THE HYBRIDITY OF LIBERAL PEACE:
STATES, DIASPORAS, AND INSECURITY

Mark Laffey and Suthaharan Nadarajah
SOAS, University of London

Abstract:

Much contemporary analysis of world order rests on and reproduces a dualistic account of the international system, as divided into liberal and non-liberal spaces, practices and subjectivities. Drawing on postcolonial thought we challenge such dualisms in two ways. First, we argue that liberalism, as a specific form of governmental reason and practice produced at the intersection of the European and non-European worlds, has always been hybrid, encompassing within its project both ‘liberal’ and ‘non-liberal’ spaces and practices. Second, through analysis of liberal engagement with diasporas, a specific set of subjects that occupy both these spaces, we show how contemporary practices of transnational security governance work to reproduce the hybridity of liberal peace. The article demonstrates the shifting conditions for local agency in relations and practices that transcend the simple dualism between liberal and non-liberal spaces, in the process showing how practices of transnational security governance also reproduce diasporas as hybrid subjects. The argument is illustrated with reference to the Tamil diaspora and the Sri Lankan state’s war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Key words: liberalism, diaspora, hybridity, Tamil, postcolonial

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, March 31-April 4, 2012. Thanks to Jana Hönke, Markus-Michael Müller, J. Peter Burgess and three anonymous reviewers for comments and encouragement.
Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, much security analysis continues to adopt a dualistic account of the international system as divided into two distinct parts. On one side are a set of liberal states, including leading members of the international community such as the United States and the European Union, comprising a pacific order built upon the principles of liberal democracy, market economics, and the rule of law. On the other side are a large number of non-liberal states, many of them subject to instability, conflict and humanitarian crisis. The latter appear in policy practice and the scholarly research that informs it as peripheral to the liberal order at the core of the international system and as the major obstacle to its extension (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Although widespread in the literature, theoretically and empirically the separation of a peaceful liberal core from a violent and unstable non-liberal periphery is unsustainable (e.g., Barkawi and Laffey, 2001). The constitutive relations between liberal and non-liberal worlds are evident in contemporary security concerns about international migration (e.g., Adamson, 2006). The al-Qaeda attacks in New York, London and Madrid prompted greater awareness of ‘the presence within’ of dangerous non-liberal subjects and their potential for ‘extremism’ and ‘home grown’ terrorism; the periphery’s dangers were manifesting in the core. Indeed, even before the ‘global war on terror’ the presence in the liberal core of diasporas – migrant communities of people with continuing links to other ‘homelands’ (Clifford, 1994) – had already placed their members and practices on the international security agenda. Diasporas were linked to conflict, violence and insecurity in the periphery by a range of scholarly inquiries concerned with, for example, ‘long distance nationalism’ (Anderson, 1992), ‘external’ support for insurgencies (RAND, 2001), and networks of illicit trade, finance and migration. Consequently, diasporas have become targets, vehicles and bases for a range of security practices in ‘host’ states, ‘home’ states, and in between (e.g., Collyer, 2012).

Analysis of the transnational security governance of diasporas highlights the ways in which ‘liberal’ and ‘non-liberal’ spaces, subjects and practices together participate in the reproduction of liberal order. Building on this observation, in this article we argue that liberal order (‘liberal peace’) is hybrid, which we equate provisionally with miscegenation. The origins of hybridity lie in critical analysis of colonialism, its forms and its aftermath, particularly in Latin America and South Asia (Young, 2001). In context hybridity, like diaspora, is best understood as a ‘struggle concept’: it both describes but also intervenes in social reality, with diverse consequences for social analysis and political effects (Hennessy, 1996:219-221; cf. Clifford, 1994:310-315). Hybridity is not inherently emancipatory however: it depends on the historical and social context within which the concept is deployed (e.g., Alonso, 2005). Recent scholarship on relations between liberal and non-liberal worlds renders hybridity as a problem-solving social scientific concept equated with mixing or interaction (e.g., Mac Ginty, 2011). In contrast, we deploy hybridity critically and strategically in order to demonstrate the miscegenated character of liberal order, and indeed of liberalism itself. From its inception liberal governmentality (e.g., Rose 1999) has encompassed both liberal and non-liberal subjects and spaces, in Europe and its imperial and colonial extensions, generating practices and apparatuses of rule which are also hybrid in nature. Articulating liberal order as hybrid enables us better to recognise the constitutive role of diverse ‘non-liberal’ practices within it.

The hybridity of liberal order is reproduced in the transnational security governance of diasporas. Specifically, we show, first, how international security practices
constitute diasporas in specific ways. Security practices directed towards diasporas are not merely the sometimes excessive responses to self-evident threats and problems posed by diaspora activity for domestic order or foreign policy goals but rather part of a globe-spanning transformative project of generating pacific liberal order. It is in relation to producing ‘peace’ and ‘stability’ in distant conflict spaces that diasporas – refugees, migrants, asylum seekers and their descendents – find themselves on the international security agenda. Diaspora members may hold German or Canadian citizenship but they appear on the terrain of international security primarily in terms of their links to, and posited impact on, their homelands. According to the specialist literature they can be either ‘warmongers’, ‘peace builders’ or both (e.g., Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006; Smith and Stares, 2007; Pirkkalainen and Abdile, 2009; Brinkerhoff, 2011). Such research, aimed explicitly at solving perceived policy problems, generates specific international responses with significant effects. For instance, the complexity of diaspora members’ subjectivities and practices, including their social, economic and political connections to their homeland and its contestations, are effaced by the dichotomy – order/disorder – inherent to liberal peace. Second, and simultaneously, international security practices act on and through diasporas to advance liberal peace in the periphery. In that sense, diasporas are not always a problem but also useful assets (e.g., Shain, 1999). Taken together, these practices reproduce diaspora as hybrid subjects, with significant consequences for diaspora agency. Relations between host states and diaspora communities are determined by the shifting relations between international security practices and often unpredictable events in the latters’ homelands rather than, say, the rights and privileges of citizenship. Terrorism proscriptions, for example, shape diaspora activism, disciplining and silencing insurgent supporters (‘extremists’) and empowering their opponents (‘moderates’) and constituting what is, and isn’t, legitimate ‘civil society’ activity. Articulated through the characteristic political forms of liberal order, diaspora agency is conditioned and made possible through these shifting representations, relations and intersections.

