystallise a campaign for national and international resource mobilisation. Yet, in an era of budget austerity, the addition of junior secondary education to the agenda may also lead to reallocation within the existing envelope.

It should also be noted that the likely choice of monitoring a post-2015 learning goal through internationally standardised tests with quantitative targets focused on measurable basic skills may have the unintended effect of jeopardising the very possibility of fulfilling the goal (Barrett 2011). The quest for a universally valid measure of ‘quality’ denies the contingent and evolving character of learning objectives. It disregards the fact that the features of quality education are the outcome of locally and historically specific political negotiations (Tikly and Barrett 2011, Samoff 2007). The risks attached to the reductionist approach of quantification require careful consideration.

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66 For more general discussions, not specific to education, on the politics of quantification and the political and social use of numbers, see for instance Bruno and Didier (2013), Desrosieres (2008) or Porter (1995). In his analysis of African development social and economic statistics, ‘mostly produced for the consumption of the development community’ (Jerven 2013: 105), Jerven emphasises the political significance of these numbers, ‘malleable’ outcomes of a negotiation process rather than outputs of a technical exercise. For a recent discussion on ‘education policy as numbers’ in developed countries see Lingard (2014).

67 Most authors recognise the important role played by the MDG target in propelling the impressive primary enrolment expansion in developing countries since the 2000s. According to UNESCO (2013: 6) ‘better global monitoring of learning can push governments to make certain that all children not only go to school but are achieving the basics’.
nature of international targets (Maxwell 2003) are high. Indeed, as argued by Jansen (2005: 378) ‘quality cannot be reduced to single or even composite statistical indices, without injuring the concept (quality) itself’. These international surveys constitute benchmarking exercises: they allow a ranking of countries in relation to their educational performances. To avoid losing the competitiveness race, ‘bad performers’ are induced to reform their inefficient educational systems in line with human capital institutional prescriptions (Bruno 2009, Brown et al. 1997). If reduced to an instrument to legitimise the implementation of the human capital educational reform agenda, an international target for ‘learning’ may only result in the insertion of African education systems within the ‘indefinite discipline of competitiveness’ (Bruno 2009).

**Conclusion**

Over the last three decades human capital theory has dominated economic research on education and development; it has also largely contributed to shape - or rather legitimate – aid agencies’ educational policy interventions. This chapter illustrated the ability of the model to evolve and respond to its internal critiques. Its most recent offshoot – the cognitive-skills enriched model with its new emphasis on ‘learning’ - is a valuable departure from the focus on access to primary education that prevailed in the 1990s-2000s. Nevertheless, this evolution has happened despite essentially unaltered assumptions of methodological individualism and primacy of individual choices. It is underlined by a utilitarian conception of education geared towards economic competition’s exclusive needs. Finally, while the education-economic growth relationship lies at the core of the human capital narrative, its literature fails to contextualise this relationship: the overarching employability paradigm assumes that African labour markets will obey Say’s law – that the supply of skilled labour will create its own demand – in defiance of economic realities.

The cognitive-skills enriched model has, however, given rise to a renewed educational agenda that conflates quality, post-primary education and marketable skills. The renewed interest in secondary education contributes to the reframing, in a knowledge economy idiom, of the education-work nexus that used to be at the heart of the manpower strategy.

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68 Policy speeches and the media in Europe have evoked a ‘PISA chock’ (Pons, 2012). Yet Pons and Mons (2013) demonstrate the absence of any direct link between PISA results and educational policy-making in France. In this country, policy-makers have rather used PISA to confirm and legitimise pre-existing policy orientations.
in the 1970s. In parallel, the encounter between human capital and new institutionalism has led to the formulation of a programme of thorough re-engineering of the educational state. From a very thin evidence base, new public management coupled with private provision is proposed as the only road to learning achievements. However, recent *Education for All Global Monitoring Reports* demonstrate that this hegemonic human capital project remains contested within the international community. Yet, in the context of the negotiations of the post-2015 education agenda, a consensus has emerged on the need to identify indicators and set international targets to monitor two new global goals of learning and lower secondary education. In light of past experiences, and while the ‘value for money’ paradigm remains prevalent, the risks are very high that these indicators will become primarily used to advance the human capital/institutional reform agenda further in African countries.

Supplanting the limitations of human capital theory and the world education agenda derived from it requires a political economy analysis more fundamental than that targeting ‘rent-seeking’ agents – bureaucrats, teachers and unions – who may resist international institutional prescriptions. The next chapter proposes an alternative political economy approach to explore the complex factors that have shaped both the design and implementation of the ward secondary schools policy in Tanzania.
Chapter Three

Political Economy of Education: Theory, Context and Methodology

In contrast to the a-historical, reductionist and utilitarian conception of education that infuses the global education agenda, this thesis proposes a political economy analysis of the relationship between education and development. Political economy is conceived here as a discipline concerned with the interactions between political and economic processes. The first section of this chapter defines further the key principles of a political economy of education. It also accounts for different approaches to educational research situated in the fields of the sociology of education and critical political economy. Paraphrasing Li (2007: 19), the aim is not to ‘construct a super theory’ but to use the ‘tensions introduced by different theoretical traditions because of the distinct questions they pose, and the tools they offer’. Section two clarifies the meaning of key concepts - ‘the state’ or ‘the elite’ - in the context of this research. Section three provides important contextual information on the organisation of Tanzania’s education system.

The research adopted a pluralistic methodological approach, mostly qualitative but complemented by a statistical and financial analysis. Annex C provides a specific methodological note on aid and budget data used in this research, their sources, underlying assumptions and limitations. The fieldwork was conducted in Tanzania between September 2011 and April 2012. It encompassed three scales of investigation: the policy-making sphere at national level (Dar es Salaam and Dodoma) and the implementation domain at district (Lushoto town) and school levels. The last section describes the main features of the methodology and specific ‘positionality’ challenges faced during the fieldwork.
1. Political economy of education: definition and theoretical sources of inspiration

1.1 Political economy of education: a definition

Heterodox political economy assumes that the economic and the political are inseparable; this entanglement calls for a mode of inquiry not restricted to the application of the apparatus of mainstream economics to politics.\(^{69}\) Political economy analyses are historically and empirically grounded; mechanisms of resource allocation and related distributive conflicts constitute important objects of study. Accordingly, the political economy approach to education adopted by the present research incorporates issues of politics, power and contest. It explicitly reinstates education in its function of instrument of social reproduction and potential social transformation.\(^{70}\) The Tanzanian education system is envisioned as embedded within the society and the economy, historically produced and reproduced at the intersection of the international and the national, shaped by material and ideological factors and a site of conflict over resource allocations. Its economic significance goes beyond providing ‘human capital’ to the labour market: it itself is a site of economic activities (for instance, textbook production or school infrastructure construction).

This research draws inspiration from the public sector system of provision (pssop) approach developed in Fine (2002, 2009) that provides a general framework for the study of a particular public sector in an ‘integral and systemic’ manner.\(^{71}\) Contrary to mainstream economics or the welfare-regime approach (Esping Andersen 1990) it recognises that the specificities of each public service – education, health, water or housing - are grounded in the very nature of each service (Bayliss and Fine 2007: 239). The study of a specific pssop requires looking at the ‘structures, agencies, processes, power and conflicts that are exercised in material provision itself’ (Fine and Hall 2012: 65). To date this approach has mainly been applied to electricity (Bayliss and Fine 2007) and water and housing (Bayliss et al. 2013). But in their critique of the World Bank’s human capital agenda, Fine and Rose (2001) and Rose (2005) suggested using the pssop approach to analyse education systems in

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\(^{69}\) Contrary to the ‘New political economy’ school that subjects politics to methodological individualism and the concept of representative agent/median voter (see for instance Acemoglu et al. 2013 and Chapter 2 for a brief critique).

\(^{70}\) However, the present research does not cover this second aspect; specifically, it does not study possible instances of contestation of the ward secondary schools policy by parents/communities/students, civil society organisations or trade unions.

\(^{71}\) The system of provision framework was initially developed to analyse private commodity consumption (Fine and Leopold 1993, Fine 2002).
developing countries. However, in the literature, the analytical description of the pssop approach remains at a very abstract level; it only ‘poses a general analytical framework with considerable leeway about how it should be filled out in both methodological and theoretical content’ (Fine 2002: 80).\textsuperscript{72}

The political economy approach to education, as clarified above, provides the research project with its overarching theoretical framework. Nevertheless, various analytical traditions, presented in the next part, have also been sources of inspiration.

1.2 The social function of schooling: overview of theoretical sources of inspiration

Lahire (1999) identified, in the social sciences, three classic ways of understanding the social function of schooling.\textsuperscript{73} A first strand of the literature considers schools primarily as sites of transmission of knowledge and focuses research on the nature and form of knowledge, teaching and learning relations in schools and classrooms and the pedagogical apparatus. For instance, in Great Britain, the ‘New Sociology of Education’, led by Bernstein (1975), studies how the educational institution selects, from all the categories of knowledge socially available, the knowledge that is legitimate to be taught and shapes the specific forms of its transmission to students. Buchmann and Hannum (2001: 88) underlined the scarcity of qualitative school-based research in developing countries and argued that ‘our knowledge of how school organisation and classroom processes influence children’s educational experience in these contexts is limited’. In the case of Tanzania, Vavrus (2008) and Barrett (2007) conducted classroom-embedded research on pedagogical practices at secondary and primary levels, respectively. Both authors put in perspective the

\textsuperscript{72}The World Bank has recently adopted a system approach to education. In January 2014, its Director for Education delivered the keynote speech at the Education World Forum, entitled ‘When It Comes To Learning, Education Systems Matter’ (http://blogs.worldbank.org/education; accessed 28/01/2014). This systemic perspective mainly relies on the Systems Approach for Better Education Results initiative (see Chapter 2), which is far from the recognition of the historicity and specificities of countries’ education systems. Pritchett (2013) similarly promotes a system approach to education. To achieve learning outcomes in mass education systems would require a shift from a ‘spider’ system (controlled and centralised) to a ‘starfish’ system (highly decentralised, that promotes changes and innovations). His policy recommendations are however clearly anti-state and pro-private (charter schools, school autonomy etc.). One may wonder if, in these two instances, the ‘system approach’ may not ultimately turn into a ‘neoliberal ruse’ to bring private provision in and legitimate channelling a growing share of public resources (including aid funding) to this part of the ‘system’.

\textsuperscript{73}Bernard Lahire is a French sociologist, professor at the Ecole Normale Supérieure and Bourdieu’s disciple. He has however extended and nuanced Bourdieu’s work. His work deals with the production of school failure, working classes’ modes of appropriation of the culture of writing, educational success of children from poor families and the political construction of the illiteracy ‘problem’.
dichotomy, which dominates discourses about teaching methods in sub-Saharan countries, between teacher-centred and pupil-centred approaches: Tanzanian teachers engage in mixed pedagogical practices that draw from both models. At the same time, they emphasise the essential relation between broader political economic processes – resourcing of schools and teachers’ salaries – and pedagogical practices: the resource scarcity experienced by Tanzanian schools limits the scope of the ‘pedagogical palette’ available to teachers.

In a second scholarly current, schooling is primarily conceived as a state instrument to discipline future citizens’ bodies and minds. From a Marxist perspective, education has been considered as an ‘ideological state apparatus’ alongside the church, the media and other cultural apparatus. According to Althusser (1970) ‘children at school also learn the “rules” of good behaviour, i.e. the attitude that should be observed by every agent in the division of labour, according to the job he is “destined” for (…) the reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of its skills, but also, at the same time, a reproduction of its submission to the rules of the established order’. In a converging perspective, Foucault analysed schooling as one of the technologies of state bio-power. For him, the subjection of the body into a docile and usable force constitutes an element indispensable to capitalist development (Foucault 1976, 1975). From a Foucauldian perspective, Bayart notes that schools in colonial sub-Saharan Africa were not only instruments to discipline the body of the colonized; they also produced a ‘moral subject (…) whose ethical and physical practices were to become constituent of the new public culture’ (Bayart 2000: 249). Stoler (1995) similarly describes the disciplinary and normative role of education as a constituent part of colonial empires’ domination projects.

The third interpretation of schooling sees its role as a site of class formation and consolidation. Bourdieu’s work symbolises these reproduction theories that relate educational inequalities to families’ unequal positions within the relations of economic production and the structure of distribution of cultural capital. Schools, curricula and pedagogical relations serve the existing asymmetrical power relations in society (Bourdieu and Passeron 1970). In his essay on the Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Freire (1982) concurred:

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74 The phrase is borrowed from Barrett (2007), inspired by Bernstein (1975: 56).
76 On the social role of education in American Southern slavery states, see Anderson (1973).
schools make dominant knowledge into the only visible and acceptable knowledge. According to Giroux (1981) schools are sites of cultural reproduction that serve to empower the already empowered in society and to maintain the marginalisation of the disempowered. For Marxist political economists too, one of schools’ main functions is to ‘elaborate, inculcate and reproduce’ the dominant ideology, which ‘is never socially neutral’ (Poulantzas 1978: 28). In the United States, Bowles and Gintis (1976) insisted that the ‘principle of correspondence’ between the social relationships internal to the education system and those of the workplace was a key mechanism of social reproduction.

In colonial Africa, western-type education systems played a critical role in the movement towards independence. The nascent local elite, who had emerged through their access to colonial education, conducted their liberation struggle in the name of values that the colonial education system was preaching. In Tanzania, Julius Nyerere was one of only two Africans who attended university abroad during colonial time (Buchert 1994). On the other hand, as argued in Bayart (2000: 249), teachers, alongside ‘catechists, doctors, nurses, administrative personnel or clerks of colonial companies, as salary-earners, were instrumental in creating the foundation of the class which is currently dominant in Africa’. Lloyd (1966) and Campbell (1974) also underlined the critical role played by education in the formation of the new elite and the relation of this group to the traditional elite and to the masses. For Bayart (1993), education played a major role in the process of ‘reciprocal assimilation of elites’: its power to form an ‘esprit de corps’ contributed to the integration of different - emerging and already established - segments of the elite to form the ‘post-colonial hegemonic block’. He also underlined the rather perfect correspondence between the spatial distribution of education institutions, their qualitative hierarchy and social stratification. Samoff (1979) analysed the relationship between education and class formation in Tanzania: since the beginning of the 20th century, ‘access to education has been the proximate determinant of class differentiation in Tanzania’; education constitutes ‘the major route to power and wealth’ (ibid: 47). Writings on the most recent period, however, are scarce. According to Samoff (2007: 494), African education systems today remain ‘organised to differentiate and serve best a small elite’. The main difference in the post-independence period certainly lies in the growing role of the private sector (Boyle 1999): new private educational options allow elites to exit a public system damaged by
decades of fiscal austerity and to access quality education, which remains unaffordable for most of the population.  

According to Lahire (1999), reproduction theorists have neglected questions regarding the specific materiality of schools. When schools are only conceived as sorting mechanisms or as sites of discipline, the specific role played in social reproduction by their constituting features - pedagogical practices, particular school knowledge or power relations shaped by this specific knowledge – is obscured. Lahire’s own research on dissonance and consonance between family and school configurations reconciles both dimensions – a concern over educational inequalities intertwined with an inquiry into the specific forms of school knowledge and modes of socialisation (Lahire 2008). In a similar vein, one can also refer to Willis’s (1981) pioneering work that explored how schooling contributes to prepare ‘working class kids’ to ‘get working class jobs’ in the United Kingdom.

The present research is chiefly interested in macro-social processes associated with education and is largely inspired by the two latter analytical traditions. But the research approach was mostly inductive, interested in unraveling, from an empirical investigation, how Tanzanian elites comprehend the social functions of public schooling and how their accumulation strategies relate to it. In the present work, ward secondary schools largely remain black boxes as sites of transmission of knowledge. This silence should not be interpreted as a statement that nothing happens in these schools; it is merely a direct consequence of the interrogations underlying this research. Further research would be needed to understand, for instance, how ward secondary schools’ environment (poor infrastructures), pedagogical relations, children’s interactions or the nature of the knowledge transmitted and its relation to children’s cultural capital contribute to transmit to the students a sense of their socially assigned position and how, in response, they deploy their own agency.

Another critique of reproduction theorists is that their mechanistic view of social reproduction through education dismisses the possibility of breaking the cycle of

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77 Di John (2007) uses Hirschman’s exit-voice framework to analyse issues of public education performance in Latin America: the expansion of private education allows the ‘exit’ of upper income groups from public education and the fragmented and clientelist political parties impede disadvantaged groups from ‘voicing’ their interest and pressuring government to improve the quality of education.
reproduction. In contrast, Freire (1982) argued that education could help construct the conditions of social transformation. Emancipatory education should not be a simple transmission of knowledge. It should rather help people construct themselves as subjects able to act in the world to radically alter it. He dwelt upon Gramsci’s (1971) call for a new type of education dedicated to the transmission of a particular type of consciousness and the formation of intellectuals capable of contesting the prevailing order and working towards a new egalitarian social order. Giroux (1989) also defends the possibility that radical, critical pedagogy might advance equality, democracy and humanity.

The approach of education as ‘capability’, developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, also provides an alternative to both utilitarian economics and reproduction theorists to think through the relationship between education, inequality and development. ‘Capabilities’ are defined as a type of freedom that enables one to choose and live a lifestyle one wants to live; public decision-makers’ distributive task should aim ‘not simply at the allotment of commodities, but at making people able to function in certain human ways’ (Nussbaum 1987). The capability approach applied to education in developing countries is still in its infancy (Tikly and Barrett 2011), but offers a promising normative way to chart out philosophical principles that could drive the design of education policies geared towards social justice. To date, the approach seems less useful in trying to understand actual education policy-making in a particular country, the historicity of an education system or its ideological and political underpinning. The capability approach has been developed in reaction to the mainstream economic approach to distributional issues but its starting point remains individual freedoms and rights. Sen (1999: xii) acknowledges a ‘deep complementarity between individual freedom and social arrangements’ but, as argued by Fine (2004: 98), his work is marked by an ‘unresolved tension between the micro-foundation of his approach, and the broader recognition of social phenomena (…) as irreducibly macro’. Sen’s ‘approach is profoundly neutral with respect both to underlying social relations and historical specificity’ (ibid). Sen also applies a universal approach to all human capabilities: the specificities of systems of service provision (education, health, food etc.) and their interaction with ‘corresponding cultures, ideologies and political practices’ (ibid: 100) cannot be unravelled within his framework.
In view of these critiques, a political economy approach as described above better fits the purpose of this research project. Nevertheless, the capability approach appears especially appealing in thinking about quality education against its utilitarian comprehension by human capitalist proponents as basic skills to compete on the global market. Nussbaum (2010, 2006) warns against the deleterious effects on democracy of an education system narrowly focused on for-profit competencies (basic skills, literacy, numeracy, computer science and technology). ‘Education based mainly on profitability in the global market magnifies these deficiencies [of democracies: ‘parochialism, haste, sloppiness, selfishness, narrowness of the spirit’], producing a greedy obtuseness and a technically trained docility that threaten the very life of democracy itself’ (2010: 142). In contrast, she insists on the democratic value of humanities. The ‘Socratic abilities’ they encourage – the ability to think and argue for oneself - do not make money and are refractory to measurement through standardised tests. Nevertheless, they contribute to producing values and skills equally indispensable to a flourishing democracy and a thriving economic development. The capability approach to ‘quality’ education also crucially emphasises the importance of a broad democratic deliberation about the meanings of quality education in a specific society (Tikly and Barrett 2011: 11-12).

2. The state and the elite: clarification of key concepts

2.1 The state: elements of theory

According to a political economy influenced by Marx, the state can be defined as a set of political institutions that embody and secure the structures of social relations. However, as convincingly argued by Poulantzas, the state occupies a position of ‘relative autonomy’ vis-à-vis class interests that enables it to achieve ‘an unstable equilibrium of compromises between the dominant classes and the dominated’ (1978, chapter 4). State education policies need to be analysed in conjunction with the role of the state in ensuring the support of the masses: ‘the state (...) acts by producing a material substratum for mass consensus’ (ibid: 31). This vision is reminiscent of Gramsci’s view that the ‘state capacities

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78 Tikly and Barrett (2011: 12) similarly argue that the capability approach ‘can provide a new way of thinking about education quality’.
79 Miliband proposed a divergent analysis of the state, conceived in a functionalist perspective as an instrument to serve the capitalist class’ interests (Miliband 1969).
to act depend upon the balance of class and social forces, and the role of actors, within civil society’ (Walsh 2012). The ruling class secures its durable hegemony through both the coercion and consent of the working class. It can consolidate its economic control by allowing certain demands made by trade unions and political parties: it engages in ‘passive revolution’ by going beyond its immediate economic interests and allowing the forms of its hegemony to change (Gramsci 1971). Block (1977) argues that under working-class pressures, the state apparatus might organise the expansion of educational resources available for the working class. But ‘there is every likelihood that the content of the education will be geared to the needs of accumulation – the production of a docile work force at an appropriate level of skill’ (Block 1977: 22). When discussing the role of the state it is also important to make a distinction between state power and the bureaucratic apparatus: state managers’ responses to ‘strong popular pressures for an expansion of social services’ are guided by their consciousness of their own interests which may not correspond exactly with those of ruling classes (ibid: 23-24).

Nevertheless, the coherence of the state as reflective of a single or a strong coalition of class interests should not be overstated. In this perspective, Bayart’s political sociology of the African state provides a useful analytical counterpoint. Bayart (1993, 1996, 2000) contests the thesis of the radical foreign origin of the state in Africa, conceived as the product of a mere transplant of the Western bureaucratic state. He insists on the historicity of the state formation trajectory, inscribed in the *longue durée*, shaped at the intersection of external and internal dynamics and embedded within the society. To account for the African state, he stresses the enduring heuristic nature of ‘the strategy of extraversion’ paradigm - ‘the creation and capture of a rent generated by dependency and which functions as a historical matrix of inequality, political centralization and social struggles’ (Bayart 2000: 222). Bayart also conceptualises the African state as built on a network of personal loyalties that spreads in every direction, horizontally and vertically, to link various informal distributive networks (the ‘rhizome’ metaphor). Analyses need therefore to look at

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80 Despite Poulantzas’ critiques of Gramsci, their analyses of the state converged on key aspects. Gramsci rejected class-reductionism and the comprehension of the state in functionalist terms. He considered the state as a site of class struggle, understood power in relational terms and through his notion of ‘integral state’ rejected the view of the state and civil society as two distinct terrains. For a comparative exposition of both authors’ analyses, see for instance Walsh (2012).

81 North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), in their ‘Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History’, stress that the state is not a homogeneous, united actor and emphasises the divergence of interests among the dominant elite coalition.

82 In emphasizing the relations between social relations of production and local context, Bayart departs from dependency theorists or World Systems scholars (Wallerstein 1974).
the ‘very personal and factional nature’ (Bayart 2000: 245) of the state in action. The state’s rhizomes form the real location of the contest over power and material resources.83 The present study of the Tanzanian state’s secondary education interventions intends to illustrate this hybridity of the African state, a terrain where international agencies’ interventions intersect with bureaucratic baronies, local notabilities and elites’ straddling accumulation strategies.

2.2 Elite or ruling class?

In this research, the ward secondary schools policy is mainly analysed through an ‘elite lens’. Savage and Williams (2008) argue that, since the 1950s, social sciences have neglected the study of elites. They encourage social scientists to ‘remember’ elites and to ‘understand the significance of elite formation in present day capitalism’. Reis (2012: 180), in her study of Brazilian elites’ perception of poverty, also underlines the large number of ‘case studies of how the poor themselves perceive their plight (…) But little has been said about the view of those at the top of the social structure’.

Long lasting epistemological debates about the definition of ‘the elite’ remain unsettled (DiCaprio 2012: 3).84 For the purpose of this research, following Reis and Moore (2005: 2), national elites are defined as ‘the very small number of people who control the key material, symbolic and political resources within a country’. The terms ‘elites’, ‘ruling class’ or ‘dominant class’ are used interchangeably.85 As argued by DiCaprio (2012: 4), ‘elites exist not only at the top, but at the top of each level of society’. In Tanzania, at district level, the ‘local elite’ is mainly made up of district staff, politicians (Members of Parliament and district councillors, members of political parties), religious leaders and local entrepreneurs:

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83 Bayart’s analyses differ from the work of Chabal and Daloz (1999) who link African states’ instability to the impossibility of grafting a Western-type state in Africa due to African states’ neopatrimonial features. For these authors, the ‘fragility’ of African states’ is driven by African leaders’ enrichment maximization strategies in face of their alleged short-term prospects in power, outside any bureaucratic and economic logics. For Bayart, who underlines, on the contrary, the enduring stability of African leaders in power, their straddling strategies between positions of power and positions of accumulation are not specific to African politics. Whereas for him ethnicity constitutes a construct of recent history, Chabal and Dalloz invoke ‘ancestral norms’ to account for patronage relations between self-interested African leaders and the rest of the society.

84 For a detailed exposition of the evolution of elites’ studies since the Italian School (Pareto 1916 and Mosca 1939), see Savage and Williams (2008) and DiCaprio (2012).

85 Early ‘elites theories’ were initially developed as a response to Marxists’ emphasis on the masses as engines of historical changes. In his classical study of class struggles in Tanzania, Shivji (1978) rejected ‘elite theories’ as an inappropriate framework to study processes of class formation. Here, the word ‘elites’ should, however, be understood as a descriptive, operational device rather than an interpretative, analytical concept.
far from being distinct, hermetic groups, they entertain fluid relations, attend the same places of socialisation and play a critical role as competing brokers of the central state in the allocation of resources to rural areas. Secondary teachers, by their age, salary level or subordinated position within the education administration, can be considered as a subaltern group especially in comparison with head teachers, obvious members of the district or ward elite. Being educated and coming from outside the village, they do, however, hold a specific, intermediary position in the district’s social relations.

Despite their small number, elites influence their country’s development trajectory through various channels: they frame the public debate, make and execute policies and they influence the allocation of resources and authority (DiCaprio 2012: 5). Neo-patrimonial views of the African state (Chabal and Dalloz 1999) or neo-institutionalist approaches (van de Walle 2001) tend to view decision-makers and more broadly elites as insulated from society, engaged in a rational optimisation of their personal interests through ‘rent-seeking’ activities. In this approach, the structural constraints that shape elites’ policy and resource allocation choices, their historicity and ideological grounding are obscured. By contrast, this research aims to unearth the political economy forces that shape and constrain them.

Finally, the current aid regime also influences the delineation of elites’ boundaries. Aid relations can indeed be considered as an increasingly transnational domain: for Harrison (2010: 108-109), the numerous dialogue and consultative forums, which characterise the current aid regime, are sites of ‘sociability’ where ‘African nationals and expatriates of various kinds intermingle’ and produce ‘transnational communities of neoliberal practice’. Similarly, Gould (2005a: 138), in his analysis of Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper processes in Tanzania, pinpoints the policy formulation arena as ‘a technocratic domain of transnational professionals’. In this research the term ‘transnational elite’ is used to designate this constellation of domestic and international actors who share converging interests and ideological views. This agglomerate may be joined by representatives of multinational corporations.

Ball’s (1990) analysis of the 1988 Education Act in the United Kingdom provides an interesting methodological and conceptual model to explore elites’ role in education policy formation in Tanzania. Several elements of his sociology of education policy are significant
to the present research. First, he emphasises the importance of struggles between interests groups within the policy-making sphere, in which educational bureaucrats enjoy degrees of autonomy that may evolve over time. He defines policy formulation as ‘an amalgam, a blending of tensions, a managing of nascent contradictions’ (Ball 1990: 43). Besides, discourses play a critical role in shaping power relations in this arena and should be subject to close scrutiny. He stresses the distinction between policy-making and policy implementation: an education policy is shaped, transformed and, possibly, subverted in the course of its execution. His methodological approach, characterised as an ‘ethnography of elite political culture’ (ibid: 2), was based on multiple interviews conducted with prominent actors – politicians, bureaucrats, members of the business elite - who influenced the design of the Act and its implementation.

Other agents involved in the education sector – students, parents, communities, teachers’ trade union and civil society organisations - are not entirely absent from the analysis. Chapter 6 of this thesis partly accounts for communities’ involvement in the implementation of the ward secondary schools policy. Nevertheless, throughout the dissertation, the elite remain the primary analytical vantage point. This perspective should not be interpreted as a denial of the Tanzanian population’s agency in contributing to shape public policies. As argued by Reis (2012: 181), ‘to say that elites matter when we discuss poverty and inequality is not to ignore that pressures from below are very relevant to the issues at hand’. But, she continues, ‘elites are strategic actors that cannot be neglected when we inquire into the prospects for poverty reduction and for social redistribution’. Specifically, Chapters 4 and 6 demonstrate the interdependent nature of the relations between Tanzanian elites and the rest of the society.

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86 This research is situated in continuity with previous works by Vavrus (2003, 2005) and Stambach (2000, 1996) who conducted locally-embedded anthropological research on secondary education in the Kilimanjaro region. Even though conducted prior to the ward secondary schools movement, their investigations into the meaning of secondary education in a neoliberal time and its role in shaping individual and collective identities strongly resonate with the interests of the present research in the role of cultural systems in shaping education policies.

87 According to Boone, ‘dependency and underdevelopment theorists, like modernisation theorists, tended to view postcolonial states and ruling classes as remarkably unconstrained by the societies over which they sought to preside’ (Boone 1994: 108).
3. The organisation of the Tanzanian education system: elements of context

3.1 The Tanzanian state and the education administration

In Tanzania, the Executive, through the President and a small group of Ministers, dominates the political-administrative landscape. The Executive can be divided into the ‘senior technocracy’ and the CCM Party. The Cabinet and the President occupy a position in between, closer to the Party than to the technocracy (Lawson and Rakner 2005). The CCM party remains today the ‘single most dominant force of accountability in Tanzania’ (ibid: 29). However, even though most government upper-level technocrats are CCM cadres, including in the ministries in charge of education, perceptible tensions exist between technocrats and politicians (Languille and Dolan 2012).

In the education sector, the state administration is formed of three main ministries.
- The Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT) is responsible for policy formulation, coordination, monitoring, setting standards and quality insurance of the whole education system. It retains direct management responsibility for higher education, technical and vocational education and Teachers Training Colleges.
- The Prime Minister’s Office - Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG) supervises the management of pre-primary, primary and secondary education by Local Government Authorities (LGAs).
- The Ministry for Community Development, Gender and Children (MCDGC) coordinates the Folk Development Colleges that provide non-formal and vocational training to communities.

In 2009-10, the government decided to decentralise secondary education. LGAs - districts, towns, municipal and city councils -, already in charge of primary education since 1998, were now fully responsible for the management and delivery of formal and non-formal basic education services. Secondary education resources were no longer channelled to

---

88 The CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) party was created in 1977, under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, as the merger of the Tanzania African National Union Tanzania African National Union (TANU, the then ruling party in Tanganyika, in power since the independence in 1962) and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), the then ruling party in Zanzibar.
89 Over the research period, the name and institutional coverage of the ministry in charge of basic education have changed several times. For instance, it expanded to include vocational education and training as well as higher education. For simplicity, the term ‘Ministry of Education’ is often used in the present dissertation.
90 This ministry is not covered by this research.
schools but to districts. LGAs also became the employers of primary and secondary teachers. This decentralisation in education was anchored to the cross-sector Decentralisation by Devolution policy (DbyD) and the Local Government Reform Programme, initiated in 1998 and heavily supported by donors (Harrison 2008).

Within the district administration, the District Secondary Education Officer (DSEO) is the interface between secondary schools and the central administration, represented at regional level by the Regional Education Officer. At a lower administrative level, Ward Education Coordinators (WEC), the administrative body closest to schools, are responsible for the coordination and monitoring of education activities within the Ward. At school level, the management (including financial) is under the authority of School Boards.

### 3.2 The organisation of secondary education in Tanzania

Secondary education in Tanzania has two levels: the lower level, Form 1 to Form 4, leading to the Certificate of Secondary Education Examination or CSEE) and the upper level, Forms 5 and 6, leading to the Advanced Certificate of Secondary Education Examination. In 2011, the organisation of secondary education in Tanzania was based on four categories of schools (government, community, non-government and seminaries), which can be subdivided between ‘day’ and ‘boarding’ schools and between ‘girls’, ‘boys’ and ‘coeducational’ schools (Table 3.1). Public education is organised through ‘government schools’ (sometimes labelled ‘old government schools’) and ‘community schools’ (or ward secondary schools). In 2011 there were 92 government secondary schools, the same number as in 2004. Access to these schools, reserved for the best performing pupils at the Primary School Leaving Examination, is regulated by the quota system put in place during Ujamaa that attributes a specific number of seats to each region and to girls. No such restriction applies to ward secondary schools: every primary school leaver should, in theory, find a seat in an O Level community secondary school. Annual school fees for public day schools are set at Tsh 20,000/student.

---

91 Primary education officially caters for pupils aged between 7 and 13; lower secondary education for students aged between 14 and 17 and upper secondary education for students aged between 18 and 19.
Table 3-1: Number of secondary schools by category in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Non-government</th>
<th>Seminaries</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day school</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boarding</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-O levels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day school</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boarding</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day school</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3238</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boarding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3241</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>3334</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>4372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author, based on the Registry of government and non-government secondary schools, August 2011

The private education sector is split between ‘non-government schools’ and ‘seminaries’, religious educational institutions. This sector is extremely diversified; it ranges from expensive, highly selective, high performing schools to ‘low-cost’ and poorly performing institutions that cater for children who failed their primary school leaving exam; its cost-based organisational features overlap with religious lines. The expansion of public junior secondary education in Tanzania has reversed the historical private/public balance in the sub-sector: public schools are now the most numerous (UNESCO 2012a).

The social and political meaning of mass, public and low quality secondary education cannot be understood without taking into account of the ability of the rich and the middle class to access quality private secondary education. Nevertheless, the research is focused on the public education system and specifically on one of its components: O Level community secondary schools. It touches only marginally upon private provision. There are several reasons for this choice. First, the Tanzanian state continues to dominate secondary education provision: in 2011, 85 per cent of lower secondary students were enrolled in public (government and community) secondary schools (URT 2012a). Second, an understanding of this complex segment of the education system would have required an in-depth investigation beyond the scope of this research. Finally, this research was interested in questioning how the ‘private vs. public’ dichotomy is played out at the very heart of the public education system. It chose to invert the traditional perspective on this issue. It considers ward secondary schools as a specific public-private partnership model that needs to be unpacked. Rather than looking at the ruling class’ strategy to consolidate its social
position through private schooling, it investigates channels by which ward secondary schools, which children from rich and middle class families do not attend, contribute to the accumulation strategies of the ruling class.

3.3 The education aid arena in Tanzania (2004 – 2012)

In 2004 approximately twenty agencies were involved in the education sector; in 2011-2012, there were eleven: DFID, CIDA, SIDA, JICA, USAID, France, the World Bank, the African Development Bank and three UN agencies (UNESCO, UNICEF and WFP).\textsuperscript{92} In terms of funding, in FY 2011/12, the World Bank, CIDA and DFID provided about 60 per cent of external assistance to the sector.\textsuperscript{93}

Between 2001 - following the abolition of primary school fees - and 2006 a wide coalition of donors supported the Government of Tanzania’s Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP).\textsuperscript{94} Over the research period, the World Bank was the only agency of any significance that resolutely invested in secondary education.\textsuperscript{95} Its first intervention (SEDP I, 2004 - 2007) was a USD150 million project,\textsuperscript{96} implemented through a sector adjustment approach (Development Policy Loan) with tranche release conditions linked to the implementation of secondary education policy reforms. It had three main objectives: (i) increase access to lower and upper secondary education; (ii) improve students’ learning outcomes; and (iii) improve the management of secondary education through decentralisation and capacity building (World Bank 2004).\textsuperscript{97}

The World Bank’s second intervention (SEDP II), approved in 2010 for a duration of five years, is a USD150 million project implemented through an Adaptable Program Loan (APL). Its core objective is ‘to improve the quality of secondary education, with a focus on underserved areas’ (World Bank 2010a: 9) and its main components target traditional ingredients of quality: schooling environment (Component 1: ‘upgrading existing schools

\textsuperscript{92} Only OECD-DAC donors are considered here. In the course of the research period, several agencies left the sector: the EC, the Netherlands, GTZ, Norway, Ireland, Belgium and Finland.

\textsuperscript{93} Source: the author’s own calculations. See Annex C (the figure does not include the notional share of general budget support to education).

\textsuperscript{94} The World Bank, the Netherlands, Canada, Sweden, Ireland, Finland, the EU, Norway, France and Belgium.

\textsuperscript{95} This aspect is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{96} USD123.6 million IDA credit and USD26.4 million IDA grant.

\textsuperscript{97} In order to avoid any confusion, it is important to note that both the government secondary education programme and the World Bank project to support it have the same name - ‘SEDP’. They are however two different documents.
infrastructures’); teachers (Component 2: ‘improving the equitable provision of teachers and quality of teaching’) and textbooks through the transfer of resource to schools (Component 3 ‘ensuring adequate financing to secondary schools and improving utilization of resources’). A fourth component concerned technical assistance and capacity building.

Since FY 2006/07, general and sector budget support has become the main aid modality in the sector. A non-earmarked aid modality, General Budget Support (GBS) is directly channelled to the Treasury and merged with other domestic revenues (the principle of fungibility): its allocation to specific sectors or sub-sectors depends on the national budget cycle and negotiations. Sector Budget Support (SBS) constitutes a variation of general budget support with a focused sector dialogue on education policies, finances and outcomes. The European Commission was the first agency to provide SBS to education within its 2006-2008 programme. In 2009, CIDA started its own SBS followed by DFID in 2011.

The relationship between education donors and the ministries in charge of education is organised through a dialogue structure, set up at the launch of the Education Sector Development Plan (ESDP) in 2001. It is based on a series of joint technical working groups, an ESDP task-force and an ESDP Committee co-chaired by the Permanent Secretaries in the MoEVT and the PMO-RALG. Since 2006, the education aid arena has been fully inserted within the GBS framework and education aid relations have in part been shaped by the demands of this specific aid modality. The GBS Performance Assessment Framework (GBS PAF), the core instrument to manage GBS aid, consists of a list of outcome and process indicators, with annual targets that donors and government jointly assess in the context of the GBS annual review as a basis for GBS donors’ disbursement decisions. Another core instrument – the Public Expenditure Review process (PER) – was set up in the early 2000s as a forum for a joint technical dialogue over budget allocations and other public finance issues. Education donors’ coordination and harmonisation is

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98 In FY 2011/12, budget support represented about 70 per cent of total external assistance to education (source: the author’s own calculation; figures includes the notional share of GBS to the education sector).
99 The World Bank, DFID, CIDA, the AfDB, SIDA and JICA are also GBS contributors.
100 A map of both arenas, education and general budget support, is sketched in Annex B. Civil society organisations have been part of these arenas. In education, three main organisations have played a prominent role: TENMET, HakiElimu and Twaweza. The present research does not cover the role of CSOs. For a brief political economy assessment, see Languille and Dolan (2012); on HakiElimu, see Philips (2011); on Twaweza, see Languille (forthcoming).
structured within the Education Development Partners Group (DPG) headed by a Chair agency supported by a Deputy-Chair and a Secretariat.\footnote{The successive lead agencies were: the Netherlands in 2006, the European Commission in 2007, SIDA in 2008, DFID in 2009 and 2010 and CIDA in 2011 and 2012.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PEDP (basket fund + World Bank)</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sector Budget Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank SEDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEDP I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEDP II</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>AfDB Education II</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank, Higher Education Development Plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA &amp; NORAD Higher Education &amp; Research</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author, based on donors’ programmes documents (dates of commitment, not disbursement). USAID programme is not included due to lack of information.

4. Methodological framework

4.1 Delineating the fieldwork: issues of scale and time frame

As a transnational policy, the object of the research – secondary education policy in Tanzania - raises methodological issues of scale. As argued by Gould (2004b: 20) ‘aid and development cannot be understood unless situated in a trans-scalar canvas of social relations, interests and imperatives’. Research that ‘cannot “jump scale” can become the hostage of “situated knowledge”, and of partial truths’. The ward secondary schools policy has indeed a fundamental trans-scalar nature; it is made of material and ideational flows between multiple levels – from Washington or Brussels to Dar es Salaam or Dodoma and to districts and villages - and between multiple sites at each level. As a response to this scale challenge, empirical investigations were conducted at three levels: national (Tanzania’s economic and administrative capitals: Dar es Salaam and Dodoma), Lushoto town and
school levels. The global level was mainly investigated through the study of donors’ educational strategies and a critical analysis of the human capital literature (Chapter 2).102

The research focused on the period 2004–2011/12, a timeframe that corresponds to the acceleration of secondary expansion and the transition to a new aid regime in the education sector. However, the definition of education systems as historical social constructs and the recognition of the enduring imprint of the colonial and socialist eras on educational structures, content and meanings required to ground this research in a good understanding of the historical context. This also applied to the local setting – Lushoto district - where implementation aspects of secondary education expansion were investigated.

4.2 Empirical investigations at national level

At national level, in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma, 103 semi-structured interviews were conducted with members of the elite – domestic and international. The selection of informants rested on a combination of two non-probabilistic sampling techniques. Through ‘purposive sampling’ interviewees were identified by their position, their reputation or their knowledge on the object of research (Kidder et al. 1991). Supplementary interviews were selected following a ‘snowball sampling method’, on the basis of names suggested by the first set of respondents (Tansey 2007).

Several sites of investigation were targeted: the education administration, planning and finance administration, political arena, civil society organisations, aid arena and the textbook industry (see Table 3.3). In the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance, various departments were identified because of their specific functions in the formulation/implementation/funding of the ward secondary schools policy. For each group of actors, an interview guide was formulated. The research entailed two one-week field trips to Dodoma, where the Parliament and the PMO-RALG are located.

102 In Dar es Salaam the author was hosted by REPOA, a Tanzanian research centre, which provided her with an office, useful letters of introduction and a stimulating working environment.
Table 3-3: Basic information about interviews conducted at national level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>No of interviews</th>
<th>Departments/domains covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education and Vocational Training</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>- Office of the Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Pre Primary and Primary Education Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Secondary Education Unit;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Higher Education Division;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Policy Planning Division (planning, budget, ESMIS,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>construction, ESDP Secretariat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- School Inspectorate Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Administration and Human Resources Management Division;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Procurement Management Unit</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- EMAC Secretariat</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Tanzanian Education Authority (TEA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Tanzanian Institute of Education (TII)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister’s Office – Regional Authorities and Local Governments</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Education Division</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<td>- Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>- Local Government</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- External Finance</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- GBS Secretariat</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Government Procurement Service Agency (GPSA)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- EDF National Authorising Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>- President Office – Planning Commission</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- President Office – Public Service Management</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>- President Office</td>
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<td>- Prime Minister Office</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- Tanzanian Revenue Authority</td>
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<td>- Copyright Society of Tanzania</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Tanzania High Commission to UK</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Donors</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>DfID, World Bank, CIDA, SIDA, EU Delegation, UNICEF, Belgian Cooperation, AFID, French Embassy</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>- Education advisers</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Economists</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Local government/decentralisation</td>
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<td><strong>Civil Society</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- HakiElimu</td>
<td>- Legal and Human Right Commission (LHRC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Uwezo</td>
<td>- SOMA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Twaweza</td>
<td>- Bakwata (National Muslim Council of Tanzania)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tambongtco (Tanzanian Association of Owners and Managers of Non-Government Schools and Colleges)</td>
<td>- TCCIA (Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- TCCIA</td>
<td>- Journalists, academics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Teachers Trade Union (TTU)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Members of Parliament and political parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>- 8 members of CCM (included 3 Lushoto MPs)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chadema (opposition)</td>
<td>- 2 members of Chadema</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCR (opposition)</td>
<td>- 1 member of NCCR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Textbook industry</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publishers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>- International (Oxford University Press, Longman Pearson and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Radar Education, MacMillan Aidan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Regional (Ujuzi Press)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Local (Ben&amp;Company, Mture Publishers, Read It, Mkuki Na Nyota)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bookellers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business associations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>- Publishers Association of Tanzania (PATA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Association of Bookellers of Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author
The author also attended, as an observer, the technical seminar of the 2011 Joint Education Sector Review, held in Dar es Salaam on 1-3 November 2011. It gathered representatives from a wide variety of education stakeholders (government, civil society organisations and aid agencies) to assess sector performances. This event helped the author identify lines of convergence and sites of friction within the ‘educational community’, between donors and government and within the government.

According to Goldstein (2002), the difficulty of ‘getting in the door’ is the first issue faced by elite interviewers. Yet, in the context of this research, access to informants turned out to be relatively easy. From the list of priority interviews initially planned only four did not take place, the most prominent of which was former Prime Minister Lowassa, the political driver of the ward secondary school policy. He was contacted and seemed agreeable to a meeting, but however this never happened. Section 4 further discusses the extent to which this relative easy access to informants was related to the author’s specific positionality within the research field.

4.3 The local: Lushoto District in Tanga Region

Fieldwork was conducted over six weeks in Lushoto District, in North-East Tanzania, in February-March 2012. It was preceded by a one-week stay in the town of Tanga to conduct interviews with the key staff of the regional administration.

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103 Education sector reviews are organised in two stages: a workshop at technical level followed by a high-level meeting at political level, gathering ministers in charge of education and heads of aid agencies.
The focus on only one district was guided by the methodological choice of privileging depth over breadth of information. Lushoto District offered an interesting particularity as regards the ward secondary schools policy: there, the secondary education expansion was particularly intense. With 72 ward secondary schools, in 2011 Lushoto was the district with the highest number of government schools in the entire country.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{104}The same year, Moshi Rural District in Kilimanjaro Region had only 62 government secondary schools (source: ESMIS/MoEVT). In 2012, according to district data, there were 79 secondary schools in Lushoto.
Empirical investigations involved qualitative interviews conducted in Lushoto town, location of the district's headquarters. Like at national level, several elite groups were targeted and a mix sampling method was used (see Table 3.4).

**Table 3-4: Basic information on interviews conducted in Lushoto district**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>No of interviews</th>
<th>Departments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| District Administrative Secretariat  | 2                | - District Administrative Secretary  
- Staff in charge of the district education fund |
| District Council administration      | 11               | - Executive Direction  
- Budget and Planning  
- Treasury  
- Secondary Education  
- Primary Education  
- Procurement Unit  
- Internal Audit Unit |
| Ward and Village Officials           | 9                | - 1 ward Executive officer  
- 2 ward education coordinators  
- 6 village secretaries |
| Preventing and Combating Corruption Bureau | 1            | - Director of PCCB District Branch |
| Politicians                          | 15 (+3)          | - (3 current MPs, CCM)  
- 1 MP adviser  
- 3 former MPs  
- 4 ward councillors or ‘diwanis’ (including the Council Chairman)  
- 2 CCM members (District Secretary, lay member)  
- 4 Chadema representatives  
- 1 CUF representative  
- 3 village chairmen |
As at national level, once research credentials had been checked by the appropriate authorities, access to informants was relatively easy. From the list of proposed informants, only the District Commissioner, District Engineer, Head of the Council’s Finance Committee and a couple of key affluent district entrepreneurs could not be interviewed.

Busy agendas and the political and financial sensibilities of their position may explain this lack of responsiveness. The fieldwork also coincided with a period of intensive activity for the Secondary Education District Office, the main administrative entry point for this research. A wave of newly recruited teachers had just arrived in town, waiting in the courtyard of the office to be posted to their new schools; some, displeased by their assignment location, assailed the office to try change their posting to another school. At the same time, the district was unable to pay new teachers their statutory allowances: the social discontent was palatable among the young teachers. The Director of the Secondary Education Office, her academic officer and her secretary could not provide much time for a researcher. This tense situation made it impossible to obtain district-level education statistics and comprehensive data on financial transfers to schools. However, the situation provided an opportunity to observe from a privileged standpoint the everyday life of an institutional cornerstone of the implementation of the ward secondary schools policy.

In terms of access to the district's official documents, the administration was very responsive. However, the minutes of district council meetings – legally, public documentation – were the only documents to which access was denied despite repeated requests. Neither the District Executive Director nor the District Administrative Secretary, supportive of the research in all other aspects, were prepared to take the responsibility of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entrepreneurs / financial institutions</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- 2 book sellers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1 construction company</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1 sawmill company</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 3 diversified companies (books, hardware, construction)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1 staff of the National Microcredit Bank /district branch (customer service manager)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 2 members of teachers’ SACCOS (cooperative officer and board chairman)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1 Dar es Salaam-based large scale entrepreneur, originated from Lushoto</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil society</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Teachers Trade Union’ District Secretary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 3 ‘Friends of Education’ (HakiElimu)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1 member of a youth organisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1 Muslim sheik</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1 representative of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania (ELCT)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TOTAL                               | 55 |

Source: the author
sharing documents that account for the functioning of the main formal site of public decision-making in the district. In guaranteeing the opacity of council meetings, they inadvertently indicated to the researcher one major site of negotiation, conflict and deployment of power in the district.

Out of the 79 secondary schools existing in the district at the time of the research, 28 were visited, including 25 ward secondary schools and three private schools: one highly selective and top performing Catholic school and two ‘low cost’ and low performing schools (a Bakwatu school\textsuperscript{105} and a wazazi school\textsuperscript{106}). Two broad sampling criteria were used to identify schools: to visit at least one school in each of the 44 wards and to get a rough balance between old (1990-2005) and new (2006-2011) schools.\textsuperscript{107} Primarily for logistical reasons, most visits to schools were conducted unannounced.\textsuperscript{108} Face-to-face interviews were systematically conducted with headmasters (or with the second master) in all schools visited. In six schools, face-to-face interviews with village leaders (Chairman and/or Secretary) or ward officials were also organised.

In addition, depending on the circumstances, nine focus groups with teachers, five with students and four with parents were organised. As pointed out earlier, this research project focused on the elite. Discussions with subaltern groups occupied a peripheral position in the data collection strategy. Nevertheless, this access to dominated voices provided a precious counterpoint to national and local elites’ main narratives. Focus groups with teachers (and students, to a lesser degree) helped in tracing the power structure that underpins schools’ management. Focus groups with parents offered a counterpoint ‘from below’ to the accounts by local elites of their allegedly generous role in the policy implementation. They also helped assess the actual material impact of the policy for the rural population. Finally, focus groups with parents and students also revealed the sketch of a national imagined community, with dominant and subaltern classes attaching a converging cultural significance to secondary education. In two cases, when the school visit

\textsuperscript{105} Tanzanian Muslim Council.
\textsuperscript{106} CCM’s parents wing.
\textsuperscript{107} One ward could not be reached due to road conditions.
\textsuperscript{108} During a monthly meeting organised by the Secondary Education District Office with all headmasters, the author introduced herself and her research assistant and explained the purpose of the research. They were informed of a possible visit.
was formally planned in advance, parents taking part in the focus group were purposely chosen by the headmaster: in these instances, the parents’ contributions were obviously chiefly geared towards conveying a positive image of the school’s management. When contrasted with the two ad-hoc parents’ focus groups, these meetings confirmed that peasant communities are shaped by power relations and that individual families entertain differentiated relationships with the schooling institution. This access to subaltern voices was all the more important given that the local elites’ interviews conveyed a very homogeneous culturalist narrative that largely blamed ward secondary school failures on peasants and students themselves.

4.4 A multi-sited and multi-level fieldwork: the researcher’s positionality challenges

The researcher is an integral part of the research process and contributes greatly to the construction of meaning during the study (Gilbert 2008: 512). Between 2005 and 2008, the author worked for the EU Delegation to Tanzania as an education programme manager; she designed and managed the first Sector Budget Support Programme for education in Tanzania. This programme gave a prominent place to ‘outcomes’ and public finances and promoted the design of new tools inscribed in a new public management approach. In 2007, she was the lead of the Education Development Partners Group, representing other education donors in education and general budget support dialogue structures. The year 2007 coincided with a pivotal moment in education aid relations, shifting from a project/basket fund approach to budget support, a transition that led to serious tensions between education donors and the Tanzanian education administration. For three years, the author was very much enmeshed within the power relations that characterized Tanzania’s education aid arena. About half of interviews conducted in the national education aid arena were carried out with the author’s former colleagues or interlocutors. This author’s specific ‘positionality’ evidently influenced, in various ways, the fieldwork dynamics.109

109 The notion of ‘positionality’ refers to the idea that the researcher contributes to the construction of knowledge; her/his identity or personal characteristics (age, gender, class, sexual orientation, religious beliefs, political views etc.) may influence aspects of the study (types of information collected, or the way in which it is interpreted). See Hertz (1997).
First of all, this specific position helped open doors and, more importantly, quickly establish a trust-based rapport conducive to open and rich discussions, both with government officials and donors’ staff. The author’s inside knowledge of Tanzanian administrators’ ethos also equipped her to navigate around what Paige called the ‘forbidden narratives’, hidden beneath ‘peculiar silences and areas of tensions – forbidden zones that the interviewer had to approach with care’ (Paige 1998: 9). In the case of donors, this former position as ‘one of them’ greatly aided the author in gaining access to what Gould (2004a: 14) called the ‘backstage’ field where donors’ staff express their scepticism about official aid narratives and their organisations’ official virtuous goals. Even in the case of previously unknown informants, this past experience helped open doors. For instance, the External Finance Department in the Ministry of Finance, constantly solicited by myriad consultants and researchers, only opened its doors when it received questionnaires that demonstrated an insider’s understanding of their work and challenges. A dismissive ‘look at the web site, everything is there!’ had been their initial reaction.

This specific position called, right from the inception of the research project, for a careful exercise of constant reflexivity. As defined in Hertz (1997: viii), reflexivity is ‘an ongoing process that constantly returns to the questions “What do I know?” and “How do I know it?” in order to maintain continual questioning as to where the information has been created’. During the fieldwork, this implied a permanent questioning of the ways by which the former active participation in the research site could influence informants’ answers. The ambiguity of the author’s position was made very clear when, during interviews, government officials would use a collective ‘you’ to speak of donors, including her among them, self-evidently. One informant explicitly said ‘Sonia, you’re a donor’. Despite the author’s attempt to clarify her present position as an academic researcher, detached from the donor community, she was gently reinstated in her former identity. When asked about the performance measurement tools introduced to manage budget support in the education sector, one official replied ‘but Sonia, you were at the vanguard of this change’. In that context, interpreting the fact that most informants had positive views on this New Public Management technology was delicate: were the answers given to please her? In this specific case, triangulation of data and tracing discursive patterns outside the circle of previously

110 For instance the contradiction between the ward secondary schools policy and Nyerere’s educational prescriptions or the issue of communities’ forced contributions (against the widespread narrative of voluntary participation).
known informants proved the solution to the interpretative conundrum: informants with whom the author had not interacted in the past conveyed a similar discourse.

