THE
United States has an opportunity to have a decisive and positive impact
on South Asia over the next four years.1
Washington is in a position to solidify a long-term relationship with
India, edge Pakistan away from chaos, prevent another regional war, and
address such important issues as the spread of nuclear weapons, terrorism
and China’s regional role.
India’s
stunning economic performance, its considerable ‘soft’ or cultural power,
its skilled leadership, and its ability to function as a democracy while
undertaking a myriad of internal economic, cultural, social and political
reforms have made it Asia’s third great power. India is also set apart
by its professional military, which remains under firm civilian control,
and by its new nuclear programme, which made India more important even
as it made it less secure.
India’s
rise has implications for American policy. Some have argued that India
is potential rival to China and could be part of a balance of power strategy
that the United States might want to pursue vis-a-vis Beijing. However,
the Bush administration should not expect India to do more than hedge
its policies towards China. New Delhi will not place its armed forces
at the service of American policies unless vital Indian interests are
also served. The recently concluded ‘Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership’
initiative puts the relationship on the right path – a slow, but steady
expansion of military and strategic cooperation between the two countries,
with each making certain adjustments that allows the relationship to move
forward.
Washington
may find it harder to accommodate India’s desire for a permanent seat
on the UN Security Council. As India’s interests, by and large, do not
clash with America’s, it should be supported for a permanent Security
Council seat, especially if it can put the Kashmir conflict behind it.
Easier to accomplish than changing the UN structure, would be support
for India as a member of the G-8 group of developed states; while India
has many of the world’s poor, it is also one of the most dynamic economies
in the world, and its democratic credentials equal or exceed those of
other G-8 members.
Pakistan’s
stability, no less than India’s emergence, has implications for America’s
wider Asian interests. Pakistan is also a nuclear weapons state, with
plenty of home-grown Islamic terrorists, it has serious disputes with
two of its four neighbours, and by 2025 it will be the world’s fifth largest
country. A failed Pakistan could be the single-most threatening development
for American foreign policy within a decade; the Afghanistan case stands
as grim reminder of the price that America paid for neglecting a state
that fell into the hands of radical Islamists.
Here there
is a far more intrusive menu of recommendations, since Pakistan’s problems
are embedded in the fabric of its society and state.2
Washington needs to press Pakistan on many fronts: it needs to ensure
that Pakistan’s enfeebled educational system is rebuilt; it should encourage,
publicly and privately, the military to withdraw from politics, while
building up the coherence of Pakistan’s weakened political, judicial,
and economic institutions. Present levels of aid may actually be inadequate,
but any increase in economic aid must be linked to strict accountability,
and any military assistance or sales to Pakistan must keep one eye on
the conventional military balance between Pakistan and India. Above all,
Washington should insist that General Musharraf cut the government’s ties
with the many sectarian and terrorist organizations that challenge directly
the original ‘idea’ of Pakistan promulgated by Jinnah.
If
there is another war between India and Pakistan it might be ruinous to
both; if it escalated to the use of nuclear weapons it might be fatal
to them as states. Over the last fifteen years the United States played
a significant role in preventing the outbreak of war – and when war did
take place (in Kargil in 1999), pressure from Washington ended it early.
However, Washington should see its role as something more than the neighbourhood
cop called in by one or both parties. As recommended by a recent Council
on Foreign Relations Task Force, the U.S. needs to be more forward leaning.
In
summary form, these are three things that the United States can do regarding
the India-Pakistan conundrum. First, the United States should not take
a position on the shape of a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute,
but let such a settlement emerge after dialogue among the parties, including
Kashmiris on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC). However, it should
support the view that Kashmir is a human rights issue, not merely one
of territory or international law. This approach would make a final settlement
easier: Pakistanis can claim their struggle resulted in more humane treatment
of the Kashmiri people, even if they do not join Pakistan or become independent;
Indians will remove a blot on their democracy; and the Kashmiris, of course,
will recover a semblance of normal life.
