THE year
2004 will obviously be remembered most for the outcome of the Lok Sabha
elections which saw a startling turnaround in the political context as
the Congress-led UPA replaced the BJP-led NDA. But the most striking aspect
of this turnaround and one with far-reaching implications, was the shattering
of the myth assiduously promoted by Hindu nationalists that their campaign
for a Hindu India was conquering more and more political ground. The heavily
loaded construct that Hindutva signified had assumed a larger than life
dimension, dwarfing all other elements of India’s political discourse
and public agenda. It entailed a high-voltage campaign which unfolded
over a decade, increasing in its intensity, with the sole aim of enshrining
a Hindu nationalist ethos of governance. This assertion of majoritarian
dominance, abrasive and bruising in its exclusionary focus but with an
undeniable allure to large sections of India’s upper castes and its newly
articulate middle classes, had presented the most potent challenge to
what was until now a settled idiom of governance of this heterogeneous
nation.
For the last decade or so, the determined campaigners
for Hindu nationalism had battered the public arena with their loud declarations
that inevitably, Hindutva would be consecrated as the national ethos.
It was only a matter of time, they said. The confidence of these self-proclaimed
arbiters of India’s national destiny helped them seize the centre-stage
of the political discourse, with the result that the entire public agenda
appeared to be polarised around their claims and demands. So strong was
the ideological sway of the Hindu nationalist propaganda in the public
arena, due in large part to the lack of intelligent appraisal on the part
of the media, that vast sections of the Indian public genuinely began
to believe that the enshrining of a Hindu governing ethos was just around
the corner and that the Indian nation state was on the brink of a major
mid-life ideological transformation.
In this context, it was a surprising twist in the tale
to have the BJP-led NDA suddenly ousted from power, plunging the Hindu
nationalist project in uncertainty. Suddenly, as never had seemed to be
the case in the last decade or so, the meticulously orchestrated campaign
to persuade Indians that the linear progression of their whole history
was only pointing to the climactic moment of the Indian nation state finally
connecting with its Hindu essence, seemed to have melted into thin air.
Reinforcing
the strong sense that something deeper was at work beneath the regime
change, was the evaporation of the potency and the imminence of the demand
for a majoritarian national ethos. Nothing illustrated this more vividly
than the fact that the seemingly invincible and unassailable icons of
the Hindutva movement appeared to be losing their lustre. It was both
ironic and an indication of the ephemerality of political charisma that
Atal Behari Vajpayee, until yesterday hailed as a legend and placed in
the league of Jawaharlal Nehru, seemed now a shrunken figure, bewildered
by his sudden irrelevance in the new scheme of things. Uma Bharati, the
firebrand sanyasi, the BJP’s political mascot who had humbled the Congress
in Madhya Pradesh, was now seen as a cantankerous and testy dissident
who had to be taught a lesson.
Another
symbolic blow to the neatly arranged tableau of Hindutva icons was the
dramatic turn of events in Tamil Nadu involving the Shankaracharya of
Kanchi. The sordid and chilling stories that rung out in the Tamil Nadu
courtrooms grimly stripped the former eminence grise of the NDA
regime, a man whose enormous personal political power had seemed curiously
out of step with his spiritual calling, of all his moral authority and
credibility. In an ironic coincidence, these different icons and figureheads,
proudly held up by Hindu nationalists as examples of a more Hindu-oriented
national culture, had suddenly lost their political weight in the new
environment.
In part,
the ‘fall from grace’ of these former icons may be ascribed to the fact
that in a changed political environment, they represent yesterday’s symbols,
perhaps inevitably out of place in a political culture which emphasises
a different set of social and political values. But that is only half
the story. The question must be asked and particularly of ourselves, as
to how and why it was so easy for these icons to tumble and lose our collective
regard? Further: is it really possible for a phenomenon such as Hindu
majoritarianism, which until last year’s parliamentary elections was seen
as the most potent and formidable challenge to our sense of nationhood,
with scores of analysts and commentators scrambling to explain its persistent
appeal to so many, to suddenly peter out and lose all momentum?