This ambiguous position was also evident during interviews with former donor colleagues. They would often invite the author’s past self into the conversation. For instance, while discussing the challenges of performance-based aid, an education aid manager wondered: ‘Who wants to say that the sector is doing poorly? I don’t necessarily want to say that to my management and neither does X [other aid agency’s education adviser] and neither did you when you were here’ (emphasis added) (interview 50). Had the author wanted to escape her ambivalent position, she was explicitly reminded that any critical charge against aid managers would inevitably also be a form of self-criticism. The fieldwork in the aid arena was shaped by a permanent self-awareness of the specific ethical responsibility derived from a past inscription within the power structures underlying aid relations. Nevertheless, the author’s ‘researcher self’ and aid managers/government technocrats inhabit two separate ‘epistemic communities’, defined as ‘a set of relationships around shared meanings’ (Mosse 2006: 945). In the face of intractable epistemological differences, the risk exists that the present accounts may be contested by those, in the aid arena, who may feel betrayed or weakened by a text that challenges the authorised system of representations they adhere to.111

These challenges only dominated one part of the fieldwork. This multi-sited, multi-level fieldwork actually required the author to draw from a ‘variety of selves’ (Reinhartz 1979), not only the former aid manager. For instance, the exploration of the textbook industry allowed her to shift to an outsider position, unknown by her informants, to experience the position of a candid observer in a completely new environment. As argued by Soss (2006: 137), ‘strangeness has its benefits too. The newly arrived outsider is often able to notice as unusual – and hence draw into analysis – the very things that insiders take for granted’. The fieldwork in Lushoto also mobilised another ‘alter ego’. There, investigations were conducted with a Tanzanian research assistant. Most interviews were conducted in English, including interviews with district staff and in schools.112 But for parents, local entrepreneurs, village leaders, and, to some extents, students, the language of interviews

111 See Mosse (2006) for an in-depth discussion. Albert Hirschman’s famous evaluation of World Bank projects in the 1960s (Hirschman 1967) met with similar epistemic challenges. His critical results were dismissed by the World Bank; one member of staff noted that Hirschman attempted a ‘marriage between two inherently incompatible points of view – that of the decision maker and that of the academician or seeker of truth’ (quoted in Alacevich 2012: 31).
112 English is the language of instruction at secondary level.
was Kiswahili: the research assistant ensured the translation. But, beyond the translating support, she played an instrumental role in identifying local ‘big men’ and helping map their political-economy networks. She opened the doors of the few places of socialisation that the district capital offered, where the symbiotic relations between politicians, district technocrats and businessmen could be observed, in vivo.

Finally, the Western researcher, as an outsider, is often perceived as a powerful person able to influence local power relations. In the various sites of the fieldwork, many informants saw the author as a witness of their political, business or personal rivals’ alleged misdemeanours. During interviews, she was pulled into various conflicts, for instance between a head teacher and a ward councillor fighting about a specific tender for school desks or between the ruling and opposition parties or between intra-CCM opponents in Lushoto. Specifically, allegations of corruption were often raised against individuals. Much of the literature directly engaging with the issue of corruption has barely addressed questions related to the predicaments associated with empirical investigations of morally condemned or illegal behaviours. As argued by Harrison (2006) ‘most discussions of ethics in anthropology concern the ethics of conducting research rather than of researching unethical behaviour’. As an exception, Stirling (1968) discussed the practical dilemma of researching and publishing accounts of illegality including corruption: if the researcher decides to remain silent on illegal practices, her account will remain partial; on the other hand, writing about them can be difficult in practice. First, the pervasiveness of accusations of corruption cannot be taken as evidence of their truth: they ‘may be only loosely related to corrupt practice, and may equally reflect existing power’ (Harrison 2006: 10). In addition, even if one ascertains the reality of corruption in a specific case, it may be quite impossible to publish the information without potentially harming informants. According to Harrison, Stirling’s answer to this dilemma – to ‘offer only a discussion in general terms, without case analysis’ – might not be entirely satisfactory: it might undermine ‘the pervasiveness of the account’ (ibid). As a response, Harrison suggests displacing the focus of the analysis from the ‘corruption’ itself to the ‘accounts of corruption’, the way they reflect power and the way they relate to ‘the material and social conditions within which they arise’ (ibid.: 24). In this dissertation, this prescription is followed and accounts of corruption are situated within a broader analysis of power dynamics and of elites’ accumulation strategies in the educational sphere.
4.5 Treatment of data

Most interviews conducted at central level were recorded; this was not the case during the fieldwork in Lushoto. Most quotations are anonymised, almost systematically for Tanzanian informants. Interviews are referred to as ‘Interviews 1, 2, 3 …’ The detailed list with names, precise position and date of interview will be made available to the examiners on demand. The minimum contextual information necessary for the analytical demonstration is provided, with the view to avoiding identification of informants. In cases where the name or the precise professional position of the informant is provided, personal consent has been formally obtained during the interview or via email at the writing-up stage. As a general rule, the terms ‘senior’ or ‘top’ government official are used to designate ministers, permanent secretaries and directors; the label ‘government official’ applies to other administrative ranks. Similarly, schools visited are attributed an alphabetic letter and their name is mentioned only if absolutely necessary for the analytical demonstration and if unlikely to cause any harm to research participants.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented the theoretical framework of the research: a political economy of education that considers education systems as historical constructs, produced and reproduced at the intersection of the international and the national, with ideological and material dimensions and sites of distributive conflicts and productive economic activities. The research draws on the insights from various analytical traditions in social sciences that point to three ways of viewing the social function of schooling: transmission of knowledge, social reproduction and the discipline of students’ minds and bodies. Finally, the chapter stressed the intellectual affinity of this research with the capability approach on two main aspects: the promotion of the humanities and the affirmation of the political nature of ‘quality education’.

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113 No corrections have been made to interview quotes other than in cases where meaning might be affected by the choice of words of an informant who has English as a second language.
Two core concepts lie at the heart of the research: the ‘state’ and the ‘elite’. In contrast to the normative and culturalist approach of neopatrimonialist authors or donors’ good governance agenda, the contemporary African state is not conceived here as the outcome of a failed graft of a Western-type state onto authentic indigenous societies. It is endowed with historicity; it is a site of conflicts and the nest of a vast web of interests, international and domestic. This research projects tells the story of the ward secondary schools policy in Tanzania through an elite lens. Elites are defined here as the few people who control the significant material, symbolic and political resources in a country. They do not form a homogeneous group: this research unearths sites of contention within the elite, both ideological and material, at national and local levels.

The research adopted a pluralist methodological framework; it is based on the exploitation of various types of data: official documents, printed media, education statistics, budget and aid data, and qualitative information gathered during fieldwork conducted in Tanzania in 2011-2012. This encompassed about 180 in-depth semi-structured interviews with members of the elite at national level and in Lushoto district, visiting 28 secondary schools and holding focus-groups with parents, students and teachers. The next four chapters propose a political economy reading of key aspects of Tanzania’s ward secondary schools policy informed by the analysis of this large variety of materials.
Chapter Four

Elite narratives and the ward secondary schools policy:
A specific formulation of the access-quality-equity nexus

‘Resort camps’, ‘advanced nursery schools’, ‘day care centres for grown-up children’, ‘garbage in, garbage out’, ‘in ward secondary schools, the product is nearly zero’: these are some of the phrases used by the research informants to describe the ward secondary schools. These respondents, from various segments of the national and local elite, expressed harsh judgements on these community schools. From a learning point of view, the recent expansion of junior secondary education in Tanzania could without doubt qualify as a ‘failure’. Nevertheless, according to President Kikwete, ward secondary schools are a success: ‘it has worked.’ He was not the only high-ranking official who approved of this policy choice. According to an official in the PMO-RALG ‘this [policy] is one of the best things we have done’ (interview 5). For a Member of Parliament (CCM): ‘we had one among the most successful policies, implemented within order’ (interview 131). Are the President of Tanzania and these officials in a state of denial? One cannot dismiss the possibility that this self-congratulating posture among a wide share of the ruling class, ‘frustrated by stubborn social realities and material facts’, has decided to, what Scott described as ‘retreat to the realm of appearances and miniatures’ (Scott 1999: 257). However, Keen stresses ‘the need to be suspicious of the idea of “failure”’ and advised researchers to focus on a tangential question: ‘What objectives are being achieved amidst apparent failure, chaos and breakdown?’ (Keen 2008: 216). In that sense, rather than assessing success or failure, one may ask, in a long tradition of political economy, whose interests have been served by observed outcomes.

This chapter presents insights to understand why this specific policy was adopted at this specific time and why alternative choices – like a gradual expansion or the prior provision of skilled teachers, ‘historically plausible alternative courses of action present in the policy debate’ (Jackson 2006: xi) - were rejected by the rulers. It avoids the temptation to look for evidence of the ‘real’ intention behind the policy choice and to search for individual

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114 Speech delivered at the University of Dar es Salaam 50th Anniversary Ceremony (20 October 2011).
motives of policy makers: motives that, even if they exist, are by definition ‘unobservable beliefs inside of heads’ (Jackson 2006: ix). Instead, the chapter traces discursive patterns that contributed to the legitimation of the policy and to making it possible. Respondents’ narratives are used to explore elites’ interpretation of the traditional access – quality – equity conundrum and to unveil the various functions that elites ascribe to their country’s education system. The chapter largely draws on the notion of ‘public rhetorical commonplaces’ defined by Jackson as discursive resources ‘that can be utilized so as to render a given policy acceptable’ (Jackson 2006: ix). Their availability is ‘an indispensable part of the process of public policy-making’ (ibid). We will see that to implement the decision to construct one secondary school in each ward, the State had to deploy its coercive power against segments of the elite (this chapter) and the wider population (Chapter 6). However, as noted by Jackson (2006: 242), ‘social arrangements are almost never stable enough to do without an on-going process of legitimation that helps to produce and reproduce those arrangements by rendering them socially and politically plausible’. The thesis argues that without the mobilization of these ‘public rhetorical commonplaces’, the reconfiguration of the post-independence educational settlement that the ward secondary schools policy has entailed would not have been possible.

The Tanzanian state is not a homogeneous entity: the ward schools policy is the outcome of intra-ruling class conflicts, especially between politicians and technocrats. This disjuncture of interests reflects conflicting visions of modernity (Section 1). Nevertheless, in 2011-2012, elites deployed a homogeneous discourse to legitimate this education policy with controversial outcomes. The analysis of interviews conducted with members of the elite, at national and district levels, and the study of press articles and official documents, revealed three main public rhetorical commonplaces, knitted together to legitimise the policy decision: a policy that answers a ‘social demand’ (Section 2); an inescapable policy to manage the youth (Section 3); and a policy meant to secure Tanzania a place within the global knowledge economy (Section 4).
1. The ward secondary schools policy and elites’ conflicting visions of modernity

1.1 Edward Lowassa’s electoral strategy rooted in a long-standing intra-ruling class conflict

The ward secondary schools policy choice was politically driven, at the highest level of the Executive. Despite the community-driven official story, all insiders’ accounts of the decision-making process underlined the critical role played by a prominent political figure, Edward Lowassa, Prime Minister between 2006 and 2010 and President Kikwete’s long-time close political ally. The label ‘Lowassa schools’, coined by the press and used by some respondents, attests to a barely contested paternity. This was confirmed by a senior official in the CCM Secretary: ‘Then came the 4th President, Kikwete. He put much on education. The Prime Minister decided that we should establish ward secondary schools to accommodate primary leavers from that ward’ (interview 85). This account points to a harmonious, collaborative division of roles between a President, who sets a general strategic orientation on education, and a Prime Minister who plays a decisive role in shaping the policy and drives its implementation.

Electoral objectives were undoubtedly not foreign to Lowassa’s decision. As argued in the introduction assessing individual motives largely remains out of the researcher’s remit. Nevertheless, it would be unwise not to relate this decision to Lowassa’s well-known presidential ambitions.\(^\text{115}\) This process cannot be analysed in abstraction from his personal efforts, on his way to the political summit, to assert his credentials as a statesman responsive to people’s needs. Despite the catastrophic Form 4 examination results, Lowassa continues to boast of his secondary education achievements to boost his political profile. Similarly, his supporters proclaim their champion’s political superiority by drawing on the ward secondary school story.\(^\text{116}\)

Moreover, President Kikwete certainly required his own education initiative to overshadow President Mkapa’s educational legacy. The name of his predecessor remains firmly attached

\(^\text{115}\) In January 2014, Lowassa, after his implication in a corruption scandal, was back to a leading position within the party and was ‘determined to win the CCM presidential nomination’ for the 2015 elections (Africa Confidential, 24/01/2014, Vol. 55 - N°2).

\(^\text{116}\) For instance, ‘Lowassa who is remembered for his influence in Ward Schools program’ In2EastAfrica, 17August 2012; ‘Records have it that it was Lowassa’s zeal and commitment to construct secondary schools in every ward’ Vox Media, 4 July 2011.
to the internationally praised PEDP and the abolition of primary school fees. The ward secondary schools can be understood not only as a technical but also as a political sequel to PEDP. For Kikwete, investing in the education field might have been a political necessity to assert his power and boost his chances to gain a second term. This was paradoxically confirmed by the member of the CCM Secretary mentioned above, whose position logically depends on Kikwete (CCM’s president): he asserted against all evidence that ‘President Mkapa did not do much on education; he tried his best with PEDP’ (interview 85). Lowassa’s and Kikwete’s individual electoral strategies point to the critical importance of educational initiatives in building a politician’s stature, at least as imagined by the elite.117

If Lowassa’s personal electoral strategy cannot be denied, it was also rooted in a long-lasting intra-ruling class conflict. Indeed, despite its enduring nature, the historical education settlement exposed in Chapter 1 did not remain unchallenged. Many officials, when questioned about the evident contradiction between Nyerere’s educational options and the ward secondary schools policy, dismissed this inconsistency as spurious. However, these claims of absolute fidelity obscured the intense contestation that Nyerere’s educational options were subject to, both during his time in power and after his resignation as President in 1985. Samoff (1979b) showed, in particular, how the petty bourgeoisie in the Kilimanjaro region developed strategies to reinforce their social and political position inherited from the colonial period: they funded their own local private secondary schools in contradiction to the national education agenda. Coulson (1982) pointed to wealthy parents’ individual strategies to ensure that their children, who did not perform well or failed the Standard 7 examination, would still be admitted to selective public secondary schools or secure a seat in a fee-based private school. The government itself implemented its own policy on private education flexibly to accommodate the ‘social demand’ (Lassibille et al. 2000). The vocationalisation of the curriculum, at least as it was implemented through manual activities or cultivation of the shamba (school field), was resented by parents and seen as a continuity of the colonial education system that denied academic education to Africans (Buchert 1994; Okoko 1987).

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117 To assess the actual influence of politicians’ educational credentials on their chances of being elected would require another research project. However, Chapter 6 briefly challenges the idea of an automatic relation between politicians’ political survival and their involvement in education.
Nyerere himself was very much aware of the pressure exerted by some segments of the ruling class to expand secondary education. ‘I know that virtually all the pressure for educational expansion comes in the form of demand for more secondary schools (…). I’m saying that it is the job of the Party and the Government and in particular the Ministry of Education to resist this pressure’ (Nyerere 1984: 153). In 1988, he vocally denounced public officials’ support of the expansion of public and private secondary schooling as subverting the Party’s programme:

‘Many of these new Private Schools are the results of public collections supported by – or even initiated by – Party leaders and prominent figures! (…) No one has suggested that it is part of our Party’s Programme! (…) It would be a greater service to the people of Tanzania, to the children of Tanzania, and to education in Tanzania, if public collections were made and used for the upgrading of our primary schools. Our leaders should look again at their responsibilities to the mass of our people’. (Nyerere 1988: 184)

The post-independence educational settlement was also subject to stern international criticism. A famous 1990 World Bank comparative study of educational achievements in Kenya and Tanzania (Knight and Sabot 1990) disparaged Nyerere’s *Education for Self-Reliance* policy and especially the restrictions put on private secondary schools. Despite its methodological flaws and its denial of the actual financial constraints experienced by Tanzania’s education system (Samoff 1992), the 1990 document still influences aid agencies’ economists today in Dar es Salaam. One of them referred to this ‘amazing study by Knight and Sabot’ and implicitly characterised the *Education for Self Reliance* as an anti-egalitarian and obscurantist policy: he used the motto ‘don’t educate anybody’ to qualify the former ‘Tanzanian way’ in education.\[119\]

The 1995 *Education and Training Policy* offers an illustration of the ideological convergence between donors and an elite segment against the education configuration inherited from *Ujamaa*. This policy document, largely drafted under external influences, incorporated a fundamental attack against a core element of the historical settlement on secondary education: it planned the end of the quota system set up during *Ujamaa* (URT 1995: 21).

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\[118\] Samoff specifically pointed out the crucial difference in the two countries’ economic bases. In Kenya ‘the economic base permits a substantially larger investment in education, both public and private’ and ‘the differences in the availability of secondary education observable in 1980 were more a function of Kenya’s relative affluence than of Tanzania’s socialism’ (Samoff 1992: 88).

\[119\] Foreign economist, aid agency (interview 51).
Since the private sector was now allowed to thrive, the quota system, portrayed as intrinsically unfair and inefficient, lost its relevance. The notion of ‘merit’, understood in relation to collective and historically constructed inequalities, was replaced by ‘merit’ viewed through an individualistic lens, in relation to ‘natural’ aptitudes, independent of social origin and that society needed to nurture: the government’s role was to support the ‘deserving ones’. These criticisms of the quota system were still referred to by some of the research informants.\textsuperscript{120}

Lowassa did not invent the ward secondary schools policy: the 1995 \textit{Education and Training Policy} identified the construction of one secondary school in each ward as a key educational orientation for the country (URT 1995: 102). The \textit{CCM Election Manifesto} in 2000 and 2005 also reaffirmed the strategy.\textsuperscript{121} However, in his inaugural speech to Parliament on 30 December 2005, the newly elected President Kikwete did not mention the ward secondary schools at all. Instead he prescribed the creation of ‘Pan-Territorial Secondary Schools that will deliberately mix talented students from all corners of the country’ with the view of strengthening national unity:\textsuperscript{122} this programmatic vision had more resonance with the \textit{Ujamaa} meritocratic model of government secondary schools than with a model of community-driven mass secondary education. The persistent coexistence of these two options provides an evident sign of friction within the state: the question of the type of secondary education that the country required or could afford has been a long-lasting site of contestation for Tanzanian elites.

Drawing the political and social map of elite coalitions in Tanzania proved an elusive quest for the researcher. As argued in Gray (2012), the Tanzanian ruling class has been characterised by its fragmentation and the boundaries of political coalitions alter according to the contested issue at stake. One enduring splinter line could nevertheless be clearly identified: the ward secondary schools policy exemplifies the disjuncture of interests between politicians and technocrats, which could be traced both at central and district

\textsuperscript{120} Including Margaret Sitta, former Secretary General of the Teachers Trade Union (TTU), former Ministry of Education during the expansion of ward secondary schools and current Chair of the Parliament Standing Committee for Social Affairs.

\textsuperscript{121} CCM (2000 and 2005).

\textsuperscript{122} http://www.parliament.go.tz/docs/pspeech_en.pdf (Last accessed on 15/02/2014).
levels.\textsuperscript{123} The opposition between the two groups exhibits a divergent appreciation of the appropriate route to modernity.

### 1.2 Ward secondary schools and the ‘rule of the experts’

Initially, the formal *SEDP 2004-2009* document was the result of a process-oriented collaboration between bureaucrats and donors’ representatives. The SEDP was the last offspring of a decade-long education planning process that started in the mid-1990s (see Chapter 1). The final SEDP document was passed through various government-donors technical committees and based on numerous studies commissioned by donors. It foresaw an expansion grounded on targets in terms of access and learning achievements (URT 2004: vii). The programme also had meticulously programmed an accelerated production of qualified teachers. These targets were derived from a modeling exercise that factored enrolment projections, required teaching force and available financial resources (World Bank 2004: 7).

Nevertheless, from the inception of the planning process, a tension was perceptible between an aspiration to universal secondary education – a socially desirable target - and a more gradual expansion commensurate with the availability of public resources – a financially realistic target. The SEDP document achieved an evidently shaky compromise between two scenarios that reflected the divergent positions of the World Bank and the government on the necessary rhythm of expansion (Figure 4.1).

\textsuperscript{123} This opposition is a long lasting feature of Tanzanian power configurations. It is rooted in the historical opposition between the intellectuals – the bureaucrats – and the, generally, less educated politicians. See for instance Ivaska (2005).
In his foreword to the SEDP I, Joseph Mungai, then Minister of Education, announced: ‘This is a visionary plan with projections of up to 2010 when we should achieve 50 per cent primary-secondary transition rate that may translate into having over 500,000 pupils joining Form One in secondary schools annually which would be about five times the current rate’ (URT 2004: i). Proclaimed by a member of the Cabinet, these targets can be considered as endorsed by the entire government, including the Prime Minister and the President, and imbued with a high level of political legitimacy. Consistent with this politically asserted goal, the core text of the document dwelled on the ‘high growth scenario’ to present the different components of the programme: from a formal point of view, preeminence was given to the government’s preference for a steady pace of expansion. However, despite being relegated to the rank of annex, the World Bank favoured option – a ‘medium growth scenario’ that took account of available resources and macro-economic prospects - was chosen as the basis of the actual implementation for the first years: only ‘favourable performance [would] mandate change into the high growth scenario’ (World Bank 2004: 20).

This built-in ambiguity reflects more than the power struggle at play in the negotiation of an aid intervention between the World Bank and a recipient country. The ward secondary schools story also reveals the proximity between Tanzanian and international bureaucrats: they share a similar faith in the intrinsic efficiency of technical rationality. Most government officials involved in the design of SEDP and interviewed during this research fully...
endorsed the technocratic planning approach that underpinned the design of SEDP. They confirmed, with visible professional pride, the technical soundness of the initial plan and the gradual nature of the projected growth: the expansion was ‘programmed, it was well programmed (...) targets had been prepared’ (official, MoEVT, interview 10). Most of them would legitimate, a posteriori, the ward secondary schools policy, dwelling upon the three rhetorical commonplaces mentioned in the introduction, enmeshed in various combinations. However, in the interstices of this dominant legitimation discourse there surfaced, often through discursive contortions, regrets that the actual expansion deviated from its carefully planned, gradual trajectory. Specifically, the immediate outcomes of the ward secondary schools policy – poor learning performances, scarcity of teachers, derelict infrastructures - could have been avoided had politicians not irrationally overruled the technocrats’ enlightened plans:

We as the ministry, we wanted to expand secondary education according to plans. As technocrats, we plan how things should go. But the political envoys said “No, no, no. We need to run, to jump”...so actually we can say, our plan was not followed by the party. We are suffering what we are suffering now because we didn’t go according to plan. (official, MoEVT, interview 10)

The following statement epitomises the conflict-ridden relations between the political and bureaucratic spheres:

That’s the difference between developed and underdeveloped countries. In developed countries technocrats are steering the wheel of development. In under-developed, political people are leading, they are the ones who decide and you will follow. You, technocrat, you will follow. It is the other way round. (...) Now, if you want to live here, you live here. If you don’t want to live here, go find your place to live. Here, politicians are leading the way and we shall expand secondary education. And you technocrats will have to do what we say. You will have to expand, you say no money, no this, no this. Go and expand.’ (official, MoEVT, interview 6)

At district level, where the material implications of the policy choice have been the most challenging for the bureaucratic apparatus, technocrats’ bitterness vis-à-vis politicians was equally perceptible underneath the usual official legitimation narrative, a resentment shared by headmasters and teachers.

In this vision, the core root of under-development lies in political leaders’ stubborn rejection of what Mitchell (2002) called the ‘rule of the experts’, the genealogy of which can be traced back to the European Enlightenment and its ‘mantra of efficiency’ (Alexander
Bureaucrats view themselves as custodians of a specific modernisation philosophy geared towards the general interest, in conflict to politicians’ cynical populism and self-serving policy choices.

1.3 The educational ‘Great Leap Forward’ and the coalescence of Tanzania’s political class

Lowassa’s individual agency was decisive in driving the ward secondary schools policy forward. Nevertheless, it was endorsed by the rest (or at least a large share) of the political class. The following statement by an official of the CCM Secretary highlights the subtle relations between the top Executive and the Party, in the decision making process. Immediately after having recognised Lowassa’s significant role in the ward secondary school, the informant continued:

*The idea itself originated from the party caucus, before being tabled before the government. It was initiated within the party. We have the official party meetings: the NEC [National Executive Committee]. The party caucus is an informal gathering of CCM party leaders, eminent leaders where they discuss basic issues. Political figures were behind the decision. The Prime Minister himself, Lowassa who was also a member of the NEC, was the one championing the idea of ward secondary schools but it’s not the decision of one person, it’s a collective idea and the government took it.* (interview 85)

Margaret Sitta, former Minister of Education, also stressed the government solidarity and collective endorsement of the policy:

*Most of decisions need to go before the Cabinet. Nothing can be done without the decision of the Cabinet. So it was not Lowassa’s decision. Of course he was the Prime Minister and as the Head of Government’s business, he took the responsibility of its implementation but you can’t say that it was Lowassa’s decision.*

The fact that, despite all the evidence to the contrary, Sitta downplayed Lowassa’s individual role is interesting in itself. This denial reveals something about the tensions within the party and about the common ideological substratum that contributes to the coalescence of competing CCM factions. During the ward secondary school process, her ministry was blatantly side-lined by the Prime Minister’s Office. She is also the wife of the Parliament’s former Speaker who has been leading a fierce intra-CCM battle against
Lowassa and his faction. Interviewed in April 2012, in a context of emerging social contestation over the ward secondary schools, Margaret Sitta could have questioned, even indirectly, Lowassa’s ward schools decision as a tactic to undermine his credibility, putting the blame for catastrophic Form Four results on him. Insisting on the Cabinet’s collective agency certainly allowed her to reassert her own influence over the decision-making process. Nevertheless, what transpires from the rest of the interview was a full endorsement of the policy and of its ideological underpinnings. ‘If you ask me about the ward secondary schools, I will tell you that I’m very very proud of them, they were a big relief. (...) We knew well that during the transition, certain cohorts will suffer. But it’s a transition period. After a number of years, things will improve’. Ward schools were not a failure, but a necessary stage in development. In that context, her denial of Lowassa’s role can be reassessed as a political attack meant to deny him getting full credit for a successful policy.

Margaret Sitta’s lexical corpus – especially the idea of a necessary sacrifice of some cohorts - can be seen in interviews with many other CCM politicians. Her endorsement was therefore not (only) a contingent answer crafted for a Western researcher’s ears. It reflects on the contrary the entrenchment, among Tanzanian politicians, of a specific developmental ideology, of what Scott referred to as ‘high modernism’ (Scott 1999: 345), grounded in the belief that development cannot occur without a ‘great leap forward’. This was a development path that would entail some sacrifices in the short run.

As explicitly stated by an MP (CCM) ‘Now we’ve got difficulties but in 30 years to come it will be different, we’ll have the biggest learned community in East Africa …Yes, the beginners will be crucified for those who come later’ (interview 131). The high casualty toll of the policy is completely assumed as a necessary, unavoidable price of development: ‘OK we start with a failure but it’s impossible to reach the top right from the beginning it’s not possible, it’s illogical. We did expect that we could have a lot of failures but as a ruling party we were ready for these challenges: we know that, later on, we’ll come to a better position’ (interview 85). The question of who was to pay the price of the policy was,

124 See for instance ‘CCM circles the wagon’ Africa Confidential 54(12), 07/06/2012.
125 A similar sign of an intra-CCM rivalry could be detected during the Parliamentary discussion of the FY2011/12 budget when MP Lowassa and his successor Prime Minister Pinda battled over who would get credit for the ward schools ‘success’. They argued about the ability of the current government, in contrast to Lowassa’s previous government, to take ‘bold decisions’ to boost the country’s development. See for instance: The Guardian 1 July 2011.
126 This developmental ideology reveals the enduring influence of early development theorists like Rosenstein-Rodan, Rostow, Nurske, Singer and Hirschman who did not believe in incremental development and advocated for a ‘big push’ to overcome the initial inertia.
obviously, not a matter for discussion and the fact that these same sacrificed cohorts would go on to be the next generation of teachers was dismissed as irrelevant.

Mirroring bureaucrats’ denunciation of politicians’ irrationality, the ‘great leap forward’ development philosophy is explicitly articulated in contrast to gradualism, bureaucrats’ modus operandi. ‘I resolved that it could not be business as usual nor should we leave it to the normal evolutionary path of growth. That was not desirable for our country’ (President Kikwete). In their rejection of gradualism, politicians also assert their position against the international community, whose proximity to Tanzanian bureaucrats’ ethos is hence implicitly posited. Margaret Sitta, recalling a meeting with the Head of the World Bank, while she was Minister of Education, explained:

I remember I attended a meeting where the World Bank asked me: ‘Why do you construct so many schools without the available teachers, you risk undermining quality?’ But I asked them, ‘Which comes first, access or quality?’ To me, access should come first. Because I’m convinced that, even without a laboratory, a kid who stays four years in a school will not be the same. It’s better than to just get to the street.

Their hostility towards bureaucrats’ technocratic rationality and quest for a ‘general equilibrium’ does not entail a disavowal of their traditional tools. The three following statements show how statistics, scientific research and economic laws are mobilised by three generations of politicians and CCM cadres to ascertain the rationality of ‘the great leap forward’:

With regards to secondary school education, the situation in Africa was the same. Of the 503,054,515 secondary school students in the world, South East Asia had 160,278,253, Latin America and the Caribbean had 57,108,671 and North America and Western Europe together had 62,686,626 students. Sub-Sahara Africa had 30,576,317 students only and Ethiopia had 4,505,507, South Africa 4,186,882, Kenya 925,341, Uganda 619,519, and Tanzania 524,325 (...) It is these statistics that informed our decision on the need for unprecedented interventions to expand secondary and higher education in terms of building more schools and colleges, increasing enrolment of students. (President Kikwete)

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127 Speech delivered at the University of Dar es Salaam 50th Anniversary Ceremony, 20th October, 2011.
128 Ibid.
The decision was based on collective research, people did research. The idea came out from research, it was based on research. (Senior official, CCM Secretary, interview 85)

In economics we have two theories of growth: the balanced theory of growth and the unbalanced theory of growth. I consider that the unbalanced growth is more productive to development…Without the law of large numbers we would not make any progress. In the course of time, we’ll improve the number of teachers, the availability of books. The success will come. We don’t regret. (Former MP, former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, interview 135)129

To accelerate the path of development, politicians needed to tame the bureaucratic apparatus. The implementation of the ward secondary schools policy involved a quasi-military mobilisation of the government bureaucratic apparatus under Lowassa’s authoritarian supervision. The latter would regularly summon staff of the Ministry of Education and Regional and District Commissioners in Dar es Salaam and hold them to account over the progress of the implementation in their respective administrative areas. A former Regional Commissioner, in post at the time of the policy, explained:

I was called one day on the phone: “Your region has only 32 per cent of entrance at secondary, why?”
Then I was called to a meeting in Dar es Salaam with the DC, DED, District chairman…in a conference room like this one. The PM told the RCs and DCs: you have 30 minutes to find a solution to allow all primary leavers to be admitted in secondary schools and 3 months to implement it. So we came with a programme. We went to the people and they did a good job. From 32 per cent in February I reached 96 per cent admission rate in April. (interview 131)

Another insider informant concurred:

There was a lot of political push from top, the Prime Minister. We had a lot of meetings at the Prime Minister’s office chaired by the Prime Minister, with attendance of the Minister for Education, the Minister for Local Government. The regional commissioners, all the top brass. Regional commissioners, top officials at the regional level and top officials at the district level. They were all called to come and explain directly to the Prime Minister what they were doing and what their plans to expand were (…)

129 In this quote the reference to Albert O. Hirschman’s ‘unbalanced growth theory’ is explicit. Against other development theorists who promoted ‘balanced growth’ (Rosenstein-Rodan or Nurks), Hirschman argued that unbalancing the economy was the best strategy to achieve economic growth. Specifically, state investments in what he called ‘Social Overhead Capital’ (basic services including education, health, infrastructures or public utilities) would result in excess capacities that, despite possible initial unprofitability, would subsequently stimulate investments in ‘Directly Productive Activities’ (Hirschman 1958).
they had to stand there and they had to explain and then, they were asked questions. If they were not well-prepared, they had to go out and get themselves prepared and come again another day. It was very serious. (Senior official, MoEVT, interview 10)

Every echelon of the CCM apparatus was put to work: ‘Through the party chain of command, up to the ten-house cells level (palozi nyumba kumi) we managed to bring the idea to every ten house, to get the message through and make people act’ (official, CCM Secretary, interview 134). Far from the official story of a bottom-up process, driven by communities’ self-help initiatives, it was very much a top-down process. Every official embarked on the mobilisation enterprise, if not by conviction, certainly in fear of losing his/her post in case of unreached targets: ‘no RC would make a mistake’ (interview 131). A representative of an NGO underlined the coercive dimension of the policy implementation: ‘It was done at great force, it was almost Chinese-like or Soviet-like orders; you must do it whether you like it or not. And so, it was … done in a very rough, very, very rough way’ (interview 67).

This voluntarist, ‘big push’, mode of policy-making was not new in Tanzania. For instance the villagisation process under Ujamaa followed a similar pattern: it started as a voluntary scheme but in face of thin actual outcomes top leaders resorted to coercion to achieve results (Hyden 1980). Similarly, Samoff (1979a: 45) pointed to the habit of Tanzanian rulers to launch ‘widely publicized “operations” (…) often with scant reference to previous experience, with little substantial analysis, and with a tendency to be heavy-handed’.

Nevertheless, the coercion exerted by the state over the bureaucratic apparatus should not be considered as the usual mode of relations between the party and technocrats. An informant, well advanced in his professional career when the policy was decided upon, noted: ‘I was not used to that and I’m sure, even for some of those top guys, they were not used to that. It was unusual, it was unusual’ (senior official, MoEVT, interview 10). In normal circumstances, the bureaucratic apparatus enjoys a rather large autonomy vis-à-vis the party: because of the lack of capacities within the party, there is ‘a very big leeway and a very big discretion by a bureaucracy to run government’ (MP, CCM, interview 149). The ward schools story confirms earlier analyses of the party–government relationship: according to Lawson and Racker (2005: 9), the CCM may interfere with the government’s policy formulation and
implementation duties ‘when it identifies a risk of the government making political mistakes’.

The fact that the CCM Election Manifesto for 2010-2015 (CCM 2010) has included as a priority for the education sector the ‘construction of one A Level school in each division’, a clear continuity of the ward secondary schools policy, demonstrates that the tension between great leap forward and rule of the experts is still alive: the intra-CCM struggle, underpinned by diverging modernization philosophies, remains unsettled. Despite these frictions within elites, in 2011-2012, they also deployed a homogeneous discourse to legitimate the ward secondary schools policy. The next three sections explore the three public rhetorical commonplaces that they mobilised to tell their ward secondary schools story.

2. The ‘social demand’ for secondary education and elites’ egalitarian aspirations

2.1 Ward secondary schools: a government response to a ‘social demand’

‘Social demand, social demand, social demand’ (academic, interview 72): one of the dominant narratives provided to explain the expansion policy relates to Tanzanian leaders’ responsiveness to people’s ‘demand’ in the context of mass primary education. In 2006, the first cohort of PEDP students was about to complete their primary schooling and the two words ‘social demand’ were heard again and again in all interviews, across all elite categories. ‘The demand is tremendous; the demand for secondary education is from the people. Now it’s so intense. In the past, the demand was for primary education. But now the demand has shifted. Everybody wants their kid to go to secondary education’ (senior official, MoEVT, interview 10). This policy ‘was a natural response to what are the demands of the communities’ (official, MoEVT, interview 7).

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130The division is the administrative unit between the ward and the district.
131The young generation of politicians, across parties, seems more prone to embrace the ‘rule of the experts’ than to adhere to the big push narrative. For instance, one young CCM member castigated CCM elders’ development philosophy, underlining its irrational inadequacy: ‘They’ve got an idealistic approach. We need a realistic approach. If you decide to build a school and you don’t have teachers, you don’t have books... what do you expect? You don’t have to politicise everything. Education is a technical issue’ (CCM member, interview 146).
The ‘social demand’ argument was also present at the time of the decision: it cannot be considered, at least exclusively, a discursive currency mobilised by elites in order to legitimise *a posteriori* the policy and its appalling learning outcomes. In 2001, Joseph Mungai, then Minister of Education, noted: ‘*The GER for lower secondary education increased from 5.0 in 1995 to 7.0 in 2000. These levels remain low in terms of social demand.*’ 132 Official planning documents conveyed a similar message. Early plans for secondary expansion were rather silent, in their statement of intentions, on any possible egalitarian purpose attached to secondary education: the two other narratives – youth employment and economic modernisation – prevailed.133 However, in 2004, three years after the abolition of school fees for primary schools, the notion of social demand was clearly visible in official discourses. In his foreword to the *SEDP 2004-2009*, Mungai stressed: ‘*Without the expansion in access stipulated in SEDP, the transition from primary to public secondary schools would drop dramatically. This would clearly be unacceptable, not only to the Government, but also to the parents*’ (URT 2004: i).

Similarly, donors have largely mobilised the ‘social demand’ rhetoric. The foreseeable ‘social pressure’ caused by primary education leavers and the necessity for the government to provide a response was acknowledged by the World Bank in its SEDP programming document: ‘*The current limited provision of secondary education is economically unwise and socially unsustainable*’ (World Bank 2004: 5). A similar argument had already been used by the agency to justify the official opening up of education to private providers in the mid-1980s: ‘*Excess demand pressures had built up to intolerable levels (…) Excess demand was indeed a major factor motivating the government’s decision in the early 1980s to remove the barriers to private sector growth*’ (Lasibille et al. 2000: 5). For the World Bank, ‘*rates of return*’ are at the root of the ‘social demand’, interpreted as the aggregate sum of individual demands for education: ‘*social demand for education is driven by labour market wage premiums for higher levels of educational attainment*’ (World Bank 2010: 80). Their SEDP project was explicitly justified on the ground of greater private returns to secondary education relative to investments in primary or tertiary schooling. For World Bank staff in the Dar es Salaam office, ‘*rates of return*’ constitute the common sense explanation of the

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government’s expansion decision: ‘Today with the huge number of primary leavers, a higher wage premium is associated to higher education’ (interview 58).

The discursive mobilisation of the ‘social demand’ argument, a public rhetorical commonplace for donors and the elite, points to a specific perception of the role of the state as a benevolent ‘servant of the people’ ensuring the conditions for equalization of social conditions. Government, donors and various elite segments may differ on the instruments or the pace to achieve this egalitarian quest but a permanent shared vision of the state’s main duty remains: to provide social services for the people.

The effectiveness of this ‘social demand’ eluded the empirical investigation; its modalities of materialisation, its supposedly bottom-up channels of expression were not substantiated by research interviewees; this ‘social demand’ took on the attribute of a self-evident social fact. Chapter 2 challenged the ‘rates of return’ narrative and its ability to account for countries’ specific education trajectory. The pre-eminence, among the Tanzanian elite, of this idea of a ‘social demand’ for secondary education should rather be analysed in conjunction with the profound contradiction between an enduring egalitarian ethos among the Tanzanian ruling class and the elitist nature of secondary education in the post-independence educational settlement.

2.2 The enduring currency of Ujamaa egalitarian ideology

Despite calls for a classless state, secondary education was constructed, under Ujamaa, as a key site of class formation. A direct link was set up between secondary education and access to white-collar jobs: entry qualifications for specific training schemes (like those for agricultural extension workers, teachers and many types of technicians) were upgraded to Form Four (Coulson 1982: 203). English, commonly perceived as an indispensable resource to access influence, power and wealth, was maintained as the language of instruction for post-basic education levels, building up the distinctive social function of secondary education. Contrary to Nyerere’s intent, secondary schools continued to be

134 This is not specific to Tanzania nor to developing countries: in the case of the United States, republican ‘egalitarian virtues’ propelled the ‘high school movement’ in the beginning of the 20th century (Goldin 2001).

135 Swahili, the national language, is the language of instruction at primary level.
referred to as ‘Bwana Kubwa’ or ‘big man’ schools and primary school leavers who could not enter secondary education continued to be labelled as ‘failed’ (Nyerere 1974).

In 2011-2012, elite discourses abounded with allusions to the power of education as an instrument to climb the social ladder and to reach positions of authority. ‘No one, no family, no community can prosper without investing in education’ (former MP, CCM, interview 135). ‘How you get to power, it’s education’ (academic, interview 73). The decisive role played by Nyerere in forging a nation united on an educational substratum also constituted a permanent reference. Few interviewees challenged the belief in the unlimited power of education. Only one respondent acknowledged that: ‘Some families, parents overinvest on education. (…) The danger is that people can become very frustrated and disappointed if they think that education is everything. It’s a misplaced thought about what education can achieve’ (senior official, interview 38).

Despite its indisputable elitist nature, in 2012 the Ujamaa secondary education model was still perceived by those who had benefited from it as a tool to serve an egalitarian development strategy. Many respondents of this research expressed their gratitude towards a system that had made their own social advancement possible. ‘[Nyerere] thought of rural people, he thought of poor people. Some people like us couldn’t pay school fees. My father was very poor. But we were educated to university education’ (official, MoEVT, interview 6). Another informant even refuted the word ‘elite’ to qualify government secondary education: ‘I don’t believe that secondary education was for the elite. I don’t. Not during Nyerere’s time … Even at that time, education was for all’ (official, MoEVT, interview 1). Here the word ‘elite’ is implicitly associated with wealth-based schooling as opposed to the meritocratic feature of government secondary education that officially allowed every child to attend secondary school, irrespectively of his/her social extraction, and to climb the social ladder. An official of the Tanzanian Chamber for Agriculture, Industry and Trade confirmed the critical role of free secondary education in the post-independence formation of the bureaucratic middle-class: ‘I benefitted from the system of free secondary school. And believe me, if we had to pay school fees, I wouldn’t have gone to secondary school because we were a large family and my big brothers were the ones who were at school. So if I had also to pay, my parents would never have taken me to school, to secondary school’ (interview 74).

This egalitarian ethos was embraced, at least rhetorically, at the highest levels of the Executive. For President Kikwete, ‘Most of us here, of my generation, would never have gone to school
and reached this far in life had it not been for the far-sightedness and good social policies of our Founding Father?\(^{136}\)

While universal primary education has almost been achieved, the site of valuation of education as a promise of a better future has drifted towards secondary education. ‘A parent who has got a child who has finished secondary education…there’s nothing to grieve. You’re starting to feel good (…) Hope, hope in the family, will be built around secondary education’ (academic, interview 72). Secondary education has been elevated to the status of ‘social equaliser’, a ‘social good’ to be delivered by the state (MP, CCM, interview 149). Economic success is also intrinsically associated with secondary education: ‘If you look at Chaggas who are succeeding, these are people who have Form Four’ (interview 72).\(^{137}\) This comprehension of secondary education as the first step out of a survival stage implicitly disqualifies primary education as a guarantor of prosperity.

More than an aggregated sum of discrete individual interests, the ‘social demand’ narrative reflects the interdependent nature of the relations between the ruling class and the rest of the society, already pointed out in Section 1. Indeed, implicit behind the ‘social demand’ rhetoric is the perception of an essential bond between political survival for those in power and their delivery of education. Because ‘education is in people’s mind’, the government’s own existence is considered at stake; ‘the government depends on the support of the people. We should respond to people’s demand’ (interview 85). The ‘social demand’ for ward secondary schools in Tanzania vividly illustrates Boone’s contention that ‘state power [is] rooted in rural societies’ (Boone 1994: 109).

A second dominant narrative mobilised to justify the ward secondary schools policy has been centred on the youth.\(^{138}\) A bulge of idle and disenfranchised primary education leavers was about to threaten the society’s peace and harmony; their capture within a state

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\(^{136}\) Inaugural speech to Parliament, Dodoma, 30 December 2005.

\(^{137}\) Chaggas are a tribe from the Kilimanjaro region that have historically, since the colonial period, benefitted from better education services.

\(^{138}\) According to the United Nations, ‘the term “youth” refers to all those between the ages of 15 and 24’ (UN 2012: 4), an age bracket that corresponds to secondary education in Tanzania. Beyond this statistical categorisation, the youth age boundaries should be considered as much more extensive and blurred. For instance in Tanzania, a country-specific definition, frequently used by stakeholders and policy makers, extends the youth upper age limit to 35 years (URT 2006: 9). More generally, the concept of youth needs to be seen as a social construct that corresponds to a particular political and economic subaltern position (Bayart’s ‘cadets sociaux’) or a socio-cultural identity. For an analysis of intergenerational relations in contemporary Tanzania through an exploration of hip-hop culture and a discussion of the concept of ‘new generation’ as a resource in politics of identity, see Stroeken (2008).
institution would ensure their domestication, the discipline of their mind and body and the
taming of their violent or deviant behaviours.\textsuperscript{139}

3. Ward secondary schools, a device for youth domestication

3.1 The youth threat to the social order of elders

In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring and London riots, international aid agencies
flooded the world with reports on the ‘youth issue’, echoed by news headlines. The 2013
\textit{World Development Report} drew attention to the ‘621 million youth neither working nor
studying’ (World Bank 2012a: 4), pointing out that ‘in extreme cases a lack of job
opportunities can contribute to violence or social unrest’ (ibid: 6). The risk that ‘hordes’ of
jobless educated young people may pose to the political order and prospects for economic
growth has unleashed international anxieties, in a renewed interpretation of Louis
Chevalier’s classical ‘working classes, dangerous classes’. The ‘Youth’ appeared to catalyse
contemporary disquiet about world socio-economic dynamics, with sub-Saharan Africa as a
focus of all fears.\textsuperscript{140}

In 2011-2012, in Tanzania, the two phrases ‘the youth roaming the streets’ and the ‘youth
ticking bomb’ were permanent references in interviews, newspapers, official speeches and
Parliamentary debates. The idea of a ‘raw youth’,\textsuperscript{141} ‘half-cooked’ and half educated,
featured prominently in discourses. Metaphors of fire or explosion were widespread:

\textit{A petrol tank will be very safe until somebody comes with a match…if you want to know how
volatile I am then bring a matchbox. Otherwise, if you don’t bring any flame, I’d be here. History
is like that. (…) People are finishing school in thousands, they are in the rural areas; they are in
towns; that is the petrol itself}. (Official, MoEVT, interview 6)

The direct link between the PEDP and the decision rapidly to expand secondary education
was underlined by most officials. But several policy options could have been envisaged to
cater for the expected rise in primary education leavers - and are indeed present in the
public debate: the gradual construction of new schools, an expansion focused on existing
schools with additional boarding facilities or the prior-training of teachers. In most

\textsuperscript{139} The reference to Foucault is transparent (see Chapter 3).
\textsuperscript{140} Sub-Saharan Africa has the fastest growing population, the highest share of 15-24 years old in the world, and records a
5 per cent annual urban growth rate, twice as high as in Latin America and Asia (UN-Habitat 2009).
\textsuperscript{141} Expression borrowed from Burton (2006).
interviews, officials – even bureaucrats who acknowledged their scepticism about or disagreement with Lowassa’s choice – resorted to two related lexical fields to legitimise the policy and, implicitly, disqualify alternative policies: the policy was a matter of emergency and the government had no choice.  

‘Maybe there was no decision. Maybe they had no choice … They didn’t have the choice’ (academic, interview 72). ‘[The ward secondary schools decision] was also the result of a crisis of the education system (…). The crisis was apparent in January 2006. (…) In real sense it solved the problem of enrolment’ (MP, Chadema, interview 83).

In the face of this ‘primary school leavers crisis’, ‘youth in the streets’ was actually the only alternative envisioned by most officials, against which the government decision was being retrospectively assessed. The word ‘street’ appeared again and again in interviews; a sort of catchphrase that seemed to embody elites’ deepest fear. ‘Youth don’t do anything. Some sell vegetables, they’re just at home. I’m concerned. They’re wasting seven plus four years at school and now they’re back home doing nothing, wandering in the street’ (politician, CUF, Lushoto, interview 144). The government had to build a dyke to contain the youth tidal wave that threatened to unleash itself on the peaceful Tanzanian order. Any other alternative was dismissed as illogical or not feasible: ‘Some people said that the government took the wrong decision. But I disagree. There were only two options: A/ to build schools and then to train teachers; B/ to train teachers and then build schools. The second option was obviously not possible’ (MP, CCM, Social Affairs Committee, interview 80).

The very formulation of the ward schools policy – to build one secondary school in each ward, very much different from a call for ‘secondary education for all’, implicitly posits an intrinsic relationship between education and population management. A formulation that puts the emphasis on the location of schools, within communities, tangles up welfarist considerations – the state bringing basic social services to the people – together with concerns over youth mobility. In a context of widespread social anxiety over the youth invading city streets, the design of an education policy in spatial – rather than learning – terms cannot be interpreted as a coincidence: ward secondary schools would assist in fixing the ‘raw youth’ in rural areas and prevent their migration to cities. As put by a former Member of Parliament: ‘It allows to concentrate kids in one area rather than letting them smoking

142 The ‘no alternative’ and ‘emergency’ rhetoric is a classical feature of policy-making legitimation processes (Ball 2012). In his analysis of the relations between the bureaucracy and the peasants under Ujamaa, Hyden (1980: 107) noted: ‘the party government officials had to induce a political atmosphere which justified extraordinary action’.
marijuana' (interview 145). This policy formulation should be contrasted with the old government secondary schools, mainly located in urban centres. Their attendance would oblige students to quit the village and the farm to enter the urban world; ‘migration’ was part and parcel of the secondary schooling experience.

The ‘social order’ discourse has had a specific gender coordinate. Family planning considerations were indeed systematically mobilised to justify the policy. A high-ranking official in the PMO-RALG noted: ‘We’ve got a high birth rate in Tanzania due largely to early pregnancies. With secondary education, you diminish the number of young mothers and fathers. When they’ve finished secondary school (Form 4), they’re young adults, they can marry’ (senior official, PMO-RALG, interview 28). This official position was echoed over and over by research respondents. Interviews reflected social anxieties about girls’ sexuality and linked the ward secondary school policy to an ambition of controlling it. One possible alternative policy – building fewer but bigger schools to benefit from economies of scale – was consistently dismissed on the ground of protecting girls, in a local echo to the following statement by Prime Minister Pinda’s wife in Rorya District, after a fund-raising event for the rehabilitation of a girl’s dormitory: ‘The completion of the hostel will be of a great benefit not for these children only but for the parents and the nation at large. We are going to protect the girls from unwanted pregnancies and early marriages as well as sexually transmitted diseases.’

The general anxiety over the exuberant and threatening ‘youth body’- the violent male body and the sexualised female body – was coupled with a general discourse that blamed the youth for their fate. This discursive trend was particularly noticeable among headmasters and teachers in Lushoto District. Most of them blamed their students’ disappointing exam results on the deficient school environment and lack of teachers. However, a large proportion would, at the same time, castigate the students themselves: ‘learners themselves are a challenge; they’ve got poor habits’ (teacher, school P). Headmasters and teachers bemoaned students’ lack of discipline (‘some students are rude and undisciplined’ – Headmaster School F); their laziness (‘students themselves don’t realise that they have to fight for their future’ - Headmistress, school J); their backwardness (‘students don’t know the meaning, the importance of education’ - second master, school Y) or intellectual limitations (‘students’ awareness is a challenge; they don’t

143 ‘Most of them get pregnant; they get few shilling, lots of distractions for young girls’ (former MP, Chadema, interview 139).
144 Tanzania Daily News, 6 August 2012.
think’ - Headmaster, school P). The use of corporal punishment confirmed that the domestication of the youth body is located at the heart of the society’s educational preoccupations. It is interesting to note that the government’s current challenge of producing and allocating enough (young) teachers to teach in ward secondary schools amounts precisely to organising a reversal in youth migration, from the cities to rural areas where the urbanite, educated youth are reluctant to live. In a striking parallel with teachers’ discourses towards their students, Lushoto District officials complained about the attitudes of these ‘raw’ teachers newly posted in the district who ‘complain so much, like children’ or ‘cry, shout, abuse, rebuke’.

Current data on demographic and urbanisation trends have provided a fertile soil for growing social anxieties over the ‘idle youth’. Tanzania has one of the highest birth rates in the world; 65 per cent of the Tanzanian population is under age 24 and Tanzanians aged between 15 and 24 represent 17 per cent of the country’s population. The demographic growth is coupled with a rapid urbanisation process. Similarly, girls’ actual educational challenges and more generally women’s subaltern social status correspond to a material reality. Nevertheless, the genealogy of this narrative is far more complex than these bare statistics.

3.2 Schooling and the youth threat: external and historical resonances

The resonance between Tanzanian and international current anxieties over the youth, already pointed out, has been underpinned by a lexical convergence: while the World Bank measures ‘rates of idleness among 15-24 years old’ (World Bank 2012a: 6), Tanzanian elites worry over the ‘idle youth’. Aid agencies firmly condemn corporal punishment but their

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145 A 2008 report showed that corporal punishment in Tanzania was perceived as acceptable: 82 per cent of all interviewees said that it is admissible for a teacher to whip a student who misbehaves in class (CAMFED 2008). According to one teacher in Lushoto (school F), the demand for discipline would come from parents themselves: ‘Parents ask to give students punishment, to cane them or ask them to fetch water’. In another school, one parent would complain about corporal punishment.