Second,
besides continuing to encourage state-to-state dialogue, the efforts of
private foundations, think tanks, academic groups, and American and regional
research centres should be supported. One group that could be pivotal
in changing long-term perceptions in both states are the business communities
in both countries, and their recent efforts at dialogue are to be strongly
encouraged. This applies to other people-to-people exchanges, and New
Delhi in particular should be encouraged to unilaterally increase the
number of Pakistanis studying and working in India, as a way of circumventing
Pakistani resistance to normal cultural and social ties.
Finally,
Washington should also consult closely with its most important allies
about Kashmir and other critical South Asian issues. Besides providing
technical expertise in border monitoring and other confidence-building
mechanisms, America and its allies should use their aid programmes to
reward India, Pakistan, and various Kashmiri groups for progress in negotiations.
It should also be given in such a way as to strengthen weak civilian and
political institutions (especially in Pakistan), and western and Japanese
firms should be encouraged to invest in plants and companies that do business
in both countries, further strengthening regional economic ties.
The
nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan were very long in development,
and they are reliably reported to each have acquired, and perhaps deployed,
more than forty nuclear weapons. These weapons are large enough to destroy
or permanently cripple five or six major cities on each side. In strategic
terms, India and Pakistan are in a state of MAD – mutual assured destruction.
South Asia’s
nuclear programmes present three different kinds of challenges to American
policy. First, there is the ever-present possibility of a nuclear exchange
between the two states. This could come about in several ways. It could
be the end-point of an escalating conventional war; it could be the result
of misunderstanding or bad intelligence, leading one side or the other
to launch without cause; or nuclear war could come about as a result of
a desperate last-minute attempt by one side or the other to punish the
other. India and Pakistan are still developing nuclear doctrines and strategies
suitable to their resources and the strategic threats that they envisage.
All of this is reminiscent of the early years of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear
arms race; in this regard each country is a ‘developing’ nuclear weapons
power.
Second,
there is conclusive evidence that Pakistan is the source for proliferation
of nuclear weapons and missile technology. There is strong evidence
of Pakistani nuclear assistance to Libya, Iran, North Korea, and perhaps
other countries over a number of years.
Third, the
region’s nuclear programmes are important to the United States because
of the risk that some fissile material or even assembled nuclear devices
might fall into the hands of non-state or terrorist groups. The chief
problem here also is Pakistan, and the proximity of radical Islamist groups
to a fledgling nuclear arsenal is cause for concern.
Together,
these three linked nuclear problems present a grave potential threat to
vital American interests, but Washington must cast aside any hope of coercing
these states into abandoning their weapons, and adapt a two-part strategy.
The
first part of the strategy is to encourage the two countries to join those
international regimes that restrict the transfer of nuclear and missile
technology, dual-use technology, and other technologies pertaining to
weapons of mass destruction. These regimes (the Wassenaar Agreement, the
London Suppliers Group, the MTCR, and America’s Proliferation Security
Initiative) are separate from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which they
are prohibited from joining as nuclear weapons states. Collectively, these
regimes, plus national legislation, and international verification of
the peaceful uses of technology could comprise a half-way house for India,
and perhaps Pakistan, and a way of demonstrating their support for the
widely accepted non-proliferation norms.
The second
half of the strategy is a proportionate quid pro quo. American policy
has linked adherence by these regimes to assistance in the areas of civilian
nuclear power and space. This link should be broken, especially in the
case of India, which has an excellent record on stopping onward proliferation.
The next administration should end the pretence that India and Pakistan
are not nuclear weapons states, and move actively to bring both into the
tent of those states that disfavour proliferation. Pakistan has a special
burden to unload, as it is still not clear exactly what technology was
transferred by A.Q. Khan to Libya, Iran and North Korea – and its apparent
cooperation in the search for al Qaeda elements does not relieve it of
this responsibility.
