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Declaration for PhD thesis

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Signed: Marie-Laure Verdier-Shin  Date: 13 December 2013
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Abstract

The task of this research is to examine how South Korean evangelicals construct their mission strategy to North Korea. In order to respond to the humanitarian concerns in North Korea, South Korean evangelicals have established or used already existing humanitarian organisations (also known as faith-based organisations in the secular field) and carried out holistic mission in North Korea. This research seeks to demonstrate how they have responded to the perceived needs of the mission field while respecting the socio-political conditions imposed both by the South and North Korean governments. However, it is also argued that they are ready to challenge South Korean governments when necessary through advocacy and that they desire to transform North Korean society and challenge the state of division. Their aim is to work for the reconstruction and reunification of an imagined Christian nation. By comparing the Korean peninsula to biblical Israel, their goal is to restore God’s glory in Pyongyang which was once called the Jerusalem of the East. However, some evangelicals reflect on mission strategies to North Korea and seek to understand the North Korean worldview better, this research suggests that they are considering implementing cross-cultural missiological principles to pursue their mission successfully. This research argues that evangelicals have been shaped by and have engaged with their context: evangelicals have never been apolitical, as they have always been driven by a strong sense of Christian nationalism. Equally, this research argues that in spite of the rhetoric, they have also been concerned to a certain extent with issues of poverty and injustices [256 words].
A note on romanisation and referencing

For the Romanisation of Korean words when using Korean sources, I have used the McCune-Reischauer system as recommended by the U.S. Library of Congress and the Journal of Korean Studies. As a French speaker, I also think that the system translates more faithfully Korean sounds. However, currently, in South Korea, the Revised Romanisation of Korean system is in use. This means that Koreans will translate their names under the new system. I have therefore tried as much as possible to romanise Korean names with the new system when referencing or quoting from a Korean source. In addition, I follow the Western model of referring to the author’s first name first followed by his or her last name which is contrary to Korean convention. Sometimes, however, Korean scholars do not always follow those rules and have adopted a slightly different Romanisation system for their names. I have tried to respect their choice as much as possible but I have also included a romanised version of their names under the McCune-Reischauer system for the sake of consistency.

When referring to a historical figure however or when referring to a Korean person (not a source), I use the Korean convention: family name, followed by their first name. Again there might be some exceptions to this. For example the first South Korean President is generally known as Syngman Rhee.

When quoting from sources who themselves romanised Korean terms, I have left their romanised Korean words untouched because I would be altering the quote by changing it. Finally, I have italicised Korean words except for those who have become commonplace in English such as the name of cities, minjung or Juche.
Glossary of terms

- American Far East Broadcasting: FEBC
- Christian Council of Korea: CCK
- Christian Solidarity Worldwide: CSW
- Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice: CCEJ
- Civil Society Organisation: CSO
- Commission's European Community Humanitarian Office: ECHO
- Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence: CPKI
- Economic and Social Council of the United Nations: ECOSOC
- Faith-based organisation: FBO
- Grand National Party: GNP
- International Red Cross Committee: ICRC
- International Crisis Group: ICG
- Korean Association of Voluntary Agencies: KAVA
- Korean Communist Party: KCP
- National Council of Churches in Korea: NCCK
- Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea: KNCCK
- Non-governmental organisation: NGO
- Non-profit organisation: NPO
- Open Doors International: ODI
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: OECD
- People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy: PSPD
- Public Distribution System: PDS
- United Nations Development Programme: UNDP
- World Council of Churches: WCC
Chapter 1: Introduction

1. Introduction

This introductory chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section will introduce the context, themes and research questions related to this research. The second part will be dedicated to fieldwork, ethical concerns and development of research questions.

**Evangelicals and social involvement**

The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st have seen a “religious resurgence” (Haynes 2007: 27), so much so that, “in the modern world, religion is central, perhaps the central, force that motivates and mobilizes people” (Huntington quoted in Haynes 2007: 27). As argued later, scholars and policy makers have come to recognise the positive contributions made by faith-based organisations (FBOs) in the fields of development, conflict resolution and human rights.

However, for a very long time, scholars in the field of international relations believed in the decline of the influence of religion in the public sphere as a result of a series of secularising events that took place in medieval Europe and the modernising theories that ensued (Jack Snyder 2011: 24). During the Cold War and the elaboration of theories of development, the majority of Western scholars ignored the role played by religion because it was seen as an obstacle to development (Lunn 2009; Fox & Sandler 2004; Marshall 2001; Clarke & Jennings 2008; Holenstein 2005). Western academics and governments believed that only nation states could bring about development by injecting substantial
amounts of development aid to help developing countries ‘progress’. In the West, many believed that the world would become increasingly secular as it modernised and progressed technologically (Haynes 2007). Until the 1960s, secularisation remained an undisputed paradigm in spite of the rise of Protestantism in North America and the role played by the Catholic Church in the reconstruction of Europe after the war (Martin 2005: 18).

The idea that religion would decline as society advanced technologically and economically is known as the ‘secularisation theory’. It formally originated with philosophers of the Enlightenment in Europe such as Hobbes, Spinoza and Hume, was consolidated at Westphalia (1648) through the subordination of religion to the state (Shah & Philpott 2011: 37), and was further promoted by Marx and Darwin in the 19th century as well as Weber, Durkheim and Freud in the beginning of the 20th century (Shah & Philpott 2011: 27).

Another factor that contributed to the apparent withdrawal of religion from society in the West was the division within Christianity itself. As this research will later explain, in the beginning of the 20th century especially, Christians became very divided over the question of whether to focus on social action (and thus involvement in the public sphere) or prioritise personal salvation (keeping religion in the private sphere) (Woolnough 2010: 9). The ecumenical movement formally established after the Second World War, the World Council of Churches (WCC), is usually described as liberal by evangelicals because of its focus on social action. Evangelicals, on the other hand, have always placed personal salvation at the centre of their theology and as such are often regarded as conservative.
The Cold War further deepened this division. Many evangelicals in the West sought to transform the political world order through missions to communist countries that called for religious conversion and by supporting to American anti-communist foreign policies, but did not make social justice their priority. Mainline Protestants, especially the World Council of Churches, were perceived by evangelicals as suspect because they engaged in social activism and also counted as members the official churches in communist countries which also meant that they often ignored or outright contradicted reports of persecution of Christians outside the official bodies in those countries.

Christianity in South Korea underwent similar forms of demarcation. In fact, under the authoritarian regimes, the South Korean Christian progressive movement elaborated its own form of liberation theology, minjung theology. Thus, for the most part, scholarship on the involvement of Christians in politics in the aftermath of the Korean War focuses on the political role played by adherents of minjung theology. For believers of minjung theology, salvation was not a personal matter but a social process. Rather than being rescued from their sins, people had to be rescued from their state of suffering, suffering under the authoritarian regimes in the South.

Evangelicals, however, remained mostly uncritical of the South Korean authoritarian regimes until the 1980s, stating that they wanted to stay ‘apolitical’ and promote a pure gospel. Furthermore, because of their history with Western Christianity and its missionaries, they are often believed to have neglected their social responsibility. A prominent minjung scholar, Kwang-sun Suh, argued that “Americans put a fundamentalist stamp on Korean religion that has lasted until the present day: ‘the revival meetings...set the tone of Korean Protestantism:
emotional, conservative, Pentecostal, individualistic, and other-worldly” (Kwang-sun Suh quoted in Brouwer, Gifford & Rose 1996: 112). More recently, Joseph Jung argued that the reason for the Korean Protestant (liberal and conservative) church’s lack of influence on society was because of its simplistic and narrow understanding of the term conversion: “ [the] famous slogan ‘believe in Jesus - go to heaven,’ [a] simplistic formula to achieve salvation or to get a ticket to heaven has been one of the key catch-phrases for evangelistic mission in Korea; unfortunately, it has resulted in an individualistic and other-worldly Christian faith” (Joseph Jung 2009: 238).

Figures seem to corroborate these arguments. As of 2006, 72.9 % of Korean missionaries were involved in evangelistic and spiritual activities with only a limited percentage involved in social welfare, community development and medical missions (Steve Sang-cheol Moon 2012: 60). With a total number of 19,373 missionaries in 177 countries, South Korea has become the second largest missionary sending nation after the United States (Steve Sang-cheol Moon 2012: 84). According to Young-dong Kim, church growth remains the strongest motive for mission and “most Korean Evangelicals have focused on reaching the ‘unreached peoples’ and frontier missions. This means the top priority policy of the Korean Evangelicals would be placed on evangelism. For some Korean Evangelicals, social responsibility is not regarded as missions, but one of many functions of the church” (Young-dong Kim 2012: 336). In other words, Young-dong Kim argues that evangelicals do not prioritise social action when they develop their mission strategy. Furthermore, Rev. Seung-min Shin, executive Secretary for Ecumenical Relations of the Presbyterian Church of the Republic of Korea (PROK) argues that it was only after the kidnapping of 23 South Korean
missionaries in Afghanistan in 2007 that the Korean Church started to reflect on “its methods of overseas mission, which ignore the socio-political and cultural context of the missionary-receiving countries, and have resulted in church planting and conversion” (Seung-min Shin 2008: 75).

However, Christianity in Korea, whether liberal or conservative, has never been apolitical or socially inactive. Protestant Christianity was introduced to Korea at the end of the 19th century. It rapidly flourished, as it was associated, inter alia, with Korea’s striving for independence and modernity. In the South, in the aftermath of the Korean War, evangelical churches actively supported the successive governments’ politics of anti-communism and economic growth. Furthermore, in spite of their strong concern with evangelism, evangelicals have always been involved—to a certain degree—in social action. In fact, the rapid growth of the church in South Korea and the Christian involvement in the public sphere is such that the theory of modernisation alongside a secularisation of society cannot be applied to the case of South Korea (see Davie 2002; Il-hyun Cho & J. Katzenstein 2011).

Famine in North Korea and evangelical responses

Since its inception, North Korea had been relying on a Soviet style economic system and a public distribution system (PDS), which was established in the 1950s to allocate food to the population. North Korea used to rely greatly on aid, especially oil, provided by the former Soviet Union and China. In 1987, Russia stopped donating aid. The former Soviet Union in 1990, and China, in 1993, demanded that the North paid goods with hard currency rather than through barter trade. In 1994, China decided to reduce its grain shipment. This decrease in foreign aid combined with government mismanagement provoked the death of
hundreds of thousands of people. By the time the international community decided to provide assistance, it was already too late. In order to cope with the virtual collapse of the PDS, the North Korean population has been increasingly relying on markets that have been burgeoning in the country. However, the regime’s monetary reforms and regular clampdowns on markets mean that to this date access to food remains a severe problem for the whole North Korean population.

The country needs economic reforms and it is the North Korean government’s refusal to undertake such reforms that has caused the North Korean population much suffering. Therefore, the population’s failure to have access to food is a consequence of government policy and not caused by a lack of food supply. In his study of famines, Amartya Sen has labelled this particular problem ‘failure of entitlement’ (Sen 2007: xvii-xviii).

In 1994, the death of the North Korean leader Kim Il-sung at the height of the famine and a nuclear crisis marked the ‘opening’ of North Korea to the world. Hundreds of refugees started to flee the country to seek food and work in China. As refugees made their way down to South Korea, they raised awareness about the horrendous human rights situation in the North. At the same time, North Korea appealed to foreign governments for food aid and foreign NGOs and international organisations were allowed to enter the country to bring humanitarian assistance.

The human rights and humanitarian crisis in North Korea meant that non-state actors in South Korea were allowed to play a more concrete role in the shaping of South Korea’s relations with North Korea. Religious groups and particularly evangelicals have been at the forefront of humanitarian assistance to North Korea.
They have also led the campaigns that condemn gross human rights violations, the existence of labour camps and have established the networks that help North Koreans escape North Korea. In other words, “Christians have become the alpha and the omega of the North Korean issue” (Il-hyun Cho & Katzenstein 2011:186).

The humanitarian intervention of South Korean evangelical organisations in North Korea are often interpreted in the context of Korean re-unification and the Protestant efforts to reconcile with the North which started with the visit of Korean American Pastor Kim Seong-nak, born in North Korea, to Pyongyang in 1979 (Mahn-yol Yi 2006: 243). The organisations themselves say that they are working toward the reconciliation and reunification of the two countries. Sebastian Kim says that the current Protestant responses to the issues of division can be categorised in three ways: “unification as part of an anti-communist campaign and mission agenda (conservative Christians), promoting dialogue between the two nations (liberal Christians), and involvement in a supportive and sharing humanitarian campaign (both conservative and liberal Christians) (Sebastian C.H. Kim 2011: 124). More concretely, South Korean evangelicals have responded differently to different concerns and their strategies can be broadly divided into three: first, evangelicals have chosen to address the food crisis by working directly with the North Korean authorities and by providing food and development assistance to North Korea. As explained later, in doing so, some evangelicals have also set aside their evangelising agenda and sought the help of liberal Christians.

Second, Korean evangelicals and North Korean refugees converted to Christianity believe that the humanitarian crisis is foremost a violation of North Koreans’ most fundamental human right by the North Korean authorities, and
have established human rights organisations to raise awareness about human rights violations and seek regime change. These groups refuse to engage with the North Korean government, which they believe cannot be trusted, and therefore for the most part, oppose the provision of humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea. Third, other groups have chosen to assist North Koreans to escape their country. Their work is often compared to that of American activists in the 19th century who had established an ‘underground railroad’ to help slaves escape to free states. Melanie Kirkpatrick has documented the labour of these Christian activists thoroughly in a recent book: *Escape from North Korea: The Untold Story of Asia’s Underground Railroad* (2012).

**Research questions**

The different approaches to the North Korean crisis illustrate the diversity of thinking in terms of mission within a similar conservative tradition. Young-dong Kim argues that “the supreme policy of the sending missionaries and mission practices should be based on the needs of the mission field, rather than the needs of the Korean missionaries/churches” (Young-dong Kim 2012: 340). By examining the ways by which evangelicals have responded to the humanitarian/food crisis in North Korea (in other words how they have responded to the perceived needs of the mission field), my research seeks to understand how South Korean evangelicals design and implement their mission strategies globally and more specifically in North Korea. The main question I am going to give a response to is: how do South Korean evangelical organisations construct their mission strategies to North Korea? While I address this main question, I am going to give answers to a series of sub questions:
How do they respond to the perceived humanitarian concerns in North Korea?

How do they view North Korea? Does active involvement in the North mean that they have given up on their anti-communist stance?

What is their context? What are the factors and conditions that limit and determine their related activities in the South and in the North?

I will be using the holistic model of contextualisation as a criterion to assess mission to North Korea. Mission is always contextual as it implies the insertion of the gospel into another context: “the Christian faith never existed except as ‘translated’ into a culture” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 458). Therefore, I intend to demonstrate how evangelicals in South Korea have been shaped by and engaged with their context. More specifically, as the purpose of my study is to show how evangelicals are engaging with issues of poverty, division of the country and human rights, I will be referring to the holistic model of contextualisation (as explained later).

Before I proceed, I would like to give a definition of some theological terms and explain what I mean when I refer to the term evangelical. Even though my research is presented in the field of Korean studies, it contains a certain number of theological terms which are, I believe, necessary to introduce in order to understand the rest of this research. For the most part, I am referring to definitions provided by two recognised evangelical scholars, the late John Stott and Alister McGrath.

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1 North Koreans might have shared the same traditions, culture, history and language and so on with South Koreans for over a thousand years, after sixty years of division living under a very different political system and isolated from the rest of the world, I think it is fair to say that the country and its people have developed very differently. I develop this further in the chapter dedicated to Juche.
2. Glossary

**Evangelism**: The prominent British evangelical scholar, John Stott, has broadly defined evangelism as follows: “*evangelism (evangelizomai)* means to bring or to announce the *evangelion*, the good news” (Stott 2008 (1975): 58). “The good news is Jesus. And the good news about Jesus which we announce is that he died for our sins and was raised from death. In consequence, he reigns as Lord and Saviour at God’s right hand and has authority both to command repentance and faith, and to bestow forgiveness of sins and the gift of the Spirit on all those who repent, believe and are baptised” (Stott 2008 (1975): 83).

**Conversion**: Christians who evangelise or share the good news expect that other people would respond positively to the message and ‘convert’. Stott says that in secular contexts, conversion means ‘to turn’: to turn around or to return. In a Christian context, conversion can be described as “having ‘turned to God from idols’ (1 Thessalonians 1:9; Acts 14:15) and also after ‘straying like sheep’, as having ‘now returned to the Shepherd and Guardian of your souls’ (1 Peter 2:25)” (Stott 2008 (1975): 169). Evangelisation must be different from the act of proselytism or the “deliberate attempt to engineer conversions” (Davies quoted by Stott 2008 (1975): 164). In 1964, the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches defined the term proselytism as such: “Proselytism... is the corruption of witness. Witness is corrupted when cajolery, bribery, undue pressure or intimidation is used—subtly or openly—to bring about seeming conversion; when we put the success of our church before the honour of Christ ... when personal or corporate self-seeking replaces love for every individual soul for whom we are concerned” (WCC quoted in Stott 2008 (1975): 165).
**Soteriology:** “The term ‘soteriology’ (from the Greek soteria, ‘salvation’) is increasingly used to refer to what were traditionally designated ‘theories of the atonement’ or ‘the work of Christ’. Soteriology embraces two broad areas of theology: the question of how salvation is possible and, in particular, how it relates to the history of Jesus Christ; and the question of how ‘salvation’ itself is to be understood” (McGrath 2011: 319).

**Eschatology:** Eschatology means the Christian understanding of the ‘last things’.

“The term ‘eschatology’, which came into general use in the twentieth century, derives from the Greek term *ta eschata*, ‘the last things’ and relates to such matters as the Christian expectations of resurrection and judgment. Related to the concept of eschatology is the Greek term ‘parousia’ which means ‘coming’ or ‘arrival’, used to refer to the second coming of Christ” (McGrath 2011: 444)

**Praxis:** “a Greek term that means ‘action’ “adopted by Karl Marx (1818-83) to emphasise the importance of action in relation to thinking” (McGrath 2011: 470).

**Postmillennialism:** Simon Ponsoby (2008) gives the following definition of postmillennialism: “the millennial rule of Christ will be ushered in by the church, which establishes a platform for the return of Jesus. This will be the result of a passionate implementation of righteousness and peace on earth through tenacious engagement in political, social, economic, and secular spheres and aggressive global evangelism” (Ponsoby 2008: 85). He further argues that postmillennialism sees the millennium as either literal or symbolic; the reign is that of the church over the world and its worldview is generally more optimistic (Ponsoby 2008: 88-90).

** Premillennialism:** premillennialism believes that only the return of Christ can defeat the evils of this world. It generally interprets the millennium as a thousand
years following the return of Jesus when Jesus will be reigning with “resurrected martyrs from Jerusalem” and holds a pessimistic view of the world (Ponsoby 2008: 88-90).

**What do I mean by evangelical?**

In his introduction to Christian theology, Alister McGrath, traces the term *evangelical* back to the sixteenth century. The term was then used by the Catholic writers who wished to return to “more biblical beliefs and practices than those associated with the late medieval church. It was used especially in the 1520s, when the terms *évangélique* (French) and *evangelisch* (German) came to feature prominently in polemical writings of the early Reformation” (McGrath 2011: 80).

As explained in detail later in this dissertation, in the English-speaking world, the term is also associated to the Methodist Revival and the Evangelical Awakening of the 18th century as well as with missions and social reforms in the 19th century. In the 20th century, it became associated with Cold War politics and anti-communism. Today evangelicalism has become a very broad term “embracing a complex network of individuals, seminaries, parachurch organisations, and journals, each with a distinctive ‘take’ on what constitutes the essence of evangelical identity” (McGrath 2000: 26).

According to Sebastian and Kirsteen Kim, the term ‘evangelical church’ can be applied to Protestant churches where the sermon, not the Holy Communion, constitutes the “climax of worship” (Sebastian Kim & Kirsteen Kim 2008: 20). It may refer to Christians with a special concern for the spread of the gospel or the good news. It may further refer to Protestants avoiding the negative connotation of the term ‘protest’. Finally, the term ‘evangelical’ is also used to refer to a more restrictive form of Christianity that can be found in Northern America, Europe
and the countries of the Global South that have been influenced by Western evangelicalism. By restrictive the authors are referring to “churches and organisations that are related historically and/or theologically to the Pietist\textsuperscript{2} or Methodist revivals in the eighteenth century and subsequent ‘Evangelical revivals’” (Sebastian Kim & Kirsteen Kim 2008: 20). This kind of evangelicalism usually relies on four assumptions:

- The authority and sufficiency of Scripture;
- The uniqueness of redemption through the death of Christ upon the cross;
- The need for personal conversion;
- The necessity, propriety, and urgency of evangelism (McGrath 2011: 80).

John G. Stackhouse Jr. (2000) adds a final category, trans-denominationalism. Stackhouse argues that the four assumptions described above are not exclusive of evangelicalism. For example, Catholics will defend the same ideas. However, evangelicals place these four assumptions above every other conviction: “There is nothing in the generic evangelical impulse that militates directly against denominational distinctives and divisions, but there is an important ecumenical dynamic to the elevating of these four convictions above the faultlines of denominational division” (Stackhouse 2000: 42).

Research led by Timothy S. Lee on Protestantism in South Korea suggests that evangelicalism and Protestantism are “more or less synonymous”. In contrast, proponents of the minjung theology referred to in other sections of this research

\textsuperscript{2} Pietism is a reactionary movement within mainstream Protestantism that first developed in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century with the publication of Philip Jakob Spener’s \textit{Pious Wishes} which “set out proposals for the revitalization of the church of his day” and challenged the increasing orthodoxization of the church and the “rational defense of Christian truth”. Pietism was further developed in England and Germany with representatives such as Nikolaus Ludwig Graf von Zinzendorf in Germany and the founder of the Methodist movement within the Church of England, John Wesley (McGrath 2011: 53-54).
do not qualify as evangelical (Timothy S. Lee 2007: 2). Lee defines evangelicalism in South Korea as such:

Evangelicalism is broadly defined here to include movements more specifically known as Fundamentalism and Pentecostalism—as a species of Protestantism characterized by a literalist bent in biblical interpretation, a soteriology that values the individual over society, fervent advocacy of evangelism, and a piety that emphasizes conversion experience and personal relationship between God and believer, relegating rituals such as baptism and Communion to a secondary place. In Evangelicalism, salvation is typically achieved through conversion, wherein one accepts Jesus Christ as personal savior and resolves to live in accordance with the Gospel (Timothy S. Lee 2007: 3).

Evangelicalism has also somehow become a useful term to define conservative Protestant Christianity as opposed to a more ‘liberal’ type of Christianity. These distinctions however became more important in the aftermath of the World War II with the establishment of the World Council of Churches. However before the war such distinctions did not really matter. American missionaries to Korea between 1880 and 1910 were for the most part evangelical but as Ung-kyu Pak argues “in America, evangelical had become the popular term for almost any theologically conservative Protestant who affirmed the necessity of regeneration, and the movement clearly included so many subgroups that no none group could claim to speak for the whole” (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 81). Therefore in my research, I will be using the term Christian in reference to all early Protestants in Korea. I will be using the terms (conservative) Christian and evangelical to refer to Protestant evangelicalism after World War II. Timothy S. Lee says that in Korea, there are three non-evangelical Protestant denominations—the Episcopal Church,
the Lutheran Church and the liberal branch of the Presbyterian Church (Taehan kijang changno kyohoe). All other Protestant denominations can be regarded as evangelical.

A 2005 national census indicated that nearly half of the population (48,580,293 as of 2010) say they are practicing a religion. Out of this estimate, 43% (10,726,463) practiced Buddhism; 34.5% (8,616,438) practiced Protestantism; 20.6% (5,146,147) practiced Catholicism (Korean Statistical Information Service 2013). The largest Protestant denominations are the Methodist Church and the Presbyterian Church. The Presbyterian Church is divided between the Kosin group (considered ultra-conservative); Hapdong group (conservative); the Tonghap group (moderate) and the Kijang group (liberal). There are further sub-divisions within the Presbyterian Church.

There are two ecumenical bodies: 1) the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK or in Korean Han’guk kidokkyo kyohoe hyŏpuhoe) which is usually considered liberal although Jooseop Keum argues that the international body, the World Council of Churches, was anti-communist in its early days and supported the UN decision to enter into war with North Korea (Jooseop Keum 2008); 2) the Christian Council of Korea (CCK or in Korean Hangi ch’ong) which is conservative. South Korea is also the home of mega-churches, the largest of which is Pentecostal but they are also Presbyterian, Methodist and Baptist. Many churches are charismatic and as such attribute great importance to the person of the Holy Spirit.

3. Evangelicals and contextualisation

I am now going to explain what I mean by ‘model’ and by ‘contextualisation’. There are several definitions that can be used to describe a model. In the present
context, a model is a “relatively simple, artificially constructed case which is found to be useful and illuminating for dealing with realities that are more complex and differentiated” (Bevans 2012 (1992): 29). Models are only constructions and even though they can provide some insight they cannot explain the whole picture which means that to understand models in this way, we must adhere to a critical realist perspective (Bevans 2012 (1992): 30).

Contextualisation was originally a term that had been coined in ecumenical circles. As already referred to above and explained in more details below, the first half of the twentieth century was characterised by a strong divide between evangelicals and ecumenical circles. In 1961, the International Missionary Council (IMC), a prominent mission organisation founded in 1912, merged with the World Council of Churches and became the Division on World Missions and Evangelism (DWME) and in 1973, the Commission on World Mission and Evangelism (CWME). During that period of time the DWME focused on ideas such as presence instead of proclamation (as a means of evangelism), interreligious dialogue, a moratorium on mission and identifying what God is doing in the world rather than what the church is doing (this idea is usually referred to as missio Dei). The organisation also shifted its mission agenda from evangelism to the defence of social justice (Moreau 2012: 33). In that context, the Taiwanese theologian, Shoki Coe, coined the term contextualisation:

To convey all that is implied in the familiar term indigenisation, yet seek to press beyond for a more dynamic concept which is open to change and which is also future-oriented. Contextuality is that critical assessment of what makes the context really significant in the light of the Missio Dei. It is the missiological discernment of the signs of the times, seeing where God is
At work and calling us to participate in it (Coe (1976) quoted in Moreau 2012: 34).

At first, evangelicals rejected the whole idea promulgated by the DWME but gradually they incorporated and debated these ideas including that of contextualisation. From an evangelical perspective, the point is to capture the universality of the gospel in a world that is rich and diverse in religious identities, cultures, languages, societies and so on. In this research, I will use the term contextualisation to understand how evangelicals in South Korea have engaged with and have been shaped by an ever-changing context.

Contextual theology slightly differs from traditional theology which relies on two sources, scripture and tradition, which are believed to be above culture and history. Contextual theology however recognises that there is a third source: “present human experience” or context (Bevans 2012 (1992): 2-3). Every model of contextualisation is the product and combination of different theological elements and theological perspectives. Different theologians have elaborated different models and have understood the concept of model in different ways. Perhaps, the most well known models of contextualisation are those categorised by Stephen B. Bevans (2012):

The countercultural model, recognises the importance of context but radically distrusts its sanctity and revelational power. The translation model is one that, while certainly taking account of experience, culture, social location, and social change, puts much more emphasis on fidelity to what is considers the essential content of scripture and tradition ... The anthropological model, will emphasize cultural identity and its relevance for theology more than scripture and tradition ... The practitioner of the praxis model will zero in on the importance or need of social change as she or he
articulates her or his faith; the one who prefers the synthetic model will attempt the extremely difficult task of keeping all of the elements in perfect balance (Bevans 2012 (1992): 31-32).

These models are not exclusive of one another and each can integrate elements of the others. In relation to Korean Christianity, the praxis model of contextualisation has been used to describe minjung theology as defined by Adams: “[m]injung theology is a conscious attempt to carry out the theological task from the Korean cultural and historical perspective” (Adams 2012:155).

**Minjung theology**

Minjung (min means people and chung/jung means masses) theology emerged in South Korea in the 1960s as part of a wider social movement. It impacted on the labour movement the 1970s and the democratisation movement in the 1980s. For about three decades, South Korea was under the leadership of a military junta that did not allow any room for dissidence. As the objective of the leaders, respectively Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, was to achieve economic growth at all costs, labour laws became extremely severe and the labour class was effectively exploited. Theologians were shocked as they became aware of the harsh treatment of workers in factories and decided to write their stories down and reflected on them theologically (Adams 2012: 157). Christians and students involved in the movement were the National Council of Churches in Korea which included some evangelical churches, the liberal branch of the Presbyterian Church and a big segment of the Catholic Church. Adams says that minjung theologians rested their theology on Korean sources: the concept of han, the Tonghak movement, shamanism, and mask dance (Adams 2012: 178-155).

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3 Tonghak (Eastern Learning) “was a revolutionary religion reaching deep into the value-system of Korean society. It justified radical rebellion against the existing order by affirming human
Other non-Korean sources were: scripture, Western dialectical thought, and the historical process itself, all of which are also concerned with history (Adams 2012: 179).

Nam-dong Suh argued that minjung theology was unique to the reality of Korea and Koreans, as it finds its root in the four suppressed *hans* (condition of suffering) of the Koreans:

1. Koreans have suffered numerous invasions by surrounding powerful nations so that the very existence of the Korean nation has come to be understood as han. 2. Koreans have continually suffered the tyranny of the rulers so that they think of their existence as baeksong. 3. Also, under Confucianism's strict imposition of laws and customs discriminating against women, the existence of women was han itself. 4. At a certain point in Korean history, about half of the population were registered as hereditary slaves and were treated as property rather than as people of the nation. These thought of their lives as han. These four may be called the fourfold han of Korean people (Nam-dong Suh 1983: 5).

Furthermore, whereas early missionaries would argue that Protestant Christianity became so successful in Korea because of the people’s rejection of old traditions and beliefs, Kwang-sun Suh, a minjung theologian of the second generation, disagrees and actually claims that Protestantism spread so rapidly precisely because of the ‘shamanization’ of Korean Protestant Christianity (Suh quoted in Adams 2012: 178). He says: “Korean Christianity has its deepest roots in the *mudang* [shaman] religion, and thereby, Christianity put down roots in the minds of the minjung. Thus Korean Protestantism has been able to grow in equality; it launched a search for Korean identity and self-awareness; its goal was to bring a new order to this world wherein all could live as equals in dignity and prosperity” (Suhn-kyoung Hong 1968: 49).

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*Baeksong means common people, citizens*
numbers, and become one of the most powerful and dynamic religions in Korea” (Suh quoted in Adams 2012: 178).

For a long time, evangelicals resisted the praxis model (liberation theology) because of its emphasis on social change and dismissal of spiritual transformation. Equally, Korean evangelicals and conservative Christians rejected minjung theology which they considered to be a heresy (Adams 2012: 197). Between the 28th of August and 1st of September 1973, a group of evangelicals from around the world gathered to address concerns related to their missionary work. In their final declaration, the participants declared the following: “We recognise that we have to turn back from the sociological dimension of ‘Salvation Today’, and return to the original dimension of ‘Salvation from Sin’” (The Seoul Declaration on Christian Mission 1973)—which basically means that there cannot be political or social salvation without salvation from sin first.

**Contextualisation, syncretism and indigenisation**

In spite of the rhetoric, from an early stage, evangelicals have been concerned with the idea of contextualisation. They encouraged the indigenisation of the church abroad. The aim of mission as formulated by 19th century missiologists Rufus Anderson and Henry Venn was to plan churches that would eventually be self-governed, self-supported and self-propagating⁵. This formula is usually known as the ‘Three Self’ principles of mission. Indigenisation, however, limits the idea of context to culture and seeks to integrate the gospel into the culture but, unlike contextualisation, does not necessarily seek to challenge or even transform it. Moreau (2012: 125) and Simon Shui-man Kwan (2005: 240) have referred in

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⁵ Moreau (2012: 126) argues here that this formula in fact encouraged a Western model of church community not to mention the social construction of the concept of “self”.

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that differentiates between contextualisation and indigenisation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Indigenisation</th>
<th>Contextualisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of contexts</td>
<td>Emphasis is placed on ‘culture’, which is narrowly understood as socially rooted ideas people hold about a certain set of questions. It almost always excludes considerations of concrete ecological, social, political, or economic conditions.</td>
<td>Local context is to be understood multi-dimensionally. Besides, it rejects the limiting of interest to what happens internally within a single social group, but demands that relations between groups, including nations, also be considered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Views of culture</td>
<td>Tends to be static and backward looking. Culture as closed and self-contained.</td>
<td>Tends to be present-and-future oriented. It often seeks to work towards sociocultural changes. Insists on considering [sic] relations between culture and social groups right up to the global scale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus of concern</td>
<td>Focuses on what is going on ‘out there’ on the foreign mission field.</td>
<td>Focuses also on what is going on in the sending countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of gospel</td>
<td>The substance of the gospel is universal and timeless. Only the presentation of it has to be changed in order to have it intelligible to other cultures.</td>
<td>The gospel is not even known until a proper analysis and critique of the context have been done, because for gospel to be good news it must address the specifics of each context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the missionary</td>
<td>Assumes a fairly critical and even definitive role for the missionary in shaping the entire process.</td>
<td>Places the burden of initiative and authority squarely on Christians of the local context.</td>
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Scholars of Korean Christianity have paid particular attention to the way Christianity has interacted with Korean culture and native religions. James Grayson (2009), for instance, has developed the theory of ‘emplantation’ to
explain Korean integration of Christianity into their culture. Grayson’s model identifies three stages of development: “Phase 1: Contact and Explication, Phase 2: ‘Penetration’, and Phase 3: ‘Expansion’ which success depends on other occurrences such as syncretism that is “1) the resolution of contradictions between the new doctrine and the core values of the receiving society; and 2) the resolution of conflict between the new doctrine and the existing religions of the host society” (Grayson 2009: 163). However, this research seeks to illustrate how evangelicals seek to address questions of injustice, poverty and division of the peninsula and thus, moves beyond an understanding of context that is limited to culture.

Related to the concept of indigenisation, evangelicals have been wary of another issue: syncretism, or “the inappropriate blending of non-Christian religious ideas or practices with Christian faith” (Moreau 2012: 138). Because they both link to the relationship between culture and the gospel, contextualisation and syncretism are intrinsically connected. These issues have been reasons for concern in Korea since the inception of Christianity in the country. I will address the question native of Korean religions’ influence on Korean Christianity in the fourth chapter of my research, however in the meantime it is worth mentioning that Korean Christians have attempted several times to reconcile Christianity with elements of their native culture: Pyun Young-tai (1892-1969) addressed the question of ancestor worship; Yun Sung-bum (1916-1980) Christianity and Confucianism; Pyun Sun-hwan (1927-1996) Christianity and Buddhism; Ryu Tong-shik (1922-) Christianity and P’ung nyudo (Korean term meaning beautiful life) (Adams 2012: 55-66). However, in a Korean context, the struggle to accommodate the gospel into Korean culture meant that most Christians were eager to eliminate unwanted elements of their own culture which they deemed
inappropriate, while they eagerly sought to integrate an already syncretised and westernised gospel. What is often considered a threat to the integrity of the gospel, however, has often defined the power relationship between the Western Christian and Christians from the global South. As Gary Cowin intelligently pointed out: “What’s the rule-of-thumb definition for the difference between contextualisation and syncretism? Simple: It’s contextualisation when I do it, but syncretism when you do it!” (Cowin quoted in Moreau 2012: 128). More recently, many evangelicals have come to realise that some form of syncretism is almost inevitable regardless of where you are and where you come from. Therefore, this research rests on the assumption that there will always be an element of tension between the gospel and the context. Bosch (2011) defines contextualisation as an “ongoing dialogue taking place between text and context, a theology which, in the nature of the case, remains provisional and hypothetical” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 437).

**Critical realism**

The philosophy I use to underpin contextualisation is critical realism. Critical realism is a philosophy that was mostly developed in the second half of the twentieth century and that is often associated to the work of Roy Bhaskar, a British philosopher. Critical realism is based on three philosophical theses: 1) ontological realism; 2) epistemological relativism; 3) judgmental rationalism. Patomaki offers clear and succinct definitions of these three concepts: “Ontological realism means that the world is real and—except for a very small part—indeed of the researcher’s (my or our) knowledge of it ... The world is not only real but it must also be differentiated, structured, layered and possess causal powers, otherwise our knowledge of it—or our being—would not be
possible” (Patomaki 2002: 8). “Epistemological relativism connotes that all beliefs and knowledge claims are socially produced, contextual and fallible” (Patomaki 2002: 8). Finally, “judgmental realism means that, in spite of interpretative pluralism, it is possible to build well-grounded models and make plausible judgments about their truth ... it explains the nature of the objects we study” (Patomaki 2002: 9). In other words, critical realism implies that reality exists independently of us and that in the process of apprehending this reality, we are influenced by previous theories, experiences, prejudices and so on.

Traditionally, evangelicals’ epistemological approach has been naïve realism: “the belief that knowledge is objective and that we can know reality as it is in all of its fullness. Those who approach contextualisation with this orientation believe that the Bible teaches truth and they can know biblical truth completely and without distortion” (Moreau 2012:79). Another approach, which has never been supported by evangelicals, is instrumentalism: “the Bible may contain truth, but it is subjective truth constrained by those who wrote, collated, and collected it” (Moreau 2012: 78). Whereas evangelicals would never contest the truth of the Bible, many have increasingly become aware of a sinful nature which affects our hermeneutical interpretation of it and, thus, have slowly moved to adopt critical realism and “recognise our inability to grasp truth without constraints” (Moreau 2012:79). However, just like many evangelicals have resisted the idea of contextualisation, many “are reluctant to admit that context shapes the way scripture is conceptualized, experienced and valued” (Ott et al. 2010: 278). Therefore, many refuse to reflect critically on the way their experiences influence the way they interpret and apply scriptures. They believe that it is possible to understand and transmit a pure gospel (Nicholls 2003 (1979): 8).
Concretely this means that this research does not make Christian scriptures alone an “epistemological priority” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 191). I do not resort to the gospel or a particular interpretation of the Bible as my unique framework of reference. As stated later, I have mainly used data collected in the context of my fieldwork and applied a triangulation of information to understand the ways in which Korean evangelicals have received and seek to spread the gospel to North Korea. Furthermore, theology alone cannot explain everything. As argued by Chung-shin Park in his research on the relationship between Protestantism and politics on the Korean peninsula, “[t]heology alone does not determine how a church will react to a sociopolitical issue at a given time. The same theology may play a liberal role in one period and a conservative role in another. The theological orientation of a church should be seen in its historical context: how it came about, and how the programs of the church were affected as a result” (Chung-shin Park 2003:51).

In his critical exploration on the meaning of Christian missions, David Bosch provides a very insightful analysis of paradigms in missiology. David Bosch argues that “the Christian faith is a historical faith. God communicates his revelation to people through human beings and through events, not by means of abstract propositions” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 185). Bosch uses Hans Küng's historical-theological subdivisions to describe the history of Christianity. These subdivisions in history suggest that missionary paradigms can never be completely objective:

In each of these eras Christians, from within their own contexts, wrestled with the question of what the Christian faith and, by implication, the Christian mission meant for them. Needless to say, all of them believed and
argued that their understanding of the faith and of the church’s mission was faithful to God’s intent. This did not, however, mean that they all thought alike and came to the same conclusions. There have, of course always been Christians (and theologians!) who believed that their understanding of the faith was “objectively” accurate and, in effect, the only authentic rendering of Christianity. Such an attitude, however, rests on a dangerous illusion. Our views are always only interpretations of what we consider to be divine revelation, not divine revelation itself (and these interpretations are profoundly shaped by our self-understandings) (Bosch 2011 (1991): 186).

Bosch argues that it is “therefore not appropriate not to talk about ‘Christian theology’ but about ‘Christian theologies’. Any individual Christian’s understanding of God’s revelation is conditioned by a great variety of factors. These include the person’s ecclesiastical tradition, personal context (sex, age, marital status, education), social position (social ‘class’, profession, wealth, environment), personality, and culture (worldview, language, etc.)” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 186). Bosch further identifies other factors which affect the way a person or a society receives the gospel: “the general frame of reference with which they happen to have grown up, their overall experience and understanding of reality and their place within the universe, the historical epoch in which they happen to live and which to a very large extent has molded their faith, experiences, and thought processes” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 187).

This does not mean that everything is relative. Bosch rightly argues that it is not because the Christian faith is culturally and socially dependent that there is no such thing as an absolute truth (in critical realism, this is referred to as judgmental rationalism): “Our theologies are partial, and they are culturally and socially biased. They may never claim to be absolutes. Yet, this does not make them
relativistic, as though one suggests in theology—since we really cannot ever know ‘absolutely’—anything goes. It is true that we see only in part, but we do see … It is misleading to believe that commitment and a self-critical attitude are mutually exclusive” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 190-191). The danger, argues Bosch, would be to grant equal validity to an infinite number of contextual theologies (relativism), hence the importance of self-criticism and ongoing dialogue with other Christians:

“I recognise that different theological interpretations, including my own, reflect different contexts, perspectives and biases. This is not to say, however, that I regard all theological positions as equally valid or that it does not matter what people believe; rather, I shall do my utmost to share my understanding of the faith with others while granting them the right to do the same” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 191). Although fallible and constructed, the Christian’s understanding of the truth should always be based on the gospel and “because of the gospel, never, however, against the gospel” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 191). However, he is aware of the issues related to biblical hermeneutics and therefore suggests that “the Christian church should function as an ‘international hermeneutical community’ … in which Christians (and theologians) from different contexts challenge one another’s cultural, social, and ideological biases. This presupposes, however, that we see fellow-Christians not as rival opponents but as partners …, even if we may be passionately convinced that their views are in need of major corrections” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 191).

Similarly British Christian scholar, Corrie, argues that “we can avoid the profoundly pessimistic conclusions of the postmodern project of deconstruction, and yet we concede that we need a critical dimension in all truth claims, and the
willingness to submit them to the searchlight of other perspectives” (Corrie 2011: 8). The search for other perspectives and constructive criticism raises an additional question: can an outsider to the Korean culture adequately discuss contextualisation? According to the theologian Hiebert, we must engage critically with the context, however “it is the insiders of a culture who ought to be engaging in this process of theological engagement, not the outsiders who only perpetuate their theological imperialism, wittingly or unwittingly” (Hiebert quoted in Corrie 2011: 8). Bevans (2012) however argues that an outsider can participate to some extent in another context if the person approaches the culture and the context openly and with a desire to learn (Bevans 2012 (1992): 19). The attitude of the researcher will be discussed further in the section dedicated to fieldwork and ethics of research below.

**Holism in Christian mission**

Moreau (2012) argues that today “by and large, evangelicals affirm a holistic focus for contextual work” (Moreau 2012: 136), although historically this has not been the case. Furthermore, there are evangelicals who continue to resist the idea. For example, Ott et al. (2010) argue that some evangelicals “fear that ‘contextualizing’ the gospel will open the door to watering down or compromising the gospel with culture” (Ott et. al 2010: 266).

Evangelicals who have accepted the idea of contextualisation were prompt to associate contextualisation with incarnation (God becoming man in the person of Jesus Christ) (Moreau 2012: 133). Sung-wook Hong says that the advocates of the holistic model of contextualisation, “understand the incarnation as a prime example of contextualisation” (Sung-wook Hong 2009: 33). God identifies with man through the person of Jesus: “In his [Jesus] words and actions, he
communicated the values of the Kingdom of God. His communication was in the culture of which he had become a part yet his words and actions have been just as relevant and powerful for people of other races and times as the church started sharing them with others” (Samuel quoted in Sung-wook Hong 2009:34). Hong argues therefore that the holistic model constitutes the most appropriate one in mission studies even though more needs to be done to develop it and address its weaknesses (Sung-wook Hong 2009: 36). The section below discusses recent developments in evangelical mission. These developments are important to understand as they have affected to a certain degree the development of evangelicalism in Korea and Korean mission strategies.

The term mission comes from Latin ‘missio’ and means ‘a sending’, “with reference to what an individual or group wants to do or is convinced to do” (Mombo 2010: 37). The concept of Christian mission has been the ongoing subject of discussion among Christians throughout history. Bosch (2011) uses the historico-theological subdivision as suggested by Hans Küng (1984) to demonstrate contextual movements in Christian history:

- The apocalyptic paradigm of primitive Christianity.
- The Hellenistic paradigm of the patristic period.
- The medieval Roman Catholic paradigm.
- The Protestant (Reformation) paradigm.
- The modern Enlightenment paradigm.

The Enlightenment exerted a profound impact on Protestant Christianity especially evangelicals. Enlightenment is known as the age of reason, the belief in science and progress and the subsequent marginalisation of religion. Bosch argues that Christians responded to Enlightenment in different ways among which the privatisation of religion, the integration of reason into Christian theology and the
equation of theology to science (Bosch 2011 (1991): 275-276). Three factors, however, reversed these tendencies: the Great Awakening in the American colonies, the birth of Methodism and the evangelical revival in Anglicanism. Some Christians reacted against the rationalisation of religion by choosing to embrace its spiritual component only. A major Christian theologian in the American colonies, Jonathan Edwards, however, chose to approach Christianity by combining both components; namely scripture and the experience of God (spiritual experience): “Edwards and the Awakening, however, combined the two principles; they knew that Scripture without experience was empty, and experience without Scripture was blind” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 283-284).

Edward’s eschatology exerted a profound influence on the beliefs of twentieth century American missionaries in the sense that it emphasised the importance of the proclamation of the gospel, repentance and faith. The birth of Methodism in England also influenced other denominations and beliefs as “Methodists were concentrating on the salvation of souls. They viewed societal change as a result of rather than an accompaniment of soul-saving” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 284-285).

A direct product of the Awakening, says Bosch, was the establishment of missionary organisations. Churches and denominations no longer became solely responsible for the evangelisation of the world, but lay individuals, in Britain and in North America, founded societies dedicated to foreign missions. Furthermore, the evangelical Christians directly affected by the Awakening, were moved to address causes of injustice around the world such as the conditions in slums, prisons, coal mines and so on (Bosch 2011 (1991): 286-287).

In the course of the nineteen-century however, Christians in both America and Britain continued to be influenced by the Enlightenment and their theology
became more and more soteriological. In North America, for example, it could be assumed that all Protestant denominations were postmillennialist. However the Civil War in the United States impacted profoundly on the beliefs of American evangelicals:

The evangelical unity forged by the Awakenings—an evangelicalism in which a “commitment to social reform was a corollary of the inherited enthusiasm for revival” (Marsden 1980:12)– was about to disintegrate; “the broad river of classical evangelicalism divided into a delta, with shallower streams emphasizing ecumenism and social renewal on the left and confessional orthodoxy and evangelism on the right” (Lovelace 1981: 298). By the beginning of the twentieth century the first had evolved into the social gospel, the second into Fundamentalism (Bosch 2011 (1991): 289).

Nevertheless, in spite of this strong emphasis on evangelism and the desire to save souls, evangelical missionaries of the nineteenth and early twentieth century did not differentiate between “service to the body” and “service to the soul” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 294).

The divide between social concern and evangelism is predominantly a twentieth century phenomenon. This change of attitude toward mission which led evangelicals to withdraw from social involvement has been described as the ‘Great Reversal’. The polarisation mostly developed in North America and the West but effectively affected evangelical churches in the global South (Tizon 2010: 62-63). Mission historians have often divided the history of Western missions in the twentieth century as follows. The era prior to 1910, first, when missionaries, in spite of a clear preference for evangelism, were involved with social and humanitarian action. Second, Edinburgh 1910, a mission conference
where there is evidence of an increasing split between those prioritising personal salvation and those focusing on social action. The latter led, third, to the establishment of the World Council of Churches in 1948. Fourth, the 1960s and beyond when evangelicals resumed discussions over the nature of missions and the relationship between the saving of souls and social action. Evangelicals started to recognise that prior to 1910, missionaries had been addressing both spiritual and physical needs but recalling at the same time that the salvation of souls had always prevailed over humanitarian and social action. Thus, Billy Graham reaffirmed in 1966: “I am convinced if the Church went back to its main task of proclaiming the Gospel and getting people converted to Christ, it would have a far greater impact on the social, moral and psychological needs of men than any other thing it could possibly do. Some of the greatest social movements of history have come about as the result of men being converted to Christ” (Graham quoted in Bosch 2011 (1991): 414). Evangelicals continued to discuss and eventually agreed that evangelism and social action could not be separated. In doing so, evangelicals were not only restoring a legacy of social involvement but also catching up with Christian liberal and secular movements.