146 District official, interview 108.

147 District official, interview 124.

148 The percentage of people living in urban areas in Tanzania is likely to grow from 24 per cent in 2005 to 38 per cent in 2030, a progression more than twice the growth rate of the population as a whole. By 2030, more than 25 million Tanzanians will be living in urban areas with Dar es Salaam among the ten fastest growing African cities between 2010 and 2020 (UN Habitat 2010: 54). 23 per cent of women age 15-19 are pregnant or already have children. Young women with no education are more than 8 times as likely to have begun childbearing than women with secondary or higher education (52 per cent versus 6 per cent) (URT 2010a: 8). If gender parity in access to primary education has been achieved, gender disparities grow at secondary and higher education levels and are also substantial in performances (URT 2011b).
educational discourses and interventions do reflect a desire to domesticate the youth body. Rose (2005) argued that the World Bank’s education agenda, under the Post-Washington Consensus and its strategic focus on women’s empowerment, was firmly embedded within a patriarchal, essentialist perspective on girls and women. DFID’s 2005 Girls’ Education Strategy, while recognising girls’ education as a right, contains a similar assignment of girls to their traditional reproductive role, of the family and of the nation: ‘educating girls helps to make communities and societies healthier, wealthier and safer, and can also help to reduce child deaths, improve maternal health and tackle the spread of HIV and AIDS’ (DFID 2005: 1). In Tanzania, the last National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction (Mkukuta II), 149 expression of a consensus between donors and government, is explicit on the ultimate goal of girls’ education: ‘Increased access to secondary education, especially for girls is expected to be one of the most effective measures to address issues of population dynamics, including [a] reduction in fertility rate’ (URT 2010c: 64).

The apparent novelty of the nexus ‘idle youth / urbanisation / crime’, contemporary to a ‘primary school leavers crisis’ driven by specific demographics and the success of a specific educational programme (PEDP) and nourished by the international discourse, conceals its long genealogy that can be traced back to colonial and post-independence administrative discourses and practices. 150 While in the mid-1950s, the colonial administration was already distressed by the ‘primary school leavers crisis’ (Burton 2006), in 1967 Nyerere evoked the ‘so-called problem of primary school leavers’ that Education for Self Reliance was meant to address (URT 1967a). Burton (2005) shows how the colonial administration, the Europeans and Asians, lived in a constant fear of being submerged by ‘raw’ youth escaping rural areas. These colonial anxieties were couched in an identical language: references to the ‘idle’ youth ‘roaming the streets’ and metaphors of ‘stream’, ‘tide’, ‘wave’ or even fire and explosion abounded in colonial administrative records and press. 151

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149 ‘MKUKUTA’ is the Kiswahili acronym of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty. Mkukuta I covered the period 2005-2010; Mkukuta II the period 2010-2015.
150 The timing of this (re)emergence of the youth theme is based on the author’s own comparative assessment of the public debate in 2005-2008 and in 2011-2012. It does not mean that in the first period the theme was not present, however, eclipsed by other subjects, it occupied a peripheral position. The study of successive Poverty Reduction Strategy documents in 2000, 2005 and 2010 confirmed the discursive shift.
151 ‘We may be regarded as sitting on top of a volcano which may erupt at any moment’ (M.J.B. Molohan, assistant district officer, quoted in Burton 2005: 100). See also, Burton (2005: 166).
‘Independence from colonial rule did not resolve debates and questions about the status of young people’ (Burgess 2005: xviii). Nyerere’s discourse and politics revealed a distinctive ambivalence towards the youth. He constantly insisted on the pivotal role of the youth in the development process but this spearheading role was reserved to a particular category of youth, hard-working and committed to rural development. In contrast, young underemployed in the cities, urban ‘idlers’, were castigated as internal enemies. Their idleness was equated with betrayal of the socialist work ethics. In the Arusha Declaration, ‘laziness, drunkenness and idleness’ were cast as serious sins ‘to be ashamed of’; ‘to loiter in towns or villages without doing work’ was depicted as unacceptable exploitative behaviour (URT 1967b).152

Nyerere’s discourse on women exhibited similar ambiguities. His unabated commitment to universal primary education came with an equal commitment towards girls’ education: ‘In Africa if every child does not go to school those to be left out will be mostly the girls’ (Nyerere 1997: 211). The quota system to enter government secondary schools was used to address gender educational disparities. However, the Arusha Declaration drew a distinction between the frivolous and lazy urban (educated) woman and the industrious woman in the village: ‘Women who live in the villages work harder than anybody else in Tanzania. But the men who live in villages (and some of the women in towns) are on leave for half of their life... The energies of the millions of men in the villages and thousands of women in the towns (...) are at present wasted in gossip, dancing and drinking’ (URT 1967b). Under Ujamaa, schoolgirls were similarly constructed as licentious beings, ‘portrayed as [an] unapologetically pleasure-seeking group that refused to observe public decorum and gendered or generational hierarchies of authority’ (Ivaska 2007: 227). This construction found a perfect echo in 2012 parliamentary debates when the Committee for Social Affairs rebuffed the Ministry of Education’s proposal to end pregnant girls’ expulsion from schools: this proposed change to the 1995 Education and Training Policy would encourage girls’ promiscuous behaviour.153 Schoolgirls’ sexualised bodies remain both a site of fixation of social anxieties and a contested domain within the ruling class.154

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152 Paragraph based on historical accounts by Brennan (2010), Burgess (2010), Brennan (2006), Ivaska (2005), and Burgess (2005).
153 MP, Chakema, member of the Social Affairs Committee (interview 84).
154 Contemporary obsession with family planning and sexuality resonates strongly with the ‘motherhood’ ideology that pervaded British public discourses on poverty in the beginning of the 20th century. The blame for infant mortality was put on maternal ignorance and negligence and schooling was integral part of a campaign to transform working class women.
Finally, the dimension of space management embedded in the ward school policy also strongly resonates with ambiguities of colonial and post-colonial administrative practices. The concerns of the state about African peasants’ mobility and their migration to towns were perennial throughout the colonial period. In attempts to control Africans’ mobility, the colonial administration devised coercive measures (pass laws, resident permit, heavy taxation of informal economy and repatriation schemes) but also considered compulsory education and the extension of the school system (Burton 2005).\footnote{Former District Officer A.H. Pike recorded the colonial administration decision in 1942 to erect ‘a ring of schools near the township boundary’ ‘in order to deter children from entering the township by affording them education facilities near their homes’ (quoted in Burton 2005: 97). Similarly, Mbilinyi (1985: 95) underlined the functional relation established by the colonial power between education policy and population stabilisation: ‘a policy of universal primary education was adopted for towns in order to absorb unemployed town youth and keep them off the streets’.

155 Similarly, under \textit{Ujamaa}, the main argument to justify the villagisation process was centred on the provision of social services (Coulson 1982: 256-57). But controlling patterns of space occupation through the construction of (primary) schools and health dispensaries or the localisation of new settlements around existing social services like schools were certainly at the heart of this major social engineering project.\footnote{According to Hyden (1980: 130), the ‘compulsory villagization in Tanzania between 1973 and 1976 is the largest resettlement effort in the history of Africa (…) a gigantic effort involving the movement of probably as many as five million rural Tanzanians’. See also Scott (1999: 224-261) for an analysis of Tanzanian villagisation between welfare ‘logics of improvement’ and simplification of settlement patterns for political control and agricultural production purposes.} These historical examples mainly deal with primary schooling, nevertheless they attest to a profound continuity of the appeal of education policy as a population management device to the Tanzanian State.

The next section explores the third rhetorical commonplace mobilised to legitimate the ward secondary schools. It is also centred on the youth, but understood as agents of modernisation whose skills will unlock the door of the global knowledge economy to Tanzania.
4. Secondary education and elites’ imagined globalisation

4.1 Ward secondary schools: equipping the youth with skills for the knowledge economy?

In the case of the UK, Ball argued that New Labour education reforms were driven by a ‘necessarian logic…which relates education very directly to the demands and inevitabilities of globalisation’ (Ball 1999: 8). Tanzania has not been spared by ‘planetspeak discourses’: the modernisation philosophy that underpinned developmental strategies and education policies, under the colonial rule and the socialist regime, has been reworked in a ‘globalisation’ and ‘knowledge economy’ idiom.

In interviews, references to ‘globalisation’ would arise, again and again, with unfailing regularity. The decision to expand secondary education has been directly fuelled by a certain interpretation, dominant within the Tanzanian elite, of the very meaning of this phenomenon for Tanzania: ‘Due to this demand of personnel and the change of the world society, globalisation, we had to focus on how to compete, to integrate to the world. That demand drove us to that decision [the ward schools policy]’ (senior official, CCM Secretary, interview 85). Elite anxiety at being left outside the contemporary modernisation movement transpired from most interviews. ‘No matter what, we can’t stay behind’ (senior official, MoEVT, interview 4). Education is seen as a major instrument in avoiding Tanzania being consigned to the fringes of the global world: ‘a nation of uneducated nationals cannot participate effectively in the present world, economically and politically’ (former MP, CCM, interview 135). The education system has to mould a population able to cope with this highly unstable, ever-changing, technology-driven globalisation: ‘we want them to cope with the changing technologies … the students should cope with the world changing technologies or whatever taking place in the world’ (official, MoEVT, interview 5).  

157 The term is borrowed from Ball (2012) and refers to a ‘way of reasoning that seems to have no structural roots, no social locations and no origin’.

158 The association between secondary schooling and modernity is not reserved to the elite. In her study of secondary schooling in Kilimanjaro, Stambach (2000) points to a similar perception, among Northern Tanzania’s population, of secondary schooling as a site of emergence of modern identities. She describes how schooling constitutes a site of collective reworking of the very meaning of tradition and modernity, through the dialectic opposition of schooling and everyday-life organisation, based on age-hierarchy and patrilineality, and its narrative of tradition identified with backwardness.
The ‘globalisation-education’ narrative has been framed alongside three inescapable imperatives: science, English and skills.

Lack of scientific knowledge would jeopardise Tanzania’s chance to enter the global economy and benefit from it: ‘I’d wish we had enough scientists to pick up the world of innovation’ (senior official, MoEVT, interview 4). If Tanzania is to become a middle-income country by 2025, ‘competitive, knowledgeable, scientific and technologically anchored among the community of nations’, the goals set by *Vision 2025*, science needs to lie at the core of its developmental strategy: ‘Basic sciences and mathematics must be accorded signal importance in keeping with the demands of the modern technological age. Science and technology education and awareness of its applications for promoting and enhancing productivity should permeate the whole society through continuous learning and publicity campaigns’ (URT 2000: 20-21). The national scientific endeavour is relayed by high-ranking officials in the education sector: Jumanne Kawambwa, Minister of Education and Vocational Training, closed his statement to the *Education Sector Performance Report 2010/2011* with a call for ‘quality improvement in education, especially in Sciences, Mathematics, ICT, Languages, Skills Development and e-Learning’ (URT 2011c: xvi). The cause of science is being embraced by all segments of the elite, from top politicians to government bureaucrats, civil society members and the private sector: the Tanzania National Business Council’s 2009 paper entitled ‘*Human Capital Development – Focusing on Science and Technology*’ bemoaned the lack of national awareness about the role of science and technology as ‘an essential tool for national development’. It called for a holistic transformation of the education system to enhance the teaching of learning of science and technology.¹⁵⁹ In that context secondary education is considered a crucial key to unlock the door of contemporary modernisation to Tanzania. ‘*In an era of science, technology and information science, secondary education develops and reinforces the capacity for continuous learning and updating to match requirements of globalization*’ (Gray S. Mgonja, former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance).¹⁶⁰

Information and communication being an integral part of the knowledge economy model, the yearning of Tanzanian elites for globalisation has crystallised into a quest for English

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¹⁶⁰ Letter to the World Bank Country Director for Tanzania and Uganda, Request for an IDA credit for the implementation of SEDP, 5 April 2004 (World Bank 2004).
mastery. English is viewed as ‘the medium of dialogue as well as intellectual and commercial transaction’ (Joseph Mungai, former Ministry of Education and Culture, URT 2004: ii). In recent years, English medium primary schools have mushroomed, mostly in urban centres, and testify to the elite appetite for English.

**Figure 4-2: Evolution of enrolment in the non-government primary schools in Tanzania, 2006-2011**

![Graph showing enrolment increase](image)

Source: URT (2011b and 2012a). Note: ‘the contribution of the private sector in Primary Education is mostly directed towards establishing English medium schools.’

Confirming Brock-Utne’s analysis (2010, 2009), Tanzanian proponents of English interviewed during this research, pointed out the lexical limitations of Kiswahili as a scientific language; they challenged its value and relevance in a time of global economic competition:

*I personally remain a proponent of English, which should remain the medium of instruction. Especially in terms of global perspectives. Kiswahili is not big enough yet: if you teach maths or physics or microbiology in Kiswahili, we cheat ourselves. Let’s wait so that Kiswahili grows, enlarge its vocabulary in sciences and technology... In the current phase, we still need English to globalise ourselves.* (Religious leader, interview 71)

The ‘English vs Kiswahili’ debate has largely been framed in terms of competition with Kenya, in the context of the East Africa Community. The perceived threat of a labour market overwhelmed by well educated, English-proficient Kenyans is widespread among the bureaucratic elite. It also permeates the business community: ‘*Once the East African regional labour market opens, Kenyans will flow into Tanzania to take Tanzanian jobs*’ (CEO, printing company, interview 97). In this competition, Kenyans’ alleged mastery of English and the
quality of their education system are viewed as critical parts of Kenya’s comparative advantages. This entrenched perception influenced the negotiations of the East Africa Community Treaty: Tanzania has obtained a restrictive clause on the free movement of labour.\textsuperscript{161}

Finally, economic development would be blocked by a fundamental skills mismatch, rooted in an irrelevant and inefficient education system. Right from the inception of the SEDP, the critical link between secondary education and the labour market was posited: ‘the supply of educated and trainable labour force’ was the first multiplier effect of secondary education identified by the SEDP document (URT 2004: v). But the youth–unemployment–education nexus gained a new centrality between 2005 and 2012. As in international spheres (see Chapter 2), with the ward secondary schools policy, youth employment has come to the forefront of Tanzanian public debates and authorities’ concerns. In a same movement, self-employment in the informal sector is being glorified as the venue for youth success and national economic development: ‘If we are to succeed as a country, our youth have to embrace self-employment (…) The youth need to realise that the success of modern societies all over the world has been built on the informal sector’.\textsuperscript{162}

All segments of the elite promote self-employment as the silver bullet to tackle youth unemployment. For Tanzanian elites, the desirable youth are entrepreneurial and innovative; they aggressively chase opportunities: ‘Tanzanians have to learn to be entrepreneurs, and be ready to see and use opportunities for self-development that economic reforms provide’ (President Kikwete).\textsuperscript{163}

As for the ‘idle youth’ narrative, the ‘knowledge economy’ public rhetoric commonplace has been forged at the intersection of international discourses and the country’s historical legacy.

\textsuperscript{161} The opening of the Tanzanian market to East African ‘professionals and technicians and associate professionals’ has been phased between 2010 and 2015 (www.eac.int/commonmarket/movement-of-labour.html, accessed 10/02/2014).


\textsuperscript{163} Inaugural speech to Parliament, Dodoma, 30 December 2005.
Chapter 1 pointed out the ‘learning crisis’ experienced by Tanzania since 2010, triggered by Form Four examination results. In this context, the word ‘quality’ has come to occupy a central position in donor-government policy dialogue. During the 2000s, chiefly focused on access to primary education, concerns over quality were not absent from policy documents but the learning achievement theme could not be debated. Like a taboo, the word quality was implicitly prohibited in the sector dialogue. The HakiElimu saga provided a vivid example of the government’s high sensibility to the quality challenge: in 2005, the local NGO’s reports and media campaigns that highlighted PEDP’s failures to induce learning improvements incurred the wrath of the Minister of Education. By 2011-2012, the government’s approach towards quality had dramatically evolved: today ‘everybody is saying the word “quality”’.

All interviewees – donors, civil society representatives and academics – acknowledged the government’s attitudinal change. As Rajani, former HakiElimu Executive Director, explained ‘Nobody in government is now…claiming that the quality is good… And the whole question now has changed.’

The negotiations of the World Bank’s SEDP II (2010-2015) constituted a major driver of the quality turn. The SEDP I was severely criticised by the Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group: it was rated as ‘moderately unsatisfactory’, quite a negative judgement in the IEG’s terms. Specifically, the disastrous impact of the uncontrolled and under-funded expansion on quality learning was assessed as putting a ‘significant’ risk on ‘development outcomes’ (World Bank 2010b: 33). The design of the Bank’s SEDP II clearly reflected this major internal criticism: ‘quality’ was put at the heart of the programme.

In parallel, DFID revised its Tanzania country strategy to ‘reflect the need to focus on improving the quality of education’ (DFID 2012: 14). This strategic orientation was the direct consequence of recommendations by the UK’s Independent Commission for Aid

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164 HakiElimu was co-founded in 2001 by Tanzanian activists to promote the right to education, with SIDA, CIDA and DFID among its main donors. Following the NGO’s reports on PEDP under-achievements the organisation was banned from conducting activities in schools. This event provoked deep tensions between the government and donors. Rakesh Rajani, co-founder and Executive Director of the organisation resigned and then set up a new organisation, Twaweza, which carries out the Uwezo studies. For an account of the HakiElimu-government conflict see Philips (2011).

165 Education aid manager, development agency, Tanzania.
Impact (ICAI) that conducted an evaluation of DFID’s education interventions in Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania between 2005 and 2010; the report stressed the ‘lack of attention to learning outcomes and to the trade-off between increasing access and ensuring quality’ (ICAI 2012:1).

Beyond a broad converging concern of Tanzanian elites and donors over poor learning performances, a consensus has also built up on the very definition of ‘quality’. The saliency of skills, sciences and English in elite discourses over secondary education has indeed mirrored donors’ education discourse and interventions.

For instance, the World Bank’s SEDP II displays a strong science emphasis, with a focus on laboratories, science textbooks and teaching practices in maths, sciences and languages. The project monitoring framework reflects this focus: the list of outcome indicators is overwhelmingly biased towards these three areas (World Bank 2010). As acknowledged by a member of World Bank staff, the focus on science was the outcome of ‘a long debate, first within the World Bank team and then with the government’ (interview 58). The design of the World Bank’s support entailed the negotiation, between the agency and the government, of ‘minimum requirements’ to transform ward secondary schools into ‘functional schools’. The government’s initial proposal included various elements like libraries, administration blocks and hostels. The minimum physical infrastructures finally agreed include ‘(i) classrooms, (ii) science laboratories, (iii) latrines, (iv) water supply, and (v) electricity supply (World Bank 2010a: 45). Both sides recognised that the choice was powerfully influenced by the World Bank - ‘it was their own preference’ (official, MoEVT, interview 5). But both also acknowledged that the government was easily convinced, Tanzanian decision-makers sharing converging scientific ideals: ‘the Permanent Secretary with whom we discussed is a scientist and an academic, he appreciated the idea’ (World Bank, interview 58). At the 2011 Education Sector Review, the same Permanent Secretary strongly reaffirmed government’s commitment to science education, in line with the Five-Year-Development Plan and Vision 2025. Processes of domestication of donors’ discourses and conditionalities are being facilitated by a cognate ideology that equates modernity with science.

166 In parallel the World Bank Science and Technology Higher Education Program 2008-2013 (US$200 million) supports the Government of Tanzania’s efforts to deliver more and better-qualified graduates in specific degree programmes of high priority including sciences and education.
Reflecting global trends (Chapter 2), Tanzania-based aid agencies also largely draw on the skills mismatch narrative. For the World Bank, Tanzanian growth prospects have been jeopardised by the deterioration in education quality that induces a skill shortage. Even if they complete secondary schools, young job seekers are not equipped with the right skills to fill the jobs available (World Bank 2009). Many aid managers expressed their concern over unsatisfied market needs for qualified employees. They also relayed the narrative of an unbeatable Kenyan competition:

_One of the main constraints of Tanzania I would say is the very low level of skill across society (…) in the public sector but also (…) the private sector. I think that’s a main concern… when you speak to entrepreneurs, that’s probably their number one concern. It’s, they say, it’s very difficult to find qualified personnel (…) when you come across somebody with above average competence then it’s a Kenyan._

(Foreign economist, interview 56)

Finally, donors have demonstrated a growing interest in vocational training. In his opening statement to the 2011 Education Sector Review, the Canadian High Commissioner to Tanzania, representing the Education Development Partners Group, underlined the challenge of ‘providing these young people with marketable skills’ and the ‘increased recognition of the importance of expanding post-secondary education, particularly Technical and Vocational Education and Training’. CIDA has also decided to support the Direction of Technical and Vocational Training within the MoEVT in conducting a tracer study to better understand the dynamics of self-employment and informal sectors.

This converging understanding of quality education as science/English/skills cannot be interpreted as the mere outcome of an externally driven, imposed global agenda. In this instance too, Nyerere’s educational legacy forms a constitutive ingredient of the discursive construct. In 2012, the Planning Commission explained its current initiative to draft a national skill development strategy as an attempt to revive the logics underlying manpower surveys during _Ujamaa_. Similarly, the introduction of a competence-based curriculum was interpreted as Nyerere’s direct legacy. The self-reliance rhetoric is summoned but

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168 Information publicly shared during the 2011 Education Sector Review.
169 Interview 40, senior official, Planning Commission.
170 A curriculum developer in the Tanzanian Institute for Education wondered: ‘What is the origin of competence-based education in Tanzania? Was it imported from other countries or did it have deep indigenous roots here? When I went to visit back the
construed through an individualistic lens. Self-reliance is no longer a collective endeavour, it is no longer the responsibility of the entire society and the role of the government is to create an enabling environment for the respectable and industrious youth, to equip them with the entrepreneurial skills that would enable them start a micro-enterprise – a ‘machinga business’ - and transform tiny income generating activities into light manufacturing firms employing large groups of people (interview 72).

Nyerere’s own contradictions offered a fertile ground for the naturalisation of the knowledge economy discourse in the Tanzanian soil. Nyerere’s personal ambiguities over English – he was a fierce advocate of Swahili as the key ingredient of nation building but also translated Shakespeare into Swahili – contributed to shape elites’ enduring belief in English as a construction site of the modern African self.¹⁷¹ Nyerere’s educational philosophy also wove together two discordant conceptions of education. On one hand, he forcefully promoted an emancipatory education geared towards individual and collective transformation - an education that would liberate human beings from their enslavement to the productive world.¹⁷² On the other hand, both his philosophy and development practices firmly tied education to economic production.¹⁷³ The vocationalisation of the secondary education curriculum testified to his firm belief in the need to reconfigure the education-labour nexus in relation to actual conditions of production in Tanzania. His manpower policy also set up a strict relationship between the secondary education certificate and entry to the formal labour market. Blurring the boundaries between education and work was a core tenet of his educational thinking: ‘What we are aiming at is converting our schools into economics communities as well as educational communities’ (URT 1967a: 91).

Contemporary discourses around the ward secondary schools testify that the general/vocational education nexus remains a highly contested domain in society at large, among educationists and within the ruling class.¹⁷⁴ For Nyerere, this unresolved tension between technical and academic education constituted a major setback to the country’s

¹⁷¹ This idea was developed by Simon Gikandi at the conference ‘The Other English: Some African Reflections’, British Library, 28/02/2011.

¹⁷² ‘I want to be quite sure that our educational institutions are not going to end up as factories turning out marketable commodities’ (Nyerere 1974: 126).

¹⁷³ This contradiction has already been pointed out in Mbilinyi (2006).

¹⁷⁴ A senior government official underlined the political sensitivity of the subject among policy-makers: ‘On the debate between skills and academic knowledge, the government is reluctant to take a strong position’ (interview 38).
development: ‘Our failure to emphasize science teaching, of all kinds and at all levels, and especially our indifference to technical and vocational training is the greatest failure of our educational system’ (Nyerere 1988: 179). At the end of his life, Nyerere endorsed the full correspondence between *Education for Self-Reliance* and the employability rhetoric: ‘Their education must prepare them [the young people] to be Self-Reliant and self-employed if they cannot secure (…) paid employment. Perhaps in the language of today, we should say that education should help the young to develop a spirit of private enterprise’ (Nyerere 1998: 164).

4.3 The knowledge economy narrative: obscuring mechanisms of social reproduction

In uncovering the ideological backbone of the globalisation narrative, the argument is not to deny the challenges faced by Tanzanian students in maths, sciences and English. It is not to refute ‘Tanzanian elites’ modernisation aspirations and their desire to see their country occupy a position at the heart of the global economy. But authorities’ and donors’ policy focus on sciences, English and skills, discursively tied to knowledge-economy inevitabilities, is problematic in many instances.

First, the knowledge economy narrative has been supported by shallow empirical evidence. Available statistics strongly support the widespread concern over declining performances in maths, sciences and English mastery even if equally poor results were achieved in art (i.e., non-science) subjects like Kiswahili or history (Figure 4.3).
But the available data on the Tanzanian labour market are not very helpful in making sense of labour market dynamics. More specifically, from these data it is impossible to derive a strong relation between labour trends and levels of education, let alone skill endowment levels. Successive Integrated Labour Force Surveys (ILFS) consistently reported a counter-intuitive relationship between employment and level of education: the urban unemployment rate was higher among people with secondary education or above and the phenomenon has increased with time.\footnote{The last ILFS, conducted prior to the ward secondary schools movement cannot account for potential unemployment among the first cohorts of ward schools Form 4 leavers. In 2006, unemployment was highest among the youth (15-25 years old); their unemployment rate was 14.9 per cent against 10.4 per cent for adults (URT 2007a: 57). A labour survey conducted in 1965 found a similar pattern (Burton 2006: 386). This was recorded in a context of reportedly good quality secondary education.} In any case, as argued by Cramer (2009: 1) data on labour markets in sub-Saharan Africa should be treated with the highest circumspection: ‘there is barely any reliable evidence on youth unemployment for any developing country’.

Besides, existing surveys do not identify ‘skills’ as a major brake on business development: the 2006 IFC \textit{Enterprise Survey} for Tanzania ranked ‘inadequately educated workforce’ in $7^\text{th}$ position out of 15 business environment obstacles. It was cited by only 1.4 per cent of firms as their top obstacle, far from electricity, the major obstacle for 74 per cent of the firms, and access to finance (9.8 per cent of the respondents).\footnote{http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/CustomQuery/tanzania (accessed 31/03/2014).} Likewise, a 2011 survey commissioned by Tanzanian businesses identified ‘skilled labour’ only as the $13^\text{th}$ priority, out of 17, for a state ‘enabling’ policy to improve the investment climate (BEST – AC
2011: 4). Tanzanians’ perceptions of the labour market also lead to the questioning of the skill mismatch claims (Figure 4.4).

**Figure 4-4: Perceived main reasons of unemployment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failed to secure work place</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed to secure start up capital or working tools</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No jobs were available</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of information about available jobs</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination / corruption</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not having enough education for available jobs</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not having enough skills for available jobs</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not having enough experience for available jobs</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self competition</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: URT (2007)

More imagined than evidence-based, claims over the irresistible demands of globalisation on the education system contribute to vitiate the education debate in Tanzania by delineating its legitimate boundaries. These claims support the entrenchment of a narrow utilitarian vision of education, hardly questioned. One respondent stood alone in his defense of a broad, humanist definition of education: ‘*What about the poets, the art, the cinema? We need diversity. We need all competences besides maths and physics and science, social sciences, art. We need to bring diversity in our society. A focus on maths and science is of course easier to justify*’ (senior official, interview 38). Quality education is becoming subsumed into (measured) learning achievements in maths and sciences; attempts at challenging the bounded definition of ‘quality education’ are silenced and discredited on the ground of globalisation requirements. This process of ‘mis-framing’ (Fraser 2008) the meaning of quality *a priori* excludes potential alternative voices that might challenge elites’ consensus around for-profit quality education and question its alleged self-evident, common sense nature. The hegemonic discourse of international and domestic elites on the globalisation imperatives contributes to depoliticize the eminently political question of quality education.

The globalisation narrative also contributes to legitimate policies that reinforce unequal dynamics within the education system. For instance, most students transit from primary schools, where Swahili is the language of instruction, to ward secondary schools with a very
poor proficiency in English; there they rarely encounter proficient English teachers. At the same time, English medium (pre) primary schools cater disproportionality for the needs of a tiny share of enrolled children (Figure 4.5).

**Figure 4-5: Evolution of enrolment in government and non-government primary schools 2006-2011**

Through their access to English-medium private (pre) primary schools, wealthy parents build their children’s education premium from the (pre)primary level. The language privilege is also relevant to maths and science subjects as long as the language required to access these disciplines is only mastered by a minority of the young generation. English as a language of instruction constitutes an instrument of consolidation of privileged position.

A large body of literature has demonstrated the benefits of learning in the mother tongue or at least in the socially dominant language. Nevertheless, Tanzanian authorities and donors frame the debate and shape their policies over the language of instruction in terms of scarcity of competent English teachers and lack of teaching and learning materials. The possibility of switching to Swahili as the language of instruction throughout the education system is not explicitly envisioned. In 2012, while recognising the political sensibility of the subject among Tanzanian elite, DFID’s education adviser invoked the globalisation imperative to dismiss the possibility of a radical policy shift in the language of instruction: ‘there’s competition within the East African community and the free market flows’. The globalisation

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177 For Tanzania, see Brock-Utne (2009, 2010).
rhetoric contributes to further entrenching a major source of inequality within the Tanzanian education system. At the same time, consciously or not, it facilitates the protection of UK and US interests in the global domination of the English language.

The attribution criteria of the Higher Education Students’ Loans offer an example of a science-focused education policy that deepened social inequalities within the education system. Beyond the issue of favouritism and mismanagement, a more important element is how the structure of the incentives it promotes consolidates the position of privileged children. In line with the national priority given to sciences, students in health, sciences and education (sciences and mathematics) are eligible for a 100 per cent loan, without means-testing; but given that community secondary schools are characterized by a severe lack of science teachers and laboratories, most of the students who can continue sciences at higher level logically come from privileged schools, well-resourced in science teachers and equipment. In brief, ‘you make rich kids learn sciences’ (MP, Chadema, interview 83). In the present conditions of the public education system, the simultaneous emphasis on science and English facilitates the reproduction of elites’ social position.

Finally, examining the occupational future envisioned by the elite for the mass of the youth, Oketch seems to have a valid point in arguing that the ‘renewed interest in the dichotomy of vocational education versus general education’ amounts to a ‘political pronouncement’ rather than a desire to improve access to education at all levels (Oketch 2007:1). In 2012, Prime Minister Pinda explicitly encouraged male youth to take on ‘boda boda’ (moto taxi) jobs, stressing their contribution to rural economic development. Tanzanian labour statistics corroborate the pre-eminence of the informal sector as a major recipient of new entrants into the labour force (URT 2007a). But, as argued by Rizzo (2011), in his study of informal transport workers in Dar es Salaam, the informal sector does not provide a temporary occupational status that leads to formal wage labour. People engaged in this labour market segment tend to remain trapped within its realm and the rosy self-

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178 As part of implementation of the 1999 National Higher Education Policy, the Higher Education Students’ Loans Board was established in 2004 and commenced its operations in July 2005. The Board issues loans to students pursuing Advanced/Higher Diplomas and degree studies at accredited higher education institutions. It is also in charge of collecting repayment of all loans issued to students, so as to make the scheme sustainable.

179 Anecdotal evidence supports the idea of an unfair distribution of loans that would benefit children of the well-connected (noted by several respondents). For the issue of funds embezzlement see for instance The Citizen 26/01/2012 ‘Punish officials behind theft of students’ cash’.

180 The Citizen 23/3/2012
employment narrative conceals precarious working conditions stemming from unregulated relations of employment and earnings at bare subsistence level.181

Yet, within elite dominant discourse, the youth unemployment problem becomes framed as a problem of the youth themselves. Their joblessness is rooted in their own attitudes and personal traits: ‘rather than thinking about their careers, they have their minds set on immediately getting nice cars, buying nice houses, eating and drinking. The students complain and fall into doing drugs, selling drugs, riots, alcohol, and clubbing’ (Prime Minister Pinda).182 Like parasites, they expect everything from the state: ‘Over the years, Tanzanian youth have complained that the government has done little to create jobs for college leavers. This attitude has consigned many to idleness and social ills such as drug abuse when they could be breaking new ground in productive activities’ (ibid). Elites firmly embrace the idea of youth ‘voluntary’ unemployment:

Many of our professionals have to look for work in the private sector on their own, or have to employ themselves. Some of them, as I speak, are walking up and down the streets of our urban areas looking for employment, even though they have marketable or usable knowledge and skills. For instance, it is not uncommon to find university graduates in agriculture, animal husbandry and fisheries looking for employment in urban areas, hoping to work in an air-conditioned office. (President Kikwete)183

This statement by President Kikwete echoes views that abounded in colonial administration reports (Burton 2006: 370) and under Ujamaa (Ivaska 2005: 101). Despite the paucity of conclusive labour statistics and a very impressionistic understanding of labour market dynamics, the employability narrative remains firmly entrenched, both among donors and Tanzanian elites. The continuous redeployment, in elite discourse, of a rhetoric that locates the onus of youth unemployment upon youth themselves obscures the state’s structural inability to conjure up the contradiction between school expansion and the scarcity of skilled jobs. The discursive plaiting of the rhetorics of employability, self-reliance and criminalisation of the youth overshadows what is really at stake behind the valuation of vocational training: the legitimation, in a context reconfigured by mass general

181 More generally, Bateman and Chang (2012) challenged the model of economic development grounded in the proliferation of tiny informal micro-enterprises. One strand of the development literature (de Soto 1989, Moyo 2009) depictsthe informal sector as a powerful springboard for individual and national economic success. It has contributed to shaping donors’ interventions focused on entrepreneurial skills and micro-credit. But this model has largely failed to deliver on its promises; it has induced, in developing countries, a distorted productive structure operating inefficiently. It was also at odds with the successful economic trajectories of East Asian tigers (Amsden 2001, 2007, Chang 2006).


secondary education, of the ‘reproduction of the division between manual and intellectual labour’ which is ‘at the very heart of the production process and in society as a whole’ (Poulantzas 1978: 60).

Conclusion

Because education policy choices are deeply rooted in national ideology, in the country’s political economy trajectory and its economic basis, a systematic exploration of elite narratives, their genealogy and their entanglement with global discourses, provides a fecund method to understand educational policy-making.

The ruling class does not stand as a monolithic, harmonious block. The ward secondary schools policy, driven by one prominent political figure with well-known political ambitions, was also rooted in long lasting intra-ruling class struggles. Specifically, it revealed the enduring disjuncture of interests between bureaucrats and politicians, underpinned by diverging visions of modernity. Bureaucrats, in clear proximity with donors, have faith in a technocratic rationality that promotes development gradualism. Despite neoliberal pressures to which they in part surrendered in 1985, politicians remain faithful to the development ideology in which they were groomed: following early development theorists, they believe that only a bold big push can propel development. Nevertheless, most have adopted the knowledge economy idiom. Nyerere’s contradictory legacy has favoured this plurality of ideological references that coexist both within institutions and in individuals.

This chapter has demonstrated that government authorities, when deciding upon the appropriate combination of access, quality and equity, are not driven by a revealed aggregation of individual rates of return. Education, understood as transmission of knowledge, has certainly not formed the main driving force of elites’ decision over the ward secondary schools policy. Concerns over youth domestication chiefly prevailed: schooling has implicitly been understood as a device to tame the youth and control population flows. The profound resonance with the colonial power’s policy and rhetoric and with contemporary international discourses reveals the structural problem faced by the modern capitalist state over the social integration of the youth. In a context of essential
scarcity of jobs, ‘a school system that kept students locked in an extended state of youth’ (Stambach 2000: 143) provides a temporary solution to the ‘youth containment imperative’.

The boundaries of the ‘quality’ debate have been strongly determined by what the elite – domestic and international – perceives as the globalisation imperative: labour markets’ imagined craving for skills, science and English. While the globalisation imperative entails a closure of the educational debate, it also reflects the fundamental ineptitude of the ruling class to chart out a labour-intensive developmental path for Tanzania, and sub-Saharan Africa in general. As Amsden noted, the employability ‘fallacy’ or ‘job dementia’ has flourished ‘out of ignorance of what industries could be created in the global South’ (Amsden 2012: 114). In such a context, the ‘blaming the youth’ rhetoric, that echoes the ‘criminalisation of the poor’ in 19th century Victorian England (Stedman-Jones 2007), coalesces with the globalisation imperative to conceal mechanisms of social reproduction at play within the education system.

According to Scott (1999: 345) the great majority of ‘high modernist planners’ were ‘strongly committed to a more egalitarian society, to meeting the basic needs of their citizens (especially the working class) and to making the amenities of a modern society available to all’. An egalitarian ethos still largely pervades both the administrative apparatus and state power in Tanzania. Nevertheless, the next two chapters will show that the modalities of funding and implementation of the ward secondary schools policy vitiate the egalitarian credentials claimed by the decision-makers.
Chapter Five

In search of the secondary education budget

This chapter contrasts the stated desire of elites for quality secondary education for all with their material effort to fulfil this desire. The post-independence educational settlement mentioned in previous chapters had a financial dimension. The *Education for Self-Reliance* focus on primary and adult education was reflected in budgetary terms: between 1966/67 and 1980/81, the share of primary and adult education in recurrent expenditures increased by 13 percentage points and in development expenditures, by 37 percentage points. Over the same period, the share of secondary education in recurrent expenditures fell by 20 percentage points and in development expenditures, by 19 percentage points (Buchert 1994: 106). Despite international criticism and internal contestation, Nyerere consistently justified the deliberate choice of a distorted educational pyramid on the grounds that Tanzania, as a poor country, could not afford to expand secondary education (Chapter 1). Could Tanzania’s economic base in 2006, when the government decided to embrace the path towards mass public secondary education, financially accommodate the break with the historical educational organisation and its budgetary manifestation: a low secondary education budget?

The budget is the expression of a political system; it reflects elites’ choices and preferences. It is also the outcome of conflicts between segments of the elite: ‘The crucial aspect of budgeting is whose preferences are to prevail in disputes about which activities are to be carried on and to what degree, in the light of limited resources’ (Wildavsky 1992: 595). Public expenditures constitute a means by which the state builds up its legitimacy and secures (or fails to secure) popular consent. The analysis of expenditures offers an interesting lens through which to examine power relations among the elite and the interdependence between the ruling class, which presides over budget design, and the rest of the society. To what extent did the break with the Tanzanian post-independence educational settlement, driven by the highest level of the Executive, provoke a realignment of elites’ budget preferences?
Assessing the distributional impact of public spending has long been a core endeavour of welfare economics. With the rise of Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategies, concerns over the inequity in government allocation of resources for social services gained traction in development economics (Bourguignon et al. 2002). In Tanzania, the most recent benefit incidence analysis of public education expenditures underlined their unequal distribution, although the inequities are lower than the sub-Saharan African average. Students belonging to the poorest families - 27 per cent of the school-age population and 0 per cent of those who reach higher education - only benefit from 13 per cent of public education resources (UNESCO 2012a: 231&232). However, this study does not say much about the politics underlying these distributional patterns, or about the magnitude of disputes attached to them, including within the dominant class. Have elites’ egalitarian claims to legitimate the ward secondary schools been realised through the budget? Have other imperatives prevailed over welfare considerations? What conflicts have underpinned the balancing of competing preferences? This chapter intends to illuminate these questions.

Tanzania is heavily aid-dependent. In FY 2011/12, the total amount of external assistance (loans, grants and budget support) represented about 30 per cent of total revenues (URT 2011d). In education, aid represented 18.6 per cent of the sector budget. During the years 2000-2009 Tanzania has also become one of the biggest recipients of budget support in sub-Saharan Africa: with this aid modality, external assistance is being directly channeled to the National Treasury to implement the country’s national strategy for poverty reduction and growth (Koeberle et al. 2006). In this context, budget systems and public finance management reforms have occupied a growing centrality in donors’ interventions and dialogue with the Tanzanian government (de Renzio 2006, Lawson et al. 2005). This chapter does not intend to provide a comprehensive political economy analysis of aid relations in education. Here the analytical lens is much narrower; the chapter’s aim is

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184 Based on data from the 2007 Household Budget Survey (conducted prior to the ward secondary schools expansion) and FY 2008/09 budget data.
185 These unequal patterns of public spending have been relatively stable over time: in 1993/94, according to an earlier benefit incidence analysis, the poorest quintile only benefited from 14% of public expenditures for the whole education system against 37% for the richest quintile. The poorest quintile did not benefit at all from public spending at tertiary level. The distribution at primary level was equal: 19% of public spending benefited the poorest quintile and 18% the richest quintile (Castro et al 1999).
186 In 2008, Tanzania ranked 7th out of the top 20 ODA recipients worldwide, in volume (UNDP 2011: 157). In 2011, the country’s net official ODA represented 10.3 per cent of its GNI; the average for low income countries was 9.1 per cent, and 4 per cent for sub-Saharan Africa (World Development Indicators 2013).
187 The author’s calculation, see Annex C.
188 In 2010, worldwide, Tanzania was the top recipient of budget support in volume and the second in terms of share in public expenditures, behind Rwanda (Swedlund 2013: 362, based on OECD and IMF data).
to shed light on the channels through which aid agencies contributed or attempted to shape the patterns of secondary education expenditures. Following Whitfield and Fraser (2008: 2), the chapter is also interested in the ways in which domestic elites manage ‘to pursue their own policy preferences, resisting donor priorities while still taking the money’.

Unlike the field of revenue mobilisation (Moore 2013, Di John 2011), the political economy of budget allocation in sub-Saharan Africa has remained largely unexplored outside a flourishing literature of a technocratic nature. Most existing works that deal with the politics of public expenditures (Killick 2005 on Ghana, Rakner et al. 2004 on Malawi, Hodges and Tibana 2004 on Mozambique) provide insightful analyses of the interplay between dominant actors involved in the budget process. However, they tend to assess budgeting procedures and practices against donors’ normative good governance prescriptions. Their description of the budget as a ‘façade’ (Killick 2005) or a ‘theatre that masks the real distribution and spending’ (Rakner et al. 2004: 4) corresponds to a Tanzanian reality, especially at district level, where central level distributional choices are renegotiated by local elites (see Chapter 6). Nevertheless, this characterisation also eclipses the fact that the voted budget embodies some structural and historical distributional choices that do have a bearing on the actual physiognomy of the public education system. Besides, conflicts that budget negotiations give rise to cannot easily be dismissed as mere ludicrous stage performances. As an exception, Mmari et al. (2005) do not treat Tanzanian budget decision-makers’ ‘incentives’ as the result of a rational calculation of their individual interests but rather unravel the complex power structure that underpins them. This chapter adopts a similar non-normative approach of elites’ education budget preferences.

The chapter is supported by an analysis of education budget and aid data between 2004 and 2012. Annex C provides a methodological note detailing data sources, the assumptions and their limitations. Given ‘the variety of compromises with accuracy’ (Samoff 1991: 675) that these underlying assumptions entail, the readers should not be misled by the ‘façade of precision’ (Samoff 1991) of the budget figures provided here; they are invited to rather focus on the general trends in public spending that they sketch out. The first section

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189 All studies funded by DFID.
190 Also funded by DFID.
presents basic information about the education budget, its sources of revenue, main blocks of expenditures and preparation process. The second section examines the dynamics of external assistance in the face of the rapid expansion of junior secondary education. The third focuses on domestic elites’ education budgetary preferences and investigates their actual financial commitment toward ward secondary schools. Finally, the last section considers the secondary education budget as a site of confrontation between domestic elites and donors; it questions the extent to which Tanzanian authorities have managed to exert a sovereign control over their education budget.

1. Setting the budget scene: actors and process

1.1 Main budget holders

Beyond key ministries in charge of education, numerous institutions conduct education activities. For simplification purposes, the analysis in this chapter focuses on three main actors: the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT, budget vote 46), the Prime Minister’s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG, budget vote 56) and local government authorities (LGAs, regional votes 70 to 95). These three budget holders account for approximately 90 per cent of education expenditures with about 60 per cent of the total education budget spent by regions/LGAs (UNESCO 2012a: 119).

1.2 Main revenues and expenditures

Domestic revenues and external finance constitute the two main sources of revenue of the education budget. Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to the education sector can be divided into four categories:

- On-budget projects and loans are integrated in budget books as ‘development-foreign’ expenditures but do not, or only partially, follow national systems and procedures.
- Off-budget projects are managed entirely outside national systems and procedures.

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191 For an extensive presentation of the budget process in Tanzania, see for instance HakiElimu and Policy Forum (2008).
192 Typically, ministries in charge of health or agriculture have their own training institutes and their budgets are integrated within the budget of their mother ministry.
193 See Chapter 3 (part 3.3) for a mapping of donors’ interventions in education. In 2010, 92% of ODA to Tanzania was computed on budget (OECD 2012).
- General budget support (GBS) funds only accrue to the education budget on a notional basis. GBS allocation depends on the national budget cycle and negotiations.
- Sector budget support (SBS) constitutes a variation of general budget support with a sector dialogue focused on education policies, finances and outcomes.

Two main categories of education expenditures fall outside the education ministries’ control: teachers’ payroll and education grants to districts and schools. The teachers’ payroll annual ceiling – and therefore the number of new teachers that can be recruited each year – is jointly determined by the Ministry of Finance and the President’s Office – Public Service Management (PO-PSM). Teachers’ personal emoluments are budgeted under local governments’ budgetary votes.

**Figure 5-1: Mapping the education budget**

Source: the author
The system of secondary education grants to districts and schools forms a complex web of flows of funds (Figure 5.2). Different streams are budgeted under local governments’ budgetary votes:

- Other charges (OC) to finance activities of district secondary education offices;
- Examination expenses;
- Capitation grants to cover the supply of textbooks and other teaching and learning materials, infrastructure maintenance, furniture and school administration. In theory, secondary schools should receive Tsh 25,000 per enrolled student. This amount was initially calculated in US dollars (in the context of the SEDP I) and has never been adjusted to account for inflation;¹⁹⁴
- School meals grants (for secondary boarding schools, Tsh 1,500 / per student per schooling day);
- Education development grants to finance school infrastructures.

In general, the issue of grants to districts and schools encompasses three interrelated questions, with both technical and political dimensions:

- The computation of the total envelope that represents the national budgetary effort to finance schools’ running and infrastructures expenses;
- The formula or criteria to be applied to this global envelope to distribute grants between districts and schools to ensure an allocation of funds according to needs;
- The actual flows of funds between the different administrative levels from the Treasury to school level.¹⁹⁵

This chapter is mostly concerned with national level budgetary negotiations and government-donors dialogue around public finance management (Circle 1 in Figure 5.2). The politics of the district budget (Circle 2), budget realities at school level (Circle 3) and ‘community contributions’ (Circle 4) are studied more closely in Chapter 6.

¹⁹⁴ Capitation grant mechanism was initially piloted in the primary schools of 16 districts under the World Bank’s Human Resources Development Program, then institutionalised as a government mechanism under the World Bank’s PEDP (for primary level) and later the SEDP I (for lower secondary schools): initially, funds flowed directly from the Ministry of Education to schools. Since the 2009 decentralisation decision, funds now flow to secondary schools via districts, as for primary schools.

¹⁹⁵ This third aspect is typically the object of Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS). For a technical presentation of this instrument, see Gauthier (2006). This tool has mainly been used in the context of donors’ broader anti-corruption agenda, to identify sources of ‘leakages’ in the flow of funds.
Figure 5-2: Mapping intergovernmental transfers in secondary education

Education ministries’ and local governments’ budgets are the outcome of close negotiations with the Ministry of Finance, which is responsible for the oversight of the budget preparation and execution. Every year, it issues budget guidelines, provides sector ministries and districts with budget ceilings, gives them instructions to ring-fence some budget items or to exclude some expenditures; it also scrutinises their budget proposals before tabling the national budget to Parliament for its approval in July. Parliamentary discussions over education finances are held in two Parliamentary Standing Committees - the Social Affairs Committee (for the MoEVT) and the Local Government Authorities Accounts Committee (for education grants).\(^\text{196}\)

1.3 The budget cycle

Tanzanian civil society organisations have invested in the domain of education public spending. Specifically, HakiElimu was heavily involved in the education public expenditure review process between 2001 and 2006. Following

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\(^{196}\) Tanzanian civil society organisations have invested in the domain of education public spending. Specifically, HakiElimu was heavily involved in the education public expenditure review process between 2001 and 2006. Following
2. External assistance and the fiscal space for quality secondary education for all

2.1 Donors’ lasting bias towards primary education in the budget support era

At the global level, as shown in Chapter 2, within the MDGs framework, ODA to education displayed a long-lasting bias towards primary education. Tanzania did not escape this international pattern. From FY 2004/05 to FY 2009/10, donors’ main sector of investment remained primary education. Over this period, the primary level absorbed between 49 per cent and 77 per cent of total education ODA (Table 5.1).

Table 5-1: Share of education sub-sectors in the total ODA to education in Tanzania 2004-2012

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>36.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education and Research</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author (see Annex C)

During the planning negotiations of the Education Sector Development Programme (in the years 1995-2001) the Tanzanian Government advocated for a broad definition of ‘basic education’ as encompassing primary and junior secondary education. The battle between the World Bank and the UN agencies over the appropriate definition of ‘basic education’ (Chapter 2) was reflected in Tanzania. Technocrats in the MoEVT were aware of the tight interdependence between enrolment dynamics at primary and secondary levels and wanted to secure financial support for an extended ‘basic education’. But the international definition of that time prevailed. A former senior official in the MoEVT wondered:

Do we have the same concept, we at the government and our donor partners? When we were advocating for basic education, did we understand the same way? When we were trying to define basic education from pre-primary to secondary and including adult and non-formal education (…) to what extent DPs bought this? It’s the starting point for the budget process. Unfortunately, on the other side of the coin, DPs take another definition. Even in planning policy we don’t come from the same route.’ (Interview 4)

Mmari et al. (2005), this research considers that CSOs’ actual influence on budget allocations has remained marginal; NGOs’ interventions are outside the analysis of this chapter.
Table 5-2: Share of external finance in total education budget

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education aid as total of education budget</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author. Note: notional share of budget support to education included; aid data based on donors’ disbursement reports (execution); budget data based on URT (2011b and 2012a) (estimates); see Annex C.

Figure 5-3: Aid modalities in the education sector, evolution 2004/05 - 2011/12 (% total education ODA)

In 2006, the Government of Tanzania and its ‘development partners’ signed the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST), which formalised their mutual commitment to the
The Paris Declaration principles for aid effectiveness (URT 2006: 5). The JAST singled out general budget support as the government’s preferred aid modality (ibid: 16). In education, several donors that used to finance the PEDP basket fund now designated general budget support as their main instrument to support the education sector (CIDA, DFID, SIDA, Netherlands, Finland and Norway). The European Union also supplemented its general budget support programme with an education sector budget support package.

Donors’ shift to budget support in education was closely associated with a commitment to a sector-wide approach. The new aid regime was supposed to encourage a greater focus on inter-linkages between education sub-sectors and a holistic understanding of education finances and sector budgetary trade-offs. However, with budget support, ‘it is up to the government to manage the money according to their national laws and regulations, and it is spent according to the prioritizing made in the national budget’. In this sense, the external assistance skewed towards primary education after the end of PEDP also derived from the government’s budget choices. As a senior official in the MoEVt said: with general budget support, ‘it depends on yourselves how you make your priority... So, if you want that money to go to secondary education, you can make your own decision to go to secondary education’ (interview 10).

Nevertheless, donors’ preferences and modes of intervention contributed to the sustained budgetary bias towards primary education. The two core instruments of budget support – the GBS PAF and sector policy dialogue – interacted to reinforce this primary education focus. In 2005-2006 the GBS PAF translated a formal commitment to a sector wide approach to education (one indicator per major sub-sector). But in 2007 and 2008, peak years of the secondary expansion, the GBS PAF reflected donors’ continued overarching preference for primary education. Only in 2009, was secondary education unambiguously treated on an equal footing with primary education. Moreover, the fact that, until the 2009 PAF, the indicator for secondary education remained ‘transition rate to Form One’ – identified in a context when Tanzania had a very low transition rate in comparison with comparable sub-Saharan countries - demonstrated donors’ lack of reactivity in the face of the radical transformation experienced by secondary education (Table 5.3 below).

197 See for instance EC (2007).

Table 5-3: Education performance indicators in the successive GBS performance assessment frameworks, 2005 – 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net primary school enrolment</td>
<td>Net primary school enrolment</td>
<td>Net primary school enrolment</td>
<td>Net primary school enrolment</td>
<td>Percentage of cohort completing Standard VII</td>
<td>Percentage of cohort completing Standard VII</td>
<td>Standard VII exam pass rate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition rate from Standard VII to Form I</td>
<td>Transition rate from Standard VII to Form I</td>
<td>Transition rate from Standard VII to Form I</td>
<td>Transition rate from Standard VII to Form I</td>
<td>Percentage of cohort completing O Level Secondary Education (Form IV)</td>
<td>Percentage of cohort completing O Level Secondary Education (Form IV)</td>
<td>Form IV examination pass rates (Division I-III) national average for the previous year, disaggregated by gender (MoEVT)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Tertiary Education enrolment</td>
<td>Gross Higher Education enrolment</td>
<td>Gross Higher Education enrolment</td>
<td>Gross Higher Education enrolment</td>
<td>Percentage of cohort completing A Level Secondary Education (Form VI)</td>
<td>Percentage of cohort completing A Level Secondary Education (Form VI)</td>
<td>Total enrolment in Degree Programmes (% females)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualified Teacher/Pupil Ratio in Primary Schools</td>
<td>Qualified Teacher/Pupil Ratio in Primary Schools</td>
<td>Qualified Teacher/Pupil Ratio in Primary Schools</td>
<td>Transition Rate from Standard VII to Form I Gender Disaggregated</td>
<td>Transition Rate from Standard VII to Form I Gender Disaggregated</td>
<td>Total enrolment (Total Enrolment in Higher Education)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualified Teacher/Pupil Ratio in Secondary Schools</td>
<td>Qualified Teacher/Pupil Ratio in Secondary Schools</td>
<td>Qualified Teacher/Pupil Ratio in Secondary Schools</td>
<td>Qualified Teacher/Pupil Ratio in Secondary Schools</td>
<td>Qualified Teacher/Pupil Ratio in Secondary Schools</td>
<td>Qualified Teacher/Pupil Ratio in Secondary Schools</td>
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</table>


Until 2008-2009, the education sector did not have a formal sector performance framework. However, the EU education sector budget support tied its disbursements to a list of quantified outcome indicators. The programme was formally committed to support ‘basic
education’ conceived in broad terms, following the Tanzanian definition (pre-primary, primary, secondary, teachers’ education, adult and non-formal education). However, its list of indicators revealed a bias towards the main challenges faced by primary education (Table 5.4).