The
second Bush administration must neither exaggerate nor underplay the threat
to American interests from radical Islam. Unlike Communism or Fascism,
radical Islam does not control a powerful state and, now that Afghanistan
has been liberated, not even a weak state from which it can launch attacks
on America and American interests and allies. Nor should it believe that
military power is a substitute for other instruments of power combating
Islamic radicalism, especially in Asia, where it is not directly linked
to Arab nationalism.
In South
Asia, where more than one third of the world’s Muslims reside, there are
four critically important Muslim communities, but each one requires a
different strategy. In India, with the third largest Muslim community
in the world, the best policy is to leave it to Indian democracy to accommodate
Muslim demands as expressed in the Indian political system.
This is
also largely the case in Bangladesh, whose democracy is functioning and
whose economy has actually out-performed Pakistan’s in recent years. Nonetheless,
a far more active public diplomacy would be appropriate. Bangladesh actively
cultivates its Islamic identity, and the second largest gathering of Muslims
in the world – after Mecca – takes place during the annual conference
of Tablighi Jama’at, the world-wide Muslim missionary movement. Bangladesh’s
active Islamic community should not be seen as a problem, but an opportunity
to engage its clerics and intellectuals in a reasoned discussion of a
wide range of issues, from economic development, to globalization, to
the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Afghanistan,
of course, is in the process of becoming a normal state. The chief problem
in Afghanistan is establishing a balance between the authority of Kabul
and the provinces, and holding the latter (often controlled by a regional
warlord) to a minimal standard. Afghanistan runs a real risk of becoming
a narco-state, a country dominated by warlords and the drug business.
Here is where the Iraq intervention did great damage to the effort of
the Karzai government, as well as other supporters of his regime, including
Japan and many European governments. It is imperative that the level of
American forces be kept high in Afghanistan, and that the process of training
a new Afghan army be accelerated. It is also critical that the United
States work closely with NATO, which is carrying an increasingly large
share of the security burden.
As suggested
above, Pakistan could far surpass the Taliban’s Afghanistan as a threat
to American vital interests. Here, Washington’s aid and public diplomacy
policies have been weak and possibly counter-productive. While the Pakistan
regime has accommodated American concerns, it still has one eye on Afghanistan
and the other on Kashmir – the United States needs to work towards a larger
regional settlement not only involving Pakistan, India and Kashmir, but
one in which Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan is normalized. The latter
might be declared a non-aligned or neutral state, or an international
conference could be held to hammer out such a status. This will be very
difficult, but without first steps, and some creative thinking, it is
very likely that the situation will regress in years to come – and the
present India-Pakistan rivalry be transported intact to Afghanistan.
Finally,
American policymakers must not claim ownership of the problem of terrorism
– Islamic or otherwise. India has been plagued by terrorism for decades,
much of it from non-Muslim communities, Sri Lanka faces a severe threat
from both Sinhala and Tamil terrorists, Nepal from Maoists, and even Pakistan
from home-grown and imported radical Islamist groups. These states see
terrorism in very different ways, and are reluctant to join America’s
‘war on terrorism’ unless Washington sympathizes with their own particular
struggle.
Until
recently the terms ‘energy’ and ‘South Asia’ rarely appeared in the same
sentence, but the prospect of rapid economic growth in the region, and
the prospect of significant cooperation between and among regional states
has changed the picture. India is one of the two major new energy consumers,
China being the other. Neither country has large oil or gas reserves,
and their unlimited exploitation of their huge coal reserves has grave
implications for the environment and global warming. Both have turned
to nuclear power, but have been handicapped by export controls imposed
in the name of non-proliferation. Finally, both states have their eyes
on the huge gas and oil reserves of Central Asia, and have begun to shape
their diplomacies around energy as much as security.
India’s
energy problems could be eased by cooperation with its neighbours, but
here the politics of distrust reigns supreme. Long discussed, and much
to be hoped for, would be a pipeline that linked northern India with the
gas fields of Iran and Central Asia. Such a pipeline might have to pass
through Afghanistan and Pakistan, and American officials have promoted
it, although they have disfavoured the inclusion of Iran. Given the instability
of present-day Afghanistan, a pipeline is unlikely in the short run, but
the regional states should be encouraged to treat it as an economic matter,
not one of honour, prestige, or status.
