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The Quest for Humanity in a Dehumanised State: Afghan Refugees and Devalued Citizens in Urban Pakistan, 1979-2012

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Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in 2013

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Declaration for PhD thesis

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Signed: ____________________________  Date: ___________________
Abstract


This thesis asks two questions. Firstly, how do refugees exert political agency in Pakistan? And secondly, does legal citizenship affect the expression of political agency in Pakistan? It examines how Afghans (non-citizens) and Pakistanis (citizens - specifically the urban poor) occupy a shared reality in Pakistan. It pays attention to urban spaces, and it looks at this shared space through a framework of “dehumanisation” and “self-humanisation” as informed by the oral narratives and ethnography collected during fieldwork in Karachi and Peshawar.

In everyday urban Pakistan differences at the level of political agency between the citizen and the non-citizen are slim. This is because official institutions do not deliver the material and non-material resources to which both groups are legally entitled. In practice, therefore, both Afghans and Pakistanis use a similar repertoire of “hybrid” formal/informal structures and strategies to redistribute everyday material and non-material goods in their push for a humanised existence. Through these shared experiences of dehumanisation and self-humanisation, an alternative space of “belonging” occurs, which goes beyond traditional demarcations between “refugees”, “citizens”, and “non-citizens”.

These formal/informal ways of being are tolerated and encouraged by official actors because they represent an alternative way of managing urban populations and maintaining the state. However, specific benefits withstanding, this sphere of formal/informal political agency inadvertently chips away at the Pakistani state, in physical and non-physical ways, creating long-term changes to the city and the political legitimacy of the state.

This thesis concludes by showing that “citizenship” matters only in the domain of state “security”. The post-2001 climate of (in)security in Pakistan has created deeply penetrative forms of enumeration and surveillance. This combines with negative constructions of the Afghan “Other” to create an everyday reality of humiliation (police harassment, verbal and physical abuse, and arbitrary detention) which is specifically reserved for Afghan bodies.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Awami National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARRC</td>
<td>Afghan Refugee Repatriation Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Befare</td>
<td>Basic Education for Afghan Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHU</td>
<td>Basic Health Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BISP</td>
<td>Benazir Bhutto Income Support Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCAR</td>
<td>Chief Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR-KPK</td>
<td>Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR-SND</td>
<td>Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees Sindh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDGK</td>
<td>City District Government Karachi (now Karachi Municipal Corporation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNIC</td>
<td>Computerised [Pakistani] National Identity Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCUS</td>
<td>Focus Humanitarian Assistance, Agha Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOA</td>
<td>Government of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOKPK</td>
<td>Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (previously North West Frontier Province)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOP</td>
<td>Government of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOS</td>
<td>Government of Sindh</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>“Global War on Terror”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation of Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Nongovernmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter-Services Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORR</td>
<td>Ministry of Afghan Refugee Repatriation (GOA body)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MQM</td>
<td>Muttahida Qaumi Movement (previously Muhajir Quami Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADRA</td>
<td>National Database Registration Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organisation (i.e. emerge within Pakistan, unlike INGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>[Pakistani] National Identity Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>Peshawar Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDPA</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>POR Card</td>
<td>Afghan Citizen Proof of Registration Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Pakistan’s Peoples Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTV</td>
<td>Refugee Tented Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAC</td>
<td>Secure Cards for Afghan Citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFRON</td>
<td>Ministry of States and Frontiers Regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHARP</td>
<td>Society for Human Rights and Prisoners Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDHR</td>
<td>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMRF</td>
<td>Unregistered Members of Registered Families (2010-11 POR card scheme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR-PK</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Pakistan Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR-PK-KH</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Pakistan Sub-Office, Karachi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPS</td>
<td>Uninterrupted Power Supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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Acknowledgments
I owe the greatest amount of gratitude, first and foremost, to all of the people who were interviewed for this thesis in Karachi and Peshawar, as well as FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Islamabad, and Attock. My deepest thanks go to every single person who shared parts of their lives with me. The need to include unheard voices and continually challenge dominant discourses is, I believe, pressing. I only hope that I have done some justice in my analysis. I am unable to mention each name individually here, however, I am eternally grateful to each person. Thank you.

For the help and support I was given during fieldwork, which enabled interviews and ethnographic work to take place, I am indebted to many people. The kindness of family, friends, colleagues, activists, and complete strangers made the task of collecting a diverse array of oral narratives and completing ethnographic work much easier. For those that I can mention in Peshawar, my deepest gratitude is with Tariq Khan, Fakhr Nisa baaji and Dr. Mohammad Idrees and family. None of my work in Peshawar would have been possible without this magic three. Uncle Idrees's impact on my life shall remain with me forever, and I thank him for his eternal kindness and patience. I am also deeply indebted to the professional support of Suhail Anjum Chishti whose kindness and belief in my project, and desire to ensure I was safe in my travels, enabled much of my work in Peshawar. In addition, I am grateful to the Basic Education for Afghan Refugees office in Peshawar, including the help of Mohammad Amin and the office’s numerous staff members. I also thank Hussain Tawawalla at the Enterprise for Business & Development Management for his willingness to share ideas and documents with me. I thank Dr. Mohammad Aslam Khan at the Institute of Geography, Urban and Regional Planning University of Peshawar and his PhD supervisee, Samiullah, for kindly sharing Samiullah’s maps of Peshawar (used in Chapter 5). I also individually offer my gratitude to Lubna Khattak, Haroona Gul, Shakeeba Kamal, Shafiqullah, Safdar Jamal, Waleed, Husnia Jan, Aliuddin, Ishtiaq, and Shaima Noor – all were a pleasure to work with and made many field trips worthwhile.

In Karachi, my deepest thanks go to my khala, khalu, Fatima, Zahra, and my naani. My naani, whose life – alongside my mother’s - has been one of the deeper inspirations for this work, came from Lahore to Karachi during part of my time in the city, and for her presence and prayers I am truly grateful. I am grateful to Dr. Ruth Pfau and the Marie Adelaide Leprosy Centre who made possible some of my fieldwork in Karachi. I am also grateful to Agha Azam of the Afghan
Refugee Repatriation Cell in Karachi, the Society for Human Aid and Prisoners’ Rights for sharing their legal aid cases with this research project, The Citizens Foundation, and the City District Government Karachi “I Own Karachi” Project. I would also like to individually extend my gratitude to Karimullah Pezwan, Bahram Khan, Yaqoob Gul, Ali Khan, Shafiqullah, and Zafar for their insights and help during fieldwork. I also particularly thank Asmat Khan and Irfan Khan for providing me with an endless supply of چائے and humour.

In Islamabad I thank Tahira khala, Abdulllah, Ahmad, Sanaullah, and Amanullah, who made my journeys between Peshawar and Islamabad worthwhile. I also thank Mohammad Bhehzad Khan, whose work on the legal status of Afghan Refugees has provided an important benchmark, and whose support in accessing media reports and legal documents in Islamabad was invaluable for this research project.

At SOAS I am deeply indebted to my two supervisors, Dr. Matthew J. Nelson and Dr. Laleh Khalili. Both Dr. Nelson and Dr Khalili have been phenomenal supervisors. I thank them both for their continual support, criticisms, and desire to push my work to always be better. I continue to be inspired and reassured by their academic rigour and commitment to an academic fellowship. I thank Dr. Nelson, my primary supervisor, for always reading my work and providing detailed and insightful feedback, and for always being willing to take the time to discuss my work with me. Dr. Nelson’s rigorous questionings, suggestions, enthusiasm and sheer passion make him a wonderful teacher, who I am deeply privileged to have been supervised by – he is a total hero. I also thank Dr. Khalili for her superhuman responses, generosity of time, endless reading suggestions, honest criticisms, commitment, and compassion. Dr. Khalili leads by example and continues to raise the bar for all of us. I consider myself incredibly fortunate to have been influenced by her. I also thank Dr. Joya Chatterji at Trinity College for providing me with strong methodological foundations for academic research during my years at the London School of Economics and whose encouragement from those years has remained deeply influential.

I am grateful to my two PhD examiners, Dr. Nandini Gooptu from the University of Oxford and Dr. Oskar Verkaaik from the University of Amsterdam. I am privileged to have been
examined two scholars who engaged in a thorough reading of my work and raised important larger and finer points that I hope to take into consideration before future publications, and which I am sure will enrich my work and thinking. Whilst it was wonderful to pass my viva without any corrections, their generous engagement with my research and very rigorous questioning and suggestions during the viva have made me think again and more deeply about my work. I thank them both for this invaluable contribution.

I thank the following people who read parts or the entire thesis and offered me important insights, criticisms, encouragement, and caught out my mistakes when my own eyes failed me: Hodon Buraleh, Maher Bitar, Sami Everett, Marwa El-Turky, Hania Sobhy Ramadan, Hamid Seyedsayamdost, Silvia Ferabolli, Ayako Komine, Vishal Gadhavi, and Ziyaad Lunat. In particular, the meticulous readings and criticisms offered by Ayako, Hania, Sami, and Silvia pushed me to refine key ideas at the final stages before submission. Hania’s brutal honesty, encouragement, and own desire to push me to be better was a reflection of her generous character, friendship, and most importantly academic honesty - I thank her especially for this, and for being a wonderful mentor.

Throughout this process I have relied on a few solid ears and eyes for advice, discussions, email exchanges, ramblings, coffees, reading recommendations, and an exchange of ideas made richer by their willingness to share their own experiences from their own respective fields. For this I thank Vishal Gadhavi, Mai Choucri, Ali Tariq Khan, Saadia Mahmood, Adela Suliman, Shehryar Malik, Jinan Bastaki, Muna Mohamad, Kashif Khaleel, Shirin Shafaie, Hodon Buraleh, Laila Fathi, Sami Everett, Marwa El-Turky, Hania Sobhy Ramadan, Hamid Seyedsayamdost, Silvia Ferabolli, Ayako Komine, and Ziyaad Lunat. Their intellectual and emotional generosity and friendship is one of the key reasons why I have been able to persist in my work. In particular Muna’s and Laila’s unrelenting positivity has made all the difference. I also have a special thank you for my dear friend Michael Hussey for being a wonderful and calming influence always. And finally to Hodon, a mini-inspiration herself, whose willingness to read nearly every piece of work I have ever written since the age of 18, attend my conferences, and constantly tell me to work harder, has been, in a word, a superstar. None of this would have been possible without her presence. I thank her from my heart, always.
At SOAS I am also grateful to a few wonderful friends who are engaged with or have been engaged with their own PhD battles. Their presence, humour, and company have made my own battle that little bit easier. In particular I thank Laila Fathi, Sami Everett, Hania Sobhy Ramadan, Shirin Shafaie, and Igor Cherstich. Laila’s spirit, passion, and friendship, shall remain a highlight of SOAS - and indeed beyond. Thank you. I also owe a special thanks to my students and colleagues in the Politics Department who continue to amaze me with their enthusiasm and curiosity, and who I am grateful of having been able to teach, teach alongside, and, in all cases, learn from. I am privileged to have been influenced by such passionate minds. In particular I offer my deepest thanks to my colleague and vivacious friend Silvia Ferabolli for having made my first university teaching experience so wonderful.

Finally, I would like thank my family – without whom none of this would have been possible. My cousins, aunts, uncles, siblings, grandparents, and all my elders have been invaluable companions throughout. To my soulmates and sisters Sarah Alimia, Suzanne Mallah, Hodon Buraleh, Fatima Shahid, and Zahra Shahid, thank you. I thank Sarah especially as my fiery big sister for her continual support. The passion which has fuelled this research is as much hers as it is mine. I also thank my mother Seema Alimia, whose own life and stories deeply influenced the direction of this work and are one of the main reasons why I engaged with it in the first place. I also thank Taya Ibrahim and Habiba Phuppo who helped shape the character of my father Abdul Gaffar Alimia so deeply. And lastly, I thank my father, Abdul Gaffar Alimia himself. My father from an early age encouraged me to consistently question dominant power structures and narratives. He has, at every stage, been engaged with my work and life, and for his constant presence, in the fullest sense of the word, I thank him.

This thesis is dedicated to Hassan, one of the most wonderful souls who I was fortunate enough to meet and be influenced by during fieldwork.
A Note on Transliteration

All interviews and expressions have been translated from Urdu or Pashto into English. In cases where Urdu or Pashto is used in the text it is accompanied with an English translation next to it.

All Pashto vocabulary is translated using “softer” forms of Pashto, i.e. Pashto not Pakhto; Peshawar not Pekhawar.

A Note on Confidentiality

All names and locations of people and people’s housing areas have been changed. I have tried to remain as close to the original details as possible, but have made decisions to change details for ethical reasons over the confidentiality and the safety and security of individuals and areas. I do, however, provide actual names when I am citing interviews with officials who have given me permission to use their names. For officials that requested confidentiality this has been respected. In one case it is clear that I cannot be talking about any area but the area in question (Chapter 5), in which case the name of the area has remained as the original, but names of all individuals have been changed. This is a decision that has been made in consultation with various residents of the area.
Part I: Does Citizenship Matter?
Introduction
Refugees, we are told, are not a part of the state. In the modern nation-state system refugees, it is assumed, are simply anomalies, or temporary guests, waiting to “return home”. The Afghan refugee “issue” has been a significant feature of Central and South Asian regional politics since the 1978 Saur Revolution in Afghanistan and subsequent invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979. It is one of the world’s largest and longest “protracted refugee displacements”. At the peak of displacement during the 1990s 7-8 million Afghan refugees were recorded, primarily in Pakistan and Iran. In 2013, thirty-five years on, the United States military occupies Afghanistan and many Afghans have still not returned “home”. Neighbouring Pakistan has been the largest “host” state of Afghan refugees, followed by Iran. Currently it is estimated that approximately 3-4 million Afghans live in Pakistan with the majority having lived in Pakistan for over 20-34 years. Dominant constructions of “refugeedom” outline that there is a distinction between refugees and citizens and that refugees, as anomalies and temporary guests, have limited political agency and impact in the states that they live in. This research challenges these assumptions. Through a comparative analysis of refugees and Pakistani citizens, specifically the urban poor, in two urban centres in Pakistan - Peshawar and Karachi -, this research illuminates that in urban Pakistan, despite languages of legal distinction, Afghan refugees and Pakistani citizens live in similar everyday realities. Assumptions that refugees, as guests, have limited political agency are inadequate. However, through this comparison this research also illuminates key findings about the significance, or rather insignificance, of citizenship in Pakistan.

1 The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) defines a protracted refugee situation as, “One in which 25,000 or more refugees of the same nationality have been in exile for five years or longer in a given asylum country” (UNHCR 2011:14).
2 4.2 million Afghans in Pakistan were recorded in Pakistan during the 1990s (CAR-KPK 2012) and 2.9 million in Iran – with Iran’s numbers not including unregistered migrations (Jalal et al., 2005:4; see also Monsutti and Stitger 2005; Saito 2009).
3 UNHCR records (2012) 1.7 million Afghans refugees in Pakistan. This figure, however, does not include unregistered Afghans which number approximately 0.45-2.2 million (Befare 2009:54).
Assumptions that citizens, as natives of the soil, enjoy enforceable rights and access to public goods more than non-citizens are also revealed to be inadequate. The domination of the military in the geostrategic security state of Pakistan and the significant impact of the structural adjustment programmes of the 1990s and economic liberalisation of the 2000s has meant that the state simply does not have the capacity to deliver the goods and rights that citizens are due. Citizenship in Pakistan it appears is a devalued possession. Thus, whilst debates within the forced migration discipline ponder the future of Afghans in Pakistan (and of other refugees elsewhere) through the lens of legal “naturalisation” / “integration” (or lack of) – as well as repatriation and resettlement to a third country – this appears to miss the point. Rather the more relevant questions to analyse are: How do Afghans, the majority of whom have been in Pakistan for 20-34 years, exert political agency in Pakistan? And, when and how is this political agency similar to Pakistanis and what does this reveal about citizenship in Pakistan? Further, what are the impacts of a shared Afghan and Pakistani political agency on the Pakistani state?

This research is based on the collection of interviews, oral narratives, and ethnographic research conducted during 2010-2011, and parts of 2012. Through the analysis of interviews, oral narratives, and detailed cases studies collected during fieldwork this research explores the similarities and differences of Afghan refugees and Pakistani citizens in everyday urban life and focuses on access to housing, utilities, and social security. It illuminates that, in many cases, official structures are unable to provide access to basic material goods to both Afghan refugees and citizens. Only in the context of state “security” and “check-posts” do the lines of distinction between Afghan refugees and Pakistani citizens have some significance, and even then citizenship does not result in a delivery of rights or welfare and instead only acts as a safeguard against some forms of state violence. This research demonstrates that, despite facing legal and structural restraints (refugee status and state shortcomings), Afghans and Pakistanis exert
political agency in Pakistan in similar ways through the use of informal political structures and strategies – including social solidarity networks. These structures and strategies enable a redistribution of the material goods denied by official structures. In order to understand political patterns in Pakistan, it is these informal spaces – spaces that do not distinguish between citizens and non-citizens -, which require analysis. Through these shared experiences, of being let down by the state and then subsequently engaging in redistributive actions, Afghans and Pakistanis create an alternative space of “belonging” which transcend traditional demarcations between the “refugee”, “citizen”, and “non-citizen”. In addition, this research uses the daily language, oral narratives, discussions, stories, and ethnographic observations collected during fieldwork to reveal that the failures of officialdom are not just understood as a material failure of service delivery, they are also understood and explicitly expressed through a language of “dehumanisation”. Similarly, informal solidarity networks and their accompanying strategies are expressed, remembered, and acted through a language of “self-humanisation” – of insaniyat (humanity), izzat (respect), and azmat (dignity). Thus, this research also reveals that informal political action is not just about material redistribution, it is also non-material redistribution and a quest for a “humanised” existence in what is understood to be a dehumanising Pakistani state. Moreover, this research illuminates important findings about the state in Pakistan. Informal political action is revealed to be an important, albeit implicitly recognised, part of the state in Pakistan, which is often encouraged by officials as an alternative means of maintaining the state. This research, however, shows that, specific benefits withstanding, the informal political agency Afghans and Pakistanis practice inadvertently undermines the state by changing urban ecologies, challenging the state’s legitimacy, and exposing its incompetence.
Chapter Outline

This introductory chapter first provides an overall outline of the different chapters of this thesis. It then explores the historical development of Afghan migration into Pakistan. It then introduces how Afghans exert agency in Pakistan. Following this, this chapter details the shortcomings of the Pakistani state which create the conditions for a shared Afghan and Pakistani position in urban Pakistan. This is followed by a literature review on informal politics. Finally, this chapter ends by discussing the wider theme of this thesis: the quest for a humanised life and explores the importance and meanings of “dehumanisation” and “self-humanisation” as understood in this research.

Thesis Outline: Overview of Chapters

Following on from this chapter, Chapter 2 explains the objectives of this research, the research methods used, and details of sampling sizes. The chapter also attempts to locate my position as a researcher and details my relationship to this body of work. Following on from that are two conceptual chapters. Chapter 3 outlines the moral, political, and legal responsibilities and expectations for enabling and safeguarding Afghan and Pakistani lives that lie with the state and (for refugees and internally displaced citizens) can also include international institutions, primarily the UN and its sub-bodies. It also details where and how the state and international institutions fail to meet these responsibilities and expectations. The chapter illuminates that official failures are not simply the consequence of structural shortcomings but they are also the result of a number of official “ways of seeing”. These ways of seeing include forms of national and ethnic discrimination, which in urban settings result in “urban ethnocracy” (Yiftachel and Yakobi 2004; Yiftachel 2006) and “ghettoisation” (Ron 2003) that significantly impact Afghans, and, in the context of ethnic tensions in Karachi, Pakistani Pashtuns. It also includes both Afghan and Pakistani lives being dehumanised through objectification for bureaucratic
management processes or political instrumentalism – the latter of which is explored using interviews which focus on how Afghans were “used” in the war against the Soviet Union and quickly dispensed with once the war ended, as well as cases of Pakistanis being used as one-dimensional “electoral votes”. It concludes by exploring how both Afghans and Pakistanis have their agency denied to them through dominant constructions of “exemplary suffering”, which are reserved for the “helpless” refugee or urban poor.

Chapter 4 provides a conceptual framework that goes on to show how the dehumanising implications of officialdom do not lead to victimisation. Instead, Afghan refugees and devalued citizens - the urban poor - use alternative, informal, structures and strategies in order to redistribute material and non-material goods that are not provided by the state. Here Afghans and Pakistanis “self-humanise” their lives via solidarity networks (structures) and navigation practices (strategies). Social capital is revealed as a crucial lifeline for Afghans and Pakistanis in urban Pakistan, again reflecting an inclusive space shared by Afghans and urban poor Pakistanis that cuts across lines of legal distinction. However, the navigation strategies that Afghans and Pakistanis use are explained as being contingent on the role of state actors, acting in informal and illegal ways, and other power sources: middlemen, landholders, and other patrons. Thus, the chapter also reveals that solidarity networks, navigation practices, informality, and patrons are implicitly promoted and encouraged by the state as an alternative way of maintaining the state: informality is a central part of the state. The chapter then, however, analyses the implications of informal/illega state actors and the presence of these patrons and shows that far from maintaining the state, the long-term consequences actually undermine it. Repeated time and time again small informal acts challenge the state. They change the physical nature of the urban cities in haphazard and dangerous ways and create/reinforce alternative power-bases, which directly impacts the lived experiences of Afghans and Pakistanis. More crucially, these acts also bite back
at the state itself: the state and state laws appears incompetent, irrelevant, comical, and even inhumane. Informality may be a part of the state, but it is, ultimately, also revealed as a contradiction.

Chapter 5, 6, and 7 are all based on interviews and detailed case studies collected during fieldwork. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 bring together the conceptual frameworks of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 and explores them through an analysis of these case studies and interviews. The chapters analyse the similarities of Afghan and Pakistani lives and show the following: how both experience “dehumanisation”; how both engage in processes of “self-humanisation” using solidarity networks and navigation practices; how challenges for both citizens and non-citizens continue; and, finally, what the political impact of these alternative structures and strategies on official structures is. Chapter 5 explores how solidarity networks, specifically surrounding the urban neighbourhood and informed by altruistic motives, enable forms of everyday basic survival in informal residential areas paying attention to the redistribution of water and other utilities, food, housing, and other infrastructures. It goes first to Karachi and analyses an Afghan quest for water, a Pakistani battle to save an informal housing settlement from being bulldozed, and a Pakistani Pashtun area’s feelings of neglect (not unlike Afghan feelings of neglect) because of the “ethnic” politics of Karachi. It then moves to informal housing areas in Peshawar to show how the state functions in different ways in the two cities but is still, ultimately, incompetent and also heavily dependent on local patrons: middlemen, dallals, and landholders.

Chapter 6 starts off with a continuation of urban stories of survival. However, this time it explores intimate solidarity networks (friendship and kin). The chapter shows how family and friendship networks enable micro-level, personalised action, which are also central in
understanding how Afghans and Pakistanis engage in material and non-material distribution. The chapter pays particular attention to case studies of pooled resources, specifically social security, remittances, and loans, which also directly challenge constructions of “exemplary suffering” (Chapter 3). The chapter then explores cases of friendship solidarities that cut across the lines of legal distinction between citizens and non-citizens and to enable Afghans to secure beyond-survival gains in Pakistan: formal property ownership in regulated residential areas. It asks, when the state cannot decide who can own property in Pakistan and informal contracts are considered more valid, is the state still a relevant actor? The chapter closes the section on cases studies and the similarities of Afghan and Pakistani lives by highlighting that, throughout the processes of informal political actions, the trust of the state and its laws is lost. Again, one of the deepest impacts of Afghan and Pakistani political agency in Pakistan is of the state being delegitimized and considered irrelevant.

Chapter 7 concludes with an account of the limits to the shared spaces that Afghans and Pakistanis occupy in Pakistan, focusing on the climate of “security concerns” that dominate the urban landscape. The chapter first, however, continues with a story of similarities. It first explains how both Afghans and Pakistanis are quantified and surveilled in new ways at an interacting local, regional, and global level because of the counterinsurgency tactics in “Global War on Terror” and a racialised global migration system defined by “Northern” hostility towards “Southern” migration (Rana 2011; Richmond 1994; Sadiq 2009:131). However, the chapter then highlights that within Pakistan Afghans are more intensely enumerated than Pakistanis. It then examines how Afghans in Pakistan face specific practices of dehumanisation via harassment and humiliation tactics used by state actors, which includes: physical and verbal abuse, daily stop and searches, arbitrary detention (individual and mass), and even deportations. These are acts that do not impact most Pakistanis to the same in the same way or to the same degree. It concludes by
showing how the dehumanising actions of state actors actually result in the trust of the state being further eroded by populations who, although not legal citizens, are an important part of the state.

Chapter 8 discusses the wider implications of this study. It shows that lines of legal distinction in Pakistan appear to only to matter when it comes to issues of state “security”. It reinforces arguments made elsewhere about Pakistan being a “security state” and reveals that Pakistan is a state that is more concerned about state security than the social security of its own citizens. The chapter also discusses the fact that Afghans, legal or not, are an integral part of the Pakistani state – a state struggling with alternatives sources of power such as urban mafias, middlemen, or landholders who are ready to step in for the state and redistribute and protect material and non-material goods. It concludes by showing that informal political action leads to self-humanisation for the urban poor (Afghan and Pakistani) but at exactly the same time these actions are contradictory delegitimizing for the state making it appear as a disconnected and inhumane structure.

**Historical Background: Afghans in Pakistan**

Cross-border migration between Afghanistan and Pakistan is not a new phenomenon. Many people, as individuals and as groups, have moved across the region in short-term, temporary, seasonal, or long-term movements because of kinship ties, trade, employment, educational links, and political reasons (Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont 1983; Monsutti 2005:4). However, colonial⁴ and post-colonial encounters in Afghanistan, British India and post-Partition Pakistan

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⁴ In 1893 the *Durand Line Agreement* separated Afghanistan from British India with the Tribal Areas (now Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA]), being created to form a “buffer zone” (Haroon 2007:13-25). This gained permanency through negotiations after the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), which were
have meant that the norms of the migrations above have been reversed and are now constructed as anomalous acts. Today national spaces are believed to represent distinct realms of belonging, one Afghan and one Pakistani, in which it is assumed that individuals can belong only to one. The modern international state system is predicated through constructions of a “national order of things” (Malkki 1995b), in which the ultimate system of political organisation is the sovereign territorial nation-state – indeed, any challenge to this “naturalised” border is seen as a pathological (Malkki 1992:34), anomalous, and dangerous act.

For Pakistan’s post-1947 leaders, the project of constructing and negotiating the nation was a volatile exercise conducted in an environment of immense regional suspicion, paranoia, intrigue, and confusion (Jalal 1990, 1995; Lamb 1991). “Moth-eaten” Pakistan (Jalal 1985) was not expected to survive. Monitoring who belonged to the state was of crucial importance because of the processes of Partition and its accompanying forms of mass population transfers in Indian and Pakistani Punjab, and Muslim migrations from India to Karachi and Hyderabad (Zamindar 2007). This was also reinforced with the huge displacements from the 1971 secession of East Pakistan (Bangladesh). Yet despite a movement for a Greater Pashtunistan within Pakistan secured in 1923 under the rule of Amanullah Khan (1919-29) (Haroon 2007:111-3). This combined with the Sistan Agreement of 1872 regarding the Perso-Afghan border (Hopkins 2007; Hopkins and Marsden 2010:33-7) to form the territorial boundaries of the modern Afghan state. In 1947, Afghanistan’s eastern neighbour, British India - including the “buffer zone” of the Tribal Areas - was partitioned and given independence, forming Pakistan - Afghanistan’s “new” immediate neighbour - and India. However, the Afghan state never formally ratified the Durand Line Agreement and its eastern border with Pakistan, which has led to intermittent tensions between the two states after Partition (Haroon 2007:186-196; Hewitt 1996; Tarzi 2012).

5 The “motto of a state for everyone and everyone in a state” (Aleinikoff 2001) assumes everyone has the security of belonging to one state, with the UDHR stating that “everyone has the right to a nationality” (Article 15.1 UDHR 1948).

6 Limited academic to the significance of Bengalis remaining in Pakistan has been completed. Recent work on illegal immigrants in Pakistan by Kamal Sadiq (2009) and recent reports by Mehdi (2010), Azam (2009), and Befare (2009) provide some detail of the issue of Bengali Pakistanis (Bengalis who were present in Pakistan before the 1971 War) and Bangladeshi illegal immigrants (Bangladeshi who migrated to Pakistan after the 1971 War). Sadiq (2009:161) outlines that Bengalis (approximately 40,000) who
(Banerjee 2000; Qureshi 1966), which was supported by the Afghan government (Haroon 2007:189-196; Hewitt 1996; Qureshi 1966; Tarzi 2012), the surveillance of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border was initially minimal, especially when compared to the surveillance of the Pakistan-India border (Zamindar 2007). Similarly for the Afghan government, routine seasonal,

“came to Pakistan before 1971 are legal citizens of Pakistan” but Bangladeshis who came after 1971 are considered illegal immigrants (ibid). The amended Citizenship Act of 1978 required all Bangladeshis, including Bengalis who came before 1971 to legally apply for citizenship (ibid). It is clear, however, that the issue of Bengalis/Bangladeshis in Pakistan is unresolved. In November 2012 Pakistani Bengalis and Bangladeshis staged a protest in Karachi against the Government of Pakistan (GOP) failure to recognise all Bengalis/Bangladeshis, with one resident stating: “I was born in PIB Colony [Karachi] in 1954 and have a Computerised National Identity Card (CNIC), but my children have been given the run around by government agencies” (Express 4 Nov 2012).

Pashtunistan literally means “Land of the Pashtuns”. The majority of Pashtuns originate from FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (previously North West Frontier Province [NWFP]), areas of current Balochistan in Pakistan, and Afghanistan, particularly Eastern and Southern provinces. The Pashtunistan movement was historically concentrated in NWFP and the Tribal Areas and not Afghanistan. The Afghan state had consolidated its hold on Pashtun areas in Afghanistan and considered the Tribal Areas difficult to control, although the Pashtun-led Afghan state was keen to have the Tribal Areas areas incorporated into Afghanistan to strengthen the “Pashtun” identity of the mixed Afghan State (Haroon 2007; Hanifi 2012; 2012b). In Pakistan the Khudai Khidmatgars are considered a central organisation to the Pashtunistan movement (Banerjee 2000). The Khudai Khidmatgars was established in 1927 as a Pashtun nationalist party in British India that aimed to lobby the provincial issues of NWFP in British India, and was incorporated as a branch of the All India National Congress Party in 1930. Although the party advocated the need to keep the “tribes” separate from the administered NWFP (Haroon 2007:156-7, 194), after Partition calls for a Pashtun ethno-national homeland included the Tribal Areas and were voiced across NWFP. This was justified on the grounds that the Khudai Khidmatgars (the dominant party in NWFP) had boycotted the pre-Partition referendum on joining India or Pakistan (with the Muslim League securing the vote). The Pakistani state somewhat quelled calls for separate national Pashtun homeland during the 1950s and 1960s as a sizeable number of Pakistan's army (the Pakistani state's dominant institution) were recruited from NWFP, including high ranking officials (indeed Ayub Khan was a Pashtun from the Hazara district).

After Partition the GOA consistently questioned the validity of the Durand Line and critiqued the GOP actions in the Tribal Areas (Haroon 2007:188-9; Hewitt 1996; Tarzi 2012:21). Haroon (2007:189) outlines that after Partition in 1947 Zahir Shah’s special envoy to Karachi went to negotiate a treaty with the GOP, which included “an Afghan request to grant complete autonomy to NWFP and rename it Afghanistan or Pathanistan”. Tarzi (2012:21-2) outlines that at the UN General Assembly on the question of Pakistan’s admission to the UN, Afghanistan (eventually) supported Pakistan’s entry but also stated that, “Afghan policy was to “wholeheartedly” support the “principles on which the claim for an independent Pashtunistan is based””. The 1949 Afghan national assembly also repudiated all agreements with British India (now Pakistan), and also rejected the 1955 inclusion of Pashtun areas in the One Unit Scheme (Tarzi 2012:22). Further, Haroon (2007:1919) and Tarzi (2012:21-2, fn12) show that pro-Pashtunistan propaganda literature was published and distributed by the Afghan Information Ministry and GOA. Tarzi adds that throughout the 1970s Afghan policies towards Pakistan included mutual border attacks. Thus, clearly until 1978, “the Pashtunistan issue formed a major component of Afghan foreign policy” (ibid).
entrepreneurial, and/or kin-based migration across the Durand Line was of minor political and strategic significance (Dupree 1975). \(^9\)

However, after the mass migrations of Afghans into Pakistan from the 1970s onwards, particularly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the language and technology of national distinction was methodologically, and strategically, used by the Government of Pakistan (GOP), \(^10\) the Government of Afghanistan (GOA), and key international actors in Pakistan such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Starting even in the early 1970s many Afghan academics, intellectuals, and political parties migrated to Pakistan (CAR-KPK 2012) \(^11\) seeking political asylum because of the 1973 *coup d'état* by Daoud Khan (1973-1978), which overthrew the Afghan monarchy of Zahir Shah (1933-1973) and resulted in aggressive government centralisation and socialist inspired modernisation (Roy 1986; Rubin 2002). \(^12\)

Migration from Afghanistan was not explicitly prohibited by the leaders of Pakistan, Prime Minister/President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of the Pakistan’s People’s Party (PPP) (1973-77) and, later, by General/President Zia ul Haq (1978-88). With the 1978 Saur Revolution, which brought into power the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), and the Soviet Union’s invasion in December 1979 unprecedented migrations took place from Afghanistan into

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\(^9\) Even though the Afghan state drove the Pashtunistan issue in its foreign policy its real impact in terms of becoming a full-fledged political movement was stifled.

\(^{10}\) In this thesis the “GOP” and “Pakistani state” are used interchangeably to describe the Pakistani state.

\(^{11}\) The CAR-KPK (2012) website states that in 1973 109,900 Afghans were present in Pakistan. (The exact number appears as 109,900 which appears to be a typing error as the next figure available for 1979 states 402,100 Afghans being present). No official registration system was in place during the 1970s – I assume that these numbers are based on intelligence and/or estimated numbers. I was told in an interview with Hajji Khairuddin, a graduate of Kabul University during the 1970s who was forced to migrate from Afghanistan as he was considered an intellectual threat due to his association with Jamiat e Islami, that he knew of a few thousand people (3,000-4000 migrating in pockets during the mid-late 1970s), which was replicated across the Afghanistan (Hajji Khairuddin, PXA71).

\(^{12}\) For earlier discussions regarding highly centrist state-led development in Afghanistan see Cullather (2002), see also Scott (1998).
Pakistan and Iran.\textsuperscript{13} Millions fled to escape the violence of the Soviet invasion and occupation (HRW 1984, 1985). Early CAR and UNHCR documentation show the sudden rise in Afghans entering Pakistan with 402,000 Afghans recorded in December 1979 (CAR-KPK 2012); 1.42 million in December 1980; 1.85 million in March 1981; and 2.08 million in May 1981 (UNHCR 1981:1a). Official figures from the GOP state that 3.23 million Afghan refugees were present in Pakistan in the 1980s (CCAR 1987) and figures from the 1990s, which include unregistered Afghans, total 4.2 million Afghans in Pakistan (CAR-KPK 2012). It is also estimated that the number of Afghan refugees in Iran peaked at 2.9 million (this, however, does not include unregistered migrations) (Jalal et al., 2005:4; see also Monsutti and Stitger 2005; Saito 2009).

After 1979 Afghans in Pakistan were categorised as “refugees”, which, despite appealing to broader religious and cultural codes of asylum (Abou El-Wafa 2009; Edwards 1986; Marsden 1998 Abu-Sahlieh 1996 and response by Karpat 1996), was framed by the hegemonic state-based Westphalian international order. Although not a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the main United Nations instruments for the protection and rehabilitation of refugees, Pakistan “conformed to” them (SAFRON and CCAR 1981:1).\textsuperscript{14} Starting in 1980 the GOP also worked with UNHCR via Material Assistance Agreements to support its “refugees”.

During this time the official discourse on the Afghan position in Pakistan was versed in exclusionary languages, technologies, and practices by the state that made a distinction between the non-national non-citizen and the national citizen. The refugee, the ration pass, and the

\textsuperscript{13} Rubin (1996:3) outlines that 600,000 Afghans were in Iran at the time of the April 1978 Coup.

\textsuperscript{14} Article A2 of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol (UN 1951, 1967), defines refugees as individuals who are, “outside of the country of his nationality”, for a “wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”.  

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refugee tented village (RTV) all symbolised the temporary Afghan position in Pakistan. Unlike earlier refugees in Pakistan, i.e. Muslims from British India’s Muslim minority provinces or the Punjab, whose bodies, narratives, and political and financial capital were used to construct the Pakistani state, Afghan refugees were not seen in the same light. However, given the need to defeat the Soviet Union (Baitenmann 1990; Marsden 2009; Rashid 2000; Weinbaum 1994), a wider geo-strategic desire to gain strength against a hostile India (Grare 2003), and a desire to silence the Afghan state’s demands for a revision of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, which had dominated Afghanistan-Pakistani relations since 1947 (see fn8), Afghans in Pakistan were “welcomed” by the Pakistan state as useful bodies. It was, however, most significantly the Soviet-Afghan war that proved to dominate the Afghan position in Pakistan. Here, Afghan bodies were useful as they acted as a vital resource pool for the militarised and political efforts to defeat the Soviet “menace” - also supported by the USA, its allies, and other regional actors. In an interview I conducted with an Afghan and former fighter with Gulbudin Hekmatyar’s Hezb e Islami party who migrated to Pakistan from Afghanistan in 1979, Engineer Aziz, he recalled how, in the 1980s, “People used to give up their seats for us on the bus. That is how much we were honoured” (Engineer Aziz, PXA59). This was a reciprocated sentiment as Afghans in refugee camps in Pakistan adorned household walls with pictures of Zia ul Haq and named camp roads and even sons after him.15

However, after the defeat of the Soviet Union, the usefulness of Afghan bodies waned, becoming even more acute after the Afghan state was blamed for sheltering the perpetrators of the New York and Washington DC September 2001 attacks. Afghan bodies in Pakistan then became a liability. The positive imaginings of Afghanis in popular discourse, which had previously been concentrated around constructions of the “heroic mujahid” (fighter), quickly

15 Information taken from field interviews and observations in RTVs “street” names in Peshawar.
dissipated and even more exclusionary frameworks were used by the GOP (Chapters 3 and 7). The Pakistani state and officials were keen on making clear the distinction between the Afghan and Pakistani state (including its people), which was reflected by Pakistan’s decision under President Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008) to join the US-led “Global War on Terror” (hereafter, GWOT). The implications of this shift in foreign policy had a direct impact on Afghan lives in Pakistan. In legal terms, whilst during the 1980s all Afghans in Pakistan were given *prima facie* (on first encounter) refugee status, by the 1990s *prima facie* recognition was disbanded (B.Khan 2012:4-7), i.e. once the Soviet “menace” had been defeated, and instead Afghans were recognised as having been given “temporary protection.” However, this was most strongly (re)enforced after 2001. During the 2000s routine Afghan migration into Pakistan was halted and greater legal clarification and technological control was exerted (Chapter 7). Currently, only the 1.7 million (UNHCR 2012) Afghans registered with a valid Afghan Citizen Proof of Registration (POR) card are considered legal persons in Pakistan. The remaining unregistered Afghans (approximately 0.45-2.2 million) are considered illegal (Befare 2009:54).

In combination with shifts in foreign policy objectives, Afghans as non-nationals are increasingly constructed as “anomalies”, “undesirables”, the “remnants” of society (Agier 2011), and a pathological threat to the naturalised nation-state (Malkki 1992:34). Afghans are also morally excluded as a dangerous “sub-human Other”. This includes being subjected to negative

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16 Archived UNHCR Pakistan *Information Sheets* and *Fact Sheets* from 1982-85 refer to Afghans as “refugees”. However, 1987 *Fact Sheets* start using the terminology “temporary asylum”: “Afghan refugees are allowed temporary asylum” and are under “temporary protection” (UNHCR-PK 1982-7).

17 The POR card is an Afghan identity card that was introduced in 2006-07 under the 2006 *Registration Agreement* and 2007 *Tripartite Agreement*. Only Afghans that were able to give evidence for having lived in Pakistan using earlier documents, such as ration pass or immunisation cards, distributed by the World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UNHCR, or one of the registered seven Afghan *mujahidin* parties, were eligible to register. Those who arrived after 2001 are now assessed through the Refugee Determination Status (RSD) process through UNHCR. The 2006-07 card was designed to last until 31 December 2009 but was extended to 31 December 2012 and then June 2013.
stereotyping and being blanket-blamed for issues of drug-trafficking, suicide bombings, and criminality in Pakistan.

Rather than reflecting concerns of a genuine threat, the “Othering” process mirrors a number of debates surrounding migration and minorities, identity politics, political mobilisation and scapegoating (Chatterjee 1994; Gilroy 1987; Jaffrelot 1996; Le Bas 2006; Malloch and Stanley 2005; McAllister 2006; Pappe 2003; Shlaim 2000). In Pakistan, Afghan “risk” metaphors are convenient tools for political mobilisation tactics by political actors such as the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) in Karachi who rally around the “Afghan threat” (which is incorporated within the MQM’s wider concern regarding the “Pashtunisation” of Karachi in order to secure votes) or is used by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial government departments to explain service delivery failures (see Dawn 1 Aug 2005 and Appendix 10). In 2011 the Pakistani Foreign Minister Hinna Khar blamed the killing of the former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani, which is suspected to involve Pakistani intelligence actors, on “Afghan refugees” (Dawn 14 Dec 2011). In addition, this Othering of Afghans reflects the ways in which Afghans are used to consolidate a fragile Pakistani national identity (Rahman 1998; Samad 1995, 1995b; Wright 1991), or to consolidate its claim to the unconfirmed border with Afghanistan (Tarzi 2012), and also to reinforce a limited tolerance for transnational forms of existence (Malkki 1992; 1995; 1995b; Monsutti 2005; 2010; Monsutti and Stitger 2005). Finally, it also reflects how global discourses surrounding the “dangerous” Muslim body, which have proliferated since 9/11 (Mamdani 2004; Rana 2011), are reproduced within Pakistan - this time targeting Afghans via specific intra-Muslim forms of Othering. These themes are discussed in further detail in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7.
Afghan Agency in Pakistan

The various forms of Othering which Afghans undergo in Pakistan combines with understandings of “refugeedom” or illegal migrants to construct and reinforce assumptions that Afghans have limited types of political agency and significance in Pakistan. In the vast literature on forced migration, refugees appear to be “waiting” to return home (Kibreab 1996) to a “normal” sedentarised life. In physical terms, refugees are understood as being positioned in spaces that have limited political influence on the state and local politics: the cordoned-off refugee tented village (RTV), or the “desert city” (Agier 2008; Arendt 1943). In addition, illegal immigrants, which many Afghans are now classified as being, are constructed simply as criminalised entities that threaten the norms of the nation-state system (Dauvergne 2008; Khosravi 2010:27). Afghans, either as refugees or illegal immigrants, are assumed to have limited political significance because they are not a legal part of the Pakistani state.

However, the assumption that that refugees are simply “waiting to return home” or “cordoned-off” has been challenged by the increasing literature on refugees, migrants, and transnational lives (Malkki 1992, 1995, 1995b; Monsutti 2005). Liisa Malkki’s body of work (1992, 1995, 1995b) challenges current norms of sedentarisation in human history, outlining that the norm of a sedentarised life is a modern phenomenon rooted in the development of the territorial (absolute) sovereign nation-state. In his body of work on Afghan migration, anthropologist Alessandro Monsutti, influenced by Malkki’s work, demonstrates that for many Afghans migration is not an anomalous act but a “way of life” (Monsutti and Stitger 2005), and increasingly for young Afghan men a “rite of passage” towards manhood (Monsutti 2007; see also Monsutti 2005, 2008, 2010). Moreover, this thesis shows that whilst a physical segregation of Afghan refugees was initially attempted during the “emergency phase” of Afghan migration
to Pakistan\textsuperscript{18} it has never been fully enforced.\textsuperscript{19} Afghans in Pakistan are not legally confined to live in RTVs. The 2005 Census of Afghans in Pakistan stated that 57.7\% of Afghans lived outside of RTVs (SAFRON et al., 2005:21) - a percentage that is likely to have risen since then. Many Afghans live in mixed Afghan-Pakistani areas, which mean that urban residents, Afghan and Pakistani, live in shared cities and undergo shared experiences - which in this thesis include the shortcomings that dominate everyday urban life in Karachi and Peshawar.

Whilst many Afghans have repatriated to Afghanistan, with 2012 UNHCR figures recording 3.77 million returnees to Afghanistan between 2002-2012 (UNHCR-PK 2012b), the continued conflicts in and against Afghanistan, and thus the challenges of “return”, have meant that many individuals, families and groups have not returned to Afghanistan in a permanent capacity, or live transnational lives, or have re-migrated back to Pakistan (Jalal et al., 2005; Kamal 2010; Saito 2009; Schmeidl 2002, 2009). The 2005 Census revealed that the majority of Afghans in Pakistan migrated to Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989) and post-war years of the pro-Communist government of Najeebullah (ending in 1992), and in this research the majority of interviews were with Afghans who had migrated to Pakistan during 1979-1989.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18} In 1981 during this emergency phase, the *Official Handbook on Refugee Management* (SAFRON 1981: Chapter 1:8) outlines that, “As far as possible refugees must be lodge[d] in camps, which for the purposes of their security should not be close proximity of the border” (i.e. because of attack), but that the “movement of refugees outside of their camps should be controlled without in anyway giving the impression of being held as prisoners”.

\textsuperscript{19} Early circulars by the UNHCR-PK (1982, 1982b) and interviews conducted in this thesis show many Afghans had settled in non-RTV areas immediately after migration in the 1970s and 1980s (i.e. Karachi).

\textsuperscript{20} In summary, there have seven been waves of Afghan migration to Pakistan since the 1970s: (1) 1973-1978. Under the government of Daoud Khan, Afghan intelligentsia migrated into Iran and Pakistan, and elite classes migrated to "Northern" states. (2) 1978-1979. After the Saur Revolution and entry of PDPA into power many Afghans migrated to Pakistan and Iran, with elites continuing migration to Western states. (3) 1979-1989. During the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan millions fled to Pakistan and Iran. (4) 1989-1992. After 1989 many Afghans returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan, but as conditions of security were not stable, many re-entered Pakistan. In addition, new refugees continued to
Thus Afghans have negotiated a political space for themselves in urban Pakistan, including those who do not have a “registered” status. In fact their experiences in the urban city powerfully illuminate local politics in Pakistan. Afghans are an integral part of the urban fabric - even if this is not reflected in legal spheres and in dominant Pakistani public discourse. This is not to say that Afghans desire to become “Pakistani” in terms of national identity and affinity (although Kamal Sadiq [2009] shows how some Afghans do “become Pakistani” by informally/illegally securing Pakistani identity cards, which I also explore in Chapter 7). Pakistani nationalism, as indeed is the case with many other nationalisms and other constructed concepts of “identity”, is in itself a contested term, as numerous studies have shown (Ahmed 1998; Jaffrelot 2002; Harrison 1986; Hewitt 1996; HRW 2011; Samad 1995b; Titus 1996, 2000; Verkaaik 1994, 2004; Wright 1991). For many Afghans in Pakistan there has also not been a complete “deteritorialization” (Kibreab 1999) of identity - affinities to ancestral villages, cities, and ideas of “Afghanness” remain. (However, it may be possible to speak of a “new” ethnic group/s emerging in Pakistan, i.e. Pakistani Afghans.) In addition, nor is it to say that Afghans represent an alternative form of “citizenship” in Pakistan. Indeed, as this thesis shows, citizenship in the orthodox sense in Pakistan is a devalued concept that only has significance in certain circumstances, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 7. Thus, Afghans do not demonstrate an

migrate to Pakistan. (5) 1992-1995. After the fall of Najeebullah (1992) various mujahidin groups violently contested for power in a civil war conflict in Afghanistan. Some Afghans (many mujahidin/resistance groups) returned from Pakistan but Afghans that had remained in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan War and occupied government or military jobs were persecuted. (6) 1995-2001, with the rise of the Taliban significant displacements of Afghan Hazaras also took places, and many migrated to Balochistan and Karachi in Pakistan (particularly during 1996-1999) – smaller populations can be found in Rawalpindi. Other migrations of government workers and others continued. (7) 2001-present. After the 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan new refugees were created. However, Pakistani laws did not recognise these Afghans as refugees but instead as illegal migrants. In addition, international organisations such as UNHCR (under the influence of the US) primarily focused on repatriating Afghans from Pakistan. It is also important to note that throughout this process many millions of Afghans remained in Afghanistan and others have had transnational lives, i.e. living between the Afghanistan and Pakistan, and even other states (Monsutti and Stitger 2005). In this thesis interviews were conducted with Afghans who had migrated across all phases, however the majority of interviewees were from the 1979-1989 phase of migrations.
alternative type of “national identity” or “citizenship” \textit{per se}; they simply display an alternative form of belonging or community within the fabric of urban Pakistan. This sense of belonging is shaped by everyday informal structures - such as social solidarity networks - and actions, which work to transcend traditional understandings of refugeeess and citizenship and include acts that push for material and non-material redistribution in the quest for a more humanised life. And, these structures and acts translate to an expression of political agency by inadvertently, yet deeply, transforming the state.

\textbf{Shared Afghan and Pakistani Lives: Devalued Citizens}

Many Pakistanis see “citizenship” as a devalued concept, and this thesis compares the similarities of the lives of urban poor Pakistanis with Afghan refugees in Pakistan to examine this. Whilst dominant discourses juxtapose the Afghan non-national “Other” against the Pakistani national “Self”, more often than not nationality, citizenship, and refugeedom do not differentiate the lives of the urban poor.\footnote{This also applies at the global level where the “poverty” of Afghan and Pakistani states in the international political and economic system means that both states are subject to hegemony of dominant actors, which is reflected in the US-led military occupation of Afghanistan and US drone bombings in FATA (Stanford-NYU 2012). It is also reflected through the construction of both states and populations as sources of “terror” under a global “Muslim” banner (Rana 2011).} Whilst Afghan refugees and illegal immigrants are subject to legal exclusionary practices, which results in less access to material goods, many \textit{citizens}, i.e. the urban poor, also face similar challenges in accessing material goods. This is because for Pakistani citizens the state is simply unable to deliver the goods that citizens are legally due, which occurs, at the macro level, for two main reasons. First, the military dominates Pakistan, a factor which has been shaped by Pakistan’s conditions of birth as a state, the bloody secession of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), and a sensitive regional geostrategic position next to rivals India and Afghanistan. This domination has also been the result of Pakistan’s position as a peripheral but
key geostrategic state in the international system. These factors – state perceptions of geostrategic insecurity and the interests of global hegemons for a strong Pakistani military – have encouraged state leaders to be more concerned with concepts of state security rather than social security and the delivery of rights to citizens. This preoccupation is reflected in the massive allocation of government budgets on defence, or what Ayesha Jalal (1990) calls Pakistan’s “economic policy of defense” (Jalal 1990; also Siddiq 2007). Here, government money is diverted away from investment in other domestic sectors, “which might directly or indirectly improve [the] conditions of the poor” (Toor 2011:189). Second, the impact of structural adjustment programmes, which took place in Pakistan in the late 1980s and 1990s, and economic liberalisation, which was especially encouraged under General/President Pervez Musharraf and currently continues under President Asif Ali Zardari of the PPP (2008-2013), have also resulted in reduced government spending on the public sector – the impacts of which are analysed in greater depth in Chapter 3. In combination with the reinforced dominance of the military in the context of the GWOT, the 2000s, Saadia Toor (2011) argues, have been the years of the “neo-liberal [Pakistani] security state” (Toor 2011). Pakistan’s geostrategic importance, its peripheral position in the international political and economic system, alongside Pakistani leadership decisions, means that for many Pakistanis there is a marked difference between the de jure and de facto experience of citizenship. Thus, for many Pakistanis their experience of “citizenship” is a devalued one as the state lacks the capacity to deliver to citizens. Many Afghans and Pakistanis find each other living in similar positions in Pakistan. In addition, this thesis also explores how for some Pakistani citizens the failure of state delivery is sometimes worse because of ethnic lenses of exclusion. This is analysed through the position of Pakistani Pashtuns in Karachi (see Chapters 3, 4, and 5).

22 During the Cold War, in popular discourse, Pakistan was referred to as the “frontline” state in the fight against Communism and an essential ally of the USA and other states. After 2001 once again the strength of the military was reinforced by US-led war in Afghanistan and FATA in which Pakistani is a central partner.
Crucially, however, neither Afghans nor Pakistanis (and in Karachi, Pakistani Pashtuns in particular) silently accept their exclusions from the state or state failings. Instead Afghans and Pakistanis create an alternative space of belonging and being via informal political structures, actions, and rhetoric. By using informal political structures (such as solidarity networks) and practices, Afghans and Pakistanis “silently” redistribute and protect the material goods and rights withheld by official actors and structures in order to push for a more humanised existence.

**Informal Political Action and Everyday Politics: The Literature**

What are the sites of political action in urban Pakistan? Dissatisfied with the assumption that a “neutralised, repressed, co-opted, apathetic, and acquiescent” sector of society (the poor and the marginalised) has been “socialised into accepting an elite domination” (Singerman 1995:3), studies of informal politics have aimed to shift the sites of power and politics from areas of “high politics”, such as formal institutions, politicians, inter-governmental treaties, to include areas of “low politics”. This has been analysed in a number of ways, including studies on the informal economy (Bromley 1978; Hart 1972; I.L.O 1973; Peattie 1987), informal political institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Nelson - forthcoming), urban housing studies (Castells 1983; Perlman 1976; Portes and Castells 1989), and studies of “everyday” politics (Abu-Lughod 1993; Bayat 1997, 2010; Brown 1990; Scott 1985; Singerman 1995).

Informality is a key lens through which to understand the experience of Afghans and Pakistanis. Informality refers to “activities in the production of legal goods and services which are not
regulated or protected by the state” (OECD 2009:11). Analysing informal institutions, Helmke and Levitsky (2006) add another layer to understanding the informal by defining it as “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2006:726-7).

During the 1970s studies of the informal economy by Keith Hart (Hart 1973) and the ILO (ILO 1972) showed the economy (usually in developing countries) as dualistic and separated into two distinct spheres: the formal and the informal. In this approach the informal was a “pre-modern” structure, which would eventually dissolve as modernity (the formal economy) caught up (Moser 1978). Structuralists, however, challenged this, arguing that the formal and the informal are interconnected, albeit with the informal economy subservient to the formal (Portes and Castells 1989; Rogerson and Preston-Whyte 1991). And, the much debated (Bromley 1990, 2004) work of Hernando De Soto (1989, 1994, 2000) added a different perspective by emphasising the dynamic nature of the informal (not its subservience to the formal economy). According to De Soto, by escaping the bureaucratic excess of the state, micro-entrepreneurs, traders, people in search of housing, and so on were able to flourish. Formal activity was simply too costly, in both time and money, leading De Soto to advocate reforms designed to reduce such official costs. Whilst the earlier studies by Hart (1973) and the ILO (1972) point to a need for the state to support small entrepreneurs and small industries as a route to development, De Soto (1989, 2000)

23 J.J. Thomas (1992) adds that output of informal processes is legal, although some degrees of illegality in the process are possible, which may be “irregular” but not criminal. This provides a useful way of distinguishing between the informal and the criminal, in which both the processes and outputs are illegal. A house then is not an illegal output, whereas drugs or prostitution are, which points to the “ordinary” and “morally accepted” nature of informal actions (ibid).

24 Eleanor Preston-Whyte (1991) shows how black South African women, employed formally in domestic labour generated informal economic activity by providing tailoring services or by running illegal bars (shebeens). In this view, opportunities for informal activity are possible because of formal employment and they are subservient to formal employment (ibid).

25 In one example, De Soto takes the case of informal housing settlements in Peru. His work shows that it takes 159 steps to legalise the housing settlements, whereas informal processes are much quicker (De Soto 1989:24, 132-4).
emphasises that it is the failure of the state which forced individuals to act in the informal economy, but once individuals are active in the informal economy, free from state intervention and excesses, they are able to experience true “freedom” (albeit with certain costs, namely severely elevated costs of credit, owing to the lack of access to formalised types of collateral) (De Soto 1989, 2000).

In addition, political scientists such as Partha Chatterjee (2004), through an analysis of informal political activity in Calcutta, argue that informality is the site of “true” democracy, and an alternative site of “citizenship”. For Chatterjee, citizenship in the orthodox sense is practically confined to a limited elite, “the new bourgeoisie” (Chatterjee 2004:37-8). The sites of richer political action are not in “civil society”, which only serves the interest of a few who are closely vested in the state (the new bourgeoisie). Instead, emancipatory political activity occurs in “political society” where people (for example, residents of railway tracks) organise themselves and engage in informal activity (such as tapping electricity and travelling without tickets). Here, residents push for the prevention of law from being implemented, to reflect some of what people really want – “just not what is necessarily envisioned by the constitution” (Chatterjee 2004). However, Matthew J. Nelson (forthcoming) asks, can “democracy” exist without law? Is stepping beyond the constitution a form of “democratic action”? The answer is no. Democracy that contravenes state law is not really democracy but something else – something that may include justice or material improvements, but not democracy (ibid).

Further, academics influenced by James C. Scott’s Weapons of the Weak (1985) explain informal action via theories of “everyday” and “ordinary” politics. According to Scott (1985), the sites of political expression and change are not simply situated in conscious political movements, but also in small, mundane, everyday actions, which aim to redistribute social goods. “Foot-dragging,
dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage and so forth... [are] the weapons of the weak” (Scott 1985:29). In urban settings this includes siphoning electricity, avoiding tax and surveillance, “quietly claiming state/public lands on the outskirts of the cities or taking over cemeteries, rooftops, and other urban spaces creating vibrant spontaneous communities” (Bayat 2010:57; see also Singerman 1995). Through “ordinary” acts, such as informally accessing public utilities (Bayat 2010; Singerman 1995), individuals and groups counteract official constraints, redistribute goods, and challenge the label of passivity attached to the marginalised groups (the urban poor, refugees, illegal immigrants, women) to provide a more complex picture of power distribution in society (albeit, again, following Nelson [forthcoming], neither “democracy” nor “citizenship”).

Asef Bayat (2010), however, goes on to address some of the “theories of the resisting poor” (Bayat 2010:51-5). The “politics of the ordinary”, he writes, do not intend to create an upheaval of the state or local politics by their ordinary actions (Bayat 1997; 2010:52-3). They are not what some authors of “resistance studies” call forms of resistance, where “awareness about oppression [motivates]... acts of resistance against it” (Bayat 2010:53) - a link between the two (awareness and the act) is needed for an act to constitute “resistance” proper (see also Scott 1985:27-35). For Bayat, informal actions are not simply reactionary (thus defensive) acts of survival, which, in effect, deny agency (Bayat 2010:48-9, 56). Rather, these actions are understood as “quiet encroachments of the ordinary” (Bayat 1997, 2010), which is the “silent, protracted, but pervasive advancement of the ordinary people on the propertied, powerful, or the public, in order to improve their lives” (Bayat 2010:56). This is not resistance per se, or citizenship, or democracy. However, it is shaped by a conscious objective of “redistributing social goods” in their (i.e. the urban poor’s) favour in a form of offensive survival (Bayat 1997, 2010).
The literature on various informal practices shows that informal activities are often strategically tolerated by official actors as they help maintain the state. Indeed, “governments often encourage self-help and local initiatives as long as they do not turn oppositional” (Bayat 2010:55). In addition, in their analysis of informal political institutions, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) go beyond traditional “informal politics” (looking at the “functional” role of informal political activity) to show where informal actions/structures are actually substitutive or competing – i.e. informal activity directly replaces the state. De Soto (1989, 2000) and Chatterjee (2004) see these as alternative sites of economic and political dynamism. However, I distinguish between these understandings to show how both substitutive and competing informalities are actually (for the state) in the long run deeply delegitimizing (Chapter 4).

This research places importance on the presence of a hybrid formal-informal space of action, which enables material redistribution that cannot be managed by official channels alone. However, this research does not view informal political action as a panacea to the state (or, where relevant, the migration regime). Nor is it understood as a new form of citizenship, or a spaces for “true” democracy (Chatterjee 2004 and response by Nelson [forthcoming]). John Friedmann (1992:7) shows that in the current political context the “state continues to be a major player” and “local empowering action requires a strong state”. Thus whilst informal political action produces spaces of agency and “empowerment”, without regulatory mechanisms cases of exploitation can and do emerge. Arif Hasan’s work (1999, 2008; with Raza 2011) and Jan van der Linden (1992) show how *dallals* (middlemen) dominate the urban periphery in Karachi and A. Ercelawn and M. Nauman (2001, 2004) also show how people end up in bonded labour in Pakistan’s brick kilns after taking out “informal” loans at high interest rates from kiln owners. In Chapter 3, this thesis examines how Afghan and Pakistani lives are exploited by informal property developers and human traffickers. In addition, a number of works show the physical
outputs that are produced via informal activity are often sub-standard, unhygienic, and dangerous. For example, Javier Auyero and Debora Alejandra Swistun’s *Flammable Lives* (2009) provide detailed analysis of the “toxic lives” of an Argentine shantytown, which includes poisoning, physical, and physiological implications. Mike Davis’s chapter on *Slum Ecology* in *Planet of the Slums* (2006:121-50) also shows how informal settlements are built on ecologically unstable land that is prone to earthquakes and landslides and severe health risks, contaminated drinking water, and human excremental surplus. Further, this research also provides examples of the challenges of poor informal water supply and poorly constructed houses, which are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Thus, whilst informal actions may appear, in the short-term, as substitutive and dynamic, very often they are riddled with difficulties. And, in the long-term, they create lasting changes to the physical and non-physical composition of political spaces which, ultimately, undermine the legitimacy of the state in its classical desired sense.

Further, unlike other studies on informal politics - including the work of Chatterjee (2004), Bayat (1997, 2010), and Singerman (1995) - this thesis looks in depth at the political implications of non-nationals being a part of informal political sites of action. Informal action is changing political patterns and expressions of political agency, which are now moving in the direction of a shared reality and importance with non-citizens. The fact that non-nationals are central to these informal spheres (empirically and analytically) fundamentally challenges the state’s imagining of itself, and questions the very logic of nationally segregated ways of being. Informal political activity reveals the fallacy of constructed boundaries of citizens versus non-citizen as Afghans and Pakistanis exist in a space that is outside of the traditional realm of the citizen versus non-citizen boundaries.
In addition, the norms of informality also mean that official laws and institutions are undermined as the informal is normalised. Alternative sources of and routes to power and action are understood as more effective than formal legal channels. Material redistribution, property, documentary and financial exchanges all take place away from formal and legal channels (Chapter 5 and 6). Moreover, the legitimacy of the state is deeply eroded as informal activity does not take place in a total absence from the state and instead relies on the illegal and/or corrupt presence of officials turning a blind eye or encouraging informal activity and/or local patrons (landholders and middlemen). Herein lie the macro-political costs of a shared Afghan and Pakistani hybrid formal-informal political repertoire - they dismantle the state. Formal-informal political action erodes the sovereignty, legitimacy, and moral status of the state, and even challenge the norms of the “national order of things” as delineations between citizenship and refugeedom appear inadequate in understanding local political patterns. A dialectical process that bites back at official actors is in effect. At the exact moment of getting what they (officials) want (i.e. a quick-solution to maintaining the state), they contribute towards their own delegitimization. Indeed, it is similar to the principle that Dostoevsky brings to light in Crime and Punishment that the greatest harm done by a criminal, in this case, ironically, the state, is not to the victim but to himself (Dostoevsky 2003[1886]; see Yusuf 2004).

**The Quest for a Humanised Existence**

Critically, in this thesis, unlike the literature on informal politics, the processes of redistribution and protection are *not* simply about “material” goods and rights for Afghans and Pakistanis. Whilst authors such as Asef Bayat show that the redistribution of goods in the face of official shortcomings is a “natural and moral response to[wards] a *dignified* life” (Bayat 1997b:61), this thesis pushes further. The quest for a humanised existence shapes practices of interconnected material and non-material redistribution and is a central (not a background) driver of political
activity. This was captured in the daily language, oral narratives, discussions, stories, and ethnographic observations collected throughout this research where the failures of officialdom are explicitly expressed and understood through the language of “dehumanisation” and not just a material failure of service delivery. Similarly, informal solidarity networks and their accompanying practices of navigation are expressed, remembered, and acted through a non-material language of self-humanisation – of insanīyat (humanity), izzāt (respect), and azmat (dignity).

This thesis understands that all human beings possess, to a degree, an inherent value within them, described either as humanness, a humanised life, or human dignity. This value is shaped by an equal vulnerability of life and a reality of death that touches all human life. In part the “worth” of human life is also possible simply by virtue of being human. Whether from a “theological [Kamali 2010], metaphysical [Kateb 2011], anthropological or even biological argument” it is agreed that “every human being has dignity [worth or “humanness”] from the very beginning and in exactly the same way – just by being human” (Pollman 2010: 250). In addition, this value is shaped by the specific characteristics that a “human” possesses. The characteristics that a human possesses, unlike the animal, include a body that has an intellectual capacity for thought, autonomy and moral rationality,26 an ability to express and experience emotion, engender self-

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26 Ideas of human beings possessing moral autonomy and rationality are rooted in a number of philosophical perspectives. In Enlightenment and Kantian thought, human individuals are differentiated from animals in their capacity to form independent decisions (or in Kantian terms, making the law for itself) - free from external influences - and the capacity to establish moral frames of right and wrong (Kant 2007[1785]; Kerstein 2012; Kaufmann et al., 2012). In addition, in Islamic thought, each individual is considered accountable for his or her own actions through his or her possession of ‘aql (reason). In his analysis of Islamic texts Mohammad Kamali (2010) outlines that the moral autonomy of the individual is evident through teachings that outline, “Every one of you is a guardian and is responsible for what is his custody” (Sahih al-Bukhari IX:256 in Kamali 2010:44). Other authors add that, “rationality was central to the philosophy of Ibn Sina (980-1037), Ibn Rushd (1126-1198), Abu Nasr Farabi (d.950)” (Adib-Moghaddam 2010:72). Whilst in the latter example moral autonomy and rationality are interconnected with attributes conferred to individuals through an existential being, in the former this moral autonomy
respect in the context of larger groups and “within” oneself, as well as personal agency. Thus, rather than arguing that some humans have human dignity and others do not – indeed, all humans have a human value within them –, this thesis focuses on exploring the role of recognition, or misrecognition, and understanding how certain human lives are not recognised as being fully human and as a result being denied the conditions in which the potentials of a human life can be exercised. In other words, it seeks to explore forms of devaluation and dehumanisation that some human beings face, with a particular focus on the role of state actors in Pakistan, how this leads to differences in the distribution of goods, and how these human beings - Afghans and Pakistanis – seek to overcome this through expressions and practices of personal agency and practices of “self-humanisation”.

In The Human Condition (1958), Hannah Arendt outlines that “man”, can “experience meaningfulness only because they can talk and make sense to each other and themselves” (Arendt 1958:8). Self-realisation and self-respect, how individuals view and value themselves, is dependent on the establishment of relationships of mutual recognition, and thus for a human life to be conferred with value, forms of recognition are important – although it is certainly not and rationality emerge from within the human constitution alone (Kant 2007[1775]). Yet despite this difference in both cases to be human is to be able to think through moral and ethical frameworks using rational deductive practices and thought. However, basing ideas of “humanness” solely on concepts of “moral autonomy and rationality” are not without issue. For example, what can be said in cases of individuals with mental disabilities? Are these persons less human? Or what of those who are unable given circumstances of oppression (Freire 1974) or false consciousness (Gramsci 2001) to embody and practice moral autonomy and rational decision making? A need to push further in understanding what it means to “be human” is required.

Indeed Hegel’s “struggle to death” (“where two subjects meet and each is willing to kill the other, thereby risking to be killed himself” [Kuch 2012:39]) is analysed by some as a deep reflection of the human desire for recognition. Further, Judith Butler (1997) highlights that the longing for recognition even forces people to accept conditions of humiliation and insult. “Sometimes we cling to the terms that pain us, because, at a minimum, they offer us some form of social and discursive existence” (Butler 1997:26 in Kuch 2010:76). In Precarious Lives (2004) and Frames of War (2010), Butler goes on to argue that human life cannot be anything but social given the interdependency on other human (and non-human) life (Butler 2010:20). In fact, Butler goes as far as saying that, “the boundary of who I am is the boundary of the body but the boundary of the body never fully belongs to me” (Butler 2010:76).
the only factor, as self-recognition and personal responsibility also have an important role (Pollman 2010). In this study, recognition is conferred on Afghans and Pakistanis in Pakistan via various social groups: friendships (Ring 1990), kin, and clan (CSSR 2005, 2005b, 2006; Monsutti 2005; Chapters 4-6 in this thesis), as well as through personal agency (Pollman 2010). However, in the age of the modern state, recognition is also conferred by the state and other official structures. Political structures are also significant in the recognition - or misrecognition - of these Afghans and Pakistani groups, which is explored in Chapter 3.

When humans are misrecognised and morally excluded (Herman 2010), for example, where individuals or groups are constructed as scapegoats or assumed to possess morally “wrong” characteristics, either because of instrumentalist political manoeuvrings, routes for identity construction, or as a result of the production of fear\(^28\), types of dehumanisation and devaluation occur. Dehumanisation also occurs when a person is not recognised as belonging to the “family of man” (Margalit 1996; Neuhauser 2010; Kuch 2010) via animalisation, or if they are constructed as an objectified machine (Haslam 2006) with characteristics that make up humanness, i.e. being autonomous and morally rational agents, possessing self-worth and agency, not being acknowledged.

In the case of animalisation this is not to argue that animal life has no worth,\(^29\) but it is to look at how the figure of the animal is contextually constructed as possessing a lower value than that of the human, making acts of violence or state apathy easier. For example, when prisoners of Abu

\(^28\) For example, in this study Afghans in Pakistan are constructed by official discourse in Pakistan as “criminals”, “drug-traffickers”, “terrorists”, or “bad Muslims” (Mamdani 2004; Rana 2011) that possess a morally dangerous character, and these are explored in greater depth in Chapter 3.

\(^29\) Indeed, in some contexts animalisation is a sign of veneration, and as Butler (2010) outlines, the interconnectedness of all organic life challenges the logic of anthropomorphic lenses.
Ghraib (Iraq 2006) were made to crawl on all fours or led on leashes, “by treating the bodies of their victims as if they were animals, perpetrators reinforce[d] the belief in their non-humanity” (Oliver 2010:88). Indeed, in this study, various interviewees referred to themselves or poorer neighbours as living like “animals”, or were referred to as such by others, because of extremely low incomes.

In the poorest area here people live like animals (*janwar*). No water, no cleaning, nothing... like animals! (Zareena, KH40).

Have you ever seen a Pakistani jail? They are just trapped rotting (*sarrabe bain*) there… stuck in their own filth. Only God can save them (Abu Zakariya, PXA53).

Again, this is not to say that Afghans or Pakistanis in jails are not human and without human dignity – this is not a judgement that this thesis is seeking to make. However, it is seeking to explore how dehumanisation is constructed and understood through the rhetoric of people interviewed.

In addition, being perceived as an object, or “automaton-like”, as simply data, numbers, or machines (Haslam 2006:58), also means key features of “human nature”, such as rationality and agency, are ignored. Instead, human beings are treated as a *means* rather than an *end*, \(^{30}\) which again make acts of violence easier. Precedents of this type of dehumanisation are seen in examples of

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\(^{30}\) In Kantian frames this instrumentalism is cautioned against: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (Kant 1997[1775]:4:429).
colonial exploitation (Taussig 2002[1984]), black Atlantic slavery, concentration camps (Bauman 1989, Oliver 2010:58-9) and forms of state and colonial torture (Lazreg 2008, Maran 1989; Mosher and Hooks 2005; Rejali 1994; Taussig 2002[1984]). In this thesis such examples include forms of state harassment: verbal and physical abuse; arbitrary detentions; mass arrests; and deportation, as Afghan lives are reduced to simply being barcodes or identity cards they are more easily devalued (Chapter 7). Crucially, however, objectification, alongside animalisation and moral exclusion, also enables other forms of violence, namely structural and indirect violence. This includes forms of violence by urban state’s efforts to “improve” human nature via the “unitisation” of people and scientific processes (Scott 1998) to meet the “higher goal” of modernity, such as bulldozing houses for profit, or to rationally and bureaucratically manage “populations” (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 5).

From a normative position, this thesis argues that all humans should be given access to conditions for survival and flourishing, however, this research shows that whether human lives are provided with the conditions needed to “persist and flourish” is contingent on how lives are understood by the political and social circumstances they inhabit (Butler 2010; Nussbaum and Sen 1993). Judith Butler (2010) explains this by exploring which lives are considered worthy of grieving. Lives that are not considered to be worthy of grief, such as those understood as possessing a lower value via animalisation or objectification (Haslam 2006), are not considered as lives - they may be living but they are something other than human life (Butler 2010). Here, the construction of values by external actors, or what this thesis describes as “ways of seeing” (Chapter 3) by official structures and actors, are crucial in determining the possibilities and restraints of a human life. Suicides from urban poverty (Appendix 11), injuries and deaths from the collapses of informal houses or bulldozing of informal settlements (HRC 2012:246-250; Chapter 5), deaths of Afghans at border crossings (Chapter 7) or in detention cells (Chapter 7)
are unfortunate, but not worthy of grief – for these occur on lives that are not recognised as being fully human in official discourses.

What do they care if our homes are knocked over? We are poor and it is always the poor that die (Group interview with Pakistani residents, Ishtiaq Goth).

No-one cares about Afghan Camp... it’s full of Afghans that’s why there is no water, nothing decent... nothing (Habibullah, KHP13).

In more tangible terms Martha Nussbaum’s and Amartya Sen’s positive capabilities approach, informed by moral philosophy and developmental economics, outlines that all humans should be able to exercise some basic capabilities in order to live a “human” life (Nussbaum and Sen 1993; Nussbaum 2000; Sen 1981, 2005). Nussbaum lists a number of basic “capabilities” that all humans should be entitled to exercise “central human functional capabilities” (Nussbaum 2001:78-80). The list includes:

Life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason, affiliation (being able to live with and towards others and having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation) [and so on] (Nussbaum 2001:78-80).  

31 In addition, Nussbaum adds that the role of the “lawgiver” is to “create a context in which a person might live and, in other words, might choose a flourishing life” (1987:7).
Sen, does not produce a list, concerned that having a “pre-determined canonical list of capabilities, chosen by theorists without any general social discussion or public reasoning” is dangerous (Sen 2004:77; Nussbaum 2000:11-14), but he does outline that some basic capabilities are essential for a good human life, which includes things such as being well nourished or being able to escape avoidable or premature mortality, as well as more complex things such as achieving self-respect or being socially integrated (Sen 1993:30-3). In the cases discussed in this thesis these basic human rights were understood as important factors in enabling persons to practice the potentials of human life.