**Table 5-4: Performance indicators for the release of variable tranche of the EC sector budget support programme**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reduction of cross-districts disparities in the net enrolment ratio in primary education</th>
<th>Gross enrolment rate in secondary education (Form I to Form IV and Form V to Form VI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pupil/grade A or diploma teacher in primary education</td>
<td>Gross enrolment ratio of girls in Form V and VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction of cross-district disparities in pupil/teacher ratio in primary education</td>
<td>Percent of students passing the Form IV examination (CSEE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupil/textbook in primary schools</td>
<td>Public expenditure on education as a percentage of total public expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of girls passing the Primary School Leaving Exam</td>
<td>% of LGAs awarded clean audits by the National Audit Office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: URT and EC (2007: 10)

The second instrument of budget support—policy dialogue at sector and macro levels—was, in practice, equally distorted in favour of primary education. A former senior official in the Ministry of Education recalled donors’ minimal concern for secondary education:

> *When we were talking of secondary education, at that time you would look at DPs’ [development partners] face, they would not take it seriously. Only the World Bank would. Others would not come heavily in meetings or with funding… In sector dialogue, they would not get interested in secondary education, their face would dry, their interest would decrease… In planning, budget process, GBS discussions, you can bring issues but they did not support secondary at all… DPs said they were not sure that it was a priority. We were saying “there’s a huge demand” and they would say “we’re not sure of that”.* (Interview 4)

The ward secondary schools policy was a direct consequence of the PEDP, which was widely supported by donors. The abolition of primary school fees in 2000 was the outcome of strong external influences, echoed internally by civil society organisations (Gould 2005). Part of the Government disagreed with the policy on the grounds of its doubtful financial sustainability (Mmari et al 2005). The personal relationship between the World Bank’s Country Director and President Mkapa played a critical role in the negotiations (Weeks et al. 2002). Nevertheless, the possibility of aid agencies financially bearing the consequences

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of their own programme and contributing additional funds to support the expansion of secondary education was never envisioned. The pace of secondary expansion did, however, raise concerns among education aid managers but only to the extent that they advocated for a return to the phased expansion as projected in the Ministry of Education-World Bank programme.

Recognising the highly political nature of a policy directly driven by the Prime Minister, the Education Development Partners Group tried to convince Heads of Cooperation and agencies to forge a high level collective position on the ward secondary schools issue. But in a time of strict observance of the JAST, Heads of Cooperation deferred to the formal structures to conduct such high level political dialogue, the Joint Coordinating Group (Permanent Secretaries and Heads of Cooperation) and the Development Cooperation Forum (the Government’s Chief Secretary and selected Ambassadors). These two forums were, however, technocratic structures. As such Heads of Cooperation implicitly admitted that the Prime Minister – political driver of the policy – remained out of the reach of a possible collective initiative from aid agencies’ top officials. It also demonstrated that quality education for all was not seen as an issue that justified the risk of a political confrontation with Tanzania’s top leaders: the structural contradiction between the pretence of influencing public policies and aid agencies’ inherent reluctance to enter the political arena was clear.

2.2 The World Bank’s SEDP I (2004 – 2007): introducing the SEDP capitation grant in a time of uncontrolled expansion

During this first sequence of the research timeframe, the World Bank was the only significant agency that resolutely invested in secondary education.

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200 In its 2005 New Agenda for Secondary Education, the World Bank emphasised the ‘common perception that the pressure created by secondary enrollment is a problem that can be deferred to the future’ (World Bank 2005: 127).
201 Mostly based on the author’s participation in the events.
202 Between 1998 and 2007, the African Development Bank’s ‘Education II Project’ targeted secondary education and funded the construction of laboratories, supply of mathematics and science textbooks and training of science teachers.
Table 5-5: Share of different aid interventions in total ODA to secondary education (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEDP</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBS/SBS</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author, based on disbursement reports, see Annex C

The World Bank’s educational assistance in Tanzania perfectly mirrored the agency’s shifting strategic orientations as described in Chapter 2. After its decisive push in favour of the abolition of primary school fees and substantial financial support for the PEDP, the Bank’s focus moved to secondary education, and later, higher education, while other donors largely remained focused on primary education.

The project conditions for tranche releases reflected the Bank’s concerns over funding mechanisms or more broadly resource allocation (including teachers) for secondary education.

Table 5-6: World Bank SEDP I - tranche release conditions and project objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Objective</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Second Tranche</th>
<th>Third Tranche</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase proportion of relevant age group completing secondary</td>
<td>- Issue circulars governing management of capitation, development and scholarship grants in schools</td>
<td>- Reduce tuition fees for Government day schools from Tsh 40,000 to Tsh 20,000</td>
<td>- Allocate appropriate budgetary resources for FY2005-2006 to ensure adequate staffing and grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve learning outcomes, especially for girls</td>
<td>- Allow private sector publishers to compete for textbook provision and end of government monopoly</td>
<td>- Allocate appropriate budgetary resources for FY2004-2005 to ensure adequate staffing and grants</td>
<td>- Amend regulations for national curriculum and examinations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Adopt package of incentives to attract teachers to underserved areas</td>
<td>- Adopt and implement a program of continuous development of professional skills for teachers and administrators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Amend the mechanisms for approval of educational books</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

203 The World Bank’s PEDP programme (2001 – 2005) was financed by a USD150 million loan and a USD50 million grant. The Bank remained outside the PEDP basket fund financed by other PEDP donors.

204 In May 2008, the World Bank approved a USD 100 million loan to support the Science & Technology Higher Education Programme in Tanzania.
The World Bank intervention entailed a structural reform of the lower secondary education funding mode. Starting in 2005, in line with the World Bank’s conditionalities, the government reduced tuition fees for government secondary schools from Tsh 40,000 to Tsh 20,000. In order to compensate for schools’ financial losses, a capitation grant mechanism was set up: the central state would transfer to schools Tsh 25,000 /per enrolled student to cover non-teacher running costs. The government would also provide development grants for the construction of new classrooms and infrastructure rehabilitation. It also agreed to expand the scholarship programme for students from poorer households. These measures were coupled with its formal commitment to ‘allocate appropriate budgetary resources (…) to ensure adequate staffing and grants’ (World Bank 2010b: 18).

The World Bank programme had a noticeable impact on the secondary education budget, which recorded a 166 per cent increase between FY 2003/04 and FY 2004/05. In its disbursement years (FY 2004/05, FY 2005/06 and FY 2007/08), the World Bank’s support represented a substantial share of the secondary education total budget. As the World Bank wrote: ‘the initial Bank support was important in giving the start-up of SEDP a strong lift’ (World Bank 2010b: 21).

Table 5-7: Share of World Bank SEDP I in total secondary education budget (per cent)

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author, see Annex C

Nevertheless, a key assumption that underlined the SEDP I financial framework – that other donors would join the Bank – did not materialise.\(^{205}\) The effect of this was

\(^{205}\) ‘It is anticipated that other donors will add to the proposed financing of 150 million US dollars through the PRBS and specific sector support in other years’ (World Bank 2004:11).
compounded by the fact that one of the major risks initially identified by the programme - ‘that the government will be unable to deliver on promises to allocate more funds to education in general, and secondary education in particular in view of competing priorities’ (World Bank 2004: i) – did occur. The ward secondary schools policy profoundly undermined the financial backbone of the World Bank’s strategy for secondary education in Tanzania. The Tsh 25,000 capitation grant could not be sustained in a context of rapid expansion. The level of secondary education capitation grant declined from Tsh 20,000 per student in 2005 to Tsh 10,000 in FY 2008/09 (UNESCO 2012a: 17). Equally, the Ministry of Finance was unable to fulfil its commitment in terms of staffing (World Bank 2004:11).

This led to major frictions between the World Bank and the government. The Bank tried unsuccessfully to convince the government to slow down the expansion in order to ensure its financial sustainability.206 The third tranche was disbursed with a major delay (in August 2007 instead of the planned September 2006), only after a partial waiver by the Bank’s Board. Frictions arose within the World Bank itself, with some members of staff opposing the partial waiver of the capitation grant conditionality on the grounds that the government’s decision to step outside the World Bank’s carefully projected expansion plan was a breach of commitment.207 Yet, despite external pressures, Prime Minister Lowassa’s government did not alter its policy choice and managed to keep aid flowing, even if delayed.

2.3 Donors and the learning crisis (FY 2010/11 and FY 2011/12): enhanced financial effort and the incommensurable fiscal challenge

Chapter 3 highlighted a strategic shift among donors in 2009-2010 towards secondary education/vocational training and quality education. To what extent has this influenced the level of their funding and their instruments?208 In FY 2010/11 and 2011/12, external assistance to education displayed a more balanced intra-sectoral allocation (Figure 5.4).

206 ‘Bank supervision missions cautioned the Government about the fiscal dangers of too rapid expansion beyond the medium growth scenario of the SEDP Program Document and its impact on quality’ World Bank (2010b: 19).
207 ‘Some in the Bank argued that the condition on the adequate size of the capitation grant should not have been waived, because it was the result of allowing enrolments to expand beyond the agreed medium term scenario’ (World Bank 2010: 33).
208 The author could not find reliable budgetary data on vocational education and training. The financial analysis is restricted to formal secondary education. During the fieldwork, DFID was preparing a new project to specifically address quality education; however, this ‘Education Quality Improvement Programme in Tanzania (2012/2017)’ is not covered by this research.
This rebalancing was due both to the World Bank SEDP II (2010-2015) and to budget support aid components.

**Figure 5-4: Allocation of total education external assistance between sub-sectors in Tanzania 2004/05 - 2011/12**

![Graph showing allocation of total education external assistance between sub-sectors in Tanzania 2004/05 - 2011/12](source: the author, see Annex C)

Donors have also altered their macro and sector instruments to accommodate both the growing interest in secondary education and the anxiety generated by students’ poor performances. Until 2009, in addition to the focus on primary education mentioned earlier, successive GBS PAFs clearly reflected input-oriented education priorities and an emphasis on enrolment (see Table 5.3). The 2009 PAF simultaneously marked the upgrading of secondary education and the insertion of ‘quality’ within the GBS framework. Moreover, since 2008/09, at sector level, a complementary performance assessment framework has been in place, the ‘rating framework for the education sector assessment’. This tool – a list of outcome and process indicators with quantified targets - has had effective sector wide application and, in 2011, with the growing concern over quality, donors increased the weight given to outcomes indicators.209

Yet, within this context of instrument adjustments, donors’ actual funding fell short of the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group’s call for an ‘enormous fiscal and managerial effort […] to reverse these trends’ (World Bank 2010b: 33). According to the IEG,

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209 On the limitations of this management by numbers see Languille (forthcoming).
‘Finding the financial resources to complete the job of building quality into the expanded system is an enormous challenge to be resolved by the government and development partners’ (ibid: 36). In terms of amount, the total aid to the sub-sector did record a sharp increase between FY 2009/10 and FY 2011/12. Yet, in constant terms, the level reached in FY 2011/12 was only slightly superior to that recorded at the beginning of the research period. The allocation pattern also demonstrates the high level of unpredictability of this external assistance due to the World Bank’s various disbursements, an established detrimental aspect of a project approach (Figure 5.5).210

Figure 5-5: External assistance to secondary education in Tanzania

![Graph showing external assistance to secondary education in Tanzania]

Source: the author (see Annex C)

In the case of the World Bank’s SEDP II, the biggest share of the programme has been dedicated to the upgrading of existing infrastructures (see Table 5.8). However, this funding only affects 264 schools, i.e., a mere 8 per cent of all community secondary schools in 2011. Only two schools per district will have the chance to be upgraded to ‘fully functional schools’, a drop within an ocean of ‘dummy schools’.211

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210 On the lack of predictability of projects and the expected greater predictability associated to budget support see Tavakoli and Smith (2013) or Hedger et al. (2010).

211 The label is from an official in the Ministry of Education.
Table 5-8: The World Bank SEDP II components – IDA financing and government’s counterpart funding (commitment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project components</th>
<th>World Bank (IDA)</th>
<th>Government of Tanzania</th>
<th>Share of government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading existing schools infrastructure</td>
<td>US$78.3 million</td>
<td>US$192.2 million</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequate financing to secondary schools (capitation grant)</td>
<td>US$37.8 million</td>
<td>US$127.1 million</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equitable provision of teachers and the quality of teaching</td>
<td>US$27.1 million</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building and technical assistance</td>
<td>US$6.8 million</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author, based on World Bank (2010a)

Donors’ actual commitment to meeting the financial challenge becomes even more questionable in light of the evolution of external assistance allocated per enrolled student in public secondary schools. The last two fiscal years have recorded a slight recovery in the amount spent by student but this spending unit envelope represented only about 10% of the FY2004/05 amount (Figure 5.6).  

Figure 5-6: Aid spending per student enrolled in public secondary schools

It is, however, important to emphasise, once again, that GBS/SBS allocation patterns remain chiefly determined by the national budget negotiation process. As such, they therefore reflect domestic elites’ budget preferences; these are investigated in the next section. Section Four will then show how donors, rather than providing more funding,  

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212 For a senior official in the PMO-RALG: ‘the World Bank money is just a peanut’ (interview 27).
have tried to alter these domestic budget preferences and push for ‘more quality expenditures’.

3. Secondary education and domestic elites’ budget preferences

3.1 Inter-sector budget allocation: educational ‘consumption’ vs productive sectors

Since the beginning of the 2000s, Tanzanian education as a whole has benefited from the increase in government expenditures fuelled by good macroeconomic performances, improved revenue collection and sustained external aid revenues. In constant prices, between 2002/03 and 2011/12 the total volume of public spending on education increased by 186 per cent (Figure 5.7). Within the national budget, the education sector constitutes the primary spending unit, before infrastructure and health: in 2011/12, education absorbed 16.9 per cent of the total budget.

**Figure 5-7: Education budget 2002/03 - 2011/12 (mill. Tsh, constant prices, base 2001)**

However, the actual budgetary effort towards education needs to be examined in perspective. Between 2002/03 and 2010/11, education expenditure grew at a much slower pace than the total government budget (Figure 5.8).

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213 Between 2005 and 2011, the average annual growth rate was 6.9 per cent. Domestic revenues increased from 9.2 per cent of GDP in 1998/99 to 17.3 per cent in 2011/12 (UNESCO 2012a).
Besides, after a peak in 2008/09, the annual budgetary effort towards education steadily declined: in 2011/12, the education share of the total budget was lower than in 2002/03 (Figure 5.9).

A senior official in the Ministry of Finance exposed the rationale of the relative under-prioritisation of education:

What we are trying to do is to try to get the quick wins which can bring in resources. You know that education is consumption (…) if you don’t have infrastructure, the agricultural sector is not ticking.
you cannot get resources we can require to make education tick also, or to give it to education so that then, we consume. It's like health, also, is consumption. But you have, as a nation, to have the quick ways in some sectors which will be the backbone of providing the services. If you make your infrastructure work properly and be in good condition, then you’ll see you’ll make money."

(Interview 31)

Senior officials in the education administration (the MoEVT or the PMO-RALG) shared similar views on education quality as a consequence of rural development or infrastructure investment – i.e. a shift away from the human capital paradigm.

These tensions over the balance between education (or, more broadly, social sectors) and productive sectors are not new: between 1999 and 2003, in the context of implementing the Poverty Reduction Strategy, the government managed to assert its overriding budget preference for ‘economic services’ and ‘production’ while fulfilling donors’ conditionality requesting an increase in per capita allocations to priority sectors (Mmari et al. 2005: 41-45). More recently, the 2011 Five-Year Development Plan 2010-2015 has represented an attempt by a faction of the ruling power to regain control over national development (Languille and Dolan 2012). It emphasises an infrastructure-led development agenda rather than the social services/good governance priorities that shaped Mkukuta I and II under donors’ influence. The human capital paradigm provides a strong backbone to the Five Year Development Plan, which critically emphasises quality education and skills enhancement and therefore reflects the secondary/quality discursive turn pointed out in Chapter 3. But its financial framework only accounts for investments in higher education infrastructure: strategic interventions in primary and secondary education have simply not been costed while approximately Tsh 580 billion is projected for higher education (URT 2011e: 124-129).

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214 Five year development plans used to guide the government’s economic choices during the socialist period and were stopped in the mid-1990s (Wynne 2005). Hickey (2012) for Uganda and deRenzio and Hanlon (2007) for Mozambique highlight a similar disenchantment with a poverty focused economic strategy and a similar initiative to craft an alternative developmental model geared towards structural transformation.
3.2 Intra-sector budget allocation sector: secondary education, the neglected child

In this general context of relative prioritisation of education in the budget, different sub-sectors have received a differentiated treatment (Figure 5.10).

Figure 5-10: Share of sub-sector allocations in the education budget (in %) 2002/03 - 2011/12

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Source: the author, based on URT (2011b and 2012a)
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Specifically, secondary education financing underwent a steady decline, from a peak of 18.2 per cent of the education budget in 2004/05 to its lowest level of 6.2 per cent in 2009/10. The evolution of ‘unit costs’ illustrates, even more forcefully, the low budgetary priority given to secondary education during the expansion phase. The post-independence budgetary trade-off between primary/literacy and secondary had not only a low share of the education budget for secondary education, but a second facet: a high unit cost for secondary education. For Nyerere, this was the price of ‘quality education’. Even after the introduction of cost-sharing measures in 1985, secondary education unit costs remained relatively high. In 1990, Tanzania had the second highest (after Uganda) ratio of secondary to primary unit costs, of 62 countries with GNP per capita below USD 5,000 (Lewin 1996: 370). Between 2002 and 2009, this unit cost recorded a dramatic decline: enrolment in public secondary schools (O and A levels) increased by 590 per cent but the secondary education spending unit decreased by about 70 per cent (Figure 5.11).
Figure 5-11: Spending per student in primary and secondary education (2002/03 - 2011/12)

Source: the author, based on enrolment and budget data from on URT (2011b and 2012a)
NB: Budget in constant prices, base year 2001. Due to data availability, by convention, the ‘primary education spending unit’ was computed using the enrolment in public primary public schools and the budget for ‘primary, non-formal, other education institutions and supporting services’. Budget figures include on-budget aid funding.

With 9.3% of its education budget allocated to secondary education in 2010/11, Tanzania’s public spending on this level was among the lowest in relation to similarly situated sub-Saharan African countries.215

This intra-sector budgetary allocation is not the full picture of the actual funding for secondary education. In practice, at local level, budget allocations were renegotiated and between 2006 and 2010, districts diverted resources initially earmarked for the primary level to secondary education; they also allocated other non-earmarked resources to this sub-sector (Chapter 6).216 Nevertheless, these national budgetary trade-offs reflect the budgetary priorities of elites for the education sector.

Four main factors can be highlighted to explain this allocative pattern that disfavoured secondary education. As shown in Chapter 4, the ward secondary schools policy was actually driven by Prime Minister Lowassa and his Office, in opposition to a side-lined Ministry of Education. This specific sharing of responsibility may have partially contributed to the inertia of the secondary education budget during the initial phase of expansion as the

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215 World Bank (2010a) for comparative data.
216 2006 corresponds to the year of the government’s decree on ward schools; 2010 to the effective implementation of decentralisation of secondary education.
The leadership of the Ministry of Education may have overlooked the budgetary requirements of a policy that they disowned. Moreover, with this highly political process that circumvented the technocratic apparatus, the budget lost its centrality as the financial arm of the bureaucracy; it became irrelevant. ‘The strategic planning process was turned on its head; it was basically left redundant’ (economist, aid agency, interview 57). The expansion, as we will see in next chapter, was largely funded outside the budget: ‘the real economic effort was much higher, only that part was not budgeted’ (ibid). Therkildsen (2000: 66) argues that in Tanzania ‘policy decisions are often taken as if no hard constraints for reform initiatives exist’. The budget inertia in the face of the ward secondary schools policy shift illustrates the enduring relevance of this characterisation.

The limits of strategic budgeting in Tanzania represent another factor that has driven the low budgetary effort for secondary education. In theory, the country has abandoned incremental budgeting: performance-based budgeting was introduced in 1998 and in the early 2000s the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) began to be used (Naschold and Fozzard 2002; Wynne 2005). Today, the allocation of resources to ministries is supposed to be closely tied to their three-year strategic plan and annual action plans. Each ministry’s objectives result from the ministry’s ‘vision’ which is itself the ministerial representation of the needs of the country as expressed in various and overlapping strategic development frameworks (Vision 2025, Mkukuta and the Five-Year Development Plan). This strategic planning and budgeting framework is replicated at all administrative levels, from districts to schools. This pyramidal structure could, in theory, offer an effective framework to realise a strategic priority shift (for instance towards secondary education or quality education) in budgetary terms. However, budget-making realities in Tanzania largely diverge from this ‘textbook’ objectives-based approach.

First of all, the national MTEF is not an instrument that allocates financial envelopes to different sectors based on a costed development scenario. Each ministry has its own MTEF, which is simply the incremental projection of the current fiscal year ceiling over the

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217 This remains however a hypothesis, even if highly plausible. Evidence to support it was difficult to gather.
218 For a general exposition on MTEFs see Holmes and Evans (2003: 5). According to the World Bank, in Tanzania: ‘The MTEF links the budget process to MKUKUTA and Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) and is aligned to the sector’s performance budgeting (...) In this regard, the sector strategy is focused on priority projects and activities and reflects funding constraints’ (World Bank 2011: 77).
219 Interviews with headmasters and district officials.
two outer years. Equally, the education sector budget is not the result of a multi-year costed plan computed from macro-economic and demographic assumptions, enrolment projections by sub-sector and targets for teacher-pupil ratio or book-pupil ratio. The MoEVT and the PMO-RALG prepare, in isolation, their own budget estimates, which are the results of the compilation of costed activity plans developed by each unit or department. The starting point of the budget preparation is not a strategic allocation among key priorities or key departments but the amount of fuel spent on different field visits or the amount of allowances induced by planned workshops. Far from being strategic, the budgeting process remains a bottom-up incremental exercise: the ministry’s leadership (Permanent Secretary and Directors) only gets involved at the very end of the process for final decisions.\textsuperscript{220} Within such a framework, it is difficult to envisage a drastic budgetary reorientation to keep pace with a strategic policy reorientation towards a sub-sector (for example, secondary education) or a department (for example, the inspectorate), which, historically, have been financially neglected. In that sense, as in Ghana (Killick 2005), the Tanzanian budget process entails a ritualistic dimension.\textsuperscript{221}

Student loans constitute the third factor behind the low budget for secondary education; they have indeed crowded out basic education resources. Budgetary trends reflect domestic elites’ overwhelming preference for higher education: this sub-sector recorded a steady resource increase between FY 2005/06 and FY 2011/12, both in absolute terms and as a share of the education budget.\textsuperscript{222} If one excludes two years, this education level recorded a regular upward trend, from 16.7 per cent of the education budget in 2004/05 to 27.2 per cent in 2011/12 (Figure 5.10).

Understanding the social, political and economic meaning of higher education today in Tanzania would require an in-depth investigation beyond the scope of this research. Chapter 4 already pointed out how the student loans allocation criteria contribute to the reinforcement of unequal dynamics within the education system. In addition, because of a

\textsuperscript{220} The eighth step out of a ten step cycle: ‘In March-April, the MTEF is submitted to the Ministerial budget committee (Permanent Secretary and Directors) to allow management to own the budget’ (interview 2, official, MoEVT).

\textsuperscript{221} Early assessments of Tanzania’s MTEF were quite positive. Le Houerou and Taliercio (2002) considered that the country had one of the best developed MTEFs in Africa. The World Bank’s official view of the instrument that it championed remains very positive today: ‘The MTEF has achieved credibility with Cabinet, line ministries, and other stakeholders. The MTEF is also seen as a key instrument in ensuring effectiveness in the use of public resources. In this regard, the MTEF has fostered a strong link with the PER process’ (World Bank 2011: 78).

\textsuperscript{222} ‘Tanzania’s higher education allocation [in FY 2008/09] is the fifth highest of forty-one countries for which data were available and among the highest of all African low-income countries’ (UNESCO 2012a: 127).
the historical very low recovery rate, the system has almost been turned into a grant system.\footnote{In November 2011, the recovery rate since the inception of the scheme was 13 per cent (Deputy Minister of Education and Vocational Training in The Daily News 09/11/2011 ‘From the Parliament - Loans board yet to recover 695bn’).} Also, because a large share of each loan is transferred directly to institutions to cover tuition fees, the scheme has \textit{de facto} meant a publicly subsidised marketization of higher education.\footnote{Between 2004 and 2010, the number of enrolled students increased by 280 per cent (URT 2011b). In FY 2008/09, about 36 per cent of overall disbursements were for students in private institutions (UNESCO 2012a: 135).} These dynamics, which mechanically benefited mainly the most privileged students and private education entrepreneurs, coincided with the rapid expansion of secondary education enrolment, which lacked any commensurate budgetary effort.

Numerous complaints have also been formulated about the fact that this funding mechanism benefits the children of the rich and well connected. An official in MoEVТ pointed out: ‘\textit{that’s true it drains resources and starves other departments. It is so needed, so critical but now even the rich get it…that’s why there are all these outcries}’ (official, MoEVТ, interview 19). The government has taken some measures to try to increase the recovery rate and most informants in the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance and Parliament consider the scheme as financially not sustainable.\footnote{‘The Government set up a Presidential Commission to analyze the current loan scheme and develop recommendations aimed at improving the scheme’ (World Bank 2012d: 2).} Nevertheless, even after 2010, in a context where quality secondary education has become a subject of major social concern, student loans remained the education budget’s top priority.

The last factor contributing to the low secondary education budget is that resources for ward secondary schools have remained a second-order budget priority. The capitation grant global envelope was never ring-fenced by the Cabinet and the Ministry of Finance. Since its inception, the starting point for computing the envelope has never been the theoretical ‘unit cost’ (Tsh 25,000 per student): as argued by the Ministry of Finance, ‘this funding target is subject to the Government’s resource constraints’ (URT 2007b: 24). The process leading to the determination of the envelope available for education grants remains the outcome of informal negotiations between the Ministry of Finance and the Cabinet, through an ad hoc prioritisation process, in the absence of any formal guidance criteria.
Among education expenditures, two categories are considered as absolutely crucial due to their political sensitivity: examination expenses and school meals in boarding schools. Failure to organise national examinations, highly symbolic moments in the nation’s yearly calendar, carries a political risk that national leaders are not ready to take. National leaders also fear the destabilising effect of secondary student riots or strikes triggered by their food, events that regularly occur and receive wide media coverage. For a senior official in the Ministry of Finance ‘meals are very crucial. (...) So if you don’t take care of that it will be terrible’ (interview 31). These expenditures take definite precedence. For another official in the Ministry of Finance, ‘you can’t postpone school meals but you can postpone capitation grant. Available funds can suffice to operate schools’ (ibid). Concerns over social order supersede the government’s stated commitments to quality education. And in the case of boarding school meals, the price of this primacy is very high in terms of breaching egalitarian goals: food in boarding schools only affects a handful of students (about 800 in 2012), against about 1.5 million in ward secondary schools.

3.4 FY2010/11 and FY 2011/12: a budget more responsive to quality and secondary education

The social commotion caused by the massive examination failures and the specific construction of ‘quality’ as ‘science, English and skills’ (Chapter 4) have had a direct impact on the education budget. Indeed, at the end of the research period the share of secondary education in the education budget recorded a sharp increase from 9.4 per cent in 2010/11 to 20.4 per cent FY2011/12. A Ministry of Education member who was directly involved in the budget preparation confirmed: ‘from FY 2010/11, the ministerial budget committee (Management, Permanent Secretary and Directors) has decided to move to secondary education’ (interview 2).

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226 At inter-sector level, according to a GBS PAF performance indicator, each financial year at least 25 per cent of the total national budget (excluding national debt) should be allocated to LGAs. In FY 2011/12 and three previous years, the target was met. However, there is not any formal key of repartition between sectors (Boex 2009).

227 Interviews with senior officials in the Ministry of Finance and the PMO-RALG.

228 An official in the Ministry of Finance highlighted this priority of examination expenses (in the case of budget execution not budget preparation): ‘During the 1st quarter we only released funds for examination (...) If during 3rd quarter you receive funds you’ll allocate for other activities’ (interview 33).
At the level of the Ministry of Education, two departments particularly critical in delivering quality – the Teachers Education Department and the Inspectorate – also recorded a substantial increase in the absolute amount of their envelope, even though they continued to absorb a minute share of the budget. A senior official in the MoEVT, involved in the budget preparation, confirmed the new budget priority granted for these two domains (interview 7).

Table 5-9: Trends of Budgetary Funding of Teacher Education and Inspectorate (Millions Tsh, current)

<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Education - MoEVT</td>
<td>25,250</td>
<td>47,053</td>
<td>28,895</td>
<td>35,892</td>
<td>47,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspectorate - MoEVT</td>
<td>5,900</td>
<td>12,096</td>
<td>11,969</td>
<td>17,806</td>
<td>17,748</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: URT (2012b: 104)

In FY 2010/11, the MoEVT and the PMO-RALG jointly decided to earmark funds from CIDA’s sector budget support to help selected districts build laboratories and teachers’ houses in hard to reach areas.\(^\text{229}\) This budget prioritisation geared towards quality-related inputs occurred without any formal or informal prescription from CIDA\(^\text{230}\); it testified to the education administration’s evident commitment to financially address the quality crisis.

\(^\text{229}\) Interview 23 (official, PMO-RALG).
\(^\text{230}\) Interview with CIDA’s education aid manager.
In this process of reconfiguration of education budget priorities towards quality secondary education, the Ministry of Finance’s endorsement has been critical. For the researcher, the opacity of the budget negotiations between the Ministry of Finance and the education administration (the MoEVT and the PMO-RALG) has proved difficult to see through. The degree of autonomy of the education bureaucracy remains difficult to gauge. Contradictory accounts of closed-door processes, however, converged to emphasise the preeminent role of the Ministry of Finance and its internalisation of the secondary education/vocational training/quality priority.\textsuperscript{231} Annual Speeches by the Minister of Finance to the National Assembly to present budget estimates for the following fiscal year encapsulate the Cabinet’s budgetary preferences. In recent years, they have paid prominent attention to the quality/science/skills nexus in education. For instance, in FY 2012/13, the focus was on the vocational/science component of ‘quality’.\textsuperscript{232} For FY 2013/14, the Minister of Finance singled out a unique ‘underlying challenge’ for the education sector: ‘to improve learning and teaching environment at all levels’. Without the Ministry of Finance’s approval, based on a shared understanding of what the education priorities are and what quality education means, the Ministry of Education would have faced difficulties in promoting a reorientation of its budget.

It remains difficult to assess the influence of donors’ performance-based management instruments (GBS and sector PAFs) on intra-government budget negotiations. One might nevertheless argue that this management by numbers has played at least a mediated role on budget allocation. It has certainly influenced the process of internalisation of the quality agenda within the government, and specifically within the Ministry of Finance. To disentangle and weight the relative influence of internal and external factors in this process proves a challenging task. Given its magnitude, the Ministry of Finance could not remain impermeable to the domestic public uproar caused by the learning crisis. At the same time, its intimate relation with donors made it a primary locus for the diffusion of donors’ learning preoccupations; negotiations geared towards the insertion of ‘quality’ indicators within the GBS PAF, ‘a very powerful instrument’ according to a senior official in the Ministry of Finance (interview 37), have certainly played a part in the reconfiguration of the Ministry’s budget priorities.

\textsuperscript{231} Tilley (2009) already insisted on the dominance of the Ministry of Finance in the budget preparation.

\textsuperscript{232} Speech by the Minister for Finance Introducing to the National Assembly, the Estimates of Government Revenue and Expenditure for the Fiscal Year 2012/2013; p.47.
Nevertheless, if budget decision-makers, under the Ministry of Finance’s leadership, have translated the strategic secondary/quality shift in material terms, these budgetary alterations occurred at the margins of the budget. In addition, domestic elites’ overarching budget preference for higher education consolidated throughout the research period. They rearticulated their budget priorities in favour of secondary education at the expenses of primary education: after a relatively steady growth in the primary education budgetary envelope between FY 2003/04 and FY 2009/10, this sub-sector recorded a sharp decline of approximately 20 per cent over the last two fiscal years covered by this research (in constant terms, see Figure 5.12).

3.5 The secondary education budget as a site of intra-ruling class conflicts

Elites’ preferences as highlighted above have given rise to frictions between various elite groups. First of all, these budget patterns have been the result of conflicts between the government and members of Parliament. During the preparation of the FY 2011/12 budget, the Ministry of Education tried to contain the inflationary trend of the student loans scheme: the Parliamentary Committee for Social Welfare rejected its attempt. The Ministry of Education was forced to top up the student loans envelope amount projected in its initial budget estimates.233

This battle over the budget for student loans provides a new example (see Chapter 4) of diverging interests, within the state, between politicians and technocrats. For representatives of the Ministry of Education, the inflationary envelope for student loans puts at stake the very survival of the ministry. Indeed, for FY 2012-13, the MoEVT’s remaining financial envelope after deduction of the student loans was only 16 per cent of the total Ministry budget. The success of the Social Welfare Committee in imposing its budgetary preference on the Ministry of Education exemplifies Parliament’s rising power within the political-administrative landscape since the 2010 general elections, away from its traditional function of ‘rubber stamping’ government decisions pointed out in earlier studies (Mmari et al. 2005).

These frictions between the MoEVT and Members of Parliament also help reveal a major reason behind elite budget preferences for student loans. Indeed, the Report of the Social Welfare Committee implicitly highlighted one key driver of MPs’ budgetary choices. Under the sub-title ‘Peace and Harmony in Colleges Country-wide’ MPs expressed their deep concerns over universities nurturing the political contestation of their power: ‘Honourable Speaker, the committee is not happy with the situation prevailing in some of the Higher Learning Institutions. The government should conduct a research to find the sources of riots and conflicts in government higher learning institutions...there is a feeling that conflict and riots of government Higher Learning Institutions are caused by political fanatics and the convincing powers of political party leaders.’

MPs see higher education institutions as sites of potential destabilisation of the social and political order.

The intra-sector budget allocation in education also constitutes a site of frictions between the CCM and the government. The ruling party apparatus appeared more sensitive than the government to the popular discontent caused by the massive failure in Form Four examinations. According to the party line, secondary education should become the education budget’s overarching priority as a way to lessen the political risk fuelled by the popular outcry. ‘Parents and the opposition are crying about secondary education, the failures and bad results; they’re not crying on primary or higher education. They complain on mass failure of secondary schools. As a government it’s a big challenge. The government depends on the support of the people. We should respond to people’s demand. It’s the number one priority for us’ (senior official, CCM Secretary, interview 85). But at the same time, the party’s involvement in the budget formulation process takes a highly mediated form. ‘We’re advising and negotiating to see how the ministry can try to capitalise its budget. We think that the ministry should give first priority to secondary education and we’re moving. But the budget is the government thing. The minister is appointed by the president, all ministers are appointed by the President and are from CCM: there’s direct engagement of the party through the ministers and deputy-ministers. Directors are also President’s appointees’ (ibid). The budget remains the technocrats’ property and the party’s ability to shape patterns of budget allocations appears largely circumscribed. However, this self-account of CCM’s position as

URT (2011f: 7-8).

Besides this social order dimension, other factors may explain elites’ protection of the higher education budgetary envelope: to secure access to a very scarce resource for a segment of the elite who cannot afford the cost of Western universities - the emerging ‘middle class’ whose conditions of reproduction are not yet consolidated; the fragmentation of the elite which prevents a consensus around an alternative funding policy option; an efficient lobbying of ‘edu-entrepreneurs’ who have set up lucrative private universities; the converging ideological adherence to the ‘financialisation’ of higher education among donors (the World Bank) and segments of the elite. The political economy of the Students’ Loans Board is, as yet, unresearched. For an analysis of the marketization of higher education in sub-Saharan Africa see Mamdani (2007).
regards government’s education budget choices reveals a dynamic power sharing between the government and the party, already pointed out in Chapter 4 (Section 1.3). The party acknowledges the government’s pre-eminence in conducting public affairs and the budget process. Yet, it can also choose to reassert its primacy in certain circumstances when it considers that government choices jeopardise the national political stability, and ultimately the survival of the party.

A last example illustrates the power dynamics among domestic elites and testifies to the ambiguity of their commitment to quality and post-primary education. One main source of finance for vocational training comes from the Skills Development Levy, a 6 per cent tax on payroll; 2 per cent of which goes directly to the Vocational Education and Training Authority (VETA). The remaining 4 per cent levy has been subject to competing claims: from Members of Parliament to increase the funding of vocational training; from the Ministry of Finance to increase the resources of the Students’ Loans Board; and from the Tanzanian Education Authority to augment its current subsidy, largely below the legal requirement. In FY 2012/13, the Ministry of Finance decided to officially allocate the 4 per cent to the Students’ Loans Board. However, employers have also long complained about the levy itself, considering it as a burden that inhibits Tanzania’s economic competitiveness in regional and global markets. In 2013, the Association of Tanzania Employers drafted a *Position Paper* in which they ‘urged the government to reduce the Skills and Development Levy’.

Their lobbying was successful: in FY 2013/14, the Ministry of Finance decided to decrease the levy from 6 to 5 per cent. In the same budget, the Ministry of Finance introduced a new 14.5 per cent excise duty on all mobile phone services (previously applicable to airtime only), 2.5 per cent of which was to be used to finance education. Tanzania has recorded a high penetration rate of mobile phones and an exponential growth in mobile banking and payments. In such a context, the simultaneous

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236 VETA is a parastatal under the MoEVT’s authority. The levy was introduced through the Vocational Education and Training Act (1994) [http://www.mof.go.tz/index.php?option=com_content&id=42&Itemid=57].

237 TEA was set up in 2001 to manage the Education Fund, a parallel funding mechanism, mainly subsidised by the government through the MoEVT budgetary vote. According to the law, the government’s subsidy to TEA should not exceed 2 per cent of the government budget after deduction of debts. Since its inception, TEA has received between 0.1 and 0.5 per cent of this budget (interview with Mrs Lulubuka – TEA Director General).


239 *Speech by the Minister for Finance Introducing to the National Assembly the Estimates of Government Revenue and Expenditure for Fiscal Year 2013/2014*, p.51.

240 Depending on the source, the penetration rate in 2011 varied between 47 per cent and 60 per cent. See for instance, [http://www.tanzaniainvest.com/telecoms/interviews/771-interview-with-prof-nkoma-director-general-of-the-tanzania-communications-regulatory-authority].
changes in the tax regime in relation to the financing of education represent a shift of burden from a small segment of the ruling class – the business elite in the formal sector\textsuperscript{241} – to the mass of the population. This budget decision, which deepens the regressive nature of public education finances, also confirmed the analysis by Mmari et al. (2005: 29) that singled out business associations as ‘the non-state actor with the most influence on the budget process’.

4. Donors’ ‘value for money’ quest in education: contesting Tanzania’s sovereignty

So far in this chapter, donors’ and domestic elites’ education budget preferences have mainly been examined separately. This analytical separation in part had a heuristic function. It also aimed to shed light on the autonomy of internal dynamics. This last section considers the budget as a site of interactions and conflicts between the two groups. In the budget support era, the budget arena has indeed become a ‘transnational domain’ (Harrison 2010, Gould 2005a). According to Harrison (2004: 77), within the new aid paradigm (what he called the ‘post-conditionality regime’), ‘it becomes far less insightful to make distinctions between external and internal interests’.

This section is situated in line with the literature that has studied the nature of national sovereignty in the context of the new aid paradigm and its claims to promote ‘national ownership’ (Swedlun 2013, Hickey 2013, Dijkstra 2013, de Renzio and Hanlon 2007). Following Whitfield (2009), it questions the extent to which, within the new aid paradigm, Tanzania’s government can exert its sovereign control over its development policy. This section focuses on two specific sites of the secondary education budget – the teachers’ wage bill and the capitation grant - in the context of the converging concern of donors and the government on secondary education quality; its conclusions over donors-government power configurations are more nuanced than existing studies (Swedlun 2013, Whitfield and Fraser 2008), which tend to overestimate Tanzanian authorities’ subservience to donors’ demands.

\textsuperscript{241} In reality, it is difficult to locate the actual incidence of the skills levy: on employers (lower profits), workers (lower wages) or customers (higher prices).
4.1 The capitation grant saga: the quality secondary education episode

As in the case of the SEDP I, the question of resources for schools - the Tsh 25,000 capitation grant – was at the centre of the Bank’s SEDP II design. A major dimension of the programme’s protracted negotiations dealt with the government’s financial commitment to it (World Bank 2010a: 15). A disbursement condition was included to ensure that the government would fulfil its share of the agreement and budget adequate funding to cover the Tsh 25,000 per student (World Bank 2010d: 14).

During implementation, in FY 2010/11, ‘the capitation grant’ turned into a major site of contention between the World Bank and the government. As a World Bank economist explained, ‘we have the same issues [as under the SEDP I] of adequate resources per students at the core of some of the agreements, and also they are at the core of the tensions that are emerging’ (interview 57). Yet, during the 2011 Education Sector Review, the World Bank’s education adviser outspokenly told the audience: ‘the secondary capitation grant is a success story; the Tsh 25,000 per student has been reached’. Indeed, the analysis of Treasury releases to Lushoto District for FY 2010/11 confirmed that the level of capitation grant sent to districts (for further transfer to schools) was approximately Tsh 25,000 per student.242 But this success was only achieved after extreme tensions between the government and the World Bank.

As in the case of SEDP I, the government did not include an envelope sufficient to reach the agreed level for the secondary capitation grant in its FY 2010/11 budget. An official in the Ministry of Finance explained: ‘with the issue of counterpart funding, there was a very hot debate that the World Bank might consider stopping the programme due to the shortfall in the performance of the project’ (interview 36). In order to force the government to endow the capitation grant with its appropriate budget share, the World Bank manoeuvred to insert the issue within the GBS framework. At their initiative, a ‘temporary process action’ (TPA)243 was included in the GBS PAF that requested the ‘delivery of annual capitation grants of Tshs 25,000 per


243 Key policy actions, temporary measures, identified at sector level as fundamental obstacles to sector improvements and that cannot be solved through ‘sector dialogue’ and needs for instance the active involvement of the Ministry of Finance.
student to all government secondary schools to facilitate purchase of textbooks and other learning materials by June 2011'.

This event illustrates the World Bank’s specific position within the education aid arena. Rivalries between the World Bank and other donors in education had already been mentioned in 2002/03 by Weeks et al. (2002). During early discussions over possible external support to the government’s secondary education plan (in the years 2002-2004), the World Bank’s modus operandi and non-cooperative behaviour contributed to discouraging prospective agencies from engaging in the sub-sector. Between 2004 and 2007, the World Bank and its Country Director played an influential role in driving donor efforts towards better coordination, harmonisation and alignment. However, within the Bank itself, sector staff’s incentives have remained primarily shaped by organisational rules and accountability lines set in Washington. Their position has been very ambivalent regarding the joint sector dialogue structures. Key members of the education development partners group complained about the World Bank’s operational mode, perceived as free-rider behaviour and disregard for local dynamics: ‘The World Bank continues to act the same, to do its parallel things on its own. Nothing to do with persons but it’s structural. But it’s very irritating and frustrating’ (interview 48). For instance, contrary to the alignment principle, the World Bank’s SEDP II was endorsed by its Board before the government’s own document was even finalised. A member of the World Bank staff acknowledged their ambiguous commitment to the dialogue structures that they circumvented on efficiency grounds: ‘we tend to allow the usual process to unfold. But there are times when we consciously bypass the process… There was no other way of doing it but to bypass the process. Mainly because it is so process-oriented… And it is just too cumbersome’ (interview 50).

However, in the case of the secondary education capitation grant, informed by their setbacks under the SEDP I, the World Bank education staff felt that their power, within a project, would be insufficient to override the government’s entrenched budget preferences. They decided to resort to the alleged leverage power of GBS to fulfil their programme requirements; that meant, however, that they had to follow the rules of the GBS game and engage in negotiations in multiple sites. The World Bank’s education aid managers had to

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245 Interview 67 with a local NGO representative.
build a strategic alliance with other influential education donors (CIDA and DFID) and convince them to endorse the initiative. These two donors, as Lead and Deputy-Lead of education donors, represented the group in macro level discussions over the GBS PAF revision. ‘We pushed for it. No, it was, it was very, it was a very…in a way, [a] very participatory process, actually. The development partners chose it… but the Bank was the biggest proponent of including that because it would help us if the government met the capitation grant requirements for this year. Then they would have met also the Bank requirement’ (interview 58). This stuttering statement by a World Bank staff member shows how the World Bank’s internal interest had to be reframed into a collective endeavour to make its way into the GBS arena. Initially, the Ministry of Finance was very hesitant. Even within aid agencies, the proposal met with deep reserve especially among economists involved in GBS management, including the World Bank’s chief economist.246 The inclusion of the ‘capitation grant’ within the GBS PAF was actually the outcome of a successful alliance between education aid managers and the PMO-RALG.

The frictions were finally resolved through programme management tricks and the distortion of the World Bank’s own commitment. To achieve the Tsh 25,000, the World Bank had to top up its initial commitment by roughly Tsh 12 billion. These funds were initially meant to finance activities budgeted for FY 2010/11 but not yet implemented and carried forward to the next financial year. The sustainability of the scheme in following years remains highly questionable.247 Besides, this secondary capitation grant ‘success story’ had been realised at the expenses of primary education: in FY 2010/11, Tsh 80 billion was budgeted for the primary education capitation grant but only Tsh 23 billion released.248 For this very reason, an education aid manager, whose individual agency was critical in ensuring the inclusion of the capitation grant in the GBS PAF, questioned a posteriori the rationale of the whole endeavour: ‘In retrospect, I see it as a mistake. First of all, because it was already in the World Bank’s agreement so it was likely to happen anyway. But secondly, because it then skewed the use of resources in the sector … the budget for primary capitation was only released at 29 per cent which was the lowest for years’ (interview 62).

246 An economist from another major agency, a prominent GBS provider, noted: ‘it was a big mistake. I think it’s bad because it’s a budget…I think it’s bad to push sector budget allocations because if you do that for every sector, you end up in the total which is above 100 per cent. And I think, it’s simply, it’s completely the wrong thing to do’ (interview 56).

247 A senior official in the Ministry of Finance noted: ‘If now we don’t continue getting the loan for financing that Tsh 25,000, it will go down, you see? This is the game of the day…when the funding is not there, it will go down’ (interview 31).

248 Interview 23, official, PMO-RALG.
Donors’ fixation on the ‘capitation grant’ is not a novelty in the Tanzanian education aid arena. Since the inception of the primary capitation grant with the PEDP in 2001, this has constituted one of the key structuring features of the sector dialogue. The two PETS conducted in 2002 (under the World Bank’s leadership) and 2008 (under first the EC and then DFID leadership), two politically loaded processes, demonstrate donors’ enduring concern about resources allocated to schools.\(^249\) However, the last episode in the capitation grant saga marked a displacement or reformulation of the capitation grant narrative. In the first phase, the ‘capitation grant’ problem was mostly framed in terms of transparency of flow of funds (the issue of ‘leakages’), in full consistency with the good governance/public finance management agenda, and in terms of equity of resource distribution between districts. Only primary education was under donor scrutiny. With the SEDP II, ‘quality secondary education’ ('textbooks and other learning materials') became the dominant narrative, albeit embroiled with the ‘corruption’ and ‘equity’ themes. Previous preoccupations have not been erased; the capitation grant saga is formed of concatenated layers of meanings that reflect the trajectory and dynamic nature of the global (education) aid agenda.

This episode also illustrates that, within the aid arena, confrontational lines straddle the boundaries of government and aid agencies: in this instance, a coalition formed between a segment of the government – the education administration – and education aid managers whose converging interests – more funding for quality secondary education – prevailed, at least temporarily, over the opposing coalition formed by the Ministry of Finance and aid agencies’ economists. These events perfectly illuminate Harrison’s view of sovereignty in the ‘post-conditionality regime’, a ‘frontier (…) formed by the interaction of forces therein, rather than by the delimitation between one space and another’ (Harrison 2004: 25-26).

Finally, donors deployed power mechanisms to force the Ministry of Finance to formally fulfil their conditionality on funding for ward secondary schools but contributed to undermining their own broader education goal: quality basic education for all. In this

\(^{249}\) The first PETS, in 2002, led to controversial findings and recommendations. The study was never endorsed by the government (Sundet 2007). During the Education Sector Review High Level Meeting in 2007, ‘conducting a PETS’ was one of the four demands that Heads of aid agencies directly addressed to the Prime Minister. It was also a non-negotiable condition for the disbursement of the FY 2007/08 tranche of the EU sector budget programme. This second PETS covered also secondary education, but only because of government’s firm insistence.
episode, as under the SEDP I, the government achieved what Plank (1993: 418), in the case of Mozambique, termed a ‘complex and perilous balancing act’, safeguarding the continued flow of aid while simultaneously securing its own overarching budget priorities.

4.2 The contentious politics of the teacher wage bill

Most government officials interviewed considered teachers’ low morale a key obstacle to achieving quality education and teachers’ salaries a core ingredient of their motivation. The learning crisis has led to new recruitment of teachers, with a marked increase in secondary level teaching staff between 2010 and 2012 (Table 5.10).

Table 5-10: Number of teaching staff, basic education, 2008-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>Growth rate over the period (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Education</td>
<td>154,895</td>
<td>157,185</td>
<td>165,856</td>
<td>175,449</td>
<td>180,987</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
<td>32,835</td>
<td>33,954</td>
<td>40,517</td>
<td>52,146</td>
<td>65,086</td>
<td>98.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ Colleges</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>1,678</td>
<td>1,745</td>
<td>1,833</td>
<td>2,044</td>
<td>92.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: URT (2012b: 108)

This recruitment had a direct impact on the official qualified teacher-pupil ratio, which has improved in the most recent years, notably at secondary level.

Table 5-11: Qualified Teacher-Pupil Ratio for Basic Education (2008-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Education</td>
<td>1:64</td>
<td>1:60</td>
<td>1:54</td>
<td>1:49</td>
<td>1:47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
<td>1:37</td>
<td>1:43</td>
<td>1:40</td>
<td>1:34</td>
<td>1:29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ Colleges</td>
<td>1:21</td>
<td>1:22</td>
<td>1:22</td>
<td>1:23</td>
<td>1:22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: URT (2012b: 108)

At secondary level, the changes in staffing levels drove a 27 per cent increase in the teaching wage bill (basic salaries) between FY 2008/09 and FY 2011/12 (in constant prices).
Table 5-12: Teachers’ wage bill (basic salary) in primary and secondary education (constant prices)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY2008/09</th>
<th>FY2010/11</th>
<th>FY2011/12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary teachers</td>
<td>126,560,465,191</td>
<td>112,611,789,467</td>
<td>160,869,491,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Teachers</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>409,016,505,576</td>
<td>480,210,344,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total teachers’ wage bill</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>521,628,295,043</td>
<td>641,079,835,684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of secondary teachers (per cent)</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Also, in 2011-2012, when threatened with a teachers’ strike, the government decided to settle a long standing dispute with the Tanzania Teachers’ Union (TTU) over teachers’ salary and non-salary arrears: in FY 2011/12, a Tsh 44 billion sum was paid to primary and secondary school teachers.

Despite these positive trends, teachers at the beginning of their career earn about half as much as health workers (Tsh 249,600 for teachers, Tsh 477,200 for health workers), although differences are less pronounced at the end of careers.\(^{250}\) Industrial action has regularly met with coercive responses from the government.\(^ {251}\) In 2010, following a strike notice by TTU, President Kikwete delivered a menacing speech to teachers while high-ranking representatives of the army and the police stood ostentatiously behind him. Similarly, in 2012, in the context of salary negotiations, the government responded to a teachers’ strike with intimidation, sending a ‘strong warning to teachers’; the action, overwhelmingly supported by the teaching force, was challenged in Court and declared illegal.\(^ {252}\)

These domestic politics of the teachers’ wage bill cannot be envisaged outside donors’ ambiguous positions about Tanzania’s civil service wage bill. In the budget support era, just as during the structural adjustment period, the Tanzanian government’s policy choices are being fundamentally constrained by the need to comply with the IMF’s fiscal

\(^{250}\) Source: Civil servants’ salary scales for 2010-2012. Salary scales are renegotiated every two to three years between civil servants’ trade unions and the government.

\(^{251}\) Since the birth of the TTU in the 1990s, the ruling power has deployed traditional containment techniques to inhibit its potential destabilising power: undermining their leaders’ credibility; intimidating teachers or capturing their leaders within the system (invitation to workshops with allowances or nomination of their President – Margaret Sitta – as Minister of Education in 2005).

\(^{252}\) For an account of the strike see for instance: ‘Tanzania: Teachers’ Strike De-stabilizes the Nation’ 01/08/2012 (http://globalvoicesonline.org/2012/08/01/tanzania-teachers-strike-de-stabilizes-the-nation/ accessed 25/09/2013).
prescriptions. For instance, in May 2011 the IMF’s Board of Directors ‘encouraged the authorities to press ahead with essential fiscal consolidation and structural reforms to sustain pro-poor growth and employment over the medium term’. Their specific recommendation on the wage bill sounded more like asking the government to square the circle: ‘the growth in the wage bill must be stabilized while providing space for recruitments in social sectors’ (IMF 2011: 16).

