MORE THAN JUST A BOUNDARY
DISPUTE:
THE REGIONAL GEOPOLITICS OF
SAUDI-YEMENI RELATIONS

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Appendices
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1.1. Notes on Arabia, June 1907

This is one of three publications (See Appendices 1.2 and 1.3) providing historical accounts were prepared for official use by British institutions such as the Foreign Office or the War Office early last century. Their significance is in the information they contain about the status of Asir prior to the Great War of 1914-1918. These documents are especially crucial in the context of the then-existing uncertainty about the status of this district in the 1920s and 1930s.

‘Notes on Arabia’ was compiled in the General Staff, War Office, June 1907 (FO 371/353, TNA, London).

This document confirms that, since 1872, the Vilayet of Yemen had been divided by the Ottomans for administrative purposes into four district-based regions: Sana’a (as the capital), Ta‘izz, Asir and Al-Hudaydah. These districts are referred to by different terms in Turkish and Arabic. The districts were sometimes called mutasarrifiyah or a sonjok and a qa’immaqamiyah, and were each headed by a mutasarrif. It must be noted that these were the Turkish terms, while in Arabic the corresponding term liwā was used. Indeed, in today’s Yemen the term liwā refers to a muhafadhah (governorate).
NOTES ON ARABIA.

Compiled in the

GENERAL STAFF, WAR OFFICE.

June, 1907.
An interesting report.
Copy to Constantinople, Febr
Cairo, Ad. July 4, 1907

This is well worth looking at & there
is a useful map, see especially Summary

It is an excellent memorandum.

Ch.
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NOTES ON ARABIA (INCLUDING THE HEJAZ, &c.) AND ITS RECENT HISTORY.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION.

The peninsula of Arabia, lying between lats. 12° 40' and 50° N., measures some 1,400 miles from the Gulf of Suez to Ras el Hadd, its mean breadth between the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf being about 600 miles. Its total area is estimated at 1,200,000 square miles, and its population from five to eight millions.

The general features of Arabia are those of an elevated tableland, backed up by low mountains to the east, and gradually rising in the direction of the features west and south, where we find it bordered by a second and loftier mountain range. The mountains, if we except Jebel Akhdar in Oman, are almost wholly barren on their sea side, but are occasionally fertile enough on their inner ranges, especially in the Yemen and the southerly districts. Beyond them lies an uninterrupted ring of sterile desert, broadest in the south and east, where it expands into a huge waste of burning sand; narrower towards the west and north, where it is more rocky in its character. Within this belt runs a series of tablelands, undulating in long slopes, and intersected with deep valleys, the former rich in pasture, the latter in field and garden produce. This central plateau constitutes about one-third of the total area of the peninsula, the desert ring another third, and the coast ranges make up the rest.

The main divisions of the country are shown in the accompanying map, but no definite boundaries exist, except that recently demarcated between the southern Yemen and the Aden Protectorate.

From time immemorial Arabia has been almost exclusively occupied by inhabitants of the great branch of the Semitic family called Arabs, and few Asiatic lands have a more homogeneous population. Within this branch are many divisions and sub-divisions with tribal and sub-tribal groups continually at war with each other; but all are essentially one in origin, physiques, speech, and religion.

The religion of nearly all the inhabitants of Arabia is Islam. The inhabitants of the Yemen are Shias,* but those of the remainder of the peninsula are Sunnis, and are therefore supposed to acknowledge the Sultan of Turkey as Khalifa; but it is, to say the least of it, doubtful if they really do so, the Grand Sherif of Mecka being quite as important a personage in their eyes.

In view of the great importance of this claim of the Sultan of Turkey to the headship of the Muhammadan faith, a short examination of the Khalifate may not be out of place.

The title of Khalifa has been borne by the Ottoman sovereigns since 1517, when Sultan Selim I. conquered Egypt; but, as a rule, it has been little more than a title. It has been the policy of the present Sultan to make a reality of the spiritual power, but his claims are somewhat similar to those which the Russian Emperor might put forward to be the head of Christendom. The majority of his subjects accept his pretensions without question or reserve, but large sections of Muhammadans, e.g., all Shias and all the inhabitants of north-

* The most important division of Muhammadans is into Sunnis and Shias. The latter number some 12,000,000 in Persia, India and Arabia; to the former belong practically the whole of the rest of Islam.

The Sunnis believe in the office of Khalifa, the "lieutenant" or "vice" of Muhammad, and accept the six books of tradition which are commonly designated by the name of Sunnah. They are divided into four schools, all equally orthodox, and differing only in the interpretation of minute points of law and ritual—the Hanafiyas (Turkey, Central Asia and North India), Shafiyyas (Egypt), Malikiyas (Morocco and North Africa), and Hanbaliyas (parts of Arabia).

The Shias (Shia as Sectary) reject the institution of the Khalifate and hold that after the death of Muhammad the headship of the Muhammadan church was vested in the Ummah. They report the six books of the Sunni tradition, but have other collections of traditions of their own.
Notes on Arabia, June 1907

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Figure 1.1.6 Notes on Arabia, June 1907
In 629 Muhammad fled from Mecca to Medina to take refuge from his own tribe of the Koreish, who were persecuting him for his new doctrines. From this year of the Hegira (Hajra, Hijra), or Flight, dates all Muhammadan chronology. The Prophet at once began a succession of military campaigns against his enemies, and at his death in 632 had united the whole peninsula of Arabia, with the exception of a few minor tribes, under one creed and sceptre.

The successors of Muhammad continued this successful and warlike policy. In 634 Damascus was taken, and 3 years later Jerusalem and the whole of Syria capitulated to the Khalif Oman, while shortly after Mesopotamia suffered the same fate. These conquests brought the Arabs into immediate contact with the highlands of Armenia and Kurdistan, which have remained the ultimate northern limits of their permanent occupation. Egypt was absorbed in the wave of Muhammadan conquest in the year 642.

During the next century the Arab Empire rapidly increased to the east and west, until, at the close of the Omniaside dynasty in 755, it comprised the whole basin of the Mediterranean except its northern littoral, and all southwestern Asia to the Indus and the frontiers of China.

Up to this time the Khalifas had resided at Damascus, but they now transferred the seat of government to Baghdad, where, for the next 500 years, the Abbaside family reigned.

But, though of pure Arab origin, the Abbaside empire did not rest on an Arab basis, and for the next four centuries of their rule the princes were mere puppets in the hands of their Persian, Turkish, Turkoman, and Turkish mercenaries.

In 1258 the Tartar chief Hulaku, grandson of Jenghis Khan, stormed Baghdad, and the remnant of the royal family fled to Cairo, where the Fatimites had been recently dethroned by the Khalif Emir Saladin.

In 1517 the Turkish Sultan Selim I conquered Egypt, and was invested by the last real or supposed descendant of the Abbasides with the mantle of the Prophet. He thus acquired for the present Ottoman dynasty the Khalifate, and so changed it from a national and hereditary to a political and religious institution.

Under Seliman the Magnificent (1520-1566), the Ottoman Empire reached the zenith of its power and greatness, and at that period the entire Arabian peninsula was included on the maps of Turkish Asia.

The Arabs, who early in the 11th century had seceded from the Abbaside Khalifate, and had, with the exception of the inhabitants of the Hejaz and part of the Yemen, relapsed into their former savage independence, now offered a nominal allegiance to the Turkish Government; but revolts soon broke out again, and in 1630 the Yemenite chief Kasim established himself as Imam of the Yemen. This dynasty's rule continued until 1871, when a Turkish army from Syria occupied the province.

The Hejaz, owing to the annual pilgrimage from Turkey and other causes, remained in closer touch with the Ottoman Government, though there were many insurrections. But in the remainder of the peninsula, in Nejd, Oman, Hadramaut, and the other adjoining districts, the Ottoman claims were, from the beginning of the 17th century, absolutely ignored, and no collision was possible, because no point of contact existed. This state of things was, however, at last modified by the Wahabi movement, one of the most important in the history of Arabia, and the end of which we have not yet seen.

The Wahabi movement, the Puritan Reformation of Islam, was started by Nejd. Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab, who was born in Nejd in 1893. Supported by the Wahabi movement, he gradually succeeded, partly by persuasion and partly by force, in imposing his rigorous doctrines on nearly all Central Arabia. The Wahabis soon became a great power in the peninsula, and in 1860 their empire extended from Mecca to near Baghdad.

The Porte now began to organize against the Wahabis a series of expeditions under various generals, the chief of whom were Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, and Ibrahim his son. In 1818 the latter at last succeeded in capturing the city of Deraya, together with Abdullah, the Imam or king of the Wahabis.
The Wahhabi power was now for a time reduced, but with the revolt of Mehemet Ali against the Porte in 1831 it soon rose again. Many of the conquered provinces revolted, and the Egyptian garrisons were gradually driven from the country.

El Haza, Arel, the whole of Nejd, Kasim, and the provinces adjoining the Yemen on the north, with Asir, were now reunited under the sceptre of one Faisal, whose capital was at Riad, and a broad belt of Wahabi rule again stretched across the centre of the peninsula from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf. As many of the principal pilgrim and caravan routes of Arabia passed through their territory, their political and commercial influence became supreme. But over Bahrain,* Oman, and the Yemen the Wahabis, though they have frequently attempted it, have never been able to establish their former dominion, and in Shammar and Jof, to the north between Nejd and Syria, a new kingdom, with Abdullah ibn Rashid at its head, sprang up in 1846, its capital being Haij. Both for its religious programme of emancipation from elaborate and superstitious ceremonial, and for its programme of emancipation from Turkish dominion, Wahabism was not uncongenial to them; they accepted it rather for its hostility to the Mekkan or "Turkish" system than for its Puritanism, which latter is not natural to a pure Beduin race. The district of Kasim, tired of Wahabi tyranny, annexed itself to the Shammar chief.

1865.

In 1865 Faisal was assassinated, and the inevitable contest arose between his sons Abdullah and Saud for the Emirate.

1870.

In 1870 Saud finally defeated Abdullah, who went off to seek the aid of the hated, and to them infidel, Turk.

El Haza, 1876–1879.

The result was an expedition under Midhat Pasha, Vuli of Bagdad, which left Basra by sea, and, with Abdullah’s aid, occupied El Haza.*

Abdullah soon discovered that the purpose of the Turks was purely conquest, and that they had no intention of reinstating him, whereupon he took to flight.

Deprived of his aid and influence, the Turks did not venture to cross the dangerous sandy wastes between El Haza and Nejd in face of the Nejdian forces, and Midhat Pasha contented himself with the conquest of El Haza.

The “sanjak” of El Haza is, however, still officially known as that of Nejd.

So far as it went, the Turkish conquest of El Haza has proved definitive, despite more than one revolt of the inhabitants; but so hated is the Turk that he has had to maintain a state of siege in the oasis ever since. The occupation, however, is intended to be permanent, for it commands the best road to Nejd and Oman.

In October, 1906, an attack was made by the Arabs on the town of Hofhuf, the capital of the province. In the engagement which ensued the Turks lost 131 officers and men and one gun. Peace was, however, finally restored, the gun was bought back by the Turks for 70L, and the latest news reports that reinforcements are being despatched to the garrison of El Haza.

1874.

In 1874 Saud led an attack on Anea, the capital of Kasim, and Bereida, then in the hands of Ibn Rashid, the rival Emir of Shammar, and this led to a convention by which Ibn Saud withdrew and Ibn Rashid returned to Haij. A further unsuccessful expedition against an Arab tribe weakened Saud, and in 1878 only Riad, its suburbs and the villages near it, remained of the Wahhabi dominion.

Towards the end of 1874 Ibn Saud died and Abdullah was proclaimed Emir. During his reign the Nejdian power further declined, while the Shammar power grew in proportion.

1881.

In 1884 popular discontent forced Abdullah to hand over military affairs to Muhammad ibn Saud, his nephew.

1887.

In 1887 Muhammad ibn Saud deposed his uncle and at once set about consolidating his power and drawing to him the tribes that had fallen away during his uncle’s reign.

* On the Persian Gulf.
Early in 1888 Muhammad ibn Rashid, the Shammar prince, with the help of the Turks, invaded Nejd with so large a force that Saud came to terms and agreed to retire from Riad. Ibn Rashid now styled himself “Emir of Nejd,” and transferred the power from Riad to his own city of Hail, further north.

In 1897 Muhammad ibn Rashid died, and the hopes of the Saud family revived. He was succeeded by his son, Abdul-Aziz ibn Rashid.

Early in 1902 Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud, a brother of Muhammad ibn Saud, who had been murdered by emissaries of Ibn Rashid, leaving Kuwait, entered Riad secretly, declared himself to the populace, who acclaimed him as their ruler, and drove out Ibn Rashid’s officials.

In November, 1902, he inflicted a crushing defeat on Ibn Rashid at Dillim (near Riad), the latter losing 250 killed, his baggage and camp.

An attempted advance by Ibn Rashid was repulsed in March, 1903.

In July, 1905, Ibn Saud took the offensive, and in February, 1904, defeated Ibn Rashid, destroyed 300 of his force, captured Bereida, Anesa and Hail. Ibn Rashid fled to Rassawa, on the Esphates, where he claimed Turkish protection.

In a memorandum addressed to the Sultan, Ibn Rashid exposed the alleged designs of England on Kuwait, whose ruler, Muharek, he stated was plotting in conjunction with Ibn Saud to gain possession of the entire Nejd, and to come down even as far as the Red Sea, when they proposed to place themselves under British protection. The Sultan ordered the despatch of four battalions to his assistance. These, numbering 2,000 men, moved out of Rassawa in April, 1904, and for 30 days marched under a tropical heat through the Nefud, finally arriving at Bereida, some 260 to 270 miles distant from Medina. Here, on the 1st June, 1904, they were attacked by Ibn Saud and utterly routed, together with some 5,000 followers of Ibn Rashid.

A Turkish expedition of 6,000 men, which started from Medina for Hail in the autumn of the same year, had to return, owing to transport and other difficulties.

The tribesmen of Asir, who had already revolted in 1902, and who after the commencement of the Hejaz Railway had hesitated between an alliance with the Hejaz tribes or with Ibn Saud, now decided for the latter, who now announced his intention of seizing Shammar from Ibn Rashid, the ally of the Turks. Anxious to retrieve their fortunes, the Turkish Government, early in 1905, despatched another expedition into the Nejd, consisting of eight battalions, under Marshal Feizi Pasha, who had suppressed the Yemen rebellion in 1903; two battalions, however, were soon sent back, presumably owing to difficulties of transport. An expedition, consisting of four battalions, left Medina about the same time under Sidki Pasha to co-operate with Feizi Pasha from that side. Both these forces eventually arrived in the Kasim district, after suffering great hardships and losing many men from desertion and disease. In April, 1905, Feizi Pasha was transferred to the Yemen to quell the rebellion in that province, and Sami Pasha succeeded him in Kasim. Meanwhile, the Turkish troops in Kasim appear to have done nothing more than “hold on.” Unpaid, half-starved, brought from a cold climate and quartered, in many cases, in single tents under a burning sun, it is not a matter for surprise that they died like sheep, mutinied and deserted.

Up till April, 1906, several small skirmishes had occurred between the rival factions; towards the end of that month Ibn Rashid advanced in strength against Ibn Saud, but this time with only 200 Turks, who took little part in the engagement which ensued, and in which Ibn Rashid was killed.

Ibn Rashid was succeeded by his son, Mutasad ibn Rashid, and a truce was now made between the rival factions.

Towards the end of 1906 the Turkish garrisons began to evacuate Kasim. It is not clear whether this was determined by the Sultan’s command, or whether the troops found themselves in such straits that they came to an agreement with Ibn Saud by which they gave up their guns and arms in return for a safe conduct out of the country. The fact remains that the

Figure 1.1.9 Notes on Arabia, June 1907
evacuation of Nejd by the Turks is now reported to have been completed, the
remnant of the troops having arrived at Medina and Busra in a miserable
condition.

In December, 1906, Mita'ad ibn Rashid was treacherously murdered by
his uncle Sultan bin Hamud ibn Rashid, who was thereupon proclaimed Emir
of Shammar.

Sultan bin Hamud had been living at Jof, at enmity with the rest of his
family and on good terms, apparently, with Sheikh Mubarak, of Koweit, who
has always been friendly to Ibn Saud, Emir of Riad.

When Sultan became master of Hail he wrote to Ibn Saud, who was then
at Bereida, telling him of the events which led to his succession and asking
him to recognize that change, proposing at the same time friendly relations
between Hail and Riad. Ibn Saud replied that he would be glad to maintain
the good relations and accept the friendliness offered, on certain numerous
and onerous conditions. Ibn Rashid refused the terms, which, if accepted,
would have rendered him virtually a vassal of Ibn Saud, and marched out
from Hail with 4,000 cavalry and about 15,000 camel riders to meet Ibn Saud,
who was at the head of a considerable force coming from Kasim in support of
his demands. Seeing that his forces were inferior to those of his rival, Ibn
Saud, who never anticipated that Sultan ibn Rashid would have such a large
force under him, at once retired to Kasim, where he proceeded to call on his
allies to help him.

The latest reports are to the effect that fighting has taken place between
the rival Emirs, which has resulted in the defeat of Ibn Saud; but details are
lacking, and the reports have not yet been confirmed.

PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION.

CENTRAL ARABIA.

All Turkish garrisons, including those in Hail and Kasim, have now been
withdrawn, the last remnants of the Kasim garrison having marched into
Medina without orders last February, and evacuated the country owing to
want of supplies and the impossibility of maintaining their position there any
longer. Sami Pasha, who held the post of Mutasarrif of Kasim, reported his
arrival at Medina with these troops, and was directed by the Porte to remain
there. These withdrawals obviously mean a considerable loss of prestige to
the Turks, as Ahmed Feiz Pasha, in 1895, formally hoisted the Turkish flag
in Kasim and Usheem, annexing those districts to the vilayet of Busra.
The Turkish troops now actually available consist of 5,000 men, who are
employed as labourers on the Hejaz Railway from Tebk to Madain-i-Salih,
a distance of 137 miles, and are strung out in small detachments of single
companies at work on successive sections.

Water is only plentiful at Tebk and Akhdar, with a fair but limited
supply at Maadam and Madain-i-Salih; at El Ala there is a good supply, and
it is proposed to construct a large depot there eventually. Between these
points the troops are dependent on the train or camel transport for water.
The working parties are, therefore, very vulnerable to attack, and if the wells
at the above-mentioned places were seized by the Arabs and the large
provision depot at Tebk destroyed, the Turkish troops would be in danger of
perishing of thirst or hunger.

The depots at Tebk and other places are not protected by any defensible
works or any artificial protection, and are very open to attack.

The Turkish troops have the Martini rifle, with which the Bedouins also
are principally armed.

Turkish reinforcements would have to be brought by rail from Damascus,
and rolling stock on the line is inadequate.

At Medina the garrison now consists of 3,000 men, who are employed
on the commencement of the permanent way from that end.
The two forces of 5,000 men between Tebk and Madain-i-Salih, and
3,000 at Medina, represent the total Turkish force available against an Arab
attack on the railway from the direction of Hail.
The exact strength of Ibn Saud's forces is difficult to estimate, as small Arab sections or tribes may join or fall away for trivial reasons of local politics, but forces. in his struggle with Ibn Rashid in 1906 he collected 25,000 men, of whom 20,000 were mounted on camels—two men on a camel—and 5,000 were Cavalry.

They move with extreme rapidity, and can cover from 60 to 70 miles a-day if required.

The two men on a camel are provided with water in a skin, some dates and flour, and a supply of cartridges.

A large number of Martinis and other rifles, such as Gras, Remington, and Berdan, have recently been introduced into the country by smuggling at the various small ports on the Red Sea littoral, or by capture from Turkish troops in the Yemen. Most of the above force, therefore, would be armed with Martinis.

It is rumoured also that Ibn Saud is in possession of four or six field guns captured from the Turks in 1904.

Sultan bin Hamud ibn Rashid can also raise some 20,000 men organized on the same plan.

The Arab women assist the campaign considerably by collecting supplies and filling cartridges. Some accompany the cavalry, and lead in the attack to encourage the troops.

From the experience of previous campaigns in Arabia, the Arab forces are never able to face Turkish troops in a definite engagement in the open, but if they confine themselves to raiding attacks, guerrilla warfare, and cutting lines of communications, they have invariably succeeded in ridding the country of the invader, e.g., Ibrahim Pasha's operations in 1837, and Ahmed Feizi Pasha's recent operations.

If, therefore, they confine their attention to strong raiding parties against the railway, cut up small posts, and destroy depots and wells, they would render the position of the Turks along the railway intolerable. To a certain extent the Turks foresee this, as the station buildings south of Tebuk are loopholed and specially constructed to withstand an attack, but their defence is scarcely adequate against a serious raid, as they only contain 10 or 12 men.

Only a very few have been completed, and the present working parties have no such defence.

The Yemen.

The Turkish vilayet of the Yemen is divided into the four “sanjaks” of Sana, Hodeida, Taiz, and Asir, with its capital at Sana and its chief port at Hodeida. The inhabitants, roughly estimated at 3,000,000, belong chiefly to the Shia division of the Muhammadan faith, but in Asir there are large numbers of Wahabis. Some of the local tribes own allegiance to the Grand Sheik of Mecca, who has not much authority outside the Hejaz, and some to the Imam of Sana.

The capture of Sana by the Turks in 1871 put an end to the real power of the Imam.

The Imam lives at Sada, about 100 miles north of Sana, where he is almost independent of the Turks and enjoys considerable religious and political influence. He is head of the Zaidi sect of the Shias and is a descendant of the Prophet. The present Imam Yahya bin Muhammad has, since the death of his father, Hamed-ed-Din, in the spring of 1904, been continually engaged in active operations against the Turks.

The history of events in the Yemen from the occupation of that province by the Turks in 1871 up to the present day is a record of chronic revolt on the part of the inhabitants, with intermittent periods of rest from exhaustion.

Acts of oppression and violence on the part of the Turkish authorities led to the revolt of the Asir tribe, the Beni Meruan, in 1891. The first reverse of the Turkish troops, who took the field unprepared and were defeated with a loss of 400 men in the early stages of the rebellion, set all the Yemen al-fame, and in a very short time the insurrection included all the tribes South of Asir.

A Turkish force which landed at Hodeida under Ahmed Feizi Pasha checked its progress for a time. Menakha was retaken, Sana relieved, and Femail Pasha (117)
1893. was despatched to crush the rebellion in the south. Here a rapid collapse of the insurrection ensued, and, with 40,000 Turkish troops in the Yemen, it appeared as if resistance were at an end. The northern mountain districts, however, were but half subdued, and with but small provocation the flame has burst out again and again with intermittent persistency ever since.

The record for the next few years continued to be one of local disturbances throughout the country, and more or less organized rebellion in certain parts of it.

1897. Goaded by famine and unfair treatment in respect of tax collection the Yemenis again broke out into serious rebellion in May, 1897, and destroyed a Turkish battalion. This led to the despatch of further reinforcements consisting of 22,000 troops and seven batteries of artillery from Mecca.

1899. In May, 1899, the Turks suffered a severe reverse at the hands of the Yemenis, led by the Imam of Sana; but another hard-fought battle took place in June in which the Turks were successful. In July of the same year orders were officially given for the withdrawal of two brigades from the Yemen, which pointed to the quelling of the rebellion. Unable to face the Turkish troops in the open, the Arabs took to the mountainous country in the interior, and thence maintained a harassing guerrilla warfare on the Turkish troops, numbering 13,000 (at an outside estimate), who suffered much from lack of supplies, disease, and frequent desertions, and whose power was restricted to the actual garrisons they occupied.

1901. Fighting again broke out in the beginning of the spring of 1901, both in the country north-west of Sana and in southern Yemen, the Turkish troops in each case being defeated with loss.

1902. Fresh reinforcements, amounting to 1,400 men, were despatched from Turkey, and a Turkish mission was sent to the Imam to endeavour to make an agreement by which he was to remain in possession of the country then in his hands and to resist the English, whose advance from the south the Sultan apprehended.

The Imam refused, however, to treat, stating that he did not look on the Turks as true Moslems, and contrasting their government with the justice and peace of the British rule.

1903. The Turkish garrisons were able to hold on only with difficulty, and for these there was an insufficiency of food, transport and ammunition. A truce, however, appears to have been patched up with the Imam, which left him in possession of the northern part of the country. The Turkish hold on the rest of the country was, however, limited to Sana and a few of the coast towns.

1904. On the 11th November a general insurrection was reported in Asir, where the Turks had a garrison of 3,000 men, stationed principally at Eba, Taif and Kumfida. Three Turkish battalions, with six guns, were attacked in the Ghamid country in northern Asir and dispersed, with a loss of 1,000 men and three guns, and Eba fell into the hands of the Arabs. Fresh reinforcements were despatched by the Turkish Government to Kumfida, where a punitive expedition was organized, but this was unable to move inland owing to difficulties of transport.

1905. Early in 1904 fresh trouble broke out in Asir and the Yemen, and Sana was besieged by the Arabs. After severing all connection between Sana and Hodeida, the Arabs attacked with varying success all the garrisoned places in the country. The important towns of Menakha, Taiz, Kataba and Ebb remained, however, in the hands of the Turks.

On the 28th March, 1905, Riza Pasha succeeded in relieving Sana with troops drawn from Syria, but the Arabs almost at once again surrounded the town, and large numbers of the Syrian troops went over to the enemy. All communications with the surrounding country were severed, and, after
experiencing the direst extremities of hunger, the garrison, consisting of about 11,000 men and 24 guns, was compelled to capitulate.

The situation of the Turks in the Yemen was now very critical. The leader of the Asir rebellion was in touch with the Imam, but no definite indication of a combined plan of action is noticeable.

Marshal Feizi Pasha, who was in command of the Turkish troops in Nejd, and had been successful in quelling the revolt in the Yemen in 1902, was now transferred to that province. On his arrival at Hodeida he concentrated many troops as were within reach, and, with the assistance of some newly-arrived reinforcements and the co-operation of a Turkish force from Taiz, succeeded in entering Sana on 1st September.

The Turks now became masters of the whole country between Sana, Sada and Hodeida, and the Imam and his followers retired to the mountain strongholds in the north of the province.

In the middle of November another strong expedition, consisting of 10,000 men and six guns, under Feizi Pasha, supported by another force under Sayyid Pasha, advanced against Shahara, the Imam's mountain stronghold, about 6 days' march north of Sana. Every attempt to capture the place ended in failure, and finally the Turks were forced to retire, with the loss of four guns. Severely harassed in their retreat and after a series of reverses, the Turks eventually succeeded in regaining Sana on 10th January, 1906.

Allowing for exaggeration, Feizi's losses throughout the 2 months' campaign against Shahara could not have been less than 8,000 men, and out of 5,000 males barely 200 remained.

Feizi Pasha spent the next 3 months in Sana recuperating his exhausted and shattered army, and telegraphed to Constantinople urgently demanding reinforcements.

His position at Sana was, however, fairly strong, and the Arabs began to show signs of exhaustion.

The month of June was marked by a mutiny among the reserves serving at the front. About 12 battalions returned to Sana and demanded to be sent back to their homes; Feizi Pasha, however, succeeded in forcing the mutineers to surrender, and divided them among the regular battalions stationed at Sana, Amran and Hajar.

The Turkish operations in the Yemen cannot be considered satisfactory at this stage. After operations on a large scale, extending over 18 months and involving terrible sacrifices of life and great expense, the Turks had been only able to recover lost territory and to secure the same against invasion.

It is difficult to make a proper estimate of the Turkish troops in the vilayet of Yemen as they stood at the end of July. The strength of the troops in the Yemen before the rebellion began may be put down as 20,000 men of all arms. This includes some 3,000 men serving in Asir "sanjak." During 1905 55,000 soldiers were disembarked at Hodeida, of whom 5,000 were conveyed to Khamis, the port of Asir. During the same period 2,000 invalids were sent home, and deserters from the army would amount to another 3,000 men. The total losses during 1905 must have been at least 28,000 men. This would leave 32,000 troops, roughly, remaining at the end of 1906. During the first 6 months of 1906, 8,000 drafts arrived at Hodeida, against 3,000 invalids and time-expired men sent home to Turkey, and quite 5,000 must have been killed or died from disease. Reinforcements to the number of 4,000 were disembarked in July, which would bring the total figures up to between 36,000 and 40,000.

In August, 1906, a nephew of the Grand Sherif of Mekka arrived at Hodeida from Sada, the Imam's capital, where he had been on a visit to the latter by command of the Sultan, with a view to causing the Imam to come to some arrangement with the Turks and to abandon his hostile attitude. His mission is understood to have been a failure. The Imam is said to have rejected a proposal offering him a position in the Yemen under the Turkish Government, with a residence at Sana similar to that held by the Grand Sherif of Mekka, and to have made a counter-proposition that he should administer, as the suzerain of the Sultan, the mountainous part of the Yemen formerly belonging to his ancestors, and should pay tribute to the Ottoman Government.
There was now a lull again in the operations. A number of sheikhs throughout the disturbed area tendered their submission, induced to do so by bribes, but their good faith is questionable, and it is believed generally that they will rise again and join the Imam when a suitable opportunity appears.

In September, 1906, a rival Imam, Hassan Yahya ed Dhubiani, appeared in the north of the Yemen Province and formed an alliance with Feizi Pasha. Hassan Yahya was for a time strong enough to threaten Shabara, but his alliance with the Turks was shortlived and his defection with a large following, estimated at 12,000 men to the side of the Imam Yahya bin Muhammad may explain the despatch by the Porte in April, 1907, of a Commission charged to do its utmost to bring about a peaceable settlement with the Yemenis. In the meantime the news from the Yemen continues to be most unfavourable to the Turkish arms, and Feizi Pasha is reported to have sustained a severe reverse at Amran north of Sana.

The Turks have not succeeded in attaining the principal object of their long and expensive campaign, viz., the capture of the Imam, the annexation of his territory, and the crushing of his influence for all time. The troops, besides being exhausted, are scathing with discontent. Both the civil and military officials generally are dissatisfied with their lot, and would, it is said, be glad under present circumstances to abandon the mountainous parts of the province, which are held only under great difficulties and considerable expense.

The Field Marshal, Ahmed Feizi Pasha, who has served at various intervals over 50 years in the Yemen, and is over 80 years of age, has hinted at the hopelessness of the situation, and should the Sultan not decide to build a railway between Hodeida and the interior at an early date, and send adequate reinforcements from time to time, with money and supplies to maintain the same, it would not be rash to predict that the Turks will be driven sooner or later to their only resource, viz., to come to some understanding with the Imam, which would also mean partial loss of territory, not to mention loss of prestige locally and in the eyes of the Moslem world generally.

Meanwhile, the drafting of regular troops from Turkey in Europe and Asia Minor to the Yemen is being watched by Bulgaria with considerable interest, and the partial denudation of the Hejaz, Syria and Mesopotamia of troops for the Yemen may have serious consequences in these provinces.

KOWEIT.

Over Koweil the Sultan has never attempted to assert his authority until the Baghdad Railway scheme drew attention to the importance it might acquire in the future as the terminus of a trans-continental railway through his Asiatic possessions.

The sheikh had the rank of a Turkish kaimakam, but was in reality an independent ruler. When, in 1898, the Porte began to show its hand and claimed to bring Koweil within the sphere of Turkish administration, Sheikh Mubarak appealed to Great Britain for protection, and taking our stand on the maintenance of the status quo, we not only entered a formal protest against any attempt on the part of Turkey to curtail the sheikh's authority, and showed our determination to defend him against any forcible interference, but concluded early in 1899 a definite agreement with him, by which his interests have been permanently placed under our protection. At first the Turks seemed, nevertheless, inclined to try and carry matters with a high hand. Troops were, from time to time, reported to be on the march overland to occupy Koweil, and on one occasion a force was sent down by sea from Busra which proceeded to another destination when it found three British men-of-war in the bay.

A modus vivendi has now been arrived at, but the Turks are evidently bent on confining Sheikh Mubarak's authority within the narrowest limits possible.

When Mubarak fell out with the Turks, the latter sought to set the Shammar prince Ibn Rashid against him, and Mubarak replied by taking up the cause of the Emir of Riad. Ibn Rashid at this time asked to be taken under
British protection on condition that Mubarek was deposed, and that his nephew was appointed sheikh in his place, for it was very important for him that Koweit should be in friendly hands, owing to the facilities that place afforded him for the import of arms and ammunition. His overtures met with no success, but on the other hand Mubarek and his allies were defeated by Ibn Rashid near Anesa, and Mubarek retired to Koweit. Ibn Rashid now advanced on Koweit, but, deterred partly by the presence of the British warships lying in that harbour and partly by the necessity of taking the field against Ibn Saud, who had proclaimed himself Emir of Riad, he returned without venturing upon an attack.

Mubarek is a shrewd old Arab, and he no doubt realizes that he has compromised himself hopelessly with the Turks. So long as he lives we can probably rely on his fidelity to the engagements he has contracted with us, but our position might be difficult with a new sheikh who declined our special protection, and with the Porte which has never recognised it. His friendly relations with Ibn Saud, the present Emir of Nejd, are worthy of special consideration.
1.2. **Handbook of Asir**

A Historical account of Asir, prepared by the Arab Bureau, Cairo, 1 June 1916 (WO 106 5981, TNA, London).

This document confirms that the Vilayet of Yemen since 1872 was divided by the Ottomans for administrative purposes into four district-based regions, largely: Sana’a (as the capital), Ta’izz, Asir and Al-Hudaydah. Subsequently, the Ottomans’ sovereignty over Asir was questioned. However, although it was evident that the Porte had failed to expand its authority over the whole district, there is no mention that Asir had in fact been detached from the Vilayet of Yemen.
Figure 1.2.1 Handbook of Asir
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NOTE.
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HANDBOOK OF ASIR.

PREPARED BY THE ARAB BUREAU, CAIRO.

FIRST EDITION, JUNE 1, 1916.

CAIRO.
GOVERNMENT PRESS.
1916.

Figure 1.2.2 Handbook of Asir
XII.—RECENT HISTORY AND
PRESENT POLITICS.

Politically Asir cannot be regarded as one, except on the
Ottoman theory that it forms, as a whole, the northern
sub-province or sanjak of the Vilayet of Yemen. In reality
it falls into four parts, one completely independent and
three acknowledging, respectively, the influence of the
Sherif of Mecca, the Turks, or the Idrissi. The three latter,
it is hardly necessary to remark, are constantly changing as
the power of one or the other aspirants to supremacy waxes
or wanes.

(1) The number of Arabs who recognize no power but
their own is comparatively small and is confined almost
entirely to nomad tribes such as the Rabí’yah Mujafrah
and Rabí’yétt-Tahahín, who dwell in inaccessible mountain
country on the ’Agábah, and to nomad sections of certain
of the eastern tribes such as the Ghamíd, Shahran, and
’Abidáh, who wander far out to the east, where they are
beyond control. There is no cohesion or fixed purpose
amongst these, and politically they are of little account.

(2) The Sherif of Mecca’s influence is chiefly evident
amongst the powerful tribes of Ghamíd, Bení Shihir, and
Shahran, who live on the inland side of the Main Ridge. He
is connected by marriage with the paramount chief of the
Bení Shihir and is a personal friend of the Ghamíd and
Shahran sheikhs; but he has never made any attempt to
administer the country, and it is doubtful if he has much
influence amongst the tribesmen. In 1910 he got into
touch with many of the tribes between Lith and Ebbah,
during his campaign against the Idrissi; but how far he has
maintained relations since then is a matter of speculation.
(3) The Turks have never succeeded in completely subduing Asir, and they now have only a precarious hold on the port of Qunfudah and the inland towns of Muhail and Ebhah, with a small district round each of these places, and, intermittently, the roads from one to the other. They are in touch with the Beni Shehir and Shahran, but chiefly by virtue of their relations with the Sherif; in the event of trouble with the latter it is probable that they would find these tribes arrayed against them.

(4) As for what remains, the Idrissi either administers or federates it, that is, the Qahtan tribes of southern inland Asir and most of the Tihamah and 'Aqabah from the Wadi 'Ain in the south to the confines of Lih, a strip of nearly 350 miles from north to south by roughly seventy broad. Idrissi’s homeland is in the Mikhla el-Yemen District, with Sabiyah as capital and the ports of Midi and Jeizan. This is a rather broad section of the Tihamah sloping up for some forty miles to the foot of the ‘Aqabah or scarp of the highlands, and about eighty miles long from north to south.

Before Mohammed ‘Ali cast covetous eyes on Asir, the whole country from Dakhil almost to Taif was in the hands of the ruling family of Beni Mugheid, whose capital was Manadir, or Ebhah as it is now called. The Emir at the time of the Egyptian expedition in 1834 was ‘A’idh Ibn Mura’i, who, with the help of his sturdy hill-men, succeeded in defeating the invaders. The country then had rest from foreign aggression until 1869, when, the Suez Canal having been opened, the Porte sent troops under Rauf Pasha to deal with the Yemen and Asir in earnest. In 1871, Mohammed, son of ‘A’idh, attacked Hodeidah, but was repulsed with great loss, and in the next year Mukhtar Pasha, who had succeeded Rauf Pasha, invaded and subdued Asir. He was helped by the Rijal el-Ma’a, who had un成功ly rebelled against the Emir and were burning to avenge their defeat. The Turks administered most of the country until the revolt of the Idrissi reduced their power to its present limits.
The house of A'idh, though deprived of much of its former glory, is still important, and Hassan Ibn 'Ali, the present head, is Wali or Turkish Civil Governor of Asir.

There is in Mikhlaif el-Yemen a very old tradition of independence which has been maintained against both the Turks and the Yemenite tribes on the one hand, and the tribes of the inland mountains on the other. Between 1830 and 1840 Abu 'Arish was ruled by a certain Sherif 'Ali, who made terms with the Egyptians in order to free himself from the Emir A'idh Ibn Mura'i. During his reign one Sidi Ahmed el Idrissi, a native of Fez, and head of a religious fraternity school (tarika), which he had preached in a school at Mecca since 1799, acquired land at Sabiyah, settled there and died (1837) in the odour of sanctity. He had been the teacher of the original Senussi, who took the covenant in his Tarika in 1823. The Idrissi family increased in wealth during the lifetime of Sidi Ahmed's son and grandson, and appears, after the renunciation of Asir by the Egyptians in 1841, to have supplanted the Sherifial family of Abu 'Arish. It intermarried with the Senussi house, settled in Cyrenaica, and had branches at Zeina near Luxor in Egypt, and in the Sudan at Argo. But the expansion of its political power to include not only all Mikhlaif el-Yemen, but the Tihamah and 'Aqabah north and south and a suzerainty over several tribes outside those limits (e.g. in the Sada district and even among the tribes of North Yemen) is the work of Sidi Ahmed's great-grandson, Seyyid Mohammed, the present El-Idris.

Born at Sabiyah in 1876, educated partly in Egypt (at Zeina and at El-Azhar, Cairo), and partly by the Senussi at Kufr, after residence at Argo and marriage, Seyyid Mohammed returned to Sabiyah determined to render Asir independent of the Turks and to aggrandize himself at their expense. By 1910 he had driven them back to their present holding; but he failed to take Ebkah against opposition organized by the Grand Sherif. Subsidized and supplied by the Italians during the Tripolitanian War, he consolidated
himself in the south, and though the Grand Sherif seduced much of his following after the Peace of Ouchy, he recovered himself during the Balkan War. Failing, in 1914, to secure recognition from the Young Turks as more than a kaimakam of Sabiyah and Abu 'Arish, he declared definitely against them on their entry into the present struggle, signed a treaty with our Resident at Aden in May 1915, and took the field in June with a following of some 12,000 men from Mikhlafl el Yemen and certain tribes of the 'Aqabah and Tihanah and the Qahtan. He has not succeeded, however, in taking Lohelah, though he has overrun much of the Northern Tihanah of Yemen, and raised part of the Zaranik and other Tihanah tribes against the Turks. His power rests largely on his personality, but to some extent also on hereditary sanctity and on the wealth and influence of his connexions, notably those with the Senussi. His most implacable foe, after the Turks, is the Imam of Yemen, and the only potentate really friendly to him in Arabia is Ibn Saud. The Grand Sherif, however, is now disposed to keep on terms and is anxious to reconcile the differences between him and the Imam Yehya.

These differences, founded on jealousy and accentuated by personal dislike, are probably too deep-seated to admit of more than a temporary settlement. In his early days the Idrissi was fully occupied in consolidating his newly won position; and in any case his schemes of expansion were directed northwards amongst the Sunni tribes of Asir rather than eastwards to the Zeidi followers of the Imam. Indeed the Imam, by his opposition to the Turks, was a source of strength, and the interests of the two chiefs were so far identical six years ago that they entered into a defensive alliance, after delimiting their respective boundaries. The Idrissi was faithful to the pact, but the Imam, having failed to avert the relief of Sana'a and attracted by the favourable terms offered to him, abandoned his ally and submitted to the Ottoman forces. The Idrissi has never forgiven him for this and has always refused to listen to

Figure 1.2.6 Handbook of Asir
any proposals for a reconciliation. He has gone further and for some years has been actively endeavouring to undermine the loyalty of the Imam’s western tribes. He was fortunate in finding a favourable field for intrigue amongst the powerful confederation of the Hashid, which had bitterly resented the peace proceedings at Da’an in 1911, and he has succeeded in keeping them estranged till the present time. In 1913, in consequence of complaints from the inhabitants, he sent an expeditionary force to Jebel Razih, which lies between Abu ‘Arish and Sa’adah, and has since administered that district. At the present time he is credited with the ambition to extend his dominions still further at the expense of the Imam. He is in communication with most of the important Sheikhs of the Northern Yemen, who are said to be ready to rise if adequately financed and armed. Whether the influence of the Sherif of Mecca is sufficiently great to induce him to forego these ambitions is a matter of speculation, but it can at least be said that the Imam’s rupture with the Turks is a necessary preliminary and that the Idrissi is in a position to drive a harder bargain than in 1910.
1.3. **Handbook of Yemen**

Historical account of Yemen, prepared by the Arab Bureau, Cairo, 15 January 1917 (WO 106/5977, TNA, London).

Similarly to the Handbook of Asir, the division of the *Vilayet* of Yemen is confirmed with Asir as the fourth *sonjok*. 
Figure 1.3.1 Handbook of Yemen
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Figure 1.3.4 Handbook of Yemen
This district lies between Asir (v. “Asir Handbook”) and the Aden Protectorate, i.e. roughly, between north latitude 17° and north latitude 13°; but neither its northern nor its southern boundary is drawn at anything like right angles to the Red Sea coast line, and, while the general trend of both these boundary-lines is north-eastward, neither runs at all straight. The northern limit, which, in the interior, is determined by a religious criterion (the population to the north of it is Sunni of the Shafe’i school and that to the south is Shiah of the Zaidist sect), makes a sharp elbow almost due north after starting north-eastward from Wadi ‘Ain, above Loheiah (Lahiyah). Then it resumes its eastward direction, crossing longitude 45° east (the somewhat indefinite inland or eastern limit) north-east of Sa’dah. The southern boundary, starting from Sheikh Sa’id; runs east-north-east to Qa’tabah, and then north-east till it crosses the 45th meridian. It is determined by political considerations combined with religious, but it is not a satisfactory line of distinction, though the only one in Arabia duly delimited according to treaty (in 1902–1905).

The total area thus enclosed is about 225 miles long, north to south, and 150 miles broad, with a content of about 33,750 square miles. It constitutes the major part of the theoretical Turkish province of Yemen; the remainder lies in Asir, which is considered a sanjak of the vilayet of Sa’na. The Porte lays claim to the hinterland as far back as the Red Desert (Er-Raml or Ruba’ el-Khâli); but since nothing to the east of the San’â plateau has ever been effectively held or administered by the Turks, the 45th meridian may be taken as the boundary of Yemen.
1.4. The administrative division of the *Vilayet* of Yemen (1914-1918)

This is an extract from a chronicle of the administrative division of the Ottoman Empire during the years 1914-1918. In the Arabian Peninsula, the *Vilayet* of Yemen is shown to be continued over the same geographic entity, with Asir as part of it. According to the map (see Figure 1-7) the *Vilayet* of Yemen was bounded to the north by the *Vilayet* of Al-Ḥijāz. This document is available through the *tarih ve medeniyet* [history and civilisation] Web site.
The administrative division of the Vilayet of Yemen (1914-1918)

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<td><strong>Figure 1.4.1</strong> The administrative division of the Vilayet of Yemen (1914-1918)</td>
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1.5. **British Policy in Yemen**

Imam Yahya’ position and ability to extend his authority over the entire country as a successor to the Ottomans was not an easy task. The greatest challenge the Imam confronted was the enmity with Britain at the time in South Yemen. These represent a number of selected official documents concerning key highlights of British policy in Yemen. For instance, Britain established special treaty relations with most of the tribes of South-West Arabia to prevent any other colonial or domestic power from expanding into such locations. For that reason, London provided those who had signed treaties with it with recognition as independent rulers. This approach was prevalent in Britain’s dealings with overlords of the hinterlands of the coastal towns, from Aden in the southwest to Kuwait in the northeast.

1.5.1. **British Policy in the Yemen**

B. 216.

SECRET.

British Policy in the Yemen.

MEMORANDA by Major-General Sir G. J. Younghusband, K.C.I.E., C.B., Political Resident, Aden, and Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. Jacob, First Assistant Resident, Aden. (Received at India Office as enclosures in Aden Residency covering letter No. C. 695, dated 23rd September 1915.)

From Major-General Sir George Younghusband, K.C.I.E., C.B., Political Resident, Aden, to The Secretary to Government of Bombay, Political Department.

10th/23rd September 1915

Sir,

I beg to forward two very interesting Notes by Lieutenant-Colonel H. Jacob, First Assistant Resident, on the Italian question in so far as it affects Arabia and the general setting up, in Southern and Western Arabia, after the War.

2. My own acquaintance with these parts is only very recent and of short duration, and, therefore, any remarks I make are put forward with much diffidence.

3. There appears to be in some quarters in England a suspicion, hardly a jealousy, of Italy and Italian influence in the Red Sea. It is thought to be undermining and supplanting British influence. With that view I cannot find myself in agreement.

4. In the first place Italy knows her weakness in these regions as compared to England, and she knows that every tribe on either shore is also fully aware of the fact. Her manifest interest, therefore, is to work hand in glove with England and not against her. With England’s benevolent assistance she can do much, without it she is powerless.

5. Now England’s policy has been to encourage and assist weak Powers, and to keep strong ones at arm’s length. We can therefore do with complacency for Italy what it would be very injudicious to do for France or Russia. We should think earn her lasting gratitude by taking her fully into our confidence and asking her to share with us the burden of settling the knotty problem that will remain to be solved on the Arabian coast after the War.

6. I was much interested to meet Colonels Bader and hear his opinion regarding the fighting value of the Arabs enlisted in the Aden Protectorate and its neighbourhood. If an Italian officer can make successful soldiers of these men, much more so can the British officer, for that way does his genius lie. The present seems to be a very favourable moment to try the experiment.

1. A commencement might be made by raising 200 Arabs of the best fighting tribes, mounted on camels and trained as fighting scouts. The political effect would be excellent and according to Colonel Bader the corps would be of untold fighting value. It so happens that at the present moment a very suitable officer for raising such a corps belongs to the Aden garrison, Major W. J. Othley, 23rd Sikh Pioneers, whose services would be made available for this purpose.

I have, &c.,

G. J. Younghusband, Major-General,
Political Resident and General Officer Commanding, Aden.

The Secretary to Government. Political Department, Bombay.

Figure 1.5.1.1 British Policy in Yemen
Figure 1.5.1.2 British Policy in Yemen
Italian merchant was living in Sanaa and was able to make commercial deals for that Ruler which won his confidence.

I believe that Italy’s connection with the Idrisi was severed after the conclusion of peace with Turkey, but I know that during our poutparlers of recent date an Arab was despatched from Massowah to Sabia to see the Idrisi, who, although he professes at this juncture supreme contempt for the Italians, remembers that country’s liberality qa’ guns and ammunition when he was a coadjutor of the Turks. The Idrisi still hankers after Italian guns to which his men are accustomed, though it is true that, so far as we know, he prefers to make his requisition for them through us.

Were Italy able to get a footing along the Red Sea Arabian littoral, her rôle as an arbiter in Islamic matters would be unquestioned and her position across the water in Abyssinia would be consolidated.

If we do not wish to extend our influence materially as well as morally in Arabia, we can hardly object to Italy’s programme, but I think the times demand new measures. There can never be an “Independent Arabia.” The idea is unthinkable. The net result would be chaos and confusion worse confounded. The Turkish rule in the Yemen though bad, inspired fear, and on their retreat from these scenes, bloodshed and rapine will increase. We cannot suffer anarchy across, and contiguous to, our protected borders. I therefore attach a memorandum on our present policy and trust that my connection with this tract since 1897 may be sufficient excuse for my hazarding a few suggestions.

II. F. Jacob, Lieut.-Colonel,
First Assistant Resident, Aden.

Aden,
8th September 1915.
In the event of Turkey’s dismemberment and her retirement from the Yemen the present political aspect will necessarily undergo a radical change.

In the first place, the Imam of Sanaa will shift his headquarters southwards. He detests the Turk but cannot dispense with Turkish largesse to such Arab mercenaries of his as the “Hashid wa Bakhil,” who can only be kept loyal to the Imam by large monthly dues. These does the Imam cannot, and would not, give from his own purse, as he is avaricious and stingy. Again, as told me by one of the Imam’s lieutenants quite recently, the Imam will not permit Turkish troops entirely to leave Sanaa for they are an outward and visible sign of Turkish power retained to overawe these contumacious tribesmen and further to collect the Imam’s revenues. The Imam was very displeased to see the Turkish occupation of Lahij, which he considers his special preserve. The Imam had a secret treaty of alliance and defence with Sultan Sir Ahmed Fuil whom he treated as his own creation.

Further, the Imam was averse to our bombardment of Sheikh Said, which he said was a part of his ancient possessions, and he had aspirations towards regaining his ascendancy in this part. On the disappearance of the Turks from the Yemen the Imam will undoubtedly try to come down into their relinquished possessions and we shall be confronted with a very troublesome, because an ambitious, ruler, whom it will be hard to placate. The Imam is clearly master of the Upper Yemen when the Turks removed their military headquarters to Taiz. He will continue to intrigue with our north-eastern border tribesmen. He has approached the Ruler of Marib and won him over to his side. Sheikh Abdul Rahmon of Marib is a Zaidi, like the Imam, but he has been trying to approach us also to acquire a stipend. The Arabs of our hinterland are almost entirely of the Shafi persuasion, and will resent the Imam’s approach, but it should be remembered that they were formerly Zaidis, and their chieftains acted in the role of Imam’s viceroy. From what I know of the Arab it would not be impossible for them to side with so powerful an aggressor if they were held back. For this reason it will be hard for us to disarm our existing treaties. At the same time these treaties are very non-committal. They may be summed up broadly into two heads: (1) An agreement on the part of the Arabs to abstain from ceding their territories to other Powers; and (2) to allow free access to their countries. The first clause the Arab will oblige by since by that very money comes to him. As regards the free access into these territories the idea is farcical. They are free to enter Aden, and they receive presents and entertainment, but if we attempted to pay a friendly visit to their countries every Arab Sheikh would resent our offer by tree and suspect annexation. We should be met with opposition. The Arab loves a “Dawa” (Government) to whom he can go for money, but otherwise he prefers our room to our company, and would be left alone. This isolation is due partly to their geographical position, and because we have so little—save for a few years on the Dale plateau—tried to make ourselves intimately known to them.

Their blood-tends, too, set them apart, one tribe from another, and amongst these alliances are formed only to be broken. There are means of breaking down this reserve, and to that I shall come presently.