These discussions culminated with the Lausanne Covenant of 1974 according to which “the full gospel should include both personal salvation and social responsibility for the fallen world” (Woolnough 2010: 9-10). This shift, fifth, to a more comprehensive approach to mission has been labelled ‘holistic mission’ and was further reinforced in 1986 when a group of ‘Concerned Evangelicals’ questioned the politics of the apartheid in South Africa and felt the need to address both questions of personal sin and injustices in society (Bosch 2011 (1991): 417).
In reality, evangelicals have not yet reached a common understanding on the idea of holistic mission. John Stott, a British evangelical scholar, summarised the argument quite succinctly. He argued that if social action was a means to win converts then “in its most blatant form this makes social work (whether food, medicine or education) the sugar on the pill, the bait on the hook, while in its best form it gives the gospel a credibility it would otherwise lack. In either case the smell of hypocrisy hangs round our philanthropy” (Stott 2008 (1975): 41). The second way of relating social action to evangelism has been to describe it as being the manifestation of evangelism, meaning that education and medical care, “are motivated by the proper love and compassion” (Stott 2008 (1975): 42). However as Stott argued, it is still hypocritical: “if good works are visible preaching, then they are expecting a return; but if good works are visible loving, then they are ‘expecting nothing in return’ (Stott 2008 (1975): 43). For Stott, social service is a partner of evangelism: “neither is a means to the other, or even a manifestation of the other” (Stott 2008 (1975): 43). Christians therefore are called to respond to a need. For example, if a person is so hungry that she or he will not hear a word, then it is more important to feed that person first. If a person is simply suffering from a spiritual problem or sin then it is important to address that particular need first. Stott says situations are different and callings are different (Stott 2008 (1975): 44).

**Christians and the Cold War**

The situation described above is even more nuanced. First, American evangelicals were a very influential political force during the Cold War. Second, as argued below, some of them were heavily involved in social action.
Some of these evangelicals viewed missions as a means to eradicate communism and thus change the world order. According to Jenkins, “Evangelicals are concerned more with creating a righteous political order than with far-reaching economic restructuring” (Jenkins 2006: 141). An example of this can be seen in the fact that some evangelical missionaries became bible smugglers into communist nations. International Christian organisations such as Open Doors, Release International, Barnabas Fund and Voices of the Martyrs were established in memory of pastors and missionaries who had risked and sometimes given their lives in their attempt to evangelise the communist nations. Primarily missionary organisations, they have expanded the scope of their mandate to include human rights advocacy with a special emphasis on religious freedom, dedicated solely to the cause of the persecuted church. All these organisations are actively working to promote religious freedom in North Korea and to spread the gospel.

In fact, mainstream Western Christianity was shaped by and helped shape Cold War politics. American Presidents used religion, especially evangelical Christianity as a propaganda tool, to combat the atheist materialism proposed by the Soviet bloc. Herzog (2010), who has analysed the politics of Christian revivals in the United States in the early stages of the Cold War, says: “if Communism was a dangerous pseudo-religion, then a powerful weapon in the anti-Communist arsenal was genuine religious faith. Perhaps more importantly, there was also a growing belief that power had both material and spiritual components” (Herzog 2010: 340). According to Diane Kirby, religion was an important component of President Harry. S. Truman’s politics during the Cold War for which he received
the support of church leaders in Europe especially from Pope Pius XII, a fervent anti-communist (Kirby 2003: 78). She further argues:

American officials and the American people held powerful beliefs about the superiority of their institutions, culture and way of life. These beliefs, including religious beliefs, prompted actions that figure prominently in the story of the Cold War and the nature it assumed. The US traditionally perceived itself as the manifestation of Truth, Justice and Freedom placed on earth by a God whose purpose was to make of it an instrument for extending His spiritual and material blessings to the rest of humanity (Kirby 2003: 3).

Therefore those holding these beliefs often thought that by promoting the American style of Christian evangelical faith and seeking more converts the world could become a better place. Between 1945 and 1960, religion became a key component of the development and implementation of American policy: “There were specific legislative achievements, such as the addition of ‘under God’ to the Pledge of Allegiance. But there were less visible, and as a consequence largely forgotten, policy adoptions regarding religion in the areas of foreign propaganda and psychological warfare, military training, state-sponsored or state-supported national faith drives, and public education” (Herzog 2010: 338). As a result the politics of the presidents tended to receive large support from the evangelical community: “[n]ational opinion surveys in the mid-1980s revealed that a quarter of Americans viewed the US-Soviet conflict in theological terms, and over half endorsed Reagan’s view of the Soviet Empire as an ‘Evil Empire’” (Gouverneur 2007: 85). As a result, conservative Christians lobbied for the creation of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 thus making religious freedom a major component of American foreign policy. Under the Act, the President is
required to undertake a series of punitive actions against countries that violate religious freedom (Hackett 2005: 669).

Authors and academics who have studied the relationship between Christianity and the communist bloc argue that Christians have contributed to the making of a bipolar world order. However, they usually neglect an important factor: the reason why Christians despised communism and regarded it as evil is also because the ‘atheism’ of communist countries usually translated into a harsh and systematic persecution of religions that operated outside of the state control. It was not only forbidden to spread the gospel and go to church, but Christians (evangelicals and Catholics) in those countries were routinely arrested, tortured and executed for their faith. Evangelicals, therefore, believed that by changing the nature of these regimes, they would help their fellow believers who were being persecuted. Evangelicals and Catholics were the first groups to denounce human rights atrocities committed by communist governments. Sadly, it also means that until the 1980s, evangelicals around the world including South Korea supported authoritarian regimes because of their anti-communist policies. In addition to their involvement in politics, evangelicals continued to remain involved in social action (even though their actions were being frowned upon by other more conservative evangelicals). In fact, the “post-World War Two period marked a significant increase in evangelical ministries” (Tizon 2010: 66).

**Holistic missions and the establishment of faith-based organisations**

With the development of holistic missions, evangelicals expanded their mandates to address contemporary issues of human rights, ecology, poverty and so on. Often, in order to do so, lay Christians, denominations and churches
established charities or faith-based organisations (FBOs). Most of the organisations that are operating in North Korea and referred to in the following chapter of this research are effectively FBOs. Some of these organisations are also known as mission or missionary organisations in Christian circles. For example, Youth with a Mission and Campus Crusade are well known mission organisations. They are also very active in providing aid and working in North Korea.

Scholars argue that it is difficult to give a proper definition for faith-based and religious organisations (Harden 2006; Torry 2005). Harden also rightly highlights the fact that a lack of understanding of spirituality and faith can become a hindrance in the process of evaluation of faith-based programmes (Harden 2006: 484). It is also important to underline the fact that the term FBO encompasses a vast range of concepts and attributes. In fact, faith-based organisations are so diverse in terms of identity and practices that the scholarship and case studies used to attempt to understand and appraise their work will never adequately reflect the situation on the ground, as every case is different. Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings provide a table of categorisations which is often referred to in the scholarship on faith-based organisations (Clarke & Jennings 2008: 25):

- **Faith-based organisations or apex bodies** which rule of doctrinal matters, govern the faithful and represent them through engagement with the state and other factors;
- **Faith-based charitable or development organisations** which mobilize the faithful in support of the poor and other social groups, and which fund or manage programmes which tackle poverty and social exclusion;
- **Faith-based socio-political organisations** which interpret and deploy faith as a political construct, organizing and mobilizing social groups on the basis of faith identities but in pursuit of broader political objectives or, alternatively, promote faith as a socio-cultural construct, as a means of
uniting disparate social groups on the basis of faith-based cultural identities;

- *Faith-based missionary organisations* which spread key messages beyond the faithful, by actively promoting the faith and seeking converts to it, or by supporting and engaging with other faith communities on the basis of key faith principles;

- *Faith-based radical, illegal or terrorist organisations* which promote radical or militant forms of faith identity, engage in illegal practices on the basis of faith beliefs or engage in armed struggle or violent acts justified on the grounds of faith.

According to Bradley, for an organisation to be recognised as faith-based, “faith needs to have embedded itself in the organisation’s operational structures rather than just existing as a source of personal motivation for individual employees” (Bradley 2009: 105). Like Clarke and Jennings, Berger distinguishes faith-based organisations from churches (or temples and mosques) and defines religious/faith-based organisations as civil society organisations that are actively involved with the public sphere:

> Religious NGOs [are] formal organisations whose identity and mission are self-consciously derived from the teachings of one or more religious or spiritual traditions and which operates on a nonprofit, independent, voluntary basis to promote and realize collectively articulated ideas about the public good at the national or international level … They differ from congregational and denominational structures, which tend to focus on the development of their memberships, RNGOs seek to fulfil explicitly public missions (Berger 2003:16).

Torry (2005) highlights the fact that FBOs are open systems (Torry 2005: 31), which means that “religious organisations vary in the extent of their exposure to or insulation from specific sources of external pressure” (Benson & Dorsett 1971: 141). Many Christian organisations have chosen to link humanitarian assistance to
their mission of evangelisation (Flanigan 2010; Clarke 2007; Berger 2003; Benthall 2005) but Berger argues that many organisations have also become more “concerned with the practical expression of their religious beliefs and consider themselves duty-bound to be a source of positive change in society (Berger 2003: 32). Some faith-based organisations and staff do not explicitly share the gospel as such but express their faith through their work. Flanigan says that some see the “provision of social services as a type of religious ministry”. Furthermore, religious organisations can be working in an environment or a community that shares the same ideology and religious traditions. In that case, Crowe says that the organisation can claim a certain “degree of legitimacy” (Crowe 2007:5). However, FBOs must be ready to “embrace debate, acceptance and ideological differences” (Crowe 2007:4). Generally in Western Europe, the agenda of FBOs does not differ much from that of secular organisations and the British Department for International Development (DFID) has in fact increasingly been cooperating with FBOs and has even recognised the contributions that they have made in the efforts to alleviate poverty. Between 2005 and 2010, DFID funded an international research programme, the Religions and Development Research Programme Consortium, which highlighted the role played by religions in development (Religions and Development Research Programme 2014).

In the United States, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has historically discriminated against religious organisations in terms of funding. President Georges W Bush, however, established the Faith-Based and Community Initiatives Act, which was approved by Congress in 2001. In 2004, USAID agreed to no longer discriminate against religious organisations which meant that organisations which combined provision of services to religious
activities such as religious education, worship, evangelisation and so on could apply for state funding (Clarke 2007).

In conclusion and to use the words of Bradley: “diversity in identity translates into diversity in practice” (Bradley 2009:102). To understand FBOs, Bradley advises to take into account “first, the degree to which a collective ‘faith’ is central to the organisation’s identity. Second the extent to which ‘faith’ shapes and drives the practices of an organisation” (Bradley 2009:104). Bradley uses a continuum to describe everything in between including organisations that make use of their religious knowledge and teachings to elaborate new development practices. To translate this into theological terms: “Since one’s theology of mission is always closely dependent on one’s theology of salvation; it would therefore be correct to say that the scope of salvation—however we define salvation—determines the scope of the missionary enterprise” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 403). The section below describes the scope of activity in Christian terms.

Not all organisations wish to spread the gospel, and have chosen instead to secularise their mandate. For example, the UK—based human rights Christian organisation Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) is rooted in Christian beliefs and only hires ‘committed Christians’ but does not evangelise. Similarly, other organisations choose to prioritise evangelism and focus on church planting, theological education and so on. For the organisations that have chosen not to evangelise, it could be proposed that they have chosen to teach Christianity by example. This type of mission can also be called *diakonia*.

The modern interpretation of the term *diakonia* is often “humble service”, whereas it was originally used in the Greek/original version of the New Testament, to mean, “the carrying out of a commissioned task” (Gooder 2006:
The modern use of the term *diakonia* is as follows: “a church-based care for the poor, the sick, and the socially deprived—it is an expression of church charity and Christian love. It might be spontaneous, but in many churches, the diakonia is well organised. It is highly practical in its orientation” (Johannessen 2009: 168). *Diakonia* is also a term that has been used by the World Council of Churches in its efforts to bring about reconciliation and solidarity. Diakonia, in other words, is not a strategy that seeks to lead to conversion but rather a social action oriented strategy of forgiveness and reconciliation.

Sometimes however organisations decide to follow the principles of diakonia because the country where they operate does not allow them to express their religious beliefs freely and/or evangelise. This is particularly the case for organisations working in the Middle East and socialist countries such as Cuba, China, Vietnam and, of course, North Korea. Often, the missionaries employed by these organisations will enter the country with a work visa and will have a full-time job such as teacher, businessman or medical practitioner. This particular type of mission is referred as tentmaking or bi-vocational ministry.

Tentmaking ministry is a phrase that has been coined to describe the ministry of the apostle Paul in the New Testament. According to the book of Acts, chapter 18 verses one to three, “Paul left Athens and went to Corinth. There he met a Jew named Aquila, a native of Pontus, who had recently come from Italy with his wife Priscilla, because Claudius had ordered all the Jews to leave Rome. Paul went to see them, and because he was a tentmaker as they were, he had stayed and worked with them” (Acts 18: 1-3). Missionaries who live abroad often rely on financial provisions from their home church, friends and families. However, many missionaries have also followed the example of Paul and have chosen to
work full-time to sustain themselves while carrying on with their mission work. It is a strategy to penetrate countries which would otherwise deny them entry as religious worker:

For any number of reasons a series of different structures has been developed to enable Evangelicals to enter countries or regions of the world that would normally, but not exclusively, be closed to traditional missionary endeavours. These types of ministries are called Tentmaking, Platform Ministries and NGOs ... If the remaining unevangelized people in our world are to hear the gospel, then Christians will have to enter nations that restrict the access of foreign missionaries. Many of the people who live in these nations are religiously confident with long traditions in Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism. There are generally poor nations... They are nations that also often violate international standards in the area of religious freedom and consider the propagating of Christian faith a disruptive Western influence. Some refer to these nations as ‘creative access nations’ or CANs (Fanning 2009: 11-12).

Often, target governments are well aware that they are granting visas and residency to organisations that carry such agendas and, therefore, Fanning argues that the question of whether tentmaking is ethical or not is irrelevant. In fact, many countries look the other way “when sometimes something violates policy but benefits the nation” (Fanning 2009: 22).

However, the work of undercover missionaries has sometimes resulted in diplomatic tensions between the United States and target countries, especially in the Middle East:

Proselytism-driven politics can take many different forms, depending on the configuration of relations among proselytizers, their targeted group, other religious organisations, and political authorities in both home and target countries. A comparable range of diverse responses is elicited by those faith-
based organisations engaged in the delivery of humanitarian relief or development aid as well as those mobilizing on the behalf of marginalized or victimized peoples. Ironically, none of these activities may have been initially inspired by any explicitly political agenda. The key point is to realize that efforts directed solely at goals defined within a faith tradition may have external effects on political processes and actors that result in policy partnerships, partisan struggles, or international confrontations (McGinniss 2006: 8).

In April 2003, Franklin Graham’s Samaritan’s Purse and other organisations claimed that they hoped to contribute to the reconstruction process in Iraq and prepare the way for democracy by converting locals to Christianity. Their programme was promptly terminated with the Bush administration having to disclaim the intentions of the NGO but it reinforced Muslim suspicion that the United States was promoting a pro-Christian agenda in the region (McGinnis 2006: 2).

The sections above has sought to define and analyse issues related to contextualisation, holistic mission and faith-based organisations. The section below will be discussing fieldwork undertaken for this research.

4. Scope of my research and development of research questions

Prior to undertaking fieldwork, I had decided that my research was going to focus on the legitimacy of South Korean Christian organisations in light of a change of government in South Korea. Under the Sunshine Policy of President Kim Dae-jung implemented in 1997, South Korean NGOs were granted better access to the North and expanded their activities to include technical aid and development programmes. The coming into power of a conservative government in 2008, however, provided them with a new political scene to negotiate with.
Initially, my research also aimed at understanding how FBOs related not only to the current political environment but also to their a priori ideological opponents: human rights organisations which generally oppose food aid to North Korea. Therefore, in my core chapter, I developed the following points: legitimacy is both an outward and an inward process, it is both “derived and generated” (Slim 2002: 7). In order to do so, I was going to be looking at the legitimacy of these organisations because it allowed me to look at “a particular status with which an organisation is imbued and perceived at any given time that enables it to operate with the general consent of peoples, governments, companies and non-state groups around the world” (Slim 2002: 7). Slim explains that an NGO’s legitimacy is derived legally and morally which means that in looking at the case of South Korean FBOs, I was going to look at the source of their mandate, which is most likely faith based, and also analyse how the South and North Korean states draft laws that allow them to operate and how these laws are being influenced by politics.

Slim argued that legitimacy is generated “tangibly and intangibly in practice” (Slim 2002: 9), therefore an organisation must not only seek support from people but will also gain legitimacy because of its knowledge, expertise and performance. It also gains less intangible support through its reputation, integrity and trust (Slim 2002: 9-10). NGOs around the world are being made the subjects of debate. NGOs are increasingly perceived to have lost their neutral stance and to be acting and implementing policies on behalf of particular individuals, groups, governments or governmental agencies. In addition to that, NGOs working in authoritarian states face severe criticism and are often accused of collaborating with evil regimes. NGOs operating in North Korea confront these two different
perspectives: they are sometimes described as a bridge between the oppressed and isolated North Korean population and the outside world and, as such, are being used by governments that promote policies of engagement with North Korea. It is also said, however, that their work and the provision of aid sustains the regime and therefore the organisations do not have legitimacy in the eyes of many human rights activists and opponents to the politics of engagement with North Korea.

Once I arrived in South Korea, I realised that part of the scope of my original research proposal was not relevant because in fact Christian organisations were not actively seeking to defend or justify their activity but rather took it for granted that their involvement in North Korea was the right thing to do because they believed that it was what God had called them to do. I decided therefore to review my research questions in the light of this. I decided to focus more deeply on the Christian identity and motivations of the organisations to better understand them. I also realised that the ideological gap between different civic society groups and in particular between Christians was greater than I had previously assumed. I therefore decided to focus my research on these aspects. I wanted to understand how could the same people who believe in the same and unique ‘truth’ be expressing their faith in such a polarised way? I developed new research questions: who are these organisations and what exactly are they hoping to achieve? I also realised how much the history, culture and current politics of the Korean peninsula impacted on the scope of their activity, and so I wanted to include the conceptual framework in which these activities take place. I developed my interview questions accordingly.

Finally, the use of written materials such as emails, books on mission to North Korea, articles and brochures from organisations helped me to contextualise and
generalise certain facts. For example, the humanitarian activity of a church or an organisation in North Korea should be understood in the wider context of South Korean evangelicals’ missions strategy, the growth of the church, their approach toward mission, their attitude toward communism/ North Korea and their historical bound with North Korea.

**Overview of fieldwork period**

I spent eleven months in Seoul, South Korea, between September 2009 and August 2010. I first travelled to South Korea in 1998 and I had lived in Seoul a number of times between the years 1998 and 2008. In August 2006, I stayed in Tumen, a town located on the North Korea border in China, where many missionary groups are stationed. I travelled to North Korea in September 2009 and September 2011.

While in Seoul, as a direct observer I attended a wide range of conferences and press conferences organised about North Korea as well as prayer meetings and services. I held informal conversations with persons involved in the Christian and non-Christian human rights movement (South Korean activists, North Korean defectors and foreigners) and humanitarian workers (Christian Protestant, non-Christian, Buddhist and Catholics) as well as diplomats, journalists and academics. I attended a meeting organised by the North Korean human rights studies department of the Korea Institute of National Unification (KINU) that took place between the researchers of KINU and organisations providing humanitarian assistance to North Korea. I also attended a three day conference on mission in North Korea that took place in Seattle between 10 September and 12 September 2010 (Empower Conference organised by the Christian organisation Reah International). This conference gathered a number of Christian missionaries.
(foreign and South Korean) active both inside North Korea and on the North Korea Chinese border as well as academics, representatives of think-tanks (policy makers in Washington DC) and politicians. I was invited to attend under the condition that I would not divulge the names of the attendees (speakers or participants). The conference focused on several aspects of mission work in North Korea including:

- Humanitarian
- Medical
- Business
- Education
- PUST (Pyongyang University of Science & Technology)
- Information Technology (Reah 2010).

**Ethical concerns**

While securing and conducting interviews, I faced a certain number of ethical concerns and obstacles. First, it was difficult to network and interview a number of people because I am a foreign researcher. In Korean culture, trusted relationships and connections are very important. In that context, accessing the field was facilitated by “introductions and referrals” (Berg 2007 (1989): 175). Access therefore was not the product of a negotiated process and gradual establishment of trust between me and the interviewees or by what I know but rather by whom I knew: “in a sense this is analogous to snow-balling: using one research participant to indicate others who can be equally or more informative…” Instead of using contacts to widen the sample as in snowball sampling, the suggestion there is to use one’s contacts and relationships to gain the vital, initial entry into the field, where one can engage with possible research participants” (Vallance quoted in Berg 2007 (1989): 175). I therefore spent a lot of time establishing connections and networking. This task was nevertheless made
complicated by the fact that Korean society, civil society and the academic world are extremely polarised over the question of North Korea. The point was to connect with individuals and organisations who would connect me with the right individuals without being associated to a political agenda. I also found that my referring to foreign researchers, and because of my former involvement with a UK—based Christian organisation, Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW), which is well-known in Korea, facilitated the establishment of some connections.

Additionally, I felt that in a number of cases, because of my efforts to speak the language and my position as a PhD student, many people welcomed me and provided me with the requested information. Korean people tend to be very touched and excited when a foreigner shows interest in their country, especially North Korea, and are deeply respectful of academics because of the value attributed to education in Korean culture.

At the same time, it was extremely difficult to secure interviews with NGO and FBO representatives first of all because the subject of North Korea and of humanitarian assistance to North Korea are very sensitive in South Korea. NGOs are usually reluctant to share information about their work. Christian groups are even more secretive about their work because of the sensitivity associated to mission work in North Korea. I had to pay particular attention to the ethical concerns related to this aspect of my research. Most (but not all) of the individuals interviewed for the purpose of this research did not want to be recorded or be named. However, my research seeks to to be as detailed as possible and is an attempt to respect the wishes of the interviewees while recognising the need to be critical and concrete in my analysis. I conducted semi-structured interviews, as I
wanted to give the interviewees the space and freedom to express themselves within the remit of my area of research.

I conducted interviews with academics, diplomats, and government officials in English. Interviewing the FBO representatives was a bit trickier as they were not all necessarily fluent in English, so I conducted the interviews in Korean and showed them my questions written in Korean and proofread beforehand by a Korean speaker. I did not use an interpreter. Occasionally, the representatives would choose to speak in English in order to clarify certain points. Two FBO representatives were confident enough to write down the answers to my questions but I have decided nevertheless to leave their comments anonymous. As argued by Sophie Laws et al. “[e]ven if respondents consent to participation, it is still your duty to protect them as far as possible from any potentially harmful effects of your research, whether these relate to individuals or whole social groups” (Laws et al. 2003: 235).

In light of the restrictions and constraints described above, I will simply refer to the conference and interviewees following the Chatham house rule according to which: "When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speakers, nor that of any other participant, may be revealed" (Chatham House 2013 ). It is important to note that not all the information provided by the interviewees was sensitive or confidential but for the sake of consistency, I will be referring to the interviewees in a consistent manner regardless of the nature of the information distinguishing South Korean interviewees from foreign interviewees. For example, I will refer to South Korean evangelical interviewees as SK1, SK2, SK3 and so on. I will refer to interviews
with foreigners as F1, F2 and so on. A more detailed list of my semi-structured interviews (job titles, names of organisations and dates of interview) can be found in the bibliography. I did not quote from all of them.

I openly introduced myself as a PhD researcher collecting data, but, because I also introduced myself as a Christian, I thought that many of the interviewees would trust that I would respect their confidentiality. In telling them I was sharing their faith, I wanted to build a level of trust between them and me. However the fact that the interviewees were pleased to share about their vision, work and mission to another Christian, especially a foreigner, had several drawbacks as well. For example, I do not think that they ever questioned the fact that I might at a later stage use the data collected to provide a critical assessment of their work. I felt there was a kind of tacit agreement that because I was interviewing them and was interested in their work that I would agree with them and share the same views. This was also the product of the fact that all times, I expressed empathy with them as their expressed their frustrations with the government (that blocked their activity) and shared their vision of a reunited Korea. Bruce L. Berg argues that “appreciation does not require the interviewers to agree with or even to accept the perceptions of their subjects but merely to offer empathy” (Berg 2007 (1989): 179). I do not think that interviewees made the distinction between my expressions of empathy and approval of their work and vision. Furthermore, I cannot prove that I actually built trust by disclosing my religious beliefs. However by not saying it, I would have withheld part of the truth about my identity and since I expected interviewees to be as candid and open as possible with me, I felt that it was only constructive that I should do the same.
Unlike questionnaires, interviews can be understood as being “social interactions” (Mason 1996: 40): “From this point of view you cannot separate the interview from the social interaction in which it was produced, and you should not try. It is better to try to understand the complexities of the interaction, rather than to pretend that key dimensions can be controlled” (Mason 1996: 40). Christian organisations are not actively seeking the support of the population or of other groups, because they believe that what they do is the right thing to do. More generally South Korean humanitarian organisations that provide aid to North Korea have been criticised for paying less attention to humanitarian principles, food monitoring and access, because they want to build a relationship of trust with the North Koreans and thus promote peace (see statement from Korean Sharing Movement below). In light of the aforementioned factors, my reasons for conducting interviews were manifold: first, I had to interview representatives of the organisations to endeavour to find out what they really think. Second, the use of interviews goes some way to compensate for the fact that I had no direct access to the field meaning that I could not directly witness the provision of aid to North Korea and observe the interactions between South Korean Christian aid workers and the North Koreans. As Jennifer Mason rightly argues “the data you want may not feasibly be available in any other form ... [the] direct observation of phenomena in which you are interested is simply impossible” (Mason 1996: 42). However, this does not mean that I was “able to get inside their heads” (Mason 1996: 40) and in fact one might wonder although it is always important to analyse as far as possible whether the data collected through interviews is “accurate and reliable” (Mason 1996: 42). In that sense, the fact that I sought to put my interviewees at ease at all times and guaranteed their anonymity means that for the
most part they were happy to share information with me and be as candid as they could. Equally, the fact that I used semi-structured interviews means that I could adjust my questions to the circumstances and the mood of the interviewees. In some ways, it is inevitable that interviews produce imperfect data, nonetheless they provided me with a deeper understanding of the situation and allowed me to identify patterns (for instance similar answers) such as the constant reference to the history of Christianity in North Korea. Finally, interviews and direct observation and the use of written material are in line with my choice of philosophical approach as argued by Jennifer Mason (1996):

- Your ontological position suggests that people’s knowledge, views, understandings, interpretations, experiences, and interactions are meaningful properties of the social reality which your research questions are designed to explore.

- Your epistemological position suggests that a legitimate way to generate data on these ontological properties is to interact with people, to talk to them, to listen to them, and to gain access to their accounts and articulations (Mason 1996: 39-40).

In conclusion, the use of interviews proved to be a useful method to gain a better understanding of a situation that continues to be sensitive for many in South Korea and therefore not easily researchable.

5. Conclusion and chapters

In this dissertation, I will discuss South Korean mission to North Korea on the basis of the holistic model of contextualisation. As the context does not solely include culture or native religions of the Korean peninsula, I will include in my discussion the wider political context (domestic and international) in relation to
North Korea and seek to understand how history, as well as other factors, have shaped contemporary Korean conservative Christianity. Finally, because in my research I highlight the place of religion in the public sphere, in the following chapter, I am going to examine the rise of religions in the public sphere and explain how in North Korea, politics of secularisation translated into harsh repression of religion freedom. I will also introduce scholars’ attitudes toward religion, especially in relation to North Korea. The third chapter will analyse evangelicals’ political theology, and issues of Christian nationalism and anti-communism. The purpose of the fourth chapter will be to illustrate the South Korean evangelical level of commitment toward humanitarian concerns in North Korea. The fifth chapter will argue that evangelicals are re-evaluating North Korean mission and are now developing strategies to implement cross-cultural missiological principles with North Koreans. The sixth chapter will identify the socio-political contexts and the relationship between civil society and the North and South Korean states.
Chapter 2: Christianity in the public sphere

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will analyse the place of religion in international relations and the field of development. It will be argued that religions have played a significant role in the public sphere and that Christianity has grown to become a world religion. The second section of this chapter will be dedicated to North Korea and the politics of religious repression. While Christianity has developed dramatically in the Global South, it has been severely repressed in North Korea. The section will be followed by a summary of the history of interactions between South Korean liberal churches and the North Korean official Christian bodies. Finally, the last section of this chapter will summarise what has been written already on the work of Christian organisations operating in North Korea. Nearly all scholars have recognised the presence of religious groups but few have actually analysed its significance with regard to the influence of Christians in Korean politics.

2. Resurgence of religions in the public sphere: faith in development

The moral precepts of justice, love, compassion and charity lie at the heart of most religions and have preceded the enactment of international laws. According to Carolyn Evans, the three major monotheistic religions, namely Judaism, Christianity and Islam, share “the idea of [a] common humanity” (Evans 2005: 4). In the book of Leviticus, a book that is common to the three traditions, God instructs his people to love their neighbors as themselves and not to hate their brothers in their heart (Evans 2005: 4). Therefore, temples and places of worship have historically served as places of refuge. The Catholics established orders to “provide charity for the poor, medical care to the sick, education for children and
hospitality to strangers” (Ferris 2005: 313). In the 18th and 19th centuries, Protestant missionaries were dispatched from Europe and North America not only to evangelise but also to bring humanitarian assistance. In the beginning of the 20th century, religious groups established charities to carry on advocacy and lobbying activity. After the Second World War, both Christian and secular non-governmental organisations were created to respond to the humanitarian crisis arising across Europe. The World Council of Churches (WCC) was established in 1948 and responded to the humanitarian need of displaced people. NGOs and churches strongly advocated for the establishment of the United Nations and the subsequent declaration of human rights (Ferris 2005: 314-315).

Religious actors tend to promote a certain type of political system because they favour a certain type of ‘political theology’ which is best described as being: “the set of ideas that a religious actor holds about what is legitimate political authority” (Toft et al. 2011: 27). William Wilberforce’s campaign against slave trade, Gandhi’s peaceful struggle for India’s independence, Martin Luther King’s leadership in the civil rights movement, Desmond Tutu’s fight against apartheid; are such examples of religious actors who acted out on a certain political theology.

In the 1980s, religious leaders (especially Christian) became prominent critics of the development policies implemented by international organisations such as the World Bank. Their criticism was institutionalised with the creation of the Jubilee campaign 2000. The campaign was a joint effort between religious, secular leaders and personalities such as U2 singer Bono, called for the cancellation of the debt of poor countries (Marshall 2001: 348). Another significant event was the establishment of the World Faiths Development
Dialogue (WFDD), a joint effort by former World Bank president James Wolfensohn and former Archbishop of Canterbury Dr. George Carey. The WFDD aims at promoting dialogue between religious and secular institutions to address questions of development and poverty\textsuperscript{6}.

Therefore, my research has been conducted at the time when scholars and practitioners have come to recognise the role played by faith not only in development and politics but also in the strengthening of social capital. In recent years there has been a growing interest in the role but also potential problems posed by the factor of ‘faith’ in religious organisations. There has also been a renewed interest in concepts of spirituality in society but this interest is not due to an “increased appreciation of religion qua religion” (Chaves, Giesel & Tsitos 2002: 108) but rather an interest in what and how religion and faith can contribute to society: “many see religion and religious organisations as springs of voluntarism, community resources, and civic skills that can be deployed in a wide variety of secular arenas” (Chaves, Giesel & Tsitos 2002: 108). Churches, temples, mosques, religious organisations and so on contribute to the healthy functioning of a civil society. In an analysis on the correlation between religion and development, Khan and Bashar (2008) argue that religion can “act as a catalyst for accumulation of social capital” (Khan & Bashar 2008: 3) and “can be seen as a promoter of growth as they direct people towards honesty, discipline, hard work, education, thriftiness (leading to savings essential for investment and thereby growth) and absenteeism from harmful activities” (Khan & Bashar 2008: 7). It has often been argued for instance that the growth of capitalism in the West

\textsuperscript{6} The organisation is now run by Georgetown University in Washington DC.
was linked to the practice of an ascetic life as promulgated by Protestant/Calvinist principles (Weber 1930/1971).

In the 1990s, the World Bank conducted a study in developing countries asking the question: what is poverty? The study, entitled *Voices of the Poor*, revealed that for the ‘poor’, it is not so much the absence of material goods that they found unbearable but rather the perpetual sense of shame, powerlessness and humiliation that affected them the most (Corbett & Fikkert 2009: 52-53). Tyndale argues that since development is about improving the lives of people, it is a metaphysical question. She argues that people gain their sense of dignity and self-worth from their spirituality and culture. Once people feel secure in the knowledge of ‘who they are’, their confidence is strengthened and they feel capable of undertaking new projects and assume positions of leadership (Tyndale 2006:161). The research led by Miller and Yamamori on Pentecostalism argues that the moral and spiritual needs of an individual should be taken into account, and that religion does fulfil a role that secular theories of development cannot challenge (Miller & Yamamori 2007: 63).

Therefore, as development practitioners and policy makers began to broaden the objectives of development to not only encompass economic development but also an enlargement of people’s choices and freedoms. They began to realise that the idea of “human development” was also concerned with spirituality (UNDP 1990). Equally, in the case of conflict, social unrest and/or political instability in a given state, improving the economy of the state is often perceived as being the only adequate remedy. However, those conflicts are often the results of not only economic disparities but also of ethnic and/or spiritual divisions. The needs to
involve religion in the mediation and reconciliation processes are therefore essential (Luttwak 1994:14-15).

In her analysis of the positive contributions of faith-based organisations to the field of development and peace building, Flanigan (2010) argues that faith-based organisations are receiving increasing recognition for the following reasons:

- Added credibility in the community
- More individualized and compassionate service provision
- More highly committed and motivated workers
- Greater safety for service recipients
- Less conflict and greater trust among NGO staff (Flanigan 2010: 30).

FBOs have been increasingly involved in seeking justice and have played “a greater role in making governments politically accountable to their constituents” (Clarke 2007:81).

**Church growth and the growing number of Christian organisations**

According to the Union of International Associations, there are approximately 33,500 international NGOs in the world. 3,183 have consultative status at the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). 320 out of these 3,183 can be characterised as religious. The fact that these organisations have been granted consultative status at ECOSOC means that they have been recognised as proper development and humanitarian aid NGOs. The table below shows that Christian organisations prevail in number (Petersen 2010).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Affiliation</th>
<th>Number of Organisations</th>
<th>Percentage of all religious NGOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritual</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multireligious</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religions</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Petersen 2010)

The study conducted by Petersen also reveals that religious NGOs are usually involved in fields similar to that of secular NGOs such as education, social justice, humanitarian aid and environmental protection. However, many chose to include promotion of their religion. Finally, others focus on spiritual matters. The table below introduces the relevant figures:
Goals and fields of work | Percentage of all religious NGOs
---|---
Culture and recreation, education, health, social services, environment, development and infrastructure, law, defense and politics | 47.3%
Religious promotion | 13.9%
Both categories | 38.8%
Total | 100%

(Petersen 2010)

Petersen’s findings reveal the great involvement of Christianity on the public sphere. It is not surprising that Christianity should be very present since it is a worldwide religion that for centuries has crossed cultural and political boundaries. It is a global phenomenon. As explained by Sebastian Kim and Kirsteen Kim, “[t]he spread of Christianity is often tied to the expansion of Europe and the rise of North America” (Sebastian Kim & Kirsteen Kim 2008: 11). However, “[a]s in the first millennium, the worldwide presence of Christianity today is not primarily the attempts by powerful churches to replicate themselves worldwide but the result of indigenous response and grassroots movements” (Sebastian Kim & Kirsteen Kim 2008: 11). The continuing expansion of Christianity as a non-Western phenomenon (though this does not mean that Christianity is no longer present in the West) is best illustrated in the table below from the World Christian Database and referred to by Philip Jenkins on his research of global Christianity:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Christians (millions)</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2050</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>1,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td>2,291</td>
<td>3,188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jenkins argues that the three continents (namely Latin America, Africa and Asia), where Christianity has and continues to develop dramatically, “share a passionate enthusiasm for mission and evangelism that is often South-South, organised from one of the emerging churches, and directed toward some other region of Africa, Asia, or Latin America—we think of Brazilian missionaries in Africa, Ugandans in India, Koreans in the Middle-East. Although poorly studied, South-South evangelism represents one of the most impressive phenomena in contemporary Christianity: the topic cries out for a major book-length survey” (Jenkins 2011: 16).

My research therefore, not only contributes to the field of Korean studies, it also provides an in depth case study on the role-played by non Western Christian organisations on the international stage. Furthermore, the Republic of Korea has joined other OECD countries in the provision of development aid around the world. In fact, many of the Christian organisations that are working in North
Korea are also working in other developing countries. Korean Christian missionaries and development organisations often convey consciously and unconsciously an ideological message. As such it is important to examine the role of Korean Christian development agencies as political actors and representatives of South Korean Christian evangelical values.

3. North Korea and Christianity

**Pyongyang: Jerusalem of the East**

Catholicism was introduced to the Korean peninsula in the 18th century and Protestantism was introduced at the end of the 19th century. As examined in the next chapter, Koreans and missionaries worked together to spread the gospel on the whole peninsula. Protestantism spread rapidly and successfully but particularly flourished in the northern region. Pyongyang quickly became a major missionary platform, the so-called Jerusalem of the East. According to Palmer, after twenty years of mission work, “the northern provinces of P’yŏngan, Hamgyŏng and Hwanghae, though containing only one-fourth of the Protestant missionaries in Korea, reported about half of the baptisms, adherents and church contributions of the whole country” (Palmer 1986: 82). Therefore, before the emergence of communism, the north of the peninsula had already become the bastion of conservative Christianity especially Presbyterianism. However, after the division of the country in 1945, Kim Il-sung sought to suppress all forms of religious expressions in the North. Christians sought refuge in the South where Christianity developed dramatically henceforth. In today South Korea, Christians have the right to meet and practice their religion and their rights are protected by the state. Furthermore, as illustrated by a table provided by In-chul Kang [Inch’ŏl Kang] (2013), Protestant Christians are very influential in the government as they
steadily constitute the largest religious group in the national assembly and thus regardless of the Presidents’ religious leanings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Buddhist</th>
<th>Other or no religion</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15th (1996-2000)</td>
<td>110 (36.8)</td>
<td>63 (21.1)</td>
<td>52 (17.4)</td>
<td>74 (24.7)</td>
<td>299 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th (2000-2004)</td>
<td>112 (41.0)</td>
<td>66 (24.2)</td>
<td>43 (15.8)</td>
<td>52 (19.0)</td>
<td>273 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th (2004-2008)</td>
<td>103 (34.4)</td>
<td>70 (23.4)</td>
<td>34 (11.4)</td>
<td>92 (30.8)</td>
<td>299 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th (2008-2012)</td>
<td>120 (40.5)</td>
<td>72 (24.3)</td>
<td>55 (18.6)</td>
<td>49 (16.6)</td>
<td>296 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th (2012-2016)</td>
<td>111 (37.0)</td>
<td>73 (24.3)</td>
<td>41 (13.7)</td>
<td>75 (25.0)</td>
<td>300 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(unit: person) (In-chul Kang 2013: 115)

In North Korea however, Christianity has struggled to survive. As Shah and Philpott explain, secularisation might be hostile to religion when a “state seeks to integrate a religious body into its own authority through suppression, coercion, and often harsh persecution, as in Communist Russia, Bulgaria, and Romania or in revolutionary Mexico” (Shah & Philpott 2011: 26). The politics of secularisation implemented by communist governments impacted countries in different ways and certain religious denominations enjoyed more freedom under communism than others. As mentioned earlier, evangelical Christians, in particular, and Catholics were persecuted because of their association to the United States and to the West.

Religious persecution is often associated with Marxism. Gabel (2005) argues that Marx believed that religion led the oppressed to accept their conditions of suffering by nurturing them with the hope of a better after-life. Since Marx wanted to improve the material condition of people, he thought that they should get rid of religion and focus on the transformation of their earthly predicament. Marx condemned the emphasis on ‘otherworldliness’. He also criticised Christians for their charity arguing that there would be no need for charity if man
could change the economic and social conditions and achieve social justice, and that charity merely holds the system in place. Marx also rebuked the Protestant greediness associated with the right to private property, which “worked against the dreamed-of communality of the future” (Gabel 2005: 87). Finally, Marx said that Christians were hypocritical when they forgot three centuries of slavery, martyrdom and oppression and started their own campaigns of persecution against heretics and infidels under Constantine (Gabel 2005: 85-87).

Communism was first introduced to the Korean peninsula in the early 1920s. Bruce Cumings argues that it seduced young generations and the ‘humble’ of Korean society (Cumings 2005 (1997): 157-158). They were nationalist and fought for the independence of the country but split between different factions: one group chose to exile and engage into armed struggle. The other group stayed in Korea, and underwent tremendous pressure from the Japanese, but by the end of the 1920s, was leading the resistance movement (Cumings 2005 (1997): 158-159). As explained by Dae-sook Suh in Cumings (2005):

[Communists and leftists] succeeded in wrestling control of the Korean revolution from the Nationalists; they planted a deep core of Communist influence among Korean people, particularly the students, youth groups, laborers and peasants. Their fortitude and, at times, obstinate determination to succeed had a profound influence on Korean intellectuals and writers. To the older Koreans, who had groveled so long before seemingly endless foreign suppression, communism seemed a new hope and a magic touch...For Koreans in general, the sacrifices of the Communists, if not the idea of communism, made strong appeal, far stronger than any occasional bomb-throwing exercise of the Nationalists. The haggard appearance of the Communists suffering from torture, their stern and disciplined attitude
toward the common enemy of all Koreans, had a far-reaching effect on people (Dae-sook Suh (1967) quoted in Cumings 2005 (1997): 159).

The Korean Communist Party (KCP) was founded in 1925 in the south and was led by a man named Pak Hŏn-yŏng (Cumings 2005 (1997): 159). Kim Il-sung (born Kim Sŏng-ju), on the other hand, lived in exile until the liberation of Korea and thus when he came back to take control of the north of the country with the support of the Russians, he was unknown to the majority of Koreans including Korean communists. One of his major tasks, therefore, was to eliminate political rivals and build an image of himself as a fearless and victorious patriot (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 69-71). First, he proceeded to attack and eliminate indigenous communists and those who had given in under persecution from the Japanese (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 89-90). Dae-sook Suh argues that it was not too difficult as Kim Il-sung received the support of Russian forces who occupied the north until 1948. Eliminating Christians who opposed Kim Il-sung’s policies was also part of Kim Il-sung’s plans to consolidate his power. Dae-young Ryu [Taeyŏng Yu], a Korean academic offers a very useful insight into the development of North Korea’s policy toward religion in his book written in Korean on modern Korean Christianity, Han’guk kŭn hyŏndaesawa kidokkyo (2009).

According to Ryu (2009), North Korea’s policy toward religion alongside the extermination of religious activity followed different stages: between 1945 and 1953, the years of formation of the North Korean state and the Korean War; between 1953 and 1972, years of the establishment of the ideology, Juche, and the suppression of all forms of dissidence; between 1972 and 1994 (year of the death of Kim Il-sung), the era of Kim Il-sungism. The constitution was also amended in 1972 to reflect the strengthening of authority of the supreme leader. The
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was formally established on 9 September 1948. The constitution that was then promulgated was called the Chosŏn minjujuŭi inmin kong hwaguk hŏnpŏp. In December 1972, it became the Chosŏn minjujuŭi inmin kong hwaguk sahoejuŭi hŏnpŏp and in 1992, it was further amended and renamed Urisik sahoejuŭi hŏnpŏp. The changes in terminology reflect the changes in ideology. For example the term socialism (Sahoejuŭi) is missing in the first constitution but was added in 1972 to indicate North Korea’s desire to implement its very own form of socialism (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 217-252).

1945-1953: establishment of North Korea and the anti-capitalist and anti-feudal revolution

Under Japanese occupation, Koreans developed or adopted different political and religious ideologies. Some Koreans turned to Christianity and by extension turned to the West, especially the United States, to modernise and seek the independence of the country. Others joined Ch’ŏndokkyo, religion of the heavenly way, followers, a native Korean religion which promoted equality and social justice. Ch’ŏndokkyo followers were actively engaged in the struggle for independence (also known as one of the righteous armies7) and were organised politically. Others collaborated with Japan or sought the protection of China or Russia. In summary, Koreans had become very divided over the question of Japan and there was no unified force to fight against the occupant. However, as the Second World War come to an end it became increasingly obvious that Japan was going to lose the war and it was believed that the Soviet Union would occupy the whole peninsula. Korean nationalists came together to form the Committee for the

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Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI or in Korean the Chosŏn kong kuk chunbi wiwŏnhoe). Branches of the CPKI rapidly spread across the country and took control of all the local administrations. The committee developed into a political structure, the Chosŏn inmin kong hwaguk (the Korean People’s Republic). Soon afterwards, it was decided that the United States would come to occupy the south of the peninsula and moderate and conservative forces left the CPKI. In the north however, most committees were led by Protestant leaders including prominent Protestant leader and nationalist Cho Man-sik in the area around Pyongyang. Cho led the party with the help of Protestant churches and was later removed by the Russians for opposing the American-Soviet agreement for Korean trusteeship. Following Yalta, the United States and the Soviet Union had decided to establish a joint provisional government on the peninsula. The UN requested that elections be held in the north and in the south but the Russians did not allow for elections to take place (Hawk 2005: 68-71).

After removing Cho Man-sik, the Russians appointed Kim Il-sung as the leader of the country. Kim Il-sung had been a guerrilla leader in Manchuria and was chosen possibly because of his language skills: he was fluent in Russian and Chinese but ironically would have to improve his Korean to lead the country (Lankov 2013: 3-4). The Soviet army occupied the North between 1945 and 1948 and the Chinese occupied North Korea for eight years, from 1950 until 1958. The Soviets were actively engaged into North Korean politics but the Chinese army however, first led the war against the United Nations then stayed in the North to ensure political stability but did not interfere with domestic politics (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 155).
In 1946, Soviets proceeded to a land reform that confiscated all lands including that from aristocrats and religious groups (churches, Buddhist temples and so on). Many Christians opposed the land reform and fled to the south of the country. Others chose to go underground. Kang Yang-uk, the then vice-President, criticised the pastors and Christians who had fled south and argued that they were fleeing not because their faith was under threat but because they wanted to keep their land (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 217-220). As both the North and the South were concerned with reunification, Kim Il-sung was trying to establish a national union between nationalists, religious groups, intellectuals and progressive groups; he did not use yet the terms socialism or communism but anti-capitalism and anti-feudalism (*panje* and *panbonggŏn*). His aim was to establish a true progressive democracy and did not want it to be seen only as a socialist revolution (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 221-222). Andrei Lankov says that communism in East Asia must be understood differently: “In the 1920s and 1930s, in the era when Kim Il Sung, Mao Zedong, and Ho Chi Minh were young idealists, communism in East Asia was widely seen as a shortcut to the national revival and modernity, a way not only to solve social problems but also to leapfrog past stages of backwardness and colonial dependency” (Lankov 2013: 5). Between October 1946 and February 1947, local elections were organised to elect central committees. In October 1946, Presbyterians sent an open letter and said that they would boycott the elections if held on a Sunday and that they did not want the church buildings to be used for other purposes than worship. Most Christians in those days were located in the northwestern region of the country; they were capitalist, landowners and pro-American. On March 23rd 1946, in an address, Kim Il-sung had laid out some of the guarantees of the future provisional government. The second element of the
list said that groups and individuals who would oppose the government should be banned (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 222-223).