The contradiction in donor expectations was highlighted both by informants in the Ministry of Finance and by donors’ aid managers. An economist in a major aid agency forcefully stressed the inconsistency of donors’ demands:

*The government tells us “You have been pushing me for two years so that I hire more teachers, where I find the money to pay for them?” You see, this is crazy. This is crazy. It’s schizophrenia. (...) We cannot say we want them to do more development. You cannot push them like you have to teach better … better quality teachers means better pay. More teachers means more pay. So you have to increase the rate payment (...) We want them to do more teachers and more health care but then if they increase the budget and they increase the recurrent and they take non-concessional loan, you will go like no, you cannot do this.’* (Interview 55)

While imposing tight fiscal discipline, donors have framed the question of the relation between the teachers’ wage bill and quality education in terms of incentives to teachers in ‘hard to reach’ or ‘underserved’ areas. Despite a formal procedure to allocate teachers based on need, Tanzania’s education system is characterised by a highly uneven geographical distribution of teachers. This diagnostic has been shared by both parties. Yet donors’ policy prescription to address this key obstacle to quality education has constituted a long lasting site of frictions between the government and donors, specifically the World Bank. The issue of ‘teacher deployment and utilization’ was a key feature of the World Bank’s SEDP I, subject to disbursement conditionalities (World Bank 2004: 18-19). With its SEDP II the World Bank has decided to finance (i) a one-off settling-in allowance

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253 This over-dependence on IMF conditionalities was already mentioned for Tanzania in Weeks et al. (2002: 147). In her general assessment of the new aid paradigm, Dijkstra (2013: 14) also underlined ‘the fact that the IMF is still the primary entrance condition (which) maintains the pivotal role of this institution in determining economic policies’.


255 At primary and secondary levels, ‘60 percent of teachers [are] allocated according to criteria other than the level of enrolment’ (UNESCO 2012e: 46).
for teachers taking up posts in hard to reach schools; and (ii) the provision of teacher housing in hard to reach schools (World Bank 2010a: 51). RCT-based evaluations were planned to test the impact of financial incentives to teachers in ‘hard-to-reach’ areas (and of capitation grants).

The government put on a united front against the World Bank’s demands, which it considers potentially highly disruptive. For the government - i.e., the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance and the PMO-RALG - the issue of teachers’ incentives cannot be dealt with at sector level: it needs to be addressed within the broader civil service framework under the responsibility of the President Office’s Public Service Management. The World Bank’s RCT-research programme also had to be redesigned and its ambition down-sized. Government officials, while willing to submit their education policies to evaluations, disagreed with one core feature of RCTs: the use of ‘control groups’ that would contradict the principle of equal treatment guaranteed by the state.

The government’s cautious treatment of the incentives issue entangles macro-economic preoccupations – the fear of a contagion spreading to the rest of the civil service thus leading to an explosive wage bill, egalitarian considerations and concerns over social order. A senior official in the Ministry of Finance pointed to the extreme political sensibility of the question: ‘It’s a macro issue. If you miscalculate you can bring a big disaster on the wage bill. To define ‘hard to serve’ areas is challenging. It has been brought to cabinet for discussion. PO-PSM is working on the definition and the strategy whereby what types of incentives and to whom but the World Bank is pushing very hard’ (interview 37). In this instance, donors’ prescriptions collided with the government’s overriding priority: to guarantee the conditions of social peace under tight macro-economic constraints.

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256 Ironically enough in the 1990s, under the Civil Service Reform Programme, the World Bank pushed for the integration of occupation-specific allowances into the basic salary to simplify the civil service pay structure.

257 Ultimately, after months of negotiations, the World Bank was allowed to conduct an impact evaluation to test the effects of communication/transparency measures tied to the disbursement of the capitation grant.
4.3 The ‘budget impasse’ and the reassertion of donors’ control over aid relations

For Tanzanian authorities, budget making constitutes a critical site of exercise of national sovereign power. The centrality of budgetary concerns in donors’ interventions during the budget support era has met procrastinating and obstructive strategies by the government, both at macro and sector levels. At the macro level, the Public Expenditure Review process, the official forum for donors-government dialogue over budget issues, collapsed. A World Bank economist explained the historical trajectory: ‘There was a period in 1998 to 2003, which was basically the golden years of the PER process in Tanzania. Then, 2004, 2005, 2006 … it became very process-oriented and very empty of content. And then from 2007 to today [October 2011], it basically stopped working in any significant way […] So, there was no real forum where to discuss these things [education budgetary trade-offs].’ In the education sector, donors’ repeated requests to revitalise the joint technical working group dedicated to budget issues (RACEF, Resource Allocation Cost Efficiency Financing) faced the education administration’s lack of diligence. An aid manager explained: ‘RACEF was defunct at your time [2006-2008]. It has been reactivated; it’s in place but not very active content wise. What we need it’s a Public Expenditure Review in the education sector every year’ (interview 48).

The government has continuously managed to confine donors outside – or at the fringes of - the budget process that remained a highly opaque domain for most economists and education aid managers. An education aid manager, heavily involved in sector discussions over budget dynamics, noted: ‘It’s still, for me, difficult to understand the budget process and the relationship with the Ministry of Finance’ (interview 62). And a World Bank economist, involved in the PER process, acknowledged a similar ignorance: ‘we’ve never really understood how it [the prioritisation process during execution] works in the practical day to day routine way’.

In contrast to donors’ tendency to envisage the budget as a technocratic instrument, the government’s repeated rejections of donors’ recurrent claims for a direct role in the budget design constituted a powerful reaffirmation of the political significance of the budget.

258 Yet, the World Bank’s official view diverges from this account: ‘The PER is partly achieving its intended objectives in that it plays a critical role in enhancing efficiency and accountability in the use of budgetary resources. The PER has instilled transparency in the budget process and is acting as an arm’s length watchdog for any malpractice by spending units.’ (World Bank 2011: 77).
Commenting on donors’ insistence on receiving draft budget guidelines with the view to influencing budget allocations, a senior official in the Ministry of Finance clearly expressed the government rationale:

\textit{DPs sometimes don’t understand. We do have meetings with them, we’re discussing budget when we have the Joint GBS review. Their comments are taken on board, including in Budget Guidelines. DPs’ role in any country is to support; they can advise but the government can reject their recommendations. The decision-making power is within the government. DPs want to be part of the decision-making. It’s not possible. People don’t understand where they stand. They can’t decide for us, Tanzania is a sovereign state. (Interview 37)}

With budget support, Tanzanian education donors have certainly won a ‘seat at the policy dialogue table’, as argued by Swedlun (2013), but they have remained in the anteroom of budget discussions. Faced with this ‘budget impasse’, donors are tempted to revert to a greater control over aid relations.

The World Bank’s mode of intervention for the SEDP II – an Adaptable Programme Loan (APL) that mixes policy conditionalities and project management mode - was chosen to allow the agency to regain control over aid relations and education finances. According to their Independent Evaluation Group, the SEDP I aid modality – a development policy loan, the Bank’s version of budget support – was a key factor in the Bank’s inability to influence the pace of expansion and the scope of the government’s fiscal effort to support it (World Bank 2010b: 32). A World Bank economist deciphered the shifting vision that contributed to shaping the SEDP II: ‘[Under the SEDP I] it was budget support (...) you have much less control (...) we thought the government couldn’t do anything wrong and anything they agreed would actually happen (...) we have basically decided not to do any budget support in education anymore and the next project is an investment project on which you have much more control on them’ (interview 57). The SEDP II can be interpreted as a project to restore technocrats’ control over education policies and finances, to again subject the education system to a sound technocratic rationality, as the only path towards quality education. The SEDP II illustrates the contradictions of donors’ rhetorical commitment to ‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’; these concepts disintegrated in the face of a government that decided to implement its own(ed) policy that contradicted the World Bank’s desired option. The Tanzania government was challenging the tacit rules of the ‘mutual complicity’ (Mosse 2005) or
'ventriloquism' (Van de Walle 2005) game; more coercive aid modalities had to be reinstated. As argued in Fraser and Whitfield (2008: 4), donors’ commitment to ‘ownership’ does not necessarily imply ‘any commitment to increasing the ability of African polities to pursue policies of their own design’: the willingness of donors to ‘increase recipient control over the aid process is often conditional upon the prior demonstration of political commitment to donor preferences’.

This trend – the tightening of donors’ grip over aid relations – has not been confined to the World Bank. DFID’s 2012 shift from an exclusive reliance on GBS to support education to diversified modes of intervention - sector budget support and projects reflecting a general trend towards a reassertion of aid agencies’ control. The rationale of this step backward to a pre-Paris Declaration epoch is being questioned by education aid managers from other aid agencies and government officials in education and finance ministries. The capitation grant saga has also shed light on the limitations of this restoration of control. Project approach, general budget support, the interplay between the two, all consistently failed to persuade domestic elites to rearrange their order of budgetary precedence in favour of quality basic education for all.

In the face of the budget support stalemates, donors have also been engineering a new approach to aid and school funding. This evolution, intending to translate in Tanzania the human capital/new institutional agenda described in Chapter 2, is exemplified by the World Bank’s SEDP II. This programme should indeed be understood as the first phase in a ten year plan geared toward performance-based school financing. Two objectives for the World Bank’s SEDP II second phase (2013-2017) – the design and implementation of a student achievement measurement instrument and the improvement of administrative and pedagogical practices through incentives (World Bank 2010a: 10, table 1) - cannot be read in isolation from the Bank’s general insistence on tying teachers’ salaries to students’ learning achievements. The first phase of the SEDP II only constitutes a preparatory period aimed at creating the appropriate conditions to allow competition for resources to

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260 ‘The World Bank will provide financial support to SEDP through an overlapping three phase 10-year APL’ (World Bank 2010a: 8).
261 World Bank (2010c).
thrive among public schools. A World Bank staff member unambiguously made explicit the World Bank’s long-term strategic objective:

[The] World Bank is more interested in learning achievements than in infrastructures or inputs. But we can’t start to focus on performance-based school financing if schools don’t have the resources. We need first to make sure that the gap is narrowed between the most endowed and less resourced before they can compete (...) I’ve great hope in this scheme [performance-based school funding]. If one wants to go back into the history of the thinking, we have to trace it back to the 2004 World Development Report on public service delivery and accounting: to provide reward for performance service delivery…The challenge in Tanzania is first to level up the playing field a bit before implementing it. (Interview 58)

The World Bank is not alone in its push towards performance-based school funding in Tanzania. The UK’s Independent Commission for Aid Impact encouraged DFID to work ‘with ministries of education to introduce a results focus into national funding for districts and schools’.262 In 2013-2014, the NGO Twaweza, supported by the World Bank, SIDA and DFID, piloted a scheme to financially reward public schools and teachers performances as measured by the Uwezo tests.263 After a visit to Tanzania in 2012, Nancy Birdsall, Director of the influential Global Development Centre, recommended that the Tanzanian government and donors develop a ‘secondary school learning Aid Program’ that would tie aid payments for secondary schools to students’ examination results (Birdsall et al. 2012).

Importing outcome based school funding to Tanzania will not be a frictionless process. For instance, the Ministry of Finance does not consider cash-on-delivery a wise move.264 The World Bank also acknowledged that its intention to promote school-based funding is being resisted by the government. A World Bank staff member explained: ‘They [the government] were very resistant to it [performance-based school financing]. They don’t buy in. But I think if we gradually promote it and introduce it they’ll finish to buy in. We might also take their senior people in countries where such scheme works to convince them but it will be in Asia’ (interview 58). Apart from the World Bank, donors are not unconditionally backing the approach. If SIDA and DFID appear enthusiastic supporters, others have expressed more skepticism. Today, the outcome of these attempts remains undetermined. However, if this trend takes shape it

262 ICAI (2012: 1).

263 For a critical analysis see Languille (forthcoming).

264 Senior official, Ministry of Finance (interview 37).
would allow the transnational elite to completely evade the structural question of the fiscal space for quality basic education for all. Within such a framework indeed, the onus is being shifted from the state and international agencies to individuals (schools or teachers); quality education is no longer a matter of resources; it is posited as an individual responsibility that can be achieved through the reordering of individual teacher behaviour or school management structures.

Conclusion

This chapter has untangled internal and external political economy factors that, beneath the technicalities of the budget, have moulded a negligible budget for ward secondary schools. Trapped within a global education agenda geared towards universal primary education, donors did not share the government’s sense of urgency in the face of primary education enrolment success. They largely abandoned their own creation and did not mobilise substantial resources to accompany the secondary education expansion. Their recent funding response to the learning crisis fell short of the enormous fiscal challenge. The enduring ‘value for money’ perspective prevailed over considerations about the expansion of the fiscal space for quality secondary education for all: ‘more quality expenditure rather than more funding’ could sum up their fiscal treatment of the learning crisis.

Domestic elites’ egalitarian claims to legitimate ward secondary schools did not provoke any substantial realignment of their budget preferences. The budget for quality secondary education appears to be a casualty of a conflict-ridden process geared towards the reconciliation of various over-determining forces: elite attempts to explore a counter-hegemonic developmental model while responding to pressing international fiscal prescriptions; the need to create the conditions of the socio-political order or their inability to find an alternative model to finance higher education. Specifically, the political order imperative was exposed as an important parameter in budget decisions over student loans, teachers’ wage bill and the resources to be transferred to schools. The politics of education budgeting confirm the prevailing understanding among elites of education as a device for youth management. But they appear to assess differently the political risk embodied by various segments of the youth. The ward secondary schools policy to contain the poor youth in rural areas has received very little support from the national budget; on the other
hand, students are perceived as posing a greater threat to the political status quo that deserves massive and continued budgetary injections.

The previous chapter underlined the recent discursive agreement, among the transnational elite, on the need for quality secondary education to answer the demands of the knowledge economy. This rhetorical consensus took a financial form but one at the margins of the education budget that did not encroach upon domestic elites’ over-arching budget preferences. Donors’ recent attempts to reconfigure the education budget towards quality secondary education have collided with structural factors that they tend to ignore – the country’s position in the global economy, elites’ imperative for political order and donors’ own contradictory demands for tight fiscal discipline. Fraser and Whitfield (2008: 2) found little evidence to suggest that in Tanzania the government has ‘substantially challenged the donor-dominance that has defined [its] aid relations over the last decade’. On the contrary, this chapter has shown that the budget has formed domestic elites’ favourite locus to assert their sovereign power: within the broad framework of asymmetrical power relations, domestic elites have persistently deployed mechanisms to successfully curtail the ‘hegemonic potential of international aid’ (Mosse 2005). In the face of this resistance, donors are tempted to once again alter their modes of intervention. But new aidmodalities under consideration - performance-based teacher salaries and school funding – completely evade the structural question of the fiscal space for quality basic education for all and obscure the responsibility of domestic and international elites in funding it.

The next chapter pursues the investigation at the local level and shows that private resources have mainly made up for this absence of national public fiscal space for ward secondary schools.
Chapter Six

Who owns the ward secondary schools?
The politics of implementation in Lushoto District

Nyerere thought that the financial package would not cater for the expansion of secondary education. According to him, we could not finance secondary education. But there are other ways. He was thinking within the budget frame. His assumption was that everything should be financed by the government. But this programme is based on the idea that people can contribute. (Politician, Lushoto, interview 135)

According to this prominent political figure in Lushoto District, by reaching untapped resources (community wealth) the country could expand its fiscal space and finance the expansion of basic social services. Chapter 4 revealed the intrinsic tensions, in secondary education expansion, between a technical rationality, politically desired social outcomes and the urgent need to manage the youth. Chapter 5 highlighted the negligible financial effort of elites to support the ward secondary schools policy. This chapter explores the built-in contradiction between the stated welfare intentions behind this policy and the actual enforcement of a principle of individual responsibility.

How did the ward secondary schools policy, designed at central level and driven by the top executive, but not backed by any substantial budgetary resources, become negotiated at local level between bureaucrats, politicians and the population? This chapter focuses on the implementation of the policy in Lushoto district, in North-East Tanzania. In 2011, with 72 ward secondary schools, this district had the highest number of government secondary schools in the entire country. The profile of secondary education expansion in Lushoto mirrored the national trajectory: a slow progression between the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the 2000s, then a marked acceleration between 2004 and 2010, with three peak years in 2007-2009. The first secondary school in Lushoto District, Kifungilo, registered in 1981, was private, built by the Catholic Church. But the expansion, even prior to 2004, has largely been driven by public schools (Figure 6.1).
In 2012, 25 out of a total of 44 wards in the district had more than one government secondary school, four wards recording four: ‘one secondary school in each village’ has become an often-heard policy slogan. This research did not undertake any comparative studies in other districts: identifying Lushoto’s specific features that may explain this outstanding ‘performance’ remains a speculative task. This chapter has a more circumscribed objective: to study the ward secondary schools policy in practice. To use Harrison’s (2008: 171) words in his analysis of the implementation of the Local Government Reform Programme in Lushoto, this chapter enables us to focus on the ways in which the ward schools policy ‘relates to social relations beyond the realm of donors and high state officials’. In their study of the Poverty Reduction Strategy in Tanzania Gould and Ojanen (2003: 52) similarly insisted on the necessity of critically examining the ‘politics of policy implementation’. This chapter provides a portrait of social relations at local level; it unveils the power struggles unleashed by the implementation of the policy at various levels of the local arena – communities and schools, villages, wards and district headquarters.\textsuperscript{265}

The ward secondary schools policy has been underpinned by a specific discourse on the relations between the central state and the local: the first section unpacks its constitutive components and sheds light on their genealogy. Section Two presents the budgetary

\textsuperscript{265} The word ‘communities’ conveys an idea of homogeneity and harmony. In reality, the rural population is subject to social differentiation, cleavages and power struggles. This term was nevertheless widely used by Tanzanian dominant groups to refer to peasants and parents. Despite its normative limitations, the term ‘community’ is used here.
constraints that restrict the ability of the district and of ward secondary schools to deliver on their public service responsibilities. Section Three studies the pivotal role of notables in mobilising communities and gaining their consent to the policy. Finally, Section Four shows how ward secondary schools have turned into a major political battlefield for local elites.

1. Community schools, the central state and the ‘local’: securing people’s ownership to fight poverty

Right from its inception, which can be traced back to the 1995 Education and Training Policy, Tanzanian policy-makers envisioned the ward secondary schools policy from a locally-driven developmental perspective: ‘urban, district, town, municipal, city councils and authorities, communities, NGO, individuals and public institutions shall be encouraged and given incentives to establish, own, manage and administer at least one secondary school in each ward (Kata) in their areas of jurisdiction’ (URT 1995: 102). In 2006, the ward secondary schools policy enunciated by Prime Minister Lowassa similarly called for a specific ‘social contract’ between the central state and the population: communities had to start the construction of schools then the state (government and districts) would cater for the roofing, cover the biggest share of running costs through the capitation grant and allocate an adequate number of teachers.

This locally driven model of expansion is deeply rooted in the history of the country but it also reflects the profound internalisation, within the state, of global discourses about the ‘local’ since the structural adjustment programmes period.

‘Self-help’ ideology has tainted development policies in Tanzania since colonial times; it was a prominent feature of Ujamaa development strategy (Kitching 1989, Samoff 1989). Specifically in the education sector, Kilimanjaro Region provided the rest of the country with a successful model of educational advancement driven by local initiatives and funding schemes (Samoff 1979b). The economic structure of this region, where a nascent capitalist class had emerged during the colonial period, provided the local petty bourgeoisie with the

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266 This is not specific to Tanzania. Cowen and Shenton (1995) trace the origin of community participation and self-help discourse and practices to the late colonial period when ‘voluntary’ community contributions were supposed to cover the cost of welfare and health services.
material base necessary to construct and run secondary schools: resources were collected through a levy on coffee production. It also enabled them to assert their bargaining power vis-à-vis a central state eager to curtail their educational, economic and political privileges. In 1984, Kilimanjaro Region represented 5.6 per cent of the population but was home to 26 per cent of all secondary schools in the country, 11 per cent of government and 42 per cent of private secondary schools (Samoff 1989: 7). An MP in Lushoto explained how he drew on this historical experience to convince his constituents to build secondary schools:

‘We had to encourage them, to educate them, to make them understand the need for secondary education, to explain to them why some regions like Kilimanjaro are developed, well advanced because they have very well educated people’ (interview 131).

The community-driven model of secondary education expansion has also been nourished by the understanding among elites of Kenya’s comparative economic success as tied to specific education choices (see Chapter 4). The post-independence expansion of secondary education in Kenya was largely driven by the Harambee schools movement: locally-funded secondary schools. The literature has challenged the romanticised assessment of the virtues of the Harambee model. For instance, Mwiria (1990) showed how, because of the scarce resources of most community schools, the Harambee movement has led to an increasingly polarized system, with secondary schools differentiated by the quality of the education they deliver. Nevertheless, for part of the Tanzanian elite, the Harambee movement constitutes an evident source of inspiration or legitimation of the ward secondary schools:

*Take the example of our neighbour, Kenya. Just early after independence, they allowed these Harambee schools to be constructed. At the beginning they did not fulfil the conditions of a school. But they started. As long as they started it, they were allowed to go. Now, in the course of time, they accomplished the unfinished infrastructures. And the schools functioned, started to function well. And then, now, if you compare the number of secondary schools in Kenya to that in Tanzania, you will find that more students are going to secondary schools in Kenya than in Tanzania although we’ve got a bigger population than Kenya.* (Senior official, MoEVT, interview 10)

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267 In the late colonial period, peasants in Lushoto who were against an irrigation scheme imposed by the colonial administration went to Kilimanjaro to consult with leaders of the Kilimanjaro Citizens’ Union, an organisation focused on issues of land allocation and local expenditures for schools. Back in Lushoto they set up the Usambara Citizens’ Union and even chose a Chagga, Petro Njau (KCU’s president) as their President: ‘Usambara did not have any leaders who were well educated as Petro Njau’ (Feierman 1990: 174 and 211).
These two narratives – the educational successes of the Chagga people and Kenya – have been structurally tied to historically-built economic structures but they have played, within the Tanzanian elite, the role of powerful myths that contribute to the framing of public policies.

The enduring presence of ‘self-help’ ingredients within Tanzanian development policies does not imply that self-help projects have been time and space invariant. Over the decades, the meaning of the concept has been subject to alterations, reflecting evolving relations between the state, society and local brokers. Jennings (2007) underlined, for instance, the shift from an initial framing of the ‘self-help’ concept, in the early years of independence, in terms of participation in the nation-building project to the post-Arusha Declaration period when ‘compulsory’ participation served state control and management priorities. Similarly, the concrete institutional arrangements organising relations between the central level and the ‘local’ have evolved over time, since colonial ‘indirect rule’ through Native Authorities. 

During Ujamaa, local governments progressively lost their democratic, participatory nature to ‘increasingly [become] an agency of central government’ (Samoff 1989: 2): elected district councils were eliminated in favour of the state regional administration. The history of the cooperative movement in Tanzania, epitomised by the fate of the Ruvuma Development Association, also illustrates the precarious position of the central state vis-à-vis the ‘local’ and the structural tension between the centre’s needs for local intermediaries to mobilise rural masses and its desire to establish control over potential competing powers (Samoff 1989).

These historical ingredients of the locally driven model of secondary education expansion have, however, been entwined with elements of the ‘pro-poor’ global discourse. With the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes in the mid-1980s, the call by Tanzanian authorities for community contributions strongly echoed the International Financial Institutions’ promotion of cost-sharing measures to support the expansion of the education sector. Since the end of the 1990s, the rhetoric has been reworked in a post-Washington consensus idiom largely appropriated by Tanzanian elites. In 1999, Tanzania’s overarching development strategy, Vision 2025, argued that ‘state welfare responsibilities

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268 See Max (1991) for an exposition of the various stages of centralisation and decentralisation experienced by the country.
269 Similarly, for Mamdani (1996: 177) ‘The Tanzania decentralization of the mid-1970s was in effect a centralization’.
are more focused on cost-effective ways of enhancing access to and the quality of social services’. One of the main development goals was: ‘To permit a greater role for local actors to own and drive the process of their development. Local people know their problems best and are better placed to judge what they need, what is possible to achieve and how it can effectively be achieved’ (URT 1999b). In 2000, Tanzania’s National Strategy for Poverty Reduction similarly insisted on the involvement of communities and local governments in social services provision within a cost-sharing framework (Palloti 2008). In 2003 the World Development Report posited community participation, user fees, decentralisation and school autonomy as key elements in the development of local ‘ownership’ and strengthening of public ‘accountability’ to achieve efficient social services delivery (World Bank 2003). In 2004, the SEDP perfectly illustrated the fruitful encounter between Tanzanian elites’ historical conception of the role of the masses in participating in development and donors’ endeavours to ‘make services work for poor people’ through the empowerment of imagined communities. The SEDP I was designed to alleviate the main financial constraint preventing the poor from accessing secondary education, the Tsh 40,000 school fees, introduced in the mid-1980s following the Structural Adjustment Programme. According to the World Bank, ‘this level of cost sharing [was] prohibitive for many households, given the low household income level of Tanzania’ (World Bank 2004a: 5). In theory, the SEDP was meant to shift the financial burden from the people to the state and the international community. This objective was materialised through the official reduction of school fees to Tsh 20,000, schools being compensated by the capitation grant.

At the same time both the World Bank and the government agreed that the expansion of secondary education should be the result of a joint effort between communities, local governments and the central state. In his foreword to the SEDP document, Joseph Mungai, then Minister of Education, reaffirmed the core tenet of the programme: ‘[The SEDP] is predicated on a community-based developmental approach intended to elicit greater participation from below’ (URT 2004: ii). The World Bank’s SEDP project document noted: ‘Community secondary schools are the means by which communities express an effective demand for secondary education’ (World Bank 2004a: 4). Communities needed to

271 The World Bank SEDP project documents completely ignore the Bank’s historical role in pushing for the introduction of cost-sharing measures in the 1980s as if this anti-poor policy was the sole responsibility of an anti-poor domestic leadership.
demonstrate that they deserved education; they needed to ‘earn their way out of poverty’. The World Bank costing framework for its SEDP I factored in communities’ contributions, projected at 25 per cent of the total construction costs (URT 2004), increasing to 30 per cent under the SEDP II (URT 2010b: 92). For the government and the World Bank the model has had two main facets: rolling back the state through a shift of ownership - ‘People are living nearby that school. And they see that school as their school’ (official, PMO-RALG, interview 25) - and a material component of cost-reduction: ‘In that way, we are minimising the cost for construction’ (ibid).

The SEDP also reflected the centrality of decentralisation in donors’ pro-poor service delivery agenda as well as Tanzanian elites’ adherence to this model of public service discharge on local governments. As early as 1995, decentralisation of education officially constituted the first objective of the Education and Training Policy (URT 1995). The ‘devolution of authority and responsibilities to lower levels’ to ‘increase efficiency and responsiveness in the operation of secondary education’ was a core component of the SEDP strategies (URT 2004: 2). The World Bank SEDP I included two disbursement conditions aimed at strengthening the decentralisation framework (World Bank 2010b: 18). This strategy of decentralisation in education was part of a broader process launched at the end of the 1990s within the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP), widely supported by donors under the World Bank’s leadership. As evidenced by its official objectives - to encourage ‘public participation, transparency and accountability’ and to improve ‘service delivery’ – the reform constituted an unmistakable Tanzanian offshoot of the Post-Washington Consensus ‘good governance’ agenda.

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273 The earlier expansion of primary education was underpinned by a similar cost-sharing scheme: under the PEDP, primary school fees were abolished but ‘community inputs’ to construction and ‘voluntary community contributions’ to quality improvement expenses were explicit features of the plan (URT 2001: 10).


275 For the 2004 World Development Report ‘decentralization can be a powerful tool for moving decision making closer to those affected by it’ (World Bank 2003: 29).

276 See http://www.pmoralg.go.tz/about_us/history.php. The Local Government Reform Programme was part of a comprehensive reform package comprising the Public Finance Management Reform, the Public Sector Reform, the Legal Sector Reform, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan and the Business Environment Support in Tanzania. In 2012, the LGRP was still on-going under the label ‘Decentralisation by Devolution’ (or DbyD) along with its sister reforms. Harrison (2008) and Palloti (2008) provide critical analyses of the LGRP reform.
An abundant literature has discussed the concept of ‘self-help’, in time rearticulated in terms of ‘community-led’ or ‘participatory’ development.\(^{277}\) In her analysis of the World Bank education agenda, Rose (2005: 173) argues that this community involvement, in the context of the search for alternative resources to finance education expansion, has provoked a ‘marketization’ of community participation.\(^{278}\) The reformulation of the ‘self-help’ ideology prompted by economic liberalisation was also contested within the Tanzanian state, as testified to by Nyerere’s own position. He fully endorsed the idea of communities contributing to education expansion through their labour but rejected the idea of their monetisation:

‘Constantly asking parents to buy for this or pay for that is self-defeating; sooner or later they will stop sending their children to school because they cannot provide what is asked for. Silver and gold they have none: what they do have is their labour. That they can often provide: labour to build a new classroom, or a teacher’s house, or to paint walls or repair a roof’ (Nyerere 1988: 183).

He simultaneously stressed the fallacy of communities’ labour contribution when the state could not provide quality education basic inputs. ‘When talking about secondary school expansion, we are quick to say that the people will put up the buildings by their own efforts. But the buildings are less important… The important things in education are the teachers, the books, and for science the laboratories’ (Nyerere 1984: 154). The World Bank itself has recently thoroughly questioned its own normative views on the virtues of localised development. Based on a review of empirical research, the Bank has reached conclusions that essentially contradict the assumptions behind its SEDP I and II programmes in Tanzania (World Bank 2012b).

The remainder of this chapter explores the practical significance of this specific public-private partnership model, as implemented in an actual setting, Lushoto District.

\(^{277}\) For instance, Booth (2011) challenged assumptions of the global good governance agenda that bottom-up pressures from services users, voters or civil society organisations may lead to improved public good provision.

\(^{278}\) For a general discussion on education decentralisation and community financing, see Bray and Lillis (1989) and Bray (1996).
2. Communities and the district: straitened financial surrogates of the central state

2.1 Public funding of ward secondary schools: the impossible district budget balancing act

Before effective decentralisation of secondary education in FY 2009/10, districts were not supposed to channel resources to secondary education, a sector out of their formal remit. During the SEDP I, rather than a transfer of responsibilities and resources to directly elected local governments, ‘decentralisation’ was interpreted in terms of ‘school autonomy’ through the empowerment of school boards. Financial transfers would flow directly from the Ministry of Education to secondary schools.

Nevertheless, Prime Minister Lowassa’s 2006 decree on ward secondary schools made legitimate, if not strictly legal, the use of district resources to support the expansion. In Lushoto, a former MP admitted the financial involvement of the district in supporting secondary education expansion prior to decentralisation: ‘During the meetings of the council budgetary committee I asked the district to contribute and to support communities’ initiatives by providing iron sheets and to reallocate money to that effect. We bought indeed iron sheets and it constituted another booster. We were allowed to do some savings here and there and also through the improvement of the revenue collection’ (interview 135). No evidence was collected to confirm or reject the hypothesis of PEDP funds redirected to finance secondary education. But human resources were diverted: the district administration transferred primary teachers to secondary schools to alleviate the abysmal shortage of secondary teachers.

With decentralisation in FY2009/10, districts’ financial framework for secondary education has gained clarity but remains heavily dependent upon central state transfers. In terms of recurrent expenditures, the National Treasury channels to the district specific grants to cover various expenditures: activities of the District Secondary Education Office through ‘other charges’ (O.C. proper), schools’ running costs (capitation grant), school meals, examination and leave travel.

279 See Annex C for additional information on the district budget and documentation.
280 Interview 111 (retired senior district official).
Table 6-1: Lushoto Secondary Education Budget, Recurrent Expenditures, in Thousand Tsh (FY2008/09 – FY2011/12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spending unit</th>
<th>2008/09</th>
<th>2009/10</th>
<th>Share of total (%)</th>
<th>2010/11</th>
<th>Share of total (%)</th>
<th>2011/12</th>
<th>Share of total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O.C. proper</td>
<td>DSEO</td>
<td>20,300</td>
<td>43,350</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>41,498</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>139,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitation grant (domestic)</td>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>306,700</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>321,050</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>351,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitation grant (foreign - WB)</td>
<td>Schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>104,885</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examination expenses</td>
<td>DSEO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100,747</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>202,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meal</td>
<td>Boarding schools</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>61,200</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>63,252</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>76,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave travel</td>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45,150</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>48,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Other Charges</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,100</td>
<td>413,050</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>571,697</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>922,872</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: for FY 2008/09 Ministry of Finance; for subsequent years: district MTEFs (estimates)

As at national level, at the end of the research period, the district budget reflected the growing importance of secondary education: in FY 2011/12 the sub-sector absorbed 26 per cent of the district total non-salary recurrent expenditures against 20 per cent in FY 2010/11.

As the direct employer of secondary school teachers, the district also receives fiscal transfers to cover teachers’ personal emoluments (PE). In FY 2010/11 teachers’ total payslip represented about 58 per cent of the district PE envelope with secondary teachers representing a growing share: from 11.4 per cent in FY2009/10 to 22.4 per cent in FY 2011/12.
Primary education has been allocated the largest share of recurrent education expenditures, but in terms of development expenditures, secondary education has taken precedence. As shown in Table 6.3, the district used two main sources to finance its secondary education investments: a share of its Capital Development Grant (CDG), a non-earmarked transfer from the central level and a share of its Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) envelope, a World Bank funded programme dedicated to local development projects.

Table 6-3: Lushoto District Secondary Education Budget, Development Expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>FY 2010/11 Amount (Tsh)</th>
<th>FY 2011/12 Amount (Tsh)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LGCDG</td>
<td>To facilitate completion of 5 classrooms</td>
<td>13 000 000 Tsh</td>
<td>24 000 000 Tsh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To facilitate completion of 1 administration blocks</td>
<td>4 000 000 Tsh</td>
<td>60 000 000 Tsh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To facilitate the construction of 4 classrooms</td>
<td>20 000 000 Tsh</td>
<td>72 000 000 Tsh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To facilitate the construction of 5 administration blocks</td>
<td>90 000 000 Tsh</td>
<td>64 000 000 Tsh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To construct 13 laboratories</td>
<td>523 315 988 Tsh</td>
<td>80 000 000 Tsh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To facilitate the construction of 4 teachers' houses</td>
<td>60 000 000 Tsh</td>
<td>120 000 000 Tsh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To facilitate construction of 2 hostels</td>
<td>80 000 000 Tsh</td>
<td>123 500 000 Tsh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To facilitate completion of 1 hostels</td>
<td>4 000 000 Tsh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASAF</td>
<td>Construction of 2 classrooms; school furnitures for 15 schools</td>
<td>130 324 450 Tsh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>completion of a laboratory, instalaltion of gas plumbing system in one school</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>To facilitate the construction of 5 teachers' houses</td>
<td>150 000 000 Tsh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LDC (2011a and 2010); for TASAF: LDC (2011b)

The ability of the district to fulfil its financial responsibilities towards its secondary schools has been largely hampered by the realities of the country’s public finance management practices. As at national level (Chapter 5), district budget-making realities have largely diverged from a ‘textbook’ performance-based budgeting. Several interwoven elements linked to national public finances have contributed to undermine the strategic nature of the district MTEF.
First, districts receive their budget guidelines very late in the budget preparation cycle. As an illustration, as of early March 2012, Lushoto planning officers had no information about their ceilings for the FY 2012/13 budget that needed to be approved by the District Council in March before being tabled to the Ministry of Finance in April-May. The current fiscal year ceiling, plus a 5 per cent increment, is the default starting point for budget preparation. Second, the unpredictability of donor funding hampers district budget preparation. For instance, Lushoto’s MTEF for FY 2010/11 did not integrate the component of the SEDP capitation grant funded by the World Bank. Because of delays in finalising the World Bank project documents, the district budget was completed before any financial commitment was confirmed: the MTEF projected a figure of Tsh 320 million (about Tsh 13,000 per student), against an actual disbursement of Tsh 608 million during FY 2010/11 (about Tsh 25,000 per student). Third, the inter-sectoral allocation of CDG funds, in theory entirely discretionary, is also largely being dictated by national priorities, defined at Cabinet level: for instance, for FY 2011/12, agriculture (‘Kwilimo Kwanza’), identified as the national priority, had to be reflected in the district budget despite divergent priorities at local level: national authorities ‘have their own national priorities. For instance, in the district we have huge transport problems. But we did not get any fund for the road. Their priority was Kilimo Kwanza and they instructed us to direct all resources to Kilimo Kwanza. We adhered to the instruction’. At sector level, the secondary education component of the MTEF also translates national sector priorities: in FY 2010/11, laboratories and in FY 2011/12, teachers’ houses.

After a budget design largely framed by competing demands from the central level, budget implementation is also restricted by central level financial constraints. District budgets largely depend on resources transferred from the central level. In Lushoto, in FY2011/12, the district’s own resources represented about 4 per cent of district revenues against 96 per cent from intergovernmental transfers. In this context, the Treasury’s cash management system constitutes a critical challenge to a smooth and predictable execution of the district budget. For instance, in FY2010/11 in Lushoto only 65 per cent of the LGCDG budgeted amount was actually received. Two planned investments in secondary education could

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281 Interview with district staff, Budget and Planning Department.
282 Source: comparison between district MTEFs and MoF web site data: releases to district.
not be executed.\textsuperscript{283} In FY 2009/10 the district received only 50 per cent of the budgeted amount for the secondary education capitation grant.\textsuperscript{284}

The capitation grant received in the schools visited for this research never reached Tsh 25,000 per student. It is likely that the discrepancy partially derives from this cash constraint: district officials, lacking the cash to pay pressing outstanding debts or for unplanned/emergency activities, may use available education funds for non-education activities while waiting for the next disbursement from the Treasury.\textsuperscript{285} Cash constraints may also fuel social tensions between teachers and their employer. For instance, in February 2012, at the time of the fieldwork, a cash-strapped district administration was unable to pay newly recruited teachers the daily allowances they were entitled to: instructed by the central level to pay immediately, the District Treasury and the District Secondary Education Officer struggled to identify a budgetary trick to meet the central level injunction and avoid open conflict with the new teachers.\textsuperscript{286}

2.2 Community contributions in practice: the private costs of ward secondary schools and their precarious balance sheets

To the question ‘who financed the ward secondary schools?’ a former District Education Officer responded without any hesitation: ‘villagers’. It is beyond the scope of this research to provide an accurate estimation of communities’ contributions to the construction of secondary school infrastructures.\textsuperscript{287} Nevertheless, based on the triangulation of all accounts, the financial burden of the expansion appeared to fall disproportionately upon communities. According to the former DEO, ‘it was a very big project; it needed a lot of money (…) In Lushoto, communities provided more than half of the amount. Then the district, and finally the government’. In all schools visited, the story was identical: schools were mainly constructed by the communities with little support from the district and/or the government. Villagers prepared the ground, provided bricks, stones, timber and labour. Villagers were also asked to contribute cash: depending on the location, the contribution could reach Tsh 6,000 or

\textsuperscript{283} LDC (2011b).
\textsuperscript{284} Source: Ministry of Finance web site for the releases; District MTEFs for the budgeted amount.
\textsuperscript{285} The hypothesis of embezzlement of funds, the dominant narrative in donors-government circles, cannot however be ruled out.
\textsuperscript{286} The situation was made even more challenging that PMO-RALG and the MoEVT sent contradictory instructions: one instructed the payment of 7 day allowances, the other 14 days.
\textsuperscript{287} See however Annex C for a rough estimation.
Tsh 8,000 per household. Once the first basic infrastructure was in place – four classrooms was the minimum requirement to get official registration authorization – villagers continued to contribute to building staff quarters, laboratories and additional classrooms.

Villagers have not only financed a big share of capital costs, they have also contributing to running costs. In all schools visited, parental contributions were the school budget’s main source of revenue of, official school fees being only a small part of their total contribution. The complete list of contributions varied from school to school around a common core. Parents had to pay, for each enrolled child: school fees, a security fee, an academic contribution, an identity card contribution, a security contribution and a ‘school label’ contribution. All these were set in accordance with a formal directive of the Ministry of Education. But schools also charged other types of contributions: building fees, emergency fees, school bag fees, teaching contributions or a desk and chairs contribution.288 Table 6.4 below displays a typical list of contributions requested from parents in a secondary school located in Soni Ward. In that school, students were also asked to attend school with a bucket to fetch water, and a spade for gardening activities. In all schools uniform is mandatory and parents are required to provide for it. They have also to pay fees for district/zonal and national examinations.289

Table 6-4: Fees and contributions in a ward secondary school (Soni Ward), 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount (in Tsh)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School fees</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caution money</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID card</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desk contribution</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic contribution</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard contribution</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School emblem</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food contribution</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One ream of A4 paper</td>
<td>N.A.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>129,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum amount to be paid on enrolment day</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on the official instruction letter sent to parents before the beginning of school year
*based on interview with a mother, the price is about Tsh 12,000

288 Depending on schools, this could be paid in cash or by buying the desk directly from a local carpenter.
289 Form Two students: Tsh 5,000 for district mock exam and Tsh 10,000 for the national exam; Form Four students: Tsh 15,000 for district/zonal exam and Tsh 35,000 for national exam (national directive).
According to the Household Budget Survey 2007, the mean per capita household monthly income in rural areas amounted to Tsh 28,000 (or Tsh 335,000 a year) (URT 2009b). If one takes the figure above as a reference, once examination costs are added, in theory, the parents of a Form Four student in this school had to allocate close to 50 per cent of their annual income to their child’s secondary schooling.

In addition, parents also contributed towards the salaries of ‘Form Six Leavers’ teachers. All the schools visited had Form Six Leavers in their teaching force. They were recruited either for the duration of the school year or for certain topics to prepare for the exams. They were generally paid between Tsh 100,000 and Tsh 120,000 a month. Officially, these teachers do not exist: they do not appear in national statistics and the state (central government or district) has no obligation towards them in terms of training, career, supervision and salary: the cost of these teachers was silently passed onto parents.

The collection of these contributions has constituted a critical challenge for school management. ‘These contributions are very cumbersome for parents; it’s very difficult for them. Parents fail to pay’: this remark by the Headmaster in School P reflected the situation in all schools visited. Headmasters hardly ever reached their budget revenue target. In School V, in 2011, they collected Tsh 200,000 against a Tsh 1.5 million budget. In School Y, on 9 March 2012, date of the visit, most Form One students still had not paid their fees, two months after the start of the school year. As a result, parents were indebted to schools and exam certificates turned into ‘credit collateral’: ‘When they come with money, they pay for previous years (…) Then we have to retain their certificate until they pay the totality of their debt. We don’t have any other choice. Last year, only three took their certificate out of forty-two’ (Headmaster, School AB).

This financial fragility of schools has been rooted in Lushoto’s economic structure. As summed up by the Second Master in School E: ‘Our school depends on parent contributions and parents depend on crop[s]. But there’s nothing to sell. A densely populated district, Lushoto has

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290 In some schools, a different scale applied to maths and science teachers (Tsh 15,000 per topic). In comparison, a permanent teacher earns, at the beginning of his/her career Tsh 249,600 per month (Source: Civil servants’ salary scales, provided by Teachers Trade Union).

291 The most recent household budget survey (URT 2009b) did not show any increase in families’ expenditures on secondary education (UNESCO 2012a) but the survey was conducted in 2006 prior to the national campaign of secondary expansion. The 2009 PETS recognised that private contributions constituted a significant source of revenue for community secondary schools (Claussen and Assad 2010: 13). At international level, based on data from 7 countries, UNESCO (2013: 136) estimates that ‘the share of education expenditure borne by households ranges … from 30% to 58% in secondary education’.
long suffered from land shortages (Sender and Smith 1978, Feierman 1974 and 1990). In this mountainous area, the fertile land in the valley is mainly owned by a privileged few.\textsuperscript{292} Even in places with cash crops, yields have been decreasing. Interviews with headmasters and parents also revealed the disconnect between the school budgetary timeframe and the seasonal nature of parents' revenues, which are dependent on harvests. In Mlola ward, for instance, most parents depend on two harvest seasons: beans in May/June and maize in January/February. Most school fees and other contributions are due at the beginning of the school year in January. Specifically, examination fees have to be paid before the end of February for Form Four students and April for Form Two students. If parents do not pay they are penalised by way of a fine (from Tsh 50,000 up to Tsh 90,000 per month). In focus groups and interviews with village leaders, accounts abounded of peasants forced to sell their assets (for instance, cattle) to pay school fees. A parent in School AA confirmed that their ability to contribute to school fees was essentially undermined by their precarious socio-economic situation:

\begin{quote}
Lot of us are farmers; we plant beans, maize or cabbage. We need to wait for the harvest and to sell on the market. And prices have decreased. We use that money, we use it for food but it's a tough situation. You can plant cabbage or onions but before the harvest they die through disease and you can't get any money. It's not that we don't want to pay, it's just tough. You can plan to earn a certain amount during the year but then difficulties occurred and the plan fails.
\end{quote}

Resources sent to schools by the state (central government and district) did not mitigate this financial fragility. In terms of development expenditures, state support was assessed as ‘very little’ not only by headmasters and village officers but also district officials. Under the SEDP I, between 2004 and 2009, the central government only provided financing to build 35 classrooms;\textsuperscript{293} under the SEDP II (2010-2015), as in other districts, only two schools would benefit from the development grant.

In terms of recurrent expenditures, in most schools visited, the level of capitation grant received by schools was reported to be far below the Tsh 25,000 official norm.\textsuperscript{294} The

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{292} Including former President Benjamin Mkapa, owner of a big farm in Mlalo, a constituency held by MP Ngwilzi, one of his close friends.\textsuperscript{293} Interview with former district official (interview 111).\textsuperscript{294} The most cited figure: between Tsh 9,000 and Tsh 10,000 per student. According to the 2009 public expenditure tracking survey (PETS), nationwide, capitation grants were lower than expected, and varied considerably between schools. In FY 2007/08, the average capitation grant per student was estimated at Tsh 17,136 (Claussen and Assad 2010).
\end{footnotesize}
marginal role of the capitation grant in schools’ daily financial management became evident when compared to the total amount of fees and other contributions paid by parents. One headmaster confirmed the auxiliary nature of the capitation grant, conceived as an ad-hoc bonus: ‘I make my budget based on parents’ contributions. If I receive the capitation grant I use it’ (School T). Besides, disbursements have been unpredictable both in terms of timing and amounts. One headmaster noted: ‘We’re very rarely informed: we go to the bank and we check our account balance… On the bank statement it is written ‘capitation grant. Sometimes we get the money at the beginning of the quarter, sometimes at the end, depending of the flow of money’ (School I). Furthermore, headmasters are limited in the use of these resources: they receive strict instructions on how to use the funds and they are not allowed to wait for a second disbursement to cumulate resources. And because capitation grant revenues are subject to greater scrutiny by governmental authorities (under donor pressure), parents’ contributions are considered as a more flexible and reliable resource by cash-constrained school managers. Given the rigidity of the capitation grant, some headmasters preferred to ignore this source of revenue: ‘There’s a limitation, the division on how to use them. It makes it difficult because, it’s a small amount. We fail to buy and we prefer not to use it.’

In national policy-making spheres, the capitation grant has long engendered passionate debates between sector ministries, the Ministry of Finance and donors, a centrality that stands in obvious contradiction to its relatively marginal place ‘at street level’.

Communities certainly did not get a fair return for their contributions. As in the rest of the country (see Chapter 1), community secondary schools have been characterised by very poor quality infrastructure, teachers and students pointing to the ‘school environment’ as a major impediment to good learning. Schools opened with one or two permanent teachers and despite the new waves of recruitment in 2010 and 2011, the student-teacher ratio in Lushoto’s government schools was 66:1 in 2011, against a national ratio of 34:1. And as in the rest of the country, teacher shortage was particularly acute in maths and science: in 2011, there were only 82 science teachers in Lushoto, 20 per cent of the permanent teaching force. The massive national failure in Form Four examinations did not spare

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295 50 per cent of the grant has to be allocated to textbooks (with priority to science and maths).
296 In some quarters, small schools can receive between Tsh 100,000 to Tsh 140,000 that they are supposed to spend immediately.
297 The students-teacher ratio was calculated through a simple division: number of students divided by number of teachers. It is a crude computation: the ratio should be calculated taking into account the availability of teachers depending for each discipline.
Lushoto’s ward secondary schools. Table 6.5 below, which presents the results of four schools visited, illustrates the scope of the learning failure in the district. All headmasters underlined the deterioration in performance since 2007.298

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division 1</th>
<th>Division 2</th>
<th>Division 3</th>
<th>Division 4</th>
<th>Failed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School Z</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School F</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School AA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Q</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: data reported by headmasters

Finally, a sense of frustration and sadness emerged from parents’ focus groups. Two entwined themes were regularly raised: a loss of hope, for them and their children, and the unfairness of the ward secondary schools deal. They paid but felt they did not get anything in exchange. Parents contributed because they had imagined a brighter future for them and their children but this hope has now vanished.

The next section shows how local notables have played a pivotal role in mobilising communities and sheds light on the various mechanisms they deployed to gain their consent.299

3. Local elites and the mobilisation of communities: coercion, educating the masses and patronage

3.1 1980-2004, the early days of secondary education expansion in Lushoto

Communities have never initiated the establishment of any community school. A Member of Parliament, a village leader, a ward councillor, a district official or a coalition between them always led the process. The expansion started in Lushoto before the implementation of the SEDP in 2004 and the enactment of the ‘ward schools decree’ in 2006. In the first

298 As pointed out by many informants, bad performances in secondary schools also have their roots in primary education. A proper investigation of the decline in exam performances in Lushoto should entail a study of primary schooling dynamics.

299 The reference is here implicit to Gramsci’s definition of ‘hegemony’ as ‘the “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group’ (Gramsci 1971: 12).
phase of expansion, the model for public secondary expansion in Lushoto was somehow reminiscent of the ‘Kilimanjaro model’ of private schools as described in Samoff (1987, 1989). Prominent local leaders initiated the process and mobilised local communities. For instance, in Lushoto constituency, Balozi Mshangama had a pivotal influence. While Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, he was one of the founders of Shambalai Secondary School along with other influential local figures: located in the town of Lushoto and registered in 1988, it was the first public government secondary school in the district. In Mlalo constituency, the expansion was largely driven by Charles Kagonji, former Head of Government’s Information Services. When he became CCM Member of Parliament in 1990, there was no public secondary school in the constituency and he began a mobilisation process. The first community school in Mlalo constituency opened in 1995 in Longwi. In Bumbuli, William Shelukindo, who worked for about 20 years as a permanent secretary in different ministries, and was elected as a MP in 1995 when the constituency was first created, initiated an educational ‘self-help’ project: in 1996 the first secondary school in the constituency opened in Soni.

Table 6-6: Members of Parliament in Lushoto constituencies, in every Parliamentary term since the beginning of the multiparty-system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bumbuli</strong></td>
<td>William Shelukindo (CCM)</td>
<td>William Shelukindo (CCM)</td>
<td>William Shelukindo (CCM)</td>
<td>January Makamba (CCM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lushoto</strong></td>
<td>Henry Shekifu (CCM)</td>
<td>Henry Shekifu (CCM)</td>
<td>Baloozi Mshangama (CCM)</td>
<td>Baloozi Mshangama (CCM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mlalo</strong></td>
<td>Charles Kagonji (CCM)</td>
<td>Hassan Ngwilizi (CCM)</td>
<td>Hassan Ngwilizi (CCM)</td>
<td>Hassan Ngwilizi (CCM)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author

Beyond a decisive initiating power, the action of these politicians was multidimensional. They interacted with state authorities about the use of land or buildings, the registration process and the allocation of teachers. For instance, in the case of Soni Secondary School, Shelukindo asked the government to allocate the buildings of a construction camp that used to belong to a German company. He also convinced some teachers originally from Bumbuli to return to teach in their home district. He negotiated their transfer with the Ministry of Education on the condition that he and other notables would personally bear the official transport costs incurred. Notables also promoted innovative funding schemes.

300 ‘Baloozi’ is the Swahili word for ‘ambassador’: Mshangama is a former Ambassador in Brussels. This title was widely used by informants.
In Bumbuli, an area of tea plantations, Yusuf Makamba, an influential CCM figure, convinced two wards to join forces and set up the Tamota–Funta Development Fund (or TAFDEF), funded through a Tsh 200 levy collected on every kilo of tea leaves sold to the tea factory.\(^{301}\) The construction of Tamota Secondary School, registered in 1997, was financed through this scheme.

Yet, one fundamental feature distinguished Lushoto community schools from the Kilimanjaro model: they were registered as public/government schools. After completion of the infrastructure, the area simply did not have the financial capacity to bear the costs of running them as private schools. For instance, in the case of Tamota Secondary School, the initial idea - to set up a *wazazi* private school\(^{302}\) - was abandoned in favour of a government school as the community could not afford the teachers’ salaries. Yusuf Makamba had to negotiate with the Minister of Education for a licence to establish a public school.

The private sector, through religious institutions, also played a role in the early expansion of secondary schooling. Historically, during colonial times, in the Usambara region, Catholics and Lutherans restricted their education activities to the primary level.\(^{303}\) The Catholic Diocese of Tanga oversaw the opening of Kifungilo Girls’ Secondary School in 1981, followed by Saint Mary’s Mazinde Juu in 1991 and Kongei Secondary School in 1997. In parallel, Protestants and Muslims developed their own educational institutions. The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania (ELCT) opened Lwandai Secondary School in 1990 and Muslims established a secondary school in Mlalo in 1995.\(^{304}\) The opening of private secondary schools entailed negotiations with the state administration. Even after the 1995 *Education and Training Policy* that called for the growing involvement of the private sector, the 1978 *Education Act* remained in force: it set strict conditions on the official registration of private schools that required the involvement of the two highest ranking officials in the education administration, the Minister and the Commissioner of Education.\(^{305}\) In establishing their three schools in Lushoto District, the Catholics benefited

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\(^{301}\) A long time serving CCM-cadre and President Kikwete’s close ally, Yusuf Makamba occupied the strategic post of Dar es Salaam Regional Commissioner before being appointed CCM Secretary General in 2006. He resigned in 2011.

\(^{302}\) CCM’s parents wing.