Importantly, however, these discussions also illuminate that “humanness” (human dignity and a humanised life) must be considered as a potential rather than an inviolable fact. This is made clear by the very fact that a human life can be denied the conditions for “flourishing and persistence” or by the fact that a human life can be dehumanised. Or, in the very least it can be said that different levels of humanisation are possible (given that all humans possess an inherent value within them). In this study, one interview with an Afghan resident, Hajji Hayyat, who lives in an informal refugee camp in Karachi, spoke about conditions in which water was not available for the people who live in the camp (Hajji Hayyat, KHA71). He spoke of the vulnerability of his humanity by, rhetorically asking, “Are we not human?” In another case in Peshawar, interviewees discussed the degrading condition of police harassment and noted, “We [Afghans] are no longer considered as humans” (Abu Haider, PXA51; Naseeb Khan, PXA52; Raheemullah, PXA53).

32 For Sen, “the capability approach to a person’s advantage is concerned with evaluating it in terms of his or her actual ability to achieve various functionings as a part of living” (Sen 1993:30-1). “Functionings” represents the various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life (including basic things such as being well nourished or being able escape avoidable mortality or premature mortality as well as more complex things such as achieving self-respect or being socially integrated) (Sen 1993:30-3). The “capability” of a person reflects the alternative combination of functionings the person can achieve and from which he or she can chose one collection, and each persons “capacity set” is contingent upon a different contextual factors, including personal characteristics and social arrangements (ibid).
Thus for Hajji Hayyat and the group discussion led by Abu Haider, by speaking about having “lost” their humanity they indicate that a humanised existence is not an inviolable and transcendent fact (Oliver 2010). Whilst the living human body constitutes as one level of “life”, to “be human” or “live a humanised life” is a vulnerable value subject to changes. The worth and constitution of a humanised existence, whether understood through forms of human dignity, or humanness, is a continual process. Thus whilst all humans do have an inherent value within them (human dignity) it is not simply “a natural gift that everyone has and cannot lose” (Pollman 2010:258), rather, it is a “fragile possibility, a possibility of human flourishing” (Pollman 2010:258). As Judith Butler outlines:

Let us think of the human as a value and a morphology that is allocated and retracted, aggrandized, personified, degraded and disavowed, elevated and affirmed...When we proclaim some group of beings who have not been considered to be human, we admit that humanness is a shifting prerogative (Butler 2010:76).

The question of whether individuals are ever fully able to unfold this potential or capability is contingent upon the concrete circumstances of our life, which again relate back to the earlier discussion of recognition. “The question is not whether a given being is living or not, nor whether the being in question has the same status of a “person””, rather it is whether the “social conditions of persistence and flourishing are or are not possible” (Butler 2007:20). This is, again, supported by Amartya Sen’s (1980, 1993, 2000) and Martha Nussbaum’s (1987, 1993, 2001) basic capability approaches, which outline that in order to be able to meet the potential of human flourishing some basic conditions are necessary – and, in this thesis for the people interviewed these conditions include things such as water, housing (Chapter 5), and the safety and integrity of the body (Chapter 5-7). What people then choose to do with these basic conditions form various
understandings of a “humanised life” – some may choose to accumulate wealth and material possessions and large families, others may choose an esoteric life – however, a minimal set of conditions are important in ensuring the (vast and various) potentials of human life can at least be striven towards.

Further, the idea of “flourishing” points to the importance of progress - at the individual and species level. The teleological advancement of “the human” - or of “humanity” as a species - on a linear trajectory towards a utopian end goal, or towards consistent “improvement” is easily criticised (El-Ojeli et al., 2009). However, it is clear that human life has the capacity for epistemological and ontological progress in a way that other living organisms do not (evolution aside). This may not always be positive – modern scientific progress has also ensured that humans are the only life form that has developed the capacity for the destruction of all matter on earth (Baumann 1989, 2000, 2004; Scott 1998). But, human life, and to “be human”, is not just about a right to life and a concern for survival. It is also the about the ability to live and strive for an enriched form of life and to push for the advancement of life. “If not then the spirit within him hardens into stone and he is reduced to the level of dead matter” (Iqbal 1968[1930]:12). This perspective can be viewed as a drive towards an improvement of the human episteme and condition. It is also, in part, related to a human desire for gain, flourishing, and improvement – with each of these terms, again, taking multiple forms and meaning (material and non-material). Indeed, in this thesis, in the sphere of informal urban politics, both Afghans and Pakistanis reflected a concern not only with mere survival, they are also concerned with the ability to secure gains and improve their conditions, which was reflected in daily language, expressions, and actions.
Finally, in the modern international political order two entities lay claim to a monopoly over the distribution of rights and goods to provide the conditions for a humanised existence: the modern state, and, increasingly, the international human rights regime, which includes numerous sub-regimes such as the international refugee regime (Chapter 3). Both are expected to and lay claim to offering a protection of rights, rights which are paths for the potentials of humanness to be embodied and practiced. However, when these structures and actors are not effective, both Afghans and Pakistanis turn to other non-state and non-official structures and strategies in their quest for humanity and progress. Personal agency and responsibility, self-respect, formulations of self-worth, and “self-humanisation” are important (Pollman 2010). Even in circumstances in which the value of a human life is attacked, under threat, or humiliated it is possible to assume personal responsibility and contextualise actions to maintain a humanised life.

Whether we keep or lose our dignity is – at least also – due to our ability and power to preserve it (Pollman 2010:258).

Pollman concedes that this may not always be possible. However, in this thesis instances of Afghan and Pakistani agency do take place. Afghans and Pakistanis do not (fully) accept the (in their words) “oppressive”, “devaluing”, and “dehumanising” acts of official actors and institutions. Indeed, even when Afghans and Pakistanis are morally excluded or relegated from the “family of man” by official actors, both Afghans and Pakistanis question these processes - as well as the legitimacy of official actors - in a quest to reassert their agency and thus humanity – both at the level of belief and of action (Bayat 1997, 2010; Scott 1985). The agency of material and non-material redistribution and its accompanying (non-material) rhetoric of “self-humanisation” reflect the continued quest for, and actions of, “humanised lives”.

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Chapter 2: A Counter-Narrative - Objectives, Methodology, and Self-Reflections

Objectives
This thesis was researched and is written in order to provide a counter-narrative to the dominant imaginings of Afghans in Pakistan and at a global level as either the “exemplary victim”, i.e. “helpless” refugees with limited agency, or as one-dimensional sources of “terror” in the context of the current “GWOT”. It is also written with the aim of recording political and historical processes that have been side-lined or typecast in recent history, including a near silence on the cases of large scale police harassment of Afghans (2007-2012; see Chapter 7). Simultaneously, through its analysis of the shared lives that urban poor Pakistanis share with Afghans, this thesis is equally about providing a counter-narrative against imaginings of urban poor Pakistanis as one-dimensional sites of “criminality”, “danger”, or “helplessness”. By using voices that are side-lined in dominant narratives in and outside of Pakistan, this thesis aims to provide a fuller picture of how the Pakistani state, global migration regimes, and citizens and non-citizens “function” (or do not) in urban Pakistan, and also discuss why constructions of “danger” are used in the first place (Chapter 3 and 7). By doing so I hope to question the way in which hegemonic political actors work – the state and international institutions - triggering a much needed debate for possible alternatives to current forms of governance (both in and beyond Pakistan), i.e. a less mechanised, objectifying, and dehumanising form of governance which is inclusive of refugees, illegal immigrants, and the urban poor.

A Note on the Cities: Choosing Karachi and Peshawar
This study is not a comparative study of two cities. It is a comparative study of citizens and non-citizens. Nevertheless, two cities in Pakistan were used as sites of study, Karachi and Peshawar. These two cities were chosen for a number of reasons. First, both cities have historically been home to sizeable Afghan populations, although Peshawar has had a much larger Afghan
population (Connor 1987; CSSRb). Second, both cities are home to spaces of informality, including a large number of informal housing settlements (Hasan 1992, 2006; Hasan and Mansoor 2012; Linden and Selier 1991), informal utility access (N.Ahmed 2008; Hasan 2006), informal migration networks (Azam 2009; Befare 2009; Mehdi 2010; Sadiq 2009), and informal financial and trade practices (Hasan et al., 2002; Irfan et al., 1999). Thirdly, Karachi and Peshawar were chosen to question dominant narratives within Pakistan. The first is that Afghans are “at home” in Peshawar. Peshawar is the “world’s largest and oldest Pashtun city”, as such it holds significance in both Afghan Pashtun and Pakistani Pashtun ethno-nationalist discourse. Certainly shared historic, ethno-linguistic and cultural affinities across the boundaries of the modern Afghan and Pakistani states are expressed by many Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns, as well as non-Pashtuns. However, to say that Afghans are “at home” in the city is to obfuscate the impact that the modern Afghan and Pakistani states have had on shifting conceptions of “Pashtun-ness”; “Afghan-ness”; and “Pakistani-ness”. Colonial and post-colonial encounters in Afghanistan, British India and post-Partition Pakistan have made borders, territory, and sedentarised identities more rigid, which the Afghan and Pakistani state seek to uphold. Thus, whilst some commentators assume that Afghans in Peshawar are, effectively, at “home” this thesis shows that in some cases, specifically that of “security” (Chapter 7) this is not the case. In fact, to be an Afghan in Peshawar is to be susceptible to specific forms of state violence. In

33 At its peak in the late 1980s and early 1990s figures show that there were 61-2 RTVs in Peshawar alone with an Afghan population of over 460,000 registered refugees in the city’s RTVs. However, this figure did not include Afghans living outside of RTVs (CCAR 1987). Currently there are 15 RTVs in Peshawar and a population of 272,239 in these RTVs, although again this statistic does not include Afghans living outside of the RTV (Befare 2011). In addition many Afghans were and are living across the wider Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. In Karachi, official documents from the 1980s show that there was one RTV (CCAR 1987) with a population fluctuating between 18,000-to-19,000 (CCAR 1987). However, this low figure is explainable by the fact that historically little attention has been provided to Karachi’s Afghans. Later figures in the 2000s officially stated that Karachi was home to over 100,000 Afghans (SAFRON et al., 2005), which was not inclusive of unregistered Afghans in Karachi. In a 2009 study the numbers of illegal Afghans are quoted as 1 million (Befare 2009:54). Whilst this figure appears to be a high estimate, I was told in interviews and discussions with residents and officials that over there are anything from 100,000-400,000 illegal Afghan migrants living in Karachi.
Pakistan’s case the state is concerned about reasserting the legitimacy of the territorial boundary of the Durand Line, which is why it is so keen on excluding Afghans in Peshawar, i.e. to eliminate the threat of Pashtun nationalism that dominated Pakistani security concerns until the 1970s (Banerjee 2000; Haroon 2007; Hewitt 1996; Tarzi 2012). Interconnected with this, it is also concerned about maintaining its own fragile internal ethnic balance, which Afghan Pashtuns - who are understood as automatic allies of Pakistani Pashtuns – threaten. Further, the state is concerned with ensuring that it, the Pakistani state, is understood as being distinct from Afghans and Afghanistan because of the US-led military occupation of Afghanistan. Whilst individuals are able to transcend boundaries citizenship the state, in light of local, regional, and global power politics, is less willing to do so. Moreover, the interchangeable use of Afghan and Pashtun as being the same - which is what forms the basis for assumptions that all Afghans are at home in Peshawar - is itself problematic as it obfuscates the significance of non-Pashtun Afghans to constructions of “Afghan-ness”, which in this thesis include: Afghan Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Mughals, and others. This also reinforces what Shah Mahmoud Hanifi (2012; 2012b) refers to as an oversimplification of Afghan history and society, which Hanifi relates to colonial influences of standardization, as well as a “post-colonial” project of Afghan nation-building, which have tended to be overly “Pashtunised” and ignored the significance of a “Persianate” character and influence.  

Further, I also wish to reemphasise the historical presence and position of Afghans in Karachi (see Chapter 5). Whilst some media reports and visits by political actors (Bhutto 2011) have

34 In an article discussing “The Quandaries of the Afghan Nation”, Shah Mahmoud Hanifi (2012:100) states, “It has long been common intellectual practice to lump together the categories Afghan, Pashtun, and Pathan. However, once data-driven, historically, and theoretically informed questions about the relationships among Afghan, Pashtuns, and Pathans are asked, the house of cards that is their unison begins to collapse”. Although Hanifi's focus is mainly analysing this conundrum in relation to the modern Afghan state, his questioning also applies across the border and in the transnational spaces of “Pashtun”/“Pathan”/ “Afghan” identity between the Afghan and Pakistani states.

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taken place in Karachi’s Afghan areas (specifically Afghan Camp), the presence of Afghans in Karachi has been almost completely side-lined in any political analysis of the Afghan refugee presence in Pakistan, which has instead focused on large Afghan demographics in Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). An exception to this is a CCSR report on Afghan migration in Karachi (CSSR 2005b).

Finally, I aim to bring to the discussions of Karachi’s politics Pakistani Pashtun voices. The majority of recent scholarship on Karachi has produced rich academic work on the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) (N.Khan 2010; Siddiqi 2012; Verkaaik 1994; - in Hyderabad see: Verkaaik 2004), Karachi’s “Muhajir” history (Jalal 1990; Zamindar 2007; Wright 1991), urban affairs (Hasan 2002, 2006, 2010; Ring 1990), and “ethnic violence” (Yusuf 2012). This also applies to other dominant/public media and literature productions, such as the Citizens Archive Project (CAP) in Karachi, which is a local oral history project geared around remembering, recording and, it can be argued, constructing ideas of shanakht (identity), based on a dominant Muhajir-Punjabi discourses. These academic and public spaces of knowledge production have contributed to their fields, but they also act as discursive vehicles that reproduce dominant discourses that are not inclusive of Pakistani Pashtun voices, amongst others, reducing them to mere background vignettes. This “backgrounding” of political Pashtun voices cannot be separated from the political and cultural context of Karachi. It reflects the fact that Pakistani Pashtun areas in Karachi which, it must be added, are never purely Pashtun areas, are contextually stereotyped as “dangerous” sites for ethnographic fieldwork (as well as government initiatives – see Chapter 3), and less socio-economically developed. This means that many “Pashtun” areas receive less attention in academic and political discourse. Secondly, much of the academic scholarship on the MQM, Karachi’s experience of Partition, or even projects such as CAP are produced by people who are Indian migrants to Pakistan, or their children, or often
socio-economically better placed Punjabis. This helps to explain why the “Pashtun” voice in Karachi appears “quieter” in academic and civil-society projects.\textsuperscript{35} This includes either being a part of academia, media, political or civil society organisations or having the social, economic and cultural networks (Bourdieu 1981, 1985) that could attract the attention of researchers, the media and so on.\textsuperscript{36} Thus, for a more holistic, reflexive, and inclusive understanding of “Pakistani” history the voices of Pashtuns, Balochis, Sindhis, Kashmiris, Chitrals, Bangledeshis, Somalis, Afghans, women, the urban poor, religious minorities, or sexual minorities, and so on, I argue, must be given space. This study cannot cover all of these angles, but it makes an attempt to understand the position of Afghans, urban poor Pakistanis, and within this Pakistani Pashtuns as a minor effort to address existing gaps.

**Methodology**
Where positivistic approaches to state-making, political science, and historical “truths” give significance to the archival document, maps, statistics, policy papers, and quantifiable and measurable facts, what is left of the lives beyond these categorisations of knowledge? What of those who do not appear on these maps, statistics, and policy papers - do their lives count? Moreover, in a study of informality, which is undocumented by officialdom, how are sites of “knowing” illuminated? Feminist, post-colonial, and Marxist literature has gone a long way in questioning dominant narratives of “truth production”, showing how the claims to “truth” cannot be separated from forms of power and political control (Adib-Moghaddam 2010; Butler 1993; Cohn 1987, 1996; Fanon 1963; Guha 1997; Hobsbawm 1974; Said 1978). Influenced by these approaches, this thesis uses oral interviews and narratives and a multi-sited ethnographic

\textsuperscript{35} For example, a recent CAP project is collecting with the oral narratives of the experience of Punjabi and Indian migrants during Partition. However, it offers no space for alternative voices, of Pakistani Pashtuns, Afghans, Bangledeshis, and others.

\textsuperscript{36} This can be compared with other areas in Pakistan where a vast, rich, and detailed analysis of “Pashtun” political, ethnographic, and historical analysis has taken place as a result of stronger social, economic and cultural capital: See Akbar (2004); A. Ahmed (2006); Barth (1965); Lindholm (1996); Marsden (2005).
approach to engage with voices that have previously been ignored to question the dominant “ways of knowing”, which have led to the marginalisation of an Afghan and a Pakistani urban poor presence in Pakistan.

During 2010, 2011, and part of 2012, I collected oral interviews in Peshawar and Karachi – other locations, including Attock, Nowshera, Khyber Agency, and Islamabad were also used, however, the prime locations for this thesis are Peshawar and Karachi. Oral history interviews were conducted with Afghan and Pakistani candidates in official urban refugee tented villages (RTVs), unofficial RTVs, urban regulated residential areas, urban informal residential areas (squatter settlements/ katchi abadis), and in some cases the urban bazaar. Interviews took place in a semi-structured format, which meant that I had a set range of questions I covered (Appendix 4), but the format and style of questioning and discussion varied in each interview. In the majority of cases the interview style was not completed as a formal questionnaire. From my own experiences of having been surveyed as an “ethnic minority” in the UK and in a climate of suspicion surrounding state and non-state surveys in Pakistan, I was aware that being overly directive and formal in my approach could lead to “performed” interviews and responses, with me seeking what I wanted to hear and interviewees telling me what they thought I wanted to hear. Instead, I learnt the questions and topics I wanted to ask by heart and would ask questions as interviews progressed, adding questions when needed or just letting the conversation run its course – this was important as I also wanted to be informed of some of the issues that interviewees understood as being important. For example, when I started field work I had no inclination that the issue of police and security force harassment would be such a dominant issue in Afghan lives. However, after a period of fieldwork it became apparent that that this was one of the biggest issues Afghans faced - motivating amendments in my research questions.
Further, interviews were either conducted as one-on-one, family, or group interviews. Some interviews were brief (15-30 minutes). Others were longer ranging from 30-60 minutes, 2-3 hours, and 4-6 hours (completed with breaks). Some interviews, usually the longer ones, were also repeated a number of times, either over a period of hours, days, weeks, and months – eventually becoming interlinked with my ethnographic approach. Whilst the shorter interviews did not reveal as much detail as the longer interviews, they still proved useful in verifying, confirming, or disputing findings from longer interviews and ethnographic observations.

In total 385 interviews were completed. 59.74% interviews were with Afghans (41.04% Afghan male and 18.70% Afghan female) and 40.26% were with Pakistanis (23.64% male and 16.62% female), with a roughly equal number of interviews completed in Karachi and Peshawar (191 in Karachi and 194 in Peshawar). And, in Karachi 39.74% of all Pakistanis interviewed in Karachi were (Pakistani) Pashtun. Further details can be found in Appendix 1-4. The samples used were not controlled and as such the samples are not equal to each other, and nor are they proportionately representative of various Afghan and Pakistani groups in both cities - especially by ethnicity or gender. Given the qualitative nature of this study, which also combined ethnographic observations, this shortcoming was, however, somewhat unavoidable and should not take away from findings.

As mentioned, a multi-sited ethnography was also important to this study. This involved me living, spending time and working in various residential areas (regulated and unregulated), RTVs, completing household interactions, speaking to various “community leaders”, travelling across both the cities, surveying neighbourhoods, observing government and UNHCR enumeration

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37 Group interviews were interviews with two or more people, either friends, colleagues, and/or some family members.
techniques, and observing, and occasionally experiencing, Pakistani policing techniques. Both interviews and ethnographic observations were possible through contacts in social networks (friendship and family) or by engaging with relevant governmental and nongovernmental organisations, all of whom had prior knowledge of the areas and communities from which participants were selected.

Where possible, interviews and narratives were recorded using a Dictaphone and later transcribed and translated into English. However, given the sensitivity of some topics i.e. security or violence, and in cases where I felt the interviewee was cautious of my position as a researcher, I did not use the Dictaphone. 38 In many cases, I wrote the answers for interviews by hand during the interview process and would write up the interview in greater detail once I had returned to my accommodation in Karachi or Peshawar. 39 This technique of on-the-day writing was also used for my field notes and ethnographic observations as much as possible. Urdu and Pashto, and occasionally English and Farsi were used - interlocutors were used if and when necessary. In most cases interviews with Afghans were conducted in Urdu with my use of Pashto being mainly reserved for introductions and general ice-breaking. This use of Urdu was possible as most Afghans have lived in Pakistan for over 20 years 40 and can speak Urdu; however, variations in the ability to speak Urdu because of gender, “ethnicity”, and “wealth” were apparent. This use of Urdu was even completed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where Pashto is the lingua franca. The Urdu used was not “classical” Urdu, however, once interviewees were comfortable with my position (I would say, “I am not Urdu-speaking” myself), they would feel less conscious and more confident.

38 For example, in one case I conducted interviews in an informal housing area in Peshawar that had faced a number of police raids. Only after return visits, were those who had been initially sceptical, satisfied (to a degree) that I was not a member of the intelligence services – and even after this I was not comfortable using the Dictaphone.

39 Some of the interviews that were recorded on tape were only translated once I returned from fieldwork.

40 The majority of my interviews were with Afghans who had lived in Pakistan between 20-34 years.
of speaking. In some cases the support of a translator, either someone from the family I was interviewing, the local area, or a companion proved useful. However, problems of translation and expression must be accounted for. More crucially, as much of the postcolonial literature informs us (Said 1978; Abu-Lughod 1993[1986]), this issue of “translation” was not just related to an issue of language. My own position - how I was perceived, and *how I perceived* – also influenced the information which was shared with me, or not, and what I recorded, or not.

I also completed interviews with official Pakistani and Afghan government representatives and institutions, former leaders and members of Afghan political parties - mainly former anti-Soviet resistance members in Pakistan -, representatives of international bodies working for Afghans – such as UNHCR -, and lawyers in Pakistan. In addition, I used an archival and documentary approach, which included accessing archives and/or current government and refugee regime documents. This included: handbooks; policy papers; reports; internal memos; government treaties; official local housing maps; archived newspaper reports from the 1980s and 1990s and online newspaper reports from the 2000s; legal court rulings from provincial high courts and local magistrate courts; legal aid cases; and human rights reports (see Bibliography and Appendices).

**Self-Reflections**

My own position and objectives framed the responses I was given (or not given) as well as how I absorbed and analysed (or not) interviews and observations. Questions over when exactly my ethnographic observations started are ones that I, as a quasi-insider/quasi-outsider, continually asked myself. Did they start during my childhood experiences in Pakistan, with Afghan family
friends and neighbours? Are they informed/motivated by my own family’s “urban poor informal life” in Pakistan (by my mother’s recollections of living on “hand outs” - when the neighbours would give them pukoras, yogurt, and wheat for roti or when they took my Kashmiri grandmother in, after she had - and has - no means of supporting herself)? Are my research concerns regarding police harassment and immigration also informed by an “outsider” environment of racial politics in London? Or are my research concerns shaped by my lens as a member of a “third world” diaspora in the “developed” world? I am sure these factors have influence, in their own complex way. Yet these statements are not made to take away from this work and its academic validity. Rather, in the spirit of transparency, they tie me to my work and allow the reader to understand more fully the position from which I write.

Turning to my position during the actual time of fieldwork, a woman in her mid-20s, unmarried, raised in the UK, Muslim, half-Pakistani (Kashmiri-Punjabi), and half East African-Indian-Yemeni, dressed in purdah speaking Urdu, occasionally Pashto, coming from a higher education institution in London, conducting research alone, working in RTVs or katchi abadis, praying salah and eating in people’s homes, provides an interesting assault on the purity of the “insider-outsider” predicament that has been raised by a number of anthropologists (Abu-Lughod 1993[1986]). It also outlines the possibilities of possessing multiple locations and sites of affinity and “identity”, which appear to be increasing with the norms of transnationalism and globalisation (Koser et al., 2002; Monsutti 2005).

41 Indeed in some case I conducted interviews with people that my family has known since the late 1980s.
42 In this context race includes religion.
43 Usually I wore shalwar kimer as I normally would in Pakistan, but usually with a bigger chadar that could cover my face and hair, or, I would wear a headscarf and niqab in-one as some women do (a trend which has increased in middle-upper class “religious” families). I do not wear a headscarf outside of the UK, and would explain this to people if they asked – in case people assumed I was performing religious piety through my dress. This was generally however, understood as a cultural difference and not understood as a question-mark on my “piety”.

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Throughout my fieldwork, I tried to remain, as much as possible, transparent in my position, background, and the objectives of my research. The ethical pressures of being responsible for the production of a form of knowledge and history continually forced me, and force me, to clarify and conceptualise the purpose of my work, which I shared with interviewees as I conducted my research, and am attempting to share with the readers of this thesis now. During fieldwork this included being open, as much as possible, about my “ethnicity(ies)”, “religion”, “class”, and education and background. I tried, as much as possible to avoid “performing” in certain ways as a short cut to trust as much as I could. Thus even in highly politicised contexts, where being “Pakistani” and/or a “foreigner”, depending on which identity “dominated”, could be perceived negatively, I felt an ethical imperative to be clear about my background if this information was asked; and I would usually share this information even if not prompted. 44 This was because I felt that I was asking to be privileged with quite personal details of people’s personal lives and did not want to have an unfair “advantage” so to speak. As much as I was asking and observing, I understood the need for others to ask and observe my own position. And, perhaps from an idealist’s lens, i.e. to produce a more inclusive narrative, I felt that the objectives of this work would be able to transcend forms of compartmentalisation and categorisation in which predicaments of being an “insider”, “outsider” along lines of nationality, ethnicity, gender, religion, or class predominate.

Importantly, as mentioned above, my background and the multi-sited nature of my fieldwork challenge the “insider-outsider” predicament and simultaneously show how multiple sites of

44 Only in certain circumstances when I, and/or the friends of colleagues I was with were conscious or privy to information regarding security did I withhold information. For example, in one instance I had started conducting fieldwork in an area that was rumoured to be involved in kidnappings, when a threat of violence was made against me. Only once I had built up enough trust and spent enough time in the area did I reveal fuller details about myself.
affinity and “identity” can be occupied. This was also influenced by me introducing my family to people during fieldwork – at a few junctures this was in person or on the phone, but usually it was through mentioning them in conversation. Working in an environment in which family matters I was conscious of making people aware of where I was staying, i.e. with family and with the consent of my parents and the family networks I had in Pakistan. This was important because as an unmarried Muslim woman, a “quasi-insider”, my reputation and whether I was considered trustworthy or not was influenced by the security my family network provided. (It was also an important way of me maintaining my own security\(^{45}\)). In addition, it was my own way of humanising myself to avoid appearing as an “automaton like” researcher (Haslam 2006). These different factors, as well as the multi-sited approach of my work, meant that during fieldwork at many times I was an “insider” and “outsider” at exactly the same moment (Abu-Lughod 1993[1986]), and sometimes neither. During interviews with Afghan households I could be an “insider” despite not being Afghan because I was Muslim, non-(full) Pakistani\(^{46}\) and/or a non-“Westerner”. Because of this I was given access to information regarding Pakistani police harassment and/or activities of the former mujabidin during the Soviet War, and/or criticism of US-led military action in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or the significance of religious ethics in shaping people’s lives - indeed on some occasions I was explicitly told it did. But at the exact same moment because I was an “outsider”, i.e. a non-Afghan women, the rules of gender did not always apply. Often I was able to sit in the male section of a household and interview senior community leaders being the only woman in a room with a number of senior (in age) men.

\(^{45}\) This applied particularly in the case of Pakistani security officials. In Peshawar, for example, I was accosted (as is often the case) by Pakistani intelligence officials. Only once they had realised I was staying with a “good” family (the “Uncle”, i.e. family friend I was staying with is a doctor), from a good neighbourhood (which they saw after “visiting” our home a few times), were they satisfied and did not monitor me any longer.

\(^{46}\) In some cases, particularly through patrilineal lenses, my father’s heritage was held in greater significance than my mother’s.
In other cases, the “insider” or “outsider” role appeared more dominant and played either a restrictive or facilitating role. As an “insider” and an unmarried woman I would usually leave field work at/before *maghrib* prayers, and would not stay overnight in people’s homes. Instead throughout fieldwork I stayed in the homes of family and/or family friends. Once, I took my mother with me to the house of a family I had been interviewing in an informal housing area after the family had formally invited me to their home after long periods of time interviewing them. However, after having met my mother and having been a guest in their house, I became a “family member” and was discouraged from talking to many men of the household as I had previously been doing. In other cases, “*Angraizi marna*” (“hitting some English” or “speaking English with an English accent”), put me in the position of an “outsider” to facilitate access to bureaucratic systems and appointments with senior officials or I/NGO workers, highlighting the continued subtleties of a “Developed vs. Developing World” hierarchy that operate in bureaucratic Pakistan. Yet on another occasions it acted as a restrictive tool as I was questioned as being an intelligence agent.

Each set of interviews and observations in this multi-sited and multi-method process of fieldwork, thus, varied, and I have tried to provide vignettes that reflect this throughout the thesis. Any researcher will face their own set of challenges, be it of an “insider”, “outsider”, “quasi-insider”, or anything else. The challenge lies in trying to see and be seen to accept these positions while also seeing and beyond these categories. Whilst affinities and attachments remain, an effort to transcend these and hear (and be a part of) human stories must be pursued.

Finally, the challenges of finding the “right” candidate to interview, choosing what to include (or not) in the body of this thesis must be accounted for. During fieldwork I found myself asking,
“Does he/she/they understand my questions and what I am trying to investigate?”; “Do I understand what is being said and why”; and, perhaps from a more challenging perspective for myself: “Am I asking the right questions?”; “Is my thesis missing the point?”; “How will I “translate” these lives into a meaningful thesis?” Whilst observations about what is happening can be made, the scenes described, and a surface level analysis completed, is a full understanding possible?

From my own work, the example of an interview completed with an Afghan female doctor compared to an Afghan male daily labourer is informative. I understood the doctor’s interview at the time to be “better” than the daily labourer’s, at least on the surface. But why was this? Because the doctor, as a woman, as someone from a shared educational background, and as someone who understood my questions and agreed with my perspective of a voice needing to be heard, spoke from a position and in a language that I could understand – more than the daily labourer? Thus I find myself asking, can you really understand unless you are speaking the same language, which is not just restricted to language per se, but also includes the language of symbols, and social, economic, and cultural capital? Perhaps not. But that should not prevent needed political analysis. Instead, it remains crucial to be responsible and reflective on my own positions and the lives I have been let into during fieldwork; to accept the shortcomings of my research, to be conscious in the field and during this writing process of my shortcomings. And, with this, to still push, to the best of my abilities, for the production of a political analysis that, it is hoped, can lead to a more humanised existence - for all of us.
Chapter 3: A Dehumanising State: Afghans and Devalued Pakistanis in Karachi and Peshawar

We fought the war funded and supported by the USA. But they used us – we were not treated as human beings, just as a tissue paper. Something that could be picked up and thrown away in an instant.

Son of Afghan mujabidin party leader, Jamaat ud Dawa (interview: Maulana Jamil ur Rehman, 2011).

Government official: Last year [2010] it is estimated that 108,000 Afghans were repatriated. But recycling\(^\text{47}\) remains an issue.

Interviewer: Recycling? In terms of [waste collection] jobs?

Government official: No, of them. Recycling of Afghans across the border is a big issue, because they cross over the border [into Afghanistan] but they return.

CCAR official, Islamabad.

Introduction
This chapter first details the legal responsibilities and the moral and political expectations related to enabling and safeguarding a humanised existence that lie with the state and, increasingly, with international institutions (primarily the UN and its sub-bodies). Next it shows how structural shortcomings and the incompetence of officialdom mean that official actors cannot deliver to refugees, illegal immigrants, and citizens the goods they are due, which results in a denial of the conditions needed for human flourishing. However, it then shows how these shortcomings are

\(^{47}\)“Recycling” (in English) is also used in official Pakistani government documents for Afghans in Pakistan, as an example, the 2010-2012 Afghan Management and Repatriation Strategy (SAFRON 2010).
informed by the ways in which Afghans and Pakistanis are seen and understood by official actors. These “ways of seeing”, essentially different forms of recognition, exclusion, or misrecognition, are assessed on three levels: (1) lenses of national and ethnic exclusion; (2) the objectification of Afghan and Pakistani bodies as “units” or “tools” - either for bureaucratic and modernisation plans or forms of political instrumentalism -, and (3) constructions of “exemplary suffering”. Afghans and Pakistanis are, thus, similarly devalued by officialdom, which creates a shared space of existence between the two.

**Responsibilities, Expectations and Failings of the State and International Institutions in Karachi and Peshawar**

In the modern international political order two main entities claim responsibility and are expected to distribute and protect the rights and goods for humanised conditions of existence: the modern state and, increasingly, the international human rights regime, which includes numerous sub-regimes such as the migration and refugee regime.

**International Regimes and the State’s Relationship with Refugees**

Realist scholars argue that international law and institutions do not work (Mearshiener 1994/5) and others argue they reflect new forms of imperialism (Bhagwati 2002; Paris 2002). However, it is clear that international norms (Bull 1977), laws, and institutions (Keohane and Nye 1989) have a presence in modern politics. International human rights laws via the United Nations (UN) Charter (1945) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948), intergovernmental organisations (such as the UN and its sub-bodies) have influence. Their presence has constructed new norms in international politics and they themselves implement political, social, and economic programmes. For some scholars this is explained in the language of “civil society” – at a local and/or a global level, which is evident through the proliferation of international and national nongovernmental organisations (I/NGOs) (Cohen and Arato 1992). In these processes
the state remains the ultimate sovereign, but international institutions and I/NGOs legitimise their existence through a space of moral politics which means they assume responsibility and create expectations to safeguard basic rights for all humans irrespective of citizenship. The UN Charter contains a number of human rights provisions, including:

Promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion (UN Charter, Article 1:3).

And of course Pakistan is a signatory to a number of international human rights agreements making the Pakistani state responsible to dispense and safeguard basic human rights to all people – citizens and non-citizens - within its territorial borders.

For Afghans in Pakistan, the emergence of an international refugee/migration regime has been particularly crucial. Refugees operate outside of the modern state system but are offered some protection via UNHCR and the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Pakistan is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, however, the GOP “conforms” to their “universally accepted principles and practices” (SAFRON and CCAR 1984:1). In 1979 the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees (CAR) in Pakistan was established (prior to this Afghan refugees were)

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48 This is either by directly humanitarian intervention, via aid programmes, or pressures on government actors, and includes support programmes for refugees and “excluded” or “vulnerable” citizens, such as internally displaced people (IDPs).

49 This includes being a signatory to: UDHR (although the UDHR is not considered legally enforceable), Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) (B Khan 2012:23-4), and United Nations Habitat Istanbul Declaration for Adequate Housing (UNHABITAT 2012).

50 UNHCR (2011) outlines that it protects 33.9 million people, which includes “10.55 million refugees; 837,500 asylum seekers; 197,600 [repatriating] refugees[…]; 14.7 million IDPs; 2.9 million IDPs [returnees]; 3.5 million stateless persons; and 1.3 million others of concern”.

51 “Due to the particularity of the situation and the varying numbers of registered Afghans in different parts of Pakistan, the activities of CAR differ in each province” (B. Khan 2012:106). However, CAR has offices in each of the four provinces of Pakistan, and the federal-level Chief Commissionerate for Afghan
managed under the Home Department in the GOP) and in 1980 a federal ministry for the States and Frontiers Regions (SAFRON) also assumed a presence via policy setting and control over CAR. In a thorough piece of legal analysis regarding Afghans in Pakistan, Mohammad Bhehzad Khan (2012:107-8) summarises that CAR is the main government body responsible for contributing to policy formulation for registered Afghans.

[CAR is responsible for the] implementation of such policies, including management and coordination of voluntary repatriation activities with UNHCR, supervision of district-level administration, establishment and administration of Afghan self-help organizations, and coordination with different government departments, UN agencies and I/NGOs. [CAR also] oversees and monitors the provision of a range of goods and services – including, but not limited to, health care, education, shelter, livelihoods, vocational training, and legal aid – to registered Afghans by UN agencies and I/NGO’s (ibid).

CAR is a government department with the status of a department attached to SAFRON and is funded by both UNHCR and the GOP to advance the responsibilities the GOP has accepted towards Afghans in Pakistan in line with the international migration framework. The GOP, influenced by international norms has accepted a legal, as well as moral and political, responsibility towards Afghans. Importantly, this responsibility was heavily encouraged during the 1980s when Afghan bodies were a useful tool in efforts to defeat the Soviet Union, at which

Refugees (CCAR) is based in Islamabad, with CCAR coordinating policy at the national level. CAR’s provincial offices in KPK (Peshawar) and Balochistan (Quetta) were established in 1979, along with the CCAR (B. Khan 2012:106-7). The Punjab (Lahore) office was set up in 1982, and Sindh (Karachi) in 2003 (B. Khan 2012:107-8). All C/CAR offices work under the policy direction of Ministry of SAFRON and in collaboration with UNHCR. Given the size of the registered Afghan population in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, CAR’s office in Peshawar is a large bureaucratic structure compared to CAR Sindh. CAR Sindh was established in 2003 (ibid), however, CAR Sindh’s administrative structure is unique in comparison to other CAR bodies because it works with the Afghan Refugees Repatriation Cell (ARRC), a government entity that is charged with overseeing the affairs of registered Afghans in Sindh alongside CAR. Interviews were conducted with CAR in Sindh, ARRC, CAR Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and CCAR Islamabad.
point the GOP promoted itself as the “ansar” (helpers) and guardians of Afghans (Baitenmann 1990).

UNHCR is the other major actor, with supporting implementing partners, that works alongside CAR and is institutionally present in Pakistan. UNHCR has been present in Pakistan since 1980 and, as mentioned, remains a major source of funding for CAR. UNHCR sees itself as

52 Other Afghan institutional actors based in Pakistan responsible to Afghans, include the GOA as represented by the Afghan Consulate in all four provinces of Pakistan and the federal capital, Islamabad, as well as the Ministry of Afghan Refugee Repatriation (MORR). However, the role of both organisations is primarily diplomatic, consular, or bureaucratic, i.e. attesting documents (the consulate), or overseeing the renewal processes for identity cards via refugee repatriation programmes (MORR). In addition, during the Soviet-Afghan War, the Unity of Islamic Resistance was also recognised as the legitimate government of Afghanistan in exile by the GOP, USA, Government of Saudi Arabia, Government of Kuwait, and other anti-Soviet states. Seven main parties in Pakistan were recognised by these states, Hizb e Islami, Gulbudin Hekmatyar; Hizb e Islami, Younis Khalis; Jamiat e Islami, Burhan Rabbani (and Ahmed Shah Massoud); Ittehad al Islami, Abdul Rasul Sayaaaf; Harakat e Inqilab e Islami, Maulana Mohammad; Mahaz e Milli Islami ye Afghanistan, Sayyid Ahmed Gilani; (Shia Hazara Hezb i Wahdat, Abdul Ali Mazari were backed by Iran). Other “smaller” resistance parties were present in Pakistan, and as interviewees explained much of the strength of the Afghan resistance to the Soviet Union was based on highly localised armed resistance at the town and village level within Afghanistan (interviews with: Hajji Khairuddin, PXA71; Engineer Aziz, PXA59; Abu Zakariya, PXA54; Ismail Ibrahimii, PXA55; Hajji Farukh, PXA56; Jamshed Ali, PXA57; Abu Haider PXA51; Nawar Saleh, PXA99; Hajji Saroush, KHA72; Yahya Din, PXA101. See also interview: Rehman (2011). However, these seven parties were given importance for strategic reasons by the GOP, USA, and other allies; and it was usually these parties that coordinated the smaller parties and actors when it came to external funding. Some interviewees also said the multiple party organisation (i.e. the seven resistance parties) was purposefully promoted to keep Afghan nationalism divided (ibid). See also Abou Zahab and Roy (2004); Grese (2003) Guzzini (2009b:44). The seven resistance parties had their own schools and published a school curriculum separate to those produced by international NGOs and UNHCR affiliated schools (some of these are included in the bibliography), and even universities were present until the 2000s – such as Hekmatyar’s University Dawat ul Jihad in Hayatabad, Peshawar. In an interview with former mujahid with Hizb e Islami (Khalis faction) in Peshawar, I was told, “I used to get basic things, bread, soap, some food. These would be given to us by an elder of the tanzeem, the tanzeem head. But it was usually for the poorest people and for those who had been fighting” (Nowroz Beg, PXA35). In another interview in Peshawar with a group of men who had fought for different parties during the war I was told, “They only worked directly like this with a few selected houses. People would get soap, and dates from the arties but it was usually typical only for party people to get things directly. You had priority to receive things if you were from the party. For the Majabidin it was a difficult time and of course for those that were actively involved they got most support” (Abu Haider, PXA51). Thus, despite offering some relief the resistance parties were not consistent or fully effective. Institutions such as UNHCR remained important in the Afghan experience in Pakistan, and not all Afghan were registered with the seven parties.
“imparting ‘protection by presence’ in Pakistan, i.e. a strategy whereby an international humanitarian presence provides assistance while at the same time contributing to the deterrence of human rights abuses” (B Khan 2012:104). UNHCR’s presence in Pakistan for Afghans is to protect “registered Afghans in Pakistan through advocating for and facilitating durable solutions i.e. voluntary repatriation to Afghanistan, resettlement to third countries, or local integration” (UNHCR 2012). UNHCR’s current activities in Pakistan include “registration of Afghans and provision of Proof of Registration (POR) cards and birth certificates” as well as “encouraging empowerment and self-reliance”, “distribute[ing] relief and assistance to disaster affected registered Afghans alongside Pakistani citizens” and the “provision of basic needs and essential services – in collaboration with CAR and I/NGO partners – in the areas of water and sanitation, shelter, primary health care, and education” (B Khan 2012:104-5). UNHCR is thus expected to defend rights and deliver goods and protection (to some degree) to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. It is meant to fill in for the absent Afghan state, and alongside the GOP, is expected to protect Afghans in Pakistan. During interviews this expectation of UNHCR support was reflected by many Afghans with statements such as:

This idhara (organisation [i.e. UNHCR]) says it is here for Afghans in Pakistan;

They [UNHCR] promise us support and are meant to be supporting us.

However, GOP institutions (CAR) working with UNHCR and international law are not effective in safeguarding and distributing rights and goods to Afghan refugees. The “refugee” remains an unresolved and undesired anomaly for the nation-state (Agier 2011) for whom resources are grudgingly spared. Further, funding for UNHCR projects in Pakistan for grassroots programmes, including Basic Health Units (BHU), education initiatives and (previously) ration programmes is contingent upon voluntary donations by international states and, “to a lesser degree from private
donors, and a small portion from the United Nations Regular Budget" (B Khan 2012:103). The CAR budget is provided by SAFRON, yet it too is impacted by international aid donations. Without regular funding, projects are not fully implemented or forced to close. In interviews completed with officials from CAR (Karachi, Peshawar, and CCAR Islamabad) and SAFRON, reduced funds, especially from the peak of the 1980s compared to the ebb of the 2000s, was repeatedly given as the reason why the projects had to close, as well other projects (interviews: Maroof 2011; Wazir 2011; Zeb 2011).

In the 1980s and 1990s there were well over 300 RTVs in Pakistan, with 152-153 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (excluding FATA) including 60-2 RTVs specifically in Peshawar, and 1 RTV in Karachi (CCAR 1987; CAR-KPK 2012). Yet currently there are only 42 camps in Pakistan - 29 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (15 in Peshawar), 12 in Balochistan, and 1 in Punjab (GO04 2011; Befare 2011). There is also an RTV in Karachi but it is an informal one. The 2000s also witnessed further reductions in health and education initiatives, including university-level ones.

Data collected from Befare (2003, 2006-2011), the main provider of primary-level education to

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53 For example contributions from international donors during the Soviet-Afghan war included donations that went straight to the GOP (not UNHCR) for project implementations. In 1983 the Federal Republic of Germany provided 136 trucks to the GOP; in 1984-5 Italy gave the GOP $2,213,000 of aid; between 1981-5 the EEC gave the GOP $2,610,039; and, in 1986 China provided the GOP with 90 metric tonnes of tea, 135 medical cases (UNHCR 1987).

54 The CAR-KPK (2012) website states that as of 15 July 1990, there were 334 RTVs across Pakistan. Archival data from CCAR regarding month by month RTV and population data shows that throughout 1986-7 the total number of RTVs varied from 318 (15-08-1986–345 (28-02-1989) (CCAR 1987).

55 The RTV in Karachi was established in the 1985-6. CCAR (1987) data shows one RTV in Karachi being present in 1986 and 1987 under two names of Bijar Buti (15-2-1987) and Deh Tasir (15-12-1986); although in two months in between it is not listed at all. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

56 Key RTVs that closed down in the 2000s in Peshawar include: Kacha Gari and Nasir Bagh (2008), Jalozai (July 2007-May 2008). Population figures for each camp were recorded as: Kacha Gari and Nasir Bagh 51,014; Jalozai 119, 964 (SAFRON et al., 2005: 31), although at the time of closure a press release by UNHCR outlined different population numbers of 82,000 (UNHCR News 29 Jun 2007).

57 A number of Afghan universities were present in Peshawar and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa but closed down in the 2000s. Notably Arayana University and Gulbudin Hekmatyar's Islamic University in Hayatabad (University Dawat ul Jihad) closed down in the 2000s.
Afghans in Pakistan since 1989, shows that in 2001 the numbers of students enrolled in Befare schools was 99,566 and the number of Befare schools was 301. In 2010 this number, however, was reduced to 48,535 students in just 129 schools. In addition, archival documents from the 1980s (UNHCR 1987) show that there were 51 mainly international NGOs working only for Afghan refugees in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, covering immediate relief, including milk distribution, food rations, health, and education. The Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Refugees (ACBAR) listed 31 offices of I/NGOs aside from UN bodies and other independent actors in Peshawar alone (ACBAR 1992, 1993). Currently in Peshawar the main I/NGO bodies active for Afghan Refugees are Befare and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (alongside the main UN bodies, i.e. UNHCR, UNICEF).

These closures are in part a result of large repatriations of Afghans to Afghanistan in the past ten years (UNHCR-PK 2012), however, they are also the result of shifts in funding and policies that are attempting to encourage repatriation by removing support. Thus it is clear that UNHCR, UN sub-bodies and implementing partners, including various I/NGOs, are reliant on and heavily shaped by the state and the wider geopolitical interests of global powers for funding to reveal an on-going tension between state sovereignty and the effectiveness of international law and institutions.

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58 Education for Afghans is either provided through Befare, GOP schools, or private Afghan schools whose curriculum matches the GOA (interviews: Amin 2011; Education Attaché 2011; Wazir 2011).
59 For Peshawar specifically in 2003 the numbers of schools was 62 and the numbers of students was 29,202 and in 2011 there were 27 schools and 16,328 students enrolled. Additional data from the GOA Education Attaché (2011), lists 104 schools and 189,528 students in 2011. This includes private Afghan schools at a primary and secondary level.
60 UNHCR continues to have a large presence in Pakistan and is involved in a large number of projects in Pakistan, which now include many Pakistani IDPs, however, a shift from the 1980s to the 1990s and then the 2000s is clear.
61 The listed states funding the 1980s relief efforts included: Australia, Canada, China (important for its Soviet rivalry), Egypt, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, USA, other multilateral organisations, the European Economic Community, and organisations from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (UNHCR-PK 1987).
After 2001, the “illegalization” (B.Khan 2012:9) of many Afghans refugees in Pakistan has also meant that many Afghans have no protection or recognition from the GOP and international institutions (B. Khan 2012:2-9). In Pakistan, shifts in the definitions of what it means to be a refugee, when a refugee stops being a refugee, and the line between “voluntary” and “forced” migration have taken place, with discussions showing that Afghan migratory movements are influenced by numerous social, political, and economic factors that go beyond traditional categories of “refugeedom” (B.Khan 2012; Kronenfeld 2008).

The International Organisation of Migration (IOM) has recently gained significance as an organisation working for the protection of illegal migrants. However, despite the IOM’s presence there remains limited space for illegal migrants in international humanitarian and migration law. The IOM is present in Pakistan, and interviews with GOP officials during fieldwork revealed negotiations were taking place between the GOP (CAR and SAFRON) and UNHCR to include the IOM in managing illegal migration in Pakistan (interview: Maroof 2011). However, no agreements were made, and interviews revealed that the proposed remit of IOM involvement was to establish similar economic incentives to UNHCR’s repatriation programme – and therefore to simply encourage Afghan migrants to leave Pakistan and reduce the state’s responsibility towards Afghans (ibid). This onus, on getting illegal immigrants to leave states and other acts of the refugee regime (i.e. UNHCR’s mandate of resettlement, repatriation, or naturalisation within the framework of “the state”), have lead some commentators to argue that international law and international institutions such as the IOM and UNHCR do not in practice

62 On November 9, 2000, Pakistan closed its borders with Afghanistan (contributing towards the illegalisation of Afghan asylum seekers), and, “on February 2, 2001, a circular was issued wherein it was declared that all Afghan nationals without refugee cards/permits or valid visas would be considered ‘illegal’ migrants and would be treated as per the laws applicable to Foreigner Laws” (B Khan 2012:2-7). This is analysed in greater depth in Chapter 7.
work for “all humans” (Agier 2011). Instead it is argued that they are instead primarily loyal to upholding the sanctity of the current nation-state system (ibid). Thinking beyond the nation-state system is not encouraged, which explains why transnational lives and especially illegal migrants – who unlike refugees are not associated with practices of “return” - are so deeply criminalised.

Illegal migrants are criminalised entities that occupy a space of lawlessness deserving of punishment (Khosravi 2010:3) because, unlike “genuine refugees” who are forced to migrate, illegal migrants are constructed as calculating, greedy, and able to “choose” migration rather than “reacting” to forced conditions (Richards 1993, 1994). This is despite the fact that the lines between “illegal migrants” and “refugees” are often blurred (Turton 2003; Khosravi 2010) and that compelling numbers of illegal populations currently visible worldwide (Dauvergne 2008:12). In Pakistan, it is also despite the fact that the switch from being a “refugee” to and “illegal migrant” was so rapid and clearly politicised, again to emphasise the blurred lines between refugees and illegal migrants. For illegal migrants a devalued reality is more visceral and blatant because illegal migrants occupy a tenuous and vulnerable position as they conflict with dominant international norms more intensely than refugees. Illegal migrants are a direct challenge to the sanctity of the nation-state (Khosravi 2010:27). The conceptualisation of refugees assumes that refugees will eventually “return home”, but the same cannot be said of illegal migrants. Further, Saskia Sassen’s work (1996) indicates that the distinction between those with some form of legal migration status and those without it counts. In Pakistan this is seen as illegal migrants can be criminally prosecuted for breaking the Foreigners Law, which carries a maximum sentence of ten years (interviews: Mehmood 2011; Siddiqi 2011). In one case, Gulzar Amin, an Afghan with an extremely low income (if he has one), was living with his immediate family on the outskirts of
Karachi in a tented shelter - he could not afford to build a *katcha*\(^{63}\) house (Gulzar Amin, KHA56). Gulzar escaped prison in Afghanistan in 2008 after being found to be a member of Gulbudin Hekmatyar’s Hezb e Islami and involved in petty political corruption, which he denies. As he lives in Karachi illegally and without documentation he is scared to leave his local area. He told me, “I do not have a POR card. I worry they might imprison me” (Gulzar Amin, KHA56).

In an interview I conducted with the Commissioner for Afghan Refugees in Sindh the Commissioner said, “They [illegal Afghans] are not our responsibility” (interview: Akhtar 2010), and similarly UNHCR officials mentioned that they can only exercise authority for registered Afghans in Pakistan. I was told by UNHCR officials, “We can only be concerned with registered Afghans”. Consistently during observations when illegal Afghans were subjected to violations by police and security forces they were turned away by UNHCR’s implementing partners for legal support. I was told, “They are illegal immigrants. They are not *genuine* refugees”. Thus some persons are left without access to basic material resources – the resources required by all humans - because they are not “readable units” that official actors, such as the GOP or UNHCR can see. They are not recognised as full human entities, nor even “exemplary human victims” eligible for rights and protection.

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\(^{63}\) *Katcha* (s) refers to a housing structure that is made from mud and not bricks. I use the term *katcha* house in this thesis, *katcha makkan* (house) or *katcha ghar* (house), can also be used. For more than one house, *katche* (pl) is used. A whole informal settlement is referred to as a *katchi abadi*. 
Modern States

Quaid e Azam, Quaid e Azam,
Quaid e Azam,
Founder of the Nation; Fatima Jinnah,
Fatima Jinnah,
Mother of the Nation; Liaqat Ali,
Liaqat Ali,
Martyr of the Nation. Zardari Uncle,
Zardari Uncle,
Paucity of Flour,
Aate ki Qilat,
Paucity of Sugar,
Chini ki Qilat,
Paucity of Electricity.
Bjli ki Qilat.
Humiliation upon Humiliation.
Zilat hi Zi

Rhyming joke in Pakistan, 2011.

The “state” in a Weberian sense exercises absolute sovereignty over a specific territory and population and has a monopoly over violence. The state is represented via government institutions, laws, and official representatives – who are embodiments of the state. State sovereignty is contingent upon external and internal forms of recognition and legitimacy. Internally, it is contingent on performances of violence and a will to rule (Blom Hansen 2005) and in the quasi-democracy of Pakistan it is also contingent on the state meeting its legal responsibility to people identified as belonging to the state, i.e. citizens, by providing them with the human, social, economic, and political rights they are due. These responsibilities are outlined in state laws and constitute “citizenship”, the process by which “people (or subjects) are identified, disciplined, and ordered so that they can be ruled [and used] by the state” (Sadiq 2009:9).

In Pakistan, citizenship is attained through jus sanguinis (right of blood), jus soli (right of soil, i.e. birth right), or naturalization (Sadiq 2009:9). In the current norms of the Westphalian state model the Pakistani state has a legal, moral, and political interest to deliver and protect rights goods (and to thus legitimise its rule). These rights and responsibilities are outlined in the Pakistani constitution and Pakistani law, and it is the responsibility of federal, provincial, and
local government actors\textsuperscript{64} (i.e. people, who are embodiments of the state), and institutions (as structures of sovereignty) to maintain these rights in coordination with specific government departments, and thus also perform – and uphold - state sovereignty. In this study this includes

\textsuperscript{64} The following summary is taken in whole or part from Arif Hasan (2010:3-4): Pakistan is a federation of four provinces and each province has an elected provincial assembly and at the centre there is a national assembly in which every province is represented in proportion to its population. There is also a senate in which each province is represented equally. At the provincial level each province is divided into \textit{zilas} (districts) and districts are divided into urban and rural \textit{tehsils} (sub-districts). \textit{Tehsils} are divided into union councils (UCs). Larger cities, including the provincial capitals are run as city districts and divided into \textit{tehsils} (towns) and the towns into union councils. The \textit{zilas}, \textit{tehsils}, and the UCs are headed by elected \textit{nazims} and \textit{naib nazims} (mayors and deputy mayors) who are elected directly and indirectly by elected councillors. The 2001 Devolution Plan enhanced the autonomy of all three levels of local government, who can raise funds and implement development independently; the bureaucracy is subservient to them. The \textit{zila nazim} is responsible for the district administration as a whole and is assisted by a senior bureaucrat who is the District Coordinating Officer DCO who coordinates the functioning of all government departments in the district. These departments included District Coordination, Human Resource Management and Civil Defence, Finance and Planning, Works and Services, Agriculture, Health, Education (apart from universities), Community Development, Information Technology, Revenue, Law and Magistracy. As Arif Hassan summarises, “Before this devolution to the district level, all planning and implementation was controlled by the provincial government and its departments” (ibid). However, some changes have taken place during 2012 (for example in Karachi).

A similar city organisation, though of a smaller scale, is visible in Peshawar. Peshawar is divided into four towns: Town I, Town II, Town III, Town IV and 92 UCs. However, here there is no separate Peshawar City District Government as there was in Karachi. Currently, town \textit{nazims} and \textit{naib nazims} report to the provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which is most likely related to population sizes. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has an approximate population of 23 million (GOKPK 2010), which is comparable to Karachi’s approximate 19 million for the city alone (and not Sindh as a whole province).

Until 2011 Karachi had the status of district as enacted (under the Devolution Plan 2001) by the Local (City) Government Ordinance (LCGO) 2001. At the time of fieldwork Karachi was governed by the City District Government Karachi (CDGK) headed by a city \textit{nazim} and \textit{naib nazim} (mayor and deputy mayor). Karachi was also divided into 18 Towns, which were further divided into 178 UCs. After the enactment of LCGO in 2001 the development and operation and maintenance related agencies, which were set up under the provincial government, devolved to become a part of the city government set up. Primary education, basic health and transport were also city government functions. “Thus, all planning, implementation and organisation and management was centralised with the city government, or allocated to towns and UC. The police however remained with the provincial government for political reasons and a strong presence of federal and government institutions and actors were evident” (Hasan 2010:15-6). But since November 2011 Karachi’s 18 towns have demerged into its five original constituent districts (the Sindh Local Government Ordinance 1979 was revived): Karachi East, Karachi West, Karachi Central, Karachi South, and Malir, which now form the Karachi Division (Karachi Municipal Corporation) and headed by a Municipals Commissioner (KMC 2012). This shift is perhaps related to the fact that the organisation of 18 towns gave local level actors too much authority, which in the climate of inter-city violence was not being managed effectively by the federal government.
GOP representatives and structures at the level of union councils, towns, city government, and each provincial government.\textsuperscript{65}

Pakistan’s responsibilities towards citizens are also outlined in the state’s social welfare promise, which historically shaped the state’s development and ideological vision, most notably under the founder of the state, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1947-8), and later Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s slogan of “rohi, kapra, makan” (“food, clothes, housing”), and has also included recent programmes such as the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), which was introduced in 2008 by the PPP administration under Asif Ali Zardari.\textsuperscript{66} However, the ability to execute this social welfare model has always been challenged by domination of the military in Pakistan – a domination resulting from Pakistan’s conditions of birth as a state, the bloody secession of East Pakistan, and a sensitive regional geostrategic position next to rivals India and Afghanistan, all of which were reinforced by Pakistan’s position as a peripheral but key geostrategic state in the international system, seen most recently with its alliance with the USA in the context of military conflict in Afghanistan and FATA. In recent years the social welfare promise to citizens has also faced attack from the influence of neo-Liberalism, which place emphasis on the reduction of government responsibility towards social needs (Hasan 2004, 2010; Toor 2011), despite the presence of programmes, such as BISP - which in this study was actually explained to me as being a “tool” for Asif Ali Zardari, a deeply polarising figure, to gain a legitimacy as he came into power in controversial terms after the assassination of his wife Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 (former Prime Minister 1988-90; 1993-96).

\textsuperscript{65} See fn10.

\textsuperscript{66} The BISP was introduced in October 2008 as cash assistance programme for urban poor families, and is closely aligned with the (current) PPP administration. During fieldwork in both Peshawar and Karachi it was evident that the government had been engaged with household surveys in order to identify eligible families. However, during interviews and discussions with Pakistanis, the number of cases that said they had received help from the BISP programme totalled 2 cases (out of 191).
Under a neo-Liberal reading of citizenship, citizenship is also enhanced by contributing to and participating in civic initiatives and *civil society*. Under this reading the onus for the distribution of goods also lies with the state’s people (who are understood as being connected and loyal to the state), and not just state institutions, as well as other private organisations. Indeed the Musharraf era saw a rise in civil society organisations and philanthropic activity in Pakistan (Zaidi 2011; PCP 2010), and this thesis pays attention to how urban poor Pakistanis are active in hybrid formal-informal spheres. However, neither neo-Liberal “civil society” and citizenship, nor informal political activities (as an alternative space for belonging) replace the state, indeed their alternative forms of “being” and “belonging” are not without their own shortcomings (Friedmann 1992; Chapter 4). For a strong civil society to be able to deliver even *laissez-faire* forms of citizenship strong state capacity and an ability to regulate these organisations is still a requirement, which is not the case in Pakistan.

Dominant understandings of the state and citizenship assume that in the current system of modern states, state institutions can manage the resources and capital within their territorial borders in order to provide and distribute rights, resources, and services to citizens, but in Pakistan this is not how things work. In Pakistan, as in many other states, the state and its institutions do not meet these idealised - and indeed idolised – norms that are constructed as “fact” for post-Westphalian states. Thus whilst refugees and illegal immigrants are left without access to basic rights and resources because of issues of legality and funding, many Pakistanis also exist in shared realities with Afghans as they are let down by “their” state.
On a macro-level, Pakistan’s peripheral position in the international economy and international pressures for economic reform has had significant impact on state capacity. Pakistan underwent a number of structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s and 1990s (Zaidi 2005), and in the 2000s economic liberalisation was heavily pursued under the Musharraf era and continued under Asif Ali Zardari’s PPP administration (Toor 2011). In the rapidly urbanising and expanding urban landscapes of Peshawar and Karachi the shortcomings of the state have become more intense as a result of economic liberalisation, meaning that “in Pakistan’s urban areas, 21 million out of 56 million people are now food-insecure” (Toor 2012:99). In fact, suicides from poverty and food stampedes now read as routine features of daily newspapers (Appendix 11). During fieldwork one woman, Nargis, shared how her husband committed suicide as a result of a lack of food, amongst other reasons. Nargis is employed as a domestic servant, but in 2011 her wages and her husband’s were unable to cover costs of rent and food for them and their two children, which contributed towards his suicide. Nargis said:

He poisoned himself – he took some liquids. We did not have enough money coming, we could not even eat, and we still can’t. Think... our stomachs were empty. He was getting depressed. He would go away [mentally] and not talk for long times. It was difficult. It is now difficult. The children have no father, I have no husband (field notes: Nargis).

In Karachi, economic liberalisation has also meant that “government investment in per capita terms has declined in education and health with the result that an increasing number of people have to rely on expensive private sector facilities” (Toor 2012:99). In Karachi the privatisation of utility companies has also meant a steep rise in monthly energy bills. Charges have increased “by over 100% in the last decade”, and have mostly affected urban poor residents in “low income settlement areas” (Hasan 2010:24-5), which include poor populations, refugees, and illegal migrants.
Whilst privatisation, such as that of Karachi Electrical Supply Company (KESC), was supposed to overcome the energy crisis in the city, privatisation has actually meant that “conditions have deteriorated considerably” (Hasan 2010:25-7; see also Bashir 2007). The same is true in Peshawar where electricity is now supplied by the privatised Peshawar Electric Supply Company, part of the Power Information Technology Company. Poor delivery of electricity services, high costs, and now load-shedding are one of the biggest crises that Pakistan faces. Load-shedding severely impacts daily life and is responsible for lost livelihoods, illnesses, and lives. A 2012 (Mills 2012:5-6) report outlines that areas in Pakistan (including urban areas) faced, “14-18 hours without power per day by October 2011, with this figure rising to 22 hours in some areas”. The report attributes this problem to “circular debt and a lack of investment” amongst other issues (ibid). In order to combat electricity shortages people who can afford it have generators fitted (fuelled by petrol) or uninterruptible power supply (UPS). However, most urban poor Pakistanis cannot afford a generator or UPS, which means when the electricity cuts, the discomfort of illness, dehydration, and water shortages is a routine experience.

In Karachi and Peshawar housing shortages, which form a key site of discussion in Chapters 5 and 6, are also a pressing issue. A World Bank (Nenova 2010:217) report states that in Pakistan, “National and local master [housing] plans are either inadequate or poorly enforced”. The report shows that “Pakistan is facing unprecedented challenges of acute housing shortages, unhealthy living conditions, and non-existent or dilapidated infrastructure across the country. More than 50 percent of the urban population lives in slum areas”. Citing an engineering firm report from 2006 (Engineering Pvt 2006), Arif Hasan (2010:7) outlines that Karachi requires, “570,000 housing units per year”, and “about 50 per cent” of this is for urban areas. However, “only 300,000 units per year are being built” and the housing backlog has increased from “4.3 million
in 1998 to 6 million in 2005” (ibid). In Peshawar the government is involved in a number of housing expansion programmes in Hayatabad and Regi Town (GOKPK 2010; Dawn 25 Feb 2010). However, these programmes do not cater to the needs of the urban poor who cannot afford to rent and/or buy property in this expensive area.

In order to bridge this gap, both cities are the sites of informal expansions on the “rural-urban interfaces” (Roy and Alsayyad, 2004:21; Chapter 5).67 These informal expansions offer some alleviation to the challenges that official development and planning projects cannot cope with. However, these outer rural-urban lands, which are expanding the boundaries of Karachi and Peshawar, are at great distances from government facilities (hospitals, schools, transport links, and electricity and waterline), which have not been constructed at the same rate as these organic and informal processes. Consequently, a dangerous quality of life is experienced in these areas. Life, bodily health, and bodily integrity (Nussbaum 2001:78-80) are at risk as basic material and non-material goods are absent, and instead half-baked physical outputs are produced via “substitutive” and “competing” informal processes, and these are analysed in greater depth in Chapters 4-6 via case studies.

Structural weaknesses mean that the official channels, institutions, and laws do not meet expectations of citizens. For the Pakistanis interviewed in this study, primarily the urban poor, their

67 Arif Hasan outlines that in cities, such as Karachi, government land is fully saturated as older informal settlements have already occupied this space. Housing settlements that are present on these government land Hasan refers to as katchi abadis. He juxtaposes this with the development of un-serviced housing settlements on privately owned land by landholders and middlemen in what Hasan refers to as the, “Informal Subdivision of Agricultural Land (ISAL)”, i.e. many houses at the rural-urban interface (Hasan 2010:7). This thesis looks at both katchi abadis and ISAL settlements but refers to them both as informal housing/residential areas.
experience of citizenship is a *devalued* one. In repeated interviews the understanding of an unaffected government formed the basis of expressions of discontent in daily language:

_Hukumat ko kya parva_

The state does not care;

_Woh kehte hai ke wo hukumat hai, leikin kuch bhi nahi karti_

They say they are the state, but they do not do anything.

For citizens, basic rights and safeguards to allow the potentials of “human life” to be practiced are not provided. Access to shelter, utilities, and food are difficult to attain through purely official channels. Indeed, citizenship in the orthodox sense, is practically confined to a limited elite, or, in the words of Partha Chatterjee, “the new bourgeoisie” (Chatterjee 2004:37). However, where Chatterjee proposes that most people (landless people, day labourers, the homeless, and the urban poor) become a part of “political society”, which is an alternative space for true citizenship and a “richer” democratic activity (Chatterjee 2004), this thesis does not jump to the same conclusions. Most are members of something akin to an informal political community, but this community does not foster an “other” form of democracy (Nelson - forthcoming), and whilst some attempts for a more humanised life are made, deep challenges remain.

**The Middle Ground: RTVs and Afghan and Pakistani Housing**

The KESC spares none of us, Afghan or Pakistani!

Interview with Yusuf Khan, KHP50.B, and Abdul Mateen, KHA69.
Critically, RTVs are not spaces of UNHCR sovereignty. They are built on Pakistani land and subject to the same urban shortcomings as Pakistani areas – in some cases more so by virtue of being Afghan areas, with even less government incentives to develop the areas. (This is returned to shortly with attention to forms of “urban ethnocracy.”) This also reveals that the Pakistani state is held responsible for the delivery, and failures, that shape Afghan lives – often much more so than institutions like UNHCR.

RTVs are supplied or not supplied with water, gas, and electricity by Pakistani government and private companies. RTVs are equally impacted by load shedding, price hikes, and shortages, which is especially the case given that UNHCR and CAR do not pay for electricity, and in a number of cases for water, which is a marked difference from the 1980s as UNHCR funding and policies have changed. The head teacher of a school in an RTV in Peshawar explained in an interview how electricity supplies were sporadic with rocketing prices.

We cannot afford to run this school without asking for more money from the students\(^{68}\) (Mohammad Imran, PXA76).

More importantly it should be remembered that Afghans are not legally confined to RTVs. In fact the majority live outside of RTVs (SAFRON et al., 2005). Thus both Afghans and Pakistanis live in shared spaces and housing areas partaking in the shared struggles of everyday urban life. Both Afghans and Pakistanis experience the shared shortcomings (food-shortages, load-shedding, and housing crises) that dominate everyday urban life in Karachi and Peshawar. Whilst Afghans cannot buy property, they can rent property, but with limited cheap rentable property available they too seek cheaper, quicker, informal alternatives – either to rent or informally purchase. Further, Pakistani newspaper archives repeatedly show numbers of Afghan and Pakistani deaths

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\(^{68}\) Electricity is paid for by the school and students.
in the summer heat with no effective electricity for fans or winter cold (e.g. Dawn 1 May 2001; 27 March 2012). “The KESC spares none of us, Afghan or Pakistani!” two friends joked one day in the heat in Karachi (Yusuf Khan, KHA50.B and Abdul Mateen, KHA69).

**Dehumanisation via Official Ways of Seeing**

The structural and contextual factors discussed above, however, require further examination. They cannot be fully understood without appreciating that their occurrence is deeply intertwined with the lenses through which official actors view and understand citizens and non-citizens. It is not just a case that funds are unavailable or that there are structurally inherited shortcomings. It must also be asked: What shapes the decisions that lead to these “structural” shortcomings? What are the decisions that govern actual shifts in funding? Why is it that some areas are worse off than other areas? These decisions are shaped by the frames (Butler 2010) and “ways of seeing” that official actors use – forms that dehumanise and devalue some lives over others, which results in a denial of the conditions in which the potentials of human flourishing can be practiced. In the remainder of this chapter three “ways of seeing” are analysed. These are (1) lenses of exclusion; (2) objectified ways of seeing; (3) constructions of “exemplary suffering”.

**National and Ethnic Practices of Exclusion in Urban Spaces**

Discrepancies in the worth of human life are also the result of “national” and “ethnic” frames that recognise, misrecognise, and exclude (Hermann 2010). This section pays attention to how frames of exclusion based on “national” and “ethnic” are practiced in urban housing areas building on the idea of “urban ethnocracy” developed by Yiftachel and Yakobi (2004; Yiftachel 2006) and “ghettoes and frontiers” developed by James Ron (2004).
In Control, Resistance, and Informality: Urban Ethnocracy in Beer-Sheva, Israel, Oren Yiftachel and Haim Yakobi (2004) describe the actions of the Israeli state in Beer-Sheva (inside Israel proper). Here, the Israeli state enforces difference in the way that Arab and Jewish localities are officially administered, with the Arab towns being classified as “illegal”, “unrecognised”, or “spontaneous” by the region’s planning authorities (see also Yiftachel 2006).

Whilst the political contexts of Peshawar and Karachi are very different to the housing settlements in Beer-Sheva, the rubric of an “urban ethnocracy” offers an insightful way of understanding the factors that shape the patterns of urban formal and informal activity. Pakistani state institutions and actors deliberately do not recognise the Afghan presence in “everyday” Pakistan in an attempt to maintain the “purity” of the Pakistani nation-state. Afghan dominant areas are not legally absorbed as part of the formal infrastructure and resources are delivered intermittently (if at all). However, this type of exclusion also extends to certain citizens. And, in this study the Pakistani Pashtun experience in Karachi provides an important example that links Pakistani Pashtun citizens and Afghan non-citizens in the city.

As non-nationals there is limited space for Afghans in Pakistani law – they are “anomalies”, “undesirables”, and the “remnants” of society (Agier 2011; Khosravi 2010). Afghan-dominated urban spaces are ordered and technologically managed in “non-permanent” ways. RTVs are based on temporary leases of GOP or private land and the RTV itself acts as scientific process of “order making” (Malkki 2002), which combines with a “national order of things” (Malkki 1995) to isolate and separate the “remnants” of society into quarantined spaces that are separate from the “ordinary social and political world” (Agier 2008:39-40). During fieldwork an informal Afghan RTV (Chapter 5) was positioned on the extreme outskirts of Karachi by the GOP in the
1980s. Basic utilities such as water and electricity were not efficiently delivered to this low priority area. “No-one cares about Afghan Camp”, one resident noted, “it’s full of Afghans that’s why there is no water, nothing decent... nothing” (Habibullah, KHA13).

However, despite this urban ethnocratic placement, in Pakistan, RTVs remain connected to the Pakistani state via CAR, SAFRON, and/or UNHCR. For the urban RTV in particular total isolation is difficult. Having existed since the late 1970s-1980s most urban RTVs have become a part of the city. In Peshawar residents explained, “Most of the time you cannot tell where an “Afghan area” starts and where a Pakistani area finishes”. It was true, you could not.69 (Indeed following violence in FATA and floods in 2010-11 many Pakistanis live in RTVs with Afghans). Similarly in informal housing areas that house large numbers of Afghans the state is not completely absent, especially as other Pakistanis live in these areas as well. Thus, instead of understanding the RTV or informal housing areas as completely invisible to the state, it is useful to turn to the work of James Ron’s Frontiers and Ghettoes (2003) for further elaboration to understand why these areas appear worse-off than other areas in the cities.

Ron’s work (2003) analyses the reasons for different types of state violence in different geographic spaces, showing that the state shares a sense of legal responsibility towards geographic spaces that are territorially well within the state, such as ghettoes (unlike national frontiers). For Ron, ghettoes and ghetto residents are “incorporated into the dominant polity, 

69 Indeed in a number of RTVs now many Pakistani families are also present. During fieldwork in Peshawar and RTV that was built on private Pakistani land also leased out land to Pakistanis, to make the area a highly mixed settlement. “The middle of the camp is full of Pakistani housing now – it’s not a part of the RTV, but you see how the camp is split by a Pakistani area” (Abu Haider PXA54). Finally, many Afghans also live in mixed Afghan and Pakistani regulated and unregulated housing areas. In Pakistan spatial segregation has never been total. However, this means that efforts to encourage segregation and forms of nationalistic “Othering” are also potentially very dangerous.
albeit with ambivalence and disdain”, and as such whilst they may be “segreeted and repressed” they are “rarely liquidated outright”, which Ron argues does take place at the frontier (2003:16). Legal agreements and norms within the state, Ron argues, matter. Thus the state in Karachi and Peshawar maintains a grudging responsibility towards the “despised members of society” (i.e. Afghans) (2003:16). As urban areas that house Afghans (RTVs or informal housing areas) are territorially well within the state (and also house many Pakistanis), the state is not absent - even though it will act in a different way when compared to formal/regulated areas, to reflect the “ambiguities of unequal inclusion” (Ron 2003:24). This ambiguity of unequal inclusion helps to illuminate why, during fieldwork, areas with high Afghan demographics had reduced access to utilities (water, gas, electricity) health care, and opportunities for flourishing when compared to Pakistani settlements that had existed for similar amounts of time. This ambiguity also explains why different treatment was possible, including Afghan areas being used as sites for informal profits by official actors acting in illegal ways, as well by intermediaries and non-state power holders: residents living in these ghettoised areas are not recognised as fully human lives, but “despised members of society”. In addition, these objectified lives also represented a resource pool that could be used by official actors acting in informal and illegal ways to generate income and profit and to act in corrupted ways. This further helps illuminate why these areas and its

70 The ghetto versus frontier framework could potentially be extended further and applied to internal state boundaries such as that of the city (Ron 2003). Although here, within the national boundaries of the city, it is unlikely that urban government politics will result in ethnic cleansing - which is the case in Ron’s study Serbian ethnic cleansing of Bosnia (Ron 2003) - the city is an integral part of national space and a sense of responsibility remains to it. In the field work completed in this thesis there is variance within ghettoised informal urban areas in relation to their geographic position within the city, which also creates different types of state presence. Interviews and observations were completed in informal urban areas that are deep within/next to “formal” Peshawar and Karachi, for example in Peshawar’s Old City and Hayatabad or Karachi’s Defence or Gulshan e Iqbal. Interviews and observations were also completed in informal urban areas that are on the frontiers of these cities, situated on the geographic peripheries, such as rural-urban settlements around Ring Road in Peshawar or the various goths along Super Highway in Karachi. Both areas see the state present, albeit in “resentful” ways but the urban frontier settlements appear to experience a more tempestuous relationship with officialdom – although they certainly do not witness ethnic cleansing as is the case in Ron’s national frontier.
residents are not totally and violently removed/encouraged to leave, which will be further explored shortly.