In 1948, after the national elections and the formal establishment of the DPRK, Kim Il-sung decided to curtail further the influence of religious groups. Thus, article two of the constitution only guaranteed the freedom to believe and the freedom to perform religious rituals in accordance with those beliefs. Mission work (including the right to evangelise) and religious education were, however, no longer allowed (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 226-227). At that time, 2.7% of the members of the Supreme People’s Assembly were religious believers. Dae-sook Suh argues that many political, social and religious organisations were represented (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 99). As such, he says, there was still an effort to represent the views of most groups.

Kim Il-sung himself is reported as saying that people could not be forced to give up on their religious beliefs but that instead, people should be allowed to realise for themselves that their beliefs were not rational. Kim Il-sung believed that eventually people would embrace atheism and stop attending places of worship (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 227). For Kim Il-sung, the Korean War (1950-1953) was a final step in the process of liberation from imperialism and feudalism. In that context, Christianity was associated with the United States and Christians became severely persecuted. Many were executed or sent to prison camps. Still, Kim Il-sung said that he did not oppose people of faith but said: if you must believe in God, believe in a Korean God (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 228-229). Actually some of Kim Il-sung’s claims worked in his favour as Christians sought protection from bombing in church buildings, American raids did not discriminate and destroyed churches, killing hundreds of people. Some chose to
turn their back on Christianity and followed Kim Il-sung (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 231). On July 30 1953, Dae-sook Suh (1988) explains that three days after the end of the Korean War, the Supreme Court of the DPRK held a trial indicting 12 conspirators under Article 25 of the North Korean criminal law. The 12 men were accused of: “espionage activities for the United States, indiscriminate destruction and slaughter of democratic forces and Communist revolutionaries in the South, and the attempted overthrow of the government of the republic by military force” (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 131). The trial cited American imperialists, American officials but also the American missionary Horace Underwood Jr. from Yonsei University (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 132).

**1953-1972: establishment of Juche and North Korean Cultural Revolution**

These years marked the completion of a North Korean form of socialism, the extermination of all forms of dissidence and the establishment of the state’s ideology and policy. In a speech delivered to the central bureau in 1956, Kim Il-sung said: we should not ignore or distrust young people who believe in religion. They can also be transformed into good socialists if we teach them well. Faith is freedom so we cannot forbid it but we can educate and change their mindset (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 234). However, between 1957 and 1959, North Korea proceeded to eliminate and punish those regarded as hostile to the government, including Christians. In 1957, the authorities developed the notorious class system, in Korean, sŏngbun, according to which “each citizen is assigned a hereditary based class and socio-political rank over which the individual exercises no control but which determines all aspects of his or her life” (Collins 2012: 1). Sŏngbun was institutionalised by Kim Il-sung between 1957 and 1960.
and continues to affect all areas of life including food distribution, education, employment, healthcare and residence. The core (haeksim) class is deemed loyal to the regime and is often based in Pyongyang where the so-called elite lives a relatively comfortable life. The wavering (tondyo) class is submitted to constant sessions of re-education but is granted opportunities to serve the party and the military. Members of the wavering classes live in the provinces surrounding Pyongyang. Members of the hostile (choktae) class are family members and/or descendants of traders, religious leaders, Japanese collaborators or allies of the United Nations and South Korea during the Korean War who were regarded as enemies of the regime and thus sent to live in remote places.

The choktae are more likely to suffer from punishment, arbitrary detention and starvation. They represent the segment of the population which was the most affected by the famine, and the majority of refugees who have escaped North Korea in search for food come from these regions especially from the northern provinces of Hamgyeong (The Chosun Ilbo 2011). Sŏngbun is hereditary and there is nothing one can do to upgrade his or her status. On the other hand, it is easier to fall from grace and it is not unusual for high-ranking officials to disappear or even be executed.

In 1958, the North Korean Council of Ministers institutionalised a “people’s group” (Inminban) structure as a means of holding neighbours accountable to one another (Hawk 2005: 73). Lankov explains that these people’s groups include between 20 and 40 families and functioned as effective tools of surveillance until the 1990s. Each group is led by an official, usually a middle-aged woman. Lankov, who had interviewed a former leader of an inminban, said that she stated:
“an inminban head should know how many chopsticks and how many spoons are in every household” (Lankov 2013: 38-39).

According to Kim Il-sung, 1958 was also the year of completion of the socialist revolution. Dae-sook Suh (1988) says that on February 8 1958, North Korea celebrated the tenth anniversary of the foundation of the Korean People’s Army. Suh argues that on the occasion, “Kim spoke with authority on any subject, and no one dared question anything he said” (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 154). Kim Il-sung criticised those working for the judiciary who released political prisoners in the name of human rights, citing the example of a Christian named Yi Man-hwa. Suh says that Kim Il-sung also “attacked such religion said that Buddhists sit and meditate but do nothing. Such lassitude may be good for Buddhism, but it bad for the state” (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 154).

Books that record Kim Il-sung speeches delivered in that period published in 1960s no longer mention religion or religious believers (Chonggyoin). Ryu says that the absence of reference to religion and religion believers is often interpreted as evidence of extermination of religion in the 1950s (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 235-236). However, in a speech delivered in 1959, Kim Il-sung conceded that not everyone was ready to support communism to the end but that, nevertheless, people should hold hands and move forward. Ryu interprets this as sign that in spite of his efforts, Kim Il-sung had been unable to exterminate all religious believers and that faith in religion had subsisted in North Korea (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 236).

In the 1960s, the North Korean state ideology, Juche (Chuch’e), emerged. According to Lankov, Juche had been mentioned by Kim Il-sung in 1955 but had
remained insignificant until the mid—1960s (Lankov 2013: 67). *Chu/Ju* means master or lord and *che* means subject, main body or core. It is often translated as ‘self-reliance’ but Lankov says that it is a mistake and that a better translation would be ‘self-importance’ or ‘self-significance’ (Lankov 2013: 67). In April 1965, as Kim Il-sung visited Indonesia to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Bandung conference in Indonesia, he stated that the key factor in terms of ideology, politics, economy and defence was the Juche idea (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 236-237). When Kim Il-Sung first mentioned Juche on December 28 1955, it was as a way of criticising ‘toadyism’: Korea’s ‘adulation’ for foreign powers. He had also reflected on the need for Koreans to develop their own application of Marxism or Leninism to fit Korea’s circumstances. Dae-sook Suh (1988) more precisely argues that Kim Il-sung’s first reference to Juche was a means to counterbalance the influence of the Soviet Union on North Korean politics while praising the Chinese who were still occupying their territory: “Kim said that in order to strengthen party spirit among the members, the Koreans must follow the example of the Chinese rectification campaign, the *zhengfeng* movement8 ... later when the Chinese occupation forces withdrew from North Korea in 1958, his first speech about Juche was revised to delete his remark about following the example of the Chinese rectification campaign” (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 144). The re-emergence of Juche in 1965 as a North Korean ideology, however, reflected the North Korean efforts to demark themselves from both the ideologies of the Soviet Union and of China (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 237). Since the 1980s, Juche has also been commonly referred to as Kim Il-sungism because of the idolisation of the leader Kim Il-sung as explained in chapter five.

8 First ideological campaign organised by the Chinese Communist Party between 1942 and 1944.
On the 25th of May 1967, Kim Il-sung clarified his ideas in a presentation entitled: “From capitalism to the period of transition of socialism and about proletarian dictatorship matters” by which he located his ideology between that of China and of the Soviet Union but essentially called on for the execution of a small cultural revolution (*Munhwa punyaesŏ ŭi pansujŏngjŭi t'ujaeng*). Basically, the North Korean Cultural Revolution called for the extermination of previous religious and intellectual cultures (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 238).

In March 1968, at a presentation delivered at the Ministry of Education, Kim Il-sung called for the re-evaluation of Christianity and Buddhism. Concerned with the growing number of religious believers in South Korea, Kim Il-sung warned of the poisonous nature of religion (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 238). Kim Il-sung called religion an obstacle to the development of a North Korean culture. He argued, for example, that Buddhist temples symbolised Korea’s historical and cultural heritage but that their religious value should be taken away (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 239). Religion was also criticised in the arts. For example a 1967 movie (*Ch’oehaksin ŭi ilga*) portrayed the son of a pro-American pastor, Pastor Choe, who becomes a true patriot and kills American soldiers. Kim Jong-il, who was involved in the making of the film claimed that the main problem was not the faith of the character but his toadyism towards America (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 239).

Ryu says that Kim Il-sung praised the film which reflected the values and the political line of the party: we can work with religious believers for the sake of our reunification but we cannot work with pro-Americans (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 239). Ryu argues that there was a shift of perspective toward religion before and after the implementation of Juche: in the beginning, Kim Il-sung criticised
religion for being the opium of the people, exploiting lower classes and being unscientific. After the establishment of Juche, religion, especially Christianity, was referred to as an imperialistic tool (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 240).

1972- present day: Kim Il-sungism

The new constitution of 1972 weakened the power of the Supreme People’s Assembly and abolished the cabinet to grant full authority to the head of state (Ch’usŏk) (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 241). The capital was also changed from Seoul to Pyongyang. The capital could still have been Seoul because North Korea never recognised South Korea as a legitimate state, and considered it was the government of the whole of the peninsula. Maps of the DPRK effectively include the whole peninsula without the line of demarcation between the two countries. However in doing so, Suh argues North Korea moved from being a satellite communist territory to being a fully independent state. Furthermore, according to Suh, “the most radical changes were in the substitution of Kim’s political thought for Communist ideology, the establishment of his revolutionary tradition as the tradition of Korea, and the all-powerful administrative organ of the Central People’s Committee” (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 270).

The new constitution also included a clause to guarantee the freedom to oppose religion and religious believers. Accordingly, in the 1970s and the 1980s, the North Korean government continued to actively promote anti-religious activities using the arts and performances (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 242-243). Ryu says that the reason why North Korea had to campaign against religious activity is because they could never fully resolve the matter. Kim Il-sung was not only concerned by the potentiality of having believers in the North, he was equally concerned by the number of Christian believers in the South and regarded them as an obstacle to
reunification. Kim Il-sung argued that the North Korean government never persecuted anyone because of their faith but because of their anti-government activity (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 244-245).

In 1992, the constitution was revised again and granted the freedom of faith but regulated whoever attracted foreign power using religion. In fact the North Korean constitution never granted freedom of religion but the freedom to believe and perform religious rituals. Kim Il-sung had vouched to do anything in order to protect the proletarian class, and would control everything to achieve this including religion (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 246). Kim Il-sung believed that he was a benevolent leader working for the good of the nation. The Pyongyang newspaper published stories of patriotic Christians such as Kang Yang-uk. Kim Il-sung argued that he placed ‘people’ over religion and ideology (Minjok ch’isangjū) (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 251).

**Contemporary state policy and the underground church**

There is no recorded religious activity in North Korea between the late 1950s and the late 1980s. According to official figures provided by the North Koreans in 2002, there are currently 12,000 Protestants, 10,000 Buddhists and 800 Catholics in the country. There is also a Cheondogkyo (Ch’ŏndokkyo) Young Friends Party and a governmental approved group of Cheondongkyoists encompassing approximately a number of 15,000 practitioners. In the capital, Pyongyang, there are four state-controlled churches: two Protestants (Pongsu and Ch’ilgol), the Ch’angch’un Roman Catholic Church and the Holy Trinity Russian Orthodox Church. It is not known how many people attend these churches but many foreigners have been able to visit them and attend services, which they describe as being political. However, David Hawk argues that in the absence of foreigners,
sermons are actually genuine (Hawk 2005: 89). Interaction with foreigners is limited nevertheless. Some visitors say they witnessed some genuine worship amongst the members of the congregations. There are approximately 60 Buddhist temples but they are regarded as historical monuments. The government has also reported a number of 500 family worship centres—the equivalent of house churches in the West—but researchers have not been able to verify their existence.

According to reports by human rights organisations and missionaries, people who undertake proselytising activities or North Koreans who come into contact with Christianity are arrested and subjected to harsh punishment. North Korea is therefore on the United States’ list of Countries of Particular Concern and was the country before last (178th out of 179) on the world index of press freedom compiled by the French human rights organisation, Reporters Without Borders in 2013 (Reporters without Borders NGO 2013). The British Christian human rights charity Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) and the missionary organisation Open Doors International (ODI) regularly document and report violations of religious freedom including the persecution, arrest, torture and execution of Christians. CSW reports that during the 1950s and 1960s, the North Koreans carried out a systematic ‘cleansing’ of Christians, which technically amounted to committing genocide (Christian Solidarity Worldwide NGO 2007). In 2010 alone, ODI reported that “[h]undreds of Christians were arrested in North Korea ... with some killed and others sent to concentration camps” (Open Doors International 2010).

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9 Country of Particular Concern is a designation by the United States Secretary of State (under authority delegated by the President) of a nation guilty of particularly severe violations of religious freedom under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) of 1998 (H.R. 2431) and its amendment of 1999 (Public Law 106-55).
Nevertheless, according to the organisation, there are an estimated 400,000 Christians, who have survived this holocaust and meet and worship in hiding, they are the members of the so-called underground church.

Missionary organisations claim to have reliable data on the current state of the North Korean underground church. According to Open Doors Korea, the North Korean church went underground in the 1950s and partly functioned until 1958. Apparently, Christians chose to go underground as the government was carrying out a census to implement its social class system referred to above. Christians were heavily targeted, sent to remote areas in the north of the country, sent to labour camps or simply executed. During the Chinese Cultural Revolution, many Korean Chinese fled the country and sought refuge in North Korea. At that time, North Korean underground churches had established a national network to sustain themselves. In the late 1980s, China opened its economy, which meant that religious activity increased and even became tolerated by the Chinese government. This movement brought revival into the Korean Chinese church which encouraged North Korean underground churches who started to reveal their identity secretly to some Korean Chinese leaders. In 1993, with the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea, South Korean missionaries started to travel to China and Korean Chinese started to visit South Korea increasingly. As a result, North Korea tried to enhance their security to prevent missionary activities through Korean Chinese churches based in China. For example, they would send North Korean spies to Korean Chinese churches to identify links between Korean Chinese Christians and South Korea. When Korean Chinese Christians visited North Korea, they were warned by the local security of
the Foreign Affairs Bureau to decrease their activity or they would send spies to
their churches in China and Korea and arrest them. Accordingly, North Korean
churches decreased contacts with Korean Chinese churches. However, with the
food crisis, they started opening to the world again, asking for help (Open Doors
Korea NGO 1999).

The South Korean branch of the organisation Cornerstone (in Korean
Mot’ongidol sŏngyohoe) has released documents providing some information
about the underground church. According to these documents, there would be
between 2000 to 4000 Christian believers in every major North Korean town.
Believers meet in secret and must be creative with regard to places of worship and
the form of worship itself. However, most meetings include the recitation of the
Apostles Creed and of the Lord’s Prayer, some singing and a sermon. There are
no ordained ministers but there are leaders. Members of the underground church
are usually Christians or the descendants of Christians who went underground in
the 1950s. As such, the church is reported to be aging and seeking new members
(Cornerstone NGO 2012). The organisation says it tries to help the underground
church by providing bibles, food, medicine, radios and other necessities.
Cornerstone claims that by the end of 2011, it had helped plant 1,273 new
churches in North Korea (Cornerstone NGO 2012).

Efforts of the liberal churches to promote reconciliation with North
Korea

While efforts to connect with the North Korean underground churches are
relatively recent, liberal churches have been interacting with the North Korean
official religious bodies since the 1970s. David Hawk (2005) says those
organisations were established precisely with the intention of interacting with
progressive voices in the Christian world (Hawk 2005: 86). During the Cold War, Christians in the West analysed the religious situation in China and Eastern Europe through the lens of anti-communism. In the 1970s however, some people initiated a dialogue between Marxism and Christianity, engaging with issues of social justice as a common ground. Whereas most people used to think that communism and Christianity could not co-exist, progressive Christians discovered that religion had subsisted, at least on the surface, in socialist countries. Similarly, in South Korea many Christians believed that religion had disappeared in North Korea and relied on research reports produced by the South Korean government to provide information about the religious situation there. In the 1980s, as exchanges with North Korea started to increase, liberal Christians were given the opportunity to interact with North Korean official religious bodies (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 191-193).

Christians from the Korean Diaspora first met with the North Korean Christian Federation in November 1981 at the Albert Schweitzer House in Vienna. At the time, the North Koreans had suggested to achieve reunification by “recognizing the existence of a confederation of the two governmental systems, forming one Korean team to participate in international events, and trimming down the size of the military” (Gil-soo Han & Andrew Eungi Kim 2006: 238). Both sides continued to meet until the early 1990s and they claim their initiative has contributed significantly to an atmosphere of reconciliation (Gil-soo Han & Andrew Eungi Kim 2006: 239).

In South Korea, the Christian peace movement began in the aftermath of the Kwangju massacre on the 18th of May 1980 when Koreans began to question the legitimacy of American troops on the peninsula and the role played by the United
States in the repression of democracy uprisings (Sam-yeol Lee [Samyŏl I] 2000: 124). At an individual level, some Christians had already been promoting peace and reunification but in 1980, the Church as a whole started to hold seminars and debates to identify ways to cooperate and interact with North Korea (Sam-yeol Lee 2000: 124). Gil-soo Han and Andrew Eungi Kim (2006) further identify two possible reasons why the Korean liberal Church became involved in reunification efforts in the 1980s. Firstly, the peace and anti-nuclear movements in the West influenced the Korean Church. In the 1970s, Korean churches began to address social and human rights injustices but did not link them to the issue of reunification, which they regarded as a political matter. Secondly, Han and Kim propose that the declining influence of the Church and the increasing secularisation of Korean society prompted the churches to assume responsibility for new causes (Gil-soo Han & Andrew Eungi Kim 2006: 247).

In 1982, the KNCC established a research centre for peace. In 1984, a conference held in Tozanzo, Japan, on the theme of ‘Consultation on Peace and Justice in North East Asia’ marked a turning point as it elevated the Korean conflict to international attention by recognising that it also represented a potential threat to peace in the region and in the world (Gil-soo Han & Andrew Eungi Kim 2006: 239-240). The discussions held in Japan led to the adoption of a declaration in 1985 that set the tone for subsequent meetings and declarations:

1. Overcoming the division of the peninsula will directly lead to achieving peace. The issue of reunification cannot be monopolized by the government but should be broadly shared with the Korean people.

2. It is unacceptable that either the South or North Korean governments avoid possible reunification as a way of holding on to power.
3. Korean Christianity aspires to democracy and justice on the peninsula. This aspiration is the cornerstone to overcoming the division of the peninsula and achieving reunification. Moreover, the central purpose of reunification is to achieve a democratic and just society, thus the reunification movement has to be democratic and just.

4. On the basis of the Christian belief that advocates peace in the Kingdom of God, Korean Christians declare that they have the responsibility, right and liberty to participate in the process of achieving reunification (Gil-soo Han & Andrew Eun gi 2006: 241).

In 1986, the WCC organised in Switzerland the first meeting between South Korean and North Korean churches. The North and South Korean churches met again in 1988 and 1990. The 1988 declaration was constituted of six chapters: “Korean Christian Missiological Tradition to Advocate Justice and Peace; The Current State of the Divided Peninsula; Confession of the Hatred of Fellow North Koreans since the Division of the Peninsula; Korean Christianity’s Suggestions to the North and South Korean governments; and Korean Christianity’s Tasks to Achieve Peaceful Reunification” (Gil-soo Han & Andrew Eun gi Kim 2006: 242).

The year 1995 was designated the “Year of Jubilee for Peace and Reunification”. In 1995, the NCCK reaffirmed its desire to promote an independent and peaceful peninsula.

5. Existing literature on NGOs in North Korea

As mentioned in the introduction, 1994 marked the ‘opening’ of North Korea to the world. Some humanitarian groups including evangelicals such as Han Kyung-shik were already sending aid to North Korea since the late 1980s but were not allowed to operate on the North Korean territory. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were first allowed to enter North Korea in 1995, when
confronted with severe food shortages, the North Korean government launched an appeal for help to the international community, who soon discovered the gravity of the famine, called the “Arduous March” (Pukhan kigun for South Koreans and Konanŭi haenggun for North Koreans).

However, altruism is not the only reason why non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or FBOs decided to get involved in North Korea. There are a range of factors—such as ideology or the pursuit of self-interests—that also determined their decision to operate in the North. South Korean organisations, in particular, said they privileged the building of relationships over humanitarian principles, and used aid as a means to promote peace on the peninsula. Existing literature on the subject tends to lump all South Korean humanitarian agencies together, which implies that all the organisations share the same agenda and draw their legitimacy from the same moral authority.

In their research and assessment of NGO activity in North Korea, scholars have tended to limit their analysis to the role played by NGOs in the provision of food aid; issues of access and food monitoring; their potential role in establishing a relationship of trust with the North Koreans and in the context of examining the ethical dilemma related to the provision of food aid to North Korea.

An important work on the issue of the ethical dilemma related to the provision of food aid is Michael Schloms’s North Korea and the Timeless Dilemma of Aid (2004). His work highlights NGOs’ lack of consistency in applying the principles of humanitarianism in North Korea: “due to differing ethical frameworks, mandates and traditions, aid agencies adopted different approaches to dealing with working restrictions in the DPRK” (Schloms 2004: 279). The author, however, does not examine in detail the mandates and traditions of these organisations. This
research seeks to fill a gap by examining the mandate and ethical framework of South Korean evangelical organisations.

With regard to issues of access and food monitoring, *Paved with Good Intentions: the NGO experience in North Korea*, edited by L. Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder (2003), provides the most comprehensive summary of the humanitarian NGO experience in North Korea. The editors sought a wide range of perspectives and thus included the analysis of the activity of American, South Korean and European humanitarian organisations. Scott Snyder argues that the early stages of NGO activity in 1995 set the tone for the subsequent years of polarisation between the members of the international community. Some organisations decided to leave the country because they believed that their activity was helping a dictatorial regime to survive and because of the lack of access and unequal distribution of food in the country. Other organisations decided to stay to meet the needs of the most vulnerable in North Korea in spite of the unwillingness of the North Korean regime to undertake the necessary reforms to secure the survival of its population (Snyder 2003: 112). The authors admit that both international agencies and organisations might have had a political agenda, but ultimately the purpose of their book is to assess the scope of NGO activity in North Korea.

There are a series of articles that have been written on the positive outcome of NGO activity in North Korea focusing especially on the NGOs’s potential influence on North Korean society and the building of relationships between North Koreans and the international community. As examined in the last chapter, they argue that foreign aid workers have multiplied efforts to create a space for capacity building, peace building and possibly the emergence of a civil society

According to Richardson (2008), South Korean civil society organisations, more especially, have an important role to play in the process of reunification even more so because, at times where relations are strained, “humanitarian aid sent by NGOs is often more readily accepted by the North than aid sent through official government channels” (Richardson 2008: 175). It is important to note that the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNICEF--which activities this research does not take into account—are the main distributors of food aid to North Korea whereas NGOs provide assistance on a much more limited scale.

Finally, scholars have analysed food aid through a state centric/realist approach. Since 1995, the governments of South Korea and the international community have been using humanitarian activity in North Korea as a means to justify different policies. Aid has been used as political leverage to encourage the denuclearisation of the peninsula or to institutionalise politics of engagement in the absence of diplomatic relations. As such, humanitarian organisations have consciously or unconsciously played an important role in consolidating foreign policies towards North Korea. To put it in the words of a Christian aid worker himself: “Most of us are aware that self-interest masquerades as altruism. Governments support and use us in various ways for different purposes, and we have our own reasons for allowing ourselves to be used” (Victor W.C. Hsu 2005: 15).
However, little attention has been paid to the political role played by the organisations themselves. As Clarke notes, “NGOs are not only important actors in their own right, but have become important vehicles for other actors, such as foreign donors, industrial or agricultural interests, religious groups, or underground movements, in articulating conflicting ideological positions” (Clarke 1998: 43). Therefore, scholars have usually neglected the fact that these organisations might convey different political and ideological ideas. Most South Korean humanitarian organisations claim that they are acting independently of political concerns and are promoting peace on the peninsula. For instance, the vision laid out by one of the most prominent organisations, the Korean Sharing Movement (우리민족-solidarity movement), is as follows:

1. As a humanitarian aid NGO it will contribute to the realization of humanitarianism and brotherhood and the formation of a Korean ethnic community.
2. As a peace NGO it will push forward to prevent armed conflict and establish a lasting peace in the Korean peninsula.
3. As a North-South solidarity NGO it will aim to relieve social economic inequalities, improve societal relations among regions, promote democracy and human rights, and cultivate the ability to resolve conflict peacefully in the Korean peninsula (Korean Sharing Movement 2010)

According to John Feffer, “[t]he missionaries are greedily eyeing North Korea. The 20 million citizens there represent fertile conversion. Indeed churches have been at the forefront of humanitarian efforts to alleviate the food crisis, and some of these denominations hope to expand their religious work as a quid pro quo” (Feffer 2003: 152). For the most part however, scholars have downplayed this important factor, as it does not seem to be recognised as an important variable to take into consideration even amongst Christian scholars.
Most of the time, the term NGO is used indiscriminately even if FBOs prevail in number. For example, a recent analysis provided by Victor Hsu, National Director for the DPRK programme of World Vision International (and a Christian), highlights the positive and effective partnerships established by NGOs with North Korean officials, but Hsu omits to differentiate NGOs from FBOs: “NGOs such as Adventist Disaster Response Agency, American Friends Service Committee, Christian Friends of Korea, Eugene Bell Foundation, German Agro-Action, Global Resources Services, Mercy Corps, Samaritan’s Purse, Save the Children UK, and World Vision have had fruitful partnerships with the DPRK in projects that address organic farming, upgrading of clinics and hospitals, livestock, food aid, vegetable and fruit fertigation and renewable energy” (Victor Hsu 2012). In fact, out of these ten organisations, seven are Christian: the Adventist Disaster Response Agency, American Friends Service Committee, Christian Friends of Korea, Eugene Bell Foundation, Global Resources Services, Samaritan’s Purse and World Vision are all faith-based organisations.

Some scholars admit that Christian organisations are present in greater number, however, they do not go beyond the facts. Such an example can be found in Edward P. Reed’s article on South Korean organisations in Engagement with North Korea: a viable alternative, edited by Sung-chull Kim and David C. Kang in 2009:

Notably, more than half of South Korean NGOs providing assistance to North Korea are affiliated with or directly supported by religious groups. Of the forty-two KNCC members, sixteen are affiliated with Christian churches or groups (Protestant and Catholic) and five with Buddhist organisations. As in other countries, faith-based NGOs are at the forefront of domestic and international humanitarian activities in South Korea. The religious groups
provide the institutional means for individuals to give expression to their faith-based humanitarian sentiments. They also provide the national networks through which support can be mobilized and information disseminated (Reed 2009: 205).

Finally, Scott Snyder, himself a Christian, highlighted in 2007 the paradoxical relationship between Christian NGOs and the North Korean government. He argues that these organisations have been successful in interacting with North Koreans because they have “place[ed] personal relationships above political concerns” (Snyder 2007: 428). Snyder also argues that the North Koreans are more comfortable working with Christian organisations as long as they “leave religion at the door” (Snyder 2007: 429). Snyder provides evidence of a lasting relationship between North Koreans and Christian groups but does not explain why Christians became involved in North Korea in the first place.

It is true that South Korean Christians have successfully managed to secure the financial means to proceed with their missionary activity in North Korea. The fact that evangelicism has become the religion of the middle-class and the educated in South Korea also contributes to the sustaining of their activities. However, it would be misleading to reduce the power of Christian evangelicals to their wealth alone. We must avoid what critical realists have labelled the epistemic fallacy: reducing the knowledge of what we know to the knowledge of being. Thus ontology and epistemology must be disambiguated. What matters is not how much money Christians have at their disposal but how they decide to use it. Money is merely a means to achieve what they consider to be a greater end, which might not be material but spiritual. Furthermore, as explained later in this research, for the most part South Korean Christian churches continue to cultivate
a strong sense of anti-communism and when relations between the two countries are strained, it is difficult to raise funds for the North in South Korea.

Another study carried out in a different region of the world shows that it is important to understand the ideological component behind the provision of aid to fully understand the politics of aid to a given country. The Norwegian government channels all of its aid to Sudan through Christian Norwegian organisations. Aud V. Tønnessen says that religion was a dominant force behind Western aid provided to Southern Sudan after the peace treaty had been signed:

This all formed part of a higher aim: that of rebuilding Southern Sudan as a home for the Christian Sudanese population, not through development and efforts to secure the peace. So in this case it is the framing of the activities that explains the intentions behind them, not the activities in themselves. If one therefore only sees mission when evangelisation takes place, or only sees a professional development programme without taking into account the interpretative frame within which the activities take place, one fails to see and analyse the impact of religion in the international aid system (Tønnessen 2011: 335).

Therefore, it is not because evangelical organisations are not directly evangelising that their impact or motivations should be ignored.

6. NGOs operating in North Korea: the situation as of 2009-2010

As of 2010, a reduced number of NGOs were still active in North Korea. Organisations active on behalf of the European Union and resident in the country were: Premiere Urgence; Save the Children; Concern Worldwide; Welt Hunger Hilfe (German Agro Action), Triangle and Handicap International. Other active but non-resident organisations are: the Mennonite Central Committee (Canada); First Steps (Canada); the Eugene Bell Foundation (US/South Korea); Christian
Friends of Korea (US); Mercy Corps (US); World Vision (US); Samaritan’s Purse (US); Adventist Disaster Response Agency (US); Global Resources Services (US); American Friends Service Committee (US); the Canadian Food Grains Bank and the Hanns Seidel and Friedrich Naumann Foundations (Germany).

As of 2009, there were 70 South Korean organisations involved with North Korea, 56 of which were members of the Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (KNCC). The North Korea aid programme encompasses all humanitarian efforts and development programmes undertaken by South Korean civil society. It covers diverse areas including emergency assistance, medical care, agriculture and so on. The Protestant faith-based organisations registered with the Korean NGO council for cooperation with North Korea in 2009 were:

- Salvation Army (Han’guk segun)
- Good neighbors (Kut neibōsū)

- Good people (Kut p’ip’ŭl)
- Korea Food for the Hungry International (Kukchekia taech’ek kigu)

- International Corn Foundation (Kukche oksusu chaedan)
- Korean Living Together Movement (Nambuk hamkke salgi undong)

- Campus Crusade Korea (Han’guk taejaksan t’aehyŏn)
- The general assembly of the Presbyterian church of Korea (Taehan yesu kyoj万家 t‘onghap sahoe pongsabu)

- YMCA Korea (Han’guk YMCA chŏn ‘gukyŏnmaeng)
- Lighthouse foundation (Tongdae pokchihoe)

- World vision Korea (Woldă pichŏn)
- The Korean Association of People Sharing Love (Minjok sarang nanum)

- New Millennium Life Movement (Saech’ŏnnyŏn saemyŏng undong)
- South-North Sharing Campaign (Nambuk nanum kongdong undong)

- The cross mission/Sam care (Saempokchi chaedan)
- Eugene Bell Foundation (American/Korean)

- Dairy Goat Project (Han’guk taejaksan t’aehyŏn)
- Korean Foundation for World Aid (Han minjok pokchi chaedan)- formerly called Korea Welfare Foundation
My research focuses on the activities of South Korea based groups that provide assistance to North Korea and have chosen to work with the North Korean authorities. These groups, organisations or churches might not always be purely composed of ethnic South Koreans as Koreans have sometimes been working in partnership with Westerners. I will also briefly refer to the work of Christian human rights groups and explain why they refuse to provide aid. These groups, also based in South Korea, might also be the joint efforts of North Korean refugees and American activists and, in that sense, are not always ‘purely South Korean’. Finally, my research does not address the activities taking place on the China North Korea border and it focuses on the work of groups who have based their activity in South Korea. A list of all the organisations currently working under the umbrella of the Council for Cooperation with North Korea can be found in the second appendix at this end of this dissertation. The first appendix is a sample of my interview questions in Korean.
Chapter 3: Christian nationalism

1. Introduction

Human rights and humanitarian groups who are working to improve the living conditions of North Koreans are also working to bring revival in North Korea. They believe that their activity will bring them closer to achieving re-unification and the re-evangelisation of the northern part of the country. In doing so however, most evangelicals are aiming to bring about regime change in North Korea as they believe that the Juche ideology and Christianity cannot coexist. This chapter will proceed in the following manner: first, it will attempt to understand what a theology of revival means for Korean evangelicals today in light of the historical relationship of Christianity with North Korea. Second, it will briefly summarise the key events of the history of Christianity on the Korean peninsula, as contemporary evangelicalism cannot be understood without reflecting on the history of Christianity in Korea. Third, it will argue that an anti-communist ideology/anti-Juche continues to shape the way evangelicals relate to North Korea. It will be argued however that evangelicals with an interest in North Korea namely humanitarian aiders and human rights activists are divided over the North Korea issue, which is also reflective of a broader national divide. It will explain that the question of which policies to adopt towards North Korea constitutes a major issue of contention between political parties in South Korea. As of 2013, there exist two major political families: the conservatives, which are grouped under the Saenuri\(^{10}\) (new world) Party—party in power—and the progressives (who could also be referred to as liberals or democrats) which are grouped under

\(^{10}\) Formerly called Grand National Party (GNP)
the Democratic Party (DEP or in Korean minjudang). The political division between conservatives and democrats pervades every aspect of society: chaebols, academia, the media, churches and NGOs. It is commonly referred to as the South-South division.

Finally, it will be argued that their anti-Juche ideology is not only the product of history but also related to the fact that many Korean Christians have related the fate of their country to that of biblical Israel and have ‘satanised’ the forces (first Japan and then North Korea) that are preventing them from building a Christian nation.

2. Christian Nationalism

Calhoun (1993) defines nationalism as a modern concept that takes roots in the “preeminent discursive form for modern claims to political autonomy and self-determination [‘especially the idea of sovereignty’] linked to the concept of nation-state in the notorious formulations of Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations in 1919” (Calhoun 1993: 213). Furthermore, Christianity is often associated with concepts of nationalism or modernisation of a society. Robert argues that generally Christianity spread relatively easily around the world because it formed part of the strategic response against colonialism:

Christian belief, as a holistic way of addressing both questions of ultimate meaning and the need for material well-being, appealed the most in small-scale societies that were confronted with larger political forces they could not control ... Intellectuals adopted Christianity as a strategic response to modernisation, a way of gaining the knowledge needed to negotiate the larger forces of political decay, or to resist colonialism” (Robert 2009: 49-50).
Nationalism in Korea is often used to describe the involvement of Christians in the struggle for independence from Japan (Ung-kyu Pak 2005; Wells 1990; Timothy S. Lee 2010). However, Christian nationalism in Korea has been expressed differently at different times. Korean Christians have been trying to evangelise the whole peninsula for over a century. According to Spencer J. Palmer (1986), “from the beginning the Koreans were made to believe that the spread of Christianity and the growth of the Christian church belonged to them and not to the missionaries” (Palmer 1986: 28). Furthermore, Christianity in Korea has never existed outside of the political realm and has arguably always been nationalistic. In his book on Korean eschatology, Ung-kyu Pak (2005) makes a significant observation. He argues that dominant religions in Korea changed with the successive governments or dynasties: “Shamanism was the dominant religion in prehistorical times; Buddhism dominated in the Silla and Koryo eras (from the seventh to the fourteenth century); and Christianity emerged during the late Chosun era and during the twentieth” (Ung-kyu-Pak 2005: 19). It can be argued therefore that historically, specific religions were allowed to thrive under a given political order and at the same time these religions championed a particular system.

With regard to Protestant Christianity especially, David Kwang-sun Suh [Kwangsun Sŏ] (2005), minjung theologian, has provided a very interesting insight into Korean political theology and the kingdom of God. Suh argues that for early Protestant Christians, the kingdom of God meant the end of Confucianism. People should convert to Christianity to move away from Confucianism and bring the country into a stage of greater modernity. Under Japanese occupation (1910-1945), the kingdom of God meant liberation and
independence from Japan. By turning to Christianity, the nation would be given greater power to resist occupation. During the years that preceded the Korean War and the years of the Cold War, the kingdom of God would have been the end of communism and the end of the North Korean dictatorship. Since the 1980s, for many Koreans the kingdom of God is the reunification of the Korean people (David Kwang-sun Suh 2005). There is a strong correlation therefore, between the idea of the kingdom of God and what Korea should look like as a nation. Suh’s remark outlines different stages of Christian nationalism and political theologies. This chapter suggests that evangelicals are not only seeking to reunify the peninsula but also to rebuild North Korea as a Christian nation.

Furthermore, according to Sebastian C.H. Kim, anyone who wants to understand the Korean Church, must understand its revivals (Sebastian C.H. Kim 2007: 43). A revival is a religious meeting held in the evenings, usually organised by churches from the same denomination and taking place in different locations at the same time. Dae-young Ryu (2008) argues that “one notable characteristic of Korean Protestantism is its theological conservatism. Further, embedded in this conservatism is a revivalistic-evangelistic temperament. Korean Christians' religious gatherings are typically emotional and stirring. Nearly all Korean congregations across denominational lines observe the century-old tradition of annual and semi-annual revival meetings that place a heavy emphasis on the Bible, conversion, and evangelism” (Dae-young Ryu 2008: 371).

Korean evangelicals strategise to bring revivals in different areas of the world. In this context, the term revival can also mean restoring or bringing back to life. For example, the mission organisation, Withee Mission International (Widi kukchesŏn kyohoe), seeks among other things to restore Christianity as a major
religion in Europe by working through migrant workers from the global South who settle in Europe. The organisation says that through the training of migrants, it has already planted churches in Belgium and in the United Kingdom (Withee Mission International NGO 2004). G. Thompson Brown has written a book on *How Koreans are reconverting the West* (2008) through its Diaspora and another book on the role of the Korean Diaspora in Christian mission, *Korean Diaspora and Christian mission*, was published by Korean authors in 2011 (S. Hun Kim & Wonsuk Ma eds. 2011). However, as argued by Chung-shin Park, “the revival theology born in the historical context of colonisation played an influential role in nationalistic politics as a theology of hope, at least in the early colonial period” (Chung-shin Park 2003: 65). Therefore, it can still be argued that today’s revival theology is still intrinsically linked to evangelicals’ political theology. As Koreans advocate for revival in Pyongyang, they are also politically aiming to ‘re’construct a reunified, democratised and Christianised peninsula.

Just like early Protestants believed that Christianity could free the Korean peninsula from Japanese occupation, they believe that the Christian faith can defeat communism and that personal conversions will lead to national renewal in North Korea. However, underpinning this form of Christian nationalism lays another form of Christian nationalism, which also emerged during the early years of the introduction of Protestantism on the peninsula. This form of Christian nationalism is best defined as such: “the set of ideas in which belief in the development and superiority of one's national group is combined with, or underwritten by, Christian theology and practice” (Stephen Backhouse 2011: xii). It is also associated to the idea that a nation used to be Christian or a God fearing country and it must therefore retrieve its Christian identity. In her definition of
Christian nationalism in the United States, Michelle Goldberg (2007) argues that the “motivating dream of the movement is the restoration of an imagined Christian nation” (Michelle Goldberg 2007: 7). Similarly, many Korean evangelicals believe that the northern territory must be re-conquered so that they can rebuild an imagined Christian nation. As such, for many Korean evangelicals the aim is to ‘restore God’s glory in Pyongyang’ or to implement what they have called the restoration theology (*hoebok sinhak*) (SK7). They believe that it is God’s will for the two countries to be reunited and for the whole peninsula to become a home to revivals again. Many identify Korea with biblical Israel and as such, continue to refer to Pyongyang as the Jerusalem of the East. Ung-kyu Pak (2005) says that under Japanese occupation, premillennialists believed that “Japan was used by Satan to prevent Korea from being a Christian nation” (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 205).

As argued further in this chapter, evangelicals who are concerned with North Korea also believe that Kim Il-sungism is evil for a number of reasons: first because it is the state religion and North Koreans are forced to commit idolatry by worshipping their leaders like gods; second because it stands in the way of reunification and the current state of division which they believe is a sin; third because it prevents Korea from becoming a unified Christian nation.

3. The advent of Protestant Christianity in Korea

Korea did not come into contact with Protestantism until the nineteenth century and it developed with Korea’s quest for modernity and independence (Wells 1990; Wi-jo Kang 1997). At the end of the 19th century, Korea was still the subject of political rivalries between the regional great powers. Thus, the Korean territory was affected by two wars: the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) at the end of which Korea was placed under Japanese protectorate.

Church historian Kyoung-bae Min claims that the first Korean Protestants were baptised in April 1864, however their names have remained unknown to this day (Kyoung-bae Min 2005: 126). The very first Protestant missionary to set foot on the peninsula was Reverend Karl Gutzlaff, who travelled to Korea with a trade delegation from Britain in 1832. Gutzlaff distributed some Christian literature but did not stay long enough to make a lasting impression on the Korean people. Thirty-three years after Gutzlaff’s visit, Robert J. Thomas, a Welsh missionary, travelled to Korea with two Catholic Koreans. After a brief visit to China, he embarked on the American vessel, the General Sherman, heading towards Korea to open trade relations. Upon arrival, the Koreans notified the Americans that they did not wish to establish trade relations and asked them to depart. The Americans ignored the Koreans’ request and proceeded on the Taedong River towards Pyongyang. The Koreans responded by attacking and burning the ship down. The assault left no survivors and Robert Thomas perished with the rest of the crew.

In the aftermath of the attack on General Sherman, missionaries began preaching the Gospel on the China-Korea border. Reports from the National Bible Society of Scotland reveal that in 1879, John Moss and John MacIntyre from the United Church of Scotland based in Moukden (Shenyang) began the translation of the New Testament with the help of native Koreans (Kyoung-bae Min 2005: 129). These Koreans were traders who travelled back to their villages in Korea with copies of the New Testament translated into Korean. The Koreans’ names were Suh Sangryoon and Lee Woongtchan. As a result, by the time the first
missionaries entered Korea, there were already many converts to the Christian faith (Kyoung-bae Min 2005: 129-130).

Koreans also came into contact with Protestantism in Japan. For example, Yi Su-jong travelled to Japan as a member of a diplomatic delegation in 1882 and was converted by a Japanese Christian (Elizabeth Underwood 2003: 63-64). Yi translated the book of Acts and the gospels into Korean in 1885. Yi also translated the gospel of Mark which was the one that Henry G. Underwood brought to Korea before revising it later (Kyoung-bae Min 2005: 127). As observed in the following chapter, when the first missionaries arrived in Korea, they had to disguise their religious identity, however, as they began to assist Koreans especially with their medical work, they endeavoured to establish a relationship of trust with the Koreans. After a coup d'état attempt led by a progressive group and a section of the Japanese military against the pro-Chinese royal family, Dr. Horace N. Allen was called to treat a royal relative high-ranking official Min Yong-ik who had been severely wounded. Thus, Dr. Allen gained the trust of the royal family and was able to open a hospital in 1885. Consecutively, other missionaries such as Underwood and Henry G. Appenzeller were allowed to establish new schools and build hospitals (Chung- shin Park 2003: 21).

Christianity spread throughout the country and scholars have attempted to identify the factors that have contributed to the growth of Christianity in Korea. The next chapter will examine how the religious background of Koreans and their spirituality helped with the integration of the gospel. The evangelising methods used by the missionaries are also often referred to in order to understand the successful integration of the Christian faith. Missionaries used the Nevius method which was based on the Venn-Anderson principles of self-propagation, self-
support and self-government (Three Self) but included additional elements such as: personal evangelism; the centrality of the Bible in every aspect of the work and bible study by every believer; strict discipline in accordance with the teachings of the Bible; cooperation and union with other bodies and denominations; help with economic circumstances of the people (Palmer 1986: 27-28). The application of these principles means that not only did the missionaries import a very pious faith but that also, they recognised the importance of working across denominations and expressed concern for the economic circumstances of the people (not least because it was seen as important that churches should be financially viable).

Missionaries targeted every layer of society and taught Koreans to read and write in *han’gŭl*. They translated the Bible into the vernacular language and opened schools. Therefore, groups, which were previously discriminated against in terms of education and literacy, were enabled to produce and read literature in the vernacular language. Churches provided a space where everyone, regardless of their class or background could receive some kind of education. Women, especially, benefited from the process of literacy and the social activities organised by the churches (Yong-shin Park 2007: 24-25). Koreans were encouraged to learn about, debate, and adopt new ideas. An excellent example of this is the establishment of the “Independence Club” in 1896 by a Korean Christian leader, Sŏ Chae-p’il (who took the name of Philip Jaisohn after acquiring American citizenship) on his return from exile in the United States and its publication of the very first newspaper in the vernacular: the Tongnip Sinmun. The newspaper, written in vernacular, called for radical reforms based on Christian doctrine (Palmer 1986: 76).
The Great Revival of 1907

A major event in the history of Christianity in Korea is the Great Revival of Pyongyang in 1907. The reasons for the missionaries to hold revivals were twofold: first because they desired for the Koreans to genuinely repent of their sins and become ‘born again’ Christians; second because they wanted to keep the church away from the political situation as explained below (Timothy S. Lee 2010). According to Kyoung-bae Min, the revival started in 1903 with a group of Methodist missionaries in Wonsan. A missionary felt moved to confess his sins to other missionaries and in front of the congregation. Deeply touched, he says, Korean Christians were compelled to follow him. In 1904, the same experience was repeated at the same conference as the previous year. News of the conference spread to Pyongyang where similar meetings were consequently organised.

On the 12th of January 1907, in Pyongyang, missionaries held a meeting to read and meditate on the Bible (in Korean such a meeting is called sakyunghoe). William Newton Blair, an American Presbyterian missionary read the 27th verse from the 12th chapter of the first book of Corinthians preaching about unity in the body of Christ. After his sermon, the congregation started praying and reportedly: “immediately, the room full of men was filled with voices lifted to God in prayer...It was remarkable!... Some were crying and pleading God’s forgiveness for certain sins which they named to Him in prayer. All were pleading for the infilling of the Holy Ghost. Although there were so many voices, there was no confusion at all” (McCune quoted in Kyoung-bae Min (2005: 223). All the members of the congregations started to confess and repent from their sins and to better understand God’s forgiveness. News of the revival spread to Seoul where Korean Christians organised similar meetings and experienced similar feelings.
(Kyoung-bae Min 2005: 223-225). Revival meetings were soon organised across the whole peninsula.

The reasons behind such a success were a combination of several factors. First of all, the revival started in the north of the peninsula. As argued in the previous chapter, Christianity was widespread in the north. People in the north were believed to be more receptive because they felt discriminated against by the rulers in Seoul and were suffering from deprivation. Donald Clark (2010) has identified the socio-geographical factors that explain the rapid spread of Protestantism in the north of the peninsula:

1 the geography of the northwest acting as a corridor for communication between Korea and Manchuria, Liaodong, and China proper and as an area for the positioning of military personnel in connection with border defense; 2 the commercial traffic through the corridor and the high-level of merchant activity on both sides of the Sino-Korean border crossing making for a certain tolerance for diversity; 3 the difficulty of agriculture in much of the region above the coastal plain, the small size of farms, and the corollary reliance on economic activity other than agriculture, namely mining, lumbering, handcrafting, and trading; 4 the isolation of the northwest from the political center of Korea in Seoul; and together with this, 5, a simmering sense of discrimination borne out by the inability of northern literati, despite rapidly rising rates of examination passage, to gain significant membership among the national’s aristocratic elite (Clark 2010: 234).