Foregrounding the constitutive and hierarchical relations between liberal and non-liberal worlds, this article is a contribution to the postcolonial critique of security studies (e.g., Barkawi and Laffey, 2006). Specifically, we engage an object – diaspora – integral to the critique of models, theories and histories which privilege (a particular conception of) Western experience and nation-state framings of global time and space. As a translocal object of analysis, diaspora challenges efforts to draw sharp lines between liberal and non-liberal worlds, inviting engagement with subjects and practices situated simultaneously in both. Building on Suthaharan Nadarajah’s fifteen years as a participant observer of the Tamil diaspora, our ethnographically-grounded analysis invokes the everyday experience of the diaspora and the hybrid modes of subjectivity produced as it is variously engaged – at ‘home’ and ‘abroad’, officially and unofficially – by the institutions and practices of liberal peace. Thus, our focus on diaspora enables recovery of the entangled global histories and geographies through which security and insecurity are produced in a postcolonial world (Hönke and Müller, 2012).

We develop our argument through analysis of the Tamil diaspora and the armed conflict between the Sri Lankan state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an exemplary case routinely cited in the literature. First, we elaborate an account of liberalism in the world as hybrid and clarify what we mean by this term.
Second, we outline Sri Lanka’s conflict and international interventions in it, and show how these illustrate the hybridity of liberal peace. Third, we consider post-Cold War liberal engagement with conflict zones and detail the ways in which diasporas have been represented in scholarship and engaged in policy practice. Fourth, we examine international security practices in relation to the Tamil diaspora before and after the end of Sri Lanka’s war and sketch the consequences for diaspora hybridity and agency. In a brief conclusion we summarise our argument and its implications.

The hybridity of liberalism in the world

Drawing on postcolonial thought, in this section we develop an account of liberalism in the world, and in particular the internal relationship between liberal peace and hybridity, with direct implications for how we understand the relations between states, diasporas and insecurity. Hybridity, a term closely associated with postcolonialism, has recently become something of a buzz-word among scholars working on liberal peace (e.g., Stamnes, 2010; Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2011). Owing to the ubiquity regularly noted by anthropologists and others, ‘the usefulness of indicating hybridity in particular instances’ requires justification, opening up the politics of such a move (Prabhu, 2007:14-15). The turn to hybridity stems from the failures of liberal democracy and neoliberal economic models as universal ‘one size fits all’ solutions to problems of conflict and instability. In response, scholars and policy analysts have argued for the adoption of hybrid models, in which a liberal international order is articulated with non-liberal indigenous institutions, norms and practices at the domestic level.

While this represents a positive development in terms of the problem-solving rationale driving liberal peacebuilding, it is not unproblematic. First, such scholarship generally continues to treat the territorial state as the appropriate scale of analysis and so remains caught in the ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew, 1994). Hybridity is understood in shallow terms, as a domestic phenomenon referring to external relations with local communities deploying non-liberal forms of decision-making or conflict resolution. Second, and more significant for our purposes, hybridity is usually understood within this literature as a novel development in liberal peacebuilding, one that signals a newly positive engagement between liberal and non-liberal worlds (but cf. Hönke, 2012). Failure to take seriously the necessity of a postcolonial perspective on world order and its making leads to an ahistorical understanding of liberalism and its forms of rule, despite occasional acknowledgement of past co-option by ‘external actors’ such as empires of ‘local violent practices for their own ends’ (Mac Ginty, 2011:64). Indirect rule under British colonialism for example was ‘a practice of government which worked through institutions that relied on what were thought to be indigenous customs and structures of authority’ (Hindess, 2005:253). The recent turn to hybridity is thus in fact quite limited and also misconstrues what liberal order means and how it is pursued across time and space.

Liberal order has always been a hybrid social formation. Modernity in all its forms, liberal ones not the least, emerges at the intersection of Europe (or ‘the West’) and non-Europe, as a co-production of diverse peoples on either side of this divide (e.g., Bayly, 2004). Indeed, as Neumann and Sending note (2010:39), as a form of power specific to modernity that both constitutes and works through ‘society’, liberal
governmentality emerges as a hybrid of pastoral and sovereign ambitions, although they downplay the relations between liberal and non-liberal worlds we highlight here. By contrast we show how the advance of liberal governmentality is dependent on its ‘translation’ (Rose, 1999:47-51) into the calculations and activities of both ‘liberal’ and ‘non-liberal’ subjects, in both core and periphery; in other words, how the exercise of sovereign, disciplinary and governmental powers through which liberal order is generated also works through quintessentially illiberal practices – as Rose observes, ‘even terror can be a calculated instrument of governance’ (1999:24). Thus, the close relations between liberal core and non-liberal periphery highlighted by the securitization of diasporas, and the diverse forms of rule within and across this divide, including violence and the use of force, are not new. The seemingly sharp division between liberal core and non-liberal periphery is in fact internal to the project of modernity: the production of the dualism lies in the very practices through which European and non-European peoples and places were tied together and is itself productive of these identities (e.g., Cooper and Stoler, 1997). Indeed, emerging as it did at the intersection of natural law tradition and the commercial and colonial expansion of the Dutch and English states in the seventeenth century, liberal governmentality has always been inseparable from practices often seen as antithetical to it, such as those of imperialism and militarism (cf. Pitts, 2005).