Segregating lenses are, however, also practiced on Pakistanis. This section will now illuminate how Pakistani Pashtuns in Karachi are also subject to forms of urban ethnocracy and ghettoisation (see also Chapter 5). Pakistani Pashtuns in Karachi are not the only example of “marginalised” Pakistanis, however, fieldwork in Karachi was influenced by cases of Pakistani Pashtuns being subjected to “ethnicised ways of seeing”, to reinforce patterns of urban ethnocracy (Yiftachel and Oren 2006) and ghettoisation (Ron 2003). Pakistani Pashtuns are full legal members of the Pakistani state. However, when I asked the question, “Does citizenship matter”, in the Pakistani Pashtun case, the answer was a stronger “No” than it was for other Pakistanis.

Karachi is a microcosm of Pakistan and South Asia. It is a mega-city, home to an estimated 19 million people from a number of linguistic, ethnic, religious, sectarian, professional, and national backgrounds. It has been the site in which various affinities of “ethnicity” have been constructed, changed, and debated, particularly since Independence and Partition (N.Khan 2010; Verkaaik 1994; Yusuf 2012; Zamindar 2007). At various junctures tensions have flared between Sindhis (and to a degree Balochis) - the “natives of the soil” and Muhajirs; between Muhajirs and Pashtuns; and so on (Bremen 2012; Haq 1995; N.Khan 2010; Moonis 1996; Shaheed 1995; Siddiqi 2012; Verkaaik 1994; Yusuf 2012). Currently, the city continues to boil. In 2010 over “1,000 people were killed in target killlings—tit-for-tat assassinations aimed at members of rival political parties and their corresponding ethnic groups—followed by 1,891 in 2011 and more
than 740 in the first five months of 2012” (Yusuf 2012:8). Karachi is now known as the city of targeted killings, violence, and strikes.

Pakistani Pashtun migration to Karachi from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA has deep historic roots. Since the 1960s the Pashtun presence in Karachi has steadily increased as a result of rural-urban migration, education and income generation opportunities, and natural population growth. Migration has further increased since 2001 as a result of military campaigns and drones in FATA. During fieldwork I was told proudly by Pakistani Pashtun residents that “Karachi is the largest Pashtun city in the world”, and although the numbers of Pashtuns in Karachi is unknown (Pakistan has been stalling on a census, with its last one being completed in 1998), and it is more likely that Peshawar is the largest Pashtun city in the world (Chapter 2), it is clear that the Pashtun presence in Karachi has significantly grown. However, Karachi’s tense multi-ethnic balance has meant “Pathan” migration has been jealously and violently resisted, particularly by the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), a predominantly urban political party that claims to represent Muhajirs (Indian migrants from Partition who settled, mainly in Karachi and Hyderabad). The MQM’s political significance in Karachi has historically been accompanied by

71 Official numbers of these IDP population shifts are not available but during field work completed from this study many Pashtun interviewees had settled in Karachi and rented apartments and informal katcha houses in Al Asif Square and newly emerging goths around Super Highway.

72 The 2012 Conflict Dynamics in Karachi (Yusuf 2012:8) report states that 300,000 Pashtuns migrated to Karachi since military operations in FATA began, and that, “the ANP claims to represent Karachi’s Pashtun population, which it estimates to be 22 percent of the total, up from about 12 percent in 1998” but does not provide a source for where/who this claim was made by.

73 “Pathan” is the word used by non-Pashtun speakers to describe a Pashtun/Pakhtun. Its use also, then, symbolises that the person who is using the word “Pathan” is not themselves Pashtun/Pakhtun but belong to another “identity group” – or it simply reflects a conversation not taking place in Pashto. The word “Pathan” is significant and politicised in the context of ethnic conflict in Karachi because it signifies which ethnic group a person belongs to, and it can be used in a derogatory way, particularly my MQM affiliated actors.

74 The MQM’s rise to power took place during the 1980s and 1990s after feeling side-lined in Pakistani politics after Partition and Independence via the increasing “Punjabisation” (Samad 1995) of Pakistani
deeply anti-Pashtun rhetoric and actions. Pakistani Pashtun migrants (and Afghan refugees\textsuperscript{75}) are constructed as national/urban “destroyers” by MQM affiliated discourse when juxtaposed against the “original” and “genuine” state-building migrants of Partition, the \textit{Muhajir}.	extsuperscript{76} Parallel to the Afghan case, Pakistani Pashtuns in Karachi are morally excluded as they are constructed as a dangerous “sub-human Other”, subjected to negative stereotyping, and frequently blamed for issues of drug-trafficking, criminality, and “Islamist”/ethnic tensions in the city. Again, however, rather than reflecting concerns of a genuine threat, the “Othering” process reflects an instrumentalist way in which Pakistani Pashtuns are used for political mobilisation by the MQM to consolidate the MQM and “Muhajir” identity in a “Self” vs. “Other” process.

The MQM is a dominant player in the politics of Karachi. Since it entered formal politics in the 1980s it has captured the majority of the city’s electoral votes, mainly from Muhajirs, as well as jobs in the city’s bureaucratic apparatus via the City District Government Karachi (CDGK) (now KMC) in Gulshan e Iqbal (see fn63). The CDGK building’s outer walls were covered in MQM images, with the figure of Altaf Hussain ever-present when I visited the offices during 2010-11.

\textsuperscript{75} Within this intra Pakistani conflict, Afghans in Pakistan are subsumed under a “Pashtun” label by non-Pashtun Pakistanis. This is despite the many ethnic variations of Afghans living in Karachi, which unlike Peshawar has a higher mix of Afghan Tajiks, Afghan Hazaras, and Afghan Uzbeks (SAFRON et al., 2005).

\textsuperscript{76} In Urdu, Pashto, Dari, and Arabic the word \textit{muhajir} means “migrant” (taken from \textit{hijrat}, which means “to migrate”). In Karachi “\textit{muhajir}” can be applied to migrants from India during the time of Partition in Karachi, which was promulgated by the MQM as a process of identity formation (Verkaaik 1994; 2004). The MQM’s ethno-political objectives and interactions with the state helped to transform the word into representing/constructing an ethnic group – i.e. it underwent being a noun (\textit{muhajir}) to a proper noun (Muhajir) (Verkaaik 2004). Pakistani Pashtuns may refer to those of Indian origins as “Muhajirs” but will more usually use “MQM”/“Urdu-speaking”, i.e. identity is given by the official language of the Pakistani state and MQM. The word “\textit{muhajir}” is also used to describe Afghans in Pakistan but with the term “Afghan” prefixed to it, i.e. “Afghan \textit{muhajir}”, if the conversation is taking place in Karachi non-Pashto/Afghan discussions. However, more often than not non-Pashto speakers simply refer to all Afghans as “Pathans”, even if they are not Pashtun. If the discussion is taking place in Pashto or Dari the prefix “Afghan” is not used. It remains to be seen if Afghan \textit{muhajirs} will transform into Afghan Muhajirs within Pakistan. Finally, within Karachi, the MQM claims that only the MQM and “Indian” Muhajirs have the right to be considered “genuine” migrants/refugees who helped to construct the Pakistani state.
The MQM’s demand for Karachi to be accepted as the “native province” for the Muhajirs also continues to be painted in graffiti and street art with the question:

_Sab ka Sooba, hamara kyoo nahi – Muhajir Sooba zaroori hai._

Everyone has a province, why do we not have a province? A Muhajir province is needed.

Huge billboards of Altaf Hussain - the exiled party leader and founder of the MQM - and street graffiti bearing his name dominate the city’s aesthetic space. Indeed I suspect the slogans, “_Jiye Altaf Hussain!_” ([Long] live Altaf Hussain!) and “_Siraf Altaf_” (Only Altaf) occupy more wall space than all of the city’s commercial advertisements combined (see also Dadi 2007). Further, the MQM, alongside other groups, is understood as being responsible for armed violence in the city, which often targets Pashtuns - or Afghans mistaken as Pashtuns. In one week during fieldwork, the death of a Pakistani Pashtun male who was shot by two men on a motorbike, apparently from the MQM, was spoken about by a number of interviewees near an unregulated Pashtun area in Karachi (Zmaray Khan, KHA61.B; Jalaluddin, KHA62.C; Fereydoun, KHA57 and Rafique, KHA58), and in another area a well-known street vendor was also shot by virtue of being “Pathan”. For the MQM Karachi is “_their_” city. The MQM is attempting to construct its public authority through a capacity for violence on human bodies (Blom Hansen 2005) and the lives of Karachi’s residents. The MQMs involvement in politics, extra-judicial violence, targeted and indiscriminate killings, billboards, and graffiti is a performance of sovereignty and claim to Karachi. Yet as MQM’s “hold” on Karachi is not fully consolidated, its performances of

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77 I was told in an interview. “They just shot this Afghan because they thought he was a Pashtun, but he was not!” (Sohrab Din, KHA67).
sovereignty stem from a position of insecurity, which are more akin to a “claim making” (state formation) process.\textsuperscript{78}

Recently the Awami National Party (ANP), claiming to represent the Pashtun vote, has increased in strength in Karachi. It positions itself in the same “oppressed” role that the MQM claims as their reality (and only theirs), as if “victimhood” it seems can only be claimed by one party. A 2012 report, \textit{Conflict Dynamics in Karachi}, shows that in 2008 the ANP increased their political strength. “For the first time the party won 2 seats out of 42 from Karachi in the Sindh provincial assembly; the MQM won 34 while the PPP secured 6” (Yusuf 2012:8). The report highlights how all of Karachi’s major political parties, “the MQM, PPP, and ANP, are the main perpetrators of urban violence. The parties clash over city resources and funds generated through extortion” (Yusuf 2012:2). It also shows that whilst historically, “Karachi’s ethnopolitical violence has pitted Urdu-speaking mohajirs (migrants) of the MQM against Pashtuns represented by the ANP […] clashes between the rural, Sindh-based PPP and Karachi-centric MQM are increasing as part of a broader power struggle between the city- and provincial-level governments” (Yusuf 2012:3).

\textsuperscript{78} The MQM’s vote bank is concentrated in the urban centers, namely Karachi and Hyderabad. It does not have significance in the Sindh province in rural areas, which means it has historically been vulnerable to federal political clamp downs. Examples of this include military crackdown operations in the 1990s. Under the military government of Musharraf, who was himself of Indian origin from Delhi and not associated with any of the major political parties (such as the PPP or PML-N) a working alliance with the MQM and centre was achieved. This was also the result of the LGCO of 2001, which gave more power to local governments. However, this has been overturned with the return to civilian government (2008) which has returned power to the centre. With the return to civilian administration and PPP victory at the provincial level, the MQM has felt vulnerable. However, the MQM has remained a major winner in Karachi and electoral politics, which means both major parties have a reliance on each other. A semi-functioning balance is in effect.
In mainly Pakistani Pashtun areas, some of which have formed on the city’s outskirts, less access to government facilities such as schools and hospitals is witnessed (with these areas being less likely to be “upgraded”\textsuperscript{79} from informal to formal status by the state). In a series of interview with Hussain Ali, a Pakistani (Afghan) Pashtun\textsuperscript{80} who lives in a mainly Pakistani Pashtun area, he said:

In the area behind us, [where] you have mainly Sindhis living the land is [officially] leased... If you go ahead of us the land is leased in the Urdu speaking area. You have the Sindhi and Urdu speaking communities behind us and ahead of us and we are in the middle. So the area behind us gets leased and the area ahead of us gets leased... what can you say to this?

For Hussain Ali his frustration with the conditions of the development and non-formalisation of his area in Karachi is clear, reflecting grades of dehumanisation within the urban poor in Pakistan. Who is the lowest of the low in Karachi? For Hussain it is the “ethnicised” Pakistani Pashtuns.

In another series of interviews with two Pakistani Pashtun brothers, Yusuf Khan (KHA50.B) and Anwar Khan (KHA50), originally from Swabi and now living in Karachi and working as fabric wholesalers, the brothers spoke of the negative stereotyping and reductionist ways in which they, as Pashtun men, are viewed. A series of repeat interviews were conducted with the brothers during 2010-12, and in one interview the elder brother, Anwar, said:

\textsuperscript{79} This is the process by which unregulated housing areas are accepted into the formal state institutions. This process was started in Karachi in order to cope with the explosion of informal housing settlements that the city has seen (Hasan 2006).

\textsuperscript{80} Hussain Ali’s family migrated to Pakistan from Afghanistan in the 1960s and he was born and raised in Karachi. Legally, he is Pakistani as he has a Pakistani CNIC and other documents. Hussain Ali reflects a new type of “ethnicity” in Karachi: the Pakistani Afghan (and, within Pashtuns, the Pashtun Afghan) where he is aware of his “Afghan” heritage but also positions himself as “Pakistani”. See Chapter 5 for more details.
The issue is the MQM. They create the conditions which are bad. Anyone who comes from Peshawar [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa] is automatically turned into an ANP member. He may never even have heard of the work that they are doing here... Really they [the ANP] do not have that many members in their ranks as it is made out – and not many people associate themselves with the ANP. But again we are not trusted here by virtue of being Pathan (Anwar Khan, KHP50).

For Anwar, he is reduced to possessing only one dimension that is without reputation and dignity – he is simply a negative “Pathan” (see fn67 and fn69) caricature and political threat via the ANP. For Anwar Khan these external constructions do not recognise the value of his human life in all its complexities and nuances. In addition, another interviewee, Abu Dawud, a Pashtun who migrated from Swat to Karachi in 1961, said:

I will tell you the actual matter; it is that we are not even able to earn our daily wage without a problem. [The MQM] will not let me earn my bread... They say we are the ones that are fighting. But we don’t do anything. I came here as a young boy in 1961 and I am now an old man, and yet they still treat me in the same way. But we are human beings (Abu Dawud, Karachi, KHA4).

Like Afghans, urban poor Pakistani citizens are also devalued by the state and accompanying dominant discourses. However, here, the situation is worse for some Pakistanis more than others. Grades of devaluation at the level of popular “frames” are evident. The lower of the low within Karachi’s ethnicised ways of seeing appears to be Pakistani Pashtuns.

“Official” examples of the same phenomena were also seen in fieldwork that was facilitated through CDGK offices and the various grassroots projects that the CDGK has implemented in Karachi’s katchi abadis. For CDGK fieldworkers certain areas were no go zones: specifically the new and older Pashtun dominated settlements around Sohrab Goth and Gadap Town. Indeed, in one case when I was a passenger with a CDGK worker in a car he accelerated speedily...
through a main road near a Pashtun neighbourhood. He told me, “These Pathan areas are dangerous. If they know I am a Muhajir there will be trouble” (CDGK01 2010). (I had travelled on this road multiple times - with Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns - and questioned this fear, but he assured me that feelings of insecurity went both ways.) He and other CDGK workers added that the lack of CDGK involvement in Pashtun-heavy areas was because of “security” concerns, but critically, this “security” concern is indicative of the ethnicised understanding of security – as the Pashtun areas are understood (and promoted) by MQM-affiliated CDGK workers as belonging to a dangerous “Other”. Subsequently in these areas there is less incentive to development activities. Pashtun votes, support, and incorporation into Karachi are not pursued by the MQM-dominated CDGK. This also extends to other actors like the PPP, who often pursue more “desired” vote-banks - usually Sindhis, and sometimes Baloch and Punjabi.

In an unregulated residential area near Liaquatabad, which is home to a mix of Punjabi, Baloch, Sindhi, Pashtun, Kashmiri and Muhajir communities, a scattered presence of actors like the CDGK is visible, unlike many Pashtun-dominated areas. “Here, the people from the government came in and put in this water tank”, residents told me. This is in contrast with the example of Hussain Ali who usually laughed when I asked him if he had any support from the PPP and/or CDGK when the area is in need of anything (Husain Ali, KHP51). “They do not come to our area”, he said. Hussain Ali said that when the local residents of the area realised that they needed to upgrade a road to enter in and out of the growing settlement safely, they received no support.

We did everything ourselves. We gathered the money (takim karkeh) – got together and took night and days shifts and built the road together (Hussain Ali, KHP51).
Critically, however, areas with high Afghan and Pashtun demographics do not see a total absence of the state. MQM affiliated actors (formal and semi-formal) and other are still visible (federal actors including the GOS or military actors such as the Rangers or Naval Officers), as they must be within the urban city. In addition, the MQM has not fully consolidated its position in Karachi as the dominant hegemon. Thus, these areas are still “well-within” (Ron 2003) the Pakistani state, and responsibility, however grudging it may be, is still expressed toward the geographic areas which comprise the urban state. Indeed, these areas also provide a space of informal profit for official actors as well as forms of intermediaries and non-state power holders. They are a vital resource that can be used by official actors acting in illegal ways to generate income. Indeed as some commentators have mentioned, Karachi, its land, and informal activities – including informal utilities lines, trade and construction contracts - offer a big opportunity for profit for everyone (T.Khan 2012:47). Everyone (Pashtun, Muhajir, Sindhi, Baloch, Afghan) wants a piece of Karachi, however, everyone is reliant on each other for it, even if the political rhetoric suggests otherwise. This means that whilst discrimination may occur, totalising forms of violence, for now, are not an option.

Objectified Ways of Seeing Afghans and Pakistani Bodies

The oppressor transforms everything around it [them] into an object of its domination... everything is reduced to the status of objects at its disposal.

Paolo Freire (1996[1974]:40).

Dehumanisation is also a result of the different mechanical and objectified ways in which the state and the international migration regime view Afghan and Pakistani bodies. Two forms of objectification are analysed in this section. They include the rational and bureaucratic goals of refugee regime or state “modernisation” plans, and forms political instrumentalism.
Rational and Bureaucratically Managing Afghans and Pakistanis

Rationalisation and standardisation to make society “legible” are seen as necessary for the refugee regime and state to manage populations, meet modernising and bureaucratic objectives, and improve the conditions of human life (Scott 1998; Ferguson 1990). In James C. Scott’s Seeing Like a State (1998), high modernist state plans understand that standardisation removes uncertainties of the natural world so that the state can control the population, nature, and spaces within its territory. (In Chapter 7, this thesis highlights how identity cards that “manage” populations have emerged at the centre of efforts to make Afghans and Pakistanis legible). Standardisation is also important for states concerned with improving sanitation, health, and education. However, Scott outlines that the techniques used by officials for measuring are “removed from the society they are charged with governing” (1998:76). This means that assessments of social life are “made by a series of typifications that are always some distance from the full reality these abstractions are meant to capture” (ibid). Standardisation then also makes both Afghans and Pakistanis appear automaton-like (Haslam 2006) which reduces Afghans and Pakistanis to instruments that can be used, removed, or exploited for electoral votes, geopolitical/political strategies, modern urban management, or other instrumentalist purposes. Human lives are analysed in simple frameworks of cost-benefit analysis and the complex position of humans as possessing moral and rational autonomy, self-respect, social relationships, and intellect is ignored. In addition, forms of rule and ordering are not just related to improving the human condition. They are also interlinked with improving the state’s control and power.

Bureaucratic ways of understanding and acting shape the refugee regime (including CAR, UNHCR, and other I/NGOs) and determine both policy decisions and funding decisions. These organisations are working for a humanitarian purpose; however, the methods used often
objectify human lives as non-human entities: “targets”, “policy goals”, and “working issues”. Saadia Toor (2011:193) highlights that the “priorities of international donors” are tied to a “preoccupation with the funding cycle and bureaucratisation” rather than the needs of a particular area and of people. In an interview with a Pakistani official working for CCAR in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa the official said:

They stopped the WFP in 1994-1995, which was a great set back. Someone at UNHCR had a bright idea and thought that what Afghans needed was to be independent and that by cutting off rations they would go back to Afghanistan. The same with closing down RTVs and the reduced funding Afghan initiatives faced. Of course what in reality happened is that people left the camp and moved into settled areas (interview: Maroof 2011).81

The official’s comments indicate that decisions regarding the needs of Afghans are also the result of (perhaps well-intending) ordering and policy goals. However, these actions failed to account for the human needs of the people on the ground. In an interview with Hamza Noor, a former resident of Nasir Bagh Camp, he said that once the camp closed down he and his family still needed somewhere to stay, “They closed the camp, but we were not going back to Afghanistan. We had nowhere to go” (Hamza Noor, PXA65). Instead Hamza and his family built a katcha house on nearby Pakistani land with permission from a local Pakistani landowner to whom they pay rent for the land they occupy. Here, the route for redistribution and social security is not provided by the law maker and guardian but are instead provided by an Afghan refugee using his family solidarity and negotiation with a non-state power holder (Chapter 5).

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81 Kacha Gari was one of Pakistan’s largest RTVs. The state manoeuvres for closure started in 2005 (alongside Nasir Bagh) when the Pakistani Army claimed ownership to the land.
In Karachi and Peshawar the urban governance and development plans are “rationalised” in neo-Liberal profit-based language, in which residents are viewed through the lenses of funds, finances, targets, and interest areas, rather than fully human lives. In Karachi, Arif Hasan notes that the fallout from economic liberalisation is considered “worth the human cost” (Hasan 2010:11) by the GOP because, as a result of these policies, “Pakistan has had an average growth rate of 7 per cent between 2003-06 and its international trade is growing at more than 15 per cent per year and government revenue has been growing at more than 20 per cent per year” (ibid). This is, according to the government, “a sign of prosperity and development” (ibid). Hasan also shows how official modernising plans in Karachi, such as KDP 2000 and KSDP 2020 (Hasan 2010:25-6; KSDP 2006) are aiming to make Karachi a “world class city” with “investment friendly infrastructure”. Similar language can also be found in Khyber Pakhtunkwa’s Comprehensive Development Strategy 2010-2017 which is pushing to introduce a “modern economy” to the area (GOKPK 2010). In both cities this has meant that informal housing settlements, which are satisfying a real basic need (shelter) by providing housing and some level of a humanised existence, challenge the state’s “rational” way of seeing. This means that when circumstances dictate, informal housing areas are often simply torn down or ignored completely (Chapter 5). Moreover, these lives are able to be torn down because they are not recognised as fully human lives, but units of “cost”. Statistics taken from the Urban Resource Centre (URC) in Karachi shows that over a period of 10 years 1270 homes were bulldozed (URC 1999 in Hasan 2010:50-1), and in 2012 Hasan notes that in the “past decade over 30,000 families have been displaced from within the city to the periphery” (Hasan 2012). The human lives that inhabit these bulldozed areas are neither recognised as valuable nor significant. Indeed they are not fully human but units to be managed. Thousands are made homeless and lives are disoriented and lost in order to meet the “rational” route to modernity and “improve” the human condition.
During fieldwork many Afghans and Pakistanis spoke of a need for improved basic human conditions (i.e. shelter, utilities, education, and healthcare), and welcomed possibilities of state projects, but often these projects were inaccessible and too costly or if they were versed in frameworks that constructed their lives, as the urban poor, as sub-human, which adds another dimension to “unitisation”, i.e. of an “anti-poor bias” (Hasan 2012) in Pakistan’s urban-development circles. Arif Hasan highlights that whilst Pakistan has “spent billions of rupees on ‘capacity-building’ in the last two decades alone”, with “some of the finest community development projects in the world” (Hasan 2012), these projects are only reserved for certain areas and people, i.e. wealthy areas/people. Schemes for affordable housing for the urban poor are not effectively planned or executed. Similarly in the planning and delivery of infrastructure projects in poorer areas there is low investment.

Per capita investment in them [infrastructure] is much lower in poorer than in rich areas. Again, in poor areas, projects are seldom completed. Even if they are completed, they are not maintained. If they are road projects, they are washed out in the first rains. If they are sewage projects, they stop functioning within a year. The contractors who build them, unlike in the rich areas, are inexperienced and their workmen have poor skills (Hasan 2012).

Thus, the lives of the urban poor are understood as insignificant units and/or also as “despised members of society” (Ron 2003:16). These are “tools” or not-fully human lives” that can be moved and lost in order to fulfil the state’s “rational” and modernising agenda, or simply neglected.

Crucially, the migration regime’s shortcomings and the GOP’s response to Afghans in Pakistan are also related to the ways in which Afghan human lives are understood as objectified bodies or possessions, which are open to manipulation in order to fulfil “rational” political objectives: the defeat of the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War (Baitenmann 1990); control over the
Taliban for influence in Afghanistan (Grare 2003; Schmeidl 2003); or more recently to exert influence over the Afghan government. Fredric Grare (2003) shows that Afghan refugees were welcomed in the Cold War as a way of strengthening Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan to counterbalance Indian influence. Susan Schmeidl (2003) also shows how Afghan “refugee warrior communities” have been formed as a result of geopolitical objectives of regional power politics, i.e. the Soviet War and the Pakistani state’s use of the Taliban. Further, Helga Baitenmann (1990) analyses the use of refugees and I/NGOs in Pakistan during the Cold War. Citing a US Department of State airgram from 1981 Baitenmann shows that the US government believed that without international assistance, tensions would arise between Pakistanis and refugees, “increasing the chances that Pakistan might abandon its stalwart opposition to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in favor of a policy of accommodation with the USSR”. So, with congressional encouragement, Pakistan saw a massive increase in funding for Afghan-based I/NGOs via the US (Baitenmann 1990).

There is debate within aid discourse regarding conflict zones, and whether aid should be used as a tool for “peacebuilding” (Goodhand 2003:840). “Maximalists” argue it should be, whilst “humanitarian minimalists” argue that this “leads to the distortion of humanitarian mandates, particularly those of neutrality and impartiality” (Goodhand 2003:840). Yet it is clear that proliferation of I/NGOs in Pakistan cannot be separated from value-laden political objectives. During the Soviet-Afghan War UNHCR and other I/NGOs received significant funding from the USA and other states that wanted to defeat the Soviet Union and/or exert influence in Afghanistan. Here, seemingly neutral institutions were tools for wider geopolitical goals (Baitenmann 1990; Goodhand 2003; Paris 2002). This funding was not maintained after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the fall of the Afghan communist-led government in 1993 (Donini 2011), despite the fact that continued conflict in Afghanistan,
meant many Afghans could not return to Afghanistan and many new waves of refugees were entering Pakistan. 82

The non-national Afghan presence in Pakistan was accepted when Afghan bodies were useful for geopolitical objectives (as a militarised resistance in exile or propaganda for the public relations war against the Soviet Union). Indeed, the GOP 1981 Handbook for Afghan Refugees refers to Afghans in Pakistan as refugees as related to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to Refugees and 1967 Protocol but specifically adds:

The definition of the term “Refugee”, according to Pakistan also includes a person who is obliged to leave the state of which he is a national under the pressure of illegal acts or as a result of invasion of such state, wholly or partially, by an alien with a view to occupying the state (SAFRON 1981:3).

As this usefulness of Afghans in Pakistan waned the Afghan presence in Pakistan, however, was no longer viewed in such a positive light. Once the heroic “mujahid” (fighter) and brave “mubajir” (refugee) 83 and an object of veneration, Afghans are now the “dangerous Talib” or “burdensome migrant”. This “bad” Afghan narrative has been used to justify the state’s sudden shift in its foreign policy and support of the US-led war in Afghanistan and its own military actions in Pakistan. In an interview with the son of a former mujahidin leader for Jamaat ud Dawa, Maulana Jamil ur Rehman, Maulana Jamil said:

82 After the fall of Najeeullah when some Afghans (many mujahidin/resistance groups) returned from exile Afghans that had remained in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan War and occupied government or military jobs were persecuted. With the rise of the Taliban significant displacements of Afghan Hazaras also took places, and many migrated to Balochistan and Karachi in Pakistan (particularly during 1996-1999) – smaller populations can be found in Rawalpindi. 1993-1995 included heavy migrations of former government workers and residents of Kabul as well as former Afghan returnees who had previously lived in Pakistan; 1996-1999 saw large scale Afghan Hazara migrations. See also fn20.

83 Even migration and refugeedom was valorised as a religious and pious act of migration, i.e. similar to early Muslim migrations during the formative years of Islam.
I was greeted by the State Department and thanked by the government for our efforts in the war - this was in 1995. After that they left us under the open sky to do what we could. During the Jihad everyone was united but the relationship is now severed. There is nothing left any longer – it is purely an interest-based relationship, never a friendship... The Cold War shaped how they dealt with us Afghans, and how they took advantage of us. We are the ones who are paying the price for this war, and for this conflict. We cannot escape the consequences (interview: Jamil ur Rehman 2011).

In the case of Maulana Jamil ur Rehman, the ease in which Afghan lives are ended demonstrate the subhuman way Afghan lives were understood by the US state and its allies. Afghan lives were only objects to be used in foreign policy goals. Humanised relationships, built on trust, respect, and mutual recognition were never really experienced.

In another series of interviews, with the former mujabid of Hizb e Islami in Peshawar, Engineer Aziz (introduced in Chapter 1), Engineer Aziz (PXA59) recalled how Pakistani sponsored announcements on local Afghan radio promised, “free land in Pakistan for Afghans to settle on”.

He said, “At that point, it was a big deal to be an Afghan refugee. We had recognition - we had the attention of the world on us”. However, he explained that now the situation is starkly different.

Why is it that then we were recognized as refugees and now we are not? Why? At that time there was a war against the Russians. Now what, there is no legitimacy to our status because the war is directed by the US (and their partners)?

Sitting in his katcha house, in the now-silent refugee camp (“it used to be so busy here”), he continued speaking about how during the 1980s his RTV had assistance but now got nothing.

He said:

Are we human or are we not worth anything? We are nothing...
The rations were there from 1985-1996… Initially there was a
budget for Afghans, [many] things were available for Afghans. Education and Higher Education was better supported. The INGOs here used to give students everything from uniforms, to books. People got tents, camp spaces were given, people were given a fee to support them... *ghee* [clarified butter], oil, flour... all these things were there. In fact, you know some Pakistanis enrolled themselves in Afghan schools because of the benefits (ibid).

In an interview with Nawar Saleh, who has lived and worked in Pakistan as a school teacher and educationist since 1980, Nawar said that I/NGOs used to distribute many material goods.

[They distributed] Milk, dates, oil, biscuits, pens, pencil sharpeners, ink… every single little thing was given for free. In Akora Khattak the milk used to come in a tanker the size of an oil tanker! And do you know how much meat there was on Eid?!” (Nawar Saleh, PXA99).

In the quest to defeat the Soviet menace no detail was spared. Not even pencil sharpeners.

Similar parallels, but of a shorter time scale (so far) and lesser funds, can be found with *Pakistani* IDPs from Swat, Waziristan and other FATA areas. Here, IDPs are viewed as an important resource in the “fight against militancy”, as repeated in Pakistani newspapers, television programmes, and official public statements. During fieldwork, Asmat Afridi, a Pakistani from Khyber Agency who had moved to Peshawar in a more permanent capacity (he is still connected to his ancestral village in Khyber Agency) noted that many people did not trust the government agencies and their supporting I/NGO actors.

They just want us to be on their side. You do not know who is working for whom. They do not care”, he said (Asmat Afridi, PXP27).

Here the Pakistani state and military, as well as I/NGOs that support them, are seen as wanting to win the “hearts and minds” of IDPs in order to facilitate access for military strategies in
FATA.\textsuperscript{84} The scale is not the same as the GOP’s examples of Afghans during the Soviet era, which had massive international backing and funding, but the theme of using people for instrumentalist political agendas is clear.

In other cases Pakistanis find attention suddenly being heaped on them during elections.\textsuperscript{85} For Pakistani citizens, when election time comes local political parties “miraculously” appear on the scene to distribute material goods. But this distribution is considered deceitful and not genuine. A material debt is in circulation (Lomintz 2009). By distributing material resources repayment is expected via an electoral vote. In an interview with a Pakistani resident in an informal housing settlement in Peshawar, I heard of the “sudden descent” of Pakistani political parties during election campaigns. Here, political parties do not see in residents a capacity for relationships of trust and mutual and equal interdependence. Instead residents are an electoral vote to be possessed. In an interview with a Hassan Bilal, a Pakistani Baluch who works as a driver, in an informal residential area in Karachi I heard that most of the time, “We do not get any help”, but that “when the elections take place someone from a party will come along and distribute basic things here - food, ration packs - but then nothing” (Hassan Bilal, KHP7). He said, “They say they are here to help us, but trust me, if I went to see them at any other time they would not even give me a glass of water”. In another case in Karachi, Sameena Haroon (KHP18), a Pakistani Sindhi woman had opened a local school in an unregulated housing area in Karachi with low school fees so the local residents, urban poor families, could send their children to the

\textsuperscript{84} Other international examples of “soft” narratives being produced as a broader strategy of winning “hearts and minds” can be seen with literature such as Greg Mortenson’s (now critiqued for falsification) \textit{Three Cups of Tea} (2003).

\textsuperscript{85} Registered Afghan refugees or illegal Afghans are unable to vote in Pakistani elections, which results in Afghans not being targeted by political parties. Aesthetically it is interesting to compare Afghan dominant areas \textit{vis a vis} Pakistani areas, with the former being visually devoid of the political pamphlets, graffiti, and paraphernalia calling to support Pakistani political parties as well as having less investment by local officials and Pakistani political parties.
school. Sameena explained in an interview that during election time political parties, such as the PPP, were eager to support her organisation but after the elections gave her little attention.

They know I know a lot of people in the area and that being associated with me is good for them. I even campaigned for them during the elections because they would give me money for the school. But, if I ever need something when they do not need me... well, they have slammed the door straight in my face! They are so good to me when they need me - otherwise I am nothing (Sameena Haroon, KHP18).

Here, for Hassan Bilal and Sameena Haroon, their status and needs are only considered when they fit the political objectives of the political parties. Otherwise they are neither recognised nor worthy of attention and silenced.

**Constructions of Exemplary Suffering: The Helpless Refugee and the Helpless Poor**

Finally, dehumanisation also occurs when Afghans and Pakistanis are stripped of their moral autonomy and rationality and other human characteristics, and only recognised as one dimensional “victims”. The “helpless refugee”, the “noble poor man”, and the “exemplary victim” are caricatures which have been heavenly romanticised in public and academic discourse and contribute towards a type of dehumanisation (see Boltanski 1999).

Barbara Harrell-Bond (1986) criticises the international refugee relief system and highlights that the sweeping generalisations made by “western” aid agencies regarding the “helpless” refugee promote a negative approach to dealing with refugees. Harrell-Bond was writing in 1986 before the proliferation the figure of the “IDP”, but this way of seeing can also be extended to include IDPs and the expanding range of “deserving” persons that form the focus of humanitarian assistance programmes today (i.e. the urban poor and women in certain societies). For Harrell-Bond, assumptions of “helplessness” create policies which “impose aid” (Harrell-Bond 1986).
In practise, however, Harrell-Bond argues that these assumptions do not best serve the interests of all refugees. Many do not accept that the solution of camps is best. In fact, many “actively reject aid” (ibid). Certainly, for many Afghans in Pakistan (as well as IDPs) this is the case, and the majority of Afghans do not live in RTVs (SAFRON et al., 2005). In a discussion with an Afghan family in Peshawar, the mother said, “We did not want to stay in an RTV, where everyone is a stranger, and the conditions are bare. You cannot even work, eat, or clean properly… We rented straight away” (field notes: Fakhr Jan and family). Similarly, in interviews with victims of militarised conflict in FATA, many FATA residents chose to circumvent IDP tents all together. One family that was forced to migrate out of Mohmand was renting a house in inner Peshawar. The father of the house explained:

Why would we stay in an IDP Camp. God forbid. We have family in the city and the conditions are better here [regulated housing area]. Both of my daughters are starting university now as well and I wanted the younger one [son] to be in a good school (Muzaffar Malikyar, PXP61).

Liisa Malkki (1995, 2009) discusses the imposition of “refugeeness” and shows that the word “refugee” itself produces: “homogenising, humanitarian images of refugees [that] works to obscure their actual socio-political circumstances – erasing the specific, historical, local politics of particular refugees, and retreating instead to the depoliticizing, dehistoricizing registering of a more abstract and universal suffering” (Malkki 1995:13). These images of the helpless refugee in “western” discourse are said to be primarily rooted in Christian religious iconography (Terence Wright 2000) and, in campaigns for aid, images of suffering and helplessness are dominant. Only images of naked and raw suffering suffice. Otherwise the picture becomes too messy and unclear (Malkki 2009). The idealisation of the refugee as a “passive” object, which is common amongst
“western” interventionist discourse, shows that the refugee regime accepts only a particular type of humanity. Only the “exemplary victim” counts. As Shahram Khosravi states in his auto-ethnography:

To have a chance of getting refugee status, one must have the ability to translate one’s life story into Eurocentric juridical language and to perform the role expected of a refugee. Like other newcomers to Cantt Station, I was advised to wear dirty clothes when going to the UNHCR for the interview and to look ‘sad’ and ‘profound’ (Khosravi 2010:33).

Further, in Chapter 6, the attempts of two young Afghan brothers to get refugee status are stalled as they are unable to explain their vulnerability in the language that the refugee regime wants (and needs) to hear.

Poverty is also constructed using similar frames, this time of the “deserving poor” by bureaucratic organisational structures. If not criminalised, the urban poor are “helpless” and in need of “help” and “charity”, or they are stuck in a “cycle of poverty” (Lewis 1958). However, constructions of poverty - absolute and relative - create dependency mechanisms and a loss of human autonomy and voice (Schaber 2010; Muller and Neuhauser 2010). With a reduction of control over oneself and a dependency on aid, and with constructions of the dependent victim - the urban poor, the refugee, the IDP are constructed as sub-human “helpless beings”. Here, another form of dehumanisation is in effect; one that constructs a controlling discipline, which in its “benevolence” silences and obfuscates important voices and nuances.

However, this thesis shows that there is a space for alternative forms of power and political agency. Difficulties and challenges are present, but the quest for a humanised existence that is quite different to the bare naked “victim” of aid agencies is pursued. Despite the protracted
conflict in Afghanistan and protracted displacement outside of Afghanistan, most Afghans are not simply “waiting to go home”. Neither are Afghans and urban Pakistanis dependent on aid and I/NGOs. The majority of Afghans have been in Pakistan for over 20-34 years and have continued with their lives - albeit in new ways and in new circumstances - and the majority of Pakistanis are stubbornly self-reliant (as they have to be). More often than not Afghans and Pakistanis question the current bureaucratic and instrumentalist ways of workings of these very I/NGOs. It is not that support mechanisms are not needed. They are. But a different mode of operation is necessary, which does not promote a loss of autonomy and frames which result only in or limited types of conditions being provided, which stunt the potentials of human flourishing.

During fieldwork in an informal refugee camp in Karachi, an Afghan resident, Yaqoob Gul, shunned the patronising tones of a local INGO worker (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10). The worker had pointed to residents and in front of them said, “These poor fellows… look at them… We are the only ones us who help them”. Later, away from the INGO worker, Yaqoob Gul said:

What help do they [the INGO] give us? [W]hat type of help is it that you get a ticket and they say they are treating you, but what are they doing? We don’t want someone giving us little pills or pieces of paper. We need more than a half-functioning box [clinic]... and we will do it for ourselves. We need a school that is beyond teaching basic reading... our daughters can be doctors as well; we too are intelligent and desire education. My nieces all go to colleges in the city, because they want to go beyond what they have here (ibid).

Similarly an interview was conducted with a Pakistani family living in the inner city of Peshawar. Eleven family members were living in a two-room ground floor quasi regulated house and the family spoke about the times that government workers conducted “needs” assessments.
People come around and ask questions and pretend to care and looking [down] on us. But what do they do? Instead my father finds what work he can and we continue on. The children are all going to a school close by. They will still get an education (Hafsah Jan, PXP70).

Here alternative constructions and possibilities of a “human” life are expressed, which are pushing for fuller forms of recognition than what is offered by constructions of “exemplary suffering”.

Conclusion
In Karachi and Peshawar the lenses through which officials view the urban poor citizens, refugees, and “illegals” construct “dehumanised” lives. These factors combine with structural shortcomings (i.e. Pakistan’s peripheral position in the economy or reduced funds for UNHCR) and result in a failure for basic material goods to be distributed, which create conditions in which the potentials for a humanised existence cannot effectively be practiced. The languages and technologies of state/refugee-regime rule over-simplify human lives. And in some cases these one-dimensional units are viewed in even lower terms because of national and ethnic ways of seeing. There are multiple consequences of these processes of devaluation and constructions of “less-human” beings. However, at this juncture, what is most significant is that they do not lead to “victimisation”. Instead Afghans and Pakistanis use alternative structures and strategies to redistribute material and non-material goods and redress these dehumanising constructions and devaluing conditions. This is conceptually analysed in the following chapter and then via case studies in Chapters 5 and 6. These dehumanising processes and self-humanising processes, which will be discussed in the next chapter, are examples of the shared experiences and realities that both Afghans and Pakistanis face in urban Pakistan. The processes of self-humanisation point to new ways of being and belonging within a state (although this is not the same as citizenship) and reflect a quest for humanity that official channels fail to provide. Critically, during this process Afghans and Pakistanis juxtapose their humanity against the incompetent,
“rational”, and impervious state. As official institutions and actors are held responsible for dehumanising Afghans and Pakistanis the state itself undergoes a process of political delegitimization and is constructed as an inhumane entity.
Chapter 4: Self-Humanisation: Informal Political Action and the Impact on Officialdom

While competition and self-interest prevail at times, individuals are connected to kin, neighbours, and colleagues in more interdependent relationships than in the industrialised West. People who utilize networks to fulfil individual and collective needs, and to influence the distribution of public and private goods and services, engage other people in their efforts. Although far from altruistic, the system allows people who have access to different types of resources to contribute to and prosper within the community, despite vast difference in status, wealth, education, piety, or property.


It seems that all people, regardless of culture, rely less on social networks when there are professional agencies that can support them.


A man standing in a long queue for bread tells the guy behind him that he is leaving to go to shoot the president. He returns after a few hours and re-joins the line.

“Did you manage to kill him?” Ask the people in the bread line.

“No. That queue is longer than this one”.

Common joke circulating in Pakistan, 2011.

Introduction

This chapter provides a conceptual framework to show how Afghans and Pakistanis “self-humanise” their lives through the redistribution material and non-material goods using solidarity
networks (structures) and navigation practices (strategies). It shows that these solidarity networks and navigation practices take place in hybrid formal/informal spaces, with solidarity networks being more “informal” and navigation practices being more hybrid “formal/informal”. It shows that despite these alternative political structures and strategies not being a total panacea they are still able to offer a more viable route for improving the lives of urban citizens and non-citizens in Pakistan than official structures. They also reflect a shared space of belonging that is inclusive of Afghans and the urban poor Pakistanis and transcends the barriers of citizenship. Further, by looking at the shared lives, structures, and strategies that Afghan and Pakistanis use this chapter also reveals how the state functions in Pakistan. Informal structures and strategies are tolerated and encouraged by the state as an alternative way of maintaining the state. However, this chapter shows that the actions that these structures and strategies enable, repeated time and time again, create significant physical and non-physical challenges to the state - the most significant of which is a sharply weakened legitimacy.

Structures: Solidarity Networks
The state, and in some cases refugee regime, is not fully absent in Pakistan but people must rely primarily on social networks because the professional agencies that can offer an avenue for material redistribution are ineffective (Harpviken 2009:28). Observations and interviews conducted during fieldwork demonstrated that many Afghans and Pakistanis were reliant on a number of solidarity networks, and, as will be shown shortly, two different types of navigation

86 A vast body of literature focuses on social networks and social capital, including works on revolutions (Skocpol 1979, 1994), social movements (Tilly 1978, 2003), informal urban politics (Castells 1983, Perlman 1976, Bayat, 1997, 2010; Ismail 2006; Singerman 2004), patterns of migration (Monsutti 2005; Harpviken 2009; Dorai 2003; Massey 1987), shared affinities of kinship and clan (Alavi 1995; Ahmed 2006; Lindholm 1990), ethnicity (Monsutti 2004, 2005; Verkaaik 1994, 2004), friendship (Bozolli 1991; Ring 1990), patronage (Gellner and Waterbury 1977; Scott 1977), and democracy (Putnam 1995) to name a few. In this thesis solidarity networks and the social capital they produce are analysed in the context of everyday (informal) urban life, or what Asef Bayat calls “social nonmovements” or the “quiet encroachments of the ordinary” (Bayat 2010:14).
practices. However, three main solidarity networks, bringing actors together for differing reasons (or “foci” [Feld 1981]) and in different contexts, appeared to be the most significant: fellowships of space & charity, bonds of friendship, and solidarities of kin (and/or clan). Here the “foci” – anonymous, friends, and family - are the different modes that organise a network and affect how it functions and what its aims are. However, these networks appeared not to be exclusive from each other and often overlapped. And, in some cases networks were not present at all or very weak, which, as will be shown, lead to a dependence on exploitative navigation practices.

The social networks analysed during fieldwork reflect types of social “structures” that are not controlled by “political institutions or the political elite” (Singerman 1994:133). These structures appeared central to producing forms of social capital which enabled material and non-material redistribution. This analysis of social networks is informed by Durkheimien approaches and structural traditions within sociology and social anthropology (Harpviken 2009:15; see also Durkheim 1984[1893]). This analysis encourages an understanding of political actors as interdependent and interconnecting rather than autonomous and detached, with linkages acting as channels for the transfer of resources and the production of social capital (Wassermann and Faust 1994:4 in Harpviken 2009:14-5; Bourdieu 1981, 1985; Portes 2000). In addition, it understands social capital as the “sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of [more or] less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu 1994:119, see also Portes 2000).

Afghan and Pakistani solidarity networks appeared to be motivated by interacting altruistic and instrumentalist (mutual insurance87) factors. Here, there is “no contradiction in the rational and

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87 Under “mutual insurance” the person receiving assistance is not expected to “give” something equivalent to the donor, but “what is expected from the recipient is simply to help others in return” (Fafchamps 1992:148).
moral economy” (Fafchamps 1992:148); instead, a combination of material and non-material motivations appeared to shape the cohesion of these networks. Interlinked to this, Alejandro Portes (2000:533-4) has produced a model that shows that motivations of donors are being “altruistic” or “instrumentalist”. Altruistic motives are where motives are formed around “value introjections”, which includes morals for alms giving, or “bounded solidarity”, where belonging to a community, such as an ethnic group, creates bonds of support (ibid). Instrumentalist motives are based on either “simple reciprocity”, or “enforceable trust”, i.e. community controls guarantying repayment (ibid). Whilst I do not take an approach of a dichotomised model as Portes (2000) does, his framework acts as a useful tool in understanding what motivated the formation of Afghan and Pakistani solidarity networks.

A Fellowship of Space & Charity: Enabling Macro-Forms of Action & Everyday Basic Needs
During fieldwork fellowships of space & charity functioned by connecting anonymous actors in shared local spaces – the urban neighbourhood - and by moral frameworks of charity. Localised spaces matter and intertwine with moral concepts associated with religion, culture, and personal experiences. These solidarity networks are examples of what analysts of social networks identify as weak ties (Granovetter 1985), which Granovetter (1973) has suggested are important at a macro level as they enable “bridging”/“brokering” actions in anonymous environment (see also Harpviken 2009:32). This allows actions that can transcend inward-looking cliques or

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88 Analysts of social networks identify network “strength” as based on either strong ties (Coleman 1998; Loury 1977; Granovetter 1973) or weak ones (Granovetter 1985). Granovetter (1973:1361), for instance, argues that the “strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy... and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie”, with each being “somewhat independent” but obviously highly interrelated”. Others add that strong ties are contingent on meeting two out of three possible criteria, including “(1) perception of close intimacy; (2) voluntary interaction between ego and alter (not interaction because of, for example membership in the same organisation); and (3) interaction between ego and alter in multiple social contexts” (Wellman and Wortley 1990:564-5 in Harpviken 2009:26-7). In this study, friendship and family networks are examples of strong ties. Fellowships of space & charity involve weaker ties because the network is anonymous and repeated interaction is involuntary (Granovetter 1973; Wellman and Wortley 1990).
concentrated networks such as kin and clan, which are examples of strong ties (Granovetter 1973).

During fieldwork these “weaker ties” of the fellowship of space & charity were important in allowing macro-level/neighbourhood action to take place. Actors were not just looking inward towards immediate kin or clan, but were working with a wider network of anonymous actors. In local areas a shared embodied “neighbourhood” experience was often recognised among residents. As neighbours and residents saw each other living a shared dehumanised experience in daily interactions, a shared need for material resources was often silently understood. Whilst some commentators have pointed to the anonymous and individualising nature of urban cities (Sutherland 1992[1924]; Park et al., 1926), or the importance of anonymous networks (Bayat 2010:20-22), in this study, at the very local level in dense urban spaces in unregulated residential areas - *katchi abadis, goths*, informal and/or formal refugee camps - anonymity does not capture urban life.

In the informal refugee camp in Karachi residents see each other daily (sometimes multiple times) as they fill up cartons with water informally supplied by state and non-state actors (Chapter 5). In this area the water cartons and pumps symbolically capture the shared human struggle of residents. These are not imagined communities (Anderson 1991) but local, shared, and lived ones, through which localised anonymous actors pool resources, such as social contacts, financial capital, and so on, to sustain the urban neighbourhood – in the example above, residents pool various forms of capital to push for better water supplies (Chapter 5). On other

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89 *Goths* are informal housing settlements usually built on the rural-urban interface, whereas *katchi abadis* are informal housing settlements usually built on government land within the city on private land closer to the main city.

90 Alejandro Portes (2000) criticises the literature that proposes social capital can be translated to the level of the “nation”. For Portes for social capital to be effective human interaction is essential, which distinguishes local solidarities from wider imagined communities, which as ethnic or national groups.
occasions, residents work together to provide “ration packs” (sugar, wheat, oil) to the “poorest members” - often strangers - of the area. In another unregulated residential area in Karachi, Ishtiaq Goth (Chapter 5), women regularly share food with other households even when food was scarce (see also Ring 1990). And, in another area, Saeed Goth (Chapter 5), residents work together to improve the area’s infrastructure.

In addition, in this study, interviewees repeatedly spoke of the significance of the moral imperatives of charity, which was informed by the acknowledged vulnerability of all human life in a specific local area, and a human obligation to act in order to safeguard life. This moral base came from existential frameworks, such as learned religious or cultural practices, or lived experiences. Often, intercommunity zakat (“obligatory” religious charity) and sadaqah (“voluntary” religious charity) was cited as guiding their actions and practices. In one interview in Karachi I asked an Afghan refugee who manages a food rations, an orphanage, and a housing quarter for widows in his local area why he was engaged in these practices. His reply was simple, “This is our zakat, our sadaqah” (Maulana Abdul Qais, KHA70).

In Islamic discourse generosity is one of the highest virtues, and the Quran and Islamic jurisprudence codifies the obligation of almsgiving by all of those who are able to do so. “Philanthropy is not solely the practice of the privileged classes or pious persons; it applies to almost all of the faithful” (Kochuyt 2009:102). It permeates daily life and is reinforced by the image of the spiritual faqir (beggar/mendicant) that has historically held significance in Afghan and Pakistani lives. Thus, some actors display a dual orientation - one rooted in material and “worldly” affairs and the other in non-material and metaphysical “otherworldly affairs” (Adib-Moghaddam 2010:254). Whilst some commentators understand network-based relationships as based on reciprocity (Portes 2000; Lomintz 1988; Mauss 2000[1954]), here the reciprocity and
gains that shape solidarity practices are not just material; they are also metaphysical, cosmological, and non-material related to imaginings of the after-life. For many, giving via “charity” is also a route to living a more “humanised” life as understood through existential, moral, and ethical paradigms. In order to live a humanised life, both in terms of inner worth and in terms of social recognition, acts of giving and support reflect a contextually located “human” way of being that is deeply intertwined with local practices of Islam. Sharing food, for example is practicing sunnah and helping to “improve the heart” (Hussain Ali, KHP51), or “our sadaqah” (Maulana Abdul Qais KHA70). For others, being able to pray and complete wudu (ablutions) or ghusl (cleaning) is essential to living a humanised life. In one case when residents of an area were denied access to water – therefore unable to do wudu or ghusl – their sense of being “not fully human” was connected to Islamic ideas of a humanised life. Thus, this solidarity network is moulded by an interconnectedness of morals, a bounded relationship (in a localised space), and rational concerns for material access to basic goods that also lead to expressions of “self-humanisation”.

Bonds of Friendship: Enabling Micro-Forms of Personalised Action I

In Afghan and Pakistani lives, bonds of friendship are “strong ties” (Granovetter 1973; 1985) and are crucial in basic and beyond-basic forms of survival. They are socially and emotionally constructed human relationships based on trust built up over time between unrelated individuals and the actors in this relationship are not necessarily linked through kin or clan. These personal relationships produce a form of social capital grounded in intimate ties of emotion, trust, experience and affection (Bozolli 1991; Gambetta 1988; Ring 1990; F. Lyon 2000). Human relationships matter. They stand in contrast to the individualising, mechanistic, and anonymous nature of the state and the official – and their shortcomings - (Haslam 2006; Scott 1998) to offer a more “human” way of being, as well as delivering goods in which the necessary conditions of a more human life are possible.
The social structure of friendship is itself humanising, providing space for expressions of affiliation (Nussbaum 2000:78-80) and social recognition. It also provides the connections through which basic and beyond-basic material and non-material redistribution can occur. Indeed, friendships are “strong” bonds in which there is a greater willingness to “invest” in riskier enterprises (Harpviken 2009:27). During fieldwork cross-cutting Afghan and Pakistani friendships, as well as intra-Afghan and intra-Pakistani friendships, were important structures that allowed Afghans and Pakistanis to redistribute material and non-material goods. These included basic material redistribution, such as foodstuffs and shelter, as well as “bigger” gains, such as property purchases and large loans (Chapter 6).

The Attachments of Kin: Enabling Micro-Forms of Personalised Action II
Whilst the structure of the family is different across different contexts (Singerman 1994:41), in the research I completed, most Afghan and Pakistani households kin and clan ties matter (positively or negatively). For both Afghans and Pakistanis the family unit is usually shaped by genetic relationships, although some cases of neighbours or communities adopting unrelated persons into the family were recorded in times of violence and poverty. Family structures, comprised of parents, spouses, children, siblings, and elders (i.e. grandparents), and are socially constructed sites of value, offering both material income and non-material security. This

91 Kin networks should be understood on two interacting levels: one, the immediate nuclear family; and two, members of the extended family. Other authors also include “non-genetic” relationships in their understanding of a family unit, i.e. that a family unit can be understood “more as an economic unit more than a mere association of closely related kin” (Singerman 1995:42). And, C. Wood (1982) places emphasis on the family unit as “a group that ensures its maintenance and reproducing by generating and disposing income (Wood 1982:339 in Singerman 1995:42). Further, many Afghans and Pakistanis understandings of family also extend to include clan, which is essentially a bigger kin network linked together by perceptions of historical relationships to a common ancestor (detailed examples of various kin and clan networks are provided in Ahmed [2006]; Monsutti [2005]). An analysis of wider clan networks was not possible in this study.
continues to be the case in urban settings. Indeed, the family continues to produce a high sense of “cohesion”, responsibility, or what Portes calls “enforceable trust”, i.e. obligations that are enforceable via community pressure (Portes 2000:533). Further, as the attachments of kin are also types of strong ties, which are often denser than bonds of friendship, this means that attachments of kin are used for substantial material redistributions, such as pooled incomes, shared food, housing and accommodation, migratory pulls, business loans, investments, or “borrowing”.

In some literature ties of kin are argued to contain a destructive or negative element (Portes 2000; Clifford Geertz 1961). Moreover, it is argued that strong kinship networks also lead to the “exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on group members, restrictions on individual freedoms, and downward levelling” (Portes 2000:533). In Pakistan (and Afghanistan), intra-family and intra-clan conflicts over land, territory, marriages, and businesses often lead to substantial material losses (Nelson 2011). In this study, a number of interviewees spoke of the fact that family feuds and rivalries were restricting access to material and non-material goods. In an interview with an Afghan family in Peshawar, the father of the house said, “I cannot return to Afghanistan. I have dushmani (enmity) with my brother. He has taken over my land and said he will kill me if I return” (Burhanuddin, PX28). Further, in a discussion with a Pakistani family in Karachi who recently migrated from interior Sindh, the family said they had been forced to leave

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92 Numerous studies, implicitly and explicitly look at the role of kin and/or clan. Some usefully examples for this study include Alavi 1995; Ahmed 2006; Dorai 2003; Monsuri 2004, 2005; Lindholm 1990.

93 Discussion on family feuds in Afghanistan and Pakistan, specifically amongst Pashtun families have historically been debated under ideas of “Pashtunwali”, which has recently proliferated in the Afghan and FATA war contexts. The excerpt from the interview above should not be inferred as a statement about “Pashtunwali”. This clarification is made because it appears that the current debates about “customary” law are leading to types of neo-colonial reifications. This is not to deny the significance of “Pashtunwali”, “badal”; and “dushmani”; but it is to place emphasis on the possibilities of social interactions, constructions, deconstructions, and reconstructions, that can and do shape the historical development of law, politics, and society. For ethnographic discussion of Pashtunwali see Ahmed (1980, 2004); Barth ([19851965]); Hopkins (2007); for neo-colonial uses: US Army (2012).
after the father’s uncles and siblings had threatened his life over a financial dispute (field notes: Masood Sumro, Karachi).

In this thesis, family networks are understood as both a constructive and destructive unit, however, reliance on them, despite their shortcomings, is crucial as family networks facilitate the redistribution of goods more than official actors can. In addition, whilst the effective modern state is meant to fill in for roles that have historically been in the domain of the nuclear family and wider kin and clan networks, during interviews state bureaucracy and state-forms of development were understood as creating forms of existence without emotional attachments, the right to love, and social relations, i.e. objectified lives. For many Afghans and Pakistani the breakup of the family is, to a degree, resisted by choice. In one interview with Orzala a Pakistani Pashtun IDP from Waziristan spoke of how important the family was to her understanding of self (Orzala, KHP12). In another case Maulana Abdul Qais, the earlier mentioned Afghan refugee in Karachi, spoke of having no desire to move out of the area despite having enough forms of capital to leave the camp (Maulana Abdul Qais, KHA71). Maulana Abdul Qais explained this as being the result of the significance in which he viewed the maintenance of his kin and clan structure, for him this structure has greater value. Here, these actions are not a rejection of “modernity”, but a reflection of the multiple, and contested, definitions of modernity possible (Appadurai 1996). However, as mentioned, for many the continued primary reliance on the family is also dictated by necessity. “There is no-one else who will help us. If we do not take care of my family nobody else will”, Maulana Abdul Qais said (KHA71). The state is present but not necessarily competent. With no effective professional agencies in hand, kin networks become essential - whilst they may not always be constructive they do offer one possible option for both survival and gains.
Importantly, solidarity networks are only one dimension of understanding how informal political action works in Pakistan. These networks must be placed alongside specific micro-level local strategies in order to fully understand material and non-material redistribution. These strategies require some interaction with official actors and other power sources to create a hybrid formal/informal site of action. And, in cases where solidarity networks are weak or absent, there is an even more direct reliance on navigation practices, which can also be often exploitative. During fieldwork two types of micro-level acts or navigation practices were evident: (a) practices of presence (both conscious defiance and camouflage) and (b) practices of protection & access. These two types are not exclusive and, often, both are used at the same time.

Practices of Presence
The practices of presence are acts carried out by Afghans and Pakistanis, either individually or via solidarity networks, in order to avoid direct engagement with official actors and legal rules (conscious defiance) and hide informal activities (camouflage). Here, human life continues, despite official actors not recognising it worth living, i.e. by ignoring or neglecting it.

Conscious and open defiance is more likely when the full glare of officialdom is weak and the likelihood of formal repercussions and policing is low or worth the risk. This is enabled by two factors outlined in Chapter 3. Firstly, conscious and open defiance occurs when state infrastructure cannot deliver what it is meant to Afghans and marginalised Pakistanis because of the state weaknesses, which are the result of macro-level factors such as economic liberalisation, (Hasan 2004; Toor 2011) underdevelopment, and a “political economy of defence” (Jalal 1990; Siddiqa 2007). Secondly, conscious and open defiance occurs when Pakistani state institutions and actors engage in forms of urban ethnocracy (Yiftachel and Yakobi 2004; Yiftachel 2006). Here the state deliberately fails to recognise the Afghan presence in Pakistan in an attempt to
maintain the “purity” of the Pakistani nation-state, or it fails to recognise Pakistani Pashtuns in Karachi in order to maintain the MQM’s vision of an “ethnic” “order” in Karachi. As a result Afghans and Pakistanis are neglected and left to rely on more heavily on solidarity networks, or other strategies, to establish informal housing settlements and access to other material goods.

The placement of RTVs or unregulated residential area in peripheral areas is one example of how a different (and lower) presence of the state creates space for the defiance of rules. In an interview with Hussain Ali who was introduced in the previous chapter, Hussain Ali recalled how individuals, families, friends, and groups worked together in Saeed Goth to build a needed road (Hussain Ali, KHP51). When I asked him if he needed to get official planning permission he said, “No one says anything to us, we just did it” (ibid). This can be compared with urban spaces that are “full” parts of the state, such as the affluent neighbourhoods of Defence in Karachi or Hayatabad in Peshawar. Housing inspectors regularly traverse the different phases of Hayatabad, from Phases 1-6, ensuring that the housing structures meet the city’s regulations, but in Saeed Goth the area and residents are not recognised as full parts of the state, which is the result of the state’s “ethnicised” way of seeing. Here the area and its residents are not worthy of state investment. However, as Chapter 3 outlines, the state is never fully absent, even in informal settings. A sense of responsibility towards areas that are territorially “well within the state” (Ron 2003:16) remains, although state actors act in a different way to formal and regulated areas (2003:24). This different way of acting includes demanding bribes, engaging in physical and verbally against residents, and charging high rents. Thus in some cases Hussain Ali does have to deal with local officials and inspectors. As a result Hussain Ali said, “Sometime we hide our activities from them”, to reflect the practice of camouflage, to which I will return shortly.
Afghans and Pakistanis, however, do challenge the logic of exclusionary practices and neglect. Whilst the imagined and physical urban and national space has no room for non-nationals (and some nationals) to declare their presence, they simply defy the rules and, as such, use this to articulate a new way of belonging to the urban city. Hussain Ali recalled that it was their own efforts that enabled gains (i.e. building the road) to be secured and that, “We are continuing to build our houses and run our businesses; there are many Pashtuns here” (ibid). I asked him if the local government officials or government schemes had invested in the area. He replied, simply, “The government does not do anything for us, we do things for ourselves”. On different occasions he reflected on Karachi being his city, despite the hostility towards him as a Pashtun “migrant”. “I have lived in Karachi all my life. I am of Karachi, from within it… This is my land”, he said (ibid).

In other instances, physical camouflage and evasion amount to a second sub-practice of presence: hiding the informal gains made by Afghans and Pakistanis. Here, Afghans and Pakistanis avoid the material and non-material costs of interacting with officials - legal and illegal - in their area. These costs include: (legal) taxes, (illegal) bribes, and cases of discrimination and violence (Chapter 7). In *The Art of Not Being Governed*, James C. Scott shows how in the hill regions in Southeast Asia (Zomia) individuals and groups strategically chose to avoid the centralising force of the state in what he calls “zones of cultural refusal” (Scott 2009:20). In Scott’s work individuals and groups consciously avoid the state because they have seen the implications of “modernity” and do not want to be a part of this expensive enterprise (Scott 2009:20). Asef Bayat’s studies on the urban poor in Egypt and Iran (1997, 2010) speak of atomised actors seeking cultural and political “autonomy” from the state (Bayat 1997, 1997b, 2010). For Bayat these atomised actors have a “desire to live an informal life”, which stems from a deep “distrust of the modern state”, which is largely the result of expensive state practices of taxation and
bureaucracy (Bayat 1997, 1997b 2010). For Bayat, the rich can afford to act in accordance to the law – indeed the law is often in place to maintain the interest of a class-based status quo – but the urban poor cannot.

Certainly, in this study, parallel to the authors above, the robotic Pakistani state (and occasionally the international refugee regime) that quantifies, enumerates, and “manages” both Afghans and Pakistanis is perceived negatively. It is avoided, berated, and distrusted. But while Bayat and Scott are correct that the state is an expensive enterprise, some elements do not fit Karachi’s and Peshawar’s cases and they miss an important point of emphasis. In this study, it is not the aim of Afghans and devalued Pakistanis to permanently escape the presence of the state because of a disdain of the costs of officialdom, i.e. bureaucracy and taxation (Nelson – forthcoming). Rather in this study in Karachi and Peshawar it is also the informal, illegal, and corrupt ways in which the state functions, as well as intermediaries or other power holders, which are avoided. At the local level, this is the more costly enterprise. Without regulatory mechanisms, sites of exploitation are practiced, which is why practices of camouflage are used. If a political order that functioned in a more effective, non-corrupt, and humanising way was present, “autonomy” and the “desire to live an informal life” would not be so energetically pursued.

*Ye logh, police wale, hukumat ke logh, sab chor hai.*

*Kaun loot ta bai? Humari khud ki hukumat.*

The people, the police, the officials, they’re all thieves. Who is robbing us? Our own government (Fahmeeda Qazmi, KHP42).

I conducted detailed interviews and ethnography in a neighbourhood on the outskirt of Karachi. The neighbourhood is home to Afghan Pashtuns, Afghan Tajiks, Pakistani Pashtuns, and Pakistani Punjabis. Interestingly, the spatial and visual organisation of the area is camouflaged
and hidden from outside areas and the main highway. It is not a settlement that has been penetrated by formal commercial companies or state actors. Formal commercial shops, schools, hospitals, and roads are lacking. Rather, it is a settlement built in a way that avoids attention. The housing structures on the outskirts of the settlement are physically camouflaged - covered by bushes and recyclable materials to trick the naked eye. An area known for its rag pickers and its recycling industry, often the houses are camouflaged by this very recyclable material (see image).

Figure 1: Camouflage covering a housing area.
In this settlement camouflage was pursued for the following reasons. First, the area is home to non-nationals and “contested nationals” - Pakistani Pashtuns - who frequently face violence from semi-regular state actors, such as the MQM’s political “gangs”. In one case during fieldwork it was reported that a young Pakistani Pashtun man was shot and killed by “two men from the MQM” who had entered the outskirts of the area on their motorbike and shot “whichever Pashtun they could find” (Fereydoun, KHA57 and Rafique, KHA58). Camouflage provides security in the face of ethnicised ways of seeing by politically armed units (MQM), weakly enforced security, and fears of petty and major crime. Secondly, in this housing area camouflage is pursued in the event of law enforcement manoeuvres against informal activities, such as building housing structures without legal permission. But thirdly, and most importantly, camouflage is pursued to avoid the unofficial, illegal, and corrupted ways in which official actors act in the area, demanding bribes in order to provide “protection” for the informal activities that residents were engaged in, which included building homes without legal and formal permission.
Practices of Protection & Access

Everything is possible in Pakistan for the right price.

Hussain Ali, PXA51.

The practices of camouflage reveal practical considerations of the state - particularly of how the state acts in unofficial ways. Indeed, it is rare that Afghans and devalued Pakistanis complete the practices of presence (even camouflage) in a “pure” form. Recourse to the state, officialdom, and various intermediaries is needed, and often it is these actors that shape the scope of local action for both survival and gains. Practices of protection & access, in other words, are critical when it comes to material and non-material redistribution. When no solidarity networks are in place or effective\(^{94}\) practices of protection & access are often the first port of call - even before the state (or refugee regime). This gives importance to official actors, or other power holders, acting informally or illegally in Pakistan. Informality is thus revealed as an important part of how the Pakistani state functions, which requires further explanation through a brief digression.

Informal responses reflect either a simple attempt to follow procedures by informally enacting/enforcing rules (albeit with accompanying cases of petty corruption); actors enabling the prevention and/or violation of rules; or a reaction to the fact that there are no clear rules. My own ethnographic work leaves open these three (interacting) possibilities. However, in the case studies I examine in Chapters 5 and 6 often there was limited clarity over legal processes and rules, which created an ambiguity and arbitrariness that left the urban poor – Afghan and Pakistani – liable to exploitation by the state or local intermediaries. During fieldwork it often became impossible to answer questions over legality of landholding or land leases (Chapter 5) or even the legal status of Afghans in Pakistan (Chapter 7), at which point Afghan and Pakistani

\(^{94}\) For example, strong social capital may be present (i.e. a large family) but without interacting economic and cultural capital this social capital does not count for much (Bourdieu 1985; Portes 2000).
lives became vulnerable to violations by the state and/or informal actors or cases of neglect. No rules often means that anything goes. Afghan and Pakistani lives are punished by an unlimited arbitrariness. In an interview with Engineer Aziz he reflected on the ambiguity of the Afghan position in Pakistan (focusing on education and security) and said:

In all of these things... we keep getting conflicting messages. We get one message from the Government of Pakistan, we get another message from the Government of Afghanistan; we get lots of different messages. And the officials do not know what they are doing then either! The first thing that needs to happen is that policies and [ways of working] must be defined – they must be clarified and understood by those carrying them out. Who is saying what and when, and why?... Now, as it stands we do not know what our position will be and what the future holds for us (Engineer Aziz PXA59).

In other cases questions of land ownership were unclear, such as Afghan Camp, Saeed Goth, and Ishtiaq Goth, which are all analysed in Chapter 5. Further, an example from a local news source in July 2010 is also illuminating. The source highlights that Pakistani Rangers were engaged in “illegal constructions” in Karachi and involved in a contest with two Sindh government departments, which was taken to the Pakistani legal courts (URC 2010). Cases like this appear routinely in Pakistan (Akhtar 2002; Hull 2008).

My own ethnographic work is, on its own, inadequate at precisely answering the questions of contested legality. Although my work has attempted to investigate the gaps, even those who have completed detailed legal ethnographies in Pakistan have found this challenging (Hull 2008). Legal and official rights and the responsibilities of the distribution and protection of these rights are revealed to be contested and/or unclear. However, the delegitimization of the state occurs precisely because of this ambiguity, as well as the two factors mentioned of informally following rules and the prevention/violation of rules. Without clarity over legal rules and regulations the
state’s writ appears insignificant, incompetent, or complicit in the exploitation that Afghans and Pakistanis face in urban Pakistan. And, as will be discussed shortly, all three factors create longer-term implications for the state.

Returning to practices of protection & access, these are actions based on payments. These are often referred to in everyday dialogue as *rishwat* (bribes), *sifarish* (corruption) and *bhatta* (extortion), which are paid by Afghans and Pakistanis to a local official actor or a local intermediary - i.e., a non-official “entrepreneur” or “middleman” who holds influence and power either through political, landed, industrial, or religious capital (Baken and Linden 1992; Hasan and Mansoor 2012:68, 2010, 2006). Payments occur in the form of money, an electoral vote, physical labour/activity, or adherence to a set of rules and norms. In return, either the official actor turns a blind eye to Afghan and Pakistani informal practices of presence, and thus protects the survival and gains made, or the intermediary safeguards activities from regulation and protects them also. Alternatively, in return for payments, “speedy” access to material resources, which are not available in formal channels, is provided by official actors or intermediaries.\(^{95}\)

In Peshawar’s University Town, an example of a protection payment was visible during fieldwork. In the town there is an Afghan butcher’s store (one of many informal shops) that does not meet regulatory standards. Yet the store is still open on most days (running successfully). A

\(^{95}\)Some authors have identified types of protection & access payments as social networks of an asymmetrical nature, i.e. as patronage networks (Gellner & Waterbury 1977). Using connections with official and unofficial power holders is understood an effective way of creating enabling material redistribution (Granovetter 1973; Harpviken 2009:32-88). However, this thesis does not use the term “networks” here – even if they could be seen as an “exploitation network” rather than a “solidarity network”. This is because they are based on explicitly instrumentalist and objectifying relationships, and not on trust and reciprocity, which is why a more mechanised and objectified term (“strategy”) is used.
residents told me how local shopkeepers protected their presence and defiance of rules by preventing the law from being enforced:

Here, and in the market [a big Afghan market] people know what to do to keep the police quiet. Our butcher will send them [the police] a share of meat to keep them quiet as he is not meant to be there... He sends them two kilos of meat from the 250 kilos he has (Nooruddin Akhtar, PXA61).

An example of “access” payment was seen in an unregulated residential area on the outskirts of Karachi (Ishtiaq Goth), where residents have limited access to water and electricity. Here, residents attempted to overcome the lack of water and electricity via the middlemen of the area, who made an informal agreement with the government (KSWB) and private (KESC) companies. The first case of protection & access mentioned official actors acting in informal ways; the second case mentioned local intermediaries. Local power holders (middlemen, landholders, powerbrokers) are often used as they have better connections with official actors (who have access to resources) and are better placed to engage in dialogue or negotiation with official actors.

For authors such as Partha Chatterjee this alternative space, specifically when the law is prevented from being implemented, as is the case of the butcher, is a “richer” space for “democracy” (Chatterjee 2004). Here, the *prevention of law is what people want*; this is the meaning of Chatterjee’s political society (ibid). However, this labelling of “democracy” appears misplaced in the case of urban Pakistan – and indeed as Matthew J. Nelson highlights, may not even apply in Chatterjee’s Indian case (Nelson - forthcoming). Firstly, Nelson asks whether democracy can exist without law? The answer is no. Democracy that contravenes state law is not really democracy, but something else, simply an alternative space of politics (ibid). Secondly, practices of protection & access are often *imposed* on Afghans and Pakistanis and not just sought out. The spaces of “choice” are often suffocatingly restricted. For instance, in the Afghan case mentioned
above it was not the butcher who sought a bribe but it was local police officers who “requested” it through the lurking of potential force, i.e. physical violence or arrest for the butcher. The Afghan butcher and the police officer exist in an asymmetric relationship. Within the Pakistani political and official system the official has greater (potential) coercive power and is able to objectify the butcher in order to secure additional income for himself. Here, the exploitative nature of official and unofficial actors and intermediaries strikes down Chatterjee’s (2004) understanding of “democracy”, throwing caution on ideas about the desirability of “autonomy” (Bayat 2010) and the “vibrancy” of informal political activity” (De Soto 2000).