Finding
answers to this set of questions would require us to introspect honestly
on the role that the media and sections of civil society played in relation
to the phenomenon of Hindu majoritarianism. It must be acknowledged that
there was a good deal of overestimation of the Hindutva phenomenon by
excited media practitioners, a disinclination to ask hard questions and
to critically examine the factual authenticity of the themes and issues
inspired by Hindu nationalist leaders and campaigners. There has been
a tendency to accept unquestioningly the terms of debate as set by BJP
and Sangh Parivar leaders, regardless of whether these conflicted with
the existing norms of the Indian democratic framework.
The media’s
approach to the Ayodhya issue is a case in point. There were few hard
questions asked as to the validity of the political framework that the
BJP had set for the Ayodhya dispute, as for example its argument for a
temple at the disputed Babri Masjid site, an overtly political demand
emanating from one group which was being encouraged by the mainstream
political parties for their own electoral compulsions. Instead of stepping
back and examining the genesis of the new demand in the larger context
of India’s existing political and constitutional scheme, many in the media
were quick to provide space for what was a blatantly sectarian impulse,
even proceeding to give this a veneer of respectability. What is discernible
is that the media more often than not, has unwittingly absorbed the elements
of the political agenda and debate as set out by the Hindu nationalist
groups, with the unhappy effect of presenting a picture of trends in Indian
civil society, that might not really reflect the authentic ground reality.
The media
and sections of civil society, particularly the upper reaches of the Hindu
middle classes, gradually began to buy into the notion that Hindu majoritarianism
was taking deep root in the Indian psyche and that the silent majority
of Indians were desirous of a national identity that reflected a Hindu
cultural essence. There was a patent failure on the part of many newspapers
and television channels to distinguish between the hard facts showing
the voters as having a different set of concerns and the wishful fantasies
promoted by the Hindu nationalist campaigners that portrayed the voters
as being giddily sold on the fanciful dreams of an ‘India Shining’.
A
disinclination to go against what was perceived as a swell of popular
sentiment led to the unwitting conscription of many media analysts in
the project to promote Hindu majoritarianism. Thus when the Lok Sabha
election results were described by the media as a ‘stunning upset’ and
a ‘shock defeat’ for the BJP, it was more of a reflection of how unprepared
it was for this result, a clear reflection of the media disconnect from
the ground reality that the voters were guided by a different set of concerns.
Many media practitioners and analysts had become accustomed to projecting
the leaders of the BJP and other Hindu nationalist figureheads as national
icons, regardless of whether these individuals in reality had contributed
to the sense of national wellbeing or not.
The
very fact that we were so wrong in estimating the persuasive appeal of
the Hindu majoritarian political campaign, overestimating what we saw
as a collective yearning for a new national cultural ethos and underestimating
the ordinary Indian’s disinterest in labels and identities – should make
us pause. We need to look into our analyses of the last five years when
Hindu nationalism had undeniable political hegemony, and see where our
attempts to depict the reality faltered.
To begin
with: the case of Atal Behari Vajpayee. Few would dispute his moderation,
his undeniable personal affability, the sincerity of his intentions to
bring about peace with Pakistan, or to put India on the fast track to
economic prosperity. But there was little to suggest that he had an approach
different from other Hindu majoritarianists in regard to the core issue
of national identity and the perception that minorities had to live in
a ‘Hindu India’. It was Vajpayee who, despite being the prime minister
of this secularism-affirming republic and not any trishul-wielding Hindu
extremist, had helped undermine the sense of collective horror over the
burning of the Australian missionary, Graham Staines by suggesting a week
later a national debate on the matter of forced conversions.
It was that
same Vajpayee who, after the trauma of the bloodbath in Gujarat in early
2002, in a partisan vein had pointed an accusing finger at the Muslim
community, hinting darkly that the ghastly pogrom against Muslims was
a consequence of the Godhra incident. He had gone on to excoriate the
Muslim community for not being able to live in peace with others. ‘Wherever
such Muslims live, they tend not to live in coexistence with others, not
to mingle with others; and instead of propagating their ideas in a peaceful
manner, they want to spread their faith by resorting to terror and threats.’