Contrary to its self-understanding as a philosophy concerned essentially with intra-state relations between the sovereign and the freedoms of the individual, liberalism has from the start been a governmental project concerned with ‘the regulation and re-organisation of the international sphere’ (Hindess, 2004:24). The production across diverse populations and spaces of a liberal order incited and was shaped by diverse resistances and appropriations on the imperial frontier in which violence was often to the fore. Administrative apparatuses within the core and the periphery were complex products of imperial practice, developed in international circuits of colonial government, as well as indigenous elements and struggles (e.g., McCoy, 2009). The project of liberal order-making was never peaceful or complete, nor was it monolithic. Significantly there was no presumption that all peoples should be governed in precisely the same way. Liberal order has always rested on a governmental concern: ‘what can be governed through the promotion of liberty and what must be governed in other ways’ (Hindess, 2004:30; emphasis added). Liberal governmentality thus produces subjects and spaces governed differently within an overall rationality of rule. For us, this means liberal order must be seen as fundamentally hybrid in character.

Hybridity can be defined in a variety of ways (e.g., Prabhu, 2007), but for us the key point is perhaps the miscegenated character of the liberal order, the ways in which it everywhere contains or is articulated with elements not well-captured through its own concepts and categories. As Wendy Brown observes, ‘liberalism is striated with nonliberal culture wherever it is institutionalised and practiced. Even in the texts of its most abstract analytic theorists, it is impure, hybridized, and fused to values, assumptions, and practices unaccounted by it and unaccountable within it’ (2006:23; cf. Latour, 1993). For example, nineteenth-century liberal order was constituted out of diverse articulations of various elements, some straightforwardly liberal in a traditional sense (e.g., ‘free trade’, ‘rule of law’) but others clearly not, such as
fraternal organizations with medieval rules … in treaty ports Shanghai and Calcutta; … New and old military units, some composed of native recruits, … decorated with medieval heraldry, medals and regalia, and claim[ing] the masculine chivalry of knights errant… Victoria the queen-empress of the British Empire, ruling over an Indian nobility retooled with European feudal nomenclature (Hevia, 2003:20-23).

In other words, the production of force, trade and imperial authority within the nineteenth-century liberal order depended on a set of constitutive relations between liberal and non-liberal practices and institutions. Understood in this way, the hybridity of liberal order we want to highlight has similarities with Tani Barlow’s description of ‘colonial modernity’ as underlining ‘the constitutional doubleness of discourses of modernity’, not least through accentuating ‘the political and ideological dependency, or intellectual interrelatedness, of colonizing powers and colonial regimes’ (2005:376). Our articulation of liberal order as hybrid seeks to capture these elements. Specifically, it points to the always already ‘bastardized and adulterated’ character of identities and the categories enabling them (Krishna, 1999:xx) as well as the constitutive relations between differentiated practices of rule within and between the metropole and colonial or postcolonial spaces.

The hybrid character of the liberal peace has been hard to see in part because of the tendency to take at face value liberal self-understandings which deny miscegenation. Michael Walzer aptly describes liberalism as practicing the art of separation: ‘Liberalism is a world of walls…’ (1984:315). Thus, complex social formations – up to and including whole world orders – can be described as liberal while, simultaneously, practices demonstrably integral to those formations such as racism or colonial and imperial violence are asserted to be not liberal. Liberalism is abstracted from its local contexts and instantiations, presented instead as effectively timeless and placeless. In colonial and revolutionary situations, for example, where the close relations between liberalism and ostensibly non-liberal practices are particularly evident, liberalism in the shape of human rights becomes ‘paradoxical’ or ‘distorted’ (e.g., Bradley, 2007), thus preserving its essential character. But as Brown argues, ‘[b]oth the autonomy and the universality of liberal principles are myths, crucial to liberalism’s reduction of questions about its imperial ambitions or practices to questions about whether forcing others to be free is consonant with liberal principles’ (2006:23). This discursive strategy has ideological effects: liberal order secures its status as essentially peaceful by publicly denying a set of relations and articulations – across the liberal/non-liberal divide – with practices that nevertheless are repeatedly and routinely linked with it, thereby obscuring the hybrid nature of liberalism in the world (cf. Latham, 1997).

In terms of our argument about the relations between diasporas and security, the hybrid sets of practices on which the production of liberal peace rests – including persuasion, coercion, ‘empowerment’, violence and sometimes genocidal force – work on and through individuals and collectives in core and periphery. The complex resistance and acquiescence they invoke in turn produce hybrid subjects (on hybridity and subjectivity, see e.g., Hall, 1990). Within the contemporary world order, diasporas pursue their goals through their own sets of hybrid practices. For instance, diaspora Tamils may act as Western citizens lobbying ‘their’ political establishments, setting agendas informed by liberal tenets such as representative democracy and
individual freedoms, and organise themselves into actors such as the British Tamil Forum. But they may also act simultaneously as part of a distinct collective, the Tamil nation, on behalf of which they engage in politics. The diaspora includes both forms of subjectivity, in multiple and complex articulations. Liberal governmentality cannot advance its own conception of world order without appropriating, mobilising or dismantling these liberal, non-liberal, even illiberal assemblages. Accordingly it addresses diaspora Tamils in conflicting, even contradictory, ways, as good liberal subjects but also as problematic subjects of a distant ethnic homeland: ‘citizens’, ‘tax-payers’, and ‘voters’ are also articulated as ‘extremist’ supporters, funders or even agents of ‘ethno-nationalism’ and violence. These competing articulations and the governmental practices they inform exist side-by-side and intersect within ‘host’ states, ‘home’ states and in between, helping to reproduce the Tamil diaspora – collectively and individually – as an internally complex and hybrid translocal subject.