Resentment against the Seoul rule was materialised with a revolt in 1811. A young man called Hong Kyŏng-nae failed the national examinations and realised that chances of improving his way of life were very slim because of his background so he organised a protest against the central government by attacking
the office of appointed rulers in the Pyongyang (P’yŏngan) area. Local people, who were already resentful of the government mismanagement and suffering from famine, joined in and after weeks of fighting, Hong was captured and beheaded. Another factor, which, according to Palmer, contributed to the rise of Christianity in the region is derived from the battles of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars that were fought in the Pyongyang area. Much Korean property was destroyed during these wars and the people suffered greatly and lived in fear (Palmer 1986: 83-84). Palmer also argues that people in the north were also very appreciative of missionaries: an epidemic of cholera in Seoul brought news of the great courage and compassion of missionaries who worked relentlessly to combat the epidemic. Koreans were very moved and believed that these foreigners loved them (Palmer 1986: 84).

Another reason is the importance of bible study. According to Roy E. Shearer, Korean Christians were able to experience the presence of the Holy Spirit because of their knowledge of the Bible, which they studied intensively. Bible study classes were held in both rural and urban areas and were very well attended (Roy E. Shearer 1966: 64-65).

Critics say that as a result of the revival, Korean Christians started to emphasise the importance of personal salvations and neglected social reforms. However, Ung-kyu Pak (2005) proposes that this criticism is unfounded. The revival produced a “spiritual rebirth and the purification of the church” and also brought people from different denominations together: “the revival was one of the religious factors that helped to bind the nation together against foreign denominations” (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 120-121). Thus, the revival did not only strengthen the faith of Korean Christians, it also reignited their evangelistic zeal.
as Christians were willing to work together regardless of their respective denominations. In the long term, it also gave them a greater incentive to resist the Japanese occupation. In other words, their focus on personal salvation and evangelisation did not distract them from carrying out social reforms. As analysed by Kenneth Wells (1990), Christians understood the struggle of the nation as a sign of spiritual weakness which means that personal transformation had to precede the improvement of earthly circumstances: “this conviction was fervently expressed by a movement to repent of both personal and national sins, which became a basic premise of Protestant self-reconstruction nationalism. Personal renewal was considered foundational to national renewal” (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 122). Christians therefore contributed greatly to the struggle against Japanese occupation.

**Struggle for independence**

A form of Korean Christian nationalism emerged in the late 19th century as some Korean scholars promoted Christianity and Western ideas as a way of gaining independence and achieving modernity. These scholars were not only opposed to the political and cultural influences of China and Japan on the Korean peninsula, they also believed in the reformation of the Confucian system.

Protestant reformers such as Yun Chi-ho developed the idea that “Korea’s material weaknesses were regarded as symptoms of moral and spiritual decline” (Wells 1990: 9) and “a lack of public morality and a fatal tendency to rely on large powers in times of both peace and crisis” (Wells 1990: 10). Wells further argues that Korean intellectuals associated philosophy with civilisation—“Confucianism and civilization were virtually synonymous—and believed that
Protestantism might provide the necessary virtues for the re-construction of the nation, for example the implementation of democracy” (Wells 1990: 51).

Whereas the objective of nationalism is to construct identities and establish boundaries between peoples, the main role of Christianity is to transcend the barriers of language and ethnicity. Thus, Wells argues, Christianity constitutes nationalism’s antithesis (Wells 1990: 4). The history of Christianity on the Korean peninsula however negates this affirmation. Wells believes that religion and nationalism both emerged as “similar modes of cultural expressions” (Wells 1990: 6). However, the fact that religion and nationalism do not share common objectives can generate tensions especially in the case of Korea where Christianity was originally a foreign religion. According to Wells, Korean protestant nationalists reconciled the two concepts by shaping people’s nationalism according to their faith i.e. the implementation of an ethical nationalism, “a nationalism which would align the people with the values of the ‘Kingdom of God’” (Wells 1990: 10). This process of “self-reconstruction” implied that “inward, spiritual and ethical strengthening was required before outward, material strength could be achieved” (Wells 1990: 9). In order to reconstruct their civilisation, Korean Protestants had to separate the ‘state’ from the ‘nation’ (Wells 1990: 10). As argued by Wells, in 1905, the level of opposition to political involvement by the Japanese Government General was such that Korean Protestants had to “emphasise the priority of cultural reconstruction over political action” (Wells 1990: 10). Wells argues that they believed that strong new nations “derive from civilisation which is founded on an ethico-spiritual ideal” (Wells 1990: 11). The practice of Christianity meant that Koreans were required to let go of some Confucian rituals, such as the worship of ancestors. However, Wells
argues that Protestant self-reconstruction nationalists “carried over neo-Confucianism’s faith in the civilizing function of education and self-improvement” (Wells 1990: 12).

In 1910, Japan forcibly annexed Korea. Some Korean scholars such as Yi Kwangsu and Yun Chi-ho believed that the United States would be sympathetic to their plight and continued to believe that Protestantism had freed the West and brought it on the path of modernity. However, as they continued to focus on cultural reconstruction over open political action against the Japanese, the rise of a more populist socialism meant that people came to regard them as passive (Wells 1990: xxxiv) and even active collaborators (Chung-shin Park 2003: 156).

By contrast, many Koreans chose to attend church precisely because it provided them with a space where they could freely express their opposition to the Japanese occupation. Furthermore, for the average Korean, disillusioned by politics and wearied by the successive wars and invasions, the Christian message provided solace and comfort as expressed by Timothy S. Lee (2010): “[m]ore and more Koreans suffered and searched desperately for salvation—from disorder, fear, hunger, and humiliation. One place where salvation was promised was the Protestant church, where a new life was offered to whoever would convert” (Timothy S. Lee 2010: 13).

At the end of the First World War in November 1918, Koreans in exile in China and the United States sent a Protestant delegate to plead their case to the Paris Peace Conference but the Western powers never meant to grant independence to the Japanese colonies. Nevertheless, Koreans in Japan started to organise demonstrations. More significantly, a number of Christians took the lead in organising the March First Independence Movement of 1919. The March First
Movement was followed by more demonstrations around the country but the demonstrations were brutally repressed by the Japanese gendarmes. In view of the violence used against the Korean Christians, the missionaries began to resent the Japanese and reported the atrocities (7,645 killed and 15,961 injured) to their home country (Wells 1990; Timothy S. Lee 2010).

Initially, missionaries did not support and at times discouraged Christian participation in politics. Therefore, as instructed by the government of the United States, American missionaries urged their congregations to stay away from politics. Independently, they were also concerned that political activity within the church could result in religious persecution and in the forcible end of their operations by the Japanese authorities. As a matter of fact, for a long time, the Japanese believed that the American missionaries were working on behalf of their government.

In 1911, the Japanese authorities had begun to persecute and to arrest missionaries and Christian converts in a series of incidents which culminated in a massive arrest known as the ‘Conspiracy case’ in 1912. In the course of the trial, it quickly became obvious that the charges against the missionaries had been fabricated and the Japanese authorities failed to prove their theory of conspiracy. Out of the hundred and five men who had been imprisoned, all were released except for six who remained in prison for a few years (Blair & Hunt 1977: 83-84). The missionaries felt relieved because the failed trial had demonstrated to the Japanese that they were indeed not involved in political matters. Nevertheless, Koreans were disillusioned by the apolitical apathy and sometimes pro Japanese stance of the missionaries and felt that the Church was indifferent to their political plight (Timothy S. Lee 2010: 32). The missionaries’ response to the massacres,
however, helped to renew the bond between Koreans and the missionaries (Timothy S. Lee 2010: 38-39).

The resistance movement against Japanese colonialism was weakened by a lack of unity and dividing ideologies. Thus, in spite of the significant number of Christian signatories to the March First declaration (15 out of 33 signatories), the proclamation did not comprise a defined Christian position, as the objective was to represent national unity and it was felt to be counterproductive to “identify [it] with a Protestant or Cheondokgyo cause” (Wells 1990: 100). Reformers had also failed to plan a long-term strategy for independence and dissension arose not only among the various groups but also within the Church. During this time the Protestants split into three factions: a group promoting democracy placed itself under the leadership of Syngman Rhee; a group led by Yi Tongwhi adhered to the ideas of socialism and armed response; and finally a group chose to follow the Japanese gradualist policy (the Japanese policy of teaching Koreans about governance) (Wells 1990: 100-101). In addition to these questions of politics, the church suffered additional divisions because of the Shinto shrine issue of whether church and state could be separate.

**Shinto shrine issue**

In the 1930s, the Presbyterian Church became very divided for different reasons: many were personal and political reasons, but mostly the conflict was theological. Churches in the northwest were conservative and those in the south were mostly progressive and accused churches in the north of dominating policies and assemblies (Kyoung-bae Min 2005: 462). Donald Clark actually reveals that a less well-known form of resistance had developed in Korean churches against missionaries and the imposition of a theology by foreigners. The seminary in
Pyongyang, in particular, advocated a type of conservative theology that some Koreans objected to. Clark argues that one of the founders of minjung theology, Kim Chejun, founded his own seminary in 1940 to break away from the influence of conservative theology (Clark 1995: 93-94). The Church became more divided over the question of whether to attend Shinto shrine services.

Koreans were first required to attend Shinto shrine services after being annexed by Japan. They were asked to bow down to photos of the Japanese emperor as a sign of courtesy toward his rule. Missionaries opposed the practice and even submitted an appeal to the Government-Central of Chosen (Shinto). In the late 1920s, it was said that Shinto and religion were two different matters and that therefore asking to bow down to a shrine was not a violation of religious freedom. Kyoung-bae Min (2005) says that matters became more complicated after the establishment of the Chosen (Shinto) shrine in October 1927 at Namsan in Seoul: “the situation began to change, because the loyalty to the Japanese polity which ordered ‘to worship (Japanese) Deities and their ancestors as the nucleus of the state’ was strictly enforced” (Kyoung-bae Min 2005: 480-481). In 1935, the Japanese started to force Christian pupils in Pyongyang to attend Shinto shrine services. Christian leaders working in the city such as Dr. G.S. McCune refused to comply and organised a meeting with other ministers to discuss the issue. All except for one agreed that they would not allow their students to bow to the Japanese emperor. Missionaries however were in disagreement over the nature of Shinto shrine services and were worried that they might have to close down the schools. In 1936, missionaries decided that mission schools in Pyongyang would close and eighteen schools were closed down by the end of 1938. A few schools in Seoul decided to conform to the policy and remained open. After the schools,
the Japanese police started to systematically crack down on churches and Christian leaders. Actually, the exact nature of Shinto shrine services was not clarified by Japan itself until 1938 when it was eventually decided that it was not a religious service. In 1938, the government also manipulated the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church to approve a motion granting approval to Shinto worship.

In April 1939, a bill for the “Religious Body Law” was adopted and implemented immediately. According to the bill, “Shintoism is not a religion, but it is the Way corresponding with the indigenous tradition of our country, which transcends religion” (Kyoung-bae Min 2005: 482-485). The bill also threatened Christianity affirming that “religious belief is basically not only anti-Japanese but also despising the principle of national polity and disregarding the national spirit” (Kyoung-bae Min 2005: 485). Finally, the bill also attempted to subdue all religious bodies by placing them under the supervision of the state which could not only regulate their administration but also intervene in matters of religious doctrines. As explained by Bruce F. Hunt:

The government used the religious control law to amalgamate all the denominations into a government controlled, government serving church. The church was forbidden to read certain parts of the Scriptures and to sing certain hymns. Shrine worship, bowing to the flag and to the east (kyujo yohai) were made compulsory in the church and the latter at least at all worship services. Small shrines (kamidana) were then installed in the churches. Non-cooperating ministers were imprisoned, several tens dying there; church groups which did not cooperate were dissolved, or, what amounted to the same thing, arbitrarily amalgamated with groups that would cooperate (Hunt quoted in Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 188).
Most of the Methodist churches decided to accept the fact that Shintoism was not a religion and thus survived. In 1942, the Japanese attempted to dissolve religious denominations by asking churches to come under a single umbrella, Kyodan (denomination). Their plan failed because of the resistance of the Presbyterian Church of Korea (Seoul Presbytery). In June 1945, however, fifty-nine representatives from different denominations accepted to dissolve and form a unique body, the Federal Reformed Church of Korea. Pastors were also sent to re-education camps to be reconverted to Shinto (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 188-189). According to Pak, the number of Christians who were imprisoned for their faith during that period amounts to more than a thousand, and more than fifty died in prison (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 197). Major resistance against the cult of Shinto came from the north, especially led by graduates of the Pyongyang Theological Seminary and Christian leaders in Kyungam province (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 190-192).

After the liberation of Korea, the Presbyterian Church was divided over the question of whether to punish the ministers who had collaborated with the Japanese during the time of colonisation that is those who had accepted to worship the Shinto shrine. They were accused of idolatry by other Christians but refused to resign which created many tensions. Those who had refused to bow in front of the shrine emphasised the monotheistic nature of Christianity and thus “deepened the extreme conservative nature of the Korean Protestant Church ... their theology became so inflexible that it did not allow the slightest difference of opinion” (Suk-man Jang 2004: 136-137). Therefore, they created a new group, the Kosin group, within the Presbyterian Church (Suk-man Jang 2004: 138).
Furthermore, after the liberation and during the Korean War, North Korean conservative Christians who fled to the South (in Korean wŏlnamin) founded most of the churches that can be found in present day South Korea. They carried with them a conservative theology and a strong anti-communist agenda. A significant number became involved with the newly established South Korean government and the military especially, even though at that time only 2% of the South Korean population was Protestant (In-chul Kang [Inch’ŏl Kang] 2007: 405-431).

5. Anti-communism/ anti Kim-Ilsungism

Cold War era

Tensions between Christians and communists started in the years of Japanese occupation. The conflict between Christians and communists has been very well described in Sok-yong Hwang’s novel The Guest, where the inhabitants of Hwanghae Province fought against each other. In the novel, the characters are haunted by the ghosts of the people who were killed. The novel also illustrates how members of the same families or friends were torn apart by the different ideologies and ended up killing each other (Sok-yong Hwang 2008). As a result of the conflict, for over sixty years, Christians (liberals and conservatives alike) were strongly anti-communist as explained by a Catholic scholar, Anselm Kyong-suk Min (2006):

Since the liberation of 1945, Christianity, Catholic and Protestant alike, was seized with an anticommmunist Cold War ideology and tried both to justify the extreme gap between rich and poor and reinforce the political division of the nation. Lacking a historical consciousness and blindly pro-American and anticommmunist, the churches ignored the challenge of social justice in the name of the condemnation of atheism and reinforced the division of the nation by demonizing and antagonizing fellow Koreans of the North” (Anselm Kyong-suk Min 2006: 267).
After the liberation of Korea and the establishment of the Republic of Korea, they supported the politics of the successive presidents. Ironically, it did not matter whether these leaders were committed Christians or not as long as they were anti-communist. Syngman Rhee was a leader in the Methodist church and appointed Christians as members of his cabinet, however Park Chung-hee, leader of the military junta, was closer to the Buddhist faith and married a very committed Buddhist. The successive leaders Syngman Rhee (between 1948 and 1960, the First Republic), Yun Bo-seon and Chang Myon (1960-1961, the Second Republic), Park Chung-hee (1963-1972; 1972-1979), the Third and the Fourth republic), Chun Doo-hwan (1981-1988, the Fifth Republic), drew their legitimacy from their opposition to communism. For the sake of national security, they repressed the civil and political rights of the population and for the sake of economic growth; repressed the social and economic rights of the population.

Christian antagonism toward North Korea, communism and Juche during the Cold War is best illustrated by the relationship between evangelicals and the military. Originally, Christians’ reasoning for rejecting communism was slightly different from today’s rejection of the Juche ideology. In-chul Kang [Inch’ŏl Kang] (2007) in his book on anti-communism in the Korean Protestant Church, Han’gukŭ kaesingyowa pankonggiŭ, writes that they rejected communism first because it advocated atheism; second because communism was based on human materialism and a humanistic perspective (self-actualisation); third because communism was against religions; fourth because it was achieved by means of violent revolutions and the establishment of dictatorship; fifth because it had been imposed on the peninsula by a foreign power, the Soviet Union (In-chul Kang 2007: 65).
Thus, in their efforts to eradicate communism, evangelicals supported the efforts of the civil war. In his novel written in 1964, *The Martyred*, Richard E. Kim—a Korean born in North Korea who fought for the South Korean army and later emigrated to the United States—challenged the manufacturing of Christian martyrdom for the sake of propaganda. His novel is about the investigation of the execution of twelve Presbyterian ministers by the communists in the beginning of the Korean War. It is progressively revealed throughout the novel that ten ministers in fact begged for their lives and one refused to pray before being executed. One survivor, whose life was spared because he had the courage to spit at his executioner’s face, decides nevertheless not to unveil the truth because he believes that Christians and the nation must believe in Christianity to survive the horrors of the war. Thus, the South Korean army and minister decide to manufacture martyrs even though some of them in fact were betrayers and cowards: “The twelve martyrs are a great symbol. They are a symbol of the suffering Christians and their eventual triumph. We mustn’t let the martyrs down. We must let everyone witness their spiritual victory over the Reds” (Richard E. Kim 1964: 48-49). This novel, written in 1964, wants to illustrate how evangelicals used the discourse of martyrdom to construct their propaganda and legitimise the atrocities committed against the other side during the Korean War.

Timothy S. Lee (2010) states that after the war, Christians conducted successive campaigns of evangelisation, organising mass revivals across the country. They also established chaplaincies in the army, police departments and prisons and used the media, especially the radio, to reach as many people as possible (Timothy S. Lee 2010: 90). These campaigns always carried a similar message: “Going to Jesus Christ is Our Only Way to Survive; Let’s Return to the Pentecost; Let’s
Evangelize the Fatherland; Let’s drive Out Communists” (Timothy S. Lee 2010: 94).

Vladimir Tikhonov (2013) argues that the institution of military chaplaincy, especially, in the 1950s and 1960s served South Korean propaganda by turning young men into loyal anti-communist Christian citizens: “the majority of Protestant clergymen identified ‘democratic spirit’, ‘anti-Communism’, and ‘Christianity’ as largely synonymous, and felt committed to ‘grounding our new country in the Gospel’s message’, with obvious encouragement from the political authorities who saw them as their strongest most unwavering supporters” (Tikhonov 2013).

This is also demonstrated by another novel by Sok-yong Hwang, the Old Garden, a novel based on his experience as a political prisoner during the years of authoritarianism. Sok-yong Hwang explains how Protestant leaders were made to visit prisons to turn human rights activists who had violated the National Security Law into true patriots: “Our speaker today, Reverend Kang, began his work in the purifying operation for Communists during the post-war period, and he has served with distinction for many years. He has turned many, many National Security Law offenders toward humanism. He has taught so many bloodless, cruel Communists to repent and to regret, and shaped them into good citizens. He is a true patriot” (Sok-yong Hwang 2009: 388).

Evangelicals also supported the Vietnam War as Dae-young Ryu (2009) argues that they wanted to help the Americans who had come to their help during the Korean War. According to Dae-young Ryu, a great majority of the commanders sent to Vietnam were Christian. A troop composed only of Protestant soldiers changed their name to ‘Emmanuel’, betraying the then close relationship between
Protestants, the military and the government. They believed that it was the will of God for Korean troops to be in Vietnam and that missionaries should be sent to eliminate shamanistic beliefs and communism. Soldiers called themselves freedom crusaders (*chayu sipcha kun*) (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 277-278). Evangelicals believed that people had to be saved not only for the sake of spirituality but also because Christianity is the source of “prosperity, moral harmony, international recognition, and security against communism” (Timothy S. Lee 2010: 85).

**Present day**

Today, many evangelicals continue to uphold an anti-communist ideology, though with an increasing understanding of the North Korean political system, it would be more correct to say that they are anti-Juche or anti Kim Il-sungism. This means that in their efforts to bring about democracy in North Korea and achieve the reunification of the two countries, some evangelicals may be ready to distort elements of the truth in order to portray the North Korean system in a negative light. For instance, North Korean leaders are often ridiculed and downgraded. On 9 October 2009, a group of Christian human rights organisations working with the North Korea Freedom Coalition, gathered in front of Seoul station as part of a campaign to take the North Korean leaders to the International Criminal Court (ICC). In order to raise awareness about the human rights situation in the North, the groups organised a photo exhibit in front of the station. One of these pictures showed the then leader Kim Jong-il without clothes on, sitting on a chair and drinking beer. It not clear whether the picture was genuine or fabricated however it was placed between pictures of starving children in an effort to shock the audience further.
Another example of this can be found in the story of Robert Park. In the beginning of 2012, the Korean press highlighted the plight of human rights activist Robert Park who crossed the North Korean border illegally in 2009 and was detained for two months before being released by the North Koreans. Robert Park, a Korean American from Arizona, was the founder of the organisation Reunification 2009. He claimed that he wanted to raise awareness about the human rights situation in North Korea by crossing the border from China on the 25th of December 2009 with a message of ‘love and forgiveness’ for the North Korean leaders:

To Mr. Kim Jong Il and North Korea's Leaders:
I proclaim Christ’s love and forgiveness towards you today. God promises mercy and clemency for those who repent. He promises forgiveness for every sin and re-birth through the Holy Spirit for those who believe Christ died for the atonement of all their sins, as a sacrifice from God, given in love. He is the true and living God. He loves you and wants to save you and all of North Korea today. Please open your borders so that we may bring food, provisions, medicine, necessities, and assistance to those who are struggling to survive. Please close down all concentration camps and release all political prisoners today, and allow care teams to enter to minister healing to those who have been tortured and traumatized. All we are asking is for all North Koreans to be free, safe and have life.

With Love, Respect and Goodwill Towards All People,

Robert Park

(Robert Park quoted in Sung-rae Jo 2009).

Robert Park said his prison guards subjected him to torture and he has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress. Understandably, he does not want to share the details of his ordeal with everyone but nevertheless wants to see the perpetrators of the crimes committed against him be brought to justice. Robert
Park has claimed that the conservative South Korean press and some evangelical groups, especially Pax Koreana\textsuperscript{11}, are distorting the facts about his detention and exploiting his case to promote an agenda of hatred towards North Korea (Interview with Robert Park 10 February 2012). Pax Koreana’s response to the case of Robert Park betrays a Cold War mentality whereby emotions and a confrontational attitude prevail over facts and constructive criticism. As Young-gi Hong (2009) explains, Korean evangelicals’ political theology is weak and lacks a social vision and that Korean evangelicals still need to establish sound theological foundations that would support “freedom, justice, and peace, not political preconceptions or particularistic interests” (Joshua Young-gi Hong 2009: 230).

Some evangelicals continue to believe that conversion to Christianity is necessary to ensure prosperity and loyalty to South Korean political and economic structures: according to the Union to Plant Churches in North Korea, a missionary organisation, North Korean refugees must convert to Christianity in order to successfully integrate into South Korean society: defectors are therefore requested to adapt and adjust to South Korean capitalistic values:

\begin{quote}
North Korean refugees need some time to achieve the minds and competitiveness, as South Korea is not North Korea. South Korea has spent a hard time to develop their economy and society like today. North Korean refugees should try hard for quite a while for the successful settlement in South Korea [sic]. Even when the self-respect is hurt, it is better to think positively to have another opportunity to try once more [sic]. Jesus Christ will the cure the wounded mind and exalt them to the worth being [sic]”
\end{quote} (The Union to Plant Churches in North Korea NGO 2010).

\textsuperscript{11} Pax Koreana is a right wing organisation that has been very active in human rights activism towards North Korea, working towards the reunification of the nation relying on the belief that, based on its spiritual foundations and rapid economic development; South Korea should be able to become a superpower (Pax Koreana 2008).
In addition, churches provide North Korean refugees with a free space where they can strategise, share and design human rights campaigns. As examined in the last chapter, between the years 1998 and 2008, South Korean Presidents discouraged North Korean refugees from becoming involved with anti-North Korea activity because they feared that their actions might have negative repercussions on their politics of engagement with the North. Evangelical churches filled the void, and in many ways acted on behalf of the state the same way churches acted like the state under Japanese occupation. Jung says that the “church is the primary contact zone where the migrants and their southern counterparts encounter unexpected cultural differences and negotiate a new sense of belonging by envisioning a Christianized reunified nation” (Jin-heon Jung 2011: 19). The report published by the think-tank International Crisis Group in July 2011 revealed that: “Christian churches have become popular among defectors as organisers of defector groups and advocates for human rights in the North” (International Crisis Group NGO 2011: 26).

Anti-Kimilsungism also translates into an ongoing support for the use and the existence of the National Security Law. In September 2010, a group of North Korean refugees based in South Korea announced the establishment of a new organisation to promote and facilitate the collapse of the North Korean regime in view of achieving reunification, peace and democracy on the Korean peninsula - the North Korea People’s Liberation Front (Tongp’o haebang). In order to do so, in an email sent to a prayer network on the 17th of September 2010, the group vows to “prevent the actions of those who support the Kim Jong Il regime in South Korea and take the lead in exposing and seeking prosecution of those who violate the national security law and show sympathy for Kim Jong il regime and
North Korea” (North Korea People’s Liberation Front NGO 2010). In order words this group is willing to sacrifice the civil and political rights of South Koreans in order to defend human rights and the development of democracy in North Korea.

The National Security Law of the Republic of Korea was enacted in 1948 and was used to arrest, torture and punish anyone accused of dissent and/or sympathising with the regime of North Korea. Former Presidents and democracy activists Kim Dae-jung and Kim Yong-sam were both imprisoned for violating the National Security Law. The law was also used to crack down on freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and freedom of thought. For example, it was strictly forbidden to study about North Korea or possess literature produced in North Korea. With the advent of democracy and the implementation of President Roh Tae-woo’s opening policy towards the communist block—Nordpolitik—democracy activists started to ask for the abolishment of the law. The use of the law has not been the prerogative of conservative Presidents as, after the IMF crisis of 1997-1998, Kim Dae-jung use the law to arrest workers and students who demonstrated against unemployment (Kraft 2006: 631-633).

In 2001, a delegation of peace activists who had visited Pyongyang were arrested for violating the National Security Law and the same year a sociology professor from the university of Dongguk was arrested for visiting the alleged birthplace of Kim Il-sung in Pyongyang (Kraft 2006: 634). The leftist Pastor Han Sang-ryeol, who made an unauthorised trip to North Korea in the summer 2010, was arrested for violating the National Security Law. In response to the incident, Kae-seok, former researcher at Human Rights Watch, said: “These are just the latest episodes in the South Korean government's opportunistic use of the National Security Law to severely restrict the right to freedom of expression. Under the
law, South Koreans are barred from meeting with North Koreans or visiting North Korea without state permission. They are forbidden from praising North Korea or disseminating North Korean propaganda. The law clearly violates South Korea's international human-rights obligations” (Human Rights Watch NGO 2010).

The law is still being used to limit the rights of South Koreans to enjoy full freedom of speech and movement but the very existence of North Korea ensures that South Korea Presidents cannot abolish it. The only way for South Koreans to enjoy full democracy would be the reassurance that North Korea no longer constitutes a threat. Thus, human rights activists who work to protect the rights of South Koreans have been actively working towards reconciliation and the establishment of a peace treaty with North Korea as they rightly regard peace as a precondition to the implementation of full democracy and a greater respect for human rights on the Korean peninsula.

Many domestic human rights organisations and the international human rights organisations Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have condemned the use of the law, which breaches South Korea’s commitment to international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCE). However, the South Korean constitution stipulates that international law equals domestic law but if there is a conflict between the two, domestic law prevails (Kraft 2006: 649-650).

**Divided church: human rights versus food aid**

Opposition to North Korea also translates into opposition to the provision of humanitarian assistance as a mission strategy. The South Korean evangelical humanitarian workers have channelled a lot of food to North Korea with the help
of the North Korean Christian Federation. Many evangelicals do not believe that the members of the North Korean Christian Federation are actually ‘Christian’. In other words, they do not believe that they are ‘born again’ but that instead they are the mouthpieces of the North Korean government created to attract foreign investments. The only church that they recognise as genuine is the underground church. For example the conservative Christian human rights activist and journalist Sung-uk Kim asserts:

Ironically, Korean Churches are the most enthusiastic over supporting North Korea. Christians gives the most amount of material aid on the civil basis in the name of ‘Mission for North Korea’ ... There are religion bodies including the Korean Christian Federation, the Korean Buddhist Federation, and the Korean Association of Roman Catholic in North Korea. These are just ways to attract foreign currency ... Some of the Christians who have been to North Korea are leftists but a significant number of them are moderate. Most of them realize what KCF really is. Nevertheless, they tend to agree to the statements where South Korean church should brace, aid, and exchange with North Korea. It means that even if CFK is surely counterfeit Christian Church, they can’t stop practicing the mission for North Korea (Sung-uk Kim 2008: 110-112).

Members of the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK) on the other hand, do not question the ‘faith’ of their North Korean counterparts. For example, Jong-sun Noh argues that as of 2006, one of the leading elders of the Bongsu [Pongsu] church in Pyongyang is the 77 years old Kang Seyoung. Her father was a pastor in North Korea who supported the communist reform of the land because he believed that it would benefit the tenants. Noh has no doubt that the faith of Kang Seyoung is genuine and argues that she is committed to her Christian faith and committed to justice (Jong-sun Noh 2008: 156). Increasingly,
some evangelicals are now admitting that the official congregation may include genuine believers (Byung-ro Kim [Pyŏngro Kim] 2005: 23; SK7).

Alongside the provision of food and development assistance, churches and denominations have been involved in the construction of churches in Pyongyang. Prior to the advent of communism, it is estimated that there were 2850 protestant church buildings registered in the north of the peninsula. The different denominations in the South hope to rebuild those church buildings and some have already done so. For example, the Presbyterian Church has sponsored the construction of the officially recognised Bongsu church in Pyongyang. This has been perceived as unfair by some, however, since not all traditions/denominations have been able to re-build a church in the North. This strategy is also criticised as it is said that the reconstruction of the church in North Korea should not be about the reconstruction of buildings but about the reestablishment of a community of Christians (SK7).

In his book on mission strategy to North Korea, published prior to the death of Kim Jong-il in 2011, *Kim Chŏng il chŏngkwŏn wahaewa pukhan sŏngyo*, Seok-ryul You [Sŏkyŏl Yu] (2011) says that Christian groups that visit the Bongsu church in Pyongyang and build orphanages label their activity *mission* (sŏngyo). You [Yu] disagrees and argues that mission means sharing the gospel of Jesus Christ with your neighbour. If you are not doing so you are not allowed to label your work ‘mission’. Sung-uk Kim (2008) similarly condemns the evangelicals who are providing humanitarian assistance to North Korea:

> It is beyond our understanding that Republic of Korea is overflown with pro-North Koreans persons and groups, and peace-mongers brainwashed by them. While attempting to protect, defend, and support Kim Jung-il regime, they thoroughly keep silent on the human rights being ruined in North
Korea. So do Korean churches. Instead of assisting North Korean Christians (underground Christians) under suppression, they have headed for helping the regime persecuting the underground Christians. They spread lies indicating that “North Korea has the freedom of faith.” They disguise the aid to Kim Jung II as the humanitarian aid or mission for North Korea (Sung-uk Kim 2008: 75).

The way Kim Il-sung proceeded to exterminate Christianity in North Korea and forced his citizens to worship him echoes the policy of the Japanese coloniser. Equally the question of whether to collaborate with such a government has created division not only between liberals and conservatives Christians but also among conservative Christians/evangelicals themselves. There are obvious tensions between the groups who are working in North Korea and providing assistance; and the groups who are raising awareness about human rights issues in North Korea.

This division between Christian groups is reflective of a wider divide within South Korean society including civil society. Richardson argues that South Korean civil society often reflects (or is reluctantly associated with) the “ideological polarization” between those on the so-called left, who have supported the Sunshine Policy and efforts of “reconciliation, cooperation, and aid”, and those “who have taken a more conservative, hard-line stance, towards the North mostly raising human rights issues” (Richardson 2008: 168-170). After the division of the peninsula along the 38th parallel, the two states had to develop different identities in opposition to the other (Snyder 2004: 22) as a result of which the US government and South Korean President Syngman Rhee proceeded to the systematic elimination of left-leaning civic movements and North Korea sympathisers (Steinberg & Myung Shin 2005: 10; Kraft 2006: 628). However, as
South Korea democratised, it established diplomatic relations with former enemies. Conjointly with the 1988 Seoul Olympics, South Korea initiated talks with Eastern countries and the Soviet Union. Relations with the former Soviet Union were finally normalised in 1990, followed by normalised relations with China in 1992. In 1991, the first Inter-Korean Basic agreement, which opened more trade and exchange opportunities, was signed.

President Lee Myung-bak was a member of the conservative Grand National Party (GNP). The GNP, now Saenuri Party, in Korea was often associated to authoritarianism because it was originally founded under Park Chung-hee and called the Democratic Republican Party. The main ideological differences between democrats and conservatives are that democrats work in favour of “the rights of laborers, higher taxes for the rich, and greater scrutiny of chaebols” and ally themselves with civic movements whereas conservatives are against governmental interventions and regulations which could hinder economic development (Sook-jong Lee 2005: 104). The biggest areas of contention, however, are North Korea and South Korea-US relations.

Democrats believe in engagement with North Korea, economic and humanitarian assistance to the impoverished North and want to gain greater independence from American influence. Conservatives believe in a strong partnership with the US and still regard North Korea as the enemy. Scott Snyder (2004) summarised the situation as follows: “Conservatives expect that North Korea will adapt and join South Korea’s vibrant democracy, while progressives appear to uphold Korean unification as a higher ideal than the preservation of democratic reforms. Or perhaps progressives see the triumph of Korean democracy as so inevitable that there is little need to worry about the forms of
unification; in the end the only choice for the two Koreas will be to pursue a unified democratic social and political system” (Snyder 2004: 34). Civil society is equally divided, especially over the question of North Korea.

For instance, at a human rights conference organised by Pscore (an organisation with offices in Seoul and Washington D.C and sponsored by the North Korea Freedom Coalition), in the context of ‘Freedom Week 2009’, three Korean organisations—namely the Korea Fathers Federation, Activists Finding Out Underground Tunnel from North Korea and American Korean Friendship National Council—distributed a statement that reads as follows: “Now is the time for us to pay God’s blessing by taking cross to liberate North Koreans and to prevent North Korea dictator regime and leftists from threatening our free country. We warn North Korea and leftists not to threaten our national security and democracy by sinking our navy ship” (unpublished brochure).

On the other hand, human rights organisations that stemmed from the years of democratisation refuse to address the question of human rights in North Korea. For example, the May 18 Memorial foundation (518kinyŏm chaedan) based in Kwangju claims that it “aims to commemorate as well as continue the spirit and struggle and solidarity of the May 18 uprising; to contribute to the peaceful reunification of Korea; and to work towards peace and human rights throughout the world. Thus the spirit of the May 18 is inherited and passed on, significantly influencing the progress of democracy in Korea” (May 18 Memorial Foundation NGO 2013). The organisation was founded in memory of the Kwangju massacre.

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12 They are referring to the sinking of the Cheonan, a South Korean navy vessel, which caused the death of 46 seamen on the 26th of March 2010. The cause of the sinking of the ship is attributed to North Korea, accused of having torpedoed the ship. Non-conservative politicians and NGOs have questioned this assertion.

13 The paper I received was in English only and I have been unable to identify the Korean names of these organisations.
of May 18 1980. In the aftermath of the assassination of Pak Chung-hee on October 26 1979, as Koreans had established an interim government and discussed a new constitution, Major General Chun Doo-hwan, loyal to Pak’s regime, carried out a coup d’état. On May 17 1980, “he declared martial law, closed the universities, dissolved the legislature, banned all political activity, and arrested thousands of political leaders and dissidents in the midnight hours of May 17-18” (Cumings 2005 (1997): 381-382). On May 18, 500 people protested on the streets of Kwangju demanding the abolishment of the martial law. Elite paratroopers, apparently drugged, were sent to terminate the demonstration and killed indiscriminately children, women, students and everyone that had gathered on the square. Citizens of Kwangju managed to drive soldiers out of the city but nine days later, the army re-entered the town and killed those who refused to give up their arms (Cumings 2005 (1997): 382-383).

The May 18 foundation has been incredibly active in promoting democracy and supporting the rise of civil society throughout Asia. However, as the website and published reports show, the foundation is not engaged into any activity either to support North Korean refugees or support democracy in North Korea. Some other mainstream humanitarian groups have also accused North Korean defectors and human rights activists of lying about human rights violations committed in North Korea and even asked human rights groups to stop criticising the North Korean regime so that they could pursue their activities in North Korea (SK2). They also sometimes believe that the human rights movement is driven by political considerations and that the North Korean authorities themselves should address the question of human rights in North Korea because foreign interference constitutes a threat to their sovereignty (SK8).
In response, right-wing activists have engaged in a veritable witch-hunt and established a black list of so-called pro North Korea politicians as exemplified by an article published by Sung-uk Kim on the website IPF (Kukche panssong) condemning politicians who want to send more aid to North Korea (Sung-uk Kim 2010). Organisations which have demonstrated a certain level of engagement with the North Korean authorities are considered pro-North Korea: the Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union; the Institute for Far Eastern Studies and the associated journal Asian perspective; the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK) are among the institutions that have been referred to as being pro North Korea.

By satanising the North Korean authorities and the North Korean system, some conservative human rights activities effectively condemn engagement policies and humanitarian efforts conducted in collaboration with the North Korean authorities. At a prayer meeting taking place in Seoul and organised by the same organisation-Jesus Army-on Friday October 9 2009, Suzanne Scholte, chair of the North Korean Freedom Coalition, said that she had the intimate conviction that once North Korea is liberated, the North Korean Church is going to be instrumental in converting the Muslim World (Scholte 2009). By connecting the experience of North Koreans to the Muslim World, Scholte establishes a parallel between the Cold War and the war on terror. As examined in the first chapter, many evangelicals believed that mission to communist countries would help eradicate communism and create a new world order. My interpretation is that Scholte suggests bringing about political change first in North Korea then in Muslim countries by means of mission. She was also quoted by Nami Kim (2010) affirming, “if you do anything to help Kim Jong Il or give him higher stature, I
think that you are basically partnering with the Devil... This isn’t just a misguided, misinformed regime that needs to be introduced to the salvation of Jesus Christ. This is a regime that is totally against Jesus Christ” (Scholte quoted in Nami Kim 2010: 15). Conservative Christians who hold such beliefs also think that the combination of the Juche and communist system is demonic: “Juche represents a powerful evil in the spiritual realm. While it is essential that Christians love people who are caught up in the Juche faith, we should not be ignorant about the evil associated with Juche idol worship. As believers in our Lord Jesus Christ, Christians must unite in prayer against Juche until we see its unholy influence over North Korea defeated” (Belke 1999: 164).

Opponents to food aid and to the politics of engagement implemented by the South Korean administrations between the years 1998 and 2008 argue that their policy toward North Korea not only sustained the regime in place but in fact prolonged the state of division which, as argued below, they regard as sin. Therefore, prolonging the division effectively means living in sin. The policies of peaceful coexistence have been greatly criticised by human rights activists because it gives legitimacy to the North Korean regime. Seok-ryul You [Sŏkyŏl Yu], for example, loathes the idea of peaceful co-existence even more as it was originally Kim Il-sung’s plans for a peaceful reunification: “[W]e consistently maintain the three principles of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity which the north and the south agreed upon and jointly declared; we hold that on these principles the country should be reunified by founding a confederacy based on one nation, one state, two systems and two governments” (Kim Il-sung (1993) 2011: 27). By definition coexistence is a less loaded term: “it is more mundane. It carries none of the religious overtones, or peace-building
implications of reconciliation; it lends itself less easily than reconciliation to a pejorative use” (Bloomfield 2006:13). Furthermore, You claims that the policies had an impact upon the South Korean population that had started to entertain the idea of a peaceful co-existence with North Korea and resist the idea of reunification (Seok-ryul You 2011: 256).

However, not all evangelicals who believe that the North Korean system is evil are opposing the provision of humanitarian assistance. On his website, Ben Torrey, an American missionary raised in South Korea, says the following about North Korea: “North Korea is ‘owned’ by Satan, the Prince of the world. The land and people are captives in darkness. Ultimately, the Lord Jesus Christ—who has already overcome Satan (‘I watched Satan fall like lightning from heaven’ Luke 10:18)—will have total victory. However, that day has not yet come. In the meantime, Satan controls the territory of North Korea” (The Fourth River Project NGO website 2010). In spite of his perspective on the situation, Ben Torrey has been actively engaged in the American relief efforts in North Korea.

In fact, as humanitarian NGOs accepted to work under the conditions established by the North Korea aid programme as promulgated under the administration of Kim Dae-jung, they were made willingly or unwillingly partners of a given policy which resulted in them losing the trust of opponents to the policy of engagement including conservatives in the United States and South Korea. In its 2004 report, the International Crisis Group (ICG) refers to the Korean Sharing Movement as progressive and World Vision Korea as pro-reconciliation (International Crisis Group 2004). However, it is arguably mistaken to believe that all evangelicals who are working in North Korea approve of the North Korean government. An aid worker interviewed for the purpose of this research
said that South Korean Christians who provided development and humanitarian assistance to North Korea had developed a deep sense of pride because they saw themselves as more educated and more advanced than their northern counterparts (F1). South Korean evangelicals also take deep pride in the fact that they can deliver aid to North Korea as it symbolises the triumph of Christianity over communism. For example, Kwan-woo Lee from Campus Crusade Korea, describes South Korea as the sheep inside the gate who needs to go and rescue the sheep that is standing outside of the gate (Kwan-woo Lee 2007: 95). Arguably, their attitude can be interpreted by some as one of self-righteousness whereby the ‘sinless’ South Korean Christians are showing God’s love to their ‘enemies’ in the hope that they will eventually see the light. As such, they have placed themselves in a position of moral superiority. It will be argued below that the anti-communism ideology and religious nationalism of South Korean evangelicals are not only a response to North Korea’s anti religion policies but that their reasoning is also the result of their interpretation of the Bible.

**Identification with Israel and spiritual welfare**

Pak argues that under the influence of shamanism, “the power of communication with the spirit-gods is possible only at the place of divine revelation” (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 228). He further explains that as Korean conservative Christians understand the Bible literally, they often give eschatological significance to biblical prophecies which they relate to contemporary events (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 225). Therefore, in the eyes of South Korean evangelicals, the territory of North Korea itself is very significant. They believe that God has especially chosen the Korean people and the Korean peninsula the same way he had chosen the people of Israel and promised them to
give them a land where they would prosper. From the early stages of Japanese colonialism, the Korean Church quickly identified with the nation of Israel in exodus from Egypt:

This book of Exodus is written about the God who, with his power, saved the people of Israel from suffering and enslavement, and made them the people who enjoyed glorious freedom; He appeared as Jehovah before Israel, and as a whole and just God. He exists by himself and of himself, he has sympathy, and He is the Savior. Exodus is the book of the miracle of God’s liberation of the people of Israel from the power of Pharaoh with His power. God has saved Israel first and established her holy. This book is a foreshadowing of the redemptive love of Jesus in the Gospels and of his power that cleanses, that is, the miracle of the grace shown forth... Egypt is the shadow of the power of sin just as Japan represented a symbol of evil in their situation. Just as the people of Israel got acquainted with the power of evil and sin, the Korean people are learning about the nature of evil (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 227).

According to Palmer, missionaries themselves had established similarities between Korea and the Palestine and Judea described in the Bible: “they taught that by habit, custom, and doctrine the Koreans were prepared to understand the Bible; their inner thoughts were recorded in the Scriptures; their superstitions were just as those in the days of Israel’s decline; their understanding of spiritual forces just what the nations around Judea understood them to be; their conclusions concerning to life were what the world of the Bible concluded life to be” (Palmer 1986: 32). Korean Christians came to believe that God had elected them not only to struggle against the perceived evil of the governing regime, but also to play a role in the evangelisation of the world.
In-chul Kang (2007) argued that after the Korean War, the idea of nationalistic superiority (sŏnmin ŭisik) combined with salvific elements and anti-communism became a strong ideology among emerging churches. New churches that emerged in the aftermath of the Korean War spread the belief that the new Messiah would come to the Korean peninsula because it was the centre of world salvation. This appealed to mainstream conservative Christians. In the 1960s, the churches conducted revival campaigns and popular preachers argued that Korea was a ‘spiritual Israel’ and that Korea, in her capacity of chief priest, had been handed over the baton to carry world mission (In-chul Kang 2007:70-73). Brouwer, Gifford & Rose picked up the argument and claimed that fundamentalists in Korea viewed “Korea as the Holy Land of the East, sharing with the United States the task of evangelizing the world, maybe even superseding the U.S. in God’s plans for Asia ... : ‘Americans are the generation who planted the seeds. We [Koreans] will harvest them” (Brouwer, Gifford & Rose 1996: 20). According to In-chul Kang in 1999, the Christian Council of Korea became actively involved in helping North Korean refugees and thought that with the help of the underground church in North Korea they would be able to reconstruct the Jerusalem of the East. In 2004 the US congress adopted with a hundred percent of votes a North Korean Human Rights Act. They believed that the law would mean the end of the North Korean regime and allow South Korean churches to enter the country to evangelise (In-chul Kang 2007: 70-73). Many compare the division between South and North Korea to the division of the kingdom of Israel that occurred after the death of king Solomon.

For example, Seok-ryul You (2011) argues that Koreans are the descendants of the same ‘tribe’ which have been separated but believes that it is the will of
God for Korea to become ‘one nation under one king’ again: “This is what the Lords says: I am going to take the stick of Joseph—which is in Ephraim’s hand—and of the Israelite tribes associated with him, and join it to Judah’s stick, making them a single stick of wood, and they will become one in my hand” (Ezekiel 37: 19 quoted in Seok-ryul You 2011: 270).

A Korean pastor, Eung-su Han, who was born in North Korea and is the head of a small church which sends food to North Korea, also advocates for the restoration of the nation and argues that the aim of missions should be the reconciliation of the Kingdom/Korean peninsula. Comparing the Korean situation to biblical Israel, he relates in Korean: Israel was a united country where people worshipped the same God. However, after the death of Solomon, his son increased the taxes and provoked the rebellion of ten tribes in the north. They elected another king Jeroboam, and founded a new capital, Tirzah. Thus, the kingdom was divided between Israel in the north and Judah in the south. In the south, people continued to worship the God of the Bible and were generally more faithful to God therefore it was God’s ‘favourite’ kingdom. In the north, on the other hand, people would worship idols. This evidently implies that the southern kingdom, South Korea, is more faithful to God and therefore is his favourite. The northern kingdom, on the other hand, worships its leaders like idols and is unfaithful to God.

Eung-su Han goes on to say: the Assyrians eventually destroyed the northern kingdom, whereas the southern kingdom, which was corrupted and unfaithful to a lesser extent, was destroyed by the Babylonian empire. However, the city of Jerusalem, which had been surrounded by Babylonian troops, did not surrender in
spite of the many attacks. Many died of hunger and the last king of Judah was eventually captured.

The temple of Jehovah was destroyed and Jerusalem was burnt. People were taken to Babylonia and the rest of the people were massacred. The Prophet Jeremiah (the weeping prophet) came in the midst of this and brought a message of hope to Israel. He claimed that Israel had been destroyed because of their sins but that God would save them eventually. God listened to the cries of his people and rescued them from Egypt and also from Babylon.

Han argues that like Israel, the Korean peninsula is surrounded by powerful countries that stand in the way of reunification but they cannot stop what God is doing. Eung-su Han believes that the people of North Korea are punished because they worship their leaders, but he also thinks that the punishment of God will not last long. Punishment brings suffering but the suffering of the sons is not greater than that of the father who punishes because the father loves his sons and his love is greater. North Korea is also seen as the Holy Land where martyrs shed their blood. Their blood is never going to be wasted and will save them. South Korean churches cannot stand straight if they abandon their brothers and sisters who suffer in the North. The prosperity and growth of South Korean churches could be praised but God will be in pain when he sees brothers and sisters who suffer. South Koreans are called to go to the North and tell the people to repent the same way God sent Jonah to Nineveh telling the people to repent so that God would not destroy the city (Eung-su Han 2011: 13-20). By referring to several passages of the Old Testament, Eung-su Han envisions a God-led reunification with the help of the South Korean Church. This entails that it is the responsibility of South Korean Christians to go and convert people in the North.
South Korean theological professor and Dean at Seoul Theological University, Young-hwan Park, defends a similar argument. Park compares the situation in North Korea to that of the land of Edom. In the Old Testament’s book of Obadiah, God warned Edom of their forthcoming fall. The people of Edom were descendants of the house of Esau, brother of Jacob the founder of Israel. Edom betrayed Israel and collaborated with Babylon. In a vision, the prophet Obadiah foresaw God’s judgement upon Edom. Park, however, believes that the judgement of God should be left to God and that South Koreans should love and help their brethren by providing humanitarian assistance regardless of the political situation. By not doing so, Park argues that it would be giving up on Korean reunification (Park quoted in Sang-hyun Baek 2011).