The exploitative side of protection & access payments raises an important question: are the strategies of protection & access sufficiently “humanising”? Do they fully allow the conditions for the potentials of human lives to be protected and human recognition to be achieved? Similar to formal avenues of participation, protection & access strategies are contingent on asymmetrical power relationships and unequal forms of exchange that reduce Afghans and Pakistanis to exploitable objects. Whilst solidarity networks appear as sources of recognition, emotion, and value they are reliant on navigation practices, which can often lead to the reification of existing imbalances of social, economic, and political power, including the corrupted actions of officials and intermediaries. In fact, even though solidarity networks display a humanising capacity, without a system of regulation the execution of navigation strategies reinforces a number of challenges in Afghan and Pakistani lives. Indeed, as John Friedmann outlines (1992), alternative forms of political expression and processes are important and should begin at a local level. However, they “cannot end there” (Friedman 1992:7; see also Escobar 1995). In the current political context:

Like it or not the state continues to be a major player. It may need to be made more accountable to poor people and their claims. But without the state’s collaboration, the lot of the poor
cannot be significantly improved. Local empowering action requires a strong state (Friedman 1992: 7).

Importantly, during the processes of navigating through systems of exploitation, Afghans and Pakistanis justify and understand their humanity against the inhumanity of the state and local state officials, which is captured in their oral testimonies and daily language. Indeed, in the face of “informal” injustice, greed, and corruption, Afghans and Pakistanis see that their “informal” actions as the opposite: self-humanising. Whilst Afghans and Pakistanis are engaged in a quest of empowerment this same perspective does not translate to state actors, who as sovereigns, are expected to lead through example.

They say that leaders are reflective of the people whom they govern over. But we are not that bad. People are not that bad – how can we be compared to Zardari? It is they [the political classes] who force us to act in this way (Aftab Khalil, KHP52).

Both Afghans and Pakistanis see the practices they are engaged in as ones of necessity – firmly juxtaposed against the “zalim” (“oppressive”) or “na-insaaf” (“unjust”) official and unofficial actors. Their actions are rationalised as necessary and the only possible routes for survival and further gains.

**Maintaining the State? The Delegitimized State**

Governments often encourage self-help and local initiatives as long as they do not turn oppositional.


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96 These were the direct words used by interviewees and participants.
A fully autonomous life renders the state irrelevant.


The Pakistani state appears to direct, encourage, and/or strategically tolerate practices of presence and practices of protection & access. Two factors explain this: at the macro level they help to maintain the state, and at the micro level they act as a site of informal profit. At the macro level the purpose appears, at first-glance, to be “functional”. Solidarity networks and navigation practices fill in for the official when the official cannot act or cope. Thus, importantly the analysis of shared Afghan and Pakistani lives also reveals an understanding of how the state functions in Pakistan. The dominant Westphalian understanding of the state constructs the state and accompanying forms of absolute sovereignty as “facthood”, but in Pakistan – and indeed in other contexts (including the original Westphalian states) - this is not how things work. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Pakistan’s “political economy of defence” (Jalal 1990; Siddiqa 2007) and the fallouts from structural adjustment programmes and economic liberalisation (Hasan 2006; Toor 2011; Zaidi 2005) mean that the state is unable to deliver to citizens and non-citizens the rights they are due. This explains why solidarity networks and formal-informal navigation strategies are accepted and even promoted by the Pakistani state: at a macro-level solidarity networks and formal-informal navigation strategies are considered to be an effective and alternative way of maintaining the state.

However, hybrid formal/informal realities are only a short-term method of maintaining the state and can also be wholly contradictory to the state. Returning back to why informality is possible this becomes clearer. Earlier it was outlined that informality reflects either a simple attempt to follow procedures by informally enacting/enforcing rules (albeit with accompanying cases of petty corruption); actors enabling the prevention and/or violation of rules; or a reaction to the
fact that there are no clear rules. Particularly in the case of actors (state or patrons) enabling a violation/ prevention of rules a deep contradiction to the state becomes clear, however, it also occurs because of the other listed factors.

Solidarity networks and navigation practices are not in the long run quasi-complimentary to the state. Whilst the Musharraf era heavily promoted “civil society” organisations and other international institutions and I/NGOs to fill in for the state and encourage a neo-liberal reading of citizenship, informal political action is not the same as “civil society”.97 Even in the case of international institutions and I/NGOs it has been suggested that they too are transforming the nature of the modern state and understandings of sovereignty. Importantly, unlike civil society actors, solidarity networks and navigation practices are not bound to the state: they are not legal in any sense and have no loyalty to the state. They are substitutive and competing,98 which is why the work of Chatterjee (2004) and his acceptance of efforts to contradict the state seem so confusing (as a foundation for “democracy”). Whilst Chatterjee is correct in outlining that civil

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97 In Pakistan I/NGOs were heavily encouraged under the Musharraf era (Zaidi 2011; Weiss et al., 2001; PCP 2010) and international institutions such as the UN and its sub-bodies have a central role for refugees and internally displaced persons in Pakistan. However, these organisations are bureaucratically organised and dependent on the approval and recognition of the state in order to act, secure funding, and be effective. The loyalty of these institutions is to state structures, rather than pushing beyond the state and contradicting it (Agier 2011). Solidarity networks on the other hand are not “legal” in any sense (Singerman 1995:133). This also means that they are not bound by the symbolic bureaucratic rituals of formal organisation, a “professionalization”, which can create a “hierarchy of authority, fixed procedures, rigidity, and the division of labour”, which reduces the “spirit of participation” (Bayat 2010:88). Whilst they may engage political and ideological organisations, they are not bound to particular political goals or ideological objectives for funding purposes as I/NGOs are, which are often accompanied by terms and conditionalities that create new types of clientelism (ibid).

98 Helmke and Levitsky (2004) outline that when a state has ineffective formal institutions, if the outputs that are produced by informal actions have the same objectives as the state they are “substitutive”, i.e. they replace the state and have a functional role. They outline that when the same ineffective state is faced with informal outputs that do not meet the same objectives of the state these outputs are “competing”. I distinguish myself from Helmke and Levitsky by arguing that even when informal actions appear “substitutive” they still challenge the state. Often actions are only substitutive at a very short-term level, and the normalisation of informality, above formality, challenges the strength of the state as a sovereign legal body.
society reflects the interest of the state and those who are attached to the state, and political society is more reflective of sites of political resistance, his assumption that this is a real site of “democracy” does not hold. “Political society”, and in this case solidarity networks and navigation practices, also undermine the state. They are sites of political action and political communities, but they are not a “democratic” site of action (Nelson - forthcoming).

In the short term, solidarity networks and navigation practices act as a Band-Aid on leaky roof. Even when informal actions do not seek to break the rules or overturn the state they are only partially effective. Thus, even in the short-term, they are not really substitutive. In addition, in the long-term informal institutions and their outputs eventually become competing to the state. Survival and gains are extracted against the Pakistani state at a direct and powerful cost to officialdom. The state is meant to be the ultimate sovereign. However, solidarity networks and navigation practices produce alternative and more trusted sites of (always informal) power. Multiple sovereigns exist and continue to be created. Other actors also have direct influence and coercion. In some cases, this even leads to a pattern in which landholders, middlemen, and other intermediaries possess greater power than the state. Consistently, in his body of work, Arif Hasan shows how dallals (middlemen) have strengthened their position in urban Karachi (Hasan 2006, 2010:43, 2012; see also Baken and Linden 1992). In a 2012 report Hassan highlights that middlemen run 60% of informal land transactions (2012:68). A slow, piecemeal and unplanned revolution (Hasan 2008) is taking place in Pakistan against the workings of the state by wearing down its effectiveness through piecemeal informal actions. Particularly when there is no clarity over legality, the state is dismissed as irrelevant.
Physically, whilst unregulated residential areas offer a short-term solution of housing and shelter they also create densely packed, hazardous, and ecologically unsustainable urban spaces (Nenova 2010; HRCP 2011; Davis 2006). In an Afghan informal refugee camp in Karachi discussed in Chapter 5 residents secure water (a basic good) through the Pakistani Rangers and private contractors. Navigation practices provide access to water, but the quality is questionable and residents are frequently anxious about the “unclean” nature of the water. One resident noted how, “The water that is available through the boxes is not clean; it is not safe to drink” (Habibullah, KHA13). In another unregulated residential area on the outskirts of Peshawar, residents’ semi-katcha, semi-pakka99 houses are densely packed together near a river, which means that when it rains heavily many houses collapse.

Our house is close to the river... this house, and the roof was affected by the [2010] floods. I cannot tell you what the conditions were like... I cannot tell you what the conditions are like in the winter or what is made of us here in the summer when densely packed houses create heat (Malalai Khattak, PXP46).

The Pakistan HRC (2012:246-250) provides a list, each month full of people dying from structural housing collapses (“Feb 5: An infant girl died in Karachi and three family members were injured in the collapse of their house’s roof; Feb 14: A two-storey house in Peshawar collapsed. Six residents were killed and another six gravely injured; Aug 12: One man was killed while another was injured when a rain drenched wall of their home gave way in Karachi”). The physical landscape of Karachi and Peshawar is rapidly expanding and being “managed” informally, but this change is without planning and regulation and does not appear safe. During fieldwork in rural-urban housing settlements and inner city settlements, waterborne illnesses were routine features. The health of the citizens/non-citizens is in jeopardy and the conditions

99 Pakka, literally means solid. This usually refers to houses built with cement and bricks (rather than mud).
for a basic humanised existence and its potentials are not being provided. It is neither a fully effective nor a fully empowering solution (Friedmann 1992).

Critically, official institutions also appear incompetent. Even if the “informal” is not looking to overthrow the state, a non-material corrosion occurs, affecting the legitimacy of the state. It appears that there are two disjointed and contradictory systems in operation – the formal and the informal. The state is expected to be able to act as the absolute sovereign, but is appears incapable of doing so. Whilst sovereign power is “always a tentative and unstable project whose efficacy and legitimacy depend on repeated performances of violence and a “will to rule”” (Blom Hansen 2005:3), in Pakistan the state appears to have no will to rule or ability to perform violence itself. It seems as if the state cannot cope and is dependent on other “sovereigns”. The significant presence of intermediaries and other power sources, such as landholders or

Figure 3: Unregulated residential area built with a mixture of tents and more solid structures.
middlemen, reveals how the urban state's reach is flawed. Instead the state is reliant on middlemen, patrons, and landholders, and other “quasi-entrepreneurs” who perform sovereignty, “manage” local populations, “govern”, and exercise a will to rule. A cyclical process of increased state delegitimization, thus, takes place. (In the next chapter it is shown that the state is dependent on local dallals, ethnic solidarity networks, and land holders, as they reach populations that the state cannot manage and provide informal housing/utilities to Afghans and Pakistanis, but that this process reinforces the strength of the local patrons, which state actors eventually emerge as unwilling and unable to challenge). The sovereignty, legitimacy, and authority of the state occupy a vulnerable position and instead forms of non-state power are strengthened through a normalisation of informality.

However, most critically, the practices of protection & access show that local official actors behave in a way that goes beyond a “functional” role. At the micro-level opportunism is no longer about maintaining the state but reflects petty corruption and profiteering. Even when the outputs that are produced are substitutive and fill in for the state, the methods that are used undermine the legitimacy of the state. Payments indicate the exploitative, objectifying, and dehumanising face of official actors and non-official intermediaries – a view that is transferred directly onto the state, as these actors are understood as being embodiments of the state. The state is not just visible in a local government office. Local officials are direct embodiments of the state. This use of bribes as well as this complicity in propping up exploitive intermediaries shatters the human face of the state: the state is seen as unable to safeguard the people within its remit of responsibility, which includes both citizens and non-citizens. By being directly involved and responsible for dehumanising Afghans and Pakistanis, official actors undergo a process of delegitimization and dehumanisation themselves. Indeed, the state is even understood as an inhumane entity.
In the interviews and observations I completed, protection & access payments (bribes) were consistently viewed as actions that dehumanised official actors and made these actors appear inhumane and cruel. It was the official actors and not urban Afghans and Pakistanis who were, in the words of interviewees, understood as being ghair-insani (without humanity), ghair-qanuni (without law), na-insaaf (without justice), engaged in chori (thieving) and haram ki kamayi (unlawful earnings), and zalimi (oppressive/cruel). In the short-term, informal ways of working by official actors may “earn a quick buck” and also allow an alternative (substitutive) way of getting things done; indeed the outputs may not be criminal (see fn21), yet the methods used eat away at the state’s legitimacy. Even in cases where officials are not responsible for exploitative acts but various intermediaries are, state actors are viewed as complicit in propping up these intermediaries or too weak to stand up against them. In one case the death of a young boy in Karachi at the hands of a middleman was understood as being possible because of corrupt local officials. The boy is said to have been killed near an underpass in the city on his way back from after-school tuition.

This happened to him because he has no-one to go to. The [middle]man was taking liberties (ziyaadityan) but the police, the government are not there to protect people from these criminals. It is often they who are involved! (Field notes, Karachi).

In another interview with an Afghan resident in Karachi, I heard how the police demand bhatta for his informal house to remain in position.

They [the police] come back again after two or three months demanding more money. “Give more money”, they say. For the people who are trying to run their homes [and earn a living] then what work can they do? They have homes in which at least 30-35 people are living, so what can they give? They lose their homes this way. No. They are not even human (Jalaluddin, KHA61.D).
The state, given its perceived monopoly of power, is meant to be just (Lakhani 1991; Lazreg 2008). It is assumed to hold a social contract with the people in its territorial boundaries – citizens and non-citizens alike. However, here it appears to actively fail and stumble at every turn.

Afghans and Pakistanis justify the use of alternative (sometimes illegal) channels as “necessity” in the face of corrupt and inhumane adversaries: local official actors who represent the state or refugee regime. In the face of injustice their actions can only be just (Bayat 1997b; 2010). Yet, where solidarity networks and navigation practices offer some spaces of empowerment for the refugee, illegal migrant, and the devalued citizen, they have the opposite effect on official structures. Even middlemen, informal entrepreneurs, and criminals are held in better esteem than official actors because middlemen, informal entrepreneurs, and criminals are not held to the same moral standard (or contract) that the state actors or the refugee regime are.

Bribes, greed and corruption are now a part of daily vocabulary to reflect how state actors are described. This transcends from the local level to the national. Local and national political leaders and officials are automatically assumed to be corrupt. President, Asif Ali Zardari, infamously referred to as “Mr. Ten Percent”, is frequently lampooned and considered the personification of the informal/criminal/incompetent Pakistani official, at the highest level. Indeed in July 2009 the PPP-led government introduced a ban on jokes about Asif Ali Zardari that were dominating the airwaves and social media.100

100 The country’s interior minister, Rehman Malik, announced the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) had been asked to trace electronically transmitted jokes that ”slander the political leadership of the country” under the new Cyber Crimes Act. The bans were ineffective as I commonly received jokes from friends via SMS and circulated them myself as well. Indeed, there was even a joke in response to the ban:

Law Teacher: *America mein kutta ko marny per don saal qeidi boti hai*
TV anchor: Terrorists have kidnapped our beloved President Zardari and are demanding $5,000,000 or they will burn him with petrol. Please donate what you can. I have donated five litres.

Breaking News: Sadar Zardari ki hajj application Saudi Govt ne reject kar di.

Why? Kion ke is tarah Hajjion mein confusion ho jati ke "Pathar Kis Ko Marna bain"?

Breaking news: Leader Zardari’s hajj application was rejected by the Saudi government.

Why? Because they were worried that the hajj goers wouldn’t know who to throw stones at.

<<Zardari bakre se khel raha tha...>>

Nawaz: Oye... Kuttay se khel raha hai?

Zardari: Ye kutta nahi bakra hai ...

Nawaz: Mai tum se nabi bakre se keh raha ho.

<<Zardari was playing with a dog...>>

Nawaz [Sharif]: Oye... You’re playing with a dog?

Zardari: This is not a dog, it’s a goat.

Nawaz: I wasn’t talking to you; I was talking to the goat.

Common jokes circulating in 2010-12, usually via SMS.

Law Teacher: In America if you injure/kill an animal you get a two year jail sentence.

Student: Ye to kuch bhi nahi hai Pakistan mein us ka maazaq urany par 14 saal qeid ho sakti hai.

Student: That’s nothing. In Pakistan if you even joke about The Dog (i.e. Zardari) you can be jailed for 14 years!
The frequency of these jokes (the above is just a tip of the iceberg) is of course explained by the uniquely deep unpopularity of Asif Ali Zardari. However, they importantly encapsulate the levels of distrust and ridicule in which the state and official actors are held in Pakistan. The state is not to be trusted. At the exact moment of getting what official actors want in Pakistan, a quick solution to maintaining the state or a quick way of making some profit, officials are contributing towards their own delegitimization. Herein lies the political impact of Afghan and Pakistani agency on the state. Slowly, piece by piece, repeated time and time again, these actions are eroding the legitimacy of the state.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has provided a conceptual framework for understanding how ordinary Afghans and Pakistanis exert agency by analysing and explaining the role of solidarity networks and navigation practices in Afghan and Pakistani lives. Solidarity networks are important social structures that offer Afghans and Pakistanis a system of support and enhance the potentials for material and non-material redistribution. Whilst the state is unable to provide for citizens and non-citizens via legal channels, solidarity networks act as an important lifeline. Whilst both Afghans and Pakistanis are let down by officialdom solidarity networks produce important forms of social capital which enhance the potentials for material and non-material redistribution. Solidarity networks and accompanying navigation practices thus reflect the similarities of Afghan and Pakistani political agency in urban spaces. Here, lines of distinction between citizens and non-citizens do not have significance. However, this chapter has shown that solidarity networks often rely on navigation practices, which subsequently reveals a continued, albeit undocumented, role of the state and other power sources. In turn, this also reveals how the state functions in urban Pakistan. Solidarity networks, navigation practices, and informality are not as separate from the state as is assumed. The “cloak of invisibility” (Singerman 1995:7) is thin as solidarity
networks and navigation practices are in fact important tools that are promoted and encouraged by the state. However, the long-term consequences of the outputs and norms of informality are significant for Afghan and Pakistani lives and for the state. Whilst some commentators outline that informality should encourage a new way of conceptualising and problematizing “the state”, this in itself is contradictory. Repeated informal acts challenge the state, which in its current form cannot be separated from dimensions of legality and absolute sovereignty. They change the physical nature of the urban cities in haphazard and dangerous ways, which also directly impacts the lived experiences of Afghan and Pakistani lives. Further, these acts bite back at the state and officialdom itself: the state and state law appears incompetent, irrelevant, comical, and cruel. The following two chapters will demonstrate these complex processes using detailed case studies collected during fieldwork. Bringing together the conceptual framework of “dehumanisation” outlined in Chapter 3, the cases studies in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 will show the following: how Afghans and Pakistani experience “dehumanisation”; how processes of self-humanisation using solidarity networks and navigation practices occur; how continued challenges for both citizens and non-citizens continue; and finally, what the political impacts of these alternative structures and strategies on official structures are.
Part II: Case Studies – Shared Afghan and Pakistani Lives
Chapter 5: Shared Urban Neighbourhoods & Survival: Fellowships of Charity

He counts water as so precious, that
   His pots and pans are contaminated with dirty water.
He makes no distinction between clean and unclean water,
   Even if his water is mixed with urine.
When he has the chance to steal water, he doesn’t miss it;
   Even if resident of khanaqah or mosque.
When distributing water he doesn’t do it fairly;
   Even if he holds scriptures in his hands,
He does not gain in the merit of giving water;
   Even if a sip were rewarded with the hajj.
He doesn’t expect from God;
   Even if there are clouds overhead all day long.
How can he wash dirt from his body,
   Where water is scarcer than rosewater?
Don’t even mention bathing and ablution,
   When a drop is as rare as a pearl.
From making dry ablutions so many times
   His beard is forever soiled with dirt.

Rahman Baba 1650-1715.

Introduction
This chapter uses case studies collected during fieldwork to show how solidarity networks specifically the fellowship of space & charity, is used to enable survival actions in informal urban space. It pays attention to unregulated residential areas and shows how these areas secure access to utilities, water, and housing. The case studies first focus on Afghans and Pakistanis in Karachi and shows the following: how dehumanisation is experienced; how processes of self-
humanisation using solidarity networks and navigation practices occur; how continued challenges for both citizens and non-citizens remain; and, what the political impact of these alternative structures and strategies on official structures is. The second half of the chapter uses cases studies based in Peshawar to reveal how the urban state is maintained using different “patrons” in the two cities.

“We Just Need Water!” An Afghan Neighbourhood’s Quest for Water
Afghan Camp formed an important ethnographic and interview site in Karachi for over five months in 2010-11 with return visits in 2012. This section describes Afghan Camp, drawing on a series of detailed repeat interviews conducted with different “elders” of the camp, their family members, and other residents. This is accompanied by analysis of informal discussions, visits to homes, and day to day interactions that were completed in the camp. During my time in Karachi, observations and interviews were completed via an INGO medical clinic and the clinic’s adjacent informal school, through mediations facilitated by representatives from CAR and ARRC, and via

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101 Afghan Camp is the only location I officially give in this study and is a decision that has been made in consultation with various residents of the area. All names and some details of interviewees have been changed.

102 The position of elder (mashi/ naininda) usually translates as a “respected” figure of a given area or kin or clan base who is trusted to “speak for” and represent certain communities. Afghan Camp is home to a mixture of Afghan families from various locations in Afghanistan and different ethnic and linguistic groups. Pashtuns, Tajiks, Turkmen, Mughals, and Uzbeks live in the camp and have one or more “elder” representing them. In the camp, these elders are recognised because of family position (i.e. senior male head), business enterprises, or levels of education (Islamic and non-Islamic education). Usually, these figures are male. These positions are usually fluid and interchanging. However, in Karachi (and other locations) the process of recognising an elder is also influenced by external dynamics and interactions with organisations, such as C/CAR, NADRA, MORR, GOA, UNHCR or other actors including medical clinics, the Pakistani police and security forces. When external actors need a mediator to gather intelligence or implement policies elders are key points of contact, which can lead to the positions of elders being reinforced, reified, or indeed even created because of this external recognition. In some cases, external actors talk about female “elders”, even though this term is not used within Afghan communities. The need for a “mediator” has become increasingly strong in Karachi after 9/11 as Afghan repatriation programs have gained momentum and because of the start of POR registration programmes. Karachi also has a Council of the Afghan Muhajiren, which is headed by one lead Afghan representative who is chosen locally by various Afghan elders and their families across the city. The elder acts as a mediator with the GOP and UNCHR - although this process has been prone to break down and is not a fully bureaucratic structure.
local friendship networks I developed which did not involve the presence of official Pakistani actors. During fieldwork my presence around the camp became familiar, and some residents were already familiar with my Pakistani Kashmiri [maternal] uncle, a carpet trader, who had worked with Afghan Uzbek carpet traders and residents of Afghan Camp in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Afghan Camp, or Camp e Jaded (“New” Camp) for Farsi speakers, or Mubajir Camp (“Refugee” Camp) for all relevant linguistic lines in Karachi, sits on the extreme outskirts of Karachi. Afghan Camp is the only RTV - albeit an unofficial one - in Sindh. It was specifically built for Afghans, although some Pakistanis have moved in after post-2001 IDP movements. In interviews with camp residents and the Commissioner for Afghan Refugees, Sindh, I was told that the land was “given” to Afghans by the Government of Sindh (GOS), facilitated by the Sindh CAR office (interview: Akhtar 2010). However, the legal status and ownership of the land is unclear. In turn this places Afghan Camp in an ambiguous position with limited legal security (as Chapter 4 outlines). In an interview with a resident of Afghan Camp, Yaqoob Gul, he said:

We do not know how long we can stay here – we have been here for many years; but Pakistanis have started moving into the area and say that this land is Pakistan and Afghans should move. We do not know what we can do (Yaqoob Gul, PXA10).

103 The number of Pakistani families in Afghan Camp is relatively small, and it can be said that Afghan Camp is predominantly Afghan. The start of the camp area has now been occupied by some Pakistani families mainly from Pishin (Quetta) and Wana (Waziristan); and some families from SWAT are also present. An unpublished 2004 UNHCR Karachi field report states that some Punjabi and Baloch families are present (UNHCR-PK-KH 2004).

104 In interviews with representatives from CAR (interview: Akhtar 2010), the GOA (interview: Khaliqyar 2010) and in interviews with residents (current and former) of Afghan Camp, I was told that there had been no legal agreement to Afghan Camp’s establishment.
Afghans were forcibly moved to the area in 1986\textsuperscript{105} in what has become a forgotten piece of history. Whilst a lot of attention has been given to Karachi’s violence, including the specific events of the 1980s which informed the creation of Afghan Camp (Haq 1995; Shaheed 1992), there is limited discussion about the Afghan experiences within the context of Karachi. Where Afghans are mentioned they are absorbed under “Pashtun dynamics”. This is despite the fact that many Afghans in Karachi are Afghan Tajiks, Afghan Hazaras, Afghan Uzbeks, and Afghan Turkmen, and that Pakistani Pashtuns make a distinction between Pakistani Pashtuns and Afghans (including Afghan Pashtuns and non-Pashtun Afghans).\textsuperscript{106} Throughout interviews in Afghan Camp and around other settlements on the outskirts of main Sohrab Goth, Afghans recalled how they were moved to Afghan Camp because of the intra-Pakistani violence of the 1980s. An Afghan Pashtun fabric wholesaler who was living in Sohrab Goth during the 1980s said:

\textsuperscript{105} In interviews with residents the exact date of the camp being established is uncertain. It is likely that gradual movement, “encouraged” by the GOP, would have taken place – although the specific methods of coercion to move Afghans to this area remain unclear in my research. I was told that the camp was established in the mid-1980s, with 1985 and 1986 being specifically cited as the year of formation. One interviewee specifically stated June 17 1986 (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10). A 2004 unpublished field report by UNHCR field staff states that the camp was established “Approx. 1982” (UNHCR-PK KH 2004) although this early a date was not verified in any other interviews or documentations and appears inaccurate. Whilst many Afghans did state that they had moved to Karachi in the 1970s and early 1980s they said they first settled in other areas and later moved (if they moved) to Afghan Camp. In data from CCAR in 1986 and 1987 it shows that one RTV was present in Karachi in 1986 and 1987 (CCAR 1987). The RTV is present under two names of Bijar Buti (15-2-1987) and Deh Tasir (15-12-1986). A footnote regarding Deh Tasir states, “The freshly opened camp at Deh Tasir, Karachi is in the nature of a transit camp whose permanent location is yet to be decided by the government” (15-12-1987).

\textsuperscript{106} During fieldwork I encountered Afghan Pashtuns and Tajiks who had “become Pakistani” by informally getting Pakistani citizenship. Other Afghan “ethnic groups” interviewed had not “become Pakistani”, but this may be because these ethnic groups did not also have CNICs. Rather, my findings are likely to be a methodology issue as this study did not complete enough of a range of interviews with all the different Afghan ethnicities present in Karachi and nor is it trying to find out specifically how many Afghans have “become Pakistani”. Sources also indicated that some Afghan Pashtuns hold positions within the ANP. However, most Afghans (Pashtun and otherwise) still display an affinity to an “Afghan” identity. Perhaps as their presence continues in Pakistan their positioning has the potential to transform into a new ethnicity within Pakistan rather than a separate nationality, i.e. Pakistani Afghan, or a transnational form of existence. This will be looked at in another case study in this chapter in the case of Hassan Ali (PXP51).
Junejo [Pakistani Prime Minister] did it, the breaking down of the area... A notice came that the [Super] Highway’s Bara Market had become quite bad and of ill-repute. So they, the government and officials, were breaking it down (Rostam, KHA68).

Another Afghan Uzbek resident now living in Afghan Camp said:

They emptied people out from Sohrab Goth and moved them here [Afghan Camp] (Hajji Hayyat, KHA71).

Whilst another Afghan Tajik said:

All Afghans were shifted from Sohrab Goth to Afghan Camp, which is when we came here. There was nothing when we came here... This place had no population and no people. Imagine that this entire place was totally quiet, a jangal... there was nothing: no houses, no structure, nothing (Maulana Abdul Qais, KHA70).

It appears that non-national (Afghan) lives were more vulnerable to the physical and structural violence of the local Pakistani state than Pakistani national lives, i.e. Pakistani Pashtuns, were, and that Afghans were also blamed for the violence in Karachi (“Our name was bad” [Rostam, KHA68]) – despite the fact that, “it was a not our issue” [Habibullah, KHA13]). In fact, this greater vulnerability of non-nationals within the “ethnicised” and political context of Karachi appears to explain why Afghan lives were objectified as units that could be simply “emptied”, “shifted”, and segregated to the barren jangal which became known as Afghan Camp. Who are lowest of the low in the “Afghan-Pashtun menacing” framework of Karachi? It would appear that Afghans are.

Afghan Camp was built up through the efforts of residents. It was also partially supported by UNCHR and the WFP (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10; Maulana Abdul Qais, KHA70; Mustafa Habib,
KHA47). Currently, Afghan Camp consists of mixed quality *katcha* houses and resembles a quasi-rural settlement (i.e. a *goth*). Afghan families from various locations, ethnic, and linguistic groups in Afghanistan, with various communities defining themselves as Afghan Pashtun, Tajik, Turkmen, Mughal, and Uzbek live in the camp. The family, immediate and extended, is the most important unit of organisation in Afghan Camp, and housing structures are generally arranged around members of the same kin, clan, or ancestral village. Kin solidarities are important in explaining at a micro-level how personalised redistribution occurs, such as pooled incomes and shared housing (see Chapter 6).

Mixed income levels are reported, but there are notable cases of extreme poverty – with poverty being measured as the inability to access food and/or shelter and/or earn an income of less than Rs.150-Rs.200 per earning person in the household per day. Some areas within the camp house high earning trading families, including some of the elders interviewed, and their houses are either *pakka* houses or with one or two *pakka* walls and the rest of the walls being *katcha*. These are families that have usually been in the camp for over 20 years. Other areas have more mixed income levels with *katcha* houses being the norm, and the poorest residents live in tent structures – the poorer residents are usually Afghans that have lived in the camp for three-to-eight years (see figures 4-6). However, there is no segregated “rich-poor” neighbourhood *per se* and almost

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107 The *katcha makkan* is sometimes “preferred” in Afghan Camp and other unregulated housing areas in Karachi and Peshawar, particularly in hot weather because this allows for cooler household temperatures, particularly if electricity supplies (and therefore fans) are unreliable. It is also much cheaper to construct than a *pakka makkan*.

108 Exact numbers of the people living in Afghan Camp are unclear. The unpublished UNHCR field report (UNHCR-PK KH 2004) placed the population at over 100,000. Following repatriation the area’s population is said to have considerably fallen. The current (2012) number of registered Afghan refugees in Afghan Camp is 25,000; and in all of Karachi, 71,000. However, numbers of unregistered Afghans in Karachi are said to be much higher, with figures ranging from 100,000 – 400,000, and a 2009 report (Befare 2009:61) estimating that Karachi has 1 million illegal Afghans (which, from fieldwork, seems like an over-estimate). During fieldwork I was told the camp is roughly home to 900 households (with an average of 6-12 persons per household), although numbers may have changed.
all housing structures are physically vulnerable to the weather - rain, floods, heat, and cold. The camp has a health clinic that was established by an INGO in 2008, a number of schools, madrassas, and a main bazaar. Generally, the camp is densely packed, and access to electricity is unreliable, which is not unusual in Pakistan and Karachi. The area also has poor access to effective sanitation, drainage systems, and water. Polio, waterborne illnesses, skin diseases (scabies), psychological stress and disorder, and malnutrition are all present in Afghan Camp.109

The actors responsible for Afghans who are registered refugees110 in Karachi include the GOP via CAR and the ARRC, UNHCR, other UN bodies, and an INGO that entered the area in 2008. GOA actors are present in Karachi but only in a diplomatic and procedural role. However, the specific responsibilities of the CAR and UNHCR are unclear and ever-changing. CAR’s role in Afghan Camp for one is minimal. In an interview with the Commissioner of CAR Sindh, the Commissioner said that as Afghan Camp does not legally exist, because of the informal sub-lease, and because the numbers of Afghans in Karachi are less compared to other areas (i.e. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA111) the department receives no money from the GOP (interview:

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109 These notes are taken from interviews and ethnographic observations completed in the INGO medical clinic. The clinic also has a programme to feed some malnourished babies and infants in the camp.

110 Afghans in Pakistan are classified as either registered refugees, for which they need to possess an Afghan Citizen’s Proof of Registration Card (POR); illegal immigrants (when no legal documents are possessed); or Pakistani Afghans (when Afghans appropriate Pakistani citizenship to become Pakistani in legal and documentary terms). UNHCR and GOP via CAR hold responsibility towards registered Afghans only.

111 Historically little attention was paid to Afghans in Karachi. In earlier archives (1980-81) no mention of Afghans in Karachi is made. However, in 1982 a UNHCR Information Bulletin reads: “Many [Afghans] have sought employment in Karachi, Rawalpindi, and Lahore” (UNHCR-PK 1982b). But it was only in 1986 that an “official” presence appears in the archives, with “15,141 Afghans” recorded in Karachi (15-2-1987) (CCAR 1987). The reason for this difference is to do with numbers, i.e. the fact that FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan bore the brunt of the emergency exodus given geographic proximity, with 2.2 million Afghans in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA and 0.85 million in Balochistan. And, it is also related to the fact that during the Soviet-Afghan War, Peshawar, Quetta, and FATA were considered “frontline” zones, absorbing the majority of refugees and housing key resistance/mujahidin fighters, with vestiges of these “frontline” sentiments remaining post-2001 (even though Karachi was a strategic port city). On the ground this means that Afghans in Karachi have often been marginalised as insignificant
Akhtar 2010). The GOP thus “gives no money” to Afghans “for anything” (ibid). “We provide the documentation needed for repatriation but aside from that, nothing”, the Commissioner said (ibid). As Afghan Camp lacks formal/official RTV status it has had an even tougher experience than other Afghan RTVs outside of Sindh (in this study, those in Peshawar). UNHCR is also aware of Afghan Camp’s existence and during fieldwork would send representatives or field staff to visit the camp and speak with elders and inform them of shifts in UNHCR policies or projects such as the repatriation programme. However, UNHCR’s presence in Afghan Camp, and other areas in Karachi, has historically been irregular and unpredictable (outside of Afghan Camp it has been virtually non-existent). Now when UNHCR is present it is only to encourage and monitor repatriation efforts and not any other forms of relief or support.

The “ambiguity of unequal inclusion” (Ron 2003) creates a tenuous position for Afghan dominant areas in Karachi. Indeed, as Afghan Camp is purposefully placed by the state on the extreme edges of the city, the majority of Karachi’s Afghans have historically chosen not to live in Afghan Camp. Alternative informal spaces are preferred above Afghan Camp. Interviews were completed with former residents of Afghan Camp who said they moved as it did not even offer the basics:

“objects” compared to the geopolitically significant Afghan bodies in Peshawar, Quetta, and FATA. This has meant less infrastructural development of Karachi’s Afghan areas and Afghan Camp when compared to the BHU and basic primary schooling that are present in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s RTVs until today. (However, from the mid-1990s Peshawar has also faced RTV closures fostering a sense of abandonment and betrayal).

112 Funds for repatriation initiatives are provided via UNHCR.
113 Afghan Camp has not had the same historic infrastructure development, i.e. of a BHU, effective waterlines, and funded school systems. The current medical clinic only opened in the past 2 years. (However, from the mid-1990s Peshawar has also faced RTV closures fostering a sense of abandonment and betrayal).
114 During field work there was no UNHCR office in Karachi, with the Karachi/Sindh office closing in 2004. Even before 2004 the UNHCR sub-office in Karachi/Sindh had closed and reopened several times. At the time of writing in 2012 a field office was reopened in Sindh. UNHCR’s role in Karachi is primarily for repatriation programmes.
The conditions are still bad there. We moved early because we wanted better opportunities (Atef, KHA29).

In other cases Afghans automatically avoided Afghan Camp:

I would never have lived there. When we first moved to Afghan Camp we settled in another area and rented property then started up trading (Jahangir, KHA66).

Certainly higher numbers of Afghans are present in mixed Afghan and Pakistani settlements along the Karachi-Hyderabad Super Highway, Sohrab Goth, and other areas within the city. However, these other spaces, particularly if they are “Afghan dominant”, have no formal support of the GOP or UNHCR - whatever its worth may be.

The Pakistani state continues to bear some responsibility towards Afghan residents in Afghan Camp because of the norms of international refugee law and agreements it has with UNHCR and the GOA, and because the area is territorially “well within” the state. Thus the GOP provides a “minimum of legal protection” (Ron 2003:16) to the area. This is seen through the sub-letting, if it can be called that, of Pakistani land – which is essentially the only action that the state “does” for Afghans in Karachi as a whole. However, even this minimal responsibility is grudgingly expressed. The result is an ambiguous legal position of the camp that also means residents are vulnerable to neglect and exploitation. The waterlines and electricity lines that are falteringly present in Afghan Camp are not provided through formal channels. Instead residents depend on informal arrangements with official and private contractors, the Pakistani Rangers (state actors supplying water), and KESC (a private company supplying electricity). Like other areas, Afghan Camp is also vulnerable to official actors, such as the police acting in unofficial ways – i.e. demanding bribes –, as well as the influence of local power holders and middlemen.
who “protect” the everyday material goods that Afghans possess, i.e. housing structures, as well as give access to them, i.e. building materials.

This area used to have big people living in it before, who had connections; but many went back to Afghanistan. Now police officials come here asking for money all the time; it is routine” (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10).

Police officers often come through on their motorbikes, trying to get money here (Changeiz, KHA14; Hidayatullah KHA15; Shaqeel, KHA16).

Figure 4: Afghan tented housing belonging to poorer section of Afghan Camp
Figure 5: Housing belonging to poorer section of Afghan Camp

Figure 6: Internal courtyard of a middle-income family in Afghan Camp
During fieldwork the issue of water and interlinked issues of poor healthcare and sanitation were repeatedly raised as an example in which a specific human right is denied to the residents in Afghan Camp. “There are many problems – are we not human?” an Afghan elder, Hajji Tooraj said during a semi-structured interview (Hajji Tooraj, KHA73). He continued:

These are human rights (ǐsnâni bâqq) violations. No sanitation, no water, no schools, no rights, no hospitals. No one can say that they have given any rights to the Afghan.

For residents the lack of direct access to water is understood and experienced as a serious affront to life, health, and sanitation. Ethnographic observations across Afghan Camp and daily conversations were dominated by accounts of water-related illnesses and deaths. During one particular week in which I was conducting interviews and completing observations in a school attached to the medical clinic, the death of a pregnant woman, Sumaiya, facing labour difficulties whilst she was in a taxi en route to the hospital formed the focus of the mood in the camp. Elders, women, men, and children mentioned Sumaiya’s “story” with anger, frustration, remorse, resignation, and even as just another normal occurrence of daily life in Afghan Camp - “Women always die here in childbirth, because of no health care and no water... how can you give birth without water!” a female resident told me as we sat in her home with her pregnant mother nearby (Gulshaan, KHA13.B). Sumaiya, in labour was frantically placed in a wheelbarrow, “like a janwár (animal)” (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10) rather than a human being, and was pushed along by two children in a panic. She was taken to a taxi at the edge of the camp that was meant to drive her to the nearest government hospital, a 45-60 minute drive away (for a cost of Rs.800) but she died before reaching the hospital. I went to speak with Yaqoob Gul, Sumaiya’s relative and resident of Afghan Camp, to find out what had happened.

We have no hospital near to us – the nearest Government hospital is miles away... It was too far. The car came back in the
morning. When I opened the door at the back it was filled all at the bottom and on the seats, with blood (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10).

As an area established for non-nationals, Afghan Camp’s positioning on the extreme frontier of the city isolates the undesirable and non-national remnants of society into quarantined spaces that cannot interact with Karachi “proper” (Agier 2011). The urban ethnocratic spatial organisation via a purposeful positioning of Afghan Camp on the urban frontier creates a daunting distance. In the case above it was this distance that combined with a lack of a material resource (water) to deny a basic right to life, and even a humanised death.

Figure 7: Map of Karachi (Orangi Pilot Project Map).

Many residential areas that have high Afghan demographics are situated off from Super Highway and Afghan Camp is at the furthest distance (near Town 18, Gadap).
Water used to be provided to the camp through direct pipes (apparently funded partly by UNHCR). However, the water supply was reduced in the mid-1990s and fully dried up from 2001-2004. Residents spoke of failed efforts to try to get funds from the GOP and various INGOs in order to renew the waterlines. The Commissioner for Afghan Refugees in Sindh said, “We do not have the funds and the money to renew the waterlines [for the camp]” (interview: Akhtar 2010). The lone INGO active in the area was also unwilling to “risk” the money required to regenerate water supplies on an area that is on a temporary and unofficial sub-lease. In a semi-structured interview with an Afghan elder, Maulana Abdul Qais (KHA70) who has lived in Afghan Camp for over 20 years and worked with others to lobby the INGO to supply water to Afghan Camp he said, “Anything that is Afghan, it is taken away [i.e. the dried up waterlines are not renewed]”. Revealing frustrations about another time when money that was raised privately for Afghan Camp was redirected to another initiative he continued, “Our things [piped water] were given to a “higher” priority area and went to Pakistanis during the [2010] floods. But we too are high priority – how many people need to die?!” Activities like this are “not an unusual occurrence”. Yaqoob Gul and an Afghan medical assistant, Mustafa Habib,

115 There is no documentation or full confirmation regarding which official actors provided the water in the first place. Most interviewees said that permission was provided by the GOS and that funding was supplied by UNHCR, although some interviewees mentioned UNICEF. In interviews with the Commissioner of Afghan Refugees, Sindh, he said that the government has always given permission for the waterlines but that it cannot fund them now that they have “dried up” (interview: Akhtar 2010), which leads one to suspect that it is likely that the waterlines were also previously funded by a non-state actor, i.e. potentially UNHCR and/or UNICEF as interviewees mention.

116 Some interviews reported that the waterlines dried up in 2001 and other say around 2004 and 2005. However, it is clear that water access was increasingly drying up at the start of the 2000s, although the actual date of the waterlines becoming “fully dry” is unclear. In a visit I conducted in the area in mid-2012 it was reported that the waterlines were re-active, but in a visit in 2013 the waterlines were said to have dried up again. Currently, problems regarding the cleanliness and regularity of the water remain. Whilst the Afghan position in Karachi – given the city’s volatile political conditions – has never been warmly welcomed by the city’s political powers (particularly when compared to the positive absorption of Afghans in 1980s Peshawar), a shift in the Afghan position is evident and is likely to have been influenced by changing instrumentalist geopolitical objectives as well as conditions within the city. Indeed, residents often spoke about shifts that they recently feel have taken place “in the past few years”, including “less/no support” and “increased harassment”.

117 This English term was the specific word used by employees of the organisation during discussions.
working in the INGO added, more than once, in private and out of sight from other INGO workers:

They have done this before, diverted funds away from Afghans. There was a foreign guy who came and he worked in the camp… he wanted to raise money for the Camp, and he did. But they redirected his money to other parts of Pakistan. They said other parts of Pakistan needed it more! (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10 and Mustafa Habib, KHA47).

The bureaucratic and “rational” ways of seeing used by the INGO are understood as devaluing and dehumanising their lives. In other areas, however, the INGO is providing relief and is a needed presence in the area through feeding malnourished children, testing for diseases, and providing shelter to severely ill persons, but in this example the INGO does not act in the fully humanitarian way that it is expected to. Maulana Abdul Qais continued:

The costs [for renewing the waterlines] were coming to Rs.29 lakh and Rs.30 lakh but they [the INGO] would not authorise this. They said that we have been here for a while but they do not know how much longer we will be here for and that money would go to waste! Behind all the talk of insaniyat (humanitarianism) is a profit based approach (Maulana Abdul Qais, KHA70).

For Maulana Abdul Qais decisions of “investment”, “risk”, and a “cost-benefit” analysis are understood as having shaped the INGO’s decision rather than the urgent and pressing basic human need of water. An organisation that is expected by residents to act in a humanising way is instead seen to be using dehumanising lenses to inform their actions - or in this case inaction. Subsequently it was this organisation itself which appeared cruel and impervious to the needs of residents. During extended interviews with other residents regarding issue of water, concerns against “rational” ways of seeing based on “risk” were raised. In a response to the manner in which the local INGO had failed to deliver in the area Yaqoob Gul and Habibullah, another long-term resident and his friend, said:
These INGO’s make promises that they cannot keep… All of the people that work here, are they sincere? You know who I am talking about and you have seen them working. Do they really care about us? One doctor that comes to the hospital, he comes when he wishes and says that he is working to help us! But he does nothing. He comes once a month, if that, and when he comes he goes home early. Sits for a couple of hours and that’s it. Two weeks ago, you were there, you were there when I asked him to come and see that kid [his nephew] with the skin problems. That doctor he just comes and sits there. Do you think he cares? He doesn’t do anything. He never did see that kid. He died this week… If you’re going to help, then help [about the INGO]. But we don’t want to hear your false words. Stuff those words and keep them yourself. We will help ourselves, God willing (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10 and Habibullah, KHA13).

Importantly, the various constructions of Afghan life as objectified units of cost (as well as earlier mentioned practices of urban ethnocracy), which lead to the denial of basic human needs are not silently accepted. Within Afghan Camp attempts to reverse the absence of water and other basic material resources are made using solidarity networks and navigation practices in which the fellowship of space & charity is important. In the face of a lack of water different “anonymous” residents (Tajik, Uzbek, Pashtun, Mughal, and Turkmen) - some related to each other, many not - work together via human interactions to secure some form of access to water. The family and clan unit is the most important unit of organisation in Afghan Camp, but in the case of accessing water for the area, the family unit is transcended. A symbolic and shared struggle for water brings “anonymous” and unrelated actors together. “It is hard for us”; “We find it difficult”; “People struggle here” were common expressions used in the interviews when describing the search for water and basic material resources, to indicate a common attachment to Afghan Camp “humanity”.

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At one point in Afghan Camp’s history, after the waterlines fully dried up residents met to discuss possible routes of action, pooled resources, and shared wider connections with formal actors and organisations. Guest rooms, homes, and mosques formed sites of public discussion. During this time, Yaqoob Gul, was in charge of producing the estimates for the costs of new waterlines. Other residents and elders, such as Maulana Abdul Qais, completed queries regarding the numbers of people in different sections of the camp, which helped Yaqoob Gul produce his estimates. Habibullah approached his contacts with the INGO to ask if they would support the waterlines scheme (which they did not). Others still approached various contacts in government departments as well as organisations they were familiar with, including an informal trucker’s organisation in Sohrab Goth. However, it was when an Afghan Uzbek, Hajji Mahfouz (KHA6) secured an informal agreement with the Pakistani Rangers who control some water supplies in Karachi that water access was secured. Full details of the terms of agreement between Hajji Mahfouz and the Pakistani Rangers were not fully disclosed during fieldwork - conversations and enquiries always stopped short of the full terms and conditions - but as Hajji Mahfouz has relationships with government officials as he acts as a mediator for Afghan Camp with external officials it is likely that his favour with the Commissioner of Afghan Refugees Sindh accelerated his deal with the Rangers. Here, different residents pooled their individual resources, social connections, inadvertently producing a rich form of social capital, in the interests of a wider Afghan Camp humanity, offering what help they could and when. Residents worked together to form “bridges” between their “weak ties” (Granovetter 1985) with each other. This neighbourhood consciousness was crucial in enabling a community-based form of action. Indeed, akin to other examples of networks in urban poor communities it is clear that “people, who utilize networks to fulfil individual and collective needs, and to influence the distribution of public and private goods and services, engage other people in their efforts... The system, allows people

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118 In most Afghan households in the camp, homes have a guest room. This is the space in which male household members receive other male guests for socialisation and family, business, and political discussions. The guestroom reflects a public space within the household.
who have access to different types of resources to contribute to and prosper within the community, despite vast differences in status, wealth, education, piety of property” (emphasis added) (Singerman 1995:136-7).

Currently, the Rangers and private contractors\(^\text{119}\) supply different under-tank systems in the camp with water at the cost of a few hundred or a few thousand rupees per fill depending on the size of the under-tank (see also N.Ahmed 2008). This is then sold in blue 5 litre plastic cartons for Rs.5 or Rs.6 that residents have to refill. In this instance, by using solidarity networks and engaging with state actors through practices of access, water is redistributed, at least partially, and provided to the residents.

![Figure 8: Plastic container used to refill water with pipe to refill each container.](image)

\(^{119}\) After the Rangers supplied water private contractors also started to supply water to the area.
In Afghan Camp basic levels of material goods are pursued in order to offer a route to meet a minimal level of a humanised life and to improve their lives. In an interview with another resident and elder, Hajji Hayyat said, “Water is a basic human need. We are human, are we not? We need water” (KHA71).

In addition, as faith is a central part of Afghan Camp residents also wanted conditions in which the non-material rituals of prayer are possible. In the interview with Hajji Hayyat, regarding the lack of water in the camp he said:

Cleanliness is meant to be half of our faith – how are we meant to be able to pray and to follow our faith if we have no cleanliness – not even to do ḵaḍḍu. The mosques are half empty and without water – how can that be? (Hajji Hayyat, KHA71).

Hajji Hayyat’s understanding of a fuller human life is deeply interlinked with his ability to practice the basic pillars of his Islamic faith.

Importantly, given the significance of religion, the quest for water is also motivated by moral frameworks of charity which strengthen the bonds between these otherwise anonymous actors.

In my dialogue with residents and elders they also understood their coming together as being based on moral concepts of charity informed by faith and a non-material order, even though these actors are from different religious schools and sects. In one instance I sat with Hajji Mahfouz informally, in a medical clinic in the camp as his eight-year old son had a high fever. I asked him why he was so active in the camp, trying to secure water and improve health and security. He said:

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120 Mosques are central features of Afghan Camp life; and houses are identified by which mosque they are closest to.
I had to do this [this charity]… and I am still always trying to do something for the people here. This is the work of humanity, this is work for people. I have a duty. These other [material] things do not matter that much, this life is short (Hajji Mahfouz, KHA6).

As mentioned in Chapter 4, in Islamic discourses generosity is one of the highest virtues; and the Quran and Islamic jurisprudence promise the obligation of almsgiving by all those who are capable to do so, which is reinforced by cultural norms.\(^{121}\) Thus for some residents and elders their actions are explained in the rhetoric of worldly matters and “a drama of otherworldly affairs” (Adib-Moghaddam 2010: 254-55). This was repeated by Maulana Abdul Qais - a part of the group that worked to restore water supplies and who also runs his own mosque, housing for widows, and an orphanage with his wife. When I asked him why he, his wife, and others worked so hard in the mosque, the orphanage, and the quarters for widows, he replied: “This is our zakat, our sadaqah” (Maulana Abdul Qais, KHA70).

Interestingly both Hajji Mahfouz and Maulana Abdul Qais have enough forms of capital to leave the camp. Hajji Mahfouz is an Uzbek Afghan with transnational connections in Afghanistan, is well-connected within Karachi, and is understood to have significant forms of cultural capital. Maulana Abdul Qais is an Afghan Tajik originally from Baghlan, who now lives in Karachi and Kabul in a fully transnational life. He has a regular, stable, income, and is well-connected within Karachi. However, neither Hajji Mahfouz nor Maulana Abdul Qais have chosen to leave Afghan Camp in pursuit of “modern” consumer comforts. Their actions are not a rejection of “modernity”, but a reflection of the multiple and contested forms of modernity possible (Appadurai 1996). When this question was posed to both of them (separately and on separate occasions) both referred to a sense of “responsibility” and a moral and ethical concern for

\(^{121}\) Nor does it just involve material donations; indeed, during our conversation Hajji Mahfouz said, “By doing this work we are in the service of others. This too is a form of worship; this too is living with imaan (faith)” (Hajji Mahfouz, KHA6).
“humanity”. This is not to say that both actors are “anti-modern”, but it is to show that for these actors an alternative form of social and metaphysical capital is possible,\textsuperscript{122} shaping their interests alongside an alternative imagining of a humanised existence other than what is offered by dominant official discourses.

The Afghan capacity to “persist” (Butler 2010) in Afghan Camp carves out a space for Afghans in Karachi. Despite nationalised ways of seeing and corresponding forms of ghettoisation, a stubborn Afghan presence is practiced and one that is versed in a self-humanising rhetoric. The fellowship of space & charity is more responsive to the needs of Afghan Camp than the officials who are responsible to it: CAR, UNHCR, and the INGO. Unlike the bureaucratic structure of the INGO this solidarity network is practiced and supported by rhetoric that is not about “risk assessments” or “false charity”. Rather it is concerned with providing a basic material resource for the basic levels of a humanised life and it recognises the value of these human lives. “People need water”, Yaqoob Gul said (KHA10). “They need water to live. Half of our issues would be over if there was decent access to water”. In the face of these challenges and the shortcomings of the INGO residents attempt to regain their humanity by juxtaposing their position against the “heartless” (the word frequently used by Habibullah, KHA13 and Yaqoob Gul, KHA10) INGO and by assuming agency and responsibility (Pollman 2010).

Crucially, however, these informal structures and strategies used in the quest for self-humanisation are not a utopian alternative. Despite the expressions of agency and self-

\textsuperscript{122} Bourdieu (1991) outlines that various forms of capital can also be sites of (symbolic) violence, i.e. what is considered to be important "cultural" capital may reaffirm existing modes of domination. But here Afghans use their social capital as a platform to secure material and non-material goods for a more humanised form of existence, which is rationalised in rhetoric different from the current political order. A different order, which contests the state's understanding of “modernisation” or “bureaucratic” management is expressed. Alternative localities emerge as important sites that contest official ways of working (Appadurai 1996).
humanising frames of the fellowship of space & charity and the practices of negotiated access, the issue of water is not fully resolved. In the immediate term the water supplied by the Pakistani Rangers and private contractors is understood as a useful substitute, but it also creates a number of physical and physiological hazards. The water provided to the under-tanks does not meet any legal health and safety regulations – a factor that appears to have worsened with multiple water providers. During fieldwork residents often expressed concerns about the cleanliness of the water supplied.

This is rough water, it is not safe (Rastin, KHA8).

People are left to use water they cannot trust. Who knows whether this water is clean? Sometimes it is bitter and salty, sometimes it is sweet (Habibullah, KHA13).

The water that is available through the boxes is not clean; it is not safe to drink (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10).

Forms of regulation when effectively managed are useful in preventing mass illnesses and preserving a certain standard of life. Where these regulations are not upheld the possibilities of human life, as in Afghan Camp, are vulnerable. The solutions are not fully effective and are only used as no other alternatives are available. Indeed Noman Ahmed’s (2009:179) study of Water Supply in Karachi shows that people were reliant on Awami (Rangers) tanks for water because “residents did not possess any options to subscribe to any combination of water supply. An overall shortage of water, lack of possibility to supply through piped means and remote location in the context of the city were the reasons [in his study] in this respect” (ibid).
Furthermore, many residents cannot afford to buy multiple five litre cartons of water each day, each at a cost Rs.5 or Rs.6. They simply do not earn enough. For these residents a dangerous alternative to the already alternative informal water supply lies in a mini “pond” in the camp, also referred to simply as “the dirty water”. In an excerpt taken from an earlier interview with Hajji Mahfouz, he recalled the deaths of four children as a result of this dirty water.

I want to tell you one other thing, and that is that the water here is not safe and clean at all. Where we are living four children died because they were washing and playing in the dirty water. Think about it. What type of parents would let their children bathe in dirty water? (Hajji Mahfouz, KHA6).

Shortly after Hajji Mahfouz added, “But what choice do they have?”, to show that these actions are ones of desperation. For the very poor there is no affordable alternative. During my ethnographic work in the medical clinic, illnesses related to water were prevalent: scabies, tuberculosis, infections, and dehydration are normal occurrences in Afghan Camp. These two factors mean that whilst informal practices are to a degree substitutive they are not a panacea. The basic right to survival and a humanised life via water is not resolved. The struggle for safe water continues.

We need water. We just need water! You can see for yourself. Just look. Look at people’s hands. Look at the cases of scabies. We just need good water! (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10).

Indeed, during fieldwork elders and residents were trying to fix the waterline in the camp and secure funding for water so that they could have clean piped water direct to each household.

In some cases some residents and/or elders also exploit weaker residents during the water access process, and in other processes of accessing basic material goods. As some elders have established relationships with officials, variances in power standings within Afghan Camp do occur, which in some cases result in elders acting with equally dehumanising intentions. Within
Afghan Camp certain residents and elders, some of whom have now moved out of the camp and live in regulated housing in Karachi, were reported as renting out houses to residents in the camp, and charging residents high rates for utilities, such as electricity.

The impact of the informal structures and strategies on the Pakistan state are also significant. The informal practices of Afghan Camp are encouraged by official actors because they fill in for the state, the refugee regime, and the INGO in question; and for the Pakistani Rangers they also offer some profit. Pakistani officials applauded the initiatives of the residents of Afghan Camp in accessing water “independently” and using formal-informal practices to do so.

He [Hajji Mahfouz] did a lot of the running around and chasing after people… he should be given credit where it is due. He did a lot. He is the one that resolved the entire issue of water. He's a good organiser (interview: Akhtar 2010).

However, at exactly the same time as informal processes are filling in for the state a dialectic of delegitimization and decay is also taking place.

In the short-term the water supplied by the Pakistani Rangers and private contractors appears substitutive. However, as the outputs that are produced are half-baked and dangerous it means that the Pakistani city is expanding and being maintained with low quality and unsustainable infrastructures, which have the potentials of creating longer term problems for the state with regards to urban development and expansion. Further, in non-physical terms, as UNHCR’s position is sporadic and fluctuating, the relevant INGO appears concerned with a bureaucratic cost-benefit analysis, and CAR is essentially absent, as such, official organisations smack of incompetence and indifference to the basic human struggles that residents of the camp are involved in. Even the mention of officials was often met with a sneer. The ambiguity of Afghan
Camp’s position and corresponding responsibilities of official actors towards it make the state and refugee regime appear defunct, and even cruel.

The only state organisation that delivers to Afghan Camp residents, and even this delivery is flawed, are the Pakistani Rangers.

The Rangers are good – they are better than the rest of the Pakistani government and actors (Habibullah, KHA13).

The Rangers are understood as being distinct from the rest of the Pakistani bureaucratic and civilian administration. They also act as important sub-contractors of the Pakistani state who are not only engaged in internal policing and security but also in profit-generation and delivering resources to residents. This would normally not be an issue – a state organisation delivering materials to important groups is usually unproblematic. However, as various studies show, the Rangers and other military actors control a number of resources in the city (Ahmed 2009) (and other spaces in Pakistan [Siddiqa [2007]]) and can be at odds with the central non-military government. For example, as Chapter 4 mentions, in July 2010 Pakistani Rangers were engaged in “illegal constructions” in Karachi against the wishes of two Sindh government departments. Whilst the Rangers were directed to stop construction by Jinnah Courts, their activities - which are routine - show complexities and multiple sources of power in the city (URC 2010).

The arrangement with the Pakistani Rangers in Afghan Camp, an informal and undocumented agreement, also normalises informal activity via state actors. More importantly, it reinforces the strength of different power sources in the city; in this case of a military that is often at odds with the civilian administration and bureaucratic government departments. Thus whilst informality is a part of the state, it is so in contradictory terms. Informal forms of redistribution make it
difficult to locate sovereignty and authority in Karachi. Instead, multiple sites of sovereignty appear to be in active - and are being reinforced – that do not align with the central state apparatus (government departments, law, local union councils, and so on). Indeed in the cases where Rangers are held in high esteem by Afghans (Habibullah, KHA13), this does not transfer onto the state edifice as a whole; instead they are seen as actors who are doing the best they can in a corrupt state. Thus official (non-military) organisations are delegitimized and understood as ineffective, even cruel, and not to be trusted. Instead solidarity networks and a profitable military are seen as more trusted units of organisation.

The incompetence (“We have no money”) and weak reach of official channels and official actors mean the state is itself reliant on formal-informal mechanisms that normalise formal-informal practices. Subsequently the “formal” appears abnormal. The informal means used to maintain the state have normalised a new culture of their own, which undermines the formal objectives of state policies, modernisation, and urban development. Karachi is aiming to become a “world class” city (CDGK 2007), but how can it achieve this with urban-rural housing areas that have weak infrastructure, poor health, sanitation, and no water supplies? And, as mentioned, these processes boost the formal-informal positions of the Pakistani Rangers and private contractors, and even middlemen and exploitative elders, whose objectives often work against “legal” and “official” objectives. These processes also create multiple sites of power in the city that exist outside of the rubric of the state. Indeed, Karachi’s multiple sites of power and accompanying political violence that currently engrosses the city cannot be separated from the significance of informality (see also Bremen 2012).
From all angles the state appears to stumble – neglectful, incompetent, or complicit. Indeed terms, such as “sifarish” and “bhatta”, are automatically associated with the state (either attributed to state actors or directly the state itself), and its character is subsequently deeply eroded. Thus, even when solidarity networks and navigation practices - with reliance on the Rangers, other private contractors, and intermediaries - do not fully solve the problem or involve exploitation, they at least enable a striving towards survival to occur and are more trusted than following the law and official channels. Indeed, whilst a strong local state for regulatory purposes or social and economic distribution is desirable (Friedmann 1992), in Karachi the idea of a strong state, to borrow from Mike Davis (2006:62), is clearly a “hallucination or a bad joke”. Thus, solidarity networks and navigation practices offer at least some possibilities of redistribution. However, simultaneously these informal ways of working in Karachi also point to a potential boiling point for the Pakistani state which does not exercise control over these emerging and competing power sources.

“Our Homes are Being Bulldozed!” A Pakistani Neighbourhood’s Quest for Shelter
Importantly, the quest for basic survival, via solidarity networks, navigation practices, and their subsequent impact on official structures, is not confined to Afghans. Pakistanis use the same methods for survival. Afghans and Pakistanis (non-citizens and citizens) occupy a shared reality in Pakistan. This is not reflective of an alternative or “true” citizenship – this would be a stretch too far. However, it is reflective of a shared space in which both Afghans and Pakistanis are agents who create political pressures in Pakistan.
What follows is an analysis of a series of interviews and observations completed in an unregulated residential area called Ishtiaq Goth on the outskirts of Karachi. Unlike Afghan Camp, whose story is told through the struggle for water, the story of basic survival in Ishtiaq Goth is told through the efforts to safeguard shelter and maintain the existence of the entire neighbourhood. However, similar functional structures - a fellowship of space & charity - and physical and non-physical impacts on the state emerge, such as poor physical solutions and challenges to official legitimacy.

In Karachi fieldwork was completed in a series of katchi abadis and goths in and around Sohrab Goth, Super Highway, and North Karachi (key “peripheral” areas of the city). These were possible through a grassroots worker from the CDGK (for non-Pakistani Pashtun and non-Afghan areas) and personal networks (for Pakistani Pashtun and Afghan areas). The case to be discussed now uses oral interviews and observations that were facilitated via an introduction from the CDGK worker (he was, however, absent during the interviews).

Ishtiaq Goth is not as far out of the city as Afghan Camp but it still sits on the northern frontier of the city (see Figure 7), reflective of the fact that most of Karachi’s informal housing expansion now takes place on city outskirts (Hasan 2006; 2010; Roy and Alsayyad 2006). Ishtiaq Goth is home to a mixed population of Pakistanis: Sindhis, Saraikis, Baloch, and Pakistani Muhajirs. No Afghans live in this particular area. Male household members work as factory workers, labourers, and traders. The area is arranged around the unit of the nuclear family with some wider kin networks present. Residents of this area have been unable to buy land through formal and official channels in Pakistan because the costs - financial and bureaucratic - of a regulated house

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123 The name of the location and people has been changed.
124 This is perhaps related to the difference in nature of settlement and migration to Ishtiaq Goth by Pakistani citizens.
are too high and because, as discussed in Chapter 3, the state is not producing enough affordable housing (Hasan 2012). Unregulated residential areas, such as Ishtiaq Goth, act as a solution to this.

Ishtiaq Goth is comparable to Afghan Camp in the standards of living, although it has a smaller population and is less densely packed, which also means that the size of the solidarity networks, including fellowships of space & charity, are smaller. Most houses are katcha houses, or a combination of katcha and pakka structures. Ishtiaq Goth is a relatively new neighbourhood with the oldest areas being eight-to-ten years old. There are no electricity lines (unlike Afghan Camp); some water supplies are present, but they are sporadic; and roads, sanitation, and infrastructure are informally constructed.

Ishtiaq Goth is built on contested land, which is not unusual in Karachi (Hasan 2006, 2010, 2012). In Karachi, many informal settlements are built on sites of contestation/land grabs over private and government owned land with contests usually taking place between various informal entrepreneurs referred to as the “land mafia” (i.e. political landholders and state actors acting quasi-legally or illegally). In Ishtiaq Goth this means the legal status of the area is unknown – again, the question of “who owns the land?” remains a legally and even politically contested question. The settlement has been strategically populated under the initiative of two informal property developers, Ishtiaq Mohammad (KHP35) and Omar Tariq (KHP36). These activities increased during 2010-11 because of floods in Sindh and across Pakistan. Ishtiaq Mohammad, a Sindhi, claims landholding rights to the area and is a member of the PPP - the other property developer is his business partner. However, during discussions, Ishtiaq Mohammad admitted that his claim on the land in Ishtiaq Goth was contested, which he said was the result a dispute.

125 During fieldwork residents were awaiting an informal deal between the property developers and KESC to be agreed.
with the GOS (Ishtiaq Mohammad, KHP35). Ishtiaq Mohammad said he is the legal owner of the land and that the land has been in his family for generations. However, he admitted that he has no legal documentation to the land, and during discussions he would say that his claim to the land was based on a “native resident” claim to Sindhi land in Karachi. In other words, he often justified his claim to the land from an ethno-nationalist political claim. Parallel to Afghan Camp and the work completed by Matthew Hull (2008), the legal rights and responsibilities to Ishtiaq Goth are unknown leaving residents of the area vulnerable to exploitations by state and non-state actors.

Local government actors, including the CDGK, are aware that the settlement exists (indeed I visited the area via a CDGK worker), however, the area receives no official support from CDGK offices or from any other GOP offices. The area, in the words of residents, is “waiting to get made”,\(^\text{126}\) which is the process of becoming a formal and legally recognised area or included in “upgrading” projects. However, as the area and residents await “legality” and its legal status is unclear and “contested” Ishtiaq Goth is denied formal access to basic utilities and resources. It is also vulnerable to exploitations for profit by local state actors acting in informal ways and intermediaries. Perhaps if the area was a part of the state’s modernisation plans or home to desirable residents, i.e. the rich (Hasan 2012), state presence would be of a different type and would offer some forms of regulatory support; instead an anti-poor bias means that this area and the citizens living in the area extend the “ambiguity of unequal inclusion” (Ron 2003:16) to include the urban poor.

\(^{126}\) “Made”/ bane-ga (future tense) is the specific word used to describe how the area is being settled by various Pakistanis. Other areas, which are regulated, also take time to get “made”. For example, in Islamabad a new regulated area slowly builds up. More people live on the land, legally, but there is a tense waiting period as people wait to see if other people will join the neighbourhood, which will then increase said neighbourhood’s security, future prospects, and monetary value. It is like waiting for any new entity to be made/successful/constructed. There is a period of time in which there is anticipation of its success; except here the stakes are significantly higher.
Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq offer marginalised Pakistanis who otherwise have difficulties in purchasing and accessing land a chance to access shelter, which is gradually built up into a more permanent form of housing – indeed this is how the area was built up. At the time of fieldwork parts of the settlement were less than a year old and there were also older areas, spaced at a slight distance from each other, which had been present for over eight years. In the current process, local construction workers are hired by Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq to make basic housing plots (literally a low boundary wall and minimal house foundations or pipes and infrastructure for water and sanitation). After the housing plots are made or even during the construction process various settlers are encouraged to occupy the housing plots. This included recent IDPs from the 2010 floods, other internal migrants from Sindh, and urban poor residents from other unstable unregulated residential areas in Karachi. During fieldwork I was told by residents that the housing structure is given to the various residents for free for a period of 12-36 months, during which they are encouraged to improve and even construct the structure. In one house, a 2010 flood IDP from Jacobabad (in interior Sindh) was encouraged to settle for free by Omar Tariq. His house was basic in structure. In fact there was no “house” - it was just an outer boundary with a wall, a door, one inner wall and a partial roof, and the rest was open space.

Omar [Tariq] bhai (brother) brought us in to sit on this land. Ishtiaq Mohammad then said that we can have it for six months for free. God willing, the plan is to stay here (Maqsood, KHP37).

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127 Fieldwork involved a detailed examination of the housing plots (unmade and made) as I was given a “tour” of the area by Omar Tariq and Ishtiaq Mohammad.
If residents can afford it they can “purchase” the land from the middlemen via an informal verbal contract. In another case a Sindhi family purchased a plot. The female household head, Nilofar, said:

This is our house... We gave a Rs.7,000 - Rs.8,000 in advance to them [Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq] and then we did everything ourselves. We built the walls up ourselves – we did these ourselves, without hiring labour (Nilofar, KHP44).

Residents are thus given access to land and are under the protection of the two property developers, but, given the contested nature of the land, this protection is tenuous and subject to challenges. Residents frequently face violent standoffs and conflicts with rival private contractors and the police, who are acting in illegal/informal ways by supporting Ishtiaq Mohammad’s and Omar Tariq’s rivals, which include houses being bulldozed.

In one instance, a resident, Tabassum (referred to as Tabassum Khala [aunt] by younger residents) had her house bulldozed (Tabassum Khala, KHP39). Approximately 65 years-old, from an “Urdu-speaking” background (Pakistani Muhajir), with one son, Tabassum Khala was left homeless and with few possessions. For her and other residents, the act of bulldozing represented an embodied act of dehumanisation. As rival private builders and middlemen, supported by the police, bulldozed Tabassum Khala’s katcha house, her home and life were reduced to insignificance. The profit the land had to offer was of greater value than Tabassum Khala’s human life. In a group interview with two families in the area one of the women of the family noted how the builders who had initially built the settlement under an informal contract with Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq defected to Ishtiaq Mohammad’s and Omar Tariq’s rivals, which was speculated as being purely profit-driven.
What do they care if our homes are knocked over? We are poor and it is always the poor that die (Group interview, Ishtiaq Goth).

Profit generation is, of course, on its own not dehumanising. However, when it becomes the primary determinant of action without due regard for human life, instead viewing lives as “automaton like” (Haslam 2006) profit generation assumes a dehumanising characteristic.

In a recollection of her experience, which was corroborated with other interviewees in the area, Tabassum Khala recalled how she was left homeless, without money or possessions. As a man her son could occupy public spaces for shelter - although even this is not without significant risk -, but as a woman she faced greater taboos and stigma, as well as physical danger. Interlinked with this material absence of shelter was a non-material component of her character - her reputation, feelings of self-worth and social recognition were also at risk. Tabassum Khala, however, accessed everyday material resources, shelter and food, through a fellowship of space & charity that emerged in this shared area. Similar to the example in Afghan Camp, residents in Ishtiaq Goth are united by a shared space and a common, tenuous fate, this time with shelter and the area’s status and existence as the main issue at stake. Again, like Afghan Camp, this is not an imagined community (Anderson 1991) but one built on shared everyday experiences, and drawn together through human relationships. The shared space of the neighbourhood creates a shared solidarity and a network of actors that feels and acts together and transcends ties of kin and family for a macro political purpose. Again, the family unit is the most important unit of organisation in Ishtiaq Goth, however, residents also form an altruistic bounded solidarity based on their shared neighbourhood, which are also connected via emotional bonds which enables action.

The women of the settlement sat and discussed in a group interview, how Tabassum Khala’s house was bulldozed:
We were all crying. We were all shedding tears; it was enough to be like an ocean. It was the first place that she has had as her own. We all stood by her... but they came without notice (Group interview, Ishtiaq Goth).

In Tabassum Khala’s case the women in the area provided her with food, shelter, and moral support, expressing a collective solidarity, altruism, and sense of shared belonging in this contested space. One resident took her into her home until Tabassum Khala was able to rebuild her katcha house, which was completed through her son’s wages and labour. In other cases, other women provided food for her and her son, a practice which is exercised when food is frequently unavailable in the area. Resources were pooled through shared human relationships in order to humanise and safeguard Tabassum Khala’s life. In this case the bonds of friendship, as well as the fellowship of space & charity, are working to redistribute a basic material good – shelter.

Similarly, when the area as a whole has been under threat from bulldozers standoffs frequently occur. Through the shared fate that atomised actors feel, however, an impetus for action - such as a conscious defiance of rule (practice of presence) - takes place. Here, and in the mentioned case of Tabassum Khala, actions are based on mutual insurance, i.e. by acting together a material resource can be safeguarded (Fafchamps 1992). This form of social capital has, partially, been successful in safeguarding a basic material resource (shelter) and exercising presence.

The women of the area recalled how they were faced with bulldozers belonging to private contractors, who had the support of the police who were also present. The contractors were ready to tear down houses and were under the impression that the task would be easy given that they had chosen to arrive at Ishtiaq Goth when male household members (in this context
gendered symbols and sources of actual physical power) were at work. The rivals of Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq were aware that the female residents of the area were vulnerable and “attacked”. The rivals were using this method in a bid to produce fear and insecurity to discipline residents to leave. During this time, the area’s women stood together and confronted the bulldozers and private contractors. In a group interviews with female residents of the area, one resident, Bilquis said:

Ishtiaq Goth is like this now, and it is just up to us to have courage and fight it out and see what we can do here. It has been a year since the conditions have got tougher. This place was made with firing... it was made on bullets” (Bilquis, KHP46).

For Bilquis, echoed by the other women - even though some were far more anxious than her - the common identity of the settlement was expressed though her expressions of “we”. In the group interview Bilquis and other women continued:

We had already lost three boys, they were shot last time… and before that they broke down Tabassum Khala’s house… we weren’t going to let them do this again. When we heard that the police were here, all of us [the] women of this area got ourselves together. Everyone came to this house, we all stood here. We knew something would happen. We got things together, what we could, stones... But they came at us, the builders, and their bulldozers; they came at us with tear gas. They threw gas on us and we came holding our Qurans, but it was of no use. They came two months ago, and they did the same a year ago. They are still demanding things. But we have nothing. We have nowhere else to go. Where can we go? But they will not leave us in peace here… we have said that we will not move from this place. Others have had to move from areas before. <Bilquis speaks loudest>: I had to move last time; I will not do it again. How many more times can I move? I will die here, but I won’t move from here. No. Not anymore! (Emphasis added).

(Group interview, Ishtiaq Goth).

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128 A very violent stand off again took place after fieldwork and the current standing/existence of the settlement is unknown.