The hybrid character of liberal governmentality – as entailing not the homogenisation of rule but rather its differentiation across peoples and spaces – was evident in the Cold War world order, defined as it was by the diverse relations between a US-dominated liberal core and a less peaceful ‘Free World’ periphery. After the establishment of the UN, liberal peace building was continuous throughout the period, reproducing and reinforcing the integral relations between the so-called zones of peace and war (e.g., Al-Qaq, 2009). Despite being revitalised by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the project of realising a pacific liberal order continued to be confronted by new or continuing forms of violent disorder within the states of the periphery. The identification of intra-state conflict as the leading problem for the international community (Mundy, 2011:279) swiftly engendered an expanding raft of interventionist practices informed by new research programs which grew into specialised scholarly fields - ‘conflict resolution’, ‘conflict transformation’, ‘peacebuilding’, ‘peacekeeping’, ‘democratisation’, ‘security sector reform’ and so on. Ideological support for these efforts was further provided by the burgeoning literature on the democratic peace. These interventionist practices and their consequences are readily apparent in post-Cold War Sri Lanka, a former part of the ‘free world’ to which we now turn.

Sri Lanka’s conflict and the liberal peace: Logics and effects of intervention

Post-Cold War international interventions approached Sri Lanka’s armed conflict as essentially a problem of ethno-nationalist separatism manifest in the LTTE’s armed struggle for an independent Tamil state (e.g. Wills, 2001). While Tamil ‘grievances’ against the Sinhala-dominated state were acknowledged, these were considered relatively easy to address through devolution of some powers to Tamil regions, reform of democratic and governance institutions, ‘reconciliation’ amongst the island’s communities and so on. The goal, long considered eminently feasible were it not for the armed conflict, was a united and inclusive liberal market democracy. The primary obstacle was, therefore, the LTTE’s armed struggle and ‘its’ secessionist project. While important aspects of the liberal peace agenda – especially economic liberalisation and development – had been pursued by bilateral and multi-lateral donors in Sri Lanka since the late seventies, international intervention in the conflict began forcefully in the mid nineties, in three phases: backing the state’s war against the LTTE up to 2001; supporting a Norwegian-led peace process, alongside
expanding the military, till 2006; and supporting the state’s resumed war till the defeat of the LTTE in 2009. Whilst recent interventions are increasingly aimed at disciplining the anti-liberal and Sinhala nationalist regime, until 2009 the state received determined international support as it pursued neoliberal restructuring, development, and counter-insurgency. What is important here is, firstly, how the production and maintenance of liberal order necessarily proceeds through the illiberal practices of peripheral states (Rampton and Nadarajah 2010); and, secondly, how international interventions – for security, development and peace – turned on liberal assumptions of, for example, a multi-ethnic majority desirous of liberal rule, the undue influence of ‘extremists on both sides’, and the centrality of underdevelopment to antagonisms.

However, this reading of Sri Lanka’s politics and conflict, and the possibilities of liberal peace, is sharply at odds with the country’s post-independence history. A substantial scholarly literature – largely ignored or discounted by policy-informing research – emphasises the significance of the swift ascendance after independence of a Sinhala nationalist and majoritarian state transformation project, and its generation, long before armed conflict, of Tamil resistance in the form of demands for federal autonomy and later independent statehood (e.g., Bose, 1994; Krishna, 1999; Wilson, 2000). By the seventies the state had already ‘regressed to an illiberal, ethnocentric regime bent on Sinhala super-ordination and Tamil subjugation’ (De Votta 2004:6). Tamils were marginalised from public service, the military and university access, and the electoral map altered to ensure permanent Sinhala dominance of government. Widespread mass protests, civil disobedience and episodic negotiations between Tamil and Sinhala leaders failed to slow the consolidation of majoritarian nationalist rule and the pre-war decades were ‘punctuated by bouts of annihilatory violence’ against Tamils (Krishna 1999:67). Especially consequential was the state’s aggressive program of Sinhala colonisation of Tamil majority areas; having initially demanded power-sharing at the centre, Tamil leaders sought federal autonomy to preserve the demographic integrity of what was now conceptualised as the Tamil homeland. Following the adoption in 1972 of today’s Sinhala-Buddhist constitution, Tamil parties united to form the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) which called for the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam. The coalition swept the Tamil areas in the 1977 elections which also brought a Sinhala nationalist, West-aligned government to power.

What this sketch of Sri Lanka’s post-independence history shows is how long before the armed conflict began in 1983, rather than a multi-ethnic liberal society, the island’s inhabitants recognised themselves as antagonistic collectives – ‘nations’ – at clear odds over historic claims to the Northeast, the ‘right’ political character of the state, and so on. In other words, rather than being merely ethnic or cultural labels, as liberal peace agents have it, ‘Tamil’ and ‘Sinhala’ had become deeply political identities, which polarised further during the war. Following the worst anti-Tamil pogrom in July 1983, in which government actors played a central role (Bush 2003:128-134), war erupted between Tamil militants and the overwhelmingly Sinhala military (on the Tamil armed struggle, see e.g., Bose, 1994; O’Duffy, 2007). Despite counter-insurgency being replete with massacres, rights abuses, mass displacement and humanitarian suffering, western states’ pursuit of a liberal ideal of Sri Lanka has ensured increasing support for the state’s struggle against ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’. Whilst donor aid flowed throughout the war, in part as reward for the
state’s continued economic liberalisation since 1977 (e.g. Shastri, 2004), western support for counter-insurgency was initially covert, in deference to neighbouring India’s Cold War sensitivities (Bose 1994:136n). However from the mid nineties, international interventions became overt, forceful and explicitly geared towards the decisive defeat of the LTTE, talks on devolution with ‘moderate’ (i.e. non-secessionist) Tamil parties, and economic and political liberalisation.