\(^{303}\) The first Lutheran mission was set up in Mtae in 1893. See Feierman (1990: 139, 143, 235) for an exposition of the relation between religion and education in colonial Lushoto.

\(^{304}\) In recent years, religious institutions have expanded their education activities: in 2001, Catholics established a seminary in Bangala; Lutherans and Muslims opened seminaries in Soni in 2010.

\(^{305}\) URT (1978, articles 14&15).
from the support of Lushoto-born Joseph Mmando, a senior official in the Ministry of Education, who played a facilitating role between the authorities and the Catholic Church.

The early expansion of public secondary education in Lushoto clearly coincided with the process of what Kelsall calls ‘districtization’, which accompanied the economic liberalisation and rise in multiparty politics in Tanzania (Kelsall 2004, 2000). With the first democratic parliamentary elections in 1995, Tanzania experienced the beginning of a re-localisation of national politics: national elites became increasingly entangled in struggles for resources and political offices at local level. National elites, who for decades lived detached from rural areas, came back to their villages of origin in search of local legitimacy as a route to national power. They had to ascertain their local roots and swear allegiance to the ‘local’, at least symbolically. The provision of education – especially secondary education - became, in Lushoto as throughout the country– their favoured area of involvement.

Notables’ personal drive persisted in the second phase of the expansion that started in 2006 but in this phase they deployed their political agency within a new coercive framework shaped by the top executive’s compelling demands.

3.2 The notables and the exercise of the state coercive power

In September 2007, while touring Tunduru District in Southern Tanzania and disappointed by the lack of ward secondary schools in the area, Prime Minister Lowassa threatened inhabitants and officials: ‘People have been charged and jailed because of these schools’. As underlined in Chapter 4, the ‘success’ of the ward schools policy lay partly in the ability of the top executive to assert its power over the bureaucracy. Prime Minister Lowassa set targets for the entire state apparatus; state representatives at local level (region, district, ward and village) were tasked to mobilise peasants to achieve their targets. In turn, state representatives, at local level, resorted to coercion to enrol the masses in the ward schools movement. In this process of resource mobilisation, district commissioners, councillors, members of Parliament, district executive directors, ward and village executives, as

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306 Apart from Shambalai Secondary School, registered in 1988, the first wave of secondary schools occurred between 1995 and 2004, the two first parliamentary terms under the multiparty system.
pressurised brokers of the top executive’s demands, all had a lot to lose: their very position within the state apparatus.

Villagers unwilling to pay were forced to contribute through the *uambozi* practice: the forced requisition of household assets (cattle, furniture, etc.). One parent in School Z described this practice:

> *At the beginning, when we decided to build a school and other activities, villagers sat down and discussed together. They reached the decision to set up this by-law: if someone fails to do their part or fails to attend the meeting, the village chairman and village executive officer choose some people among the participants and ask them to go and pick a goat or whatever… People are given deadlines: to recover their property they have to bring the money. If they can’t pay cash they have to make bricks for instance.*

The practice is grounded in the national legal framework: once authorised by the district council, villages or wards are entitled to pass local regulations enforceable within their jurisdiction through a local court of village executives. Any breach of regulations means that the offender can be charged with a criminal offence, fined or even imprisoned. Village and ward officers recognised the instrumental role of these by-laws in compelling villagers to contribute to the construction of ward schools. ‘*If we don’t have a by-law to apply it’s difficult to get support from the community to build…It’s a catalyst to pressurise our development in our community*’ (former Ward Education Coordinator). Lowassa’s decision on ward schools made this legal form of coercion possible and the extraction of peasants’ surplus took place on a larger scale than previously: prior to 2006, ‘*every member of Parliament, every district commissioner or regional commissioner would try on its own (…) Mobilising resources was very difficult especially because at that time there was no decree from the government*’ (MP, Lushoto, interview 131).

From the interviews emerged a reality of local social relations that profoundly deviates from the ‘voluntary, self-help’ narrative: villagers avoided the demands put on them by the state and coercion was necessary to draw reluctant peasants into the state’s realm. ‘*Our main challenge is the participation of the community to the construction (bricks, labour etc.)… Most of them don’t like it and say “the government should play their part”. They can do it but only if they are forced. The ones who refused to attend the meetings are taken to the ward executive officer for penalties; their properties are taken to be sold and to fund the works.*’ (Ward official, interview 122). Machiavellian ruse supplemented state coercion. One retired district official explained: ‘*In some wards, they were
not willing to contribute. So we would send their children very far, allocate them to distant secondary schools so that it would become very costly for them. The next year they would tell us “we need to build our own school” (interview 111).

Students themselves have been enrolled as agents of the state. Once schools officially opened, students’ own labour force has been exploited to complete the infrastructures: ‘To minimise the cost of building we asked students to dig the trenches, to carry sand… We employed a local fundi but students worked on it’ (Headmaster, School W). Students also constitute headmasters’ privileged device to overcome parents’ avoidance of the fee burden. In the majority of schools visited, the school administration expelled students who did not pay their fees, in effect turning them into tax collectors: ‘Parents must be squeezed to pay. If you don’t send their kids back home to ask fees they’re not paying willingly’ (Headmaster, School I). This coercive strategy contradicts both the official instruction from the Ministry of Education and core pedagogical goals: students can be excluded for anywhere between one or two weeks to two months before being allowed to resume their schooling. In this instance, concerns over resource mobilisation blatantly prevail over any educational consideration. Yet, this strategy also reflects the precarious position of headmasters, as front-liners in the implementation of severely under resourced state policies.

3.3 ‘Contributors of ideas’: Notables as Gramscian intellectuals

The verb ‘to educate’ was heard repeatedly in interviews. However, it was not used to qualify activities happening within classrooms or to define the functions of schooling. It was pronounced in reference to a key function of local political leaders (members of Parliament, ward councillors/diwani, village chairmen, party representatives) and local bureaucrats (from district and ward officials to village secretaries):308 ‘to educate the poor, to educate the peasants, to educate the parents’. In this context, the concept of ‘intellectuals’ as defined by Gramsci ably captures the role played by local notables in the implementation of the ward schools policy: to engage in organisational, directive and

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308 The Ministry official directive on the issue derives from the Education for Self-Reliance promotion of manual activities in the curriculum: ‘It’s a duty to participate in the construction but it must be planned and integrated in the school timetable. The school timetable should be 141 days/year. So it should not disturb the normal routine of the school (it should be in evenings or week-ends)’ (official, MoEVT, interview 22).

309 Village secretaries are appointed by PMO-RALG; they are state officials. Ngware and Haule (1992) underlined the historical close association between village institutions and party structures.
educative activities (Gramsci 1971). In such a perspective, ‘intellectuals are not defined by the quality and content of their discourse (…); they are defined by their place within the ensemble of social relations’ (Feierman 1990: 18). In this sense, Lucas Shemdowa’s self-definition as a ‘peasant’ should not be misleading: as Malindi’s ward councillor and Chairman of Lushoto Council, he was an influential intellectual in the district. Similarly, ward councillors and village chairmen with minimal education became part of the ‘intellectuals’ category, their proximity to peasants allowing them to play a pivotal role in their mobilisation.

‘Intellectuals’ cannot be considered as a homogeneous and cohesive category but in mobilising communities, at least during the phase of rapid expansion, the different factions coalesced to relay the centrally designed project on the ground. They all contributed to the advancement of popular consent to the central state’s demands. Even representatives of opposition parties engaged decisively in mobilisation activities: ‘We tried to convince people to contribute as any other party. Whenever there was a meeting, we encouraged villagers to contribute’ (CUF representative, Lushoto). Local leaders’ core teaching to the masses revealed a profound appropriation of the cost-sharing ideology:

_The policy of the government is: “they have to show effort and whoever is ready gets support”. Otherwise you create dormant brains; it’s spoon feeding. The government policy says we need cooperation between the communities and the government. It’s not only about needs, you have to show efforts. It’s related to privatisation and the development policy that has changed: now communities have to show their efforts._

(Ward Education Coordinator, interview 122)

As members of the elite, these ‘intellectuals’ strongly share the belief, described in Chapter 4, in education as the main engine of development. However, their social self-positioning as *walimu* (teachers) of the peasants is firmly grounded in a collective perception of peasants as ‘backward’ and resistant to education. The phrase ‘they don’t value education’ was systematically enunciated by all strata of the local elite, down to teachers and village secretaries, as if a self-evident correlative to the ‘we need to educate them’. For instance the young MP January Makamba evoked his own cultural challenge:

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310 This analytical framework is directly borrowed from Feierman (1990) who used Gramsci’s definition of intellectuals to study the political struggle of a group of peasants in Lushoto in the late colonial period, a localised movement that finally merged with the nationalist party.

311 ‘Professionally, I’m a geologist but my occupation is farming; I’m a peasant’. 
Our people still don’t value education as other cultures do. A parent would be absolutely content to let his or her daughter who passed Standard 7 just stay home and get married. Very content. And actually, sometimes, they deliberately ask them not to pass. So it’s difficult when you’re in this situation. As an outsider... An outsider has to push.\(^\text{312}\)

Local leaders do recognise communities’ impoverished socio-economic status. But, in a second discursive movement, they immediately posit a direct correspondence between cultural and financial valuation of education: ‘People don’t know the importance of education: they don’t pay’.\(^\text{313}\) The culturalist lens cast on the peasants’ relation to education allows the framing of the issue of education finances in terms of the poor themselves. Their low educational status directly derives from their essential ‘backwardness’ and ‘laziness’. In the following statement, Mshangama described his tactic to persuade reluctant villagers to build a secondary school:

I asked them three questions, it was my lecture to them:

1/ For whom are we putting up classrooms? They answered: “For our children”.

2/ If we refuse to put up a new classroom for any reason who will lose? The DC? The Councillor? The MP? They answered: “Our children”.

3/ In that case, have you acted sensibly to refuse to put up classrooms? Are you fools, are you stupid?

Yet this narrative collided with parental accounts of their willingness to pay, nourished by their desire for education. Belief in the power of education is not a specific attribute of the elite. In Lushoto, a social demand for education had already been voiced during colonial times (Feierman 1990: 140-143; 190-191). Focus groups with parents confirmed that the valuation of education in contemporary Tanzania cuts across social classes. For poor farmers, education is the promise of a better future for their children, the key engine that can trigger change in otherwise immutable peasant conditions. In Lushoto, a densely inhabited district, education has replaced land as the crucial asset to bequeath to one’s children: ‘The inheritance is not a farm anymore. Now you give your son or daughter education’ (parent, School AA).\(^\text{314}\) This hope is obviously passed on to children. Students interviewed wanted

\(^{312}\) It is one example among many but it demonstrates the trans-generational nature of this social-positioning as ‘educator of the masses’. Unterhalter et al. (2012) identified a similar ‘blaming the poor’ discourse throughout Kenya’s education system.

\(^{313}\) Ward Executive Officer, interview 116.

to become engineers, doctors, teachers, chemists, nurses, pharmacists, pilots and accountants. This hope in an educational path to a brighter future instigated parents’ adherence to the government’s expansion policy: ‘Somehow I agreed with the decision of the government because before kids were not very educated because there were so few schools. So for the sake of the kids, I agreed at the beginning’ (mother, interview 151).

Data from the 2006 Integrated Labour Force Survey confirmed the national scope of this social desire for education. To the question ‘If given a choice, what would you like to do?’ an overwhelming proportion of respondents replied: ‘going to school full time’ (Figure 6.2).

![Figure 6-2: People’s preferred activities](source: URT (2007a))

It is difficult to assess the respective weights of consent and coercion in the implementation of such a process: depending on the village and the nature of the relation between the population and state representatives in the locality, the mix of coercion and consent differed. However, this policy certainly bears less resemblance to the Kilimanjaro model than to historical centrally driven policies such as Ujamaa villagisation: like that historical scheme, it has been implemented in a very heavy-handed, top-down manner.

### 3.4 The notables and the iron sheet: an educational patronage

Local elites have pressured communities to provide the financial base of the expansion. Nevertheless, the resource mobilisation process also comprised an element of reciprocity:
notables did not restrict their contribution to ‘ideas’; they also provided material resources.

A district CCM cadre pointed out: ‘If you meet people and ask them to build schools you have to contribute’ (interview 134). Feierman (1990: 49) explained how in pre-colonial Shambaai, Kilindi kings based their accumulation strategy on the extraction of the peasant economy through the payment of tributes. In exchange, rulers dispensed banana groves and, above all, ‘rain medicines’, the golden key to food security. For the Ujamaa period, Hyden (1980: 18-19) evoked the ‘economy of affection’ prevalent in Tanzanian rural areas that forced bureaucrats and politicians to develop various forms of patronage to gain the support of ‘uncaptured’ peasants. The conditions of implementation of the ward schools policy demonstrate that the ‘beneficent notable’ remains an essential structural figure in social relations in contemporary Lushoto.

‘Iron sheets’ were notables’ most prominent material contribution to community secondary schools. In interviews, ‘roofing’ and ‘iron sheets’ were the item most cited in describing their support for the establishment of schools. It proved impossible to estimate, even roughly, the financial value of these personal gifts to the community or to relate it to the giver’s personal wealth. Notables’ munificence may even be completely cost-free for them, bags of cement or iron sheets representing entrepreneurs’ kick-backs in privileged tender awards. In the social valuation of notables’ leadership, parents and village executives seemed to value the intellectual function – organising, directing, educating – higher. However, those leaders who did not contribute at all in material form generated resentment and incomprehension.

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315 Current Lushoto territory.
316 Kilindi kings drew their power from their ability to control the rain.
317 For a critical reading of Hyden’s notion of ‘economy of affection’ and its ambiguities see Geschiere (1984).
318 Bayart (1993) uses the concept of ‘evergetism’, borrowed from the French historian Paul Veyne, to describe the patron-client relations in sub-Saharan Africa. Power, money and prestige constitute the three core ingredients of this ‘private liberality for public benefit’ (Veyne 1990: 10).
319 In other districts, a similar practice of donation of iron sheets prevailed. See for instance ‘Tanzania: Serengeti Council Chairman Donates 120 Iron Sheets’ Tanzania Daily News 26/2/2012.
320 As an indication, in 2011, a Member of Parliament earned Tsh 7.3 million per month (a basic salary of about Tsh 2 million plus various allowances. The construction of one school requires about 200 iron sheets, each costing between Tsh 22,000 and Tsh 25,000.
321 ‘Councillors don’t have money but they are close to businessmen; they attribute them some bids. For instance, they would tell “we need 1 ton of cement. But please give me one or two bags for free’ (informant, Lushoto district).
322 For the early post-independence period, Feierman (1990: 195-196) noted ‘[wealthy peasants] were criticized only if they did not use the profits to help meet the needs of less fortunate relatives (…) Even when prosperous men were stingy and were resented, their commercial farming was never criticized as inappropriate. Only their unwillingness to help was resented’.
The significance of this educational patronage does not lie in its monetary value: notables have to contribute to assert their status in the community but their largesse does not have to be proportional to their wealth. In this perspective, iron sheets are loaded with a profound symbolic meaning. Since their introduction by the colonial power, they have represented a material symbol of progress, modernity and high social status in African rural areas.\(^3\) Interestingly, the Ministry of Education’s formal requirement for iron sheets of a specific size – 28 gauge – derives directly from a regulation in force during colonial times. By dispensing iron sheets to help spread education - immaterial symbol of modernity - notables position themselves twice as intermediaries of modernity.\(^4\)

To finance their ‘iron sheets’ largesse, notables drew from their personal wealth, especially in the primary phase of the expansion. In the early days of the process of re-localisation of national politics, MPs were discovering the nature and obligations of their function. Shelukindo noted: ‘I didn’t know; as a MP you’re the shipper, the position is so demanding: demanding on your time and demanding on your resources’. Originally, local notables residing in Dar es Salaam or in other urban centres (like Tanga) were also considered a major source of funding. For instance, the Mkuzu Club, in the Kinondoni area of Dar es Salaam, used to gather prominent people from Lushoto, including petty businessmen from Kariakoo:\(^5\) they were the main financial sponsors behind the establishment of Shambalai Secondary School in 1988. Similar schemes have continued to be operational: for instance, Mgwashi and Mlalo wards benefit from well-organised groups of ‘expatriates’ in Dar es Salaam and villagers in Kalumelo have been supported by a committee in Tanga.

In recent years, an adulterated form of patronage – publicly funded – has developed with the establishment in 2009 of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF): a nation-wide mechanism that channels budgetary resources to each parliamentary constituency to

\(^3\) Corrugated iron was developed and patented in Great Britain around 1830 and then exported to the colonies of the Empire. In the case of Nigeria, Falola (1999: 246) note that, following the abolition of slavery at the end of the 1880s, ‘Such things as corrugated iron sheets, bicycles, wrist watches, a variety of imported cloths replaced slaves as status symbols and money was needed to purchase them’.

\(^4\) ‘This symbolic significance of iron sheets is not specific to Tanzania. In Machete Season: the Killers in Rwanda Speak, Hatzfeld tells the exile of genocidal Hutus to neighbouring DRC. Before running away, and despite the desperate urgency of their situation, they took time to take down the roofing of their houses: corrugated iron sheets were the only material objects they brought to Congolese Kivu with them (Hatzfeld 2005).

\(^5\) Kariakoo, in Dar es Salaam, is the biggest market place of the country. Mshangama and Mmando were both members of the ‘club’.
finance small-scale development projects. In Lushoto, ward secondary schools have constituted a privileged field of investment for these funds. These are public financial resources subject to standard programming and disbursement procedures but the MP heads the CDF committee that allocates the funds to various projects and the gain has without doubt been a personal one.

Finally, to bring material support to the community, notables, especially MPs, have also exploited their position of extraversion: in this case too, they do not tap into their personal wealth but rather their personal connections outside the district. Shekifu raised funds from the Telecommunication Regulatory Board and cement companies. Shelukindo obtained support from important parastatals (the National Social Security Fund, the Tanzanian Port Authority and the National Provident Fund). Notables’ extraversion strategy also crosses national boundaries to reach foreign sponsors. School AB has benefited from the support of Austrian benefactors, including a Catholic diocese: they were mobilised by Sister Marjelis, headmistress of the neighbouring primary school and resident of the nearby Kifungilo Catholic convent, through a personal fund-raising initiative. In another instance, Mshangama advised villagers to name their newly built school ‘Prince Claus’, after Queen Beatrice of Netherlands’ German husband. During the colonial time, his father used to manage a sisal estate in Tanga and the future Prince Claus attended a missionary school in Lushoto. The Dutch Ambassador came to the school inauguration and brought gifts from the Queen. Stamped with a colonial seal, this rural ward school has in one action been connected to contemporary globalised Europe: German and Dutch tourists come and give presents to the school. These foreign material contributions have been symbolic. But by bringing to the community a highly valued resource – access to the outside world – the notable built up his local reputation as an agent of modernity.

Three entangled motives underpin notables’ patronage practices. One is a sense of duty, a willingness to give back to the community, felt especially by those who benefited from a higher education and occupied influential posts within the state apparatus. Shelukindo’s

326 In her study of the mechanism, Tsubura (2012: 1) describes the CDF as ‘a tool that MPs can use to respond to the development needs of their constituencies, cultivate their relationships with the electorate, and enhance their chances of re-election’.
327 Shekifu has been a member of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Communication and Transport which implies at least an institutional proximity with TCRB or cement companies.
328 Shelukindo used to be Chairman of the Board of the National Provident Fund.
testimony illustrates this commitment nourished by a profound trust in the developmental virtues of education:

*I’ve been out of that area for a long time. That was the first time I had time to understand my community where I was born. So I realised that development can be spread through education. (...) And I was at this point of my life when my own children were going to schools and university and so on but the others my relatives they are just working hard but achieving nothing. (...) I came to assist my community here. I have a responsibility. I was lucky that I was educated and I got a job with the government and went to the highest level of permanent secretary. Now, it’s high time I assist my community... It was my personal conviction that I had a role.*

A second major motive is personal interest, the desire to be re-elected. Political survival depends on reciprocating communities’ contributions. As Shekifu put it: ‘We need to get the people’s votes’. Nevertheless, their largesse, mobilisation efforts and educational credentials at local level are not a guarantee of political endurance. Especially in the case of MPs, the intra-CCM nomination process is highly competitive and subject to ‘veranda politics’ in Dar es Salaam.329 For instance, in Bumbuli, Shelukindo, caught up in the intra-CCM national struggle related to a large-scale corruption case, was ousted by the young January Makamba, parachuted into a constituency he won without having to contest; he also replaced Shelunkindo as Chair of the strategic Parliamentary Standing Committee for Energy and Minerals.330 In 2010, in Lushoto constituency, Mshangama, despite his widely recognised personal engagement in favour of local development, could not resist Shekifu’s personal financial base and high-level connections that enabled him to build up a wider electoral clientele.331 Finally, in Mlalo, Ngwilizi, a close friend of former President Benjamin Mkapa who was personally involved in Ngwilizi’s campaign, was preferred to Kagonji who then defected to the opposition party, Chadema.

329 The ‘veranda’ metaphor is drawn from Terray (1986). Since 2010, the selection process of CCM candidates for MPs and Councillors seats has been decentralised/democratised but the national leadership has kept a say on the results (senior official, CCM Secretary, interview 85).
330 January Makamba, son of Yusuf Makamba, was adviser/speech writer to President Kikwete. In 2012 he was appointed Deputy-Minister for Science and Technology. His would-be Chadema opponent during the 2010 electoral competition for the Bumbuli seat, withdrew from the political race at the very last minute: since then she has held important positions within the bureaucratic apparatus. January Makamba, inexperienced in local campaigning, thus conveniently won his seat without any political fight (based on interviews with several informants in Lushoto and Dar es Salaam).
331 Henry Shekifu is close to Lowassa and President Kikwete (in 2005 and 2010 he was Kikwete’s campaign manager in Tanga, Kilimanjaro and Arusha). He used to work as a manager of parastatals and is now engaged in business: he is one of the main distributors of mineral water in Tanga Region.
Ultimately, patronage is a ‘way for the notables to express their sense of superiority’ (Veyne 1990). Nowhere is it more palpable than in Mshangama’s self-appraisal of his contribution to the expansion. ‘In almost every ward, they wanted to name schools after my name’ and two schools were, indeed, named after him and his wife: his personal flag flies in Lushoto rural areas. His discourse reveals a quasi-feudal sense of ownership. According to him ‘the ownership must be seen to belong to the community’, a telling passive voice that barely conceals the actual nature of the ownership. In his discourse, communities’ schools become ‘my schools’ that are ‘the reward of a MP to his people’. Ignoring communities’ disproportionate financial and labour contributions, he gave himself full credit for these schools’ existence of. In a similar - if less eloquent - manner, most notables interviewed insisted on leaders’ preeminent efforts, implicitly positing themselves as the true owners of the schools: Shekifu claims, ‘It's not easy to educate the masses. But we've got 28 schools and it's thanks to the leaders' efforts, the government's effort’.

4. Ward secondary schools: a new political battlefield for local elites

Chapter Four argued that the ward schools policy has been, at its core and starting with its terminology, a space management policy. In Lushoto, the ward schools policy, locally translated into a ‘village schools policy’, has also been predominantly shaped by ‘spatial politics’.

4.1 Politicians’ battles for territory control: village competition and the ‘ghost secondary schools’

The ward schools policy in Lushoto has given rise to a fierce competition between villages. Surprisingly, in a highly populated district characterised by a long-lasting land shortage, the implementation of the policy did not generate major land disputes. Some conflicts did arise but in general, access to land was not a critical impediment to the expansion. In most cases,

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332 "The State engenders social relations in space" (Lefebvre 2009:225). In their reading of Lefebvre’s work, Brenner and Selden (2009) highlighted two meanings of ‘the politics of space’: it refers both to space as a contested site and to state ‘spatial management’ or ‘spatial policy’. For these authors, ‘territory is always being produced and reproduced by the actions of the state and through political struggles over the latter; yet at the same time, in the modern world, territory also conditions state operations and on-going efforts to contest them’ (ibid: 367). Snyder (2008) argues that spatial politics was also a key feature of the PEDP implementation.
a portion of the land of existing primary schools was granted to the future secondary school.\footnote{A legacy of the colonial period when missions were heavily involved in primary education, allocating a large piece of land to primary schools.}

However, the choice of the precise school location certainly led to multiple conflicts. A dominant story can be determined from the 25 community schools visited. In the early stage of the process, several wards and then villages teamed up to build an initial school. The location was chosen to serve all the contributing villages equally – for instance, at the centre of the ward or the centre of villages; or in relation to public transport facilities; sometimes the location was, indeed, constrained by the availability of land. Once the initial school was built, sometimes even before its completion, inter-village conflicts arose, fuelled by the perception in one village that the original deal was unfair.

The case of Shume is typical. In March 2012, this ward had six community secondary schools: ‘There were some conflicts between the villages. One thought it worked harder than the other village. So each village decided to have its own school’ (Councillor, interview 133). In Bumbuli constituency, TAFDEF, set-up by Tamota and Funta wards, was dissolved before the completion of the first planned school. Initially, both wards had agreed that they would build Tamota School before building a school in Funta. However, during the building process, Funta’s inhabitants decided that they should start their own school. But the resources drawn from the tea levy were not enough to support two schools; farmers would have to contribute Tsh 15,000 more. In this context, the joint scheme lost its appeal for the people in Tamota, a zone of tea plantations unlike Funta: the tea levy was seen as an unfair burden and lost its legitimacy, already undermined by the TAFDEF Secretary’s mismanagement of funds.

This inter-village tension has been fuelled by politicians’ political struggles and quests for prestige. When conflicts occurred between villages over the location of a school, Mshangama systematically advised the construction of separate schools, in each village. For instance, in Kwai Ward, when inhabitants were negotiating the construction of their first secondary school: ‘\textit{Villages in north of Kwai (Kireti, Kwai) wanted the school at Kwe Makame. Villages in the south (Mkuzi, Migambo, Milongwi), wanted the school in Mkuzi. I told them “Let’s put...}'}
two secondary schools”. Now there are four secondary schools there. Far from a sui generis or ‘natural’ competition, this rivalry between villages was largely driven by political leaders’ ambitions: ‘The DbyD [decentralisation] process is very political. Certain wards have two schools. So when a politician wants to become a ward councillor, he will emphasise the construction of another school to satisfy certain villages’ (district official, interview 109).

Some objective arguments, put forward by officials to justify the multiplication of schools, cannot be dismissed easily. In many locations in the district - a hilly, mountainous area - the topography makes a walk to a distant school a difficult journey for students. The high population density coupled with a high number of primary schools (256 in 2012) has also led to a high number of Standard 7 leavers. Nevertheless, in many schools visited the key challenge was actually the lack of students. In many instances, a new school was built in the vicinity of an existing secondary school and shared the same catchment area. In several schools, headmasters complained that ‘students are too few’. For instance, School P, very close to School O, was registered in 2007 to take 120 students every year: today, it should enrol no less than 400 students. But with a total of only 120 students actually enrolled in March 2012, they experienced a ‘shortage of students’ and only four of the eight classrooms were occupied. This was not an isolated case as confirmed by a district official: ‘At this moment we do have some schools where there is no student at all (...). Their catchment area does not fulfil the need for a school but they have already prepared the place and already started the construction’ (interview 124).

Contradicting the dominant narrative about an irrepressible demographic pressure, the Chairman of the Council predicted a future landscape of ‘ghost secondary schools’: ‘In a short period of time, I guess that some of the schools won’t have any students because of family planning, HIV death rate or the migration to urban centres’.

District bureaucrats have attempted to prevent a local interpretation of the national policy – one secondary school in each village – that obviously contradicts their own interests. Indeed, numerous schools spread over the district territory caused intractable management challenges for the District Secondary Education Office. ‘Schools are too many’ to be properly supervised.334 But local politicians have manoeuvred to obtain ministerial authorisation to open ‘their’ sub-standard or unfinished school or to enrol under-performing Standard 7

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334 Interview 124. Even the national top executive expressed concerns about the scope of expansion in Lushoto. According to Mshangama, President Kikwete, addressing an education audience in New York, made a reference to Shume ward and its six community secondary schools: ‘we have to stop them because the response was too positive’. 
leavers in ‘their’ school. These local arrangements with central state regulations illustrate the precarious position of district bureaucrats. On one hand, they cannot alienate politicians as they depend on them in order to be able to fulfil their duties: for instance to be informed of school-level realities or to mobilise communities. On the other hand, their decisions can easily be overruled by local politicians who enjoy a personal and direct relationship with top decision-makers in Dar es Salaam. Submerged by the politics of fiefdoms, district bureaucrats have proved unable to contain the wave of new schools.

4.2 The district budget between technocratic rationality and spatial politics

An unmistakable site of contestation for access to central resources, the district budget has crystallised the conflicting interests of politicians and bureaucrats and cemented their ambiguous position as intermediaries of the state in the local arena.

In theory, the development part of the district budget is designed through an ascending programming process, from villages to ward and district, officially aimed at ‘enhancing community participation/ownership in development processes’: the Opportunities and Obstacles to Development process. In fact, the prioritisation of investments, across villages and sectors, falls under the responsibility of the district Department of Budget and Planning. The draft budget is partially driven by local needs, as documented by the statistical apparatus: ‘We have to propose where to build. We consider the number of students, the number of buildings, the number of population, the number of Standard 7 leavers and how old a school is’ (district senior official, interview 124). The district MTEF document, in its narrative part, insists on a necessary focus on ‘disadvantaged areas and marginalised areas’ (LDC 2010: 29). A district staff member further identified them through formal criteria: the ‘very remote areas where there are few transportation facilities, the areas hit by hunger and areas that lack basic social services (water, education, health services)’ (district official, interview 109). In this perspective, the MTEF clearly reveals the essence of a planning/budgeting exercise for civil servants: to allocate scarce resources to the most pressing needs.


336 In his own analysis of the budget process in Lushoto, Harrison (2008: 179) similarly remarked that village and ward demands were subject to an ‘opaque reworking carried out at the District level by the Planning Department’
Yet, voted on by the district council, an elected body, the district budget is ultimately a political artefact that reflects power struggles between politicians (MPs and councillors) and between politicians and district bureaucrats. The MTEF document itself recognised ‘political interferences in education issues’ as one of the main planning and budgeting challenges (LDC 2010: 19). Based on interviews, the major cleavages that shake the local political arena during budget negotiations can be sketched out.\footnote{To decipher the nitty-gritty of budget negotiations and assess the actual power balances between the different actors would ideally require the study of minutes of council meetings. The author was unable to gain access to them.}

In their programming, district officials integrate the political constraints and take account of the political organisation of the district: for example, the existence of three parliamentary constituencies. ‘\textit{We have to distribute evenly}’ (senior district official, interview 124). This attention to the political parameters does not prevent intense arguments with politicians. The identification of the geographical location of district investments is especially subject to heated negotiations.\footnote{For the allocation of capitation grant ‘there’s no argument’ (MP, interview 148). Harrison (2008: 181) similarly noted that technocrats in the District Planning and Finance Departments were regularly pressured by ward councilors.}

\begin{quote}
Those politicians what they need is to maintain their votes. The projects they defend might not be a need. That’s when we come to miscommunication and political interferences. Political figures want a project to be in his or her ward. But it might not be the district priority or a needy ward. It might already have good infrastructures. For them a 40 million project is a way to win votes. That’s the challenge. But we use several meetings and the statutory committees. Then we discuss in baraza [Council] meetings and we harmonise among political figures. We convince them that their projects are not a national priority or a district priority. But if they convince us about the need of their project, that’s a real need of the village, we can also agree with them. They do discuss politics; we speak of facts, guidelines and priorities… it’s sometimes hard… A politician is not a technical person; he does not care about “vulnerable areas.”
\end{quote}

(Interview 109)

Bureaucrats position themselves as the guardians of a technical rationality jeopardised by politicians’ strategies: ‘My role, as a planner, is to harmonize politics. We need to educate them. We can’t agree with everything a diwani or MP wants because they’ve got their personal political interests’ (senior district official, interview 126). Here again the opposition between the educated
expert and the politician can be seen. According to a Member of Parliament, the control of knowledge grants district bureaucrats an ascending influence over ward councillors who, less educated, struggle to make their political authority, grounded in democratic election, prevail over the technocratic legitimacy: ‘It’s a very delicate balance. Because on one hand, we have the councillors who are supposed to oversee the council. They are “the bosses”. But the level, the asymmetry of exposure and knowledge and expertise between the councillors and the DED and all these council experts - the planning officer, the education officer… it’s massive. So they know how to manipulate data, documents or reports’ (MP, interview 148).

4.3 The Headmaster and the Notable in decentralisation times: a power reconfiguration

As argued by Feierman (1990: 21), ‘traditional intellectuals’ see themselves as partially autonomous. Tanzanian secondary school headmasters have indeed long occupied a specific position among the district elite. Prior to the decentralisation, they used to receive instructions directly from the central level and would run ‘their’ school within a loose accountability framework: ‘Headmasters were there as an institution, nobody could ask questions… No one was here to make any follow up’ (senior district official, interview 124). Their high social status stemmed from their position straddling the local space and the modern outside world, embodied in the administrative capital: they would regularly travel to Dar es Salaam and the Ministry of Education to negotiate their school’s affairs.

For the teaching profession in Lushoto (teachers, headmasters, TTU District Secretary), the decentralisation process has had a positive impact, especially for the management of teachers’ career and salary issues. Teachers complained about bureaucratic hurdles faced at district level, largely due to the understaffing of the District Secondary Education Office. Yet, for the majority, becoming a district employee has made their life easier. However, by redistributing the centres of decision, decentralisation has reordered the pathways to favours within the state. Teachers and headmasters lamented the perceived shift from a

339 In this chapter, the District Commissioner’s role has not been touched upon. This omission reflects the data collected. Informants rarely evoked DC’s interventions or her educational patronage. One explanation can be linked to a flaw in the researcher’s questionnaire that did not include direct questions on this specific figure. The DC also kept her door closed to the researcher. In any case, the DC is, in the district, a powerful and feared political character. According to one informant ‘Makamba, Shekifu, Ngwilizi, the DC, the directors and other rich men like Bosnia control the decision-making process in the district’ but ‘the DC is the most powerful’ (interview 141).

340 For TTU district Secretary, ‘teachers thank the decision; for them it’s a revolution’.
predictable, rule-based management by a neutral, Weberian central state to a district management more prone to parochialism, tribalism and personal favouritism. The following statement by a long-time secondary education headmaster was symptomatic:

> *Somebody can hate someone and start a rumour on this person to damage his/her reputation saying that he/she does not fit the position (we use the Swahili term ‘majungu’: back biting or gossiping). At MoEVT, they were very careful: in case of problem, they would send a delegation for a thorough investigation. It’s more biased than in the past ... For instance, last year, one head master was transferred because of the pressure of the council but we don’t know on which grounds. They misuse the power they have gained through decentralisation.*

Specifically, the posting of teachers to schools within the district – a key responsibility devolved to the district – nourished teachers’ resentment vis-à-vis a process they considered as biased. And indeed, when newly recruited teachers reported for their initial posting in mid-February 2012, the District Secondary Education Office and its vicinities metamorphosed into a busy auction place. Fresh recruits would openly bargain with the DSEO or the DED, threatening to quit if posted to ‘unfriendly places’. Headmasters would vaunt the particular assets of their schools to attract the rare and precious young teachers. In the shadow, well-connected parents of new teachers would call district officials to obtain a favourable posting for their progeny, close to town.

Favouritism certainly did not make its appearance only with decentralisation. In the past those headmasters who enjoyed privileged access to key officials within the Ministry of Education would obtain favours, for instance in terms of allocation of teachers, career advancement or simply a swift solution of their administrative issues. Decentralisation has certainly reorganised the mechanisms of preferential treatment and has shifted the burden of the informal obligation of responding to teachers’ pleas from central civil servants to district staff. Ministerial corridors used to constantly buzz with the noise of swarms of teachers and headmasters in search of small favours. In the Ministry of Education, at the

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341 Other teachers would openly denounce what they perceive as a tribalist management “To be helped you’re supposed to be known. They ignore us. But if you talk Kisamba, everything is solved quickly” (teacher, School C).

342 As put by a bitter teacher in the district, “They’re uneven in allocating teachers to schools. Some have family links and they can be allocated near towns. Before, with the system of appointment, names were displayed by MoEVT. It was more difficult to ask for favour” (teacher, School H). An informant, CCM cadre, acknowledged his personal initiative – a phone call to a specific District Executive Director - to obtain a good posting for her daughter, a newly recruited teacher.
time of the research, decentralisation was partly viewed as a loss of power vis-à-vis PMO-RALG but all officials expressed great relief at being freed of teachers’ demands.

In a Gramscian perspective traditional intellectuals ‘have some freedom of manoeuvre in allying with one power bloc or the other, although they usually compromise with the dominant social group’ (Feierman 1990: 21). The decentralisation of secondary education has engendered a process of power reconfiguration between headmasters and other local power holders (ward councillors and staff, village secretaries and chairmen). The nature of their relations varied from one school visited to another, from fruitful cooperation to friction, covert animosity or even open conflict that required the intervention of district auditors and ministry inspectors. The following statement by the headmaster in School AA exemplified collaborative partnerships: ‘We’re together with the Village Chairman, the Village Executive Secretary, the Ward Executive Officer, the Diwani. We ask them to come here to parents’ meetings; we ask them their support to get desk and building contributions... we agree many issues together’.

In some cases, headmasters would unquestioningly admit village leaders’ absolute power (‘The village leaders lead everything; they have the power’ - Headmaster, School J) or surrender by fear and swear allegiance (‘Some village leaders are powerful and want to control even the headmaster. Some headmasters are under threat... Some headmasters fear; some obey directly: they have to be close to the powerful leaders’ - politician, interview 145).

‘Commotions’ and ‘collisions’ – informants’ words – between headmasters and local leaders are firmly rooted in the traditional opposition between the educated and the non-educated. In reversing the relation between education level and authority, the decentralisation process has devalued headmasters’ social position: ‘You feel big when you report to the ministry. When you’re in a ward secondary school, you report to the ward development committee. The chairman (the councillor) and the Ward Education Coordinator might be standard 7 or a form 4 leaver. As a secondary school teacher you might be a two degree holder and used to be dealing with higher authorities’ (senior district official, interview 124). Headmasters tend to read their relations to local leaders in terms of technical expertise rather than power struggle. However, at the core of tensions lies a battle over ward schools’ ownership (‘these local leaders assume it’s their school and it should be run according to their will’; Headmaster, School Q) that covers a struggle for the control of their resources. Prior to decentralisation, funds would flow directly from the Ministry of Education to the school via the regional sub-Treasury. Since fiscal year 2009-10,
headmasters have continued to control the use of their school’ capitation grant but have lost their influence over development funds, directly managed by the district or channelled to the ward and sometimes to the village bank accounts. Headmasters have bartered their previous decision-making power for a mere advisory role: ‘I’m invited to Ward Development Committee meetings, we always attend. The Headmaster is a permanent member. We advise them... The Ward Development Committee are the ones who decide’ (Headmaster, School T).

In this battle for influence, headmasters have kept control over one instrument essential to asserting their power within the local arena: they are the secretaries of their school board, the school decision-making body. The board approves the school budget and all school expenditures need to be supported by a board decision. They also deal with disciplinary issues but the budget remains their core responsibility. The conditions of selection of members are set out in a Ministry of Education directive and, theoretically, board membership has to be formally authorised by the regional and district authorities. In practice, headmasters choose board members with almost complete autonomy, and tend to select individuals close to them. School boards are an affair of ‘big men’, not of commoners: retired district officers and teachers, political figures, religious leaders and businessmen. Village representatives are often omitted from these exclusive clubs: ‘The budget is their responsibility: so we’re not invited at all meetings. We’ve never been invited to the meeting deciding about the budget. It has never happened’ (Village Secretary and Chairman, School R). Membership grants access to material resources – sitting allowances – and prestige: the fact that former MPs are members of several school boards confirms that this membership is constituent of a high social status and provides a position to secure local influence.  

This control of board membership also allows headmasters to prevent an inclusive mode of management that would give teachers a voice in schools’ affairs: teachers are supposed to collectively choose their representative to the board; in the vast majority of schools visited, the choice was the headmaster’ privilege.  

The selection of board members also offers headmasters an opportunity to reassert their autonomy vis-à-vis the central state and their bargaining power vis-à-vis local authorities. A

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343 Sitting allowances amount to Tsh 30,000 per meeting. Mshangama is a board member in Shambalai Secondary School, Kagonji in Mtumbi, Lukozi and Manolo Secondary Schools.

344 The level of teachers’ involvement in the management of school affairs varied from one school to the other, the model of the omnipotent headmaster remaining, nevertheless, dominant. Students are not represented on the board.
2012 circular by the Ministry of Education forbade ward councillors (and their staff) from being voting board members. Central authorities issued this instruction to strengthen the accountability framework, as explained by a senior regional official in Tanga:

*Councillors were fighting to be members, across the country … If the councillor … becomes also a member of the school board while he’s supposed to monitor the schools, can he be the political/government eye in this particular ward … If there’s embezzlement of funds in that school and if the councillor is also a member of the board, who will be the eye to ask question?*’ (Interview 104)

Yet, in several schools visited, while aware of the circular, headmasters continued to justify the presence of district or ward officials on their board.

Parents have been *de facto* systematically excluded from school board membership. For most officials, their presence did not even make any sense - ‘board members represent the parents’ (district senior official, interview 124). In practice, decisions over a new contribution or fee increase would be arbitrarily taken by the school board and parents only subsequently informed during parents’ meetings: a model closer to oligarchy than participatory democracy, to a company board than community self-management. Headmasters and district officials reported low attendances at these parents’ meetings, putting the blame on parents: ‘Villagers sometimes claim they know nothing but it’s due to their characters: parents would never come to parents’ meeting, they prefer to work, they don’t care about the use of funds, when they’re called they don’t come and they say they’re not informed’ (senior district official, interview 124). In the case of development village meetings, even in locations where popular consent has prevailed over coercion, the decision-making process is firmly in the hands of village and ward officers who control the meeting agendas. The room for dissident views appears quite narrow: ‘In meetings you can’t show your reluctance’ (district official, interview 122). As argued in Samoff (1989), Shivji and Peter (2000) and HIS (2011), villagers’ actual involvement in decision-making has remained very limited.

**Conclusion**

The SEDP was originally conceived by the World Bank as a welfare programme to alleviate communities’ financial burdens. But in direct line with the Post-Washington consensus and its promotion of a ‘neoliberalism with a human face’ (Rose 2005), this pro-poor educational

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345 An education criterion – to be at least Form Four leaver – may prevent them from being formally chosen.
346 In a handful of schools, parents’ meetings, while mandatory, were not even organised.
policy was also based on two core premises: user charges generate users’ ownership and control, leading to an efficient management of basic social services; and local government autonomy enables a national redistributive policy to be more responsive to local needs. This hybrid discourse, which resonated with Tanzania’s historical self-help development ideology, was largely appropriated by Tanzanian elites and profoundly shaped the ward secondary schools policy. Even if donors and the Tanzanian Executive disagreed on the pace of the expansion, they largely agreed on its locally driven model of implementation.

The way this public private partnership was actually implemented in Lushoto shows the faults in the original ‘voluntary contribution -> ownership -> control -> accountability’ narrative. Discursively, symbolically and in decision-making, the communities who built the ward secondary schools and continue to provide a large share of their running costs certainly do not own them. At the same time, the ability of the district, financial surrogate of the central state in the local arena, to fulfil its responsibilities regarding its public secondary schools has been curtailed by the contradictory demands and public finance management practices of the central state. The decentralisation process can be interpreted as a central state device to pass on to local governments the burden of coping with the intractable financial implications of its education policy choices.

In 2012, in Lushoto District, ward secondary schools were certainly owned by an unstable and conflict-ridden triad, composed of district bureaucrats, politicians and other notables. These local elites played a pivotal role in the mobilisation of communities. As brokers of the central state, they resorted to the state’s coercive power to force communities to contribute. But local elites also deployed an ideological apparatus and patronage practices to gain the population’s consent to the policy and its cost-sharing features. At the same time, spatial politics has been the main engine of the expansion: ward secondary schools became a major political field contested by politicians who used the construction of new schools as a route to prestige and power. Their opportunistic translation of the central state policy into a ‘village school policy’ led, however, to a hyper-fragmentation of the local policy space with district administrations struggling to secure a certain degree of territorial financial solidarity beyond village boundaries. The next chapter shows how, as well as being

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347 This does not imply that ‘communities’ are passive before the powerful. The final chapter will briefly touch upon people’s everyday strategies of resistance to or avoidance of state’s demands. Nevertheless, these strategies do not equate to challenging the power structure.
a political battlefield and a site of social mobilisation, the ward secondary schools have also constituted an engine for elite capital accumulation.
Chapter Seven

Tanzania’s textbook sector: Aid agencies, multinational companies, and the national political settlement

Following an influential study by the World Bank in the 1970s (Heyneman et al. 1978), a worldwide consensus emerged within the educational community, which considered textbooks as a key vehicle to achieve quality education. However, textbooks are not only mediums of knowledge, culture and language. The American creationists’ battle to adapt Californian textbooks to their vision of the world is a reminder of the ambivalent nature of these objects (Apple 1991: 24-25). Like the national curricula that they embody, textbooks participate in the circulation of specific values. Recent business deals between the firm Apple and giant publishing companies like Pearson or MacGraw Hill demonstrate that textbooks also form a lucrative market for global corporations. Western powers have also long considered textbooks as a powerful instrument of foreign policy and of diffusion their values.

Tanzania’s textbook sector is no exception. At the time of the research fieldwork, the textbook policy arena was the subject of an intense power struggle where educational goals, ideological values, commercial interests, politics and diplomacy were intricately entangled. In 2008-2009, the President and his Minister of Education decided that primary schools should shift from a multiple textbook policy – where schools could purchase any textbook from an official list of approved titles – to a single textbook policy – where schools nationwide had to use the official textbook selected for each grade and each subject. This decision profoundly destabilised the sector. In March 2012, the United Kingdom and the Government of Tanzania agreed that the £29.5 million refunded by British Aerospace Enterprise Ltd in relation to the ‘radar case’. The £29.5 million should primarily be used to

purchase and supply textbooks for Tanzanian public primary schools. In July 2012, the World Bank and the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) convicted Oxford University Press of fraudulent practices in East Africa, including Tanzania; as a result, the Tanzanian Public Procurement Regulatory Authority barred the company from public procurement activities. Paraphrasing Apple and Christian-Smith (1991: 5), one may argue that Tanzanian textbooks ‘are caught up in a complicated set of political and economic dynamics’. This chapter attempts to shed light on the intricate forces that have shaped Tanzania’s textbook sector.

Initially, a simple research question drove the investigation of the textbook sector: what are the implications of an enrolment expansion on market-based production of educational goods? Several other reasons further justified dedicating a chapter of this dissertation to textbooks. First, full marketization of textbook publishing coupled with the devolution of purchasing power to schools constituted core elements of the World Bank SEDP I. Schools’ resources to purchase textbooks and other learning materials were again a core component of the Bank’s SEDP II. More generally, textbooks manifest two essential features of donors-government education dialogue between 2004 and 2012: a centrality of the capitation grant and a growing focus on ‘quality’. In public schools, both at primary and secondary levels, the capitation grant is the only public source of funding for the purchase of textbooks and other educational materials. This funding mechanism has been critical in shaping Tanzania’s textbook sector, including the conditions of its insertion within the global economy, via both North-South and South-South economic links. The health of an entire private industry, almost entirely publicly subsidised, relies on effective and timely flows of capitation grants to schools. While the capitation grant has been a major site of contention between donors and government (Chapter 5), dialogue on, and investigations of, the subject have remained confined to the education/public finance management spheres. Public expenditure tracking surveys typically follow flows of funds until school doors. The economic activities that these educational public resources generate and the social relations that they structure remain unknown territory for scholars and donors, in Tanzania as in

349 In December 2010, the UK Serious Fraud Office convicted British Aerospace Defence Systems Ltd of corrupt practices in its supply of an air traffic control system to Tanzania. The UK Parliament then ordered that Tanzania be refunded the money. Its use was subject to long negotiations between DFID and the Government of Tanzania.
350 The Guardian 15/07/2012. Had it not been convicted of corruption by the UK SFO, OUP, a major British multinational, would have got hold of funds originated in a scam by another major British multinational.
351 At primary level, 40 per cent of the capitation grant should be dedicated to textbooks; 50 per cent at secondary level.
other developing countries. While the private provision of education has been the subject of a growing literature (for instance, Heyneman and Stern 2014; Mundy and Menashy 2014; Ball 2012 and 2007; Rose 2002), the literature on the market-based production of educational goods and its political-economy dimensions remains very thin. Finally, this chapter offers a direct complement to the Chapter 6 analyses of district elites’ political involvement in the ward secondary schools movement. While the SEDP and the ward secondary school policy grant the ‘local’ a prominent place, the textbook trade prism allows the exploration of the local dimension of elites’ accumulation strategies tied to education resources.

The first section covers the historical trajectory of Tanzania’s textbook sector and describes the sector in 2011-2012. The second section shows how donors’ ideology and modes of intervention have profoundly shaped the textbook industry. The third demonstrates that the specific distribution of power within the Tanzanian state has also deeply influenced the state of the textbook sector. Finally, the last section explores elites’ multi-sited strategies of appropriation of the textbook public manna.

1. The Tanzanian textbook industry: historical trajectory and organisation in 2011-2012

1.1 An historical account: from state monopoly to state-regulated private sector

In colonial Tanganyika, the book trade was mainly the affair of religious institutions: Christian missions built up small-scale networks of bookshops that have survived until today. The early years of Independence coincided with a new stage in the internationalisation of British publishing companies that resulted in an increased localisation in East African markets (Smith 1975, Golding 1978). In the 1960s and early 1970s, the Tanzanian publishing scene was dominated by Oxford University Press and Longman (Bgoya 1982: 13). Under Ujamaa, the socialist government put in place a state-owned ‘book industrial complex’ composed of various parastatals: in publishing, Tanzanian

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352 In the late 1990s - early 2000s, a comprehensive documentation about textbooks in sub-Saharan Africa was published under the auspices of the Association for the Development of Education and Africa, the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and the Bellagio Publishing Network. This informative ‘grey literature’ mostly had a capacity building purpose to support prospective indigenous publishers.
Publishing House, East African Publishing House and Dar-es-Salaam University Press; in printing: TanPak and Tanzania Printing Company; for the distribution of textbooks: Tanzania Elimu Supplies. Primary textbook authorship was entirely controlled by the Tanzania Institute of Education (TIE, then Institute of Curriculum Development). Secondary level textbooks were mostly imported: TIE manuscripts at secondary level were only developed in the mid-1980s.\textsuperscript{353}

In 1991, with economic liberalisation, a new textbook policy was issued that opened up the industry to the private sector. The sector's parastatals were incorporated in the wide programme of divestiture of state assets and their privatised offspring no longer played any substantial role in the textbook industry. The liberalisation of the sector was coupled with an ambition to build an indigenous publishing industry, indigenous firms being defined as ‘the majority of whose ownership, production, personnel and profits are African’ (Nottingham 1969: 143). The 1991 Textbook Policy allowed for a transitional period to be used to nurture the infant industry before full marketization. The government, with support from the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), facilitated a learning process in the private sector: it organised training sessions for local publishers covering all aspects from authorship to commissioning manuscript, design, editorial activities and illustration. TIE manuscripts were tendered to private publishers in phases between 1992 and 1999. Seventy-nine titles for primary level were tendered and about eight million textbooks produced by private publishers. Textbook procurement and distribution were progressively devolved from the Ministry of Education, first to districts, and then to primary schools in 2001 and secondary schools in 2004. That same year the Tanzania Institute of Education finally stopped its publishing activities and henceforth concentrated solely on to curriculum development. Textbook publishing became an entirely private activity within a state-regulated framework.

1.2 The Tanzanian textbook sector in April 2012: main organisational features

The production of books entails a complex process – from authoring, publishing and printing to distribution and promotion – and involves a set of institutions and agencies,

\textsuperscript{353} For a presentation of the book sector during Ujamaa see Bgoya (1982).
domestic and international, public and private. They form what Askerud (1997: 28) referred to as a *book sector*. The term ‘emphasizes the interdependence and interrelatedness of all economic, social, cultural and statistical aspects of book production and consumption’. For each activity in the book chain, different modes of production may exist, distinguishable by their specific public-private mix. The specific configuration at a specific time can be considered as the historical outcome of a contest between and within various social forces that include the state, international development agencies, multinationals, indigenous capitalists and teachers.

In Tanzania, textbooks account for the vast majority of national book consumption, representing between 80 to 90 per cent of the book market. Tanzanians’ low purchasing power and the absence of a vivid reading culture explain this dominance. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the potential size of the basic education textbooks market has grown in parallel with the dramatic increase in enrolments, both at primary and secondary levels. Table 7.1 below provides a rough estimation of the potential size and value of this market in 2011:

**Table 7-1: Potential textbook market for Tanzanian primary and junior secondary government schools in 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enrolment (gov. schools)</th>
<th>Primary O Level : F1 - F2</th>
<th>O Level: F3-F4</th>
<th>F3-F4 (chemistry)</th>
<th>F3-F4 (physics)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8,200,651</td>
<td>800,597</td>
<td>659,645</td>
<td>263,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of subjects</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market size (Total number of textbooks)</td>
<td>73,805,859</td>
<td>7,205,373</td>
<td>4,617,515</td>
<td>263,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical amount of public subsidy (capitation grant, Tsh)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market value Tsh</td>
<td>295,223,436,00</td>
<td>93,669,849,000</td>
<td>60,027,695,000</td>
<td>3,430,154,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market value €</td>
<td>133,642,713</td>
<td>42,402,774</td>
<td>27,173,534</td>
<td>1,552,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total Secondary (€)</td>
<td>72,099,565</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total market size (€)</td>
<td>205,742,278</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

354 In this chapter the terms ‘book sector’, ‘book chain’ or ‘book industry’ are used interchangeably.
356 Saiwaad (2001: 157), a figure confirmed by several informants.
357 In 2007, the mean per capita household monthly income in rural areas was Tsh 28,000 (URT 2009b). The average cost of a secondary textbook is about Tsh 8,000.
358 The evaluation is here restricted to textbooks. It does not include teachers’ guidelines, reference books, supplementary readings and textbooks used in teacher colleges.
Primary education textbooks dominate the market and the state of the industry has largely been dependent on demand at this level. However, the movement towards mass junior secondary education has created new market opportunities. The secondary education market segment is specific in several aspects. The publishing language is English and it is smaller (in size and value) than the primary segment and is still in its infancy. ‘From a business point of view, secondary school publishing cannot give you the market share that you require. You need primary textbooks (...) because that’s where most of the money is, for any country’ (international publisher, interview 90).