129 The interview was completed in Urdu. Bilquis used the term “hum”, which can also mean singular “I” in formal Urdu, however, in this context “hum” refers to all the residents of the area.
In this case the fellowship of space & charity produces a form of social capital that brings together shared resources, *human bodies*, in a standoff to practice presence and survival. I was also told of how the women of the settlement, and men, meet and discuss what they can do “next time the standoff takes place” (Bilquis, KHP46). Political agency is evident in expression and practice. (However, this is not always successful as the deaths of the three boys shows).

In some cases the women explained their actions through a prism of faith, as well as cultural practice. Feeding and housing Tabassum Khala was a “*farz*” (duty), sharing food brings “*barkat*” (blessings), and standing up against the “*zalim*” (oppressor/tyrant) is a duty of Muslims, they said (group interview, Ishtiaq Goth), to also reflect solidarity based on values (Portes 2000). It is also through the “strength of God” (Fahmeed, KHP42) that residents believe they will be able to “stay on this land” (Zeenat, KHP43). Again, similar to the narratives in Afghan Camp an interacting material and non-material orientation shapes the lives, actions, and networks of residents in Ishtiaq Goth.

Crucially, throughout the different types of instrumentalist motivations and emotional attachments, it is clear that residents understood their attempts at material redistribution (or perhaps of material maintenance) as being deeply tied to non-material issues. By securing shelter and their neighbourhood - a basic right - residents also understood their actions as acts that pursue a more humanised existence. “We want homes too. Are we not entitled to have a home?” Zeenat, a Baloch resident said (Zeenat, KHP43). When Bilquis says that “I had to move last time; I will not do it again”, she reflects a yearning and desperation (“I will die here, but I won’t move from here”) for a basic right (shelter), which she is repeatedly denied. Neglected and ignored by the state and unable to use official channels, Bilquis’s words express a stubborn quest
for a humanised life. Certainly a humanising rhetoric, based on concepts of self-worth, such as “izzat” (honour), “hausala” (nerve), and “himat” (courage), permeated the narratives collected in this area and expressed via action.

Yahan ki aurato ne banbat himat dbikaya... Hum ne hausala kiya... Hum bhi taqat mand bai.

The women here, showed great bravery. We demonstrated real nerve. We too are strong (emphasis added) (Bilquis, KHP46).

In the example above, Bilquis spoke of the standoff against the police as showing the human characteristics of this solidarity network, which is in stark contrast to the morally pugnacious act of bulldozing. By showing that they literally “did” courage and nerve her rhetoric expresses how she and the other women view their acts through humanising lenses. When residents faced the most recent standoff with the police and bulldozers from private contractors the residents said, “They threw gas on us and we came holding our Qurans” (group interview, Ishtiaq Goth). Here the Quran is symbolic of a non-material form of protection and a symbolic reminder and assertion of the residents, as well as the police’s and private contractor’s, humanity as understood through Islam. Here, similar to Afghan Camp (although of a different type and scale) the fellowship of space & charity also practices “presence” and shows the capacity of a neglected population to survive.

The informal structures and negotiated practices above are, however, not fully effective (similar to the case of Afghan Camp). Indeed three residents lost their lives in Ishtiaq Goth. The dependency of residents on the two intermediaries, who themselves are not fully effective, means that conditions for the residents of the area continue to be challenging; this is also reinforced by the unknown and contested legal status of the land in Ishtiaq Goth.
It is worth reemphasisising that it is Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq and not an autonomous and “vibrant” informal neighbourhood network, who have better access to economic and political capital and are the ones who direct the areas expansion. It is they who negotiate with private company and government workers (KESC and KWSB) to secure water and (future) electricity lines. It is also when they flex their muscles that the practices of presence, i.e. the continued existence of housing in the area, have a higher chance of being maintained and protected. In Ishtiaq Goth solidarity networks alone are not enough. Without understanding that it is Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq that protect informal activities and provide access to material resources the story of Ishtiaq Goth’s quest for survival is incomplete.

The reliance on the two intermediaries reveals a solemn and exploitative face of “survival” in Ishtiaq Goth. The property developers want to strengthen their position in this contested area. They are not acting with benevolent tendencies to resolve the state’s housing crisis. Rather they
seek to strengthen their hold over their contested land by changing the facts on the ground, and they use the residents bodies to do so. Whilst residents are encouraged to settle in these areas for free, such as the earlier mentioned IDP from Sindh, they are also expected to pay at a later date – in monetary and non-monetary terms. A material and non-material debt is in circulation without any form of legal regulation, creating a lived experience of exploitation. Newer house plots paid no rent but in older houses very high rent was being paid.

Initially we did not have to pay Ishtiaq Mohammad. He brought us over and told us to settle in… But slowly then we started to have to pay him rent. The money built up and now we have to pay him much more (Gul Nabi, KHP41.B).

In addition, for Maqsood, the IDP from interior Sindh, the scepticism over Ishtiaq Mohammad's generosity was clear:

What - you think he is not going to take money from us. We owe him… you don’t know how things work here (Maqsood, KHP37).

Beyond this monetary exchange, the two property developers also extract a “service” from the individuals who come and settle in these areas by using their bodies and lives as a means to consolidate their grip over the area. Here, the bodies of residents are “automaton like” (Haslam 2006) objects used in physical labour to build up the housing structures – such as Nilofar or Maqsood - and absorb the risk of inhabiting or squatting in an area without utilities. Indeed, it is these bodies that are living on an urban frontier, subject to the cold of an open unconstructed space at night. As two residents said:

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130 Karachi contains its share of precedents in which informal settlements remain in place as official forces cannot or will not implement the law because they lack the capacity to do so and it is cheaper to allow a settlement to continue to exist and/or because a collusion between officials and the land grabbers takes place (Hasan 2012, 2010). This is a strategy that Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq are attempting, and in this process earn a profit via the exploitation of residents.
At night they [the police] stop people: children, boys, men. And once you have no light outside in this area there is no way that you can go outside. It feels almost as if you are standing in the middle of a graveyard... you cannot leave (Shahnaz Nabi, KHP41)

And:

There is no light here. We are living in darkness. Literally. You are here during the day, you cannot stay beyond magrib (Fahmeeda Qazmi, KHP42).

Indeed, it is these bodies that face the bullets and tear gas and confront the police and bulldozers when a physical contest with the state and other actors over the land occurs. It is their “three boys” who were killed by the bullets of the standoff.

In addition, a lack of enforceable regulation and regulated development means that housing structures are of a poor standard. Residents are punished by a lack of clarity over the legal status of the area and the “prevention of law”/”violation of law” tactics that are used in the area. People frequently sleep in the cold, are vulnerable to the open heat in the day, and are at dangerous distances from healthcare, access to foodstuffs, and employment.

There is no health service near us. There is not even a chemist’s shop here! How can we cope… there is nothing here! (Zeenat, KHP43).

During fieldwork in various sites illnesses and cases of tuberculosis were recorded. In one household in Ishtiaq Goth a family owned a cow (Rubab, KHP38). The family used the cow’s faeces to maintain and build their katcha house walls, a routine practice in poorer and rural areas, and as fuel to cook food. These practices are not usually hazardous to health provided enough space is given to allow the faeces to dry, indeed it is a normal practice used to build and fix a katcha house. However, in this case the housing plot size and structure was very tight and
haphazard. As a result, instead of having enough space for the faeces to dry out, fresh and moist faeces was present in the main section of the house. To quote Mike Davis’ work on informal "slums", urban residents are essentially “living in shit” (Davis 2006:137-42). Subsequently flies, which are not an unusual specimen in unregulated residential areas, were present in exceptionally large concentrations - so much so that the family had developed a technique of speaking and moving with their hands over their mouths, and covering their sleeping baby’s eyes and mouth with a soft cloth. Despite the fact that most members of the household were suffering from serious forms of illness (suspected tuberculosis\(^{131}\) - although this had not been diagnosed as the family could not access health services), the family was unwilling and essentially unable to sell the cow as it was one of their only sources of wealth and support, i.e. for the housing structure and for producing milk and fuel. Thus in Ishtiaq Goth basic physical survival continues but often only just, and usually it is a physically and physiologically hazardous survival.

What do the presence of solidarity networks and navigation practices in this marginalised Pakistani community reveal about the local Pakistani state? In the short term and on a physical level they appear to be substitutive and filling a gap for the state by providing shelter to a population that the local government itself cannot take care of. Karachi’s rapidly expanding population needs shelter and housing, but the state is not constructing the numbers of houses needed by residents at a fast enough rate (Hasan 2010). The actions of the informal property developers resolve an “awkward” population issue. In addition Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq penetrate into areas that the state itself cannot reach: the rapidly expanding rural-urban frontier. They are also able to “manage” populations the state cannot, or will not, cater to, such

\(^{131}\) This suspicion was told to the family by other members of the area, including a former government employee. When process for medical diagnoses is not possible many people often turn to the most senior or experienced member of the community to discuss and “guess” a diagnosis. However, having also spoken to CDGK and health workers who have passed through this and neighbouring areas, I was told that it was very likely that the family was suffering from tuberculosis.
as IDPs, the extreme urban poor, and in other examples, undesirable ethnic groups, illegal immigrants, and refugees. Indeed, there are numerous informal settlements that surround Sohrab Goth, or that are positioned off from Super Highway where many Afghans (registered and unregistered), Pakistanis, including IDPs from FATA, and illegal immigrants (such as Bangladeshis) live. These informal settlements emerge quickly, organically, and in speedy response to the expanding populations on the ground.

However, at the same time a number of challenges are produced. These seemingly small acts repeated time and again have a large impact on the state in both physical and non-physical ways. At the physical level the informal housing settlements that are produced expand the city rapidly in a way that contradicts official urban management and expansion plans and in a way that is physically unsustainable. Indeed the CDGK’s Karachi Strategic Development Plan 2020 (CDGK 2007) points to a need for having “strategic” growth rather than the current, “unplanned and haphazard growth” which is “leading to acute civic problems” (2007:2). It is these informal areas that are the first to be washed away in the rain and susceptible to illnesses and disease because of poor sanitation. It is these areas and processes of expansion that have created a mega-city which has poor and unsustainable urban infrastructure.

At a non-physical level, the state is perceived as ineffective. For most of these urban poor residents the state was absent prior to settling in Ishtiaq Goth – indeed this ineffectiveness is why they had to settle in these informal areas in the first place. In Ishtiaq Goth the state continues to be ineffective in offering protection against exploitation for profit by the two informal “entrepreneurs”. Whilst local officials are aware of Ishtiaq Goth’s presence, with one local official speaking about the “challenges” the settlers of Ishtiaq Goth face and their sense of
“solidarity and perseverance” (interview: Shoaib 2010), the official and other officials remain impotent - similar to official actors in Afghan Camp. State regulation does not offer protection. But more importantly state law and regulation regarding the area is unknown and unclear. More often than not when I asked about the role of local officials or state actors in terms of maintaining order or offering support, a blank response was given.

No one cares about us, and our voices are unheard. We want our voices and our struggles to be heard (Bilquis, KHP46).

On the occasions when local officials (like the police) are present, they appear in corrupt roles, i.e. preventing the law from being implemented, or violating the law it, or in an alliance with the rivals of Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq to simply push residents off the land. This combines with deeper rooted resentments of not being able to afford a home because of wider state failures. The ambiguity, complicity, corruption, and apparent indifference to the lives of residents erode the legitimacy of local officials. Similar to Afghan Camp, through this experience, the silent undercurrent of the incompetent, offending, and complicit official actor is accepted as the norm. As a result, instead of the state, solidarity networks and a politics of presence are turned to. But in Ishtiaq Goth these have deeper exploitative tendencies.

In Ishtiaq Goth, similar to the situation in Afghan Camp (with the Rangers and certain elders), even the two middlemen with their flaws and exploitative tendencies are considered as more effective than official actors and channels. It is the middlemen that provide the channels and routes for shelter and secure access to utilities in the area by informal agreements with the KESC and KWSB. They can deliver. Official channels cannot. Alternative actors are performing sovereignty through a delivery of rights and a “will to rule”. Official laws and norms appear unfulfilling. Even some residents of Ishtiaq Goth understand the relationship they have with
Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq not as exploitation but as generosity. Informal entrepreneurs, and even outlaws, to a degree, are not perceived as negatively as official actors because the former are not held to the same moral standard or social contract as state actors, the refugee regime, or formal political parties.

But Ishtiaq bhai (brother), he is doing a lot for the people here. It is because of him that we are settling and sitting on this area (Bilquis, KHP46).

Critically in these Afghan and Pakistani cases mentioned above, it appears that neither “citizenship” nor “refugeedom” in the way of difference counts for much. Both Afghans and Pakistanis are impacted by structural shortcomings and objectified ways of seeing. Both Afghans and Pakistanis use similar structures and strategies in an attempt to redistribute material and non-material goods. Both Afghans and Pakistanis are impacted by the shortcomings of informality. Further, both Afghans and Pakistanis have a political impact on the state through these quiet (albeit not fully effective) encroachments of the ordinary that change the physical and non-physical characteristics of the state. Whilst the state considers informality as an alternative form of management the reality from Afghan Camp and Ishtiaq Goth appears that it is in fact eroding its power.

“Pashtun Lives Don’t Count!” Ethnicised Lenses & Pashtun Neighbourhood Action

In certain areas in Karachi specific citizens within the urban poor bracket appear to be at a greater disadvantage because of ethnicised ways of seeing. During fieldwork in areas with high demographics of Pakistani Pashtuns residents understood the challenges they faced being the result of the state’s ethnicised way of seeing. The following section is based on repeat one-on-one interviews over a period of three months with Hussain Ali (see Chapter 3) who lives in one such settlement: Saeed Goth (Hussain Ali, KHP51). A specific visit to Saeed Goth was not
completed in the same way as it was for the previous two areas.\textsuperscript{132} Rather, this section uses one-on-one interviews and supporting interviews from colleagues that worked with Hussain Ali in a bazaar in the main city. The material collected in the interviews is facilitated by my work in areas neighbouring his settlement and our shared contacts in these areas.

Hussain Ali is 35 years-old and was born in Karachi. His grandfather migrated to Pakistan from Afghanistan, and his family settled in Karachi during the 1960s.\textsuperscript{133} All of his family are Pakistani in documentary terms, possessing Pakistani CNICs and documents. His family have limited connections in Afghanistan and do not really live transnational lives as some other Afghans who have “become Pakistani” do. This is also likely to be related to the fact that his family did not migrate to Pakistan in the context of the massive refugee movements starting with the Soviet War. Hussain Ali perhaps reflects a new type of “ethnicity” in Karachi: the Pakistani Afghan (and, within Pashtuns, the Pashtun Afghan) where he is aware of his “Afghan” heritage but also positions himself as “Pakistani”.

Saeed Goth is home to Pakistani Pashtuns, Pakistani Afghan-Pashtuns, including Hussain’s family and extended kin, some “Farsi-speaking Afghans” and “also some Punjabis” (Husain Ali, PXP51), and homes are arranged around the family unit (nuclear and extended\textsuperscript{134}). When I asked

\textsuperscript{132} This was not done with any overtly political reasons. Rather Hussain Ali worked near my aunt’s apartment (my accommodation in Karachi) and it was logistically easier to conduct interviews with him in the late evenings (after 8pm) on my way home from other field activities.

\textsuperscript{133} The exact date of his parent’s movement to Karachi is unknown, but is assumed by Hussain to be in the 1960s as all of his siblings were born in Karachi.

\textsuperscript{134} In Hussain’s case he said, “Our immediate and extended family live in one line [of houses] in the area. Paternal and maternal uncles together, so the people of our home, our family, is together”. He, however, also said that whilst marriages, trade, and socialisation occur within they also occur outside of it. “It is not necessary to always marry within the family. We find out if the other family is good, you know get information on them, and get to know them, and that is how we build relationships”, he said.
him how many people lived in the settlement he said approximately “6-7 lakh people” (ibid). The area is an unregulated residential area off Super Highway, with a mixed Pakistan area (predominantly Sindhis) and an “Urdu speaking” area nearby (see Figure 7). Ishtiaq Goth has no institutionalised schools, although informal madrassas are present. Hussain Ali’s brother travels at a distance in order to get to school. There is no hospital nearby, waterlines are present, and electricity was installed in 2000. Whilst the area has been built up over more than 30 years, it has no legal recognition and the land is not leased to tenants. In Ishtiaq Goth, a non-Pashtun area, the lack of recognition is more related to its new status and contest over who owns the land. In Saeed Goth it is understood by residents as being the result of ethnicised official lenses.

Saeed Goth is not a “katchi abadi” area (the title given to informal settlements built of government land [Hasan 2010:7]) but appears to be an informal subdivision of (private) agricultural land (ISAL) (see also fn66). However, who the main legal landholders are in Saeed Goth, i.e. the government or private landholders, is unclear. Details of the legal status of Saeed Goth were not investigated as they were in Afghan Camp and Ishtiaq Goth (which even then were unclear), however, Hussain Ali revealed that residents do not have documented leases to the land. Thus, combining the area’s tenuous position as an unregulated residential area and an ethnicised way of seeing, the state behaves in a different way in this area. Hussain Ali understands that his area (“a Pashtun area”) is not upgraded but:

In the area behind us, [where] you have mainly Sindhis living the land is [officially] leased... If you go ahead of us the land is leased in the Urdu speaking area. You have the Sindhi and Urdu speaking communities behind us and ahead of us and we are in the middle.

135 During fieldwork, when data was not available via government or INGO data I usually completed ground level interviews with a number of different residents, particularly people who had deep historical experience of the area in order to corroborate numbers and get a more “accurate” idea of numbers. In the case of Saeed Goth this was not possible, and instead I rely on the interview with Hussain Ali.
So the area behind us gets leased and the area ahead of us gets leased... what can you say to this?

Here the politics of Karachi, which have been shaped by the rising presence of the MQM and the strength of the PPP, are understood as impacting everyday urban life.

In interviews with Hussain Ali he was concerned whether or not the area would get upgraded because of the political context of Karachi and the city’s ethnic politics.

The land is not leased, but people are living here. We are waiting to see what will happen here. We’re just waiting... But the thing is people are spending Rs.20, Rs.25 lakh on their house, building the property. They would not be spending this money if the land was not secure or if the lease was to going to happen.

Asking me for my opinion as someone who worked with official organisations, Hussain Ali asked me, “This area will get upgraded, yes?”

Hussain Ali explained that criminal activities occurred because state law and regulation are absent. He said, “What does the state do? We cannot turn to them when there are crimes and problems going on”. In Hussain Ali’s view, the state does not meet its responsibilities towards this area, i.e. including providing shelter, education, health care facilities, basic urban infrastructure, and security, because the area “belongs” to “Pathans” (see fn67 and fn69) – here he used the word “Urdu-speakers” use to describe Pashtuns. The area is home to some Afghan families as well.

Had the area been home to only Afghans, as is predominantly the case in Afghan Camp, the unwillingness to formalise the lease may have been rationalised through a national legal logic, i.e. that non-nationals do not have legal property and land rights in Pakistan. However, this area is home to a large number (in fact majority) of Pakistani citizens who expect to be incorporated into the formal urban development plans of the city. The fact that they are not indicates that for
some citizens in Karachi, i.e. Pakistani Pashtuns - including Pakistani Afghan-Pashtuns -, citizenship has little value. For other Pakistanis living in the area - Punjabis -, the implications of living in a predominantly Pashtun area also negatively impacts their experiences of citizenship.

In Hussain Ali’s account conditions of dehumanisation are not readily accepted by him and other residents. The fact that the area has grown to house between “6-7 lakh people” and now has electricity lines, that there is an attempt to get gas lines into the area, that people have invested “Rs.20-25 lakh on their house”, and that, according to Hussain Ali, Saeed Goth is on a government waiting list to become formalised is an indication of the quiet encroachments of the ordinary, which are slowly changing the face of the city and enabling “undesired” Pakistanis (Pashtuns, Pakistani Afghans, and Afghans) to become a key part of it.

Hussain Ali recalled how this mixed neighbourhood worked together through solidarity networks based on a fellowship of space & charity and bonds of friendship since 2009. Residents transcended differences in ethnicity and nationality and family bonds to produce forms of social capital which enable residents to work together for issues of infrastructure and security.

There are four of us friends who have lived here all our lives, and we thought we needed to do something. So that is what we did. We got together, we’re friends, we’ve grown up together, and we said, “We should do this”. We had thought that we would be part of a political party, but so many people warned us against working with them that we changed our minds – you cannot trust these organisations.

Hussain Ali, his friends, and the residents of the area completed “consultations from the elders and others around us”, and started activities in the area. This has included different residents
patrolling the area against criminal activity. Here different “men”\textsuperscript{136} are assigned “patrolling duties” on different days of the week or month.

I have to attend duty every Thursday night. Until \textit{fajr} I patrol the neighbourhood. Everyone takes their turn to do their duty. Even the elders - our elders are not ashamed of working.

Indeed on some days when I would go to meet Hussain Ali he would have left early for these patrolling duties. In addition, Hussain Ali discussed how residents were working together to build a road link, which was needed as the settlement lacked a safe crossing and link to another road making it “difficult for the labourers, and even children, who have to come and go from this road to pass through”. He said how residents pooled together shared resources totalling Rs.4-5 lakhs to build the road link. An engineer who provided a quote for the area said it would cost Rs.13-14 lakhs. As the residents could not afford this fee they instead decided to build the road together.

There is some land that comes before the road link and we bought the empty plot... right on the edge there is also a house, we decided to buy that house and the plot of land so we can build this road link.. But as the Engineer was too expensive we took it on ourselves. Everyone, the elders, the youngsters are working together to build the road. Everyone has a role.

In Saeed Goth residents act out of shared space & charity, friendship and emotional bonds, as well as for material purposes, i.e. to build needed shared urban infrastructure. This exertion of agency, “We did it, we took it on ourselves”, is versed in an empowering rhetoric which attempts to overcome the shortcomings of the state.

So what if the state is not there? We can do things without them.

\textsuperscript{136} In this context, “manhood” was explained as starting from the teenage years.
However, in this informal settlement issues continue for residents and state structures. Whilst patrolling and the road link have offered some solutions to the area, the area is still awaiting to hear its fate on whether it will be regularised or not, and issues of everyday survival and gains are not resolved. Hussain Ali once said:

There are many things that are lacking in this area. We still need a school, we still need safety. The area is getting built up... but it is difficult for people to manage this area and build it up alone.

This impacts the state by making the state appear incompetent. It appears that the state cannot deliver. “You could say that there is no government near us”, Hussain said, flabbergasted, as he often was by my questions of “state support and interaction”.

In physical terms, the road link that was being built during fieldwork was constructed in an informal way that does not meet any formal regulation plans, and points to a future point of risk to the residents, as is the case in other informal areas. For the local state these physical changes also create forms of urban infrastructure that are developing and expanding the city and do not meet state regulations – which, as mentioned earlier, pose challenges to the local state’s longer-term vision of modernisation. Further, whilst dominant political discourse in Karachi shows strands of anti-Pashtun (and indeed anti-Afghan) sentiment, through informal structures and practices of presence, an informal settlement that is home to Pakistani Pashtuns, Pakistani Afghans, and Afghans reveals itself to be a permanent presence in the city.

Further, the informal patrolling systems do not guarantee security. For the state it appears that there are alternative and more trusted sources of power (solidarity networks) which are “policing” the local state and performing sovereignty (Blom Hansen 2005). If the state, in Weberian tradition, is meant to have a monopoly on violence, these “patrols”, when repeated across the
city (as they are), present potential challenges to the authority and sovereignty of the state. As small groups across the city take on policing competing concepts of justice and law enter the political landscape. Indeed, this appears to be a key reason why the current political situation of Karachi appears to be based on multiple “armed” groups enacting “law” and “protecting” citizen rights in a violent order.

**The Different Patrons of Peshawar**
The practices of protection & access used in the cases discussed in Karachi produce an interesting insight about how the state functions. Managing urban expansion, urban population growth and migration is not something that the state is equipped to handle alone. In Karachi, local officials are unable to penetrate large urban populations and areas alone. Instead they are dependent on intermediaries (such as in Ishtiaq Goth)\(^{137}\) and official actors acting in informal ways (such as the Pakistani Rangers in Afghan Camp), and solidarity networks (across all examples, and particularly less-penetrated area like Saeed Goth). These areas are zones of unequal inclusion because of “nationality” (Afghan Camp), “poverty” (Ishtiaq Goth), and “ethnicity” (Saeed Goth). The state bears some responsibility towards these areas but acts in minimal - and often unclear - ways, or when it is present is usually in an informal/illega capacity. Instead of maintaining the state, however, these aspects challenge the state.

In Peshawar informal urban growth is again partly accepted as an alternative way of maintaining the state, which includes issues related to Afghans and Pakistanis, such as large protracted Afghan refugee populations and internal migrations or displacements. However, here the state is also unwilling to interfere in “organic” growth because of an unwillingness to challenge the

\(^{137}\) Whilst in Ishtiaq Goth, the choice of the intermediaries (Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq) is under contestation, the alternative outcome would still be dependent on intermediaries acting in informal ways – certainly no formal housing scheme is going to be implemented in Ishtiaq Goth.
strength of Peshawar’s existing landed classes. When local officials do intervene it is usually to check if housing regulations meet minimum requirements or to extract small bribes from smaller landholders or unprotected individuals. In Peshawar, it is the local landed classes who emerge as central to understanding the expansion of the “rural-urban interface” (Roy and Alsayyad, 2004:21) and informal politics. Whereas in Karachi land is a deeply contested issue, with contests taking place on both public and private land (but increasingly on private land), in Peshawar the strength of the landed classes is greater, which reflects the historically different types of urban development in the two cities. However, either way in both cases it is clear that the state is dependent on intermediaries – albeit of different kinds, i.e. middlemen versus landholders - which often leads to the prevention, or violations, of Pakistani law that creates a slow piecemeal erosion of the state’s legitimacy and undermines its strength.

To highlight the difference between Karachi and Peshawar, this section pays attention to the unregulated residential areas on the outer ring of Peshawar surrounding the recently complete Ring Road and within the city near Nasir Bagh and University Town. For four months oral narratives and observations were recorded in different rural-urban unregulated residential areas that pepper the Ring Road, Nasir Bagh, and University Town. This was possible through professional and personal networks. On some occasions, I accompanied an NGO, which was completing surveys in the area, and at other times I used personal friendship networks in the area to visit certain households. Activities involved household interviews, one-on-one interviews, group discussions, area surveys, and ethnographic observations.

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138 This is partly related to differences in the historical and political developments of the two cities. Karachi is a mega city (19 million people), a port city, and the former capital of Pakistan. On the other hand, Peshawar is relatively more rural, smaller (5 million people), and a “frontier” city.
In Peshawar as a number of studies have shown, the city has absorbed large numbers of Afghan refugees from the 1970s onward (Connor 1987; CSSR 2005). Here, the refugee regime has a sizeable presence. Many Afghan refugees have historically been supported by UNHCR and its implementing partners. However, the refugee regime has increasingly reduced its support for Afghans in the city. As mentioned in Chapter 3, ration programmes and other initiatives closed down in the mid-1990s, and since then there has been reduced funding in education and health programmes. A large number of RTVs also closed down.\(^{139}\) In addition, for other Afghans, the refugee regime and RTV life did not offer enough scope for a humanised existence in the first place and many families chose to live outside of RTVs. Currently, the majority of Afghans in Peshawar do not live in RTVs, and instead live in rented, and in some cases owned, informal and formal areas. This section pays attention to non-RTV Afghans living in unregulated residential areas in Peshawar. For Afghans that live outside of the RTV, UNHCR and CAR have limited significance, and interactions are limited to occasional surveys, identity card production, or the attestation of documents (i.e. school certificates). Instead Afghans rely on solidarity networks particularly of kin, including clan, which are the main unit of social organisation, and/or bonds of friendship. And, in Peshawar, practices of protection & access act as a critical strategy that enables an urban presence in terms of shelter and housing to be secured.

Similarly for Pakistanis, specifically the urban poor and internal migrants from other areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the local state is understood as morally and politically responsible for protecting and distributing goods to citizens. However, it often does not meet these responsibilities. With regards to housing, there are no clear strategic development plans for affordable housing and the development of urban infrastructure in the city. The Government of

\(^{139}\) In an interview with a senior Pakistani official working for CAR, he said that despite RTVs closing down to “encourage” repatriation to Afghanistan many Afghans could not return and so instead settled in regulated and unregulated residential areas in Peshawar (interview: Maroof 2011).
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s 2010-2017 Strategic Development Plan is more concerned with affordable housing for government employees than the urban poor, and detailed plans for urban property development do not stretch beyond regulated residential areas, such as Hayatabad and Regi Town. Thus poorer residents must rely on solidarity networks, usually of kin and clan, and practices of protection & access in order to secure affordable housing.\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{140} Schemes, such as the PDA and the Defence Housing Scheme, were introduced in the late 1980s, with new phases being updated since then for a more regulated form of urban expansion. These schemes have been highly successful and many families have rented accommodation here, however, many families simply cannot afford the rent in these areas.
Figure 10: Maps showing the growth of Peshawar district by decade from 1866-2009.

(a) Pre 1866 built up area; (b) built up area 1866; (c) built up area 1947; (d) built up area 1981; (e) built up area 1991 (f) built up area 2009.

Note how the first maps show the city boundaries are concentrated to the inner city (i.e. Old Peshawar/Androon Shehr). Later images show how the city has expanded, formally and informally, and show the expanding boundaries of the city now touch the rural-urban interface.

Maps by Samiullah (2013), Institute of Geography, Urban and Regional Planning, University of Peshawar.

Crucially, the development of informal housing structures on the agricultural peripheries of the city (i.e. the rural-urban interface) via informal structures and strategies meets the needs of a large and growing population that the local state itself cannot manage, and, to a degree, provides both Afghans and Pakistanis with opportunities in which the potentials of human life can be pursued. However, as the maps above show, they have also massively transformed the city in informal and unplanned ways.
The construction of the Ring Road\textsuperscript{141} has influenced pockets of informal rural-urban housing areas to be developed in this area. The informal settlement in the following images, Gul Kalay,\textsuperscript{142} is one example and is home to Afghan and Pakistani tenants.\textsuperscript{143} Residents are arranged around the family unit (nuclear and extended, i.e. paternal families living together).

As residents settle in the area, they have historically either constructed new, unregulated housing structures - sometimes \textit{katcha} structures or a mix of \textit{pakka/katcha} structures -, or occupied pre-existing housing structures. In Gul Kalay the settlement has grown as the landlord, who is also the ancestral landowner of the area, wanted to generate additional income by renting land. Tenants, Afghans \textit{and} Pakistanis, are not related to the landholder, although as you go deeper into the area and closer to the core of the original village, housing structures and land owned by kin members are present. For many Pakistanis in Peshawar whose ancestral village is within Peshawar or within these rural-urban interfaces, the connections of the ancestral village and clan are a critical source of social capital and housing security. But in the case of urban tenants who are not “native” to the land, tenants pay rent to the landowner. Their rent is collected by various local “representatives” within specified area parameters – in this area the representative is someone who is designated to collect the rent for every 10 or 20 houses in a given area. In the first image, a resident of one of the houses collects rent for the houses in his row of houses and the adjacent rows.

\textsuperscript{141} The Peshawar Ring Road is an orbital road, still in construction at the time of writing, that encircles 25 km of road around Peshawar. The Ring Road has strategic significance for transporting goods and fuel to Afghanistan for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces stationed there; this is why the US government has invested millions in its speedy completion (US SD 2011). As it has created links with other areas it is also a site that attracts people to live in.

\textsuperscript{142} \textit{Kalay} is Pashto for village but in these examples resemble Karachi’s \textit{goths} or urban-rural settlements.

\textsuperscript{143} All names of locations and residents have been changed.
Figure 11: Shared Afghan and Pakistani housing in Gul Kalay, Peshawar.
In this area there are minimal interactions with local authorities and the structures do not meet most (if any) legal building requirements as outlined in Pakistani law. Urban tenants, Pakistani and Afghan, practice their presence and informal way of living with minimal interference by the local state because they have the “guardianship” of the local landowner. They build their housing structures and extend and modify structures with limited regulations. Only in matters of security
has the state intervened in this area.\textsuperscript{144} In Karachi in contested informal settlements, such as Ishtiaq Goth, Saeed Goth, Afghan Camp, or other settlements surrounding Sohrab Goth, it is common for police officials to demand \textit{bhatta} (extortion) if the strength of protection & access networks from local intermediaries is weak (and in some cases even when this is present). A Pakistani Pashtun resident who lives in an unregulated residential area near Sohrab Goth in Karachi said:

\begin{quote}
Even if I try to move one brick the police will ask me for money if I want to carry on building! (Mansoor, KHA65).
\end{quote}

Another resident said:

\begin{quote}
The police will even come and break down your wall on purpose and then tell you to pay them if you want to rebuild your wall (Zmaray Khan, KHA61.B).
\end{quote}

In Karachi too, where the strength of local patrons is strong the vulnerability of the area is less likely to occur. However in Karachi, unlike Peshawar, land is a much more contested issue, which means incidences of “interference” in informal residential areas is greater. In Gul Kalay in Peshawar interference or an implementation of law is not the norm. I was told by the local landowner:

\begin{quote}
This is my land – I can do as I please with it (Landowner of Gul Kalay)\textsuperscript{145}.
\end{quote}

His explanation for the lack of conformity to housing regulations was a frequently and typically heard response across interviews in the area and in the city.

\textsuperscript{144} After a bombing in Peshawar (2010) police suspected that some of the individuals involved in the bombing were hiding in these areas and a security raid was conducted. Residents in this area complained that they were targeted arbitrarily by virtue of being Afghan.

\textsuperscript{145} This was also repeated in a number of other settlements across Warsak Road, Kohat Road, and rural-urban lands touching on University Town, where the strength of the landed families was significant.
In Peshawar it is often the prevention of law, which appears to be the dominant type of formal-informal navigation rather than the unclear, contested, and ambiguous nature of land in Karachi. The rationale of “this is my land – I can do as I please with it” was repeated time and time again to explain how certain unregulated houses are built and why they faced limited interrogation from official actors: “The stronger the family the less likely intervention will take place”, I was told. In Gul Kalay and other cases, a type of protection emerges for these tenants, with landholders being the ones to negotiate with the state as they possess the economic, cultural, and political capital to do so, rather than tenants. This, again, reveals the limits to the capital that atomised actors and their solidarity networks possess.

In a series of interviews conducted in Gul Kalay and other areas I asked residents about the incursion of the state on informal housing practices, with questions focusing on the processes involved in the construction of various housing structures. “Who constructed this housing structure?”; “Did you have to submit any forms to the local council?”; “Did you ask a middleman to submit the forms for you?”; “Do you ever face any questioning from local authorities, i.e. government officials or the police, regarding your housing structure?” were asked and in most cases the response was related back to the strength of the local landholder and the landholder’s networks and interaction with state and political structures. This “strength” is measured in a number of ways, which includes the landowner being connected to political figures of authority through his own family or friendship networks or if he himself is in a significant position of political power and authority. In Peshawar, as in Karachi, local patrons matter. However, in Peshawar it is usually the direct landholder (and his affiliates) who are the main intermediaries rather than the competing, contested, and mixed number of middlemen in Karachi.

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146 The semi-structured questions were asked during the course of discussions and interviews and were not completed in formal settings or circumstances – see Appendix 4.
The strength of the local landholder was also visible in other areas, such as Asadullah Khan (named after the landholder) near Nasir Bagh, which used to be home to one of Pakistan’s largest RTVs. On one occasion family interviews were conducted with an Afghan family that had migrated from Nangarhar in Jalalabad (Afghanistan) in 1982. The male household head, Ibrahim Hafiz recalled how the land that they live on and (informally) own was donated to them by the Pakistani landholder, who also donated other surrounding land to other Afghans during early phases of mass migrations in the 1980s.

We all came together, all of the 8-10 households of our family. We made this house in 1983, before the rains started. The people here (from this area), the people helped us. People came and gave us food for a month – people opened their doors to us. We had to make the houses and homes ourselves – this was the condition of all of the people here... everyone in the same harsh reality. When we moved to here first we just settled on some land nearby near the (deep) pond. But Asadullah Khan the landholder told us to move and settle on this area, the area we are in now, because the other land flooded during the rains. We never knew these things but he told us that we would be safer on the land we are in now. That insan and his family let us settle here, out of generosity. We never had to pay for the land and our eight families still live here. This is the thing, he treated us like brothers. He has died, but even then his family, his son, say that “No, my father gave these people this land during the war, and I will do as my father did. These people will still live here, have this land (Ibrahim Hafiz, PXA41).

Ibrahim Hafiz and his family (immediate and extended) worked, using the solidarities of kin to migrate and settle in the area. But it was through the practices of protection & access through the Pakistani landholder that he and his family secured their position in the area. Ibrahim Hafiz mentioned how he “bought materials, hired labourers” to build the large housing structure in which their immediate family and extended kin members live. This housing settlement was made without interaction with local officials. His younger son, Ejaz, explained, “If the landholder does
not have an issue, what can the police do?” (Ejaz, PXA41.B). Legally Ibrahim Hafiz and his family have no right to the land – there is no documentation to say that this land and property are in their name. However, the informal contract that they held with the landholder, which has since his death been maintained by his children, is enough and appears binding.

Importantly, the case of Ibrahim Hafiz and his family reveals how regulation is not enforced because these actions also resolve issues of urban population growth that the state on its own is incapable of dealing with. Similar to Karachi, these actions reflect a way of managing urban populations and the actions of Asadullah Khan serve a functional role that appears, at least at first, convergent with official objectives and act as a substitute for the state. In Peshawar, the Soviet-Afghan War bore a significant imprint. The acts of Asadullah Khan are considered by Ibrahim Hafiz as an act of human generosity, which are also laced with religious and cultural understandings of migration, refuge, solidarity, and hospitality (Centlivres 1988). And for the Pakistani state, these acts of generosity were particularly encouraged during the Soviet-Afghan War because having a sizeable Afghan population in Pakistan, including militarized resistance groups, was strategically beneficial but not something that the state could manage alone. In Ibrahim Hafiz’s case, eight families migrated together. In other cases entire towns and villages moved together or individually, such as RTVs in Akora Khattak with people from one village in Kabul Province, or Hajizai with people from clustered villages in Nangarhar, or clustered Turkmen village movements from Jawzjan to Attock. As millions migrated in emergency exoduses from Afghanistan into Peshawar the Pakistani state used the rhetoric of Islam and promoted the role of the Pakistani ansar (helpers) helping the Afghan mubajireen (migrants/refugees) (Bartenmann 1990). Thus Asadullah Khan’s actions did not need official intervention because Asadullah Khan was effectively contributing towards managing a large

147 Observations taken from fieldwork.
(needed) urban population as well as the wider foreign policy objectives of the Pakistani state. However, this is no longer the case. As outlined in earlier sections Afghans in Pakistan are no longer welcomed by state actors and policy. Yet now the state is too weak to challenge the landholders on whom it was previously so heavily reliant and whose power it so heavily encouraged and reinforced.

Currently, Peshawar faces continued issues of increased migration because of floods and violence in FATA. Many Pakistani IDPs settle in the RTVs that were once donated for Afghan purposes. Many others settled in regulated and unregulated residential areas, such as Gul Kalay mentioned earlier. The informal housing boom thus also reflects a functional way of “managing” Peshawar’s population growth. Unlike in case of Ibrahim Hafiz, there is no longer any ideological obsession with defeating the Soviet Union, but these practises still reflect a way of maintaining the state. For other Afghan and Pakistani residents in Gul Kalay the housing area also absorbs large numbers of the unmanageable population that official actors cannot cope with.

However, there are a number of challenges that remain with these informal housing structures, which do not necessarily produce conditions that can enable a fully humanised existence. In physical terms the condition in Gul Kalay, and other similar settlements, continues to pose challenges for the lives of both Afghan and Pakistanis residents. The physical outputs that are produced do not meet health and safety regulations and legal building requirements. The prevention of laws from being enforced means that sanitation systems are present but basic. Electricity lines are present (Figures 14-16). Some households have direct access to water through waterlines, other houses have an under-tank system, but the poorest houses have no waterlines and instead siphon water off from the local mosque. The housing structures are
vulnerable to local flooding, and the pathways of the settlement frequently get bogged down with sewage waste and rubbish. Thus, whilst they provide housing and shelter the conditions that are present are densely packed, hazardous, ecologically vulnerable, and unsustainable. In the poorest sections of the settlement illnesses and poor sanitation were visible, and can be seen in the images provided in this section. In Gul Kalay and across Peshawar (as well as other areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), nothing captures the potential hazards of poor urban infrastructure and development with greater clarity than the numbers of buildings that were damaged and washed away in the 2010 floods. In an extract from an interview with an Afghan family, the mother of the house said:

I lost my roof, the walls, everything... at least half of our house was broken down from the rain. The structure collapsed (Mezghan, PXA38).

Malalai another Pakistani resident in the house opposite said this often happened with adverse weather conditions:

Something usually happens here because of the weather... A wall falls, the roof collapses, and the roads flood (Malalai Khattak, PXP46).

If a form of regulation was in effect, it is likely that the upheaval the floods had on the lives of Mezghan and Malalai as well as millions of others may have been a different story.

Moreover, because of limited regulation, tenants can be subjected to higher forms of rent, or informal/implicit contracts of agreement which can involve the landowner giving out loans to produce a bonded debt. It is unclear what the legal rights of tenants are, as such residents are often punished with high rents. In one area Afghan residents complained that the Pakistani landed family was demanding very high rent and residents said, “The prices are getting higher and higher”. In another rural-urban area on the outskirts of Ring Road, near Bahadur Kale, a
man who was approximately 70 years-old said that his family have lived in the area for many years with their own katcha house, which the local landholder had given to them (Fariduddin, PXP52). In return he and his family offer services to the local area and landholder’s family, but are (implicitly) expected to stay in this “role”, as “caretakers/in servitude”. Thus, whilst limited forms of regulation and informal forms “fill in for the state” when the state cannot act or provide some scope for a humanised existence, it must be acknowledged that limited regulation can also enable the reification of existing social power asymmetries.

The acts of formal-informal housing expansion for Afghans and Pakistanis create inadvertent physical and non-physical impacts on the state. Again, seemingly small and insignificant acts repeated time and again create significant changes. In physical terms, whilst informal housing is substitutive and manages populations that the state cannot manage, in the long-term low quality and hazardous urban infrastructure is produced, which actually impedes the urban development objectives of the state.

Further, official actors and laws appear weak. For Afghans who do not live in RTVs the refugee regime and actors, such as CAR, are essentially non-existent, and the state cares in minimal terms for Afghans. For the urban poor Pakistanis and Afghans who live in shared areas, the local state and its norms appear ineffective and the legitimacy of official institutions is in doubt. Local officials are unwilling to interfere with landholders’ urban expansion projects, so residents instead find trusting the strength of landed and non-official families via practices of presence more effective. The state is not absent but it acts, in the long-run, to contradict and undermine its own strength through a reliance on a formal-informal way of working and reinforces the strength of non-state actors.
Figure 13: Gul Kalay, showing water that rises during floods.

Figure 14: Gul Kalay and new houses being developed by the local landholder and intermediaries.
Conclusion
Solidarity networks and the agency they enable reveal a shared space for self-humanisation by Afghans and Pakistanis. Afghans and Pakistanis are engaged in the pursuit of bettering their lives in the face of official failings. A stubborn quest for survival is in effect. However, these formal-informal activities are not a panacea to the failures of officialdom. Significant challenges continue
to press on the lives of Afghans and Pakistanis and, ultimately, even to the state. These small everyday actions repeated millions of times by both Afghans and Pakistanis are changing the nature of Karachi and Peshawar - often in physically unsustainable ways. In addition, official structures, particularly the state, are deeply wounded and dismantled through these formal-informal actions. In Karachi the state is complicit with and reliant on exploitative middlemen and intermediaries or too weak to reach needed areas, and in Peshawar the local state is too weak to question landed classes. Alternative sovereignties are continually being performed and the bribing, corrupted, and incompetent state appears to be stumbling at every turn.
Chapter 6: Micro-level Survival & Gains: Family and Friendship Solidarities

My best friend is Pakistani; we’ve grown up together all our lives. Of course he will help me when I need it. It is not like anyone else will help us.

Interview with Mudassir, PXA36.

You have to take everything by proxy. The house we have is still not [in] my father’s name. It is in the name of a friend of his - the house is registered under his [friend’s] name.

Interview with Abdul Wahid, PXA1.

Introduction
Intimate networks of friends and family are central in understanding micro-level, personalised actions of basic and beyond-basic gains. This chapter first continues on with the story of everyday life and urban survival, but in a slightly different way to the actions that sustain the wider urban neighbourhood discussed in the previous chapter as it pays attention to intimate micro-level actions within family networks and focusing on elements of social security, remittances, and loans. After this, the chapter explains how intimate solidarity networks enable both Afghans and Pakistanis to secure even larger gains, which go beyond urban survival and basic redistribution. It does so by analysing two cases of property ownership in regulated residential areas. Again the Pakistani state and law is directly challenged, transformed, and revealed as increasingly insignificant. Official structures and laws, including those that make a distinction between the refugee, illegal immigrant, and the citizen are understood as ineffectual and alternative sites of sovereignty continue to be in effect.
Pooled Resources I: Basic Security & Migration

The examples discussed in the previous chapter show how the fellowship of space & charity enable macro-types of actions that redistribute goods that allow the “survival” of larger urban informal settlements. Crucially, however, intimate solidarity networks prove useful in allowing micro-level actions to occur, such as shared household security, and income generation. Although not counter-intuitive, these networks and their small detailed workings are also crucial in understanding how basic material and non-material redistribution are sustained and made possible, without which the stories of Afghan and Pakistani survival would remain incomplete.

As mentioned in Chapter 5, in Karachi’s Afghan Camp, the family structure is a central form of security through which an access to material goods is possible. Like all structures, the family is not wholly benevolent (Singerman 1995:43), but in Afghan Camp, “the family orders people’s lives” (ibid), and is central to community life. Here understandings of a humanised life are also related to relationships of kin. The family structure is itself humanising as well as acting as a structure through which income can be generated in order to access basic material goods, i.e. income to eat, access shelter, and access health services for “persistence” and “flourishing”. As these are strong ties, families are also willing, or obliged (Portes 2000), to take on more responsibility for other members.

In Afghan Camp, most “families” are understood through patrilineal genetic lines, and most households consist of the husband and wife/wives, children of the husband and wife (and sometimes the husband’s children from previous marriages), at times the husband’s parents, or - where relevant if they have married sons and the required space - sons and their wife/wives and
children. Extended kin networks are also present in the camp, and a number of areas in the camp are also arranged around wider kin and clan networks.

When Afghan Camp was first established, with residents settling from Sohrab Goth and other areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the vast majority settlement patterns were based around immediate and extended kin networks.\(^{148}\) As a number of migration studies have shown, the family unit is often one of the most important structures that enable migration and settlement (Boyd 1989; Dorai 2003; Harpviken 2009),\(^{149}\) this is amplified in other emergency situations as well (Clarke and Short Jr. 1993). In the historical recollections of many Afghan residents of Afghan Camp it was via the strength of family networks that migration practices were enabled and facilitated. In an interview with Yaqoob Gul, Yaqoob Gul revealed how he and his family migrated from Baghlan to Karachi.

At first my paternal uncle and his family came here and came to Karachi straight away. Once they got settled in my parents came over and other members of my family. Slowly, bit by bit we all came over. I came to Karachi in 1983, where I moved in with everyone in Sohrab Goth. When Sohrab Goth was broken down

\(^{148}\) Information taken from various interviews with older residents and former residents of Afghan Camp.

\(^{149}\) In emergency situation settlement patterns can also be “cluster-based”, where whole villages move together and clan and sectarian based, which overlaps with family networks. In this study interviews were conducted with Hazara Afghans in Karachi and Islamabad who provide an example of cluster-based movements supported by strong social networks and a transnational civil society organisation, FOCUS. The majority of Hazara Afghans are Ismaili and had the support network of the Agha Khan foundation, FOCUS. Interviews with Hazara Afghans revealed how central FOCUS had been in managing the Hazara migration to Pakistan during the late 1990s and 2000s. In an interview with Pakistani officials one official said, “The Agha Khanis were really good, they managed everything themselves. You see that there case is slightly different to everyone else’s they are organised. The government has never said anything to them, because in fact they do the GOP and UNHCR’s job better than them!” (interview: Azam 2010). In an interview with an Afghan Hazara recalling her migration to Karachi she said, “When we first came over we were in a big emergency hall location for a few weeks. We were told how things work in Pakistan, where we could stay… Then they helped find us jobs, housing, and accommodation. They even supported us for a while. Now they say we should work ourselves, but they helped me get the job” (Ferdous, KHA26). This was also supported by an interview with the main representative of Hazara Afghans in Karachi, Mohmmad Darwaish (interview: Derwaish 2010).
we all moved to Afghan Camp. Some families have moved out of Afghan Camp and others of us are still here (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10).

On this point a slight digression is useful in order to show how intimate solidarity networks enable many Afghans to move beyond the frames of “exemplary suffering” through which the refugee regime and host state view Afghan lives. In a number of interviews in Karachi and Peshawar, the independent family unit was important in explaining how Afghans settled into RTVs, moved out of RTVs, or in some cases did not even live in an RTV. In an interview with an Afghan family living in rented accommodation in Hayatabad (Peshawar) Maryam Jan, the female head of the family, revealed how she and her family migrated to Pakistan from Kabul City in 1994 in an emergency response to militarised violence in which her younger sister “lost two of her children by rocket bombing”, and her “maternal uncle also lost his two children by rocket attacks” (Maryam Jan, PXP32.B). Her family, which included her husband, her five children, and the sister who had lost her children, initially stayed in an RTV in Nasir Bagh, but shortly after moved to an unregulated housing area before finally moving to rented accommodation in the regulated Hayatabad neighbourhood. Whilst UNHCR was important in offering initial relief, i.e. emergency shelter and basic goods Maryam Jan’s family moved out of Nasir Bagh after her family’s “emergency phase”. Maryam Jan explained that this was possible because some family members “used to live in Hayatabad before us”, and although her extended family “moved out to Canada (a while after)”, they still “left all of their things and possessions for us. Whatever was here they left it for us and then they moved away from here”. Using family networks Maryam Jan’s family settled in Peshawar, which provided the conditions for a life that went beyond the basic life of the RTV. In the RTV Maryam Jan said:

I was concerned for my daughters… Who wants to live with them in a camp? My daughter, my sister, we were all afraid. Every type of person was there... everyone was living there. We
were not used to this. In Nasir Bagh we had difficulties; we had problems with money and to earn… Once we had heard rumours that someone was going into neighbouring tents to rape the girls. Yes, we had heard that they were going to rape the girls. Once I heard this we had to leave….. And the bathrooms – uff! <Exasperated sigh>. We had to share with everyone and you had to walk so far. It was not a bathroom, it was not a toilet – it was open. Everyone used it. It was a kinara and everyone was there using it (ibid).

Maryam Jan positioned RTV life as one of anonymity - “everyone was there” - in which the public “kinara” reflects a source of devaluation compared to what her previous experiences of city life in Kabul. RTV life did not offer enough and indeed in the RTV there was even a perceived looming threat (rape). In contrast her family connections offered a chance for more human relationships, emotional attachments, and a life that went beyond models of exemplary suffering. Maryam Jan currently works from her home and her three sons work in Khyber Bazaar in Peshawar. All three of her sons earn a steady income, at least more than what was available in the RTV. Maryam Jan’s two younger daughters both attend a high school in Hayatabad, pursuing formal education, and the eldest daughter is a teacher. For Maryam Jan and her family a different form of existence from the “baseline” forms of human survival than the refugee regime provides were pursued.

In Afghan Camp, it is also usually the family (immediate and extended) that one turns to generate and get access to everyday material and non-material resources such as food, money, shelter. This is especially the case when the state, refugee regime, or supporting I/NGOs are ineffective, if present at all. Again, “it seems that all people, regardless of culture, rely less on social networks when there are professional agencies that can support them” (Harpviken 2009:28). In the case of Zareena, a Turkmen Afghan widow, aged 30, and mother of five
children, Zareena revealed how her younger brother had been essential for her survival (Zareena, KHA40). Zareena has been a widow for four years. Her husband passed away from an illness he got in Afghan Camp, and both her parents have also passed away. She had no in-laws. In fact, according to Zareena her marriage had been arranged by deception by her paternal aunt and her aunt’s husband in order to pay off a material debt for them. \(^{150}\) After her husband’s death, Zareena turned to her younger brother, who is 20 years-old, and who felt obliged through forms of enforceable trust (Portes 2000) to support his older sister and her five children. Zareena said:

> He is only 20 years old. He says he works in the city... He earns Rs.4000-Rs.5000 a month [Rs.160-Rs.250 per day]. The electricity bill alone is Rs.1500. Everything is so expensive.

Yet despite these material constraints, her brother continues to support her. In part this is because he feels obliged to do so, and because his reputation is also vested with that of his sister’s, i.e. his reputation cannot afford to let his sister be self-dependent or in absolute poverty, which could also lead to becoming “bad/ruined woman”, as his sister’s body is also a site of his honour. “He is my brother, he must do this”, Zareena said. However, this also shows that in this context the family unit and structure acts as a site in which concepts of a humanised and valued life are constructed.

In another example in the camp, as mentioned in previous chapters, Maulana Abdul Qais and his wife have set up separate housing quarters for widows that are a part of his wider kin network (Maulana Abdul Qais, KHA70). He said:

\(^{150}\) Zareena grew up in Peshawar and moved to Karachi with her aunt and uncle when she was meant to be getting married to their son, her cousin. However, when she arrived in Karachi her aunt’s husband needed to settle a material debt with a contractor. Zareena was the payment for this debt. Instead of marrying her cousin she married the contractor. After her husband’s (the contractor) death it was only through her remaining nuclear family network via her younger brother (who has also migrated to Karachi) that she was able to survive. In this example we see how kin networks can have a complex role as facilitators, liberators, and oppressors – which serve as a warning against the romanticisation of informal networks of survival.
We have set up a women’s quarter, we actually built it. It is for people of our own family so that they have security... We - my wife and I - make dry roti and give people some fruit. We do at the women’s quarters as well... These are our people.

Thus in Afghan Camp the family unit (immediate and extended) is a critical source of social capital and security at the micro-level. It is this unit that decides and deals with immediate and everyday decisions of redistribution and support through which an Afghan persistence and presence is possible, in which basic goods, and goods that deliver beyond what officialdom offer, are secured. These structures are also important structures through which formulations and understandings of the self are given meaning through the family unit. This central position of kin networks is crucial in understanding how survival is possible – without which the lived reality of Afghan lives is incomplete.

Outside of Afghan Camp in Sohrab Goth, two teenage brothers have been able to survive and persist in the city because of their sibling relationship. Interviews were completed with Zalmay, who is 15 years-old (KHA1). Zalmay lives in a single room with his brother, Jibran (KHA1.B), in Al-Asif Square. As the older brother Zalmay safeguards and provides for his younger brother. Zalmay and Jibran migrated from Afghanistan to Pakistan in 2000 with their immediate and extended family, including his father and mother, step-mother (his father’s first wife), and uncles. Since then, their mother passed away and his father has moved back to Afghanistan with Zalmay’s step-mother. Zalmay’s relationship with his father and his step-mother is increasingly stretched with limited interaction. As Zalmay and Jibran migrated to Pakistan after 2000 and without proof of arrival or any registration with the refugee regime, both are also considered to be illegal immigrants. Both Zalmay and Jibran are undergoing the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) assessment process, however, the process itself is long, arduous, and, in the words of Zalmay, “tormenting my life”. Zalmay writes to UNHCR regularly (he learnt English informally
and has recently been enrolled in a school) in order to make his case to UNHCR. But he does not, it appears, speak the “language” that UNHCR wishes to hear (Khosravi 2010:33). The letters he sends include pictures coloured by felt pens. “I am scared”, he wrote in one letter with a drawing of the sky, which for him reflected a better place that he wanted to get to. When I spoke with a worker from an INGO, which supports UNHCR, and who is familiar with his case, the worker said, “Yes, UNHCR is dealing with his case. However they need to know if he is really a refugee. Many people are scared”. In the office of this INGO I was told, “He phones everyday”. One day I phoned UNHCR in Islamabad on Zalmay’s request. Zalmay said, “You speak English properly; you know how to say what they want to hear. Ask them about my case. Why won’t they help me”? When I phoned I was told by an office worker, “Zalmay must stop phoning here. There is a process that he is aware of. He will be notified of his outcome”. Zalmay said he has never been notified of anything, but more importantly he said he does not know how this “system” works. During fieldwork Zalmay was provided with a UNHCR letter stating his case was being assessed. He keeps the letter safe in case of police harassment, even though the letter usually does not work. However, he has no other support or guidance from UNHCR, CAR, or wider GOP bodies in any capacity.

Zalmay and Jibran are, however, able to survive and support each other through their sibling relationship and accompanying material, non-material, and emotional attachments. As the older brother, Zalmay safeguards and provides for his younger brother. He said, “I get really worried for my brother, but I have to take care of him. I work a lot, I do not want him to, and he is too young”. Zalmay works two jobs: in Al-Asif Square he is a bus-boy and on weekends he travels to the affluent Defence neighbourhood to work in a bazaar, which attracts many middle and upper-class families in Pakistan. “It is far for me to come in, but they [the customers] pay well. They give you tips here at least”, he said. Here, bonds of affection (Hyden 1983) and obligation
motivate (Portes 2000) Zalmay’s actions to provide income and emotional support. Both are essential in understanding how micro-level security is achieved.

In the cases above (particularly Zareena and Zalmay) it is clear that the family unit acts as both a constructive and destructive unit. The fact that Zareena was sold by her paternal aunt to settle a debt reflects how her life was viewed as a commodity to be traded. Yet the fact that her brother has supported her and her five children also reflects the constructive dimension of family bonds. For Zalmay the fact that his father’s wife and her family abandoned Zalmay and his brother also point to the destructive potentials of the family-unit. Yet the fact that he is supporting his younger brother points to a more constructive nature. However, in all of the cases mentioned above, the complex working of family structures – both constructive and destructive – still provide an important resource pool. Whilst these cases are not counter-intuitive, they provide a better understanding of the micro-level processes that enable survival and basic material redistribution are possible, without which the Afghan story in Pakistan would remain incomplete. They show that routes to a more humanised life are not monopolised by the state and refugee regime but include intimate solidarity networks that are understood themselves as being humanising, and also enable agency and a striving towards a more humanised life.

However, these solidarities of kin are not a panacea in terms of distributive capacity. In the case of Zareena (in addition to having been sold as a commodity) she and her children, her brother and other siblings, struggle without food, her brother’s Rs.4000-Rs.5000 income is not enough to support them all. Zalmay and Jibran live in fear without security in a one room apartment. One evening Zalmay phoned me frantically worried that his brother had been taken by people associated with his step-mother or by criminals that he said live in his building. “I cannot find
him. Where is he? What do I do?! What if they have taken him?” 30 minutes later he phoned to
tell me he had found him. “He had just gone to the shop. He is fine. I told him off… I am just
worried for us. I am always worried. People know we are alone, they could do anything”, he said.
In these cases, intimate solidarity networks are an important structure and offer important forms
of social capital, yet without other forms of capital, i.e. economic or cultural, and without
support by official actors the full potentials of a secure “humanity” are not fully possible or
practiced (Friedman 1992). Functional official structures and laws would be of benefit
particularly for the more vulnerable. Instead the failure of official actors to meet the expectations
of Zareena, Maulana Abdul Qais, Zalmay, and others when repeated time and time again, create
expressions of discontent and delegitimization that directly target the state, and, in the case of
Zalmay, the refugee regime, or for Zareena the local INGO. As I sat with Zareena in Afghan
Camp’s INGO school, her daughter’s application was rejected. “She’s not that desperate, there
are people worse off than her”, a school employee told me. Zareena said to me later:

We do everything ourselves. What do you think [officials] will do?
We get nothing. How will they help us? Where will these people
[from Afghan Camp’s INGO] help us? How much poor am I
meant to be? (Zareena, KHA40).

For Zalmay, the idea of official support was also nothing but a crude joke:

No one will ever do any one thing for you. Not one thing. Don’t
go to UNHCR (Zalmay, KHA1).

This is not to say that either Zareena or Zalmay seek to escape official structures or forms of
support – indeed these structures still have access to resources that both Zareena and Zalmay
need and want, i.e. education, legal status, and safety. In an ideal situation they would be able to
access these rights and goods via official channels as well as solidarity networks. However, the
failure of this to be the case creates a scenario in which official structures and actors are
increasingly delegitimized, considered ineffective, and even ridiculed.
For most Pakistanis it is also the family unit (immediate and extended), when present, that appears as the most trusted and effective unit of organisation. Similar to the cases discussed in the section above, the family unit is central to migration strategies, moving beyond ideas of “exemplary suffering”, and basic everyday security.

Many IDPs from FATA or the recent floods have periodically been located in RTVs in Pakistan (HRC 2010; OCHA 2012), but many have avoided the RTV and state support altogether. This is because the RTV and the state do not provide the same trust that solidarities of kin or even bonds of friendship do. In Karachi a series of interviews were completed with a Pakistani (unofficial) IDP from Waziristan belonging to a Mehsud family, which were supported by interactions with her sister and children (Orzala, KHP12). Orzala and her immediate family initially migrated from Waziristan in 1996 to Karachi. Orzala’s family, land, and house also remain in Waziristan but her immediate and extended family are split across the two locations. She returned to Waziristan when she married but when conditions in Waziristan deteriorated she and her husband moved back to Karachi where the two of them have informally purchased a house. IDPs from FATA have been provided with RTVs by the Pakistani state and via UNHCR (HRC 2010; UNHCR 2010b), but in many cases the government response has been slow (IRIN 1 June 2005), lacking, or marred with suspicion given the Pakistani military actions in FATA. For Orzala, who already had family members in Karachi, government support was not needed or desired. They first stayed in an apartment with her parents and cousins in Al-Asif Square, making use of family obligations and social and cultural obligations of hospitality. Similar to Maryam Jan, for Orzala RTV life was not desired.
Why would I live in a camp when I have my family here? We have a lot of connections and history in Karachi, so we moved in with our family (Orzala, KHP12).

For Orzala family life is crucial to her security, sense of self, and understanding of a humanised life. Orzala, her husband, her sister (Khadijah, KHP12.B), and her sister’s husband (later joined by her mother) later moved to another area in the city – again on the rural-urban interface. Here they pooled their resources and bought some land that was being informally sold where Orzala and her husband purchased her house. The family unit again, alongside informal navigation practices, reveals itself as central in enabling micro-level actions which, when repeated time and time again, help to sustain, transform, and expand the urban city.

In another informal housing area in inner Karachi repeat interviews were conducted over three months. In this settlement – of Pashtuns, Sindhis, Balochis, Kashmiris, Punjabis, Hazaras, and Muhajirs - most houses are arranged around the family unit of husband and wife/wives, children of the husband and wife (and sometimes the husband’s children from previous marriages), and sometimes the husband’s parents, and - where relevant if they have married sons, and the required space - sons and their wife/wives and children. Extended kin networks are also present, though not to the same degree as Afghan Camp, and networks are arranged across both patrilineal and matrilineal lines. In one case interviews were completed with Hassan Bilal and his family (Hassan Bilal, KHP7). Hassan Bilal lives with his seven daughters and wife in two informally constructed rooms that were built above his brother's semi-regular home. Hassan Bilal is a Baloch Pakistani who has been living in Karachi since 1965, i.e. since infancy. In my interviews with him and his family he revealed that he had just found work as a driver after having been unemployed for a number of months. Just a few months earlier he and his immediate family were homeless, unable to pay rent, and without an income. There was no system of support offered by the local Pakistani state.
We receive no help – we have to rely on our own resources. *Eik glass pani tak nahi dehenge* ([they will] not even give [you] one glass of water). [Here] Sometimes, the political parties come into the areas for election time… then they just disappear (Hassan Bilal, KHP7).

It was through Hassan Bilal’s intimate relationship with his brother that he got access to shelter and survived. His brother, Ahmed Bilal said, “His situation got really bad. You see even now his conditions are bad” (Ahmed Bilal, KHP7.B). He continued, “But he is my brother. This is my house, so I just told him to build two rooms on top of my house (ibid).

As we walked up the stairs, the steps of mud and brick moved as they were poorly constructed. “We essentially live on the roof”, Hassan Bilal said. He continued, “We can’t even shut the door of this room, which creates a lot of problems when it rains and when it gets cold”. He said:

> If I tell you really what the situation is, well then, here in this household there was no food to eat last night and there was no tea to drink this morning. [Or food to eat]. This is the condition. How are you going to manage a household on Rs.3000-Rs.4000 per month. How? (Hassan Bilal, KHP7).

In addition, his brother Ahmed Bilal highlighted how his own house now, with additional rooms on top and no effective drainage system, quickly floods when it rains and is “sinking” lower in to the ground (Ahmed Bilal KHP7.B).

In this case the solution provided by solidarity networks is, again, not a complete solution. Hassan Bilal and his family are still maintain an inherent human quality that all human beings possess simply by virtue of being human. Social solidarities, forms of recognition, and self-responsibility mean that this continues to be the case. Not having adequate shelter does not make one less human. However, it is clear that Hassan Bilal’s life is not provided with the basic
needs conditions or recognition that could improve the conditions and possibilities of his life however he should see fit. A fully “humanised life” or “human dignity” are not inherent and unchanging facts, given the potentials for humans to be dehumanised (Pollman 2010), but by being provided with a minimum set of conditions and recognition the potentials of human life can be reached – or at least striven towards. In the current political order, these conditions are expected to be delivered by the state. But in the case of Hassan Bilal, and the other Afghan and Pakistani lives mentioned in this thesis, the state fails.

As a result of the state failings that citizens and non-citizens face, official actors are, again, delegitimized in physical and non-physical ways. Housing adjustments that are made are completed without any form of planning and do not meet the state’s modernisation and developmental objectives. Further, repeated time and time again these “minor” adjustments are creating massive developmental, ecological, and health challenges for the residents in these spaces and for the state itself. In Hassan Bilal’s neighbourhood the wider area is full of housing adjustments which have subsequently made the area densely packed, which residents explained have meant the area has increased water and sanitation blockages, particularly when it rains and because of a high concentrations of plastic bags blocking drains and of garbage being piled up. The Pakistani state appears incompetent and unsure of how to act in this area.

There is nothing. No help. [But] yes, sometimes here you have the welfare people. During election time you have the people from the parties. You have the goods that are delivered but they are not distributed. The people that need these things they do not get anything. Not a thing. What do they care (Hassan Bilal, KHP7).

Here local political actors appear callous and corrupted with goods not being redistributed. The moral character of the state is again questioned, eroded, and challenged.
In another informal housing area in Peshawar, I interviewed a family that had taken in the recently divorced sister-in-law (Ruqaiya, PXP70.C) of the household head (Abdul Sattar, PXP70). Hafsah Jan, the niece of Ruqaiya said, “Her husband was not good to her. Our women do not normally get divorced” (Hafsah Jan, PXP70.B). And, it is usually not the norm that in cases of divorce that the divorcee will move in to the household of their married sister. However, for Ruqaiya, with no other family members able to support her, no means of income, and no possibility of state support, she turned to her sister’s family. “We are all cramped in one place”, Ruqaiya said as I conducted the interview in the two-room house, “but this is what my sister felt she must do to help me”. Hafsah Jan added:

Someone [officials] really should help her. Her life and the lives of her children are lived in difficulty. People do not accept her, but what support can she get. We can only offer her something little. Our conditions are tough, but what about her and her children. She needs something more than what we can give her (Hafsah Jan, PXP70.B).
Figure 17: The inner courtyard of Abdul Sattar’s home (PXP70).
A stubborn persistence and presence continues, as Hafsah Jan, Abdul Sattar and other family members are willing, because of strong ties, to take on the deeper demands and responsibilities of caring for an additional household member. However, for this family unit, who survive on the daily wages of Hafsah Jan’s husband and Abdul Sattar, who sells potato and bread on a food cart outside of schools near his home, their everyday conditions of existence continue to be difficult. “Persistence” continues, but under stressful circumstances. Given the shortcomings of official actors, who are expected to deliver, the state also continues to appear incompetent:

We get nothing, nothing. Someone will come and do a government survey, and that is it… What else? Nothing. And
nothing even works. The electricity goes; the house is packed [with us]. Government support? Ask us if there is even a government! (Ruqaiya, PXP70.C).

Figure 19: Abdul Sattar engaged in his daily trade

Pooled Resources II: Bonds of Family - External Migration & Remittances

Even the refugees are fleeing.

Interview with government official, Islamabad.

Afghan and Pakistani families also pool resources and provide security, not only by providing shelter and support to each other but also by working, trading, and generating income together. As conditions in urban Pakistan do not provide the opportunities and conditions for a fully humanised life many Afghans and Pakistanis are migrating out of Pakistani cities (and rural areas) and moving abroad. Current push and pull factors – i.e. the global and racialised labour market (Rana 2011) – have enabled a wider range of classes to enter the transnational working class (Rana 2011:111), which include the urban poor and “refugees”.

Traditionally in Pakistan it has been the rural classes that have migrated out of Pakistan or a landed and educated class (Rana 2011: 111; see also Werbner 190, 2002; Azam 1995).
of the nuclear and extended family (usually male) migrate to a third country, legally and illegally, where they perceive employment and economic opportunities to be greater, as well as the chance to improve their social standing (Arif and Irfan 1997b). Particularly in cases where migration is illegal, intermediaries or officials acting illegally are involved to reflect a practice of access. However, this also extends to legal migration, such as labour migration to the Gulf States (HRW 2006:6; Arif 2009).

In Peshawar and Karachi many families, both Afghan and Pakistan, were interviewed who had some family members living in Peshawar or Karachi and/or other areas in Pakistan. Other family members were living across international borders in Afghanistan and Iran (Jalal et al., 2005; Monsutti 2005; Monsutti and Stitger; Saito 1999), the Gulf States (Addleton 1992; HRW 2006; Rana 2011:97-133), Western Europe, and Australia.152 By sending family members (immediate and extended) abroad for work these families ideally receive economic remittances that support activities - such as paying rent, purchasing property, paying school fees, and buying everyday goods and food - in what have been mis-described as “altruistic” remittances by IMF working papers (Bougha-Hagbe 2006). The IMF also understands remittances as an essential way of maintaining the state and generating state wealth. The IMF (Kock et al., 2011:3) outlines that remittances, mainly from the Gulf countries, are equal to 4.2 per cent of Pakistan’s GDP ($7 billion), and are boosted by state labour contracts with Gulf States and “manpower contracts” (Azam 1995; Arif and Irfan 1997; HRW 2006:26). However, the story is not that simple. They also create a number of challenges for Afghans, Pakistanis, and even the state.

152 The Western countries that Afghans interviewed in this study had family members living in included: Australia, Canada, Germany, Norway, and the UK. Pakistani families interviewed had migrated mainly to the UK, which is related to the long-history of Pakistani-UK migration and the large Pakistani Diaspora in the UK. See Werbner (1999, 2002).
Afghan Migration (Again) & Family Remittances
In interviews many Afghans highlighted that it is not unusual for a family member or members to be living and working abroad and/or existing in transnational connections. Afghans thus become double and sometimes triple or more migrants. In interviews with a family living in rented accommodation in a regulated housing area in Peshawar, the family revealed how the remittances they received from extended family members were essential to the family’s ability to make rent payments. “They send us money from Australia, which is how we pay the rent… It makes a difference to us” (Baitool Amin, PXA20). In another RTV in Peshawar an interview was completed with a family whose two sons are working in Germany. “At least when you earn money there, you know you have earned and you can keep the money”, the father said, reflecting the distrust of the way the Pakistani labour market functions (Wazir Gul, PXA5). And, in Afghan Camp, a number of families have transnational connections with family members working in Afghanistan and Iran. In one household, in Afghan Camp, Gulshaan (KHA13.B), the daughter of Habibullah (KHA13) (see Chapter 5), told me how her husband and brother-in-law live and work in Iran and send money back to her and other family members through informal money transfers (Gulshaan, KHA13.B). Another interviewee revealed how his uncle was contemplating joining the Taliban in Afghanistan in order to earn additional income, which would be re-invested in his family in Karachi (Dilawar Noor, KHA36). Further, in an interview with a family living in an informal housing area on the outskirts of Sohrab Goth, a man had just returned from Iran after living there for four years. “The conditions there were so difficult, but I needed to earn something, which I thought I could do better there”, he said (Salahuddin, KHA62.D). Finally, another family revealed their experience of sending their son from Pakistan to Iran to Turkey and now potentially to Italy (Irfan, KHA48; Abdullah Zuhair, PXA89). For these Afghan families, personalised networks are important in pooling resources, enabling migration, and generating and sharing income. Here the corrupted ways in which the Pakistani economy
functions are evaded through migration, which subsequently enable other family members to persist and practice presence within Pakistan.

However, for many of these interviewees challenges remain. For some families the remittances are not always consistent and for others not enough. Dilawar Noor (KHA36) spoke of how his older maternal uncles, who were his guardians, left to Iran two years ago but were not supporting him financially (Dilawar Noor, KHA36). In other cases, depending on the method and location of migration, the monetary costs are considerable. For illegal migration the financial costs and human risks are considerably higher (Khosravi 2010:27-40). Sending a family member abroad through illegal actions requires the support of an intermediary, a *dallal* or other types of middleman, and even officials (Khosravi 20:56-8). This can involve high payments to intermediaries and officials (Khosravi 2010), where intermediaries and officials view human lives as sites of opportunity. Further, for those involved in migration the act of migration, specifically if it is illegal, involves risky activities for the travellers (Khosravi 2010:28). In December 2012 11 people (some Afghan) were killed at the Iran-Pakistan border (Dawn 22 Dec 2012) and in 2009 62 people (Afghan and Pakistani) suffocated to death in a truck near Quetta’s border with Afghanistan (Huffington Post 4 Apr 2009 [note, this case was not a repatriation movement]). Thus whilst migration and remittances strategies are an important way of generating income and survival, the processes involved are not always fully humanising.

Irfan (KHA48) was interviewed over a period of 12 months during fieldwork (communication has continued thereafter). Irfan is an Afghan Tajik who was born, raised, and educated in Pakistan. He left his home in Peshawar and moved to Karachi. From Karachi, he moved to Iran, in search of employment opportunities after he had been struggling to find work to support his
family. His father, Abdullah Zubair (PXA89) a former leprosy sufferer, works, but does not earn enough income for his family. In interviews and discussions I had with his father, he told me that he wanted better opportunities for his son.

He went to school, he has an education. But what can he get here. The work in the city does not offer him anything, and he gets no money. He can speak English from school but what can he do here. One day someone is killed… they ask him if he is Afghan, and create problems. I do not want him to live here (Abdullah Zubair, PXA89).