However, in 2000 as battlefield stalemate emerged and the economy collapsed, the international community switched to urging internationally-mediated negotiations with the LTTE (for overviews of the peace process, see e.g., Nadarajah and Vimalarajah, 2008; Goodhand et al, 2011). When the government resisted, despite initially agreeing to Norwegian facilitation, Oslo’s diplomats facilitated secret talks between the LTTE and the main opposition. After the latter won the 2001 elections an internationally-supervised ceasefire and Norwegian-brokered talks followed. At the same time, the international community, led by the US, EU and Japan, adopted a raft of parallel strategies which defined the limits of ‘peace’: a united, liberal market democracy. Donors pledged billions of dollars in aid to the government which in turn put forward a far-reaching neoliberal reform agenda, the battle-worn military was reorganised and expanded (Blodgett 2004) – under the explicit logic of deterring the LTTE from return to war (e.g. Lunstead 2007), and pressure was maintained on the LTTE – e.g. through threats of further proscriptions and other sanctions – to both abandon secession and remain at the table, irrespective of progress. Yet from 2003 the peace process began to fray amid acrimony over ceasefire breaches, and the government’s non-implementation of interim agreements. Despite this and its complicity in a murderous ‘shadow war’ between both sides’ intelligence services, the state received unqualified international support, which continued when the opposition returned to power in 2004. The violence escalated steadily and in 2006 the government, now headed by an avowedly Sinhala nationalist President, resumed all out offensives. Explicitly blaming the LTTE for the failure of the peace process, the international community again backed the military campaign, despite the heavy civilian casualties, widespread rights abuses and deepening humanitarian crisis, until the government declared victory in May 2009.

We discuss post-war dynamics in Sri Lanka below. However, the above outline of post-Cold War international interventions serves two purposes. Firstly, it shows how liberalism in the world is anything but pacific: even as liberal governmentality advances its possibilities through high intensity war, it attributes the attendant atrocities and humanitarian crises to its illiberal implementation partners – the peripheral state and military – or their adversaries. Secondly, the above sets out the shifting context in Sri Lanka in which western states’ engagement with the Tamil diaspora unfolded. Connecting security practices in peripheral spaces with those in the core demonstrates the hybridity of liberal order.

**Conflict and diasporas: Governing representations and practices**

Amid post-Cold War efforts to expand the liberal core, new studies in the nineties soon produced various understandings of its primary obstacle, intra-state conflict. These varied from those based on ideas of ‘ancient hatreds’ and ‘new barbarisms’ to emphasis on the political economy of war zones (see overview in Mundy, 2011). The
most influential for international policy, and consequently significant for the analysis here, are works that prioritised the instrumental rationality of conflict – i.e. that violence is sustained by ‘greed over grievance’ (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) - or linked these ‘new wars’ to the state collapse and ensuing anarchy impelled by globalisation (Kaldor, 2001). Based on economistic, rational-choice logics, these analyses, whilst subject to strong critique (e.g., Kalyvas, 2001; Cramer 2002), have been profoundly consequential in how international peace interventions have been designed, and how conflict actors’ responses have been understood. Crucially, inherent to these conceptions of conflict is also that of peace i.e. liberal peace. Although another set of equally heated debates have emerged over the content and promise of liberal peace (e.g., Paris, 2010; Cooper et al 2011), international practices to generate order turn on a vision of a stable territorial state governed by liberal democracy, market economics and the rule of law. These constitute a universal model held to both maintain peace within and between states and also offer a route to this. In other words, irrespective of the political and other specificities of the conflict in question, peace is to be attained the same way: on the one hand, ceasefire, dialogue and compromise agreement between conflict parties and, especially, accommodation between the various sections of the country’s society; and, on the other hand, liberal reform and transformation of state institutions.

It is against this post-Cold War international framework for pursuing security (peace) in the periphery that western states began criminalising armed actors in distant warzones as terrorists – irrespective of whether these actors posed a direct threat to them. The US first codified this conceptual hostility in 1997 by publishing a list, regularly expanded, of designated (proscribed) Foreign Terrorist Organisations. Almost every major armed actor around the world was on it, including the LTTE, which was also on Britain’s equally comprehensive list published in February 2001 – seven months before 9/11. Leaving aside continuing debates over what constitutes terrorism, the policy salience of ‘terrorism’ is in international efforts to pursue liberal peace in conflict states. For example, in July 2001 the LTTE attacked Sri Lanka’s international airport in Colombo, also the military’s main airbase. The raid, which dominated news coverage around the world, destroyed or badly damaged thirteen aircraft, including five airliners of the national carrier, making it historically the largest attack on civilian aviation. Yet, when Canada, EU and UN first published lists of banned terrorist organisations after 9/11, the LTTE was notably absent. The exemption was linked to the LTTE’s participation from 2001 in the internationally backed, Norwegian-led peace process in Sri Lanka. Indeed, the EU and Canadian only banned the LTTE in 2006, after the Norwegian initiative had collapsed and coinciding with the start of Sri Lanka’s massive internationally supported military campaign which ultimately destroyed the LTTE in 2009.