Many South Korean pastors clearly believe that only the South Korean Church can evangelise effectively North Korea. In another recent Korean book on mission to North Korea entitled T’ongilŭl hyanghan sŏngyo chŏngch’aek (2012), Jin-hwan Kim [Chinhwan Kim] proposes the establishment of a Christian community as a peaceful way of spreading Christianity in North Korea. The author argues that South Korean Christians who work and live in North Korea can take advantage of their position to preach the gospel secretly. He argues that the strategy neither does constitute an attack on the North Korean government’ political or social structures nor does it try to ‘fix’ the regime. The author believes that the South Korean Church especially has a role to play in the evangelisation of the north of the peninsula and that Christians who are currently working in North Korea could share the gospel. Quoting form the first book of acts, verse eight he says-- “But you will receive power when the Holy Spirit comes on you; and you will be my witnesses in Jerusalem, and in all Judea and Samaria, and to
the ends of the earth” (1 Acts: 8)—Jin-hwan Kim argues that before going to the ends of the earth, the South Korean church should first evangelise Judea and Samaria (Jin-hwan Kim 2012: 184).

Yong-seok Im [Yongsok Im], in his book on Korean reunification, T’ongil chunbi doeössumnikka? (2011), holds a similar position and explains that in the book of Matthew, Jesus orders his disciples to go to the house of Israel first, before going to the gentiles: these twelve Jesus sent out with the following instructions: “Do not go among the Gentiles or enter any town of the Samaritans. Go rather to the lost sheep of Israel. As you go, proclaim this message: ‘The kingdom of heaven has come near.’ Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse those who have leprosy, drive out demons. Freely you have received; freely give”(Matthew 10: 5-8 quoted in Yong-seok Im 2011). The authors believe therefore that it is the prerogative of the South Korean Church not only to evangelise North Korea but also to care for those who are ill and suffering in the North. They also believe that this should become a priority before proceeding to the evangelisation of the world.

Furthermore, as the North Korean system is perceived as evil, it is believed that no human power will be able to defeat it but that only the power God can bring about its destruction. Therefore, South Korean evangelicals do no longer encourage a physical conflict as such but instead believe that they are waging a spiritual warfare. It was said already that Kim Il-sung resented the growing number of Christians in the South and saw their existence as an obstacle to unification. Likewise, evangelicals believe that they constitute a rampart against communism and therefore, are the guardians of South Korean democracy as demonstrated by an article published by the Korean version of the Christian
magazine Christianity Today in January 2012. In the article, Yong-hoe Lee, a representative of Jesus Army (literally in Korean: Chijosū amī)—a group of conservative Christians with prayer houses on the Chinese North Korean border, Muslim countries and Israel—argues that North Korea wants to destroy churches in the South. He speaks of spiritual warfare between Christianity and the Juche ideology of Kim Il-sung. Lee reports in his article that the North Koreans have a branch of their intelligence services in Seoul and that there are currently over 50,000 North Korean spies who have infiltrated different institutions and governmental departments including the South Korean intelligence bureau. He also condemns late President Kim Dae-jung for his policies and South Korean pro-North Korea activists and salutes the use of the National Security Law to stop them. According to Lee, Hwang Jang-yop, a late high-ranking defector who designed the Juche ideology on behalf of Kim Il-sung, said that the only reason why South Korea had not yielded to the North Korean ideology yet in spite of all the spies is because of the powerful presence of the evangelical church in South Korea. He argues that North Vietnam had a spy office in the South prior to its victory over the South and that is how the communist Vietnamese succeeded in communising the South. In 2008, Kim Jong-il reportedly enquired to his head of intelligence: “why did it work in Vietnam and not for us?” The head of the intelligence reportedly replied: “that is because of the church. If we could reduce the power of the church by one tenth, then we could successfully communise the South”. Lee further argues that the strategy of the North therefore is to reduce the power of the church and destroy the ten largest churches through the help of spies (Yong-hoe Lee 2012).
Another example of reference to spiritual warfare can be found in a prayer booklet published in both Korean and English by the Korean branch of the mission organisation Youth With A Mission (YWAM or in Korean yesu chŏndo dan). In one of the prayers, it is said that God created one nation and that the division is the work of Satan acting through human forces. Once again, it is believed that the Korean peninsula and Israel have already been liberated by God who has overcome evil:

God does not depend on military power or economic development to free His people. The fact-reality- is: They are free!

Application: Even today, Korea is one!

There exists no North Korea, no South Korea, except in the organisation of governments, economic and political, military powers (which are transient). But these temporary, passing institutions do not change God’s reality, which is that Korea is one people, one nation. Why? Because God created one nation on the Korean peninsula. Who would dare claim that the dividing wall between North and South Korea is the work of God? No! It is the work of Satan. But just as He did in Israel, so God has already worked. The people of Israel had not yet appropriated their freedom, but nevertheless they had been set free! (YWAM Korea 1999: 48).

You argue that the South Korean Christians must prepare for reunification because it might occur at the least expected time. You contends that regardless of how much effort Korean Christians put into preparing for reunification, God is the only one that will make reunification possible (Seok-ryul You 2011: 271): “one God and Father of all, who is over all and through all and in all” (Ephesians 4: 6 quoted in Seok-ryul You 2011: 270). Not only will reunification happen at the least expected time, it will only happen in God’s time: “Now, brothers, about times and dates we do not need to write to you, for you know very well that the
day of the Lord will come like a thief in the dark” (1 Thessalonians 5: 1-2 quoted in Seok-ryul You 2011: 271).

Therefore, Christians are called to hope and to pray for reunification. According to Durihana/ back to Jerusalem, one of the leading missionary organisations that helps North Korean refugees escape from China and, in the process seek their conversion; “the hope of this time is only the Cross on which Jesus was crucified, and our nation will be given from God the unified Korea through the prayers from the believers of God and their dedication” (Durihana NGO 2009).

The above passages demonstrate a strong belief in the forthcoming reunification of the two countries: the state of division is a sin and cannot be endured. In the same way Jesus liberated the people of Israel, North Koreans will be saved if they convert to Christianity. It is the will of God for the country to be reunited. The South Korean Church is also required to pray and act because it has been blessed and the blessing must be shared with people in North Korea. In fact, the South Korean Church might face God’s wrath unless they take action as exemplified by Han’s reference to the destruction of the southern kingdom by the Babylonian empire.

After the death of Kim Jong-il in 2011, many were hopeful that with his death the country would open to the world and similarly, Christians were praying for change: “It is imperative that Christians around the world pray for the Lord to open doors for the gospel to spread in the country ... Please pray for revival to break out in North Korea and for the Lord to restore His glory to cities like Pyongyang, which was once known as the Jerusalem of the East” (International Christian Concern’s (ICC) NGO 2011). In Seoul, prayer meetings for North
Korea operate similarly to revival meetings and as illustrated by this email sent to the prayer network, the Korean Church is asked to confess its sins and to repent both for personal and national sins:

We Repent before God!! Our sins and crimes are so grave and deep that will result in God's wrath. But we, intercessors for Korean peninsula [sic] are humbly asking God's mercy and compassion toward us once again. Day and night we are groaning. Please pray for Korean Churches' repentance, especially leaders'. May the Holy Spirit reveal the gravity of our sins in whole nation soon. (*Pukhan kido* 25th of July 2010)

Groups working inside North Korea hope that their activity will bring them closer to the possibility of another revival. In 2007, the organisation Lighthouse Foundation launched a campaign to mark the revival in Pyongyang:

Working to bring Unity and Revival once Again

2007 marks the Centennial Anniversary of the Pyongyang spiritual revival.

We believe that the value of this spiritual revival not only brings a turning back to the Lord, but also a sharing of love between the North and the South.

So for us at the Lighthouse Foundation, this Centennial is both a special occasion and also a wonderful opportunity. We have embarked a new project and work of faith entitled, ‘Celebrate the Pyongyang revival by doing a five loaves and two fish miracle of feeding one million North Korean children’

(*Lighthouse Foundation* 2007)

The organisation South-North Sharing Campaign (founded in 2003 by a coalition of progressive and conservative churches referred to in the next chapter) also motivates its humanitarian actions by comparing Koreans to the people of Israel. In her introductory statement, one of the female pastors, representative of the organisation, recalls that North Korea was first to receive the gospel, first to plant churches and send missionaries around the country. She then asks the
question: ‘in light of so much pain and suffering, has God forsaken its people’? She then refers to a passage in the book of Romans. In the passage, Paul is puzzled by the fact that Israel has not accepted the good news and questions: “I [Paul] ask then: Did God reject his people? ... God did not reject his people, whom he foreknew ... And what was God answer to him? I have reserved for myself seven thousand who have not bowed the knee to Baal. So too, at the present time there is a remnant chosen by grace” (11 Romans: 1-5). At the end of the passage, Paul comes to understand that God has also come to save the gentiles but is yet to save the whole of Israel. North Korea, in other words, is yet to be saved and there is hope.

Therefore, the organisations pray and provide assistance hoping that the North Koreans will realise that what is given is from God and not from South Korea because one day God will fulfil his promise: “Come, you who are blessed by my father; take your inheritance, the kingdom prepared for you since the creation of the world” (25 Matthew: 34) (South-North Sharing Campaign NGO 2013). Even though the organisation does not refer to the idea of revival as such, the concepts of inheritance and the fulfilment of God’s promise imply a restoration of what was lost and a renewal of the kingdom of Israel/Korean peninsula.

By restoring the Korean peninsula as a Christian nation some evangelicals also believe that they will open the way to the Silk Road which connects China to Jerusalem. This movement is also called the ‘back to Jerusalem movement’ and was initiated by the Chinese church in the 1920s. It vouched to send missionaries to all the Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist countries that stood between China and Israel. Presently, the organisation Back to Jerusalem says that it is working with the North Korean underground church sending Chinese Korean Christians to
evangelise and support the underground church of North Korea (Martin & Bach 2011). The Sarang community church argues that we need to create a new Korea (NK). This new Korea can only be created through the cross of Jesus Christ which brings reconciliation and unifies the country once more. In the new Korea, people would enjoy freedom of religion and the people of Korea are united, opening the way for the re-evangelisation of Jerusalem and of the countries located around the Silk Road (Sarang community church 2010: 56).

5. Conclusion

This chapter argued that Korean evangelicals’ theology of revivals was intrinsically linked to their political theology, which is characterised by a pervasive anti-Juche/anti-communism ideology. Even though their vision of a reunified Korean peninsula is clearly rooted in their Christians beliefs and understanding of the Bible, in practical terms it means that evangelicals are challenging North Korean political structures. Historically, they have often been accused of being ‘apolitical’ and have often claimed themselves that they did not wish to become involved politically. Likewise, Christian organisations that provide aid to North Korea say that they are acting independently of political concerns and that they want to show God’s love to the North Koreans with “sincerity” and “no condition” (SK5), however, their campaigning for a re-unified and evangelised peninsula can only translate into regime change in the North. Once again this shows that Korean evangelicals believe that personal and national transformations cannot be easily separated. As the next chapter will argue, their focus on inner salvation combined with their humanitarian and human rights activity to achieve societal change means that they have fully embraced consciously or unconsciously a particular concept of holistic mission.
Chapter 4: humanitarian assistance as mission to North Korea

1. Introduction

As this chapter will demonstrate, religious organisations including evangelical groups took the lead in the campaigns to send food aid to North Korea challenging at times the South Korean government. While some organisations are more open about their evangelising objectives, others argue that, as Christians, their duty is to feed the hungry without any other agenda in mind. In any case, this chapter will argue that evangelicals have responded to a perceived great need and have sought to alleviate suffering in North Korea. In doing so, it will clarify common misunderstandings with regard to evangelicals’ attitude toward poverty and social injustice. This chapter will show that evangelicals in Korea have also been concerned with the material and physical well-being of people in spite of their focus on the salvation of souls.

2. History of South Korean aid to North Korea and the role of faith-based organisations

In September 1995, affected by heavy rains, North Korea asked the international community for help. The humanitarian agencies and organisations who first responded to the appeal were soon to realise that the situation was much worse than previously expected and that in fact people were suffering and dying from starvation. NGOs began to operate in North Korea in October 1995 with the help of the UN World Food Programme (WFP), which was also starting its activities in the country at this time. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) and a few other programmes, however, had for some years been represented. A small WFP office opened in 1996, and in 1997 and 1998 NGOs operations were
stabilised after some organisations gained permission to establish residence in the country (Snyder 2003: 3-5). Most aid agencies, especially faith-based organisations, continue to operate under the umbrella of the UN through the Food Aid Liaison Unit (FALU), which was founded in 1997. In 1998 and 1999, European and American agencies expanded their activities to include food security, agriculture, health and water and sanitations programmes (Schloms 2004: 163). Unlike in other countries where NGOs work mainly in partnership with the local population and/or local organisations and grassroots associations, foreign NGOs operating in the DPRK have limited interaction with the local population and in the absence of local counterparts, must collaborate with the authorities. Indeed, interaction is limited to line ministries, professional associations, educational institutions or cooperative farm management and is carefully monitored and without continuity (Weingartner 2001: 19).

On 17th of June 1995, the South Korean President Kim Young-sam government had agreed in a meeting held in Beijing to send 150,000 tons of rice to the North. The process of delivering it, however, was delayed by two incidents: first, the South Korean public was angered at Pyongyang’s insistence to hoist a North Korean flag on the delivering ship, the Seafex, while in port in Chungjin on 27 June 1995. On 2 August 1995, North Korea detained the crew of a South Korean rice-carrier ship and accused them of espionage. However, North Korea apologised for the Seafex incident and South Korea apologised for the incident with their ship. The crew was liberated and aid resumed (Jong-moo Lee 2009: 118). The South Korean government, however, established a series of conditions which had to be met in order to proceed with food shipments: “Pyongyang had to make an official request for rice aid to the South Korean government; refrain from
making derogatory comments about the South Korean government and conduct a
new round of government-level talks with Seoul” (Gory 2008: 111).

In the summer of 1995, South Korea’s six largest religious denominations
established an organisation called the ‘Pan-Religious Order Promotion Committee
to Help Our North Korean Brethren’. They collected food items such as instant
noodles that were sent via the Korea National Red Cross (Gory 2008: 105). In
January 1996, South Korean religious groups organised a Peace Conference to
help victims of the floods. Later in 1996, the movement increased its activity to
appeal the government to open the aid channel to North Korea and thus abolish
the monopoly of the Red Cross. The movement led to the launch of the Korean
Sharing Movement (KSM) to help North Koreans not only in North Korea but
also those located in Russia and on the China North Korea border (Oknim Chung
2003: 83-84). In addition to KSM, other organisations were created and started to
assist North Koreans in the domain of health and medical care. These
organisations were Medical Aid for Children of the D.P.R. Korea, the Eugene
Bell Foundation, and the Korea Welfare Foundation (Oknim Chung 2003: 84).

The movement experienced a setback after renewed series of provocative
attacks by North Korea including a threat to quit administering duties included in
the 1953 Armistice Agreement, the penetration of North Korea troops into the
Joint Security Area, incursions into disputed waters and crossing of the Military
Demarcation Line by North Korean soldiers (Gory 2008: 107). As a result, the
Kim Young-sam government decided to suspend further shipments of aid but
nevertheless, contributed $3 million toward a food aid package collected and
distributed by the United Nations (Gory 2008:107). In spite of its principle of
neutrality, the South Korean Red Cross refused to send more food aid unless
North Korea apologised for the incidents thus betraying a possible close relationship between the organisation and the South Korean government (Gory 2008: 108). On 1 January 1997, the government eventually decided to allow NGOs to continue raising funds for North Korea. In March of the same year, the organisations revealed to the South Korean public that the North Korean Public Distribution System (PDS) was dysfunctional and organised an international congress on the North Korean food crisis. All sectors of society were represented at the dinner which 700 people attended. The conference led to another national campaign to raise funds which, according to Oknim Chung, resulted in the largest national rally in South Korea since the March First Independence Movement (Oknim Chung 2003: 85).

Some religious organisations, however, had already decided to defy the ban and had been providing aid to North Korea illegally through China (Gory 2008:110). The South Korean government took legal action against the organisations, namely the Korean Sharing Movement and the National Alliance for Democracy and Reunification of Korea (Chŏn'guk yŏnhap); in an effort, it is said, to exert tighter control over the assistance programme (Gory 2008: 112-113). In the meantime, representatives of major religious groups and prominent NGOs organised a campaign to buy relief corn. Later in July, the leaders organised a signature campaign to plead the government to provide additional food and medicine to the North. The campaign represented an evolution from fundraising activity to advocacy (Gory 2008: 113).

South Korean direct aid to North Korea is always dependent on political considerations. Jong-moo Lee, from the Korean Sharing Movement, argues that

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14 This incident was repeated in May 2011 when the National Council of Churches decided to send 172 tons of food aid to North Korea without the permission of the government.
the fact that the successive governments choose to deliver aid directly to North Korea as opposed to funneling it through the UN and NGOs demonstrates that South Korean governments’ decisions to deliver aid is not based on humanitarian principles (Jong-moo Lee 2009: 123).

In March 1999, South Korea sent 50,000 tons of fertiliser to North Korea without any conditions. Between May and June of the same year, both parties met secretly in Beijing and South Korea agreed to ship an additional 200,000 tons of fertiliser to North Korea. As a result, North Korea accepted to hold talks to discuss a potential reunion for separated families (Jong-moo Lee 2009: 119). Kim Dae-jung used the provision of aid to North Korea as a means to obtain concessions and avoid an unexpected collapse of the North Korean regime. Under his administration, the North Korea aid programme was established and NGOs registered with the South Korean government were given direct access to North Korea. In 2003, Roh Moo-hyun, a human rights lawyer, became President of South Korea. Under his watch, the North Koreans conducted a missile launch on 5 July 2006 and proceeded with a nuclear test on 9 October 2006. They also suspended talks with the South after the latter decided to receive 426 North Korean refugees from Vietnam. Roh used aid as way to put pressure on North Korea and persuade them to resume dialogue. However, although Roh provided twice the amount of aid his predecessor had, he could not uphold the reconciliation momentum (Jong-moo Lee 2009: 121-122).

Under the following South Korean President, Lee Myung-bak, the annual delivery of 400,000-500,000 tons of rice and 300,000-350,000 tons of fertiliser ceased. Lee Myung-bak wanted to reward North Korea for good behaviour and for taking concrete steps towards the denuclearisation of the peninsula (Hyeong-
jung Park 2009: 153). Aid to North Korea has dramatically decreased as illustrated in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>August 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>150.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer</td>
<td>120.0</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International organisations</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>227.3</td>
<td>348.8</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Unification Department statistics used by Jong-moo Lee 2009: 122) –Unit: billion won

According to NGOs, the South Korean government’s policies with regards to assistance was as follows: “When the North asks for aid, the government will give aid directly after examining its demand; in cases of severe famine or natural disaster in North Korea, it will aid the North; considering the public opinion in the South; to the humanitarian aid from the South, the North should show its appreciation by some countermeasures on such problems as separated families, persons kidnapped to the North, or prisoners of the Korean War” (Jong-moo Lee 2009: 123).

3. **Scope of activities of evangelical organisations**

In May 2002, the Korean version of the evangelical magazine Christianity Today (K’irisuch’ae'nö't'i t’udei Han’guk p’an) proudly reported that South Korean Christian organisations delivering aid to North Korea were responsible for 50% for of the total NGO aid delivered to North Korea, 75% of the total aid channelled by religious organisations was evangelical (Christianity Today Korea 2002). According to Byung-ro Kim [Pyŏngro Kim], between 1995 and 2007, the total amount of South Korea aid to North Korea was 1.6 billion dollars. Out of the
total amount, 11 hundred million dollars were donated from the government and five hundred million dollars came from private organisations. Byung-ro Kim says it is difficult to assess how much Christian organisations contributed to these five hundred million dollars but that their contribution must probably amount to one third of the total. Kim argues nonetheless that their contribution declined after 2007 (Byung-ro Kim 2010: 12).

The South Korean history of humanitarian assistance to North Korea shows that Christian organisations from a conservative/evangelical background were able to bridge the divide and cooperate with organisations that are labelled more liberal or progressive. In July 1990, progressive and conservative Christians sent ten thousands gama (80kg units) of rice to North Korea. Shortly after, the “Third Movement of Reunification of the Korean Church” was established. Their cooperation was institutionalised with the establishment of the South-North Movement for Sharing for Peace and Reunification (Nambuk nanum undong) on the 27th of April 1993. The organisation has now become the South-North Sharing Campaign. Mahn-yol Yi notes that conservative evangelicals wanted to help North Koreans but needed the expertise of progressive Christians who had been working with North Koreans for over a decade. The organisation promotes reconciliation and a peaceful reunification but does not have a proselytising agenda. In 1994, progressives and conservatives established another organisation: the Korean Christian Council to Promote Reunification (Han’guk kidokkyo p’yŏnghwa t’ongil ch’ŭjin hyŏpŭi hoe) that functions as an umbrella organisation for 116 Protestant groups (Mahn-yol Yi 2006: 252). In addition to organisations established with members of the progressive groups, evangelicals also collaborated with secular leaders and leaders of other religious traditions as
exemplified by the creation of the Korean Sharing Movement already mentioned above.

Secular and religious leaders from various denominations and faiths established the Korean Sharing Movement in 1997. Today, it represents the interests of diverse South Korean humanitarian groups and constitutes one of the leading organisations involved in North Korea. The Korean Sharing Movement was co-founded by an evangelical pastor, Reverend Soh, a former democracy activist. Rev Soh is also the founder of the Citizens Committee for Economic Justice (CCEJ) (in Korean Kŏngsil ryŏn), an evangelical organisation that draws on evangelical teachings to address the economic and social injustices induced by the South Korean economic and political policies. Both organisations seek to achieve social justice and equality through “sharing” and a more just redistribution of wealth. It is also inclusive and aims to gather all citizens: the wealthy as well as the marginalised; believers and non-believers. The CCEJ’s mandate includes issues of environmental protection, building of democracy and national reunification (Joshua Young-gi Hong 2009: 222-224). KSM has been involved with a large number of projects especially with regards to food security and agricultural projects. As of 2008, KSM’s projects in North Korea included: agriculture modernisation, collective livestock support, education support project, malaria prevention support, medicine prevention support, and hospital modernisation, meal service for children, information technology education and aid for Koreans residents in Russia (KSM NGO 2009).

In the field of food aid and agriculture, the evangelical organisations that have been very active are the Korean Sharing Movement, Good Neighbors Korea and the International Corn Foundation. The International Corn Foundation works in
partnership with churches and has also obtained consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC). The organisation was established in 1998 to provide North Korea with “super corn” a special hybrid of corn. Although the organisation is not explicitly clear about its Christian background, the English website states the following: “Suppose a brother or a sister is without clothes and daily food. If one of you says to them, go in peace; keep warm and well fed but do nothing about their physical needs, what good is it? Faith by itself, if it’s not accompanied by action is dead” (James 2: 15-17) (International Corn Foundation NGO 2012). The International Corn Foundation together with Good Neighbours Korea signed a contract with the North Korea’s Academy of Agricultural Science to pursue a project of inter-Korean agricultural technology cooperation (Oknim Chung 2003: 97).

Another organisation that has been involved in providing food assistance to North Korea is Food for the Hungry International. The organisation “was founded in 1971 in the United States by Dr. Larry Ward as a Christian NGO to raise awareness of poverty and hunger around the world, bring food and love to the hungry with the spirit of bread and gospel and help them build secure, self-sufficient communities” (Food for the Hungry International Federation NGO 2010). In 1989, the organisation founded a Korea branch: “KFHI supports domestic social welfare of broken homes, elderly, handicapped through regional offices and welfare facilities and water development, meal programmes and a North Korea programme as well” (Food for the Hungry International Korea NGO 2010). Bringing bread and gospel effectively means concern for both the spiritual and physical welfare of North Koreans. The organisation says it wants to help
North Korea achieve independence through exchange and cooperation (Food for the Hungry International Korea NGO 2010).

Finally, one of the leading organisations in terms of food security and agriculture is World Vision Korea. One of its main projects has been to develop more effective methods of propagating potato seeds (Oknim Chung 2003: 98). World Vision is a development organisation that was founded by Han Kyung-chik (see below) and the American missionary Bob Pierce in 1951 to support orphans during the Korean War. The organisation has developed to become one of the largest and most experienced development organisations in the world but it continues to cultivate strong links with North Korea. World Vision Korea is committed to the concept of ‘holistic mission’: World Vision Korea vows to bring about economic, social, emotional, physical and spiritual changes in the communities they are working with (World Vision Korea NGO 2013). The organisation has rules that prohibit direct evangelism as they aim to show by example; to demonstrate God’s love in the hope that their work will raise questions to which they believe God is the answer. World Vision began its work in North Korea in 1994 and provided emergency assistance in the wake of the famine. World Vision Korea works with North Korean counterparts, the KNECA (Korea National Economy Cooperation Association) and with KAAS (Korea Academy of Agricultural Science), a National Agricultural Institute under the Ministry of Agriculture. World Vision is involved in agricultural programme for food security (World Vision Korea NGO 2013).

In terms of medical assistance and care for children, the elderly and the disabled, some of the most prominent organisations have been the North America Christian Doctors Association, the Korean Foundation for World Aid, Medical
Aid for Children of the D.P.R. Korea, Okedongmu and the Eugene Bell Foundation (Oknim Chung 2003: 99). The Korean Foundation for World Aid (formerly Korean Welfare Foundation) was established in 1997 and has obtained consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC). It has been operating in North Korea since 2000, mainly providing food for the children and working with nurseries. It says that it wants “to open a window in the heart of North Koreans through the delivery of aid” (Korean Foundation for World Aid NGO 2007). In 1998, the organisation was involved in modernising Sunbong hospital (Oknim Chung 2003: 100).

Eugene Bell Foundation was founded in 1996 and has been mostly involved in treating tuberculosis but some of its programmes also included: “the provision of vitamins for children, antibiotics, skin care ointment, and medical equipment, as well as establishment of pharmaceutical factories, the eradication of diseases, and nutritional meals for children” (Oknim Chung 2003: 101).

According to Oknim Chung, medical aid in North Korea started in the early 1990s with a group of U.S. based doctors including Korean doctors living in the United States, the Christian Association Medical Mission (CAMM). CAMM helped build the Third People’s hospital in Pyongyang with funding from South Korean Christian groups Oknim Chung 2003: 99). After 2000, other organisations popped up and started getting involved in the provision of assistance in North Korea. For example, the Lighthouse Foundation has been involved in North Korea since 2003. It focuses on soyamilk and bread delivery to orphanages and has been working with the Belgian/French organisation Handicap International to promote the rights of the disabled and supply training and equipment such as wheelchairs. The organisation says that it hopes to demonstrate God’s love to the people of
North Korea as a means to win converts as illustrated in the verse chosen by the organisation to reaffirm its mission: “You are the light of the world... In the same way, let your light shine before men, that they may see your good deeds and praise your Father in heaven” (Matthew 5:14-16). The Lighthouse Foundation Mission Statement is as follows:

From a Christian perspective, the Lighthouse Foundation’s mission is to shine God’s love by meeting human needs in North Korea helping to prepare the way for national reunification on the Korean Peninsula and to also assist those suffering in other nations, ultimately contributing to world peace. We primarily focus our efforts on helping the vulnerable people of North Korea, such as young children, orphans, disabled persons, the elderly and mothers in childbirth. By giving this kind of assistance where help is needed, hope and love are made known and the Korean peoples are brought closer together” (Lighthouse Foundation NGO 2008).

Good People is an organisation established by the Yoido Full Gospel Church in 1999: “Good People World Family share their Christian love by assisting those who need education and development in underdeveloped countries and relief from hunger and sickness, including North Korean brethren as well as those in other countries” (Good People NGO 2013). The aim of the organisation is clear: it wants to evangelise North Korea.

[T]he world's largest church is preparing to evangelise its sister to the north. "Reunification of this peninsula is the great desire of our country," declares Rev. Jae Woo Chung, senior pastor of one of Full Gospel Church's fifteen satellite congregations ... Pastor Chung speaks confidently of "when reunification comes ... we can't say when this will happen. But we are preparing. Getting ready to evangelise North Korea has been a focus of our church for fifteen years already." ... Former director of the World Mission Department of the 700, 000 member congregation, Chung describes a three-
part strategy for evangelizing the country ..."Our strategy is to work through an NGO called 'Good People,' our North Korea Mission and through intercessory prayer," he explains (Lausanne World Pulse 1995).

Other Korean branches of internationally based missionary organisations, such as Campus Crusade and the YMCA, have also been very active. Bill and Vonette Bright founded the Campus Crusade for Christ International in 1951 on the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) campus. Campus Crusade has developed into an international organisation with ministries around the world. The organisation also sometimes operates under a different name in order to attract less attention to its mission and intentions. For example, Campus Crusade in Western Europe has been renamed Agapé. Campus Crusade’s mission is: “[h]elping to fulfill the Great Commission in the power of the Holy Spirit by winning people to faith in Jesus Christ, building them in their faith and sending them to win and build others; and helping the Body of Christ do evangelism and discipleship” (Campus Crusade for Christ International 2013). In 2003, Campus Crusade established a development agency to attend to the physical and spiritual needs of people afflicted by poverty, conflict and/or natural catastrophes: “Global Aid Network is a multi-national network of ministries serving to demonstrate the love of God, through word and deed, to hurting and needy people around the world through relief and development projects” (Global Aid Network NGO 2013).

Similarly, Campus Crusade Korea has been involved in humanitarian assistance to North Korea since July 2000 and the organisation sends goats to North Korea. Inspired by Mark’s verse: “You give them something to eat” (Mark 6: 37), Campus Crusade Korea has been working in North Korea to construct not
only goat farms but also cheese and milk farms. The organisation also believes that its activity in North Korea is an act of “pre-evangelism” (Kwan-woo Lee 2007: 95). It means that the organisation is presenting one hand with love and one hand with the gospel. The organisation equally hopes to help achieve the peaceful reunification of the two Koreas.

YMCA Korea: the movement has been present in Korea since 1903 and was originally aimed at young men. It has been involved with North Korea since 1990 as explained below:

Movement Towards a Peaceful Reunification: Ever since the declaration of this movement in 1990, Korea YMCA has been active in contributing to reconciliation and peace between the South and North. In addition, it also has implemented a campaign for unity overcoming division between the South and North Korea. Particularly, The YMCA launched a 'Fund-Raising Campaign to Help North Koreans who have been suffering from hunger and famine' by appealing to South Koreans' fellow-feeling towards the hunger-stricken North Korean brethren. The YMCA has played a key role in closely connecting with various organisations to raise up to 1 billion won. The significance of this humanitarian relief effort lies in the fact that it helped to move one step nearer toward its goal of reconciliation (YMCA c. 2008).

Finally, other organisations with strong links with the United States and also those acting in China have been involved in medical relief care. Cross Mission/Sam stands for ‘Spiritual Awakening Mission’. According to the website of the organisation, it is a NGO that provides medical and relief assistance to impoverished and forgotten people: “Through our field clinics and medical missionary teams, we hope to save lives and souls by sharing their pains and spreading the love, centred on the Gospel” (Cross Sam Mission NGO 2011) The organisation has offices in China, South Korea and the United States. Though it
provides mostly medical care, the organisation has expanded its activities to include the smuggling of MP3s with recorded sermons in North Korean, helping North Korean refugees in China and supporting the underground church (Mission Magazine 2011).

The section above illustrates the high level of evangelical involvement in North Korea. Even though the organisations mentioned above express a clear desire to address the spiritual needs of North Koreans, they have taken the lead in lobbying the South Korean government and implementing relief programmes in North Korea to address their physical needs first.

4. Respect of North Korean anti-religion laws and secularisation of activity

For some organisations, providing humanitarian assistance is merely a means to a greater end: that of evangelising North Koreans. For others, social action is a substitute for evangelism. Finally, for other groups, the two activities walk hand in hand. Regardless of these organisations’ understanding of holistic mission, they have been addressing a need and have contributed to the international efforts to relieve hunger and suffering in North Korea. Hyun-man Im [Hyŏnman Im] argues that the provision of humanitarian aid to North Korea is a way of expressing practical love to the people and is necessary before any verbal message of love can be received and understood (Hyun-man Im 2012: 278)

However, there is a problem related to their activity: the fact that in North Korea, the recipients of food and development assistance—mostly the elderly, children and the disabled—are not aware that the aid they receive comes from Christian organisations. In fact, Christian organisations have to accept the fact that the North Korean children who benefit from their assistance are made to thank father Kim Il-sung for the food that they receive.
The organisations however constantly try to develop creative ways so that the children will know that the food that they receive is not only a gift from the South but is in fact God’s provision (F2). For example, they say that it is now possible to pray before sharing a meal with their North Korean counterparts. Others say that they have found creative ways to distinguish themselves from the regime, for example by reading the Bible aloud in front of an official. Christian Friends of Korea, the American organisation, is displaying Christian crosses on the vehicles used in North Korea. Finally, the director of an evangelical organisation said that North Koreans liked Christians because Christians do not smoke or drink (SK4). This might sound anecdotal but in a country where the majority of men smoke heavily, it is actually very significant.

Christians, who provide humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea, believe that their activity in North Korea may have an impact in the spiritual realm that might not necessarily be directly experienced in the earthly world: their activity might exert invisible power that is not yet realised and therefore not yet exercised. They think that they can subvert the North Korean regime not through confrontation but by embracing it with ‘God’s love’. Some of them also believe that their activities prepare the ground for the process of re-evangelisation (SK3). Others argue that the North Korean territory is not fertile yet--comparing it to the rocky soil of a parable in the Bible—and that Christian humanitarian activists can clear the way for the proclamation of the gospel.

In fact, the difficulty of carrying of mission work in North Korea means that organisations and churches have had to develop creative ways to do mission work that are actually more multi-dimensional than more straightforward evangelism methods such as church planting. More significantly, Christian organisations have
been able to mark themselves out by showing great determination and perseverance. FBOs’s workers tend to see their work as a calling from God and therefore behave differently from workers of secular organisations in the sense that they are often more willing to make long-term commitments and will continue to work until “change occurs” (Graddy & Ke 2006: 312). The establishment of a relationship with the recipient of a service and the service provider is also characteristic of faith-based organisations (Graddy & Ke 2006; O’Connor & Netting 2008). Bradley argues that in the case of Christian organisations, their staff are always motivated by a strong sense of duty and spirituality (Bradley 2005). The case of James Kim, the founder of the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST), is such an example.

James Kim strongly believes that capitalism and a market economy will lead the North Koreans on the path to redemption and for precisely those reasons; American and South Korean evangelical businessmen have supported his projects. James Kim’s father converted to Christianity at a young age and attended a university in Pyongyang that had been founded by Presbyterian missionaries in 1897. He was the head of a Christian school near Pusan when the Japanese invaded the peninsula and the whole family fled to Heilongjiang province in northeastern China to avoid bowing to a Shinto shrine. After the liberation of Korea, the family returned to South Korea but the civil war broke out in 1950. At the age of 15, James Kim became the youngest solder enlisted by the South Korean Army. James Kim says that one night, on the battlefield, he read the gospel of St. John and the verse 3:16 spoke to him: “That whosoever shall believe in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life”. Consequently, James Kim said he vowed to devote his life to working with the then enemies: China and
North Korea. James Kim studied in Europe and emigrated to the United States in the 1970s. His dream was to follow his father’s steps and establish universities both in China and North Korea. He successfully managed to secure funding from evangelicals in the United States and South Korea to found the Yanbian University of Science and Technology (YUST) in Yanji, China. But his dream was to construct an international university in Pyongyang where there would be courses in English, computers and Internet access. Ultimately, his aim was to lay grounds for a MBA programme to train future generations of North Koreans on the virtues of capitalism. In fact, James Kim has been nicknamed “the capitalist who loves North Korea”. James Kim had travelled many times to North Korea before he saw his dream realized and in 1998, he was arrested and accused of spying. He was imprisoned and tortured for more than 40 days in a North Korean prison. He was eventually released and one day to his surprise the North Koreans visited YUST and asked him to build the same university in Pyongyang. He raised 10 million dollars and received great support from the evangelical elite and business corporations in South Korea. Because of a strong sense of anti-communism pervasive among South Korean Christians, he says that this money was a miracle, a gift from God (Powell 2009: 60-65). It was very difficult to secure funding in South Korea as Christians and churches are usually only interested in giving as long as it contributes to the reconciliation and reunification with North Korea. Thus, every time North Korea shows signs of hostility, churches withdraw their pledges.

Not all organisations however want to appear different and some of them prefer to secularise their work and mandate, arguing that they are only interested in famine relief. For example, Good Neighbors hires Christian staff and works in
partnership with churches but denies that it wants to evangelise North Korea. It is composed of ‘Good Neighbors International’, which carries out international relief and development projects and North Korea aid projects; and ‘Good Neighbors Social Welfare Corporation’, which focuses on domestic social welfare. The organisation has expanded and includes offices in the United States and other regions of the world. It is registered with the United Nations. Good Neighbors claims to be a secularised development organisation that is not involved in missionary activity. The website does not refer to any bible verse or Christian statement. Nevertheless, Good Neighbor’s staff upholds the founder's Christian belief - stewardship and "love your neighbors as yourself". The organisation has been accused several times in the Korean press of using humanitarian activity to secretly carry mission work in North Korea (and other countries). In a clarifying argument that can be found on its website, the organisation argues that its goal is not to plant churches in North Korea and elsewhere but to provide assistance to the North Korean children. It vouches to act in complete transparency and address issues of concerns with regard to transparency and mission statement. It also argues that it is impossible to establish churches in North Korea anyway and that the Christian groups and churches that are providing assistance are not planting churches (Good Neighbors Korea NGO 2008).

5. Korean evangelicalism and social involvement

In this section, I will argue that historically, evangelicals have been engaging with issues of poverty and injustice. I will reflect on Korean conservative Christianity especially with respect to their understanding of poverty and concern with ‘earthly matters’.
Prosperity Gospel

Traditionally, evangelicals and conservative Christians believe that injustice, wars, corruption, poverty, illness, human rights violations and so on are all consequences of the ‘fall’. In the beginning, God had created a perfect world where man could live in perfect harmony with God. When Adam and Eve ate the forbidden fruit, sin was introduced into the world and man was separated from God. In the Old Testament, God makes a covenant with his people and asks them to obey the law that he dictates but they constantly disobey him. Consequently, in the New Testament, Jesus comes to forgive humanity for their sins. In other words, it is through Jesus only that one can re-establish the lost relationship with God and be reaccepted into the kingdom of God. They believe that born again Christians are no long subjected to the law, as they were in the Old Testament, as they have already been forgiven through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. In contrast, they believe that the rest of humanity is subjected to the law of the Old Testament as they have not recognised Jesus Christ, and therefore they stand forever condemned (see Stott 1986). Adherents to this belief will emphasise the importance of evangelism and the salvation of souls. However, for some, salvation will also come in the form of material prosperity. God is the key to a successful life because they believe in a gospel of prosperity.

The prosperity gospel argues that poverty and illness are the direct consequences of sin. Material poverty is interpreted as a lack of faith. The poor are therefore led to believe that the salvation of their soul will allow them to be blessed financially and materialistically. To receive eternal salvation, the individual is required to repent from his or her sins. Followers of the prosperity gospel are also asked to give to God, through the church, in the form of offerings.
or tithes. The teachings from the prosperity gospel are in fact interpretations of the following Bible verses: John 10:10—“I have come that they may have life and that they may have it more abundantly” and Luke 6:38—“Give, and you will receive. Your gift will return to you in full—pressed down, shaken together to make room for more, running over, and poured into your lap. The amount you give will determine the amount you get back”. Typically, the prosperity gospel emphasises the individual’s relationship with God and personal economic gains but expresses little or no concern for issues of social justice (Machado 2011).

Although the prosperity gospel is often associated to a segment of Christianity—Pentecostalism—it has in fact become a trans-denominational widespread movement around the world. It is particularly present in the United States, Colombia, Brazil, Nigeria and Guatemala. There is a growing concern across the world amongst other evangelical groups about the apparent success of the prosperity gospel. Time Magazine for instance covered the subject extensively in 2006. According to a poll by Time, 17% of Christians surveyed said they were adherents of such a movement, “61% believed that God wanted people to be prosperous and 31% … agreed that if you give money to God, God will bless you with more money”. It is defined as being “fuelled by the combination of Pentecostal teaching and American consumerism” (Van Biema & Chu 2006).

Koreans have also developed similar forms of theologies, the Full Gospel Theology and theology of blessings (Kibok sinang), in response to the state of distress and poverty engendered by the Korean War. Just like the minjung theology was developed independently of liberation theologies in Latin America, these theologies should be understood in light of the Korean socio-political context of the twentieth century. The Full Gospel Theology is associated to (Paul
David) Yonggi Cho, founder of the Yoido Full Gospel Church, a Pentecostal church that started in 1958 with a handful of people and has developed to become one of largest churches in the world. The theology advocated by the Full Gospel Church is as follows:

The Seven Theological Foundations of the Full Gospel are

1. Faith in the Cross on Calvary

Full Gospel faith refers to the acceptance and belief of Christ shedding His blood and dying for us to provide eternal salvation so that anyone who believes and accepts can be born again in Christ. Since salvation was made complete on the cross on Calvary, it is part of the foundation of the Full Gospel faith.

2. Faith in the Fullness of the Holy Spirit

It is the purpose and hope of Full Gospel theology to bring back the faith of the early church Christians, the faith which clearly reflected the fullness of the Holy Spirit.

3. Faith in the Spreading of the Gospel to All the World

Those who are born again through the redemption of the cross of Jesus Christ and have received the fullness of the Holy Spirit, will naturally find their faith growing and filling them with a desire to witness to others.

4. Faith in the Good God

Full Gospel Faith places absolute faith, in a good God, the God of love Who not only provided the salvation for us, but continues to bless us.

5. Faith in Christ Who Carries Our Diseases

Full Gospel Faith firmly believes that Christ not only redeemed our spirits but also our bodies from the curse of disease, and that He continues to bestow that blessing on Christians today.

6. Faith in Christ Who Will Return

Full Gospel Faith is an eschatological faith which hopes for the New Heaven and the New Earth as stated in the Bible, and which allows the faithful to live in complete devotion to the Lord.
7. Faith in Sharing

Sharing faith refers to that which allows the faithful to first thank God for the blessings he has received, return that blessing through tithing, and then share the blessing with others. It is a redemptive, charitable faith (Yoido Full Gospel Church c. 2007).

Adherents to this theology believe that when Adam and Eve committed the original sin, humankind was cursed. Their sin brought about spiritual death, physical death and destruction of the environment/surroundings. By sending his son Jesus, God forgives human beings who therefore must believe in Jesus if they want to be forgiven. Points five, six and seven are particularly important as they specifically relate to issues of poverty and illness. Point five emphasises that Jesus did not only come to redeem spirits but also bodies. According to Yonggi Cho, in the mind of God, body and spirit are united: “For the word of God is alive and active. Sharper than any double-edged sword, it penetrates even to dividing soul and spirit” (Hebrews 4:12 quoted by Yonggi Cho 1992: 70-71). Point six argues that people should have faith and hope in the coming of a new heaven and of a new earth. Finally point seven commands us to bless others through tithing.

Critics of the full gospel often argue that it is promoting an individual faith and the search for personal gains. However, point seven clearly commands believers to share their blessings with others and to be charitable. Finally, point four serves as a reminder that God is good and has sent Jesus to redeem humankind from the original sin. Therefore, if people believe in Jesus, they are healed from the curse and God can bless them in three different ways: spiritually, physically and materialistically. This is commonly referred to as the three blessings theology (sam chung ch’ukpok).
The Full Gospel theology has also been criticised because of the emphasis on material prosperity and success however this must be understood in the context of intense poverty in the aftermath of the Korean War. As Yonggi Cho himself relates, the church started under a tent left by American soldiers and was there to attend to the needs of the poor and of the sick: “People with all types of illnesses—stroke, stomach disorder, rheumatism, tuberculosis, physical disability—came and received healing from the Holy Spirit. Even the local hooligans and troublemakers had a change of heart and became members of the congregation. However, the church was always in financial difficulty” (David Yonggi Cho 2008: 43-44). Yonggi Cho did not only attend to the needs of society at that time but also showed his desire to transform injustices by appointing women leaders and thus, challenging directly Confucian traditions. The theology developed by Cho is believed that have responded adequately to the social and spiritual needs of Koreans after the War (Sebastian C.H. Kim 2008: 138). David S. Lim (2004) writes that by advocating a “positive faith”, Cho helped the poor to overcome their condition of suffering and despair and trained them to become leaders and overcomers (David S. Lim 2004: 136). However, the theology of Yonggi Cho has also been criticised in Korea and internationally. As Lim further argues, Cho might perpetuate “a false consciousness that Korea is the last remaining powerhouse of world Christianity and that the Korean Church is a house of prayer when in fact it may be swollen with pride in thinking that religion is a way to become rich, successful and respectable” (David S. Lim 2004: 141). Furthermore, according to Cho, the health of Christians is dependent on the integrity of their faith. Cho has developed the concept of a fourth-dimensional world which is spiritual. As Cho describes, “the human spirit rules over the flesh that comes from
the three-dimensional world. If the spirit grieves, then the flesh becomes ill; when the spirit is sound, then the flesh is healthy” (David Yonggi Cho 2006: 11). There is arguably a danger in attributing physical sickness to sin in the life of a believer.

The church and its leaders have also been criticised for being shamanistic and thus propagating a syncretised Christianity. The impact of shamanism on Korean Christianity is at times criticised and at times valued.

**Influence of native religions and beliefs on Korean eschatology**

In his extensive research on early Korean eschatology, Ung-Kyu Pak (2005) argues that missionaries introduced a premillenialist worldview to Korea which Christians adopted promptly because of their desperate socio-political conditions of that time. Pak also argues that the Korean worldview, which had been shaped by shamanism and other traditional religions and beliefs in Korea, fit into the premillenialist worldview, which means that Korean Christians tend to be conservative, otherworldly and individualistic.

Shamanism is “Korea’s earliest and most indigenous religion” (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 22) and is believed to have influenced the Korean Christian worldview dramatically. There is no consensus on whether the term ‘shamanism’ can adequately describe Korean indigenous practices. The term shamanism has historically been used to describe indigenous practices in the region of Siberia. According to Howard, the Sino-Korean character *mu* is used to refer to the Korean practices. For example, *mudang* is used to describe the practitioner, *musok* is the belief complex, *muga* refers to the texts and so on (Howard 1998:2). Scholars such as Tae-gon Kim (1998) and Seong-nae Kim (1998) debate whether the term *musok* can indeed be referred to in English as Korean shamanism. Tae-gon Kim (1998) argues that *musok* is indeed a Korean indigenous version of shamanism
and suggests the following definition:

Korean shamanism is a traditional religious phenomenon based on nature, interpreted in a way peculiar to Korea. The Korean shaman is endowed with a specific gift of trance-possession that allows her to communicate with the supernatural. By means of supernatural power given to her by the spirits, the shaman is able to fulfill human desires for explanation, understanding, and the telling of fortunes (Tae-gon Kim 1998: 23).