On each
such occasion that Vajpayee strayed into this contentious territory, the
media did dutifully register the partisan tenor and sectarian implications
of these remarks and editorials were written pointing out the untenability
of this approach on the part of the prime minister. But surprisingly,
none of all this added up to casting a shadow on the image being assiduously
projected of Vajpayee as a national leader with a healing touch and as
a moderate in the BJP. Significant sections of the media continued to
unquestioningly subscribe to the high-profile, high-decibel nationwide
campaign claiming that Vajpayee was India’s ‘tallest leader’, a statesman
in the mould of Jawaharlal Nehru, even that he was a closet secularist,
a dove among the hawks, a ‘Vikas Purush’ to Advani’s stern persona
of a ‘Loh Purush’.
What
accounted for the media’s willingness to buy into this hype, regardless
of whether or not it was an accurate representation of Vajpayee’s real
political intentions and personal attitudes? It must be recognised that
this iconic build-up of Vajpayee led the media to hasty and absurd conclusions.
Newspapers and television channels argued that with a strong leader like
Vajpayee being projected, the NDA would coast to victory in the Lok Sabha
elections, even as the BJP’s campaign managers expressed satisfaction
that with the foreign-born Sonia Gandhi leading the Opposition charge,
there was a ‘leadership vacuum’ on the other side which would drive the
electorate into the NDA’s corner. The ‘Vajpayee factor’, as it was dubbed,
did not have the political weight ascribed to it by an over-eager media
which had clearly overlooked the signals from the ground.
The
second aspect of this tragic misreading of the signals from the ground
was that the agenda and themes articulated by the Hindu nationalist idealogues
were uncritically adopted and echoed in media assessments of those particular
political situations with the result that the implications and the political
understanding of those contexts were grossly distorted.
Take for
example the Gujarat Assembly elections in December 2002. The incongruous
victory of Narendra Modi after thousands had been slaughtered in chilling
blood-soaked orgies of violence earlier in the year rattled the national
media that was hard-pressed to find explanations for this strange culmination.
Thus many in the media and in intellectual circles found it difficult
to hold their ground and continued to insist that electoral success did
not represent a vindication of the Modi regime’s genocidal binge. Instead,
the Modi victory led to another bout of theorising and speculation in
the media, mostly to the effect that the moment had come to acknowledge
that Indian political parties, particularly the Congress, would have to
‘update’ its political vision to accommodate the new political reality
of the new cultural consciousness of Hindus.
For instance,
the Times of India in its editorial of 16 December 2002, analysing
the Gujarat Assembly result proclaimed: ‘…the mandate given to "Modi-ism"
must be democratically acknowledged…’ While taking care to say the results
were not to be construed as a vindication of the Modi record in office
or the BJP at the national level, the editorial paid a back-handed tribute
to Modi’s leadership. ‘Gujarat 2002 is a victory for "Hindu Hriday
Samrat" Narendra Modi’s politics of polarisation.’ The editorial
noted that the Bajrang Dal candidate who won from Godhra had said that
this was a victory for Hindutva. ‘Indeed it is,’ the editorial said but
also distanced itself from endorsing the ‘Gujarat experiment’.
But
more interesting was the conclusion of the Times editorial which
critically and dismissively noted the Congress party’s dismal performance
in these polls. ‘Clearly, the party has to go to the drawing board all
over again, to come up with a political vision that is more in tune with
its historical ethos and that of the country.’ What was meant by the reference
to a ‘historical ethos’ was not spelt out but it was evident that the
newspaper, as also other media organisations, had begun to believe that
the Gujarat results reflected a deep-seated and long-term trend of increasing
Hindu assertiveness.
The tendency
to echo whatever were the themes and issues highlighted by the Hindu nationalists
and to vest these with credibility, had the media placing undue editorial
emphasis on these ‘problems’, as though these were critical points in
the national discourse, requiring urgent redressal. The BJP’s contentious
suggestion that forced conversions was an issue of national concern was
picked up uncritically by the press. Substantial newspaper space and a
generous amount of airtime was given to this issue – a theme which was
at best a specious argument being made for political ends. Suddenly, the
country was subjected to a stream of articles and arguments in the national
and local media on the subject of Christian conversions.