It is also through international policy and practices aimed at pacifying the conflict states that migrant communities in the West - Tamils, Kurds, Kosovars, and many others - come into security focus. They do so, moreover, in specific ways: i.e. in terms of how they undermine or contribute to liberal peace in their home states. Whilst many ‘conflict-generated’ diaspora, such as the Tamils, have been growing in Western states for many decades, they became the subject of substantive scholarly and policy-related inquiry on conflict in the post-Cold War era. They did so, moreover, in ways succinctly captured in the title of a recent review of the field by one of its leading scholars: Diasporas and conflict societies: conflict entrepreneurs,
competing interests or contributors to stability and development? (Brinkerhoff, 2011). The review outlines the literature’s focus on diasporas’ ‘motivations for engagement’ in their places of origin, and their ‘specific potential positive and negative impacts in societies experiencing or recovering from conflict.’ Setting out an explicit rational choice analysis and mapping of diasporas’ potential positive and negative influences, the paper lays out ‘why a more nuanced understanding of diasporas and peace and conflict is so important to policy and practice for a more peaceful world’ (Brinkerhoff, 2011:116-7; emphases added). The ontological and epistemological continuities between these mainstream studies of diaspora agency and the new wars literature are clear and sometimes explicit (e.g., Bigombe et al, 2000:333-5; Demmers, 2007. On the ‘diaspora-conflict-peace-nexus’ see Pirkkalainen and Abdile, 2009).

This problem-solving literature works with taken-for-granted conceptions of conflict and peace inherent to the global liberal project. In this sense diasporas are posited as externalities to the conflict (state) whose ‘influences’ are to be understood in terms of whether they lend themselves to generating disorder (‘warmongers’) or order (‘peacebuilders’) in their home states. In policy terms, this directly shapes the possibilities, limits and terms of international engagement with diasporas: expatriate warmongers need to be constrained and disciplined through surveillance, policing and immigration, while peacebuilders need to be encouraged, assisted and mobilised – for example, through development vehicles. With even ‘nationalist and factional interests’ in the diaspora held to have the potential to contribute to reconstruction and development and not just conflict (Brinkerhoff 2011:116), international engagement is exhorted to be cognisant of the ‘political opportunity structures’ shaping diasporas’ agency (Weyland 2004). Whilst warmongers and peacebuilders are conceivably to be found both within the conflict society and its diaspora(s), the rationalist cost-benefit logic informing research and policy practice adds a crucial edge to the positioning of the latter as externalities to the conflict state: unlike their counterpart communities at home, diasporas are deemed to have less to lose from the conflicts they stoke, to be more wedded to nationalist ‘dreams’ (sometimes by virtue of the inability to ‘fit’ into western societies), or even to need a blazing homeland to justify continued refugee status.

Significantly, the pursuit of liberal peace engenders a normative dichotomy based on violence. On the one side, to be assisted, supported and encouraged, are those prepared to work non-violently towards an inclusive and pluralist future for the home country. On the other side are those seeking alternate - exclusivist, particularist and separatist – outcomes, sometimes through violence. The latter constitute the primary enemies of liberal peace who, if they cannot be persuaded or coerced into joining and working towards the project, must be confronted, marginalised and, if need be, destroyed. Crucially, the liberal peace places the territorial state, central to its advance, in the former category. This is not to deny that the state may be engaged in discrimination, exclusion and even violent repression; what matters is that it is amenable to future liberal reform and transformation. Conversely, the state’s armed challengers are placed in the latter category: the capacity for liberal democracy and market economies to address any and all grievances means there is no room for continuing ‘wars of national liberation’ or armed ‘freedom struggles’ – even in cases of state repression. Thus, it is actors’ relationship to violence (be they perpetrators, supporters or opponents) and how they respond to international interventions - i.e.,
will they disarm and either disband or join the state reform/building project - that decides their location on the frontline of liberal peace. Similarly, and just as importantly, the politics of local actors and constituencies are categorised in relation to their fit with an inclusive, pluralist vision of the country. There is no (longer) room here, for example, for pursuit of ‘self-determination’ involving division of territorial rule along ethnic (i.e. exclusivist) lines. In these ways, the possibilities of local agency are redefined and sharply circumscribed by the project to universalise individual freedom.

This has immediate consequences for diaspora agency. For example, while it is widely claimed that diaspora communities are well positioned to lobby host governments and other international actors, the above logic dictates whose arguments, aspirations, and claims should be taken seriously and whose should be ignored or rejected. Proponents of ‘freedom struggles’ and advocates of self-determination and independent statehood, or even (exclusive) ‘group’ rights more generally, become, by definition, warmongers, extremists, and nationalists (in the derogatory sense) to be viewed with suspicion, watched and policed, and marginalised from policy formulation. Conversely, those advocating non-violence, accommodation and pluralism, reconciliation, democratic outcomes and protection of individual (human) rights are to be supported, encouraged and inducted into the formulation and execution of international engagement with their home states. Moreover, since most people are assumed to aspire to a liberal way of life, a scarcity of moderate actors makes for specific inferences about the diaspora in question: either the pro-peace majority are being silenced - e.g. crowded out or intimidated by nationalists or insurgent agents who have ‘penetrated’ the diaspora (e.g., Weyland 2004) - or the diaspora as a whole is hardline. Amid its continuing advocacy of self-determination and independent statehood, explanations of Tamil diaspora dynamics have now shifted from the former to the latter (see representative discussions in Human Rights Watch, 2006 and International Crisis Group, 2010).