Seong-nae Kim broadly defines musok as follows: “a religious system grounded in the specific socio-economic and historic conditions of Korean society” (Seong-nae Kim 1998: 34). However, Seong-nae Kim is reluctant to adopt a more specific definition as she distinguishes regional variations of musok. She therefore suggests “to look at the contextualization of regional variations” (Seong-nae Kim 1998: 41) rather than identify “regional typicality” (Seong-nae Kim 1998: 41).

Shamanism is an animistic religion. Animism is the “tendency to anthropomorphise natural objects that are normally inanimate” (Baker 2007:16). In the past, Koreans not only worshipped household gods but also mountain gods and the Dragon King who ruled over the waters (Baker 2007: 15). Shamanism continues to thrive in contemporary Korea. When facing difficulties, Koreans like to resort to the services of shamanic diviners, usually women, who will perform a dance and sing to attract the attention of the spirits during a ritual known as kut. She will then intercede with the spirits that are causing distress to her clients (Baker 2007: 16-17).

Shaman texts also include Korean creation myths. Even though those tales betray the influences of Chinese cosmological representations and influences from orthodox Buddhism, they describe the creation of the world, a separation of
heaven and earth with a paradise that is not unlike the Garden of Eden (Walraven 2007: 244-246).

According to Pak, some of the influences of shamanism on Christianity are “1 the concern with power, and the attraction of a God who can dominate other spirits and protects people; 2 the hope for tangible results from faith in Christianity, just as shamanism pursue specific familial, medical, or financial objectives; 3 the belief in ubiquitous and potentially dangerous spirits” (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 31). Christian scholars usually argue that because of shamanism, Koreans already believed in the existence of one supreme being, a ‘High God’: “[t]he Korean concept of a High God was formed from shamanism thought and later transformed through encountering other beliefs from the outside world. However, Korean[s] never lost the distinctive character of the High God who is the supreme being over all the spirits and gods” (Sung-wook Hong 2009:45) [.]

Pak believes that shamanism reinforced the dualistic nature of Korean Christianity: “While shamanistic Christians seek for the well-being of their present life, they also pursue eternal life when their earthly desires are not fulfilled. They in turn regard this life as a secular life to be ignored or escaped. This tendency produces two conflicting tendencies: a clinging to this world and an avoidance of this world” (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 31).

Buddhism formally entered the Korean peninsula at the end of the fourth century. Baker (20007) argues that in the beginning, Buddhism was not very different from folk religion/shamanism and the first Buddhist monks claimed they could cure illnesses that gods could not (Baker 2007: 18). An analysis of Korean religious history by James Huntley Grayson (2002) shows that Buddhism was never a unified movement in Korea. Baker (2007) argues that Korean Buddhism
is Mahāyāna (great vehicle) Buddhism. A significant feature of this particular form of Buddhism is its focus on compassion: “there are a large number of buddhas and bodhisattvas who, out of compassion, offer assistance to suffering humanity and, indeed, to all sentient beings” (Baker 2007: 19). However, Grayson (2002) writes that in the sixth century, another form of Buddhism, known as Hinayāna (smaller vehicle), developed alongside Mahāyāna Buddhism (Grayson 2002 (1989): 31). In the seventh century, Buddhism flourished on the peninsula and a form of esoteric Buddhism grew together with a more orthodox, monastic form of Buddhism (Grayson 2002 (1989): 47). Grayson also argues that in that period of time, orthodox Buddhism became more sophisticated and developed schools of Buddhist doctrine also knows the Five Schools (O-gyo) or orthodox sects (Grayson 2002 (1989): 59).

According to Don Baker (2007), many Koreans were attracted to Buddhism “for its soteriological message: its promise of effective techniques for escaping suffering by developing insight that will dissolve the illusions that cause that suffering” (Baker 2007: 18). Buddhism also offered supernatural beings that individuals could turn to request assistance to overcome health, familial or financial problems (Baker 2007: 18-19). It can be suggested therefore, that the Buddhist background strengthened the dualistic nature of Korean Christianity.

Buddhism is also said to have brought fatalism into Korean thinking. Ung-kyu Pak argues that Buddhism itself was a syncretic religion that adopted Shamanistic practices and beliefs. Buddhism’s greatest influences on Korean Christianity were its pessimism and focus on the other world: “It may be said that Buddhism does not appreciate the value and meaning of life, but inspires faith in the other world”
(Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 36). Referring to another Korean scholar, Ung-kyu Pak quotes:

> It was a coincidence that the futuristic asceticism of Buddhism was in line with the imminent eschatology of Christianity. Christian eschatology includes in itself the danger of denying the present life and overemphasizing the other world. By doing these two things, it may lose its sense of responsibility and duty for the present life and end by being apathetic toward society (Young-hoon Lee quoted in Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 36).

Finally, according to Ung-kyu Pak (2005), Confucianism and Taoism from China also influenced Koreans’ belief system and the dualistic understanding of human beings:

> The ancient Koreans believed that human nature is composed of body and soul, and death was conceived of as a separation of the two. It has been believed; furthermore, that the soul exists beyond death (...) the belief in the eternal existence of the soul was developed into ancestor worship in combination with traditional filial obedience to ancestors (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 46-47).

In light of the above, it can be argued that at the time of Japanese colonisation of Korea, the impact of traditional religions and beliefs on Korean mindset means that Koreans held a dualistic understanding of human being, distinguished soul from the body, and tended to be otherworldly but not necessarily at the expense of social justice. The preoccupation with spiritual and physical well-being means that many Korean Christians have historically been concerned with issues of poverty and spiritual salvation. Chung-shin Park says that “Koreans who had long been humiliated by foreign powers, were frustrated and angry when their country became a protectorate, later a colony, of neighbouring Japan. Their despair and
helplessness led to search for psychological consolation and a source of new hope” (Chung-shin Park 2003: 30). Christianity allowed Korean Christians to unite under a unique belief to fight against a common enemy. It also provided them with a positive alternative to the state of occupation. As argued in the previous chapter, for some Korean Christians, the coming of the Kingdom of God involved the end of Japanese occupation.

Additionally, shamanism is also said to be the religion that inspired minjung theologians to combat social injustice and human rights violations because it is the religion that has “traditionally been the religion of the poor, the oppressed, the uneducated, and during the Neo-Confucian Yi Dynastí, the religion of women” (Adams 2012 177). As argued by Ung-kyu Pak (2005), shamanism and other traditions prepared the ground for the successful integration of Christianity in Korea but this does not mean that Christianity, especially the conservative Christianity imported by missionaries, reinforced their fatalism or world escapism. On the contrary, Christianity provided them with a new hope and functioned as a driving force to resist the colonising power.

**Influence of American Evangelicalism**

As mentioned in the introduction of my research, Kwang-sun Suh argued that “Americans put a fundamentalist stamp on Korean religion that has lasted until the present day: “the revival meetings...set the tone of Korean Protestantism: emotional, conservative, Pentecostal, individualistic, and otherworldly” (Kwang-sun Suh quoted in Brouwer, Gifford and Rose 1996: 112). Early Korean Christians were also exposed to the middle-class values and attitudes promoted by the American missionaries. American Protestant missionaries to Korea came from a middle-class background and brought capitalism to Korea. The expansion of
trade was indeed “a desirable result of foreign missions” (Dae-young Ryu 2001:109). But were American missionaries really individualistic and otherworldly?

First, they did not want to be engaged politically: Wells (1990) says that missionaries followed the principle of church state separation that originated from the European Reformation as a means to prevent the state from interfering in religious affairs (Wells 1990: 35). Second, it is also said they had come to save souls and bring inner peace and were not interested in solving Korea’s political and social problems (Timothy S. Lee 2000: 127). Western missionaries who went to Korea came from different backgrounds and were following the different theologies and eschatological views taught in their respective theological colleges and churches. However, it is also true that most missionaries had been exposed to and therefore followed a premillennialistic eschatological orientation (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 84). As explained in the introduction, in the aftermath of the civil war, evangelicals in the United States developed a pessimistic view of the world. They interpreted suffering and catastrophes as signs of the imminent return of Jesus on earth but also as evidence of the corruption of humankind. The world is evil and individuals must be urgently saved before Christ comes back to earth to rapture his saints. In spite of their pessimism, Ung-kyu Pak argues that premillennialists were the “world’s greatest optimists” and supported world mission programmes that sought to establish schools and hospitals to improve the living conditions of people (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 71). Because they believed in the imminent return of Christ, the question what would you want to be doing when Jesus comes back? dictated their behaviour. Therefore decisions taken on a daily basis were very important and had to be ethically and morally acceptable: “[t]he nearness of the
Lord’s coming gave added meaning to their lives in the present” (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 59). In other words, life on earth mattered. Therefore, regardless of their eschatological orientation, missionaries to Korea were involved in medical or social activity: early missions in Korea aimed to release people from: “disease (medical missions), ignorance (educational missions), fear of spirits, oppressive social structures, and evil customs” (Ung Kyu Pak 2005: 95).

Another reason why missionaries focused on social and medical activities is because, at that time, Korea was still hostile to the introduction of foreign religions. In 1884, when the American Horace N. Allen arrived in Korea to preach the gospel, the country was still wary of Western religions and thus, Allen was introduced as a medical doctor for the American diplomatic representation. In 1885, two American missionaries: Henry Appenzeller, from the Northern Presbyterian mission; and Horace Underwood, from the Northern Methodist mission, became the first ordained missionaries to Korea. Chun-gshin Park describes the then Korea as anti-Christian and anti-Western. Firstly, this was because of a strong Chinese influence on the peninsula and the prevalence of Confucian ideas; secondly because Catholicism was associated to the elite from the South and their political rivals regarded Catholicism as a heresy; thirdly because of the history of colonialism and aggressive behaviour of Western powers; finally because Korean Catholics had challenged the authority of the throne (Chung-shin Park 2003:18-19). Because of this hostile environment, missionaries focused on indirect acts of evangelisation such as the provision of social services, education and medical care. Missionaries had to downplay if not disguise their religious identity and adopt a ‘non-evangelistic policy’. However, Elizabeth Underwood (2003) argues that Horace Allen wanted to bring about social changes
in Korea because he adhered to a postmillenialistic worldview: “He heartily believed that through the promotion of good works the Presbyterian could bring about both an opening to evangelical work and the conversion of the Korean society from top-bottom” (Elizabeth Underwood 2003: 66-67). She argues, however, that her ancestor, Horace Underwood, was premillennialist and therefore for him education and medical work were merely a means to an end (Elizabeth Underwood 2003: 67). Not only missionaries but Korean Christians quickly became involved in social activities. Although at a later time than the first missionary activity in this area, in his research on the relationship between Christianity and social welfare written in Korean, *Han’guk kyohoewa sahoe pokchi* (2008), Moo-yeol Choe [Muyŏl Ch’oe] explains that Yun Ch’i-ho and O Kŭng-sŏn were the first Protestant Koreans to open orphanages. The first one was opened in Seoul in 1919: the *kyŏngsŏng koa kujehoe* then in Pyongyang in 1921, 1925 in Sŏnch’ŏn and 1934 in Wŏnsan (Moo-yeol Choe 2008 (1999): 94).

Chung-shin Park says that Koreans adopted the apolitical conservative views of the missionaries but it affected them differently: Protestant Christians associated Christianity to the advanced West, modernisation, and thus by embracing Christianity they sought to reform Korean society politically and socially: “The early Protestant church’s doctrine and theology, though conservative fundamentalist in nature, made Korean Christians more hostile toward Confucian ethics and practices, and thus truly revolutionary” (Chung-shin Park 2003: 55).

In many respects, today’s missionary activity taking place in North Korea is not very different from early Western missionary activity in Korea when missionaries with different eschatological orientations sought to fulfil God’s
mission by bringing assistance to Koreans in spite of a hostile political atmosphere. Many of these organisations are in fact continuing the missionary, education and medical work that their predecessors started. For instance, the Korean children of American missionaries who had worked in Pyongyang establishing schools and orphanages have formed the Lighthouse Foundation. The Eugene Bell Foundation has been named in the memory of the American missionary Eugene Bell (1865-1925) who worked in South Jeolla province. His descendants have established the organisation in partnership with ethnic South Koreans.

**Failure of the March First Movement and the emergence of socialism**

As examined in the previous chapter, the movement for independence that led to the March First Movement failed. After the massacre of Koreans by the Japanese, many Christians withdrew from the public sphere and criticised those who chose to remain politically and socially active. Chung-shin Park (2003) says that Korean Christians retained the same conservative theological beliefs but became disillusioned and resigned. What functioned as a political drive in the early stages of colonisation, became a hindrance to political activism in the aftermath of the March First Movement (Chung-shin Park 2003: 65). Therefore, the Christian leaders who had stood against the Japanese withdrew from the public sphere and sought security rather than activism to protect their newly acquired social position (Chung-shin Park 2003: 67). Chung-shin Park also argues Protestantism started to separate itself from the poor, the alienated and the oppressed. Church leaders became socially established and began preaching a ‘pure gospel’ (*sunsu sinang*). Churches, which had previously formed a united front to resist Japanese occupation, became divided and more competitive.
(Chung-shin Park 2003: 152-153). Many Christian Protestants moved from being nationalists to being collaborators. Some were forced to collaborate, others chose to collaborate so that they could continue to operate schools and churches and finally others collaborated to keep their wealth and social status (Chung-shin Park 2005: 156). This focus on the otherworldly was accompanied by a split of theology between those who were “influenced by the pessimistic worldview of dispensational premillenialism” and those “who came under the influence of socialism and social gospel. One of the reasons for this diversification was that, often after having first suppressed them, the Japanese rulers allowed many books to be published and many social associations to be formed. Through these associations and publications, socialism began to influence Christian intellectuals, while nationalist Christians began to establish numerous social associations for their purposes” (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 145).

At the same time that Christianity was losing its significance in society, communism emerged as an alternative nationalistic and progressive voice. As explained in the second chapter, communism was first introduced on the Korean peninsula in the 1920s via Japan, China and Russia. Its encounter with Christianity quickly became problematic. Communists initiated anti-religious campaigns, especially, an anti-Protestant missionary movement. Mostly, they criticised Christians for being indifferent to social injustices and for promoting imperialistic and capitalistic ideas. They also accused Christians of entertaining close links with Japan. Churches responded to these criticisms in two ways: some Christians ignored the criticism and retreated from the public sphere even further; others attempted to integrate socialist ideas to transform the inner spiritual and individualistic nature of the Church.
The social gospel, or social Christianity, was both a response to and under the influence of contemporary theories as explained by Kirsteen Kim: “social Christianity emerged within the liberal Protestant tradition—a movement encompassing both progressive and modernist views—in the mid-late nineteenth century under the influence of Hegelian idealism (the progress of human spirit), Darwinian theories of evolutionary progress, and comparative religion, and in reaction to the rise of individualism in religion and society” (Kirsteen Kim 2007: 14). In Korea, Christians adopted a new perspective on the relationship between capitalism and labour and realised that churches were responsible to the Korean public.

For example, the YMCA influenced the Church greatly by teaching a social gospel and working for a more just society. In 1925, the organisation started a social programme to improve farm villages “to awaken the Korean Churches to understand the real situation of the villages which increasingly suffered grinding poverty under the colonial exploitation, and to turn the attention of the Churches and missionaries towards the hardships of the farm villages” (Kyong-bae Min 2005: 352). The YMCA, together with the Presbyterian Church, Changnokyo kongūihoe, promoted the rights of women developing empowering and literacy projects. The YMCA also challenged Korean traditions by campaigning against second marriages (in other words men taking concubines or ch’ŏp in Korean). The movement developed into Chosŏn yŏja kidok ch’ŏngnyŏnhoe or YWCA in English (Moo-yeol Choe 2008 (1999): 104-105).

The social gospel (sahoe pogŭm) must be distinguished from Christian socialism (kidokkyo sahoejuŭi) which actively adopted socialist/commmunist ideology. The social gospel denied socialist elements like historical materialism.
But in practice, these two streams proceeded in the same way to promote a form of utopian socialism. Some Christians tried to combine Christianity and a socialist utopia (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 204-209). These Christians, says Chung-shin Park, wanted to keep society united over the question of Japan and initially thought that Christianity and socialism could work together for the good of society. However as socialists continued to label Christianity a religion of the wealthy, Christians began to turn anti-socialist and defended the gospel as being good news for the poor and the oppressed (Chung-shin Park 2003: 144-145). It is difficult to differentiate Christian socialists from Christians who advocated a social gospel and identify the extent to which some believed in one idea or the other. However, the encounter between Christianity and socialism on the Korean peninsula shows that the relationship between Christians and socialists has not always been as clear cut as we are sometimes led to believe. It also means that from the beginning, Christians associated the term society/socialism (sahoe) to the term common property/communism (kongsan) and thus did not distinguish between socialism and communism (Moo-yeol Choe 2008 (1999): 258). The fact that North Koreans used the term sahoe in their constitutions further reinforced their prejudice and to this day continues to influence evangelicals’ attitude toward the term socialism or social justice.

In spite of the rhetoric however, more conservative churches continued to address some of the issues that affected directly the Korean public. For example, as schools were forced to follow a Japanese curriculum and teach the Japanese language instead of Korean, they became involved in campaigns for Korean literacy and language. Churches would run Sunday and summer programmes for children who would otherwise have been unable to learn Korean (Moo-yeol Choe
Undoubtedly, in doing so, these churches wanted to make sure that forthcoming generations would not turn away from Christianity. But, practically, this means that children were given the opportunity to learn their mother tongue properly.

While Christianity somehow lost some of its influence in society in the years that followed the March First Movement, Christianity became influential again after the liberation and division of the country. During the Korean War, “almost half of the foreign aid organisations which joined the Korean Association of Voluntary Agencies (KAVA) were Christian. US Presbyterians alone raised USD 1,800,000 for Korea in 1950-1954 and most of this money was channelled through Korean churches” (Tikhonov 2013: 5). American missionary organisations also helped Korean Christians to build churches, orphanages, schools, shelters and clinics (Haga 2012: 99).

After the Korean War and the establishment of the Republic of Korea, the Korean evangelical churches continued to assert that they did not want to become involved in political matters and wished to preserve a separation of church and religion by advocating a pure faith. It would be more correct to say that churches were politically aligned with the policies of the successive South Korean governments and therefore did not see the need to challenge them. Evangelicals enjoyed the freedom of religion granted by the successive authoritarian South Korean governments and did not contest its legitimacy until the late 1970s. Equally, evangelicals never completely stopped caring for poverty and social injustices. Sebastian C.H. Kim explains that in the aftermath of the Korean War, there “was a shift in thinking from the early revival phenomenon of emphasising ‘spiritual blessings’ in its eschatological dimensions to include the material
manifestation of those blessings” (Sebastian C.H. Kim 2007: 44). Evangelicals therefore supported the economic growth of the country prompted by the free market policy and were actively involved in the relief campaigns. For example, one of today’s leading international development organisations, the evangelical organisation World Vision, which started programmes of child sponsorship to assist orphans of war, was established during the Korean War, in Seoul, South Korea.

Holism in the church

As mentioned above, World Vision was co-founded by an American doctor, Robert Pierce, and a North Korean pastor, Han Kyung-chik, who later became a dominant figure in Korean evangelical circles, promoting social action and working relentlessly for the well-being of Korean society. According to Daniel J. Adams, the theologians Rhee Jong-sung and Pastor Han Kyung-chik epitomised the Korean churches’ efforts to reconcile evangelicalism and ecumenism. Both were members of the Presbyterian Church of Korea (Tonghap), the largest denomination in Korea.

Rhee Jong-sung was born in South Korea in 1922 and received a very broad theological education (Adams 2012: 104). He became assistant pastor at Yougnak Presbyterian Church in 1957 and advocated a holistic theology (t’ong chŏnjŏk sinhak) “1. It is Trinitarian; 2. It focuses on the whole gospel; 3. It is concerned with the whole person; 4. It brings together the church and the secular world; 5. It is not anthropocentric but rather cosmic in scope; and 6. It is concerned with the kingdom of God” (Adams 2012: 109). As Adams argues, one of the most important points of his theology is the emphasis on the trinity, which means that we should not ignore or play down one person of the trinity. For
example, Pentecostals tend to focus exclusively on the person of the Holy Spirit whereas minjung theologians focused on the presence of Jesus while ignoring the Holy Spirit (Adams 2012: 113-114).

Han Kyung-chik was born in North Korea in 1902 and served as a pastor in the north where he was fighting against the Japanese occupation. In 1945, he founded the Christian Social Democratic Party with another pastor, Yun Ha-young. He wanted to build a new nation based on Christian values but as he was going to be arrested by Soviet agents, he fled to South Korea (Adams 2012: 117). Han Kyung-chik’s form of holistic ministry included five elements:

First, he was the ideal “gentleman minister” and leader of the church and society. Second, he was the humble shepherd of his congregation. Third, he showed solidarity with those who suffered in society and sought to alleviate their sufferings. Fourth, he always remained in the center and took the middle-way and was thus a force for unity rather than division. And fifth and finally, through his dedication to social service he was respected both nationally and globally (Adams 2012: 120).

Su-jin Kim [Suchin Kim] (2011) has written a book in Korean on Han Kyung-chik emphasising the contribution of the Korean pastor to a holistic form of evangelism (Arūmdaun pinson Han Kyŏng Chik). Han Kyung-chik believed that it is by the grace of God that South Korea had been blessed spiritually, economically, politically and socially. He said that mission, education and social services were nonetheless necessary to overcome the difficulties faced by the country (Han Kyung-chik quoted in Su-jin Kim 2011 (2000): 130). Like most North Korean Christians who had found political asylum in the South, Han Kyung-chik was openly against the North Korean system and demonised its supporters. However he became acutely aware of the humanity of the North

6. Conclusion

This chapter discussed the great level of involvement and dedication of evangelical churches in addressing hunger and poverty in North Korea. While it is still difficult for these mission organisations and churches to conduct straightforward evangelistic work in North Korea, they have developed methods to address the perceived needs of North Koreans while respecting North Korea’s prohibition of conducting religious activity. It was argued that in spite of the rhetoric and uneasy relationship with socialism and social issues, evangelicals have always been concerned to a certain degree with issues of poverty, hunger and physical health. However, their commitment does not mean that evangelicals have lost their anti-communist attitude. Their aim is to achieve the re-unification of the peninsula so as to re-evangelise the north of the country.
Chapter 5: Juche and mission to North Korea

1. Introduction

Since the advent of communism in the North, Christians have actively been engaged in anti-North Korean campaigns as explained in previous chapters. These campaigns translated into efforts to evangelise North Korea. This research argues that humanitarian aid is one of the methods used by evangelicals to approach North Koreans in a more holistic way. There are, however, different strategies that have been implemented: Korean evangelicals have directed their efforts toward the evangelisation of North Korea through various means ranging from the broadcasting of the gospel into North Korea to the evangelisation of North Korean refugees in China and in South Korea. However, as some evangelicals come to revaluate mission to North Korea, they also seek to gain a greater understanding of the North Korean system and culture. This chapter will argue, therefore, that some evangelicals are gradually moving from an anti-North Korea agenda to the recognition that an understanding of the North Korean worldview is necessary to conduct mission successfully in North Korea.

This chapter will therefore seek to expose how some evangelicals have come to understand Juche/Kim Il-sungism. In their attempts to understand the North Korean worldview better, evangelicals have engaged in an analysis of the North Korean ideological system which they believe no longer functions as mere ideology but has become the religion of the state. Evangelicals no longer believe that they are facing a government that promotes atheism but that that they must tackle another religion altogether. This chapter will proceed in the following manner. First, it will analyse the concept of Juche and argue that North Korea has developed a form of civil religion as
defined by the 18\textsuperscript{th} century French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Then it will examine the views of scholars, including evangelical scholars, on the North Korean religion. It will then present the various mission methods that have been used so far in relation to North Korea. Finally, it will summarise recent assessments and mission appraisals by Christian scholars and pastors with regard to North Korea and it will argue that some evangelicals imply that cross-cultural missiological principles must be followed in order to pursue successful mission with North Korea.

2. Analysis of Juche

North Korea’s civil religion

Theologians, sociologists and other scholars have debated for years over the meaning of the term \textit{religion}. The concept of ‘civil religion’ as formulated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in 1762 in his \textit{Social Contract} can be used to describe the North Korean religion adequately. According to Rousseau, prior to Christianity, each state had its own cults and gods. Governments made no distinction between their gods and their laws. Gods of one nation had no power over the gods of other nations and thus there were no wars of religion. When Romans developed their empire, they often adopted the new gods of the conquered countries and thus the empire was soon full of different gods and cults, a development became known as paganism. As Rousseau argues, when the Jews refused to worship the gods of their conquerors, the latter had no other choice but to enslave and persecute them. However, Jesus came to build a spiritual kingdom on earth, which, argues Rousseau, disrupted the order of things. Rousseau says it became difficult for people to pledge allegiance both to the priest and to the master. Rousseau argues that Christianity “gives men two codes of legislation, two rulers, and two countries [which] renders them subject to contradictory duties” (Rousseau 1762).
Rousseau adds that there are two other kinds of religions: one that is the religion of man and the other that is the religion of the citizen. The religion of man does not require temples and cults but implies a direct relationship with God as well as “the obligation of morality”. The religion of the citizen is codified by the state and includes allegiance to cults and rites as prescribed by the laws. However, that religion might turn bad as it might be “founded on lies and error” and become tyrannous and exclusive. Rousseau, therefore, proposed a combination of both: a religion which combines a relationship with God and a sincere faith (religion of man) with a religion that prescribes loyalty to the nation (religion of the citizen). Rousseau has labelled this kind of religion civil religion (Rousseau 1762).

In the second chapter, we examined how Kim Il-sung and the North Korean authorities proceeded to eliminate all forms of dissidence. Christians in particular have been targeted because they refuse to pledge allegiance either to the country or to the man who is now being idolised by the propaganda. Chapter two also explained that Juche was not part of the original building of the North Korean state and only formally emerged in the late 1960s in an attempt by North Koreans to distance themselves from the Chinese and Russian ideologies. However, it can be argued that since its inception, North Korea has been in the process of developing a civil religion. That religion needed a name and they called it Juche. First, it started with requiring allegiance to the state and to the nation. As explained by Andrew Shanks (2000): “whereas church-religion was the establishment of a rival organisation to that of the state, Rousseauian civil religion was intended simply as a form of social cement, helping to unify the state by giving sacred authority to republican law” (Shanks 2000: 29). In other words, civil religion is an expression of one’s nationalism. As such, North Koreans are
required to follow the rituals and acts of civil obedience imposed by the state. With the emergence of Juche and the subsequent idolisation of its leaders, it can be argued that North Koreans attempted to develop a ‘religion of man’ as well.

Rousseau defined civil religion as follows:

It follows that it is up to the sovereign to establish the articles of a purely civil faith, not exactly as dogmas of religion but as sentiments of social commitment without which it would be impossible to be either a good citizen or a faithful subject.... While the State has no power to oblige anyone to believe these articles, it may banish anyone who does not believe them. This banishment is not for impiety but for lack of social commitment, that is, for being incapable of sincerely loving the laws and justice or of sacrificing his life to duty in time of need. As for the person who conducts himself as if he does not believe them after having publicly stated his belief in these same dogmas, he deserves the death penalty. He has lied in the presence of the laws (Rousseau 1762).

According to Rousseau, it is the right of the king to enact laws and dogmas of a civil religion. Civil faith means commitment to the nation. The king cannot force citizens to follow such laws but if citizens refuse to obey, they will be banned and punished. Furthermore, just like in North Korea, the citizen is required to sacrifice his or her life for these laws and, for the nation. Rousseau further states:

The dogmas of civil religion should be simple, few in number, and stated in precise words without interpretations or commentaries. These are the required dogmas: the existence of a powerful, intelligent Divinity, who does good, has foreknowledge of all, and provides for all; the life to come; the happy rewards of the just; the punishment of the wicked; and the sanctity of the social contract and the laws. As for prohibited articles of faith, I limit myself to one: intolerance. Intolerance characterizes the religious persuasions we have excluded (Rousseau 1762).
As will be discussed in further detail later below, Kim Il-sung embodies the dogmas of North Korea’s civil religion: he is powerful, intelligent, does good, is almighty, provides for all, gives meaning to life, rewards the just and punishes the wicked. Rousseau also includes another important aspect in his definition, tolerance, however he highlights that one’s expression of faith cannot challenge one’s duties to the state: “Now that there is and can be no longer an exclusive national religion, tolerance should be given to all religions that tolerate others, so long as their dogmas contain nothing contrary to the duties of citizenship” (Rousseau 1762). This again, seems to be true in the case of Juche, which, in principle, does not reject other beliefs but actually makes it impossible for North Koreans to follow another religion. One of the main issues with regard to Juche and religious freedom, says David Hawk, is the monolithic nature of the system, which he argues does not leave any room for other interpretations or ideological systems (Hawk 2005: 83). Juche rejects the idea of an abstract God who is above human experience (Byung-ro Kim [Pyŏngro Kim] & Yong-kwan Cho [Yonggwan Cho] 2012: 62). As examined in the second chapter, in its early stages, the North Korean constitution included religions and religious believers as part of the formation of the new state. Kim Il-sung, however, eliminated those he deemed to be disloyal to the nation. As Christianity is associated with the United States (the enemy), Christians are labelled as being unfaithful to the state and must be eliminated.

Juche has evolved over time and has been adapted to reflect North Korea’s domestic and international policies. It is therefore very different from other mainstream religions, such as Christianity, which rely on the truth of sacred texts which are not meant to be changed or altered. The section below will describe
how scholars, and especially evangelicals, have interpreted Juche in its current form.

**Religious characteristics of Juche**

Eun-hee Shin argues that Juche became North Korea’s national religion in the 1990s but the notion of Kim Il-sung, as father of the North Korean nation, started as early as the 1980s. Juche became exclusive and systemised by Kim Jong-il in 1982 (Byung-ro Kim & Yong-kwan Cho 2012: 57\(^{15}\)). Since his death in 1994, Kim Il-sung has been described as ever present with the Korean people and most of the monuments built in his image that can be found this day in North Korea were built after 1994. The North Korean dictionary of philosophy does not record any definition for Juche. Instead Juche is referred to as Kim Il-sung’s revolutionary thought. What follows is Kim Jong-il’s analysis of the Juche idea in 1982:

The Juche idea is a new philosophical thought which centres on man. As the leader said, the Juche idea is based on the philosophical principle that man is the master of everything and decides everything ... That man is the master of everything means that he is the master of the world and of his own destiny; that man decides everything means that he plays the decisive role in transforming the world and in shaping his destin ... Man, though material existence, is not a simple material being. He is the most developed material being, a special product of the evolution of the material world. Man was already outstanding as he emerged from the world of nature. He exists and develops by cognizing and changing the world to make it serve him,

\(^{15}\) Kim Byung-ro is probably the most knowledgeable South Korean scholar in terms of the relationship between North Korean society, Juche and Christianity. The book referred to here is a collaboration with Cho Yong-kwan in Korean: *Pukhan han kôlûm tagasõgi* (2012).
whereas all other material lives maintain their existence through their subordination and adaptation to the objective world.

Man holds a special position and plays a special role as master of the world because he is a social being with Chajusong, creativity and consciousness. The leader gave a new philosophical conception of man by defining Chajusong, creativity and consciousness as the essential features of man, the social being ...

Man cannot, of course, live outside the world; he lives and conducts his activity in the world. Nature is the object of man's labour and also is the material source of his life. Society is a community where people live and conduct activities. Natural environments and social conditions have a great effect on human activity. Whether natural environments are good or bad and, in particular, whether the political and economic systems of a society are progressive or reactionary -- these factors may favourably affect human endeavour to remake nature and develop society or limit and restrict that activity.

But man does not merely adapt himself to environments and conditions. By his independent, creative and conscious activity, man continuously transforms nature and society, changing as he desires what does not meet his needs, and replacing what is outdated and reactionary with what is new and progressive. This is man's endeavour and struggle to change and transform the world into one that serves man better (Kim Jong-il 1982).

In summary, according to the text above: man is the centre of everything. Man, as a human being, is characterised by three significant components: chajusong (sovereignty), creativity and consciousness. Man does not exist independently of the world but lives in a given socio-political context and has the power to transform it. Accordingly, human beings cannot function independently of each other and cannot achieve chajusong, creativity and consciousness outside of society. According to Juche, society consists of three elements: human beings, social wealth (materialistic wealth, cultural wealth), the social relations between
people and relations between people and social wealth. For example, a capitalistic
society is a system whereby people with social wealth control those who have
less. On the other hand, North Korean society is formed by people who have
relations of love (Byung-ro Kim & Yong-kwan Cho 2012: 60-62). In that sense,
Juche differs from Marxist-Leninist theory that views human beings as means of

Byung-ro Kim argues that Juche became a religious faith because it started
with the socio-political life whereby a human being is not only a biological entity
or a spiritual being but primarily a social being that interacts in society. As such,
individual souls become collective objects of worship (Byung-ro Kim & Yong-
kwan Cho 2012: 59). As social beings, human beings acquire historic spiritual and
materialistic wealth. Western philosophy has tried to understand the origin of the
universe by trying to identify what came first, the substance or consciousness
whereas Juche argues that human beings must be understood as basic units who
have both (Byung-ro Kim & Yong-kwan Cho 2012: 58). Therefore, lives of
humans consist of a physical life and a socio-political life. Humans die but their
socio-political life is eternal. Here, Juche also differs from Marxism-Leninism
which never discussed issues of life and death.

Finally, the body cannot function without the brain and as such, the revolution
cannot be accomplished without the North Korean leader Kim Il-sung. According
to Byung-ro Kim, a contemporary understanding of the notion of Juche starts with
the idolisation of the leader Kim Il-sung (suryŏng) (Byung-ro Kim & Yong-kwan
Cho 2012: 58). Eun-hee Shin describes the leader as being the “unifying
principle” of the Juche thought: “in theory, the leader is considered to be a co-
relational partner, not a power that controls or dominates the people or the party.
The unity of the people, the party, and the leader is profoundly social, as each of the three is interpenetrated by the other two” (Eun-hee Shin 2007:521). The three entities act like a unit that cannot be separated. The leader’s role is to serve the people as a “virtuous and benevolent” leader (Eun-hee Shin 2011: 521). According to an Orientalist perspective on Asian societies, Asians “idealiz[e] benevolent, paternalistic leadership and legitimiz[e] dependency” (Jong-woo Han & L. H. M. Ling 1998: 56). However, it is perhaps more accurate to say that, under the logic of Confucian political discourse, the “rule of man” or the “rule of virtue” supersedes the “rule of law” which means that the head of the state must rule and behave with integrity, “his role is to be the moral exemplar and to uphold the ethical order of society” (Chaibong Hahm 2005: 426). In other words, to secure legitimacy, the head of state must demonstrate an irreproachable behaviour. As such, the North Korea propaganda must always highlight the countless achievements of North Korea’s ‘perfect’ leaders.

Cumings provides a detailed analysis of the Korean Neo-Confucian view of the human body, which is helpful for understanding the concept of body politics: “the body was simply one network of functional interactions within the cosmic patter of interrelating and interdependent networks. Disharmony within the body’s physiological processes could be either a reflection of disharmony in the cosmos at large, or it could itself be a cause of such disharmony” (Cumings 2005 (1997): 412). Cumings further explains that the Korean assumption is that mind and heart are virtually the same thing. Furthermore, he says that the “principle of human action is not an ‘if, then’ premise about an a priory human being, whose external circumstances motivate him to act in a certain way ... instead the principle is an internal condition in the human being, premised on a state of mind” (Cumings
2005 (1997): 415). Cumings says that in fact the “internal condition” is actually the virtue (te) embodied in mind (hsin) which is the organic integration of brain, heart and body and is the “cause by which material force comes into existence” (Cumings 2005 (1997): 415-416). It is what differentiates us from animals. He further argues that the “mind combines principle and material force to become master of the body ... now let the body be the body politics, and presto, the virtuous king becomes its master” (Cumings 2005 (1997): 415-416). As such, Kim Il-sung is defined as the father of the nation, “his heart is the traction power attracting the hearts of all people and a centripetal force uniting them as once” (North Korean propaganda quoted by Cumings 2005 (1997): 422).

3. Juche and Christianity

Bruce Cumings says that the first statue of Kim Il-sung was unveiled on Christmas day 1949 in a conscious attempt, he says, to present Kim Il-sung as a “secular Christ, or Christ-substitute” (Cumings 2005 (1997): 420). In 1997, the calendar was changed to replace the birth of Jesus Christ with Kim Il-sung’s birthday as the basis for calculation. North Korean propaganda relentlessly relates imaginary exploits of the great leader. All North Koreans are regularly required to take pilgrimages to places of significance for the North Korean propaganda, bow to the portraits and monuments of their leaders and memorise texts and guidance of the leader.

Comparisons of Juche with Christianity also include the institutionalisation of Juche as a religion; self-criticism (confession of sins); re-education (sermons); acts of worship, prayers and songs (worship, prayer and hymns) and the display of religious symbols and beliefs. Byung-ro Kim says that for example, Kim Il-sung badges could be compared to crosses. North Korea propaganda also uses words
like love, grace, eternity, salvation, faith and redemption (Byung-ro Kim & Yong-kwan Cho 2012: 66-68). Juche also promotes an ascetic way of life and North Koreans are required to follow the teachings of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in the same way as Christians are required to follow the teachings of Jesus. North Koreans are required to “consider all things that serve our Great Leader, who is the Genius of the revolution, the Sun of the people, the legendary Hero, with the greatest happiness and greatest honour. Endlessly revere and adore the Great Leader, and eternally lift him higher” (Christian Solidarity Worldwide NGO 2007: 20). Furthermore, Byung-ro Kim argues that Juche helps people endure hardship as they are made to believe in the upcoming of a socialistic paradise (Byung-ro Kim & Yong-kwan Cho 2012: 59). The promise helps people endure suffering and pain. However the ‘paradise’ promised to North Koreans or the ‘kingdom of God’ is never otherworldly or an outer reality but is indeed about the improvement of living conditions.

There are several institutions or seminaries dedicated to the study of Juche and the achievements of the leaders scattered in North Korea and North Koreans, like Christians, have sought to spread their beliefs around the world (Byung-ro Kim & Yong-kwan Cho 2012: 69-70). Thus, Juche followers can also be found outside North Korea. As indicated on the website for international study of the Juche idea, there are Juche research centres in many African countries (Tanzania, Egypt, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Benin and Uganda) (International Institute of the Juche Idea 2014). Admirers of the system can also be found in the United-Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and in France.
In his PhD thesis on the idolisation of Kim Il-sung and its missiological implications, Kwang-min Ha (2008) argues that Juche presents characteristics of both high and low religions. Ha refers to a distinction made by Gailyn Van Rheenen (1991) between high religions, which represent world religions such as Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Hinduism, and low religions that are usually animistic such as shamanism. Van Rheenen says that high religions can be distinguished by four characteristics: they are concerned by the meaning of life (where do we come from, where are we going and so on); they refer to written texts such as the Bible or the Qur’an as their main source of authority; they are institutionalised; they provide believers with moral and ethical guidance (Van Rheenen 1991: 57-58).

First, Juche explains the meaning of life as explained below. Juche relies on the teachings (kyosi) of Kim Il-sung whose writings have been recorded in several volumes (Kwang-min Ha 2008: 136). Juche is institutionalised and North Koreans are taught about the achievements of their leaders from birth. Juche gives people moral directives and is based on the existence of a supreme being: Kim-il Sung (Kwang-min Ha 2008: 136-139). Finally, Juche possesses characteristic of animistic religions because it was been influenced by Confucianism and shamanism, which are concerned with people’s everyday life (Kwang-min Ha 2008: 140-145).

Kim Il-sung

Arguably one of the most problematic questions for evangelicals is to understand Kim Il-sung’s god figure status. One of the most thorough analysis on the matter is Kwang-min Ha’s PhD dissertation (2008) which is worth contrasting to the work of non-Christian scholar Brian R. Myers’ The Cleanest Race How
North Koreans See Themselves—And why it matters (2010). In his research on the North Korean ideology, Brian Myers argues that “yes, we know the country has a personality cult, but this fact alone tells us little. Cuba has a personality cult too” (Myers 2010: 11). Myers’ comparison to Cuba is inadequate. Cuban propaganda is very different from North Korean propaganda and it would be very difficult to argue that Cubans have idolised Fidel Castro. As of 2008, Cuban propaganda focused on the achievements of a socialist revolution and expressions of anti-Americanism with limited reference to Fidel Castro16. Myers also argues that American Christian groups are wrong to claim that divine powers have been attributed to the two Kims (Myers 2010: 13). Ha’s research endeavours to answer that question: do North Koreans believe that Kim Il-sung is a god? In order to do so, Ha seeks to compare North Korea propaganda, as presented in literature and school textbooks, to the real life experiences of North Korean refugees. His findings reveal that “North Koreans possess an idea of a divine being or spiritual being and that their concept of God derives primarily from myths and superstitious beliefs ... Their conception of divine beings implies two things: that North Koreans have an understanding of supernatural beings and, seemingly, that Kim Il-sung does not belong to the category of divine beings” (Kwang-min Ha 2008: 104).

Myers’ main argument is that Juche teaches that “the Korean people are too pure blooded, and therefore too virtuous, to survive in this evil world without a great parental leader” (Myers 2010: 15). The view of Kim Il-sung as a great parental leader is supported by Ha’s findings: Kim Il-sung is portrayed as a father-figure for every family and also a father-saviour of the nation who

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16 I am making these assertions based on my two visits to Cuba where I travelled extensively in the context of my work in 2006 and 2008.
liberated the country from Japanese occupation and American imperialism. Ha’s argues that North Korean literature, opera, songs and school textbooks introduce Kim Il-sung as an “alternative father who could protect them from the Japanese brutality” (Kwang-min Ha 2008: 52). In addition, Kim Il-sung is also presented as saviour of the nation: “the sun is the image used to capture this image. There are several of Kim’s attributes that are attached to the symbol of the sun. The most outstanding attribute is Kim’s power to save his people from the ultimate evil, Japan” (Kwang-min Ha 2008: 56). Equally, North Korea’s Juche is meant to save South Korea from American imperialism and to bring the two nations together under its umbrella.

Ha’s research also make two important contributions: first, Ha argues that “Kim rose to a position of absolute power in the early 1970s. Around that time, a movement to idolize Kim sprang up in the North. Influenced by this movement, North Korean literature began to describe Kim as having ‘omni’ attributes in extreme forms. Following Kim’s death in 1994, literature began to present him as an eternal being that lives everywhere” (Kwang-min Ha 2008: 82). However, unlike God, Kim-il Sung is not present outside of North Korea and is therefore not omnipresent the way God is. Another difference with God would be that according to the Bible, God is creator of the universe and has control over natural elements. Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il take control of nature but have not created it.

Ha goes on to say that “the North Korean government invented the divine attributes of Kim’s images at politically critical times. Whether or not the government is aware of this, however, the images of Kim that are produced directly contributed to the process of spiritualizing Kim Il-sung” (Kwang-min Ha
2008: 82 emphasis is mine). His interviews with refugees reveal that most North Koreans continue to see Kim Il-sung as parent and that they worshipped him without realising or thinking about the true nature of his being. This means that without realising, North Koreans have been worshipping their leader like a god. Ha argues that it is only after leaving North Korea and pursuing further education, especially when studying theology, that North Koreans come to understand the process of idolisation of leaders that has taken place in their home country (Kwang-min Ha 2008). In other words, the deification of the Kims does not so much emanate from the propaganda itself but deification occurs in the act of worship. In his book, Myers does not verify his theory against the experiences of real people. By contrast, in his research on Juche entitled Maŭm ch’iyurŭl tonghan pukhan sóngyo (2012), the Christian academic Hyun-man Im summarises the perspectives of a number of North Korean refugees. Some of the testimonies reveal the extent to which North Koreans are led to believe that their lives and fate are intrinsically connected to Kim Il-sung.

For instance, one interviewee defines a true human being as a human being who has been transformed by Juche. If the person remains unchanged then they are not a human being (Hyun-man Im 2012: 158). Another interviewee confesses: I exist because of our great leader Kim Il-Sung. Kim Il-sung controls me and my being. There is no distinction between the great leader and me (Hyun-man Im 2012: 148).

Finally, another important matter for evangelicals is whether or not Kim Il-sung was influenced by the Christian faith when he developed Juche. In an article published in 1986, Yong-ho Choe explores the Christian background of Kim Il-sung’s family. First, Kim Il-sung’s father, Kim Hyŏng-jik (1894-1926) attended
Sungsil Academy in Pyongyang. The school had been established and was run by American missionaries with the objectives of training Christian leaders to spread the faith. Kim Hyŏng-jik did not complete the curriculum but Yong-ho Choe believes that he must have accepted Christianity at some point because the school would require students to prove their commitment to the Christian faith. After leaving the school Kim Hyŏng-jik becomes briefly involved in political activism against the Japanese. As such, he becomes a member of the Korean National Association (*Chosŏn kungminhoe*). On March 2013 1917, Kim Hyŏng-jik and fellow activists are arrested by the Japanese. The Japanese reported that most of the members of the association were either students or former students of the Sungsil Academy and that the association recruited Christian followers (Yong-ho Choe 1986: 1083-1086). Kim Il-sung’s mother is also believed to have been a very committed Christian, daughter of an influential church leader. Yong-ho Choe argues that Kim il-sung was made to attend church in his youth and even a Christian school between the years 1923 and 1925 (Yong-ho Choe 1986: 1088). As such Yong-ho Choe argues that there is no doubt that Kim Il-sung was exposed to the teachings of the Christian faith and practices. However, in his biography of the North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, Dae-sook Suh (1988) says that “his parents were ordinary people who suffered the poverty and oppression of the time and died early without giving much education or assistance to their children” (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 5). This suggests that in fact, in spite of their Christian background, Kim Il-sung’s parents might not have transmitted Christian values to their children as “they did very little” (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 53). However, after the death of his father, Ryu [Yu] (2009) argues that Kim Il-sung was looked after by a Methodist Pastor, Son Jŏng-do. Ryu [Yu] claims that Kim
Il-sung regarded him as a benefactor, and for this reason, after the establishment of North Korea, continued to involve Protestant leaders in the leadership of the country. In fact the first vice-president was a Christian pastor, Kang Yang-uk (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 217). In light of the aforementioned, one can only speculate on the extent to which Kim Il-sung drew from Christianity to build on his own ideological system. It can be argued however that Juche/Kim Il-sungism is the product of the history of the Korean peninsula and is a blend of different influences: Marxism, Confucianism, shamanism, Shintoism and Christianity. When Kim Jong-il took over power, he developed the personality cult.

**Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un**

In 1980, Kim Jong-il was appointed successor to his father at the Sixth Congress of the Worker’s Party to the Presidium of the Politburo, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and the Military Commission (Cumings 2005 (1997): 424). The process of succession was carefully prepared and experts identified the presence of Kim Jong-il as early as 1973 (Cumings 2005 (1997): 425). In 1977, a booklet published in Japan had also confirmed succession ordering the nation to obey unconditionally the son of the great leader and “carry forward the uninterrupted revolution and the great revolutionary task of the fatherland generation after generation” (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 280). The son is portrayed as being both loyal to his father (the leader) and to his family (the nation). Cumings quotes a village song from the 1970s to express the relationship between a child and his family:

Silver baby, golden baby,
Treasure baby from the deepest mountains,
On the water, sun and moon baby,
Patriotic baby for the nation,
A baby with filial piety for his parents,

Undoubtedly, Kim Jong-il, who was born in the mountain Paektu, comes to embody perfectly the child referred to in the song. Kim Jong-il is presented as a ‘disciple’ of his father and is also portrayed as a benevolent parent who works hard, teaches and loves and cares for his people. A book published in North Korea in 1989, entitled The Great Man Kim Jong Il, shows how North Korean propaganda describes Kim Jong-il. First the book is divided into different sections entitled as follows: devotion; love; trust; servant of the people; our way; keen intelligence; boldness. Arguably these virtues are Confucian but some of them such as love, trust, devotion and servanthood are also Christian.