Looking
back at the content that filled newspapers during the height of the BJP’s
sway, it might appear that little else was happening in an India reeling
from a barrage of propaganda assault by overzealous Christian missionaries
even as Muslim terrorists were sneaking up to plant bombs in public spaces.
Why did the media allow itself to be manipulated to highlight the stereotypes
and false constructs deliberately floated in order to advance the cause
of Hindu majoritarianism? Instead of an independent scrutiny of the claims
being made by the Hindu nationalist propagandists, many major publications
and television channels were mindlessly coopted into painting a picture
of Indian society well on its way to becoming a Hindu one, purging itself
of the ‘alien elements’. This uncritical assimilation of political propaganda
cut the media off from the actual political and social reality, so different
in its contours.
Sometimes
the eagerness to adopt the terms of reference for the political agenda
as set by the ruling BJP led the media to absurd and hasty political theorising
and wrong judgments. When the BJP won, spectacularly, the elections to
the state assemblies in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, knocking out high-profile
Congress leaders such as Digvijay Singh and Ashok Gehlot, the media jumped
to the conclusion that the BJP’s election campaigns in these states which
confined themselves to critiques of the incumbent regimes based on their
governing performance, signalled that the BJP was now moving away from
Hindutva and had come into its own as a ‘mature party of the Right’ rather
than the bigoted sectarian group that it had originally been perceived
as.
For instance,
the Indian Express gushed in an editorial shortly after the election
victories, on 5 December 2003: ‘It is blindingly clear that these elections
were not won on the temple or any other hoary things… The BJP that has
won three of the four states is a more professional organisation, more
attuned to the changing lay of the land and flexible enough to alter its
strategy accordingly. It is a party that is becoming more mainstream every
day and accommodating – yes, more like what the Congress once used to
be. Basically, there is a new voter out there who is more demanding, more
assertive in the demand for bread and butter and flyovers. The BJP needs
to remain the organisation that can silence its rabble-rousers to hear
this voter.’
The
trouble with this sort of editorial reflection was its shortsightedness.
That same ‘new voter’ seemed to express a different political preference
when the Lok Sabha elections took place a few months later and the same
media then changed its mind and decided that it was ‘bread and butter’
issues that had thrown the BJP out and brought in a new set of rulers.
Just as that particular editorial musing was so wrong on the idea that
the BJP could effectively capture the loyalties of those looking for succour
in the matter of livelihood and economic betterment, so too on the matter
of Hindutva.
The defeat
in the Lok Sabha elections had the BJP fleeing back to its Hindutva wellspring
and, as has now been demonstrated, the BJP has acknowledged that it needs
to remain anchored to its political vision of a ‘Hindu’ India. At the
BJP national executive meeting in late November in Ranchi, its new president,
L.K. Advani made clear that this was the direction in which the BJP would
be heading. ‘Friends, the time has come to proclaim, and proclaim with
all the courage of our conviction, that India is secular principally because
of its Hindu ethos. Remove the Hindu ethos and there will be no India
left.’
What all
this highlights is this: the media cannot afford to be conscripted in
a discourse that has as its primary end the advancement of the interests
of a particular political group. In the last five years, large sections
of the media not only absorbed uncritically the themes and issues thrown
out by the Hindu nationalists aiming to increase their own space in the
public arena but also appeared to have so disconnected themselves from
the truth that at the ground level there was disenchantment and disillusionment
with what was seen as empty political rhetoric. Thus the media and the
middle classes who were caught up in these spurious dreams were thrown
off balance by the BJP’s defeat in the 2004 elections. They, after all,
believed that the political space vacated by the Congress and other secular
groups was still tightly within their grip.
The tragic
irony was that it was the media which had seemed to vacate its space in
abandoning its traditional role as a vigilant observer in the democratic
process. Its failure to scrupulously ensure that its reporting and analysis
distinguished between the wishful and fanciful thinking of self-serving
propagandists and the actual ground realities, resulted in the construction
of a false picture of the ordinary Indian’s political and social priorities.
We cannot afford to make this kind of mistake again if we intend to reclaim
our space as a credible inter-locutor in the democratic process.
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