Irfan had fake Pakistani documents made through an intermediary, “I’m just getting my documents made from someone who my father knows, and then I will start travelling”, he said as we sat in his home (see also: Khosravi [2010:62-2]). Having these documents made required him and his father to pool their incomes. Once his documents were made, he travelled by foot and by van into Tehran (Iran) where he worked in a factory, sharing a room with other Afghans and earning a low wage. Unsatisfied with the conditions in Tehran, where he was treated badly - “The conditions for us as Afghans are really bad here; you know… it is just not good” (see also Olszewska 2010; Jalal et al., 2005; Saito 2009) -, he moved to Istanbul (Turkey) with money from his father and his income as well by being supported by other “global” intermediaries. Again his journey was made partly through walking and partly by road, “We walked for at least three days”, he said. (At the time of writing he is on his way to Italy). At each phase, from what Irfan and his family have shared with me, Irfan tries to send money back to his family, but this can be difficult. In addition, his own living conditions are cramped and vulnerable. In Istanbul (like in Tehran) he also works in a factory with a poor wage. “I’m just trying to get my money together, but if they paid us it would be easier. At the moment we get paid, but on and off… I’m not even sure what I can do to resolve my situation” Irfan said despondently. Further, his methods of travel are also
high risk, “Don’t worry, the man who organises this will think of a way to get us in”, he said regarding Italy, “Maybe by boat, or by car, or hiding in cargo… let’s see” (Irfan, KHA48).

Remittances are personalised actions that help maintain Afghan lives in urban Pakistan via income generation but they can be riddled with challenges. For the state, they take away resources and lives in the form of human capital which could contribute towards the Pakistani city and relocate them in the economies of other states. (The 2010 Afghan Management and Repatriation Strategy [SAFRON 2010] and UNHCR Surveys [SAFRON et al., 2010a-c] have recognised the contributions of Afghans to the Pakistani economy). Further, the example of Irfan being able to make documents illegal via a middleman delegitimize the state, who are seen as incompetent and even complicit in allowing these actions to take place. State actors acting in informal ways are breaking the law. They are not just preventing it from being implemented but are actively violating it. “What will happen if you get caught?” I asked, “You can just show officials some money”, Irfan said (Irfan, KHA48). Echoing the work of Kamal Sadiq (2009), the sites of legal documentary creation are not just monopolised by the state – multiple lawmakers are present and active in Pakistan, including corrupted officials and intermediaries.

However, most crucially, whilst the GOP’s main objective is to encourage Afghans to leave Pakistan, the illegal migrations of Afghans to get out of Pakistan are deeply symbolic of the broken nature of the Pakistani state. In the words of a Pakistani official, “Even the refugees are fleeing” (interview: Zeb 2011). These acts also reflect the broken system of refugee protection, which also impacts the international refugee regime. Repatriation, naturalisation, and (legal) resettlement to a third country – the three main refugee solutions – are ineffectively
implemented and redundant. In the case discussed, the refugee regime was not to be trusted and consulted at any juncture.

**Pakistani Migration & Family Remittances**

The example of pooled resources via remittances and increased migration using intimate networks is similarly applicable to Pakistani families. Even citizens find that there are not enough opportunities or forms of security in Karachi and Peshawar to keep them rooted in Pakistan. In a number of interviews in Karachi and Peshawar, remittances, and pooled incomes of immediate and extended family networks were revealed as important ways in which families survive (Azam 1995; Arif and Irfan 1997; Rana 2012; Werbner 2002). For both citizens and non-citizens a shared, often informal, strategy of income generation via migration is in effect. In an interview in Peshawar a woman revealed how her father lives in the UK and returns once every one-to-two years; “There is nothing in Peshawar for him, so he moved abroad”, she said (Shawana Khan, PXP22). In another area, one family is partly supported their by their 20 year-old son’s migration to the UK. In Peshawar his father, Sarfaraz Ali said, “We want him to study, earn money, and become something. There is nothing for him in the city and in our [ancestral] village”, he said (Sarfaraz Ali, PX37).

In a semi-formal residential areas in Peshawar, interviews were conducted with Waqqas (PXP9) with his family present. Waqqas migrated to Peshawar from Landi Kotal (in Khyber Agency, FATA) in search of employment opportunities in the mid-1990s. However, for Waqqas, even Peshawar did not offer enough opportunities, so he now lives a transnational life between Peshawar and Kuwait where he works as a driver. He intermittently returns to Pakistan to see his immediate and extended family and transfer his financial capital to his property and family in
Peshawar and Landi Kotal. For Waqqas and his family the remittances are constructive. They generate income and redistribute wealth and are a form of “offensive” survival (Bayat 2010). If there is no help from officialdom or when circumstances are tough, an initiative is taken to push forward in the pursuit in the betterment of their lives – even if this betterment takes them away from their territorial “homeland”. Alternative ways of belonging, both within and outside of the state – are in effect. When the state fails, Pakistanis use intimate solidarity networks to create opportunities to generate income, which crucially also transcend the state.

Again, these forms of survival and income generation are not without their challenges. In the case of Sarfaraz Ali’s son, Rameez Ali (LNP1), when I met him in London he revealed how he was living and could barely make rent. “I wish I could send something back”, but he could not (Rameez Ali, LNP1). Similar to the Afghan examples mentioned above, the challenges of illegal migration (or indeed poorly regulated legal migration [HRW 2006; Arif 2009]), which includes a reliance on intermediaries creates high costs and high-risk. In September 2012 58 illegal immigrants (including Pakistanis) were killed by a boat that sank near Turkey (Pakistan Today 7 Sep 2012), and in December 2012 17 Pakistanis were killed en route to Australia (Dunya 29 Dec 2012). A 2009 report (Arif 2009) indicates that even many legal workers who go to work in the Gulf States are recruited in processes in which their legal rights are not safeguarded, and a 2006 Human Rights Watch report documents workers frequently having their wages (1.5-2 months’ worth) withheld as “security” to prevent workers from “running away” (HRW: 2006:30).153

153 Although migration and remittance patterns Afghans and Pakistanis exist in shared realities and use similar mechanisms to survive and secure gains (the family unit and practices of negotiated access). These shared lives create conditions in which the boundaries between the citizen and non-citizen are irrelevant. Indeed, illegal immigrants and migrants from Afghanistan and Pakistan occupy shared spaces and ways of being even in global cities. Afghans and Pakistanis work together in shared factories in Istanbul (Irfan, KHA48) or the Gulf States (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10; Rostam KHA68), and are equally a part of a globalised and racialised labour diaspora (Rana 2011).
For the Pakistani state, increased emigrations of citizens also pose deep existential questions which erode the state’s physical potential and non-physical legitimacy. Whilst from a neo-liberal perspective freedom of movement and migration may represent a truly globalised world and a key source of remittances to maintain the state (Kock et al., 2011), what can be said of a state whose citizens feel they must leave in order to improve their lives and the lives of their families? This is not migration for the sake of tourism and the spaces of “choice” are not as vast is often assumed for illegal/legal migration (Khosravi 2010). Many migrants do not return to Pakistan - either unable or unwilling, which indeed question the meaning of the state in a Weberian sense (i.e. a state comprises of a “people”, as well as territory and sovereignty). Thus, the continued and consistent migrations out of Pakistan for income generation thus question the very value of Pakistani citizenship in Pakistan. For Waqqas his transnational existence has improved his monetary income but it was a decision made because of the lack of opportunities for him in Peshawar. “I had to go. I do not have anyone here, just my work, which my family needs me to do. Staying here [in Peshawar]... what good does it do for us? Nothing” (Waqqas, PXP9).

Cross-Cutting Afghan and Pakistani Networks: Friendship & Loans

In other cases it is the intimate bonds of friendship (not family) that provide a space of trust and reciprocity in which micro-level and personalised actions can be executed. In a neighbourhood in Peshawar, Afghan and Pakistani households frequently turn to each other when they need everyday goods, foodstuffs, water, or small loans to pay children’s school fees. Similarly cases were seen in Pakistani households. Quick sprints across the street to neighbours houses were shared tactics by Afghan and Pakistani households to ask neighbours for minor loans to pay for school fees, shopping, and rent. In Hayatabad in Peshawar, this was not unusual. “We pay each other back...we do these small things, to help each other”, Afsana said (Afsana, PXA105). In Ishtiaq Goth (Chapter 5) it was through the bonds of friendship that the sharing of food was
possible (alongside moral and ethical concepts of charity) and in Saeed Goth (Chapter 6) it was friendship and charity that pushed actors to work together and pool resources to build a road. Thus these small everyday loans are crucial micro-level acts which enable both Afghan and Pakistanis to continue to live, whilst experiencing human interactions and relationships. The actions also point to the shared spaces and shared lives of Afghans and Pakistanis that challenged nationally segregating lenses.

This pattern can be expanded to the exchange of large monetary loans between friends. As Afghan refugees many Afghans have had difficulty establishing bank accounts and taking out formal loans. It was only in 2010 that Afghan refugees in which registered Afghans were eligible to open bank accounts (interviews: Azam 2010-11; Maroof 2011; Mehmood 2011, Siddiqi 2011). However, the process remains long and bureaucratic and for some Afghans too costly. For illegal immigrants there are, of course, no avenues for opening a formal bank account. Many Pakistanis also face difficulties in setting up bank accounts, and are ineligible for bank-loans and formal credit. Often it is cheaper in both time and cost to bypass formal proceedings (Arif et al., 1999). Thus again, for both Afghans and Pakistanis, human relationships based on trust and mutual reciprocity prove more useful than the bureaucratic processes of bank loans, which, for different reasons, cannot be accessed.

In an interview with two friends, one Pakistani (Mehboob PXP12), and the other Afghan (Mudassir, PXA36) both said that it was through their friendship that they were comfortable in loaning money, when needed to each other. There was an underlying assumption that the money would be paid back, but Mudassir added, “if he can’t it does not matter… we have grown up

154 Indeed an implementing partner of UNHCR in Karachi frequently had to communicate (in person or via phone and/or written communication that registered Afghans can open bank accounts).
together since we were children”. In another series of interviews conducted with two Pakistani Pashtuns in Karachi - both fabric wholesalers introduced in earlier chapters, Anwar Khan (KHP50) and Abdul Mateen (KHA69) - the bond and trust friendship allowed Anwar Khan to give Abdul Mateen a loan so that he could rent a market space. The affinity and friendship that the two had for each other has grown over a number of years. They live in the same area where they and their families often cook and eat meals together and share bonds of trust and affection. Both Anwar Khan and Abdul Mateen used to work in the same market, however, Abdul Mateen wanted to expand his own business and move elsewhere. With no bank account he turned to Anwar Khan for a loan. “I never had any issue in giving money to Abdul Mateen”, Anwar Khan said. “He is good on his word and I know him. He plays football with our kid <points to his younger brother Yusuf Khan, who is sitting in the store>… We don’t need these banks, credit cards and systems” (Anwar Khan, KHP50). The premise is based on a relationship of mutual reciprocity. If Anwar Khan ever needs something he will be able to turn to his trusted friend for the support and respect he needs.

These relationships and systems of loans, however, can breakdown. They are not a guarantee of security. Despite this, in the face of structural shortcomings they offer an important way in which the presence of Afghans and Pakistanis can be practiced, and practiced in humanised frameworks and relationships. Solidarity networks are an important lifeline. In addition, these small actions repeated time and time again create inadvertent impacts on the state. They reveal circulations of wealth that do not directly interact with the state (Arif et al., 1999). Whilst authors such as Hernando De Soto (1989, 2000) point to the vibrancy of these small micro-economies and generations of wealth, these actions are based on the foundations of a distrusted officialdom, which, repeated time and time again (and not just with regards to loans) challenge the character and competence of the urban state. At all times, the official ways of working are avoided.
Property Gains

Finally, personalised connections of family and friendship are also essential in enabling micro-level actions that allow Afghans and Pakistanis to engage in significant material and non-material redistribution. This is different in scale to the macro-level actions enabled by the fellowship of space & charity and is also different to some of the micro-level actions discussed above. This section demonstrates this with regards to formal property gains.

As non-citizens Afghans cannot purchase land or property, and when RTVs close down many are faced with problems of finding shelter. Similarly, as urban poor citizens, many Pakistanis cannot purchase formal property, but this time it is because they lack the capital to do so (Hasan 2006, 2012; Hasan and Mansoor 2012). As this thesis demonstrates, informal property settlements offer an important route of access to shelter and housing for both Afghans and Pakistanis. In informal housing settlements in Karachi, where land is contested, and in Peshawar, where the strength of the landholder counts, both Afghans and Pakistanis are able to “own” property in similar ways.

In Karachi, in an informal settlement near Sohrab Goth both Afghans and Pakistanis live side by side. The land that they both “own” was sold to them by middleman approximately 18 years ago.\(^{155}\) I asked Jalaluddin (KHA62.C) and Salahuddin (KHA62.D), Afghan Tajiks whose family

\(^{155}\) Often once the land has been sold in this way, residents are left to defend their territory themselves. This means that local official actors have an opportunity to bribe and contests the positions of these actors, which they do. New areas, where informal settlers are trying to secure their presence they face the task of negotiating with official actors, who often demand bribes and payment.
has been living in various areas in Karachi for over 25 years, “How did you purchase this land?” Salahuddin responded that the land was purchased through an informal agreement in which some paper documentation was provided – though this documentation was not an official lease (i.e. a sanad). In legal terms these actors have no right to this land but the land was able to be sold, informally, because of a contestation over it in which the GOP, the PPP, and the landowners, also connected to the PPP, were involved, but one in which ultimately the PPP and “their” landholder emerged the strongest. (The legal status of the land essentially remains unclear and contested.)

In Peshawar, in one informal housing area, Afghans and Pakistanis no longer pay rent to the landholder who has “given” residents the land (Field notes: Wardak Rasool). This was also seen in the case of Ibrahim Hafiz mentioned in the previous chapter, it is through the “benevolence” of the landholder in Asadullah Khan that Ibrahim Hafiz’s family “own” the land (Ibrahim Hafiz, PXA38). Because the likelihood of official repercussions is low, and because laws are not implemented, “ownership” (or occupation/squatting) is possible.

However, what happens in areas where legality is more strongly enforced and the state is present in its coercive capacity? Do the practices of protection & access discussed above still work? How is it that in some cases even Afghans “own” houses in formal and regulated areas? How is it that many Pakistanis hide (camouflage) their ownership in order to extract real gains against officialdom? This, I argue, occurs when intimate networks are present and more willing to invest in riskier activities, and which may also cut across the nationally segregating practices of citizenship.
Cross-Cutting Afghan and Pakistan Networks: Afghan Property Gains with the Support of Pakistanis

As non-citizens in Pakistan, Afghans are not legally allowed to own immovable property or land in Pakistan (Foreigners Law 1946). The segregating logic of the nation-state does not wish for the Afghan presence in Pakistani to become sedentarised and permanent, particularly within regulated areas. However, a small number of Afghans have used solidarity networks, such as the bonds of friendship and solidarities of kin & clan, to extract tangible gains of “possession” in contradiction to Pakistani state law. The desire for greater forms of security that are not possible through RTV accommodation nor from simple renting have pushed Afghans to see alternative routes for a more permanent presence in urban Pakistan. These cases are usually only possible when strong forms of social capital combine with strong forms of economic capital, to highlight as Bourdieu does (1985), the interconnectedness of his three fields of capital (Bourdieu 1981, 1985). Indeed, many Afghans have very strong social networks and social capital (i.e. large solidarities of kin). However, without the relevant financial and cultural capital their capacity to act is restricted.

In this study a small number of Afghans that “owned” property in formal and regulated areas in urban Peshawar and Karachi for either housing or business purposes were interviewed. The willingness to discuss “ownership” issues, particularly if the Afghan in question has not “become Pakistani” (Sadiq 2009), was a sensitive question. Indeed, when interviews were conducted with Pakistanis who had affiliation with a formal organisation present, discussions over housing ownership were never completed. In many cases, this was because ownership may well not have existed. However, in the cases where it may have been present, it is likely that the topic was not discussed for fear of repercussions by actors seen to be associated with the state. In the cases discussed of two Afghans in Peshawar discussed in this section, Abdul Wahid (PXA1) and Hajji
Khairuddin (PXA71), both of whom possess Afghan POR cards,\textsuperscript{156} the interviews were conducted via personal networks rather than I/NGOs or other local official actors. Both interviews were repeat interviews, with each interview being conducted for two-to-three hours each.\textsuperscript{157} Where relevant they are also supported by other interviews.

Abdul Wahid is an Afghan Tajik who migrated from Baghlan province in Afghanistan to Pakistan in the mid-1980s with his family (Abdul Wahid, PXA1). During the phase of their initial migration he and his family first settled in Chitral, staying in the house of a Pakistani business partner and friend of Abdul Wahid’s father. Their stay in Chitral was for eight years and was possible through concepts of hospitality and a shared bond of friendship. No rent was ever paid during this time. Here, access to a basic good (shelter) was possible through friendship bonds and reveals the importance of social networks in migration and settlement processes (Boyd 1987; Dorai 2003). After eight years Abdul Wahid and his family moved to Peshawar and purchased a house in a regulated housing area. Abdul Wahid’s family own their house as a result of informal processes, “We own the house. It is ours”, Abdul Wahid said. This ownership was possible through the “good connections” of his father and his Pakistani friend. In the second interaction with Abdul Wahid said:

> We have a business of gems, which we bring from our own province [in Afghanistan] and that helped with the good connection between my dad and his friends/business partners because they do business together. It was because of this I think they came to the conclusion that our family should be shifted to Peshawar, so it could be easier for my father’s work.

\textsuperscript{156} Examples of Afghans who have “become Pakistani” are not used, as the process for purchasing housing formally is the same as it would be if you are a “full citizen”.

\textsuperscript{157} The interviews covered a wide range of issues, however, only some elements have been include in this section.
For Abdul Wahid it was because of a “solid reputation” and the fact that he and his father’s friend had known each other beforehand that his family was able migrate and “survive”, and then purchase a house in a regulated housing area in Peshawar. Familiarity, experience and trust fostered the ties between the two families to produce a strong and intense form of social capital that enables and motivates action.

They [the Pakistani friends] have been working with my father for many years. Reputation is important; you should have good connection with others… and ensure that they know you for some time beforehand (Abdul Wahid, PXA1).

In the case of Hajji Khairuddin, he and his family migrated from Afghanistan during the 1980s (Hajji Khairuddin, PXA71). Hajji Khairuddin is an Afghan Pashtun and former ant-Soviet resistance fighter (or “Mujahidin” member). During the 1980s he spent much time in between Afghanistan and Pakistan, during which he built up a number of friendships and wider networks of business connections (Granovetter 1973). He and his family own a number of businesses that operate in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and he and his family (nuclear and extended) own a regulated house in Peshawar. For Hajji Khairuddin, similar to Abdul Wahid, forms of strong ties shaped his ability to secure gains of a more difficult and “high risk” nature. Through friendship solidarities and emotional connections which he built up during his years as a mujahidin fighter, a trader, and via connections of wider kin (i.e. clan networks) he purchased his home as well as business properties.

In another interview completed with an extended family member of Hajji Khairuddin (his wife’s cousin), Ghazaleh Jan revealed how having intimate and personalised bonds are central in being able to access (or not) significant gains (Ghazaleh Jan, PXA91). She also, however, added a gendered perspective to the debate by juxtaposing her inability to own property against Hajji
Khairuddin’s ability to own property. Ghazaleh Jan is an unmarried Afghan woman in her mid-forties. Because of the conflict in Afghanistan, Ghazaleh Jan had a disrupted youth in between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and for a number of other reasons Ghazaleh Jan never married. In the context of her social and family settings, being an unmarried woman means Ghazaleh Jan is dependent on her immediate and extended family members to secure access to shelter and housing. Currently, she lives in rented accommodation with her disabled father who she cares for in Peshawar. She has five brothers living in Europe. Her mother has passed away, and she has three sisters that are married. Although her brothers send her and her father remittances, within Pakistan she has weaker solidarity networks than Hajji Khairuddin. She does not have intense personal friendships or business ties with men, who are often the key to “hard” forms of power (i.e. property) in patriarchal social and political structures in Pakistan. For example, Ghazaleh Jan has strong bonds of friendship with other Afghan and Pakistani women, including her cousin and wife of Hajji Khairuddin, but these friendships do not allow for the provision of housing rights, to illuminate the existence of a gendered power asymmetry which shapes the ability (or inability) to redistribute material goods. Having a solid male contact is important form women and acts as a key form of protection, access, and mobility in Ghazaleh’s example in Peshawar. Ghazaleh Jan said:

Hajji Khairuddin was able to secure his position and future in Pakistan because he has been so well-connected and because of his work. But there are others of us (i.e. extended family members) who cannot do the same because we do not have the same connections. For me it is difficult, because I never got married. I live here on rent, I can’t buy a property. My situation is such that I don’t have enough connections to be able to get the paper work cleared [in someone else’s name]. I am not that well connected – I am an unmarried, 45 years old woman… in some regards my position is not that strong (Ghazaleh Jan, PXA91).
For Hajji Khairuddin the situation is different. He and his immediate and extended family are well-connected on both sides of the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. As a man he has been more easily able to get access to “hard” forms of material goods, i.e. property. He has purchased property in the name of a Pakistani man he knows well through clan and business connections. He said that, “People knew us already, within FATA and Pakistan from our previous work and trade so we were able to start things off again here” (Hajji Khairuddin, PXA71). As such, “When it comes down to buying any properties and so on, our partners, our traders, are our friends and people who we have very good and trusted relationships with they will do this for us”. He continued that, “We buy things (business outlets) on others names, which is what we did with our business in Rawalpindi... [This is possible] because of our good links and good connections” (ibid).

In both the case of Abdul Wahid and Hajji Khairuddin, intimate bonds are explained through human relationships. Human relationships shape and incentivise action and are fundamentally quite different to official structures, which unfold in environments of anonymity. These relationships are built on emotions and trust, as well as instrumentalist ideas of reciprocity, and circumvent the legal restrictions and give non-citizens access to rights and goods in Pakistan. Hajji Khairuddin, given kin networks that cut across both Afghanistan and Pakistan, frequently mentioned that, “This Durand Line was a created border, a created line, made 108 years ago”, adding, “the people across both lines of the border are one and the same” (Hajji Khairuddin, PXA71).
For both Abdul Wahid and Hajji Khairuddin property is owned “by proxy” (Abdul Wahid, PXA1), circumventing the restrictions on Afghans purchasing immovable property and goods in Pakistan. Abdul Wahid explained:

You have to take everything by proxy. The house we have is still not [in] my father’s name. It is in the name of a friend of his - the house is registered under his [friend’s] name.

Hajji Khairuddin said, “We buy things like our business outlets in other people’s names”. In order to overcome the absence of legal property rights for non-citizens in Pakistan, Abdul Wahid’s and Hajji Khairuddin’s friends sign the legal deeds and have the property registered in a Pakistani name at local government offices to camouflage the Afghan ownership, whilst all of the payment for the house was completed by Abdul Wahid’s father and for Hajji Khairuddin by his friend.

Here bonds of friendship and the solidarities of kin & clan produce a social capital that, when combined with financial capital, enable an agent to secure access to a human and material right which would otherwise be denied by the state. A gain is made against the official system. In the earlier case of the area of Asadullah Khan, a Pakistani (Asadullah Khan) donates land to Afghan families, which occurs without networks of solidarity but with (initially) strong implicit support by the Pakistani state and strong protection from a local landholder. However, for Asadullah Khan the gains are also explicable because Asadullah Khan’s generosity occurs on the outskirts of Peshawar in an unregulated housing area, which is usually the site in which an Afghan urban presence is tolerated. This is not the case for Abdul Wahid and Hajji Khairuddin, where the gains are made in regulated housing areas. Regulated housing areas are areas in the city that local authorities want as part of the longer term Pakistani “developed” and “sustainable” city. They

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158 This was also supported in other interviews where Afghan traders working in Peshawar spoke of buying things under Pakistani names.
are neither on the frontier nor in the ghetto (Ron 2003) but within “Pakistan proper”. Indeed significant official investments are made by the state to achieve this, unlike in unregulated housing areas, where actions are shaped more the strength of the landholder (Peshawar) or issues of land contestation (Karachi). Thus in the case of Abdul Wahid and Hajji Khairuddin a “bigger” gain is made, which are in clear divergence with official objectives.

“Gain” here is measured in two ways. One is of scale, for example in the case of Abdul Wahid and Hajji Khairuddin property is “bigger” than the examples used in the fellowship of space and charity, which are about everyday basic resources such as water, shelter or food. The second measures “gain” against the official, legal system. Thus is the case of Abdul Wahid and Hajji Khairuddin, gains are made against the system and formal housing expansion in informal housing settlements. However, these gains are not accessible to everyone, revealing a continued problematic of social solidarity networks that require further analysis, which, unfortunately, this thesis is not fully able to engage with. Despite this, however, the small acts of solidarity between friends and clan members discussed do reveal importantly how the landscape of Peshawar is changing and also intensely challenging Pakistani state’s idea of its domain. Here, the state is not being maintained, but it is being directly challenged with Afghan and Pakistani social relationships being considered as more significant in extracting gains against the state. When the state cannot decide who can own property in Pakistan and informal contracts are considered more valid, is the state still a relevant actor?

**Conclusion: Shared Lives: Self-Humanisation and the Delegitimized State Revisited**

Often the formal-informal sphere is more effective in redistributing material and non-material goods in Pakistan than the formal sphere. The micro-level actions that intimate networks
facilitate enable basic material redistribution (shelter, income, foodstuffs) and “beyond basic” material redistribution (property ownership). Both Afghans and Pakistanis are let down by official structures and their segregating and technological ways of seeing, which is why there appears to be very little difference between the lives of non-citizens and citizens. Solidarity networks appear to be based on particularistic, idiosyncratic, organic needs of specific people in specific contexts, and are versed in humanising terms that stand in stark contrast to official actors. Critically, these networks reflect a shared space between Afghan and Pakistani lives, with solidarities often cutting across lines of national distinction – particularly friendship ties. These solidarities and navigation practices reveal the integral significance of both Afghans and Pakistanis to urban Pakistan. Afghans and Pakistanis exist in shared spaces, are exercising agency, are redistributing material and non-material goods, and are continuing on in the pursuit of bettering their lives (Bayat 2010). Pooling resources via incomes and housing, providing each other with loans, migrating for employment, or helping each other transcend legal barriers via property exchanges, Afghans and Pakistanis are living, working, and pushing for gains together – or at least in similar ways in urban Pakistan. The case studies discussed have also shown that as small formal-informal actions are repeated time and time again they create significant changes to the urban state. Across these two case study chapters (5 and 6) it has been shown that informality is also implicitly understood as being a part of the state and a way of maintaining the state. State actors are never too far from the surface. Yet looking beneath the surface at the ways in which the state engages in informality - either allowing informal actions to enact laws (albeit informally with petty corruption), to prevent or violate laws, or simply as a result of there being limited clarity on the writ of the state - these actions are synonymously eroding the state, particularly its legitimacy. Even exploitative middlemen and intermediaries and non-official sources of power are associated with greater trust than official actors. In other cases these actions mean that sites of law-making are resting with mini lawmakers, as is the case for Irfan’s document providers, which in fact directly challenge the significance of the state. In other cases
solidarity networks are able to engage in property exchanges in contradiction to state law. The trust of the state, its character - as embodied in local actors -, and its laws is lost. This trust continues to be attacked in the context of “security”, and official tactics of enumeration, policing, and surveillance, which also impacts “everyday” life in Pakistan and is discussed in the next chapter. Here both Afghans and Pakistanis witness the continued delegitimized and dehumanised face of official actors, although as Chapter 7 shows, this occurs more intensely for Afghans, to create a limit to the shared lives of Afghans and Pakistanis in urban Pakistan.
Part III: Case Studies: When Citizenship Counts
Chapter 7: When Citizenship Counts: “Security” and the “Global War on Terror”

It is not us who are “terrorists”. It is them, the officials. They have forgotten their humanity.

Interview with Engineer Aziz, PXA59.

Have you ever seen a Pakistani jail? They are just trapped rotting (sarrabe bain) there… stuck in their own filth. Only God can save them.

Interview with Abu Zakariya, PXA53.

Memory buried deep does not disappear. History relentlessly resurfaces. In a knowing smile or a racist crime. In words blurted out or a gesture one regrets.


Introduction
Check-posts, surveillance, and deportation – all related to military actions in Afghanistan and FATA and internal bombings - dominate urban Pakistan. In a “security” context citizenship, via identity cards, matters. This chapter first shows how both Afghans and Pakistanis are quantified and surveilled in new ways at an interacting local and global level because of the GWOT. It then shows how Afghans face quantification and enumeration more intensely than Pakistanis. Next it
shows how Afghans in Pakistan face specific practices of dehumanisation in everyday life, which includes daily stop and searches, arbitrary detention (individual and mass), and deportation. These are acts that do not impact most Pakistanis in the same way or to the same degree to draw a limit to the shared lives of Afghans and Pakistanis in urban Pakistan. It concludes by showing how the dehumanising actions of the Pakistani state bite back at the state itself, and in some cases refugee regime, and erode its legitimacy. They also pose future problems for the Pakistani state of a hostile and mistrustful population (Afghans), who are a part of urban politics – even if they are not legal citizens.

**Population Management and Surveillance in a Globalised Military Conflict**

Official strategies of biometric identification, enumeration, and surveillance are increasingly important in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Shortly, this will be explained as being related to the GWOT. But first it is important to understand that enumeration and surveillance are modern tools of “order making”. Technologies of identification consolidate state control (Scott 1998:53-83). They allow bodies that belong to the state, i.e. citizens, to be identified and used by the state as human capital to fulfil political objectives, such as state modernisation, warfare, and taxation. In addition, identification and surveillance schemes allow modern states to “embrace” citizens (and the refugee regime to embrace refugees or IDPs) and improve the quality of life via “inclusionary surveillance” (Handel 2011:262-4; see also Foucault 2003[1976]:246, Torpey 2001). Here, the state and the refugee regime use identity schemes to distribute rights and protection 

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159 John Torpey (2001:271 in Sadiq 2009:106) highlights how the identity card was an important “currency of domestic administration marking out eligibles from ineligibles in the areas of voting [and] social services”.

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Documentary forms of identification have been important for Pakistan’s process of state-building. Permit-systems (1948) and passports (1952) were crucial in absorbing and then limiting Muslim migration from India into the South Asian Muslim homeland of Pakistan after Partition (Zamindar 2007). Two years after the secession of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) Pakistan introduced the 1973 National Registration Act that paved the way for the introduction of a paper-based National Identity Card (NIC) (NRD 1993) (see Appendix 13 for images). In addition, birth, marriage and death certificates, property and land deeds, the passport, and the national census have been important tools in processes of national ordering and state-building. Currently, all Pakistani citizens are provided with computerised identity cards, which the GOP understands as being central to modern forms of governance (NADRA 2012). Computerised databases also provided 2010 and 2011 flood victims with a Watan card to improve access to rations and shelter (UNHCR-PK 2010f) and in 2012 NADRA technologies helped identify 67 plane crash victims (Business Recorder 23 April 2012). The GOP also uses computerised databases to support more transparent electoral processes, with over 37 million ghost voters said to have been eliminated ahead of the scheduled 2013 elections (Dawn 24 November 2012).

In Afghanistan, socialist inspired reforms in the 1970s introduced the first national census in 1979 (GOA 1981) as well as and identity cards (see Appendix 13 for images). Similar to Pakistan, birth, marriage, and death certificates, property and land deeds (Alden Wiley 2003), and the passport were “embracing” tools. With mass migrations into Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s,

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160 Bengalis (after 1971, Bangladeshis) who “came to Pakistan before 1971 are legal citizens of Pakistan. They number about 40,000” (Sadiq 2009:161). However, Bangladeshis who came after 1971 are considered illegal immigrants. The amended Citizenship Act of 1978 required all Bangladeshis, including those who came before 1971 to legally apply for citizenship (ibid). See also Mehdi (2010).

161 The passport is a form of identification for inter-state and international travel created in the context of the emergence of the modern system of nation-states (Torpey 2000).

162 A number of authors have looked at the state building and modernisation process in Afghanistan (Cullather 2002; Hopkins 2007, 2008; Haroon 2007:153-186); but limited attention has been paid to the shifts and importance of enumeration and documentation in this process and the significance of the 1970s and 1980s. Shah Hanifi (2012) has produced an insightful analysis on the construction of a
Afghan identity documents gained further importance. Ration passes allowed the refugee regime to embrace refugees by delivering food, health care, and housing (SAFRON 1981, 1984). Currently, the Afghan identity card, UNHCR supported birth certificates, and various UNHCR surveys are seen as providing Afghans in Pakistan with an environment in which they can “survive” and be “protected” (For the role of the Afghan resistance parties in Pakistan “embracing” Afghans during the 1980s see fn51 and Appendix 13.)

However, the recent intensification and sophistication of enumeration and surveillance of both Afghans and Pakistanis (2001-2012) is less about inclusionary forms of surveillance and more about local and global exclusionary practices and counterinsurgency tactics. A racialised global migration system defined by “Northern” hostility towards “Southern” migration (Richmond 1994; Sadiq 2009:131) creates an urgency to monitor and restrict undesirable migration. This has increased with the GWOT and its accompanying rhetoric of the “dangerous” mobile “Muslim” body (Rana 2011). Increased enumeration is also not just about enhancing life and living (biopolitics) it is also about deciding who dies (necropolitics) (Mbembe 2003 in Handel 2011). The counterinsurgency tactics that are being practiced in Afghanistan and Pakistan by US-led forces and their “junior partner” Pakistan means that control technologies - such as biometric identity cards or censuses - provide a panoptical and elevated view of Afghan and Pakistani societies, transforming them into legible units to enhance the success of military tactics in the context of a dominant “Pashto-ised” Afghan identity; Antonio Giustozzi (2000) has produced an analysis of Afghan political development in 1978-1992.

163 The benefits of having birth certificates for refugees are aimed at preventing an entire generation of Afghans from “not-existing”. Indeed you only “exist” if you have the right type of documentation (Sadiq 2009).

164 As highlighted in Chapter 3, UNHCR considers that is imparts “protection by presence” in Pakistan, “i.e. a strategy whereby an international humanitarian presence provides assistance while at the same time contributing to the deterrence of human rights abuses” (B Khan 2012:104).
global war. Ethnographic observations in identity card offices and interviews show that names, father’s names, provinces of birth, family trees, facial photographs, and finger prints are now tracked and mapped with efficiency (see Appendix 15, Figures 20-1 and 31-2). Forms of “border control” have been significantly improved. Further, it has even been speculated that GOP information and “data” – i.e. Afghan and Pakistani lives – has been shared with other international actors, promoting patterns of extraditions, rendition, torture, and drone bombings, all of which are now a routine feature of post-2001 Pakistan and Afghanistan (AI 2006; Grey 2006; Stanford NYU 2012).

Currently, a private organisation known as the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) - initially the National Database Organisation (NDO) - is responsible to order Afghans and Pakistanis into legible units of understanding. NADRA creates and manages computerised Pakistan national identity cards (CNIC), other Pakistani documentation, and the Afghan Citizen Proof of Registration (POR) card.

Examples of colonial and military rule being facilitated by enumeration and surveillance practices are present in the work of Appadurai and Breckenbridge (1991); Cohen (1993); Fiscbach (2010); Abujidi (2010).

In an interview with Imran Khan (leader of Pakistani opposition party Pakistan Tehreek e Insaaf), Julian Assange revealed that Wikileaks had, "Discovered a cable in 2009 from the Islamabad embassy [where] Prime Minister Gilani and Interior Minister Rehman Malik went into the [US] embassy and offered to share NADRA [information]... A front company was set up in the United Kingdom, International Identity Services, which was hired as the consultants for NADRA to squirrel out the NADRA data for all of Pakistan” (Assange and Khan 2012).

The CNIC card is also commonly called the shanakht (identity) card.

This includes a Multi-Biometric e-Passports; Child Registration Certificates (a registration document used to register minors under the age of 18 years); Family Registration Certificates (documents issued to nationals of Pakistan highlighting the family tree structure of the applicant); National Identity Card for Overseas Pakistanis (NICOP); and the Pakistan Origin Card (POC) which provides “eligible foreigners” of Pakistani origin to “get back to their roots” (NADRA 2012). NADRA has also extended to provide technology for other initiatives including: vehicle management (toll booths), automated border control, e-driver’s license, e-balloting, and e-commerce (paying for utilities bills) (ibid).

The POR card is also commonly called the mubajir (refugee) card.
NADRA was established under General Musharraf in 2000 under the NDO Ordinance 2000 as an attached department under the Interior Ministry. However, the organisation now sits under the Interior Ministry as “an independent corporate body with requisite autonomy to operate independently and facilitate good governance” (NADRA 2012c). NADRA reports itself as self-reliant with no government funding. In part, NADRA’s funds are generated from its involvement in local and international public and private surveillance projects.

In August 2012 it was reported that 92 million Pakistanis have been registered with CNIC cards. With only individuals who are over the age of 18 being eligible for a card, this, in the words of a NADRA press statement, means that, “Pakistan has emerged as one of the few countries in the world where 96 per cent of the adult population has been registered through the most secure biometric technology” (Dawn 18 Aug 2012). The same statement goes on to say that:

Registration level[s] in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa had been observed at 99.9 per cent, followed by Punjab 99 per cent, Gilgit-Baltistan 89 per cent, Sindh and Fata 88 per cent and Balochistan 76 per cent against the projected population... Our focus is now Sindh and Balochistan and we are moving ahead in Fata despite severe law and order situation (ibid).

All eligible Pakistanis are required to possess a CNIC, and nationwide registration schemes during the 2000s upgraded individuals from the older NIC to the CNIC and registered new individuals. Identity cards have thus emerged as an essential feature of Pakistani life. (Indeed one

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170 Most of NADRA’s senior staff and board have a mix of government experience and international corporate experience. The current Chairman Mr. Tariq Malik reports himself as having been the “Chief of Technology in the largest county of State of Michigan, USA” (NADRA 2012b).

171 NADRA’s website and presentations stored on the World Bank database boasts that it has provided services to Pakistani and international government departments and multinational corporations such as: The Government of Sudan’s, Civil Registration Project; The Government of Kenya’s, Passport Issuing System; The Government of Nigeria’s: National Identity Management System; The Government of Bangladesh’s: High Security Driver’s License; telecommunications companies, including: Telecom; Mobilink; Ufone; Telenor; financial institutions including: Barclays; Royal Bank of Scotland; Standard Chartered; and utility bill companies including: PTCL, IESCO, SNGPL, SSGPL. (NADRA 2010, 2012; Daily Times 25 Jul 2009).
just needs to go to a NADRA registration center and see the buzz of people getting their CNIC cards made).

Since 2001 Afghans in Pakistan have also faced intense forms of enumeration. However, Afghans in Pakistan have been enumerated in ways that Pakistanis have not. Pakistan has not completed a national census since 1998 and the government has been stalling on the 2011 census project. Yet Afghans have been nationally enumerated twice since 2001, once with the 2005-06 Census of Afghans in Pakistan (SAFRON et al., 2006), and second with the 2010-11 Population Profile Verification (PPVR) scheme (SAFRON et al., 2010). In August 2001 the National Aliens Registration Authority (NARA), the twin of NADRA, was established to manage illegal immigrants in Pakistan. Whilst the 2006 Afghan Citizens Proof of Registration (POR) card scheme was initially managed by NARA, it soon shifted to the more sophisticated NADRA in 2007. This is because, unlike other illegal immigrants, who are also numerous and who remain under NARA management, Afghan bodies have a specific significance in Pakistan because of importance of the war in Afghanistan to both Pakistan and its “partner”, the US administration and other allied states.

The scale of identification, enumeration, and surveillance of Afghans is enormous. In 2006-07 the Afghan POR card was introduced under the 2006 Registration Agreement and 2007 Tripartite Voluntary Repatriation Agreement between the GOP, GOA, and UNHCR. Currently 1.7 million Afghans are registered with the POR card in Pakistan (UNHCR-PK 2012). The card was initially designed to last until 31 December 2009 but was extended to 31 December 2012 under the (May) 2010 Tripartite Voluntary Repatriation Agreement, and later to June 2013. Under the 2010 Agreement

172 In a 2009 report, NARA is cited as estimating that “a population of more than 3.35 million illegal residents [is] in Pakistan, mostly located in Karachi”, including Bangladeshi and Burmese populations (Befare 2009:39).
the POR card was upgraded to include more secure technology, the Secure Cards for Afghan Citizens (SCAC), which resulted in another nationwide card renewal scheme in 2010-2011 (NADRA 2011; UNHCR-PK 2010g). This was followed by the 2011 Unregistered Members of Registered Families (UMRF) scheme, which registered immediate Afghan dependents (spouses, children, and parents) who missed the 2006-2007 registration process. During fieldwork a considerable amount of time was spent at NADRA offices for the Afghan POR card (re)registration processes, and some images are provided in Appendix 13 to give an indication of the scale of activities.

Afghans are enumerated in more intense ways than Pakistanis. National identity cards act as documentary sites that imprint and rigidify the national frontier in an era that has limited tolerance for transnational forms of existence or multiple senses/practices of belonging (Malkki 1995; 1995b; Monsutti 2005; Monsutti and Stitger 2005).173 The scale of enumeration is also related to the fact that to be an Afghan in Pakistan is increasingly to be a negative political being. Whilst at the global level all “Muslims”/“Arabs”/“South Asians” (Said 1997; Mamdani 2004; Rana 2011) are constructed risks (Douglas 1992[1966]), within Pakistan it is “Afghans” who undergo this “Othering” process. An intra-“Muslim” form of Othering within the apparent Muslim homeland of South Asia is taking place - a homeland that had previously used the rhetoric of Islam to encourage Afghans to seek refuge Pakistan. Further, the main US-led military actions in the GWOT from 2001-2012 have taken place in Afghanistan. Interlinked with this is the international community’s and the GOA’s focus on “rebuilding” Afghanistan. Afghan refugees are understood as a vital source of human capital that should be used to rebuild the Afghan nation as well as to win a counterinsurgency campaign, which explains why the GOA, 173 Afghans in Pakistan are anomalies and a threat to the “natural” order of the modern state. Indeed, the dominant “solution” they are offered by UNHCR is to repatriate. The other options of naturalisation and resettlement to a third country are not engaged with in the same way; and as UNHCR is dependent on the GOP to work it do not push the naturalisation agenda.
GOP, UNHCR, and of course the USA are primarily concerned with repatriation programmes (UNHCR-PK 2002a-2012; UNHCR-AF 2002b, 2003, 2004, 2007a-b, 2008; see also Tripartite Agreements 2003, 2006). To demonstrate the significance of repatriation efforts and its connection to US counterinsurgency tactics a slight, but useful, digression is necessary.

During fieldwork in Peshawar I was repeatedly told by Afghans that in the immediate post-2001 years (i.e. 2002-05) that leaflets had been “dropped” in different Afghan RTVs in Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and FATA, which were calling on Afghans to “return” to Afghanistan in an effort to “rebuild” the state. In the discussions and rumours, Afghan residents said that they did not know for certain who had dropped these leaflets, but in one case Engineer Aziz (PXA59) and his neighbours said they had been dropped by air and suspected that the leaflets had “probably been dropped by the Americans, of course”. Engineer Aziz said, “The leaflets said that it is safe now to return to Afghanistan, that our homes are free… but how could this be true, when there is still a war taking place in Afghanistan?” In addition, in one of my interviews with Engineer Aziz, Engineer Aziz said:

A year ago [2010] they [US state representatives] held a grand meeting to speak to us and our representatives to inform us that they have made a difference to our lives – that they have bought us stability, that they have come to make our country stable and give us democracy. (Engineer Aziz PXA59).

Thus, here, the efforts of repatriation are inextricably intertwined with broader state-building and counterinsurgency efforts.

Returning back to the importance of computerised identity cards in Pakistan and increased Afghan enumeration, it is evident that this intensification and subsequent normalization of identity cards works to impresses national boundaries on Afghan bodies in more intense,
individualising, and new ways.¹⁷⁴ During the 1980s and 1990s only family heads, usually men, held ration passes or were registered with mujahidin resistance parties (Appendix 13). However, now, all individuals over the age of five must have a POR card, and all children under the age of five are registered on the back of one of their parents POR card - this can be compared with Pakistani citizens who can only receive a CNIC after the age of 18 (Appendix 13).

In everyday life grades of differences between Afghans and Pakistanis are experienced because of identity cards. The everyday formal-informal political activities discussed in the previous chapters shows how citizens and non-citizens live in shared realities, but identity cards are increasingly suffocating everyday life. Computerised identity cards are necessary for official routes to purchasing “Pakistani” SIM cards, registering at government and private schools, colleges, and universities,¹⁷⁵ getting treatment at government hospitals, purchasing (Pakistani only) and renting property, paying for utility bills, voting in elections (since 2011), and, as will be shown shortly, navigating through check-posts. Whilst other paper documents can be used (Sadiq 2009), such as real and counterfeit college identity cards or driving licenses, official identity cards increasingly matter.

Afghans with the POR card face greater obstacles than Pakistani citizens because they do not have the “right type of card”. Correctly or incorrectly¹⁷⁶ everyday institutions often only accept

¹⁷⁴ Parallels of this have been deeply debated in the post-colonial discourse influenced by Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978), to show how colonial practices of enumeration (Cohn 1987, 1996) were never really scientific and neutral but rather also created forms of contestation (Dirks 1994; Rai 2004; D.Scott 1999) and/or reified existing social asymmetries (Dirks 1991).
¹⁷⁵ For those under the age of 18’s parents’ cards are used.
¹⁷⁶ Incorrect examples occur when Afghans are eligible to access some material goods but not given this access. This is either as a result of a lack of knowledge by Pakistani actors or it is the result of increased discrimination that Afghans experience at local levels. For example, the computer databases of mobile phone operators dispensing SIM cards initially did not recognise the POR card, even though SIM cards are not illegal for Afghans. And, although in 2011 Pakistani officials told me that “Now Afghans can also buy SIM cards” (interview: Azam 2011), it is still difficult, if not impossible, to purchase a SIM card using the POR card. Similar situations arise for bank accounts; and many Afghans mention that some private
the Pakistani CNIC. Rights that are reserved for citizens are policed and “protected” with greater ferocity. Even some of the informal urban gains that Afghans have achieved are reversed. Buildings that are “owned” by Afghans or occupied by them are treated with increased suspicion. For example, Ibrahim Hafiz, who was introduced in the previous chapter, has noted increased “interest” in his property by local Pakistani officials (Ibrahim Hafiz, PXA41). This also helps explain why the interviews with Afghans who own property in Pakistan discussed in the previous chapter were more difficult to complete.

Some Afghans have, during the 1970s-2000s, informally gained C/NIC cards, which allow them to become “paper” Pakistanis (Sadiq 2009). However, even these cases are being overturned. This was observed in ethnographic observations and interviews with Afghans and representatives of the tripartite parties who oversee the POR card registration and renewal process (as well as in media reports – see Appendix 12). Observations and interviews in NADRA Afghan registration centres when the 2006-2007 POR card was being updated to the 2010-2011 POR SCAC card were completed and in one interview a Pakistani NADRA worker said:

> Now if anyone possesses an Afghan card and a Pakistani 
> sbanakti
> card it [the CNIC card] immediately gets flagged up on the system when they come in for registration. This is how we catch them out (interview: NADRA02 2010).

The same NADRA worker also upgraded NIC cards to CNIC cards in the Pakistani scheme. He continued:

> If Afghans had the older (non-computerised) identity card (NIC) and went to get the CNIC they got caught out. The database for schools, colleges, universities, and even government hospitals have turned Afghans away after they showed them the POR card. Examples of this were captured in interviews and legal aid documents which I collected from UNHCR’s implementing partner, SHARP (2008-2010).

177 Representatives from the Afghan Refugee Repatriation Cell (ARRC) in Karachi, CAR in Peshawar, UNCHR, and the MORR (GOA) oversaw the card renewal process and NADRA workers executed the mechanical processes of registration.
the new card asks for more details, family trees etc. You can pull out the whole family tree system, which goes into more detail. It is here that they (Afghans) get caught: in the [family] histories (ibid).

Mansoor is an Afghan Tajik (Mansoor, KHA65) and interviews were conducted with him at a NADRA office in Karachi and in his home, with his immediate and extended family (without the presence of any officials) in an unregulated settlement outside of Sohrab Goth. On one occasion Mansoor walked out of the NADRA centre after seeing his paternal uncle being caught with having both a POR and a CNIC by the computer systems. He said afterward, “I cannot risk them cutting up my CNIC card” (ibid). In another interview, Rostam, an Afghan fabric wholesaler who has lived in Karachi since 1982 and possesses a Pakistani CNIC card as well as Pakistani property, said:

My relative had a CNIC card. He also wanted to get an Afghan [POR] card made [in case he goes to Afghanistan] but when he went to the registration centre to get the Afghan card made, his documents were “cut” [made void]. That is why I will not get an Afghan card made; I need my CNIC for my business (Rostam, KHA68).

Moreover, the GOP 2010-2012 Afghan Management and Repatriation Strategy (Appendix 5) outlines:

NADRA should launch a special drive to detect and cancel NICs[,] passports etc., fraudulently obtained by refugees and discourage the tendency of obtaining illegal NICs, passports, and domicile certificates (SAFRON 2010:Section IX:V).

A table that lists available online (English) media reports in which Afghans were caught in possession of CNICs by Pakistani officials is provided in Appendix 12, which includes a case in 2008 that reports “80,000 Afghans possessing CNIC cards” had CNIC’s revoked via NADRA’s updated technology (Dawn 29 Dec 2010).
By identifying and managing Afghans, the Pakistani state is trying to ensure that Afghan non-national bodies do not become a permanent (legal) feature of the state. Rather the objective is to,

Reduce the state’s responsibility towards the subjects. The state does not “chase” the subjects in order to catalog and embrace them; rather it chases them and spies on them in order to prove that they do not belong to it (Handel 2010:264).

Intertwined with documentation is the increased legal specificity of the Afghan status in Pakistan. Unlike the 1970s-1990s there are now four clear categories of Afghans in Pakistan: registered Afghans who possess POR cards; illegal immigrants who have no legal documentation; Afghans with valid visas and passports; and Afghan Pakistanis who possess CNIC cards (and even this latter category is subject to challenges). A reversal of prima facie recognition - if indeed it was ever legally given (B. Khan 2012:4-5), even if the political rhetoric (i.e. SAFRON and CCAR 1981:3, see Chapter 3) and I/NGO material at the time suggested otherwise - is inextricably linked with the shifting Pakistani relationship with Afghanistan. As international pressure on the Taliban government in Afghanistan intensified during the 1990s, the GOP distanced itself from the Taliban (despite their involvement with the Taliban) and discouraged Afghan migration into Pakistan. The state wanted to reinforce lines of national distinction at the state level because of international pressures, which had direct consequences for Afghans in Pakistan or in transnational ways across the border. On November 9, 2000, Pakistan closed its borders with Afghanistan, also contributing towards the legalization of Afghan asylum seekers.

On February 2, 2001, a circular was issued wherein it was declared that all Afghan nationals without refugee cards/permits or valid visas would be considered ‘illegal’ migrants and would be treated as per the laws applicable to Foreigner Laws (B Khan 2012:2-7).

Anyone who arrived after 2001, or failed to register by then, such as Zalmay (KHA1) in Chapter 6, were not considered as refugees but economic migrants and assessed through a new Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process by UNHCR (B Khan 2012:2-9; Kronenfeld 2008). In 2001,
for the first time, a screening process known as “individual status determination” was introduced for new arrivals in RTVs in Nasir Bagh, Jalozai, and Shamshatoo Peshawar (B Khan 2012:9).

Those assessed to be eligible for international protection… were not given the status of refugee but were merely qualified to be ‘persons of concern’… entitled to ‘temporary protection. The GOP was aiming to close down the aforementioned camps [Jalozai and Shamshatoo] were alleged to be hotbeds for criminal and militant activity (ibid).

Discouragement continued most intensely after September 2001 and Pakistan’s firm decision of alliance with the US. This discouragement has been facilitated by biometric and computerised technologies. During 2001-2012 the main objective of the GOP, alongside UNHCR, the GOA and international donors, has been to repatriate Afghans from Pakistan to Afghanistan. The 2003 *Voluntary Repatriation Agreement* between the GOP, GOA, and UNHCR set the tone for future repatriation strategies. It referred to Afghans as “citizens who have sought refuge in Pakistan and not Afghan refugees” (in B Khan 2012:9-10; see also 2003 Agreement). It also introduced a scheduled repatriation programme with a time-limit. This was initially set to last for three years but has since been extended a number of times. *The Afghan Management & Repatriation Strategy 2007* was approved by the Pakistani Cabinet in May 2007 and for the first time spoke of the “deportation” of Afghan “illegal” migrants (B Khan 2012:11). The *2010-2012 Afghan Management & Repatriation Strategy* (Appendix 5), informed by the *2010 Voluntary Repatriation Agreement*, also stresses the “temporary management” of Afghan POR card holders in Pakistan (SAFRON 2010: Section 2; Section IX). The *2010-2012 Strategy* states that, “Unregistered refugees are to be considered illegal immigrant[s] and need to be deported/ dealt with under the law of the land” (SAFRON 2010: Section IX: II). It also calls for a “Separate dedicated [police] force to trace the
unregistered Afghans” (SAFRON: Section IX: III). In addition, the primacy of repatriation is seen via financial incentives that official UNHCR repatriation programme offers ($150 financial assistance per head to each family, which is received at encashment centres in Afghanistan). It is also seen in the symbolic act of cutting the POR card when Afghan returnees cross the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, where repatriating Afghans have their POR physically “cut” and they can no longer, legally enter, live, and move in Pakistan.

This tightening of the Afghan experience in Pakistan and emphasis on repatriation cannot be separated from the shifting geopolitical involvement of Pakistan in Afghanistan, and, as mentioned, a counterinsurgency campaign headed by Pakistan’s senior “partner”, as well as Pakistan's own internal “ethnic” insecurities, and the Pakistani state’s insecurity over the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (Tarzi 2012). No other non-citizens are subject to the same forms of enumeration and surveillance in Pakistan. For example, the number of Bangladeshi migrants - either “refugees” or “illegal immigrants” - in Pakistan is striking, specifically in Karachi (Befare 2009; Mehdi 2010; Sadiq 2009:161-2). However, there is no focus on Bangladeshis by international institutions such as UNHCR nor by the Pakistani government (bar NARA). This neglect is related to unresolved issues from the 1971 war, but more importantly it is explained by the fact that Bangladeshis are not “bodies” that need to be monitored in the same way as

178 Interestingly, though not surprisingly, the 2010-2012 strategy documents show some leniency to some groups, (though exact terms are not specified apart from the mention of business permits). These are towards the “rich” – “those who have invested over Rs.5 million in productive businesses should be allowed to continue their businesses” (SAFRON 2010: Section IX: VI) and, “Afghans that want to bring in investment of over Rs.50 million”. According to the document, “All countries in the world should encourage investment” (SAFRON 2010: Section IX: VIII). It also shows leniency towards cheap daily labour, the “skilled and unskilled” Afghans, which again is convergent to the GOP neo-liberal objectives of pushing towards “shiny” and “developed” cities (see chapter two). Finally, it adds leniency towards “single women who have lost their bread-earners and have no one to support them”.

179 Fieldwork and interviews were also conducted in Bangladeshi heavy settlements in Karachi. Many Bangladeshis said, “At least Afghans have some form of identity cards, we do not even have any document to say who we are” (Group discussion with Bangladeshi residents in an informal ghet near Liaquatabad, Karachi).
Afghans are. First, Bangladesh is not a bordering neighbour as Afghanistan is. Second, Pakistan has a vested political and military stake in Afghanistan, which is not the case with Bangladesh anymore (see fn6 and fn160). Third, international institutions such as the UNHCR are influenced by hegemonic superpowers via funding routes, i.e. the US, which has a vested interest in monitoring Afghans in the context of a counterinsurgency campaign. The separation between humanitarianism and counterinsurgency strategies, clearly, is thin. Finally, Bangladeshis are not constructed as the same type of negative political beings that Afghans in Pakistan and at the global level are, i.e. suspected “militants”, drug-dealers, “Taliban”.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, even when no Afghan involvement in internal acts of violence in Karachi or Peshawar is evidenced Afghans are blamed. The “dangerous” Afghan “Other” is a useful caricature to justify Pakistani political and military action and support of the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is also reproduced in public discourse. Afghans in Pakistan are reduced to sub-human, violent, and vicious site of “terror”. They are now constructed as “bad” Muslims – operatives of “Al-Qaeda”, the “Taliban” or a “dehshat ghard”. In an interview I conducted with Engineer Aziz, which was conducted in Pashto and Urdu, he specifically used the English word, “terrorist” to describe how Afghans were currently understood in Pakistan (Engineer Aziz, PXA59). His use of the word “terror” may have been influenced by his awareness of my English fluency and my position as a researcher, but it also reflects the penetration of this word into everyday language in Pakistan. He said:

This label that is associated with us - this label that all of a sudden has been thrust upon us - of “terrorists”. All of a sudden we heard it, “terrorist”! All of a sudden we, Afghans, had become “terrorists”. They never called us this before, because they needed us then (Engineer Aziz, PXA59).

As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, negative stereotyping is also experienced by Pakistani Pashtuns in Karachi. In Karachi, Pakistani Pashtuns are stereotyped by non-Pashtun discourses,
particularly of the MQM, as being responsible for the city’s drug, crime, and security problems. During fieldwork interviews and observations (and direct experience), police harassment of Pashtun (or suspected Pashtuns) was routine.

The police try to see if you are Pashtun or not – we have a bad reputation. Our name has been dishonoured by them. They see if you are Pashtun and if they think you are then they will stop you – irrespective. The police always harass us. Always, it goes without saying – this is just natural and obvious (Anwar Khan, KHA50).180

Pakistani Pashtuns are, however, to a degree safeguarded by virtue of being Pakistani, which is now identified and reinforced through the CNIC card. I now use James Ron’s (2003) “ghetto versus frontier” concept discussed in Chapter 3, which is related to geographic spaces and apply it to Afghan and Pakistani bodies. As a reminder, Ron’s work (2003) analyses the reasons for different types of state violence in different geographic spaces, showing that the state shares a sense of legal responsibility towards geographic spaces that are territorially well within the state, such as ghettos, which is not the case at national frontiers. As a result ghettos may face discrimination and forms of violence, but this is much less than what takes place at the frontier.

Ron’s (2003) notion of space can be extended to include human bodies, which is made possible through forms of computerised enumeration. Borders and distinct national spaces are not just located at crossing points but are also located in the lives and bodies of people (Khosravi 2010:99). However, this means that Afghan housing areas covered in previous chapters get treated differently than Afghan mobile bodies, because unlike geographic areas that are fixed within Pakistani territorial sovereign spaces, Afghan bodies are mobile and “unpredictable”

180 One meeting with Anwar Khan was interrupted when Yusuf Khan (KHP50.B), his younger brother, was stopped by the police on his way to meet us.
embodiments of an Afghan national frontier and threat. Indeed, whilst some authors conceptualise the frontier as a space that “builds and connects” different communities (Marsden and Hopkins 2012:4), in Pakistan, the “Afghan frontier” is constructed as a “dangerous” non-national Afghan space/body, in which the bounds of legal responsibility and penetration of the state do not full apply.

In Karachi, then, Pakistani Pashtun bodies via their CNIC cards belong “well-within” (Ron 2003:16) the Pakistani state. This means whilst Pakistani Pashtun bodies are “ghettoised” and despised by Karachi’s official actors they are not, like Afghans, a walking/talking “dangerous” frontier figure. In Karachi, the Pakistani Pashtun body is “ghettoised” but the “state bears substantial responsibility for their welfare” (Ron 2003:9). This means that despite being negatively stereotyped in Karachi, Pakistani Pashtun bodies fare better than Afghans, particularly when it comes to passing through a check-post or being detained by the police, i.e. they may be harassed, as the interview with Anwar Khan shows, but their experience will not match the Afghan one.

Afghan bodies on the other hand are living and mobile embodiments of the frontier (Khosravi 2010:99; Ron 2003). In fact, they embody the wrong side of the frontier, which is made clear via the

181 FATA too has continually been placed on the frontiers of imagination and administrative rule by the colonial, post-colonial, and neo-colonial paradigms that have shaped the modern state experience of Pakistan and Afghanistan (Haroon 2007; Hopkins and Marsden 2011; Tarzi 2012). Indeed, FATA continues to be categorised as Tribal Areas and not full provinces. There is limited institutional infrastructure from the Pakistani state in FATA, from mundane radio and television presences, to government schools, hospitals, and buildings. During fieldwork I was told that, “There is not any development here; not because we do not want it, but because they [the GOP] do not care for the people here... what do they know of FATA” (Murtaza, PXP8). And, authors such as Amin Tarzi state that the incorporation of “FATA into Pakistan proper” is essential for improved Afghanistan–Pakistan relations as it will lay to rest Afghan claims to, and Pakistani insecurity of, the Durand Line (Tarzi 2012:28). This position of FATA on the margins of Pakistani imagination explains why it is easier for FATA to be bombed, and not say,
Afghan POR card. The proliferation of negative stereotyping and scapegoating creates a culture of fear and risk associated with Afghans, which combines with new individualising and penetrating forms of enumeration to form a potent mix. The Pakistani state is not bound “by the same legal and moral obligations” to Afghan bodies (Ron 2003:9), which explains why Afghan bodies face forms of greater violence as they move across cities in Pakistan. These transgressions are visible in everyday routine harassment and humiliations that Afghans face.

Humiliating and Harassing Afghans: The Check-Post, Mobility, Detention, Deportation, and Crime
Humiliation is a non-material concept interlinked with constructions of self-worth and dignity. According to Fattah and Fierke, “emotions such as humiliation or betrayal are universal”, but are “given meaning in culturally specific forms and in response to historically and contextually

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Lahore (which also has significant and high levels of violence), which again fits in with Ron’s idea of the “frontier” as being a zone more vulnerable to transgressions by state and non-state actors (Ron 2003). In recent history this helps explain the military campaigns and drone attacks that have dominated FATA. In addition, residents of FATA are also negatively stereotyped as responsible for producing the “safe havens” that have sheltered the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. But whilst the physical region on the whole is imagined may be a “frontier” – and even this is not a “full” frontier - this does not always translate to the “bodies” of individuals from FATA. This is because, ultimately, FATA residents carry Pakistani citizenship cards – the CNIC. FATA bodies are thus considered “well-within” the Pakistani state. They are Pakistani bodies. This means they do not face the same issues that Afghans do at the check-post in cities such as Peshawar. This can be seen in the example of two friends in Peshawar. One, Ziauddin (PXA60) is 29 and an Afghan Pashtun who studied in Pakistan and for a short-time in Tajikistan. Ziauddin and his family have been living in Peshawar since 1982. The other friend, Murtaza (PXP8), is 28 years old, a Pakistani Pashtun from Khyber Agency (FATA), who runs a furniture business in Peshawar’s karkhano area. Ziauddin moved into Peshawar proper approximately 10 years ago (2001). In a semi-structured interview with both of them in the home of the Ziauddin, I asked both of them if they ever face any issues when they were at the check-post in the city. Murtaza responded that, “I have a CNIC card, so they say nothing to me, they know I am Pakistani. However, for him [Ziauddin] the situation is different” (Murtaza, PXP8). Ziauddin responded with a simple, as if obvious, “Yes!”, and started discussing police harassment in the city. “The police are always ready to make problems; they’re after money. You have to understand the injustices and harassments that Afghans face. The police stop you and say that you are hiding something, when you are not” (Ziauddin, PXA60).

The GOP does still have legal obligations to Afghans reflected in international law, agreements with UNHCR and the GOA, and its role as “guardian” of Afghans in Pakistan, which is upheld via institutions like CCAR. This means Afghan do not face the same degrees of violence that James Ron (2004) uncovers in his work at the Serbian frontier, i.e. of ethnic cleansing.

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specific events” (Fattah and Fierke 2009:71). In addition, Fattah and Fierke highlight that an understanding of a “prior equilibrium” is also needed to understand “humiliation and betrayal”. Within this historical state of equilibrium, “all humans have identity and a degree of agency measured in self-respect, trust in their social world and thereby a sense of safety” (ibid). Humiliation (and betrayal) takes place within a relationship “where one party, who expects a higher status, is lowered in status and feels shame or a loss of self-respect” (ibid). Afghans expressed sentiments of humiliation as they are routinely stopped at check-posts, searched, asked to pay bribes, face verbal and physical abuse, and experience arrest without legitimate justification. Afghans undergo these experiences in ways that Pakistanis do not and during fieldwork many Afghans felt these acts reflected a rapid lowering of status, or as Fattah and Fierke state, “a disruption of equilibrium” (ibid). Previously revered (“People used to give up their seats for us on the bus - that is how much we were honoured” [Engineer Aziz, PXA59 – Chapter 1]), the shift of the Afghan position in Pakistan has been sudden and deep (“All of a sudden we, Afghans, had become “terrorists”” [ibid]).

At the micro-level these actions are shaped by corrupt local officials who view Afghans as objects that can be exploited for illegal profit. However, at a macro-level these acts, repeated time and time again, reflect a “performance” of sovereignty (Blom Hansen 2005). Everyday forms of sovereignty are repeated by everyday performance of violence and “reproduced through ritualised everyday laws, the killings of criminals as well as enemies of the state, or those who did not pay absolute respect [to the sovereign]” (Blom Hansen 2005:6). Repeated and ritualised requests for bribes, stop and searches, physical and verbal abuse, and arbitrary arrest reflect a strategy of exclusionary discipline.
**The Check-Post & Mobility**

Increasingly, Karachi and Peshawar resemble fortress towns. Check-posts and road blocks dominate urban roads. Stop and searches are a routine part of daily life and in order to get through the check-post and identity card is essential. The check-post is meant to act as a public site of theatre (Handel 2011) to survey, police, and deter subversive political actors, i.e. potential bombers. Indeed, in light of the number of internal bombings in Karachi and Peshawar check-posts are considered as a crucial form of surveillance. Accurate figures of the numbers of Pakistanis killed since 2001 in Pakistan are not available, but estimates from 2004 range “between 14,780 and 43,149... and more than 40,000 injured”, mainly through internal bombings (CW 2012). Bombings leaving over 40 people dead in a week (15 December 2012, Peshawar Airport Attack; 17 December 2012, Jamrud Bazar Khyber Agency Blast; 22 December 2012 ANP Peshawar Meeting Blast), and blasts such as Khyber Bazaar blast 9 October 2009 (Peshawar), or the 7 October 2010 Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine blast (Karachi) are now a “routine” feature of urban life. Police and ambulance sirens form the background music to the cities. Periods of “lulls” in violence and bombings are not taken for granted, and asking people about the “conditions” (*halaat*) is a routine part of daily conversation. In this thesis interviews were completed with Afghans who had also been victims of the internal bombings within Pakistan. In one interview a man took off his shirt to show how his body had been violently scarred by the 2009 Khyber Bazaar bombing. I left the room as he showed the male friend I was with the rest of his body, with the scars covering his legs and back (Jan Mohammad, PXA31.B). In another case a child’s face had been deeply disfigured as a result of an internal bombing. “This is the city of amputees, for one reason or another”, a medical doctor in Peshawar said.

For ordinary Afghans in Pakistan the check-post, however, has also taken on a more perverse role. The check-post is not just about security and protection of the city and residents from bombings – as important as this is. For Afghans the check-post also acts as a public site of
“theatre” for disciplining Afghans via harassment and humiliation strategies, which reduce feelings of self-worth, in order to “encourage” Afghans to leave Pakistan. Afghans, find it more difficult to pass through the security check-posts than Pakistanis and are now easier to identify via the POR card (or by having no identity card). Whilst previously distinguishing between Afghans and Pakistanis may have been difficult, now who is Afghan and who is Pakistani is known with greater certainty through identity cards. In order to get through the check-post Afghans are much more likely to have to engage in some practice of negotiation, usually the payment of bribes. Amal Jamal focuses on concepts of “racialised time” among Palestinians to highlight how this results in a specific form of dehumanisation (Jamal 2008 in Zureik 2011:17-8). Jamal, building on Martin Heidegger’s work, shows that, “control over one’s time is an essential human prerequisite”, which “distinguishes humans from animals” (ibid). In the Afghan case (similar to the Palestinian case) the denial of control over time because of the check-posts, results in a theft of Afghan time and means that the value of Afghan life as being distinctly human is not recognised. In an interview with Ibrahim Hafiz (see Chapter 5) he noted that he and his business suffer considerably in the current climate of stop and searches.

The police are systematic as they check Afghans at all of the different entry points in Peshawar; at the six-gates – Hayatabad, Phase 6, Phase 3 pull, Ring Road… How are we supposed to get anywhere, it takes so long. Hayatabad was being made in 1994 by us, Afghan workers, and yet we face these issues. Now you cannot live your life with any dignity. You live here without your honour and without your dignity. The police have no respect for us; we are not treated as humans here. Before things were relaxed, there was no pressure or troubles. But now the situation has changed (Ibrahim Hafiz, PXA41).

183 In addition if you pay attention to the Afghan POR card it is written in English (Appendix 13) compared to the Pakistani CNIC which is in Urdu. This also contributes to the problems that Pakistani police forces have when they are presented with the card, as many officers cannot read English, and do not accept the card as valid. Some education initiatives were conducted by UNHCR and circulars issued by CAR regarding the POR card. However, given the political attention that is attached to Afghans in Pakistan it is unlikely to be the main explanatory cause.
Ibrahim Hafiz’s excerpt also shows that movement is restricted. For Ibrahim Hafiz these actions actively infringe on his “honour” and “dignity” (Ibrahim Hafiz, PXA41). Ariel Handel (2011:268) outlines the check-post as a public site of theatre, which “is not a surveillance apparatus but an uncertainty production post that is designed to control movement – not to regulate it but to minimise it”. Afghans thus do not live fully free lives. Instead their movement is restricted, caged, and increasingly suffocated. In one interview in Hayatabad, a 25 year-old Afghan man, Ferhan Rashid, who was living with his parents, with his father having recently suffered a nervous breakdown, mentioned how he longed for freedom of movement.

Sometimes, I wish I could move and be free… I feel like a caged bird. We [as a family] are constantly stressed and in each other’s faces, but because we find it difficult to move we cannot do anything else. Our lives and those of others face a lot of (internal family) problems now… there is a lot of tension (Ferhan Rashid, PXA19).

This restriction on movement is not experienced to the same extent by Pakistanis. Afghan mobility is severely restricted, curtailed, and subsequently localised, as are feelings of self-worth and a valued life. Pakistani mobility and self-worth is not. Thus when the Afghan compares his or her self-worth next to that of the Pakistani, in this situation, his or her status has a lower value. Where the previous chapters show that Afghans and Pakistanis exist in shared realities, at the check-post and in the “security” context, the shared realities between non-citizens and citizen reach a limit. Afghans and Pakistanis, friends, colleagues, neighbours, family members, and/or strangers see the other being treated differently in public spaces through public performances of sovereignty and deterrence via harassment and humiliation. The Afghan status and valuations of self-worth and dignity are lowered in an effort to “alter behaviour”, i.e. encourage repatriation, via emotional responses (Fattah and Fierke 2009:71-2). Even Pakistani Pashtuns in Karachi (and to a lesser degree Pashtuns from FATA in Peshawar) who are subjected to discrimination

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184 In other cases harassment and humiliation is used to send “messages” to the GOA in cases where Afghan and Pakistani state relations break down (a frequent occurrence).
and negative stereotyping, when faced with the theatre of the check-post and other cases of detention and harassment, are afforded significant protection via the possession of a CNIC card. They do not have to suffer through the same suffocating and stressful circumstances.

The difference of experience between Afghans and Pakistanis can be seen in the example of the two friends in Peshawar mentioned in Chapter 6, Mudassir (PXA36) and Mehboob (PXP12). Mudassir is 40 years-old and an Afghan Pashtun originally from Jalalabad in Nangarhar. He and his family migrated from Jalalabad in 1979. He returned to Afghanistan a year ago but returns to visit his friends and family (his parents, brothers, and in-laws still live in Peshawar). Mudassir said that he returned to Afghanistan the year before, and explained that:

Since 2001 things changed. We couldn’t even eat [earn an income]. I was concerned about when the police would next harass me at the check-posts. If you have money it is ok, you can get released… but without it becomes too much of a rush, you are always under some sort of pressure, you are always in a rush when you are moving across the city... I grew up in Pakistan since I was six or seven. It is my home too, all of my family are here, Mehboob and I have grown up together, and we went to school together, got married at the same time… I walked all of these streets with my friends. But the police… it got too much (Mudassir, PXA36).

When I turned to Mehboob, a Pakistani Pashtun who is originally from a rural village outside Peshawar, and asked him if he faced any issues at the check-post in the city he replied, “I just show them the shanakhti [CNIC] card and they say nothing”. Simple. Thus Mudassir’s status is lowered from his previous experiences of being revered in a place he considers home, especially when compared to his lifelong friend. An inculcation of fear and uncertainty through practices of humiliation, by slowing down time, by creating “pressure” on Mudassir’s availability of time and movement, make Mudassir feel less valued. The result is that Mudassir’s behaviour has been
altered; he has done what the GOP wanted. An Afghan has repatriated. Quotas are being met. The national borders are being safeguarded from a supposedly “dangerous” threat.

Most Pakistanis usually pass through a check-post quite easily, and instances of (individual and mass) arrest and deportation are non-issues. I entered into a database all the interviews I had conducted with Afghans and Pakistanis (this does not include ethnographic observations and daily interactions). 70.43% of Afghans I interviewed across Karachi and Peshawar said they have faced police harassment in the form of verbal/physical abuse, request for bribes, arrest, detention, deportation. This is in comparison to only 41.94% of Pakistanis I interviewed. By city, in Peshawar 72.65% of Afghans said they face police harassment, compared to 24.68% of Pakistanis; and, in Karachi 68.14% of Afghans said they faced police harassment compared to 58.97% of Pakistanis. A more detailed breakdown of these figures can be accessed in Appendix 6.

Table 1: Afghan vs. Pakistani experiences of police harassment, both cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of Afghan &amp; Pakistani police harassment experiences, Karachi &amp; Peshawar</th>
<th>385</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total respondents (Afghan &amp; Pakistani):</strong></td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan respondents</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total as a % of all Afghans interviewed in Karachi and Peshawar</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
<td>70.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No harassment</td>
<td>18.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown answer</td>
<td>10.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistani respondents</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total as a % of all Pakistanis interviewed in Karachi and Peshawar</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
<td>41.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No harassment</td>
<td>56.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown answer</td>
<td>1.94%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Afghan vs. Pakistani experiences of police harassment by city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of Afghan &amp; Pakistani police harassment experiences by city</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peshawar total respondents (Afghan &amp; Pakistani):</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total as a % of Afghans interviewed in Peshawar</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total as a % of Pakistanis interviewed in Peshawar</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Karachi total respondents (Afghan &amp; Pakistani):</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total as a % of Afghans interviewed in Karachi</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total as a % of Pakistanis interviewed in Karachi</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even in some cases where Pakistani citizens do not have a CNIC, local forms of knowledge and intelligence, such as detection of variations in Pashto dialects (in the case of police forces in Peshawar), or local familiarity (in both cities), means that these Pakistanis are often able to prove themselves as Pakistani, i.e. a non-negative stereotype and “threat”, and face reduced challenges in passing through the check-post. In an interview with Pakistani residents living a quasi-regulated housing area in University Town, I asked two property developers who lived in the area what they did in the event that they forgot their CNIC cards and were requested for it by local police officers (Meherban Aminullah, PXP4; Janat Gul, PXP5). One of the developers, Meherban Aminullah replied:
The police know us here, the same officers have seen us every day and know we are Pakistani, they won’t say anything to us (Meherban Aminullah, PXP4).