In one of the stories, a young girl working at a TV relay station on top of a mountain develops a high fever which no medicine or remedy seems to cure. She loses consciousness and her limbs become paralysed. Hearing the news, Kim Jong-il sends a helicopter that, in spite of the danger, lands on top of the mountain to lift the young girl and take her to hospital:

She was senseless and her pulse did not throb. The virus which had found its way into the brain caused paralysis of her limbs and affected internal organs, but strenuous efforts were made to cure the patient. Around this time the expensive medicines sent by the dear Comrade Kim Jong Il arrived from Pyongyang. The specific medicine bearing his love gave vigour to her body ... as a result before long she recovered her health and returned to her post on the mountaintop. “No one in the world values and loves man as our dear Comrade Kim Jong Il does. His love is the elixir of life which brings the dead man back to life” the girl said (Il-bok Li & Sang-hyon Yun 1989: 32).

Some Christians might not help but think of the story of Jesus healing a paralysed man. The book is full of similar stories: Kim Jong-il braving the storm
or encouraging workers to fill storerooms with fish so that they never go hungry. Again these stories echo in one way or the other stories of the Bibles where Jesus shows no fear in face of the sea storm and feeds the mass with ten fishes.

However these stories also aim to discourage North Koreans from protesting in the face of hardship. For example, Kim Jong-il is said not to feel the cold “They felt uneasy thinking that he must be bitterly cold in his thin short-sleeve clothes. However, he went to the next storeroom as if he did not feel the cold at all” (Il-bok Li & Sang-hyon Yun 1989: 9). In another passage, Kim Jong-il shows that he does not need breakfast: “He scooped a cup of spring water and offered it to him politely. The dear Comrade Kim Jong Il said with a smile: ‘drink of water helps allay one’s hunger.’ At this the official remembers that he set out without taking breakfast and felt a lump in his throat” (Il-bok Li & Sang-hyon Yun 1989: 15). Kim Jong-il is therefore not only portrayed as a servant leader but also as a human being who can endure hardship without complaining and with joy.

This image of servant leader however is different from that of Jesus as presented in the Bible. The Kims are usually presented as brave and victorious combatants who are willing to fight against their enemies whereas Jesus is presented as the leader who died for his people. Ha explains: “Kim has no shepherd image. Maybe the father image resembles that of a shepherd. The caring father can replace the loving and caring shepherd. However the concept of sacrifice and even death for his flock is not imaginable ... The reality is that North Koreans are forced to sacrifice their lives for that of the leaders. The opposite, however is not true” (Kwang-min Ha 2008: 173).

Kim Jong-un, the youngest son of Kim Jong-il, was appointed supreme leader after the funeral of his father on 28 December 2011. It was argued, and perhaps
hoped, that because of the lack of preparation, the succession might engender political disunity in the country. However, as early as the 1980s, a Soviet diplomat said the following to Bruce Cumings: “a new generation is tied to Kim Jong Il’s inheritance and has been brought along with it; he controls all of them and their careers, and therefore everything will go smoothly: “You should come back in the year 2020 and see Kim Jong Il’s son inherit power” (Cumings 2005 (1997): 429). This diplomat seems to have predicted accurately relatively smooth transfers of power in North Korea. However, the reign of Kim Jong-il was marked by natural disasters, famine and consecutive political crisis with South Korea and the United States which affected the legitimacy of the leader. It will be interesting to see how the future unfolds under the new leader.

4. Mission strategies to North Korea

Korean Christians, from the North and from the South, have never relinquished the hope of evangelising the whole nation. In the aftermath of the Korean War, South Koreans had virtually no contact with North Korea. The best way to evangelise the North therefore was through the use of radio broadcasting. During the Cold War, especially, broadcasting into North Korea was used not only to spread the gospel but also to undermine the legitimacy of the North Korean government. As mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, since the humanitarian crisis of the 1990s and the flow of North Korean refugees into South Korea, evangelicals have developed mission strategies aiming not only at evangelising North Koreans but also at addressing their physical needs.

Broadcasting

Evangelicals were the first religious group to establish radio organisations that would broadcast into North Korea. They established two organisations in the
1950s and one in the 1970s. These organisations aimed to broadcast the gospel into the communist bloc: China, North Korea, the Soviet Union and Mongolia. A group of evangelical churches under the umbrella hangiryŏn broadcasted as early as October 1954 through the use of the national broadcasting system. According to In-chul Kang, archives reveal that in that period of time, 36 people preached and the organisation also carried out psychological warfare ten times by including political messages in their talks (In-chul Kang 2007: 297-298). In December 1954, the Christian Broadcasting System (HLKY) was established. The organisation used the UN broadcasting system based in Tokyo to broadcast into the communist bloc. In 1965, the South Korean government through its ministry of culture and public information sent a letter of appreciation to these groups for their contribution to society and for their work against communism. This once more betrays the close relationship between evangelicals and the South Korean conservative governments.

In December 1956, another Christian broadcasting organisation (national broadcasting for the evangelisation of the Republic of Korea or in Korean Han’guk pogûmchûi pangsong kûk) was established by the organisation TEAM. TEAM started in South Korea in 1953 and was established by the American Evangelical Alliance Mission which itself began in 1890 in the United States. The organisation would broadcast in four languages: English, Korean, Chinese and Russian for 19 hours a day. In its constitution, the organisation said that through evangelism and messages from the free world, they would fight against communism. It changed names several times to be finally renamed Far East Broadcasting in March 1979 (Kukdong pangsong) (In-chul Kang 2007: 299-300). Far East Broadcasting collaborated with another broadcasting organisation (Asea
pangsong) which was founded in June 1973 by the American Far East Broadcasting (FEBC). All organisations benefited from the financial and technical assistance of American churches. In 2001, Far East Broadcasting and Asea pangsong broadcasting merged to become one radio station. In 1971, the two organisations held a conference in Los Angeles and agreed that they would not cooperate with the World Council of Churches as these organisations were and continue to be conservative politically and theologically (In-chul Kang 2007: 300).

In September 1995, an American based organisation launched in 1952, Trans-World-Radio (TWR) established a branch in South Korea: TWR-Korea. They broadcast for one hour and a half every day targeting North Koreans and Korean Chinese. Since 1995, they have broadcasted into China and North Korea on short-wave transmitters that are being identified with the Internet application Google earth. They want to raise up North Korean Christian leaders through radio broadcasting. They hope to supply spiritual food and help North Korean in the underground church strengthen their faith. They also want to provide various training programmes to Korean Chinese in China to prepare them for mission for West China (In-chul Kang 2007: 307-308).

Contemporary North Korea mission also includes the use of helium balloons containing bible verses, anti-North Korea propaganda, US dollars and sometimes socks and other material. Fighters for a Free North Korea (in Korean Chayu pukhan undong yŏnhap) led by a North Korean defector convert to Christianity, Park Sang-hak, have taken the lead in sending helium balloons to the North. Missionaries also smuggle Christian material into North Korea through the use of memory sticks and other technological devices.
Evangelisation of North Koreans in North Korea and internationally

In his book on mission strategy to North Korea, Seok-ryul You says that one of the most effective ways to achieve the re-evangelisation of North Korea before the reunification is by training missionaries to go undercover into North Korea. These missionaries could be highly trained South Korean citizens, ethnic Korean Chinese or North Korean defectors. He argues that they should be sent back to their hometowns to evangelise their families and friends. According to You, the death of Kim Il-sung left a deep void in the heart of North Koreans who had based their faith in him. They used to overcome pain, difficulties and hunger thanks to him but now that he is gone, they are left with a feeling of emptiness. In light of the aforementioned, You argues that they can receive the Gospel easily (Seok-ryul You 2011: 291). The process of evangelising refugees in China or sending them back to North Korea is highly risky and dangerous and most international missionary organisations such as Open Doors will not send refugees back but rather work with North Korean Christians inside their home country.

For the most part, churches in South Korea and missionaries have played an important role in helping North Korean refugees integrate into South Korean society. Churches and mission organisations have set up networks to help North Koreans leave their country and grant them shelter in China and South East Asia. In South Korea, they not only address the spiritual needs of North Koreans; they also help them deal with their earthly circumstances by providing them with various social services and education. Younger generations especially can benefit from English language training, vocational training and help entering the South Korean education system. The organisation Durihana for example, provides North Koreans with education, career advice and so on (Durihana NGO 2009).
The organisation Good Seeds (*Cho’un ssiat*) also provides North Koreans with housing, career advice as well as mentoring programmes. It started in 1994 and opened the first alternative school for North Koreans, Heavenly Dream School (in Korean *Hanŭl kkum hakkyo*) (Good Seeds NGO 2014).

**Human rights activism**

Another critical aspect of evangelical mission to North Korea which is often neglected both in secular and Christian literature, is their active involvement in North Korea human rights campaigns. Their involvement is not only due to their anti-communist/anti-North Korean agenda but is also the result of a genuine desire to alleviate suffering in North Korea. Evangelical organisations and churches have thus led South Korean civil society and the international community in pursuing justice for North Korea. Many of the North Korea human right organisations are faith based as exemplified by the activities of the North Korean Freedom Coalition. In 2009, human rights organisations and the North Korean Freedom Coalition based in the United States, organised Freedom Week in Seoul. The week was dedicated to raising awareness about human rights violations in North Korea and establishing new policies. Even though the coalition claims that its “members are from all political parties and religious faiths and [who] have many different views about North Korea” (North Korean Freedom Coalition 2003), the week begins with a Christian prayer vigil and is punctuated by other prayer meetings during the course of the week.

5. **Assessing North Korea mission**

Methods used to evangelise North Koreans have sometimes been the object of criticism. They have been criticised in the international media and have also sometimes been condemned by secular human rights organisations. For example,
at a conference held in February 2010 in Kyungnam University, the then Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch, Kae Seok, accused the South Korean organisations of proselytism over human rights and/or humanitarian considerations (Kae Seok 2010). In an article published by the New York Times in 2007, it was revealed that: “For years, under the leadership of Choi Kwang, a hard-driving missionary from South Korea, North Koreans seeking refuge in China were taken to apartments where they were put through a rigorous training course in Christianity that began daily at 6 a.m. and continued until 10 p.m. Before taking breaks for meals, Choi and the North Koreans would embrace and pray: ‘Let's spill Jesus's blood in North Korea! Let's become martyrs for North Korea!” (Sang-hun Choe 2007). Another article published by the L.A. Times revealed how a South Korean American writer rescued a North Korean refugee not from the hands of the Chinese police but from the hands of a South Korean missionary who was keeping him hostage to raise funds at home (Glionna 2012).

In light of the impressive number of North Korean converts to Christian evangelicalism, a Catholic bishop said: “It must be said that our Protestant brothers are very aggressive in their mission and work very hard trying to convert North Koreans … We Catholics are however in one sense tougher because we want people who choose the Church of Christ to be at peace with themselves and fully conscious of their act” (Joseph Li-sun Yun 2011).

Evangelicals have also criticised some of the methods used in China. In his book written in Korean NGOwa hamkke hanūn sŏngyo (2010), a medical doctor, Myung-keun Lee [Myŏnggŭn I], provides several examples of unethical behaviours that caused the repatriation of several North Korean refugees to North Korea. As Myung-keun Lee himself was overseeing projects to assist North
Korean refugees in China, he faced several challenges. For example, a zealous missionary tried to discipline North Korean orphans too harshly. Some children tried to escape by jumping from the window which attracted the attention of the neighbours who called the police. The children were sent back to North Korea and the missionary was deported. On another occasion, the doctor received the visit of a South Korean pastor who stayed in China for about ten days to teach the Bible. Upon his return to South Korea, the pastor shared his story with the media which resulted in the repatriation of the refugees involved and the arrest of Dr ’s Lee Chinese colleague (Myung-keun Lee 2010: 146-148). In addition, in spite of the rhetorical importance given to North Korean refugees by South Korean Christians, North Koreans face several challenges in churches.

For instance, Jung says that “on the diagram of North Korean mission, [North Korean refugees] are weighed with the holy God’s calling so that they shall ‘return’ to their homeland as God’s warriors to enlighten their families and neighbours with Christianity and the free market economy even though they are located at the bottom of the church hierarchy” (Jin-heon Jung 2011: 23). Kwang-min Ha also laments in his research the lack of leadership given to North Korean refugees in South Korean churches (Kwang-min Ha 2008: 95-96). According to a report by the think tank International Crisis Group, the relationship between churches and North Korean refugees can sometimes be problematic:

Financial aid leads some to view churches primarily as a source of money rather than spiritual guidance. Kang says he often receives phone calls from defectors asking, “how much money does your church give when defectors register?” He also points out that some defectors stop attending services once the cash stops or they register with several churches at the same time to receive multiple benefits. Some churches require a profession of faith and
disclosure of past experiences, particularly hardships, in front of the congregation. This, Kang contends, is counter-productive and often traumatic. Some defectors feel conflicted about religion, since the fervour of some churches feels reminiscent of the worship of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il (ICG 2011: 26).

In a report prepared for a conference organised by the Sarang community church in June 2010, Kwang-min Ha argues that in 2001, 69.8% of the refugees who entered South Korea declared to be Christian. In 2007, only 53.8% of the same interviewees responded that they were followers of the Christians faith. Ha therefore doubts that their faith was genuine in the first place but most importantly questions the efficiency of the methods used by missionaries (Kwang-min Ha 2010: 44).

Evangelicals are not only in the process of reassessing their approach with North Korean refugees; mission carried out inside North Korea is also being revaluated. For example, Myung-keun Lee argues that during the food crisis, South Korean churches invested a lot of money in the building of bread factories in North Korea. Churches provided everything: from flour to new machinery that North Koreans cannot maintain. Myung-keun Lee says that this process undermined already existing bread factories. The people no longer wanted to buy bread because it was possible to receive a more nutritious and tastier bread somewhere else. Myung-keun Lee believes that it would have been more effective and less costly to send flour to North Korea and allow the people to use it as they pleased (Myung-keun Lee 2010: 158-159).

Lee makes a similar observation with regard to the building of PUST. He explains that for instance, it took eight years for churches in America and South Korea to gather the funds necessary for the building of the new university. The
aim of the school is to provide a good quality of education and expose students to an international environment. Lee argues however that the cooperation between the British Council and Kim Il-sung University was more efficient and less costly. It did not take as long for the British Council to start its education programmes in North Korea and they have made efforts to fit their curriculum into the wider North Korean education system whereas PUST was imposed from the outside (Myung-keun Lee 2010: 178-180).

Therefore, some evangelicals have now come to the conclusion that a better understanding of the North Korean culture, political and social systems is required in order to carry out effective mission to North Korea. They have now realised that: 1) mission to North Korea is not the same as domestic mission; 2) the fact that North Koreans grow up in a radically different world view means that mission to North Korea is cross-cultural. Even though they are not referring to the terms cross-cultural missiological principles as such, their desire to study the North Korean worldview and to approach mission to North Korea with more humility suggests that they are seeking to implement such principles. Recent books published on North Korea mission reflect this desire to understand North Korea better (see Kwang-min Ha 2008; Hyun-man Im 2012; Jin-hwan Kim 2012; Yeong-sook Im 2011; Byung-ro Kim & Yong-kwan Cho 2012).

6. Cross-cultural mission to North Korea

Van Rheenen describes cross-culturalism as the “learned skill of relating to people of other cultures within the contexts of their culture” (Van Rheenen 1996: 105). He further argues that cross-culturalists perceive “that cultures have both strengths and weaknesses and take other cultures as seriously as their own ... treat those of other cultures as equals, just as they would those of their own culture”
(Van Rheenen 1996: 106). As argued by Byung-ro Kim, the Christian faith should help South Koreans overcome the ideological conflict and heal the wounds from the war (Byung-ro Kim 2005: 29). In practice, this means that evangelicals are required to express greater respect for the North Korean culture and socio-political context. However, this does not mean that evangelicals will stop challenging human rights violations or the structures that cause North Koreans to go hungry. As argued in the introduction of this research, contextualisation means that the context will be challenged: “the gospel should be presented in such a way that believers in Jesus Christ are both at home in their culture (the indigenous principle) and speak prophetically into their context (the pilgrim principle)” (Ott et al. 2010: 270). Referring to a statement made by Whiteman (1997), Ott et al. (2010) explain further: “When the Gospel is presented in word and deed and the fellowship of the believers we call the church is organized along appropriate cultural patterns, then people will more likely be confronted with the offense of the Gospel, exposing their own sinfulness and the tendency toward evil, oppressive cultures and behavior patterns within their culture” (Whiteman 1997 quoted in Ott et al. 2010: 270). In other words, the transmission of the gospel in a way that is respectful of the North Korean culture and worldview will lead North Koreans themselves to challenge the structures that cause them to suffer from injustice.

In applying such principles, evangelicals will also avoid pitfalls like syncretism. In his dissertation, Kwang-min Ha (2008) says “sharing the gospel with North Koreans without acknowledging their worldview may lead to syncretism. North Koreans may accept the Christian God while they still believe in Kim Il-sung or his ideology” (Kwang-min Ha 2008: 22). Syncretism is not the
only cause for concern. There are several challenges that evangelicals must overcome when trying to explain Christianity to North Koreans.

For instance, North Koreans are asked to disassociate Christianity from the image of a foreign and hostile power, the United States. As explained in the second chapter of this research, North Korean propaganda portrays Christianity as the religion of imperialistic America and calls it the religion of the enemy. Many of the South Korean churches and organisations that have been providing assistance to North Korea have actually done so in an effort to deconstruct this negative image. More generally, Juche and the North Korean education system and propaganda offer accounts of history that cannot be verified and that are severely distorted. It is therefore a process of unlearning and relearning that all North Koreans must go through once they have left their country. In fact the more educated are more likely to suffer from this, as the more they know, the more there is to unlearn. Hyun-man Im says that missionaries must dismantle this distorted idea of Christianity (Hyun-man Im 2012: 207).

However, some evangelicals also propose that the impact of Juche on North Koreans can be used in a positive way. For example, Hyun-man Im thinks that the necessity to memorise texts, songs and quotes from the leaders mean that generally North Koreans are educated and literate. Furthermore, Hyun-man Im argues that private companies in South Korea could make greater use of cheap labour available under the current North Korean economic system to pave the way for greater economic cooperation and development (Hyun-man Im 2012: 227-228).

Furthermore, an increasing number of evangelical scholars call for a more integrated approach to mission and therefore for a more integrated form of
salvation. In the introduction to this research, it was said Korean Protestant churches were accused of lacking influence on society because of a limited understanding of the term conversion (Joseph Jung 2009). However, the Christian scholar, Moo-yol Choe (2008) argues the mission of Jesus is not only the salvation of individuals but also the liberation of the persecuted and of the poor (Moo-Yeol Choe 2008 (1999): 15). Similarly, Yong-seok Im (Yongsok Im) (2011) calls not only for the political reunification of the two Koreas but also for the reunification of body and mind; politics and society; culture and religion. He defines salvation as being a process of holistic transformation (Yong-seok Im 2011: 36-37). Im further argues that mission to North Korea is not about planting South Korean churches but about understanding the weaknesses of the South Korean church and is a process of reformation for both North and South Koreans (Yong-seok Im 2011: 74).

Finally, Joon-sik Park argues that following the example of Anabaptists17, Korean evangelicals need to move from an anti-communist position to a biblically-based perspective of reconciliation. He also recommends that they should move “beyond their evangelistic interest and humanitarian concern toward undertaking peacemaking initiatives” (Joon-sik Park 2012: 62). In fact, some evangelicals do call for the restoration of relationships (Yong-seok Im 2011: 31-32) or shalom (Byung-ro Kim 2005: 29).

Moo-yol Choe (2008) defines shalom as follows: he says that shalom means well-being and peace but that shalom also encompasses other aspects: first, peace (p’yônghw$a) for the family, in society and of the country. Second, he says that

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17 Anabaptism is a term derived from the Greek meaning ‘rebaptizer’ and used to refer to 16th-century radical-wing of the reformation (McGrath 2011:465). Mennonites are descendants of such a tradition and have become very involved in issues of social justice, peace and reconciliation.
shalom also means inner peace (in Korean p’yōnggang). Third, shalom means righteous society (ch’ŏngŭiroun sahoe) which will maintain the peace and the inner peace. Fourth, shalom means social order or structure of community, society and family (sahoe chilsŏ). Fifth, shalom means that individuals will help each other in their weaknesses, filling the gaps of society to make it whole (chŏnch’ echŏgin ch’ŭngmyŏnesŏ onchŏnham) (Moo-yeol Choe 2008 (1999): 14). Choe says that shalom should be the goal of every mission (Moo-yeol Choe 2008 (1999): 15) and that mission should be about both a revival of the kingdom of God and a revival for human beings (Moo-yeol Choe 2008 (1999): 20).

It can be argued that evangelicals who are providing aid to North Korea are working toward greater integration and greater unity. In fact, their efforts seek to transcend their context—that is a Cold War mentality—as exemplified by a statement made by Victor W.C. Hsu in May 2005, at the 4th International NGO Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to the DPRK:

For the sake of clarifying the issues, let me be polemical and suggest that we have become increasingly polarized between supporters and opponents of engagement, and the debate has become very intense. In fact, our discourse has radicalized because some of us gave [sic] become increasingly vocal, arguing not just against engaging in assistance to the DPRK, but actively working, not only advocating, for the collapse of the regime. I hasten to note that it is not fair to lump all NGOs into only two camps. The pro-engagement NGOs do not necessarily approve of the DPRK regime. And those who are using confrontation tactic do not necessarily seek regime change in the DPRK. Their primary motivation is the welfare of North Koreans (Victor Hsu 2005: 15).
This suggests that some South Korean evangelicals have engaged in a process of self-reflection and self-criticism, which includes the willingness to engage in dialogue with those who share a different view of the world and that of integrating new perspectives. They are willing to engage with the North Korean culture to bring about meaningful change.

7. Conclusion

This chapter argued that in spite of a persistent anti-North Korea agenda, some evangelicals have engaged into a process of revaluation of their attitude toward North Korea and that of mission strategy. In doing so, they are increasingly trying to understand Juche as a religion rather than an ideology. This chapter paid attention to the spiritual context within which South Korean evangelicals operate. The next chapter will analyse the socio-political context.
Chapter 6: Civil society and the South and North Korean states

1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to identify the political and social structures that determine and condition the activity of civil society and therefore, Korean Christian organisations, in the North and in the South. Scholars around the world and especially in South Korea have analysed extensively the development of a civil society in the Republic of Korea and its role in the democratisation of the country (Hy-sop Lim 2000; Woong-jae Ryoo 2009; Armstrong 2002).

Korean civil society has been described as being “contentious and politically polarized” (Sook- jong Lee & Arrington 2008: 76) with the success of their activities depending on the “political environment in which they are undertaken” (Richardson 2008: 170). Korea is still deeply rooted in Confucian ideology. Steinberg and Shin (2005) believe that the “population as a whole is socially Confucian” and that Confucianism continues to affect the democratisation of the Korean peninsula (Steinberg & Myung Shin 2005: 4). It will be argued however that civil society in South Korea very much depends on the “political configurations” of the state rather than on “cultural predilections” (Glasius, Lewis & Seckinelgin 2004: 10) and that Confucian traditions have had limited impact on the development of civil society and on its relationship with the South Korean state. Since the foundation of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1948, successive South Korean Presidents have used the existence of North Korea as a political tool to repress, promote and/or control South Korean civil society.
In spite of a rapid development of civil society after the democratisation of South Korea in 1988, civil society continues to suffer from the sequels of military dictatorship. Political corruption and the increasing gap between rich and poor have negatively affected the level of confidence of Korean people in political institutions (Jong-sung You 2005) and “weakened social cohesion” (Cheon-sik Woo, Tae-jong Kim & Won-ho Jang 2007: 8). The absence of a peace agreement with North Korea combined with a Cold War mentality have arguably been feeding feelings of distrust and division in South Korea.

This chapter will proceed in the following manner. First, it will look at a definition of civil society in the context of the development of civil society in the Republic of Korea (ROK) since 1948. Second, it will examine issues currently affecting the relationship between the South Korean state and civil society. Third, it will be argued that South Korean Presidents have used civil society, particularly humanitarian NGOs, as a political tool to implement their policies towards North Korea.

The second part of this chapter will be dedicated to North Korea: the mechanisms of the food crisis and social changes induced by the famine. Finally, it will identify the pros and the cons that define the dilemma of humanitarian aid to North Korea. In doing so, it will also examine some of the challenges experienced by the international community and South Korean organisations as they attempt to operate in a very controlling state.

2. Defining civil society

Defining civil society remains a subject of debate among academics, NGOs and policy makers. In the NGO world, the term often refers to “the arena of voluntary-uncoerced-collective action around shared interests, purposes and
values... Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power” (Pouligny 2005: 497). According to the UNDP, civil society is the sphere which serves as an intersection between the state and the market and which is determinant to the healthy functioning of democratic state (Soesastro 1999).

In a study of civil society in post-socialist countries, David Lane (2006) identifies three theoretical approaches to civil society. Firstly, he refers to the most generic definition provided by civil society theorists who say that civil society is the group of autonomous associations who act as intermediates between individuals, primary groups (family) and the political authority (state). However, says Lane, sociologists claim that modern society has created different spheres of social life, which include culture, education, mass media etc. and that each group interacts and influences another, thus creating a strong network of interdependence. Finally, Lane gives an historical perspective of civil society taking into account the ideas of critical theorists. Critical theorists such as Marxists claim that civil society is the product of the bourgeoisie and is therefore not autonomous because it is dependent on that particular class. According to Gramsci, civil society is the space where ideology can be created and constitutes a vital element in the process of reaching consensus and the legitimisation of power. Thus, the rise in power of a particular group is based on consensus rather than coercion. For critical theorists, political economy prevails over other aspects of society, which implies a hierarchical relationship of the different units rather than a horizontal one, as it is the case with sociological interpretations (Lane 2006).

Further embedded in that problematic scenario is the question of the role of civil society with regards to the state. Foley and Edwards (1996) distinguish two
different approaches: a civil society which works together with the state to enhance it and a civil society that opposes the state. The first version of civil society is based on Alexis de Toqueville’s “Democracy in America’s” definition whereas Whaites (1996) promotes the idea that “civil society (in contrast to traditional society) is a defensive counterbalance to the increased capabilities of the modern state. It provides the realm in which society interacts constructively with the state, not to subvert and destroy it, but to refine the state’s actions and improve its efficiency” (Whaites 1996: 241). Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik, while establishing strategies to counter the communist regime in Poland in the 1980s, formulated another version of this. Their definition emphasises the importance of complete independence of civil society from the state precisely because the role of civil society is to oppose resistance to the state (Foley & Edwards 1996: 38).

Other areas of discord are often due to the fact that theorists are unable to decide whether civil society should be completely autonomous from the state and the market, or whether it should function in cooperation with the other spheres, and if so, how and to what extent? Finally, the question is also related to other theoretical debates such as when and how to draw the line between what is and is not political. Therefore, adherence to a particular theory of international relations may also determine perceptions of what civil society should be or is.

In a critique of current literature of NGOs and civil society, Claire Mercer (2002) claims that a neo-liberal/Anglophone perspective on development inadequately reflects the realities of the different cultures of developing countries (Mercer 2002: 6). In an East Asian context, the idea of a society that opposes the state is especially challenged by the pervasive influence of Confucian traditions.
whereby family, society and state function in the same way, they are the “smaller and larger versions of the same kind of relationships: they are related as microcosm and macrocosm, not antagonists” (Weller 2005: 6). Weller says since there is no antagonistic view of state versus society therefore, it is possible for a so-called civil society to work alongside an authoritarian state without ever threatening its existence (Weller 2005: 8). In China, for example, civil society can take different forms. Hadi Soesastro (1999) explains that Chinese organisations can be typically Chinese in the sense that they can be half official and half unofficial, which indicate that a state-led civil society is predominant in China (Soesastro 1999).

It will be argued below that civil society in the Republic of Korea resisted actively the consecutive authoritarian governments. In fact as argued previously, Koreans had already fought courageously against the colonisation of their nation by Japan. Samuel Kim (2006) argues that as the movement for independence was not unified, it left the country even more fragmented: “except for the negative anti-Japanese identity that was shared by all, the nationalist exiles returned home with a set of mutually competing foreign sources of legitimacy: the groups were in varying degrees, Americanized, Russianized, Sinicized, Communized, or Christianized” (Samuel Kim 2006: 8). However, this also means that Koreans were creative in thinking and were ready to advocate for their rights and independence.

3. Civil Society and the South Korean state

The development of civil society

In the case of South Korea, scholars have generally opted for a critical theory analysis of civil society development and their argument will be summarised
below. However, the ideas of Cumings (2002) and Woong-jae Ryoo (2009) will be presented as a theory as other scholars such as Clark (2007) and Duncan (2002) have challenged their analysis. First, as mentioned in the first two chapters of this dissertation, Christianity and faith-based organisations have been very active in the public sphere in the course of the twentieth century. This research has highlighted the political nature of Korean evangelicalism. However, as noted by Clark (2007), it is also worth mentioning the Church’s “determination to set its own moral and social agenda as an institution of civil society” (Clark 2007 (2002): 178). As such, Clark argues that Protestant Christianity developed dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s by developing mainly “non-political expressions” and advertising a “variety of messages … so that there was truly something for everyone” (Clark 2007 (2002): 183). Thus, together with the growth of the Church, came the proliferations of education institutions promoting literacy and education as well as publishing houses, newspapers and broadcasting organisations (Clark 2007 (2002): 184). These churches and organisations have been active civil society organisations without necessarily being political or confrontational of the South or North Korean state.

Second, in an article entitled “The problematic modernity of Confucianism” John Duncan (2002) questions the relevance of using Western models and Western experiences to understand the emergence of civil society in Korea (Duncan 2002). Duncan (2002) also challenges the belief that Confucian traditions contributed to the democratisation of Korea. Some scholars have explored the idea that the Confucian mechanism of checks and balances offered a valid alternative to Western style democracies. For example, Duncan refers to Cho Hein (1997) who argues that, in Chosŏn, the court of intellectuals—the
literati—sought to control the power of the sovereign and supported the idea of a weak ruler. The literati were self-appointed guardians of the people and of moral values. According to Cho Hein, the authoritarianism and military rule, which characterised the governments of Korea between 1948 and 1987, were in fact reminiscent of Japan’s colonial rule of Korea (1910-1945). In his analysis, Duncan concedes that whereas there are elements of Confucianism that are not incompatible with democracy, such as the rejection of military rule, he dismisses the idea that democracy in Korea is the product of some sort of “congruence between Confucianism and the Enlightenment” (Duncan 2002: 53). Duncan argues that “the best way to establish the possibility of some sort of Korean equivalent to ‘civil society’ or the ‘public sphere’ is to demonstrate that there was in the Chosŏn some process of social differentiation analogous to that which took place with the rise of market economy in Western Europe, a process that both levelled status differences and provided individuals with independent livelihoods that were not dependent on political power and patronage” (Duncan 2002:52). It is impossible within the scope of this research to analyse these issues further, however, this chapter will support the argument that the Confucian emphasis on education has produced generations of intellectual elites who took the lead in fighting for human rights and promoting democracy in South Korea and that is why it will highlight their role in a critical analysis of the rise of civil society in Korea.

It was the educated—university students and university graduates—who initiated movements of dissent and supported workers’ rights in the times of rapid industrialisation of the South (Sang-jin Han 1998: 302). Bruce Cumings (2002) and Woong-jae Ryoo (2009) concur with that analysis and take further the
argument of critical theorists. In separate studies of the South Korean civil society, they refer specifically to the writings of Habermas on the emergence of capitalism and the consequent developments of a public sphere and a bourgeoisie in seventeenth and eighteenth century Western Europe. The bourgeoisie—the middle class—has been historically referred to as the rebelling class, independent from the state and representative of the civil society. The dissemination of newspapers and increasing means of mass-communications facilitated the growth of capitalism and the rise in power of the bourgeoisie (Cumings 2002; Woong-jae Ryoo 2009). However, Cumings says that Habermas quickly recognised that this kind of civil society was limited in time and space, and civil society eventually became what it is today: a space “for competition between plural interests who negotiate and compromise among themselves and with government officials, while excluding the public from their proceedings” (Cumings 2002: 22). Cumings and Ryoo argue that contrary to the Western European bourgeoisie of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the South Korean bourgeoisie has never acquired nor desired the ‘hegemonic influence’ of the elite middle-class described by Habermas. The South Korean bourgeoisie is in fact a direct product of the rise of capitalism under authoritarian regimes and “has historically demonstrated little capacity or willingness to look beyond its own narrowly defined class interests and envision a capitalism that genuinely embraces and accommodates the working class” (Woong-jae Ryoo 2009: 28). The South Korean bourgeoisie was born as a result of the modernisation of the state under Japanese rule, which for the most part dismantled the traditional Confucian Korean political system. Thus, the bourgeoisie supported authoritarian governments because they favoured economic
growth and in spite of a growing political influence, has remained distant from the concerns of the average citizen (Woong-jae Ryoo 2009: 29).

Therefore, Cumings (2002) argues that the development of modern day civil society in South Korea can be found in a “site of conflict”: in the fight for independence and the struggle for democracy (Cumings 2002: 25). Cumings argued that students actively engaged in the more unstable political periods of the twentieth century: in the process of liberation of the 1940s, in the toppling of the Rhee regime and the transition to the Second Republic. During the Second Republic established after Syngman Rhee, from April 1960 to May 1961, civil society flourished with the expansion of the media industry and a remarkable number of university students (Cumings 2002: 25).

Students and workers also actively engaged in the resistance to the Park and Chun dictatorship and used minjung ideology to convey new political and social messages within South Korean society (Cumings 2002: 32). Equally, protesters in the 1980s were not from the bourgeoisie but were students, workers, and members of a disillusioned middle-class (Woong-jae Ryoo 2009: 29).

South Korean civil society was severely repressed under the military dictatorships, but rapidly developed after the democratic transition of 1987. Modern day South Korean civil society emerged from the civic movements that brought about democracy in the eighties and more especially the student and the media-related movements (Woong-jae Ryoo 2009: 34). These organisations are torchbearers of democracy in South Korea, they are mostly engaged in domestic issues such as policy reforms, social justice, civic and labour rights, immigration and so on. Some of them are also strongly involved in the promotion of civil society and democracy throughout the rest of Asia with the notable exception of
North Korea. Other organisations are involved in international affairs: humanitarian assistance to North Korea or other developing countries, and human rights activism towards North Korea. North Korean defectors often manage the latter.

**Contemporary civil society**

In his book, *The Other Cold War* (2010), Heonik Kwon argues that the establishment of a Cold War order resulted from the process of decolonisation. Thus, the experience of Cold War was different for the postcolonial world where societies and families were torn apart violently. According to Kwon, research suggests that such historical developments continue to affect “interpersonal relations and communal lives” in countries that were torn apart by civil war such as Korea (Heonik Kwon 2010: 113). Consequently, in post-war South Korea many families were denied the right to mourn the loss of their loved ones who had been killed for adhering to socialist ideals. After democratisation, civic rights groups reclaimed the right to grieve the dead and in 2005, an investigation was launched into the massacre of an estimated two to three hundred thousand civilians, allegedly communist sympathisers, that took place in the early stages of the war (Heonik Kwon 2010: 105-113). Kwon argues that since the end of the Cold War, “the state can no longer base its legitimacy on its role in safeguarding the political community against external threats only. The displacement of the state from the dualist geopolitical structure forces it to build an alternative legitimacy in an active, constructive engagement with the civil society” (Giddens (1994) paraphrased in Heonik Kwon 2010: 116). The section below will demonstrate that the South Korean state has not yet been able to fully engage constructively with civil society.
Since 1988, the number of civil society organisations has been growing and consecutive governments have been cooperating more closely with civil society. Prominent leaders of civic movements engaged in politics and the formal distinction between state and civil society became blurred. Some began to work in the local assemblies or the National Assembly, others in political parties or the Blue House. Under Kim Young-sam, the government started to cooperate even more actively with civil society. The relationship between civil society and the state further developed under Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. The People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) (in Korean չամյու Յոնդե) and the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), two major organisations, expanded the scope of their activities to issues that had been neglected in the past, such as reunification with North Korea (Eui-young Kim 2009: 876).

In 2000, in the run up to the Presidential elections, the PSPD, together with other NGOs, launched a “blacklist campaign” of 86 candidates allegedly unfit for the position because of their previous involvement in antidemocratic activities, corruption, suspicious financial activities and so on. For the most part, the campaign was described as a success and received the support of the Korean population. Nevertheless, opponents to the campaign accused the organisations of impartiality and of violating electoral laws. For example, most of the blacklisted candidates were in fact members of the opposition i.e. the conservative party (Eui-young Kim 2009: 887). The conservatives therefore requested the resignation of pro Kim Dae-jung leaders of the organisations and drew attention to Kim Dae-jung’s financial assistance to the organisations — 192.5 billion won ($17.5 million) between 1998 and 2000 (Eui-hang Shin 2003: 705). Many criticised the NGOs for failing to fairly criticise the government and for “lacking
expertise” (Eui-young Kim 2008: 311). Even though the two NGOs consequently refused to receive financial assistance from the government (Pan-suk Kim 2002: 297), Eui-young Kim (2008) argues that since 2000, the popularity of the PSPD and of the CCEJ has been in “steady decline” (Eui-young Kim 2008: 309).

The government is still wary of organisations’ pursuit of self-interests and has the power to dissolve an organisation if it goes against perceived public interests (Jun-ki Kim 2003: 196). In order to gain access to certain benefits, such as the ability to raise funds, a non-profit organisation (NPO) must register with the government but the government has the authority to reject an application for registration (Bidet 2002: 135). Article 32 of the Civil Code, which was passed in 1958, provides for the “incorporation, operation and liquidation” of non-profit organisations and states that “an association or foundation engaged in scholarly work, religion, charity, social interaction or otherwise nonprofit activities may be made a legal person subject to the approval of relevant ministries”. Article 39 grants the government the right to dissolve an organisation “engaged in acts detrimental to public interests”. In 1975, the Act concerning Incorporation and Operation of Public Interest Organisation (the PIO Act) was enacted to govern further organisations established to “serve public interest in areas of charitable activities” (Jun-ki Kim 2003: 17). Kyoung-ryung Seong (2000) argues that one of the weaknesses of Korean civil society is that it suffers from an “excess of self-interests” and conflict thereof which CSOs are unable to solve by themselves and require mediation by the state (Kyoung-ryung Seong 2000: 101). CSOs in fact do not have experience in conflict resolution and suffer from the absence of mediators that all parties can trust (Cheon-sik Woo, Tae-jong Kim & Won-ho Jang 2007: 12).
The years of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun (1998-2008)

The coming into power of President Kim Dae-jung in 1998 brought about significant changes in the relations between the two Koreas. Kim Dae-jung pursued a policy of engagement with the North called the Sunshine Policy. Through the policy, President Kim sought to establish reconciliation and peace through economic cooperation and greater interactions. As argued previously, he promoted peaceful coexistence as opposed to reunification. The policy was based on three principles: the first principle is that the South would not tolerate any military provocation or threat by North Korea. The second principle was based on “flexible dualism” establishing new terms of economic engagement: “Easy tasks first, and difficult tasks later”; “Economy first, politics later”; “Non-governmental organisations first, government later”; “Give first, and take later.” The third principle emphasised the importance of a strong military deterrence (Chung –in Moon 2000: 7-8).

In 1999, the government established the “Office of Civic Cooperation in the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA) to support the activities of NGOs” (Pan-suk Kim 2002: 281). The government wanted to partner with CSOs in the governance of the country. As a result the CSOs requested financial compensation from the government in exchange for their expertise and cooperation—because of the small numbers of supporters, many NGOs’ financial situation have been and remain a subject of concern. In response to the NGOs’ request, the National Assembly adopted in 2000 the Act of Assistance for Nonprofit Civil Organisations (AANPCO). Whilst the aim of the act was to contribute to the rise of their activities, NPOs must fulfil a certain number of criteria before they can gain government support. For instance, an
organisation must meet the required minimum number of 100 members before it applies for government assistance; the organisation is also prohibited from supporting a political party or promoting a religious ideology (Pan-suk Kim 2002: 286). According to the Asian Institute for Civil Society Movement (1998), funding for NGOs comes, from the largest part, from membership fees and donations (41.2 %) and the second largest share comes from the government (14.8%) (Pan-suk Kim 2002: 293). However, with the successive financial crises and decline of public trust in the third sector, NGOs came to rely increasingly on government’s financial assistance. The danger, says Kim, is that the government could favour certain NGOs activities over others, the latter being those who would work against the government’s policy lines. For instance, NGO service providers were more likely to benefit from government assistance than advocacy NGOs. Equally, the governments of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun financed and even took control of the South Korean NGO aid programme to North Korea through the Non-Profit Private Organization Support Act (January 2000) as well as the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund that granted funding to NGOs operating in North Korea (Gory 2008: 193).

In doing so, the successive governments took the lead in creating networks and ensuring greater homogeneity in the humanitarian assistance. In the beginning, NGOs were working independently of one another but with the implementation of the Sunshine Policy and the subsequent development of a North Korea aid programme, NGOs were made to cooperate more closely with the government. One of the major contributions of state interference in NGOs’ assistance to North Korea was the recognition of the need for consistency in the process of alleviating hunger in North Korea. Paradoxically, greater cooperation and consistency also engendered greater
competition. However, the successive South Korean Presidents also used and manipulated organisations providing humanitarian assistance to North Korea to fit their own political agenda and strengthen their North Korea policies. As examined in the third chapter, under the Kim Young-sam government, NGOs were not permitted to provide aid directly to North Korea. Kim Young-sam feared that the channel of aid through non-state actors could undermine his policy towards North Korea. NGOs had to request permission from the Ministry of Unification before sending aid to the North and it could only be channelled through the Red Cross (Gory 2008: 108-109). In 1998, President Kim Dae-jung adopted new measures so that NGOs would no longer need to go through the Red Cross to provide aid to North Korea and in April 1998, two leaders from the Korean Sharing Movement were allowed to visit North Korea. The Kim administration also facilitated fundraising activities and expanded the scope of aid items to include fertiliser and farming machinery (Gory 2008: 119-120).

In October 1999, the Unification Ministry said that NGOs providing humanitarian assistance to North Korea were soon to benefit from subsidisation from the state and an Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund was established in 2000 (Gory 2008: 122). The South Korean government took the lead in providing rice and fertiliser to North Korea while NGOs were required to provide development assistance (Gory 2008: 128). The Korean government monitored closely the activities of civil society groups through the creation of strict registration measures to enter the North Korea aid programme.

In his research on the level of independence of South Korean humanitarian NGOs, Gory (2008) concludes that President Kim designed strict registration criteria to the North Korea aid programme to control and monitor the activities of
CSOs in North Korea and ensure that they were in line with his policy of engagement. Gory further contends that NGOs played the “role of policy backstop” to the government’s policy which means that NGOs would act as an interface between the Korean governments when relations were strained. In addition to that role, Gory affirms that NGOs helped “institutionalize the engagement policy towards North Korea through the conduct of sustained assistance programmes” (Gory 2008: 278).

In the meantime, North Korean human rights organisations sought financial assistance in the West (mostly the United States and Europe) and saw the scope of their activities and freedom of movement restricted. Presidents such as Kim Dae-jung and Roo Moo-hyun remained silent on both the question of human rights violations in the North as well as the failure of the North Korean state to implement democracy. Thus, their governments were very supportive of the NGO work in North Korea while restricting the freedoms of North Korean human rights activists including defectors. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to comment further on South Korean state control over the segment of civil society that deals with North Korean human rights organisations however it is worth mentioning that between the years 1998 and 2008, the Presidents curtailed the rights of many North Korean human rights activists especially North Korean defectors because the latter challenged the legitimacy of the Sunshine Policy. North Korean defectors have reported incidents of intimidation by the South Korean National Police and research into their personal lives; restriction on freedom of movement (refrained from sending balloons across the DMZ or prohibition for the, now late, high-ranking defector Hwang Jang-yop from leaving the country); restriction on freedom of speech to report human rights violations in North Korea; restriction on
freedom of the press (including the prohibition of broadcasting human rights documentaries); restriction on freedom of assembly in certain buildings (impossibility to hold human rights conferences in hotels supportive of the government’s policy) and so on. In fact the South Korean liberal governments argued that the provision of food aid helped protect the human rights of North Koreans. Their policy was the following:

[W]e should work on a more fundamental remedy, to help North Korea as a state, to walk out on its own from the current situation, and on [sic.] the long term, to prevent any more displaced occurring. Thus, this again concludes to the absolute importance of humanitarian assistance. On that account, we can conclude that, when discussing human rights of North Korean displaced people, it is compulsory to be willing to give humanitarian aid to North Korea, so that there would not be more displaced people. With such needs coming to reality, we all will certainly contribute to the settlement of peace (rights to peace) on the Korean peninsula (Kyung-seo Park 2005: 25).

The progressive Presidents were severely criticised both at home and internationally for refusing to address the question of human rights with the North Korean authorities. However, it can be argued that their policies of engagement, albeit flawed, achieved greater results in terms of relations with North Korea as exemplified by the establishment of the industrial complex, Kaesong.

Lee Myung-bak (2008-2012)

Soon after he came into power in February 2008, Lee Myung-bak was severely criticised for his attempts to interfere with freedom of assembly, freedom of the press/media (including the independent film-making industry), freedom of speech, freedom of thought and so on (Situation of Freedom of Expression in Korea and the use of UN procedures International Workshop 2009). Lee Myung-
bak also sought to restrict the right to establish trade unions and exerted pressure on existing trade unions. The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and Reporters Without Borders (RWB) condemned him for his excessive interference in the appointment of key executives of broadcasting companies. South Korea was placed on the list of “countries under surveillance” by RWB for scrutinizing on-line news content and the arrest of a young blogger Minerva amongst other things (Reporters WithoutBorders 2010). Amnesty International also condemned the South Korean administration for excessive use of the force and arbitrary arrests of peaceful protesters who demonstrated against government policies between 25 May and 10 July 2008 (Amnesty International 2008). Unlike his predecessors, Lee Myung-bak did not attempt to prevent North Korea human rights activists to exercise their right to criticise the North Korean government and there was an increasing number of North Korea human rights related events taking place in the South. However, National Security agents attended these events and monitored their activity.

Lee Myung-bak also challenged the validity of the inter-Korean agreements made under the engagement policies of his predecessors and took a tougher stand towards North Korea. South Korea’s official position with regards to humanitarian assistance was as follows:

First, provision of humanitarian aid in parallel with the universal standard of humanitarianism and fraternity is essential. Second, South Korea will directly assist the North instead of using international agencies, while strengthening transparency in distribution on behalf of those North Korean citizens in need. Along with this, the South Korean Government will review whether to respond positively, upon official request of humanitarian assistance from the North. Third, national consensus regarding the severity of food shortage or natural disaster will be weighed considerably in
deciding food aid delivery. Fourth, in response to receiving South Korea's humanitarian assistance, the North should be willing to resolve South Korea's humanitarian concern for separated families reunion and returning of abductees and prisoners from the Korean War (Hyeong-jung Park 2009: 153).