Private schools, which in 2011 represented only 1.9 per cent of primary, but 15 per cent of secondary enrolment, constitute a small segment of the market, with its specific characteristics: higher purchasing power of parents and schools, at least in high-fee institutions; for English medium primary schools, a reliance on internationally published books; for publishers and booksellers, a lower supply cost to the schools, which are mainly located in urban centres. In a context of unpredictable funding of government schools, targeting private schools may be a sound survival strategy for publishers, but it does not represent a sustainable business development strategy. Public schools make up the bulk of publishers’ potential customers and the textbook industry depends heavily on their ability to purchase its products.

The Ministry of Education is responsible for the development of the curriculum and related syllabi. The Tanzanian Institute of Education, a parastatal under its authority, carries out the operational activities of curriculum development. The Ministry’s Education Material Approval Committee (EMAC) approves the content of textbooks and other teaching and learning materials, ensuring that they reflect the curriculum and that substandard textbooks are not supplied to schools. The EMAC’s 15 members reflect the diversity of actors in the sector and include directors in the Ministry of Education and representatives of publishers and booksellers. The EMAC Secretariat, a team of three

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359 Higher education also entails its own specificities: smaller readership; procurement by universities or purchase by students; more expensive, internationally-published textbooks and greater potential for digital publishing. The senior secondary level also mainly depends on imported textbooks.
technocrats, is in charge of the technical preparation of the committee’s decisions. They receive publishers’ manuscripts and submit them to three evaluators for assessment; the committee then takes a decision (approve, reject or conditionally approve) on the basis of the evaluators’ reports.

In 2012, 45 publishers were officially registered in Tanzania, of which 29 published school/university textbooks and other educational materials. Table 7.2 below presents the main textbook publishers, according to the number of textbooks approved.

Table 7-2: Main textbook publishers in Tanzania based on the number of titles approved by EMAC (Sept. 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publisher</th>
<th>Total number of approved titles (Primary and Secondary)</th>
<th>Primary level approved titles</th>
<th>Form I - IV approved titles</th>
<th>Reference books, Suppl. readings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OUPT (Oxford University Press Tz)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben &amp; Co.</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macmillan Aidan</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Books</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ujuzi Books Ltd</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jadida Book House</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Longman</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mture Educational</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mkuki na Nyota</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E&amp;D</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longhorn</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author, based on EMAC List of Approved Titles (30/09/2011)

These publishers are a mix of multinational or regional companies and indigenous publishers. The ‘big three’ British publishers – Oxford University Press Tanzania (OUPT), Macmillan and Pearson Longman – are major players. Regional publishers from Kenya – Longhorn and Ujuzi Books – have also taken root. Modes of organisation between parent companies and their Tanzanian branches vary. In the case of Pearson Longman, the world’s largest educational publisher that reopened its Tanzanian office in 2005, a Pearson Longman team handles the publishing activities but all distribution activities - pricing, importation, stocking, marketing/advertisement, delivery – are managed by a separate,
independent distributor - Radar Education, a locally-owned company, with a British manager, and Pearson Longman’s exclusive partner in Tanzania.

Macmillan Aidan offers an organisational variation. Until recently, it was a joint venture, set up in 1998 between Macmillan and a locally-owned company, Aidan. Aidan was founded in 1996 by Khalaf Rashid, a Tanzanian citizen, in collaboration with Macmillan International Publishers which was eager to improve the distribution of its UK-published textbooks in Tanzania. Set up initially as a distribution company, Aidan then diversified to incorporate publishing activities; its owner worked as Macmillan Aidan’s managing director until 2009. However, in 2010, following its involvement in a corruption scandal in a World Bank-funded textbook project in Sudan, Macmillan was barred from any World Bank project in East Africa for six years. The company halted its operations in Tanzania and, in 2011, Rashid bought out Macmillan’s shares in the Tanzanian joint venture. Macmillan International no longer has any interest in ‘Macmillan Tanzania’ and Rashid now owns the catalogue and the stock; copyrights were transferred and, in March 2012, the name change was under way (interview with Khalaf Rashid, Aidan Ltd).

Oxford University Press Tanzania (OUPT) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Oxford Publishing Limited (OPL), a branch of the International Division of Oxford University Press. The latter is a department of the University with no separate legal personality. The University (and therefore OUP) operates as a charity within the legal framework of the Oxford and Cambridge Act 1923 and the University Statutes and Regulations: it is not governed by the UK Companies Act and does not have limited liability. As a wholly-owned subsidiary, OUPT pays dividends and certain fees to OPL.³⁶⁰

Beyond these key organisational features, it proved difficult to assess the level of control of parent companies over their Tanzanian branches or the nature and scope of financial flows between them. What share of the locally-generated profits does accrue to the group, to the subsidiary? What role do transfer-pricing mechanisms play? Who are the board members of the locally-owned subsidiary? Does the parent company a say on subsidiaries’ strategic choices over recruitment, pricing or editorial policies? Answering these questions would require a dedicated in-depth investigation.

³⁶⁰ Based on Press release by the UK SFO, 03/07/2012 http://www.sfo.gov.uk.
Amongst the indigenous publishers, Ben & Co, Educational Books Publishers, Mkuki na Nyota and E&D Vision Publishing Ltd may be singled out as ‘big local publishers’; they enjoy a rather sound economic situation and the quality of their products is widely acknowledged. The other twenty local textbook publishers may be labelled as ‘small’, with few titles and small print runs, operating in a precarious financial situation. The big local publishers are considered credible competitors to the multinationals, which, however, dominate the market. Robust information about companies’ turnover or market shares is not available. ‘It’s so secretive in Tanzania. It’s a guarded secret’ (local publisher, interview 91). However, according to informants’ estimates, OUPT most likely controls 40 per cent of the market, MacMillan 30 per cent and local publishers about 15 per cent. Longman Pearson appears to control 28 per cent of the secondary level segment. This concentration is not specific to Tanzania.\textsuperscript{361}

Printing represents a large share of publishing costs. Access to quality and affordable printing capacities is a critical determinant of publishing profitability. In turn, printing capacities depend on the provision of raw materials (mainly paper and ink) and the availability/maintenance of adequate technological equipment. The Tanzanian market is split between three main printers (Jamana, Colour Print and Tanzanian Printers) and myriad small-scale printers. Between 2000 and 2011-12, the number of printers grew from 10 to more than 40: machinery became affordable and private banks perceived printing as a profitable business and were willing to provide loans to prospective entrepreneurs in the sector.

The textbook printing market is very competitive: ‘There are too many people going after textbooks, too many printers, so profitability is a problem’ (printer, interview 97). The tax/duty structure constitutes one of the most critical factors influencing printing costs. In compliance with the United Nations Florence Agreement and its Bologna Protocol,\textsuperscript{362} textbooks are imported to

\textsuperscript{361}In 1991, in the USA, 75 per cent of the total sales of college textbooks were controlled by the ten largest textbook publishers; 53 per cent of the elementary-high school market being controlled by the four largest (Apple 1991: 29). In the West, publishing has experienced the following development cycle: small-scale/family businesses, concentration (vertical and horizontal integration) and internationalisation. At the end of the cycle, ‘there remain many hundreds of small independent publishers, but the bulk of the trade is concentrated into the hands of these larger combines’, vast conglomerates that incorporate publishing with other media and digital manufacturing (Golding 1978: 454).

\textsuperscript{362}An international agreement adopted by the UNESCO General Conference in 1950, it provides exemption from tax and import duties for printed materials, works of art, films and other materials of an educational, cultural and scientific nature.
Tanzania duty and VAT-free. Imports of raw materials (ink and paper) are subject to a 10 or 25 per cent excise rate and an 18 per cent VAT rate. Duty remission schemes are, however, in place for ink and paper imported from the SADEC region or the East African Community (by 2012, a 0 per cent rate). Ink and paper used specifically to produce educational materials can also be imported duty-free: paper converters request exemptions granted annually by a specific committee within the Ministry of Industry and Trade. In both cases, however, the 18 per cent VAT rate applies and it is passed on to printers. Textbook publishers, which are exempt from VAT, cannot recover the VAT charged by their printers and so the cost is ultimately absorbed in the textbooks price. Local paper manufacturers are unable to cater for textbook publishers’ demands in terms of quantity and quality and the bulk of paper for textbooks is therefore imported, mainly from Sweden, Finland and South Africa.

Table 7-3: World main paper exporters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value (million US$)</th>
<th>Avg. Growth (%) 07-11</th>
<th>Growth (%) 10-11</th>
<th>World share (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>16,913.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>11,588.5</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>10,767.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>10,165.1</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>7,658.7</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In this context, about 75 per cent of books are printed abroad, especially for big print runs. Asian countries have seized the biggest share of the printing market. OUPT mainly prints in India but also in Malaysia and Dubai. Longman Pearson prints in Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, and China; it imports its internationally published textbooks through its UK-based head office which, however, organises wholesale printing in Asia before dispatch to its overseas offices. As shown in Figure 7.1, the United Kingdom clearly lost its leadership position in the book trade with Tanzania, dethroned by India. In

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364 Estimates provided by informants.
365 This internationalisation of printing is not specific to Tanzania. Western publishers have outsourced their printing component to ‘countries with lower labour costs and most efficient production techniques’ (Altbach 1991: 248).
2000, the UK captured 27 per cent of Tanzania’s imports of ‘Printed books, brochures, leaflets and similar printed matter’, a figure that had fallen to 14 per cent in 2010.\(^{366}\)

**Figure 7-1: Evolution of Tanzanian imports of ‘Printed books, brochures, leaflets and similar printed matter’ from 2010 top five exporters, 2000-2010 (USD current, CIF value)**

![Graph showing evolution of Tanzanian imports of 'Printed books, brochures, leaflets and similar printed matter' from 2010 top five exporters, 2000-2010 (USD current, CIF value).]

Source: the author based on data from Tanzania Revenue Authority

Asian printers are attractive to Tanzanian publishers because of their paper stock capacity - they buy large volumes on international futures markets at very low prices - and the comparative quality of their production. They also help Tanzanian publishers to mitigate risks related to piracy.\(^ {367}\)

Since 2004, Tanzania has enforced the principle of school autonomy in the purchase of textbooks at secondary level. Teachers now choose books from the EMAC’s list of approved titles and submit their choice to headmasters who prepare an expenditure plan for the school board’s authorisation. Headmasters submit their requirements to three booksellers and select the lowest-priced offer.

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366 Over the same period, the UK remained the leading exporter of ‘Dictionaries and Encyclopaedias’ to Tanzania, with a market share stable at around 60 per cent of Tanzanian imports.

367 In the early 2000s, piracy caused major disruptions in the sector. At the time of the research, the issue was much less pervasive. Publishers introduced anti-piracy devices and conducted joint operations with COSATA (the Copyright Society of Tanzania) and the police: illegal copies were seized and about 300 people taken to court for infringement of copyright regulations (interview 39, official, COSATA). Also, pirates may have lost interest in this market due to the lack of funds in primary schools since 2006-2007 and the end of donor direct support to PEDP and its capitation grant.
The decentralised purchasing system propelled the development of the bookshop network. According to the Booksellers Association, today there are around 850 booksellers, up from 68 in 2000 (Saiwaad 2001:159). It is a diversified trade with small-scale district-based retail outlets, middle-sized businesses in main urban centres and a handful of big wholesalers located in Dar es Salaam. The price of textbooks is fixed; the publishers’ catalogue price applies everywhere. Publishers provide booksellers with a discount to cover distribution costs and mark-up.

1.3 **The textbook crisis and the single/standard textbook policy decision**

The learning crisis mentioned in previous chapters coincided with a textbook crisis. A few years after the full opening of the market, complaints were voiced about the poor quality of textbooks in circulation. The complaints came from all segments of society: parents, teachers, civil society, ministerial officials, even the EMAC Secretariat ‘has admitted errors and poor quality textbooks circulating in schools’. Moreover, since the inception of the capitation grant, flows of funds have been erratic, largely below the theoretical amount of Tsh 10,000 at primary level (see Table 7.4) or Tsh 25,000 at secondary level (see Chapters 5 and 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7-4: Capitation grant amount disbursed to primary schools through LGAs, 2006/07 – 2010/11 (in Tsh, current)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: URT (2011c: 47)

Textbooks have been ‘generally in short supply in government schools, especially at the secondary level’ (UNESCO 2012a: 36). At primary level, the actual textbook-pupil ratio, despite a dramatic improvement in comparison with 2001, fell short of the national target

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368 Some are good quality, some are not good quality. Some cover all the syllabus and topics, some don’t… I take these books and I read them and it’s very sad to find a lot of mistakes’ (civil society representative, interview 65).

369 ‘Even mediocre titles go through the screening process and they’re given approval as textbooks’ (official, MoEVT, interview 8).

370 *The Guardian* 02/03/2010.
of 1 book per pupil by 2010 (Table 7.5). At secondary level, the official ratio was 1:5 in 2009 (World Bank 2010: 44) and 1:3 in 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7-5: Primary textbook pupil ratio, 2001 - 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Textbook Pupil ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: URT (2011c: 31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Responding to the national outcry, factions within the state, chiefly driven by the Director of TIE and the then Minister of Education, convinced the President that a single textbook policy (initially confined to primary education) would solve the crisis. Consideration was also given to reinstating TIE in its former publishing role and to reviving state printing capacities, via the import of Chinese machines. Within the state, some contemplated the option of recreating a state ‘book industrial complex’.

In 2010, the MoEVT finally organised the selection of two textbooks per subject per grade (at primary level): the so-called ‘standard textbook system’, presented as a compromise between the single and multiple textbook systems. This policy was interpreted by publishers as a catastrophe. For the Secretary of Publishers Association of Tanzania (PATA): ‘everything is in shambles’. This decision was also perceived as a victory of international publishing companies, as OUPT won the lion’s share of the standard textbooks. This foreign capture of the national market was not believed to have been achieved via the natural exercise of market forces: it is widely thought that the selection process for the standard textbook system was flawed. Publicly available information about the conviction of OUP by the UK SFO does not refer to a specific tender. Nevertheless, the corrupt practices occurred between 2007 and 2010, a period which precisely coincided with the consolidation of OUPT”s dominant position.

The rest of the chapter shows how this industry, much like the education system, has been shaped at the intersection of external and internal forces, dominated by entwined ideological and material interests.

371 The Guardian 03/02/2012 ‘Single textbook system killing publishing sector’.
372 OUPT won 57 titles, Educational Publishers 21 titles, MacMillan Aidan 19 titles, Ben and Co 15 titles, Mture 14 titles and Jadida: 12 or 13 titles.
2. Aid agencies and multinational publishing companies in Tanzania: an ambiguous companionship

2.1 The World Bank and the marketization of Tanzania’s textbook industry

The Tanzanian journey from a state-led textbook industry to private sector domination started with a ‘book sector study’ conducted by the World Bank in 1988. This document directly informed the 1991 Textbook Policy developed during the negotiations of the Bank’s Education Planning and Rehabilitation Project (1990-1997). Privatisation, competition and decentralisation were the core tenets of the policy. One key objective was ‘to raise the levels of efficiency in textbook production and distribution and lower unit costs by allowing the commercial sector to compete for textbook publishing, printing and distribution services and provide incentives for their participation’ (World Bank 1990: 33). The shift to the market was supported by the wider international community, including Nordic countries traditionally more sympathetic to state intervention. SIDA provided an USD12 million grant in parallel with the World Bank’s project to supply textbooks to primary schools and support the Ministry of Education’s efforts to privatize textbook publishing.

The gradual process of privatisation and marketization, unleashed in 1991, was consistently pursued in every subsequent World Bank programme (see Table 7.5 below). But in 2004, the SEDP I was underpinned by an implicit diagnosis: all remnants of state intervention in the textbook industry needed to be removed. Two key elements of the programme – the capitation grant and the confinement of the Tanzania Institute of Education to curriculum development activities – were explicitly intended to foster undistorted competition as the pathway towards cheap, yet good quality, textbooks (World Bank 2004: 9). The release of the first programme tranche was conditional upon TIE’s disengagement from publishing activities (World Bank 2004: 18). The programme and its conditionalities were consistent with the World Bank’s 2001 Operational Policy on Textbooks and Reading Materials, unambiguous on the allegedly ‘indispensable’ role of the private sector: ‘Movement away from uneconomical public enterprises toward more efficient contracting with the private

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373 In the late 1980s, ‘book sector studies’ were commissioned by the World Bank as a core component of the reorientation of its assistance towards marketization of developing countries’ textbook sectors. In 1992, 22 book sector studies had been conducted, financed by the World Bank, ODA, other bilateral agencies and UN agencies (http://www.unesco.org/education/blm/appendix1_en.php#1-1-2, accessed 18/03/2014).
sector should be in evidence for Bank financing to be offered’ (World Bank 2001). Marketization was non-negotiable; ‘the government had no choice’ (local publisher, interview 88).

Table 7-6 (a): Textbook components in World Bank education projects in Tanzania since the late 1970s

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>6th Education Project</th>
<th>7th Education Project</th>
<th>Education Planning and Rehabilitation</th>
<th>Human Resource Development</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Curriculum</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Diversification of secondary curriculum</td>
<td>Curriculum revision (focus on science and mathematics in secondary schools)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Textbook Policy</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Privatisation/marketization of the textbook market</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Textbook funding mechanism</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Feasibility study on TIE (future role, staffing needs, physical expansion)</td>
<td>Support to Tanzania Elimu Supply: - Capacity building - Construction warehouses - Supply of vehicle</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening of TIE - Strengthening of MoE Book Management Unit - Strengthening of libraries (primary, secondary university)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity building / Equipment</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Teaching materials and books (School of Accountancy DSM) /International competitive bidding</td>
<td>Supply of textbooks for secondary schools / International competitive bidding</td>
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<td>Supply of secondary textbooks</td>
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<td><strong>Book provision</strong></td>
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Table 7.6 (b): Textbook components in World Bank education projects in Tanzania since the late 1970s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PEDP</th>
<th>SEDP I</th>
<th>SEDP II</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Curriculum</strong></td>
<td>Curriculum revision for primary (conditionality for three tranches)</td>
<td>Curriculum revision: - Decrease in number of subjects (initial conditionality) - Competence-based curriculum (3rd tranche conditionality)</td>
<td>Criteria of a 'functional school' (no library but laboratory / science textbooks and chemicals but no art textbooks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Textbook Policy</strong></td>
<td>TIE barred from publishing activities (1st tranche conditionality) - Revision of the textbook selection process (2nd tranche conditionality)</td>
<td>Capitation grant (first tranche conditionality) School level textbook procurement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Textbook funding mechanism</strong></td>
<td>Primary capitation grant system School level textbook procurement system: third tranche conditionality</td>
<td>50% of capitation grant for science and language textbooks ('equivalent of US$5 per student for textbooks')</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity building / Equipment</strong></td>
<td>Support to EMAC - To examine cost-effective alternatives for textbook provision - To improve regulation of curriculum development (TIE)</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**Book provision**

Source: the author, based on World Bank project documents
A TIE curriculum developer eloquently described the unequal power relations that underpinned the negotiations of the SEDP I:

*I will never forget this lady from the World Bank. I was so threatened that my Institute will be dying the next day, the way she was tough… And she was so bitter that the Institute was still behaving as a book writer. And actually she had a lot of power in her hands because she had covered the President Office, the Minister, the Permanent Secretary; she was dropping from the air, somebody from another planet. It’s like receiving a visitor from the sun. So powerful and the way she talks, her hands… “I will report this to your President”, “I will do this. I will do that, talk to the Minister”. You are talking to the Minister? You are talking to the Permanent Secretary? You have talked to the President? Who am I now to answer any of your questions? Please, will you take everything you wanted and keep me still alive?*

These words from a middle-rank official illuminate the significance of structural adjustment programmes for African bureaucracies. By undermining civil servants’ professional pride, these projects represented an attack against what constitutes a structural ingredient of an efficient civil service defined in classical Weberian terms: civil servants driven by a core set of professional norms and values. This reconfiguration of the textbook sector was a component of a much broader economic project, the translation in a specific sector of the World Bank’s agenda of market promotion and confinement of the state to an ‘enabling’ role.374 The hegemonic nature of this transformative project was described by an official in the MoEVT: changes in textbook publishing were inserted ‘in this kind of wave that was changing everything. The wind was just too strong that it changed the entire scene … it was flattened so that it was just an even ground for everything. So nothing was left standing (…) Whoever was maybe resistant or was lagging behind the process, definitely, was forced by the strong wave that was sweeping’ (interview 8).

2.2 Deconstructing the market myth: revising the *Ujamaa* textbook legacy

The World Bank argued that its advocacy for market-based textbook provision was guided by ‘cost-effective pragmatism’ in opposition to the ‘political dogmatism’ of state proponents (World Bank 2001: paragraph 18). It put forward a classical set of arguments: state production leads to poor quality textbooks and supply shortages due to the absence of

built-in incentive mechanisms to improve quality, lower prices and circumvent bureaucrats’ corrupt practices. Yet, the opening of Tanzania’s textbook market was not based on any robust evidence of a comparative lack of efficiency of the state-owned textbook publishing complex.

First of all, the World Bank’s textbook policy has not always been exclusively pro-market: ‘in 1985 Bank staff worked under a view, then common, that a centralized, state-dominated system was the most desirable mode of textbook provision (...) between 1973-1985 a majority of projects supported state activity in textbooks’ (World Bank 2002: v). In Tanzania, under its Seventh Education Project (1980-1990), the World Bank provided direct support to Tanzania Elimu Supply, the parastatal in charge of textbook distribution (World Bank 1980: 24). In its intervention, the World Bank followed UNESCO and UNICEF, leading international educational agencies in the 1960s-1970s. From the 1950s onwards, both institutions played an instrumental role in raising international awareness about books’ developmental role and in supporting newly independent countries’ efforts to build their own publishing industry (Askerud 1997; UNICEF 1979 and 1987). In Tanzania, a UNICEF-UNESCO educational programme supported the government’s primary school textbooks publishing activities. SIDA gave significant support through free provision of paper (Bgoya 1982: 25). In 2002, a World Bank-commissioned review of its past textbook operations worldwide even challenged the alleged efficiency of the invisible hand of the market: ‘when the private sector has a monopoly in textbook provision, it may find little reason to trim prices or improve the quality of its products (...) public-sector textbook publishing is a viable option’ (World Bank 2002: 19).

In Tanzania, in the mid-1980s, the state-managed textbook sector was in a very bad state. The average textbook-pupil ratio at primary level was estimated at 1:13 for all subjects. The shortage was equally acute at secondary level (World Bank 1990: 79). The three main sector parastatals were in ‘serious financial trouble’ (World Bank 1990: 75). 375 Nevertheless, drawing general conclusions about an intrinsic inefficiency of state-controlled textbook production from its peculiar situation at this specific time seems far-fetched.

Gray’s work on the political economy of Tanzania’s economic transition challenges the dominant narrative about the failure of the *Ujamaa* industrial policy (nationalisation, creation of parastatals, limits on the expansion of international and domestic capital). Between 1961 and 1979, the country experienced a continuous industrialisation and diversification process. The liberalisation/privatisation ‘success’ story was not one of ‘take-off’. It represented a return to the longer run growth of the industrial sector since independence (Gray 2012). Specifically, as shown below (Figure 7.2), the output of the printing and publishing industry, starting from a low base, recorded a steady increase during the 1970s. Between 1970 and 1979, output grew by 153 per cent. In 1982 Tanzania Publishing House recorded a turnover of Tsh 26.8 million (USD 2.23 million) and a profit of Tsh 6.1 million (USD 0.5 million) (Bgoya 1982: 14).

**Figure 7-2: Printing and Publishing Output in Tanzania 1970 – 2005, in Tsh 100,000, constant prices (base 2000)**

There was a sharp decline in publishing and printing production between 1985 and 1988 but this evolution cannot be analysed in isolation from the international crisis that severely affected Tanzania and from the impact of structural adjustment programmes. During this period, the education system was resource-strapped: ‘Public expenditure on education in 1986 (…) was only about two-thirds of what it had been in 1982 in real terms’ (World Bank

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376 Jerven (2013) cautions about the accuracy of GDP data (volume and composition) in sub-Saharan Africa.
This shrinking in public spending available for purchasing textbooks had a direct impact on publishing and printing parastatals. All became under-financed, while also constrained by shortages in raw materials, foreign exchange limitations and insufficient capital formation investment.

Parastatals in the book sector, as in other sectors, also displayed dysfunctional features. Corruption became rampant. ‘By the early 1980s (...) parastatal managers, with support from politicians and bureaucrats, increasingly engaged in illegal activities to bolster their falling incomes’ (Gray 2012: 234). Specifically in the textbook industry, Walter Bgoya, former manager of Tanzania Publishing House between 1972 and 1990, explained: ‘*When I came in, the love affair between the state and the publishing house was already fading. Other private interests for private gains had entered into the game*’. However, these inefficiencies derived from the contradictions between the industrial policy and the political settlement rather than from state ownership and intervention in production. As argued by Gray (2012: 227), ‘the experience of industrial policy in Tanzania (...) during the socialist period was of ineffective and poorly managed industrial policy rents (...) the Party could not force managers to use rents efficiently…Managers were able to maintain their hold on state created rents even when their performance was poor’. As Section 4 will illustrate privatization and marketization did not curtail corrupt practices, which have flourished throughout the textbook chain.

Moreover, during the socialist period, the relations between the private and public sectors were more fluid than commonly perceived. For instance, Tanzanian Publishing House was initially set up in 1966 as a joint venture between the state and Macmillan before the state bought Macmillan out in 1975, a configuration not specific to this industry (Gray 2012). Longman pulled out of the country but OUP (like Macmillan) stayed, although with a diminished position. Furthermore, parastatals operated in ‘many ways as any private company, expected to make profit and support themselves’ (Bgoya 1982: 14). The state also did not have a complete monopoly: in 1982, Bgoya (1982: 13) mentioned five active private publishers, all limited liability companies. And it was only in 1981, in a situation of economic crisis, that the government’s *Confinement Policy* restricted the textbook trade to

377 Similarly, Chachage (1995: 241) noted that ‘the parastatals were being directly used for private accumulation through corruption, fraud and embezzlement’. 

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state agencies. Ben & Co, one of the major local publishers today, was set up in 1980-1981 as an educational publisher but specialised in supplementary textbooks.\textsuperscript{378}

Moreover, the impressive growth in the publishing and printing output between 1995 and 2003 cannot be explained in isolation from the industrial legacy of Ujamaa. As explained in Gray (2012: 227), ‘industrial development under liberalisation was built on the industrial capabilities that were constructed through state intervention during the socialist period’. In the early 1990s, the private textbook industry did not start from a \textit{tabula rasa}.\textsuperscript{379} Entry costs for commercial publishers and multinationals’ foreign development investments were considerably reduced by previous state investments in developing textbooks. In the initial phase of marketization, TIE tendered its manuscripts to private publishers whose tasks were limited to printing and supply, while the state, with donor support, guaranteed the purchase of a certain amount of copies. The private publishing industry not only benefited from a transfer of physical assets,\textsuperscript{380} it was partially built upon human resources who had acquired experience and capacities within the public sector. Walter Bgoya provides the most topical illustration. A talented, dedicated and internationally renowned publisher, he founded his own publishing company, Mkuki na Nyota, in 1991, a difficult economic period marked by a highly devalued shilling. However, he benefited from his close contacts with printers nurtured, much like his personal publishing skills, during his time at Tanzania Publishing House.\textsuperscript{381}

Finally, one core criticism of state-produced textbooks – their poor quality – needs to be revisited. First, there is a distinct lack of reliable evidence, i.e., derived from analyses by independent curriculum specialists, concerning the quality and relevance of Tanzanian state-published textbooks. Instead, available assessments could be seen as examples of \textit{a posteriori} knowledge construction to legitimate \textit{a priori} ideological positions. The 1988 Book Sector Study, for instance, underlined major flaws in state textbooks. The study was, however, funded by the World Bank (and ODA), the very same agency that had pushed for

\textsuperscript{378} According to Chachage (1995: 241), across economic sectors, ‘the number of private business companies rose from 880 in 1974 to 16,007 by 1984’.

\textsuperscript{379} Schulpen and Gibbon (2002: 1) argue that donors’ approaches to private sector development ‘treat developing countries’ private sector as \textit{tabula rasa}’.

\textsuperscript{380} Specifically TIE manuscripts. Tanzania Publishing House was privatised in 2002 through a management and employees buy-out scheme. It proved impossible to obtain information about the details of the take-over scheme. Some questions remain unanswered. Who provided the financial resources of the take-over (in 1995 the company was valued at Tsh 71 million)? What concrete assets (catalogue, copyrights...) were divested to whom? Etc.

\textsuperscript{381} ‘The old man and the stars’, Interview of Walter Bgoya, 02/11/2011 (http://www.frankfurterbuchmesse.eu).
privatisation/marketization. The World Bank’s 2004 SEDP document did not provide any evidence or bibliographical references that supported its implicit assumptions: the automatic link between market competition and cheap, quality textbooks, and the poor quality of Tanzanian state textbooks due to state interventions. The most recent assessment, which in 2010 proposed an updated comparative analysis of state vs. commercial textbooks (Read 2010), was commissioned by PATA, Publishers Association of Tanzania, instigated by its international members whose interests were threatened by the government’s single/standard textbook policy.

In terms of price, it is beyond doubt that marketization increased prices. Read (2010: 38) gives the example of a TIE biology textbook sold at Tsh 5,860 in 2004; in 2007 the Longman Pearson version retailed at Tsh 10,000. Yet the report asserts that, when the low quality of TIE textbooks is factored in, commercially-published expensive but high-quality textbooks become the best ‘value for money’. Research informants provided, however, a nuanced view of TIE textbooks. Most respondents acknowledged their quality in terms of content. The lack of know-how and of access to technology was pointed out as the main factor to explain TIE ‘ugly books’. Even Pearson Longman acknowledges that the ‘TIE label’ is a marketing asset and they manipulate this reputational asset with caution, by fear of damaging their credibility when promoting other textbooks not authored by TIE.

The purpose of this section is not to paint a romanticised picture of state-published textbooks: most informants agreed that the quality of textbooks has, in general, improved since the opening of the market. But was this improvement directly driven by market forces? The contention is that state ownership per se, like the market in the post-1991 phase, lacks the explanatory power to account for the way the textbook industry has been working in practice. Gibbon (1996: 767) insists on an essential characteristic of the private sector in sub-Saharan Africa: its ‘virtual inextricability (…) from the state/public sector’, a feature denied by the World Bank. It seems more useful to look instead at how the market is actually shaped by the social relations within which it is embedded (Polanyi 1957).

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382 Comparison in constant prices.
383 This harsh statement is from a local publisher (interview 70).
Four main donor practices are examined here that have critically contributed to shaping the Tanzanian textbook market.

First of all, aid agencies have directly acted as representatives of multinationals in Tanzania. In the 1980s, the decision to enforce an all-Kiswahili policy throughout the education system was defeated, despite Nyerere’s initial support, due to strong pressure from the British Council and UK-based textbook publishers (Brock-Utne 2000). Today, British publishing companies continue to expect DFID to protect their interests in Tanzania. For instance, Pearson Longman took advantage of DIFD’s position as a lead donor in the sector: ‘We engaged with them a lot when we were head of the donor committee on education…DFID, because they’re British and I’m British and Pearson is British. They seem the more natural fit… But now it’s … CIDA and we don’t have close relations with them.’ When, within the standard textbook selection process, Tanzanian authorities did not consider titles by Pearson Longman and obviously favoured its main competitor, OUPT, the firm ‘requested that the British government write on [its] behalf to the Minister of Education in objection to the primary evaluation process because obviously it’s a British business, a British owned company’.385

One figure epitomises these intimate relations between aid agencies and multinational publishing companies. The 1988 Book Sector Study was co-authored by Anthony Read, an international consultant who also worked as a lobbyist for multinational publishing companies.386 In 2010, the report commissioned by international publishers to demonstrate the comparative advantages of the market was again authored by Read. He also authored a DFID Guidance Note on ‘Learning and teaching materials’, DFID’s only publicly available strategic document on textbooks (DFID 2011). Read’s long-lasting presence on the fringes of the Tanzanian textbook policy arena, at the intersection between donors and

384 A distinction borrowed from Bgoya (1997).
385 Pearson most probably contributed to initiating the procedure that led the UK SFO to convict OUP. DFID’s actual responsiveness to British firms’ demands could not be assessed.
386 Read worked for Oxford University Press before becoming director of the Book Development Council at the UK Publishers Association (http://www.icpartners.co.uk/clients/). In 1989, he co-founded his first consulting company - International Book Development Limited. The company’s single shareholder was Cfbt Education Trust, a renowned UK charity that provides education services in the UK and internationally, with an annual turnover exceeding £100 million and more than 2,000 staff worldwide.
international publishing companies, testifies to aid agencies’ role as vehicle to advance global corporates’ interests in African markets.

Within the donor constellation, SIDA is an exception. The main donor for state textbook production and distribution during the socialist period, SIDA forcefully rallied market proponents at the end of the 1980s (Brock-Utne 2000: 82-83) but it also embraced the cause of the indigenous publishing industry. Between 1993 and 2000, its Publishing Pilot Project (PPP) played a critical role in supporting, financially and through technical assistance, the government’s attempt to create market conditions conducive to indigenous publishers (Grahm et al. 2008). But with the end of the project and the complete liberalisation of the market, local publishing companies lost SIDA’s interest. Yet, when the single/standard textbook crisis arose and threatened local publishers, SIDA tried to revive a policy dialogue on local textbook production. Its attempt to rescue its own legacy largely failed, reflecting its now peripheral position within the aid arena, today commensurate with its relatively limited financial capacity.\(^{387}\)

Donors’ procurement procedures have also played an important role in building up multinationals’ dominant position in the Tanzanian market.

Unrestricted competition to source textbooks has always been the World Bank’s main mantra, even during *Ujamaa*. Support for the local publishing base has barely featured on its agenda.\(^{388}\) Under its *Education Rehabilitation and Planning Project*, that drove the liberalisation of the textbook industry, the Bank organised the provision of secondary level textbooks through its traditional procurement modus operandi international competitive bidding, which structurally favours international publishing companies. The World Bank’s procurement guidelines grant domestic publishers a 15 per cent price advantage over the lowest foreign bidder, a rule meant to level the playing field rather than proactively promote African publishers (Bgoya 1997). Through its procurement rules, the Bank has also been a key engine for the global dissemination of a ‘gold standard’ to assess textbooks.

\(^{387}\) When Sweden’s global interest in the paper industry are considered, the progressive aura attached to SIDA’s long-lasting involvement in the textbook sector may be seen in a different light.

\(^{388}\) This dichotomy between the World Bank and SIDA in the textbook sector perfectly illustrates Schulpen and Gibbon’s (2002: 1) assertion that bilateral agencies have paid more attention to the development of countries’ private sectors while multilaterals have been more focused on structural reforms.
based on criteria defined in the West, in relation to particular levels of technology and specific pedagogical configurations.  

Under its Publishing Pilot Project, SIDA was instrumental in the promotion of ‘local competitive bidding’ to tender for TIE’s primary level manuscripts. However, in practice, all ‘commercial publishers licensed for business in Tanzania’ were finally allowed to bid: tendering was not reserved to genuine ‘indigenous publishers’. This regulation, while more favourable to indigenous publishers than international competitive bidders, did not prevent international publishing companies from entering the market and competing with indigenous publishers.

With the inception of the capitation grant system, the World Bank stopped procuring textbooks directly for Tanzania. But under the African Development Bank’s project ‘Education II’ (1999-2007), 400,000 secondary level textbooks were procured through international competitive bidding. This typically favoured international publishing companies: Macmillan Aidan, Oxford University Press UK and Cambridge University Press. The recent USAID Textbooks and Learning Materials Program (TLMP), which provided textbooks to public secondary schools, also illustrates the persistent contribution of donors’ procurement procedures to the strengthening of multinational companies’ market position. Oxford University Press and Uhuru Media Ltd won USAID’s unrestricted competitive tender. With an obviously ‘indigenous’ name, the second firm is actually a subsidiary of ADA group whose Director, Rashid Khalaf is the former managing director of Macmillan Publishing who bought out the UK shares after the Sudanese corruption scandal. Information on ADA Group and Uhuru Media Ltd is scarce: whether ADA Group’s involvement in textbook publishing and distribution can be considered the

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389 Altbach (1991: 245) challenges this heteronomy of textbook assessment criteria: ‘the use of glossy paper, illustrations and hard covers for most textbooks is related to the conditions in the schools of the affluent countries. While poorer countries often produce less elaborate books, everyone is affected by what is considered [the] “gold standard” of textbooks’.

390 Information based on ADF (2007, Annex 6: 4-6). The two other successful bidders – General Booksellers Ltd and Mhesa Trading Co Ltd – are Tanzanian companies: the former is Tanzania’s major wholesale bookseller and the second specialises in stationary and office supplies. Based on available information, it is not possible to say whether, within this contract, they provided textbooks published by local or international companies.

391 The TLMP is managed by the USAID African Bureau through a cooperative agreement with South Carolina State University (SCSU) as part of President Bush’s Africa Education Initiative. SCSU worked in collaboration with the MoEVT to produce secondary school science and mathematics textbooks for mainland Tanzania. TLMP received final funding in FY 2010 and was supposed to terminate in FY 2011. USAID/Tanzania provided an additional year of funding in order for SCSU to meet its second year target of producing 750,000 textbooks (information provided by USAID aid manager, Tanzania).

outcome of a successful indigenisation process similar to the creation of Longhorn in Kenya is difficult to say. Uhuru Media Ltd could simply be a dummy company set up to circumvent the World Bank’s ban on Macmillan and to allow Aidan to bid for USAID’s programme.

DFID’s BAE funded Primary Education Support Project further illustrates how the ‘good governance/anti-corruption’ imperative prevails over any educational rationales or long-term developmental considerations. The modality to channel the BAE funds - centralised procurement of textbooks - was imposed by British authorities on transparency grounds. Indeed, a large scale tender appeared easier to audit than financial flows channelled through the capitation grant mechanism. DFID also commissioned a global private consultancy company – Crown Agents USA Ltd – to supervise the project’s procurement process. This scheme was, however, contrary to the Tanzanian national systems and procedures whereby textbooks are purchased by schools, through the capitation grant. The centralised procurement process has also been widely recognised as being poorly responsive to actual school needs. With this initiative, DFID was actually acting against its own commitment to aid effectiveness. It also undermines DFID’s intense involvement within Tanzania’s education arena over the last ten years which had aimed to promote a strengthened capitation grant system. Western-controlled procurement processes are obviously not immune from corruption but even in a transparent case of grand corruption by a prominent British firm like BAE, the suspicion of corruption finally ends up on African shoulders. Ironically, in October 2011, the World Bank announced a six-month

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393 Longhorn Publishers, in Kenya, was created through a buy-out of Longman by local interests.
394 ADA Group’s publishing activities may also reflect contemporary global trends in publishing: the merger of publishing activities within broader, widely diversified global groups dedicated to communication, media and digital information: ADA Group owns, for instance, Creative Eyes, an advertising and communication company with offices in Kenya, Rwanda and Ghana, which is part of Publicis Africa Group’s network, Publicis being the third largest communication group worldwide.
396 For instance, according to ADB (2007: xii) ‘GoT provides books through capitation grants. This is a more efficient way of providing books to schools. A centralized provision of textbooks appears to be less cost effective’.
397 According to the SFO, the ‘UK Government has been helping BAE and the Government of Tanzania to determine what the money should be used for and how it will be delivered and monitored to ensure the funds are used effectively’ (press release 15/03/2012, SFO web site). An official in the Ministry of Finance deciphered the real nature of this generous guidance that blatantly contradicted the UK’s commitments to the principles of alignment and ownership: ‘You see this money was taken from the government. It was not specific to education. We wanted it to be refunded through GBS. It was a hot debate. We could not reach an agreement. They were putting conditionality... DFID insisted that funds should be channelled to education... Why should they put conditionality on money that is supposed to be refunded to the government of Tanzania?... We need the money, we had no other way’ (interview 34).
398 Without OUP’s conviction, DFID’s effort to force the government into purchasing primary textbooks would have facilitated the return of corrupt funds to the UK through another scam by a British multinational.

Finally donors’ utilitarian conception of quality education has had an important impact on the organisation of the Tanzanian textbook sector. The concerns over ‘quality’, chiefly framed in terms of demand for science (Chapters 4 and 5) have been directly reflected in donors’ textbook interventions. The list of minimum criteria to define a ‘functional secondary school’, negotiated as a prior condition for the World Bank’s SEDP II, displayed a strong bias in favour of science instructional materials: minimum classroom supplies for students need to include ‘One textbook per student in six subjects – biology, chemistry, English language, Kiswahili language, mathematics, and physics’ (World Bank 2010: 46). As a consequence, secondary schools were officially instructed to earmark 50 per cent of their capitation grant, partly funded by the World Bank, to purchase science and maths textbooks. The Headmaster in School T captured this official zeal over science textbooks: ‘We were asked to buy as many science textbooks as possible’. In 2010-2011, in parallel to the World Bank’s pressure, USAID supported, within its TLMP, the provision of science textbooks to 1,500 Tanzanian public secondary schools. At primary level, the purchase of textbooks with the BAE funds concentrated on ‘Kiswahili, English, Maths and Science’.

When encountering the intractable reality of schools on the ground these efforts to restructure schools’ incentives towards science resulted in inefficient, sometimes absurd, situations. Many schools visited in Lushoto were submerged by science textbooks, while facing shortages in arts. In School AA, the headmaster explained: ‘We’ve got an excess of science books: 200 are remaining. They’ll remain here for the coming years. So we’ve reached a ratio of 1:1 in sciences. But we face a critical shortage of books for art subjects … The shortage of books in art subjects is my main challenge’. The World Bank-MoEVT instruction achieved its intended effect: the availability of science textbooks improved and the performance targets of the World Bank SEDP II were reached in some schools. But the instruction had overlooked the actual teaching conditions in ward secondary schools: the lack of science teachers and the fact that students preferred arts subjects. As a result, the science textbooks went unused and large piles of them lay idle in headmasters’ offices.

400 The official instruction included ‘language’ in priority textbooks. Nevertheless, based on interviews with headmasters, the directive was mainly interpreted as a priority for science and maths textbooks.
It should also be noted that, in limiting socially legitimate knowledge to hard sciences and valuable books to science textbooks, donors completely ignore the potential emancipatory role that access to books in general could play as an instrument to achieve quality education and, more broadly, to support a national developmental project. The World Bank’s successive support to the Tanzanian education system demonstrates a steady narrowing of the agency’s understanding of the role of books. The 1990 *Education Rehabilitation and Planning Project* acknowledged the critical educational role played by general reading – ‘access to wider reading materials is essential if primary education is to progress beyond the sterile acquisition of functional skills’ (World Bank 1990: 8). It also underlined the importance of schools libraries (ibid: 38) and praised the ‘government's recognition of the vital role which libraries, access to reading materials and information play in the educational and social development’ (ibid: 8). The project supported the provision of secondary and primary schools with a selection of reference, nonfiction and juvenile fiction titles. Under the World Bank SEDP I, schools were allowed to procure for the construction of libraries and the purchase of library materials (World Bank 2004). But with the World Bank SEDP II, laboratories became more important than libraries, and laboratory equipment and chemicals more important than textbooks in arts subjects. The ambition of nurturing a national reading culture completely vanished.

Tanzania’s textbook sector has been shaped by donors’ contradictory interventions on textbooks, rooted in the dual nature of textbooks - vehicles for quality education but also a lucrative market for multinational companies. The current state of Tanzania’s textbook sector has been equally influenced by the national political settlement.

3. **The Tanzanian textbook sector and the national political settlement: the impossible reconciliation of competing interests**

3.1 **Resistance to marketization of the textbook sector and the unresolved state vs. market ideological battle**

The different stages in the process towards full marketization of the textbook sector gave rise to intense frictions between the World Bank and the Tanzanian state. The highly

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401 Under *Ujamaa* the publishing parastatal complex was supported by a public library network, created in the early years of independence (Bgoya 1982). The network, hit badly by the financial crisis in the 1980s, never recovered nor benefitted again from donor support (Bgoya 1997: 29).
The contested nature of the 1991 Textbook Policy became apparent from the World Bank’s completion report of its Education Planning and Rehabilitation Project. According to the assessment, when the project started, and despite the government’s formal agreement underlined in the project appraisal,\(^{402}\) ‘there was no consensus on the textbook policy’. The report stressed the enduring ‘absence of a clear and consistent policy framework on the textbooks component’, subject to ‘protracted discussions’ that resulted in a ‘slow textbook liberalization process’ (World Bank 1998, annex A: 8). The government reluctantly fulfilled the project conditionalities: it took more than five years to finally announce the opening of the market to private actors (World Bank 1998: 34). Its own assessment of the project also underlined the tensions and divergences between the government and donors (World Bank 1998: Annex C). Khalaf Rashid from Macmillan Aidan confirmed that the government resisted the logic of conditionality: ‘Definitely, there was a big resistance, a big resistance’. Similarly the design of the SEDP I entailed intense negotiations. An official in TIE recalled: ‘There was a lot of struggle, struggle, struggle …there was a lot of power used by the World Bank (…) to suppress any initiative of the Institute to write books’.

The change was evidently imposed on the Tanzanian state by powerful external forces. Nevertheless, this local resistance did not mean that state power or segments of the bureaucracy unanimously rejected the shift. The SEDP I was negotiated at the end of President Mkapa’s second term. This leader genuinely embraced the neoliberal agenda to such an extent that a scholar from the University of Dar es Salaam argued: ‘Mkapa was the neoliberal founder of this country [who] did not tolerate any criticism against neoliberalism’ (interview 73). Giving a new impetus to the privatisation process and extending its remit to new sectors – energy, mining and railways – were at the heart of his personal political platform. The full marketization of the publishing industry was therefore entirely consistent with the top leadership’s developmental vision.

In 2011-2012, research interviews confirmed the currency of market arguments in the Tanzanian context, across social positions. For instance, OUPT’s Tanzanian director noted: ‘There will be no quality because there is no competition’. For an official in PMO-RALG: ‘The

\(^{402}\) Literally so: the word ‘agreed’ was actually underlined in the 1990 appraisal document, as if the World Bank’s project designers wanted to secure, in a technical-legal form, a hard-won settlement and to force the other signatory party to honour an agreement conceded under the constraint, and therefore of a precarious political nature (World Bank 1990: 34).
government had to do away with the production of textbooks because they can produce textbooks, sometimes, with low quality. There’s no competition’ (interview 25). Similarly, Walter Bgoya, former manager of Tanzania Publishing House, wondered: ‘If it is state-managed, then in the long run what’s the incentive to produce good quality books?’ These quotes testify to the internalisation, among segments of the elite, of the market mantra. Nevertheless, the single/standard textbook decision revealed the state’s persistent ambiguity vis-à-vis capitalists and the private sector.

3.2 The premature weaning of an infant industry and the state anti-capitalist ethos

According to Amsden (2001), the East Asian miracle was largely driven by a development state able, through successful management of market rents, to induce a technological learning process in specific industries. To a certain extent, the Government of Tanzania’s textbook policy in the 1990s represented an instance of developmental industrial policy in a niche sector considered strategic due to its relation to the education system and the national culture (Davies 1997). The viability of an indigenous publishing industry, able to counter the market power of the British ‘big three’, required special treatment to offset international companies’ comparative advantages. An official in the MoEVT explained: ‘Phasing in, phasing out is like weaning a baby from the mother...you are removing the child from suckling the mother slowly; you are not starving the child. You’ve got to get some supplement or some other types of nutrient in order to take over. The introduction of the new system had to be gradual’ (interview 8). While the 1991 Textbook Policy embodied elites’ surrender to market forces, the government’s indigenisation project, with SIDA’s support, could be interpreted as the re-articulation of a sovereign developmental project within the market framework. In that context, the single/standard textbook policy could be considered as the premature weaning of an infant industry. Why did Tanzanian authorities decide on an abrupt change in the textbook policy that destabilised a local industry that they had been so determined to create?

Even during the PPP project which was geared towards the construction of a local publishing base state commitment to indigenous publishers remained ambiguous. The

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403 Similarly, the 1996 national industrial policy called for support for indigenous manufacturing: ‘The Tanzanian entrepreneurial class is still small in size and in most cases lacks experience in modern industrial management which is increasingly becoming globalized. The government will therefore deliberately undertake measures to promote [an] indigenous entrepreneurial base’ (URT 1996: 13).
principle of local protection of infant industries was only partially applied. The choice of the ‘local competitive bidding’ to procure TIE manuscripts for the private sector, that allowed multinationals to enter the Tanzanian market, was jointly agreed by donors and Tanzanian authorities. Some state factions, indeed, were not ready to close the doors to foreign companies. This reluctance was certainly driven by intertwined factors: a firm belief in the developmental role of FDIs, the historical prestige that Tanzanian leaders attached to British brands and multinationals’ successful lobbying.

In 2008-2009, the crisis over the multiple textbook system vividly revealed the enduring state ambiguity vis-à-vis business people and the private sector. Since economic liberalisation, public officials have engaged in private sector activities and education has been one of their favourite areas of investment. Nevertheless, hostility towards profit-making remains entrenched within the Tanzanian state and the local publishing industry is not immune to it. According to Khalaf Rashid, of Macmillan Aidan, ‘There’s always been distrust between government and the private sector… It’s still very distrusting of private sector and its profit motive’. In 2010, PATA proposed monthly meetings with government authorities to discuss educational materials issues. The nascent partnership came to a rapid end, the government resenting the publishers’ profit-making drive: ‘They told us, “You are just businessmen; you want to make profit with the government money”’ (local publisher, interview 95). This anti-capitalist acrimony also targeted indigenous publishers, perceived as global capital’s accomplices: ‘[local publishers] killed us, our killers are local. The killers of this institute are local publishers, not the international ones. The local ones are using the power of these internationally established publishers to push their demands. They are working together: the birds of the same feather will fly together, always’ (official, TIE).

In fact, a profound ideological misunderstanding has influenced the state-local publisher relations. Publishers and booksellers consider themselves singular entrepreneurs. The Secretary of the Booksellers Association noted: ‘We are business people but we are service providers… they’re seeing us mostly a hundred percent as business people. But for us we are saying, it’s not just a business, it’s also a service. What we need is to provide good service to schools instead of just being

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404 Leaders ‘want’ Oxford, because they learnt with these books (local publisher, interview 91).
405 Former Minister of Education Joseph Mungai, who in 1995 opened an English-medium, primary-level boarding school, epitomises officials’ enrichment straddling strategies.
406 They illustrate the distinction made by Bourdieu and Passeron between capital and symbolic profit (1970).
business people (...) So we are a part of education’. Publishers interviewed also expressed a candid passion for books and reading. To what extent this self-identification as special entrepreneurs has affected their business decisions remains subject to a detailed study. Publishers’ dedication to educational goals certainly needs to be put in perspective: ‘You have those good and genuine publishers who are doing very well. They’re not just publishing for the sake of getting money. Yes, but you have others who are not’ (civil society representative, interview 65).

The strong anti-capitalist ethos has been further fuelled by another key feature of the long-lasting political settlement: elites’ political survival depends on their egalitarian credentials. As argued in Gray (2012: 267), ‘part of the political legitimacy of the Party constructed under socialism was its commitment to equality. It is still very difficult for Tanzania to promote a capitalist class. Open forms of subsidy to business and the private sector are not politically acceptable to most people’. The vast majority of parents considered the multiple textbook system as a source of inequality. The market was flooded with poor quality textbooks and because national examinations were based, in practice, on a single specific textbook, parents considered the market-oriented multiple textbook policy inherently unfair, claiming that those children who studied from one of the ‘other’ books were at a disadvantage in exams. In promoting a shift to the standard textbook system, the Tanzanian top leadership actually responded to the people’s demand for equality. According to a NGO representative, ‘Most people, unfortunately, including the majority of parents and even teachers, seem to prefer the single-textbook approach. That's easier and more attuned to the national need to create a unified educational system’ (interview 76). In a time when CCM’s political clout was shaken by Chadema’s growing political influence, this choice could serve its endeavour to reassert its political legitimacy.

3.3 A fragmented sector

Gray (2012) pointed out a structural obstacle to an effective industrial policy geared towards productive accumulation: a fragmented elite and the inability of the top leadership to impose discipline on CCM internal factions. This fragmentation appears as a key (dis)organising feature of the book sector.

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407 In the West, the publishing trade has experienced a gradual normalisation; it has almost completely become dominated by pure accountancy logic (Golding 1978: 455).
The absence of an official book development policy testifies to authorities’ lack of commitment to a thriving national reading culture and a flourishing indigenous publishing industry. Such a strategic document, covering all aspects of the book chain, would constitute the starting point for an effective coordination of the multitude of actors, public and private, involved in the sector (Bgoya 1997). Education bureaucrats’ divergent attitudes towards the single/standard textbook also illustrate this fragmentation. From the beginning of the crisis, a number of officials in the Ministry of Education opposed the measure and adopted a wait and see attitude. A long serving top civil servant in the Ministry was transferred to another administration as a disciplinary measure because of his open opposition to the Minister’s decision. In 2011-2012, research informants provided contradictory information about the actual policy in place. The Deputy-Permanent Secretary for Education in PMO-RALG and the Commissioner for Education in the MoEVT invoked the standard textbook policy as a reality. Its extension to secondary schools was supposedly under serious consideration. At the same time, another senior official in the MoEVT firmly stated: ‘The multiple textbook [policy] is still in place. The standard textbook policy is not yet in place. There’s been no change. No circular has been issued... When everyone is convinced that we need to turn to a standard book policy, we shall change the policy’. As to a possible extension to secondary schools, an official in PMO-RALG was forceful: ‘There’s been no discussion on a change in the policy’. This cacophony of voices certainly reflects the contradictory interests and discordant ideological views among the multiple factions within the Ministry of Education and PMO-RALG: those who supported the need for a state tightened control over the textbook chain; those who were directly involved in SIDA’s PPP project, who gained capacities and continued to strongly believe in this model; those who believed that the standard textbook policy would deepen favourably competition among publishers and those who were convinced that the new system would restrict Tanzania’s chances of benefiting from the global knowledge economy. This also illuminates the degree of autonomy/agency of education bureaucrats within the state and their ability to influence a policy decided on in higher levels, by politicians. Against this background and in the context of the BAE refund, the decision to shift to centralised procurement under PMO-RALG’s authority also fuelled the power battle between the PMO-RALG and the Ministry of Education.