The Tamil diaspora and the liberal peace: The shifting conditions of local agency

The Tamil diaspora of an estimated million people is concentrated in Canada, Britain, Australia, Switzerland, France, Germany, Norway and other European states. It is now widely accepted in international discourse that ‘the diaspora’ has an important and legitimate role in Sri Lanka’s politics. However, this is a strikingly recent development. Certainly, expatriate Tamils are highly mobilised today and several major organisations are visibly active, lobbying host governments and opposition parties, international NGOs, UN bodies and so on (e.g., Vimalarajah and Cheran, 2010). However, what is new is not diaspora activism per se, but how the international community is responding to it. As the diaspora grew through waves of refugee flight, its political activity was at first largely ignored, and then increasingly subject to coercive security regimes – proscription, policing and immigration. It is only since the end of the war that leading diaspora actors have been able to access the policy spaces of liberal peace and become part of international engagement with Sri Lanka’s crisis. This section sets out the changing nature of relations between the international community and the Tamil diaspora, and shows how the limits of diaspora agency have been determined to a great extent by international relations with Sri Lanka – i.e. rather than, as might be assumed, the other way round.
Although some Tamils emigrated to the West in the sixties and seventies, it was after the anti-Tamil pogrom and outbreak of armed conflict in 1983 that large numbers began arriving to claim asylum (e.g. International Crisis Group, 2010:2-4). Until the mid-nineties, expatriate Tamils did not figure prominently on western domestic security agendas, except in terms of varying immigration regimes. Neither did the LTTE, despite western military support for Sri Lanka; indeed, it is notable that, along with other armed movements, the LTTE located its International Secretariat in London from which it conducted diplomacy, propaganda and fundraising until the UK ban in 2001 (e.g. Orjuella, 2012:102-3). Tamil expatriates were largely free to pursue political activities, including advocacy and fund raising on behalf of the LTTE. However, this changed from the mid nineties when the international community began to intervene more actively to pursue liberal peace in Sri Lanka. Condemnation of the LTTE, its violence and ‘extremism’ (i.e. secessionism) became routine, and host governments’ attitudes towards Tamils supportive of the LTTE and Tamil Eelam (self-determination) hardened.

The discursive separation between the LTTE and ‘the Tamils’ inherent to liberal peace interventions in Sri Lanka also encompassed diaspora actors i.e. as either ‘supporters’ or ‘opponents’ of the LTTE, and as either ‘extremists’ (i.e. advocating self-determination) or ‘moderates’ (i.e. seeking a united, liberal Sri Lanka). As this reading became dominant in policy, popular and scholarly discourses, Tamils campaigning in support of self-determination met with scepticism, suspicion and hostility from host governments, media, NGOs and so on - the most credible Tamil voices were held to be those who criticised the LTTE and rejected separatism. Thus, although the majority of expatriates were those supporting Tamil Eelam (e.g. Vimalarajah and Cheran, 2010:22-3; International Crisis Group, 2010:i; Orjuella, 2012:103-4,116), as has become evident since the war’s end (see below), their opponents were given greater credence. It also became commonsensical that the scarcity of such ‘moderate’ Tamil voices was due to intimidation and suppression of dissent by the LTTE and its supporters (e.g. Wayland, 2004), and that the majority of Tamils were silent supporters of peace in a united Sri Lanka (for a detailed and critical discussion of these dynamics, see Vimalarajah and Cheran, 2010). With proscription of the LTTE, this alignment between the two mappings – separatist/moderate and LTTE supporter/opponent - had more profound consequences for diaspora agency: to support Tamil Eelam now was by implication to support terrorism, and risk the attention of host states’ terrifying security apparatuses.

Thus, as international interventions for liberal peace expanded in Sri Lanka, security practices at home began to impact more forcefully on diaspora activity (e.g., Nadarajah, 2009). Whilst there had always been monitoring of Tamil diaspora actors, especially the LTTE, surveillance increased from the mid-nineties, becoming acute after the ‘war on terror’ began. Meanwhile, it became harder to secure police permission for public events advocating for, or identifying with, Tamil Eelam.

---

2 This dichotomy also informed immigration regimes: whilst western governments have routinely sought to reject asylum claims and deport applicants, the grounds for rejection changed. In the 1980s association with the LTTE was accepted as grounds for fearing persecution in Sri Lanka. However in the late 1990s these increasingly become reasons for rejecting asylum claims; claims citing fear of the LTTE were also successful. Western states also sometimes denied visas to ‘hardline’ Tamil politicians or, having granted visas, detained and questioned them on arrival.
especially after the US and UK banned the LTTE. In Britain, it became routine for Tamils, unlike other citizens, when organising rallies or demonstrations to have to meet with police to demonstrate how these would not be ‘glorifying’ terrorism – to use a term in the anti-terror legislation. Disciplinary constraints were also applied outside legal frameworks – such as covert police advice for venues not to host some events (e.g. diaspora sports competitions for ‘Eelam’ cups), charity commissions’ more careful scrutiny of Tamil accounts, and broadcasting authorities’ readiness to take seriously (anonymous) complaints against Tamil diaspora media reporting.

However, strikingly, it was many years before proscriptions resulted in arrests and charges under anti-terrorism legislation. This hiatus was arguably related to the Norwegian-led peace process: Sri Lanka’s resumption of military operations against the LTTE in 2006 was preceded by further proscriptions (by Canada and the EU) and followed in several western states by high profile arrests, as well as periodic searches of some Tamil businesses and activists’ homes - actions clearly intended as signals of support for Sri Lanka and to increase pressure on the LTTE and those supporting it or Tamil Eelam. While arrests, sometimes by armed police, generated international media coverage and spread fear and insecurity amongst Tamil expatriates, most cases were subsequently dropped and a tiny handful resulted in convictions. Crucially, the new proscriptions were accompanied by a specific discursive framing: Tamil citizens, it was held, needed to be protected from LTTE intimidation (e.g. Human Rights Watch, 2006). This policy-driving logic soon became dominant, even as it overlooked well-known Tamil practices – e.g. during the peace process thousands of expatriates travelled to LTTE-held areas to volunteer for humanitarian and developmental work, especially after the 2004 tsunami (e.g. Vimalarajah and Cheran, 2010:17); mainstream Tamil parties in Sri Lanka won elections in 2001 and 2004 on platforms endorsing the LTTE; and tens of thousands of expatriates routinely attended rallies supporting the LTTE or annual commemorations of its war dead (e.g. Orjuella, 2012:103).