Then there is the Idrisai Saiyid of Sabih. His present action was supposed to be directed against the Turks, but he will fall foul of the Imam whose borders are contiguous. They once were friends, but the Imam’s change of front towards the Turks before their war with Italy, and his adherence to the cause of Islam against the Infidel estranged the Idrisai, who charged his rival of acting without prior reference to himself, and hence the chasm now existing between them. Here was a case of two Arab chiefs of opposite religious beliefs being friendly one with another, and it lends colour to my
assumption that the blending of Zaidi (Shia) with Shafai (Sunni) is not altogether chimerical. A transmision of prejudices is possible at any rate.

We shall have our hands full after the war with Turkey, reconciling the conflicting interests of Imam and Idrisi, especially as the latter is now bent upon enlarging his territories at Turkish expense, and this will claim tracts which, with the departure of the Turks, the Imam would himself like to take over.

We have stated in our Treaty with the Idrisi that we did not wish to acquire any fresh tract of land in South West of Arabia. Looking, however, to the Turkish encroachments across our border and their occupation of Lahej, our policy must be amended.

Then, too, Ibn Nasir Mukbil—known as Mawia—has foiled us. He expected to be kept in his tract of Kumais and Shurman under our aegis. He dislikes both Turks and Imam. His adhesion to the Turkish cause—the result, I believe, of “force majeure,” and also some dissidence in his mind of our bona fides, since we did not move up to meet him at Da‘ah—though not necessarily indicative of any hostile animus against us—will put him into a difficult position with ourselves when peace is concluded. His country is very fertile and rich, as is also that of Hijaziya to the south, which also Ibn Nasir Mukbil’s influence pervades, and even so far south as Sheikh Said. This country the Imam will covet. It should properly be ours in spite of our declared policy to hold aloof. The times have materially changed.

The Idrisi’s representative asked the Resident in Aden why he did not take Sheikh Said, Mocha, and Hodeida, which he said “would further our joint cause,” and would certainly not be unpardonable to his master, in spite of our expressed reluctance to take fresh territory.

To come to our own stipendary. The Haushabi Sultan and the Awazi Sheikh have both joined the Turks at Lahej. The Haushabi, it is true, was compelled to join the enemy who marched down through his territories, but Sultan Ali Mani did not confine himself to this action but was a prime mover in the sacking of Lahej, where he took special delight in destroying his rival the Abdali Sultan’s property. The Haushabi has for years chafed under his position as a quasi-subordinate of the Abdali House and was glad of this opportunity of revenge. I do not think we should hereafter recognise him as a friend. I would suggest we should put up a nominee and place the country directly under the Abdali Sultan, whose tribesmen, though not a fighting clan, did their utmost to stem the Turkish advance and who came back with us to Aden—their fortunes completely shattered. The Abdali’s loyalty is unassailable.

The Arab cannot understand our retreat from Da‘ah in 1907. His prophecies all hold that we must return one day to assume possession of the country. It is Allah’s will, and cannot long be delayed. The times are therefore propitious for us “to lengthen our cords and strengthen our stakes.”

We do not by our present system of dealing with ruling Sheikhs and Sultans fall in with the genius of Arab hegemony. Everyone is as good as his fellow. “Kallus Sheikh biladu” i.e., everyone is chief of his own tract—they say, and this tract is narrowed down to mean the “family unit.” By giving stipends to the headmen we are paying monies to merely nominal rulers, and though each titular ruler has to allocate some quota to influential men of the tribe, who would otherwise render his position untenable, the rank and file got practically nothing. The Arab is what Burton termed a pantiscrot, and owns no superior, and hence the frequent lootings to fill empty coffers and of blood fauds the result of penury. It is true we pay large sums of money annually qua Darbar presents and entertainments in Aden, but even this distribution touches but the fringes of Arab society and leaves a smouldering resentment against us and the ruling Sheikhs.

The railway is the best means of combating this inequality of treatment. The railway would open up the country; give all and sundry a chance of disposing of their produce; introduce commodities into Arabia and create wants now unknown. By it the country will be parcelled and we shall extend our influence. By it the system of transit dues will perish.
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will get a share in the advantages that accrue. The railway creates a carrying trade. At present we depend on overseas traffic to supply our Aden garrison; this would not be altogether necessary. Again, the railway is strategic. Had we had a railway, or even a passable road to Lahej, the recent debacle at Lahej would have been avoided. The railway opens up a sanatorium for our troops—a great desideratum, and without a railway the scheme of bringing water into Aden is doomed to failure.

It is a commonplace that Said Pasha had no wish to attack Aden, but encouraged by our removal to Aden in 1907 the Turks have ever striven to deflect Arab allegiance to their side, and now they have proclaimed a Jihad and have occupied Lahej to show the Arabs the superiority of Islam's claims, and the desirability of making a common cause against the Unbelievers. In this they have failed.

I do not suggest that our prestige is irrevocably lost. A few of the Arab stipendiary Chiefs have written discounting such an idea and they believe that the setback is irrecoverable. They call on us to do our part as a Government and come up to oust the Turks. Themselves they are impotent to face the Turkish guns, and an Arab combination is difficult against the Turks by reason of the strong distrust that exists between them. It is therefore now a psychological mission to reverse the old so-called Indian "Redah" system of employing and paying a few Head Sheikhs to keep the country in order. Such rule is not congenial to Arabia. The Arab genius lies not this way. The system has been tried and found wanting.

Another suggestion I make is that of raising levies. My attached Memorandum will show what Italy has done with this material. I asked some of the returning Askaris why they went so far afield as Mogadiscio. They replied it was a case of getting their bread and butter. "Why have you not joined our cause?" I asked. "Because you have never asked us!" I would propose to raise on trial 200-300 men and train them here in Aden.

This is another way of extending our influence. The up-country Arab is a fighting man and such employment would please him. It also puts money into the pocket of the yokel, where in Arabia all are yokels. At this time such a levy would have been particularly useful. One never knows when the next crisis will be. I put forward the suggestion without details which would be given later. I know, and am known by, the Arabs and I am sure they would flock to our standard—more especially after this war when the whole countryside will be in commotion owing to the Arab rivalries and jealousies and the ordinary avocations will be dislocated.

Yet another proposal is that of educating the Chiefs' sons. The proposal was made in 1906 but fell through. We need in Aden a school for chiefs, run on Islamic lines with a stiff British leavening. I sounded several Chiefs at the time and had scarcely any adverse comment. The young Arab boy soon becomes an inveterate lot-eater and what with early and over-marriage his mental powers suffer ship-wreck. This is another way of subtly extending British ideals and the seed once sown would grow. Arabia will never remain independent. Some European Power will covet it. Why not we? We are on the spot and our methods are better known and our mode of administration is admired. We have not been forward so far to spread British ideas.

Again, I would strongly recommend the introduction of medical missions. We have the example on our Indian frontiers of the late Dr. Donnell and the brothers Neve, and the same can be done here. Not many years ago Dr. Harpur, of the Church Missionary Society, opened medical work in Dala, but he was recalled because of Turkish activity at Dala, though the Amir of Dala was averse to his departure.

We have in Aden men of the stamp of Doctors Young and MacRae whose philanthropic labours are known all over the hinterland and beyond, but the personal work that lies beyond Sheikh Othman and in our hinterland would afford a large scope for the dissemination of the British "tang," and would be accumulative and reproductive.

Finally, I would say that we have a very important sphere of action by sea. The Hadramaut has been unvisited for one year, and it is there that
Figure 1.5.1.8 British Policy in Yemen

Turkish and Islamic influence has lately been at work. The Arab’s intellect lies in his eyes, and he cannot fully comprehend an absentee ‘Dawla.’ There are vast potentialities on the Hadramaut seaboard in the way of mineral and oil—a commercial aspect which should give a further impetus to action on our part.

The Resident’s visits to the Hadramaut have of necessity been suspended during this war, for there is now no station ship, and the absence of the flag is to them unintelligible and is likely to induce intrigue.

H. F. Jacob, Lieut.-Colonel,
First Assistant Resident, Aden.

Aden,
9th September 1915.

Forwarded to the Political Resident for favour of his submitting these remarks to Government, together with his own. I have treated on what is known to me of the political aspect of the case, but the military is so closely interwoven that much can be added to strengthen the case from a standpoint where my knowledge is necessarily limited.

H. F. Jacob, Lieut.-Colonel,
First Assistant Resident, Aden.

Aden,
9th September 1915.
1.5.2. Note on the political situation in the Protectorate’s Hinterland

William C. Walton, Acting Political Resident, Aden, to the Secretary to Government, Political Department, Bombay, ‘Note on the present political situation in our Hinterland and beyond the Border’, 14 March 1916 (L/P&S, 18/ B 227, IOR, London).
Figure 1.5.2.1 Note on the political situation in the Protectorate’s Hinterland
1. Since the fall of Lahej on 4th July 1915 our prestige has naturally been on the wane. No Arab loves the Turk, whose rule is strict and relentless. The Arab does not love us, but it is just a matter of comparative treatment. He receives our doles and is not going to forgo this concession in return for a very nebulous compensation from elsewhere.  
2. Since the fall of Lahej we are now to-day confronted with the following facts—

The Husseini Sultan, through whose country the Turks passed en route, is now Turkish. So is the entire tract of Salhebi country and the many Salhebis. Amir Noor, of Dala, too, has gone over and drawn a Turkish stipend. Some of the Shairi villages and Salhebis have followed suit; also the Hill of Jihaf. The Alawi Sheikh had to go to Lahej owing to Turkish pressure. The principal Salhebi of the Redan Begi—Muhammad Salih the Khowahl—declares for us, but is apprehensive of a Turkish incursion after seeing the fate of the Shairi village of Al Malaha and the plight of those on the Ilaha plateau. His nephew went to Lahej to treat and temporise with the Pascha.

The Fadli Sultan, urged by fear, and seeing what befell the Abdali at Lahej, answered the Pascha’s call to Lahej. We protested at his action, and in fact we checked the Turkish advance on Huray by the reconnoissance of 30th January 1916, when the Turks had the worst of the engagement. We shall not blame Sultan Husain for this defection if we view things through his spectacles. He knows of our power in ordinary times, and he saw us engaged all over the globe, and his noted our withdrawal from Gallipoli and the present impasse at Kut-al-Amara. So far as his own tract is concerned the Turks are in closer touch with him. “The Arab’s intellect,” as their proverb puts it, “lies in his eyes.” He has no future and none to forecast.

The late Sultan of the Bani Kisraw (Lower Yafa) was anti-British and anti-Fadli alike. The newly elected Sultan is an unknown quantity. He is said to be a Turco-Bulgarian. He has no incentive to join us at this juncture. His tribesmen are out of hand. Several of the various clans have addressed us to know our policy.

Some of the Upper Yafa non-stipendiaries have long resented their exclusion from our circle of friends, i.e., recipients of doles, for democratic Arabia owns no superior, and cannot understand our choice of friends—not always a happy one. Goaded by the non-recognition of their claims, these non-recipients have for long been in touch with the Imam of Sana, and the descent of the Turkish forces opened an avenue for securing loot and some monetary consideration from the Pascha.

The Basha Sultanate is hedged in by a coterie of tribesmen, of whom the Humashik and Azaani are the most influential. The former have been for some time past in communication with the Imam. The new Sultan has not come down to sign the Treaty. It is doubtful whether his tribesmen will permit him to come.

The Sheik of Beihan to his north fears Imam’s intrigue, and is always at variance with his tribesmen and the rival faction of the Sa’ida.

I am not quite sure of the attitude of some other of our stipendiaries in Upper Yafa. They write letters teeming with loyalty, but I know of an interchange of letters between some of them and the transborder Arab, and some sort of secret understanding exists. Prior to the affair at Lahej the Maima Sultanah (stipendiaries) wrote to the Abdali Sultan that they would come in surreptitiously to his standard if called by him, but would not attend the call of the Resident. These Yafa’is will go where their interest leads them.

The passing over of Arabs to the Turks does not mean that they will assist the Pascha in arms against us, nor indeed does the Pascha desire a horde of Arab mercenaries in his camp. He has his own Arabs of Taiz and of
Figure 1.5.2.3 Note on the political situation in the Protectorate’s Hinterland

Hajjaryia. The Turks came down to Lahij rather reluctantly, and the Pasha’s object was to prove to the Arabs that their interests lay in exposing the Bahri to the Turks under his leadership. Another, and military, reason, was to keep up British troops in Aden. His own situation was so alarming that he was forced to promise to fight their brothers-Muslims, the Turks, and he is a glib quoter of the Koran.

The presence of the Turkish camps in our close vicinity has politically a bad effect. This effect will be more serious in time advances.

So far the Pasha has failed to win over such eminent leaders as the two Alaski Sultans, the Antaki Shiekh, the Imam of the Aden, or indeed any one in the Hadramawt (so far as we know though letters have passed) and so a whole Upper Tafa have rejected Turkish overtures. To the Harem are generally referred. There is a limit, however, to Arab patience and with the march of the days time our friends may get to think our cause is less strong than they believed. The Fadhil refuses to accept that his going to Lahij was a delusion and states that he went to volunteer and his return to Aden and the partial occupation of the Aden contact with Aden will continue the conclusion. Since, however, he is thought to be in receipt of a Turkish dole and also allows a free flow of supplies to Lahij we have been obliged to withhold his stipend and to lay an embargo on his port of Shukra. He has been invited to Aden to state his case and prove his friendliness, but he is not expected to comply. His position on the sea coast and the fact that Shukra is the chief inlet for trade from Aden to the country up north and east has generally encouraged our friends inland. In this lies the real significance of the Fadhil’s defection to Lahij. To palliate the difficulty we have allowed certain goods, under guarantee, to go to Shukra for the use of the tribes above, but the supply is necessarily very restricted, so as to guard against Arab culpability and the transfer of some of these goods even to the tribes at Lahij. It is not reasonable to trust to the display of the outraged feelings of our Fraternities against the Fadhil Sultan, and the strict result of any action will be resentment against the authors of a policy which has failed to differentiate between friend and foe. The genius of the Arab is to defend his hearth and home and he has a marked disinclination to unite against a brother Sultan. He may fall back on the plea that all is God’s will, but he will find little of the Government which cannot remedy the situation. The Sultans have little power over their nomads and it is these rather that direct the Arab policy.

The tributaries of the Beni Kamil (Sudan) have received a curriculum of their supplies from Aden. Here the Pasha intervened and suggested a three months’ truce between the Fadhil and a new of Al Kair and between the Fadhil and his recent tribuscant of Mirhab Aden Mansur, a man whom the first to hasten to the Turkish overtures.

That a Turkish Pasha could succeed in reconciling even temporarily tribes so long at variance is a tribute to Islam’s success where we have always failed. This will be the interpretation by Arabs generally and is detrimental to our prestige.

There is only one way of counteracting the effects of this Turkish incursion, and that is by force of arms, and, if successful, the whole trend of Arab feeling will be revolutionised. No diplomacy however will be of any avail. A peace with Turks and a diplomatic settlement of Turks will not improve our relations with the Arabs. Our retreat from Laha in 1846 was ascribed to superior Turkish diplomacy and the earlier domination of the Mecca did not enhance our military prowess. We have engaged at the conclusion of the war to adjudicate, where feasible, between the conflicting claims of Islam and the Hedali if we pay, and that unexpectedly, none will accept our mediation. Further, when Turks are not backed by diplomatic machinery, we shall require a very large force to bring to book Arab tribes which have not so far been impressed with our military resources. I am sure that a march on Lahij would draw large horde of Arabs on the retreating Turks.

To proceed to outside spheres:

"The raising of the standard of Islam behind Aden", writes Mr. Archer of Suezland, "has not passed unnoticed in the Ghulam Proctorate." His dispatch refers also to the bad effect of our inaction in Aden. A 2
The Idriasi Sayid of Abu Arish is inactive ostensibly because he lacks gun ammunition. There is more behind his inaction. He is waiting to see our military movements here, and on other fields. He told me at Djenez the other day that he was assured of our success in other fields, but feared that so far as he himself was concerned the Turks might be left in situ, a perpetual pinprick to himself. This is an extra check on his activity.

The Sherif of Mocca is not to be won over solely by excess of food to the point of Jeddah. He too expects action on our part and a definite programme besides. The Idriasi distrusts him, Sayid Mushtafa being chief witness.

There is no possible twist in Idriasi and Imam. They are irreconcilable and for well-known causes. I do not admit the possibility of an Arab union against the Turks. The Arab Chiefs have each his own sphere to which they may oppose the Turks separately if they have a given and acceptable programme laid down. This is essential, but we have no definite policy disclosed. The Imam of Sana has not actively joined the Turks though he has supplied food to their forces. His aspirations in the Yemen are peculiar and of wide range. For years he has been in correspondence with Yafa, Besan, Beihan, Marib, Turba, Xawa, Jaban, Bani Dabyan, &c., and there is no chief within our sphere whom he has not written. He had a special fondness for the late Sultan Sir Ahmed Faizi, with whom he concluded a pact. Sir Ahmed reciprocated the Imam's friendship. Our Hinterland as a whole is in the hands of the Shafi persuasion and not too keen to befriended the Zaidi Imam. It is true, however, that all this Protectorate was once under Zaidi control and it is not impossible that a reunion might be brought about in certain circumstances if the Hinterland Arab, who is not over-religious, thinks he sees British inaction which means to him British indifference. The Imam loathes the Turk and only pressure of financial difficulties lies in the way of his tearing up the Izzat Falsah treaty of 1911 which was concluded to oppose the Italian menace. If the Hinterland Arab once believes that Islam is jeopardised, there will be no bar to a union along certain lines. I remember that note that Sir Ahmed Faizi once remarking that the Modern kalima bound all Moslems regardless of differing persons. He was referring of course to the Imam and our Protectorate which was once the Imamate.

The Idriasi and Imam were once friends. We tried to bring them together early in 1914 but the Imam was piqued by the Idriasi's previous alignment with Italian interests against the Modern Turk, and could not forgive the Imam for befriending their once mutual foe without first consulting himself, and again, as I have said, the Imam was in receipt of a Turkish note and Turkish promise of assistance against his uneasy tribesmen of Hashid wa Hukil. So the rift widened. The Imam rather inclined towards us even at the risk of offending the Turks, and he was much impressed by our readiness to teach him the manufacture of gunpowder, but it is our past policy of non-intervention which is handicapping us at this critical juncture. Our bombardment of Sheiki Sabil managers the Imam and a similar action at Lohiya incensed the Idriasi. Both acts paved agggradation.

I was discussing the Idriasi and Imam with an influential Sayid in 1912. He said that a reconciliation was impossible. "Each one wishes to get to the top of the house." He added that so long as Maliki, Shafi's and Hanifi disagreed, the Yemen must fall a prey to England. I discounted all idea of territorial expansion, but he replied: "If a morsel of bread is put into your mouth you cannot but eat it. You will not conquer the Yemen by force. It is a case for purchase. If the Yemen goes, Islam is gone."

There remains another important Sheikh, Ibn Nanir Nukhil of Marib. He signed an agreement with us at the beginning of the war, and gave us the choice of three places wherein to meet and come over to us. We did not agree. He is not a traitor to us and I still reckon on his support if occasion offers. He did not join in the fight at Lohiy, and long before that date, when constantly pressed to lead an attack, pleaded sickness and one cause or another. Marib hates both Turk and Imam.

Finally, to strike at the Turks before Sheikh Othman will imperil their hold both of the Yemen and Hejaz, for by it alone will the Idriasi and Sherif of Mecca enter actively on our side; the former to secure his own territorial
ends versus the Imam and the other to assert his spiritual claims in the Hejaz. The Turkish Caliphate is vulnerable in the vicinity of the Holy Cities of Hejaz, and here mainly their prestige lies.

This is the political situation. The employment of force is a matter for military concern. I merely state facts I have noted for several years past.

H. F. Jacov, Lieut.-Colonel,
First Assistant Resident, Aden.

10th March 1916.

Figure 1.5.2.5 Note on the political situation in the Protectorate’s Hinterland
1.5.3. The Aden Protectorate

William C. Walton, the General Officer Commanding Aden, to the Secretary to Government of India in the Foreign Department - Notes by Colonel R.A. Wauhope and Lieutenant Colonel Jacob, 15 May 1916 (L/P&S, 18/ B 231, IOR, London).
Figure 1.5.3.1 The Aden Protectorate
and must live on the surrounding country; therefore they must station themselves at the larger trade centres such as Lahej, Mav and Taiz. Bula
also is such a centre, but Marseir is not.

If Lahej be denied to them they must stay at some of the centres named, but they cannot consolidate themselves elsewhere, except temporarily at Marseir. But if Lahej is not held, a large concentration can be effected
within a day’s march of Aden.

The last stage of the issue of the W. Tihani route from the foothills
forms a narrow defile. If a force attempting to issue from the defile were attacked during the movement, they would be liable to defeat in detail, and
and to suffer disaster.

If the enemy are allowed to concentrate, with all their strength outside
the defile, the only disadvantage that they suffer from is that they are fighting
with their backs to it, but they hold the exit. If attacked when half out of
the defile the advantage should be with the attackers.

There is a position at Tannan which commands the exit from the defile,
but it is not fit for permanent occupation owing to the heat striking off the
rocks in the restricted area. Nebat Dakim which is 88 miles south of
Tannan is extremely unhealthy and miserable.

At Al Anad, the tracks from the north are obstructed by a hill, and this
forms a supporting position about 12 miles south of Tannan. It is less
unhealthy than Nebat Dakim and has a plentiful supply of water. The
Turks have a hospital here. There is good water from a spring in the
W. Tihani near Zaida and open ground suitable for a camp, but no shade.
This would be the best place for the halted camp of a force detailed to hold
the Tannan position.

It is situated about 11 miles south of Tannan.

The places mentioned above can be occupied in such a way by a force
of three or four battalions with guns as to deny the approach to Lahej to a
force of very much greater strength.

From a defensive point of view it is exceedingly strong, but as regards
the health of the troops it is, owing to the presence of mosquitoes, rather
worse than Aden or Sheikh-Said.

It has, however, many advantages over either of the latter, because it
covers the fertile area of the Lahej district, from which vegetables, etc.,
can be obtained, because it practically prohibits an advance from Mavas, and
because it controls the coast tribes in the vicinity of Aden.

It is, in my opinion, the least advance that should be made.

If made, it should be clear from the outset that it is a permanent move,
and that we go to stay.

In any case, even if a further advance has been decided on, it must be
the first stage of such an advance. It would be well to pause and consolidate
here before attempting anything more. Until the railway has been brought
up, and troops have been exercised in the hilly country and hill camels have
been collected, these positions should be made good.

6. If we are to go no further than Lahej, it becomes necessary to
consider the advisability of occupying Sheikh Said.

This is a collection of barren rocky hills with 15 or 20 grass huts used by
fishermen who are the only normal inhabitants. The Turkish telegraph line
of the Tihani passed over from here to Perim. There were a fort and some
barracks on J. Udai near Turia, but these have been demolished. There
is no natural harbour (the Khor is only a shallow inlet), nor is there here a
natural trade centre. There is water, but it is brackish; the local Arabs drink it, but no one else can. The Turkish garrison obtains water brought on
pack animals from Bal Hajar and Dabab.

It is unlikely, judging by the formation of the land, that there are any
underground streams from the main hills of the interior. Therefore, any
occupation must entail the erection of cisterns.

The danger of Sheikh Said to us lies in its position dominating the
Bob-al-Mandab Straits.

If it were properly armed by another power we could not hold Perim,
which provides the natural harbour, of which Sheikh Said should be,
normally, the defence.

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Figure 1.5.3.2 The Aden Protectorate
An attack on Sheikh Said from the land side would be difficult because of the want of water in the desert to the northeast. Water might be found in this desert by boring, but this would take time. The Hejaz railway, when it reaches Yebdo on the coast, will have outflanked the Suez Canal and the potential importance of Sheikh Said will then be increased. ‘We cannot, in short, allow it to be occupied by a foreign Power.

It would be sound to make sure of it before the Turks come out of this war, otherwise it may lead to unnecessary argument.

What we do with Sheikh Said when we have got it is another matter.

If we advance to Taiz and occupy that country in force, there will be no need to garrison Sheikh Said, which is a very undesirable spot for the location of troops.

But if we do not occupy the Taiz District in a military sense, it seems that it will be necessary that Sheikh Said should be occupied and garrisoned. As soon as the Turks look like withdrawing from the war we ought to take it, but not sooner than is necessary. As already indicated, its further defence and the garrisoning of this place must depend on the decision arrived at with regard to Taiz.

7.—(3) The third alternative is contained in the proposition that we should advance to Dala and make good our line as delimited on our maps. I have been unable to discover any other reasons for originally going to Dala than that (a) it is provided a much needed sanitarium for the Aden Garrison; (b) it brought us into closer contact with the Hinterland tribes; (c) we could not go to Taiz.

Dala does not close any route practicable for an army, and it is turned at once by any hostile advance from the north-west by the Tihan route. It is a place of little strategic importance, and the question of an advance to this place need not therefore be further discussed. It is not worth any risk.

(4) This last proposition, viz., to occupy Taiz, has been discussed by Colonel Watho in his memorandum herewith attached. It is undoubtedly by far the most attractive proposition. It appears to me to be worthy of the deepest consideration. It is a big scheme and would require a force of, probably, two divisions to inaugurate it, and a permanent force of a division, after things had settled down. It would be necessary to carry on the railway from Aden to Taiz and desirably to continue the railway to Ras Kadiib just north of Hobilah. This railway would be guarded from attack from the north by a mountain barrier through which we should hold the passes. The project might entail trouble with the Imam Yehis, but would be favourably viewed by our friend the Idrist, to whom we might offer the coast country southwards from Lahaya to Ras Kadiib.

By this means, and by strengthening the Sultan of Morakka, would be formed a barrier to foreign intrigue and occupation around the whole of the coasts of Southern Arabia.

All the advantages of a sanitarium would be available for our troops in the fine climate round Taiz. Any forces maintained here would be exceedingly well placed strategically for war in Persia, India, East Africa, the Red Sea littoral, or in the West.

The whole trade of the Yemen would increase vastly under a stable government and would find a natural exit by rail either to Ras Kadiib or Aden.

The new frontier would be naturally defensible.

On the civil administration of the triangular tract between this frontier and the sea I am not in a position to offer an opinion, but perhaps it might be run on the same lines as the Sudan.

I agree with Colonel Watho in the opinion that Indian troops are least suitable for employment in Arabia, especially Indian Muhammadans, who seem to become hypnotised by the thought that they are in the land in which lies Mecca.

It seems possible that Sudanese troops might do better. But in any case time and money would, in my opinion, be well spent in an attempt to form a local corps of Arabs under British officers. They will not take kindly at first to too strict a discipline, but according to all available information there are many good fighting men who would enlist if required.
There are Arabs who are hard working, as is evidenced by their good work when toiling steamers and as dockers.

8. The First Assistant Resident advocates, as does Colonel Wakeha, the advancement of our sphere of influence to Taiz. In fact the end he has in view coincides with proposition (4). But he proposes methods which have, to my mind, proved a failure in the past. The undertaking of political obligations supported by no adequate measures for their fulfilment, and the building of railways in country outside our jurisdiction, appear to me to be open to grave objections.

If, therefore, it be decided to advance from Aden, an adequate force to ensure the fulfilment of all obligations and guard our interests in a suitable location for that force, for which Aden is quite unsuitable, appear to me to be essential elements in any practical proposition.

In short, any satisfactory scheme must meet the strategical as well as the political requirements of the situation.

As for a Chief's College, Aden is no place for it. More healthy surroundings and a cooler climate are essential. But no one would suggest that it should be outside our border. To push the Turks back through the passes and beyond our protectorate border will probably require the concentration of a force of two divisions.

No greater force would be required to push them beyond Mavia and Tant, and there should be no retirement thence.

For some time to come this force would probably be not more than sufficient to cope with the dissatisfaction of the Imam of Sanaa, unless we come to terms with him before we advance. Although the Idrizi might assist us in engaging him in case he declines to come to terms. Although it may appear to the Arabs that any advance to Taiz is due to a desire for personal or national aggrandisement, such an advance would be, in my opinion, forced upon us from no such desire.

I believe the advance will be forced upon us by considerations not only of self-preservation at Aden but of the preservation of the best interests of the Arab. If it is, I can see no advantages but great danger in attempting to make it without adequate force.

I am fully aware that our action here is dependent on success or failure in other distant fields of action, but any success in distant spheres will not entirely compensate for local inaction.

I therefore submit these papers in case a possibility for action should present itself, in the hope that they may be found of some use in due course.

Yours, &c.,

W. C. Walton,
Brigadier-General Commanding, Aden.

Copies to—
The Secretary of State.
The Chief of the General Staff, India.
The Commissioner, Cairo.
British Policy in Yemen

ENCLOSURES.

Enclosure No. 1.

The Boundary of the Aden Protectorate.

(Not by Colonel H. M. Waghorn, B.E., C.I.E., C.M.G.)

1. In 1820 the Turkish occupation of Yemen which had lasted nearly 100 years came to an end, and from that year until the reconquest of Sana'a in 1872 the province was ruled by the Imams of Sana'a, the descendants of the ancient dynasty established in the ninth Century, A.D. Their hold over the outlying districts gradually weakened, and in 1839 when Aden was captured by the British, the Abdali Sultan, to whose allegiance was independent of the Imam and had extended his influence over the adjoining tribal territory. This was so recognized by the British Government that in 1839 the sovereignty of the Imam was ignored and a treaty made with the Abdali, under which the British Government became responsible for the stipends paid by him to the Fadli, Yafai, Haashabi and Amiri tribes for safeguarding the routes to Aden.

2. Direct relations with these tribes were entered into later, and treaties made extending British protection to them in return for certain obligations which they undertook, but the limits of the Protectorate remained until recently as we took them over on our first occupation of Aden.

3. Turkish intervention in Yemen recommenced about 1840, but it was not until 1872 that the advance of the Turks brought them into contact with the tribes in treaty relations with us. In that year they advanced from Kataba, occupied a large part of the Amiri territory, and deposed the Amir of Talo, and, in spite of remonstrances from the British Government, pushed on as far as Ta'izz, which they only evacuated under strong diplomatic pressure. The Porte then admitted that certain specified tribes were within the British sphere of influence, but their aggressive policy was persisted in, until in 1901 the British Government found it necessary to expel a Turkish force from a post established at Al Harraja in Haashabi territory. A Commission was then appointed by the two Governments to determine the boundary of the specified tribes, and this was agreed upon and demarcated on the ground, from Sheikh Said to a point near Kataba, beyond which it was agreed that the boundary should run north-east up to the desert, thus cutting off Turkish access to Ta'izz and the Hadramaut Valley.

4. The preceding paragraphs show that the present boundary, though recently agreed to by Turkey, was acquired by us at a time when neither Turkey nor the Imam had any recognized rights in the neighbourhood of Aden; this is perhaps important to notice at the present time when the Imam may be inclined to make claims which his predecessors did not think of bringing forward 30 years ago. It is also interesting to note that the de facto rulers of Aden, from whom we inherited, so to speak, the present frontier, found it necessary to subsidize the tribes commanding the approaches to Aden; and that it was even then impossible to regard Aden as an isolated position, and without interest in the hinterland through which its trade communications ran.

5. This boundary is in many ways an unsatisfactory one. It ignores military considerations entirely; it follows no definite natural features; and except at one point near Dala it denies us possession of the heights commanding the border, and of the fertile highlands, leaving to us only the barren sandflats and deserts. The possession of Marib and the high plateaux to the north of it would have changed the position entirely in our favour; we could then have established outposts in a healthy climate covering all the approaches to Aden from the north-west. Short of that line there is no

Figure 1.5.3.5 The Aden Protectorate
British Policy in Yemen

6. If the Turks, after the war, are still to remain in Yemen, a buffer zone of tribal territory must still be maintained, but a more satisfactory boundary must be fixed, such as will give us access to the highlands, and ensure our command of the approaches to Aden. If, however, they disappear from Yemen, a much larger question arises. The British Government can hardly contemplate the occupation of Yemen, and with it of the Red Sea coast, by any other Power, and will itself be committed to some form of protectorate over the province. The greater part may remain independent, or under Arab rule, but, in order to develop its resources, it may be necessary to exercise control over the ports (which must continue open to European trade) and the main trade routes into the interior. A brief description of the general character of the country will show how far this is practicable or desirable, and where we can establish ourselves so as to exercise this control with the least risk and outlay.

7. The northern limit of Yemen actually under Turkish administration is a line drawn eastward from Lahira for about 120 miles inland, and passing about 25 miles north of Sana'a; the southern boundary is the line Sheikhi Said—Kataba, as demarcated; the eastern boundary is some 20 miles east of the line Sana'a—Kataba, the whole averaging 200 miles in length from north to south, and 120 miles in width. The Tihama, or maritime plain, extends along the coast and for about 20 miles inland, rising gradually to a height of about 900 feet, at the foot of the lower hills. It is, generally speaking, desert, except where one or other of the hill torrents debouches; some of the oases thus formed are of considerable extent and fertility. Bait el Fakih, Zahid and Haia are the most important. There are also several considerable places on the coast, the inhabitants of which own dhows and do a thriving trade between Aden and the Red Sea ports. The Jabal, or highlands, between the foothills and the crest of the main range, is broken into numerous lateral ranges from 5,000 to 10,000 feet in height, intersected by fertile valleys, and watered by perennial streams. The hillsides are everywhere covered with well-built villages and towers, and cultivation is carried on wherever the slope is not too steep; the terrace fields, extending sometimes for thousands of feet up the mountain sides, and the irrigation channels which utilize the available water to the utmost, show the skill and industry of the inhabitants. Fruit, coffee and field crops of all sorts are produced, and under settled conditions the productivity of these highlands could be greatly increased. From the main watershed eastwards the country is generally open and flat, falling away gradually from an average height of 6,000 feet to the desert. Several towns are situated on this high plateau—Sana'a, the capital, Damir, Yarim, Ibb and Jibha.

8. The difference in character of these main physical divisions of the country would no doubt be reflected in the attitude of the population towards a change in the administration. The people of the Tihama, many of them well-to-do traders, and owners of grazing craft constantly running into Aden, would welcome a British Protectorate; some of them, the Zaramik for example, have already expressed this wish. The Jabal, which from its inaccessibility has been less subject to Turkish misgovernment, considers itself quite capable of managing its own affairs without reference to any authority whether British or Turkish; but its population is settled and industrious, and as an increased demand for its produce would certainly arise, it might be expected to accept more or less willingly the very slight interference in its affairs that would be rendered necessary under a British Protectorate. The inhabitants of both these tracts are Sunnis of the Shafi'i sect, while those of the towns and of the plateau generally, north of Ibb, are mainly Zaidis, and would look to the Imam as their political as well as
British Policy in Yemen

9. The main lines of communication North and South, through Yemen, are: Lohova—Lahiya—Hodeida—Zabid—Hai—Taiz, along the Tihama, and Sana'a—Damar—Yarum—Ibba—Taiz on the plateau. Both these lines converge at Taiz, and here also the routes meet which lead from the west and north-west from Mokha and Shabik, and from Kataba and Aden from the east and south-east. This is, in fact, the key to the communications of Southern Yemen; it lies in a remarkable gap in the main water-rail range, the only one in the whole length of the range through which a railway could be constructed from Aden to the Western Tihama, and it is approached from Aden by the Tihama valley at an easy gradient, with an ample supply of water at all season. Large quantities of grain and forage could be grown in the fertile district to the north-east, and sites for encampments could be found in the immediate neighbourhood, in an excellent climate, at any elevation desired.

10. Whatever Government is established in Yemen, it will be necessary to maintain, as at present, a zone of tribal territory entirely independent of Sana'a, and under British coördist. Taiz and its dependencies must be included in this zone, and the present limits of the Protectorate must be extended westwards to some point on the Red Sea north of Mokha. This southern corner of Arabia is of too great importance strategically to allow any doubt to exist in the future as to its ownership, and our hold on it should be secured by the construction of a railway to Taiz, or some suitable point to the north-east of it, with a road extending from railhead eastward through Mavia to Dula. It should be specifically included from the Imam's jurisdiction, although only a part of it would be, for the present at any rate, occupied by us.

11. A well defined and defensible line for the occupied district would be the crest of the range bounding the Taiz valley on the north-west, through J. Nuvin, the Muharras Pass, J. Soruk, J. Bashan and J. Jihab to J. Harir; at each end of this line the high ranges curve sharply back to the south, forming natural barriers. Such a line fulfills the required conditions; it gives us control of the approaches to Aden, and provides an ample choice of sites for encampments in a healthy climate within a few hours journey from the coast, where our frontier officers will be in touch with the people of Yemens, as they can never be in Aden.

12. The occupation of Hodeida or one of the Red Sea ports may also have to be considered. They serve the coffee growing districts of Jahl Haraz, Raina and others, and the trade of Zabid and the other Tihama towns. Other European nations besides ourselves are concerned in their development, and will look to us for the maintenance of security. Railways have been projected by the Turks themselves to connect Hodeida with Sana'a and Taiz; we cannot ignore the responsibilities involved in our Protectorates.

13. The adoption of this policy will entail, at the outset, the employment of a considerable force. It should be carried into effect with as little delay as possible on the withdrawal of the Turks; otherwise the country will relapse into anarchy, or the Imam will seize the opportunity to forward his occupation of Mavia and Taiz. The necessary arrangements, political and military, should therefore be considered at once, to ensure the advance being made at the right moment.

14. As regards the constitution of the provisional Government some important changes would seem desirable. The greater part will be future be sustained in a cool and healthy climate, and a large proportion should, for some time to come, consist of British troops.

Figure 1.5.3.7 The Aden Protectorate
The employment of Indian troops in Arabia is for many reasons inexplicable; the native element should therefore be recruited from the local tribesmen. Excellent material is available and will come forward as soon as the people are convinced that our Protectorate is really a permanent one.

R. A. Wakhope,
Political and Military Intelligence Officer, Aden.

Enclosure No. 2.

A POLITICAL POLICY IN OUR HINTERLAND.
(Note by Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. Jacob, First Assistant Resident, Aden.)

At the beginning of the war with Turkey everything was made to depend on a political policy. The Turks were asked to create a diversion against the Turks. On this account precautionary measures of a military nature were put out of court and the seriousness of a Turkish movement was somewhat discounted from the military viewpoint.

1) The Idrisi agreement was made on 30th April 1915. Had the Idrisi Saiyid been more active, the descent on Lahej would have been delayed or entirely frustrated.

2) The Mavia Sheikh concluded an agreement on 19th February 1915.

3) The Imam of Sana'a dislikes the Turks but he is still friendly with the House of Abdali, and the Turks for their occupation of the Abdali capital. Writing to the Abdali Sultan, so late as in April 1915, the Imam expressed his distrust of the Turkish Government in the Yemen, and summed them of some minor disturbances. He said he had no desire, even so long as "together the scattered hearts of his brethren in the faith and to keep alive the flickering soul of the Islamic Nation." He reiterated his friendship with the House of Lahej and said he would always remain in friendly relations with the House.

The Imam's Lieutenant, Saiyid Mohamed Ali Sharif, also wrote to the Sultan. He said that the Governor-General of the Yemen and other interested persons in Sana'a had conspired against him and receiving despatches. The Imam, his master, then wrote a still more to the Governor-General and protested against certain Turkish acts and suspicions which were contrary to the spirit of the Turco-Islamic truce. The writer added that disagreement between the Imam and the Turks might occur, and they might not take shape. He concluded that it was impossible for the Imam to join the Abdali, but he promised neutrality and an abiding consideration for those under Abdali protection; that the Imam had noted the object of some designing persons (i.e., Turks), and he thereupon collected his forces and would make his own expedition when necessary. The writer had asked the

Figure 1.5.3.8 The Aden Protectorate
1. All this goes to show that the Imam did not approve of Turkish measures against Lahej. He does not admire Turkish methods of rule, but for the time he finds it the best policy to abide by the terms of the Treaty he made prior to the Turco-Italian war.

Had these political measures succeeded, we should have combated the Turks by proxy and very economically. There was a military side, and co-operation on our part was essential. I will not here criticise the causes which led us to refrain. It is better to face the facts and see what should be done in the future.

I have my remarks on the hypothesis that the Turks will be expelled from the Yemen.

3. When the Turks retire, the border line will be a thing of the past. Chaos will succeed. The Turk is at present the cork in a bottle of beer. When the cork is drawn the beer will foam over. The democracy of the Arab only adds to the difficulty. The Arab lacks cohesion. What has been said of Spain by a distinguished writer in the year 1830 is true of the Yemen to-day. Repelling intercourse with other nations, the Yemen is thrown back upon itself. This isolation, however, does not unite the separate tribes in any community of national feeling. The contrary is the case. Bound together in provincial clanship, the inhabitants know themselves and their neighbours not so much as Arabs, but as Sinah’i and Zeidi, Yafah hillsmen and those of the plain; Aalshi, Aushali, Bedani, etc. Tribes may be bought and re-bought by different and opposing parties.

If the Turk goes, the Arabs will rejoice at regaining their independence. Will they then welcome our taking over Turkish rights and liabilities?

The Imam opposes Turkish rule, not because he loves us, but rather because he considers the Yemen the property of his forebears. The raid on Lahej he abhorred just because Lahej he considered a part and parcel of his ancient domain and he had a secret treaty with the late Sir Ahmed Fuad of Lahej.

When in 1640 the Turks left the Yemen, the Imam took it over. Will he now, after this lapse of time, with a similar disappearance of the Turks, be content to be cribbed, cabined and confined in the tracts now assigned him by the Turks, i.e., in the Northern Yemen?

When we told the Imam we did not seek territorial expansion in the Yemen and asked him to join us to expel a foe to Arab progress, he at once instanced our attack on Sheikh Said as showing that assertion that we were poaching on his preserve, and he could not believe that no superior motive lay behind our desire for his friendship.

4. I have said that our border line will be a failure soon when the Turk goes. This line was drawn between ourselves and the Turks, and between us and the Arabs. The Arabs have never recognised the line. The line cut in two tribes who had for years considered themselves as in attack and defence. I speak of Juhayman, Nawa, Haraz Hulayla and Hasa. Juhayman in the Damascus went over to the Turks. The Sheikh made frequent and fervent appeals to be taken over by us. He was as often told that he was within borders of our good friends the Turks. When the Turk goes, the Treaty between us and the Ottoman Government of March 1914 is also a dead letter. I refer to the Turkish recognition of the proclamation of the north-east line from Lakamah of Aden.

5. We must work back to our delimited border and expel the Turks who have crossed it, and in crossing have taken over the Bushra and Aqaba agreements.

6. Until we take over our former borders we shall have but cause with our Arab prestige and it will be too far for us to talk of a definition of our territory in the future.
British Policy in Yemen

7. A new border is imperative. We must keep the Imam, if possible, within a certain prescribed area. Colonel Wreford advises that we go up to Taiz. I am not sure of the advisability of the measure he proposes, though the end in view is admirable. The Turks had made Taiz their headquarters and had before this war practically left the Imam supreme in the Northern Yemen. We, too, should keep him there and not allow him to come south.

8. I do not advocate a "forced penetration" of this new area. I do not believe that the Arabs will welcome us as sleepers in Turkish shoes. The Turks were, at any rate, Moslems, even if had Moslems. They derived their rule in the Yemen from their Caliph. Their rule was despotic and detested. They never allowed the presence of Taiz up to 1839, but only because we did not abuse them. We did not administer the country but unostentatiously supervised their administration. We levied no taxes. The Turks disapproved all whom they thought dangerous to their rule and then taxed the people by force. Should we begin to administer the country, our popularity would cease; but unless we imitate in principle the Turkish regime we cannot stay in the country and make our stay economically profitable.

9. For this reason I do not recommend a forcible occupation of the country. I think we can best rule there by proxy. We can take over Taiz, Shurman, and Kama Ina and the Hogariya district, and in fact, all southward to Sheikh Said, but this tract should be merely a "sphere of influence," a sphere where we will break no foreign power to come in, just as our present treaties stipulate for no occupation or sale of lands, which by stipends paid we consider as exclusively within the British sphere.

The Mavia Sheikh administered the Taiz and Mavia tracts under the Turks: Ahmed Noman that of Hogariya under the same masters. We should follow suit, though it would be well to give over a part of the Hogariya district to the Abdali who has lost much, permanently and morally, before and since 18th July by expelling our races. I say "our races" advisedly, for though Lalej was big and his interests mainly at stake, yet by treaty we were pledged to safeguard his territory.

10. In order to open this country, a railway to Taiz will be the best means. There are many ways of greatly extending our influence over this new tract, and I have enumerated some of them in my Memorandum of 9th September 1913, which was forwarded to Government by Sir G. Youngwood, with his letter No. C. 649, dated 26th September 1913. These measures include levies, a school in Aden for Chiefs' sons, etc. By these means we shall prove to the Arab our sincerity when we asked them to cast the Turk, who for many years had been a bane, to Arab progress in the Yemen, and further when we denied all idea of personal aggression.

11. The most difficult problem before us will be to placate the Imam, and this is best done by putting up an influential Arab in the Taiz district—one, however, who happens to be anti-Zaidi, as indeed he is anti-Turk.

12. As regards existing treaties with the Arabs, we must either retain or repudiate them. The Arabs did not join us to fight the Turk. They could hardly fight the Turk on their own without guns. They might harass the Turkish communications, and would do so now if we advanced from Sheikh Orman. They will not harry the Turks until well assured of our forward policy. They have all practical purposes lost first-hand touch with the hinterland. If we are not eventually to card the Turks, and until the Arabs are sure of this, our ultimate aim, they will hesitate before incurring very great risk hereafter—the Turks being left in situ.

The majority of the Arab protestations have remained neutral. This war they consider as waged between two Governments, but as one against one that grants largesses and protects them against foreign intrusion. Their present neutrality does not argue love for Turks, but shows that they would be left alone to live their own

Figure 1.5.3.10 The Aden Protectorate
1.5.4. Note on the political situation in the Hinterland

ADEN: The political situation in the Hinterland.

1. The military history of the Aden Protectorate since the outbreak of war with Turkey may be very briefly related. News reached the Aden authorities on the 12th June 1915 that Turkish forces were being concentrated at Mave, which lies just beyond the border of our protectorate, with a view to advancing, via Ad-dareja, upon Lahej, the headquarters of the principal British protected chief of the Hinterland (the Abulal Sultan), and situated only about 20 miles from Aden as the crow flies. On the 3rd July news was received that Lahej was actually threatened by the Turks, who had routed the Sultan’s levies, and the military authorities at Aden decided to send up the local movable column for the protection of the town. The force reached Lahej but was unable to maintain its position there in the face of superior enemy strength, and was compelled to retire upon Aden and to leave Lahej to its fate. Two 10-pounder guns, several machine guns, and a considerable amount of ammunition and equipment, were abandoned during the retreat. The Turks followed up their success, and the British troops found it necessary to retire behind the defences of Aden itself, leaving Sheikh Othman—whence Aden obtains its water supply—in the enemy’s hands. General Youngusband was promptly despatched to Aden with reinforcements, and had little difficulty in driving the Turks out of Sheikh Othman and regaining control over the water supply; but he made no attempt to advance upon Lahej or to clear our protectorate of the enemy.

2. The situation in which we have had to acquiesce during the past two years is anything but a satisfactory one. Indeed one of the main reasons which prompted the India Office in suggesting the transference of military control was the hope that it might lead to more effective measures. It is true that our position at Aden itself has never been seriously threatened; but we have had the humiliation of looking idle on, mouth after month, at the occupation of our territory by the enemy, and of presenting to the world a spectacle of inability to help either ourselves or our friends. There may have been excellent reasons for this inactivity. But, locally, it is political results have been deplorable; and there is little hope that the political situation will improve until we are in a position to take effective military action. So far we have confined ourselves to attempting to induce the local Arabs (Saiyid Idries, &c.) to do for us what we have not found it convenient to do for ourselves—a policy which, naturally, has not been very fruitful in results. The Arabs have little love for the Turk, but so long as they are doubtful how far we really mean business they will hesitate to commit themselves irretrievably. They are moreover torn by internal rivalries and dissensions. Little effective help can be expected from them until we take the field ourselves. It seems indeed hardly reasonable to expect them to declare themselves effectively against the Turks and on our side while we to all appearances are too weak to do anything substantial ourselves.

3. There is one point on which it is desired to lay great emphasis. It is all-important, from the point of view of our future relations with the Arabs, that we should, before the war ends, ourselves expel the Turks by force of arms from Lahej and the remainder of our protectorate. Victory elsewhere, followed by a diplomatic withdrawal on the part of the Turks, will not suffice for local purposes, and will not serve to re-establish our prestige or the belief in our ability to protect our own interests and those of our friends. The Arab, as has frequently been remarked, is impressed only by what passes before his eyes.

4. It should be added that, according to the Indian military authorities, there are only about three, or at most four, months in the year (November to February) suitable, for climate reasons, for military operations in the Aden area.

Political Department, India Office,
25th August 1917.

Figure 1.5.4.1 Note on the political situation in the Hinterland
1.5.5. Al-Idrisi to General Stewart, Political Resident, Aden

Letter from Al-Idrisi to General Stewart, the Political Resident, Aden, 12 May 1919 (Schofield, 1993: Vol.4.p. 265). Al-Idrisi’s dependence on British subsidies and support was crucial.
From Siyid Mohamed bin Ali bin Mohamed bin Ahmed bin Idris.

To General Stewart,
Political Resident, Aden.

A.O.

In the beginning of the war your Government had announced that they did not desire to acquire any territory in Arabia but wished that the country of the Arabs should belong to the Arabs, and, further, they had promised to expand our territory in the southern and western directions. In view of this promise of Government and as we took part in the fight and have suffered considerable losses in men and materials we have become entitled to such expansion.

Moreover now that the inhabitants of Najil, Bait-al-Fakah and Zabid have more than once invited us in writing and through deputations expressly sent to us for this purpose, we do wish to advance towards them, but after consulting you.

We observe that those are making encroachments on places beyond their original limits, whereas we have been adhering to our original limits and the places which have now come into our hands from the Turks were on our borders; we holding one side and the Turks the other - one of these is Zaidia. All the eastern side of this district is in our hands.

In the year 1327 al Hijra (11 years ago) our men occupied the house of Bouni Fasha, the Kaimakam of the Zaidia district, and took possession of all its contents of magazines provided by the Turks. Severe fighting took place at al Hijja, al Kanawis and As-Salib, the account of which was publicly published in the Egyptian papers and others. On your referring to this history and making enquiries you will know all these facts.

May you be preserved.

(No date).

Figure 1.5.5.1 Al-Idrisi to General Stewart, Political Resident, Aden
1.5.6. Example of correspondence between Al-Idrisi and Yemeni tribes

Letter to Al-Idrisi from the chiefs of Bait Al-Fakaih, located to the south of Al-Hudaydah, west of Yemen (Schofield, 1993: Vol.4. pp. 267-268). Al-Idrisi was able to attract tribes from deep within Yemen.
Figure 1.5.6.1 Example of correspondence between Al-Idrisi and Yemeni tribes
Figure 1.5.6.2 Example of correspondence between Al-Idrisi and Yemeni tribes
1.5.7. On Lieutenant Colonel Jacob’s mission to the Imam

Summary of events leading up to the despatch of a mission under Lieutenant Colonel Jacob to the Imam of Yemen, 27 January 1920, FO 406/43, TNA, London.
No. 45.

Summary of Events leading up to the Despatch of a Mission under Colonel Jacob to the Imam of San'a (Communicated to Foreign Office, January 27.

ON the 20th March, 1918, the Resident at Aden invited the Imam to come in definitely on our side and turn the Turks out of the Yemen. He promised that if the Imam were to do this his independence would be ensured; he would be supplied with the necessary munitions; the disposal of Turkish prisoners of war would be left to him; he would be financed on a pre-war Turkish scale, tribal subsidies being paid through him and not direct, and a non-Idrisi port would be opened to trade for his benefit. The terms of our treaty with the Idrisi were explained to him at the same time.