However, if an Afghan who does not have his card this situation is near impossible. For these Afghans, who often have the lowest forms of economic capital, i.e. the poorest, life and movement is restricted to slipping in and out of the shadows and engaging in practices of camouflage from official state forces. Highly localised realities are easier to exist in and movement across greater distances is avoided.

In Karachi’s Afghan Camp some of the poorer segments of the camp are without appropriate documentation, with some residents having migrated after 2001. One resident, Behrooz, works as a daily labourer 15 kilometres away and has no POR card or C/NIC.

I am scared every time I leave my house… on my way to and from work. Sometimes I worry so much, so does my wife, so I won’t leave. There are many others that just will not leave this area at all (Behrooz, KHA60).

Yaqoob Gul, who was present at the time added:

Many are too concerned to leave their houses. Those that do, even those with cards, what do they earn in a day - Rs.250? Even this is taken from them at the check-posts by the police… They snatch their daily earnings and daily bread from them (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10).

Police harassment and violation by other security forces are not unusual in Pakistan (Abbas 2011; ICG 2008; ISPU 2009; TI 2010; HRW 2012). A 2011 report outlines that the police in Pakistan complete “routine excesses, violations of human rights” (Abbas 2011:9). In 2010 the Pakistani police were named as the most frequent recipients of bribes in the 2010 Global Corruption Barometer of the Transparency International, with the weighted figure for police being 4.5. (1 is for not at all corrupt and 5 for extremely corrupt) (TI 2010; Dawn 10 December 2010). However, Pakistanis (devalued or not) do not undergo the same scale and type of harassment and forms of
humiliation that Afghans do. Indeed, during fieldwork questions such as, “Have the police ever asked you for money” were laughed at by Afghans for the sheer absurdity of the question. But Pakistanis took time in considering a response.

In this study, most Pakistani instances of complaint against police forces (at the check-post or otherwise) were for specific cases that affect both Afghans and Pakistanis,\textsuperscript{185} such as not helping in cases of crimes, asking for petty bribes, or as was shown in the example of Ishtiaq Goth in the previous chapter, siding with middlemen in cases of land disputes. However, these were shared issues amongst Afghans and Pakistanis. This is not to dismiss the negative perception of a “corrupt” police force, but it is to indicate that there is a difference in the degrees and types of experiences of dehumanisation that Afghan and Pakistanis face.

In this study, Pakistani Pashtuns in Karachi also faced similar forms of verbal abuse and denigration, indeed from the data breakdown of interviews completed 54.84\% of the Pakistani Pashtuns interviewed in Karachi during fieldwork reported cases of police harassment, compared to 31.11\% of non-Pashtun Pakistanis interviewed in Karachi (Table 4, Appendix 6). But the details of the interviews with Pakistani Pashtuns reveal that the forms of police harassment that they faced did not usually result in arrests, detention, court proceedings (unless criminal activity was involved), or deportations. Thus, as mentioned, the Karachiite Pashtun is safeguarded, to a degree, by virtue of the CNIC card.

Further, from fieldwork interviews and observations at check-posts (and occasional direct experiences myself on suspicion of being Afghan) the amount of money paid to officers shows

\textsuperscript{185} The cases of the Pakistani Baluch involved in the separatist movement within Baluchistan may, however, prove an interesting anomaly to the argument of this chapter, and one that should also be considered. The violent military clamp downs on Baloch demands for increased provincial power and/or separatism have resulted in hundreds of killings by state forces with many more and missing (See: HRW 2011).
that the Pakistani starting fee is much lower, Rs.50-100 compared to the Afghans starting fee of Rs.500 upward – in some cases extortionately high fees of Rs.10,000 and higher are also asked. (In both cases fees are then negotiated downward). For Pakistanis interactions with the police at check-posts result at most in a small bribe and these are not (usually) justified by local officials using the same dehumanising stereotypes and rhetoric that accompany Afghan cases. Excerpts from interviews show that Afghans are increasingly accused of being “terrorists” – “Al-Qaeda”, “Taliban”, “desbat gbard”, or “terrorist”. This is also combined with accusations of not “belonging” to the city. In one interview, Suleiyman, a factory worker living in Peshawar since 1992 said:

Every day on the way to work we know we will get stopped, or maybe after every four or five days. The police, they accuse us of being terrorists, of being Al-Qaeda. Tell me, if I was Al-Qaeda why would I be walking to work, [and working] in a factory? Tell me. What is the logic of this? They accuse us of being terrorists, Al-Qaeda! (Suleiyman, PXA22).

For Suleyman, he is dehumanised through the label of “Al-Qaeda”, reduced to a caricature, by the theft of his time, and by a routine enforcement of humiliation by local officials. He said, when speaking of the number of Afghans who have been arrested, that many “have lost their confidence now” (Suleiyman, PXA22). Feelings of self-worth, valuation, and dignity have been taken away.

In another interview, Junaid Tareen, a 26 year-old teacher living in Peshawar since 1996 tole me how he was slapped across the face by a local police officer, his physical space and body violated and humiliated and his position in Pakistan questioned (Junaid Tareen PXA104). He said:

The police officer slapped me across my face when I was coming home from teaching at college one day. He asked me, what I was still doing here [in Pakistan], that we create trouble here.

Here, Junaid was angered by the fact that he could not do anything:

I said he could not hit me. That I belong here, and am an insan, but it did not affect him.
In retaliation to the slap, which smacks the authority and claimed superiority and power of the Pakistani official onto Junaid - physically and emotionally - Junaid verbally expressed resistance, but this did not stop the officer, to whom he later paid a bribe. And again, whilst in Karachi Pakistani Pashtuns are also subjected to similar forms of verbal abuse and denigration, the Karachiite Pashtun is comparatively safeguarded by virtue of the CNIC card, as well as an awareness of the norms of “national rights”. Anwar Khan once said:

Our families have been on this land, what is called Pakistan, for thousands and thousands of years. We have always been here; we know that this is our land (Anwar Khan, KHP50).

Within Peshawar, the world's largest Pashtun city, Afghan Pashtuns are said to have an “easy time” (Chapter 2). However, during fieldwork this did not appear to be the case when it came to issues of police and state harassment. Peshawar is often constructed as an integral Pashtun capital in Afghan Pashtun and Pakistani Pashtun ethno-nationalistic discourse. Many public and academic commentators interchangeably use “Afghan” and “Pashtun”, ignoring the complex composition of the modern Afghan state, which is home to Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Mughals, and other “ethnic” groups. Through this conflation and the position of Peshawar in Pashtun nationalist discourse, it is assumed that Afghans in Peshawar are, effectively, at “home”. In Paper Citizens Kamal Sadiq (2009:53), using the 2005 Census of Afghans in Pakistan, states the majority of Afghans (81.5%) are Pashtuns, “which means they can easily be absorbed into the larger co-ethnic Pakistani Pathan and Pashtun communities”. Whilst social (as well as cultural and ethnic) solidarities do transcend national boundaries, and whilst at a local and informal level (as the previous chapters have shown) citizenship does not count for much, in the security context and in interactions with the state it does have importance. To be an Afghan Pashtun among Pakistani Pashtuns is not to be at “home”. Indeed, in Peshawar 78.89% of the Afghan Pashtuns I interviewed in the city complained of police harassment (Table 3, Appendix 6). This can be
compared to only 24.68% of the Pakistanis I interviewed - 94.81% of whom were Pashtuns, in Peshawar.

In addition, ethnic variances within the “Afghan” category add nuance to the Afghan experience in Peshawar. Afghan Tajiks, Turkmens, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Kabulis and others are more noticeable as Afghans than Afghan Pashtuns as they speak Tajiki, Turkmen, Uzbek, and Dari (rather than Pashto) and (sometimes) considered to look different and more easily identifiable by Pakistani officials. Their visual “threat” and presence is even greater than for Afghan Pashtuns. Indeed, in Karachi all Afghans are absorbed under the Pashtun/Afghan “Other” framework, which explains how a number of Afghan Tajiks and Uzbeks have made CNIC cards, and are assumed to be “Pathans” by non-Pashtun Pakistani actors. However, in Peshawar, a Pashtun city, the differences within the Afghan category are more easily picked up on. As one interviewee, an Afghan Turkmen living in Peshawar noted:

I always get stopped. I can’t even make a fake CNIC in Peshawar because the police will know I am not a Pashtun (Khizar, PXA81.B).

**Individual and Mass Arrest: Collective Punishment**

Unlike Pakistanis, many Afghans, registered and unregistered POR card holders, have faced consistent and large scale arbitrary arrest and deportation, primarily since 2007 onwards, i.e. after the introduction of the POR card. Registered Afghans are legally allowed to live and move in Pakistan, but despite this numerous cases of arrests under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act were evident. In an interview with a human rights lawyer for Afghans in Pakistan the lawyer said:

Male detention occurs in an extremely high number of cases – it is not unusual. People will be arrested on the basis of being

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186 The statistics in this thesis show that non-Pashtuns Afghans face less harassment than Afghan Pashtuns (60.87% of non-Pashtun Afghans interviewed in Peshawar complained of police harassment compared to the 78.89% of Afghan Pashtuns interviewed). However, this is likely to be a sampling issue as the number of non-Pashtun Afghans interviewed in Peshawar was small and female-heavy (Appendix 6).
Afghan and detained. If Afghans are committing criminal activities why are they not arrested under Pakistan’s criminal laws? Why are they arrested under the Foreigners Law? (Interview: Siddiqi 2011)

In 2009 and 2010 mass arrests were visible on an unprecedented scale amid discussions of renewing the Afghan POR cards. These acts were possible, in part, because of a lack of clarity about the Afghan legal position in Pakistan as the POR card expired in December 2009 and official renewal was not explicitly agreed until 2010. Some circulars were issued by CCAR (CAR-KPK 2009, 2009b) to state that in 2009-10 Afghans, despite the expiry of the POR card, Afghans still had permission to remain in Pakistan, however, a lack of clarity and communication within the different GOP departments and institutions meant that even the legal courts were unsure of the Afghan legal position in Pakistan. In one Judicial Magistrate court case in Peshawar in February 2010, an Afghan applicant was arrested under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act. The Afghan was a POR card holder, yet because of the confusion surrounding the extension of the POR cards the application for bail was rejected.

This court feels that Afghan Citizens who are/were refugees, but their statues of refugees have ended on 31-12-2009 and their status have not been renewed by the concerned officials, hence they have become foreigners in circumstances and hence they should not be entitled for bail on concession on the basis of old Afghan Citizenship card. (February 2010, AJ son of GK vs. the State. Bail rejected).

However, the mass arrests of 2009 and 2010 were not just about a lack of legal clarity. The 2009-10 mass arrests also served the purpose of harassing and humiliating Afghans in a collective way in which Afghans as a whole were being informed of their reduced status in Pakistan. It has also served as an important political message to the GOA from the GOP, which the GOP and other refugee host states intermittently make, in order to display their sovereignty and bargaining position with regards to the GOA - even if the “real” impact on the GOA is minimal. As state
level relationships between Afghanistan and Pakistan have become increasingly strained during the 2000s, Afghans in Pakistan are often on the receiving end of the frustrations of this relationship. Afghan bodies are the sites in which the shifting geopolitical objectives of the Pakistani state are played out. One human rights lawyer said:

Afghans are constantly subjected to police harassment. Often it serves as a pressure point to the Afghan government if a Pakistani political leader/government needs to make a point (interview: Siddiqi 2011).

On the ground, only one implementing partner of UNHCR, the Society for Human and Prisoners’ Rights (SHARP), which is only active in Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad (cities with smaller Afghan demographics) and not Peshawar or Quetta (cities with the highest Afghan demographics), was present to negotiate with Pakistani police forces and representing Afghans in Pakistani magistrate courts for the lawful release of Afghans. (This support, however, was only afforded to POR card holders). Otherwise Afghans (both POR and non-POR card holders) had to rely on themselves, solidarity networks, and navigation practices with police forces after arrests. This navigation usually involved paying bribes. If it could be afforded. When arrests went to court often private legal advocates were hired, but again, only if it could be afforded. Rumours continued to circulate throughout fieldwork about the numbers of Afghans that are languishing in jails, not able to afford access to any form of legal aid or informally negotiate their way out of prison. Indeed throughout fieldwork, interviews were dominated by this topic. “The police! The police! The police! You must ask what they have made of us!”; a group discussion on the outskirts of Karachi once powerfully said. “The police!” were words said with a shudder for most Afghans during fieldwork. Given the circumstances, there was heightened sensitivity about sharing information regarding arrests when I conducted interviews. Usually information and experiences about police harassment either at the check-post or through individual and mass arrest was only shared after a degree of trust had been built up and interviewees were satisfied
with my status as a researcher (not in any way affiliated with the GOP or a national or international institution). For example, part of my ethnographic fieldwork involved accompanying teams involved in the PPVR Household Survey’s (2010-11) in Peshawar and the wider Khyber Pakhtunkhwa area. The survey has specific question about detention (SAFRON et al., 2010b 7.14-7). I never encountered any interviews over a three-and-a-half month period with an answer that said, “Yes”. However, in some cases I returned to the exact same households at a later point, introduced myself as an independent researcher, with no GOP affiliation, and explained the purpose of my research. During these interviews, I was told in greater depth and detail about cases of police harassment and arrest. Other examples of this occurred in Afghan Camp. When I was present with representatives from CAR/ARRC, I was given insightful, but formal interviews where the main issue of Afghan Camp was restricted to discussions around water. However, as my position in Afghan Camp developed apart from GOP affiliated actors many people were much more willing to talk about cases of police harassment.

In an interview with Habibullah from Afghan Camp he said:

There was a time last year [2009-10] when people were constantly being arrested, one elder had to go and get 150 people released who were arrested at one time. At another point 40 people were taken. This is what we had to deal with. Our women were taken too. They [the police] would demand money from each person, from each man the police said, “Pay us Rs.10,000, Rs.20,000 and you can go”. Who had this money? They stopped our women as well – they still stop the ladies and search them too. They are animals, they are not even human. Who knows what they are! No one is here to listen to our issues, to the things that have happened to us, to the times that we were arrested or to the harassment that we have faced. Is this just? Is it? Record this, the truth as to what happens to us (Habibullah, KHA13).

Here, women (often constructed as sites of honour) were also humiliated, which also contributed towards the emasculation of male Afghans, who could not complete their gendered duties to
protect “their” women. In addition, the scale of excessive and un-payable fees indicates that the actions of arrest are not to do with the disciplining Afghans into acting in accordance with the law. Rather these actions are a display of the norms of corruption, and the performance of Pakistani superiority in order to lower the value of Afghans in relation to the Pakistani.

As one interview with Yaqoob Gul highlighted (as well as numerous other interviews), the mass arrests involved families, friends, neighbours, and strangers, and were repeated across the country in 2009-2010.

At one point I was in Karachi trying to get people released. Then I was in Jacobabad, or Larkana, or Sukkur, or Kashmore. I had relatives telling me they were having problems in Quetta (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10).

Interviews conducted in all sites, Karachi, Peshawar, as well as other areas in Sindh, FATA, across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Islamabad revealed that during 2009-10 Afghans faced significant police harassment and chances of arrest, much of which also continued on in 2011. Abdul Wahid, introduced in Chapter 6, recalled how he was arrested in Peshawar and taken to prison after Eid in 2010.

One police officer asked me [It was a mobile police van, you know with Datsun vans]. He stopped me; he asked me about everything, first he asked me, “Are you from Afghanistan? Are you a *muhajir*?” I said, “Yes I’m from Afghanistan, and I say yes I am *muhajir*... because I am confident, I have everything. I have the ID [POR] card… He took it to his senior officer, he was sitting in the car, then he wrote the arrest form out, and took me to the police station. I was shifted to a cell where there were 15 or more Afghans there standing... there was no place to sit. In the morning we were then shifted to court. There were some judges there... what you have to say, the lawyers... it is getting funnier as I remember (Abdul Wahid, PXA1).

Again, in this case the performance of superiority, with the superior officer sitting in the car, remains clear. Abdul Wahid also mentioned how 15 other Afghans were present in the jail with
him. He said that the prison experience is almost a rite of passage for Afghans in Pakistan, reflecting the collective Afghan experience that is created in Pakistan:

> It is impossible that you do not see the prison at least once. This is a stamp to prove you are Afghan (Abdul Wahid, PXA1).

Similar to Julie Peteet’s (2002) study of arrest being a male rite of passage in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, the Afghan experiences of arrest in Pakistan is but another (male) “rite of passage”. Abdul Wahid continued to discuss the “awful” conditions in the cell:

> We were there for some time... it was dark; cells of children are different to those who are men like me. We had nothing. No meal, no beds. We didn't sleep at night – there was no place, it was full of other people. Most Afghans had been there for 13-14 days.

No longer satisfied with the political climate in Peshawar, Abdul Wahid has now moved to live in Islamabad in the hope that he will face fewer issues in the capital city.

Further, during fieldwork in Karachi, a story was circulating amongst different Afghans who lived around Sohrab Goth, the Super Highway settlements, and Afghan Camp. “You heard what happened to Hajji Tooraj [KHA73, a senior Afghan elder mentioned in earlier sections] didn’t you?” Sohrab Din and (KHA67) and Jahangir (KHA66) asked me as I sat in their shop informally, on my way home from fieldwork. I had heard something surrounding the elder in question, one of Karachi’s most senior elders who negotiates with CAR, UNHCR, and other actors, but was unsure of the full story. Sohrab Din continued:

> It turns out the police had arrested all of these Afghans near Gulshan e Maymar. The people who got arrested and their families phone up Hajji Tooraj to help them get out of the cells. So Hajji Tooraj turns up with some other elders, protesting and demanding that the prisoners be released. You know what the police did? They put Hajji Tooraj in jail! They don't even leave the elders alone! (Sohrab Din, KHA67).

187 Interestingly, Abdul Wahid adds that he met prisoners “Even from Africa, from Bangladesh I met several people… they could speak Urdu” (PXA1)
Even a key representative is not left alone in Karachi, pointing to the exertion of a collective display of discipline targeting Afghans. As thousands of Afghans were individually, collectively, and repeatedly arrested and transported to prison cells and police stations, a creation of a shared Afghan experience, of collective humiliation and discipline appears to have been enacted.

These collective experiences were further recalled in other stories, which were circulating in Karachi, where I was told how a newly married teenage woman had gone missing and were presumed dead after travelling back from Afghanistan with her husband and after having been subjected to police harassment and physical abuse. The husband, I was told, in despair kept on pleading with the police to tell him where his wife was.

There was a man who was coming back to Karachi from Afghanistan via Quetta… No one knows what to say to him. He had been in Afghanistan as he got married and he was bringing back his wife. She was from Afghanistan and had never lived in Pakistan before. Along the way the police stopped the bus that they were on and told them to get off the bus. The man was arrested. The police said his documents were incorrect even though he had his POR card and the required documents. He was taken to jail and the bus went off… He kept asking, time and time again, “Where is my wife”? He said that he had been repeating this the whole time that he was arrested. He said, “I don’t care what you do to me, but tell me, where is my wife?” They had arrested him, but no one knows to this day what happened to his wife. He still has not found her. She had never been here before. How would she know what to do…? God knows what has happened now. They are jabil (ignorant); they are zalims (oppressors)… This is janwari (animal) behaviour…” (Story repeated in discussions).

In this “waqiyā” (story), as I heard it, what should have been a joyous occasion was rapidly snatched away and transformed into a tragedy, or a “badsa” (incident). The life of a woman was narrated as having been lost and destroyed - physically and non-physically.
Deportations & Rotting Prisons
In a number of cases Afghans who are caught without POR documentation have been deported. The legality of this is derived from:

Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946 which allows the Federal Government to make orders providing that a particular foreigner or prescribed class of foreigners “shall not remain in Pakistan or in any prescribed area therein (B.Khan 2012:189).”

Again, official numbers of deportations are difficult to attain, although it was admitted to taking place in interviews with Pakistani and Afghan officials (interviews: Khaliqyar 2010; Maroof 2010), recorded in reports taken from human rights lawyers in Pakistan, some magistrate rulings, reports from SHARP, and interviews with Afghans in Karachi and Peshawar (see also B. Khan 2012). In interviews that I completed with Afghan residents in a rural-urban informal settlement in Peshawar I was told how the area experienced three police raids during which a number of men were detained, arrested, and some deported (Sibghatullah, PXA42). This residents said occurred despite the fact that there was no security threat in the area. In one family’s case, Spozmai spoke of her husband being deported as he did not have documentation (neither did she), but, “He just moved back across”, she said (Spozmai, PXA44). Similarly, in Karachi, in interviews across the city I was told how Afghans have increasingly been deported in the past few years, which “did not happen before” (Hajji Hayyat, KHA71; Mustafa Habib, KHA47; Rostam, KHA68).

B.Khan (2012:189-90) highlights that: “A private member’s bill was introduced in the National Assembly by MNA Shireen Arshad Khan on March 30, 2010 seeking to amend the FA [Foreigners Act]”. But because “The National Assembly Standing Committee is yet to submit a report on the bill… has not been discussed in Parliament. The bill seeks to: add the terms ‘asylum seeker’, ‘refugee’ and ‘endorsing authority’ (namely, UNHCR, NARA & CAR) to the FA; exempt recognized asylum seekers and refugees from the penal provisions of the FA; set a requirement that police officers must obtain a search warrant from a court before entering into a dwelling unit or property when seeking to give effect to orders, directions etc. in pursuance of the FA; prohibit the deportation of an asylum seeker while his status determination case is pending before the endorsing authority; and eliminate the existing bar against instituting civil or criminal proceeding against persons acting in good faith under the FA”.
In instances of deportation Afghans are booked by the police under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act for having no legal documentation and then face trial. Conviction for no documentation carries the maximum sentence of 10 years. Judges may be discreet and instead imprison Afghans for a day, a week, or a month (and so on), or they give orders for immediate deportation. However, the GOP is reported to have no money to physically deport prisoners or pay a third party to do so. And as non-POR card holders, UNHCR has no mandate to support these Afghans. In an interview with a lawyer working for the SHARP, I was told:

We can only defend registered Afghans. We simply have to turn down Afghans that are not registered. As our organisations work for all prisoners, we can try to be discreet. But UNHCR is only meant to help registered Afghans (Mehmood [SHARP] 2010).

And in an interview with a GOA official in Karachi a senior representative said:

[The Government of] Pakistan says that the GOA must take responsibility for the fees and the costs of deporting Afghans. They say they do not have the money. The problem is that the GOA does not have the money either. The past years have not allowed us to have this money...Where are we going to get the funds for this? (interview: Khaliqyar 2010)

In these cases prisoners are left to pay for their deportation themselves, if they can afford it, and only then are escorted out of Pakistan by Pakistani officials. But there are many cases where Afghans simply do not have the money to pay and are simply sitting in jail. “Have you ever seen a Pakistani jail?” one Afghan elder in Peshawar asked during an interview, “They are just trapped rotting (sarrahe hain) there… stuck in their own filth. Only God can save them”, he said (Abu Zakariya, PXA54). Cases of “sarna”, which literally means “rotting”, being eaten away, and sitting in their own filth reflects a dehumanised status of Afghans who are violently denied the

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189 In the interview the Afghan official said that, “We held a dinner here at the embassy. And we approached the attendees to cover the costs... enough money was raised to cover the costs for 200 prisoners” (interview: Khaliqyar 2010).
conditions which could enable the potentials of a “humanised” life to be practiced. Instead in Abu Zakariya’s understanding an Afghan life is reduced to organic decay and helplessness.

Further, Habibullah, speaking in a group interview with other residents of the camp recalled that:

I went to the prison [after a case of mass arrests] and there were 210 people there. Women were there too. I met three Afghans who were crazy. There is no justice here. One of them was very lively. There was one Afghan in there that has been there for ten years. He has gone completely crazy; I tried to talk to him and he just spurts <does motion>. I asked the guard, ‘Why is he like this?’ I asked the jailer, ‘Why is he like this?’ The jailer replied, ‘When we picked him up, when he came over from Afghanistan he was like this’. No! No! They [the police] have made him crazy. <Echoes of agreement across the factory>. It is they who have made him crazy. They have forgotten their humanity; they do not know what it means to be a human any longer (Habibullah, KHA13 leading an informal group discussion).

In this example, Afghans are dehumanised, hoarded together like cattle, and their mental capacities increasingly strained, and the body is stripped of its humanity (Scarry 1985) and unable to respond.

Sites of Self-Humanisation
Even in these cases the constructions of the “dangerous” Afghan and practices of humiliation are not, however, readily accepted, internalised, and reproduced by Afghans. There is space for agency and action. Unlike cases of torture (Lazreg 2008), in the examples discussed here state aggression against Afghans does not reflect the exertion of absolute power, where the body is stripped of its humanity (Scarry 1985) and unable to respond - although as the examples of mental degeneration demonstrate the “unbecoming” of the human body remains a real possibility.
In physical terms, many Afghans use solidarity networks to navigate around the Pakistani state or influence officials to change their actions. Habibullah negotiated with Pakistani officials in order to get releases for arrested Afghans. In other cases, Habibullah, Yaqoob Gul, and others facilitated border crossings and raised funds when individuals have not had money themselves. The case of Afghan Camp provides an interesting example through which solidarity networks and practices of navigation offer some space to “self-humanise”. Here a group of elders and residents have devised a process where they dispense their mobile numbers to residents: unrelated neighbours, relatives, and friends. During times of bad security conditions in the city when Afghans are more likely to be arrested - for example, if a bomb blast has taken place - many elders and residents either call people to ensure that residents of the camp are safe, have their numbers available in cases when individuals try to contact them, or go to negotiate with police officials, or in some cases scour the city in cases of severe violence, in a bid to counteract the tactics of harassment and humiliation. In one interview, Yaqoob Gul explained:

When the situation in the city gets really bad [either due to political conflicts between political parties or due to police harassment] I get a lot of phone calls from friends and people we know, people who are concerned. I advise them and I make phone calls myself and I tell them to sit within your own businesses [i.e. just go in your shops and shut the shutters], sit in your own homes, do not go outside, do not enter the city... stay in your own homes, stay inside (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10).

Similarly, in the informal housing settlement in Peshawar, Gul Kalay, a father, Afsandar Ali (PXA36), who has been living in Peshawar since 1992 recalled how his son was arrested but was able to get bail through his solidarity networks – specifically through bonds of friendship. Afsandar Ali migrated with his family from Sukhrod in Nangarhar province in 1992 when conditions in Afghanistan deteriorated. He has three sons who have been schooled in Peshawar, one of whom is still studying (Shin Gul, PXP37, who was arrested) and the other two are working. Afsandar Ali recalled:
[My son and his friends] they were out here playing cricket – just nearby. The police came and picked him up and took him in as a result. They took him in for no other reasons other than he was Afghan. He had to pay Rs.1000 – for what? In the police cell, the police were demanding Rs.1000... It was his friends that went and got him released. They are the ones, his friends, Afghan and Pakistani, who went and got him released, got the money together. As people we have no issues between us; but with the police the story is different (Afsandar Ali, PXA36).

Even in the earlier case of Abdul Wahid it was his family that came to help him get access to a court (Abdul Wahid, PXA1). This was a theme that was similarly repeated across interviews and documents collected in this thesis.

However, informal solidarity networks and navigation strategies are not always successful. The scale and reach of the networks is not fully effective. Many Afghans have been deported, others continue to be harassed on a daily basis, and passing through check-posts has not become easier. Indeed, in Afghan Camp, Yaqoob Gul also noted how once his relative had been killed in the main city, but because the conditions were bad, and the challenge of moving within the city increased he could not even retrieve the body for three days (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10). Even death occurs in non-humanised conditions, “His body, it just lay there” (ibid). For Afsandar Ali whilst the bonds of friendship enabled his son to be released, he was still arrested another time shortly after. During fieldwork Afsandar Ali’s son, Shin Gul, continued to find it difficult to pass through a check-post in the city (Afsandar Ali, PXA36). The GOP is still able to carry out its “disciplinary” strategy as a bribe has to be paid. Similarly Abdul Wahid continued to face forms of police harassment, and indeed he eventually moved to Islamabad in order to try to escape forms of harassment (Abdul Wahid, PXA1). Solidarity networks only offer a brief respite.
In non-physical terms, the constructions of the “dangerous” Afghan and practices of humiliation are not, however, readily accepted, internalised, and reproduced by Afghans. “Stories” of harassment and humiliation, some serious and some comic, are routinely circulated and retold amongst friends, families, and strangers. In part, they reflect an environment of uncertainty and fear that has been produced and retained in the consciousness and memories of Afghans - and increasingly in collective ways, as the earlier mentioned “stories” reflect. But crucially, they also reflect a space for mocking, humiliation, and dehumanisation of the unjust and immoral Pakistani “dehumanisation” regime itself. In one case, I conducted interviews with a group of Afghan men in their twenties who lived near me in Peshawar over a period of three months. During these interviews jokes regarding the times that they, or others, had been arrested were commonly shared.

Once, Khaled, Shaukat, and I were stopped. It wasn’t that late, we were on our way to Khaled’s brother’s wedding. But of course the police stopped us. “Afghan”, he said. So, we showed him our 

In addition, in the earlier story that was circulating in Karachi, people also demonstrated an attempt to humanise the Afghan life in question, and by extension the Afghan position in Pakistan, by juxtaposing the Afghan life against the injustice of the state. In that story, the Pakistani state, which is considered to have some responsibility towards Afghans, has betrayed its position of trust. In one instance a Pakistani man who also relayed this story to me, said, “I could not look him [the woman’s husband] in the eye. He just kept saying, again and again, “Where is my wife?” This is the condition of our state”. In the face of dehumanising experiences
and an inhumane state many Afghans understand that the positions they occupy are out of compulsion and necessity. Self-respect, personal responsibility, contextual awareness, and agency (Pollmann 2010) – even if they exist in an asymmetrical reality - are vocalised through these stories of resistance. The stories are not a utopian panacea, but they do allow Afghans to maintain an understanding of possessing a “humanised” existence, certainly more so than the juxtaposed inhumane Pakistani state and its actors.

**Delegitimized Guardians**

Both the GOP and, to a degree, UNHCR are considered the official institutions responsible to Afghans for the protection of material and non-material rights in order to provide the conditions for a humanised existence. However, it is clear that both the GOP and refugee regime do not simply fail in this effort but that they are also at the heart of creating and enabling the conditions of violence which Afghan lives are subjected to. Critically, however, by dehumanising Pakistanis, and more intensely Afghans via tactics of harassment and humiliation, the state and official actors are themselves reproduced as delegitimized and inhumane structures that fail in their duties of governance.

Forms of security control and surveillance are important tools and are needed in Pakistan where thousands of people have died in the past ten years alone from internal bombings and other forms of political violence. An issue of hypocrisy and scepticism, however, arises when enumeration is not simply about inclusive protection but is also about determining who lives and dies in the context of the GWOT, a war whose motives were continually questioned in the course of interviews and discussions. During the processes of enumeration, and shared intelligence (as discussed in the first section of this chapter), the trust and legitimacy of official
actors and institutions is deeply eroded. The state and refugee regime are expected to uphold basic rights such as safety from violence - indeed they project themselves as the “guardians” that are capable of doing so. However, the state and refugee regime are revealed not only as incompetent but complicit in allowing these rights to be violently snatched away. In a group discussion with several Afghan men aged between 30-45 the group spoke with guarded suspicion of the numerous enumerative purposes that UNHCR was involved in.

They are not doing this [enumeration] for us; they want to know how many of us there are. They are keeping an account and monitoring how many of us Afghans there are and know every single detail about our lives (Rastin, KHA8; Habibullah, KHA13; Saleem, KHA17; Tariq, KHA18; Gulzar, KHA19).

The security climate in urban centres has created an environment in which suspicion, fear, and rumours are now a norm. However, critically, this fear is not just against the “Talibani”, “terrorist”, “Al-Qaeda”, or any of the additional terms that are used to describe the “threats” (constructed or real) that are lurking within urban Pakistan. This fear is also against the GOP and local officials, including the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and the numerous international intelligence agencies that are rumoured to be operating in Pakistan from India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to the British Security Service (MI6). By being engaged in extra-judicial violence against these actors it is the Pakistani state that is also considered a site of terror, fear, and oppression. Michael Taussig (2002[1984]) analyses The Putyamo Report, which was submitted to the British government in 1913 after seven weeks of travel through the rubber gathering jungles of Caraparana and Igaraparana and six-months in the Amazon basin. In this he shows:

The system of torture [colonialists and rubber company employees] devised to secure rubber mirrored the horror of the savagery they so feared, condemned – and fictionalized (Taussig 2002[1984]).
Indeed, in the interview with Engineer Aziz he said, “It is they; it is the NATO forces, who are the real terrorists” (Engineer Aziz, PXA59). Increasingly the state is analysed through a prism and language of “terror” itself by both Afghans and Pakistanis. The state is understood as being cruel, callous, and inhumane. Throughout fieldwork state institutions and actors and international institutions were often automatically considered as being infiltrated with “jasoosi” (spy/intelligence) elements. Moreover, the continual reference to official institutions (namely the state, but also international institutions) as “ghadar” (traitor), “zalimi” (oppressive), and “na-insaaf” (without justice), “beghair insani” (without humanity), “jabil” (ignorant), or “janwari” (animalistic) reflects the deep lack of trust, which permeates Afghan and Pakistani relationships with official structures in this context of “security”, or rather insecurity.

As this chapter has demonstrated, experiences of state violence and enumeration are intensified tenfold for Afghans in Pakistan as Afghans face specific and targeted harassment and humiliation, and have a vulnerable (and unclear) legal position in Pakistan. The Pakistani state and its specific arms, such as the police, are delegitimized. Afghans are not wary of law, security,

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190 During fieldwork I was continually told by Afghans and Pakistanis to avoid working with any INGOs because they were assumed to be full of international intelligence operatives. Indeed in some INGOs I was actually introduced to retired military personnel. This would later informally be explained to me as “code for ISI”. In other cases with other colleagues in organisations that I was completing ethnographic work (I/NGOs, NADRA centres, and other enumerative bodies), a “game” that was played was “Spot the Agent”, where you would literally (as the name suggests) try to guess who the intelligence officer within the organisation was. Further, in discussions with Anwar Khan (KHP51) he said to me to, “Stay away from NGOs, especially when you are in Peshawar [and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa]. Over 70% of people have zero trust for them as most of them are infiltrated with some foreign and national intelligence agency or the other” (KHA51 2011). And, on a number of occasions by various sources in Karachi and Peshawar I was told that “over 30-40% of international aid agencies are infiltrated/working with some kind of intelligence service or the other”. Moreover, recent killings of I/NGO workers in Pakistan show how I/NGO workers have become symbols of the “(in)security” climate that dominates Pakistan. In 2012 this included the killings of a Swedish social worker in Lahore (December), a British Red Cross worker in Quetta (April), three Pakistani Christian aid workers (August); five Pakistanis polio workers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (December) (Dawn News 24 December 2012), and a further seven polio workers in Swabi, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Dawn News 1 Jan 2013). This mistrust of INGOs has been significantly influenced and increased after the killing of Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad in 2011, which is understood as having been reliant on the information of a local I/NGO worker. With these statements, I am not concerned at “proving” if INGOs are infiltrated or not, but I am concerned at demonstrating how various I/NGOs are constructed as symbols of distrust in a political climate of suspicion and intrigue.
and order, but they are in fear of a particular type of law, security, and order: the corrupted and objectifying Pakistani one, which appears to be the dominant, normalised order.

The refugee regime and UNHCR, which is set up to protect via presence, appears both impotent (unable to prevent harassment and humiliation from taking place) and complicit in the exclusion of Afghans in Pakistan. In Karachi, UNHCR has funded SHARP, its implementing partner, to provide protection for Afghans in the city. However, in Karachi its actions have not been able to assist all Afghans, and as mentioned earlier, there are no SHARP offices in cities with high Afghan demographics (Peshawar and Quetta). Because UNHCR and “the regime of refugee law owes its primary allegiance not to refugees but states” (Aleinikoff 1995:11) and acts to maintain the international order of states, illegal immigrants are left alone “to rot” in jails. The continued use of nationally segregating lenses means that humanitarian regimes are not as fully humanising as they would like to claim. Thus, the refugee regime and UNHCR’s role as a guardian is often met with sneers and scepticism, if it is ever even considered at all. The cases of Yaqoob Gul, Habibullah, and others assisting Afghan detainees demonstrates how many Afghans are in fact left alone to deal with the transgressions of the Pakistani state. Indeed, during semi-structured interviews in the interview segments regarding “help/protection from UNHCR” a blank face at the absurdity of the question was the usual response. The questionings of UNHCR’s “humanitarianism” and even its claims to neutrality are further challenged by the fact that UNHCR (and others) offer no support or enumeration to the sizeable Bangladeshi “refugee” population in Pakistan. This lack of support to Bangladeshis cannot be separated from the fact that Bangladeshis in Pakistan do not have the same geopolitical significance that Afghan bodies do in the context of a US-led counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Thus UNHCR, a seemingly neutral institution, also appears complicit with or at least vulnerable to the wider
political goals of global hegemons and, again, not necessarily concerned with the “humanitarianism” to which it lays claim.

Moreover, for Afghans, sentiments of betrayal by both the GOP and UNHCR (as well as failures of the GOA and former Unity of Islamic Resistance) run deep. As Fattah and Fierke (2009) highlight, betrayal occurs when, in a relationship, one’s status is lowered from the previous equilibrium. For Afghans the rapid descent of their status from iconic and mythologised warriors to objects who have no control over their time, space, and movement has deeply fostered this sense of betrayal. In his seminal lecture, Terrorism, Theirs and Ours, Eqbal Ahmed (1998:258) reminds readers that,

In 1985, President Ronald Reagan received a group of bearded men…. President Reagan received them in the White House. After receiving them he spoke to the press. He pointed towards them, I’m sure some of you will recall that moment, and said, “These are the moral equivalent of America’s founding fathers”. These were the Afghan Mujahiddin. They were at the time, guns in hand, battling the Evil Empire. They were the moral equivalent of our founding fathers! [...]The matter of terrorism [then] is rather complicated. Terrorists change. The terrorist of yesterday is the hero of today, and the hero of yesterday becomes the terrorist of today. This is a serious matter of the constantly changing world of images in which we have to keep our heads straight to know what is terrorism and what is not.

In the narratives collected for this thesis, including interviews carried out with former members and fighters of the “Afghan mujahidin”, many Afghans illustrated having felt used, reduced to objects only of geopolitical value - as Maulana Jamil ur Rehman highlights in Chapter 3’s opening statement, like “tissues” that could be thrown away once their use complete. Just by glancing at the narratives mentioned thus far in this thesis the disjuncture between past and present experiences is clear.
Since 2001 things changed (Mudassir, PXA36);

Now, you cannot live your life with any dignity…. Before things were relaxed, there was no pressure or troubles. But now the situation has changed (Ibrahim Hafiz, PXA41);

Then, at that point, it was a big deal to be an Afghan refugee…. Now we are thinking and now we feel that we are not recognised as refugees, that now we have no status, that now no one believes we are refugees…Now we get nothing. Are we human or are we not worth anything? We are nothing” (Engineer Aziz, PXA59);

I was greeted by the Washington State Department and thanked by the government for our efforts in the war, this was in 1995. After that they left us under the open sky to do what we could (interview: Maulana Jamil ur Rehman).

For Afghans, the GOP is considered responsible for providing basic safety and security from physical and emotional harm, especially in light of the promises of the 1970s and 1980s. At a bare minimum, the GOP is not expected to violently attack these basic rights by humiliating Afghans in strategic ways and for instrumentalist purposes. And at a bare minimum UNHCR is not meant to sit idly by and allow them to take place. The 180-degree shift that Afghans have encountered was not anticipated. By engaging in these practices, Pakistani official actors have betrayed their trust, a trust that they themselves promoted so vociferously during the 1970s and 1980s. The prevalence of harassment and humiliation that is conducted on Afghan bodies is witnessed by all, citizens and non-citizens, and is testament to the hypocrisy and betrayals by Pakistani (and other state) officials, and indeed its cruel character. In this chapter alone, the narratives are seeping with terms that describe Pakistani officials as oppressors. When the narrative of the “missing woman” is narrated it is not the woman who is the ultimate sub-human, but the Pakistani official. When the prisoners have been “made crazy” this is not the fault of the prisoners, it is the
officials who have made them crazy, through which their own character and legitimacy is compromised: “They have forgotten their humanity; they do not know what it means to be a human any longer”. At the very moment the state appears to be getting what it wants with the repatriation of Afghans, its own character, legitimacy, and morality are severely attacked. Here informal political action and navigation practices (protection & access payments via bribes) used by the state are not upholding the state or official actors in anyway. Instead they are a source of decay.

Whilst Afghans are not “citizens” in Pakistan, and therefore cannot impact votes or electoral power bases, the Pakistani state is still affected by its relationship with Afghans in Pakistan, as well as the reality of transnational lives across the Afghan-Pakistan border. The Pakistani state must think beyond the short-term for the actions in which it is engaged, which is important for both internal reasons and external reasons. The practices of harassment and humiliation increasingly appear to be occurring in a collective form and as such are retained in the collective consciousness of Afghans in Pakistan, as well as those who return to Afghanistan (or those who move elsewhere), which has been expressed in daily narratives or stories collected in this thesis. If the Pakistani state ignores, denies, and does not acknowledge the actions it has engaged in, the repercussions of its acts are likely to resurface. To borrow from Didier Fassin (2007:28), “Memory buried deep, does not disappear. History relentlessly resurfaces”, whether in a “knowing smile”, or a “racist crime” (ibid), or broken down relationships, and other forms of violence. On a regional level, thus, if the Pakistani state is serious about cooperation in Central and South Asia it must rethink the consequences of its actions – this is especially pressing given the transnational reality of the area. Furthermore, on an internal level, the problems of not rethinking its actions are even more urgent. Internally, these memories are retained in the consciousness of a people that are a real and active presence within Pakistan and particularly the
urban fabric of Peshawar and Karachi. As has been shown in the previous chapters, Afghans are an integral part of these cities. Their presence reflects an alternative way being, which is shared with many Pakistanis. But by using profiling tactics to harass, humiliate, and discipline Afghans, the Pakistani state is in effect creating resentful and mistrustful groups that, even if not legal citizens, are members of an active and important informal political space in Pakistan. This is the reality that the state cannot refuse to address and points to a potential future crisis point for the state. Fassin (2007) outlines that memory is not passive, it is continually mobilised, reappropriated, and reinterpreted, thus, all is not lost for the future of Pakistani state. However, in order for the state to be able to get to this point, its actions and policies must undergo serious re-evaluation.

**Conclusion**

“Citizenship” or identity appears not to matter when it comes to a story of survival or relative gains. However, it does matter when it comes to shifting geopolitical concerns, which is masked in and justified through the “security” context that dominates Pakistani cities. This chapter has shown that the limits to the shared realities that Pakistanis and Afghans occupy in Pakistan are reached in the “security” context in Pakistan, which combines with negative stereotypes associated with Afghans in Pakistan and more penetrative forms of enumeration and surveillance to culminate in a violent lived reality of insecurity for Afghans. To be an Afghan in Pakistan means to be subject to more violent forms of “national ways of seeing” and specific forms of dehumanisation via state harassment and humiliation practices. Whilst both Afghans and Pakistanis are increasingly enumerated, surveilled, and policed in the context of the GWOT and the war in Afghanistan and FATA, the Afghan experience is different and more intense within Pakistan when compared to Pakistanis – devalued or not. Afghan bodies are perceived and read as mobile embodiments of the frontier – and indeed the wrong side of the frontier – in which the
shifting geopolitical objectives of the Pakistani state are practiced. (Indeed, even the disciplining of the Afghan state to meet Pakistan’s Afghan foreign policy objective with regards to Afghanistan seem to take place on Afghan bodies in Pakistan). Critically, however, throughout these processes the Pakistani state and even the refugee regime do not remain unscathed. Because UNHCR is effectively silent about the processes of harassment and humiliation Afghans face and is a driver behind population profiling, UNHCR is understood as an impotent actor as well as a guilty party in the betrayal of Afghans in Pakistan and at the global level. In addition, UNHCR's impotence regarding “illegal” Afghans who are “rotting” in prisons fundamentally questions the label of “humanitarianism” to which the organisation lays claim. This is compounded by the fact that UNHCR’s neutrality is questionable as its interest in “protecting” Afghans cannot be separated from the significance given to the US-led counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan in the current international order. The lines between humanitarianism and counterinsurgency in the context of Afghans in Pakistan wear thin. Crucially, however, for the Pakistani state, the main “guardian” of Afghans in Pakistan, a delegitimized status - as well as its own dehumanisation - is even more pronounced. This is because it is the Pakistani state and actors who directly engage in acts of violence, harassment, and humiliation on Afghan bodies. The state, by achieving its goal of “encouraging” repatriation through the use of harassment and humiliation tactics is itself dehumanised and indeed constructed as an inhumane, unjust, and untrusted caricature. This is something the Pakistani state cannot afford if it is serious about regional cooperation and regional peace building efforts (which frankly it appears not to be), or its own internal strength and well-being. Afghans, legal or not, are an integral part of the Pakistani state, and the state cannot afford to isolate them, when it is itself beset with internal concerns related to urban mafias, middlemen, or landholders, and alternatives sources of power, aside from the networks of solidarity who are ready to step in for the state and redistribute and protect material and non-material goods.
Chapter 8: Conclusion: The Inhumane State

This thesis has sought to bring to light the similarities and differences of Afghan and Pakistani lives in urban Pakistan by using often side-lined Afghan and Pakistani oral narratives. It has shown that legal citizenship or refugeedom, and even illegal migrant status - i.e. no status -, only creates a difference in daily life in the context of geopolitics, borders, and a counterinsurgency in FATA and Afghanistan, masked in the language of “security concerns” (real and constructed). Otherwise, in everyday life Afghans and Pakistanis live in similar realities. This is perversely fitting for a state which is dominated by geostrategic concerns and the military - a position that is constantly reinforced by external “allies” and global hegemons. Thus, whilst other works have shown how a “security consciousness” dominates Pakistan as a result of the historical birth and development of the Pakistani state and its geostrategic significance in international relations (Jalal 1990) or the vast industrial-military complex that permeates every sphere of Pakistan (Siddiqa 2007) this research has inadvertently illuminated the pervasiveness of this “security” consciousness through the comparative analysis of Afghan refugees and Pakistani citizens in Pakistan. How the Pakistani state conceptualises itself and its understandings of “statehood” are visible in how it treats its citizens, and indeed refugees. And in this security state of Pakistan citizenship is simply a computerised identity card used to check whether you are or are not a threat to this security state. Even then the concern about belonging does not result in the delivery of rights or welfare; instead, it is simply a safeguard against some forms of state violence, namely harassment and humiliation tactics. Otherwise citizenship has limited value and is not understood in a positive and empowering way. For Afghans too, their refugee and non-citizen identity is simply a computerised identity card, however, here, instead of acting as a tool for protection it enables forms of state violence – a violence that is, again, indicative of the “security” consciousness that permeates the Pakistani state.
Returning to one of the questions that this research set out to answer, this research has demonstrated that for both Afghans and Pakistanis “legal identities” and lines of national distinction do not make a difference to the everyday urban lives of Afghans and Pakistanis. Even when legal identities are visible, i.e. at the check-post or via an identity card, they are not empowering – however, for Afghans they are an active and violent site of disempowerment. Yet in most aspects of everyday life in Karachi and Peshawar, legal identities and lines of national distinction do not make a difference to the lived realities of Afghans and Pakistanis, with this research paying specific attention to the urban poor. The lines of legal distinction between citizens and non-citizens in Pakistan do not impact how both Afghans and Pakistanis are able or unable to access basic and beyond basic material and non-material goods – i.e. social security - in order to secure the conditions in which the potentials of a “humanised life” can be practiced.

This research started by showing how Afghans, exert political agency in Pakistan, challenging assumptions of the limited political significance of refugees in Pakistan. However, very quickly, it also demonstrated that many Pakistanis, particularly the urban poor, live in shared realities with Afghans, illuminating a devalued embodied experience of Pakistani citizenship. Through this comparative analysis this research has revealed that in everyday urban Pakistan, in stories of basic survival and relative gains, the language of legal distinction between citizens and refugees are often irrelevant in explaining local political patterns. It has demonstrated this by looking at: how both Afghans and Pakistanis are not provided with material goods by the state (or refugee regime); how both Afghans and Pakistanis attempt to overcome official failings using social solidarity networks and navigation practices to engage in material and non-material redistribution; how both Afghans and Pakistanis understand and express state failings and their subsequent agency in a language of “dehumanisation” and “self-humanisation”; and how the redistributive actions of
both Afghans and Pakistanis have a direct political impact on the state by creating physical changes to urban cities and challenging the legitimacy of the state and exposing its incompetence.

Whilst experiences of forced migration, living in exile, and the creeping significance of national documentation should not be discounted, most Afghans (the majority of whom have been living in Pakistan for 20-34 years) live similar lives with Pakistanis in everyday urban life. Aside from the language of “security”, the state does have other legal responsibilities and expectations towards both Afghans in Pakistan (influenced by the international refugee regime) and its own “national”/“natural” (Malkki 1995) Pakistani citizens. However, often the state (and in some cases refugee regime) is unable to distribute the material goods it claims responsibility for. When the urban poor – be they Afghan or Pakistani – try to get access to utilities, shelter, and social security in day-to-day life, the Pakistani state, and in some cases refugee regime, appears incompetent to both citizens and non-citizens alike. The state has limited interest in and capacity for the social security of citizens, or indeed refugees, and certainly not for illegal migrants. In the informal housing settlements I explored in Ishtiaq Goth, Saeed Goth, Gul Kalay, the informal refugee camp of Afghan Camp (Chapter 5), other informal settlements, and even regulated housing areas, Afghans and Pakistanis are living, working, and engaged in similar everyday struggles.

Throughout this thesis Afghan and Pakistani narratives express this shared space between Afghan and Pakistani lives using a language of “dehumanisation” and “self-humanisation”. This research has proposed that all human beings possess, to a degree, an inherent value within them, described either as humanness, a humanised life, or human dignity. This value is shaped by an equal vulnerability of life and a reality of death that touches all human life. However, it has also
understood that “humanness” (human dignity and a humanised life) must be considered as a potential rather than an inviolable fact (which is made clear by the very fact that a human life can be dehumanised), or in the very least it can be said that different levels of “humanness” are possible. The question of whether we are ever fully able to unfold this potential (however we see fit) is contingent upon the concrete circumstances of our life. In this research the failures of the state are explained and expressed as being dehumanising because they stunt the conditions in which even basic levels of a life with human dignity can be lived - for both Afghans and Pakistanis. Very often this denial is a result of the ways in which state actors recognise, misrecognise, and exclude Afghan and Pakistani human lives as either “units” to be managed, “exemplary victims”, the “dangerous Afghan/Pashtun”, or the “undeserving poor”. Water, shelter, food, social security, freedom from violence, and other basic rights are not provided by the state (and in some cases the refugee regime), either by design or incompetence, or both. But these are not just “service delivery” failures, they are also understood and expressed as actions that ignore the status of their (Afghan or Pakistani) humanity. Indeed at various junctures one can even move beyond my argument regarding Afghan and Pakistani similarities as both experience a shared reality (and death) with animals. In Afghan Camp, Sumaiya died in childbirth after having been pushed around the camp like a “janwar” (animal). In Ishtiaq Goth, Rubab and her family live with cow faeces and flies all around (Chapter 5). Here, Afghans and Pakistanis expressed that their human lives were not recognised as having distinctly “human” qualities as they were not provided with the conditions in which the potentials of human life could be practiced because of state and refugee regime failures.

In other cases, Afghan and Pakistani lives are understood as having been constructed as subhuman lives by officialdom through processes of objectification, being reduced to automaton-like units – free from human agency and qualities – and only to be used for politically
instrumentalist purposes. In Chapter 3 this thesis has shown that during the Soviet-Afghan War the USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and others fawned over every detail of Afghan lives in Pakistan. From massive oil tankers being filled with milk, to millions of pencil sharpeners no detail was spared. Yet as soon as the Soviet Union had been defeated, Afghan lives were forgotten. Perhaps this is because they were never really understood as “human lives” to begin with (Butler 2010:xix) but simply objects to be used and “thrown away in an instant” (interview: Maulana Jamil ur Rehman). Critically, this abuse and lowering of status and type of humiliation has not been forgotten by Afghans living in Pakistan. Similarly, many Pakistanis understand that they are viewed as objects to be used for wider political objectives – winning an election or winning the “hearts and minds” of people in the context of an on-going counter-insurgency campaign. (Inadvertently, again, these cases reveal how “identity” often only matters in the context of state “security” and geopolitical considerations.) Further, in other instances, both Afghan and Pakistan lives are denied agency as they are constructed as “exemplary” victims and allowed to occupy limited definitions of helplessness and need.

For some lives within this shared “dehumanising” space, this research has shown the situation is markedly worse. There are grades of difference in the levels of devaluation experienced. To be an Afghan in Pakistan is not exactly the same as being a Pakistani in Pakistan. As this thesis has demonstrated, nationalist and ethnic lenses of exclusion applied by local state and political representatives make the experience of everyday life even worse for some. Afghans and areas with high Afghan demographics are stereotyped as dens of crime and “terror by state actors and local political representatives. Afghan areas are “ghettoised” (Ron 2003) through forms of urban ethnocracy (Yiftachel and Yakobi 2004; Yiftachel 2006). Here, Afghan lives are devalued - not just because they are not provided with the material resources which could help to improve the quality of life (i.e. with water) but also because they are not recognised as lives that are worthy of
having access to these goods in the same way as other Pakistani lives are. Many Afghans understood their position in urban Pakistan as being neglected because “[We’re] Afghan... that’s why” (Habibullah, KHA13). However, in Karachi, Pakistani Pashtun areas also experience forms of urban ethnocracy. Pakistani Pashtuns in Karachi are stereotyped and “ghettoised”. In this study, Pakistani Pashtuns such as Hussain Ali (KHP51) explained their neglect through the lens of ethnic discrimination. Here, Pakistani Pashtun-dominant areas in Karachi compared to non-Pashtun areas are constructed as less human and thus less worthy of having access to the material goods which could help improve the conditions of their lives.

This thesis, however, has shown that Afghans and Pakistanis do not silently accept these various forms of devaluation. Afghans and Pakistanis stubbornly persist, survive, and flourish, turning to solidarity networks - using friends, family, and even anonymous neighbours - to redistribute material and non-material goods so as to “self-humanise” their lives. Even in circumstances in which the value of a human life is attacked, under threat, or humiliated it is possible to assume personal responsibility (Pollman 2010) and contextualise actions to maintain a humanised life - personal agency, responsibility, self-respect, and formulations of self-worth ensure that this is the case. This push for non-material redistribution was captured in the narratives and expressions analysed in this research, to illuminate and emphasise that informal political action is not just about material redistribution but also non-material redistribution in juxtaposition to what was explained to be a dehumanising Pakistani state.

Importantly throughout this thesis various forms of social capital, social networks, and human relationships and their outputs were shown to be more trusted than state actors and bureaucratic processes. The case studies discussed in Chapter 5 showed how fellowships of charity emerged
in Afghan and Pakistani neighbourhoods to enable residents to redistribute water, shelter, basic infrastructure, and security. In Chapter 6 the family appeared as a central force that is able to redistribute incomes, food, shelter, and, thus, humanise lives. Urban lives, Afghan and Pakistani, are working and pushing for a material and non-material redistribution side by side. Our obsession with legal, and indeed ethnic distinctions, does not capture the ground level lived realities of the complex, multi-national, urban lives in Peshawar and Karachi. These shared cross cutting spaces are not an alternative space of citizenship; they simply reflect an alternative way of belonging in Pakistan – an alternative that is also an important site of politics.

This thesis has, however, also illuminated that solidarity networks must rely on hybrid formal-informal actors and strategies to secure material and non-material goods. Intermediaries, middlemen, landholders, other patrons, or state actors acting in informal or illegal ways are a central component of this informal labyrinth - or rather formal-informal labyrinth - in urban Pakistan. Importantly, then, by looking at the shared lives of Afghan and Pakistanis, this research also reveals how the state functions in Pakistan. Whilst the Westaphalian model constructs the state and accompanying forms of absolute sovereignty as solid fact in Pakistan – and indeed in other contexts - this is not how things work. This questioning of absolute sovereignty of course supports the idea proposed by Thomas Blom Hansen (2005) and others that sovereign powers are *always* required to continually reassert their authority and legitimacy via “performances” of sovereignty. However, in Pakistan it is also a reflection of the limited reach and capacity of the state – indeed, a limited capacity that means the Pakistani state is unable to engage in these required performances. Pakistan’s colonial inheritance and history of weak institutional development has influenced state “strength”, or lack of (Jalal 1990). In addition, as mentioned earlier, in Pakistan the military dominates the state – with some arguing the military *is* the state. This military domination has been the result of the Pakistan’s hyper-Realist sensitivity
to regional geopolitical security, which, given Pakistan’s geostrategic significance in Central and South Asia, has continually been reinforced by global superpowers - most recently with the US-led war in Afghanistan, and prior to that with the Soviet-Afghan War. Further, the fallouts from enforced structural readjustment programmes of the 1990s and state-led liberalisation of the 2000s have led some commentators to refer to Pakistan as a “neo-liberal security state” (Toor 2011) that is simply unable to deliver the goods its citizens and other members are due. Critically then, the geostrategic importance of Pakistan and its peripheral position in the international economy is central in understanding political developments within the state. If agency is limited in Pakistan, it is not only limited for Afghan refugees and Pakistani citizens but also for the state itself.

This neoliberal security state is unable to deliver to citizens and non-citizens the goods they are due - indeed, instead it prioritises security, geopolitics, and liberalisation, and is encouraged to do so by global hegemons (the USA, the IMF, and so on). These factors creates an impetus for the state itself to accept and even promote solidarity networks and formal-informal navigation strategies, as they are considered an effective alternative for maintaining the state (and at local levels also offer sites of opportunity and profit). “Informality” in Pakistan is thus a part of how the state functions – albeit an unacknowledged part. In Peshawar and Karachi the state simply lacks the capacity and will to meet the social security needs of the cities populations, such as the massive housing demands of rising populations from natural birth rates, rural-urban migration and forced displacements – for example from 2010 and 2011 floods or military and drone campaigns in FATA. This explains why the informal housing settlements that are present around the Ring Road in Peshawar, or off from Sohrab Goth, or North Karachi - built by Afghan and Pakistani solidarity networks and/or middlemen or landholders -, or informal utility access, or informal remittances, and the other examples discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 reflect an important,
albeit informal, processes of “urban management”. For Pakistan, as for many other states, informal spaces of action are crucial in understanding how the state is “maintained”.

However, whilst some commentators propose that informality should encourage a new way of conceptualising and problematizing “the state”, this research has repeatedly demonstrated that these formal-informal strategies are deeply contradictory to the state and work to undermine it. Even when informality appears to be substitutive for the state, the benefits of these substitutions only applies for the very short-term, and even then the benefits are not always effective and are often “half-baked”. For Afghans and Pakistanis, the lived experiences of informal actions are far from being fully empowering. Unlike the “civil society” organisations promoted by the Musharraf regime, informal structures and strategies are not legal in any sense and have limited, or at least ad hoc, regulation. This means in physical terms the informal expansion of urban settlements is unsafe, unsustainable, and often dangerous. In this research, the water in Afghan Camp is unclean, and informal housing structures across both Karachi and Peshawar frequently fall down in the rain (Chapters 5 and 6). Without clear regulation - or with legal enforcement being prevented or violated via the protection (or neglect) of middlemen, landholders, and officials - hazardous informal housing areas now dominate Peshawar and Karachi. In Karachi and Peshawar densely packed housing areas with an accumulation of waste materials because of poor sanitation and refuse collection result in hazardous living conditions shared by urban poor Afghans, Pakistanis, and other regional migrants (Bangladeshis, Somalis, Burmese and so on). Walking up the stairs of Hassan Bilal’s informally constructed home (Chapter 6) or walking through Gul Kalay (Chapter 5) is, in a word, risky. Whilst survival, persistence, and agency can be applauded these cannot be read as a satisfactory source of providing the condition in which the potentials of human life can be practiced. Real and pressing challenges remain.
Further, everyday acts of solidarity and the formal-informal nexus also have a direct political impact on the state. As this research has demonstrated, at a macro-level, informal processes are understood by officials as maintaining the state. However, at a micro-level they offer official actors a chance of profit and opportunity, and if the surface is scratched a little deeper it is clear that the different ways in which the state enables and tolerates informal actions actually reveal a deeply contradictory form of “maintenance”. The state enables and tolerates informal actions as either an alternative way of enforcing law (albeit with petty cases of corruption), to prevent/violate laws, or, as a consequence of no clear rules being in place. However, in all of these cases the state is undermined - even when informal actions reflect an alternative way of enforcing law or maintaining the state. This is because these actions undermine the norm of legality and create new norms of informality – or illegality –, and they expose the ambiguous, contradictory, and incompetent nature of the state. Herein lie the political impacts of urban poor (Afghan and Pakistani) agency and the accompanying formal-informal nexus in Karachi and Peshawar. Small, ordinary acts, repeated time and time again are powerfully and physically transforming urban landscapes in unsustainable ways, legal ways of working are delegitimized, and, furthermore, alternative sources of power are being created and reinforced.

Inadvertently the formal-informal nexus creates multiple pockets of sovereignty across both cities that are not loyal to the state. Mini lawmakers and “kings” with their own orders are being created and/or reinforced. In addition, as local official actors – embodiments of the state – act in corrupted ways, the trust of the state is lost. Local middlemen, landholders, and other patrons are not held to the same moral standards as the “protectors of the nation”, thus, even if they (the patrons) act in corrupted ways, their reputation and legitimacy is less affected than that of state actors. Thus, whilst informal political actions appear to maintain the state this is almost certainly an illusion. At the exact same time as formal-informal actions appear to be maintaining the state
they are undermining its strength and legitimacy. Even if the idea of absolute sovereignty can never be fully practiced, a state is still expected, both in the Weberian sense and, in this study, by local populations, to have a monopoly on sovereignty – but this appears not to be the case in Pakistan’s urban centres.

If citizens or non-citizens want to get access to a material resource or rights the best chances of access these days are not the legal and official ways of working but informal ones. What can be said of a state in which legality holds limited significance, where there appears to be no rule of law? Or a state in which the distribution and protection of rights lie not with the state but alternatives? Or a state in which “citizenship” is seen as insignificant, irrelevant, and even devalued? Indeed, these processes help illuminate why the current administration of Asif Ali Zardari and the PPP is unable to exert its influence in many urban areas. As the state is unable to deliver rights and resources to citizens and non-citizens, citizens and non-citizens turn to solidarity networks and informal navigation strategies, which include middlemen, landholders, or corrupt officials, to get access to goods. Informal structures and strategies are considered more effective and trusted than legal ways of working (“everything is possible here” – Chapter 4). The normalisation of informality, a disregard for law, and the deep delegitimization of the state means the state is not to be trusted; instead, alternative sovereigns or solidarity networks which take its place are. And whilst this has not been the remit of this study, it is clear that the violence and political contests in Karachi and Peshawar, which the current state is unable to manage, are closely related to these norms of informality.

If the Pakistani state is serious about the long-term development of its urban centres (and rural areas) its ability to dispense justice and rights to the people must transcend ad-hoc norms of
informality. And crucially, within the wider global political context, it must be given the chance to do so. However, in the security state of Pakistan and in the context of global political and military conflicts, whether Pakistan will be able to transcend from a state only concerned about state security to a state concerned about social security, and, thus, not reliant on ad-hoc forms of informality, remains a deep challenge. Indeed, broader questions emerge when the significance of enumeration and identity cards is analysed. Why and how is it that a state that is unable to distribute basic rights (water, utilities, shelter, education, and healthcare) to citizens, one of the most intensely enumerated states in the world – enumerating not only its own citizens but extending this practice to non-citizens. Here, the wider global geopolitical climate and the politics of neo-imperialism appear to have a significant hand. A racialised “Northern” quest to “manage” globalising migration patterns and the dangerous “Muslim body” (Rana 2011), the globalised and privatised security industry, and the continued role of Pakistan as a key geostrategic state – currently in the war in Afghanistan and FATA - are crucial.

The increased enumeration that Afghans and Pakistanis face in Pakistan demonstrates that “identity” and “legality” only matters in the context of geopolitics, borders, and a counterinsurgency in FATA and Afghanistan, masked in the language of “security concerns” (real and constructed), and not for issues of social security. Even here “identity” and “legality” is not empowering. It is just a computerised identity card to help you, or inhibit you, from passing through a check-post. It does not result in a delivery of rights. However, for Afghans in Pakistan, unlike for the Pakistanis this study engaged with, identity cards also act as an active site of disempowerment. This research has concluded by revealing that there is a limit to the shared lives of Afghans and Pakistanis, which is most visceral in the context of “security”. Afghan bodies in Pakistan are constructed and understood and mobile embodiments of a walking/talking dangerous “national” frontier. In a state that prioritises state security, borders,
and geopolitics, this creates specific forms of violence – practices of harassment and humiliation – which are played out on the bodies of Afghans in daily life. In Pakistan, Afghan bodies become sites in which shifting geopolitical objectives of the state are practiced. Unlike previous years, namely the period of the Soviet-Afghan War and even the early 1990s, when Afghans were welcomed in Pakistan, since 2001, the Pakistani state has continually attempted to emphasise a line of distinction between Afghans and Pakistanis – in territorial and population terms. Mass arrests, everyday forms of harassment, and deportations via discipline tactics are used to “encourage” Afghan bodies to leave Pakistan. Afghans are no longer welcome in Pakistan as the Pakistani state is desperate to be understood as the “Good Muslim” state (Mamdani 2004) in its alliance with the USA – a role and alliance that is justified within Pakistan as a preventative measure against a similar invasion and occupation to the one that took place on the “Bad Muslim” (ibid) Afghan state by the USA and its other neo-imperial allies (see Musharraf 2008).

This post-2001 targeting of Afghans, however, is effectively creating resentful and mistrustful groups that are a part of the state. These are wounds that are retained in the memory and consciousness of Afghans who, even if they not legally citizens, are active members of an important informal political space in Pakistan. This is the reality that the Pakistani state cannot refuse to address; it points to a future crisis point for the state. Again, through these processes of harassment and humiliation the Pakistani state and even the refugee regime do not remain unscathed. Most crucially, the Pakistani state is delegitimized and constructed as an unjust and un-trusted caricature. In this study it is the local official actor – an embodiment of the state – who carries out acts of harassment and humiliation that is himself not recognised as being “fully human” and is in fact understood as inhumane by Afghans and Pakistanis in their shared urban spaces, a labelling which transfers directly onto the state itself. In combination with the state’s failings, incompetence, and corrupt presence in everyday urban life, which are clear to Afghans
and Pakistanis alike, it is, thus, the Pakistani state which is the Dehumanised and even Inhumane State – not the Afghan and Pakistani lives which live in a dehumanised state of affairs because of misrecognition, exclusion, and a denial of the conditions for human survival and flourishing.

If the current political order in Pakistan (and beyond) is a socially constructed one, as I understand it is, in the spirit of understanding that our worlds can be made, unmade, and remade, this research urges a reconsideration of the exclusionary and stunting frameworks that are being applied by the Pakistani state on Afghans and Pakistanis, which are also reinforced by asymmetrical international power balances and global hegemons. Afghans are an integral part of the Pakistani state as are urban poor Pakistanis. The embodied experiences of state failures and violations are retained in the memories and consciousness of Afghan and Pakistani lives, however, these memories are not passive (see Fassin 2007). They can be mobilised, reappropriated, and reinterpreted. Thus, all is not lost for the Pakistani state and the lives within it. However, in order for better memories to be created and old wounds to be healed there is a need to push for a more inclusive form of politics, which is concerned – aside from lip service – to the lived realities of the urban poor in Pakistan, and recognises the value of both Afghan and Pakistani lives. Pakistanis and Afghans, in their quest for recognition of their “humanity”, demonstrate the potentials of urban centres like Karachi and Peshawar and demonstrate an active quest for flourishing, survival, and a change from the current political order. These potentials, however, can only be achieved if the Pakistani state is able to emerge beyond its constructed role as a “key” geostrategic state for global hegemons, if the Pakistani state, political leaders, and institutions are recognised as being effective, and ultimately, if the Pakistani state is able to provide urban centres and people the regulation which they so need.
Appendices

Appendix 1: All Interviews Sampling Summaries

Note these numbers do not include all ethnographic observations and interactions.

Table 1: Summary of all respondents, Peshawar & Karachi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of all respondents, Peshawar &amp; Karachi</th>
<th>Total as a number</th>
<th>Total as a % of all interviews completed</th>
<th>Total as a % of all Afghan/Pakistani interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peshawar &amp; Karachi</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghans</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>59.74%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistanis</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>40.26%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Women</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>18.70%</td>
<td>31.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Men</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>41.04%</td>
<td>68.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani Women</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>16.62%</td>
<td>41.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani Men</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>23.64%</td>
<td>58.71%</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 2: Summary of all respondents – city breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total as a number</th>
<th>Total as a % of all (385) interviews</th>
<th>Total as a % of all interviews for the city</th>
<th>Total as a % of all Afghan / Pakistanis interviews in the city</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td><strong>Peshawar</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghans</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>30.39%</td>
<td>60.31%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
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<td>Pakistanis</td>
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<td>20.00%</td>
<td>39.69%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghan Women</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6.49%</td>
<td>12.89%</td>
<td>21.37%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghan Men</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>23.90%</td>
<td>47.42%</td>
<td>78.63%</td>
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<td>Pakistani Women</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4.42%</td>
<td>8.76%</td>
<td>22.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani Men</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15.58%</td>
<td>30.93%</td>
<td>77.92%</td>
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<td><strong>Karachi</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghans</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>29.35%</td>
<td>59.16%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistanis</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>20.26%</td>
<td>40.84%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Women</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>12.21%</td>
<td>24.61%</td>
<td>41.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Men</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>17.14%</td>
<td>34.55%</td>
<td>58.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani Women</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>12.21%</td>
<td>24.61%</td>
<td>60.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani Men</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8.05%</td>
<td>16.23%</td>
<td>39.74%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Summary of Afghan respondents by ethnicity, Peshawar & Karachi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity*</th>
<th>Total as a number</th>
<th>Total as a % of all Afghans interviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hazara</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farsiwan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujjar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mughal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>58.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.74%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Summary of Afghan respondents by ethnicity – city breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Total as a number</th>
<th>Total as a % of all Afghans interviewed, Peshawar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farsiwan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujjar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>76.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Total as a number</th>
<th>Total as a % of all Afghans interviewed, Karachi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hazara</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mughal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>39.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15.93%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: Summary of Pakistani respondents by ethnicity, Peshawar & Karachi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Total as a number</th>
<th>Total as a % of all Pakistanis interviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baloch</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindko</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmiri</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhajir (Pakistani)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>67.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saraiki</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Summary of Pakistani respondents by ethnicity - city breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Pakistanis, Peshawar</th>
<th>77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondents by ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total as a number</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindko</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Pakistanis, Karachi</th>
<th>78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondents by ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total as a number</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baloch</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmiri</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhajir (Pakistani)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saraiki</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2: Quick Reference of all Interviews Used in Thesis

Arranged alphabetically by forename. For further details see Appendix 3.

Note all names provided are alias names. No real names are provided for reasons of confidentiality and security.

Aasiya (KHP9)
Abdul Mateen (KHA69)
Abdul Qais, Maulana (KHA71)
Abdul Sattar (PXP70)
Abdul Wahid (PXA1)
Abdus Samad (KHA8)
Abu Haider (PXA51)
Abu Zakariya (PXA54)
Afsandar Ali (PXA36)
Aftab Khalil (KHP52)
Ahmed Bilal (KHP6)
Anwar Khan (KHP50)
Asmat Afridi (PXP27)
Atif (KHA29)
Aurangzeb (PXA58)
Aziz, Hajji (PXA59)
Behrooz (KHA60)
Bilquis (PXP46)
Burhanuddin (PXA24)
Changeiz (KHA14)
Dilawar Noor (KHA36)
Ejaz (PXA41.B)
Fahmeeda Qazeemi (KHP42)
Fariduddin (PXP52)
Farukh, Hajji (PXA56)
Ferdous (KHA26)
Fereydoun (KHA57)
Ferhan Rashid (PXA19)
Ghazaleh Jan (PXA91)
Gul Nabi (KHP41.B)
Gulshaan (KHA13.B)
Gulzar Amin (KHA56)
Gulzar (KHA19)
Habibullah (KHA13)
Hafsah Jan (PXP70.B)
Hamza Noor (PXA65)
Hassan Bilal (KHP7)
Hayyat, Hajji (KHA71)
Hidayatullah (KHA14)
Hussain Ali (KHP51)
Ibrahim Hafiz (PXA41)
Ishtiaq Mohammad (KHP35)
Ismail Ibrahimi (PXA55)
Jahangir (KHA66)
Jalaludin (KHA62.C)
Jamshed Ali (PXA57)
Janat Gul (PXP5)
Jan Mohammad (PXA31.B)
Jibran (KHA1.B)
Junaid Tareen (PXA104)
Khadijah (KHP12.B)
Khairuddin, Hajji (PXA71)
Khizar (PXA81.B)
Mahfouz, Hajji (KHA6)
Malalai Khattak (PXP46)
Mansoor (KHA65)
Maqsood (KHP37)
Maryam Jan (PXA32.B)
Mehboob (PXP12)
Mehran Aminullah (PXP4)
Mezghan (PXA38)
Mohammad Imran (PXA76)
Mudassir (PXA38)
Murtaza (PXP8)
Mustafa Habib (KHA47)
Naseeb Khan (PXA52)
Nawar Saleh (PXA99)
Nilofar (KHP44)
Nooruddin Akhtar (PXA61)
Nowroz Beg (PXA35)
Omar Tariq (KHP36)
Orzala (KHP12)
Rafique (KHA58)
Raheemullah (PXA53)
Rameez Ali (LNA1)
Rastin (KHA8)
Rostam (KHA68)
Rubab (KHP38)
Ruqaiya (PXP70.C)
Sameena Haroon (KHP18)
Salahuddin (KHA62.D)
Saleem (KHA17)
Sarfaraz Ali (PXP37)
Shahid Haque (KHUR1)
Shahnaz Nabi (KHP41)
Shaqeel (KHA16)
Shawana Khan (PXP22)
Shin Gul (PXA36.B)  
Sibghatullah (PXA42)  
Sohrab Din (KHA67)  
Soroush, Hajji (KHA 72)  
Spozmai (PXA44)  
Suleiyman (PXA22)  
Sundus Malikyar (PXP61.B)  
Tabassum Khala (KHP39)  
Tariq (KHA18)  
Tooraj, Hajji (KHA73)  
Waqqas (PXP9)  
Wazir Gul (PXA5)  
Yahya Din (PXP101)  
Yaqoob Gul (KHA9)  
Yusuf Khan (KHP50.B)  
Zareena (KHA41)  
Zalmay (KHA1)  
Zeenat (KHP43)  
Ziauddin (PXA60)  
Zmaray Khan and family (KHA61)
Appendix 3: All Interviews Details

All interviews completed during fieldwork are listed in the table to follow. The table does not include additional ethnographic observations, discussions, and interactions (although some interviewees were a part of ethnographic observations).