This
approach has one important precedent, the agreement between India and
Pakistan on the allocation of Indus waters, embodied in a 1960 treaty.
This agreement provides for technical consultations, experts meetings,
and a system of appeal and grievance adjudication. The Indus Waters Treaty
is a model for future regional cooperation, especially on energy, environmental
concerns, and even the management of the region’s impressive water resources.
On India’s
other flank, Bangladesh has discovered considerable quantities of natural
gas, but is reluctant to sell it to its energy-starved neighbour, each
Bangladeshi government afraid to act for fear of being accused of selling-out
to the Indians. This gas may be a wasting asset, since Indian firms have
made huge new finds in the Bay of Bengal. Washington needs to rethink
its role in such matters, and perhaps in collaboration with key allies,
notably Japan, develop a regional arrangement whereby national sensitivities
are accommodated in a regime that has its own built-in mechanism for adjudication
and dispute management, one that is perhaps backed up (as was the Indus
Waters Treaty) by the World Bank or some other international entity. Washington
should also re-examine its current policy on cooperation with peaceful
civilian programmes in India, discussed above in the context of non-proliferation
policies.
Finally,
Washington must come to a more refined understanding of China’s role in
South Asia. China is not only Pakistan’s major military ally, it has become
one of India’s leading trading partners, and plays an important political
role in Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, where a Chinese economic and
cultural presence is welcomed as a way of balancing the dominant India.
And, of course, for years scholars, diplomats and journalists have speculated
about the eventual rivalry, or even war, between Asia’s two giant states.
There is strong evidence that the Bush administration saw India as a ‘balancer’
of China, even after radical Islamist terrorism became America’s number
one foreign policy priority after 9/11.
Assuming
an inevitable clash of titans would be as foolish as ignoring the likely
rivalries between India and China; believing that the United States could
play a major role in this balance, tilting it one way or another, is no
less mistaken. As in dealing with any power with a self-image of a great
state, India cannot be lined up against China unless it felt a genuine
threat from Beijing.
The overwhelming
evidence of recent years is that India sees China as an economic and political
opportunity more than a strategic, civilizational, or economic problem.
India does seek American military technology as insurance against a potentially
threatening China, but more immediately, against an unpredictable Pakistan.
The Congress party, which bore the deepest grudge against China after
the 1962 war, was the first to undertake a major initiative towards China
when Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing in December 1988.
On China,
Washington’s policy should be one of wait and see, avoiding both naiveté
and a narrow optic of realpolitik. There is also an opportunity for the
United States to encourage India and China to collaboratively develop
the lands of Southwest China and India’s Northeast in a regional development
initiative that would also include Burma and Bangladesh. Such an initiative
would necessitate a rethinking of American policy towards Burma, presently
under sanctions because of human rights violations, but it would be a
political ‘paradigm shift’, and may be the only way in which the economies
of one of the world’s poorest, most resource-rich, and densely populated
areas can be opened up.
While the
United States must necessarily deal with the ‘big ticket’ items of terrorism,
nuclear proliferation, nuclear war, civil war and Islamic radicalism,
my view is that the most effective way to deal with at least some of these
problems is indirectly – through the expanded democratization of the region’s
politics and the liberalization of its economies, with both of these complemented
by a quality programme of public diplomacy. The United States must, in
effect, become a partner for those South Asian individuals, groups, and
states that seek stability, order, social reform, and expanded democracy.
This is one region of the world where American interests and ideological
predilections converge with regional ambitions and aspirations.
Footnotes:
1.
This is a shortened and revised version of a chapter in the recent Asia
Foundation study, America’s Role in Asia. Asia Foundation,
San Francisco, 2004.
2.
For a comprehensive discussion see Chapter 9 in Stephen Philip Cohen,
The Idea of Pakistan. Oxford University Press, New Delhi,
2004.
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