On the 5th May, 1918, the Imam sent a non-committal reply, in which he reiterated his previous claims to the overlordship of the Yemen, and made a few scathing remarks about the Idrisi.

He made twelve demands, as follows:

1. Supply of munitions before commencement of operations.
2. Establishment of his rule and independence over all the Yemen, i.e., over that part which was once under the sway of his predecessors, as also over that which his hand should acquire. His Majesty's Government to undertake to close access absolutely and continuously to all, whoever they might be, who propose to make aggression in the Yemen.
3. His Majesty's Government to pay the same subsidy which the Turks used to pay, all sums to pass through the Imam's hands.
4. His Majesty's Government to have no direct dealings with any of the people of the Yemen, except the Sultan of Lahej.
5. Despatch of ammunition.
7. Prohibition of import of spirituous liquors, wanton pastimes, and all munitions except those intended for his use.
8. None but Moslem merchants to be allowed in the Yemen except with his permission.
9. Immediate opening of a port, e.g., Hodeidah or Mokha.
10. No interference.
11. Prisoners of war to remain at his disposal.
12. Recovery of debts due to him by the Turkish Government.

Figure 3.5.7.1 On Lieutenant Colonel Jacob's mission to the Imam
On the 10th September Sir Reginald Wingate proposed to reply to these demands as follows:

1. 3, 9, and 11: To repeat undertaking given in the letter of the 20th March.
2. 4, 5, 7, 8, and 12: To give temporising replies.
3. 4, 7, 10: (a) His Majesty's Government to reaffirm their willingness to ensure the independence of the Yemen without prejudice to their protectorate rights and their obligations to the British and expatriate chiefs.
4. (b) His Majesty's Government to disclaim any wish to intervene in internal affairs of the country, provided that the interests of British subjects would be adequately safeguarded there.
5. (c) His Majesty's Government to propose that, in return for their assistance, the Imam should undertake not to enter into treaty relations with, nor to alienate territory, nor grant concessions to a foreign Power without their consent.
6. The Imam to be asked to send an envoy with fuller powers to treat and an exact knowledge of his requirements in money and material.

On the 29th September Sir Reginald Wingate reported that the proposed reply was approved, subject to the following considerations:

1. Arms not to be supplied until more satisfactory guarantees have been received that they would be used against the Turks.
2. Imam to be told frankly that His Majesty's Government could not agree to his second and fourth proposals.

On the 14th October Sir Reginald Wingate reported that the proposed letter to the Imam was being held up in view of the change in the Aden political situation. He also brought up the question of the amount of the proposed subsidy.

On the 31st October an armistice was concluded with the Turkish Government. On the 20th November a report was received that the Imam was obstructing the evacuation of Turkish troops from the Yemen on the ground that the Turkish Government owed him large sums for the upkeep of Turkish troops during the war. On the 6th January a report was received that the Imam was sending a deputation to Aden, and on the 14th January the General Officer Commanding, Aden, had been sent back on the ground that they had presented letters to the French, American, and Italian representatives, and that this proceeding constituted a misuse of envoys.

On the 21st February a letter was received from the Imam to His Majesty the King, in which he begged that his independence and rights of sovereignty in the Yemen might be recognised. He also complained of the British occupation of Hodeidah. This letter had been handed in at Aden by the Imam's envoys.

On the 4th March the Italian Delegation in Paris informed Mr. Balfour that the Imam had asked for representation at the Peace Conference, and asked what answer should be returned. They were told that as the question of representation had been finally disposed of there could be no question of complying. Mr. Balfour impressed upon the Foreign Office the necessity for pressing on negotiations to bring the Imam definitely into our orbit, and Sir M. Chestham was instructed accordingly.

On the 11th March Sir M. Chestham expressed the opinion that the Imam's financial straits offered a hope that he might be induced to make a reasonable and durable agreement. He recommended the continued occupation by His Majesty's Government of Hodeidah, and perhaps Mocha, coupled with support of the Idrisi at Lobeira.

On the 14th March it was suggested to Sir Milne Chestham that, in view of the disappearance of Turkish rule in South-West Arabia, the general policy of His Majesty's Government towards the Imam and the Idrisi should he reconsidered, and that the system of subsidising small sheikhs should be discontinued.

On the 21st March Sir M. Chestham reported that he had received a letter from the Imam, deprecating the summary dismissal of his envoys, expressing a wish to maintain his old-standing friendship with us, and asking for a recognition of his territorial and financial claims against the Turks.

On the 26th March Sir M. Chestham was instructed to authorize the Resident at Aden to inform the Imam that the question of his representation at the Peace Conference had been finally disposed of and that territorial questions were under
On the 27th March the Foreign Office pointed out to Sir M. Chestham that the suggestions put forward in his telegram of the 11th March amounted practically to a proposal to bring pressure to bear on the imam by blockade measures. The imam might object to the Idrisi occupying Lohiya, and it was thought unwise to take any step which appeared to prejudice the issue between the imam and the Idrisi. The suggestion was made that Colonel Jacob should be sent to ascertain the imam’s views as a preliminary measure.

On the 10th April General Allenby telegraphed that he was in entire agreement with the general policy proposed in regard to the imam and Idrisi. He suggested that a treaty should be formulated with the imam especially excluding boundary questions. A treaty was being drafted and would be telegraphed shortly for approval. General Allenby’s reply was based on the assumption that Great Britain was to be given a mandate for Aden, and that point was referred to Paris.

On the 14th April General Allenby reported that in his opinion His Majesty’s Government should endeavour to avoid permanent occupation of any points outside the lines of the Idrisi Government, with the possible exception of Salif.

He also gave his views as to the boundaries between the imam and the Idrisi.

On the 16th April General Allenby telegraphed the outline of a draft treaty, by which His Majesty’s Government were—

1. To renew the independence of the imam’s domain throughout Yemen without prejudice to present British interests;
2. To deal with him alone within the Yemen, provided his rule is just and palatable to his subjects;
3. To prevent the import of liquor and harmful drugs;
4. To allow the Yemen trade by sea as soon as military exigencies permit;
5. To have all harbour and railway concessions;
6. Not to be liable for continuance of old Turkish stipends nor for settlement of Turkish debts;

while the imam was—

1. To guarantee religious freedom of all his subjects;
2. To correspond with the British Government alone;
3. Not to cede, sell, or mortgage any part of the Yemen to other Powers or people;
4. To forbid all import of arms, applying in case of need to His Majesty’s Government;
5. To have no foreigners in his service without the consent of His Majesty’s Government;
6. To put the question of frontiers in the hands of a Commission, at which all concerned would be represented;
7. Both the imam and His Majesty’s Government to have official agents—the imam at Aden, His Majesty’s Government both at the imam’s Court and at such of his ports as they deemed necessary;
8. To arrange, where circumstances permitted, that goods for the imam’s personal use and for British Government official needs be allowed to pass customs free of duty.

Finally, His Majesty’s Government were to pay the imam a subsidy to enable him to carry out his obligations.

On the 28th April General Allenby proposed that Colonel Jacob should be sent immediately to negotiate with the imam, and on the 29th April he requested that a reply might be expedited, as it was essential that matters should be carried through before the 1st June. He was informed on the 1st May that definite instructions could not be given until a reply was received from Paris.

On the 9th May General Allenby proposed that negotiations should be postponed until the position of His Majesty’s Government as regards Arabia was clearly defined, and on the 7th May a reply was received from Mr. Balfour from which it was clear that His Majesty’s Government were not to demand a mandate for Arabia, but that efforts were to be made with a view to their special position in the peninsula being recognised by the High Contracting Parties.

The Foreign Office accordingly referred General Allenby’s proposal for the postponement of negotiations to Mr. Balfour on the 13th May and proposed to concur.

On the 17th May Mr. Balfour replied that there appeared to be some advantage to be gained by expediting the conclusion of a treaty with the imam, as, if and when
the question of Arabia came to be discussed by the Peace Conference. His Majesty’s Government might be in a stronger position if they had by that time concluded a treaty with that ruler. He was content, however, to leave the date of Colonel Jacob’s mission to Lord Curzon’s and General Allenby’s discretion.

On the 29th May Lord Allenby replied that Colonel Jacob was in any case unlikely to accomplish anything during the month of Ramazan (June), and that Colonel Jacob himself was convinced that it would not be possible to come to any understanding with the Imam until the position of His Majesty’s Government in respect of the Arabian rulers was clearly defined. He made alternative proposals that a committee of delegates from Arab rulers should be formed in Cairo, and that Colonel Jacob should first visit London and Paris. The Foreign Office pointed out in reply that there was no prospect of obtaining an early settlement of the Arabian question in Paris. The object of Colonel Jacob’s mission was not that he should arrive at a definite understanding with the Imam, but only that he should report to him as to the policy of His Majesty’s Government, and inform him that they felt bound to recognize the Idrisi. Action might result in a conflict between the Imam and the Idrisi, which, taken in conjunction with the recent outbreak of hostilities between King Hussein and Ibn Saud, might have serious results.

The formation of the proposed committee was for the time rendered impracticable in view of the strained relations between King Hussein and Ibn Saud, and the despatch of experienced political officers to the Imam and the Idrisi was considered the best policy, provided that it could be safely and expeditiously carried out. Colonel Jacob should accordingly be despatched to the Imam if the latter expressed his readiness to receive him, and Captain Clayton should at the same time be sent to the Idrisi.

On the 9th June General Allenby reported that the two officers were ready to proceed. He pointed out that by their treaty of 1915 with the Idrisi His Majesty’s Government were bound to use every diplomatic means in their power to adjudicate between the Imam and the Idrisi at the conclusion of the war.

On the 22nd June General Allenby suggested that in order to ensure a good reception for Colonel Jacob His Majesty the King should write a letter to the Imam, and that the latter should be informed that this was being done.

On the 7th July the Foreign Office concurred in a proposal made in a despatch of the 18th June from General Allenby that Colonel Jacob should proceed to England and report on the conclusion of his negotiations. They presumed that he clearly understood that no actual treaty was to be signed, and added that he should be particularly careful to make no promise that a subsidy would be paid to the Imam.

On the 17th July a letter was despatched to the Imam by His Majesty the King in which the object of Colonel Jacob’s mission was explained.

The mission left Aden for Hodeidah on the 14th August, and proceeded on the 25th August to Bajil, where the Imam’s escort was to meet them. They were escorted from Hodeidah to Bajil by two sheikhs of the Qubara tribe. On the 3rd August Colonel Jacob reported that he and his mission were practically prisoners at Bajil, having been detained by the Qubara sheikhs. The Imam’s agent and escort were said to be similarly detained.

After protracted negotiations, the mission were finally released on the 13th December and returned to Aden.

H. W. Y.

Figure 1.5.7.4 On Lieutenant Colonel Jacob’s mission to the Imam
1.5.8. Negotiations with the Imam

Despatch from the Political Resident, Aden, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 15 April 1922 (Schofield, 1993: Vol.4. pp. 469-471). Al-Idrisi’s role as proxy was needed. Britain was also aware of Al-Idrisi-Saudi contacts and possibly their agreement of 1920.
PARAPHRASE TELEGRAM from the Resident at Aden to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
(Received Colonial Office 11.30 a.m., 18th April, 1932.)

Negotiations on basis of appendix C of my despatch of 16th July 1931 have been carried on with greatest patience between envoy Imam and First Assistant Resident and it will now be possible for them to submit draft treaty which deals with all points in Appendix C except amount of Imam subsidy, Idrisi position, and the protectorate boundary. Their discussions with view to ascertain how far agreement seems possible so far have been quite informal views of myself and Imam are still reserved but First Assistant has kept closely in touch with me and I have little doubt that envoy has done the same with Imam.

2. Position is as follows. The envoy maintains Imam claims to Idrisi territory as far northern as Oezạn as to whole of Yemen including Aden protectorate on historical grounds. Consideration of two separate questions is involved by these claims one regarding remainder of Yemen which includes all territory of Idrisi, other regarding British protectorate. These questions are separate and not analogous. Envoys endeavours to have them treated as interdependent. Envoys have stated verbally that if Idrisi territories were settled to his satisfaction Imam would not press other claims which means Idrisi to relinquish to Imam all post armistice acquisitions (one corrupt group) Hodeida, Imam’s strong desire to possess Hodeida is economic as it is his natural outlet to sea. He also mentioned recognition by Idrisi of Imam’s religious leadership but knows this would never be accepted.
As regards protectorate and remainder of Yemen; old standing treaties with protectorate tribes are the basis of British rights and responsibilities in Aden protectorate. Before the war the protectorate was recognized internationally and Anglo-Turkish Commission in 1908 defined its boundary. Before and during the war Yemen outside protectorate was Turkish and I understand that its position remains to be defined by international agreement at final conclusion of Turkish Peace Treaty though we have dealt with Idrisi and Imam as independent rulers and technically is still unchanged. Actually Imam occupies major portion of it and remainder has been taken by Idrisi. If we break our treaties with protectorate tribes we should suffer grave loss of prestige even with Imam himself as we should be regarded as having done so under pressure from Imam. Moreover no concession to Imam in protectorate would be regarded by him as compensation for what he really wants and his rule would be most unpopular. I therefore propose to let Envoys understand clearly that original treaties with Arab chiefs will be adhered to and that interference with Protectorate tribes will not be permitted and that protectorate boundary will be maintained as decided with Turks. It is necessary to consider relative positions of him and Imam as this declaration may stop our negotiations unless accompanied by concession regarding Idrisi. Idrisi has never wavered in loyalty and was first Arab chief to throw in his lot with us during the war, and we are bound to him by Treaty. He is a powerful potential factor on Imam flank and his position could be extended with our support in case of emergency south to include Zabid and Mooha. We now hold him back but he would readily take the field against Imam. Offensive and defensive alliance has been concluded by him with Ibn Saud.

Figure 1.5.8.2 Negotiations with the Imam
If opposed to us position on coast makes Idrisi an easy prey to foreign intrigues.

He would bitterly resent losing Hodeidah. During negotiations there have been Zeidi intrigues against us and frontier aggressions which have not been without cognizance of Imam who is unknown to us. I have been told most privately that he approached the Americans for arms quite recently but was refused— if it became necessary to exercise it as regards obtaining of arms and frontier intrigues his isolated position leaves him to a great extent in our power.

4. I consider therefore on moral and political grounds we should do nothing for sake of attempting to win Imam, to alienate Idrisi, and regarding Hodeidah no compromise or concession should be made except in consultation and in agreement with Idrisi. At present I cannot suggest any compromise likely to be acceptable to Idrisi but if and when treaty concluded with Imam I propose offering to invite him and Imam each to send representative to Aden to endeavour to reach a modus vivendi under our auspices— they might be asked— if they fail to reach agreement—to accept the decision of an international or British commission which might be sent to Hodeidah in effect settlement respective claims of European inhabitants and of two rulers being taken into consideration.

5. Meanwhile all reference to Idrisi and Imam boundaries should I propose be omitted from draft Treaty except those between British Protectorate and the latter. I will await your approval to this and to my proposal in paragraph 3.

Envoy wishes to keep Ramazan at his home and subject to Imam’s approval I agree. Unless you approve my stating position regarding protectorate at once on his return early in June I should like to be in position to state policy clearly.

I suggest you should send for Major Barrett C/o H.S. King and Company Pall Mall and show him all papers if you require any explanations. This refers to your telegram of 14th October 1921.
1.5.9. Britain recognised 23 independent states in South Yemen

Memorandum by the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, attached with a note on the ‘Legal Position of Her Majesty’s Government in the Aden Protectorate’. It confirms that the “Western and Eastern Aden Protectorates [were] made up of twenty-three States (eighteen in the West and five in the East), which [were] separate and independent of each other and other Powers” (14 April 1952, CAB 129/92, TNA, London).
On 14th March the Defence Committee (D.56) 4th Meeting, Item 1) considered a proposal by the Chiefs of Staff that inter alia the Commander, British Forces, Arabian Peninsula should be given discretion to retaliate against guns firing against targets in the Aden Protectorate from inhabited villages on the Yemen side of the border, subject to the following limitations:—

(i) no bombing of guns sited in inhabited villages to be carried out; precision air attacks against such guns to be limited to rockets and cannon fire;

(ii) retaliatory action as above to be restricted to field guns and anti-aircraft guns which have opened fire; suspected gun positions not to be attacked.

2. The Defence Committee decided that before any decision was taken on this matter:

(a) our legal and treaty rights in the area in question should be further examined; and

(b) a draft Parliamentary statement should be prepared on lines indicated in the discussion.

3. On 24th March the Colonial Secretary submitted to the Prime Minister a note on Her Majesty’s Government’s legal position in the Aden Protectorate, which had been seen by Foreign Office and Colonial Office lawyers. A copy of this note, minus its appendices, is attached as Annex ‘A’. The Defence Committee considered the matter further on 11th April, and decided to refer it to the Cabinet on 14th April (D.56) 7th Meeting, Item 2).

4. With regard to the Parliamentary statement a draft arranged Parliamentary Question and written Reply was prepared by the Colonial Office and, after it had been agreed with the Governor of Aden and the Commander, British Forces, Arabian Peninsula, was circulated to the Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence and Air Ministry. The Ministry of Defence and the Air Ministry concurred, and a copy of

SECRET

Figure 1.5.9.1 Britain recognises 23 independent states in South Yemen
the draft as agreed with those Departments is attached as Annex 'B'. The comments of the Foreign Office are still awaited, but I understand their views to be that if it is decided that an extension of counter-battery action against Yemeni guns should be authorised and that a public statement on the subject should be made, then this draft statement would be appropriate for the purpose.

5. I consider that extension of counter-battery action against Yemeni guns of the kind proposed should be authorised and that, if it is agreed that publicity for such a decision in the form of a Parliamentary statement is desirable, then the draft statement at Annex 'B' should be made.

I therefore ask the Cabinet:-

(a) to approve the proposal set out in paragraph 1 above, and, if so,

(b) to agree that a written Parliamentary statement should be made as soon as possible in reply to an arranged Question in the terms of Annex 'B'.

P.

Colonial Office, S.W.1.

14th April, 1958

Figure 1.5.9.2 Britain recognises 23 independent states in South Yemen
British Policy in Yemen

ANNEX 'A'

LEGAL POSITION OF HER MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT IN THE ADEN PROTECTORATE

The Western and Eastern Aden Protectorates are made up of twenty-three States (eighteen in the West and five in the East), which are separate and independent of each other and other Powers. The legal and constitutional position of Her Majesty's Government in the Protectorates rests fundamentally on the Protectorate Treaties which were concluded with the ancestors of the present Rulers of each of these States in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The first of these Protectorate Treaties was concluded soon after the occupation of Aden by the British in 1839; the last was with the Audhali Sultan in 1914. Under these Treaties Her Majesty's Government undertakes to give protection to the States and the States undertake not to enter into relations with foreign powers without the knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty's Government.

2. Her Majesty's Government also exercises jurisdiction in the Aden Protectorate by usage and sufferance, and this has been formalised from time to time by the Aden Protectorate Orders in Council, 1937 to 1956, which were made under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1930. The main object of these Orders is to give Her Majesty's Government jurisdiction over non-natives in the Protectorate (e.g. dealings with Petroleum Concessions Limited, who hold an exploration permit in the Protectorate, are regulated under the Order in Council).

3. The majority of the Protectorate States also have Advisory Treaties with Her Majesty's Government, the first of which was concluded with the Quaiti Sultan of Qishn and Socotra in 1954. Under these Advisory Treaties the States undertake to accept the advice of the Governor of Aden on matters connected with their own internal welfare. The authority of Her Majesty's Government over the internal affairs of the States is limited, and the right to advise Rulers is very sparingly used in practice.

Aden/Yemeni Boundary

4. Before the First World War the Yemen was part of the Turkish Empire. In the years 1905 to 1906, an Anglo/Turkish Boundary Commission demarcated the boundary as far as the Wadi Bana. This agreement was ratified by the Anglo/Turkish Convention in 1914, and at the same time the undemarcated boundary beyond the Wadi Bana was defined by a "true north-east line" known as the Violet Line. Under the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 the Turks surrendered all their Arab territory; and the Imam of the Yemen refused to recognise the validity of the Anglo/Turkish Convention although the Independent Yemen, as a successor State to the Turkish Empire, should have been bound by it.

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Figure 1.5.9.3 Britain recognises 23 independent states in South Yemen
5. In 1934 an Anglo/Yemeni Treaty was concluded by which the existing de facto boundary between the Aden Protectorate and the Yemen was to be recognised by both parties until such time as a definitive boundary settlement was made. As compared with the Angin/Turkish boundary, there is in this 1934 boundary a considerable salient across the Violet Line in favour of the Yemen. This salient consists of what is now the Yemeni Province of Beidha, and was ceded to the Yemen at the time of the Treaty because the Emir of Beidha was not in a treaty relation with Her Majesty's Government.

6. Article 3 of the 1934 Treaty states that "the settlement of the question of the southern frontier of the Yemen is deferred pending the conclusion ........... of the negotiations which shall take place between them (the parties) before the expiry of the period of the present Treaty i.e. before 1937."

"Pending the conclusion of the negotiations referred to in the preceding paragraph, the high contracting parties agree to maintain the situation existing in regard to the frontier on the date of the signature of the Treaty, and both high contracting parties undertake that they will prevent, by all means at their disposal, any violation by their forces of the above-mentioned frontier, and any interference by their subjects, or from their side of that frontier, with the affairs of the people inhabiting the other side of the said frontier."

7. Despite the acceptance of the de facto boundary in the 1934 Treaty, quarrels with the Yemen over the boundary persisted. Under the Anglo/Yemeni Agreement of 1951 the Yemen undertook to set up with Her Majesty's Government a Joint Boundary Commission to demarcate in certain disputed areas the position of each party as it had existed in 1934 in the litoral areas. The Yemenis have not fulfilled this undertaking. The 1951 Agreement, despite the vagueness of the wording, may be regarded as recognition that a de facto boundary existed.

8. All the Treaties and Agreements referred to in the preceding seven paragraphs were freely negotiated and are considered valid under international law.
Figure 1.5.9.5 Britain recognises 23 independent states in South Yemen
1.6. Subsidies to Arab Rulers

Ibn Saud and Al-Idrisi were among the Arab leaders who received considerable political, financial and military support from Britain, because of their alliance with London against Turkey during the Great War. Imam Yahya, however, rejected any subsidies. The issue of Subsidies would become a pressing question in London in the 1920s, but the selection of reports and memorandums presented here represents examples of British commitments to Arab rulers. The aim of presenting this selection is to provide an indication of British colonial policy and the situation prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula during the post-Great War. This policy was considered by this thesis to be a factor that affected Imam Yahya’s position substantially, especially when compared to the benefits secured by his enemies. This context will be illustrated further, using relevant evidence, in Chapter 2.

1.6.1. Arabia: Subsides to the Rulers

Subsidies to the rulers, 1915 (L/P&S, 18/B 376, IOR, London).
### Figure 1.6.1.1 Arabia: Subsidies to the Rulers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kingdom</th>
<th>Pre-War</th>
<th>Present Day</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>nil²</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transjordan</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jazan</td>
<td>Rs.1,50,400 per annum, consisting of Rs.86,400 paid since 1861 as settlement of the Sultan's claim in Basra, and Rs.1 lakh in connection with the suppression of the arms traffic, 1812</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hejaz &amp; Nejd</td>
<td>300 dollars per annum since 1928 increase</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najd</td>
<td>300 dollars per annum since about 1870</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aden</td>
<td>Various sums ranging from 30 dollars per pre-war month to about 2,000 a year, paid from 1850 to 1870.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²A forecourt site was leased by Hejaz before the war for Rs.50,000 per annum. This lease was terminated in 1922.

³The Sheikh has enjoyed since 1915 immunity from taxation on his date gardens in Iraq. This is worth about Rs.50,000 per annum. This immunity still continues but it is uncertain whether the Iraqi Government will continue it after the signature of the Treaty. Matter under consideration.
### Pre-war - Present-day

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Pre-war</th>
<th>Present-day</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Jassan Yahiya) (Turkish subject)</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>We propose for payment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Idris Salih)   (Turkish subject)</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>If a treaty which is at present under consideration is concluded with him, he will get one single lump sum of $50,000 as compensation for certain unfavourable territorial adjustments and in consideration of the services he has rendered and we hope will render to us.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(King Hussein)  (Turkish subject)</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>If he signs a treaty satisfactory to us, within the current year he will be given a single final payment of $50,000. It is not proposed to re-vote this sum if it is not paid this year. The King is unlikely to sign the Treaty at all. Various subsidies have been paid during and since the War. In the present year a sum of $50,000 is provided as a final payment in consideration of past services and on the understanding that he makes satisfactory arrangements with his neighbours. $25,000 has actually been paid over.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ismail)</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>Occasional doocours to various sheikhs are made from time to time from Iraq &amp; from Jordan Funds. They are small in amount and are for services rendered; they are of course nothing to do with Imperial Funds which are not affected.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Figure 1.6.1.6.2 Arabia: Subsides to the Rulers**
1.6.2. FO Memorandum on the Subsidies to Kings Hussein and Ibn Saud

FO Memorandum on British Subsidies to Kings Hussein and Ibn Saud; presented to the British Government on 13 July 1920 (CAB 24/109. TNA, London).
CONFIDENTIAL.
C.P.-1653.

[E 8300/9/44]

THESE papers relate to a matter in dispute between the Foreign Office and the Treasury, viz., the temporary continuance of the monthly subsidy at present being paid to the King of the Hejaz. The case of this and other similar subsidies to Arab chiefs is raised in its larger as well as in its narrower aspect in the accompanying Despatch from Lord Allenby, and is explained in the Foreign Office Note.

I must ask the Cabinet for an early decision.

C. of K.

Foreign Office,
July 13, 1920.

Memorandum on the Subsidies to King Hussein and Ibn Saud.

On the 5th May last Lord Allenby was consulted by the Secretary of State as to the desirability of continuing the payment of a subsidy to the King of the Hejaz. Lord Allenby gave it as his opinion that continuance was most important, and recommended that the amount should be 250,000 rupees per mensem. The Secretary of State concurred in this recommendation and approached the Treasury on the 15th May for sanction for payment at this rate to be continued until the independence of the Hejaz had been finally ratified by the Peace Treaty, or until some alternative scheme had been elaborated with the other Powers interested—whatever might be the earlier. The Treasury in their reply of the 18th June intimated that they were unable to sanction these payments until some general policy with regard to subsidies to Arab rulers could be laid down. On the 80th June the Foreign Office replied that, while fully appreciating the desire of the Treasury for a formulation of policy, it would be premature to attempt this at the present juncture. Sanction for this subsidy was again requested and it was intimated that, in the event of the Treasury being unable to concur, the question would be laid before the Cabinet. On the 7th July, the Treasury concurred in the latter course.

The attached despatch from Lord Allenby deals with the whole question of our future Arabian policy, and draws attention to the indirect responsibilities which His Majesty’s Government might be deemed to have incurred in that region. The consideration of the general questions of policy raised by Lord Allenby must await the result of the negotiations now being conducted in Paris on our “special position” in Arabia, as well as a decision on the question of the machinery to be set up in London to give effect to His Majesty’s Government’s policy in the Middle East. But in the meanwhile, the continuance of the Hejaz subsidy is a matter of urgency and the following statement of the facts is submitted to show how considerable are the Imperial interests involved.

The Hejaz is an original member of the League of Nations and thus will be entirely independent under the Turkish Treaty. Its importance is due to the fact that the Moslem Holy Places—Mecca and Medina—lie within it. Each year these towns form the object of a pilgrimage from our Moslem dependencies, and from other Moslem countries outside the British Empire. Last year the number of pilgrims from within the Empire was approximately 100,000, the majority coming from India. The interruption of the pilgrimage would cause the most unfavourable reaction there, and in our other Moslem Dependencies, and incidentally a probable success of pro-Turkish and Pan-Islamic sentiment.

Nejd lies to the East of, and marches with, the Hejaz. Ibn Saud, its ruler, is the most powerful chief of Arabia from the military point of view, and would probably not have great difficulty in over-running the Hejaz, if hostilities between the two countries were to break out. His followers are coming increasingly under the influence of the Wahabi movement, which may be described as a form of extreme Moslem Puritanism. The tenets of Wahabisins induce amongst its adherents a strong

Figure 1.6.2.1 FO Memorandum on the Subsidies to Kings Hussein and Ibn Saud
tendency towards fundamentalism and intolerance, the latter not only directed against other sects of Islam, but also against the foreign Christian and Jewish minorities. A Wahhabi occupation of the Holy Places would probably close them effectively to the Pilgrimage from India, Egypt, and the Straits Settlements.

There is no strong rivalry between King Hussein and Ibn Saud. Among other points of difference, there remain certain frontier disputes of long standing. No actual hostilities of any importance, however, have taken place since early in 1919. An indirect communication was recently sent to the two chiefs, by the Foreign Office and India Office respectively, pressing them to agree to a personal meeting, in the hope that their differences could be thus adjusted. The indirect communication pointed out that in the event of the ruler refusing the invitation to meet his rival, he could not expect a continuance of financial assistance from His Majesty’s Government.

Both Hussein and Ibn Saud agreed to such a meeting, and it is hoped that they will come together at Mecca, during the present pilgrimage season, and that some modus vivendi will then be arrived at on the frontier and other questions at issue, and that the danger of a Wahhabi occupation of the Holy Places will thus be averted. The subsidies to King Hussein and Ibn Saud were originally purely military measures adopted during the war. The payments to the former were made in connection with his successful revolt against the Turks, during which his troops fought with us in Palestine and Syria, and to the latter to assist him in military operations on our behalf during the Mesopotamia campaign.

The subsidy to King Hussein has been continued since the Armistice on a reduced scale, in the interests of the pilgrimage. The Hejaz is an unfertile and rocky strip of land whose intrinsic trends and resources are negligible. Its inhabitants outside the towns consist mainly of desert tribes of Bedouin, who are largely beyond the control of the Hejaz Government. The various routes to the Holy Places, including the Hejaz railway itself, are open to the attacks of these tribes, who, unless overawed or subservient, are always ready to attack and plunder the caravans of the pilgrims and to cut the railway for the same purpose, and thus render the pilgrimage difficult or impossible. The policy of the Turks during their domination of the Hejaz, was a combination of armed force and subsidies, for an indefinite period to the followers of other Moslem sects. A Wahhabi occupation of the Holy Places would probably close them effectively to the Pilgrimage from India, Egypt, and the Straits Settlements.

In view of the Hejaz’s membership in the League of Nations, there are obvious objections to the indefinite continuance of this subsidy, which may eventually be desirable to arrange some form of international loan, to which the various Powers interested in the pilgrimage might subscribe, or to resort to some similar measure. But any action in this sense would be premature, before some effect is clearly seen, and before the question of our special position in Arabia (excluding the Hejaz), which is now being negotiated in Paris, is disposed of.

Apart from this aspect of the subsidy question, however, King Hussein has only with great reluctance agreed to meet Ibn Saud, his assent to the meeting being believed to be to some extent due to his apprehension that the subsidy would forthwith cease in the event of a refusal on his part. If His Majesty’s Government were now abruptly to withdraw their financial support there would be considerable risk of the proposed meeting not taking place, and the chance being lost of a satisfactory settlement of the Hejaz-Nejd question.

The continuance of this subsidy till the peace settlement is effected, at 250,000 rupees per month (the amount recommended by Lord Allenby) is thus clearly necessary if we are to prevent the outbreak of serious trouble in Arabia, which would react on Islam in general.

The payment of a subsidy to the Emir at Nejd has also been continued since the Armistice largely in the interests of the pilgrimage. The Emir is described as being in a permanent state of financial difficulty. His military strength, however, is believed to be adequate to enable him to undertake a successful invasion of the Hejaz on the west or a raid on the south-west portion of Mesopotamia on the east. The opportunities for plunder offered by such expeditions would provide him with an easy and tempting means of replenishing his Treasury. An invasion of the Hejaz by the Wahabis in the early part of the last century resulted in a general massacre of the inhabitants, and such an invasion to-day would in all probability at

Figure 1.6.2.2 FO Memorandum on the Subsidies to Kings Hussein and Ibn Saud
least result in the closing of the pilgrimage. The dangers of a raid into Mesopotamia are obvious. In the event of a preliminary success, Ibn Saud would probably be joined by the local tribes, who would be ready to seize such a favourable opportunity for plunder, and he might also meet with some support from the Extremist Party in Bagdad and elsewhere. At present, however, Ibn Saud’s attitude to His Majesty’s Government is perfectly friendly, and there is no reason to suppose that he now contemplates any aggression against Mesopotamia.

It is hoped to avert the danger of an attack on the Hejaz by the proposed personal meeting between the two rulers. In the meanwhile Ibn Saud is receiving a subsidy of 75,000 rupees per month from Mesopotamian funds. In the event of a satisfactory agreement being reached at his meeting with King Hussein, the question of the reduction of this amount will be open to reconsideration, but till the meeting has taken place any reduction would seem inadvisable.


[Field Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 10.)]

(No. 550.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to submit the following remarks on the question of the grant of subsidies to Arab rulers, with reference to your Lordship’s despatch No. 382 of the 4th May, transmitting the minutes of a meeting held at the Foreign Office on the 17th April, in which I observe that the Treasury are not yet convinced of the necessity for the continuance of the subsidies.

It appears to me that to arrive at a just decision on this subject it is necessary in the first place to compare the position of the different rulers now and before the war, to weigh the services of each during that period, to examine whether any responsibility rests on His Majesty’s Government for the changes which have occurred, and, finally, to consider whether, on grounds of morality or expediency, it is justifiable to impose on the British taxpayer the burden of providing some or all of them with monetary assistance in the future.

The beginning of the war saw an effective, if not entirely efficient, Ottoman administration in the Hejaz and Yemen: Ibn Rashid a mediatised Turkish vassal; the Idristi in revolt against the ruling power, but already discussing terms of peace; and Ibn Saud, who had not long before ejected the Turks from Hasa and Qatif, showing a disposition to resume his allegiance, provided that he was allowed a free hand as Vais of Nejd, and given an adequate stipend. It will be seen that the feeling of racial consciousness, which is now so marked, was already showing itself even in the more remote parts of the Peninsula, but a study of the records of the time will also show that the Ottoman Government, however unwillingly, was beginning to realise its incapacity to retain by force the Arab countries, and was preparing to grant a measure of self-government which might satisfy the aspirations of its inhabitants.

The consideration of the subject was, however, abruptly broken off by the commencement of the war, and after the Ottoman Government had declared against the Allied Powers, Great Britain, taking advantage of the discontent which already existed, made promise to the Sherif of Mecca, Ibn Saud and the Idristi, which induced them definitely to cast off their allegiance and throw in their lot with the Allies. I do not propose to examine and compare in detail the services performed by these three rulers, but I think it may fairly be said that each, according to his capacity, rendered real and effective assistance at a time when the result of the war still hung in the balance and, by so doing, brought to nought the plans for a Jihad, diverted or rendered innocuous large Turkish forces, and greatly facilitated our task in keeping open to traffic the Red Sea.

It may be said with some show of justice that they have had their reward in gaining their independence and freeing themselves from the Turkish yoke, but the fact must not be lost sight of that, with the removal of the dominant influence, the Arabian Peninsula was left without administrative and financial means or experience for the preservation of order and for the substitution of effective local government in place of what had existed previously.

This applies in particular to the Hejaz, and I cannot refrain from thinking that the promises made by His Majesty’s Government impose a certain moral obligation to ensure that the future of these countries is at least as prosperous as their past.
I do not, however, wish to press unduly this point, since sentimental considerations must give way to those of economy at the present time, and I will pass on to the more practical aspects of the case.

As your Lordship is aware, the Arab revolt was not regarded with sympathy either in India or in our other Mahomedan countries. This feeling still exists to-day. The revolt can only be justified by its success, and we shall undoubtedly lay ourselves open to severe criticism if the Peninsula passes into a state of anarchy.

Further than this, the Allied policy with regard to Syria and Palestine is not in accord with the wishes of the local populations, and has already exposed His Majesty's Government to a charge of breach of promise and opened the field to Turkish and Bolshevik propaganda from the north.

The situation in the Middle East to-day gives rise to grave misgivings, and seems unlikely to improve in the near future. On this account I consider it is of great importance that, if we gain a special position in the Arabian Peninsula, His Majesty's Government should so employ it as to earn the gratitude of the people and silence the criticism of those detractors, who accuse us of cynicism and self-interest in our treatment of the Arabs.

At the present moment we are in a favourable position to achieve this, since the factors which have rendered so restless the Arabs in Syria and Mesopotamia have not operated with any great force in the Peninsula itself, and its rulers, with the exception of the Imam Yahya and the new Emir of Hall, who has in point of fact come under the influence of Ibn Saud, have given satisfactory proofs that they are prepared to look to us for help and guidance and protection.

The question then arises whether we can gain our object without payment, and, if not, whether the results achieved will justify the expenditure.

As regards the former point I consider that the experience of the last four years shows the answer to be emphatically in the negative. I do not advocate any undue interference in the internal and local affairs of the Peninsula, but I presume that we shall attempt to adjust the relations between the different rulers and claim to influence all foreign relations, and it is only reasonable to suppose that the rulers will require some form of guarantee. Furthermore, moral influence has its effect in the East, but it will not always prove such a strong deterrent as the threat to cut off supplies, more especially in countries which are far removed from the intercourse of civilisation and where it is impossible to achieve a purpose by armed force.

I do not think it is too much to say that if we attempt to gain a predominant influence in Arabia without being prepared to pay for it our efforts will result in failure.

As regards the advantages to be gained, I place, first and foremost, the chance of recovering and maintaining our prestige in the Middle East.

We have destroyed the Power which, however badly, ruled Arabia. We must put something in its place, and, in so doing, endeavour to re-establish the good name for disinterestedness and sympathy with Moslem races that we are, and shall continue to be, summer and winter. It is, therefore, the more necessary to seize our opportunity in the Peninsula where the conditions are favourable and where we shall not be exposed to foreign rivalry once our special position is recognised.

Secondly, there is considerable evidence to show that a determined effort is being made to undermine Islam against all European Powers. A friendly Arabia will be an important check to this.

Thirdly, it is necessary to have a friendly population in the countries bordering our vital sea routes.

Equal to these in importance is the necessity of keeping open the pilgrim routes to the Holy Places and of ensuring that the pilgrimage itself is undisturbed.

We are under judgment of the Moslems in all parts of the world in this matter, and failure will do us incalculable harm.

Finally, I would place the advantages to British trade which the opening up of the interior of the Peninsula will afford, and sixly, the desirability of preventing other Powers from gaining a predominant position, more especially in South-west Arabia.

I trust that the above considerations will be sufficient to show that the advantages to be won are not small, and that, in the event of His Majesty's Government being granted a special position there, the necessity of affording monetary assistance, until such time as the different countries can make their own way, will be recognised.

I understand that it may be difficult for His Majesty's Government to provide the money, and that joint subsidies or loans may be necessary. This would be unfortunate from a British point of view, but it would not alter the principle which

Figure 1.6.2.4 FO Memorandum on the Subsidies to Kings Hussein and Ibn Saud
I am endeavouring to lay down. It would merely mean that the responsibility, and therefore the credit, to be gained would be collective. I am unaware of the reason which call for a joint loan, and should have thought that the subsidies granted to the rulers of Bahrain, Muscat, and Kuwait by the Government of India before the war would have furnished a useful precedent in claiming the sole right to give monetary assistance now.

I do not advocate the permanent continuance of subsidies on the present scale, and I would gradually replace them with stipends and loans.

All the rulers, with perhaps the exception of Ibn Rashid, possess sea ports or tracts of land or other resources which are capable of development, and I consider that loans should be granted where there seems a good prospect of a productive return and where security can be offered.

Stipends should, I think, be granted to King Hussein, Ibn Saud and the Idrissi. The case of Ibn Rashid is of relative unimportance, while that of the Imam Fu‘aha is still so obscure that it is idle to consider it now. Eventually we shall probably find it cheaper to pay than to fight.

I also consider that certain conditions should be attached, such as the maintenance of internal peace, acceptance of our control of foreign relations, and the keeping open of the trade and pilgrimage routes. These would doubtless be embodied in the form of a treaty with each ruler.

With regard to Mr. Phillip’s suggestion that it might be more satisfactory to “back one ruler only,” I would observe that it has already become evident that the ideal of subsidising the various chiefs through one channel is an impossible one. There is no ruler who would be accepted by the remainder as paramount, and there is none who could be trusted to make the right distribution of the funds. King Hussein, whom, no doubt, Mr. Phillips had in mind, has indeed proved the least likely to be accepted as suzerain and to endeavour to bolster him up as Grand King of Arabia, by paying other subsidies through him, would be a politically unsound, if not an actually dangerous, policy to adopt.

The question as to the amounts of the stipends and loans is one which requires further consideration, and in this despatch I have not attempted to do more than lay before your Lordship the broad considerations which, in my opinion, justify the adoption of the principle that their payment in the future is an investment which is necessary, and which will bring in its due return.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Resident, Aden, the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, and to the Foreign Department, Delhi.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY, F.M.
1.6.3. **Arabia: Questions of Future Policy**

Arabia, Questions of Future Policy, Subsidies to the Chiefs: ‘Notes by Political Department, India Office, 29 October 1920 (L/P&S, 18/ B 353, IOR, London).
Recent telegrams from Sir P. Cox on the subject of Ibn Sa’ud scarcely admit of answer without reference to the general policy of His Majesty’s Government with regard to the bigger chiefs of the Arabian peninsula. It would be inadvisable, for example, and is probably impracticable, to decide whether Ibn Sa’ud should receive an annual subsidy, and what the amount should be, without a simultaneous consideration of the cases of other big chiefs, even though it were to be generally admitted that his friendship is of the value to us represented by Sir P. Cox in his telegrams or by Major Dickson in his note on the political situation in Najd. It may be assumed that His Majesty’s Government are not prepared to support or interest themselves in one or only of these chiefs. On that assumption, a subsidy to Ibn Sa’ud would seem to involve subsidies to other chiefs also. Supposing this were so, His Majesty’s Government would then find it necessary to discover some measure of value to guide the distribution of their grants-in-aid.

Various circumstances would then determine our policy. The chief considerations would be perhaps previous commitments on the one hand and present value on the other. These two considerations might be, so far as concerns particular individuals, contradictory as in the case of Hussein, or not contradictory as in the case of Ibn Sa’ud. But Arab politics change so rapidly that there is no certainty that contradictions may not arise and disappear in a month or two. There is one chief in the peninsula who has hitherto embarrassed us very little by his friendship, and this element has been, and may still be, the most powerful of all—that is, Ibn Rashid. One cannot afford to ignore Ibn Rashid’s great name—probably the biggest in the peninsula—and his striking successes on important occasions in the field against Ibn Sa’ud. Hussein is almost without importance in comparison, and it must be remembered that any success which Hussein might win through alliance with Ibn Rashid would redound to Ibn Rashid’s, not to Hussein’s, profit. Is it to be envisaged that we may one day have to buy Ibn Rashid’s friendship? He is the neighbour of the Emirate tribes and the Dibatr, and the friend of Shaikh Salim of Kuwait. From the point of view, therefore, of our commitments in Mesopotamia, it might seem more profitable to buy his friendship in preference to that of Ibn Sa’ud. Since, however, as an enemy with a subsidy from the Turks he never harmed us, the question of a subsidy for him in a possible future chain of circumstances cannot be considered pressing. But he is between Mesopotamia and Ibn Sa’ud. From the point of view of Mesopotamia, then, could there be any justification for a subsidy to Ibn Sa’ud?

But there are other ways in which Ibn Sa’ud’s friendship is of importance. There is, Eastward, the Arabian littoral of the Persian Gulf. The Government of India, in their wire to Sir P. Cox the danger of making too much of Saiyid Talib, emphasized this point. And there is, Westward, his power for harm in the Hedjaz at Mecca and Jeddah, because it is quite clear that if he wished he could capture Taif and Mecca, and probably Jeddah. His friendship with the Idrisids makes this the easier.

But what of Hussein and our commitments to him and the Hedjaz, and his services, or services in his name, to the Allies during the war, and the necessity of keeping Mecca intact in the eyes of the Muslim world? It could scarcely be regarded as a satisfactory method of guarding Mecca to pay Ibn Sa’ud not to take it. It is not, of course, certain that the Ikhwan seriously have designs on Mecca. If not, it was, it would probably be to our interests to break rather than make Ibn Sa’ud, and Major Dickson asserts that a stoppage of his subsidy would break him. In any case one would have thought that the mere suggestion on his part that if we fail to comply with his wishes he may not be able to control his men should be met with a rebuke. Actually Ibn Sa’ud and the Ikhwan can take Mecca but probably dare not because they know that such an act would involve them in a struggle with combined powerful forces further north which they could not hope to resist. From this point of view, then, it is doubtful how far a subsidy is necessary at all.
The fact probably is that the doling out of subsidies, unless we are prepared to give every big chief a subsidy, upsets the natural equilibrium of Arabian politics. The fact remains also that in regard to Ibn Sa‘ud we are subsidizing a heresy, whose control and cohesion depend solely on the fine personality of ‘Abdul ‘Aziz. It might be wiser to view the situation from the point of view of his followers rather than that of the particular individual Ibn Sa‘ud.

On the other side, we have to recognize that in Hussein we have, whether we could help it or not, backed a poor horse. Away from war conditions and the inspiration of British officers of pan-Arab sentiments, he is nothing but a “panpered and querulous urchin.” Yet his sphere is of the highest importance, and it is difficult to see what an infidel Government can put in his place as guardian of the sacred shrines. Yet some policy will have to be evolved for their guardianship, which will at the same time save our prestige in the eyes of the Muhammadan world and ensure the protection of our interests for the future. Here again Arabian politics have lost their equilibrium. In the old days the forces of the Ottoman Empire were at the disposal of Mecca if it were threatened from outside. What have we to put in their place, seeing that we are precluded from direct intervention?

As regards the subsidy problem for the Hedjaz, there would be the best of reasons for a subsidy to a good Sharif from the greatest of all Muhammadan Powers, if the epithet may be used of the Power which has the largest proportion of Muhammadans under its protection.

Then there is Faisal, who presumably will have to be fitted in somehow. He might conceivably take his father’s place, and it would appear reasonable to ask both Hussein and Faisal to interest themselves in their own country in preference to meddling in the affairs of countries with which they have primd facie no concern. The question of previous commitments, however, adds an irritating complication to their case, and it would be well for His Majesty’s Government to make up their minds what exactly these commitments amount to, and how far they are now prepared to carry them into effect in the face of French action in Syria, French suspicions of Faisal, and hostile intrigues on the part of Hussein and Faisal, and with the rebels in Mesopotamia. The annoying feature of the Hedjaz situation is, thus, that there is a strong case for a subsidy to the interests of Mecca and Medina and the pilgrim routes, but there is no one to whom we can assign a subsidy with sufficient assurance that it will not be used against us, and that it will not be interpreted by the Moslems of India as dangerous and unwarranted interference in Muhammadan affairs.

Then there are the cases of the Idriis and Hussein on the one side and the Idriis and the Imam on the other to crown the general complexity of affairs. As regards the Idriis, he has recently expressed his expectation that His Majesty’s Government will settle the Quinfidah question; and in view of the past history of the case it may be difficult for us to decline. All these considerations make it difficult to devise a suitable policy. We are committed too far to leave the situation to find its own equilibrium. The only alternative would seem to be to assemble all the big chiefs together, not excluding Ibn Rashid if he would consent to come, and ask them to form some kind of confederation by agreement among themselves, and devise the strongest safeguard for Mecca, in which they are all interested. The occasion might then be taken of lecturing them all on chivalry and other intrigues, whose objects are undoubtedly not to the interests of Arabia as a whole. If efforts in this direction met with success, then all or none would receive subsidies as His Majesty’s Government might find it desirable or practicable.

19th October 1920.

R. MARRS.

The general proposition that the less we meddle in Central Arabian affairs the better, will scarcely be disputed. We have no interests in the interior, and no means of effective intervention. The growth of rival federations, such as Major Dickson describes, or indecisive hostilities, such as have recently been reported from Koweit, need not trouble us in the least. We cannot prevent these people from fighting; and so long as one side does not gain too pronounced an advantage (and this seldom happens), we have no special object in preventing them.

Figure 1.6.3.2 Arabia: Questions of Future Policy
If we were merely to consult our own immediate interest and convenience, we should stop all subsidies without more ado and leave the various chiefs to fight it out with one another. Probably nothing in particular would happen. But there is always the risk of the Wahabis occupying Mecca, with results that would be extremely embarrassing to us. Can we afford to run that risk? If not, we cannot stand altogether aside and leave events to take their course. We must make some attempt to promote a settlement between the contending parties.

On the whole, the proposed conference offers the best means of achieving this object. It seems essential that Ibn Rashid should be among those invited to attend. As to the rest, the Department has always been against bringing the chiefs to London, where they will be exposed to all kinds of undesirable influences, and where their entertainment, maintenance, &c., will present peculiar difficulties. Aden seems preferable on every ground. Bombay would, presumably, be wholly unacceptable to King Hussein. As regards the nature of the settlement to be effected, it may be thought premature to discuss details; but considering the extent to which the chiefs are influenced by personal jealousy of one another, it ought not to be impossible to settle with them on a basis of no subsidies to any of them.

29th October 1920.

J. E. S.
1.6.4. Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis on Future Policy

‘Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis on the Future Policy of His Majesty’s with Regards to Subsidies to Chiefs of the Arabian Peninsula’, 16 December 1920, FO 371/6238, TNA, London.
Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis on the Future Policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to Subsidies to Chiefs of the Arabian Peninsula

AT a meeting of the Inter-Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs held at the Foreign Office on the 7th December, 1920, it was decided that a memorandum should be prepared in the Foreign Office giving a reasoned statement of policy for the future as regards subsidies, on the basis of:

(a.) Participation in equal shares by His Majesty's Government and the Government of India.
(b.) Adherence to treaty obligations.
(c.) Provisional yearly total of 160,000 rupees, to be distributed by agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Government of India.
(d.) Participation by other Powers interested in the pilgrimage in financial support to the Hedjaz.

This statement of policy to be submitted in the first place to the India Office for concurrence, and subsequently in its final form to the Government of India and the representatives of His Majesty's Government concerned for their views. On receipt of these views, the Treasury to be approached for their final sanction to the total agreed upon between the India Office and the department of His Majesty's Government responsible for Arabian policy.

2. The question of future policy is discussed in paragraphs 3 to 17. The advisability of making certain temporary arrangements during the current financial year is dealt with in paragraph 18.

3. It will be convenient to consider the policy which His Majesty's Government should adopt for the future under the following heads:

(a.) The present position of Arab chiefs in the matter of subsidies.
(b.) The obligations to which His Majesty's Government are already committed either by treaty, custom or policy.
(c.) After deducting the amount which these obligations represent, the manner in which the balance of the provisional sum of 160,000 rupees can best be divided amongst the remaining chiefs, taking into consideration their relative importance, their past and present services, and their capacity to injure or benefit British interests in the future.

4.—(a.) The present position of Arab chiefs in the matter of subsidies.
This is as follows:

(i.) The Sultan of Muscat receives annually 156,400 rupees.
(ii.) The Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla receives annually 720 rupees.
(iii.) Fahad Beg of the Anazeh receives annually 204,000 rupees.
(iv.) The Aden protectorate chiefs receive annually 70,000 rupees.
(v.) Ibn Saud receives annually 60,000 rupees.
(vi.) King Hussein receives no subsidy.
(vii.) The Idrisi receives no subsidy.
(viii.) Ibn Rashid receives no subsidy.
(ix.) Imam Yahya receives no subsidy.
(x.) The Sheikh of Kuwait receives no subsidy.
(xi.) The Sheikh of Bahrein receives no subsidy.
(xii.) The Trucial chiefs receive no subsidy.

