The problem

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TO reduce the Ganga to merely a river, would, for many South Asians, be regarded as a travesty. Venerated by millions, and not just believing Hindus, as the basis of post-Vedic civilization (the earlier site being the Sapt-Sindhu region), the Ganges basin has for millennia supported life and livelihoods in the North Indian plains. From its source in the upper reaches of the Himalayas all the way to the deltaic regions of greater Bengal (including Bangladesh), it has hosted some of our earliest settlements, nourished foundational myths and epics – in short, defined the collective imagination of the millions who have drawn on, and continue to do so, its largesse. This is a characteristic it shares with all great river systems – the Nile in Egypt, the Euphrates and Tigris in modern day Iraq, the Yangtze in China, the Mekong in South East Asia, and so on.

The Ganga basin, stretching across 2500 km, is today amongst the most densely populated regions in the world. With an average density of over 550 people per sq km, a figure which goes up to 900 in the deltaic region, on its health hinges the very survival of the land. That is why how we look at it, and treat it, is so crucial. Used and abused over the years, what was for ages regarded as the cradle of Indian civilization, now increasingly resembles a potential graveyard in the making.

In part the problem may be that modern river management, at least in South Asia, is often defined by reductionist engineering and comprehensive water control. Treated more as a resource than a live flow, the focus has been on introduction of infrastructure such as weirs, barrages, canal systems and, inevitably, large dams. The hydraulic principle underlying these varied structural interventions has remained disarmingly simple: regulate flows either through diversion or impoundment in order to harness the volumes as cusecs or megawatts. To state it sharply, modern river management remains overwhelmingly towards commandeering river flows for irrigation and hydroelectricity.

One implication of this civil engineering bias has been a shocking neglect of the river water system as a means of transport and communication. This despite the fact that till the end of the 18th century, the Ganga river basin was a major artery of trade and mobility in the region. The other major implication of treating the river as a form of stock rather than as flow – a focus on impoundment or diversion of river volumes – has been substantial alternations in the river’s natural flow regime, with detrimental effect on fish survival and fisherfolk. The ecological impairment of the river, alongside an alarming increase in pollution levels, particularly in regions of high population density (cities) and location of industry, has created a crisis of survival for millions of fisher communities.

The manner in which we have gone about our dam and canal building programme has other implications. Impounding of high volumes of water in large, multipurpose hydel projects has resulted in huge displacement of people, as also creation of fresh upstream and downstream conflicts amongst those dependant on the water. Diversion and overdrawing of waters in canal systems has both led to reduced water flow in some regions, with the river reduced to a trickle in lean months, and water logging and increased soil salinity in lands where the water leaches out of the canals. Often, trying to marry the twin objectives of electricity generation and flood control has proven difficult. And finally, questions have been raised about the location of dam sites, more so since the best locations for power generation are in the upper reaches of the river, the Himalayas, which also happen to be the most vulnerable to seismic shocks. Overall then, there is a strong case for revisiting our dominant conceptions of the river, as also our frameworks for and strategies of river water management.

As a critical source of life and livelihood, it is hardly surprising that the manner in which we use river waters is intensely political and conflict-ridden. The laws and rules governing water use – what activities we permit and promote; where we locate dams, canals, weirs and barrages; the design of engineering structures, and so on – and how and on what basis decisions are made, are today all being questioned. There is a rising clamour for transparency, for sharing of all relevant data, for enhanced participation, as conflicts – amongst potential and actual users, upstream and downstream – intensify. Unfortunately, our governments continue to treat river water data as an issue of national security and remain extremely reluctant to place any information in the public domain. Little do they realize that a veil of secrecy only heightens public suspicion and feeds into lack of trust.

Finally, the Ganges is an inter-state river. Decisions regarding the river have implications not just for India, but also Bangladesh (lower riparian) and Nepal, whose rivers flow into the Ganges. And yet, India remains most reluctant to evolve a framework for regional cooperation, preferring bilateral treaties with its smaller neighbours. This continuing obduracy on its part, resulting in strained relations in the neighbourhood, has cost the region dear. This tendency, rooted in the peculiar geopolitics of the region, is unfortunate. Little do our decision makers realize that regional cooperation around the Ganges, in the manner of the countries of the Mekong river basin (China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand), could unleash vast potential gains.

Interestingly, India which behaves as an upper riparian in the case of the Ganges vis-ŕ-vis Bangladesh, and reluctant to take its genuine concerns on board, finds itself in the position of a lower riparian vis-ŕ-vis China when it comes to the Brahmaputra. Now with China seeking to construct major dams in the upper reaches of the river as also divert its waters to augment supplies in the parched regions of the North, India is being forced to reconsider its framework governing sharing of river waters. Possibly, it may now be willing to more actively engage with its neighbours (Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh) in a regional perspective and more seriously accommodate the international thinking on river waters.

Sharing Ganga waters is thus an imperative if our region, host to the largest concentration of poor people in the world, is to craft an alternative future. This demands that each of the countries concerned, dominantly India, radically revise their frameworks concerning the river and use of river waters. They need to move away from an obsessive focus with civil engineering interventions to generate power, increase irrigation and control floods and also factor in the different communities pursuing different activities whose life and livelihood depend on the river. They need to pay much greater attention to the river’s ecological health – reduce pollution and maintain natural flows; reappraise the role of riverine transport and so on. They also need to give much greater weightage to local efforts to preserve and augment water resources by bringing in communities and not only the state machinery. But above all, they need to move away from extant notions of ownership and control and treat the river as it should be – a living, integrated network.

This issue of Seminar discusses a few concerns related to the sharing of river waters in the hope that it may contribute to enhanced regional cooperation as also push fresh thinking on water management.

 

* Many of the contributions to this issue draw on a series of consultations on the Ganga and the Mekong rivers organized by the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and M-Power, Vientienne, Laos, with support from the Asia Foundation.

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