These security practices exemplify the hybridity of both liberalism and diasporas. On the one hand, western security regimes articulate expatriate Tamils as liberal and peaceable citizens whose freedoms need protection from the martial LTTE; on the other hand, they work through a ‘categorical suspicion’ (Marx, 1988) of diaspora members as existential threats to liberal peace in Sri Lanka to be disciplined and policed through measures liberalism routinely condemns elsewhere as political repression. Diaspora identity reflects a similar contradiction. While expatriates adopt quintessentially liberal methods of political advocacy – rallies, petitions, referenda, lobbying of ‘their’ elected representatives, and so on – these practices are fretfully self-regulated to avoid, firstly, falling foul of anti-terrorism legislation, and, secondly, being dismissed as ‘extremists’, ‘ethno-nationalists’ or ‘separatists’. As such, even as they exercise their rights as western citizens, expatriate Tamils must also work to be recognised as good subjects of liberal peace.

International engagement with the Tamil diaspora underwent a dramatic change from 2009 (e.g. Vimalarajah and Cheran, 2010:6; Orjuella 2012:93), underlining once more not only the integral relations between liberal and non-liberal worlds but also the dependence of the possibilities for diaspora agency on the relations between host and home states. Firstly, the mass killings of tens of thousands of Tamil civilians in the final months of the war (United Nations, 2011) triggered an unprecedented wave.
of diaspora mobilisation and protest in several capitals. In Britain, thousands occupied the square outside parliament in mid-March and protested continuously for 72 days until the war ended in May, and in a staggering show of anger and strength, over 100,000 people marched on April 11 (BBC, 2009). The tenor of the protests, as underlined by the banners, chants and thousands of Tamil Eelam flags, was clearly in support of the LTTE and independence. At the same time, relations between the West-led international community and the Sri Lankan state deteriorated as the latter pointedly retreated from liberal peace. The state’s conduct after the war also led to a convergence of international and Tamil demands: the release and resettlement of hundreds of thousands of Tamils who survived the cataclysmic final months to be interned in militarised camps; an independent investigation of, and accountability for, the war crimes and crimes against humanity; demilitarisation of Tamil areas; and negotiating a political solution with Tamil leaders. This convergence was given further impetus by the state’s belligerent rejection of these demands. Riding a wave of Sinhala triumphalism, the state also adopted a further string of domestic policies antithetical to both Tamil interests and the liberal peace, including renewed Sinhala colonisation of Tamil areas, the use of paramilitary terror to stifle political agitation, and military control of resettlement and development.

At the same time, the destruction of the LTTE radically changed the conditions of diaspora activism (Vimalarajah and Cheran, 2010:5-6; Orjuella 2012:105-6). Supporting Tamil Eelam, whilst still criticised as an extreme position, could no longer be equated to supporting terrorism and, openly expressed in mass protests and a series of diaspora-organised referenda in 2009-10 (Vimalarajah and Cheran, 2010:22), could no longer be dismissed as a peculiarity of the LTTE or a minority. In contrast to the earlier framing of expatriate Tamils as being terrorised and silenced by the LTTE, and in the absence of significant ‘moderate’ mobilisation, ‘the diaspora’ as a whole is held to be hardline (e.g. International Crisis Group, 2010). However, as of this writing (June 2012) this contradiction has not been foregrounded in the international community’s engagement with the diaspora, including many actors once avoided as ‘pro-LTTE’. The point here is that it is precisely in its post-war efforts to secure liberal peace in Sri Lanka that liberal governmentality has come into direct confrontation with Sinhala nationalism, and international actors are finding common ground with the diaspora, sharply redefining the conditions of its agency - and that of the state.

**Conclusion: Hybrid practices, hybrid subjects**

This article made two arguments. First, we showed how liberalism, as a specific form of governmental reason and practice produced at the intersection of the European and non-European worlds, has always been hybrid, encompassing within its project both ‘liberal’ and ‘non-liberal’ spaces, practices and subjects. Second, through analysis of liberal engagement with the Tamil diaspora, we showed how practices of transnational security governance work to reproduce the hybridity of liberal peace. Locating the Tamil diaspora in its multiple relations with the pursuit of liberal peace in Sri Lanka, the article demonstrated how this project determines, to a significant part, the conditions for local agency in relations and practices that call into question the simple dualism between the liberal and the non-liberal. Furthermore, we also showed how transnational security practices act on and through diasporas to advance
a globe-spanning transformative project of generating pacific liberal order, in the process reproducing diasporas as also hybrid. It is worth noting here that the hybridity of liberal order makes possible the very resistances the project seeks to overcome. In the case of the Tamils, as in many others, it has long been forgotten that their challenge to the global liberal project is staged on a quintessential liberal basis: self-determination. In sum, then, the article shows how it is in positing a division of the world between order and disorder, equating the former with its tenets, and arrogating to itself a mission to transform the latter into its semblance, that a hybrid liberalism assures itself of its existence.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Stamnes E. (2010). *Values, Context and Hybridity: How can the insights from the liberal peace critique literature be brought to bear on the practices of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture?* Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Centre for International Policy Studies, University of Ottawa.