5.—(b.) The obligations to which His Majesty's Government are already committed by treaty, custom or policy.

(i.) Muscat.—The subsidy paid to the Sultan is made up of the sum of 86,400 rupees, which was first paid by the Government of India in 1872 as representing the amount of the tribute formerly paid by the Sultan of Zanzibar under an

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Figure 1.6.4.1 Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis on Future Policy
Figure 1.6.4.2 Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis on Future Policy

arbitration award delivered by Lord Canning, Viceroy of India in 1861, and a further sum of 100,000 rupees approved in 1911 in connection with the agreement for the regulation of the arms traffic. The modification of the former sum is scarcely possible under any circumstances, but the reduction of the latter might be considered by the India Office and the Government of India from the point of view of the desirability of reducing this subsidy to its true proportion in comparison with the subsidies which will be granted to more powerful chiefs.

(ii.) Shahr and Mokaita.—The nominal stipend of 2,000 rupees per annum is paid to the Sultan in accordance with the terms of his treaty in 1882. It is not considered necessary to increase this amount since the Sultan was granted a loan of 400,000 rupees in 1847.

(iii.) Ahasab.—Ibn Hadidhal is paid 17,000 rupees per mensem from Mesopotamian revenues in return for certain specified services, and his case is therefore outside the scope of the present memorandum except in so far as his subsidy is likely to be taken as a standard by other chiefs and compared to the detriment of the amounts which will be offered to them.

(iv.) Asan.—The stipends, amounting to 70,000 rupees per annum, are paid to the chiefs of the protectorate chiefly by virtue of treaty rights, and cannot therefore be reduced or cancelled so long as His Majesty’s Government maintain a hold over the protectorate. It is not, however, suggested that they should be increased.

(v.) Nejd.—The subsidy to Ibn Saud has been paid as a matter of policy and not in fulfillment of a treaty obligation. The question of its reduction is discussed later.

It will be seen that, setting aside the subsidies to Ibn Saud and Fahad Beg, British obligations at present amount to 257,120 rupees per annum, and that the subsidy paid to the Sultan of Muscat is the only one which is susceptible of modification.

6. (c.) The manner in which the balance of the provisional sum of 100,000 rupees can best be divided.

His Majesty’s Government are now faced with the double task of substantially reducing their financial commitments in Arabia, and at the same time of securing the special position for which the good-will of the chiefs is necessary as is the consent of the Principal Allied Powers. This task will be rendered more difficult by the policy which has been pursued in the past. The exaggerated scale on which subsidies have up to now been calculated has, indeed, given rise to a justifiable idea of their own value that the greatest care and tact will have to be exercised in making them realize that the reduced rate at which it is proposed to subsidize them in future carries with it no disparagement and that it is due, not to a diminution in confidence or friendship, but to the inevitable transition from war conditions to those of peace.

Ibn Saud, in particular, may prove difficult to deal with since he has been pressing for an increase for many months and, in the opinion of Sir Percy Cox, who has recommended that his subsidy should be increased to 100,000 rupees per annum, is in serious monetary difficulties. In this connection, it will be remembered that fears of a similar nature were entertained last year when the question of reducing the subsidy to King Hussein was discussed. These forebodings, however, did not prove true, since the King’s subsidy was not only reduced from 100,000 rupees to 25,000 in three months, but was altogether discontinued from the end of February last without causing more than a slight aggravation of his fancied grievances. This precedent must not be without value in forecasting the attitude of Ibn Saud, the drastic reduction of whose subsidy is a necessary preliminary to the introduction of the new policy, for the reason that it approximates to the total which is available for division amongst all the chiefs.

7. In his and other cases, it is submitted that the best way of disarming criticism is by making a frank explanation of the situation, coupled with assurances of continued friendship and an indication of the many benefits which any small State must receive by the mere fact of being in treaty relations with and enjoying the protection and support of His Majesty’s Government. This may not be appreciated at its full worth in the first instance, but practical evidence can be given in the future by a readiness to assist in other ways. These would, from a financial point of view, consist chiefly in fostering trade, in developing the prosperity of Arabian ports by such steps as inducing steamship companies to call and in taking other measures which might lead to an increase in revenue without burdening the British taxpayer.

8. A factor of more immediate importance, and one on which the success of the
new proposals will largely depend, is the necessity of dividing the money available in such a manner as to eliminate all cause of jealousy between the different chiefs, then justly and with a due regard to the positions which they hold.

A careful appraisement of their respective merits is accordingly necessary, and it will be convenient to consider in the first place the cases of the three small States who dominate the greater part of Arabia.

Kuwait. — The Sheikh of Kuwait is not in receipt of a subsidy, but he has a stretch of foreshore (Bundar Siwailik) which is leased by His Majesty’s Government for an extent of 60,000 rupees per annum. The civil commissioner at Bagdad has recommended that the lease should be terminated and that, in compensation, a sum admitted as a subsidy and subject to his good behaviour. The exemption from payment of taxes on the date gardens in Basra is presumably a matter which only concerns the Mesopotamian Government. The payment of a subsidy in compensation for the lease of the stretch of foreshore is still under the consideration of the India Office and the Indian Government, but the possibility of its becoming a charge against the provisional sum of 100,000 must be taken into account.

10. Bahrain and the Trucial Coast. — The advisability of granting subsidies to the Sheikhs of Bahrain and the Trucial Chiefs appears open to argument, since for many years satisfactory relations have been maintained with them without resort to such a course, and, so far as is known, there have been no pressing demands from the sheikhs themselves.

This is a matter on which the India Office and the Government of India must advise, but if it is decided that the exclusion of Bahrain and the Trucial Coast from the benefits which are being accorded to other chiefs is inadvisable, it is suggested that their respective subsidies should not exceed that granted to the Sheikh of Kuwait.

It may be remarked that the question of subsidising the Persian Gulf Chiefs is of relative unimportance, since they owe most of their prosperity to the support of His Majesty’s Government, and must realise that their geographical position renders their retention of that support vital. It is extremely unlikely, however, that they will ever cause any serious trouble, and His Majesty’s Government can therefore afford to disregard any personal feelings which they may have in this matter and decide each case purely on its merits.

11. The Hedjaz and Nejd. — The general peace of Arabia to-day centres sound the actions of King Hussein and Ibn Saud. For although the other great Chiefs may make war on their immediate neighbours, there can be no widespread confusion in which King Hussein and Ibn Saud do not take part. During the last three years war between the two has been confined to many occasions, and the danger is perhaps as great to-day, but always some factor has arisen to avert it and to confirm the impression that neither desires to put the issue to the test.

It is not easy to appraise the fighting strength of two Chiefs whose countries are so inaccessible, and if available evidence turns the scale in favour of Ibn Saud it must not be forgotten that he has formidable enemies in the Sheiklfs of Kuwait and the Shammar, and that he would lose his flank exposed if he attacked the Hedjaz.

From the point of view of His Majesty’s Government, Ibn Saud is a man to placate on account of the menace which he might become to Mesopotamia, the Persian Gulf, and the Holy Places of the Hedjaz, and to reward in return for the friendship which he has shown. During the war his services were more of a negative character, but since then he has undoubtedly rendered great assistance by his control of his army and fanatical tribesmen. He has proved himself possessed of statesmanlike qualities, in marked contrast to those of his rival, King Hussein, and his continued friendship and dependence on the advice of His Majesty’s Government will prove to be of the greatest value in the future.

It is generally recognised that the Hedjaz movement represents a danger which, if allowed to continue unchecked, might overwhelm the Hedjaz and spread rapidly northward to Syria and Mesopotamia, and there is little doubt that the restraining influence of Ibn Saud has been chiefly instrumental in keeping it within bounds hitherto.

The claims of King Hussein to the favour of His Majesty’s Government rest rather on his past than his present services. It is a matter of history that King

Figure 1.6.4.3 Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis on Future Policy
Figure 1.6.4 Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis on Future Policy
that the latter are determined to maintain their independence, and that there is still a possibility of their regaining the dominant position which they held during last century.

However, this may be, it can be said that at present Ibn Rashid is of importance to His Majesty’s Government as the ruler of a country through which many thousands pass annually on their way to and from the pilgrimage, as a check on the spread of the Ikhwān to the north, and as a possible raider against Mesopotamia. His friendship is, therefore, a matter of some importance. He has made several tentative advances to Sir Percy Cox, who suggested that a meeting should take place at Nahr-yah this winter, but his attitude since that proposal was made has not been so satisfactory, and Sir Percy Cox has decided to take no further action at present.

The Imam Yahya has proved more hostile than Ibn Rashid since the armistice. He has laid claim to the whole of the Aden Protectorate, and has maintained his officials at Duula and other places in the north since the spring of this year. Negotiations have proved of no avail, chiefly owing to the fact that he refuses to recognise His Majesty’s Government as having any right to discuss the affairs of the Yemen. It is known that he has approached other foreign Governments, and until the special position of His Majesty’s Government has been recognised by the Principal Allied Powers it will probably be found impossible to come to terms with him.

The military strength which he could bring to bear at any time against the Aden Protectorate is apt to be exaggerated. It is true that Ahmed Feski Pasha required 50,000 men in 1904 to reconquer Sanaa, but he had to contend with a unitedly hostile people. Since then, large tribes, such as the Hashid and Bekil, have proved disloyal, and an invasion of the protectorate on a large scale is unlikely so long as the Idrisi remains hostile to him. The Imam can, however, collect sufficient forces to cause His Majesty’s Government considerable embarrassment and to overcome the local tribes, and it will probably be found cheaper in the end to pay him a subsidy than to eject him by force.

Neither in his case nor in that of Ibn Rashid is there any question of immediate payment, but since there is a possibility of some arrangement being made with both of them during the financial year 1921–22, it will be advisable to make some provision in the division of the allotted sum.

It is recommended that the unsatisfactory attitude of these chiefs should be taken into account, and that their shares should each be represented by the symbol 1.

14. The proportions according to which (after the subsides to Muscat, Shékh and Mokalla, the Aden chiefs and, if approved, Kuwait, Bahrain and the trucial chiefs, have been deducted) it is recommended that the balance of the provisional sum of 100,000l. should be divided between King Husain, Ibn Saud, the Idris, the Imam Yahya and Ibn Rashid are, respectively, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1.

No attempt has been made to indicate the value of these shares in terms of money, since the rate at which it will be decided to calculate the rupee is unknown.

15. In view of the fact that it will be convenient in future to pay all subsides in rupees, and of the further fact that the payment of regular and unvarying sums to the chiefs is most desirable politically, it is recommended that the provisional sum of 100,000l. should be converted into rupees, with due consideration of the present and possible future rates of exchange, and that the sum in rupees which is finally settled should be considered as representing the amount permanently available for subsides. Chiefs in Arabia are not versed in the intricacies of questions of exchange, and they would undoubtedly misunderstand the reasons for a sudden reduction in their subsides which might be necessitated by a change in the rates of exchange. The grant of fixed subsides which will not be affected by any fluctuations in the value of the rupee is a matter which will materially influence the success of the proposed new policy.

16. The question of the subsides to which the shares of His Majesty’s Government and the Government of India should be respectively allocated is one on which it is difficult to express an opinion before receiving an indication of the views of the India Office and the Government of India. The tentative suggestion is, however, made that the Government of India should supply all the rupees required, and that their moiety should include the amounts paid to the Sultans of Muscat and Mokalla, the Aden chief, the Sheikhs of Kuwait and Bahrain, and the trucial chiefs, if approved, and half the amounts paid to Ibn Saud and King Hussein, on the ground that these are the chiefs with whom they are most intimately concerned.

17. The further recommendation is made that any balance of the total sum for
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...
(g.) The subsidies to which the Government of India should contribute and the proposal that they should provide the rupees required (paragraph 16).
(h.) The payment of unexpended balances as presents to chiefs under certain conditions (paragraph 17).
(i.) The progressive reduction of the subsidy of Ibn Sand (paragraph 18).

December 16, 1920. K. C.

Figure 1.6.4.1.6.7 Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis on Future Policy
2.1. Proposal for the division of the *Vilayet* of Yemen into four districts (1899)

This is one of the early Ottoman proposals in response to difficulties arising in Yemen ‘the Yemeni Question’ (*willayahs*), 28 August 1899.
Figure 2.1.1 Proposal for the division of the Vilayet of Yemen into four districts (1899)
2.2. Request to attach qadha Ghāmed, the sonjok of Asir (1889)

This was a request from the Wali of Yemen, sent on 3 September 1889, for qadha Ghāmed, the sonjok of Asir, to be attached to the village of Ṣeaia'er (Yemen During the Ottoman Times, 2008).
Request to attach qadha Ghāmed, the sonjok of Asir (1889)

GAMED KAZASI MERKEZİNİN SAYĞAR KÖYÜNE TAŞINMASI
Asir Sancağı'na bağlı Gamed Kazası merkezinin Sayğar köyüne alınması

Beyliği Divanı Hümayûn Câmilî Vâlîsî'na
Asir Sancağı'na tabi Gamed Kazası'na bağlı ve hilâli Suyer kayyesinin merkez ilîhâzi hususuna Yemen Vilâyeti'nden vuku bulan işâr ve Şûrûyi Devletçe verilen karar üzerine taraflı să-nî Hâsan-Name-i-İshâzî'ni de'li'ne iştirak etmek için bir hafta içinde dâr elâhâzî ile getirilmesi teşvik edilmiştir. Beyliği Divanı Hümayûn Câmilî'ye davilla-i dâr elâhâzî ile arz ettirilmesi ile ilgili bir mektûzâzî kımmında işbu müzezeyle ilîhâzî ilâhâzî olunur.

Fi 7 Muharrem sene [1307] ve fi 22 Augustos sene [1305] / [3 Eylül 1889]
Müsteşarı Nezârethi Dâhilîye
Riskan

Figure 2.2.1 Request to attach qadha Ghāmed, the sonjok of Asir (1889)
2.3. Kaymakam (*Qaim Maqam*) Rehmi’s proposed list to effect reform

(Farah, 2002: pp. 292-293)

Proposed Plans for Reform

I. Kaymakam Rehmi’s proposed list to effect reform:

- promote industry and commerce and prevent manipulation by foreigners;
- organize smaller *kazas* into *sancaks* and have a full map of the land better to pinpoint obligations of tribes for taxation purposes and where to dispatch troops precisely if necessary;
- reorganize *nahtyes* — most of which are too broad and in rebellion — to effect more efficient administrative measures and police adequately;
- place temporarily army officials in charge of the strategic and critical *kazas* until new organizational measures are put in place;
- rotate the police force every six months and limit vigil to two-hour shifts;
- natives are armed today with more modern weapons, more are killed in feuds; need to take away their arms;
- standardize taxes so extortion can be avoided, hence need to determine taxable items accurately, such as buildings and cattle, and adjust fees accurately to ensure quick and easy collection when levies are made; adjustments can be made on three- to five-year basis and pro rated;
- census is needed for army recruitment purposes; not a popular measure, hence need to have the *shaykh* of each area conduct house by house survey every year and record births and deaths; same procedure should apply to tribes;
- three million or so inhabitants in Yemen, with arms in hand can generate much unrest; disarming them is not easy task; need capable *kaymakams* assigned to Yemen and transferred every three years;
because of the number of sancaks, if proposals for modification are made and acceptable, then mutasarrufs of these should, like the kaymakams, be men of integrity;

- the Ministry of Education had resolved a few years ago to open a number of primary schools; these should not only be for children of notables and officials but also for those of poor tribesmen;
- new reorganization measures will increase expenditure; to limit these, it is suggested that army officers specializing in medical and engineering tasks be assigned to take care of such needs since the income of the vilayet is limited;
- appoint first-rate men from the inhabitants to municipality councils; none at present measure up to the standard; secretaries and directors of correspondence at every administrative level should be equally qualified, and close watch be kept over them; the poor pay up to 1000 piastres in fees to have their case heard in court; it should be free for them;
- justice, criminal and civil courts had failed and were abolished. Sharīʿah courts should be given precise instructions by the Mufīi to gain confidence of inhabitants, and process of appeal defined in order to prevent the loss of the plaintiff’s case by default; and
- people of Yemen are notorious for their ‘rascality’; one can not even detail the variety of feuds, rivalries, vengeance killings, aggression on each other’s properties, and feuds between towns and tribes. All are subject to arbitrary and tyrannical decisions and reconciliation. The state needs to end this by defining precisely rules of settlement and punishment.
2.4. **Recommendations of the commission of inquiry, 7 April 1907**

This was a commission of inquiry headed by Ferik Ferid Pāshā (7 April 1907). Its main proposal was to divide the *Vilayet* of Yemen into three new administrative districts (*willayahs*): Sana’a, Ta‘izz and Asir (Farah, 2002: pp. 293-294).
II. Ferid’s commission’s recommendations:

- changing Ta’izz into a separate vilayet to divide the Zaydi from Shafi’i regions; keep San’ā’ as is;
- collections should be conducted by authority of the councils under the supervision of a police unit accompanying the shaykh or ‘āqil heading the team;
- changing ‘Asīr’s kaza into a separate vilayet; its income never exceeds five million piastres; it is too difficult and takes too long to reach;
- regulating and standardizing Sharī‘ah laws and courts for the entire vilayet; the complaints submitted to courts are not uniformly acted upon in the whole of the vilayet; often it is customary practices of the tribes that prevail; courts should all operate on one and the same basis, areas in which tribes are observing Jewish laws should be subject to the same regulations;
- distributing taxes fairly and evenly; this would require conducting a census and registering property; the collection of revenue should be done by shaykhs or ‘uqqāls heading the teams and acting under strict authority of the meclises (local councils) and accompanied by police units in order to keep order; and a respectable individual to accompany the on-collection missions; and
- establishing more schools to educate the inhabitants.

Figure 2.4.1 Recommendations of the commission of inquiry, 7 April 1907
2.5. Yemeni dignitaries’ visit to Istanbul.

An invitation was extended for some of the Yemeni dignitaries to visit Istanbul in 1907 so as to discuss the Yemeni Question (Yemen During the Ottoman Times, 2008).
Figure 2.5.1 Yemeni dignitaries' visit to Istanbul
2.6. **The Yemeni delegation leaves Istanbul**

Confirmation of an appointment of the Yemeni delegation with the Sultan prior to its return to Yemen, 8 August 1909 (Yemen During the Ottoman Times, 2008).
The Yemeni delegation leaves Istanbul
2.7. Yemeni Proposals for Reform:

2.7.1. Imam Yahya’s second proposal for reform (1907), (Farah, 2002: pp. 294-295).

- the wali to stay at Ṣan‘ā’ with some troops to keep the road to Manākhah open, since the inhabitants of Haymah, Bilād al-Bustān, Qaḍā’ ‘Ans depend on it for their livelihood and improving their lot, and do not expect to clash with Ottoman troops;
- inhabitants of Radā’ and the area around Yarīm in the Qa‘ṣabah country and beyond ‘are savages’, so defiance can be expected from them since they are in the hands of foreigners (English); no discussion will avert this (defiance);

Figure 2.7.1.1. Imam Yahya’s second proposal for reform (1907), (Farah, 2002: pp. 294-295)
- Husayn, Khawlān, Niḥim, and Hāshid leaders whose source of livelihood is known, as are their ways and movements; if they are not tied to the imam, the government might be forced to deal with them harshly and more evil can be anticipated from them. If the imam prevents them from gaining a livelihood outside his administrative jurisdiction, rumours will increase;
- appointing a judge from Istanbul to adjudicate according to the Hanafi rite will not do since we are Zaydis and Shāfi’is and we rarely disagree with each other. In situations of misunderstanding, it is better to let the imam be the source of legal reference;
- defining carefully the subject and to whom it applies and by whom, which then can be applied judiciously once quickly revealed to the commoners and jurists;
- issuing an iradé sentiyé (imperial decree) to cancel all miri tax exaction to give the inhabitants a chance to rebuild their homes, their farms and trading establishments and to define the amount to be paid, in instalments to the government, by the imam on behalf of the tribes;
- extend the period of the concession (intiyāz) already granted to the imam so he can undertake constructions desired starting with ʿilmīyah schools; and
- issuing a decree authorizing adjudication in the whole of Yemen administered directly by officials and specifying the responsibility of the imam according to the Shari’ah, including punishment; whereby all would be equal and judges be of the ulema of the locality appointed according to their rite, the Shāfi’i for the Shāfi’is and Zaydi for the Zaydis.

Figure 2.7.1.2.7.2 Imam Yahya’s second proposal for reform (1907), (Farah, 2002: pp. 294-295)
2.7.2. Efforts of Yemeni deputies in Istanbul according to accounts by the 

Campaign for settlement in the Ottoman press

Appalled at the increased commitment of troops and scarcity of funds in 
what appeared to be a no-win situation, the press increased its clamouring 
for a peaceful solution. This was evinced in a lengthy article published in 
Sadayt Millet (Echo of the Nation) entitled ‘Yemen Alhva’ 
(Conditions in Yemen),[1] which stated that despite the troops making a 
100 per cent effort, the insurgence could not be put down by military 
force. It argued for concrete reforms, as recommended in a report by 
Sayyid ‘Ali Maqjafr Efendi, specifically:

- improve first and foremost the quality of the officials themselves;
- be familiar with Arabic to learn about local conditions at first hand;
- establish technical and vocational schools;
- reform and reorganize the court system;
- levy the mīrī tax with fairness;
- entrust the collection of taxes to chiefs of tribes, not the police;
- consider the establishment of a railroad between Ṣan‘ā’ and Hajjah;
- establish a telegraph line between Hodeida, Ta’izz and Ṭasir; and
- protect and promote agriculture by abolishing internal customs dues.

The minister of the interior’s secretary promised to discuss these 
suggestions at the next session of the Medrasan (Chamber of Deputies). 
Süleiman Efendi (Bustâni), an Arab deputy and agriculture minister,[2] 
proposed inviting a few Yemenis to Istanbul and sending some officials 
to Yemen to discuss plans. During the session of the chamber Ismail 
Hakkı Beg said that the proposal had been taken up for discussion the 
year before but that, with the downfall of Sadrazam Hikmi Paşa, the
matter had been dropped. Süleiman retorted that they decided to do something the previous year but nothing came of it and he suggested the president of the Chamber of Deputies take up the matter again with the minister of interior (Talaat), who had been stalling.

There was a heated debate in the Chamber of Deputies on 12 February 1910, with the deputy from Şan′ā’i demanding to know why Talaat had failed to respond to the various recommendations for change in Yemen. Muḥammad Maqḥafi Efendi bluntly stated the position of his country in an animated speech, declaring:

We want to be part of the Ottoman state; if we cannot have independence, then to live as Ottoman subjects; changes are necessary; we have been neglected and abused and ignored for too long; this is why the revolt is on. Officials sent us are ignorant, negligent, abusive: they do not even mix, as in Hodeida, with local notables. They do not know Arabic, and most do not know Turkish. So Yemen becomes the place for them to get rich and forget the needs of the country. We need a commission of inquiry to investigate and recommend means for improving Yemen. We need roads, rail, better social and moral building facilities, security against marauding tribes, a police force. Soldiers and officers sent to Yemen do not know our traditions; those who are in authority do not know Arabic, let alone our customs. This must change.68

Under mounting pressure, Talaat acknowledged that he had received the memorial but argued that the time was not right to act on the scheme to reorganize the country’s administration, citing tribal attacks on caravans, the uprising in ‘Asīr, the threat to Hodeida by Idris, and the capture of 80 posts by insurgents. Talaat had promised that once pacification was complete, he would send a high functionary to determine the type of government suited for the country.69

Figure 2.7.2.2. Efforts of Yemeni deputies in Istanbul according to accounts by the Ottoman press
2.8. Recommendations of the Council of the State, 8 December 1908.

The recommendations of the Council of the State were to detach the liwā of Asir from the administration control of Sana’a and to transform this district into a separate Vilayet, December 1908. The proposal was published by the Shura-i-ummat, 3 December 1908 (Sir Gerard Lowther, the British Ambassador at Constantinople to Sir Edward Grey the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 8 December 1908, FO 424/217, TNA, London). Schofield (1993: Vol.3. pp. 674-675). Farah (2002: pp. 261, 294)
Recommendations of the Council of the State, 8 December 1908.

Figure 2.8.1 Recommendations of the Council of the State, 8 December 1908
That, in order to police the coasts of the vilayet and prevent smuggling by sea,
that, owing to its distance from Sana'a, the Sanjak of Asil be detached from the
Yemen Vilayet and created into an independent Mandate State.
That, as the facilitation of transport by establishing a railway from Atolah be
examined, and measures be taken to put them into execution.
That the civil and religious administration in the district of Sana'a, whose
be delegated to the Sherif Yahya, who claims the Imamate, and that in regard to this matter, as news has been
put to bloodshed among Moslems, and that in regard to this matter, as news has been
companions, who were recently sent by the Government, the decision to be taken by
the Government on the conclusion of their efforts be awaited.
That the increases to be made in the salaries both civil and military be notified
after examination, and that, as the retention of officials for a long period in the said
districts is productive of despair and insobriety, a period of three years be fixed for
military officers and two for civil officials, and that the civil officials have at the end
of two years from the date of entering on their duties the option of being transferred
or applying for three months' leave, and their wish be at once complied with and
return travelling expenses be allowed them.

These decisions, having been come to by the Council of Ministers, have been
signified in detail by despatches from the Grand Vizirate to the Ministry of the
Interior and thence to the Vali of the said province, to the Suridh al-Islam, to
the Ministries of War and Marine, and to the land Registry Department.
III. Council of Ministers’ recommendations:

- better control over the armed forces in Yemen through the appointment of competent commanders and increase of expenditures by 20,000 to 30,000 to ensure against their bilking the natives;
- more schools, ports and improvement of the Hodeida–San‘ā’ road;
- punish those who defy authority, the troops to have charge of arrests;
- better control over collections of zakah and ‘ushr taxes;
- more responsible officials of good character;
- provide better means of communication and transportation;
- better treatment of sayyids and tribal chiefs by offering them gifts and hospitality;
- consult with the vali of Hijaz on how to make improvements; and
- invite a delegation of two to Istanbul to discuss whether Mahmud-Nedim would make a better vali than Feyzi.


- appointing competent and upright officials;
- resolving complaints re collection of revenue according to laws governing the process and preventing mishandling thereof;
- increasing schools and Qur‘anic learning facilities and sending those willing to military and public schools and to teacher training schools in Istanbul;
- assessing the current military force in Yemen and increasing it to the necessary level;
- improving means of control and execution of decrees;

- reviewing judicial cases in Sharī‘ah courts, with the exception of those in the coastal area;
- increasing salaries to match the increase of prices and distances;
- dispatching a number of warships to patrol the coast and prevent smuggling;
- detaching the liwā‘ of ‘Asīr from the vilayet of Yemen and erecting it into a mutasarrifiyah, constructing a rail line between Hodeida and Ṣan‘ā’ to facilitate communications;
- reviewing different plans submitted so far for such a project;
- assigning administrative and legal matters of the Ṣa‘dah region to the imam in order to contain the shedding of blood; and
- limiting the term of service for military officials to three years and civil officials to two years, leaving them the choice of extension.

Figure 2.9.1 Proposal of the Istanbul Chamber of Deputies, February 1909
V. Chamber of Deputies’ recommendations:

• appointing competent and upright officials;
• resolving complaints re collection of revenue according to laws governing the process and preventing mishandling thereof;
• increasing schools and Qur’anic learning facilities and sending those willing to military and public schools and to teacher training schools in Istanbul;
• assessing the current military force in Yemen and increasing it to the necessary level;
• improving means of control and execution of decrees;

Figure 2.9.2. Proposal of the Istanbul Chamber of Deputies, February 1909
2.10. Request that *qadha* Abu Arish attached to Asir, 25 August 1910

This request from the *Vilayet* of Yemen suggests that *qadha* Abu Arish be detached from *sonjok* of Al-Hudaydah and, instead, be attached to the *sonjok* of Asir due to its close proximity to the latter, 25 August 1910 (Yemen During the Ottoman Times, 2008: p. 305).
Figure 2.10.1 Request that qadha Abu Arish attached to Asir, 25 August 1910
2.11. Treaty of Al-Ḥafāyir was not implemented, 1910.

The Treaty of Al-Ḥafāyir was a deal proposed to Al-Idrisi by Said Pāshā in 1910 and was named after the village where it was concluded. Mistakenly, Al-Shahari (1979: 40-43) and Abazāh (1975: pp. 205-214) thought that the Porte had approved the agreement. Conversely, the Treaty of Al-Ḥafāyir was not implemented. Here Sir Gerard Lowther, the British Ambassador at Constantinople confirmed that efforts to implement the Treaty of Al-Ḥafāyir ended in failure. (Sir Gerard Lowther, the British Ambassador, Constantinople to Sir Edward Grey the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 25 January 1911, Schofield, 1993: Vol.3. pp. 691-692).

![Image of Sir Gerard Lowther's letter to Sir Edward Grey](image.png)

Figure 2.11.1 Treaty of Al-Ḥafāyir, 1910
2.12. Indication that Asir remained part of the Vilayet of Yemen

G.A. Richardson, the British Vice-Consul at Al-Hudaydah, was reporting on the situation “in this vilayet (of Yemen)” where the Porte was confronted with revolts by both the Imam “Yahya, in the mountains, and the pretender Seyyid Muhammed Elidrisee (Al-Idrisi), in the Tehama (Tihāmah)”. Obviously, the reference was to the Vilayet of Yemen; and indicates that the Al-Idrisi revolt was within this administrative district i.e. Asir had remained part of it (G.A. Richardson, the British Vice-Consul at Al-Hudaydah to Charles M. Marling the British Embassy Constantinople, 13 January 1911, Schofield, 1993: Vol.3.pp. 692-693).
Indication that Asir remained part of the Vilayet of Yemen

Vice-Consul Richardson to Mr. Martling.

Hodeidah, January 13, 1911.

Sir,

Since my despatch No. 571/E of the 15th December last was submitted the situation in this vilayet has become worse, and there appears to be every probability for the necessity in the near future of military operations on a large scale against both the Imam Soayyid Yahya, in the mountains, and the pretender Soayyid Mahomed El-Idrisse, in the Tahama.

About the 25th December news was received here that the notorious Boni Pasha, at one time the principal shiek in the Zaidia district, had escaped from Sana'a and had joined the Imam Yahya's standard. It will be recalled that Boni Pasha was responsible for the greater part of the trouble in the Zaidia and Wayidat districts last winter and was, on the demand of Soayyid Mahomed El-Idrisse, called by the Governor-General to Sana'a, where he has been under detention ever since.

In former Zaidi revolts in the Yemen, Boni Pasha, however unscrupulous, has proved of great assistance to the Turks in repelling incursions into the El-Hujur district by adherents of the Imam, and also in pushing up supplies and facilitating the movements of troops from Hodeidah in that direction.

It would now appear that he will be entrapped by Soayyid Yahya, with whose assistance he effected his escape from Sana'a, to harass the Turks in the Hujur kaza.

At the same time other bands have appeared in various quarters in the mountains.

For instance, Soayyid Abdulla-bin-Draham, one of Soayyid Yahya's trusty lieutenants and his principal adviser, who, it might be remembered, conducted the negotiations at Constantinople in 1900 between the Porte and the Imam with reference to the future administration of this province, has, with a strong following, appeared in the Ta'iz district, where he will head the rebellion. The latter area will be familiar ground to him, as he conducted the operations against the Turks there in the revolt of 1905.

At Yerim, one Soayyid Abbo Naib is urging the strong Zaidi element to rise in insurrection, whereas Sherief Abdulla Dhumain, formerly an officer in the Ottoman army in the Yemen, has proceeded to the Anis country to take charge of the rebellious movement there.

The famous Ali Mikdad, whose name is very familiar in the history of the Turkish military operations in the vilayet of Yemen, has, I learn, already arrived at the outskirts of Djobol Reima and induced the tribesmen to take sides with the Imam Yahya.

The acting kaimam of the above district has sent an urgent appeal to the Hodeidah authorities for reinforcements, but in the state of affairs existing at present generally throughout the vilayet they find it impossible to comply with his request.

About a week ago news was received here of an engagement between the Turks and Arabs in the Summara mountains near Yerim, in which the former had, amongst other casualties, a major and two junior officers killed, and lost a Maxim, which fell into the hands of the insurgents. Further, that assistance arrived from Sana'a and that the Arabs were put to flight.

This information, however, has not as yet been confirmed. The local authorities admit that some fighting recently took place with the rebels near Suk-el-Khamis, but furnish no details of the result.

Figure 2.12.1 Indication that Asir remained part of the Vilayet of Yemen
Indication that Asir remained part of the Vilayet of Yemen

The veteran Nasir Mahkoth, who has on several occasions in previous upheavals in this province defeated the Turkish troops in the kasa of El-Hujjeh, has, I also learn, taken the field there once more and is busy engaged mustering the clans.

Telegraphic communication between the Yemen and the outer world has been completely cut off since the beginning of this year. The Hodeidah–Sheik–Saids line has been cut by the Zermeek tribesmen near Beit-el-Fakhir since November last, and the Hodeidah line via Ta’i and Mokha up to about a week ago, when the insurgents and Ta’is. Since then telegraphic communication has been hopelessly interrupted throughout the vilayet.

The post that left this for Sana’a some eight days ago under a strong convoy has been unable to proceed further than Suk-el-Khamis, owing to the massing of the rebels in great strength between that place and the capital.

It is freely rumoured here that Sana’a is actually invested in the Imam’s followers, but the authorities here are remarkably reticent on the subject.

As far as I can ascertain, there are about eight battalions of infantry and nine batteries of field and horse artillery and a number of big guns in the capital, which is well provisioned and has an ample stock of munitions of war.

The situation in the province of Assyr continues to cause the local authorities grave concern.

The capital, Abha, where there is a garrison under the mutessarif, General Saleiman Pasha, is still under siege, and strong Arab bands professing allegiance to the pretender Seyyid Mahommood El-Iridise are active between the capital and the vilayet.

The above-mentioned Seyyid, who, it may be recalled, came to an understanding last winter with the Ottoman Government through their representative at Curnfu, General Seyyid Pasha, has now become dissatisfied owing to the non-execution of the reforms in both the sanjak of Assyr that were promised him, as well as in his sphere of influence generally in the northern half of the Tehama in the Yemen. He (the Seyyid) telegraphic communication with the pretender, but who, I hear, has declined to receive General Seyyid Pasha before the acceptance of certain preposterous demands made by him.

Amongst the latter are, I am informed, one for the immediate destruction of the Turkish forts and karbagas recently established along the Assyr littoral, and another for the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces from his (the Iridise’s) sphere of influence, where he undertakes to maintain order and tranquillity with 1,000 Turkish troops which he has asked to be placed at his disposal.

On the 11th instant General Seyyid Pasha arrived here in the Turkish gun-boat "Young," with the object of communicating by telegraph with the central authorities at Constantinople. This however, he now finds is hopelessly impossible from Hodeidah.

The kaimakan of Aboor Arisch has recently reported to the Hodeidah mutessariflik about the activity and restlessness of the tribemen in that locality, and similar accounts have reached the same quarter from the Zaidyja kaza.

It is generally expected that thirty-six battalions of regular infantry with proportionate artillery and cavalry units will shortly arrive from Constantinople to establish tranquillity in this vilayet.

Yesterday, Ibrahim Pasha, the newly-appointed mutessarif of Hodeidah, with Mahir Bey dismissed, arrived here by the Khedivial mail steamer.

It is rumoured that the present Governor-General and Commander-in-chief, General Mahomed Ali Pasha, will be replaced by a senior and more experienced officer.

I have, &c.

G. A. RICHARDSON.
2.13. Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

Al-Idrisi, particularly upon realising that the Treaty of Al-Ḥafṣir with the Ottomans was not implemented, expressed deep disappointment both in the form of public declarations and in the form of correspondence - for instance, the letter he sent to the Minister of Interior (see below) or the letter he sent to Imam Yahya in March 1912. Indeed, he had complained that several attempts to reach an agreement had ended in failure.

These texts are important not merely due to the message each of them contained, but more crucially for the formulations Al-Idrisi adopted to express his aims, both in terms of the geographic context or his political goals. For instance, although Al-Idrisi was regarded as the leader of the revolt of Asir against the Turks, where his Ṣaḥyā stronghold was located, and his influence was mainly concentrated over this town and its surrounding area, he nonetheless presented himself as having ambitions over the entire Vilayet of Yemen and further north into Al-Ḥijāz.

Such texts provide interesting insights into Al-Idrisi’s ultimate political objectives as well as his relations with Imam Yahya. Like the other Arab leaders, Al-Idrisi presented himself as having a mission to change the situation in Yemen in general. Al-Idrisi’s maintained his stance that his revolt was directed against Ottoman control of the country. He initially framed his ambitions within the problems and aspirations of the wider country, that is, the whole of Yemen. Indeed, it is evident that he was proud of being an Arab Muslim and, most importantly, of being a Yemeni. However, there were no mentions of Asir as being the aim of his revolt, neither in the letter he sent to the Minister of Interior nor in his subsequent declaration. Whenever Asir was mentioned this was in a different context, for instance when Al-Idrisi referred to a message he had received from the Ottoman commander in Asir, Husayn Effendi. Al-Idrisi’s ambition to rule over Asir as an independent entity would only become clear in the 1920s.
2.13.1. Al-Idrisi to the Turkish Minister of Interior (27 November 1910)

A translation of a letter Al-Idrisi sent to the Turkish Minister of Interior, 27 November 1910. In the letter, Al-Idrisi expresses his disappointment that the agreement concluded with the Porte had not been implemented (Schofield, 1993: Vol.3. pp. 690-691).
Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

Figure 2.13.1.1 Al-Idrisi to the Turkish Minister of Interior (27 November 1910)
Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

Figure 2.13.1.2 Al-Idrisi to the Turkish Minister of Interior (27 November 1910)
2.13.2. Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

This declaration was issued in the form of a letter from Al-Idrisi to an unnamed friend in Egypt. The text, however, was classified as a *Bayan* [public declaration]. It was distributed publicly in Yemen and abroad on 25 March 1912. Here Al-Idrisi himself confirmed that the Treaty of Al-Ḥafāyir was not ratified. He stated clearly, in this statement, that the agreement he concluded with Said Pāshā was not ratified by the Porte.

The texts of both the Arabic and the English translation are taken from (Bang, 1996). It is also available in (Abazāh, 1975: pp. 466-474).
Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

Figure 2.13.2.1 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Figure 2.133.2.2 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

مفسدين وشوهوا كثيرًا من الروايات التي يروونها عني بالباسها
لباس التغيير والتمويه
وكذبوا على أولئك العرب المخلصين الذين قد روى عن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم في أمهم ما يفتحرون به فقد روي عنه عليه الصلاة والسلام أنه قال: «أني لأشم ريح الامام من جهة اليمن» أو كما قال وروي عنه صلى الله عليه وعلى آله وسلم أنه قال: «العلم يمان والحكمة يمانية» وفي رواية: «الامام يمان والحكمة يمانية».
واذ كان ذلك كذلك كان حقًا على أن أذكر مجملًا من الحقيقة تطعن به نفس الخواني المسلمين في غير جزيرة العرب والله على ما أقول وكيل
نحن بحمد الله مؤمنون من أهل السنة والجماعة نؤمن بالله وملاكك وكتابه ورسله واليوم الآخر ونعمل على ما يوافق الشرعية المطهرة مبلغ علمنا وطافتنا - نامر بالمعروف وتنهي عن المنكر ونجهد في إزالة البذع الضارة بالدين واهل الدين وغير مرتين ولا مساجين ولا ماكرين ولا مخادعين.
لا ندعو شيئًا من الدعاوى العريضة التي يحمل بها دؤو الأوهام على عقول العموم فلا نتجلل المهدية كما يزرعون: لا نслушد كما يقترون: ولا نزعيم لشيء ولا شيا من علم الغيب كما يشعرون.

Figure 2.133.2.3 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment.

Figure 2.13.2.4 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Figure 2.13.2.5 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

Figure 2.13.2.6 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

Figure 2.13.2.7 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Figure 2.13.2.8 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

Figure 2.13.2.9 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

Figure 2.13.2.10 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Figure 2.13.2.11 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Al-Idrīsi expresses disappointment in the declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrīsi in Yemen and abroad.
العالية (كما يعبرون) لم تصدق على الصلح بهذه الطريقة ثم نكثوا إيمانهم من بعد عهدهم وطعنوا في الدين وأظهروا الرضاء بعدم اقامة الحدود أخذوا يشعرون على اقامة حدود الله وترك الحق لولي الدم وقالوا إن المدنية تأتي ذلك ثم أظهروا لنا منشورات نشرتها الدولة صرحوا فيها بأنهم تفضلوا على المسلمين في هذه البلاد أو منحواهم (من عند أنفسهم) منحة العمل بالشريعة في المدنيات دون الجنائات وشعروا بمثابتهم في طلب ذلك في الجنائات إلى غير ذلك مما يختلف مقاصدهم وتباين الأغراضهم ودستورهم الحديث.
علمنا بذلك فقلنا لا حول ولا قوة إلا بالله العلي العظيم بالله ولله هذا الخذلان مثى كانت الشريعة تقام دون أن تقام حدودها وما الذي يمنع ذلك في بلاد العرب وهي خلو من كل الأجانب عن الدين فماذا فرضنا ان الدولة تجد صعوبة في تنفيذ الشريعة كما هي في غير بلاد العرب فما هي الصعوبة في تنفيذها هنا مع رضي الاهالي بذلك وسرورهم به وظهور نتائجه لهم وتشددهم في طليبه؟ ثم ما هي تلك المدنيات التي منحنوا الحكم فيها على مقتضى
Figure 2.13.2.14 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

Figure 2.13.2.15 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

Figure 2.13.2.16 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Figure 2.13.2.17 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

Figure 2.13.2.18 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Figure 2.13.2.19 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

Figure 2.13.2.20 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Figure 2.13.2.21 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Figure 2.13.2.22 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

Figure 2.13.2.23 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

Figure 2.13.2.24 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
الصلاة ويؤتون الزكاة ويصومون رمضان ويحافظون على الأوامر
وترك النواحي ما آمكنتهم في حين أن أولئك لا يعملون شيئًا من ذلك بل تراهم يجعلون المساجد تكنات لعساكرهم ومستشفيات
لمرضاهما وامكنته لفسوقهم ولهوهم ولعبهم وكثيرًا ما دخل كبارهم
في المساجد بكلابهم على مراي من العرب الخصب وعملوا من
العمل الكفري ما لا نجد في الوقت سعدة لسرده
فإذا ترك ينصرون الله ورسوله ولا يؤذون إلا في الله وطلب العمل
بكتاب الله وسنة رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم وأظهر نور الله في
حين أن أولئك يريدون ان يطفؤوا نور الله باقوا لهم ويارب الله ان
يتم نوره ولو كره الكافرون لينت شعري ماذا يطلب منا ومن العرب
بعد هذا؟

إنسكن لهذه القوة التي يشرحها سعادته الوالي ونتظر حتى
يحرقوها بقية بيئتنا ويستبيحوا فضلة أموال العرب ويذبحوا الابناء
ويسحلوا النساء (كما تعودون بذلك وهم في جيزان فذر الله
كيدهم في حراقهم وجعل عليهم دائرة السوء)

أو نسلمهم أنفسنا ونتنازل عن ديننا ودنيانا وآخربنا
أو نساءهم على إعادة الحال على ما كانت عليه ونتنتظر حتى
يقض الله لبعض ذرى الأمر منهم من يشترينا شراء سقط المنام

Figure 2.13.2.25 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

Figure 2.13.2.26 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

Figure 2.13.2.27 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

Figure 2.13.2.28 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
أمهات المسائل تكثر فيها الظلمون وتفتح لها العيون وما الله بعفاف
عما يعمل الظالمون.
وفي الختم نرجو الله أن يصلى الأحوال ويوفقنا إلى ما فيه الخير
ويساعدنا على استئصال الجرائح المفسدة ويكفينا شر المفسدين
و يجعلنا من المستمرين لقول الله تعالى في كتابه المبين (ولا تهنوا
ولا تخزروا وانتم الأعلون ان كنتم مؤمنين)
تحريرا في 6 ربيع الثاني 1320
الامضاء محمد علي الادريسي

Figure 2.13.2.29 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Translation

This is an announcement to the people and a guide and council for the pious.

In the name of God, the merciful and compassionate.

‘Praise belongs to God who has sent down upon His servant the Book and has not assigned unto it any crookedness; right, to warn of great violence from Him, and to give good tidings unto the believers, who do righteous deeds, that theirs shall be a goodly wage therein to abide for ever’ [K 18:1].

May the blessings and peace of God be upon our Sayyid Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh, the truthful and trustworthy, whom God chose among the best of Arabs, whom he sent to all the people as a bearer of glad tidings and a summoner with God’s permission, and a shining light and He revealed to him the unambiguous parts of the Mighty Book: ‘You are the best nation ever brought forth to men, bidding to honour, and forbidding dishonour,

Figure 2.13.2.30 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
and believing in God' [K 3:110].

He made clear to him the circumstances of previous peoples; in this there is a warning, and he said: ‘Cursed were the unbelievers of the children of Israel by the tongue of David, and Jesus, Mary’s son; that, for their rebelling and their transgression. They forbade not one another any dishonour that they committed; surely evil were the things they did’ [K 5:82]. He [God] defined for him [Muhammad] the limits and the law, and said: ‘whosoever trespass the bounds of God has done wrong to himself’ [K 65:1], and he said: ‘Whosoever judges not according to what God has sent down—they are the unbelievers’ [K 5:44].

Thereafter: God—Blessed and Exalted is He—has said: ‘O believers, if an ungodly man comes to you with a tiding, make clear, lest you afflict a people unwittingly, and then repent of what you have done’ [K 49:1]. And he (may God bless him and grant him peace) said: ‘The hypocrite is distinguished by three things; if he gives an account, he lies; if he promises, he does not keep his word, and if trust is placed in him, he behaves treacherously’ [hadith].

I have learnt that some of these people, for whom I seek the guidance of God and nothing more, have reported things about me that God knows I am innocent of. They attributed to me acts that only come from evildoers, and they distorted many of the stories that were told about me by clothing them with deceit and distortion.

They told lies about those honest Arabs, about whom the Prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) said things of which they may be proud: ‘Surely I smell the wind of faith coming from the direction of the Yemen’ [hadith] or words to that effect. Likewise he (may the blessings and peace of God be upon him and his companions) said: ‘Knowledge and wisdom are both of them Yemeni’ [hadith]. Or according to one version: ‘Faith and wisdom are both of them Yemeni’ [hadith].

Things being as they are, it is right that I should relate the truth, so that my brother Muslims outside the Arab Peninsula can have peace of mind. God is the guardian of what I say.

We are, praise be to God, believers belonging to the Sunni community. We believe in God, His angels, His books, His prophets and in the Day of Judgement. We conform to the pure
Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

shari‘a, to the extent of our knowledge and ability; we order good and forbid evil, and we strive to eliminate innovation harmful to religion and religious people; not to show off, not plotting and not deceiving.

We do not propagate anything of the widespread claims which are misinterpreted by the false ideas in the minds of the masses. Thus, we do not claim the mahdiyya, as they declare. We do not practice tricks such as they falsely allege. We do not claim illumination or knowledge of the hidden, such as they rumour it.

‘Glory be to Thee! We know not save what Thou hast taught us. Surely Thou art the All-knowing, the All-Wise’ [K 2:32].

We do not occupy ourselves with anything of what the false incompetents accuse us of; they are powerless. We neither claim the caliphate nor kingdom as they mistakenly suspect. We do not search for influence or wealth nor any personal worldly objectives which the greedy and covetous ones fight one another over.

[Rather we seek] what leads to heaven, and a method for the promotion of the welfare of Islam and the Muslims by lawful means; we seek in it what is of purpose. It is the same to us whether the result comes by our hands or by the hands of those who work for Islam. So, we (God knows) seek good for its own sake, and we distance us, as much as we can, from evil. All that we are concerned with is piety and reform. My success is from God alone; Him do I trust and to Him do I turn.

I have a good example in my blameless ancestors and in the way I was brought up, and in that what those who know me know about my moral standards and my conduct and the history of my life since I was young is the greatest proof of what I have mentioned, (thanks be to God) and I am not boasting.

The reader will say, therefore, what is this outcry which has occupied so many minds? And what is the reason for what they claim to be rebellion and troublemaking, and causing confusion to the state [i.e. the Ottoman empire] at a time when it [the state] is tottering on the edge of an abyss of difficulty. Its leaders are not acting together, and control of the state is left in the hands of the inexperienced, and the wicked triumph over the good, in addition to which it suffers from the aggressor’s onslaught and

Figure 2.13.2.32 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
what it fears from the hands of the greedy.

The answer is that this was created for the state by its faithless civil servants (and some of its officers)—it is with these the state has filled the important offices, and allowed them, in their extravagance, arrogance and pride, to create havoc in the land, without fear or shame. We see them making the forbidden lawful and abusing honour, openly sinning and deviating from the laws that God and his Messenger sent, without care and without manners. Prayer is not called for, nor is fasting observed, nor are they just in their judgements. Neither do they restrain their junior members (or even themselves) from interfering with the livelihood of the citizens, to say nothing about their indulgence in bribery and manipulation of public money.

They display contempt for the Arab Nation and the Arabic language. Furthermore, they neglect all public welfare, and they insult men of religion and do other things that originate from tyrannical, treacherous people.

All of this, together with the desire of those foreigners who have no qualms to create unrest and to stir up riots (in order to be able) to force the state (and the state was already carrying burdens heavy enough to make powerful states groan) to raise soldiers and mobilize armies, so they might have an excuse to join their partners (secretly) in these big undertakings into which state funds are poured randomly.

So, they fill their bellies with this fire, as well as the bellies of their partners, and are not concerned with the welfare of the state or whether the conditions of the people get better or worse.

I can scarcely believe that this was the doing of the governors of the Arab Peninsula, the origin of prophecy and the place of revelation, in the midst of humble, uncorrupted beduins—before their eyes and ears (the beduins can put up with things that will make the settled people groan).

Do you think that it is still possible for the beduin to believe that his rulers are Muslims—no matter how much you try to convince him, no matter how much proof you offer him by different means, since actions speak louder than words and what they demonstrate is conclusive.

On the contrary, it certainly has become self-evident that the new and inexperienced state governors are the ones who are
creating unrest and stirring up discord. It is the same to us whether this was done with the knowledge of the high authorities (as they are called)—in which case they remain silent for some reason—or without their knowledge. We have come to know recently that young men like these have begun to sell lands, especially Arab lands, at the most paltry price.

Readers are aware, from what was announced earlier in some of the Egyptian newspapers, that we returned from our search for knowledge in the lands of Egypt and elsewhere to the lands of the Yemen where we have our origin.

There we found the people in even greater hostility to the rulers (than before we left them) because of the things described above.

We found them refusing to pay taxes and taking their matters to judgement by the oppressors [i.e. the Turks].

[There was] a general breakdown of public security in all districts because of the demands for revenge, and the government left the people with a free rein. [i.e. did nothing to stop this]. This was the matter which brought a halt to all work and activity, both in trade, agriculture and other domains, to such an extent that a man was unable move a foot outside his dwelling unless some of his companions went with him, equipped with arms to fight off assailants (and they were many!).

If you had seen [what went on] at that time, you would have seen something discouraging [lit.: 'to make the liver burst'], fit to prevent you from sleeping, and to prolong wakefulness. Yes, if you had seen, you would have seen the mosques lying idle, the shari‘a neglected, the soil lying arid and misfortunes continuous; a man could not go to his prayer without carrying arms, and being escorted by his group to serve as his guard. And you would have seen plundering and looting and killing of innocent people, fit to upset firm souls and soften hard hearts.