408 Personal interviews.
The private sector displayed a similar fragmentation. As pointed out by a representative of an international publisher: ‘We’re not a united sector. The Publishers’ Association of Tanzania is itself riddled with internal competition, internal agendas…the publishing community is very divided’ (interview 89). The rivalry between international and indigenous publishers was evident in PATA’s refusal to officially endorse Read’s 2010 report commissioned by international publishers. A prominent local publisher explained: ‘We do not feel that we needed somebody from the UK to come and tell us what we should be doing when we had already done it’. A distrust shared by the other side: ‘PATA is not a disinterested body. I would strongly object to PATA being representative without [us] being there and sitting there as well… I don’t trust what they would decide on our behalf’ (interview 89). At the same time, publishers and booksellers were also clashing, each blaming the other for the sector’s predicaments. Booksellers viewed the government’s decision on centralised procurement as a major threat to their own survival, and one which would chiefly benefit publishers.409

This division of the sector may explain the difficulty it has had in competing for rents with other sectors. For instance, for decades publishers and printers have lobbied for a duty/VAT exemption on paper imports (interview 91, local publisher). India managed to build up a strong domestic printing industry by relaxing the duty/tax system on imports of raw printing materials (Indian Institute of Foreign Trade 1982). However, the Tanzanian local paper industry, less fragmented and controlled by a handful of people, was more effective in securing its protection from the global market.410 Printers’ only room for manoeuvre lies in individual negotiations with the Ministry of Trade about the scope of their exemption for education-related imports, negotiations shaped by personal and informal relations (printer, interview 97).

Gray (2012: 250) argues that ‘during the socialist period, power within the state was still fragmented to the extent that people within the system could forge small coalitions to resist their rents being removed’. At the time of the fieldwork, the textbook sector exemplified the enduring relevance of this analysis. The state was incapable of disciplining all the contradictory interests in a sector finally reduced to a site of ‘primitive accumulation’.411

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409 ‘All the bookshops will close and publishers will be well off’ (interview 96).
410 The paper industry employs more staff and produces a larger output than the printing/publishing industry (UNIDO data); protecting the paper industry may therefore be, economically, more sensible.
411 Gray (2012: 78) defines ‘primitive accumulation’ as the ‘process of accumulation outside the formal market process where political power is used to privilege the accumulation activities of particular individuals’. This definition is largely in
4. Elite capture of the textbook public manna

‘There was a lot money floating, easy pickings (...) There is a lot of money waiting to buy books, to buy education materials. And so many are involved in using public money to buy books so it is very difficult for this system, for the safety valves to work in that kind of system because money is everywhere, is given, is dished out to almost everyone’ (official, MoEVT, interview 8). This statement reflects the perception of most informants: the textbook sector is marred by corruption. It also clearly reveals the state’s difficulty in exerting rent control in a hyper-fragmented landscape of fraudulent activities. OUP’s corrupt practices have already been mentioned in relation to the standard textbook selection process. This section examines three further specific sites in the textbook chain where domestic elites and multinational publishing companies have deployed accumulation strategies outside the formal market process.

4.1 The EMAC, the market gate-keeper

At central level, the EMAC, the body that controls the conditions of entry into the market, has been in a critical position to manage/distribute rents. A considerable amount of informal negotiations has occurred at this level. The identities of the EMAC reviewers are even kept secret to protect them: ‘Otherwise they would be killed’ (interview 100). This statement, made in all seriousness, by a local publisher reveals the intensity of the battle and the level of financial interests at stake. It is also common knowledge that some ministry officials sitting in the EMAC author textbooks under pseudonyms, thus having vested interests in the selection process. In the education administration, the ideological battle triggered by the standard textbook policy has obviously been coupled to a struggle over material interests.

In this particular industry, being first to the market provides a competitive edge that latecomers find difficult to overcome. Securing an exclusive and early access to the market constitutes therefore a sound – if not legal – business strategy to build up a dominant position. This can be achieved through bribing the market gate-keeper to, for example,
secure a quick entry into the market for one’s sub-standard textbooks or to ensure a late market entry for one’s most serious competitor. An official from the Ministry of Education explained: ‘These publishers are also rushing to get the products in the market to sell, to get money. So, very hurriedly, they can go and corrupt the EMAC, they can corrupt everybody. They are moving at the speed of light so that they grab the money. So it is very easy to forsake even the quality of the books because of that kind of gold rush’ (interview 8). In such a context, curriculum changes, while provoking massive losses for some publishers, also become ‘very good business’ for others. They indeed open up opportunities for market share redistribution, but not necessarily through free competition. Getting exclusive access to an early draft version of a syllabus together with the EMAC’s early approval can greatly contribute to a swift reactivity to a changing demand: when other publishers enter the market, they find it already saturated with products from competitor(s) that informally secured privileged access to insider information. In this context, international publishers’ financial base provides them with a powerful arm to win the rent competition. The Ministry of Education finally disbanded the EMAC in June 2013, because of ‘poor performances and corruption’.

4.2 The Publisher-Politician: publishing as a political springboard

The individual trajectory of a Tanzanian publisher and CCM Member of Parliament – Nyambari Nyangwine - provides an edifying illustration of productive bonds between commercial textbook publishing and the political sphere. As a university student, he began to write academic and secondary education textbooks. After finishing university, he started to sell books, as a businessman. He then established his own publishing company. To date, he has published 176 titles. Teachers in Lushoto were critical of the quality of his textbooks: ‘We’re forced to use the current books but there’re many mistakes, especially the ones from Nyambari’ (teachers, School H). ‘Teachers don’t appreciate them, there are a lot of mistakes; it’s spoon feeding, cramming’ (Headmaster, School A). For teachers, Nyangwine’s products were

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413 Words borrowed from an informant (interview 132). Over the last two decades, Tanzania experienced a series of curriculum alterations, largely driven by World Bank’s conditionalities (under its SEDP and PEDP projects). Curriculum reforms constitute a complex domain that would require a dedicated political economy investigation. But specifically, a sudden curriculum change in 2005 ‘started to spell disaster for the industry’ (local publisher, interview 93): publishers were left with massive stocks of textbooks in their warehouses.

414 According to informants, after the 2005 curriculum change, the revised syllabus was made available to publishers only in mid-2006. By November, OUPT’s new textbooks had already been approved by the EMAC. But its manuscripts were actually consistent with an early draft of the syllabus, not with the final version.


416 Interview with Nyamgwine.
typically textbooks wrongly approved by the EMAC: ‘Lots of books nowadays are authorised by MoEVT but some are very shallow. For instance Nyambari Nyangwine’ (teachers, School K).\footnote{In most cases, teachers interviewed spontaneously mentioned Nyangwine’s textbooks when questioned on their textbook challenges. It was rare that the researcher had to prompt them specifically on the subject.}

Despite the poor quality of his products, he has been successful: ‘In one year, I would sell 10,000 copies for each title for Forms One to Four and for Forms Five and Six: 5,000 copies in sciences and history and 2,000 in maths.’ His success is based on three main factors. First, he was able to seize a market opportunity: ‘I became a publisher because I wanted to make a profit. And in secondary schools and especially high schools, most publishers were foreigners’. For several years, while the other main publishers focused on the primary level, he enjoyed a quasi-monopoly position in the secondary textbooks area: ‘Five years ago, Nyambari Nyangwine was the best-selling publisher. Today, it’s Oxford (...) Nyambari was the only one on the market few years ago. Now there are many more and there’s been a shift from him to the others’ (interview 156, bookshop, Lushoto). For Forms Five and Six, he was still, in 2012, the only Tanzanian publisher for social sciences, English, History and Economy. Given the high price of imported A Level textbooks, his products, even if of lower quality, certainly benefited from greater price competitiveness. A second element of success was his ability to secure the EMAC’s approval for some of his titles, despite their dubious quality.\footnote{The EMAC’s list of September 2011 only includes 5 titles by Nyangwine (out of his stated 176 titles). His success may actually have pre-dated the MoEVT’s 2010 directive to secondary schools to buy only EMAC-approved textbooks. This instruction may explain the erosion of his position on the public secondary schools market segment. He explained ‘I mostly sell to private schools and individual students. With public schools you need to go through procedures, it’s too complicated.’}

The third factor has been an efficient marketing and distribution system. One teacher in School H explained: ‘For instance, we’ve got some books from Nyambari Nyangwine; they’re not well prepared. People who bought these books were not keen on the information in the books. But the owner promoted his books; he would send posters’. In 2012, Nyangwine had become an accomplished entrepreneur, with diversified business activities: ‘I’ve got four companies: a publishing, a stationary, a bookshop and a security company. I’m the chairman of these four companies and each has a director. My wife is the general director and she is the one going to China to negotiate printing contracts’.

In 2010, he won the Parliamentary election for Tarime constituency. Born in 1976, he did not have a significant militancy life prior to his election.\footnote{His personal page on the Parliament web site has two mentions of political experience: in 2008 ‘youth commander’ and in 1993 ‘Youth Secretary in Mara Secondary’. The same web page displays a list of 20 of his published textbooks even in terms of self-promotion, his publishing credentials took precedence over his political credit (http://www.parliament.go.tz/index.php/members/mpevs/1740/ 2010-2015; accessed 13/06/2013).} In a party that has been reluctant
to open up opportunities for the younger generation, his swift political success can be considered as quite remarkable. His financial base, derived from his publishing activities, certainly contributed to his political take-off. According to his own account, his political career cannot be delinked from his business activities. He was among the publishers who incurred major losses after the sudden decision to change the curriculum in 2005. ‘That’s why I came to politics and stand in the Social Affairs Committee, to try to influence the policy.’

Parliament has not only offered him a platform from which to protect his commercial interests, it has also provided him with new market opportunities. At a time when he faced the erosion of his market share challenged by OUPT’s market penetration power, his MP colleagues purchased textbooks from him. ‘Many MPs have bought my textbooks, about 50 [MPs] since last year’. An MP confirmed: ‘I also bought some books for secondary schools, with my CDF funds. The MP Nyambari, from Tarime, sold me 1,885 books’ (interview 80). Therefore, MPs are using public resources – the Constituency Development Fund - to directly purchase Nyangwine’s textbooks. While they flood secondary schools in their constituency with low quality textbooks, building up their educational credentials at little cost, they also contribute to the personal enrichment of their politician-entrepreneur colleague. As for Nyangwine, he solved the textbook shortage issue in his constituency by freely providing his own poor quality textbooks. Chapter 6 highlighted politicians’ critical need for a strong local base. For Nyangwine, his textbooks, initially a mere commodity and then a key to unlocking the door of the political arena, became the foundation of his local political rooting. This provides an interesting case of an accumulation trajectory where commercial profits, political career and local patronage have been symbiotically tied to textbooks.

4.3 The textbook trade and the district educational business complex

The Lushoto District economy provides another prism through which to explore accumulation strategies in the context of the textbook trade. All research informants pointed to the headmaster-bookseller nexus as the weakest link in the textbook chain. The devolution of textbook purchasing to schools in conjunction with the capitation grant

420 While charting out a research agenda to understand the structural effects of economic policies in sub-Saharan Africa, Olukoshi (1996: 78-79) identified ‘private trading network and structures’ as an important research theme. This subsection sheds some light on key questions Olukoshi raised about ‘the nature of the activities [private trading actors] are embarking on’, ‘patron-clientelist ties that are being built or which are being exploited by the traders’ and ‘the relationships of the traders (…) to the state’.
system led to rampant collusion between booksellers and headmasters who arranged over-invoicing schemes.\textsuperscript{421} The following account by a local publisher reflects both the scope of the phenomenon and the state’s inability to circumvent it:

\textit{One district education officer went to inspect some of his schools. He asked one head teacher \ldots to show the books they had bought; there were no books but the documents showed that the books have been bought\ldots So he suspended the head teacher and then he went to another one and another one, and another one, and another one, and the same thing applied. There were no books but books have been\ldots in the ledger books. \ldots So he suspended all of them. And then he went to the tenth teacher. He found the same. So, be told them, “Go back to work.” The suspension was waived. (Interview 88)}

This ‘vitabu hewa’ phenomenon\textsuperscript{422} obviously explains why officials in the Ministry of Education do not take the official 1:3 textbook ratio seriously, computed as it is from annual census forms submitted by headmasters: the ‘\textit{figure does not portray the reality (\ldots) we only assume it is 1:3}’ (official, MoEVT, interview 15).

The empirical investigation in Lushoto confirmed that arrangements between booksellers and headmasters were common practice. In several schools visited, separate interviews with headmasters and with teachers’ focus groups led to a divergent picture of the school textbook situation. Headmasters provided an inflated textbook ratio compared with the teachers’ figure. Members of staff at ELCT bookshop, further illuminated bookseller-headmaster business relations: ‘\textit{[Booksellers] provide teachers with receipts of Tsh 400,000 while they only buy for Tsh 200,000. So teachers tend to go there. We’re an institute bookshop. [X]’s is a private business; he can decide himself and can provide teachers with commissions or discounts. They talk the business language.}’ According to the headmaster in School G the label ‘booksellers’ cannot even be applied to the local entrepreneurs involved in the textbooks trade: ‘\textit{[They] are “walanguzi offisadi”\textsuperscript{423} They don’t go with the price, with the rules. You don’t get anything from them until you give them something. They abuse of money. They bring books which are not recommended.}’

Beyond headmasters’ petty corruption practices, the exploration of the district textbook trade provides an instructive entry point to understanding the key structuring features of a district economy. Four booksellers were located in Lushoto town: the ELCT bookshop,

\textsuperscript{421} The words ‘collusion’ or ‘collude’ were systematically used by informants to characterise headmasters-booksellers business relations.

\textsuperscript{422} ‘Vitabu’ stands for books and ‘hewa’ for air.

\textsuperscript{423} ‘Speculators’.
‘Mjema’, ‘Bosnia’ and ‘Kimako’. Other textbook traders - Gideon Gogwe and Soni General Traders - were located in Soni, an important district economic centre. Of these, only the ETLC bookshop, set up in 1970 by the Lutheran Church primarily to sell religious books, was exclusively dedicated to the book trade. In the case of Mjema, Bosnia and Kimako, textbook selling was only one activity within a diversified business complex. Eliapenda Mjema owns three companies all with school-related economic activities: his textbook and stationary company, a construction company which builds classrooms and laboratories in ward secondary schools and a hardware company which supplies cement, iron sheets and also school desks and chairs. Kimako’s business is similarly organised around the textbook and stationary shop, part of Tuvako Ewaka Trading Company which is also involved in construction, hardware activities and the supply of school desks and chairs. Bosnia Company, owned by Shabani, is also highly diversified: its activities range from hardware, stationary, spare parts to cosmetics, construction and coffee growing. The company builds schools, laboratories, libraries and teachers’ houses. With the recent national emphasis on science, their bookshops have also started to supply laboratory equipment and chemicals. Textbook trade, therefore, constitutes only one transaction site between these entrepreneurs and the teachers. Actually, teachers largely contribute to shaping the town economy: they fuel an entire local business cycle. A staff member at the Lushoto branch of the National Microfinance Bank explained:

Business in town depends largely on teachers, especially at the end of the month, when they come to town. They go far away and buy many things. Retail shops benefit a lot from them. The bigger employee population is constituted by teachers. There are no private investors. And teachers need to meet their social needs: they buy things. Without teachers, we would close. No other sector provides as many customers not even district officials. When teachers come to town they buy stationary and the suppliers borrow from us to be able to supply. It’s like a cycle. Businessmen come to us so we benefit indirectly from teachers.

Kimako, Mjema and Shabani, together with a few others, dominate Lushoto District’s economic activities, outside agriculture. The description of their business portfolios reveals an important feature: an accumulation strategy driven by a horizontal specialisation. An important part of their business chiefly is in acting as an intermediary: thanks to their capital strength and often their involvement in transportation, they acquire simple commodity goods in bulk in Tanga or Dar es Salaam - cement, iron sheets, sand and
textbooks - and retail them locally. The nature of the commodity does not matter, only their market outlet - the district council and its offshoots in the area. Shabani underlined local entrepreneurs’ dependence on the district: ‘We just deal with them because there’s no other work to do. They’re our main customer’. The traded commodity could simply be a tender. For instance, thanks to a robust financial base, a ‘tenderpreneur’ could successfully bid for a construction contract and then pass it onto another entrepreneur together with a loan to acquire the raw materials or with transport facilities to reach the construction site.\(^{424}\)

For these entrepreneurs the source of success resides in their robust capital base.\(^{425}\) In the case of the textbook trade, this financial base enables them to keep a large stock and therefore to be reactive to schools’ demands, especially in peak seasons (January, when the school year starts and the beginning of July, half-term time). It also enables them to supply textbooks on credit and gain their customers’ fidelity. But above all, these tenderpreneurs need to have a robust financial base to be able to deal with the repercussions of the cash-management issue that constrains the district planning and expenditure plans (see Chapter 6): tenderpreneurs need to be able to absorb long delays in payment by a cash-strapped district. The same characteristic applies to schools: ‘They don’t pay on time, they don’t pay well. There were delays, even for one year’ (entrepreneur, interview 160). However, entrepreneurs never choose to enforce the penalty clause included in their contract with the district: ‘Informally we talk with our suppliers. It means that contracts are not really binding documents. Because from the signed agreements they could sue us but they don’t. We’re in a good relationship’ (senior official, district, interview 126). Entrepreneurs’ over-dependence upon the district explains this prevalence of informality. Their economic survival hinges on a sustainable and smooth relationship with the district, their only credible market outlet: ‘Tenderers don’t want any conflict because tomorrow they won’t be able to work in that place so they don’t use that clause’ (official, district, interview 125). Working with the district also requires the ability to absorb a long chain of informal financial demands by district bureaucrats from the procurement stage to final payment. A local entrepreneur explained: ‘If the money comes from the district, you have to pass through the division officer and the ward executive officer to sign and they will delay the signature until you give them something. Now a new problem at the district, when you finish your work, they tell you to go and take a technician, then an engineer and then the ward officer then the internal auditor’ (interview 161).

\(^{424}\) The label “tenderpreneur” seems to have been coined by South African journalists.
\(^{425}\) The fieldwork did not allow investigation of the origin of this financial base.
The distinctions between private and public sectors are blurred. Tenderpreneurs and public officials form a small exclusive clique that dominates the political economy district landscape with public officials engaging in straddling accumulation strategies. ‘Most of the companies are themselves; they set up their own companies’ (local politician, interview 141). ‘In the district it’s difficult to get any tender. They give them to each other or they use somebody’s name. They know how they pick themselves’ (local entrepreneur, interview 163). School boards translate, at community level, this educational business complex. In eleven schools visited, headmasters had selected businessmen as members of their school board along with politicians and district officials: local petty traders, Lushoto-based hardware businessmen and constructors. For instance, Shabani of Bosnia Company was a member of School Y board. In School V, the headmaster selected construction businessmen so that ‘they can assist in constructions in the school’. In School C, teachers explained the pivotal role of the school board and teachers’ inability to influence its decision: ‘Within the board, there’s only one teacher who is a member, the headmaster or second master. We don’t have a meeting before to consult on the agenda and raise issues. They know themselves… For the books, we submit our list with the titles. They take our list but don’t even provide the titles requested. And [the headmaster] told us to use these ones first because due to the little money he could get only these titles’.

While ward secondary schools have been turned into a political battlefield for district elites (Chapter 6), they have also become ‘business schools’ (mother, School Q), a major site for elites’ accumulation.

Conclusion

Apple and Christian-Smith (1991: 33) argue that ‘to fully understand how specific cultural goods are produced and distributed for (our) public schools…we would need to unpack the logic of a fairly complicated set of interrelationships’. This chapter examined Tanzania’s textbook publishing and distribution infrastructure and their historical embeddedness within intricate political economy dynamics.

Footnote: Four schools had not yet established a board; in the remaining schools, only general information was provided about the board.
The 1990s opening of Tanzania’s textbook market imposed by donors was not based on any hard evidence of a comparative lack of efficiency of the state-owned textbook publishing complex. It propelled a process of commodification of textbooks, subjected to generic market principles. In practice, donors’ modes of interventions – their direct promotion of multinationals’ interests, their procurement procedures, the prevalence of the ‘transparency imperative’ and their utilitarian definition of quality education – were major factors in the shaping of the Tanzanian textbook market. These tangential objectives took precedence over broader educational goals and the construction of a flourishing national publishing industry.

The textbook sector was also affected by the specific political settlement built up in the early years of Independence. According to Gray (2012: 246) ‘the problem of devising a successful industrial policy system that could channel resources to companies to finance the learning period while also imposing discipline on the rent recipient were clearly not resolved by the privatisation process’. This chapter demonstrated the relevance of this analysis to the textbook sector. The enduring elite fragmentation and the state’s ambiguous relationship with capitalists have prevented the re-articulation within the market framework of a sovereign project through indigenous publishing companies. They have, on the contrary, provided a fertile soil for the advancement of multinational companies in the Tanzanian (text)book market.

In this context, the exploration of elites’ capture of the textbook public manna should not be misleading. Headmasters’ petty corruption, district entrepreneurs’ accumulation strategies and international companies’ corruption practices do not have the same significance. Their analytical juxtaposition should not lead to their conflation. But these phenomena reveal the state’s persistent inability to impose a discipline upon rent beneficiaries. To date, educational ambitions have had little bearing on this struggle over ideological and material interests, between and within internal and external forces. The future will reveal whether the standard textbook model, coupled with centralised procurement and the eviction of the most unruly players – the EMAC and Oxford University Press at national level and the headmaster-entrepreneur duopoly in the district – constituted a successful attempt by the state to regain control over the sector, an instance of effective rent management to achieve educational goals.
Chapter Eight

Conclusion

In 1988, commenting on the expansion of the government’s programme for secondary education, Julius Nyerere stated:

‘These [openings of new public and private secondary schools] are no plans for teaching but for cheating (...) What will it benefit a child if he or she goes from a poor primary school to an even poorer secondary school, without facilities or even an adequate number of teachers? What we are doing is upgrading primary education for a few, and then pretending that it is Secondary Education.(...) Something which is secondary education only in name is a deception of an innocent child as well as being useless as a preparation for future service to the community. We are training for frustration and alienation.’ (Nyerere 1988: 184)

Two decades later, ward secondary schools came to materialise, on a large scale, Nyerere’s words. The central state did not honour its part of the ‘ward schools contract’ which turned into a fools’ game and peasants and parents bore a disproportionate share of the costs of the reform. They did not get a fair deal in return for their investment: poor quality infrastructure, a shortage of teachers, scarcity of educational materials (textbooks and science equipment), and massive failures in the national examinations. These poorly performing ward schools are also expected to provide the next generation of teachers required by an ever-expanding education system. In the absence of a massive financial investment in the system, one may argue that the conditions have been created for self-perpetuating poor quality public education. Nevertheless, following Hirschman’s idea about unbalanced growth and bottleneck, one cannot dismiss the possibility that the ward secondary schools policy may lead to unintended productive consequences. If one embraces the idea that that educational policy 'learning paths' are not always linear or predictable, the actual long term developmental effects of the ward secondary schools policy remain today undetermined.
This thesis has used this specific educational policy as a prism to illuminate educational policy-making and implementation in Tanzania. The Tanzanian education system has remained since its inception the product of a complex interaction between external and internal forces, both material and ideological. This research has been driven by a general interrogation of the contemporary interplay between these forces in reproducing or transforming this education system. The exploration of the ward secondary schools policy, through a historically grounded analysis that posited education policies as sites of power and conflict, has, hopefully, shed light on important dimensions of the country’s education system.

Within the research field of education and development in sub-Saharan Africa, this thesis is novel in several respects. First, it is original in its very subjects, secondary education, which has barely been investigated in the last two decades, and an educational policy and its budget, which are, here, not reified as technocratic artefacts. The research has also gathered rich qualitative material, through interviews with about 180 members of the elite, at national, district and village levels. This elite lens constitutes an innovative feature of the thesis, which has demonstrated the heuristic value of a systematic analysis of elite narratives to make sense of an education policy. The social significance of the policy has emerged from the identification of contradictions between elite discourses and the material dimensions of the policy. Moreover, the thesis provides rare evidence on the role of education in local elites’ patronage strategies. While education has been widely recognised - in the literature on African ‘big men’ or on decentralisation - as a site of social mobilisation for local elites, this has rarely been thoroughly documented with empirical evidence. The thesis also offers significant insights on the financial reality experienced by ‘community schools’ and their material significance for the rural population. Finally, the investigation of the textbook sector constitutes another distinctive contribution of this thesis. It allows insights into the intimate relations between the education and economic spheres, which go beyond the production of the labour force. Specifically, the thesis provides evidence, to date perhaps unique, on the formation, in a district, of a politico-business complex around education resources, an important addition to the understanding of the social role of education in rural Africa.
The remainder of the chapter summarises the main findings of the thesis and then concludes by sketching out a future research agenda.

The comprehensive political economy approach adopted in this research proved more useful than alternative available theoretical frameworks. Indeed, Tanzanian authorities, when deciding upon the ward schools policy, and more generally on the appropriate combination of access and quality, have not been driven by a revealed aggregation of individual rates of return, as proponents of human capital theory might argue. Nor, the analysis and evidence suggest, can the ward secondary schools policy be effectively understood as a policy advanced by self-interested elites engaged in individual optimisation strategies, as advocates of new institutional political economy would argue. The role played by politicians’ individual ambitions, in national and district arenas, cannot be denied. Specifically, Prime Minister Lowassa was instrumental in launching and driving the policy. At district level, local politicians, while acting as the central state’s brokers, also reconfigured the national policy to serve their own pursuit of power. Nevertheless, arguments about elites’ individual self-interest fail to explain why Tanzanian politicians have invested in this specific field to fulfil their desire for power and they do not illuminate the mechanisms by which the politicians succeed in mobilising the population to implement their educational choices.

Education – if defined as transmission of knowledge, or learning – was certainly not the Tanzanian authorities’ concern when embarking on the process towards mass secondary education. The ward secondary school policy is, at its core, a device for youth management. It should be understood as the last offshoot of a process that started in the mid-1980s with the introduction of cost-sharing and the encouragement of private schools; this process steadily remodelled the educational settlement forged during the socialist period. Against the reality of public secondary education as a historical site of elite formation, the 2006 shift towards mass public secondary education marked a displacement of the locus of social differentiation in education. The expansion occurred against a background of quasi-universal primary education coupled with job scarcity and quality private education available only to the wealthy. In this context, under-resourced ward secondary schools can be interpreted as a renewed educational settlement intended to resolve the structural tension, inherent in education systems across the world, between their integrative purpose
and their role in social reproduction/differentiation. This might help explain Tanzanian elites’ seemingly high level of tolerance regarding the catastrophic Form Four examination failures. One might argue that, for Tanzanian elites, the ward secondary schools policy, far from being a failure, was adapted to the actual conditions of production in Tanzania today – an agrarian economy, capital intensive industrialisation, low-skilled service activities in the informal sector – and was pursuing an appropriate goal: a domesticated youth. Contrary to prevalent discourses in global spheres, access without learning may not be, from elites’ point of view, meaningless. This policy illustrates the enduring relevance of Marxist analyses and Foucault’s views on the socialisation function of schooling.

Neither the elites nor donors have met the fiscal challenge of mass secondary education. Since 2009/10, donors and domestic elites’ converging concerns over quality have allowed marginal budgetary adjustments in favour of secondary education and quality-related inputs. But the ward school process did not bring about any substantial budgetary realignment from either side. Donors did not provide the additional funding necessary to mitigate, at least, the damaging effects of access expansion on the quality of education. Their financial treatment of the learning crisis remained overly shaped by a ‘value for money’ approach and pressing demands for tight fiscal discipline. Elites’ egalitarian claims to legitimate the ward secondary schools policy also did not trigger any reconfiguration of their overarching budget preferences. Budget decisions have remained geared towards productive sectors at a macro level and to higher education at sector level while the social order imperative prevailed over welfare considerations.

For the central state and donors, locally driven secondary education expansion has offered an answer to the financial conundrum posed by a narrow national fiscal space shaped by their own preferences. In the light of the reality in Lushoto, one may argue that the model bears more resemblance to the bricolage of a public-private basic social net for the poor than to an effective commitment to quality secondary education for the poor. It marks the implicit renouncement of the concept of quality public education as a national public good. Given the degree of coercion involved in their collection, communities’ contributions to building and running the ward secondary schools may be reckoned a regressive tax on the poor. Moreover, far from being sites of human capital accumulation, ward ‘business’ secondary schools have mainly opened up a new field of prestige, power and capital
accumulation for the international, national and district elites. The capitation grant, earmarked for ward schools’ textbook purchases, constitutes a major site of frictions between donors and government authorities. It also embodies the symbiotic relation between public resources, local private sector development and foreign companies’ strategies to penetrate the Tanzanian market. The exploration of the textbook chain also illuminated the degree of elite capture of educational resources, via corrupt practices at various scales. Ward secondary schools may eventually be interpreted as the privatisation of the funding of rural public secondary education for a private gain that did not accrue to one of its major financiers, the peasants. In that context, new aid modalities currently under consideration – performance-related teacher pay and school funding – would radically shift the onus of quality education from the central state and international aid agencies to individuals. In doing so, donors would completely evade the structural question of the fiscal space for quality basic education for all and obscure the responsibility of domestic and international elites to fund it.

The ward secondary schools policy, whilst marking a break with the post-independence educational settlement, also displayed important elements of continuity with the past. This was especially evident in the homogeneous discourse deployed by elites to legitimate this education policy, with controversial outcomes. To sustain the policy elites, at national and local levels, have mobilised the national ‘imagined community’, historically nurtured by a widely shared belief in the power of education as an engine for collective, family and individual success. This conviction that cuts across social class boundaries partly enabled the large-scale social mobilisation that made the construction of ward secondary schools possible. Moreover, the mode of implementation of the ward schools policy, which implied a large dose of coercion and ignored the actual financial constraint, bore a marked resemblance to historical centrally driven policies that were implemented in a heavy-handed fashion by the central state. Tanzania’s history of ‘self-help’ development also offered an important discursive resource to justify the choice of communities’ contributions to fund the policy. Finally, the dominant class discourse revealed elites’ persistent self-positioning as benevolent educators of the masses, bringing development to obscurantist peasants, parents and students, who ‘do not value’ education and who are eventually blamed for the policy failures.
The legitimation discourse of elites, while deeply rooted in the country’s history, has been tangled with international aid agencies’ contemporary rhetoric: an instance of a hybrid discursive construct. Specifically, the symbolic system that has conceived secondary schooling, since the colonial period, as a site of access to modernity has been reworked in a ‘globalisation’ and ‘knowledge economy’ idiom. This discourse conceals domestic and international elites’ lasting concerns over youth integration as well as their enduring inability to chart out a job-intensive developmental path in Africa. In many respects, the ward secondary schools policy qualifies as a home-grown educational policy. Yet if donors and the Tanzanian executive disagreed on the pace of the expansion, they at least agreed on its locally driven model of implementation. Elites’ ‘imagined rural communities’ echo the World Bank’s romanticised poor, whose fate is detached from any historical and socio-economic structures, who need to be empowered to exercise their consumer rights, but who are also required to earn their way out of poverty and ignorance.

The actual funding conditions of the policy and elite capture of education resources intended for ward secondary schools render donor and elite rhetoric deeply ideological, in Marx’s sense of obfuscating or inverting reality. These discourses do, indeed, mask unequal material interests. Yet, the findings of this research confirm the importance of not overstating the functionalism of elites’ educational policy choices or the homogeneity of the state and the donor community. The ward secondary schools policy has been the outcome of conflicts between various factions of the dominant class. In particular, the study of the decision making process of the ward schools policy, the investigation of the national and district budgets and the analysis of the textbook policy demonstrated the specific position of education bureaucrats within the state. The interests of these bureaucrats may partly diverge from those of senior politicians or the Ministry of Finance. At both central and district levels, they enjoy degrees of autonomy and battle with other segments of the state to defend their sector-specific interests. In the case of the ward schools policy, the top executive had to resort to its coercive power to fully enrol a reluctant bureaucracy. The confusion around the actual textbook policy framework, a few years after the President’s announcement of the single textbook policy reform, can partly be explained by the successful strategies of education bureaucrats in the face of a policy of which they disapproved. These tensions are underpinned by diverging modernisation philosophies: while technocrats, like their counterparts in foreign aid agencies, firmly
embrace the ‘rule of the experts’, politicians, at least the generation in power, adhere to a ‘big push’ development strategy. The last episode in the capitation grant saga further illuminated that, within the aid arena, confrontational lines straddle the boundaries of government and aid agencies. In that instance, a coalition was forged between the education administration and education aid managers. Their converging interests – more funding for quality secondary education – prevailed over the opposing coalition formed by the Ministry of Finance and aid agency economists. One may eventually argue that the formation of educational policies and budgets in Tanzania can be best understood as historical processes animated by interdependent individuals and groups of actors, underpinned by a more or less unstable and shifting balance of power. At no point can a given manifestation of such processes be considered as definitive.

Finally, while the post-2015 global education agenda will probably incorporate a ‘universal lower secondary education’ goal and a ‘learning’ goal (United Nations 2013), the extreme case of ‘access without learning’ that Tanzanian ward secondary schools embody may usefully inform on-going reflections about this future agenda. In particular, this research has documented the crucial importance of an expanded fiscal space to support a process geared toward mass junior secondary education. Its findings challenge a core tenet of the new conventional wisdom that prevails in global spheres: resources do actually matter to learning. Furthermore, the findings of this thesis invite a close examination of the role of donors’ discourse, practices and competing agendas in the actual failures of traditional education policies such as schooling expansion, textbook provision or better pay for teachers. In the budget support era, good governance, anti-corruption, value for money, and results imperatives have taken precedence over a broader educational agenda. Donor micro-management has certainly crowded out the national policy and political spaces, hampering a locally specific deliberation on the very meaning of quality education for Tanzania. In the case of the textbook sector, donors’ promotion of western multinationals’ interests, their market ideology and their narrow, utilitarian definition of quality education have certainly prevented the deployment of an imaginative book and reading policy that could serve an emancipatory education.

In conclusion, a future research agenda may be sketched out that would address critical questions not covered in this thesis. Three main themes may be identified. A first theme
concerns the relations between education and the labour market. The ward secondary schools policy was certainly not formulated as a response to labour market demands. Economic considerations did play a determining role in shaping the policy, but chiefly as a critical discursive resource to legitimise it. Understanding of the actual relations between the Tanzanian education and training system and the country’s economy remains rudimentary. Quantitative and qualitative empirical data to elucidate the complex channels of interdependence between the two spheres are lacking. What impact has the enrolment expansion had on labour markets and wage levels in different sectors? In particular, does keeping people in school longer have a positive effect in tightening labour markets and, therefore, raising real wages for those employed? How to reconcile claims about the scarcity of jobs and the fact that young graduates shy away from the teaching profession? What are the specific features of the teaching labour market? To what extent do school fees influence parents’ working trajectories, including work-related migration patterns? More fundamentally, can the relation between education and economic development be subsumed into considerations over the production of the labour force?

A second research theme deals with the growth of private education provision. To what extent has the ward schools movement deepened a process of exit out of the public education system? What are the actual conditions that enable private schools to deliver better learning achievements? Are these performances the result of: a full embrace of market principles; specific modes of organisation and accountability; the social characteristics of their students? What is the effect of the growing private education sector on the labour market for graduates? To what extent do the egalitarian ethos of Tanzanian elites, their conditions of social reproduction and their straddling accumulation strategies contribute to shape the state’s policy vis-à-vis private education providers? To what extent would the growth of private education prevent the formation of an alliance between low income groups and the middle class to pressure the government to improve the quality of public education?

The third research axis would focus on a range of actors not studied in this work: parents, communities, teachers, students, the teachers’ trade union and civil society organisations. Indeed, the elite lens adopted for this research largely obscured, by definition, their actions. It would be interesting to examine how these actors did engage with this policy and
investigations in Lushoto already indicate various instances of disaffection and ‘exit’. Student truancy was pervasive. Besides, most parents refused to pay the food contribution that school boards imposed on them following a ministerial circular. This central level instruction to schools translated a joint donor-government determination to address the issue of poor learning achievements but was not supported by any additional funding; parents were summoned to fight the learning crisis; they defected. In the media and in informants’ interviews, teachers’ absenteeism and lack of commitment to their professional duties were regularly framed in political terms, as a form of ‘low intensity strike’. The fieldwork in Lushoto revealed that the conditions of reproduction of a teachers’ labour force have become extremely financialised, in part due to teachers taking out loans to pay for their children’s private education. Teachers’ high level of indebtedness, rooted in an under-resourced, under-performing public education system, may fuel their absenteeism as well as contributing to undermine their ability to engage in collective action. Teachers’ actual working, pay and living conditions would, in particular, deserve an in depth political economy analysis.

Will the transformed educational organisation prompted by the ward secondary schools policy form a stable educational settlement, as enduring as its post-independence predecessor? The extent to which, and the mechanisms through which, the existing forms of avoidance may lead to more structured forms of contestation are a matter of speculation or further investigation. The 2015 presidential elections, in which Edward Lowassa, the ‘father’ of the ward secondary schools, may be a prominent contender, may turn the ‘learning crisis’ into a major site of electoral competition between an ailing CCM ruling party and Chadema, its most credible opponent. Finally, Tanzania has discovered huge reserves of oil and gas. In this context, the capacity of the country to circumvent the rent curse and to use part of the new manna to expand the national fiscal space for good quality education for all would critically hinge upon the ability of social forces to radically alter the coalition of interests that currently determine the mobilisation and allocation of resources to public education.
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Annex A  Political leaders, development strategies and education policies: historical landmarks

Source: the author
Annex B  The education and general budget support aid arenas in 2011

EDUCATION AID ARENA

- Joint education sector dialogue fora and instruments
- ESDP Secretariat
  - E-ESDP Chair and Dep. Chair + Secretariat
  - UN agencies: UNESCO, UNICEF, WFP
  - Project approach: USAID, JICA
  - Education DPG
    - GBS/SBS donors: DFID, CIDA, SIDA, France
    - Education DPG:
      - World Bank & AfDB
      - Project approach: USAID, JICA
    - TENMET (Civil society)

GENERAL BUDGET SUPPORT ARENA

- Joint Technical Working groups
  - Poverty Monitoring DPG:
    - AIDB, EC, Canada, Switzerland, World Bank, UNICEF
    - Poverty Monitoring DPG:
      - AIDB, Belgium, IMF, DFID, Canada, IICA, Denmark, Norway, World Bank
      - GBS/GBS DPG:
        - AIDB, Canada, CIDA, Denmark, EC, Japan, Norway, Sweden, UK/DFID

Source: the author
Annex C  Aid and budget data, a methodological note

Two main categories of data are used to support the financial analyses of this dissertation: the education budget at central and district levels, and overseas development assistance. This note intends to clarify their sources, the methodological assumptions that underline them and their limitations.

1. Education public expenditures: the budget

Since a seminal education Public Expenditures Review in 1994, Tanzanian education finances have been subject to continuous scrutiny. Over the research period, this close examination entailed several public expenditures reviews (for instance OPM 2001; World Bank 2011b); two public expenditures tracking surveys in 2002 (REPOA 2004) and 2008-2009 (Claussen and Assad 2010) and one Rapid Budget Analysis (GBSDPG 2007). UNESCO (2012a: Chapter 3) provides the most comprehensive and in-depth analysis of education finances. However, its analysis only partially covers the period of this research. One key limitation of these different studies for the purpose of the present research project lies in their various definitions of the scope of the education sector. Indeed, delimitating the boundaries of education expenses remains a matter of conventional choice which makes the integration of budgetary data from different second-hand sources a delicate exercise.

Budget books are quite widely available, in hard copy for older years,\footnote{In various public libraries, even if each institution cannot provide a time-consistent set of budget books, both for recurrent and development: in Tanzania REPOA or the Parliament's library in Dodoma; in London, SOAS.} and on the Ministry of Finance’s website for most recent years. Nevertheless, the construction of a consistent time-series of education expenditures scattered over several budget votes, if possible, would have been very time-consuming. URT (2011b) provides the only time-series of the education budget that covers the entire research period. For this reason, this data was used (Table C.1).
This table has several limitations. First, it is not accompanied by any information about its specific definition of the scope of the education sector and sub-sectors (in terms of budget votes and sub-votes) and the institutional organisation of the sector has changed on several occasions (for instance, the merger of higher education with the MoEVT or the decentralisation of secondary education in 2009). It also does not provide any information about vocational training, a sub-sector that has gained attention in recent years. However, given that the primary source of the data has not changed – the Ministry of Finance – it is assumed that the underlying assumptions have been consistent over time. This choice also has the advantage of using the government’s own data on intra-sector budget allocations.

This table provides budgeted amounts rather than actual expenditures; budget implementation can give rise to major variations. But given that Chapter 5 is chiefly concerned with elites’ budget allocations preferences over large categories of education expenditures, the use of ‘budget estimates’ does not constitute a major deterrent factor.

One critical issue is that this table does not discriminate between personal emoluments, other charges, capital expenditures from domestic source (‘development local’) or external source (‘development foreign’). This lack of disaggregation prevents a refined financial analysis; for instance, traditionally, a proper education financial analysis would assess the share of non-salary recurrent expenditures and compare it with its counterpart in the total

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**Table C-1: Budget allocation by education sub-sector, in cent million Tsh (current prices)**

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<td>Total Government Budget</td>
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<td>2,607</td>
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<td>4,850</td>
<td>6,067</td>
<td>7,216</td>
<td>9,514</td>
<td>11,609</td>
<td>13,526</td>
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<td>12,107</td>
<td>13,972</td>
<td>15,965</td>
<td>17,941</td>
<td>20,948</td>
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<td>28,213</td>
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<td>Education sector</td>
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<td>488</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,430</td>
<td>1,744</td>
<td>2,045</td>
<td>2,283</td>
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<td>619</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary and higher education</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>622</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: URT (2011b)
government budget. In a similar vein, data on the total government budget does not discount for the weight of the debt service which is a first order budget priority. The distinction between discretionary and non-discretionary is obscured and the assessment of the actual budget effort towards education made less meaningful (for a discussion see Penrose 1993). Nevertheless, in trading off between time-consistency in intra-sector allocation and disaggregation of data, the first parameter appeared more important to the argument developed in Chapter 5.

To make up for the absence of data on the teachers’ wage bill, a specific table was constructed from two main sources. For FY2008/09, the primary teachers’ wage bill is based on data from ‘Login Tanzania’. This website, set up within the donors-funded Local Government Reform Programme, provides detailed data on local government finances by district, function and sector. Some inconsistencies exist with the Ministry of Finance’s Integrated Finance Management Information System (IFMIS). The executed budget amount (‘cumulative outcomes’) was used here. In FY 2008/09 secondary education was not yet decentralised: secondary teachers’ personal emoluments are therefore based on the MoEVT’s budget books (supply vote 46, secondary education directorate, actual expenditures). In FY2010/11 and FY2011/12, both primary and secondary education were decentralised but data on education personal emoluments provided by Login Tanzania do not disaggregate between primary and secondary education. Both teachers’ wage bills were directly computed from regional budget books available on the Ministry of Finance’s website (appendices to Volume III). The exercise required adding up, for each district in the 21 regions, the actual expenditures (FY 2010/11) and the approved estimates (FY 2011/12) corresponding to ‘primary education basic salary’ (sub-vote 5007, item line 210101) and ‘secondary education basic salary’ (sub-vote 5008, item line 210101). The analysis focused on ‘basic salary’ and did not include ‘personal allowances’ (sub-vote 210300).

428 www.logintanzania.net. The website was discontinued in September 2013. District budget data are now provided on the PMO-RALG web site, starting with FY 2010/11 (http://lginf.pmoralg.go.tz/lginformation/).
### Table C-2: Teachers’ basic salaries, primary and secondary education (in Tsh, constant prices. 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008/09</th>
<th>2010/11</th>
<th>2011/12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Teachers</strong></td>
<td>284,851,524,545</td>
<td>227,864,348,510</td>
<td>267,526,654,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary teachers</strong></td>
<td>70,507,222,948</td>
<td>62,736,372,962</td>
<td>89,620,886,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total teachers’ wage bill</strong></td>
<td>355,358,747,492</td>
<td>290,600,721,473</td>
<td>357,147,540,771</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author, based on Login Tanzania and MoF budget books. Note: personal enrolment data from Login Tanzania (primary teachers, FY2008/09) may not be restricted to ‘basic salaries’ and may also include ‘allowances’.

### 2. Education overseas development assistance

The OECD-DAC aid data set is an important source of data on overseas development assistance flows. However, when research requires disaggregated data by sub-sector and historical trends, DAC statistics are much less practicable. The lack of uniform time series data leads Bennell and Furlong (1998), in their evaluation of ‘trends in donor funding for education and basic education since the late 1980s’, to ‘re-survey all the bilateral donors in order to obtain basic statistical data on education aid expenditures since 1990 (…) as well as other relevant policy documentation’. In a similar vein, to compensate for the lack of disaggregated and easily available data on external assistance to Tanzanian education, the author constructed a specific data set from various sources. The result should therefore be interpreted as a composite and highly imprecise construct that only provides general trends.

The various sources are the following:

- **PEDP funds (FY 2004/05 and FY 2005/06):** an official matrix of amounts ‘deposited’ by donors in PEDP bank account. The document was drafted by the MoEVT and provided to the author by CIDA. Data were in USD; exchange rates were drawn from [http://ec.europa.eu/budget/contracts_grants/info_contracts/inforeuro/inforeuro_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/budget/contracts_grants/info_contracts/inforeuro/inforeuro_en.cfm). The fiscal year when funds were ‘deposited’ was used even if, due to administrative time lags, funds might have been executed in the following fiscal year.

- **PEDP funds (for FY 2006/07 onward, mainly from France):** budget books (volume IV public expenditures estimates – development) (actual expenditures)

- **For the World Bank SEDP I and II and higher education project:** disbursement financial information provided by the World Bank’s web page on its Tanzanian projects. For instance for the SEDP I,
- For the African Development Bank’s secondary project (FY 2004/05 and FY2005/06): budget books, (volume IV public expenditures estimates – development) (actual expenditures)

- For Nordic projects on higher education and research (SIDA, NORAD): budget books (volume IV public expenditures estimates – development) (actual expenditures)

- General Budget Support: to account for the contribution to education of general budget support – a non-earmarked aid modality - a percentage equivalent to the share of education in the national budget in a specific year was applied to the GBS total amount of that same year. This amount notionally allocated to education was then distributed between each education sub-sector along the allocative key derived from the education budget pattern as exposed in URT (2011b) (table E.3). Data on GBS disbursements by agency are from Ministry of Finance’s Aid Management Platform as reported in ADE et al. (2012: 5). However, for FY 2004/05, the data is based on ODI and Daima Associates (2005) (table E.4).  

- Sector budget support: over the period, three agencies have provided sector budget support (EC, CIDA and DFID). Disbursements data are provided in ADE et al. (2012: 5) along with GBS funding (Table E.4). Like GBS, SBS is in theory a non-earmarked aid modality. However, in practice in Tanzania, the Ministry of Finance tends to apply an ‘additionality’ principle and allocates the entire amount to the education sector. Therefore the author decided to allocate 100 per cent of SBS disbursements to the education sector and then to apply the distribution key between sub-sectors (Table E.3).  

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429 To account for general budget support in the calculation of total aid, UNESCO Institute of Statistics adds up 20% of GBS aid to ‘public expenditure on education’ figures reported by countries (UNESCO 2012c)

430 USAID’s support being off-budget, it is here not accounted for.
### Table C-3: Distribution of the education budget between sub-sectors (per cent)

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary, non-formal, supporting services</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secondary education</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher education</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary and higher education</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: URT (2011b)

### Table C-4: Disbursements of GBS and education SBS, in million Tsh (current prices)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GBS Total</strong></td>
<td>464,872</td>
<td>591,711</td>
<td>790,334</td>
<td>963,397</td>
<td>940,646</td>
<td>1,214,665</td>
<td>900,330</td>
<td>947,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBS Education</td>
<td>70,196</td>
<td>94,674</td>
<td>156,486</td>
<td>174,375</td>
<td>186,248</td>
<td>222,284</td>
<td>158,458</td>
<td>160,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBS Education</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>63,587</td>
<td>57,448</td>
<td>38,386</td>
<td>138,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>42,097</td>
<td>41,669</td>
<td>38,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21,490</td>
<td>15,779</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>76,110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author; data from ADE et al. (2012: 5) based on the Ministry of Finance’s Aid Management Platform

### Table C-5: Allocation of education external finance across education sub-sector, in million Tsh (current)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEDP (basket fund and WB)</td>
<td>172,294</td>
<td>58,197</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,410</td>
<td>1,896</td>
<td>2,046</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBS/SBS</td>
<td>44,808</td>
<td>59,170</td>
<td>100,949</td>
<td>98,081</td>
<td>168,836</td>
<td>194,305</td>
<td>122,470</td>
<td>151,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (UN, French, ICT,...)</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>15,182</td>
<td>1,852</td>
<td>2,316</td>
<td>2,325</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>4,170</td>
<td>2,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>221,302</td>
<td>147,733</td>
<td>104,654</td>
<td>107,124</td>
<td>175,383</td>
<td>196,891</td>
<td>130,810</td>
<td>155,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEDP World Bank</td>
<td>35,570</td>
<td>42,886</td>
<td>38,236</td>
<td>38,236</td>
<td>67,527</td>
<td>41,862</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>5,225</td>
<td>1,725</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBS/SBS</td>
<td>12,801</td>
<td>14,774</td>
<td>19,583</td>
<td>27,614</td>
<td>23,240</td>
<td>17,376</td>
<td>19,358</td>
<td>60,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>53,595</td>
<td>59,385</td>
<td>19,583</td>
<td>65,850</td>
<td>23,240</td>
<td>17,376</td>
<td>86,685</td>
<td>102,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Higher Education/research</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Elements of Lushoto District budget and community contributions

Analyses of Lushoto district budget proposed in Chapter Six are based on two main data sources:
- The Ministry of Finance’s website and the Treasury releases of grants to district
- Lushoto District Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (or budget), provided to the author by Tanga Regional Administrative Secretariat

In general, district MTEFs have been privileged as sources of information (some minor discrepancies occur between the two sources).

Recurrent expenditures:

Treasury releases to LGAs in FY 2010/11 are accessible on the MoF website. They comprise of all grants earmarked for district level recurrent secondary education expenditures (district secondary education office’s other charges, examination expenses, teachers’ leave travel allowances and moving expenses, capitation grant and school meals).

In the case of Lushoto, only one government secondary school (Shamabalai A level) is affected by school meals.

Treasury releases to Lushoto District for FY 2010/11 confirmed that the level of capitation grant sent to districts (for further transfer to schools) reached an approximate amount of Tsh 25,000 per student. However, the Lushoto District MTEF based its computation of the secondary education grant on 23,950 enrolled students, the figure used by this research; the Treasury release to the district was calculated with a different figure: 26,545. Similarly,

![Table](http://www.mof.go.tz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=608%3Amg&catid=55%3Aother-chargesoc&Itemid=224)
there is a slight discrepancy between personal emolument (PE) data provided in district MTEFs and in MoF budget books.

Development expenditures

In terms of capital expenditures (or ‘development’), the Treasury releases account for the transfer of development grants to districts. In 2009/10, at national level, a specific education window – the Education Sector Development Fund – supplemented LGAs’ discretionary development funds. It was merged within the general, discretionary Local Government Development Fund in FY 2011/12. District MTEFs provide the allocation of these discretionary funds between various sectors and sub-sectors.

The district MTEF accounts for the World Bank’s ‘capitation grant’ as ‘development’ expenditures and not ‘OC-recurrent’. In FY 2010/11, the World Bank capitation grant was not included in Lushoto’s MTEF due to a delayed formal commitment. The author could not verify the existence of a supplementary district budget that would have accounted, in the course of the fiscal year, for these additional resources. The MTEF implementation report does not account for these additional funds. The author did have access to the Lushoto SEDP report for that year: this specific report, intended for the national authorities as well as the World Bank, may well propose a more comprehensive account of the actual capitation grant resources.

The Lushoto FY 2011/12 MTEF includes a budget item on ADB funds. Detailed information on these financial resources could not be collected: no one interviewed in any of the different structures (district, PMO-RALG, the MoEVT, MoF and even the ADB itself) could provide an explanation of these funds.

Community contributions in Lushoto: a rough estimation

Based on the standard unit cost of Tsh 7 million for one classroom and considering that a school could only officially be registered with a minimum of 4 classrooms, the amount contributed by Lushoto communities between 2006 and 2010 for the construction of secondary schooling infrastructures could be roughly estimated at Tsh 1.3 billion (current prices).
References: Budget books (Ministry of Finance):

Recurrent Expenditures:

*Volume II Public Expenditure Estimates Supply Votes (Ministerial) As Passed By National Assembly*, various years

Development (capital) expenditures:

*Volume IV Public Expenditure Estimates - Development As Passed By National Assembly*, various years

District education expenditures:

*Appendices to Volume III Estimates Of Public Expenditure Supply Vote - Details On Urban And District Councils Grants And Subventions* (2011/12 and 2012/13, all regions)