Interviews were completed in a semi-structured and informal format. Forms and questionnaires were not used during the interview process, although as Appendix 5 shows, there were a range of questions I covered during the interview process. Before the table is provided details about the categories used are explained.

ID Reference

KH: Karachi.
PX: Peshawar.
LN: London.
A: Afghan.
P: Pakistani.
Number: Interview reference number.
*Alias name: If interview directly used in thesis, alias name provided.
Letter following number: same family member.

Examples

3. KHP7
Hassan Bilal
Interview in Karachi Peshawar, interview with a Pakistani, interview reference number 10.B; household family member of interview reference; Hassan Bilal is the alias name used in the thesis.

UR: Unrecorded

Sex
M: Male.

F: Female.

Age

Ages were recorded either by asking respondent / relative of their age. In some cases exact ages were not given (approximates were given by the respondent).

Interview Type

GI: Group Interview, completed with 2 or more respondents.

1:1: One-on-one interview.

L: Long interview, i.e. over 30 minutes

B: Brief interview ranging from 10-25 minutes

R: Repeat interviews conducted 2 or more times.

Place of Origin (Afghanistan / Pakistan)

Afghanistan origin: Applies only to Afghans. Details of the province of origin are provided.

Pakistan origin: Applies only to Pakistanis.

Note on Pakistani interviews in Peshawar

For respondents originating from within Peshawar details of the area / village in Peshawar are provided. For respondent originating from outside of Peshawar details are provided by city or district.

Note on Pakistani interviews in Karachi

Province of origin / district of origin within Pakistan are provided.

Date of first migration

For Afghans, the date of first migration means the date of first migration to Pakistan (not the city they currently live in). The date is either for the individual in question or if the individual was born in Pakistan for his/her family. The date of first migration (and not second or third) is used
as a number of Afghans migrated back to Afghanistan only to resettle in Pakistan or currently exist in transnational lives.

For Pakistanis, the date of first migration means date of first migration to the city in question (i.e. Karachi or Peshawar). For Pakistanis that are “native” to the city, i.e. ancestral heritage and links are within the expanding modern city, his question does not apply. For example, in Peshawar as the city has expanded many rural areas has become a part of the city. When this is the case, “Origin” appears.

Origin.: Originates from area within the city.
Unk.: Unknown place of origin. The question was either unasked or unanswered during the interview.

**Residence in Peshawar or Karachi**

Notes area of residence in Peshawar or Karachi during interview. During interviews specific details (addresses) were provided or noted down. However, in this appendix only general area names have been provided for reasons of security / sensitivity.

Unk.: Unknown residence. The question was either unasked or unanswered during the interview.

**Housing type**

Owned: Respondent / family member owns the house.

Rented: Respondent / family member rents the house.

UNHCR RTV: United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Refugee Tented Village. The RTV is recognised by UNHCR, CAR, and the GOP and has the legal status of RTV. The land is owned either by the GOP or leased to the GOP by a Pakistani landholder. In most cases RTV inhabitants should not pay rent. In some cases landholders now rent the land out to new settlers (including Pakistanis) – if this was the case a note has been made in the column.

UH: Unregulated housing. This includes housing that is constructed with no legal recognition or quasi-legal recognition by the state, i.e. when informal housing areas are waiting to get upgraded to a regulated area. This includes *katche ghar* (houses made from mud) and squatter settlements on government or private land.

RH: Regulated Housing. This includes housing that is constructed in regulated housing areas and housing that has legal status and recognition by the state and conforms (on the whole) to legal
building requirements. However, even in these cases, houses may be built without meeting legal building requirements.

Squatter: The housing area was under a “live” / current land contestation during fieldwork. Occupants were brought in, usually by middlemen, as a wider strategy to build up the area. In these cases the land/ housing is either free, rented, or informally sold by the middleman to occupants. Notes of free / rented / ownership are made when relevant.

IRTV: Informal RTV. The RTV is informally recognised by UNHCR, CAR, and the GOP as an RTV; however, this recognition is not legally noted.

Madrassa free: Free housing for madrassa students.

Nomad: No fixed abode.

GOP Colony: Government housing provided to government workers, which is rented, free or owned.

Unk.: Unknown housing type. The question was either unasked or unanswered during the interview.

**Ethnicity**

*Note on Afghan and Pakistani ethnicities listed: This is not an exhaustive list of all Afghan and Pakistani ethnic groups. The ethnic groups were self-defined.

The determination of “ethnicity” was made by asking questions on language, mother tongue, qaum/qabile.

Afghan ethnic groups listed

- Hazara
- Gujjar
- Farsiwan
- Mughal
- Pashtun
- Pashtun (Arab)
- Tajik
- Turkmen
- Uzbek
Unk.: Unknown ethnicity. The question was either unasked or unanswered during the interview.

**Pakistani ethnic groups listed**

- Baloch
- Hindko
- Kashmiri
- Muhjair (Urdu-speaking)
- Pashtun
- Pashtun (Afghan)
- Punjabi
- Saraiki
- Sindhi
- Sindhi-Memon

Unk.: Unknown ethnicity. The question was either unasked or unanswered during the interview.

**Occupation**

Listed occupations

- Beautician
- Daily labour: This included rural daily labour (fieldwork), construction,
- Disabled
- Doctor
- Domestic: Housewife or household duties, this includes unmarried women (daughters, children) who have key domestic production duties.
- Domestic servant
- Driver: private car/ rickshaw/ taxi
- Elderly

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Factory worker: Factory work, which is different from daily labour as some contracts may be signed

Govt. employee: Government worker

Handicrafts

Imam

Informal: Bottle collector, rag picker, recycling (refrigerators)

IT Consultant

Landowner

Land.: profit brought in from other lands

Madrassa student

Mechanic

Middleman

NGO Worker

Other

Painter / artist

Political profession

Property developer: formal

Retail: Formal retail (mall) store worker

Retired

School director

Shepherd

Shop keeper: informal store owner / manager

Street vendor (Informal): additional details provided

Student

Teacher: This included primary, secondary levels of education; as well as principals/ vice-principals of schools (distinctions are noted).

Trade/ Business: Involved in their own trade / business. In some cases details of specific trade are provided (i.e. trucking, transport of goods)
Unemployed

Unk.: Unknown occupation. The question was either unasked or unanswered during the interview.

Web designer

Widowed

Wholesaler: honey/ fabric/ fruit/ vegetables

Identity Card

POR: Afghan Citizen Proof of Registration Card (Afghan only)

CNIC: This includes both the computerised national identity card (CNIC) and older National Identity card (Pakistani and Afghan).

None: No identity cards were possessed by respondent.

Unk.: Unknown of respondent possesses an identity card or not. The question was either unasked or unanswered during the interview.

Police harassment

Y: Yes

N: No

Harassment includes: unwarranted verbal and/ or physical abuse, arrest, detention, been forced to pay a bribe, deportation, police/ security raids in housing areas, repeated stop and searches (aside from routine check-post policing). Interviewees usually responded to these instances specifically occurring by the police forces, although in some cases complaint against other security forces (intelligence officers, military personnel) were also made. Harassment was either experienced directly on the respondent or their lives were impacted by these forms of police harassment as a family member harassed. For example, a wife whose husband was repeatedly arrested is equally impacted by police harassment even if she was not arrested.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID reference</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Interview Type</th>
<th>Afghanistan origin</th>
<th>Date of first migration (individual or family)</th>
<th>Residence in Peshawar</th>
<th>Housing type</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Occupation(s)</th>
<th>Identity Card</th>
<th>Police harassment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PXA1</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1:1; GI, (L, &amp; R)</td>
<td>Badakhshan</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>University Town</td>
<td>Owned: RH</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>Teacher; student</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PXA2</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1:1; GI, (L, &amp; R)</td>
<td>Kabul (City)</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Hayatabad</td>
<td>Rented: RH</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>Teacher; student</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PXA3</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1:1; GI, (L, &amp; R)</td>
<td>Kabul (City)</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Hayatabad</td>
<td>Rented: RH</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>Farsi; principal</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PXA4</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1:1; GI, (L, &amp; R)</td>
<td>Kabul (City)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Unk.</td>
<td>Rented: AP</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PXA5</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1:1 (L)</td>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Meera Kachon</td>
<td>UNHCR RTV</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>Daily labour; OR</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PXA6</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1:1 (B)</td>
<td>Kabul (City)</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Meera Kachon</td>
<td>UNHCR RTV</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>Daily labour; OR</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PXA7</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1:1 (L)</td>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>GT Road</td>
<td>Unk.</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>Trade/bus: trucking; OR</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PXA8</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>GI (L)</td>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>GT Road</td>
<td>Unk.</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>Trade/bus: trucking; OR</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PXA9</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>GI (L)</td>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>GT Road</td>
<td>Unk.</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>Trade/bus: trucking; OR</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PXA10</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>GI (L)</td>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>GT Road</td>
<td>Rented: UH</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>Mechanic; OR</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PXA10B</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>GI (L)</td>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>GT Road</td>
<td>Rented: UH</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PXA11</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>GI (B)</td>
<td>Kabul (City)</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Hayatabad</td>
<td>Rented: RH</td>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PXA11B</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>GI (L)</td>
<td>Kabul (City)</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Hayatabad</td>
<td>Rented: RH</td>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PXA13</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>GI (L)</td>
<td>Kabul (Province)</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Akora Khattak</td>
<td>UNHCR RTV</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>Wholesalers: honey/land</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PXA13B</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>GI (B)</td>
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<td>1979</td>
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## Afghan Interviews Karachi (113)

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<td>M</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1:1 (B)</td>
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<td>Unk.</td>
<td>Kohat Road</td>
<td>Rented: UH</td>
<td>Paid</td>
<td>Store owner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1:1 (B)</td>
<td>Buhadar Kale</td>
<td>Orig.</td>
<td>Buhadar Kale</td>
<td>Rented: UH</td>
<td>Paid</td>
<td>Govt. employee (retired)</td>
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346
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<th>Sex</th>
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<th>Interview Type</th>
<th>Pakistani Origin</th>
<th>Date of first migration (individual or family)</th>
<th>Housing type</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Occupation(s)</th>
<th>Identity Card</th>
<th>Police harassment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KHP1</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>GL (L)</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
<td>1986 Yang Gabe Khan</td>
<td>Owned: UH</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>CNIC. Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>KHP2</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>GL (L)</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
<td>1986 Yang Gabe Khan</td>
<td>Owned: UH</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>KHP3</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>GL (L)</td>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>1960 Liaquatabad</td>
<td>Owned: UH</td>
<td>Baloch</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHP3.B</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>GL (B)</td>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>1960 Liaquatabad</td>
<td>Owned: UH</td>
<td>Baloch</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>KHP4</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>GL (L &amp; R)</td>
<td>Swat</td>
<td>1960 Banitas</td>
<td>Owned: RH</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>Vegetable cart</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Daily labour CNIC. Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>KHP4.B</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>GL (L)</td>
<td>Swat</td>
<td>1960 Banitas</td>
<td>Owned: RH</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>Vegetable seller</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHP5</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>GL (L &amp; R)</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
<td>1960 Liaquatabad</td>
<td>Owned: RH</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>Property dealer</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHP5.B</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>GL (L)</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
<td>1960 Liaquatabad</td>
<td>Owned: UH</td>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>KHP6</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>GL (L)</td>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>1963 Liaquatabad</td>
<td>Owned: UH</td>
<td>Baloch</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>CNIC. Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHP7</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>GL (L)</td>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>1963 Liaquatabad</td>
<td>Owned: UH</td>
<td>Baloch</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>CNIC. Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pakistani interviews in Karachi (Total: 78)
<p>| KHP7.C | F | 16 | Gil (L) | Balochistan | 1963 | Liaquataba d | Owned: UH | Baloch | Student | N | N |
| KHP7.D | F | 16 | Gil (L) | Balochistan | 1963 | Liaquataba d | Owned: UH | Baloch | Domestic | N | N |
| KHP8 | M | 60 | Gil (L) | Khyber Pakhtunkhwa | 1990 | Liaquataba d | Owned: UH | Paishun | Domestic | CNIC | N |
| KHP11 | F | 19 | Gil (L) | Balochistan | Unk. | Liaquataba d | Owned: UH | Unk. | NA | Unk. | Y |
| KHP12 | Ozalu | F | 30 | 1:1; Gil (L &amp; R) | Waziristan | 1996 | Afghan Camp | Owned: UH | Paishun | Domestic | CNIC | Y |
| KHP14 | M | 54 | Gil (B) | Male Memon Goth | Orig. a. | Male Memon Goth | Owned: RH | Sindhi | Driver | CNIC | N |
| KHP15 | F | 24 | 1:1; Gil (L &amp; R) a. | Male Memon Goth | Orig. a. | Male Memon Goth | Owned: RH | Sindhi | Student | CNIC | N |
| KHP15.B | M | 65 | 1:1; Gil (L) | Male Memon Goth | Orig. a. | Male Memon Goth | Owned: RH | Sindhi | Landholder; trader/busin. | CNIC | N |
| KHP16 | M | 55 | 1:1 (L) | Male Memon Goth | Orig. a. | Male Memon Goth | Owned: UH | Sindhi | Trader | CNIC | N |
| KHP17 | F | 45 | Gil (B) | Unk. | Unk. | Male Memon Goth | Nomad | Sindhi | Nomads | None | Unk. |
| KHP18 | Saimma Hanoon | F | 27 | 1:1; Gil (L) | Interior Sindhi | 1992 | Baldia Town | Owned: RH | Sindhi | School director | CNIC | N |
| KHP18.B | F | 25 | 1:1; Gil (L) | Interior Sindhi | 1992 | Baldia Town | Owned: RH | Sindhi | Teacher | CNIC | N |
| KHP19 | C | 40 | 1:1; Gil (L) | Interior Sindhi | 1992 | Baldia Town | Owned: RH | Sindhi | Unemployed | CNIC | N |
| KHP19 | F | 37 | Gil (B) | Balochistan | 1991 | Baldia Town | Owned: UH | Saraiki | Domestic | CNIC | Y |
| KHP19.B | F | 19 | Gil (B) | Interior Sindhi | 1991 | Baldia Town | Squatting: Saraiki | Teacher | None | N |
| KHP19.C | F | 45 | Gil (B) | Interior Sindhi | 1991 | Baldia Town | Squatting: Saraiki | Teacher | None | N |
| KHP20 | F | 28 | Gil (L) | Interior Sindhi | 1992 | Baldia Town | Owned: UH | Baloch | Domestic | CNIC | N |
| KHP20.B | F | 60 | Gil (L) | Interior Sindhi | 1992 | Baldia Town | Owned: UH | Baloch | Domestic | CNIC | N |
| KHP20.C | F | 60 | Gil (L) | Interior Sindhi | 1992 | Baldia Town | Owned: UH | Baloch | Domestic | CNIC | N |
| KHP21 | M | 22 | Gil (L) | Interior Sindhi | 2001 | Baldia Town | Owned: UH | Sindhi | Student | CNIC | N |
| KHP21.C | F | 21 | Gil (L) | Interior Sindhi | 2001 | Baldia Town | Owned: UH | Sindhi | Student | CNIC | N |
| KHP22 | M | 13 | 1:1; Gil (L &amp; R) | Swat | 2009 | Afghan Camp | Rented: RH | Paishun | Student | CNIC | N |
| KHP23 | M | 13 | 1:1; Gil (L &amp; R) | Swat | 1961 | Banaras | Owned: RH | Paishun | Street Vendor | CNIC | Y |
| KHP24 | M | 37 | Gil (L) | Swat | 2005 | Banaras | Owned: RH | Paishun | Business | CNIC | Y |
| KHP25 | M | 38 | Gil (L) | Khyber Pakhtunkhwa | 1971 | Banaras | Owned: RH | Paishun | Daily labour | CNIC | N |
| KHP26 | F | 70 | Gil (L) | Punjab | 1971 | Banaras | Owned: UH | Punjab | Elderly | Unk. | N |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KHP28</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>GI (L)</th>
<th>Bearer</th>
<th>Unk.</th>
<th>Banaras</th>
<th>Owned: UH</th>
<th>Bashram</th>
<th>Student</th>
<th>CNIC</th>
<th>Y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KHP29</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>GI (L)</td>
<td>Mardan</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Banaras</td>
<td>Rented: UH</td>
<td>Bashram</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHP30</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>GI (B)</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Banaras</td>
<td>Rented: UH</td>
<td>Bashram</td>
<td>Widows, domestic</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>KHP30.B</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>GI (B)</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Banaras</td>
<td>Rented: UH</td>
<td>Bashram</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHP31</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>GI (B)</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Banaras</td>
<td>Rented: UH</td>
<td>Bashram</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHP34</td>
<td>Ishtiaq Muhammad</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1:1; GI (L &amp; R)</td>
<td>Sindhi (North Karachi area)</td>
<td>Origi n.</td>
<td>North Karachi</td>
<td>Owned: UH</td>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>Property developer; middleman</td>
<td>CNIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHP35</td>
<td>Omar Tariq</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1:1; GI (L &amp; R)</td>
<td>Sindhi (North Karachi area)</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Liaquat Ali</td>
<td>Owned: RH</td>
<td>Bashram</td>
<td>Property dealer</td>
<td>CNIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHP36</td>
<td>Manjoold</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1:1 (B)</td>
<td>Interior Sindhi</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>North Karachi</td>
<td>Squatter: UH, Rented</td>
<td>Baloch</td>
<td>Factory worker</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>KHP38</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>GI (L)</td>
<td>Mardan</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>North Karachi</td>
<td>Squatter: UH, Rented</td>
<td>Saraiki</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>CNIC</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHP39</td>
<td>Tabassum Khalat</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1:1; GI (L)</td>
<td>Unk.</td>
<td>Unk.</td>
<td>North Karachi</td>
<td>Squatter: UH, Rented</td>
<td>Un/speaking</td>
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<td>CNIC</td>
</tr>
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<td>KHP40</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>GI (L)</td>
<td>Hyderabad</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>North Karachi</td>
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<td>Saraiki</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
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<tr>
<td>KHP41</td>
<td>Shahbaz Nabi</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>1:1; GI (L)</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>Punjabi</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<td>North Kashmir</td>
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<td>Kashmiri</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>CNIC</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>KHP43</td>
<td>Zeenat</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>GI (L)</td>
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<td>Orign a</td>
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<td>Nifada</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1:1 (B)</td>
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<td>Unk.</td>
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<td>Sindhi</td>
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<td>CNIC</td>
</tr>
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<td>Unk.</td>
<td>Unk.</td>
<td>North Karachi</td>
<td>Squatter: UH, Free</td>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
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<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>KHP46</td>
<td>Bhequ</td>
<td>F</td>
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<td>1:1; GI (L &amp; R)</td>
<td>Interior Sindhi</td>
<td>Unk.</td>
<td>North Karachi</td>
<td>Squatter: UH, Rented</td>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>CNIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>55</td>
<td>1:1 (B &amp; R)</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
<td>Unk.</td>
<td>Clifton</td>
<td>Squatter: UH, Rented</td>
<td>Bashram</td>
<td>Driver: Rickshaw</td>
<td>CNIC</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>KHP48</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1:1; GI (L &amp; R)</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Clifton</td>
<td>Rented: RH</td>
<td>Kashmar j</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>CNIC</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>KHP49</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1:1; GI (L &amp; R)</td>
<td>Unk.</td>
<td>Unk.</td>
<td>Lyari</td>
<td>Rented: UH</td>
<td>Urdu speaking</td>
<td>Tailor</td>
<td>CNIC</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>KHP50</td>
<td>Anwar Khan</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1:1; GI (L &amp; R)</td>
<td>Swabi</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Sohrab Goth</td>
<td>Owned: UH</td>
<td>Bashram</td>
<td>Wholesaler: fabric</td>
<td>CNIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHP52</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1:1 (B)</td>
<td>Kashmir</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Clifton</td>
<td>Rented: UH</td>
<td>Kashmar</td>
<td>Daily laborer</td>
<td>CNIC</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHP53</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1:1 (B)</td>
<td>Swabi</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Lyari</td>
<td>Rented: UH</td>
<td>Bashram</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>CNIC</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Additional Interviews, outside of Pakistan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LN = London</th>
<th>UK = Unrecorded, i.e. not a full interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| LNA1 | Ramirez Ali | M | 22 | 1:1 (L & R) | Swabi | Unk. | Gahadad | Owned: RH | Bashram | Student | NA | NA |
| KHP51.P | Shahid Haque | M | 33 | 1:1 (B) | Sindhi | Unk. | Saddar | Rented: RH | Sindhi | NGO Worker | CNIC | NA |
Appendix 4: Sample of Questions and Information Looked for during Semi-Structured interviews

Following are the questionnaires used during semi-structured interviews. The interviews were not completed using the questionnaires below in a physical format, i.e. respondents never had to fill in a form or have me interview them with a clipboard. Rather, the questions were remembered by heart and answered in a conversational dialogue. The table below is therefore not reflective of a particular order in which questions were asked. In some interviews not all questions were asked / answered, as I was keen to allow interviews to take more fluid route. During ethnographic participant-observer interactions a structured format was not followed, however, these set of questions are a useful indicator of some of the specific research questions that I was seeking an answer too. In addition, some questions added after ethnographic work and after being told by respondents that these were the crucial questions to ask, i.e. questions surrounding police harassment.

The majority of interviews were conducted n Urdu/ Pashto/Farsi, where necessary a translator may have been present.

Note: additional comments can be found in the table.
**AFGHAN SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW (2010-2012)**

Note: Questions to be covered in a semi-structured format and not to be read out/filled out as a survey - discussion and examples from the participant should be encouraged

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REF</th>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>ANSWER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P (B)</td>
<td>Profile (Background)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Profile</td>
<td>How long have you been living in Pakistan?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Profile: Origin</td>
<td>Where are you from in Afghanistan? (Province)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Profile: Language</td>
<td>Which language(s) do you speak at home?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note on housing: If interviews are conducted in people’s homes, some questions may not apply

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H</th>
<th>Housing</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Housing: Current</td>
<td>Where do you currently live in Peshawar/Karachi?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Housing: Current Social Networks</td>
<td>Do you live with your family? (Who lives with you in your home?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Housing: Current</td>
<td>Is it an apartment, pakka makkan, katcha ghar?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Housing: Current</td>
<td>Is the property owned by you or do you pay rent?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Housing: Current</td>
<td>If you pay rent, who do you pay rent to? Are they Afghan or Pakistani?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Housing: Current</td>
<td>If you own the property is the lease in your name?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Housing: Current</td>
<td>Who do you pay your electricity and utilities bills to? (Bank, landholder, middleman?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Housing: Historic</td>
<td>Can you tell me a bit about the history of where you and your family have lived, any problems you encountered/reasons for movement etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Housing: Historic</td>
<td>When you/your family first came to Pakistan, where did you live, i.e. Did you live in Peshawar or another city and was it a home/camp?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Housing: Settlement</td>
<td>Why did you move from the first location? What enabled you to do this?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Housing: Historic &amp; Current</td>
<td>In cases of homes which are owned: Did you build this property yourself/ hire labourers? Where did you get the materials, i.e. cement etc., and labour for this?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Housing: (I)NGO/GOP support</td>
<td>Did you ever get any help from UNHCR, an NGO, the GOP, Afghan parties during your stay? (Ration cards, tent, quilts, schools, water etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Housing:</td>
<td>Do you have relatives living near you or in your</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Networks</td>
<td>home (i.e. cousins, uncles, parents)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D</strong></td>
<td><strong>Documents and Law and Order (POR cards)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Documents: Afghan Status</td>
<td>Do you possess a POR card?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Documents: Afghan Status</td>
<td>Did you get your card at NADRA or through another person?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Documents: Afghan Status</td>
<td>Do you have an Afghan passport?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Documents: Dual ID</td>
<td>Do you have a CNIC? If so who helped you to get it? (Note: sensitive question, only ask if relationship with interviewee is strong)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Documents: Dual ID</td>
<td>Did you or any family members ever possess a NIC (not computerised)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Documents: Daily Life</td>
<td>Was it previously necessary to have documentation as an Afghan refugee?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Documents: Daily Life</td>
<td>Have you ever been denied access to anything on account of your POR card? (Hospital treatment, schooling, education).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Documents: Daily Life</td>
<td>Prompt discussion on importance of documents for daily activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Documents: Law and Order</td>
<td>Can you pass through security check-post with ease?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Documents: Law and Order</td>
<td>Have you or anyone you know even been arrested or detained on account of having/not having your POR card? If so can you tell me a bit about this?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Documents: Law and Order</td>
<td>Have you ever had to pay a police bribe? Has this ever been related to you being Afghan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Documents: Law and Order</td>
<td>Have you or anyone you know ever been deported?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Documents: Law and Order</td>
<td>Is it common for police to raid / enter this area?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Documents: Law and Order</td>
<td>Have the police ever physically or verbally abused you / family member?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S (S)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Social Networks: Strategies of Self-Survival</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Social Networks</td>
<td>When you came to Pakistan did your family come with you as well?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Social Networks: Housing</td>
<td>When you moved did you have (extended) family and friends here already?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Networks</td>
<td>In the case of friends being present: Were they from the same places as you in Afghanistan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>M</strong> Migration Histories &amp; Current Attachment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>What were the reasons for moving to Pakistan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Migration Social Networks</td>
<td>Can you tell me a bit about your family's experience of moving and settling in Pakistan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Profile</td>
<td>Were you born in Pakistan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Transnational Migration</td>
<td>Do you go back to Afghanistan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>Do you think you could permanently settle in Afghanistan? Pakistan? Another country?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E</strong> Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>What types of education are possible in this area (madrassa, government schools, private schools, universities?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Are you/your children studying? If so, where?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Are there Afghan schools here? (Details re: fees, ages, registration with Afghan Consulate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Are there obstacles to accessing Pakistani private and government schools?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Is it difficult to get access to Pakistani government schools?</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Who set up the school and how is it administered?</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Are schools supported by UNHCR/NGOs?</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Is it common to get extra classes outside if school, such as IELTS or computer classes? If so are these registered organisations?</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Education Social Networks</td>
<td>Has this local community worked to set up a school etc.?</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Education Social Networks</td>
<td>Do children learn at home and informally?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P (I)</strong> Profile: Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Profile: Income</td>
<td>Do you/ household members work?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Profile: Income</td>
<td>Where do you work?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Profile: Income</td>
<td>How did you get this job?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Social Networks: Income</td>
<td>Do any of your friends or family members work with you?</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>Do you have relatives outside of Pakistan? Where are they based? Do they send you anything? Do they visit?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Social Networks</td>
<td>Observation</td>
</tr>
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<td>-----</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>S (G)</td>
<td>What are the main expenses here? And is there enough money? (Do you get to eat meat and vegetables? What does your diet consist of?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Networks</td>
<td>Do you have good relations with local Pakistani communities (e.g. Working together, studying together, and living together)? Can you explain about your relationship with Pakistanis since you have been here?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>Do you ever feel discrimination for being Afghan by the state / locals?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Facilities, Mobility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mobility</td>
<td>Can you freely move across Pakistan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Access to water</td>
<td>Do you have good access to water supplies? Discuss.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Access to electricity &amp; gas</td>
<td>Do you have good access to good water/electricity supplies? Discuss.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Access to medical facilities</td>
<td>Do you have good access to health supplies?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Profile - Observations; Interview Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observation to watch out for/ directly ask, if appropriate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No of attendees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximate Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother Tongue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qabile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POR card holder/ CNIC card holder/ No documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**PAKISTANI SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW (2010-2012)**

Note: Questions to be covered in a semi-structured format and not to be read out/filled out as a survey - discussion and examples from the participant should be encouraged

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REF</th>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>ANSWER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P (B)</td>
<td>Profile (Background)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Profile</td>
<td>How long have you been living in this city? (if applicable)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Profile: Origin</td>
<td>Where is your home town/village (if applicable)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Profile: Language</td>
<td>Which language(s) do you speak at home?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note on housing: If interviews are conducted in people’s homes, some questions may not apply

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H</th>
<th>Housing</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Housing: Current</td>
<td>Where do you currently live in Peshawar/Karachi?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Housing: Current Social Networks</td>
<td>Do you live with your family? (Who lives with you in your home?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Housing: Current</td>
<td>Is it an apartment, <em>pakka makkan, katcha ghar</em>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Housing: Current</td>
<td>Is the property owned by you or do you pay rent?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Housing: Current</td>
<td>If you pay rent, who do you pay rent to?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Housing: Current</td>
<td>If you own the property is the lease in your name?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Housing: Current</td>
<td>Who do you pay your electricity and utilities bills to? (Bank, landholder, middleman?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Housing: Historic</td>
<td>Can you tell me a bit about the history of where you and your family have lived, any problems you encountered/reasons for movement etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Housing: Historic (IDP specific)</td>
<td>Have you ever lived in an RTV? If so when?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Housing: Settlement</td>
<td>Why did you move from the first location? What enabled you to do this?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Housing: Historic &amp; Current</td>
<td>In cases of homes which are owned: Did you build this property yourself/ hire labourers? Where did you get the materials, i.e. cement etc., and labour for this?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Housing: (I)NGO/ GOP support</td>
<td>Did you ever get any help from the GOP / NGOs / UNCR (IDPs) (Ration cards, tent, quilts, schools, water etc.)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Housing:</td>
<td>Do you have relatives living near you or in your</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

355
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social Networks</th>
<th>home (i.e. cousins, uncles, parents)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>D</strong></td>
<td><strong>Documents, Law and Order (CNIC card)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Documents: CNIC</td>
<td>Do you possess a CNIC card? Or the older NIC card?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Documents: CNIC</td>
<td>Did you get your card at NADRA or through another person?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Documents: Daily Life</td>
<td>Was it previously necessary to have documentation as a Pakistani citizen?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Documents: Daily Life</td>
<td>Have you ever been denied access to anything on account of your CNIC card or lack of?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Documents: Daily Life</td>
<td>Prompt discussion on importance of documents for daily activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Documents: Law and Order</td>
<td>Can you pass through security check-post with ease?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Documents: Law and Order</td>
<td>Have you or anyone you know even been arrested or detained on account of having/not having your CNIC card? If so can you tell me a bit about this?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Documents: Law and Order</td>
<td>Have you ever had to pay a police bribe? Has this ever been related to your ethnicity (*key for Pashtuns in Karachi).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Documents: Law and Order</td>
<td>Have you or anyone you know ever been deported?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Documents: Law and Order</td>
<td>Is it common for police to raid / enter this area?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Documents: Law and Order</td>
<td>Have the police ever physically or verbally abused you / family member?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S (S)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Social Networks: Strategies of Self-Survival</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Social Networks</td>
<td>Do you have family members living nearby? If moved to the city, when you moved did your family come with you as well?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Social Networks: Housing</td>
<td>If moved, did you have (extended) family and friends here already?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Social Networks</td>
<td>If moved, are other people from you original city /district also here?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>M/S</strong></td>
<td><strong>Migration Histories / Sedentarised histories</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>What were the reasons for moving to the city?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Migration Social Networks</td>
<td>Can you tell me a bit about your family's experience of moving to Peshawar/ Karachi?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Profile</td>
<td>Were you born in Pakistan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sedentarised life</td>
<td>If always lived in one area, what are the reasons behind this?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**E Education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>What types of education are possible in this area (madrassa, government schools, private schools, universities?)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Are you/your children studying? If so, where?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Are there obstacles to accessing Pakistani private and government schools?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Is it difficult to get access to education?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Who set up the school and how is it administered?</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Are schools supported by UNHCR/NGOs?</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Is it common to get extra classes outside if school, such as IELTS or computer classes? If so are these registered organisations?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Education: Social Networks</td>
<td>Has this local community worked to set up a school etc.?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Education: Social Networks</td>
<td>Do children learn at home and informally?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**P (I) Profile: Income**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Profile: Income</th>
<th>Do you/ household members work?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Profile: Income</td>
<td>Where do you work?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Profile: Income</td>
<td>How did you get this job?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Social Networks: Income</td>
<td>Do any of your friends or family members work with you?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>Do you have relatives outside of Pakistan? Where are they based? Do they send you anything? Do they visit?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Income</td>
<td>What are the main expenses here? And is there enough money? (Do you get to eat meat and vegetables? What does your diet consist of?)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**S (G) Social Networks**

| 1 | Social Networks | Do you have good relations with other communities (ethnicities, religious / sectarian groups), e.g. working together, studying together, living together. |
| 2 | Discrimination | Do you ever feel discrimination on ground of ethnicity (*Karachi.* |

**F Facilities, Mobility**

<p>| 1 | Mobility | Can you freely move across Pakistan? |
| 2 | Access to | Do you have good access to water supplies? |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>water</th>
<th>Discuss.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Access to electricity &amp; gas</td>
<td>Do you have good access to good water/electricity supplies? Discuss.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Access to medical facilities</td>
<td>Do you have good access to health supplies?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P(O); I</th>
<th>Profile - Observations; Interview Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observations to watch out for/ directly ask, if appropriate</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of attendees</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Approximate Age</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Size</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Level</td>
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</table>
Appendix 5: Text of Afghan Management and Repatriation Strategy 2010, SAFRON

Government of Pakistan
Ministry of States and Frontier Regions
******

MANAGEMENT AND REPATRIATION STRATEGY FOR AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN FOR THE YEAR 2010-2012

The strategy for repatriation of Afghan refugees for the years 2007-2009, framed in consultation with all the relevant stakeholders, was approved by the Cabinet on 9th May, 2007 following the recommendations of a Cabinet committee. The targets of the strategy, which aimed at complete repatriation of the refugees up the end of 2009 could not be achieved as the concerned government departments and provincial governments did not keep up with the given timeframe and the security situation in the region deteriorated. UNHCR stressed for a flexible and open ended policy as early as 2007, while the Government of Afghanistan also requested for review of the targets of repatriation due to nonconductive environment in the region. As a consequence there are still 1.7 million registered besides an estimated 1.00 million unregistered Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan. The issues which continue to overshadow the repatriation process include lack of sustainability and recycling, lack of conducive environment and absorption capacity in Afghanistan, overall security situation in the region besides the absence of required level of international support and funding from the donor agencies.

REVIEW OF STRATEGY

During a meeting of the Prime Minister with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in August, 2008, it was agreed that a revised repatriation strategy will go beyond 2009. Subsequently, in the 16th Tripartite meeting held in Islamabad on 29th August, 2008 the Government of Pakistan announced the Repatriation Strategy 2007-2009, would be reviewed beyond 2009. It was also decided that the revised strategy will be on a medium term basis and linked with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) for the period 2009-2013.

2. In accordance with the announcement of the government and to regulate and manage the Afghan refugees in Pakistan in future, a revised Management and repatriation strategy for Afghan refugees for the years 2010-2012 has been framed which encompasses all aspects of the refugees’ issues including repatriation and reintegration. So far, inputs have been received from Ministry of Interior and its departments such as FIA, NADRA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial Governments of NWFP and Punjab besides the Project Director, Afghan Refugees Repatriation Cell. This Management Strategy takes into account the legal and illegal Afghan refugees living in Pakistan. The revised strategy will focus on the following:

I. Repatriation to and reintegration of refugees in Afghanistan
II. International support for refugees and repatriation
III. Host community development

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IV. Development of refugees affected areas
V. Addressing security concerns in Pakistan due to refugees presence
VI. Border Management/crossing to control recycling
VII. Constitution of a high powered body to address Afghan refugees issues both in Pakistan and Afghanistan for durable solutions
VIII. Joint Bilateral Commission
IX. Temporary management of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan during the period of 2010-2012

I. REPATRIATION OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN

Tripartite agreement regulates the repatriation and management of POR holders. The first agreement was made in 2003 for three years and further extended in 2006 upto December, 2009. The Tripartite agreement envisages that the repatriation of Afghan refugees would be “voluntary and gradual and with dignity”. This agreement is also required to be extended upto 31st December, 2012.

2. The biggest hurdle in the voluntary repatriation of the Afghan refugees has remained the non-conducive environment in Afghanistan mainly due to Government of Afghanistan’s lack of infrastructural capacity and required level of focus on the returnee issues. But as decided in the Brussels Conference, Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) is to be implemented up to 2013. This envisages a plan for reintegration of returnees inside Afghanistan for a durable solution to the problem. Another issue which has not kept the repatriation process at desired pace is the security concern of the international community.

3. Repatriation, as a voluntary programme, is regulated by Tripartite agreement, therefore, it needs to be linked with ANDS to act as a pull factor. Linking the process with ANDS will require taking into account the absorption capacity of Government of Afghanistan and saving the returnees from inhuman suffering due to continuation of hostilities and lack of governance inside Afghanistan. The Government of Afghanistan (Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation) has to update its counterpart in the GOP (Ministry of SAFRON) on the preparation and the yearly absorption figures inside Afghanistan. The GOP, as such, must have appropriate level of stakes in the ANDS.

4. The Government of Pakistan reserves the right to relocate the Afghan refugees from one camp to another or consolidate the camps due to security and administrative concerns. For repatriation purpose, Governments of Pakistan, Afghanistan and UNHCR would agree on yearly planning figure for repatriation for which GOA and UNHCR would make arrangements for reintegration.

5. The refugee camps closures and the yearly repatriation targets will be considered in consultation with members of the Tripartite Commission as well as with the Provincial
Governments. Presently, the following number of camps are located in different regions of Pakistan:

- Total number of camps: 42
- Camps in NWFP: 29
- Camps in Balochistan: 12
- Camps in Punjab: 01

II. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR REFUGEES AND REPATRIATION

The support of international community for the management of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and their repatriation to Afghanistan is deemed essential. The level of support has however varied in the past, mainly depending on the security concerns about the region. The fact that Pakistan has served as a host to largest refugee population in the region for the longest period of time and that this issue is also linked with overall security situation of the region must be highlighted at all international fora. UNHCR and other donor agencies need to attract more support not only for the refugees in Pakistan but also for providing appropriate shelters and economic incentives within Afghanistan to ensure their dignity in accordance with the international norms. The international community may also consider grant of food assistance and subsistence allowance for one year to create pull factors in Afghanistan.

2. In addition to the above, a central office in Afghanistan is necessary to ensure implementation of a sustainable reintegration plan. Exchange of information with GOP and guarantee of international support and UN agencies is also required. Model villages within Afghanistan may be established to encourage the refugees to return to their homeland.

III. HOST COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Host fatigue naturally exists in the regions with large concentration of the refugees’ population for nearly three decades. In the Brussels Conference 2003, it was decided that the Government of Pakistan would be assisted in developing refugee impacted and host communities. While the UNHCR has extended some help to the host communities in the past, the areas of concern including provision of water, sanitation, forestation, infrastructure, damage repair, burden on services etc require much more attention of the international agencies. It is imperative that funding for the purpose produce actual results to pacify to the host communities. The concerned offices looking after the refugees such as Ministry of SAFFRON/CCAR/CARs must be involved in the process to identify the areas which require the most attention for development/rehabilitation.

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF REFUGEES AFFECTED AREAS

As decided in the Brussels Conference in 2003, the international community must honor its commitment in relation to the regions which served as hosts to the refugee population and
suffered land degradation, soil erosion, deforestation, shortage of water and other environmental hazards besides damage to the infrastructure and services. While the UNDP/UNHCR are set to launch the RAHA initiative, it is again important that the concerned government offices particularly the CARs as well as the Provincial Governments are taken on board to address the actual issues and to set the priorities for the affected areas’ development/rehabilitation.

V. SECURITY CONCERNS

Keeping in view the prevailing security situation in the region in general and in Pakistan in particular, the Government of Pakistan will be required to strictly monitor certain Afghans. This may lead to trials under the law of the land and punitive actions. Information on such actions taken will be shared with UNHCR and other stakeholders. The unregistered/criminal Afghans will be dealt with strictly under the law.

VI. BORDER MANAGEMENT

Border management is another essential element of the security concerns arising from the illegal influx of Afghan nationals across the border. The border is porous and extends along the Federally Administered Tribal Areas which are governed under a separate set of laws. The camp closure in Tribal areas has led to numerous problems in these areas including the refugees integration into the local community. The GOP has the right to address the issue of these illegal Afghans in the manner it deems fit. Any legislation required for the purpose may be promulgated in consultation with the concerned authorities.

VII. CONSTITUTION OF A HIGH POWERED BODY TO ADDRESS THE AFGHAN REFUGEES PROBLEMS

The lack of coordinated and concerted efforts in the past has proved that any attempt to successfully manage the refugees’ problem may not produce the desired results in the absence of a high powered body consisting of representatives of all concerned Federal and Provincial Government Departments as well as agencies to quickly and efficiently address the problems. Such a body would not only monitor the progress of benchmarks but look into unforeseen situations. The Committees at the Federal and Provincial levels, working with specific mandates and with periodical meetings may be constituted as follows:

FEDERAL LEVEL

- Secretary SAFRON Chairman
- Secretary Interior Member
- Secretary Foreign Affairs
- Chief Commissioner Afghan Refugees
- Director General I.B
- Director General FIA
- Rep. of NADRA
- Home Secretary concerned
(NWFP/Punjab/Balochistan/Sindh)
- Secretary Excise & Taxation - Provincial
- Rep. of FBR
- Member Board of Revenue (Provincial)
- Rep. of FATA Sectt

PROVINCIAL LEVEL
- Secretary Home/Tribal Affairs - Chairman
- IG/DIG Police - Member
- Commissioner Afghan Refugees
- Rep. of CCAR, Islamabad
- Rep. of FATA Sectt (Not below Addl. Secy)
- Rep. of I.B
- Ref of FIA
- Rep of NADRA
- Rep. of Excise & Taxation Deptt
- Rep. of Board of Revenue

VIII. JOINT BILATERAL COMMISSION

As agreed in the consultations for the Tripartite meeting, GoP and GoA will form a high level joint commission to oversee the issues/problems faced by Afghans in Pakistan and resolve so that their return and reintegration could be timely ensured. The CCAR will represent the GoP in the Commission. The GoP will also be given access to all information for smooth settlement of returnees in Afghanistan.

XI. TEMPORARY MANAGEMENT OF AFGHANS IN PAKISTAN

It is understood that owing to the non-conductive environment in Afghanistan, many Afghans will not be able to return to their homeland in near future. The proposed high powered bodies at the federal and the provincial levels will therefore monitor the planning process and implementation of the following steps to manage the refugee population during the period 2010-2012:

i) Keeping in view the voluntary nature of repatriation and lack of absorption capacity in Afghanistan, the timeframe should be reviewed in consultation with Tripartite Commission parties and extended up till 31st December, 2012. Planning Figures should be set and reviewed each year.

ii) Unregistered refugees are to be considered as illegal immigrants and need to be deported/dealt with under the law of the land.

iii) A separate dedicated force to trace the unregistered Afghans be formed as local police has been stretched too much these days to accomplish the important task.
iv) The deportation process should be simplified and UNHCR involved to assist their return.

v) NADRA should launch a special drive to detect and cancel NICs passports etc, fraudulently obtained by refugees and discourages the tendency of obtaining illegal NICs, passports and domicile certificates etc.

vi) Those refugees who have invested over 5 million in productive business should be allowed to continue their businesses and may be given work permits for a specific period of time.

vii) Those refugees who have made unproductive investments as in houses should be given reasonable time to dispose off their properties. They should be allowed stay visa for one year.

viii) If an Afghan or groups of Afghans want to bring investment to Pakistan of over Rs.50 million, they may be encouraged to do so. All countries in the world encourage investment.

ix) The Afghan refugees had a stabilizing affect on labour market in Pakistan. This advantage should be retained. The Government should consider granting renewable visas to one hundred and fifty thousand skilled and unskilled Afghans. The figure comes 0.093% of the Pakistani population and 0.29% of the work force.

x) Afghan students should be allowed to study and complete their education in Pakistan. They should in fact be encouraged to study here. This may be regarded as a battle for the hearts and minds of future generations of Afghans.

xi) Those single women who have lost their bread earners and have no one to support them should be allowed to settle in Pakistan.

xii) Being an international issue, the Federal Government should involve international agencies UNHCR, IOM and other countries to resettle some Afghan refugees in other countries.

xiii) Cross border visits of Afghan refugees elders from both countries may be arranged to exchange information and find ways and means for sustainable return.

xiv) It must be mandatory that all Afghans living in areas other than camps be registered with local police stations.

xv) All industrial establishments employing Afghan labour should report them for registration.

xvi) All land lords to report their Afghan tenants to the respective Commissioners for Afghan Refugees and local police stations in the urban and rural areas. Land lords to rent properties to Afghans very sparingly and in genuine cases only to registered refugees.

xvii) All businesses run by Afghans like restaurants, shops and vendors etc. to be registered and monitored.

xviii) All businessmen and other Pakistani citizens to report Afghan employees working with them to the Commissioner, Afghan Refugees and local police stations and such employments must be discouraged.

xix) The details of the already enrolled Afghan students in Pakistani madrissahs be shared with Ministries of SAFRON ad Interior. However, all madrissahs be advised to discourage enrolment of Afghan students.
xx) CCAR, CARs be reorganized and strengthened as their existing capacity to manage and administer the camps and to monitor RAHA initiative is not sufficient. The UNHCR to provide a full time consultant for the purpose.

xxi) Extension of PoRs to be extended upto 2012 through a notification.

xxii) PCM (Proof of Card Modification) to correct and update the cards to continue. The PPV (Population Profiling Verification) which aims to improve and verify information about the special needs of registered Afghans would be a joint venture of Government of Pakistan and UNHCR.

xxiii) ANDS in Afghanistan and VRC in Pakistan will be closely coordinated.

xxiv) Camp management and camp consolidation will be decided in consultation with Provincial Governments and Provincial CARs.

xxv) Periodic review will be carried out for identification benchmarks or repatriation.

xxvi) Increased and effective role and responsibilities of Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary, Levies and border force to effectively control cross border movements.

xxvii) The record/database of repatriated Afghans will be provided to FIA immigration check posts to prevent reentry.

xxviii) After setting a deadline through media campaign, unregistered refugees may be repatriated through the provincial governments, local police/authorities with the assistance of UNHCR.

xxix) NADRA, in collaboration with UNHCR, may install monitoring system to control cross border movements using the registration database to avoid recycling and illegal immigration.
Appendix 6: Police Harassment, Afghan vs. Pakistani Interview Responses

The following is a summary of police harassment results as taken from the interviews completed in this study.

Table 1: Summary of Afghan & Pakistani police harassment experiences, Karachi & Peshawar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality &amp; Harassment</th>
<th>Total as a number</th>
<th>Total as a % of all Afghans interviewed in Karachi and Peshawar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan respondents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>70.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No harassment</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown answer</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani respondents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>41.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No harassment</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>56.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown answer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.94%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Summary of Afghan & Pakistani police harassment experiences by city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of Afghan &amp; Pakistani police harassment experiences by city</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peshawar total respondents (Afghan &amp; Pakistani):</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total as a number</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total as a % of Afghans interviewed in Peshawar</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan respondents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total as a number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistani respondents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total as a number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total as a number</strong> <em>Total as a % of Pakistanis interviewed in Peshawar</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Karachi total respondents (Afghan &amp; Pakistani):</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total as a number</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total as a % of Afghans interviewed in Karachi</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan respondents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistani respondents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown answer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Summary of police harassment experiences by Afghan ethnicity, Karachi & Peshawar (Afghan Pashtun vs. Non-Pashtun – Other)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of police harassment experiences by Afghan ethnicity, Karachi &amp; Peshawar (Afghan Pashtun vs. Non-Pashtun – Other)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Afghan respondents:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>230</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Pashtun respondents:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>135</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total as a number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Other respondents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>91</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total as a number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnicity Unknown respondents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total as a number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown answer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Summary of Pakistani Pashtun experiences of police harassment vs. Pakistanis non-Pashtuns, Karachi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of Pakistani Pashtun experiences of police harassment vs. Pakistanis non-Pashtuns, Karachi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Pakistani respondents:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pashtun respondents</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total as a number</th>
<th>Total as a % of all Pakistani Pashtuns interviewed in Karachi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No harassment</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown answer</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Non-Pashtun respondents | 45 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total as a number</th>
<th>Total as a % of all non-Pashtun Pakistanis interviewed in Karachi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No harassment</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown answer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Ethnicity Unknown respondents: | 2 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total as a number</th>
<th>Total as a % of all Ethnicity Unknowns interviewed in Karachi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harassment</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No harassment</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown answer</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 7: Sample of Legal Aid Cases from SHARP regarding Police Arrests and Harassment

Note: specific dates, names and file numbers have been censored.

February 2008, Meeting with Afghan elder of Afghan Camp, regarding police harassment on their routes to and from work. Date of access: 21 October 2010.

February 2008, Meeting with Afghan elder of Medina Colony, regarding police harassment on their routes to and from work. Date of access: 21 October 2010.

February 2008, Meeting with Afghan elder in Nazimabad regarding police harassment on their routes to and from work and of shopkeepers. Date of access: 21 October 2010.

June 2008, Meeting with Afghan elder of Baloch Goth regarding police harassment on their routes to and from work. Date of access: 21 October 2010.


December 2008, Meeting with Afghan elder and police officer after reports of police harassment on their routes to and from work and of shopkeepers. Date of access: 21 October 2010.

January 2009, Meeting with Afghan elder of Jamali Goth regarding police harassment on their routes to and from work. Date of access: 21 October 2010.

July 2009, Police demands of bribes by local shopkeepers reported by Afghans. Date of access: 9 November 2010.


October 2009, Police raid and arrests of 13 Afghans. Landhi. Date of access: 9 November 2010.


November 2009, Arrest of 14 people. Date of access: 9 November 2010.

November 2009, Arrest of 6 Afghans, three with POR cards, one with NIC, two with no documentation. Date of access: 21 October 2010.

December 2009, Advice case rejected by SHARP as arrestees without POR. Date of access: 9 November 2010.
Appendix 8: Sample of Unregistered Afghan Deportation Order, Arrested Under Foreigners Act

IN THE COURT OF II ADDL & SESSIONS JUDGE KARACHI WEST

BEFORE:- (Mrs. Romana Siddiqa)

S.C. 1065/2009

The state...v/s... N [redacted] and others.......................accused

FIR No. [redacted]./2009
U/S: 3/4 / 14-Foreigner's Act 1946
PS: Maripur Karachi

To,

The
Superintendent
Central Prison /
Juvenile Offenders / Women Jail /
District Prison Malir
Karachi

SUBJECT:- CONVICTION LETTER

WHEREAS the above noted matter is fixed today on 21-12-2009 for supply of copies under section 265-C Cr.P.C before me (N.) II Addl. Sessions Judge Karachi West, when all accused persons have pleaded their guilt through filing separate applications whereupon show cause notices have given to which they replied that they are pleading guilty without any force or coercion, I do hereby convict and sentence for a period of undergone and fine of Rs.500/- and in case of failure he would be undergone for sentence of period of one week. He is present before Court in custody and is remanded back to Prison to undergo the sentence so awarded to them u/S 245(2) Cr.PC. however they are entitled to get the benefit u/S 282-B Cr.PC. The superintendent of jail is hereby directed to make arrangement of deportation of the accused person above named after completion of his sentence through the Home Department, Government of Sindh with intimation to this Court.

(Mrs. Romana Siddiqa)
IIND. ADDL. SESSIONS JUDGE KARACCHI WEST

CONVICTION SLIP:-
1. Age about years.
2. Religion: Islam
3. Occupation: in custody
4. Mark of Identification:
5. LTI of accused
Appendix 9: Sample of Registered Afghan Arrested under Foreigners Act

IN THE COURT OF 2ND JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE UBAURO

CR CASE NO 411/09

STATE

V/S

1. W s/o Hajji W
2. Hajji W s/o PG
by caste Kharot Pathan R/O District [redacted] Afghanistan
3. FK s/o AS
by caste Angerkhel Pathan r/o District [redacted]
Afghanistan..........................................................Accused

FIR no [cens.]
U/S 14 Foreigners Act
PS Ubauro.

Mr Mehmood Sikander Advocate for all accused.
Mr Abdullah Malik ADPP for State.

ORDER
26.11.09.

By this order I intend to disposed off above titled case by allowing an application
u/s 249-A CrPC moved on behalf of all accused who are facing trial before this court.

The brief facts of the case are that above named accused were implicated in this case due
to illegally entering into Sindh without any authorized valid document or visa, during
interrogation they disclosed that they are Afghan National and living illegally in Pakistan

Application in hand was noticed to state through learned ADPP.

Heard the both parties at length, learned defense council Mr. Mehmood Sikander argued that all
accused are innocent as they are having valid document refugee card called as POR (Proof of
Registration) issued by NADRA Government of Pakistan which is valid till 31 December 2009
entitling them to reside in Pakistan, that there was an argument between the Government of
Pakistan, Afghanistan and UNHCR which entitle Afghan Refugee to live temporarily in Pakistan.
He further argued that a circular dated 28.10. 09 regarding status of Afghans refugee has been
issued by Home Department Sindh wherein directions were made not to [deport?]...
[A circular is present] made by NADRA Dated 24.10.09 and photo copy of circular dated 28.10.09 issued by Home Department Sindh. On other hand learned state council did not appose the application. The Court sent copy of circular for verification whether same is genuine or otherwise which verified from Home Department wherein they verified such circular to be genuine through letter Dated 26.10.09 received by this court through fax.

Perused the material placed on record, which suggests that all accused are having their POR cards validated their stay in Pakistan till 31.10.09, hence their entrance in Pakistan is not illegal therefore the penal law Foreigner Act does not apply upon them and there is no possibility of their conviction in this case resultantly application in hand is allowed as prayed all above named accused are acquitted in this case u/s 249-A CrPc accused are confined in jail their release writ is ordered to be issued and present case stands disposed off accordingly. Announced in open court on this 26th day of November 2009.

Sd/-26.11.2009.

(ASGHAR ALI TANWARI)
II- CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M UBAURO.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper, Date</th>
<th>Headline</th>
<th>Article Excerpts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Nation, 19 April 1991.</td>
<td>Afghan refugee repatriation.</td>
<td>The Kalashnikov culture and the corresponding increase in crimes, the access to drugs, the rise in drug addiction and in sabotage activities are all linked to refugee presence in the country... Have taken over the trucking industry/vegetables markets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The News, 22 November 2000.</td>
<td>Mansehra blast scares Afghan refugees.</td>
<td>Scared of going outside following allegations that the recent bomb blast in the town may have been the work of an Afghan refugee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The News, 26 June 2005.</td>
<td>Point of return - Editorial.</td>
<td>We want to be rid of the much maligned Afghans who gave us drugs and guns. There may be a few among them who we have befriended during the three decades they have been forced to live on our soil, on borrowed breathing space in a crowd of the disadvantaged. We are hoping that they will soon go home not because we sympathise with them, and we would have loved to throw them out to save our economy if we had the authority to do so.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawn, 1 August 2005.</td>
<td>Plan to curb refugees’ anti-poll activities.</td>
<td>The interior ministry has convened a meeting on Monday to devise a strategy to check involvement of Afghan refugees in crimes and terrorist activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The News, 3 August 2005.</td>
<td>Afghan refugees to be moved from Islamabad.</td>
<td>More than 3 million Afghans have been living in the country and authorities in the capital believe the refugee settlements provide easy shelter to criminals such as robbers and even terrorists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The News, 2 September 2005.</td>
<td>Grand operation against illegal Afghan immigrants likely this month.</td>
<td>Three bombs have exploded in the capital during the last five years, claiming 26 lives, the report said... According to details of Afghan refugees arrested in criminal offences since 1990, as many as 1,025 Afghan nationals, allegedly involved in heinous crimes, including murders, robberies, kidnapping for ransom, narcotics and business of illegal arms and ammunition, were arrested. They allegedly killed 21 persons in different sectors of the capital and kidnapped nine persons during the aforementioned period, the report said. Hundreds of Afghan nationals were found involved in untraceable offences, including killings and terrorist activities and supervising underworld crimes, said the report. Inspector General of Police Chaudhary Iftikhar Ahmad, when contacted by ‘The News,’ said that the police would effectively achieve the target of eliminating Afghans, illegally living in the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The News, November 9 2005.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Afghans refugees given deadline to leave NWA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawn, 5 July 2006.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Timergara blast: Afghans quizzed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawn, October 23 2006.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Time for Afghans to go home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawn, 13 December 2006.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Afghan DPs facing difficulty in enrolment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The News, 14 January 2007.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Drive back home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The News, 15 January 2007.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shaukat sees security risk in some refugee camps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nation, 16 January 2007.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Frontier Post, 22 April 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan and terrorism - Pervaiz Iqbal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
incidents of encroachment on lands and property, overgrazing of fields of the local population, large-scale deforestation, land erosion, illegal shanty towns, massive increase in rent ceilings, introduction of drug and Kalashnikov culture, intensification of sectarianism, increased competition for transport and construction businesses, housing and jobs, and incidents of violence, etc. This had put a heavy strain on the social services of an already underdeveloped NWFP province. More importantly, law and order problems increased due to begging, crime and immorality. This was followed by a spate of terrorist bomb explosions throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The Taliban period provided some respite as it was able to control law and order in Afghanistan to a considerable extent.

**Dawn, 1 June 2007.**

This Afghan liability.

The easy availability of NICs by illegal means has enabled them to acquire property, have jobs and start business. Traditionally hospitable to foreign Muslims, Pakistanis have never hesitated to welcome Afghan DPs despite problems between the two governments. However, many Pakistanis feel that the Afghan refugees have misused their hospitality and it is time they returned home. Terrorists cross over into Pakistan and find shelter in the refugee camps.

**Dawn, 1 September 2008.**

Pakistan wants repatriation of Afghan refugees expedited.

A source in the ministry of states and frontier regions said the government had told Afghan officials and the UN refugee agency that it was becoming impossible for Pakistan to continue to host the refugees because Afghan nationals had been found involved in recent acts of terrorism in the country.

**The Post, 19 April 2008.**

The issue of Afghan refugees.

The prevailing violent and criminal culture in Pakistan has created security problems. Suicide terrorism, sectarian violence and ‘civil war’ in various areas have compelled the authorities to say that Afghans are to go back to their country... Pakistan has announced that all 2.4 million Afghan refugees, mostly living in camps, must return home by 2009. This and three other camps near the Afghan border, which together hold 230,000 refugees, are scheduled to be closed by the end of August.

**The Post, 5 August 2008.**

Afghan refugees and Pakistan.

These refugees caused deep rooted troubles on various fronts like shortage of resources, competition in labour market, environmental degradation, drugs, ethnic imbalances, etc. Some of these also got involved in criminal activities, smuggling, narco-traffic, and social problems but now they have turned into trouble spots for global
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 June 2011</td>
<td>Afghans, IDPs overstaying their hospitality.</td>
<td>The prolonged stay of Afghan refugees and internally displaced persons from tribal regions has created social and economic problems besides posing threat to peace of the district, locals complain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 December 2011</td>
<td>Afghan refugees killed Rabbani, says Khar.</td>
<td>Minister for Foreign Affairs Hina Rabbani Khar on Tuesday held Afghan refugees living in Pakistan responsible for the assassination of former Afghan president Prof Burhanuddin Rabbani.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April 2012</td>
<td>Eradication of terrorism remains a challenge: IGP.</td>
<td>About the factors responsible for increase in militancy, he [Inspector General of Police Mohammad Akbar Khan Hoti] said that presence of millions of Afghan refugees and close proximity of the province to the tribal belt etc were affecting the law and order situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 11: Sample of Recorded Suicides from Poverty in Newspapers Stories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper, Date</th>
<th>Headline/Location</th>
<th>Article Excerpts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dawn, 29 July 2008</td>
<td>Old man commits suicide (Sukkur).</td>
<td>Reports said that Mohammad Hassan Bhutto hanged himself with a rope from a ceiling fan and died instantly. He was father of seven children and was unable to take care of them due to extreme poverty and unemployment, area people said.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nation, 7 October 2008</td>
<td>4 commit suicide over poverty (Karachi).</td>
<td>Farhan, 23... was jobless and thriving to get some work... Sohail, 40... was the father of four and recently lost his garments factory job in Korangi Industrial Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawn, 14 September 2009</td>
<td>Eyewitnesses recount scene at Karachi stampede (Karachi).</td>
<td>Eighteen people were suffocated to death during a stampede here on Monday as poverty-stricken women battled for a free bag of flour being distributed by a philanthropist in Kohri Garden. The dead reportedly include a number of children as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The News, 22 May 2011</td>
<td>Father of five commits suicide over poverty (Lahore).</td>
<td>Police said he was disturbed over poor financial conditions as he was unable to run his house. He locked himself up in a room and hanged himself to death.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The News, 20 September 2011</td>
<td>Mother of four commits suicide over poverty (Lahore).</td>
<td>A 28-year-old woman, mother of four daughters, committed suicide in the South Cantt police area on Thursday morning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Express Tribune, 27 October 2011</td>
<td>Suicide: Poverty-stricken man takes own life (Haripur).</td>
<td>A man committed suicide here on Wednesday due to poverty, the Kot Najibullah police said. Twenty-year-old Basheer Ahmed, a resident of Kangra Colony, was unemployed and had been facing great difficulties supporting his four orphaned siblings, police and family sources said.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The News, 1 November 2011</td>
<td>Poverty-hit man commits suicide (Malakand Agency).</td>
<td>A poverty-stricken man committed suicide in Shaheed locality of Sakhakot area in Malakand Agency on Monday, sources said. The sources said that Fazlur Rehman, father of six children, used to earn his livelihood by selling ‘Pakoras’ in Sakhakot Bazaar. He had been ill for a long time. He committed suicide by shooting himself dead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Times, 17 November 2011</td>
<td>Suicide (Karachi).</td>
<td>A young man committed suicide reportedly due to poverty in Martin Quarters on Wednesday.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The News, 23 December 2011</td>
<td>Man commits suicide over poverty (Lahore).</td>
<td>A 50-year-old man committed suicide due to poverty in the Shadbagh police area on Thursday. The deceased was identified as Muhammad Naeem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The News, 4 January 2012</td>
<td>Man commits suicide in Bannu (Bannu).</td>
<td>A man committed suicide due to abject poverty in Fazal Shah Mithakhel village in the limits of Mandan Police Station here Tuesday, sources said. The sources said that 45-year-old Sher Nazeef, father of children, entered his room and shot himself dead with a pistol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawn, 15 February 2012</td>
<td>Suicide the only way to escape poverty? (Islamabad and Karachi).</td>
<td>Stories and testimonies of various individuals in Islamabad and Karachi who either attempted suicide or have been affected by the death of a family member, usually related to poverty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nation, 3 May 2012</td>
<td>Man commits suicide due to poverty (Lahore).</td>
<td>According to details, Ghulam Fareed, 26, hailing from Mughalpura who was facing problems to feed his family due to poverty attempted to commit suicide by shooting himself with pistol injuring him critically. He was rushed to hospital but could not survive. The deceased was pickup driver and father of two children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Today, 16 May 2012</td>
<td>Poverty-stricken couple commits suicide in Khanewal (Khanewal).</td>
<td>A poverty-hit couple, also parents of two children committed suicide by jumping in front of a moving train on Tuesday. Afzal and his wife Fozia of Shakargarh area of Sialkot and residing in Khanewal were facing financial problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Express Tribune, 10 June 2012</td>
<td>One million people commit suicide every year.</td>
<td>[Discussion regarding the multifaceted causes of suicide, psychological and economic, and the increased suicide rates in Pakistan].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahore Times, 10 June 2012</td>
<td>Poverty stricken man hangs himself in Tank (Tank).</td>
<td>A thirty years old man hanged himself to death in Mamraiz village...According to details one Imam Bakhsh s/o Muhammad Bakhsha and father of three children committed suicide by hanging himself to the roof of their room due to poverty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahore Times, 12 June 2012</td>
<td>Poverty stricken man, attempting for self immolation expires in Civil Hospital Karachi (Karachi).</td>
<td>A Poverty stuck man who attempted to commit suicide through self immolation over poor financial position and debt, succumbed to his wounds in hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Express Tribune, 3 July 2012</td>
<td>Self-immolation: Man commits suicide (Rawalpindi).</td>
<td>A 45-year-old man attempted self immolation at Liaqat Bagh area of the city on Tuesday, police said. According to details, Ashfaq Ahmed, resident of Gwalamandi area attempted self immolation over poverty issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nation, 31 July 2012</td>
<td>Poverty compels father of two to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 August 2012</td>
<td>The Nation</td>
<td>Man, woman commit suicide (Lalmusa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Two people including a woman, a mother of five, committed suicide by taking pesticide pills while doctors saved the life of a man after he attempted suicide. All the frustrated persons swallowed pesticide pills easily available in the market. The reasons behind the suicides were stated to be poverty, unemployment and family feuds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 2012</td>
<td>The News</td>
<td>Man commits suicide over poverty (Lahore).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Javed Masih, a resident of Ali Husnainabad, was depressed as he was unable to run his family due to unemployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 October 2012</td>
<td>The News</td>
<td>Two attempt suicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Two people attempted suicide in separate incidents here on Sunday.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A poor widow attempted suicide due to poverty at Mohallah Gobindgarh. She was taken to a hospital. Azam attempted suicide by cutting his throat at Dhusley. He was rushed to a hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 November 2012</td>
<td>Frontier Post</td>
<td>Man commits suicide (Mian Channu).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>According to details, Ashraf, father of two children, hailing from Mohallah Rehmania, tehsil Mian Channu of Khanewal district was facing financial problems due to low income which led to domestic disputes and quarrels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 November 2012</td>
<td>Dawn</td>
<td>Father of 3 hangs himself (Fateh Jang).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A man committed suicide due to poverty at Gharbi Mohalla... The deceased was experiencing financial hardships because of prolonged unemployment, and his wife was the sole bread earner who worked at different houses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date unknown</td>
<td>Dawn</td>
<td>Poverty-stricken widow commits suicide (Lahore).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A widow committed suicide by swallowing poisonous pills...The Shahdara Town police said Zareena Bibi, mother of two, was perturbed over daily expenses and the house rent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 12: Afghans Getting Caught with CNIC – sample of news stories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper, Date</th>
<th>Headline</th>
<th>Story Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dawn, 14 March 2002</td>
<td>Maliks, staff face action for false CNIC verification</td>
<td>Political administration of the Bajaur Agency has initiated action against its clerical staff and Maliks of the agency for wrongly verifying Afghan refugees as Pakistani nationals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawn, 29 August 2005</td>
<td>2 more Afghans held with fake travel papers</td>
<td>Two Afghan nationals on charges of possessing fake travel documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The News, 20 May 2007</td>
<td>Afghan refugees holding CNICs creating trouble</td>
<td>Majority of Afghan refugees in Balochistan, though not having Proof of Registration (PoR) cards but the Pakistani Computerised National Identity Cards, are reluctant to return to their homeland...[they] are creating problems in the repatriation process, an official told The News on Saturday.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawn, 1 June 2007</td>
<td>This Afghan liability</td>
<td>A photograph in yesterday’s Dawn shows a group of Pakistanis demonstrating against the illegal issuance of national identity cards to a large number of Afghan nationals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawn, 5 March 2008</td>
<td>Attempts by thousands of aliens to get CNIC foiled</td>
<td>NADRA has foiled 11,396 attempts of obtaining computerised identity cards (CNIC) by confirmed aliens, their applications have been blocked permanently and cases are marked as fraud, according to a Nadra spokesman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The News, 6 October 2008</td>
<td>Govt to kick out Afghan refugees from Bajaur</td>
<td>Tribal sources said majority of the Afghan refugees during their long stay in Bajaur had purchased lands and properly constructed houses. Some of them are attached with various businesses and farming and have even obtained Computerised National Identity Cards (CNICs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawn, 9 October 2009</td>
<td>Refugees urged to surrender duplicate PoR cards</td>
<td>National Database Registration Authority and the UN refugee agency have detected fraud in the system of issuing cards for Afghan refugees and found that some refugees have managed to obtain more than one card. Nadra and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees have issued the Proof of Registration (PoR) card to the Afghans still living in Pakistan for identification for giving financial assistance at the time of their repatriation. A UNHCR official said that the refugees with more than one card might have got themselves registered at different centres and managed to acquire cards from more than one centre. But now the data is centralised and such errors could be detected easily, he added.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“Afghan refugees holding more than one card cannot defraud the UNHCR in getting double benefits by using different cards because during repatriation process the refugees are made to pass through an Iris machine which readily identifies the person having passed through it before,” he said.

It is learnt that Nadra has sorted out names, years of birth, provinces and districts of residence of all those who have more than one card. The UNHCR has urged such Afghans to surrender the fraudulently acquired cards to avoid penalty.

Each registered Afghan will be allowed to keep his original card.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APP, 20 Feb 2010</td>
<td>92,802 Afghan refugees issued CNIC</td>
<td>After implementation of the multi biometric technology 85,032 attempts for getting CNICs on fake documents were foiled and the applications were deferred till verification, the sources said.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Times, 1 July 2010</td>
<td>Over 25,000 Afghan nationals have CNICs, NA told</td>
<td>[Rehman] Malik [Interior Minister] says NADRA has so far detected over 90,000 cases of fake CNICs. Over 25,000 Afghan nationals have obtained computerised national identity cards (CNICs) from the National Database and Registration Authority on fake documents, Interior Minister Rehman Malik told the National Assembly on Wednesday. Responding during the question hour, he said NADRA has detected over 90,000 cases of fake identity cards so far, which have been blocked. He said, &quot;NADRA's employees foil around 100 to 200 attempts of obtaining computerised identity cards daily&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nation, October 15 2011</td>
<td>13,000 'aliens' possess Pakistan’s CNICs: Malik</td>
<td>The minister of interior also informed that around 8,000 cards had been blocked in Balochistan of suspect/ alien applicants on the basis of reported as alien by government agencies, proof of registration (PoR) card holder in addition to CNIC holder, fake particulars, holder of dual or bogus manual NIC/CNIC, fake parentage, old NIC issued to two different persons, fake date of birth or addresses, fake attesters and fake identifications papers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawn, 25 October 2011</td>
<td>29 held in illegal CNICs issuance case</td>
<td>NADRA vigilant cell held 22 foreigners and seven Nadra employees and handed them over to Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) in Akhrotabad, Balochistan,” Nadra’s spokesman said here on Monday. Nadra vigilance cell received information that some foreigners mostly Afghan nationals were trying to get CNICs in connivance with Nadra</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
employees in Akhrotabad.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The International News, 11 June 2012</td>
<td>An Afghan refugee held for possessing a Pakistan CNIC.</td>
<td>The sources said the police found a CNIC in the possession of Nuzrat Khan. It had been issued to him with the name of Mohammad Suleman. The city police registered case against Nuzrat Khan under sections 419, 420 and 478 of the Pakistan Penal Code and Section 14 of the Foreigners’ Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nation, 15 June 2012</td>
<td>Govt, UN to move for Afghan rehab.</td>
<td>NADRA has already tracked and abandoned thousands of the fake Computerised National Identity Cards (CNIC) and has assisted the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) to nab the illegal refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Express Tribune, 22 September 2012</td>
<td>NADRA starts crackdown against fake CNICs.</td>
<td>NADRA also launched a crackdown against Afghan refugees who are living in Pakistan illegally. Over 200,000 Afghans whose temporary ID cards have expired have been directed to leave the country. They will be no longer treated as refugees in Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 13: Identity Cards and Enumeration Practices

Figure 20-32: Identity cards and enumeration techniques (Appendix 13)
دکتر نیکچی روزارت
رئیس‌جمهور سیاست‌الرو
اداره
386
افغان مهاجرین
یک سهمیه

[redacted text]

[signature]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>R.T.V. No.</th>
<th>R.E.G.D. No.</th>
<th>PHOTO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

**INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE CARD**

**Chapter 7 para 26**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Father's Name</th>
<th>Tribe/Sub Tribe</th>
<th>Details of Family Members</th>
<th>PHOTO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Adults**

| | | | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| M |  |  |  | M |
| M |  |  |  | F |
| M |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

**Infants**

| | | | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| M |  |  |  | M |
| M |  |  |  | F |
| M |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

**Address in Afghanistan**

6. Date of arrival in Pakistan

7. Point of Entry

8. Date of Registration

9. Date of Verification

10. Movables Property Assets

- Live Stock
- Vehicles

**Remarks**

11. Identification Mark

12. State of Health

13. Special Skills/Profession

14. Remarks/Specific Instructions

**STOCK REGISTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE FOR AFGHAN REFUGEES**

**PROVINCE**

**DISTRICT**

**B.V. No.**

**A.**

**Item**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remarks:**

**Initial:**

**Checklist:**

- [ ]

**Weapons:**

- [ ]
Facial shot

Unique individual number

Name

Gender

Father’s name

Distinguishing mark

Date of birth

Signature

Official’s Signature

Facial shot

Unique family number

Unique individual number

Fulltime address

Alternative address

Fingerprint

Expire date

Issue date

Unique individual barcode
Details of images

Images 1 and 2: Upgraded 2010 SCAC POR card, front side and back side. Note registration of children under the age of 5 is placed on the back of the card. Also note the card is written in English.

Image 3 and 4: The Republic of Afghanistan Paper ID card introduced by the Communist Afghan government (circa 1979). Details include photo identity, name, fathers name, religion, date of birth.

Image 5: Unity of Islamic Resistance, Poverty Card (Da Guryatub Kart). The card was provided to some Afghans in Pakistan during the 1980s by resistance parties in Peshawar. It includes a picture of the male household head and family details. Each family was provided with a family identification number (top right hand of card).

Image 6-8: Afghan Muhajireen Passbook as issued by CCAR, Islamabad.

Image 6: Passbook front page, includes identification number of the family.

Image 7: Passbook fine print, which includes disclaimer that the passbook does not equal Pakistani citizenship. The text states this passbook does not entitle Pakistani citizenship (Is pass book seh Pakistan ka sheriyat ka haq nahi hota hai – shehriyat - literally: to be of the “city”). The text also outlines that only one passbook will be given to the family head, which will be taken back when the family leaves Pakistan.

Image 8: Inside pages of passbook. note only family heads needed to possess a passbook. Details include listing of months rations received, details of family members, date of passbook issue.


Images 10-14: Afghan POR card registration and upgrade to SCAC processes in NADRA centres (2010-11).

Images 15-16: Pakistani CNIC card, front and backside. Note how the Pakistani card includes a thumb print, and photo on the back side of the card. Note that the card is also written in Urdu.
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(WHO) World Health Organisation


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