You would have seen endless civil wars between the tribes, clans and subdivisions, draining the money, widowing the women, orphaning the children, dividing brothers and diminishing the

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2 The Arabic word *tawāghiṭ* (sing. *tāghūt*, Qur’ānic: ‘devil, false idol’) can be translated ‘oppressors’. The oppressors referred to here are the Turkish governors who, since the beginning of the twentieth century, had tried to implement Ottoman civil law (the *kanûn*) in the *vilayets*.

Figure 2.13.2.34 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
number of offspring.

All of this you would have seen taking place, in front of the very eyes of the government and its men, without their urging any move or making any effort to stop this sweeping flood of misfortunes.

You would not find any of these governors and officials having concern for any of these matters, except where there was a profit in it, for him alone or with the help of some of his associates.

The situation reached the point where the government itself was unable to obtain water from the wells unless it made preparations, recruited an army and protected itself behind its friends. (What a disgrace!)

There is no doubt that this intensified the hardship of all, and the wise ones started to look for a way out of this situation.

(If they had found a refuge, a shelter or a place to go to, then they would have turned towards it—with haste.)

When the crisis intensified, and God wanted to bring relief, then He made us a way out; He granted me success in intervening between two great tribes to make peace (and peace is good), so God guided those who believe to the truth over which they differed, by His permission, and establishing the basis for peace (and it could not have been established but for the will of God and His divine power). This was achieved by abandoning former claims to blood [revenge] and in allowing cases to be tried before the shari‘a instead of before the oppressors [i.e. Ottoman court]. Also by implementing the punishments of the shari‘a in accordance with what God revealed in His book and what is reported in the Sunna of His Prophet (may God bless Him and His family and grant them peace) and that which the pious forefathers and the mujtahidi ināms guided us to (May God be pleased with them all).

Thereby, security was stabilized in the lands of these two tribes.

Trade picked up, agriculture flourished, people felt secure for their persons and their property. Minds calmed down and children and babies were protected. Prayer was established among individuals and in the community and the laws of God were observed (‘Whoever trespasses the bounds of God has done

Figure 2.13.2.35 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
wrong to himself' [K 65:1].

The other tribes were anxious ['stretched their necks'] to join this system; their members wanted peace of mind and to leave behind the hardships caused by conflict, quarrelling and disunity.

It is well-known that the pride and stubbornness of the Arabs prevents any tribe from initiating the quest for peace. Thus I pursued the matter with their representatives secretly, and God granted this humble servant success in intervening between a number of tribes and peace was established between them by the blessing of sincere faith.

Thus, they succeeded as their brothers had succeeded before them. That was a thorn in the flesh to some of the commissioners. (If they had been faithful to God and His messenger, to their government and their nation, then that would have been their greatest hope for general security and would have made it easier for them to carry out their mission.)

Yes, that was a thorn in the flesh of some and an opportunity for others, since they made this matter something to lean upon, to press the state to spend exorbitant sums of money to no avail. In this way, they and their partners among the conspirators could obtain whatever profit they wanted.

Therefore, the sick-hearted started to spread rumours, announce falsities, circulate untruth and lies, and to light the fire of revolution from both sides. I strove to quench that fire when it first was ignited, by wisdom and goodly exhortation, by good treatment, much amiability and search for mutual understanding—so that the evil inside them would come to an end. I did not succeed, since the error of the misguided ones triumphed over the right of the soundly-guided ones, and the explanations of those gone astray found attentive ears among influential men of the Government—who would never examine the situation and take charge of it with justice.

Orders went out to prepare armies and send them to fight this frail being who has no might and no power except through God most High and Mighty. That was because the reform undertaken by my hands did not please the governors, despite its manifest benefits.

So, when the Arabs saw that, they began to harbour doubts.

Figure 2.13.2.36 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
about their rulers, until they became quite certain that these Governors were from outside the Islamic community (The beduin is convinced only by what he sees with his own eyes). They thought—and some thoughts are sinful—that these armies had been sent to fight them until they renounced their religion (if they were able).

Thus, they [the tribesmen] prepared to defend themselves and their religion, their peace of mind and their security, and they were filled with Arab fervour and the zeal of Islam.

I started to soften their sharpness and wrath into wisdom and calm, and I convinced them to adopt the stance of defending themselves, their property and honour while keeping the obligations of their faith.

They held this position until Sa’id Pasha arrived in the Yemen with his huge army. (He is, by all appearances, a sensible and far-sighted man.) At that time he did not want to address the problem before he could explore the matter himself. He and I worked for a meeting. Then, when we informed him, and he knew the truth and the lies of these rumours became as clear as daylight to him, he agreed with us that we should leave things as they are, and that the Government should accept that verdicts in this Arab land should be passed in accordance with the Islamic sharī‘a.

When this agreement was concluded I strove, as a duty to God most High, to support the state. Thus, I helped it to extend the telegraph, a task which the Government had not been able to perform since it established itself in the Yemen, due to the sums that had disappeared without trace.

So, I helped them with 10,000 poles needed for this. They used to pay one lira for one pole, and no sooner had they been put up before they were snatched away by plundering hands beyond the Government’s reach.

All of this I did, and I convinced the Arabs to pay light taxes in the name of zakāt—they had not paid anything to the Government. I also gave other forms of support which I do not have the time to explain here. I thought that by these efforts I was doing the state a great favour, and its officials would credit me for that, and they would know my sincere devotion to my state, my government and my people, and that they would approve

Figure 2.13.2.37 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
of this agreement and allow the ordinances of God to be implemented in this place which has not been trodden by foreigners, and that they would leave to me to command good and forbid evil with a good conscience, unsullied and untroubled.

But, matters turned bad, since they repeated the events which made it clear that this agreement was nothing but a fraud, aimed at anaesthetising the nerves of the Arabs, so that these evildoers could enter inside the umma and cut its cords and neutralize its efforts (God is not unmindful of the acts of the oppressors).

The Arabs were never more surprised than when the officials suddenly announced that the high authorities (as they are called) did not approve of peace by these means.

So they [the Turks] broke the oath they had given and they defiled religion, and announced it was their pleasure not to implement the ordinances of God. They began to abuse upholding the punishments of God and allowing the right [of revenge] and they said that urban circumstances did not allow this.

Furthermore, they set forth proclamations which were published throughout this land. In these they declared that they granted privileges to the Muslims in the land, or they granted Muslims the favour of operating the shari'a—in civil cases but not in criminal cases.

They condemned those who continued the quest to implement these rules in criminal cases, and equally they condemned all those who contradicted their intentions and purposes and their new constitution etc.

We learned about it so we said ‘There is no power and no strength save in God Most High and Mighty’.

By God a disappointment; when was the shari'a implemented and its punishments were not?

What prevents this in Arab lands which are empty of all those who are foreign to the religion [of Islam]?

If we assume that the state experienced problems in implementing the shari'a in non-Arab lands, then what is the problem in implementing it here where the people are agreeable to it and rejoice in it, and witness its results for them and they eagerly call for it?

Further, what are these civil cases for which they grant us the right to apply the shari'a; we have no wealth, no trade, and

Figure 2.13.2.38 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
there is no such overcrowding that would bring about civil cases that could not be decided by mutual consent—or by the decision of arbitrators?

Do you think that they imagined that they were making a reform, and that they would bring about profitable trade, marketable products, fruitful farming and so on, and that they understood that civil controversies are an important matter which could be considered a privilege for these who hold fast to their religion and graciously allow them to let verdicts be in accordance with the Islamic shari'a? May God prevent us from fighting God and from acts which may anger Him.

I used to hear before that those misdeeds I saw, and which all those have set foot in the noble Sanctuaries saw—those misdeeds that make the body of the noble shari'a shiver and cause her structures to crumble, that is the dread which accompanies the pilgrims to the House of God, which God has granted inviolability and protection, with the spreading of plunderers and highway robbers and murderers of pure, innocent people—I have heard that some of the officials in charge of the matter intended this to happen and encouraged it, to satisfy their own desires and fulfil their needs.

If it were not for these desires and those needs, the state (and the state is not weak and incapable of producing peace in this blessed land) would have worked to annul it [the insecurity] and establish protection for the Muslims who are filled with Islamic zeal and who work for the accomplishment of their lawful obligation as they leave their fathers, brothers, spouses and relatives, their homelands and all their worldly affairs—and ‘they shall come unto thee on foot and upon every lean beast, they shall come from every deep ravine, that they may witness things profitable to them and mention God’s Name on days well-known over such beasts of the flock as He has provided them’ [K 22:27-8].

I used to hear about it, and I spared no effort to defend the state and its men.

But now, I have seen and the Arabs have seen how these officials are blocking the way towards the implementation of the punishments of the shari'a, and that they have prepared armies to fight us over this issue. In addition they hindered them from

Figure 2.13.2.39 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
the way of God and from the Sacred Mosque, and the devout from Yemen were hindered from performing their religious duties.

Thus, I was filled with doubt and it would not be wrong to say that it became impossible to convince those whose opinion matters among the Arabs of anything else.

Despite my guiding them to peace and peaceful behaviour, and my calling the Arabs to peace and to taking up the stance of defence—the Government did not hesitate to announce that it had mobilized armies against the men of the Yemen such as they could not overcome, and that it would give to them an ample supply enough and ammunition to bring about our extermination.

They permitted them to burn the homes such as it was their habit of doing when dealing with the Muslim Arabs among their citizens, as distinct from non-Arabs. Equally they permitted mutilation, torture and caning of their citizens, which they were powerless to stand up against. This was the very thing it forbade itself in regard to its unsuspecting enemies, and it published proclamations to this effect, in particular about fair treatment and civilized conduct, in the beginning of its war with them.

When we heard about this we were forced to prepare to defend ourselves and we anticipated the judgement of God, when, surprisingly, other events caused them to turn away. So they preferred to return to the first treachery, the treachery of talking of peace as long as obstacles are absent and they have possibilities to accomplish their objectives.

At that time their messenger was sent to address us on this matter [who was] Shaykh Tawfiq, so we suggested to him to meet with Sa‘id Pasha. He informed us that he was his [Sa‘id Pasha’s] authorized agent in this matter, and he had full authority. So, we said that we welcomed the sparing of bloodshed, on our original terms which were that the laws in our lands would be on the basis of the Islamic shari‘a, with no separation between its civil and criminal codes, and so forth.

This natural Islamic right should be granted us in an official manner, that is the ordaining of good and the forbidding of evil, so that no selfish meddlesome official should have any say in our affairs, since we had undertaken what was our duty under the circumstances, because we established peace between the

Figure 2.13.2.40 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

tribes while the situation of the government remained unchanged.

So he left us, and we awaited the reply from the government and they mocked us and ignored us (may God deride them!). Thus, armies were prepared against us for the second time, two mighty expeditions possessing great strength—such as they announced—God is strongest in prowess and mightiest in giving exemplary punishment.

The two expeditions attacked at the same time, one from the north, consisting of a mighty number of effective troops, fully equipped and with its motorized vehicles, military leaders, with rapid firing guns and other long-range artillery, such as they published in the daily newspapers, and a large number of supporters of sharif Husayn b. 'Ali under his leadership and that of his two sons, the divinely-protected.

It is well known to everybody what was published at that time, the state had equipped this joint army with provisions and ammunition enough to demolish all the Arab lands. The second of the two came from the south, from Jizān, and all of this strong expedition consisted of the regular [Ottoman] army which was of great strength and size. They announced that these two field expeditions would join together and fall upon any people and lands which came their way.

We put our trust in God, besides whom we have no power and no strength, and we entrusted our matter to Him and said: 'How often a little company has overcome a numerous company, by God’s leave! And God is with the patient’ [K 2:249].

Truly, God’s assistance helped us. To Him is the gratitude for the Arabs’ bravery.

Nothing came out of these great announcements and many alarms which the likes of us, desert beduins, do not know the purpose of.

When strategy failed us and we were unable to arrive at a peaceful solution under which the fixed laws of God and His shari‘a would be preserved, we were forced to defend ourselves and the beduins took a defensive stance.

And then, when the combat occurred with both of the armies, the northern and the southern, it became clear that all the thundering and lightning had been nothing and that all the rumours were like empty shells, since these two armies were shaken at

Figure 2.13.2.41 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
the confrontation (God helped us and prepared for them a mighty punishment).

The joint Northern army was afflicted by such reverses that much of its materials, provisions, supply and equipment fell into the hands of the Arabs.

The Honourable sharīf (may God bless him) was forced to pursue another plan, which consisted either of splitting kin-groups or certain other ways of influencing people in subtle ways.

In this way he was able to go in the direction of Abhā on a rough road, not much used, far from the usual way connecting Abhā and al-Qunfudha, the road which joins the beduin of the Yemen together.

He preferred it despite its length and its roughness, so he should not suffer any setback until he had entered Abhā by any method, as if his mission was nothing more than entering Abhā without meeting the Yemeni Arabs one more time.

He soon departed from it, and started on a third road, having with him a falcon covered with a black cloth, a road harder and rougher than the one he had come on, travelling in fear and watchfulness. He chose this rough and roundabout route, consisting many difficult mountain passes and with little water (the Baysha road); this road which goes east of al-Tāʾif in the direction of Najd, because this is the road of defeated fugitives and those who are fleeing.

I came to know that they were hiding the truth, and they started to claim that their entry (into Abhā) was by force, but we are wise Arabs and we are not concerned with the words of talkers when they are alone in remote lands.

We are men of deeds; we rely on God alone, sufficient for us is He, and a most excellent benefactor.

As for the southern army, it ended up with the battle of al-Ḥafāʾir. Do you know what the battle of al-Ḥafāʾir is?

It was that battle in which the Yemeni tribesmen took up the defence by the wells at al-Ḥafāʾir, three-quarters of an hour from Jizān. The regular government army barricaded itself at Jizān and the surrounding mountains, and they sheltered themselves in their citadels and forts and fixed their artillery on the mountains and the hills near the sea.

They were supported by their war-ships, and they started to

Figure 2.13.2.42 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
harass the beduins, by rapid-firing artillery from the sea and from the land. The beduin were steadfast, surrendering to the judgement of God, and then one Monday in the middle of Jumādā II 1329 [mid-June 1911] the regular armed forces launched an attack with rapid artillery under the protection of artillery which was on the top of the hill and on the warships and in the forts. They performed all sorts of military stratagems.

The tribesmen had no power and no strength except in God most High and Mighty; He is with the steadfast, and they were firm. They remembered God much, and He fulfilled His promise to them, and they were victorious. The wrongdoers shall know the punishment which awaits them.

Yes, the beduin were steadfast and they defended the implementation of the fixed ordinances of religion. So, war continued against that mighty army until all of it perished except for an insignificant portion who were saved by fleeing. There were innumerable wounded, and into the beduins' hands fell guns, ammunition, equipment, artillery and machines which gave them power superior to their [the Ottomans'] power and strength for activity. He who knows the situation can assess it.

The remaining survivors of the two armies returned to Jīzān. God imposed on them, and on those who came to their help, wind, armies of the air and plague-like diseases which swept away the survivors and the helpers except for an insignificant few. They were finally forced to return to Jīzān, and they rested. God has everything in His hands and He has power over everything.

After all this, it was not long before a letter with proposals of peace arrived for us from his excellency the wāli of Asīr, dated before the beginning of the recent events with the Italians.

We executed God's orders, we relied on Him and put our trust in Him.

We sent a messenger to his excellency, one of the leading beduins, to address him with regard to the request.

We provided that messenger with every peaceful proposal,

3 The exact date for the battle at al-Hafā'īr is 13 June 1911; al-Shahhārī, al-Muṭāmī' al-tawassu'īyya, 57-8.
4 It is uncertain what is meant by this. Most likely the expression refers to locusts or some disease-bearing insect.
and we sent a letter with him, expressing our objectives and desires for unity and unanimity, that we wanted to be brothers and helpers for the truth.

On the way, in the vicinity of Abhā, it reached the ears of that messenger that the wālī was only planning a deceit, and that he had laid a murderous snare for him.

So, he remained outside of the city where he was safe. He [the messenger] sent a letter to him [the wālī] and informed him that he had come, heeding the call for peace, and that he wanted to discuss that, in order to know how the matter would end. God grants success.

His [the wālī’s] answer was just to send him [the messenger] a long, extensive message, filled with arrogance, conceit and haughtiness, and not a word of it was without threat and menace and rejection of the agreement. Here is some of what was stated in it, word by word:

‘I have received a letter from Husayn Effendi, and in it he states that you have asked for a clarification of conditions with the government, and their modality. I was surprised by this request. This situation causes suspicion to be deep-rooted, and the events which take place now with the infidels suits your purposes. So, no conditions are necessary. What conditions should there be between the government and its citizens? The duty of the citizens is to obey the government and its orders.

We intended, trusting in God, to send a military campaign to crush the rebels and insurgents with force, and to pardon to the obedient and to grant them safe conduct.

Our request for a unified 6 Asir was not out of weakness or seeking help from them.

The force, which exceeds 50 battalions gathered in al-Zaydiyya, al-Zuhra and al-Luḥayya. We have with us 17 battalions, and that is enough for every enemy in the Yemen and Asir in the interior and the exterior and you know it. In addition you can assess the outcome of rebellion and uprising, etc. etc.’

We have received this message and other messages sent from some of the officials of the government to the Arabs, and in them was more than that [more threats etc.].

6 The wālī here refers to the outbreak of the Turkish-Italian war of 1911-12.
It should be clear to the reader how intense is our regret over the fact that the government officials are of this type. They are the ones who cause the unrest, and whenever it approaches an end they stir it up again. [We also regret] that they always constitute a stumbling block in the way of quelling the unrest—as explained before—especially in such circumstances and such critical times.

May God guide them or give us another people in their place, and may they not be like them.

What does the fair-minded man understand from all this, except that we always work for peace, while the state officials work to destroy the state’s foundations. We work for reform, and those deviant ones work to undermine it. We work for the implementation of the pure shari‘a, and they work to abolish it and eliminate all traces of it.

What is this calamity, by which God tested the state and the umma, by placing it in the hands of this group which seeks to topple it and cause it to fall into a bottomless pit.

How could you have faith, after this, in an evildoer of the same kind as these wicked ones, who purchase their life in this world with their afterlife and block the way of God. They do these deeds to the beduins, and they rush to pour threatening words upon them.

They know the pride and self-esteem of the beduin, and that they will not be content with disgraceful things—in particular when they have the upper hand and have so far been victorious.

They thereby bring victory to God and His messenger, and they persist in the quest for the implementation of the pure shari‘a and its restrictions.

They [the beduins] are not doing anything of that which the Turks do. The Arabs perform prayer, give zakāt and fast during Ramadān, and they observe the commands and heed the prohibitions as far as they are able. Whereas they [the Turks] do none of this. On the contrary you see them turning the mosques into barracks for their soldiers, hospitals for their sick, and into locations for their immoralities and for their games and merriment. Their leaders often enter the mosques together with their dogs, in front of the very eyes of the humble beduin. They perform other godless acts, which I do not have the time to relate here.
The beduin help God and His messenger, and they do not harm anyone, except for in the sake of God and in the quest to work for the Book of God and the Sunna of His prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) and for the manifestation of the light of God.

At the same time these others want to extinguish the light of God with their mouths [presumably; with their talk]. God will that His light shine—even though the infidels dislike it. I wish I knew what is required of us and of the Arabs after this!

Should we surrender ourselves to this force which the wālī described, and sit and wait until they burn the remainder of our houses, confiscate the rest of Arab property, slaughter our sons and violate our women? (As they promised us in Jizān. God turned their own plot against them and inflicted upon them an evil fortune.)

Or should we hand ourselves over to them and renounce our religion, our worldly life and the hereafter?

Or should we help them to restore the situation to what it was, and wait until God designates for some of those in power who will buy us like some piece of scrap, just like they bought others from Arab lands, like in Tripoli, according to what I have heard?

If we did so, we would in their eyes be the greatest of people and the most excellent of men, whom they reward with a share in their profit. God will give extensive hardships, and he will pour upon us and them an agony which the believers know.

I think every aware Muslim, who wishes well for Islam and for the Muslims, will say that it is our duty to make preparations for defence and not to subject ourselves to jeopardy. Particularly after they set in motion all their armies, from the north and the south with the purpose of attacking us, in the manner the Pasha described in his former letter.

‘But it may be that God will bring thee victory, or some commandment from Him, and then they will find themselves, for that which they kept secret within them, remorseful’ [K 5:52]. ‘O believers, if you help God he will help you, and confirm your feet’ [K 47:7]. ‘But as for the unbelievers, ill chance shall befall them! He will send their works astray’ [K 47:8]. ‘That is because those who disbelieve follow falsehood, and those who

Figure 2.13.2.46 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
believe follow the truth from their Lord. Even so God strikes similitudes for men’ [K 47:3].

The reader will be surprised that this army moving to attack us and their helpers announced what they announced. Nevertheless, they deceived us when they encouraged men, sometimes from their helpers and sometimes our friends, to send private letters to us, requesting a truce with the state. This without there being any sign in these letters of any government officials (even the least of them) having an apparent hand in them.

Despite that, though I uncovered the tricks and knew about the deceit, I kept on answering these letters welcoming the saving of bloodshed, based on practising the noble shari'a and the implementation of the punishments of the shari'a. That was a lump in their throat and a mote in their eyes. I would remind whoever wrote to me that before the actual bloodshed between the Arabs and the Turks and before the occurrence of the successive Arab victories, I was in favour of peace, making its basic condition the practice of the shari'a and implementation of the punishments of the shari'a. I am surprised because I have not found a way to correspond with the state in a serious way now, so long as its officials behave in the way described above.

Perhaps honourable readers who wish to observe the faith after this will wonder about what would guarantee observance of agreements and non-violation of them, such as before. [The reader will also wonder] about how we could be convinced that such a thing would come about—were it to be that its implementation be imposed by the word of state officials of position and influence whose own aim was treachery. We leave the answer to this to our clever and knowledgable brothers in the faith. These are some of our matters which we have summed up clearly for you: whoever of our friends comes to us, after a difficult journey on rough roads, he knows what we are doing in our desert; establishing the rituals of religion and regular security to such an extent that one could almost believe that if a man left any of his possessions or goods on the public roads, no one would touch them and no one would covet them.

I need not describe the performance of prayers, Friday and communal prayers, and the remaining rituals of religion that follows from there, devoid of innovation and far from lies and

Figure 2.13.2.47 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad
paths of evil. Being in such a state, how can it enter the mind of a sensible person or circulate in the hearts of man, that which I have heard that they allege; that I am an evil hand manipulating wickedness and perhaps being manœuvred by a foreign power. I think that no sensible person could possibly imagine that.

I, however, think that the other states are fully aware that the Arabs are the strongest people in their religion (in particular the Yemeni Arabs) and that nothing unites them more than defence of the heart of the religion, honour and the Arab lands, as is well known. Those lands [the Arab lands] are filled with deserts, wildernesses and mountains. No one can expect to reap any harvest from them, that would justify the opening of a door which would cause much damage to them and which concerns Islam and the Muslims in the east and west, and which is one of the most special of their vital religious affairs,—that is the door of mockery of the legacy of the Messenger of God (may God bless him and grant him peace) and the two Caliphs who succeeded after him (may God be pleased with them both). This door touches one of the most important questions, about which there are many doubts and upon which many eyes are open. God is not unmindful of the acts of the oppressors.

Finally we beg God to set matters right and grant us success in all that is good and help us eliminate the germs of immorality and protect us from the sin of evildoers and cause us to be obedient. ‘So loose not heart, nor fall into despair; for you must gain mastery if you are believers’ [K 3:139].

Written 6 Rabi‘ II 1330 [25 March 1912]
Signed
Muḥammad *Ali al-Idrīṣī
2.14. The Treaty of Da‘ān of 8 October 1911

By this time, the Porte was in fact ready to delegate part of its authority to the local chiefs with a prime condition that they remain loyal to Istanbul and preserve the sovereignty of the state. This can be seen, for instance, in the unimplemented treaty with Al-Idrisi according to which he was promised the position of *Qaim Maqam*, or the appointment of Hassan Ibn ‘Aaydh as the assistant of the Ottoman *mutasarrif* in Asir in 1911, as well as the treaty concluded with Ibn Saud in May 1914 according to which he would become the *Wali* and commandant of Najd. However, the Da‘ān Treaty between the Porte and Imam Yahya remains, to a great extent, different from any of the others.

Indeed, although the Imam was given authority over part of the country only, this agreement with the Ottomans remains of significance. According to the agreement, the Imam was given full authority over the northern territories from ‘Amrān and, further north, to Sa‘adah. Shared authority with the Ottomans was granted to the Imam from the area south of ‘Amrān into the Sumarah, further south of Dhamār. The rest of the country remained under the sole authority of the Ottomans. It is possible that the Imam had accepted the agreement after being alarmed by the growth of Al-Idrisi’s power, aided by the support the latter received from Italy at the time. However, this was also a truce agreement that the Porte accepted because of the most serious rebellions they had to contend with in Yemen, at least since the rise of Imam Yahya in 1904. Indeed, while the other chiefs, Ibn ‘Aaydh, Al-Idrisi and Ibn Saud, through the agreements they accepted, were employed by the Porte, the Imam rather achieved recognition of his own power. (Salem, 1984: 516-518. Farah, 2002: pp. 297-298)
نص شروط الاتفاق (1)

الذي تم بين الإمام يحيى واللواء أحمد عزت باشا

المعروف باتفاق دان (2)

أول شهر ذي القعدة عام 1329 هـ (1911م)

يعتبر هذا الاتفاق رضيّة للطرفين المتنازعين - الإمام والسيانيين - وهو نتيجة مجهودات حربية وسلبية طويلة. وقد اعترف السيانيون في الإمام بالشخصية الخاصة وبعض النفوذ الذي اعتبره زعما لمالة دينية مبينة، والإتفاق في جملته عبارة عن مواد تنظيمية لتحديد العلاقة بين الإمام والسيانيين، وتحديد اختصاصات الولاء والوظائف السيانية، وتوضح مدى سيطرة العاصمة السيانية على ولاية اليمن، ونصت مواد الاتفاق كذلك على نظام الحكم هناك، وطريقة حكم الضرائب، وسير العمل في المماحة المختلفة، ومراقبة الشرطة الإسلامية في الدائرة المختارة، وغير ذلك من الأمور الإدارية (راجع ص 136).

1 - ينتخب الإمام حكاما لمذهب الوديد، وتبلغ الولاية ذلك، وهذ

تحت الأستانة لتصدق المشيخة على ذلك الاختيار.

2 - تشكّل محكمة إستثنائية للنظر في الشكاوى التي يعرضها الإمام.

3 - يكون مركز هذه المحكمة صنعاء، ويختار الإمام رئيسها وأعضاءها، وتصدق على تعيينهم الحكومة،

Figure 2.14.1 The Treaty of Da'an of 8 October 1911
The Treaty of Daʻān of 8 October 1911

Figure 2.14.2 The Treaty of Daʻān of 8 October 1911
The Treaty of Daʻān of 8 October 1911

Figure 2.14.3 The Treaty of Daʻān of 8 October 1911
Terms of the Truce of Da‘ān

- the imam to select judges of the Zaydis and to inform the administration thereof;
- the headquarters of the court is to be in Ṣan‘ā‘;
- a court of appeal to be organized to look into the complaints presented by the imam;
- decisions on punishment to be approved by the shaykhs, sent to Istanbul for approval after the judge fails to achieve reconciliation, and a decree of confirmation to be issued within four months;
- imam to have right to point out ill conduct of officials to the vali;
- government to have the right to appoint judges for Shāfi‘i and Ḥanafi Yemenis;
- mixed courts to be organized to look into disputes involving Zaydis and others;
- government to appoint supervisors for courts that seek to adjudicate disputes in villages of the countryside to lessen the burden of travelling to the locality of the fixed court;
- Waqfs and bequests to be under the jurisdiction of the imam;
- government to appoint Shāfi‘i and Ḥanafi judges outside mountain region;
- exempting for ten years levying and collecting taxes from the inhabitants of Arhab and Khawlān to compensate them for their poverty, property losses and their loyalty;
- mīrī levies to be collected according to provisions of the Sharī‘ah;
- complaints against tax collectors before the courts or government agencies should entail participation with the judges to investigate and pass necessary judgement;
- Zaydis should have the right to offer gifts to the imam, either directly or through shaykhs, or judges;
- the imam is obligated to surrender one-tenth of income to the state;

Figure 2.14.4 The Treaty of Da‘ān of 8 October 1911
- due to its poverty, the region of ‘Ans, which had suffered heavy devastation due to the fighting waged there, should be exempt from taxes for ten years; and
- the imam is to free hostages held from Ṣan‘ā’ and its environ, ‘Amrān and Ḥarāz.

Figure 2.14.5 The Treaty of Da‘ān of 8 October 1911
2.15. The Anglo-Idrisi Relationship

Al-Idrisi was the first Arab chief to throw his lot in with Britain, agreeing to join Britain’s war effort against the Turks. He signed with Britain the Treaty of Friendship and Goodwill of 30 April 1915. It is evident that he benefited from the support he received from Britain since the 1915 Treaty, especially as he was able to expand his domain and to attract tribes from different parts of Yemen including the tribes of Hashed and Bakail, considered the main supporters of the Imam Yahya.

2.15.1. The Anglo-Idrisi Treaty of Friendship and Goodwill (30 April 1915)

The treaty is available in (L/P&S/18/B 293 IOR, London), Arabic.
The Anglo-Idrisi Relationship

Figure 2.15.1.1 The Anglo-Idrisi Treaty of Friendship and Goodwill (30 April 1915)

Figure 2.15.2.1 Report on the 1915 Treaty with Al-Idrisi, Foreign and Political Department
this matter is safeguarded by the condition that the extension of the Idrisi’s territories should be at the expense of the Turks, and should be hereafter involve himself in a collision with other Arab Chiefs by an aggressive policy, we could point to this condition and disavow his action.

5. Further, it might have been desirable to insert a clause giving British and British Indian traders free access to the Idrisi’s ports, but this might legitimately be held to be a corollary of the pact of friendship which it is the object of the Treaty to consolidate.

6. As any further assistance in funds or munitions to the Idrisi is explicitly to be in accordance with the measure of the Idrisi’s activities, our responsibilities in this matter would appear to be sufficiently safeguarded.

7. We think, therefore, that although the Treaty as drafted is open to objection on the ground that it is neither very clear nor very concise, it will, if the small amendment suggested in paragraph 5 above be effected, adequately meet the requirements of the situation. We would ask, therefore, for authority to ratify it as it stands subject to this qualification.

To return it for extensive revision to our Political Resident would be to endanger the ultimate success of the negotiations, and would, at any rate, involve undesirable delay. If Your Lordship agrees, we should be glad of orders by telegraph.

We have, &c.,

My Lord MARQUES.

(Signed) HARBORNE OF FERNHURST,
BEACHPOMP DIFF.
R. W. CARLYLE.
B. A. IBAH.
W. H. CLARK.
R. H. CRADDOCK.
W. S. MEYER.
C. H. A. HILL.

No. C. 343, dated Aden Residency, the 1st May 1915 (Secret).

From Major-General D. G. L. Shaw, Political Resident, Aden, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

In sending you by this mail three copies of the Treaty signed by me and the Idrisi Saiyid for the ratification of the Government of India, I have the honor to state that the Idrisi representative will leave to-morrow for their country. They appear to mean business.

2. There is little left to be said. Paragraph 5 is the most important one, and is in accord with the cipher instructions received from you.

3. Paragraph 7. The precise details of assistance in funds and munition is expressly omitted at the request of Saiyid Mustafa and is done to avoid wounding Arab susceptibilities. A receipt in full for assistance given has however been obtained. The concluding portion of this paragraph is very inessential. Having begun a good work with so important a Chief, and one so innumerable to everything Turkish, it will be necessary to prosecute the matter a little further, but I was careful to insert the last nine words of the paragraph as showing the quid pro quo for which the Idrisi is responsible.

4. I would request that two ratified copies of the Treaty may be returned to me, one to be given to the Idrisi and the other for this office records.

This Treaty of Friendship and Goodwill is signed by Major-General D. G. L. Shaw, the Political Resident, Aden, on behalf of the British Government and by Saiyid Mustafa bin Saiyid Abdul ‘Ali on the part of His

Figure 2.155.2.2 Report on the 1915 Treaty with Al-Idrisi, Foreign and Political Department
Figure 2.155.2.3 Report on the 1915 Treaty with Al-Idrisi, Foreign and Political Department
2.15.3. Report by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob on his mission to Al-Idrisi in January 1916.

- This report was attached to a despatch from the Political Resident, Aden, to the Secretary to Government, Political Department, Bombay, 27 January 1916 (L/P&S, 18/ B 229, IOR, London).
SECRET.

From Brigadier-General C. H. U. Price, C.B., D.S.O., Political Resident, Aden, to the Secretary to Government, Political Department, Bombay.


Sir,

I have the honour to forward, with reference to my telegram No. 107 A.P. of 3rd January 1916, an interesting report of Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. Jacob, First Assistant Resident, on his visit, as my representative, to the Idrisi. I have forwarded copies of the report and of this letter direct to Foreign Department, Delhi, His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo, and His Majesty's Secretary of State for India. The Idrisi welcomed Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob and the officers who accompanied him most cordially, and I am confident that the mission and the reciprocation of views will bear good results.

2. The clauses of our Trade Policy were fully discussed seriatim. I am glad to say that the Idrisi is in accord with the terms of the policy, which are given in the accompanying Schedule. I trust they will meet with approval.

3. I was desirous of the question of trade between Idrisi ports and Jeddah being discussed, in which connection the Southern Red Sea Patrol has experienced some difficulty in controlling shore traffic. The reasons being that while our Policy prohibits shore plying between ports in this Administration and ports on the Southern Red Sea coast line, and while control has been assured over such traffic from Somaliland, French, and Italian ports, yet it does not interfere with shore traffic from ports in the Northern Red Sea area, including Jeddah, trading with Idrisi ports, and under which pretence there is little doubt they run their goods into enemy ports lying towards Jeddah.

This question was discussed, therefore, and it is noticed that the Idrisi appreciates the advantages, generally, of prohibiting this trade. It would seem that his apparent objection to it's cessation is based on material grounds, affecting the interests of his people in depriving them of a source of cheaper grain. In the circumstances it is advisable to drop the matter.

4. The export of kerosine oil to Mehed has been engaging my attention for some time. We have reduced consignments from Aden to within reasonable limits. The French and Italian authorities have met my representations and requests on this matter in a cordial spirit. I have addressed, also, the High Commissioner, Egypt, in connection with this export trade from ports in the Northern Red Sea area.

5. I am not in favour, at present, of exempting any of the enemy ports from the restrictions imposed by the trade Policy. We have experienced some disappointment already in this respect. From all information I have received the Arabs lay all the blame for their troubles upon the Turks and K. L. Z. A.

Figure 2.15.3.1 Report by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob on his mission to Al-Idrisi in January 1916.
not upon the British. It is well to foster this feeling. It is fairly certain, also, that the Turks will reap the benefit of such exemptions especially at Hodeida. Moreover, by exempting certain ports, blockade-running activities would start afresh, and as a natural consequence the labours of the Southern Patrol would increase south of the Idrisi coast line where ships trading is now well under control.

6. The Idrisi's request to assist one Salih Ahmed al Bahr of Huseiniya will receive consideration. It should have a good effect to accede to it. His desire for the presence of Salih Mustafa has been cabled to the High Commissioner, Egypt.

7. Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob recommends a decoration of Knighthood to be bestowed by Government on the Idrisi. Personally I think the honour now would be premature.

8. The Idrisi's favourable comments on Commander Crawford R.N., will be communicated to His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, Egypt, through the Senior Naval Officer, Aden.

9. I am indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob for the ability and tact with which he has conducted the Mission. He is a Political Officer of wide knowledge and experience of this country and a talented Arabic scholar.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed) C. H. U. Price, Brigadier-General,

Political Resident, Aden.

No. 58.
Copy forwarded, with compliments, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

(Signed) C. H. U. Price, Brigadier-General,

Political Resident, Aden.

As representative of the Political Resident, Aden, I arrived in H.M.S. Minto, Commander Crawford, R.N., at Jezan, at 12.30 noon on 6th instant. I was accompanied by Col. Wainhouse, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., R.E., who sought topographical information, and Major Bradshaw, General Staff Officer, who came to discover the military situation. The Political Resident’s letter of introduction was taken ashore, and later in the day, Muhammad bin Yulayn Ba Sahi, the Idrisi’s Wazir, came aboard to give us a welcome and to tender sheep and fowls as a present from the Idrisi. He said his master would see us after dark and on shore. I found that this manoeuvre was due to the Idrisi’s desire to disarm people’s prejudice against the foreigner. I remarked that the whole countryside knew of the treaty between the Idrisi and British Government and the close nexus and friendship existing and proved by the munificence given to the Idrisi on opening of his ports alone to traffic from Aden, Ejbouti, Massawa, and Asb. It is a commonplace that this preferential treatment has greatly enhanced the Idrisi’s prestige and importance in the Arab world. Earlier in the war, certain of the Idrisi’s riddles, it is said, were averse to his fighting the Turks, and although now the Turk has fallen in Arab estimation, the Idrisi thought it better not to deal too openly with non-Muslims lest the old feeling for the Turks should be reawakened. Again, the role of the Idrisi is a pious one and too great a familiarity with us might be misunderstood. To tell the truth, the Idrisi feared loss of caste. It is a fact, however, that during his past with Italy, so Italian officers were allowed to land on Idrisi soil, and before our arrival at Jezan, the only privileged person to land had been Commander Crawford of H.M.S. Minto on two occasions. For the same reasons the Idrisi would not board the Minto.

We got ashore after 6.30 p.m., when two or three officials met us and conducted us to a house hard by, where upstairs in an anteroom the Idrisi met us standing, and after salutations conducted us to an inner room, where himself seated on a couch, he gave us places on chairs each side. (The party included Commander Crawford, R.N., who was there to watch naval interests). His Wazir, Ba Sahi, was in attendance. This Minister will not allow his master to discuss matters except in his presence. I have known Ba Sahi for several years and have met him often in Aden. My impression is that the Idrisi depends on his advice and judgment. The Idrisi himself told me that all maritime and shipping affairs were in Ba Sahi’s hands; that he himself managed affairs inland. All through the interview, which lasted three hours, the Idrisi constantly turned to his Minister to seek corroboration of his views, and on many a subject touched he would say “For this, please deal with Ba Sahi.”

I next had an opportunity after the interview to talk a few minutes alone with the Idrisi. I asked him if Ba Sahi was not serving his own interests rather than his master’s. He replied rather dubiously and asked if I had any suspicion. He asserted that Ba Sahi was a good man. I quoted the tradition “Al Mustashar Mu’taman,” i.e., “It is incumbent to trust one whose advice you seek.” The Idrisi felt relieved and said these were his sentiments. I shall touch on Ba Sahi again later.

Southern Red Sea Potted Policy.—I discussed the revised Red Sea potted policy of 7th December 1911. The Idrisi asked that Khor al Birik (and not Ras Touf) be regarded as the northern limit of his coastal area for trade and Sahi as the southerly point, though he claims that his territory extends from Halfi Point to Buheir, a little south of Sahi. The trade between parts in this area he considers a most valuable asset to assure the goodwill of his maritime subjects. He was confident that no supplies could reach

Figure 2.155.3.3 Report by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob on his mission to Al-Idrisi in January 1916.
The Anglo-Idrisi Relationship

Figure 2.155.3.4 Report by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob on his mission to Al-Idrisi in January 1916.
are used by him to conciliate both his own outlying tribesmen, with many of whom the Imam has long been at enmity, and also tribes of neutral or friendly tribes outside the province of Awd.

Kerosene Oil.—This applies in a large measure to the supplies of kerosene oil, a commodity which, it is felt, solely for the Idriani tribesmen's particular use, is being shipped to Meidi for in excess of local requirements. It has been said that Arabs do not use this oil, but this is quite erroneous.

Even if the supplies imported into Meidi do in part find a Turkish military market the Turks are not in such great numbers to derive a marked advantage. The Imam's country supplies a large quota of supplies to the Turkish. Arabs armed against the Idriani forces in the neighborhood of Lohiya. To carry out our original policy of favouring the Arab to warn him from the Turk, it might not be unusual to allow the supply of goods to many a port, which though styled enemy is really supplied by Arabs who loathe the Turks. Hodeidah especially is in a very bad way and many Arabs have died there of starvation.

In this way trade would be stimulated, Arabia pleased, the British name popularized, as it was when Jedidah and Mecca were freely supplied, in spite of Turkish forces present in the Hijaz. Again, the work of the Southern Naval patrol would be made lighter and the ships would pay attention rather to the shipping of arms, ammunition, and specie.

Relative to the importance of separating Arab from Turk the Idriani asked if we would allow an occasional show to go from Aden or from Meidi to Al Tur (in Zemani port) with supplies from one Sayid Ahmed al Hadi, an influential man living inland at Haseniyah. The Zemani, he said, were largely pro-Turk but favour shown to so prominent a Suljik would be far-reaching. "What you sow to-day, you will harvest to-morrow," he said.

This is another instance of the Idriani's plan of reconciling the Arabs.

Port Clearances to Idrisi Dhora. With regard to the issue by him of Port Clearances to his dhows the Idriani was in full agreement. I explained to him the details these papers should show and emphasized the importance of a flag-paper to be carried by every dhow flying his flag. He has given me a drawing and wants a seal made for him.

Supplies to Turka. The Idriani assured me that no supplies were sent through his country to the Turks. Khartoum, he admitted, was the port selected by the enemy, and from there they went to Al Haid, the capital of the Turks, whereas the Turks were stationed. Khartoum, Lohiya and Khobra were the ports the Naval patrols should especially watch.

Firing on H.M.S. Lashan's Boats. I spoke to him of the two affairs a little south of Jizan where the Lashan chased dhows carrying specie, the crow landing and firing on the warship's boats. The Idriani referred me to Ha Sabi, but remarked that the coast line between his ports was not safe, and a good deal of smuggling was done there by enemy craft. The Idriani had arrested Said Musa of the Sheik of Al Haid, on suspicion of corresponding with the enemy at Hodeidah, but after a time released him as nothing could be proved.

Idrissi's animosity against Turks. I was very much impressed with Idriani's animosity against the Turks which I take is genuine. He acknowledged a mission from Esveer Pasha before the war, but he could no longer trust Turkish promises or Turkish faith. At the beginning of the war, when the Turks were brought into the area, the Idriani said that public opinion in Awd was in sympathy with them as Muslems, but now the aspect was changing. He, the Idriani, was glad the Turks had exposed the German cause, for this had weakened Arab respect for Turkey, since the Germans were distrusted as fighting for purposes of self-aggrandisement; they were faithless and unscrupulous, and Turkey was blamed for throwing in her lot with them. He was confident the Allies would win in the long run, but seemed apprehensive lest a peace be concluded which would leave the Turks in possession of their present territory in Arabia. He asked about the Dardanelles especially, but recognized the strength of the Dardanelles as they were.

Figure 2.155.3.5. Report by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob on his mission to Al-Idrissi in January 1916.
Idrisi Military Movements.—I asked him what he was actually doing with the enemy in his immediate frontier. As regards Lohiya he said he lacked guns to cope with the Turks and Arabs there. If he took Lohiya—and the occupation of the Banu Qanun tribe was a negligible quantity—he would become the target of a strong advance movement of Turks and Arabs aided by Imam Yahya, who he declared was actually aiding the Turks with supplies and men. He urged me to get him ammunition for his guns and he gave Major Bradshaw some specimen shells which perhaps can be had from captures made in Egypt and Mesopotamia. The Idrisi was very pleased with Government’s generosity in presenting him so much rifle ammunition, but his inactivity on this front is due to lack of gun ammunition. The Turkish positions on this front are strongly fortified. The Idrisi remarked he was holding up the enemy here who otherwise would be at Iaher.

Turkish Deserter.—Many Turkish deserters had come in from Asir and from Saana, and were living about Jezan and Meidi. Two of them—a Turk and an Arab—he handed over to us for conduct to Aden. He showed us a box of dynamite, which he alleged had been brought down to Jezan to destroy his house there. Idrisi’s treatment of deserters seemed lenient. I gathered this was due to Arab sentiment towards Modernism.

Idrisi’s Political Movements.—The Idrisi seemed politically very active in conciliating the tribesmen. He had just received a deputation of 500 Asir tribesmen in Jezan. He was treating with the people of Qamid also.

Hashid Wa Bakil.—The 1,000 rifles he requires from Pibidjilli he intends to give to his tribesman Rijal Al Ma, who inhabit his northern limit. He was equipping with the powerful tribes of Hashid wa Bakil, who I hear from other reliable sources are dissatisfied with the Imam’s movements. The Idrisi said that if Government would assist these people peculiarly they would come down en masse against the Turks. It was purely a question of bribery.

I interviewed in Aden some months ago an emissary of the Hashid tribe, who hinted that for a consideration they would willingly join the British. Any pacts made with the tribe might be done through the medium of the Idrisi.

Imam Yahya.—The Imam is a declared foe of the Idrisi ever since he joined the Turks before their war with Italy. Imam and Idrisi are not very friendly in spite of differences of creed, and the Idrisi said he might again be reconciled if Imam came half way to meet him.

As to the Najran province, the Idrisi said he was negotiating with them too. These people are of the Lomna persuasion and extremely hostile to Imam Yahya, though friendly to Turks, who had exposed their cause in times gone by against the Imam.

In short, the Idrisi’s work at the present moment is mostly diplomatic, and unless he gets gun ammunition I do not think he will be able to make any headway against Turks and Turistic Arabs. His progress in the field is indestructible. I remember meeting in Dangerous in 1913 Suleiman Pasha, the local Commandant. He was before that fighting the Idrisi in Asir, and he said he found him a difficult problem to solve. A fact he could not subdue him.

Sheriff of Mecca.—Idrisi discussed the Sheriff, and hinted to know his attitude towards the British. He affected to know nothing. He said he revered the Sheriff, whose territories once comprised the Idrisi domain, and it is correspondence with the famous tribesmen of Banu Tur. If he knew the Sheriff’s mind he would join forces with him, but feared to go up and find him openly siding the Turks. He believed that the Sheriff might be powerless just now to oppose the Turks, and was therefore forced to decline his friendship with them. The Banu Tur, however, he said, prime losers if the Medina railway were extended to Mecca, and it would be British policy to aid these people as much as to make it possible for them actively to oppose the railway construction.
Figures 2.15.3.7. Report by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob on his mission to Al-Idrisi in January 1916.

SEMUEL.—The Idrisi was anxious to know the Semuei’s attitude towards Great Britain. He believed they were hostile and he was surprised.

SAYYID MUSTAFA.—He asked me to write for the presence of Sayyid Mustafa whose advice was of paramount importance to him. He was now in Egypt.

IDRISI’S PERSON.—In person the Idrisi is tall and broad and of black complexion. Very courteous and suave and his manners highly polished. He was particularly friendly to us and spoke highly of the British Government and their attitude to the Muslim world. He struck me as rather intelligent, as is natural, looking to his upbringing and education at Al Azhar. He is, as befitting his position as head of the Ahmadiyya tariqa, an intensely religious man, and spends much of his time in religious exercises. He moves about but little in the daytime and conducts most of his business at night.

SHEIKH OF JEZAN.—The Sheikh of Jezan, one Bin Zamin, is a most agreeable old man and very friendly to our warships when they call.

SHEIKH MUHAMMAD YACHYA BA SAHI.—I have already said that all maritime and commercial matters are left to Ba Sahi. This is mentioned by Military Intelligence, Cairo, in its Secret telegram E.R. 327, dated 29th December 1916. His partner, Ba Zubeir, lives at Medini, and these two control the flow of supplies in various directions. Ba Sahi is no lover of the Turks. I think his unique position and the estimation in which he is held by the Idrisi makes him a natural butt for the criticisms of the envious. We have long suspected Ba Sahi to be working for his own private ends, and he is doubtless a wealthy man. It is not feasible to contrive his removal. Nothing has so far been proved of Ba Sahi’s nefarious acts.

HOW TO IDRISI.—I will sum up this already lengthy report by pressing the importance of assisting the Idrisi by every means possible, with guns and by largesse, to impress the tribesmen. I believe it to be a sound investment. I would further suggest he be decorated by Government with a Knighthood. This honour would encourage him and elicit better work. A religious title might, however, be more greatly esteemed.

COMMANDER CRAWFORD, R.N.—Finally, I would eulogise the excellent work, great tact and affability towards the Arabs displayed by Commander Crawford, R.N., who is very popular in those parts, and who with the Officers of his Ship has been for so long a time in a trying climate and very difficult waters. The Idrisi spoke highly of this Officer, the first one privileged to land on Idrisi soil.

H. F. Jacob, Lieutenant-Colonel,
First Assistant Resident, Aden.

17th January 1916.
Policy for His Majesty's Ships in the Southern Red Sea Patrol.

All Southern Red Sea Arabian ports are closed for trade with the following exception, viz.:

(i) All goods carried from Aden, Perim, and Kamaran to Medi and rice radd which will be taken by Cowasjee, Dinshaw, and Brothers' steamers and by no other means.

(ii) Goods from Djibouti, Massowah, and Assab in French and Italian dhows respectively will be carried between those ports and Medi and to none other Idrisi port. These dhows, however, will report to Port Officer, Kamaran, en route both ways to obtain special clearances. Any dhow found transgressing this order will be detained by naval patrols.

(iii) Inter-trade between Idrisi ports lying between and including Khor al Birk and Hahl will be permitted in the Idrisi's own dhows alone, and his Nakudus will be furnished by Idrisi port officials with proper port clearances, flags, papers, and manifests. Failing this measure they will become liable to seizure.

(iv) All ports lying between and inclusive of Khor al Birk and Hahl will be open to dhow trade from the Northern Red Sea Patrol area inclusive of Jeddah. All such Idrisi ports will be allowed to trade by dhows with ports in the Northern Red Sea Patrol inclusive of Jeddah, but such dhows must be furnished in the same manner as in clause (iii), with proper port clearances, flags, papers, and manifests. Failure to comply with this measure will entail seizure.

(v) Goods will be allowed to pass by dhows from Aden to Djibouti and Obock, but only under special guarantee.

Aden Residency
C. H. U. Fuce, Brigadier-General
Political Resident, Aden.
27th January 1916.

Figure 2.155.3.8. Report by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob on his mission to Al-Idrīsī in January 1916.
2.15.4. **Report by the General Staff Officer, Aden Brigade, on Colonel Jacob’s visit to Al-Idrisi**

Colonial Jacob visited Al-Idrisi in Jizān, in January 1916. This report on the visit was attached to a despatch from the Political Resident, Aden, to the Secretary to Government, Political Department, Bombay, 29 January 1916 (L/P&S, 18/ B 228, IOR, London).
SECRET.

From Brigadier-General C. H. U. Price, C.B., D.S.O., Political Resident, Aden, to the Secretary to Government, Political Department, Bombay.

No. C. 95. Aden Residency,

29th January 1916.

Sir,

In continuation of my letter No. C. 80, dated the 27th January 1916, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a letter No. 4657 G.O., dated 29th Idem, from the General Officer Commanding, Aden, to the Chief of General Staff, Delhi, forwarding a report from the General Staff Officer, Aden Brigade, who accompanied Colonel Jacob on his recent visit to the Idrisi Said.

I am forwarding copies of this letter and its accompaniments direct to His Majesty’s Secretary of State for India, the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi, and His Britannic Majesty’s High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &c.,

C. H. U. PRICE, Brigadier-General,
Political Resident, Aden.

Aden Residency,
29th January 1916.

No. C. 96.

Copy forwarded, with compliments, to His Majesty’s Secretary of State for India, London.