Whereas President Lee Myung-bak did not make any changes to the laws regulating the North Korea aid programme, he nonetheless instructed the Ministry of Unification to suspend partially the projects in place. The government also withdrew the government’s financial support. In 2009, out of the 54 organisations registered with the North Korea aid programme, only six organisations benefited from state funding. The administration wanted to provide aid in compensation for North Korea’s efforts in the process of denuclearisation. Jong-moo Lee from the Korean Sharing Movement said in 2009: “The current situation is reminiscent of the times of the YS [Kim Young-sam] administration. Not only has the administration reduced the support to NGO activities with matching funds from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund, but also it has made civil aid activities wither by allowing NGO visits and sending aid materials to the North on a selective basis” (Jong-moo Lee 2009: 123). In February 2013, the new South Korea President took office. Park Geun-hye, daughter of Park Chung-hee, has vouched to re-establish a relation of trust with North Korea, trustpolitik. She has also said that she would no longer link humanitarian aid to politics and therefore has allowed a limited number of aid shipments to North Korea. However, 2013 has been marked by high tensions between the two nations. Furthermore, the question of whether to provide food aid to North Korea has always been a contentious issue as the North Korean government is recognised as being responsible for the famine of the 1990s and now for issues of food security in the country.
4. North Korea and the food crisis

Food security and the famine

As mentioned in the introduction, in the 1990s, North Korea went through a famine which forced the country to call the international community for aid and to open its doors to foreign agencies. Even though the famine is believed to have been most acute between the years 1990 and 2001, Schwekendiek (2011) argues that surveys conducted in 1987 already indicated severe rates of malnutrition in children: “the nutritional stress was already quite considerable before the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, and also contradicts the government’s explanation that the natural disasters of the 1990s caused the famine” (Schwekendiek 2011: 59). Actually the north of the peninsula is rich in natural resources whereas the south has traditionally been the bastion of agricultural production. Thus, after the division of the country, Schwekendiek (2011) argues that the north struggled to feed its population because only 16% of the land is arable: “[b]ecause of its mountainous terrain, it has only 16 percent arable land being a natural and insuperable obstacle to produce sufficient food even under excellent weather conditions and massive utilization of fertilizers” (Schwekendiek 2011: 117). But geographical conditions alone cannot explain why North Koreans have been suffering from famine, malnutrition and food shortages. Food is indeed an important component of the North Korean propaganda. Kim Il-sung himself promised in October 1962 at the third session of the Third Supreme People’s Assembly that every household would be enabled to eat a hot bowl of rice and beef soup at every meal after the completion of the seven-year development plan (French 2007: 27). As the North Korean leaders and his government took responsibility for the well being of their citizens, North Koreans should have been
granted access to food unconditionally and unlimitedly. The reality however is very different. There is no food security in North Korea. According to a definition given by the 1996 World Food Summit, “food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (Ireson 2013: 101). This means that even when there is food available, all citizens should have the financial means to purchase it and the food should also be physically accessible to everyone. The role of the government in ensuring availability and accessibility is therefore crucial in order to guarantee food security. However because of the undemocratic structures of the North Korean system and society, people go hungry.

In modern times, famines do not occur in democracies as argued by Amartya Sen (1999):

Authoritarian rulers, who are themselves rarely affected by famines (or other such economic calamities), tend to lack the incentive to take timely preventive measures. Democratic governments, in contrast, have to win elections and face public criticism, and have strong incentives to undertake measures to avert such famines and other such catastrophes—be it economically rich (as in contemporary Western Europe or North America) or relatively poor (as in post independence India, or Botswana, or Zimbabwe) (Sen 1999: 16).

Furthermore, to ensure food security, the government would have to undertake reforms and open the country to trade and investment which they refuse to do as they are worried that reforms and opening of the country would lead to its collapse. Instead, in accordance with its ideological system, North Korea strives to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency. Schwendendiek (2011) argues that even during the Cold War, North Korea could have compensated for its lack of arable
land by selling its natural resources which include tungsten, magnesite, gold, copper and coal to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) which was the cooperation system established by the Communist states during the Cold War. Kim Il-sung however refused to engage in such trade probably because Japan had exploited such resources in colonial times and used them during the war against the United States. Schwekendiek believes that Kim Il-sung wanted to use the resources for the development of North Korea itself (Schwekendiek 2011: 117-118).

Exactly how many people died during the years of famine is not known. According to Andrei Lankov (2013), there have been two major studies conducted thus far that have attempted to estimate the number of deaths accurately: research conducted by Daniel Goodkind and Loraine West in 2001 estimated that between 600,000 and one million people died between 1995 and 2000. In 2011, the scholars (together with Peter Johnson) revised their numbers downward to 490,000. In 2010, Pak Keong-suk estimated that 880,000 people died between 1993 and 2008 (Lankov 2013: 79).

**Agricultural development: issues and obstacles**

In the aftermath of the Korean War, the North Korean government emphasised industrial development and agricultural production. According to Ireson (2013), scientists in North Korea developed rice and maize varieties that “were high yielding\(^{18}\) and responsive to fertilizer input” (Ireson 2013: 105). In spite of the rhetoric, North Korea always relied on the import of fuel and fertiliser from the Soviet Bloc. In 1987, Russia began to reduce its aid and price support. In 1990, as

\(^{18}\) Crop yield is the yield of a crop per unit area of land cultivation and the seed generation of the plant itself.
Moscow was in the process of establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea, it began to ask North Korea to pay for its imports at world market price. China briefly compensated for the loss but in the mid-1990s, also began to demand cash payment. As a result, North Korea could no longer purchase the energy and other essential elements to maintain agricultural production (Manyin 2013: 135). As Ireson (2013) points out, the problem is not that North Korea farming is energy intensive (all modern farming is) but that North Korea was and is no longer able to pay the price for the energy it needs (Ireson 2013: 106).

The weather furthermore exacerbated the crisis because of terrace fields. Reportedly an idea of Kim Il-sung, terrace fields have increased soil erosion and have rendered plains more vulnerable to heavy rains (Lankov 2013: 78). The North Korean government blamed natural catastrophes (floods in 1995 and 1996 followed by a drought in 1997) for the food crisis but it is arguably the government’s inability and refusal to import fuel and fertiliser that triggered the crisis.

**Dysfunctional Public Distribution System**

Since the quasi-collapse of its economy in the early 1990s, the PDS has been dysfunctional for various reasons. Furthermore, the system has never secured the distribution of food equally as the quotas for rations are dependent on a person’s ranking or class in the North Korean society. In chapter two, we saw that the establishment of a class system in North Korea, determined the allocation of food rations. Thus with the crisis, whatever food available was distributed to people in accordance with their political importance (Natsios paraphrased in Ireson 2013: 108).
According to the original system, farmers were made to provide a portion of their production to the government and reallocate the surplus to urban areas but since the famine of the 1990s, in addition to the obstacles mentioned above, they have shown increasing reluctance to send their production to the PDS and have been reselling part of their production illegally on farmer markets (chang madang). Their increasing reluctance to work on cooperative farms and to supply goods for the national distribution also contributed to the dysfunction of the PDS (Natsios 2001: 91). One way to motivate farmers to sell their production to the state again and to allow them to make a profit which they could reinvest in future production would be for the state to buy production at market price, however the North Korean government persists in freezing their prices at a much lower rate as Ireson explains:

A farm that at some point produces a grain surplus is now either forced to sell that surplus to the state at a small fraction of its market value, or, if it evades the regulation, it is still unable to use a market-based profit to purchase seed, spare parts, or fertilizer that could be used to further increase production the following year. The same situation holds for industrial enterprises producing farm supplies if they cannot sell them at a cost commensurate with the production costs and secure raw materials in the same manner. Until these obstacles are removed, any aid, development loans, or investment in either the DPRK agriculture or industrial sectors will be unsustainable (Ireson 2013: 123).

Because of their heavy dependence on the PDS and its lack of reliability, people in the urban regions are usually said to have suffered more from food shortages and the famine but according to recent studies by Hazel Smith, access to food has recently become a problem for farmers and their families as well: the regions of South Hwanghae and North Hwanghae, for instance, have become the
worst provinces “in terms of the relationship of nutritious status to agricultural self-sufficiency in the early 2000s”. In contrast, the population in North Hamgyong are now doing better because of the increasing number of interactions and market transactions with China (Smith 2009: 85).

The World Food Programme used to channel food aid through the PDS, which has been greatly criticised because of the unfair nature of the PDS. Others argue that the PDS has altogether disappeared in spite of the government’s efforts to maintain it (Ireson 2013: 111). Today, Hazel Smith believes that the best way to ensure transparency of food aid distribution would be through the use of schools as distribution points (Smith 2011a).

**Rise of a dual economy**

In order to cope with the quasi-collapse of the PDS, the North Korean population has been increasingly relying on farmer markets, which have been burgeoning in the country. In 2000, the Bank of Korea reported that the underground economy amounted to 27 percent of North Korea’s Gross National Income (Eberstadt 2007: 209)

Farmer markets have become more diversified and supply a range of different products. According to Frank (2005), in the North Korean approach to the economy, “markets play a supplementary role in increasing the efficiency of state-directed production and distribution, and are not intended to replace self-direction of the economy” (Frank 2005: 292). An appreciation that was also the more recent analysis of a representative of the North Korea’s national bank, the Central Bank:

In the past, the utilization of the market was partially allowed because the state was unable to satisfactorily secure the supplies needed for the production activities of enterprises as planned. The market was utilized as a
supplementary means based on the principle of socialist economic management. We believe that, as the capability of the state has strengthened, the role of the market—which has performed its function as a supplementary means—will gradually dwindle (Chosun Sinbo interview with Central Bank representative Cho Song-hyo’n quoted in Snyder 2010: 2).

Noland and Haggard refute this, arguing that “North Korea is certainly not a case of a dual economic and political transition. Rather, North Korean reforms should be interpreted as ratification under duress of a bottom-up process of marketization that the regime has subsequently struggled to control” (Haggard & Noland 2007: 165).

The rise of the markets furthermore means that North Korean citizens need the financial means to purchase goods on the markets: “food produced does not equal food distributed” and a “full marketization of food would leave the newly created poor unable to purchase an adequate diet” (Ireson 2013: 113). The examples of South Hwanghae and North Hwanghae provinces mentioned above are such examples of provinces which produce rice in abundance but where local citizens are unable to purchase the production.

At the end of 2009, the authorities proceeded to a revaluation of their currency. On 30 November 2009, the North Korean authorities gave its citizens a week to exchange its old currency for a new currency at the rate of 100:1. The reforms failed for two reasons: because of a lack of goods available, the government was unable to compensate for the loss of the markets through the PDS; because of a sudden lack of currency, traders were unable to buy supplies in China to resell on the markets (Snyder 2010: 1). Nonetheless, at the end of December 2009, the North Korean regime took further steps to implement the reforms by banning the
import and use of foreign currency and closing down some of the largest markets in the country (Snyder 2010: 2). The negative impact of price reforms and the inflation it caused was worsened by the fact that no supply-side measure had been provided to boost output. Practically, this means that owners of won, the original Korean currency, lost over 95% of their savings as a result of this devaluation. Many people are believed to have died from starvation as a result of the 2009 currency reforms as they were no longer able to purchase food on the markets. The minister of economy was reportedly executed (Snyder 2010: 4). To this date, the country continues to suffer from severe food shortages and the population, especially children, is gravely affected by malnutrition. According to a report published in May 2012 by the United Nations, two-thirds of the 24 million population face chronic food shortages: “Nearly a third of children under five show signs of stunting, particularly in rural areas where food is scarce, and chronic diarrhoea due to a lack of clean water, sanitation and electricity has become the leading cause of death among children” (United Nations 2012).

**Social changes in North Korea as a result of the famine**

On the one hand, scholars who advocate for the provision of food aid to North Korea tend to agree that political reforms in North Korea will not take place until the population has been fed. For example, Hazel Smith argues that “all the revolutions made in history and those in the Middle East are not made by starving people. Revolutions are made by people who have enough to eat and want more freedom, usually educated, usually lower middle class” (Smith 2011). The case of China, however, shows that for the most part, the educated middle-class benefits from the political status quo and is therefore not interested in challenging it.
Human rights activists and opponents of food aid, argue, on the other hand, that the provision of humanitarian assistance prolongs the existence of the state and thus, the suffering of the people: stop the provision of food assistance and the regime will collapse. The organisation Free North Korea Radio (*Chayu pukhan pangsong*), especially, have been opposing the provision of food aid to North Korea arguing that it only benefits the elite (Free North Korea Radio NGO 2009).

Either way, access to food will play an important role in the future of North Korean society. As explained above, North Koreans have found creative ways to try to cope with the food crisis outside of the control of the state. At best, the North Korean regime has been able to contain these efforts but it is too late to stop them.

In spite of this tight control by the regime over its population, it is possible to identify three factors which have emerged in spite of the state and which might, in the long term, contribute to the rise of a form of political resistance in North Korea. As a result of the famine, North Korea has been undergoing significant changes, among which are: a certain degree of decentralisation of power, movements of people and the rise of private markets.

Unable to cope with the crisis of the 1990s, the central government deferred more responsibilities to local leaders. Andrew S. Natsios (2001) and Sue Lautze (1997), in their respective studies of the North Korean famine, acknowledge the decentralisation of power to provincial and county authorities and their positive contributions in addressing the humanitarian crisis. As further argued by Hazel Smith, “as a class they seem to have been less driven by ideology and more by genuine duty to the people they were responsible for feeding. They showed some independence from the politics of the central government and negotiated around
the bureaucratic obstacles that the central authorities had placed in their way. Of course, some performed better than others”. Hazel Smith also describes local leadership “as the motor of socioeconomic change” and explains how county and provincial authorities—who also suffered from the famine—tolerated population movement within North Korea and also illegal border crossing to China because they could not feed their populations (Smith 2005:94-95).

Movements of the population inside the country and the possible existence of a certain number of ‘displaced persons’ have yet been thoroughly documented but might serve North Korea well and foster changes. Freedom of movement is, in theory, strictly limited in North Korea. However, increasing movements of population within North Korea and also in and out of the country, have resulted in an increasing number of interactions and encounters among people emerging from different social and economic backgrounds. According to Andrei Lankov, the North Korean government has nearly lost all authority over domestic travel (Lankov 2013: 89). In a study led by Alan Whaites from World Vision UK, displacement and conflict may bring about the necessary societal changes leading to the growth of civil society such as the transformation of original identities and detachment from previous preconceptions (Whaites 1996: 242).

Trips in and out of China also mean that over the last two decades, North Koreans have had greater access to outside information and the media. In their report entitled “A Quiet Opening: North Koreans in a Changing Media Environment”, Nat Kretchun and Jane Kim (2012) reveal that the number of North Koreans who have not been exposed to foreign media is decreasing and that there is an increasing amount of material being smuggled across the border into North Korea such as televisions, radios, DVDs and USB sticks. This increase of
access to foreign information has been accompanied, the authors argue, by an “increasing willingness among North Koreans to share information with those they trust ... bribes often allow one to avoid punishment and far fewer North Koreans appear to be reporting on each other than before” (Kretchun & Jane Kim 2012: 1). Finally, private markets, which for many have become the only source of food supply, have also established the foundations of capitalism in North Korea where individuals, not only farmers, can trade. More importantly, they have opened a new space, outside of the control of the state, where people (especially women) can come, meet and exchange information. In 2008, a group of women demonstrated against threats by the government to regulate or even close some of these markets (Good Friends NGO May 2008).

5. The new ethics of humanitarianism and the dilemma of food aid to North Korea

With regards to North Korea, David Hawk (2010) argues that engagement/peace oriented policies have always lacked a human rights component. He identifies three policies that have so far been implemented: a concern for human rights but a confrontational approach (US policy 2002-2005); full engagement with no regards for human rights (South Korean policy 1998-2008); engagement with no human rights component (US policy 1993-2000). For the most part, South Korean evangelical groups have either been providing food assistance and promoted engagement or have adopted a confrontational approach and have been fighting to improve human rights in North Korea.

The challenge, argues David Hawk, would be to engage with the North—promote peace—whilst including strategies to promote human rights (Hawk 2010: 17-30). In other words, it is possible to implement an inclusive approach towards
North Korea: work for the establishment of a peace agreement, provide food assistance and promote human rights. Such a holistic approach would require that non-state actors and states agreed to work together. Professor Vitit Muntarbhorn, former UN rapporteur for human rights in the DPRK, used to plea for a “people first policy” in reference the military first policy implemented in North Korea.

In fact, the debate over food aid to North Korea falls within a broader debate with regards to new ethics of humanitarianism and an ideological shift within the field of human rights. Since the establishment of the International Red Cross, humanitarianism has relied on principles of neutrality according to which assistance should be provided to both sides of a conflict, regardless of the human rights atrocities committed by one side against the other. The core principles of humanitarianism as laid out by the ICRC are: humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence:

- **Humanity** commands attention to all people. Impartiality requires that assistance be based on need and not on the basis of nationality, race, religion, gender, or political opinion. Neutrality demands that humanitarian organisations refrain from taking part in hostilities or from taking any action that either benefits or disadvantages the parties to the conflict. Independence demands that assistance should not be connected to any of the parties directly involved in armed conflicts or who have a stake in the outcome; accordingly, there is a general rule that agencies should either refuse or limit their reliance on government funding, especially if the donors have a stake in the outcome (Barnett & Weiss: 2008: 3)

Meanwhile human rights activity was considered political since it was an ideological response to the conservative dictatorships of the Cold War era. Towards the end of the Cold War, activists began to reconsider their ideology. Thus, human rights activism borrowed the concept of “impartiality” from
humanitarianism and began to recognise that the state was not necessarily always the perpetrator of crimes (Leebaw 2007: 227). For example, in Peru, the Truth Commission acknowledged that during the 1980s, crimes were committed both by the state and by the Maoist group, the Shining Path. Likewise scholars and aid practitioners began to recognise that humanitarian assistance actually played a role in politics. For example, the ICRC was accused of complicity for refusing to speak out against the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany (Barnett & Weiss 2008: 37). As aid became an instrument of foreign policy, it became politicised.

As a result, since the early 1990s, in addition to the more traditional concerns for issues of development, the mandate of NGOs has been broadened to include promotion of “civil society, democracy, good governance, and social capital” (Mercer 2002: 5). This “New Policy Agenda” (Edwards & Hulme 1996) or “new humanitarianism” (Fox 2001) is founded on the beliefs of neoliberal economics and liberal theory, which also promote the idea that market and private initiatives are the most efficient means to achieve economic growth (Edwards & Hulme 1996: 2). This “new policy agenda” or “new humanitarianism” implies therefore that NGOs are no longer considered neutral but are recognised as political actors. The idea that human rights and peace building should be incorporated to the NGO humanitarian activities puts an end to the differentiation between humanitarian and development interventions and to the principle of neutrality (Fox 2001). Western states have been examining new “ethical” foreign policies to respond to the new challenges posed by a post-cold War world (Chandler 2003). The promotion of human rights, which was once marginalised, has now superseded the politics of aid and economic integration, which are even considered by some as a hindrance to democracy and human rights. The use of sanctions and
international isolation are considered more “ethical” (Chandler 2003: 304). The defence of human rights and democracy through humanitarian intervention was institutionalised in a report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and is commonly referred to as the “responsibility to protect” (Chandler 2004: 60). In reality, human rights advocates and humanitarian practitioners have engaged in an “impossible comparison between the apples of human life and the pears of human freedom” (Slim 1997: 249). At a humanitarian conference held in Seoul in November 2009, Hazel Smith said that all UN agencies “failed to resolve the assistance/protection dilemma” in North Korea. Hazel Smith claims that this goal cannot be achieved and she argues that in general:

[T]he role of humanitarian agencies is to support international human rights law as well as to deliver assistance. In the DPRK, this meant that humanitarian agencies, as in every country in the world, were supposed to try to counter human rights abuse as well as to provide assistance to those who needed it. As everywhere else in the world, humanitarian agencies working with a government that most of the world found to be a congenital abuser of human rights, could not find ways to both carry out their assistance role and to carry out the protection mandate (Smith 2009: 88).

However, the fact that the current food shortages are attributed to the government and their failure to undertake reforms is not the only reason why many are against the provision of food aid to North Korea. There are other arguments used to oppose the provision of food aid as described below.

**Lack of reliable data**

Nicholas Eberstadt (2007), an economist, argues that it is virtually impossible to carry out an exhaustive appraisal of the state of the North Korean economy because of the unreliability of the documents provided by the North Korean
authorities, the scarcity of accurate statistics as well as North Korea’s refusal to allow the international community including the WFP to conduct thorough research around the country (Eberstadt 2007). North Korea has also been accused of exaggerating and/or distorting data when calling for assistance. However Schwekendiek (2011) says that there are good reasons to believe that the North Korean government would not falsify data: “This is because it is too difficult to falsify just one figure alone ... Supposing a regime manipulates one number, then it would have to falsify all others as well: if it artificially increases its industrial output this year, it would have to falsify next year’s figure too to report politically impressive growth rates, hence it would have to keep on falsifying and exaggerating in its figures for all periods thereafter” (Schwekendiek 2011: 18). Instead Schwekendiek believes that North Koreans being surveyed tend to give what they believe to be politically correct answers in order to protect their families (Schwekendiek 2011: 21).

**Political considerations: bellicose behaviour, human rights violations and the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)**

North Korea is criticised by some for not spending its hard currency on the import of food. Since 1999, it is estimated that 90% of North Korea’s food provision comes from food aid as opposed to commercial imports. Hazel Smith claims that non-food imports occurred in the areas of energy, agriculture and industry, which might contribute to the development of the country in the future (Smith 2009: 84). In contrast, most academics criticise North Korea’s failure to import food and argue that food aid has prevented North Korea from undertaking the necessary economic reforms that would improve the living conditions of its citizens and that it allows it to spend its foreign currency in the purchase of other items (Taylor & Manyin 2011: 30). North Korea is accused of investing its money
in military expenditures and the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) including nuclear weapons instead of spending money on the welfare of its population. Equally, there has been a growing discontent in the international community with regards to North Korea’s behaviour. Two nuclear tests, missile tests, the sinking of a South Korean military vessel and the shelling of Yeonpyeong, a disputed island in the Yellow Sea, have angered North Korea’s largest food donors: South Korea and the United-States. Furthermore, it is argued that aid can only be beneficial and contribute to the country’s development when the country has pre-emptively adopted policies that are favourable to economic growth, which is not the case of North Korea (Coyne & Ryan 2009: 38).

**Food diversion, monitoring and access**

In addition, human rights campaigners and North Korean refugees have been questioning the provision of aid to North Korea arguing that is does not reach the most vulnerable segments of the population and that in fact much of the food aid received is being diverted to the army. The North Korean authorities restricted the WFP and NGOs staff from conducting unanticipated verifications (Taylor & Manyin 2011:13). The authorities denied random access to foreigners, claiming they could challenge the nation’s stability by undermining the “control of information and the control of individual movement” (Taylor & Manyin 2011:16). In the 1990s, NGOs and UN agencies faced a number of restrictions on their activities in North Korea. The North Korean government was involved in every aspect of relief efforts, banned organisations from using Korean-speaking staff and enforced a week’s advance notice to be given to conduct food monitoring (Snyder 2013: 216). The question of whether food is effectively diverted to the army constitutes another subject of controversy. The military-first strategy,
sŏngun, has been a dominant characteristic of Korean propaganda since 1995 and “expresses the emphasis on the military throughout society” (Young-sun Lee & Deok-ryong Yoon 2004: 52). Lee and Yoon say that that the military-first policy naturally proceeds from the economic crisis provoked by the 1995 flood and the 1996 drought. As thousands of people died and a considerable number of people abandoned their jobs to go and seek food, the military then took over people’s jobs ensuring, political, economic and social stability.

According to various reports, food being sold on markets at a government-controlled price serves as evidence that officials are stealing and reselling food. Refugees have also reported that food aid was being distributed to the army (Taylor & Manyin 2011: 9). But it can also be argued that there exists no verifiable evidence to corroborate those claims since they mostly rely on the testimonies of refugees, or that some food has been diverted but not a substantial amount. According to the WFP, diversion is unlikely for the following reasons:

- The North Korean army and party elite have preferential access to national agricultural production (which is mainly rice and more desirable than the WFP’s wheat donations),
- China and other countries provide food aid that can be used by the North Korean military and elite,
- The Army has its own agricultural production,
- There is a culture of respect for state authority, and
- Intense regimentation of all sectors of society precludes thefts (Quinones 2002: 17).

Another reason why the diversion of food might be unlikely these days is because food aid is targeted and over the years, the WFP has been able to negotiate a certain level of freedom with the North Korean authorities that allows them to conduct their activity in greater transparency. In an email, Katharina Zellweger (2012) said that the WFP had the best monitoring system:
The most vulnerable are children, pregnant and nursing women and the elderly. WFP food aid is targeted and goes mainly to children, mostly children below the age of six, that is at present to about 1 million children in nurseries and kindergartens. Food provided is mostly in the form of fortified blended food. WFP has unhindered access to ports, warehouses, factories, institutions and households. In 2011, WFP staff travelled more than 350,000 miles throughout the country. Over 2000 beneficiary visits were conducted. Data collection and supervision has been strengthened as the DPRK government by now facilitates taking measurements of children, surveys and assessments. Moreover, WFP has now access to markets and also Korean speakers among its monitoring team (Katharina Zellweger 2012).

With regard to access and monitoring, South Korean NGOs faced even greater challenges not least because their staff are all Korean speakers. The North Koreans restricted their access to the region of Pyongyang but some organisations managed to negotiate access to the south and the north of the province. World Vision Korea and Good Neighbors were also able to negotiate access to specific institutions such as children’s homes or schools (Reed 2009:210). The KSM also implemented a housing programme in the south of Pyongyang (North Hwanghae province) whereby the NGO would provide materials and local people would provide the labour. This operation required a certain level of interaction between the NGO’s staff and local people who knew that their counterparts were from South Korea (Reed 2009: 212). With the implementation of such projects, NGOs were able to facilitate the visit of a large number of donors from South Korea: between the years 1996 and 2005, the Ministry of Unification of South Korea has reported that 13,822 South Koreans visited the North to visit projects (Reed 2009: 212).
But South Korean organisations are also very realistic and admit that there continues to be problems with food monitoring and access: “I recognise there is clear tension between human right organisations and humanitarian aid organisations. Both organisations have different scope of work but work hard for the DPRK children and people. Corruption is prevalent in underdeveloped countries, especially bad government [sic] including the DPRK, Somalia and Zimbabwe. As a humanitarian aid worker, I do believe that the fact that people receive only 20% of the food we sent, we have to send humanitarian goods for some people” (SK6). And as Schwenendiek (2011) argues “international food aid has indeed helped the people” (Schwenendiek 2011: 61).

The ongoing debate with regards to food aid is in fact reminiscent of the debate that took place in the earlier years of the North Korean famine when the international community de-humanised the North Korean population by putting emphasis on the political nature of the famine under the mismanagement of an authoritarian state. Generally Western media tend to focus on the leadership of North Korea. The Kims are well known figures in the media. The media however rarely reports on the daily struggle of the population of 24 million. With regards to the debate that took place in the 1990s, Aaltola argues:

On the one hand, because of the existing humanitarian emphasis ‘instinctively’ connected with images of famine, the ‘natural’ sequence of events in the North Korean case seemed to point to the following chain: natural disaster--> famine--> suffering--> immediate aid. This stereotypic sequence emphasises the moral point of view, which is immune to political influences: one has a moral responsibility to help the needy and suffering immediately. On the other hand, the North Korean famine was placed in a larger, politically charged context instead of highlighting the face-value and iconic implications of the situation: Communist mismanagement--> chronic
As explained earlier human rights activists are amongst the strongest opponents to food aid for North Korea because they claim that it sustains the regime. Humanitarian workers, especially South Korean representatives, are often of the view that the human rights movement is driven by political considerations whereas they claim to be addressing the problem at its roots by promoting peace and feeding the people inside the country thus addressing directly the problems of defection and China’s forced repatriation of refugees. Many NGOs who provide aid to North Korea believe that North Koreans have the right to food and that refusing to deliver it amounts to a violation of their dignity and right to life (SK1). However, as pointed out by Seong-ho Jhe, former human rights ambassador at large for South Korea, the UN resolutions with regards to human rights in North Korea never prioritised civil and political rights over the right to food but emphasised the need to improve all aspects of the lives of North Koreans. Seong-ho Jhe rightly argues that civil society and policy makers in South Korea should stop regarding human rights and food aid as conflicting concepts and start to adopt a constructive and balanced attitude. He also calls for an end to the Cold War discourse ongoing in the South:

It is not appropriate to dichotomize those who stress humanitarian aid to North Korea and those who debate the North’s human rights situation, labeling the former as liberal, nationalistic and pro-unification and the latter as conservative, Cold War-orientated, confrontational and anti-unification ...
the South Korean government should implement mature and balanced North Korea policies that provide humanitarian aid on the one hand and continuously raise the human rights issues in the North on the other so as to address inter-Korean relations in a comprehensive and integrated manner (Seong-ho Jhe 2011: 79).

In fact, the provision of assistance to North Korea has served different purposes. In addition to relief efforts, humanitarian workers and promoters of politics of engagement believe that working in North Korea with North Koreans is important for a number of reasons as listed below.

**Building trust**

Many NGOs and institutions have concentrated their efforts on building relationships with North Koreans and re-establishing trust between North Korea and the rest of the world. According to Hazel Smith, “an unanticipated effort of humanitarian operations was to contribute substantially to the potential for active peace on the peninsula. In some ways, these operations provided a motor and model for peacebuilding initiatives” (Smith 2005: 6).

The main difficulty for NGOs working to promote peace, empowerment or democracy lies in the procedures of evaluation or assessment: “[a]ssessing NGO performance is a difficult and messy business.” Edwards and Hulme (1996) argue that one can only “judge” and “interpret” NGO performance. Not only is there no “bottom line” to measure progress against but also the outcome of NGO activity largely depends on the influence of external variables which are out of the control of NGOs. Therefore, some argue that the connection between NGOs and the processes of empowerment and democratisation are in reality purely “speculative and rhetorical” (Fisher 1997: 449). However, in an analysis of the work of rights-based NGOs in Latin America, the authors argue that “just because income
generation is measurable quantitatively, it does not prove that economic gain is a more valid goal that the less measurable goals of empowerment, increased self-esteem or creativity” (Lazar & Molyneux 2003: 229). Edwards and Hulme further assert that these achievements, which belong to the “realm of the invisible” (Kaplan 2000: 520), are the essence of sustainable development and that their importance should not be downplayed (Edwards & Hulme 1996: 34).

Non-state activities have taken different shapes and range from capacity building to academic and cultural exchanges. NGOs are involved in what is called Track II diplomatic exchanges—“that is, sponsoring informal communications between North Korean scientists, academics, military officers and private citizens, and their counterparts in the United States or overseas” (Taylor & Manyin 2011:10). South Korean NGOs, in particular, are often determined to strengthen their relationships with their North Korean counterparts. They also frequently believe that aid to North Korea could be more consistent if the government lifted the ban on travel to North Korea (Jong-moo Lee 2009: 131). They want to reduce the problems of social integration that may happen after reunification (Jong-moo Lee 2009: 129). As argued by Samuel S. Kim, reunification without reconciliation could be disastrous and reconciliation could actually be a goal in itself (Samuel S. Kim 2006: 343).

**Capacity building; teaching by example**

Erich Weingartner says that aid workers should demonstrate to their North Korean partners “through example, how a civil society functions” (Weingartner 2001: 34). Another reason why NGOs and the international community want to work inside North Korea is because they want to train and empower the North Koreans: “Capacity building is an ongoing process of helping people,
organisations and societies improve and adapt to changes around them. Performance and improvements are taken in the light of the mission, objectives, context, resources and sustainability” (James 2001: 3). Many South Korean NGOs argue that “they are willing to heighten the consciousness of North Koreans regarding development assistance projects through the successful demonstration of pilot development assistance projects, and to stimulate North Koreans to change institutions and policies into ones which fit more into development purposes” (Jong-moo Lee 2009: 130).

The European Union places great emphasis on capacity building in North Korea. Since the beginning of its operations in the country in 1995, the European Union (EU) has been very supportive of “reform inducement”: “ECHO’s projects are peanuts, but our objective is to open their mind” (Schloms 2004: 13). NGO workers say they are not oblivious to the fact that the North Korean government itself must take constructive measures to implement concrete positive changes: “while NGOs can make a contribution towards improving the situation of the DPRK people and are perhaps sowing seeds of change, humanitarian aid agencies cannot solve the problem; this needs the commitment of the DPRK government to bring about change and it needs an international environment which is less hostile, in which mutual interests and mutual responsibilities are shared” (Zellweger 2005: 27).

Critics have said that the work of NGOs has had very limited impact on North Korea’s behaviour but supporters of aid say that “trust-building efforts, though not immediately measurable, might be an important investment in the possibility of future reconciliation” (Thomas T. Park, Seliger & Hyung-suk Kim 2007: 145).
In fact, literature on civil society in former communist states and NGOs’ involvement with such regimes challenges preconceived ideas about civil society and international NGO work. Scholars have increasingly acknowledged the existence of a state-led civil society in former communist states or in present day China and recognised that Western civil society, for instance Western NGOs, should accept to work in collaboration which such bodies. For instance, the leaders of Vietnamese NGOs are in reality former high-ranking officials (Lux & Straussman 2004: 178). The case of Vietnam also illustrates the fact that the intentions of the NGOs are not necessarily the same as that of donors in terms of expected outputs or working style (Lux, & Straussman 2003: 176). Development NGO work in Vietnam began two years after the beginning of the transition, ‘Doi Moi’, and was initiated by a Thai NGO, Population and Development International (PDI). In the early days of its work, the NGO focused on training and educational projects for governmental officials. The organisation also worked with state led actors such as the Ministry of Health, the Vietnam Women’s Union and the Vietnam Youth Union (Lux & Straussman 2003: 176). Lux and Straussman argue that this type of engagement which was not a “state-to-state encounter” or “state-to-United Nations” relationship; provided the foundations for modern day civil society’s development in Vietnam (Lux & Straussman 2003: 177).

6. Conclusion

This chapter examined the background to NGO activity in both North and South Korea. It identified the relationship between the state and civil society in a Korean context. It was argued that civil society very much depends on the political configurations of the state rather than on cultural predilections. It was
argued that although South Korean Christian organisations have a degree of agency, they are limited in their endeavours because of wider structural factors such as the South Korean state control over NGOs, an over politicised and polarised civil society as well as other socio-cultural factors that prevent the strengthening of civil society. In the second part, this chapter identified the factors that determined NGO activity in North Korea. In doing so, it explained the mechanisms of the ongoing food crisis in North Korea and further speculated about the potential emergence of civil society in North Korea. Finally, it summarised the arguments in favour and against food aid as the international and domestic debate affects greatly the way NGO activity is perceived in North Korea.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

1. Summary of argument

This research examined the way South Korean evangelicals responded to the humanitarian crisis in North Korea because I wanted to identify how evangelicals design their mission strategy to North Korea. In the process of doing so, the aim was to help understand the role of South Korean evangelicalism/conservative Christianity in relation to North Korea. South Korean Christian evangelical organisations have been at the forefront of humanitarian activity in North Korea and this research argued therefore that the current civil society response to the crisis in North Korea could not be fully understood without assessing its religious component.

I used contextualisation as a criterion to assess mission to North Korea. The concept of contextualisation and my underpinning philosophy of critical realism, mean that the experience of Koreans must be taken into account to understand Korean evangelicalism. I argued that evangelicals have been shaped by and engaged with their context. In addition to the spiritual and cultural background, historical and socio-political factors have affected the way by which evangelicals have received, integrated and sought to spread the gospel. More specifically, as the purpose of my study was to show how evangelicals are engaging with issues of poverty, division of the peninsula and human rights, I referred to the holistic model of contextualisation.

My dissertation sought to give answers to the following questions: how do South Korean evangelical organisations construct their mission strategies to North Korea? How do they respond to the perceived humanitarian concerns? How do they view North Korea? Does active involvement in the North mean that they
have given up on their anti-communist stance? What is their context? What are the factors and conditions that limit and determine their related activities in the South and in the North?

First, my research sought to build a bridge between the ‘secular’ and the ‘sacred’ and argued that in spite of the twentieth century’s politics of secularisation, religion has not disappeared from the public sphere and is in fact growing. Equally, it was argued that the North Korean government never managed to resolve the question of religion and that in spite of its politics of religious persecution, especially toward Christians; North Koreans are still interested in faith and spirituality. It was also said that current research on the relationship between North Korea and NGOs does not fully integrate the level of influence exerted by Christians, especially evangelicals, on policy toward North Korea.

My research concluded that while providing humanitarian assistance to North Korea, South Korean evangelical organisations (faith-based organisations) have demonstrated their willingness to work within the North Korean context. They have responded to the perceived needs of the field while respecting the limitations imposed on their activities. They have accepted to work with the North Korean authorities, which means that they had no choice but to integrate their activities within the broader domestic system. In other words, their activity cannot be perceived as being imposed from the outside but instead as being the result of collaboration between South and North Koreans. However, this does not mean that they have not challenged South Korean policies when they deemed it necessary, as exemplified by their advocacy activities at the height of the famine. It was further argued that because of the restrictions imposed on their activities by
North Koreans, evangelicals were compelled to develop more creative ways to approach North Koreans than straightforward evangelism.

My research also argued that the aim for evangelicals is not only to address humanitarian concerns but also to restore God’s glory in Pyongyang and achieve the reunification of the two countries. Therefore, their activities are not devoid of a political agenda and continue to carry an anti-communist/anti-North Korea overtone that characterised the era of the Cold War. A strong sense of Christian nationalism continues to explain the reason why South Korean evangelicals become involved with mission to North Korea.

Thus, it was argued that their revival theology is intrinsically linked to their political theology as they are aiming to reconstruct a reunified, democratised and christianised peninsula. They continue to believe that Christianity can liberate North Koreans from Kim Il-sungism and believe that Korea, as a nation, has a special role to play in the evangelisation of the world. They believe that the coming of the kingdom of God will include the reunification of the two Koreas as they compare the current situation to that of biblical Israel.

My dissertation also exposed differences of opinion within the conservative tradition: evangelicals have split between those who oppose food aid—the human rights movement—and those who advocate food aid—the humanitarian movement. Most Christian human rights activists oppose food aid not only because they believe that it sustains the regime, but also because they believe that it amounts to aiding evil. Humanitarian activists, on the other hand, believe that they can help North Korean society develop by expressing God’s love through the provision of food aid and development assistance. This shows that it would be inaccurate to lump together all evangelicals. As it was also explained, the division
is reflective of the wider domestic context whereby those with conservative political leanings are believed to be against the North Korean regime whereas those with democratic political leanings are believed to be in favour of engagement with North Korea.

The chapter dedicated to Juche and mission to North Korea argued that North Koreans have developed a form of civil religion as formulated by philosopher Rousseau. It was argued that some evangelicals are slowly moving from a position of antagonism toward the North Korean system to a position of greater humility. So far, most South Korean evangelicals have placed themselves in a position of moral superiority in light of the perceived failure of the North Korean system to provide for its people, however, many are increasingly recognising the importance of understanding the worldview of North Koreans and of restoring broken relationships.

In the last chapter, I examined the evolving relationship between civil society and the state in South Korea. It was argued that successive South Korean governments have not allowed civil society groups to operate fully independently and that, often, governments use civil society to implement or strengthen their policy. The absence of a peace treaty especially, continues to affect regional politics and the scope of civil society activity. This chapter also looked at the mechanisms of the food crisis in North Korea and identified the restrictions imposed on civil society activity.

In conclusion, this research argued that in spite of the rhetoric, South Korean evangelicals were never apolitical and were always engaged to a certain extent in social action. It was argued that South Korean evangelicals have been shaped by
their context and have also engaged with it. Their dedication to relieving hunger and poverty in North Korea shows that they take the socio-political context of North Korea seriously. Furthermore, in spite of the spirit of division between humanitarian and human rights groups, ultimately it means that evangelicals, as a group, have sought not only to address the symptoms but also the roots of the problems by challenging the North Korean political structures. In that respect, it could be argued that their activities as a whole have embraced the North Korean problem holistically.

As some South Korean evangelicals continue to re-evaluate and identify new strategies to approach North Korea, they seek to understand the North Korean worldview through the study of Juche and it is suggested that, in fact, they are looking to apply cross-cultural missiological principles. They also believe that mission to North Korea should be more integrated and include the restoration of relationships or shalom.

### 2. Further areas of research

In his concluding remarks on the future of Korean theology, Adams argues that Koreans are no longer developing new theologies. He claims that “many of the creative theologians in Korea have had a personal experience of suffering which has caused them to question old assumptions and to think deeply about life” (Adams 2012:269). Adams says that many experienced suffering under Japanese occupation, during the Korean War and the establishment of the DPRK. Liberal Christians also suffered when they challenged South Korean conservative government but now, says Adams, Korea is enjoying a period of prosperity and “the personal experience of suffering is no long the norm, but rather the exception, for theologians” (Adams 2012 270). Furthermore, in their respective
studies, both Jin-hwan Kim (2012) and Byung-ro Kim ([2005) deplore a lack of research on a theology of reunification.

However, with a growing number of North Korean refugees converting to Christianity—there are currently approximately 24,000 North Koreans in South Korea and many also live in Europe and the United States—new theologies might not come from South Korea, as it is generally expected, but rather be the prerogative of North Koreans who have experienced tremendous suffering in their home country and escaped to face the challenges of living in capitalistic and competitive societies. Further studies of mission to North Korea and theologies of reunification therefore should not only include the voices of the North Koreans themselves but in fact be their own work. In other words, North Koreans should no longer be the objects but the subjects of mission studies and theologies of reunification.

This research focused on the involvement of South Korean evangelicals in relation to North Korea. Further research should be dedicated to the study of the role of liberal churches in addressing humanitarian concerns in North Korea. Unlike evangelical groups, liberal churches have a less antagonistic attitude toward North Korea and, as seen in the second chapter, have engaged into dialogue with the North Korean official churches. However they have also been actively engaged in humanitarian relief campaigns in North Korea. On the other hand, liberal churches have been less critical of human rights violations committed and it would be interesting to explore why this is the case.

3. Conclusion

While this research focused on mission to North Korea, South Korean Christian humanitarian organisations and missionaries are currently spread in
different regions of the world, this research provided an insight into their values and motivations. It lays the grounds for further research on the role of South Korean evangelical missionaries as they seek to engage with the contexts of other areas of the world.
Appendix 1 Semi-structured interview questions

1. 이상에 참여하기로 결정한 이유는 무엇이며 목표는 무엇입니까?

2. 북한과의 대화창구는 어떻게 됩니까?

3. 당신은 인권단체와 어떤 관계를 맺고 있습니까?
   인도주의식량지원의 문제점 (대북 식량 전용) “allegations of food diversion”에 대해 어떻게 생각하십니까? 풍선을 먹우는 등과 같은 대북 선전 행위/인권단체의 활동이 당신의 활동에 영향을 미칩니까?

4. 남한 정권의 변화는 대북활동에 영향을 주었습니다?
   만일 그렇다면, 어떤 방식으로 영향을 미칩니까? 남북관계의 변화가 어떻게 영향을 줍니까? 예) 북한 방문의 제한?

5. 대한민국 내에서 보수와 진보 사이에의 분리/갈등 (division) 당신의 활동에 영향을 줍니까?

6. 개인적으로 생각할 때 전반적으로 대한민국 국민들은 대북지원에 찬성/반대 한다고 생각하십니까? 만일 그렇다면, 설명해 주십시오.

7. 당신은, 왜 한국의 기독교 단체들이 일반 단체보다 더욱 북한 문제에 관심을 갖는다고 생각합니까?
   예) 이것은 한반도의 기독교 역사 때문인가요? 선교적인 이유인가요? 하나님의 사랑을 보여 주기 위해서인가요?
Appendix 2  Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea: Member Organisations

거래의 술
Green One Korea
greenonekorea.or.kr
Welfare & Environment

경남동일농업협력회
Gyung-Nam Unification Agricultural Collaboration Cooperation
gntongil.org
Agriculture/ Medical aid/ Welfare & Environment/ Humanitarian Aid

구세군대한본영
The Salvation Army Korea Territory
salvationarmy.or.kr
Agriculture / Welfare & Environment / Emergency Aid

기아대회
Korea Food for the Hungry
kfhi.or.kr (Eng )
Agriculture / Medical Aid / Emergency Aid / Welfare & Environment

국제옥수수재단
International Corn Foundation
icf.or.kr
Agriculture / Welfare & Environment

굿네이버스
Good Neighbors
goodneighbors.kr (Eng )
Agriculture / Medical Aid / Welfare & Environment / Humanitarian Aid

굿피플
Good People
goodpeople.or.kr
Medical Aid / Welfare & Environment / Humanitarian Aid

나동 인터내셔널
Nanum International
inanum.org
Medical Aid / Welfare & Environment

남북강원도협력협회
Inter-Korean Kangwon Association Council
No website
Agriculture / Welfare & Environment

남북경제협력발전협의회
Inter-Korea Cooperation & Development Council
No website
Agriculture / Medical Aid / Welfare & Environment

남북나눔운동
South-North Sharing Campaign
sharing.net
Agriculture / Humanitarian Aid
Korea Peace Foundation
snpeace.or.kr (Eng)
Agriculture / Culture / Emergency Aid

Korean Living Together Movement
kltm.org
Agriculture / Medical Aid / Welfare & Environment / Humanitarian Aid

Jeju Center for Inter-Korea Exchange & Cooperation
jejunk-coop.or.kr
Agriculture / Medical Aid / Welfare & Environment / Humanitarian Aid

The Korean National Tuberculosis Association
knta.or.kr
Medical Aid

The General Assembly of Presbyterian Church of Korea
pck.or.kr (Eng)
Agriculture / Medical Aid / Humanitarian Aid

Korean Medical Association
kma.org
Medical Aid

The Korean Association of People Sharing Love
No website
Agriculture / Welfare & Environment / Medical Aid / Humanitarian Aid

SAM Care International
samcare.org (Eng)
Medical Aid

Okedongmu Children in Korea
okfriend.org (Eng)
Medical Aid / Humanitarian Aid / Welfare & Environment

Northeast Asia Foundation for Education and Culture
neafound.org

Lighthouse Foundation
lighthousekorea.org (Eng)
Medical Aid / Emergency Aid / Humanitarian Aid / Welfare & Environment

National Council of Saemaul Undong Movement
saemaul.net (Eng)
Welfare & Environment / Humanitarian Aid
세계결핵제료운동본부
Zero TB World
zerotb.net
Medical Aid

초록우산 어린이재단
Green Umbrella Child Fund Korea
childfund.or.kr (Eng)
Agriculture / Medical Aid / Emergency Aid / Humanitarian Aid

따뜻한 한반도 사랑의 연탄나눔운동
Coal Sharing Movement*
lovecoal.org
Humanitarian Aid / Welfare & Environment

새천년생명운동
New Millennium Life Movement
new2000.org
Welfare & Environment

세이브더칠드런
Save the Children Korea
sc.or.kr
Welfare & Environment / Medical Aid

거레하나
Movement For One Korea
krhana.org
Agriculture / Medical Aid / Emergency Aid Welfare & Environment Education

세두리좋은사람들
New World Nice People
nwp.kr
Agriculture / Medical Aid Welfare & Environment / Emergency Aid

서비스포파스
Service For Peace Korea Foundation
sfp.or.kr
Humanitarian Aid

어린이의약품지원본부
Medical Aid for Children
healthchild.org
Emergency Aid / Medical Aid

우리민족서로돕기운동
Korean Sharing Movement
ksm.or.kr
Emergency Aid / Medical Aid / Humanitarian Aid / Welfare & Environment

원불교은혜심가운동본부
Won-Buddhists Movement for Sowing Grace
won.or.kr (Eng)
Medical Aid / Humanitarian Aid
World Vision
worldvision.or.kr (Eng)
Agriculture / Medical Aid / Emergency Aid / Welfare & Environment

Eugene Bell Foundation
eugenebell.org (Eng)
Medical Aid

Jeollanamdo Residents Interchange Association
unijn.or.kr
Agriculture / Humanitarian Aid

One Korea Buddhist Movement
bubta.org
Agriculture / Humanitarian Aid

Paper Culture Foundation
paperculture.or.kr

Good Hands
goodhands.or.kr (Eng)
Humanitarian Aid / Agriculture / Emergency Aid / Welfare & Environment

Nation Reconciliation Committee
caminjok.or.kr
Humanitarian Aid

Committee for the reconciliation of the Korean People
hwahai.cbck.or.kr
Medical Aid / Humanitarian Aid

Korea Unification Network
kuninet.or.kr
Medical Aid / Agriculture / Humanitarian Aid / Welfare & Environment

The Corea Peace3000
peace3000.net
Agriculture / Humanitarian Aid / Welfare & Environment

Forest For Peace
peaceforest.or.kr
Welfare & Environment

GreenTree Charity Foundation
greentreekorea.org
Medical Aid / Humanitarian Aid
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