I have, &c.,

C. H. U. PRICE, Brigadier-General,
Political Resident, Aden.

From the General Officer Commanding, Aden, to the Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, Delhi, India.

4657/55/G.O.

Headquarters, Aden,
29th January 1916.

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 107 A.P. of 3rd instant, I have the honour to submit an extract of a report by Major C. H. Bradshaw, General Staff, Aden, on the Idrisi movement from a military point of view.

2. During November last, the Idrisi informed us of his dispositions, from which it was understood that his intention was to seize Lahiya. He was offered naval co-operation to achieve this object. He pointed out that though the Turks lightly held that place, they assured its safety by the presence of Turkish-Arab forces, well equipped in guns, in strong natural positions flanking his communications to the east and south, and though seizure of the town by coup-de-main would not be a difficult operation, it would result in his own discomfiture, unless his enemies were first ousted from their positions in the hill tracts, which he was not strong enough to effect. This summed up his appreciation of the situation.

3. Shortly after, his force was pressed back to its present position. It is apparent that the Idrisi has no thought of resuming the offensive. He is devoting his attention to consolidating his political influence, and to winning over influential tribes, through the assistance offered to him by our treaty and trade policy.
4. He is still of material assistance to us in winning Arabs from the Turks by these means and in detaining Turkish troops who otherwise might be spared for service at Lahej. Our latest information indicates, however, that one battalion, if not two battalions, have been withdrawn from the Idrissi frontier and are en route for Lahej.

5. In the matter of assisting the Idrissi with rifles and ammunition, previous enquiries from the Idrissi and his Agent have elicited that the Idrissi possessed Italian rifles and Le Gras in equal proportion. It would appear the Italian rifles for outnumber the French. The Idrissi has several times pressed us to obtain Western ammunition for these Italian rifles. The Italian Government, however, have expressed their inability to provide any. I am not aware of any other source of supply, and yet without it a large number of the Idrissi's armed retainers will become ineffective gradually. I would ask if there is any possibility of this ammunition being manufactured for issue to the Idrissi on payment. A million rounds of Le Gras have been sent to the Idrissi during the course of the War. A consignment of another million has just been received, which it is intended to retain for the present.

6. The Idrissi has not requisitioned upon us for rifles until recently, when he urgently asked for 1,000 Le Gras rifles on payment wherewith to arm the Rijal-al-Ma, a tribe on his Northern territory. Djibouti cannot supply this rifles now, and the Secretary of State for India has been requested to approach the French Government with a view to the demand being met.

7. Though our assistance to the Idrissi has been confined hitherto to supplying him with rifle ammunition and a few rifles, I think it essential that we should help him with gun ammunition. There is some reason to believe that the passive rôle he has assumed is not wholly unprofitable by want of confidence to meet his enemies with lack of gun ammunition. Major Brudshaw has brought with him patterns of the shells such as the Idrissi requires, and I would suggest that I may be informed by cable to whom I should send these shells for report as to the possibility of obtaining a supply.

8. Major Brudshaw reports that the Idrissi possesses some 3,000 Turkish Mauser rifles for which he has a scant supply of ammunition. If there is any captured stock of this ammunition in Mesopotamia I would suggest that a consignment be sent to me to keep in hand for issue when considered desirable.

I have, &c.,
C. H. U. Punch, Brigadier-General,
Commanding at Aden.

The Secretary to Government,
Political Department, Bombay.

Copies of the report and letter sent to:
The Secretary of State for India.
The Secretary in the Foreign Department, Delhi.
The High Commissioner, Cairo.
Extract from a Report by Major C. R. Bradshaw, General Staff, Aden.

**Regarding the Idrisi.**

When at Gaizan, not knowing Arabic, I was unable to understand the conversation with him at the meeting, but from the answers to questions, which were asked at my request, and from enquiries I made through the other means available, I came away with the following impressions from a military point of view:

That military operations were not uppermost in the mind of the Idrisi or of his Prime Minister. He appears to have withdrawn his tribesmen within his own sphere of influence to the south, that is, approximately along the Wadi Ain. His own fighting men seem to be back on the line Buhais-Kidf-al-Butri, and the guns and the bulk of his own men, other than tribesmen, in the Medi district.

The Turks or the Turkish Arabs do not seem to have followed up the Idrisi force as it retired in November 1915 from Ghanda and Waykla, but to have remained in their former positions, having received somewhat of a severe check from the Idrisi force, sufficient probably to discourage any offensive against them.

The main route from the north to the south is that from Medi and Bughleen, Kidf-al-Butri, and thence to Haigha and to Zehra and Lahiya. The Turks and Turkish Arabs have not outposts further north than the general line Der Shama-Irb, and are disposed at the important junctions in Wadi Shala and along the Wadi Mousa. That is in their former positions.

The Idrisi and his Prime Minister appeared to have no notion of the number (tiulur) of the Turkish battalions or regiments. The only facts that appeared to be impressed on their minds were that the Turks were much stronger than they are in artillery, and that the Turks had about 3,000 fighting men available. These were not collected, but dispersed as stated above. They also said that the Turks had no really senior officer anywhere up in their direction, and that the senior officer—Lieutenant-Colonel Raghib Bey—is a very poor commander, whom they did not fear in the least. Some Turks were acknowledged to be still with the Imam at Sanaa. The proportion of Syrian Arabs in the Turkish battalions is great, in most cases as much as fifty per cent. The Arab portion are discontented with the Turks judging by the remarks of an Arab deserter, who was handed over with an Asiatic Turk. He said they received no pay and the Turks got everything first and last. He said they were longing to get rid of them.

The Imam and the Turkish commander at Abha appear to be able to correspond occasionally by the inland route Sadaq-Abha, but this can only be done when a trustworthy Bedouin can be got to take the letter. Otherwise, this route is still closed to the movement of troops, supplies, or correspondents in any appreciable amount.

My general impression is that there is “nothing doing” in the military line in Asir now, that is, nothing of an offensive character against the Turks, but the mere fact that the Idrisi is hostile to the Turk, and an enemy of the Imam, has a military advantage for us. From what I could gather,

*At our request by the Idrisi.*

Figure 2.155.4.3 Report by the General Staff Officer, Aden Brigade, on Colonel Jacob’s visit to Al-Idrissi
there are still seven battalions locked up in the triangle Hadikiah-Sama-

* About 20 (Field and Mountain) - Lohiyah, with a certain number of guns and ammunition. This is what has been estimated to be there. As long as the Idrissi retains his hostility to the Turks and to the Imam this number of battalions is likely to be retained in the north.

I further got the impression that the Idrissi does not intend to do anything more for the present, except to remain in comparative readiness. His attitude is attributable to two main reasons:—

(1) He is not at all sure who is going to win the war, and like all smaller potentates, he does not want to commit himself further before he is reasonably sure.

(2) He really is not in a position to take on the Turks with any certainty of success, as although he has a great many rifles and an equal or even greater number of guns than the Turks on his southern frontier, yet he has a limited number of rounds for the Italian guns and rifles, and, what is more, he sees no prospect of obtaining any further supplies for these.

His guns, except for five captured from the Turks, are all Italian, and he states that he has only 100 to 150 rounds per gun left. He intimated that he could not do anything with this amount. This is quite natural, for these rounds are all that really stand between him and the possibility (military) of all his tribesmen being subdued by the Turks. The Turks have subdued and hold the Yemen by their guns; they are usually much inferior in rifle power to the Arabs, that is in the number of riflemen they can send out with their guns, the Arab being an equally good (or bad) shot as compared with the Turk. The Idrissi cannot be really expected, therefore, to do any more unless he can be assured of an ammunition supply for his guns. The following is the number of guns he acknowledges as having:—

1 heavy, Italian.
10 field, Italian.
10 mountain, Italian.
5 mountain, Turkish (captured) 50 rounds per gun only.

His position as regards rifles is almost as unsatisfactory. He states that by far the greater number of his rifles are also Italian, the number quoted being 20,000. For these he has only 600 boxes of 1,000, i.e., 32 rounds per rifle.

If he had all these rifles in his own land this would enable him to equip 3,000 men with 300 rounds, which is not much, when there is no reserve behind them. (The Arab is apt also to waste ammunition in fun-de-jours, &c.) Besides this I believe that the majority of these rifles have already been distributed among his tribesmen, who must all be given some ammunition, if any of them are going out to fight.

He stated that he had got two to three thousand Mousser (Turkish) and four thousand Le Gras rifles. It is only for the latter that he has a good supply of ammunition owing to the arrangements made by Government. He has also a few hundred Martini and some ammunition. He seems to thoroughly realise how unsound his admixture of rifles is, and the difficulties of ammunition supply of such a mixture, but as long as we cannot help him

Figure 2.155.4.4. Report by the General Staff Officer, Aden Brigade, on Colonel Jacob’s visit to Al-Idrissi
Figure 2.155.4.5. Report by the General Staff Officer, Aden Brigade, on Colonel Jacob’s visit to Al-Idrisi
2.15.5. **British commitments to the Idrisi**

Memorandum on British commitments to the Idrisi by the Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, November 1918, (CAB 24/68/85, TNA, London and L/P&S, 18/ B 293, IOR, London).
MEMORANDUM ON BRITISH COMMITMENTS TO THE IDRISI.

THE Idrisi had for many years before the war been de jure the independent ruler of a tract of the Arabian Peninsula on the borders of Asir and Yemen. From this tract he had effectively excluded the Turks, with whom he was in a chronic state of war, and during the Turco-Italian war of 1911-12 the Italians entered into relations with him, and supplied him with arms.

On the other hand, his independence had never been recognised by foreign Powers; and in the division of the Arabian Peninsula into a Turkish and a British sphere, effected by the Anglo-Turkish Conventions of the 39th July, 1913, and 9th March, 1914, the Idrisi's country was implicitly recognised by His Majesty's Government as being under the sovereignty of Turkey.

The fact, however, that the Idrisi possessed a coastline and two ports—Mekid and Jiesan—over which the Turks had no control, brought him into direct relations with foreign governments on commercial matters, and he was in touch with His Majesty's Resident at Aden.

In August 1918 he sent his Minister to Aden to discover His Majesty's Government's attitude towards him (in view, no doubt, of the Anglo-Turkish Convention concluded shortly before). And he again had a confidential agent at Aden in September 1914. At that time Turkey had not intervened in the war, but her attitude was already threatening, and on the 11th September, 1914, the Resident at Aden accordingly telegraphed to Bombay suggesting that overtures to the Idrisi should be made by His Majesty's Government on the following lines:

"We could make Idrisi an offer of protection and friendship and a distinct adjudication of his claims against Imam; we could also make over to him Farsan, which was his property once and which was taken by Porte; also we would leave upon his ports Mekid, Hasib, and Djecan."

The Idrisi, the Turks, and the Imam of Sanas were engaged in a three-cornered duel, and, in the event of war with Turkey, it was clearly His Majesty's Government's interest to obtain the co-operation against the Turks of at least one, and if possible both, of the two Arab rulers. The Turks, however, made a very high bid for the Imam's friendship, and it rapidly became clear that he would not take sides with us against them. In these circumstances the establishment of relations with the Idrisi became essential.

On the 30th October, 1914, the Resident telegraphed to the Government of India, reporting that the Idrisi's agent had assured him that the Idrisi had not come to terms with the Imam and would never do so with the Turks, and proposing that a verbal message should be sent through the agent.

This proposal was transmitted by the Viceroy to the India Office in a telegram of the 1st November, 1914:

"It seems desirable that negotiations with Idrisi's agent should immediately be commenced by Resident on lines proposed in his telegram of the 11th ultimo with these modifications. He should offer our protection and friendship and good offices to Idrisi, but not an adjudication of settlement of differences with Imam, also protection of his ports Djecan, Mekid, and Hasib. Restoration to him of Farsan in event of war might be hinted but not promised by Resident. In negotiating with Idrisi Resident should be warned to do nothing likely finally to estrange Imam, who appears to be wavering."

[Handwritten note: This Draft was received, dated August 1914, to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

Reference to trade between Aden and Idrisi ports in 1918/19.


214/21/14 and 214/28/14.

6844/21/14 and 6844/28/14.]

[884]
On the 31st October, 1914, the India Office, anticipating the above telegram, had telegraphed instructions to the Viceroy, regarding the Resident’s proposal, as follows:—

“His Majesty’s Government are unwilling, subject to anything which you may have to say, to commit themselves to a definite offer to the Idrisi, fulfilled of which they may be unable to enforce even in the most favourable circumstances, and they are not prepared to undertake adjudication of details between his claims and those of the Imam. His Majesty’s Government will, however, be glad to exercise their good offices in bringing the two parties together . . . . Assurance should be given to the Idrisi that Great Britain and her Allies will not touch the Holy Places or Jeddah, and that they have no intention of giving naval action which will affect his ports. In the general settlement on the conclusion of the war, he may count upon their diplomatic assistance to secure his autonomy. You may promise him such arms and ammunition as can be spared by you.”

Their instructions differed from the Viceroy’s in omitting all mention of the Fazan Islands, a point in which the Foreign Office concurred and on which specific instructions were sent to the Viceroy by the India Office on the 7th November, 1914.†

Meanwhile, on the 4th November, 1914, the Resident had telegraphed that the Idrisi’s agent was leaving Aden to communicate to the Idrisi the terms of the Viceroy’s telegram of the 1st November, 1914, and that it was urgent that the negotiations should be carried through.‡

On the 21st November, 1914, the Idrisi wrote to the Resident expressing approval of the suggestion that the Arabs should unite against the Turks, thanking His Majesty’s Government for the promise to send him arms and to leave his ports unblockaded, and asking that his independence should be assured, and a reliable representative sent to discuss the preliminaries for an agreement.§

In view of this letter, the Government of India made the following proposals to the India Office in a telegram dated the 20th December, 1914 ||:

“A reply might, we consider, be sent to the Resident, either by a letter or through a reliable source, to the effect that Idrisi’s expressions of friendship have been received with satisfaction by the British Government, who are prepared to give him a guarantee of independence if he succeeds definitely in effecting a union of his Arabs against the Turks and in preventing their use of his country as a base of operations against Great Britain; also that the extent to which he co-operates will determine the question of any further reward.”

And on the 28th December, 1914, the India Office, with the concurrence of the Foreign Office, accordingly instructed the Viceroy by telegram as follows ¶:

“The Imam’s attitude leaves us no alternative but to give him a guarantee of independence to Idrisi, and I therefore approve your proposals, although the guarantee exceeds assurances sanctioned in my telegram of the 31st October.”

On the 29th January, 1915, the Resident reported that the Idrisi’s Minister had arrived at Aden to negotiate, and on the 30th January, 1915, that the Idrisi had joined the Iraak Islands, forestalling the British Navy, ||

On the 3rd February, 1915, the Resident telegraphed as follows §§:

“The Idrisi’s Minister here is quite prepared to attack the Turks at once . . . . He asks for a protectorate treaty with us, and wants arms and ammunition immediately, and a sum of money to further his object . . . . Terms of any subsequent treaty need only include his security against attack by sea, and a promise of diplomatic support after the war to secure autonomy against his rival, the Imam.”

In reply to this telegram, the Government of India sent the Resident instructions, of which they informed the India Office on the 4th February, 1915 §§:

“We have . . . authorised Resident to negotiate treaty with Idrisi on understanding that this is subject to confirmation of Government of India, and that any terms likely finally to alienate Imam while still wavering are avoided.”

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Figure 2.155.5.2 Memorandum on British commitments to the Idrisi by the Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, November 1918
Figure 2.155.5.3. Memorandum on British commitments to the Idrisi by the Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, November 1918
It might also be urged that, by allowing the Idrisi, under article 3, to extend his territories, and, at the same time, under article 5, guaranteeing his independence hereafter, we may be bringing ourselves into an embarrassing position vis-à-vis other Arab chiefs, but our position in this matter is safeguarded by the condition that the extension of the Idrisi’s territories should be at the expense of the Turks, and, should he hereafter involve himself in a collision with other Arab chiefs by an aggressive policy, we could point to this condition, and disavow his action.

“Further, it might have been desirable to insert a clause giving British and British Indian traders free access to the Idrisi’s ports, but this might legitimately be held to be a corollary of the pact of friendship which it is the object of the treaty to consolidate.

“As any further assistance in funds or munitions to the Idrisi is explicitly to be in accordance with the measure of the Idrisi’s activities, our responsibilities in this matter would appear to be sufficiently safeguarded.

“We think, therefore, that, although the treaty as drafted is open to objection on the ground that it is neither very clear nor very concise, it will, if the small amendment suggested (in the first paragraph quoted) above be effected, adequately meet the requirements of the situation. We would ask, therefore, for authority to ratify it as it stands, subject to this qualification. To return it for extensive revision to our Political Resident would be to endanger the ultimate success of the negotiations, and would, at any rate, involve undesirable delay. If Your Lordship agrees, we should be glad of orders by telegraph.”

In answer to this, the India Office, with the concurrence of the Foreign Office, telegraphed to the Viceroy as follows on the 21st June, 1915——

“His Majesty’s Government approve treaty with substitution of words ‘Western Arabia.’ We prefer this not so much because of Mesopotamia as because of Sheikh Saiyid, which it may be necessary to annex after war, and which we regard as Southern rather than Western Arabia. This possibility should be borne in mind in any language used to Arabia.”

And these instructions were transmitted by the Government of India to the Resident at Aden in a telegram dated the 24th June, 1915. Copies of the treaty, which had been forwarded from Aden to Simla on the 1st May, 1915, were now sent back on the 28th June, 1915, for this alteration to be made; but on the 20th July, 1915, the Resident reported that it was not possible at that stage to get hold of the signatories.

On the 23rd August, 1915, the Resident reported further that, in the Arabic text of the treaty, the counterpart to the English words “Arabian soil” (Art. 6) was “the Yemen.”

“It was explained to Saiyid Mustafa, the signatory of the treaty, who is now here, that the word ‘Yemen’ was not an adequate translation of the amended English, but he did not approve of any alteration. He remarked that, were the British Government to annex Sheikh Said, Mokha or Hodeida, his master would be only too pleased, as he indeed was at our occupation of Kamaran.

“In these circumstances, it is not considered politic to amend the Arabic reading. The English wording is of course authoritative.

“It does not seem therefore necessary to re-write the treaty, for such a course would create suspicion among the Arab mind.”

In view of this despatch the Viceroy telegraphed as follows to the India Office on the 9th October, 1915——

“We do not consider use of term Yemen in the Arab text open to serious objection. Should we desire to take over Sheikh Said, our action would be justifiable, in view of Arab and Turkish acts of aggression, under a broad interpretation of clause 6 of the proposed treaty. We therefore suggest immediate ratification.”

And this was approved by the India Office, with the concurrence of the Foreign Office, on the 23rd October, 1915——

“The Treaty was accordingly ratified by the Viceroy in Council on the 9th November, 1915, with the substitution of the words ‘Western Arabia’ for ‘Arabian soil’ in the English text, but with no alteration in the Arabic.

Figure 2.155.5.4. Memorandum on British commitments to the Idrisi by the Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, November 1918
Figure 2.155.5.5. Memorandum on British commitments to the Idrisi by the Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, November 1918
In practice, however, any improvement of our position at Aden would affect not the Sherif and the Idrisi, but the Imam. And though the former may find it necessary in public to avoid signing away Moslem soil to the unbeliever, or Arab soil to the foreigner, they would neither of them be sorry to see their rival, the Imam, weakened by an extension of British power at his expense. In fact, the Imam’s Minister has, in private, quite frankly adopted this point of view. (1932/36/16.) The real struggle over the Aden boundary will come in our negotiations with the Imam, and in this case lack of precision might be fatal. Apart from the Imam, we have to consider France, with her claims to the Aden; but we have safeguarded ourselves here by the reservation attached to the self-denying proviso in article 10 of the Anglo-French Agreement of the 16th May, 1916. The two Powers agree “neither to acquire themselves, nor to consent to a third Power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian Peninsula. . . . This, however, shall not prevent such readjustment of the Aden frontier as may be necessary in consequence of recent Turkish aggression.”

We are safeguarded against Italy also by her inclusion in the provisions of the above article, under article 7 of the Italian Agreement of the 18th August, 1917. As regards our dealings at Aden, therefore, the present treaty with the Idrisi may be regarded as reasonably satisfactory.

APPENDIX.

Text of Treaty of April 30, 1915.

This Treaty of Friendship and Goodwill is signed by Major-General D. G. L. Shaw, the Political Resident, Aden, on behalf of the British Government; and by Sayid Mustafa-bin-Sayid Abdul Ali, on the part of His Highness Sayid Muhammad-bin-Al-Bin-Muhammad-Bin-Ahmed-bin-Idris the Idrisi Sayid, and Amir of Shaib and its environs.

2. The said objects are to war against the Turks, and to consolidate a pact of friendship between the British Government and the Idrisi Sayid, above mentioned, and his tribesmen.

3. The Idrisi Sayid agrees to attack and to endeavor to drive the Turks from their stations in the Yemen and to hand over his power to the Turkish troops in the direction of the Yemen and to extend his territories at the expense of the Turks.

4. The Sayid’s prime objective will be against the Turks only, and he will obtain from any hostile or provocative action against Imam Yahiya, so long as the latter does not join hands with the Turks.

5. The British Government undertakes to safeguard the Idrisi Sayid’s territories from all attack on the sea-board from any enemy who may molest him; to guarantee his independence in his own domain, and at the conclusion of the war to use every diplomatic means to adjust the relations between the rival claims of the Idrisi Sayid and the Imam Yahiya or any other rival.

6. The British Government has no desire to enlarge its borders in Western Arabia, but wishes solely to see the various Arab rulers living peacefully and amicably together, each in his own sphere, and all in friendship with the British Government.

7. As a mark of appreciation of the work to be performed by the Idrisi Sayid, the British Government has added him with both funds and munitions, and will continue to assist him in the prosecution of the war so long as it lasts, in accordance with the promise of the Idrisi’s activities.

8. Finally, while maintaining a strict blockade on all Turkish ports in the Red Sea, the British Government has for some months past been giving the Idrisi Sayid full and free scope to trade and traffic between his ports and Aden, and this concession the British Government, in token of the friendship existing, will continue uninterruptedly to maintain.

9. This treaty will be held to be valid after its ratification by the Government of India.

Signed this day, Friday, the 30th April, 1915 A.D., corresponding with the 13th of Jamad Shawal 1335 Hijra.

D. G. L. SHAW, Major-General, Political Resident, Aden.

H. F. JACOB, Lieutenant-Colonel, First Assistant Resident.

C. R. BRADSHAW, Major-General, Staff Officer, Aden Brigade.

Signed in vernacular, on behalf of the Idrisi Sayid:

SAIYID MUSTAFA-BIN-SAIYID ABDUL ALLI.

Signed in vernacular:

SHERIF MOHAMMAD-BIN-AWAD BA SALN.

HARDINGE OF PENSBURGH, Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

This treaty was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council at Delhi on the 4th day of November A.D. 1915.

A. H. UL-BEIT, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department.
2.16. FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs.

This memorandum was prepared for the FO by Mr W. J. Childs in spring 1916, and would be updated in May 1935. While it confirmed that Asir formed the fourth district of the Vilayet of Yemen, it could be considered as an early text in which Asir was regarded as a separate entity due to it being located beyond the Ottomans’ control. Furthermore, seven autonomous areas in the Arabia Peninsula were identified, among them Al-Idrisi’s control over Asir (FO 371/ 6238, TNA, London. Schofield, 1993: Vol.4. pp. 102-120).
THE SEVEN INDEPENDENT ARABIAN STATES.

The purpose of this paper is to give a brief outline of each of the seven independent Arabian States at the time of the Arab rising against the Turks in June 1916. As the part played by the rulers of these States depended largely on the physical character and economic resources, the manner and life of the people and the form of faith held by them, it has been necessary to touch upon these factors. The regions of South-Eastern Arabia, including the Aden Protectorate, the Hadramaut, the Sultanate of Oman, the Trucial Coast and Qatar, which are in effect cut off from the remainder of the peninsula by the Great Desert, and therefore played little part in the ambitions of the greater Arab rulers and the consequent political and military issues, are excluded.

The seven autonomous areas referred to are:

1. The Imamate of the Yemen ruled by the Imam Yahya.
2. The Principate of Asir ruled by the Idrisi.
3. The Emirate of Mecca (or the Hejaz) ruled by Husein, Emir and Sherif of Mecca.
4. The Emirate of Nejd, ruled by Ibn Saud, Emir of Riyadh.
5. The Sheikdom of Kuwait, ruled by the Sheikh of Kuwait.
6. The Emirate of Jebel Shammar, ruled by Ibn Rashid, Emir of Hail.
7. The vague territory containing the Oasis of Jauf, and various outlying oases, in possession of Nuri Bey esh Shalan, Paramount Chief of the Ruwala.

At the time of the outbreak of war in 1914 these seven States were more or less autonomous areas. Each area was vaguely defined, each peopled by a group of loosely united tribes, and each governed by a personal ruler who received the varying degrees of allegiance, which the self-interest of the tribes prompted and which the ruler found possible or politic to enforce. Each area, except those of Jebel Shammar, Kuwait and Jauf, had a distinct political history extending back for more than a century, and, in the case of Mecca, for many centuries. Each had political aspirations prompted, not only by the ambitions of its rulers, but by obvious considerations of advantages for the tribal group, and each had its own particular and traditional enemies and allies. In differing degree, too, these embryonic States were subjected to exterior influence, exerted chiefly by the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain.

I.—The Imamate of the Yemen.

Though chiefly a mountainous country, the Yemen is the most fertile and closely settled area in Arabia, and in 1916 contained a population of about a million. The capital is Sana. The inhabitants of the highland Yemen, a race of hardy and warlike cultivators, hold the Zeid creed, a schismatic form of Shi'ahism judiciously modified in the direction of Sunnism. The lowland population, on the other hand, are chiefly Orthodox Sunnis. In theory the position of the ruling Imam is that of an elective spiritual leader, but in practice the office has tended to become hereditary.

Turkish administration regarded the Yemen as part of the Turkish vilayet of the name. The whole vilayet comprised the three sanjaks of Sana, Hodeida and Taiz in the mediatised province of the Yemen; the fourth, Asir, formed part

(1) This memorandum was prepared by the late Mr W. J. Childs and found among his papers. A few modifications and additions have been made to bring it up to date. May 1915.
(2) Complications existed in consequence of a custom well recognised in Arabia by which tribes occupying land within one autonomous area would sometimes prefer to give theoretical allegiance to the ruler of another autonomous area, as being more distant and therefore less likely to exercise an unwelcome authority.
Figure 2.166.2 FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs
FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs.

Figure 2.166.3 FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs
of Khaihar. This boundary was accepted by the Ottoman Government and supported by the demands of religious prejudice, which forbade Christians to use the Hejaz Railway farther south than Medain Saleh, just outside the lower boundary in question, unless for special official reasons. The Hejaz, so defined, is a general barrenness due to lack of moisture. Oases are few and small; the largest one in which Medina is located is one mile. Only a small fraction of the population is settled in towns and on the land; the remainder are Bedouins, partly or wholly nomadic.

Various circumstances combined to place the Hejaz in a position by itself among the autonomous areas of Arabia. It is the Holy Land of Islam, and its two holy cities of Mecca and Medina, respectively the birthplace and burial place of the Prophet, are the chief shrines of pilgrimage for the great Sunni sects of the Mahometan faith, and the present mechanism has determined the whole story of the country. The annual pilgrimage of thousands of pilgrims, coming from all parts of the world, has provided the means of existence for a large proportion of the population. The extension of the Holy Places from Mecca to Medina in 1908, and the Hejaz more accessible to Turkish arms than any other portion of Arabia, was effective only after a period of time has elapsed. The importance of the Holy Places in the world of Islam conferred upon the holder of the Emirate of Mecca, which included the Hejaz, a standing and influence vastly greater than that of a merely local Arabian ruler. The position of the Emir and Sheriff(*) of Mecca, indeed, combined both temporal and religious power. For the “reigning head of the domain, sheriff family is ex officio Chief of the Prophet’s tribe, the Qureish, and Hereditary Keeper of the Holy Place.”

The Emirate of Mecca dates from the 10th century and was an outcome of the disintegration which overtook the early caliphate. From that period until the close of the 18th century the Emirate was always the de facto power in the Hejaz. The Ottoman effort to exercise suzerainty, which began in 1538, was effective only while the high fighting prestige of Turkish arms lasted. From the 18th century the Hejaz also declined, until, in 1783, it was represented by a single garrison, precariously holding the port of Jeddah. But from this time the Emirate was confronted by dangers more serious than any heretofore. The Pilgrims of the Haj were first attacked by Wahabi raiders from Nejd in 1783, an outrage repeated in subsequent years, despite the Emir’s efforts to put down the Wahabis. In 1803 a Wahabi expedition took and sacked Mecca itself, and, as an incident of the raid, beheaded twenty sheriffs. In 1804 another expedition assaulted and took Medina. At this stage the great pilgrim caravans from all parts of the Mahometan world ceased. In 1810 the Wahabi Emir again entered the Holy Cities, plundered the Tomb of Mahomet at Medina, which he caused to be opened, and broke the Kaaba (the Black Stone) at Mecca in pieces. Spoliation of the Faithful on pilgrimage, complete interruption of the Haj, outrage upon the sacred shrines of Islam, last moved the Ottoman Sultan to action. As Protector of all Moelims he did what in him lay and Turkish forces being unavailable, he sent his Mahomet Ali from Egypt against the Wahabis, an adventure which the latter, with an alert eye to his own ambitions for independence, gladly undertook. The

(*) In normal pre-war times the pilgrimage accounted for an annual influx of nearly half a million persons into Hejaz.

(*) “Grand Sherif of Mecca” was a European form of title. Arabs called the ruler of Mecca Emir, and addressed him as Sayyidin (our Lord).
The seven independent Arabian states, 1935

Egyptian conquest of Nejd, completed in 1917, led the way to Egyptian rule being established in the Hejaz until 1940. During this period the Emirate of Mecca was known before.

In 1940, however, the Porte resumed control. Turkish Government began immediate recovery by the Emirate of its old status. Natural forces, making for a Progress was definite, if slow. Notwithstanding the consolidation of Turkish Aun-er-Ra‘iq, not only retained but improved the privileged position his eminence the Emir of Mecca could achieve; they were able to command the Turks and even at the cost of large concessions, to be on with any decline of Ottoman power. And such, in fact, is what happened.

At this point it becomes necessary to give closer attention to the Emirate and the affairs of the Hejaz in the years which immediately preceded the war.

The Emirate was never, in theory, hereditary or restricted, except by pre-emption. For at least a century past the Egyptians were appointed by the Power occupying the Hejaz, but the Ottoman periods 1851-6 and 1880-2, when the Emir from the rival house of Dhawi Ashraf was, generally speaking, the best in the Emir’s own house, considered themselves equal or better to the ruling house, and an Emir seldom avoided having foes within his own household; in fact, one son was as likely to claim the succession as another.

Hussein Ibn Ali, who took the title of King of the Hejaz in 1916 and died in 1918, was the grandson of the first Abbadish Emir (who died in 1857) and was nominated to the Emirate by Kiamil Pasha, the Anglophil Turkish Grand Vizier, in 1908. In 1905 Hussein had been long resident in Constantinople. His uncle, Abbadish, had been nominated to the position before him, but died while on the way to Mecca to assume office. Hussein’s cousin, Ali, the previous Emir, had been bannished with all his family, and his other cousins, the children of Hussein, were debarred by the Porte. In this way the choice fell eventually upon Hussein. It should be recorded, as throwing light on certain aspects of King Hussein’s character, that his mother was a Circassian. He was appointed to the Emirate, when approaching 60 years of age, as a man of pacific character who would serve the Turkish Government’s aims and keep on good terms with Great Britain. At first he seemed to fulfil the Porte’s intentions well. In 1910 he called out his tribes in support of the Turks against the Idrisi’s revolt in Asir, relieved a Turkish garrison besieged in Abha, and reduced the Idrisi’s power. In the same year he sent an expedition to Qasm to assert the rights of the great Hejazi tribe of the Ateibah, and though, owing to defection by Ibn Rashid, Emir of Hail, his force had to retire without any considerable military achievement, he was able to make an arrangement with Ibn Saud, Emir of Najd, whereby the Ateibah tribe remained free of that Emir’s taxation. At the same time he enforced the right of the Meccan Treasury to contributions from Qasm. Hussein’s influence was thus extended to Central Arabia. Soon afterwards he gave his protection to fugitive rebels from Ibn Saud, who, having been given refuge by the Ateibah, drew upon that tribe the reprisal of a raid by the Emir of Najd. This incident notwithstanding, the Meccan Emir’s relations with Ibn Saud remained outwardly peaceful.

Meanwhile, Hussein’s pro-Turkish attitude was undergoing a change. Prompted apparently by his second son, Abdullah, credited with being his father’s

(*) The Ashraf (sherifal clanname) were the descendants of Hasan, grandson of the Prophet. There are some twenty-one classes of this descent in Arabia, but only twenty-one of which live in or near to Mecca. In numbers the clans are small. Theoretically, Emirs of Mecca might be chosen from any Ashraf clan; but for many centuries practice confined the succession to the Abbadish, Dhawi Zaid, Dhawi Barakat and Dhawi Furur, with a great preponderance of Abbadish Emirs since 1827, when Mahomet Ali of Egypt put aside the Dhawi Zaid.
successor designate, he began to cherish the design of freeing the Emirate from
dependence on Turkey, and though professing himself to have no ambition towards
the Caliphate, the same could not be said for Abdullah, either as his father's
policy definitely in opposition to Turkish aims. He openly opposed the extension
of the Hejaz railway southward to Mecca and supported his Harb tribesmen in
their vehement hostility to this and other Turkish designs. When war broke out
in 1914 he refused his assistance to the Turks in raising troops from the Hejaz,
but he continued to organise the tribesmen for insurrection when the moment
should come. He reconciled himself with the Idriis and endeavoured to unite
that prince and the Imam of the Yemen with himself in following a common anti-
Ottoman policy. In 1915 he sent Abdullah to Central Arabia to make peace
between Ibn Rashid of Hall and Ibn Saud, and to obtain again payments to Mecca
from Qaisim and Sedeir in northern Najd.

The strength of the Emir's position before the Arab rising began may be
judged by the consideration shown to him by the Turks. He received a large
annual subsidy from the Ottoman Treasury. He was styled "Highness." He
had his own force of Arab warriors, paid by himself, and his own police, who
exercised authority as far south as eastern Asir. He was chief executive officer
in Mecca itself. He alone could summon Hejazis for military service, who were
thus exempt from Turkish conscription, and he alone could levy and collect taxes
in Mecca and Medina. He could also levy contributions from lands belonging to
the Ottoman authorities in the Hejaz. In addition, as has been seen, he could,
for the benefit of Mecca, lay Qaisim and Sedeir under tribute.

The Ottoman side of the bargain compelled the Emir to admit Turkish
garrisons in all Hejazi towns as the Turks might require, to accept a Turkish
Governor-General, or Vact, in Mecca or Taif according to season, and sub-
Governors and administrative officials in five other centres. The Turkish garrison
at the beginning of 1916 was about 12,000 men, stationed at Mecca, Medina, Taif,
Jeddah and other ports, and along the Hejaz railway. Ah, either his father's
become the de facto power in the Hejaz, with wide influence extending southward
to eastern Asir, northward to the southern Aneiza tribes, and eastward to Central
Arabia. He had, in fact, confined Turkish authority to the areas held by Turkish
garrisons.

Behind these outward manifestations of growing influence and power, the
moment was fast approaching for Hussein to attempt the execution of his
ambitions, which had, indeed, greatly widened since Turkey entered the war, as
had also his prospects. From the 30th October, 1914, he had, in fact, become a
prince whose goodwill, influence and active assistance would be exceedingly
valuable to Great Britain.

This is not the place in which to detail the history of how the Emir of Mecca
came to co-operate with Great Britain in a war against the Ottoman Empire,
rules by a Sultan who was Khalifa of Islam. That intricate story belongs to the
history of the Arab rising. Suffice it to say now that in September 1914 the Emir
of Mecca's son, Abdullah, was cautiously approached by Lord Kitchener, who
knew him personally, and that between this opening enquiry and the end of 1915
an exchange of letters between His Majesty's Government's representative in
Cairo and the Emir (a correspondence which did not cover the whole ground and
was not always explicit upon the points sought to be defined) committed both
parties to courses at the time highly acceptable to both. These negotiations
revealed the vast extent to which the ambitions of Hussein had now grown.

The independence of the Hejaz had become merely the nucleus for a design
which took a part of south-eastern Asia Minor, Syria and Mesopotamia, and
almost the whole of Arabia for its field. Calling these regions the "Arab
Countries," he aspired to see them freed from Turkish rule, where it was then
established, and united under one sovereignty, or, as several instances, into a
confederation acknowledging an Arab suzerain. Though sometimes professing indifference as to who the Sovereign or Suzzerain should be, provided
unification were attained, Hussein had himself or his immediate successor in view.

Behind these aspirations for the enlargement of his temporal authority remained
the delicate question of an Arab Caliphate.
At an early stage in the negotiations with Great Britain, Hussein had received vague encouragement from Lord Kitchener and Sir H. McMahon to make assumption of the Caliphate one of his purposes. He was careful, however, to avoid adopting any open policy in this choice of Islam, but there can be no question that it was a position which not only he himself secretly desired but his ambitious son, Abdullah, avowedly sought.

After the tentative prompting to Hussein to seek the Caliphate given by Lord Kitchener and Sir H. McMahon in the message of the 31st October, 1914, the Caliphate as one for Muslems alone. They restated this traditional British policy explicitly in a telegram to Sir H. McMahon on the 14th April, 1915. 17th November, 1915, they warned him to avoid "all possibility of being involved in any question concerning the Caliphate." The subject was accordingly ignored by Sir H. McMahon in subsequent negotiations.

In the agreement which Great Britain eventually reached with the Emir, his territorial demands were conceded with certain limitations and reservations. The British protectorate of Aden, the British protected, island sheikhdom of Bahrain and the south-eastern part of Asia Minor were excluded, limitations to which the Emir agreed. Great Britain also specifically excluded Western Syria and made reservations regarding the Vilayets of Bagdad and Basra in Mesopotamia, but on these points the Emir temporised, and though the validity of the British reservations is not open to doubt, the agreement did not contain the Emir's full acceptance of the reservations. Another important British limitation, that nothing in the agreement should prejudice the rights of other Arab rulers then in treaty or about to execute treaties with Great Britain, was also left in a somewhat similar position. Several old treaties between His Majesty's Government and Arab States in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf were already in force. A treaty had also been signed with the Idrisi of Asir on the 30th April, 1915, and another, with Ibn Saud of Nejd, was concluded on the 28th December of the same year. The Emir's letters nowhere show an unequivocal acceptance of the limitations imposed on him in regard to these treaties.

This matter becomes of particular interest in considering subsequent relations between Hussein and other Arab rulers. The reservation, in fact, struck deep at the Emir's ambition to unite the various Arab States, or, as far as those in treaty with Great Britain were concerned, compulsion was ruled out, and unity of the Arab race could be achieved only by friendly consent.

Subject to these limitations and reservations, Great Britain in effect undertook to recognise and support Arab independence in the territories proposed by the Emir of Mecca and to aid him with money, arms and munitions. For his part the Emir undertook to spare no efforts to attach all Arab races to the cause of the Allies and to give military assistance to the best of his ability. He also undertook not to make peace without the agreement of Great Britain. These broad terms had been arranged, and money, arms and munitions supplied by Great Britain, Hussein and his four sons raised the Hejazi tribes in insurrection against Turkish rule on 5th June, 1916. Two days later the Emir issued a proclamation denouncing the Turkish Government as dominated by the Committee of Union and Progress and proclaiming the independence of the Hejaz.

IV. Emirate of Nejd ruled by Ibn Saud, Emir of Riyadh

Of all the autonomous Arab areas with which this paper deals, the Emirate of Nejd came least under Turkish influence and power. It was too remote, too inaccessible, too poor, to offer permanent attraction for Turkish conquest and occupation. Nevertheless, it did not altogether escape the hostile acts of its own rulers courted Ottoman intervention, and in 1817 an Egyptian army, on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan, took and destroyed the capital and ensured Egyptian occupation of a kind for a generation. But thereafter Egyptian and Ottoman influence ceased. Upon this vicarious occupation rested the chief Ottoman claim to sovereignty in Central Arabia. Later, Turkish attempts to establish effective occupation were indeed made, but with little more than verbal pretension to success, as when, in 1871, midhat Pasha occupied Haas, the Persian Gulf, the province of Nejd, and on the strength of that achievement...
was styled "victor of Nejd," and when Feisal Pasha, in 1906, operating in support of the Emir of Hail, hoisted the Ottoman flag in Qasim, the north-western province of Nejd, but did not keep it flying for more than a few months. In 1913, under the rule of Nejd, the Turkish Government, still clinging to the theory that Nejd was an Omayyad and the Hejaz. In the south it was bordered on the Great Desert and the southern continuation of the territory of the Shammar tribes, who gave allegiance to the Emir of Hail. The central portion of Nejd, the area from which the State derived the main part of its strength, comprises a long chain of oases scattered from north to south upon its surface. The long and extensive tract of sometimes very broken country known as Jabal Tuwa'il, which forms the "backbone" of Nejd, and by the precipitation it ensures access for the great group of oases, is the chief of these uplifted masses. The eastern portion of Nejd, the lately regained province of Haas, the general fall from the interior to a low-lying coastal plain upon the Persian Gulf, but also contains tracts of high ground and hills. This province possesses a water supply exceptional for Arabia. Indeed, in the great oases of Haas and Qatif, springs and streams abound and make these districts the richest in Nejd.

Any approximate estimate of the total population of Nejd is impossible. The central 10,000 square miles of oases country, at the period under review, certainly did not contain more than 250,000 souls, almost entirely settled on the land. The province of Haas had 150,000, two-thirds of whom were settled, and one-third nomadic. The population of Nejd, exclusive of Haas, where Shiites predominate, hold the Sunni belief of Islam. "Nejd is the home of Wahabism," an ascetic revivalist movement among Moslems who sympathise with the strict but orthodox Hanbal school of Sunniism. (1) Wahabis are, in fact, the militant Puritans of Islam, to whom the sword is the appointed means of argument, conversion, or purification against Moslems who will not voluntarily accept the Wahabi teachings. Upon this primary motive for armed aggression, a motive at first strictly religious, were easily grafted the secular ambitions of Wahabi rulers, and, on the part of the people, a sense of unity, born of geographical isolation and success in arms, which had in it something of a national consciousness.

The circumstances attending human existence in the central oases group of Nejd contributed the ample basis upon which Wahabism flourished and won its supremacy. Here was a population of cultivators and herdsmen, isolated, self-supporting, but poor, devoid of commercial interests and entirely unaffected by the cautious and sobering influences exerted by the presence of a trading class, even in a primitive state of society. It was a population born and hardened, bellicose in spirit, men of their hands who supported their religious convictions with vehemence. It was, further, a population centrally placed with regard to other communities, but prevented by distance and intervening desert from intercourse with neighbours who differed from them in large details of spiritual belief.

(1) D.G. Hogarth, *Handbook of Arabia*, volume I.
Qasim, the north-west border province of Nejd, and for fifty years the subject of almost continuous hostilities between the Emirate of Nejd and Jebel Shammar, is pastoral and carries only a sparse population, but Lower Qasim, which has been described as "a land of green villages and fields," is in a stretch of fertile oases 100 miles in length, strung out along the settled population of the whole province was not less than 50,000.

From the geographical fact that the province stands midway upon the trans-Arabian route between Mesopotamia and Mecca, it is a trading district by camel or otherwise engaged in transportation. The people are warlike and outlook and better acquaintance with extra-Arabian civilization than any other inhabitants, and Anizia 10,000, ranked as the largest and most commercial in Central Arabia. As the home of many prosperous and widely-travelled merchants and dealers, jealous of their rights and privileges, accepting only the overlordship of the Emir of Nejd and the payment of an annual tribute.

Such are the elements, each supplementing the others, which have produced the history alike of Nejd and of Wahashim. The two form a subject inseparable. In combination they present the story of a primitive State, which, far more than any other in Arabia, possessed the spirit and tradition of conquest and expansion and the native human means of giving effect to these promptings.

About 1750 an ascetic revivalist and Haji, by name Mohammed Abul Wahab, who preached a return to the pure and simple form of faith taught by the Prophet, took refuge at Deraiya, in Nejd, from the incensed people of Harimala, his native town. The Sheikh of Deraiya, Mohammed Ibn Saud, was the first important convert made by Abul Wahab. This early Ibn Saud concurred, in this new teaching of the reformer which declared that upon all true believers lay the unescapable duty of war against false believers, who were to be treated on the same footing as unbelievers and idolators. War was Mohammed Ibn Saud completely conquered and converted the inhabitants of the central oasis-group in Nejd as well as the adjoining territory of Hasa.

In 1765 Mohammed Ibn Saud was succeeded by a son, Abdul Aziz-bin-Saud, who inherited alike his father's enlarged territory, power, ambitions and spiritual convictions. He ruled till assassinated in 1803. During these thirty-eight years he extended Wahabi conquest far beyond the borders of Central Nejd and Hasa. He issued ultimatums to his intended adversaries in the terms of conversion, submission or death. Under his rule, Wahabi forces carried out the most difficult and dangerous expeditions, in complete contempt of death, with unflinching success, and spread the fame of Wahabism throughout the whole Mahometan world. Pilgrim caravans of the Haj were first attacked by Wahabis in 1763, an outrage many times repeated.

Early in 1801 Abdul Aziz sent an expedition under his son, Saud, to the holy Shiah City of Karbala on the Euphrates. There, on the Feast of Bairam, 1801, the Wahabis destroyed the sacred relic of Augustus Umar and slew the temple guards and priests, with such undeterred attacks that no one remained alive who could reveal to the raiders where the priceless treasure of the shrine was kept. The Wahabi force which in 1803 defeated and captured Mecca spared the Holy Places, but sacked the city and beheaded twenty sheikhs by way of example.

On the 14th October, 1803, Abdul Aziz-bin-Saud was assassinated in the mosque at Deraiya by a sheik, in revenge for the attack on Meched Huein at Karbala. His son Saud, who succeeded, was another ambitious, fanatical and competent ruler and soldier. He held power from 1803 to 1814. In 1804 he captured Medina, and carried away the accumulated treasures from the tomb of Mahomet. In 1806 and 1807 he completely stripped the Haj caravans. In 1810 he raised Medina and Mecca again, caused the tomb of Mahomet to be opened and sent to Deraiya a great booty of jewels and other captured treasure. Northward his raiders carried their operations almost to Damascus. At this stage the pilgrim caravans ceased; not only those sent officially from Turkey and Egypt.
but those in which the Faithful from Persia and the Yemen and other Mahometan
countries usually reached the Holy Cities.

But fifty years of uninterrupted military success, conquest and spoliation had
produced results in Nejd strangely at variance with the austere teachings of the
founder of Wahabism.7 Treasure torn from shrines as the forbidden offerings
of idolatry, or from individuals as proof of wanton depravity, had filled Riyadh
with an accumulation of riches hitherto unimagined in Central Arabia. Display
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The seven independent Arabian states, 1935

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The return of Nejd to power was, however, not attained solely by the pleasant
donation of Egypt, a rival Emirate had arisen at Hail under Abdullah bin-
dispute the control of Qasim.

In 1860 Abdullah, successor to Feisal, reasserted Nejd authority in Haas on
force despatched by Midhat Pasha. More serious still were the reverses suffered
in the long struggle between Nejd and Hail. In 1898 Riyadh was captured by
Mohammed-bin-Rashid, Emir of Hail, and again in 1901. Then followed a
period of ten years during which the various districts of Nejd were in charge of
the Emir of Hail, representatives of the Saud family were reduced to puppets, and Nejd, in effect, became a vassal State of Hail.

The history of Nejd now reaches the period from which emerged the latest
strong ruler of the House of Saud, Abdul Aziz-bin-Saud, the present King of
Saud Arabia. Abdul Aziz, born in 1875, son of Abd-er-Rahman-bin-Saud, was
in exile with his father at Koweit when his uncle, the nominal Emir of Nejd, was
murdered by order of Ibn Rashid in 1902. With only forty men, Abdul Aziz
entered the Sedeir district of Nejd, secured support there, marched on Riyadh,
which welcomed him, and ended the Rashidi domination the same year.

Recognising the energy and outstanding qualifications for leadership shown by
Abdul Aziz, his father, Abd-er-Rahman, renounced his own claims to the Emirate
accepted his son as Emir and, assuming the title of ‘’Imam,’’ took the direction
of religious affairs in Riyadh. By 1904 the Emir was master of all Southern Nejd.
He marched on Qasim in that year, but was compelled to retire by a Turkish
force co-operating with the Emir of Hail. In 1906, however, he made another
attempt, and this time succeeded in imposing partial subjection and payment of tribute upon Qasim, both of which he maintained at the cost of recurrent
fighting with the Emir of Hail.

In 1910 danger threatened the Emir both from within and without. Certain
grandsons of his late uncle, Saud, claimed the Emirte for their own branch,
and sought to raise the southern provinces, Khair and Harih, in rebellion.
At the same time, Abdullah, second son of the Emir of Mecca, entered Qasim with a
Hejazi force to support the rights of the Ateelah tribe said to have been infringed
by the Emir of Nejd. This Emir’s younger brother, who was his representative
in Qasim, was made prisoner. Ibn Rashid, Emir of Hail, had promised
co-operation with Abdullah in this movement, but failed to take action.
The Hejazi force, therefore, retired, but not before Abdullah had exacted an undertakings from the Qasim towns to pay £4,000 annual tribute to Mecca in place of the “Peter’s pence” hitherto subscribed voluntarily. On his part, Abdullah
conceded that the towns should elect their own Governors. Nevertheless Ibn Saud assumed, and also to an arrangement whereby the Ateelah tribe within the
borders of Nejd should be free from his taxation.

Meanwhile, the rebel operations in Southern Nejd having failed, the leaders
took refuge with the Ateelah on Nejd territory. In 1911 Ibn Saud inflicted
severe punishment on this tribe for harbouring his enemies. By so doing he
aggravated the fallen of the Emir of Mecca, who professed to regard the attack as a
violation of the agreement made the previous year. The Meccan Emir gave
asylum in the Hejaz to Ibn Saud’s traitorous kinmen, but took no further notice
of the attack on the Ateelah though he appears to have carried to account—as did
Ibn Saud—the countenance shown his enemies. Both Emirs had ambitions to
fulfil; both Emirates were increasing in power; rivalry between them accordingly
grew apace.

But Ibn Saud had the greater geographical opportunities for expanding his
territory with advantage. Being an inland region, it could be extended in almost
every direction; he had, too, the helpful tradition of a Nejd which had grown
more extensive than it was at that time. The Province of Haas had been snatched from his
Emirate in 1871 by a Turkish force sent by Midhat Pasha. Vali of Baraa, and
was now known to Turkish Administration by the comprehensive name of the
‘Sanjak of Nejd.’’ Haas was the only relatively wealthy province within the
borders of earlier Nejd, or within the territory that was open to conquest by Ibn Saud; its recovery would greatly increase the meagre resources of its State;
further—a most important consideration—it would give him access to the sea.

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Figure 2.166.11. FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs
Without success he had endeavoured to enlist the support of the Indian Government by offering a renewal of the declaration made in 1866 by his uncle, the Emir Abdullah, to His Majesty’s Government regarding British interests in the Persian Gulf. But he was soon to have his opportunity for conquest. At a time when Turkey had her hands full with the Balkan War, and the Emirate of Hail was enfeebled by the dissensions of the Rashid family, some of Ibn Saud’s rebellious relatives were enjoying friendly refuge in Haas territory. They were said, moreover, to be preparing an attack against him. Here were both opportunity and reasonable excuse for prompt action by the Emir of Nejd, and early in 1913 he marched into Haas, captured Hofuf on the 5th May, and on the 15th May compelled the Turkish garrison of Qatif, the chief seaport, to surrender. The Governor and garrison he allowed to return to Ottoman territory by way of Qais, and Qatar.

At the same time His Majesty’s Government were negotiating a convention with the Ottoman Government regarding the Persian Gulf and adjacent territories. Little was known about the inland Emirate of Nejd, which had had no direct contact with the Gulf and British officials for many years. That it was an Emirate capable of over-running and permanently holding a Turkish province, and that its ruler was really a figure of outstanding importance in Arabian politics, were facts still to be recognised. In negotiating the convention, therefore, His Majesty’s Government attached very little importance to Nejd and its Emir. The convention was signed on the 28th July, 1913. The eleventh article of this instrument defined the “Ottoman Sanjak of Nejd” in such a way that it was made to include not only the coast-line and Province of Haas, but Central Nejd as well. It thus implied that the Emir was an Ottoman subject and his action against the Turks nothing but rebellion. Having committed themselves to these views, His Majesty’s Government were placed in a difficult position when the Emir, unrecognized by the Turks, maintained himself as de facto ruler of Haas and 300 miles of the Gulf coast-line and made overtures to the Indian Government. Whatever his status in theory, His Majesty’s Government could not avoid having direct relations with a ruler of this weight, who held so much of the Gulf coast.

Acting under instructions from the British Resident in the Persian Gulf (Sir Percy Cox), the British Political Agents at Koweit and Bahrein, the former being Captain W. H. I. Shakespear, D.S.O., went to Qais, and conferred with Ibn Saud on the 15th and 16th December, 1913. He showed much friendliness, invited His Majesty’s Government to keep the peace on the coast and revealed the rebellious relatives were endeavouring to impose on him. These terms included the readmission of Turkish garrisons; that all communications from foreign Powers or their agents should be handed over to and dealt with by the Turks; the exclusion of foreigners and their agents from the province, and no concessions to foreigners for railways or motor-car services. In effect, Ibn Saud now desired British mediation.

In a memorandum of the 9th March, 1914, His Majesty’s Government explained their difficulties in regard to Ibn Saud to the Turkish Government, entered a protest against the last three of the Turkish conditions above cited and defined what they themselves required of Ibn Saud. Their requirements included no interference with other Arab principalities in the Gulf; co-operation in maintaining the maritime truce in the Gulf for the suppression of piracy; co-operation in suppressing arms traffic; free admission of British traders to Qatif.

Meanwhile negotiations between the Turks and Ibn Saud continued, and on the 15th May, 1914, the Emir signed a treaty with the Vali of Baer. It placed the “Vilayet of Nejd” in charge of Ibn Saud for life, with succession to his descendants by Imperial firman; it readmitted Turkish troops to the seaports of Haas; it provided for the Turkish flag being flown and forbade the Emir to take part in foreign affairs or to grant concessions to foreigners. It also required the Emir to aid Turkey in war when requested by the Imperial Government. In June the Emir accepted the title of “Vali of Nejd and Haas,” but is said not to have regarded it seriously.

From the signing of the Anglo-Turkish convention on the 28th July, 1913, to the outbreak of war between the signatories on the 31st October, 1914, His Majesty’s Government encouraged the advances which Ibn Saud made to them.

(*) See Atchison, volume XI, p. 206.
During the same period the Turks attempted to reconcile Ibn Saud and Ibn Rashid and to obtain promises of their military co-operation with the Ottoman Power. These overtures the Emir of Nejd put aside. In October 1914 the Sheikh of Kuwait, on his own initiative, wrote to Ibn Saud stating that he intended to stand by His Majesty’s Government if war broke out and that he advised Ibn Saud to do the same. The latter replied that, in the event of war with Turkey, he would stand by the sheikh’s and the British Government.

Early in October His Majesty’s Government resolved to send Captain Shakespeare, formerly British Resident at Kuwait, on a special mission to Ibn Saud; negotiations were begun before he arrived by His Majesty’s Government asking the Emir in November to co-operate with the Allies in the war and offering in return to guarantee him against Turkish attack, to recognise him as independent ruler of Nejd and Hasa, and to enter into treaty relations with him. These proposals became the basis of subsequent negotiations. Captain Shakespeare reached Ibn Saud’s camp on the 31st December, 1914, and discussed with him the political situation. It appeared that Ibn Saud was resolved to remain neutral until he could secure a binding treaty with the British Government, and that what he sought was a solid guarantee of his position under what would be, in effect, British suzerainty. On the 4th January, 1915, Captain Shakespeare was able to send Sir P. Cox a translation of Ibn Saud’s rough draft of the treaty he proposed. When forwarding this document, Captain Shakespeare added some observations of his own:

“...I venture to submit,” he wrote, “that Ibn Saud in effect asks (in his rough draft of a treaty) for little more than what has been already conveyed in the Acting Resident’s assurances (the proposals of a British guarantee, already mentioned) if these were meant to apply to the future and were not limited to the present crisis, and if they are interpreted liberally and generously. In exchange Ibn Saud offers to make himself a British vassal for good...”

At this stage Ibn Saud was able to render valuable assistance to His Majesty’s Government by the attitude he took and the advice he gave to the Emir of Mecca when that ruler hovered in doubt as to the policy he should adopt.

On the night of the 17th January, 1915, a letter from Abdullah, the Emir of Mecca’s second son, reached Ibn Saud, who was then in camp with his army not far from Majmaa, in Sedir. It stated that the Turks were urgently pressing his father to proclaim the jihād and call up the tribes; but that he was temporising until he could learn what Ibn Saud’s own attitude was towards Ibn Saud and British. Ibn Saud read the letter aloud to Captain Shakespeare and asked what reply would be most advantageous to Great Britain. The story, as told in a letter from that officer dated the 10th January, 1915,(*) is too long to be repeated here, suffice it to say that Ibn Saud advised the Emir to temporise further, pleading fear of a British attack on Jedda and other Hejazi seaports. He explained that he saw no advantage in siding with the Turks. He added that he himself had just returned a temporising reply to a deputation sent him by the Porte, alleging his pending operations against Ibn Rashid, and fear of a British attack on Qatif. With this letter to Abdullah he promised to enclose copies of British proclamations regarding Turkey and the war, and British undertakings regarding the Holy Places.

At this time (January 1915) Turkish preparations for the attack on the Suez Canal and Egypt were in progress. Rumours and expectations filled Syria, where all believed that the attack would succeed and be followed by momentous results for Islam. The jihād had been proclaimed in Constantinople on the 14th November, 1914, and though the full response was still uncertain, signs were not wanting that it might set Arabia ablaze and greatly increase British difficulties. Wanting that it might set Arabia ablaze and greatly increase British difficulties, the Ulema of Arabia were looking anxiously towards Mecca in expectation of what the Ulema of that city and the Emir, who was direct descendant of the Prophet, and Hereditary Keeper of the Holy Places, would do in this crisis of Islam. Nor, so far, had much progress been made in the negotiations between Great Britain and that Emir. In fact, nothing had been received from Mecca beyond expressions of goodwill towards Great Britain and the statement that the Emir could not break with the Turks at present. This response Abdullah, on the 10th December, 1914, had conveyed on behalf of his father in reply to Lord...
Figure 2.166.14. FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs
long strip of the coast, and in the interest of peace and order it will be essential for the Power that controls the Gulf to have a working agreement with him. The extent, therefore, to which his claims must be met must be measured not only by the immediate services, which he may be expected to render, but also by the potential powers for mischief which, in the event of success, he will possess, and if permanently estranged will doubtless

Negotiations for the treaty were protracted, but the instrument was eventually signed at Qatif by Sir P. Cox and the Emir on the 29th December, 1915. (\(^{(v)}\) Ratification by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India followed on the 15th July, 1916. By this treaty His Majesty's Government recognised Ibn Saud as independent ruler of Nejd, Hassa, Qatif and Jubail, and engaged to support him against aggression by any foreign Power \(^{(*)}\) to such extent and in such a manner as the British Government, after consulting Ibn Saud, may consider most effective for protecting his interests and countries. For his part Ibn Saud covenanted to have no relations with any foreign Power, and absolutely not to cede, sell, mortgage, lease or dispose of any part of his territories to any foreign Power or the subjects of a foreign Power without the consent of His Majesty's Government.

Three other points in particular may be noticed regarding the provisions of the treaty:

(a) That article I, after defining the several "countries" recognised by His Majesty's Government as being under the independent rule of Ibn Saud, added the words "and their dependencies and territories, which will be discussed and determined hereafter," These words appear to have committed His Majesty’s Government to arbitrate in any territorial disputes that might arise between Ibn Saud and his neighbours—King Hussein, for instance—and, by implication, might have taken them even further.

(b) That the India Office, soon after the treaty was ratified, laid down the important decision that "we cannot admit that article II (promising His Majesty’s Government’s support against aggression by any foreign Power) is binding on us against other Arabs."

(c) That article VII engaged His Majesty’s Government and Ibn Saud to conclude a "further detailed treaty . . . . . ."

We must now consider the relations which existed between Ibn Saud and the Emir of Mecca from the outbreak of war in 1914 to the beginning of the Arab risings in June 1916. This period covers the secret negotiations between His Majesty’s Government and the Emir. Of these negotiations Ibn Saud was unaware, though the ultimate success or failure of the action contemplated in the negotiations could not leave him unaffected. Both Emirs feared the Turks (Hussein, once pro-Turkish, having adopted a hostile policy since 1913), and would have been glad to see them ejected from Arabia; but each was jealous of the other as an Arab ruler and rival chief, whose large ambitions could only be satisfied at the other’s expense. Moreover, fertile sources of discord lay in the uncertainty of the claims and obligations of each in the absence of boundaries, and in the fluctuating allegiance of nomad tribes, who passed from one region to another

\(^{(v)}\) Printed as appendix to F.O. 11890.
FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs.

The Saud, just emerging from a dangerous rebellion in Haas, which had severely strained his resources, the visit was not only inopportune, but highly suspicious. His misgivings were reflected in his conversation with Sir Percy Cox in December 1915, when he reminded the Chief Political Officer that Wahhabis should assume the title, it would make no difference to his status among other Arab rulers. Ibn Saud would appear, in fact, to have scent the wider political ambitions to which the war had given rise in Husein, and was now on his guard.

V.—The Sheikdom of Kuwait ruled by the Sheik of Kuwait.

At the time of the Arab rising in 1916, Kuwait was of small importance in wider Arabian politics, and its interests pertained as much to the Baara Vilayet as to the peninsula. British influence was paramount. The sheikdom was generally in rivalry with the Emirs of Haal, but had always been friendly with Ibn Saud. It therefore requires some mention here.

Kuwait had a coastline to the Persian Gulf of 200 miles, an undefined maximum breadth of 150 miles, and an area of about 20,000 square miles. Its surface is chiefly desert, so much so that of the settled population of about 37,000 at the period under review, all but 2,000 resided in the town of Kuwait, and the nomad population was estimated at only 13,000. The sheikdom had no political power, nor the prospect of attaining any. It owed its position as an autonomous sheikdom to British support, given because the harbour of Kuwait was the best in the northern part of the Persian Gulf coast and became the prospective terminal point of the Constantinople—Bagdad Railway.

Until the last years of the 19th century Kuwait was only an insignificant sheikdom, with a jurisdiction extending little beyond the town. In 1871, when Mithat Pasha began a policy of Ottoman expansion in Arabia, the Sheik of Kuwait declared himself an Ottoman subject, accepted the rank of kaimakan, and his territory was nominally incorporated in the Vilayet of Baara. But the Indian Government never accepted this arrangement; they were therefore able to insist on dealing directly with the sheik, Mobarak-us-Suba, when in 1899 the question of a Persian Gulf terminus for the extension of the Constantinople—Bagdad Railway began to loom above the horizon. On the 23rd January of that year the sheik signed a treaty(1) with Great Britain, which secured British predominance. In 1904 he accepted the appointment of a British Political Agent at his Court. In return Mobarak was given a subsidy. The Turks made repeated efforts to coerce him by means of Ibn Rashid, from whose forces he was saved in 1895 only by a British landing-party.

In 1907 the British Government made a more specific agreement with Mobarak, by which they secured a perpetual base on the foreshore of the Bandar Shuweik Basin in Kuwait harbour, and the right of pre-empting all or any part of his territory which he might propose to alienate. In return they promised that “the town of Kuwait and its boundaries belong to Sheikh Mobarak-us-Suba and his heirs after him. In the Anglo-Turkish Convention(2) of the 29th July, 1913, the territory of Kuwait was recognised as an “autonomous kaza of the Ottoman Empire, and the sheik therefore acknowledged the suzerainty of the Turkish Sultan. His territorial boundaries were defined, practical autonomy was conceded to him, and the validity of his agreements with His Majesty’s Government, including the base of land and His Majesty’s Government’s right to give him support, was admitted by the Porte. On the outbreak of the war Mobarak formally repudiated all connexion with the Ottoman Empire, and in November His Majesty’s Government promised, in return for help against the Turks, “that Kuwait shall be recognised as an independent principality under British protection.” The sheik died at the close of 1915.

VI.—The Emirate of Jebel Shammar (or Hail) ruled by the Emir of Hail.

The portion of Northern Central Arabia known geographically as Jebel Shammar, the territory of the great Shammar tribe, formed another of the independent Arabian States at the time of the Arab rising. Geographically, this

Figure 2.166.16. FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs
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area is an expanse of upland, traversed from south-west to north-east by the two parallel mountain ranges of Jebel Afa and Jebel Selmah, standing some 20 miles apart. Jebel Afa covers an area of 100 miles by 20. Jebel Selmah is not so long and is considerably smaller in extent. The greatest altitude of each is less than 3,000 feet above sea-level. The general surface of the Arabian plateau, which lies gradually from south-west to north-east, has hereabouts an elevation corresponding to the levels of the surrounding country. Jebel Afa has a westward continuation in the form of cliffs and isolated hills of great height for about half its extensive area. Jebel Selmah has a similar continuation southward for about half the area so included under the comprehensive name of Jebel Shammar.

Precipitation caused by these mountain ranges has made Jebel Shammar an area favourable for Arab life. Springs abound, though making no streams, rainfall is sufficient to ensure pasturage, not only in the upland country, but, in spring, even on the adjoining sands of the Nefud desert.

Upon this geographical Jebel Shammar as a centre, a political Jebel Shammar arose, whose confines varied from time to time with the fluctuations of its Emirs in conflict with their neighbours. In 150 from north to south, its territorial limits, however, were entirely indeterminate and can only be indicated broadly. Upon the east it was bounded by the Emirate of Nejd; on the north it extended vaguely towards the province of Qasim in the Euphrates and the territory of Kuwait; on the north it had another vague boundary, 250 miles to the north, had only been lost to Jebel Shammar four years earlier.

The settled population of the Emirate was estimated at 20,000, the nomad population, which yielded allegiance to the Emir, about the same. The cultivators population, formed a solid nucleus closely bound together by loyalty to the Emir, by tribal relations and by a national pride in Shammar achievements during the past fifty years. The unity and fighting capacity of the tribes have been remarked by various European travellers and are attested by recent history. The capital and chief town was Hail, which stands in the area between the two mountain ranges of Jebel Afa and Jebel Selmah. The population of the Emirate were Sunnis of the Wahabi belief. In practice the townsmen and cultivators were fanatical supporters of the creed, the nomads much less so, but the influence of Wahhabism extended into the desert far north towards Damascus.

The earlier history of the Emirate goes back only to the close of the 18th century and may be dismissed with a few words. Until the last decades of that century Jebel Shammar represented nothing more, politically, than the territory in which the Shammar Arabs wandered, found opportunities for cultivation, and enjoyed a tribal independence. During the last years of the 18th century the region was brought under the domination of the Emir of Nejd as the result of Wahabi conquest and conversion. With the overthrow of Wahabi power by the Egyptians in 1817, the Jebel Shammar country became subject to Egyptian control, but with the gradual decline of this alien power and influence, the Emirate of Nejd resumed its authority. In 1833, Emir Feisal appointed Abdullah-bin-Kashid, representing the leading Shammar family, as Governor in Hail. Abdullah shrewdly used the position to increase his own power and influence, a course rendered the more easy by the detention of Feisal in Cairo for a period of five years. Abdullah did not, however, throw off allegiance, but on his death in 1847 he left his successor, Talal, virtually free of the authority of Nejd.

To the Jebel Shammar Emirate thus established, great days came with the Emir Mohammed, who seized power in 1875 and proved himself the strongest native ruler seen in Arabia during the 19th century. He not only consolidated his principality and maintained complete independence, but formed the most powerful confederacy of Arab tribes ever effected. At the head of their combined forces in 1881 he brought the Emir of Nejd to battle, the greatest Arab battle of the time, as the occupying Riyadh. Hail now

Figure 2.16.6.17. FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs
became the capital of Central Arabia, from Jauf-el-Amir, on the edge of the Syrian desert, to the Great Desert of the south, and Mohammed ruled as sole Emir until his death in 1907. How Nejd, under Abdul Aziz-bin-Saud, the Sultan of Nejd, recovered its independence in 1902, has already been related.

Towards the close of his reign Mohammed adopted a pro-Turkish policy, which was followed consistently by his successors in return for Turkish support. Explanation of this policy may be found partly in the comparative ease with which Turkish support on Turkish pressure could be directed upon Hail from which the Hejaz Railway. Support, therefore, became an alternative to the Emirs of Jebel Shammar found preferable to coercion. On various occasions, especially in 1904 and 1905, Ottoman forces assisted the Emirate in its struggle against Ibn Saud and the Sheikh of Koweit. Moreover, an aim of Turkish policy at this time was to use Jebel Shammar against supposed British ambitions in Arabia, particularly in the Persian Gulf, where, in the Turkish view, its Majesty’s Government had secured the Sheik of Koweit as a dependent, and, through him, were promoting their interests to the disadvantage of those of the Ottoman Empire. To this end Ibn Rashid was pushed by the Turks into attacking the town of Koweit in 1905, a movement in support of the sheik.

After the death of Mohammed no ruler had the strength and personality necessary to hold the widespread Emirate of Jebel Shammar together. Indeed, during these years, the House of Rashid was divided against itself, and was infamous throughout Arabia for repeated resort to murder as a convenient means of gaining the succession. In 1906 the ruling Emir, Abd-al-Aziz, was killed in battle with the forces of Ibn Saud and the Mutairi tribe in alliance with him. In 1908 a boy of ten, Saud-bin-Rashid, became Emir and was supported in the position until able to direct affairs himself. He ruled Jebel Shammar during the period of the war. Notwithstanding the fact that the innate solidity and loyalty of the Shammar tribe was never better exhibited than under this Emir, his reign witnessed further curtailment of the Emirate. Hostilities with Nejd were almost continuous. In 1910 Ibn Saud compelled Jebel Shammar to surrender the Province of Qasim to his suzerainty. In 1912 Jauf-el-Amir was seized by the Ruwalla sheikh, Nuri-es-Shalan, who successfully maintained himself against determined Shammar attacks particularly in 1914. When Turkey entered the war in October 1914, Emir Ibn Rashid, then a featherbrained youth of sixteen, already noted for irresponsible violence, worked hand in hand with the Turks. He supplied them with camels, was actively hostile to the Sheikh of Koweit and the Euphrates tribes who were friendly towards the Allies, and received presents of money, motor cars, rifles, ammunition and even a few machine guns from the Turkish Government. It seems that he undertook to operate against the Allied flank to Mesopotamia. Probably he would have caused trouble in this quarter but for the campaign started against him in January 1915 by the Emir of Nejd. The battle of Jerrab, near Majmaa, which resulted on the 24th January, may have been indecisive, but it put Ibn Rashid’s force out of action for a time and prolonged a treaty of peace in which the advantage lay with Ibn Saud. By this treaty, signed on the 10th June, 1915, Ibn Rashid’s authority was confined to the narrower Jebel Shammar. He withdrew his pretensions to Qasim, and acknowledged Ibn Saud’s suzerainty over certain tribes, a matter hitherto in question, and rejected only the Emir of Nejd’s claim to the overlordship of Jebel Shammar. But the peace, which followed had no reality and Ibn Rashid merely awaited his opportunity.

VII. — Jauf-el-Amir.

The part of Northern Arabia lying around Jauf-el-Amir, which in 1910 came under the independent government of Nuri-sh-Shalan, Paramount Chief of the Ruwalla, cannot be regarded as havens, being one of the chief autonomous areas of Arabia. It was too limited in resources and could not have direct relations with the outer world in any way possible to a State owning a seaboard. The Yemen, Adrar, Nejd and, in less degree, Jebel Shammar, all had their bases in large settled populations of cultivators; the Hejaz, in the accident that it was the Holy Land of Islam. Jauf, however, had no such permanent foundations. Jauf, as an
independent area, rested upon a confederation of purely nomad tribes, who, while ranging over desert and steppe larger in extent than Great Britain, made the confederation and the capture of Jauf alike, were due to the personality of the Paramount Chief, Nuri-es-Salalan, whom Colonel T. E. Lawrence described as of Jauf would be one of dependency either upon a powerful Jebel Shammar or on a power seated in the north, such as, for instance, an independent Syria. To valuable possession, as controlling the one route across the desert which separated Central Arabia from Syria. By this route Jauf is about 260 miles from Hail, in Jebel Shammar, and 350 miles from Damascus. Jauf had also a further strategical importance which made itself felt. In the event of the construction of a railway from the north into Central Arabia, the route to be followed would be from the Hejaz Railway to Jizah in Transjordan and thence up the Wadi Sirhan to Jauf. As far as is known no other route is practicable.

Jauf-al-Amir (so called to distinguish it from other Jaufs) is merely an oasis a few miles in length, in a depression at the head of the Great Wadi Sirhan. To and derives its chief importance from that fact. Jauf was subject to the Emirate of Jebel Shammar. In 1910 Nuri-es-Salalan, a nomad chief, whose authority extended over a confederacy of Ameza tribes, seized the group of oases and withstood all the efforts of the Emir of Jebel Shammar to eject him. In 1916 the population of the oasis group of Jauf did not exceed 11,000, but the tribal confederacy of nomads recognising Nuri, a confederacy whose ranging grounds extended from Jauf in the south to Damascus in the north, and to what is now Transjordan in the west, may have numbered as many as 20,000 souls. Upon this wandering and widely dispersed population alone rested Nuri-es-Salalan's ability to maintain himself in Jauf.

The northern portion of the confederacy came within the reach of Turkish authority. Nuri and his House therefore took a lively interest in Turkish affairs as matters closely concerning their own future. In 1911 the Paramount Chief was invited to Damascus by the Vali, Sami Pasha, and was there imprisoned for a year. This indignity alienated him from the Turkish cause. In 1913 the Turkish Government proposed to carry a branch of the Hejaz railway from Jizah to Qaf in the Wadi Sirhan, for the purpose of extending Turkish authority over the desert tribes. The scheme was violently opposed by Nuri and had to be abandoned in consequence. When war broke out in 1914 he refused to supply camels for the Ottoman Government and removed his tribes to their eastern pastures beyond reach of the Turks. His tribes, among the greatest camel-breeders in Arabia, possessed vast numbers of animals, and the withholding of these supplies greatly increased Turkish difficulties during the attack on the Suez Canal.

Nuri's son, Nawwaf, who governed Jauf on behalf of his father, was a strong supporter of the pan-Arab movement. Indeed, Nuri-es-Salalan and his confederacy were accounted by the Emir of Mecca as among his firmest and most important supporters during the Arab rising.

*Foreign Office, May 1935.*
2.17. Anglo-Idrisi agreement Regarding Farasan Islands (January 1917)

This new agreement between Al-Idrisi and the British Government was concluded on 22 January 1917.
Figure 2.17.1 Anglo-Idrisi agreement Regarding Farasan Islands (January 1917)
II. His Majesty's Government recognise that the Farasan Islands have been captured by the Idrisi Saiyid from the hands of the Turks, and have become part and parcel of the Idrisi's domains, in all of which his independence is assured.

III. The Idrisi Saiyid engages not to cede, mortgage, or surrender these islands nor the places situate on his sea-board, including the islands connected therewith, to any Foreign Power, and further to call on His Majesty's Government for assistance if these places or the interests therein are assailed or threatened from without.

IV. His Majesty's Government undertake to protect these islands and the Idrisi sea-board from all hostile action, without any interference on their part with his affairs and independence; and again, in return for his engagement to preclude the intervention of any Foreign Power in his territory or with his interests, His Majesty's Government engage to afford the Idrisi Saiyid the requisite help with the means of war such as arms and ammunition and the like, both now during the duration of this General War and afterwards; and to facilitate the necessary avenues to the acquisition by him of such benefits as regards a telephone system and various developments such as the prospecting for mines and the extension of commerce and similar benefits; and, further, will vouchsafe his convenience and that of his followers in the choice of a secure asylum in the event of a crisis arising in his country, which God forbid— together with such support of Government as shall assure his dignity and well-being, and shall use every endeavour to restore him to his former condition without any diminution therein.

V. The Idrisi Saiyid engages to keep a body of his armed retainers in the Farasan Islands as a token of his independence and to maintain his effective occupation therein.

VI. The Idrisi flag shall fly permanently over the Farasan Islands and in his other territories as a sufficient sign and token of such ships of his occupation and this without any other auxillary token.

VII. The rights and duties of the Idrisi Saiyid herein detailed shall be extended to include his family, kinsmen, heirs and successors.

VIII. This agreement is signed by the Idrisi Saiyid on the one hand, and on the other by Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. Jacob, the representative of the Resident, Aden, on behalf of His Majesty's Government and shall be held binding on both parties.

Dated Jizan 22nd January 1917, A.D., corresponding to 28th Rabi al Awwal 1336 A.H.

True translation.
(Signed) H. F. Jacob,
Lieutenant-Colonel,
First Assistant Resident, Aden.

MEMORANDUM ON THE SUPPLEMENTARY ENGAGEMENT CONCLUDED WITH THE IDRISI SAIYID ON 22ND JANUARY 1917.

In this engagement with the Idrisi it may appear at first sight that we have given more than the occasion demanded. The truth is that the Idrisi refused point blank to admit the really essential paragraph III. without his country-proposals being added. It is necessary to understand his attitude. The Idrisi does not know how the war will end. Last year he was certain the Allies would win. He is less hopeful now. Then, he feared he might patch up a peace which left the Turks "in situ" as his implacable foe; to-day, he looks round and sees

Figure 2.177.2. Anglo-Idrissi agreement Regarding Farasan Islands (January 1917)
them very much to the fore in Arabia and holding their own. He cites Lahiya, Kufra, and the Shuber; the slow progress of the Sherif of Mecca, and finally Mesopotamia, and he doubts our ability to dislodge them. His fears to-day are two-fold. He believes that—

1. his refusal to treat with any other Power, and his promise not to dispose of Farasan Islands and rights therein, will drive upon him Turkish animosity. The Turks up to now have watched his coquetting with us but believe they can win him back to the fold hereafter. Let them once come to know of his closer "affinity" with us as regards the Islands and they will regard him as completely ostracised. There is no arguing with a fanatic of such preconceived notions.

2. this engagement will deprive him of future assistance in arms and ammunition from Djibouti and Massawa, both of which places he has, for many years very considerably assisted in the arms traffic.

Cut off from these two sources of supply to whom he asks, should he apply for the necessary sinews of war, and whom should he approach hereafter except the British Government? The Government must therefore take the place of these two Powers.

The sole Power the Idriisi fears now, and after the war, is Turkey aided by Germany, and the reason given for securing not only our promise of assistance in arms, but of advice in the development of his country, an asylum—should a crisis in the country compel his temporary withdrawal—coupled with the assurance of a continuation of these terms after the war to himself and successors—is this one inordinate fear of a prospectively irate Turkey. From this obsession he could not be dissuaded. At first it was our flag that would incense the Turks, and on the second visit it would be the engagement to refrain from a cession of the Islands that was bound to arouse Turkish resentment.

At one time in the proceedings the Idriisi had insisted on the despatch of British troops inland, if he were attacked by the Turks, but I reminded him that our earlier treaty was confined to his sea-board and to protection by sea power.

I may say that although this engagement in its inception was peculiar to the Farasan Islands, yet the Idriisi was loud in predicting for the whole of his territories the ill-forebodings he had conjured up as the likely result of his agreement to paragraph III. It was therefore not possible—given the desideratum of securing his adhesion to this paragraph—to exclude from the agreement this extended area of his entire sea-board. His Minister (Da Salhi) declared (and we cannot refute it) that the Farasan Islands were the Idriisi's before the 30th April 1915, and that, though not specifically mentioned, the Farasan became at once a part and parcel of his sea-board and within the purview of that treaty.

One result of the present agreement will be the exclusion of Italian influence in the Idriisi's domains. His Minister told me that the Italians were very desirous of concluding some agreement with the Idriisi to secure a qui pro quo of their long established connection qui d arms trade, and that even now the Italians sent him ammunition. At the same time the Idriisi coveted the idea of dealing with any Power save Great Britain, and to our Government he looked for every form of assistance.

As regards paragraph V, I found it imperative to insist on any fixed number of his retainers on the Island. I had insisted on "a number not less than one hundred men," but this was met by the argument that many more might be required and the exact number had best be left to time and circumstances. The Minister who was deputed on board said that the Farasan Islanders were a very stout body of men who would give a good account of themselves if necessary. I waived the point of number for I was dealing with a peculiar case of non, and was guided also by the principle that especially with Idriisi, it is unsafe to insist on what one cannot enforce nor supervise without causing friction. It is enough that he has engaged to ensure his "effective occupation."
At our first meeting the Idrisi could not understand whose intervention we feared. It could not be an enemy, for we surely had control of the Red Sea outlet. As for allies, were they not our friends? If they interfered—
or if we would anticipate such a contretemps—we should tell them that the islands were Idrisi, seized by him from the enemy, manned by him, and his flag hoisted, to show his occupation, and, finally, that he was under British protection.

Such announcement seems to me very essential. I am not aware of any future cut-and-dried division of the several interests in the Red Sea, but it had occurred to me that to hoist our flag and to land our troops would savour of British occupation and place these islands ipso facto within the category of matters to be adjusted after the war.

We are already assisting the Idrisi with the sinews of war, and the only foe after the war against whom he asks protection is the Turk—if the latter is left in the 'Asir province. The necessity for such protection after peace is concluded is very problematical, if at all possible.

The Idrisi would not sign the English copy. It was unreasonable, he said, to sign what you cannot understand. He however retained both Arabic and English copies. I did not press him to comply. His case is a peculiar one.

The agreement was concluded and signed, after much cross reference, on the evening of the 22nd instant, and H.M.S. Minto was asked by wireless telegraphy on 23rd to land to remove troops and flag, which he did that same day.

I would thank Commander G. Arnot, R.N.R.; H.M.S. Perth, and Lieutenant L. P. Naider, R.N.V.R., the Political Officer of the Southern Red Sea Patrol, for their cordial cooperation in dealing with the Idrisi. He is the most suspicious and the most exclusive individual of his class I have ever encountered in Arabian politics. A give-and-take policy was indicated, as he himself was only too ready to remind me.

(Signed) H. F. Jacon, Lieutenant-Colonel,
First Assistant Resident, Aden.

H.M.S. Perth,
21st January 1917.

Figure 2.17.4 Anglo-Idrissi agreement Regarding Farasan Islands (January 1917)
2.18. Green light from London for Al-Idrisi to expand south (December 1920)

Al-Idrisi was given the green light from London for the ultimate inclusion of Al-Hudaydah into his territory. Lord Earl Curzon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Major General T. E. Scott, Political Resident, Aden, 13 December 1920 (Schofield, 1993: Vol.4. p. 403).

Figure 2.18.1 Green light from London for Al-Idrisi to expand south (December 1920)
2.19. Political position of the Yemen: 1920s

2.19.1. Note on the political situation in the Yemen

2.19. Political position of the Yemen: 1920s

The extinction of Turkish rule in the Yemen at the end of the war left the country in chaos. The Arab rulers, the Idrisi and the Imam of Ibb, have emerged as the most important political factors - apart from the British - in the Yemen and Asir, but it remains to be seen whether either of them is capable of overcoming the disruptive tendencies in Arab politics and of evolving a stable, organized state from the congeries of petty tribes and rival sheikhs who inhabit the country.

The seat of the Idrisi's power is at Saba on the southern border of Asir, of which province he is often referred to as the ruler. He in fact possesses only a coastal belt in Asir roughly as far north as al-Mali Point. The fertile district of Tabuk in the interior of the province has been seized by Ibn Saud, the Sultan of Najd.

The Idrisi, barred from expansion northwards by the presence of the Wahabi power and by the King of the Hedjaz, has gradually extended his influence southwards into the Tahama of the Yemen. This movement has brought him into embittered conflict with the Imam of Ibb, who regards the entire Yemen as his rightful inheritance. The quarrel between these rulers is embarrassing to us, as we are bound by association during the war to the Idrisi, while at the same time we are anxious to establish friendly relations with the Imam of Ibb.

IDRISI

During the war the Idrisi threw in his lot with the British, and though his action was not very vigorous and his assistance was of little real value, it nevertheless remains true that he stood loyally by his engagements.
2.19. Political position of the Yemen: 1920s

In this newly acquired territory the Idrisi had not the great personal influence he possessed further north, though he was looked up to and respected by the tribes. His rule in Hodeidah was arbitrary and the heavy taxes and levies imposed by him on the merchants were unpopular, especially with the British Indian traders settled in the port. The Idrisi's method of patriarchal rule based on religious leadership was not suited to a commercial port of the importance of Hodeidah, but his government was the only possible one for the town when we abandoned it, and it was accepted by the townspeople lest worse befall. The Qura and other Shafi tribes in the neighborhood of Hodeidah adhered to the Idrisi because he could provide them with the means of warding off their aggressive Zaidi neighbours.

Taking advantage of this religious (and to some extent social) antagonism, the Idrisi decided to bid for the leadership of the Shafi Tehmin against the Zaidi Imam of Sanan, and his policy met with considerable success. His ability to play this role depended to some extent, but by no means entirely, on the amount of support given to him by us. He was assisted by the fact that we supplied him with a certain amount of munition, and that he was

Figure 0.2 Note on the political situation in the Yemen
2.19. Political position of the Yemen: 1920s

Figure 0.3 Note on the political situation in the Yemen
of the late Idris's cousin Sayed Mustafa al Idris who was at one time nominated as his heir, and who was possibly cast in his nephews. He is a man of considerable ability and force of character, ambitious and enterprising but possessed of great personal charm of manner. Sayed Mustafa has long been devoted to the Idris's interests and he played a leading part in building up the Idris State and extending it southwards. He is older than the late Idris. His home is in Egypt, where he possesses considerable wealth and he may possibly be unwilling to settle permanently in Asir.

The Imam of Sanaa,

The Imam of Sanaa remained neutral during the war, refusing to break up the treaty that he had concluded with the Turks in 1911. After the collapse of the Turkish power he laid claim to the entire Yemen on the strength of his alleged hereditary rights, which in his view were never abandoned but only in abeyance during the Turkish occupation. He regards the British at Aden and the Idris in the Truc as an infidel and heretical foreign interloper from Europe and Africa, and he recognizes neither the British protectorate as demarcated with Turkey, nor the Idris rule established over the northern Tihama tribes as a result of the war. The main object of his policy at the present time in the acquisition of Hobbadah, now held by his rival the Idris, and with this purpose in view he aims at effecting a break between the British and the Idris and at securing the much coveted port by our aid.

Hobbadah is the natural port for Sanaa - the gate of Sanaa, as his envoy in Aden puts it - and the Imam hopes to be able to develop it at the expense of Aden. To attain this and he is probably prepared to recognize the independence of the tribes in the British protectorate, at any rate as a temporary measure until he feels himself strong.
strong enough to disregard this undertaking.

The Imam's historical claim to be ruler of the entire Yemen is not based on strong foundations for the control of the Imam of Sanaa over the country in former centuries was usually weak and became nominal in the eighteenth century, when the coastal tribes shook off Zeidi control. At present his claims are not admitted by the Hashish and many of the Zeidi also resist him - notably the Hashid al-Fakih.

He is not himself strong enough to consolidate his territory and to suit the Idrii, and for this reason he seeks foreign aid though he is fanatically anxious to avoid any form or any appearance of foreign control.

He intrigues with the French and other foreign powers, but he realizes that the British is the most influential foreign Government in South-west Arabia and therefore seeks to establish good relations with us, though as far as possible on his own terms.

The Imam has an advantage over the Idrii in the fact that he has behind him a long tradition of hereditary dominion in the Yemen. The Imams of Sanaa have been temporal rulers for centuries, and their power is consequently regarded as more stable than that of the Idrii.

Apart from the British and the Idrii the Imam is the only approach to a regular Government in the Yemen. The nucleus of his power lies in his leadership of the religious sect of Zeidie who inhabit the comparatively fertile highlands of Yemen. The coastal districts bordering both the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea are occupied by Shafieis, who in some parts extend a considerable distance inland into the mountains. They are hostile to the Zeidie and consequently to the Imam on religious as well as on social grounds.

Figure 0.5 Note on the political situation in the Yemen
The Shafei tribes in the neighbourhood of Aden are in treaty relations with the Indian Government, which has extended to them the protection of His Majesty's Government in return for the exclusion of other foreign influence and for keeping open the trade routes. The latter point is to the advantage of the tribes themselves, who probably have been attained without the making of any treaty.

Small stipends are paid to some of the tribal chiefs and their dependants also demand and frequently receive from the Aden Residency presents which long usage has led them to regard as their right. The protection guaranteed to them by His Majesty's Government is largely nominal except in the district in the immediate vicinity of Aden. During the war we failed to protect even Lahej from the Turks, but we have now an outpost manned covering the Abdali territory and we have helped the Hausublis and subsahis against Zeidi aggression by diplomatic means, and - more effectively - by aeroplane action. On the other hand the Amir of Dala has been a fugitive in Aden since early in 1920, when his country seized by the Imam without interference on our part.

The tribesmen in Hadram, which is closer to Aden, have been encouraged by us to resist Zeidi aggression by means of presents of ammunitions and money. The loose tribal federations in Yafa and Hadala are apparently sufficiently powerful to look after themselves, and they do so with little or no assistance from us. This Yafa and Hadala barrier gives security from Zeidi invasion to the coastal tribes in the East of Aden.

On the Red Sea coast the Shafei tribes as far as south as the Shafa have avoited Zeidi conquest by submission to the Idrisi. South of the Shafa down to the borders of the
2.19. Political position of the Yemen: 1920s

The British protectorate in Yemen has been left to their fate, and being unarmed, unassisted, and divided amongst themselves, they have fallen under Imam's rule. This has given the Imam access to the sea, and he is endeavouring to develop the port of Mocha which, however, he regards as a poor substitute for Hodeidah.

Mocha is however more likely to be a dangerous rival to Aden than is Hodeidah, owing to its proximity. It might draw the trade of Taiz, to which Hodeidah would never do. From this point of view it is to our advantage for the Imam to turn his attention from the development of Mocha to that of Hodeidah.

The Jaffar of the Taha regret the departure of the Turks, who protected them from the Idris, Next to Turkish sovereignty they would probably choose nominal submission to either the British or the Idris. They may however in course of time reconcile themselves to the rule of Hans provided that the Imam leaves them a reasonable amount of autonomy and does not try to interfere with their religious doctrines.

**British Relations with the Yemen.**

An endeavour has been made to sum up the present position and the aspirations of the Idris, the Imam and the Jaffar tribes, and it remains to consider the position of the British and of the policy of His Majesty's Government in relation to the politics of the Yemen.

Before the Turkish collapse we did not need to concern ourselves beyond the limits of our so-called Protectorate. During the Unionist regime in England and the forward policy was adopted, the boundary was demarcated with the Turkish Government, troops were moved up country and preparations were made to establish a sanatorium for Aden at Dula.

The Liberal Government which came into power at
2.19. Political position of the Yemen: 1920s

Figure 0.8 Note on the political situation in the Yemen
the British cause, he had a better right than the Imam to reap the rewards of victory in the Turkish Scheme. He had, however, been constantly warned by us not to attack the Imam. He was informed that none of his acquisitions made during the war could be regarded as, or even regarded as, his until a final treaty of peace had been concluded, and he was told not to continue his advance further south than Zaidiyah. The object of this restriction was to leave Hodeidah (which was then in temporary British occupation) open to acquisition by the Imam. The Imam failed to take advantage of the opportunity given to him chiefly owing to the obstruction of the coastal Shefi tribes—notably the Qura— and the position in this district remained in this indeterminate state until matters were precipitated by the detention of the Jacob Mission by the Qura on its way from Hodeidah to negotiate with the Imam.

The failure of the mission was followed by the seizure of Dala by the Imam and by a further advance by the Idriesi up to the gates of Hodeidah.

The British evacuated Hodeidah in January 1921 in fulfillment of frequent declarations made by us and owing to the demands of the enemy leading the British Government to resist the withdrawal of the garrison. The town was thereafter immediately occupied by the Idriesi with our concurrence and encouragement.

The Qura and other Shefi tribes in the neighboring town cemented their friendship with the Idriesi by submitting to his suzerainty and this, together with occasional assistance in the shape of ammunition from us, entrenched the Idriesi in so strong a position that all the efforts of the Imam to dislodge him by force of arms completely failed.

The Imam quickly resolved to try other means of circumventing his successful rival, and early in 1921 he despatched an envoy to Aden to negotiate for a treaty.

Figure 0.9 Note on the political situation in the Yemen
Figure 0.10 Note on the political situation in the Yemen
2.19 Political position of the Yemen: 1920s

Figure 0.11 Note on the political situation in the Yemen

The main object of British policy in the Yemen is to ensure the security of Aden at a minimum of cost. Before the war an endeavour was made to attain this aim by defining the boundary between Turkish and British Yemen and by subordinating the tribes in the neighbourhood of Aden.

The uselessness of the Protectorate as a military defence was demonstrated in 1911, when a small Turkish force advanced through it without opposition from the tribes and seized Lahej and Sheikh Otman with little difficulty.

Nevertheless, after the Turkish surrender our relations with the Protectorate tribes were renewed on the same footing as before the war, and we are now engaged in an effort to induce the Imam to accept the boundary drawn by the British and Turkish Governments in 1909. So far he has steadfastly refused to recognise the artificial line that was agreed to by his old enemy the Turks, and he has emphasised his disregard of it by occupying and holding Dala and the surrounding Amir country and by repeated attacks on the protectorate tribes in Hadramout. These attacks were made simultaneously with declarations of friendship for His Majesty's Government, with whom he was negotiating for a treaty.

It is a question whether our agreements with the outlying tribes of the Protectorate are worth preserving, but so far we have aimed at maintaining them for two reasons.

In the first place, although the Imam's military power is not formidable, we do not desire to see it established within striking distance of Aden and Lahej.

Secondly, a repudiation of the tribal treaties, although it might be justified on the plea that the tribes do not keep their side of the bargain, could be liable to be regarded as a desertion of friends whom we have bound ourselves to protect.
2.19. Political position of the Yemen: 1920s

Figure 0.12 Note on the political situation in the Yemen
2.19. Political position of the Yemen: 1920s

Figure 0.13 Note on the political situation in the Yemen
2.19. Political position of the Yemen: 1920s

Figure 0.14 Note on the political situation in the Yemen
long-standing quarrel with his powerful neighbour the Imam, and as the ruler of a maritime country, it is of great value to him to remain on friendly terms with us, the principal naval power in the Red Sea, especially as long as we remain in possession of Kamran.

It should be our object to bring about an understanding between the Imams and the Idrisi which will leave us on good terms with both, and it is in the best interests of the Idrisi himself that he should award our efforts, if necessary even by sacrificing Hadidah, of which the Imam is never likely to leave him in peaceful possession. On the other hand, the Imam should, in his own interest, do all in his power to conciliate the Sheba tribesmen in this district, and especially the important Qahra tribe which occupies a key position on the road to Hadidah.

It is possible that the Imam is at heart irreconcilable to all foreigners in the Yemen and that he will regard himself as morally bound by any agreement that he may make with the British or with the Idrisi. But as far as it is possible to judge he is a constant factor in Yemen politics, and so long as we remain at Aden we shall have to deal with him as a neighbour. If we are worth while to make an attempt to convert him into a friendly one, provided that this does not entail breaking with our former friends, the Idrisi and the tribes of the Aden Protectorate. The recognition by the Imam of our Protectorate boundary and of the Idrisi within a boundary still to be defined should in my opinion be a sine qua non to any understanding with the Imam, and should be a necessary preliminary to entering into treaty relations with him.

If our efforts to come to terms with the Imam fail or if he makes a treaty with us only to break it at the first opportunity, we may eventually be driven to fall back on one of the alternative policies that have been mentioned. That would probably necessitate an increase in our local military strength and an increase in our political...
2.19. Political position of the Yemen: 1920s

Figure 0.16 Note on the political situation in the Yemen
State territory II: Asir, 1913-1934

The truce, should be based on a system of reciprocal advantage on terms honourable to either side, and not on a basis of legalized blackmail by the weaker party.

The value of a treaty with the Imam of Yemen will be much enhanced if there is potential mineral wealth in his country, or if its trade is capable of considerable development. We have no reliable information on these points at present, but the establishment of friendly relations will facilitate investigation which may possibly lead to valuable results. In that case the treaty would benefit Aden commercially as well as militarily and politically.

It is evident that all the Arab rulers in the Yemen, great and small, base their policy with regard to us on the principle of obtaining as much as they can from us and of giving as little as possible in return. Their fault in politics is the same as that attributed by Canning in matters of commerce to the Dutch - "of giving too little and asking too much".

As a matter of fact they have little to offer us, and we are consequently often inclined to doubt whether their friendship is worth seeking.

An alternative policy would be to wash our hands completely of Yemen politics and, trusting to the possession of Aden, Perim and Emirate to safeguard our interests in the Red Sea, to refuse to be drawn into the quarrels and rivalries of our Arab neighbours.

This policy of isolation has a good deal to commend it, and it has the merit of simplicity. Had we pursued it steadily and consistently from the first it might well have proved to be the best practical policy for a power that has no desire for territorial aggrandizement in this part of the world.

We have however departed from this policy in the past, and our existing commitments with the tribes of the

Figure 0.17 Note on the political situation in the Yemen
2.19. Political position of the Yemen: 1920s

Figure 0.18 Note on the political situation in the Yemen
2.10.2. Relations with the Imam of Yemen

Cabinet Memorandum, circulated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, on ‘Relations with the Imam of Yemen’, in June 1927 (CAB 24/187, TNA, London).
2.19. Political position of the Yemen: 1920s

Figure 019.0.2.1 Relations with the Imam of Yemen
2.19. Political position of the Yemen: 1920s

Figure 0.2.2 Relations with the Imam of Yemen

ANNEXURE NO. 1.

Paraphrase Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Resident, Aden. Sent 5th March, 1927.

FUTURE relations between His Majesty's Government and the Imam reference to your despatch of 9th February† and your despatch of 19th January.* His Majesty's Government concurred generally in views expressed in latter despatch and have decided that communication on the lines set out below should be addressed to Imam after No. 5 Royal Air Force Squadron has arrived at Aden and flown over the Protectorate in full force for at least a week. The Imam should be informed that His Majesty's Government have every wish to maintain friendly relations with him and would welcome the establishment of a formal understanding between the two Governments. They have already given ample indication of their desire to arrive at such an understanding by sending Sir G. Clayton to Sanaa but they are quite unable to agree to the territorial demands put forward by the Imam. They have no wish to extend their sphere outside the boundaries of the Aden Protectorate or to threaten the Imam's absolute independence; on the contrary, it is to their interests that there should be a stable government in the Yemen and they are anxious to be on friendly terms with it. If at any time the Imam is prepared to come to an agreement with His Majesty's Government recognising the treaty relations between themselves and the Protectorate tribes, His Majesty's Government, for their part, would be glad to discuss with him the terms of such an agreement. While reiterating their desire to come to a friendly arrangement of this character His Majesty's Government feel it incumbent upon them to make it plain beyond all question that the Imam has no rights whatever within the Aden Protectorate, and they feel it necessary now to give him warning that continued occupation by him of a portion of that Protectorate renders him liable at any time to such measures of retaliation by land, air or sea, at such time and in such manner as may be deemed suitable, and that further encroachment in the Protectorate or any action on his part against any islands in the Red Sea is calculated to precipitate action on the part of His Majesty's Government. But there is nothing that His Majesty's Government desire less than to be driven to any such action and the advantages of a peaceful agreement between the Imam and His Majesty's Government whereby tribes within the Protectorate were guaranteed against any outside interference would be of such advantage to the progress and commerce of the Yemen that His Majesty's Government hope that the Imam will once more consider whether an agreement cannot be reached.

You will doubtless settle in consultation with the Officer Commanding the Air Force on a suitable opportunity for addressing the Imam on the above lines.

AMERY.

* Not printed.
Paraphrase Telegram from the Resident at Aden to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Dated 24th April, 1927

MESSAGE to Imam Yahya, reference my telegram of 30th April. The Imam has now replied to the following effect: He makes the usual protestations of friendship and of his desire to conclude a friendly agreement with His Majesty's Government. He refers to "threats" contained in communication from His Majesty's Government, and states that no action which would impair the independence of the Yemen can be tolerated by him. He concludes by offering to send a plenipotentiary to Aden to discuss the making of a treaty, and asks me to communicate with His Majesty's Government on the subject.

Paragraph 2. Agreement with the Imam in my opinion should, if possible, be brief; on his side recognition of the Protectorate, on His Majesty's Government's acknowledgment of the independence of the Yemen, with perhaps a third clause to the effect that more elaborate agreements will be discussed when the Imam has implemented the treaty by the evacuation of the Protectorate.

Paragraph 3. Subject to your concurrence I therefore propose that a reply should be returned to the Imam acknowledging and reciprocating his hopes for a friendly agreement and continuing on the following lines: "As he has been assured on several occasions His Majesty's Government do not desire to interfere in any way with his independence in his own territory of Yemen. His Majesty's Government are quite unable to acquiesce in his occupation of parts of territory of tribes with whom they are in treaty-relations and such threats as were contained in my last communication plainly applied only to reprisals for acts of aggression committed or to be committed by him. His Majesty's Government are as heretofore prepared on his acknowledgment of the Protectorate boundary to recognize the Imam's independence in his own territory. If his plenipotentiary will be authorized to acknowledge on his behalf the independence of those tribes and undertake to withdraw from those areas within the Protectorate boundary which are now occupied by the Imam's troops he will be welcomed and a friendly agreement to the above effect will be easily arranged. It will be useless for his envoy to come to Aden if he will not acknowledge the Protectorate boundary as claimed by His Majesty's Government. In this explanation His Majesty's Government are animated by the desire that negotiations if opened again shall not fail for a third time. When the above agreement is signed and ratified agreements on other matters can be discussed in a friendly spirit."

Paragraph 4. Pending your reply I am sending a polite acknowledgment of his letter to the Imam. Despatch containing a translation of Imam's letter is being sent to you by the next mail.

ANNEXURE No. 3.

From Major-General J. K. Stewart, C.B., D.S.O., Political Resident, Aden, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, London.

Sir, Aden Residency, 19th January, 1927.

In continuation of my telegram* sent in reply to your Confidential despatch of the 30th December, 1926, I have the honour to state my views on the points raised in the Foreign Office letter No. E/7036/2860/91 of 24th December. I have already expressed these as shortly as possible in my telegram, and the following observations expand my comments on the paragraphs of the Foreign Office letter.

1. Reference paragraph 2 of Foreign Office letter. I understand that the Royal Air Force makes no claim to be able to recover by air action any country in which the Imam has already firmly established himself, but they do claim that, in case of further incursions, they would be able to make the invaders withdraw by means of direct action against them and of an attack on the morat of the Imam and his Commanders by aerial action against towns and troops within the Imam's borders. Hence it is aggression in the Protectorate which is most likely to bring about active measures by us. I consider therefore that the warning to the Imam should be that his occupation of a portion of the Aden Protectorate renders him

(*Not printed.)

Figure 019.2.3 Relations with the Imam of Yemen
liable at any time to such measures of retaliation by land, sea or air and in such manner as His Majesty's Government may deem suitable, and that any encroach-
ment by him in the Protectorate, or action against the Islands in the Red Sea are calculated to precipitate such action. I will refer to the method in which this warning should be conveyed in a later part of this letter.

3. Reference paragraph 3 of Foreign Office letter. The Imam do not doubt generally desire a settlement with His Majesty's Government, but as it has been pointed out, he wants it only on his own terms. The friendly sentiments expressed in paragraph 5 of his letter of 17th October, 1924, are similar to many such declarations that he has repeatedly made during the last five or six years, often at times when he was actually engaged in seizing portions of our Protectorate. A better clue to his meaning is contained in paragraph 2 of the same letter in which he says: “except for the consent of the British Government to grant in full our justified and rightful requirements, the legality of which is proved, there is not the slightest cause for the postponement of the establishment of a formal and general understanding between the two Governments.” What the Imam regards as his rights in the Protectorate is shown in his own draft for clause 3 of the proposed treaty, which was sent to the Secretary of State with Major Barrett’s despatch of 31st July, 1924. Major Barrett commented on this draft in his memorandum which accompanied his despatch. I fully agree with his criticisms of it. The Imam affected to regard the illusory concessions made in his draft as a suitable qui pro quo for our turning the Idrisi out of Hodeidah and giving it to him. Since then he has obtained possession of Hodeidah without our help, and it has been quite clear throughout and down to the present time that he has no intention of recognising the existence of our Protectorate except under compulsion. He has consistently ignored any references to it in all his replies to our letters, however friendly his general language may have been. When Sir Gilbert Clayton permitted the opening of a discussion with the Imam on the possibility of the Zeilis retaining Dala, the Imam promptly advanced claims to other districts in the Protectorate, and Sir Gilbert Clayton thereupon abandoned the negotiations. If we wish really to satisfy the Imam, we must be prepared to surrender the whole Protectorate to him, and even then he will in his heart resent our continued presence in Aden itself.

4. Reference paragraph 4 of Foreign Office letter. I agree that a radical revision of the treaties with the Protectorate Chiefs may be desirable. But I submit it is not the right time to revise them while they are being violated by a third party, and at a moment when we are obviously finding it difficult to enforce them out. A settlement with the Imam should precede a revision of our relations with the tribes inside the Protectorate. Sir Gilbert Clayton advocates a review of the Protectorate treaties, to be followed later by the Imam. If this revision is a part of a bargain with the Imam would be tantamount to selling our friends to the Imam for a treaty; a step which Sir Gilbert Clayton did not propose, and which, I am convinced, neither he nor His Majesty’s Government could regard as honourable. If the Imam puts no more value on his own words than we should by such action have shown for ours, the treaty gained would be of little value.

5. Reference paragraph 5 of Foreign Office letter. I agree that the proposed warning might be combined with a bid for friendship. We should once more make it clear that we have no wish to threaten the Imam’s absolute independence or to extend our sphere outside our Protectorate, but that on the contrary we are glad to see a stable Government in the Yemen and anxious to be on friendly terms with it. If the Imam is convinced that we mean what we say both by our warning and by our renewed offer of friendship, it is possible that he may decide to yield to hard facts, and to make the best of the situation by accepting our overtures and agreeing to our terms.

6. Reference paragraph 6 of Foreign Office letter. If my understanding is correct as given in paragraph 2 above, then the warning in the terms stated in that paragraph should be conveyed to the Imam incorporated in a friendly letter, but if it is intended to depart from the passive attitude entirely, and to try to force the Imam to evacuate the portions of the Protectorate held by him, I am of opinion that the warning should specifically tell the Imam that his retention of those portions will lead to action. At the same time he should be told that the alternative is his withdrawal and the establishment of relations on a friendly basis. This warning should certainly not be given unless His Majesty’s Gover-

Figure 019.2.4 Relations with the Imam of Yemen
2.19. Political position of the Yemen: 1920s

A reference paragraph 7 of Foreign Office letter. It may be to the interest of His Majesty’s Government to reduce their obligations in the Protectorate to the minimum compatible with the safety of Aden itself, but we cannot honourably divest ourselves of our obligations at the present time. This contention is supported by the first three lines of paragraph 5 of Sir Gilbert Clayton’s memorandum appended to his report on his mission to Sana’a. The termination of these treaties by an understanding with the Imam would not merely lower our prestige, though our prestige would inevitably suffer seriously. It is a question whether our written treaties should or should not be honoured. If we are to carry out treaties only when it is convenient to ourselves to do so, it is rather a waste of time to try to make one with the Imam, for he will not fail to draw the inference that such fair weather friends cannot be trusted, and that our readiness to sacrifice old friends in order to gain a new one who is more powerful is an indication of what he himself may expect if fortune ever turns against him.

8. The Foreign Office letter says that there are no arguments in favour of the retention of the treaties with the northern Chiefs except such as are inspired by considerations of prestige. At the same time it says that certain of the treaties must presumably be retained in any event, i.e., those with the Sultans of the coast. If by the “northern Chiefs” the Foreign Office means Chiefs such as those of the Amiris, the Yafais, the Audalies, the Altaliquis and Behan, the following are my comments:

The Amir Chief is the Amir of Dalal, who visited Aden in 1919 under a written promise from the Resident that he would be protected against aggression from beyond the borders of the Aden Protectorate both then and thereafter. He was subsequently told in writing that if the Imam did not abstain from interference in his territory the Resident would recommend that British troops should be sent to Dalal to protect him. The failure to carry out these promises is not simply a matter of losing prestige; it is a clear breach of faith.

9. With regard to the Yafais and the Altaliquis, they are the best fighting material in the Protectorate and their abandonment to the Imam would expose to Zeidi attachment such as the Sultans of the coast whom the Foreign Office propose to retain in any event. A sketch map showing areas of these tribes is attached to illustrate the remarks following. The Yafais’ country at one time extended to the sea; but, although they no longer claim the whole of their former territory, they maintain their demand for Khanfar and other districts in Abyan which have been taken from them by the Fadlis. Under pressure from Aden the Lower Yafai Sultan has reconquered a truce with the Fadli Sultan (one of the Sultans of the Coast), but if the Yafais became subordinate to the Imam while the Fadlis remained independent the old quarrel would certainly be resumed between the Zeidis, ostensible allies of the Imam, while acting on behalf of the Yafais, and the Imam would claim the fertile tract of Abyan which lies only about 90 miles from Aden, and his possession of which would cut off all communication with the Fadlis and the other inhabitants of the Coast. Moreover with Yafa and Beda and the Audali country all in his possession the Imam could seize the Fadli territory whenever he pleased.

10. The position of the Altaliquis is somewhat similar to that of the Yafais. They extend to the coast and if they are excluded from our Protectorate and left to the Imam the coast would be again laid open to the Zeidis, and, with the Audali country gone, we could hardly hope to preserve the Wahidi of Balahaf or the other petty tribes (Irika, Haura and Bir Ali) lying along the coast to the borders of Mokalla, nor could we prevent the extension of the Imam’s influence over the Hadramaut and probably Mokalla itself.

11. The advantages of preserving our Protectorate over the Sultans of the Coast are somewhat problematical, but they are entitled by treaty to our protection and the Foreign Office letter assumes that these treaties should be honoured in any event. In practice, however, we should not have the means of safeguarding the coast if the Zeidis were in control of the mountain districts which cover them. The coastal tribes cannot be relied upon to make a serious defence, and their confidence in the British would be destroyed by our abandonment of the other tribes of the Protectorate. In my opinion abandonment of the remaining “northern Chiefs” means in practice (though it may not in theory) abandonment of all the Protectorate except the triangle of Abdali territory and possibly a few outlying districts in the immediate vicinity of Aden. The Zeidis would then be
established within sight of Aden. Their ruler is in close relations with a European Power from which he receives munitions of war and does his best to obtain further munitions, aeroplanes included, from other Powers. His negotiations on this matter with a representative of an American firm have come to our knowledge. It seems improbable that he needs all this armament to wage war against the Idrisi or even Ibn Saud or for the preservation of his authority in his own country, and the question of the defence of the fortress of Aden under these changed conditions would need reconsideration from a military point of view. With the Imam on a frontier defence of which he is considered essential to the safety of Aden, there must be troops sufficient and ready to oppose the Zeidis on their making their first move, and this would involve an increase in the permanent garrison.

To my mind therefore the question of the retention of the treaties with the northern Chiefs involves far more than mere considerations of prestige. Far from the party losing appreciably by their termination we the British have more than prestige and the tribes on their side would lose what they value more than anything else—namely their tribal independence.

12. Paragraph 8 of Foreign Office letter. The question of prestige no doubt enters largely into the Imam’s attitude, but he also has more definite considerations at stake. At present he holds the most fertile portions of the Protectorate from which he can extract most revenue, and he is anxious to open the road to the comparatively rich districts of the Hadramaut. He is also impelled by his historical and religious traditions and by an Arab ruler’s natural impulse towards expansion to extend his rule over the whole of South-Western Arabia. He regards the British at Aden as heroic interlopers from Europe, just as he regards the Idrisi as an interloper from Africa. He is an Arab “Nationalist” who can never look upon any foreigners established in this part of Arabia with feelings of real friendliness. Although amour-propre is certainly an important consideration, it is by no means the only factor in the situation either in his own mind or with us, and he ultimately gives way to our claims or if he accepts a compromise with us, he will do so only because he realises that he has not the strength to do otherwise.

13. Reference paragraph 9 of Foreign Office letter. The tribes cannot, by themselves preserve a state of semi-independence against him, and there can be no dual control. Promises by the Imam of conditional non-interference are, quite literally, illusory. We either support the tribes or we leave them to the Imam. He may for some reason hold his hand against them temporarily, but we cannot in fact work on the assumption that there is any half-way house. As for the Imam assuming our obligations to the Chiefs, our obligation is to protect them, and the Imam has no power against whom they desire and crave protection is the Imam himself. If there is no reference whatever to the Imam’s theoretical claim to Aden which he admits he has no intention at present of advancing seriously, and it should not in any circumstances be given any consideration or be made the subject of any kind of bargain.

14. Reference paragraphs 10 and 11 of Foreign Office letter. The Foreign Office wish to discover whether there is any practical basis for a conciliatory offer to the Imam which might bring about a friendly settlement with him combined with an honourable reduction of British obligations to the Chiefs. For the reasons that I have stated I do not think that any reduction can be honourable in the present situation, nor do I think that any settlement with the Imam which does not give him the whole Protectorate can be genuinely friendly, however much it might be made to appear to be so in words. But there is one course, which is more dishonourable than open repudiation of our engagements, and that is professed adherence to them coupled with an intention to disregard them in practice. Experience during the last seven years has shown that only force or a genuine threat of force will check the Zeidi advance. With a squadron of the Royal Air Force at Aden I believe that further encroachments can be prevented, and in my opinion both our honour and our interests dictate that no further encroachments should be allowed.

46. The recovery of territory that has already been lost is another matter. A military reoccupation of Dala would, I think, free the Protectorate from Zeidi intrusion, but I understand that there is no possibility of this step being taken.

It is open to question whether the Royal Air Force alone can bring about an

Figure 019.2.6 Relations with the Imam of Yemen
evacuation of Dala and the other occupied districts. The Royal Air Force do not claim this even themselves. Determined action by air over the Imam's own territory (combined possibly with naval action against his coast) might induce him to give way if continued with great intensity over a prolonged period, which is probably impracticable. If there is no hope of ever recovering the lost portion of the Protectorate, the question should be considered of telling the Chiefs concerned openly, of giving them such compensation as we can, and of offering to treat with the Imam on the basis of the status quo. The Amir of Dala would have to be pensioned off. His case is such a bad one that he should be treated most generously. The bulk of the Radfan tribes which are appanages of Dala have already submitted to the Zeidis under force majeure, as has also the Aalwi Sheikh. The Audalis present a more difficult problem, for the present line of Zeidi occupation cuts them in two, leaving the Zeidis in possession of the best part of the country. Some compromise might possibly be effected here. The Yafais would have to submit to the loss of their outlying districts, which have been in Zeidi occupation for several years. There would be a serious risk that these concessions would encourage the Imam to make further encroachments; but if we were certain that these would be firmly resisted by us he might possibly accept and respect a boundary based on the status quo.

16. Personally I have not much confidence in the stability of such an arrangement and I do not advocate it. If the Imam's country breaks up on the present ruler's death, there would be risings among all Shafei tribes, and we should find ourselves in close contact with unruly tribes still hating us for our defection and creating anarchy in the country.

17. An alternative would be to continue to wait upon events. The Imam's death may be followed by a contested succession, and an opportunity may present itself of making a settlement with a new Zeidi ruler without sacrificing the friendly Shafei tribes which wish to remain under the protection of His Majesty's Government, and an opportunity would then arise for a complete review of all our protectorate treaties.

18. I consider that a definite decision of our future policy towards the Imam, and if possible a settlement with him, should precede a revision of our treaties with the tribes inside our Protectorate boundary. Meanwhile in my opinion any further encroachments in the Protectorate (with the possible exception of Behar) can be and should be, after warning issued, met by intensive and sustained Air action against the raiders and against the Imam's troops and towns across the border until the Zeidis withdraw from the area concerned. With regard to the parts of the Protectorate already in Zeidi occupation, there are three alternatives:

1. To demand that the Imam shall withdraw from them, at the same time threatening him with the use of force if he does not comply. This course should be adopted only if His Majesty's Government are satisfied that they have the means to enforce their demand, and are willing to use it if need be.

2. To adopt a waiting attitude in the hope that the course of events may produce a more favourable situation. The Imam should be addressed and the warning conveyed to him that aggression means reprisal, but that when he is prepared to come to an agreement with us on reasonable terms we shall be glad to discuss them again with him.

3. To reopen negotiations with him on the basis of stabilising the present status quo. This will involve a withdrawal from the position taken up very definitely by His Majesty's Government at the time of Sir Gilbert Clayton's mission to Sana'a, and although the Imam will no doubt welcome the change of attitude he may at the same time look upon it as a confession of weakness and be thereby encouraged to hold out for still better terms for himself. If the negotiations were consequently to fail His Majesty's Government would find themselves in the unpleasant position of having offered to break faith with their own dependants for the sake of the Imam's friendship, and of having been nevertheless rebuffed. In that case they would have forfeited the confidence of their friends without any compensating advantage.

19. Of these three alternatives, the first is the one indicated by our treaty obligations and by our promise to the Amir of Dala. Its adoption would not gain the friendship of the Imam, but it might gain his respect, which I am afraid we

Figure 019.2.7 Relations with the Imam of Yemen
do not at present possess. He will at any rate realise that the British Government is one that is prepared to honour its obligations even when it is inconvenient and troublesome to do so, and this may make him more ready to trust us in the future when once a settlement has been effected. This alternative, however, would entail long continued and violent Air action which it is unlikely that His Majesty’s Government would be prepared to undertake.

20. Of the other two alternatives I prefer the second. If it is adopted I consider the allowance to the exiled Amir should be still further increased, and he should be told frankly that His Majesty’s Government are not at present prepared to use force against the Imam in order to restore him; that he must wait until the situation is more favourable; and that His Majesty’s Government do not recognise the legality of the Zeidi occupation of his country.

To sum up, I recommend:

(1.) A warning to the Imam against further aggression incorporated in a friendly letter.
(2.) In case of further aggression immediate intensive and extended and sustained Air action against raiders and as a reprisal on his towns and troops.
(3.) Otherwise a passive attitude until the Imam sees reason, or dies and makes way for a perhaps more reasonable successor.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
J. H. R. STEWART, Major-General,
Political Resident, Aden.
2.20. The Saudi-Idrisi Treaty of August 1920

Asir was an administrative district under the Ottomans’ rule, but it was evident that the Ottomans had failed to expand their authority over the entire geographic entity of this district. Yet, nor had Al-Idrisi either, however, by the 1920s, it would be regarded as the future entity for the Al-Idrisi Emirate. Clearly, what is of importance about this treaty is that there is no mention of Asir. As such, Ibn Saud would simply avoid any recognition of such district. Instead, whenever Asir was mentioned in the treaty, it was in reference to tribes or locations within Asir, such as Asir Ghāmed or the tribe of Rijal Al-Ma‘a of Asir.

Significantly, as in the Anglo-Idrisi Treaty of 1915, the reference is solely to ‘Yemen’ simply because Asir had been known to be part of it. Presumably, since references to ‘Asir’ were avoided, the aim was clearly to divide Asir between the signatories according to what each recognised the other party’s claims in Yemen to be. In other words, this is an acknowledgement that up to that time Asir was still understood to be part of Yemen, albeit as a geographical part of it rather than any form of political recognition. However, although unintentionally so, this is a manifest recognition of the perception of Asir as part of the Yemen. The treaty is available in (Amin Sa‘id, 1959: pp. 97-98, the Saudi Green Book, 1934: pp. 472-473).
بيان سعودي - إدريس مشترك

وثبنا هذا البيان السعودي - الإدريس المشترك الذي اتفق مندوب
الأمام ومندوب السيد الإدريس عليه يوم 16 ذي الحجة 1338 هـ، وهو:

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله

يعلم به الناظر إليه، والراقب عليه، بأيام الإمام عبد العزيز عبد الرحمن
الفصل حفظه الله، لما أمرنا بالقدوم على الإمام محمد بن علي بن إدريس لعقد
الأخوة الإسلامية الخاصة وجمع المسلمين على دين الله ورضاه ودعوة الناس إلى
التعاون على الإעין التعري والآمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر والإجادة في سبيل
الله وان تكون إحدى أعداء الدين، فلنا قدمنا على الإمام المذكور
مرة ذلك وأحبه حرصاً على الجاهل والتعاون عليه، فأنفقنا الحال منه،
على عقد الأخوة بين الأمامين المذكورين على مثل ما ذكر إعلاه، فبقي كان
في بلادنا الإمام محمد بن علي من الشياطين والبلدين في اليمن ما هو في ملك آل

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Figure 2.2020.2.20.1 The Saudi-Idrisi Treaty of August 1920
The Saudi-Idrisi Treaty of August 1920

Figure 2.200.2.20.2 The Saudi-Idrisi Treaty of August 1920
The Saudi-Idrisi Treaty of August 1920

In the name of God the Most Merciful, the Compassionate: and may Prayers and Peace be upon His Prophet!

Be it known unto him who sees and reads that the Imam 'Abdul 'Aziz Ibn Abdurrahman Al Faisal, whom God protect, commanded us to go to the Imam Muhammad Ibn 'Ali Ibn Idris to conclude (an agreement) of special Islamic brotherhood; to establish unity in the Faith of God and His Prophet; to invite men to combine in good works and piety; to promote virtuous conduct and to thwart evil; to strive in the Way of God; and to unite against the enemies of the Faith.

When we approached the said Imam he was gratified and desirous of the general good and of collaborating to that end. It was therefore decided by us and by him that brotherhood should be established between the two Imams on the lines mentioned above.

Whereas in the Kingdom of the Imam Muhammad Ibn 'Ali, tribes and territories in the Yemen in the past belonged to Al Sa'Qd, these the Imam 'Abdul 'Aziz abandons to him owing to his (Idrisi's) desire for the general good and for co-operation to that end and (owing to) his good disposition.

It is thus necessary to specify the tribes and define them in order that each (of the Imams) may undertake the duties enjoined by God regarding the subjects under his hand. Therefore the tribes of all Ysm, Wad'a and those belonging to them of the Beni Jama'a, Sahar, Sharif, Cahtjan, Ruffeyda and Ubayda, including the Beni Bishr, Beni Falq, Shahrane, Beni Shahr, Ghasmid, Arf Ghasmid and all districts of Mahayel including Beni Thu'a, the people of Bareq and Tarqash, the people of Ar-Usfah and others belonging to them and all the tribes of Halli mentioned, are all within the domains (vilayet) of the Imam 'Abdul 'Aziz.

Figure 2.20.3 The Saudi-Idrisi Treaty of August 1920
Those belonging to the imām Muhammad ibn 'Ali Al Idrīsī are the Tiḥāma, except what is set forth above, and other (places) in his (Idrīsī’s) possession. The ‘Ujjal Al Ṣāḥīb of Asīr are his (Idrīsī’s) own property.

Neither party should interfere in the affairs of the subjects of the other party.

The tribes of the Surāt, Tiḥāma, Yaman and others mentioned above as belonging to ‘Abdūl ‘Azīz ibn ‘Abdūrrahām are understood (to include) the villages, deserts, mountains and plains (of those areas).

They (the imāms) should consult and collaborate with each other and should endeavour to carry out the duties enjoined by God, both as regards the Faith of Islam and (the welfare of) their subjects.

This has been issued, written and declared by us, the representatives of the imām, acting on his behalf, and by the imām Muhammad ibn ‘Ali ibn Idrīsī, in his presence and with his signature. This agreement and covenant has been given by us and by him.

"He who goes back on his word, violates his own promise".

May God grant us success.

The Prayers and Peace of God be upon Muhammad, his relatives and companions.

10th Dhul Hijja, 1330.
(Seal).
Muhammad ibn ‘Ali ibn Idrīsī.

Representative(s) of the imām.
1. ‘Abdūl ‘Azīz ibn Muhammad Ar-Rashid
2. Mas’ūd ibn ‘Abdūl ‘Azīz Al-Jarūlīsh

Figure 2.200.2.20.4 The Saudi-Idrisi Treaty of August 1920
2.21. Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Sana’a) between Italy and Yemen, 2 September 1926

This treaty was of political significance in its recognition of Imam Yahya as the King of Yemen. The treaty is available in (Salem, 1971: 526-528), and the English translation in (Hurewitz, 1956: Vol.2. pp. 146-147).
Figure 2.2.1 Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Sana'a) between Italy and Yemen, 2 September 1926
Figure 2.21.2 Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Sana’a) between Italy and Yemen, 2 September 1926
Figure 2.21.3 Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Sana’a) between Italy and Yemen, 2 September 1926
47. TREATY OF AMITY AND COMMERCE (SAN‘A): ITALY AND YEMEN
2 September 1926

(Ratifications exchanged, San‘a, 22 December 1926)


The Ottoman Empire conquered Yemen in the sixteenth century, only to lose it in the seventeenth and reoccupy it in the nineteenth (1849–72). Imam Yahya (1904–48), religious leader of the Zaydi Shi‘ah sect in the Yemeni highlands, concluded an agreement with the Sublime Porte in 1911 (confirmed in 1913) The Imam was vested with limited religious and legal autonomy but remained in tributary relationship with the Sultan, whose suzerainty

Figure 2.21.4 Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Sana’a) between Italy and Yemen, 2 September 1926
he recognized. Loyal to the Ottomans in World War I, Yahya asserted his independence immediately after the Mudros armistice (Doc. 18). He occupied in 1919 certain districts in the Aden hinterland belonging to shaykhs in protectorate relations with Britain and later refused to surrender the districts, claiming that historically they formed part of his patri- mony. Anglo-Yemeni talks in 1925 bore no fruit. Primarily to annoy London, the Imam began to court the Italians in Eritrea on the Red Sea coast opposite Yemen. The Italians required little prompting, as the Eritrean Gov- ernor, Cavaliere Jacopo Gasparini, attested in signing the following treaty of amity and com- merce with his Arabian neighbor. Italy thus became the first European country to recog- nize Yemen’s independence. A supplemental secret agreement of 1 June 1927 (text in Doc- uments on International Affairs, 1926, pp. 222–24) promised Italians limited capitulatory rights, but its preamble’s reference to an alli- ance stated an Italian objective rather than an accomplishment. Still, Italy remained the only European power with some measure of polit- ical influence at Sana’a through the early years of World War II. Survey of International Affairs, 1925, vol. 1, pp. 320–24; H. Scott, In the High Yemen, passim; H. F. Jacob, “The Kingdom of Yemen, Its Place in the Comity of Nations” (Grotrius Society, London), Pro- blems of War and Peace, 18 (1933), 131–53.

Art. 1. The Government of His Majesty the King of Italy recognise the full and absolute independence of the Yemen and of its Sovereign, His Majesty the Imam Jahia. The Italian Government will abstain from all interference in the Kingdom of His Majesty the King of Yemen that might be incompatible with the provisions of the first paragraph of the present article.

2. The two Governments undertake to facilitate commercial relations between their respective countries.

3. The Government of His Majesty the King of Yemen declare that it is their desire to import from Italy the supplies, i.e., the technical means and material which can advantageously be employed for the economic development of the Yemen, as also the technical staff.

The Italian Government declare their readiness to do all that is possible in order that the technical means and material and the staff shall be despatched under the most favourable conditions as regards quality, price and salaries.

4. The provisions of articles 2 and 3 do not limit the liberty of the two parties with regard to commerce and supplies.

5. No merchant of either of the two States may import or carry on trade in articles prohibited by the two Governments in their respective countries.

Both Governments shall have power to confiscate articles imported into their respective countries contrary to a prohibition to import or deal in them when such prohibition has been made known.

6. The present treaty shall not come into force until the ratification of His Majesty the King of Italy has reached His Majesty the Imam Jahia, King of the Yemen.

7. The present treaty shall have a duration of 10 years from the date of the ratification mentioned in article 6, and 6 months before its expiration the two parties shall come to an understanding in case they desire to replace it or to prolong it.

8. In witness whereof His Majesty the Imam Jahia, King of the Yemen, and his Excellency Cavaliere Jacopo Gasparini, in the name of His Majesty the King of Italy, have signed the present treaty drawn up in two exactly identical copies, in the Arabic and in the Italian languages.

Since, however, there is nobody attached to His Majesty the King of Yemen who knows perfectly the Italian language, as the negotiations in respect of the present treaty of friendship and commerce were carried on by both parties in Arabic, and as his Excellency Cavaliere Jacopo Gasparini has assured himself that the Arabic text is exactly equivalent to the Italian, the two parties agree to be bound, in case of doubt or of divergent interpretations of the two texts, by the Arabic text interpreted according to the classical language.

Figure 2.21.5 Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Sana’a) between Italy and Yemen, 2 September 1926
2.22. **Idrisi-Saudi Treaty of Mecca of October 1926**

Unlike the 1920 treaty in which there was no mention of Asir, here in the Mecca Treaty of 1926 the Idrisis’ chief was addressed as the ‘Imam of Asir’ (i.e. the leader of Asir) although the Idris’s authority was limited to only part of Asir. For Ibn Saud to recognise the Idrisis as the ruler of Asir and the entity as his emirate is questionable. Most likely, recognition of the Idrisis’ independence was needed so as to legitimise the next Saudi move i.e. the conquest of the district. Indeed, there had been some international recognition of this entity as the Idrisis’ emirate, mainly by Britain, and Ibn Saud wanted to absorb the district on that ground, using the Idrisis’ counter-claims to oppose those of the Imam Yahya.

The treaty was concluded on 21 October 1926, but was only promulgated on 8 January 1927. (The Arabic version is available in the Treaty Series, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Saudi Arabia, Al-Jahni, 1992. The English translation is by the BLJ, AIR, 2/1020).
ملحق رقم (2) 
اتفاقية مكة المكرمة 
بين جلالته الملك والأدريسي (3)

الحمد لله وحده : 
بين ملك الحجاز وسلطان نجد وملحقاتها ، وبين الإمام السيد الحسن بن 
على الأدريسي .

رغبته في توحيد الكلمة وحفظا لكيان البلاد العربية وقوية للروابط بين 
أمراء جزيرة العرب قد اتفق صاحب الجلالة ملك الحجاز وسلطان نجد 
وملحقاتها عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن الفيصل السعود صاحب السيادة امام 
عسير السيد الحسن بن على الأدريسي على عقد الاتفاقية الآتية : 

المادة الأولى : يعترف سيادة الإمام السيد الحسن بن على الأدريسي بأن 
الحدود القديمة الموضحة في اتفاقية 10 صفر سنة 1339 هـ المنعقدة بين 
سلطان نجد وبين الإمام السيد محمد بن على الأدريسي والتي كانت خاضعة
للادارة في ذلك التاريخ تحت سيادة جلاله ملك الحجاز وسلطان نجد
وملحقاتها بموجب هذه الاتفاقية.

المادة الثانية: لا يجوز لامام عسير أن يدخل في مفاوضات سياسية
مع أي حكومة وكذلك لا يجوز أن يمنح أي امتياز اقتصادي الا بعد الموافقة
على ذلك من صاحب الجلالة ملك الحجاز وسلطان نجد وملحقاتها.

المادة الثالثة: لا يجوز لامام عسير اشثار الحرب أو إبرام الصلح الا
بموافقة صاحب الجلالة ملك الحجاز وسلطان نجد وملحقاتها.

المادة الرابعة: لا يجوز لامام عسير التنازل عن جزء من أراضي
عسير المنظمة في المادة الأولى.

المادة الخامسة: يعترف ملك الحجاز وسلطان نجد وملحقاتها بحاكمية
امام عسير الحالي على الأراضي المنظمة في المادة الأولى مدة حياته ومن
بعده لمن يتفق عليه الأدارة وأهل العقد والحل التابعين لأمامته.

المادة السادسة: يعترف ملك الحجاز وسلطان نجد وملحقاتها بأن
ادارة بلاد عسير الداخلية والنظر في شؤون عشائرها من نصب وعزل
وغير ذلك من الشؤون الداخلية من حقوق امام عسير على أن تكون
الأحكام وفق الشرع والعدل كما هي في الحكومتين.
المادة السابعة: يتعهد ملك الحجاز وسلطان نجد وملحقاتها بدفع كل مال يدفع داخل أو خارج من أراضي عسير المبينة في المادة الأولى وذلك بالاتفاق بين الطرفين حسب مقتضيات الأحوال ودعاوى المصلحة.

المادة الثامنة: يتعهد الطرفان بالمحافظة على هذه المعاهدة والقيام بواجبيهما.

المادة التاسعة: تكون هذه المعاهدة ممولا بها بعد التصديق عليها من الطرفين السامين.

المادة العاشرة: دونت هذه الاتفاقية باللغة العربية من صورتين تحفظ كل صورة لدى فريق من الحكومتين المتعاقدتين.

المادة الحادية عشرة: تعرف هذه المعاهدة بمعاهدة مكة المكرمة.

وقعت هذه المعاهدة في تاريخ 14 ربيع الآخر سنة 1345 هـ الموافق 21 أكتوبر سنة 1926 م.

ملك الحجاز وسلطان نجد وملحقاتها
عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن الفيصل آل سعود
(الختم الملكي)

إمام عسير الحسن بن علي الادريسي
خادم الإسلام أحمد الشريف السيوسي
(الختم الرسمي)

Figure 2.222.2.22.3 Idrisi-Saudi Treaty of Mecca of October 1926
The Idrisi-Saudi Treaty of Mecca of October 1926

Figure 2.22.2.24 Idrisi-Saudi Treaty of Mecca of October 1926
The King of the Hejaz, Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies, agrees that the internal administration of Asir, the regulation of its tribal affairs, appointments, dismissals and so on, subject to the reign of the Imam of Asir provided such administration is in harmony with Sharia law and justice, as is the case in the two Governments [Nejd and Hejaz].

ARTICLE 7.
The King of the Hejaz, Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies, undertakes to defend from internal and external aggression the territories of Asir as defined in article 1. He will do so by agreement between the two contracting parties as circumstances and interest may necessitate.

ARTICLE 8.
Both parties promise to adhere to this agreement and to carry out its obligations.

ARTICLE 9.
This agreement will be effective after ratification by the two high contracting parties.

ARTICLE 10.
This agreement will be drawn up in Arabic in two copies, of which one will be kept by each of the two contracting parties.

ARTICLE 11.
This agreement will be known as the Mecca Agreement.
Signed on Rabii I, 1406 (October 21, 1926).

(Royal Seal) ABDUL AZIZ BIN ABUL MAUDH- AL-FASAL AL-SAUD.

The Imam of Asir

(Official Seal) EL-HASSAN BIN ALI EL- IDRISI.

In the presence of the writer,
the Servant of Islam.
(Sign) AMIR AL-WALID AL-REZVI.
2.23. **The Anglo-Saudi Relationship**

Similarly to Al-Idrisi, Ibn Saud followed and joined Britain against the Turks during the Great War, concluding the Treaty of 26 December 1915. Ibn Saud established a good relationship with Britain, gaining its support over many important issues. A new Treaty would be concluded with Britain in Jeddah in 20 May 1927. Most importantly, Britain committed herself to lending considerable political, financial and military support to Ibn Saud even during times of internal difficulties such as the anti-Saudi intrigues by Al-Dabbagh family in the early 1930s. Indeed, London responded positively to a Saudi request concerning the anti-Saudi activities led by Mohammad Hassan Al-Dabbagh and Taher Al-Dabbagh, while in the same period of time the opposition to the Imamate in Yemen were allowed to function freely from the Aden Protectorate.

Consequently, the significance of this relationship is not that Britain became involved directly in this section of the Saudi-Yemeni dispute. Instead, what matters is how this relationship has been perceived in Yemen among the wider public and by the elites. Indeed, although numerous issues were considered by British diplomacy as secret matters, several stories on the topic had been part of public discussions in Yemen since they first surfaced.
2.23.1. **The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of 26 December 1915**

L/P&S, 18/ B 295, IOR, London.
TEXT OF THE TREATY OF DECEMBER 26, 1915.

In the Name of God the Merciful and Compassionate.

Preamble.

The High British Government, on its own part, and Abdul Aziz ibn Abdur Rahman ibn Faisal Al-Saud, Baal of Najd, El Hasa, Qatif and Jedda, and the cities and ports belonging to them, on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, and their tribesmen, being desirous of continuing and strengthening the friendly relations which have for a long time existed between the two parties, and with a view to consolidating their respective interests—the British Governments have named and appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Corr, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., British Resident in the Persian Gulf, as their Plenipotentiary, to conclude a treaty, for this purpose, with Abdul Aziz ibn Abdur Rahman ibn Faisal Al-Saud.

The said Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Corr and Abdul Aziz ibn Abdur Rahman ibn Faisal Al-Saud have agreed upon and concluded the following articles:

I.

The British Government do acknowledge and admit that Najd, Al Hasa, Qatif and Jedda, and their dependencies and territories, which will be described and determined hereafter, and their ports on the shores of the Persian Gulf are the countries of Ibn Saud and his fathers before him, and do hereby recognize the said Ibn Saud as the independent Baal thereof and absolute Chief of their tribes, and after him his sons and descendants by inheritance; but the retention of the individual shall be in accordance with the nomination (i.e., by the living Baal) of his successor; but with the proviso that he shall not be a person antagonistic to the British Government in any respect, such as, for example, as regards the terms mentioned in this treaty.

II.

In the event of an aggression by any foreign power on the territories of the countries of the said Ibn Saud and his descendants without reference to the British Government and without giving him an opportunity of communicating with Ibn Saud and consulting the matter, the British Government will aid Ibn Saud to such extent and in such a manner as the British Government, after consulting Ibn Saud, may consider most effective for protecting his interests and countries.

III.

Ibn Saud hereby agrees and promises to refrain from entering into any correspondence, agreement, or treaty with any foreign nation or Power, and, further, to give immediate notice to the political authorities of the British Government of any attempt on the part of any other Power to interfere with the above territories.

IV.

Ibn Saud hereby undertakes that he will absolutely not cede, sell, mortgage, lease, or otherwise dispose of the above territories or any part of them, or grant concessions within those territories to any foreign Power or to the subjects of any foreign Power, and that he will follow her advice unreservedly provided that it be not damaging to his own interests.

V.

Ibn Saud hereby undertakes to keep open within his territories the roads leading to the Holy Places, and to protect pilgrims on their passage to and from the Holy Places.

* * *

The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of 26 December 1915

Figure 2.233.2.23.1.1 The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of 26 December 1915
VI.

Bin Saud undertakes, as his fathers did before him, to refrain from all aggression or interference with the territories of Kuwait, Bahrain, and of the Sheikdoms of Qatar and the Oman Coast ("other tribes and chiefs" omitted), who are under the protection of the British Government, and who have treaty relations with the said Government; and the limits of their territories shall be hereafter determined.

VII.

The British Government and Bin Saud agree to conclude [words in original draft omitted] a further detailed treaty in regard to [word omitted] matters concerning the two parties.

Dated 18th Safar 1334, corresponding to 26th December, 1915.

(Signed and sealed) ABDUL AZIZ AL-SAUD.
P. Z. Cox, Lieutenant-Colonel,
British Resident in the Persian Gulf.
(Signed) CHELMEDFORD,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

This treaty was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council at Simla, on the 16th day of July, 1916 A.D.

(Signed) A. H. GRANT,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign and Political Department.

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Figure 2.233.1.2.23.2 The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of 26 December 1915
2.23.2. **The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Jeddah of 20 May 1927**

This treaty was of political significance in its recognition of Ibn Saud as sovereign. It was followed by the Italian-Yemeni Treaty of September 1926 in which Imam Yahya was also recognised as the ‘King of Yemen’ (Treaty Series 25, 1927).
Figure 2.23.2.1 The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Jeddah of 20 May 1927
Figure 2.23.2.2 The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Jeddah of 20 May 1927
Figure 2.23.2.3 The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Jeddah of 20 May 1927
Figure 2.23.2.4 The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Jeddah of 20 May 1927

ARTICLE 9.

The treaty concluded between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies (then Ruler of Nejd and its then Dependencies) on the 29th December, 1915, shall cease to have effect as from the date on which the present treaty is ratified.

ARTICLE 10.

The present treaty has been drawn up in English and Arabic. Both texts shall be of equal validity; but in case of divergence in the interpretation of any part of the treaty the English text shall prevail.

ARTICLE 11.

The present treaty shall be known as the Treaty of Jeddah.

Signed at Jeddah on Friday, May 20th, 1927 (corresponding to the 18th Zul Qa’da, 1345).

GILBERT FALKINGHAM CLAYTON.
FAISAL ABDUL-АЗIZ AL SAUD.

(1.)

Sir G. Clayton to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies.

Your Majesty,

I have the honour to remind your Majesty that, in the course of our negotiations, which have happily resulted in the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and good understanding between His Britannic Majesty and your Majesty, the question of the frontier between the Hejaz and Transjordan was discussed, and I explained to your Majesty the position, as defined in a draft protocol submitted by me to you, which His Majesty’s Government have taken up on this question and to which they must adhere.

His Majesty’s Government regard the above-mentioned frontier as being defined as follows:

"The frontier between the Hejaz and Transjordan starts from the intersection of meridian 58° E. and parallel 29° 35’ N., which marks the termination of the frontier between Nejd and Transjordan, and proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Hejaz Railway 2 miles south of Muddawara. From this point it proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Gulf of Aqaba 2 miles south of the town of Aqaba."

Respectfully,

GILBERT CLAYTON,
His Britannic Majesty’s Commissioner and Plenipotentiary.

Jeddah, May 19th, 1927 (18th Zul Qa’da, 1845).
The Anglo-Saudi Relationship

Figure 2.23.2.5 The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Jeddah of 20 May 1927
Figure 2.2323.2.6 The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Jeddah of 20 May 1927
The Anglo-Saudi Relationship

Figure 2.23.2.7 The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Jeddah of 20 May 1927
Figure 2.23.2.8 The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Jeddah of 20 May 1927
2.23.3. Ibn Saud kept London informed on the development of relations with Sana’a

This is an example of the exchange of information between Britain and Saudi Arabia concerning the Saudi-Yemeni conflict, 16 July 33 (FO 967/52, TNA, London).
Ibn Saud kept London informed on the development of relations with Sana’a.
We have received the following telegraphic message from the delegation at Sana’a and forward it for your information:

Al Asiri and al Kitabbar came to us on Monday deputed by the Imam Yahya as representatives to enter negotiations with us and after the exchange of compliments, we started discussion. They said to us that they had something to say concerning the frontier and we asked them to explain their intentions clearly so that we may know them and understand their meaning but they requested us to postpone this till the next meeting. The second meeting was held to-day and after a long preliminary discourse on the good faith of the Imam Yahya, and that he does not like misunderstandings between the two countries they (the representatives) informed us with shame in their faces that they want the restitution of the Idrissi’s territory and the districts of Qahtan and Hammar in Asir to their original home (country) because they are part of the territory of the Imam Yahya. They added there is no difference between both parties and that His Majesty the King did not enter the Idrissi’s territory until after the Idrissi had taken refuge with him. Now the Idrissi is completely routed so that there is no reason to prevent His Majesty the King from restoring the said territories to their original country. They also proposed other trifling matters. We answered them that we definitely do not agree to discuss anything connected with the territory (Ydrissi) and Asir and that to go more deeply into the matter would cause misunderstandings between us and that this would be of no advantage.

Figure 2.23.3.2 Ibn Saud kept London informed on the development of relations with Sana’a
advantage and we could see no necessity for discussion in this respect. They appeared to be annoyed at this and informed us that they would communicate our speech to the Imam Yahya and would give us a reply. We also wished to discuss with them the question of the Idrisi remaining at Zohb Majer and his misdeeds, but they did not answer this. It seems that our negotiations with them will continue no longer because it appeared from the beginning that there is no good faith here to enable an agreement to be reached.

The above is the summary of the telegraphic message sent by the delegation therefore Ibn Suleiman should proceed to Jeddah at once to inform His Britannic Majesty's Minister about this and to inform him that we dislike evil but people provoke us to do it. In view of the friendship which exists between us and the Government of Great Britain we communicate this fact to them for their information and to let us know their (H.M.G.) opinion in this respect, specially after we have become certain that certain Governments have already supplied and will supply arms and ammunition to those coasts and we should like to know their (H.M.G.) opinion in this respect.

Figure 2.23.3.3 Ibn Saud kept London informed on the development of relations with Sana’a
2.23.4. A Saudi promise to show understanding of British interests in Yemen

The Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs to the British Chargé d'Affaires in Jeddah, 16 July 1933 (FO 967/52, TNA, London).
Figure 2.23.4.1 A Saudi promise to show understanding of British interests in Yemen
Figure 2.23.4.2 A Saudi promise to show understanding of British interests in Yemen
advantage and we could see no necessity for discussion in this respect. They appeared to be annoyed at this and informed us that they would communicate our speech to the Imam Yahya and would give us a reply. We also wished to discuss with them the question of the Idrisi remaining at Zohb Najjar and his misdeeds, but they did not answer this. It seems that our negotiations with them will continue no longer because it appeared from the beginning that there is no good faith here to enable an agreement to be reached.

The above is the summary of the telegraphic message sent by the delegation therefore ibn Suleiman should proceed to Jedda at once to inform His Britannic Majesty's Minister about this and to inform him that we dislike evil but people provoke us to do it. In view of the friendship which exists between us and the Government of Great Britain we communicate this fact to them for their information and to let us know their (H.M.G.) opinion in this respect, especially after we have become certain that certain Governments have already supplied and will supply arms and ammunition to those coasts and we should like to know their (H.M.G.) opinion in this respect.

Figure 2.23.4.3 A Saudi promise to show understanding of British interests in Yemen
2.23.5. **Saudi Arabia wanted direct involvement of Britain in its dispute with Yemen**

The Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs to the British Chargé d'Affaires in Jeddah, 30 July 1933 (FO 967/52, TNA, London).
Figure 2.23.5.1 Saudi Arabia wanted direct involvement of Britain in its dispute with Yemen
Figure 2.23.5.2 Saudi Arabia wanted direct involvement of Britain in its dispute with Yemen
Figure 2.23.5.3 Saudi Arabia wanted direct involvement of Britain in its dispute with Yemen
2.23.6. The anti-Saudi intrigues by Al-Dabbagh family (early 1930s)

Correspondence concerned with the anti-Saudi intrigues by Al-Dabbagh family, early 1930s (FO 967 52, TNA, London).
Figure 2.23.6.1 The anti-Saudi intrigues by Al-Dabbagh family (early 1930s)
Figure 2.23.6.2 The anti-Saudi intrigues by Al-Dabbagh family (early 1930s)
Figure 2.23.6.3 The anti-Saudi intrigues by Al-Dabbagh family (early 1930s)
Figure 2.23.6.4 The anti-Saudi intrigues by Al-Dabbagh family (early 1930s)
2.23.7. **Example of Anglo-Saudi cooperation (1934)**

Charges for the cost of telegrams sent back home - through the British Navy - by the Saudi army during its occupation of Al-Hudaydah in 1934, 28 Sep 1934 (FO 371/17930, TNA, London).

![Image](image.png)

*Figure 2.23.7.1 Example of Anglo-Saudi cooperation (1934)*
2.24. Yemeni claims along historic and national connections grounds

Imam Yahya expressed his claims over Asir, Najrān and South Yemen along historic and national connections grounds in most of his correspondence with Britain and Saudi Arabia, as can be seen from this selection of examples. Other similar texts can be found elsewhere in these appendices.

2.24.1. Imam Yahya to King George V (22 December 1918)

Yemeni claims along historic and national connections grounds

Figure 2.24.1.1 Imam Yahya to King George V (22 December 1918)
Yemeni claims along historic and national connections grounds

From,

Imam Yahya Mohamed Hamed-ud-din.

To,

The Illustrious King of Great Britain.

One whose wants are supplied by God represents to Your Majesty that the province of the Yemen has been under the Imam's rule of our ancestors for 1000 years and more. It has never been governed by the Ottoman Government, in the same way as other Arab countries, but on the contrary it has been self-governed. There has been nothing to link it with the said government, except an alliance concluded in the regime of Sultan Suliman the I, between one of our ancestors Al Imam Al Mutahar bin Al Imam Shamsud-din and the aforesaid Sultan. In conformity with that alliance the Turkish Government withdrew from the Yemen but have, however, been constantly alternating between attempts to subject the country and not. This was due to the resistance offered by our ancestors and by ourselves until the last pact was concluded between the aforesaid Government and us, which has been entered into in view of the settlement of the matters between us, that there might be an end to the warlike and bloodshed, which had continually been in vogue in this land, as history will testify. As a result of this alliance we now have considerable claims against the said Government. It is therefore necessary that we persist for the recovery of the same. We had addressed the Agent of your majesty by letter and telegraph shortly after he had written us, and the subject of the armistice between the allied powers and Turkey. In these missives we informed him that it would

Figure 2.24.1.2.24.2 Imam Yahya to King George V (22 December 1918)
Yemeni claims along historic and national connections grounds

Figure 2.24.1.2.24.3 Imam Yahya to King George V (22 December 1918)
2.24.2. Imam Yahya to Major General J. M. Stewart, the Political Resident, Aden (22 December 1918)

We had telegraphed and explained to your honor the reasons of stopping the withdrawal of the Ottoman defence stationed in the district of Yemen, pointed out the liabilities of our claim against the Ottoman Government, and requested information concerning the establishment of our rule in Yemen in the same way as existed in the time of our ancestors. Such claim is being undeniable admitted by the history of the world and upheld by the Great Powers. While we have been, in spite of the armistice concluded between the Powers, anticipating your honor’s reply, we have learnt about the attack made by the British squadron and forces against the important Port of Yemen, i.e., Hodeida and its territoral occupation. Such sudden action has made a bad impression and a great agitation amongst the inhabitants of Yemen generally, though we had formerly explained to you that we do not wish any bloodshed or the occurrence of anything which might disturb the friendly relations, we necessarily wish to maintain with the Great British Government. We requested Your Excellency to obtain the final decision of the Great Powers for the non-interference with our Imamie Government in Yemen in the same way as our ancestors use to be.

Now we deem it advisable to delegate a delegtion comprised of Sayid Ali bin Ahmed bin Ibrahimi bin.
Imam Yahya to Major General J. M. Stewart, the Political Resident, Aden (22 December 1918)
2.24.3. **Abdullah Al-Wazir to Fuad Hamzah (9 March 1934)**

Document No. 162

Reply of Seyed Abdullah al-Wazir dated 23rd Dhu’l Qa‘da 1352

To the noble illustrious president Fuad Hamza, may God protect him.

Peace, Mercy and Blessings of God may be upon you. I read your letter of 23rd Dhu’l Qada 1352. You will remember the previous correspondence. I am still having good faith in you. I have more than once explained the true objects of our meeting, expressed the inclination to a favourable settlement and, that the two Kings know better than any other body of all this. They have already agreed on the matter of the Idrisis, the frontiers, the mountains and Yam. We therefore should not hover about matters already agreed upon between them.

Your Honour is not unaware of the fact that the statement of King 'Abdul 'Aziz is reliable, and I am quite sure of his previous clear statement when H.M. the King the Imam Yahya started to complete the administration of the affairs of Yam and H.M. declared (? Ibn Saud) that he had no object in ruling over them and that this has never been and will never be. His statement is a proof of

Figure 2.24.3.1 Abdullah Al-Wazir to Fuad Hamzah (9 March 1934)
Yemeni claims along historic and national connections grounds

Figure 2.24.3.2 Abdullah Al-Wazir to Fuad Hamzah (9 March 1934)
The two Kings intended of our meeting not that we should cause discord but with a view to promote and complete the remaining steps necessary to establish firm friendly relations and complete brotherhood. So let us realize the hopes and confirms the words with deeds. May God grant us all guidance and success. You might fix the time convenient to you for the meeting with a view to finishing the remaining points. Peace, Mercy and Blessings of God may be upon you.

(sd) Abdulla Ibn Al-Wazir

Figure 2.24.3.3 Abdullah Al-Wazir to Fuad Hamzah (9 March 1934)
2.25. **Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen**

The Saudi counter-claims, opposing those of Yemen’s association with the disputed territories, were published as part of the ‘Green Book’ that Saudi Arabia issued in 1934. As has been stated by this thesis, the Green Book does not unreservedly subscribe to the notion that, historically, Yemen has existed as an effectively continuous, unified political entity, particularly over the area historically known as *Billād Al-Yāman*; a notion for which, it could be argued, there is no definitive evidence. However, the Saudi argument, as this document proves, highlights the implications of the territorial dispute on historical narratives. Indeed, such claims initiated a selective and misinforming pattern, for instance by turning for reference to the work of several famous historians, such as Al-Hamdani, even though the information provided by the latter is actually completely the contrary to what is being claimed. (The Saudi Green Book, 1934: pp. 212-215 and 458-464).
Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen
Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen

Figure 2.25.2 Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen
Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen
Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen
Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen

Figure 2.25.5 Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen
political frontiers, defining ethnical limits and ascribing religious or historical restrictions. It is not possible to divide up the inhabitants of the various provinces of the Island into Ethnographical or Ethnical, Theological or lingual units etc. The Island (Peninsula) is a Geographical independent unit of which some territories have certain special natural attributes, but still they do not cause them to be excluded from the fold of the greatest unit.

Non-existence of Ethnical or lingual differences

Inhabitants of the Peninsula are Arabs before everything and no differences exist amongst them except in some local simple dialects or accents as those ethnical or lingual differences which differentiate between the Saxons and the Latins, Sicilians and Slavians, Muguls and Indians, Abyssinians and Sudanese.

Non existence of religious differentiations

The religion prevailing in the Peninsula is the liberal Islamic religion. No other religion participates with it and no other faith shares with it (any right) like Christianity and Jewishness and others. Even with the possibility of the existence of certain sects in some parts, they are not excluded from their Islamic nature to which they strictly adhere.

Oneness of history

There is no doubt that the past brings together the parts and divisions of the Peninsula, and that history unites their customs and traditions.

Unification of Customs and traditions

The past of the Peninsula in general combined customs and traditions into one general style adopted by the inhabitants of the Peninsula and which became their special peculiarity when compared with other nations.

Natural partitions in the Peninsula according to Common-law, and Custom

All partitions observed, known or being laid down to divide up the Arab Peninsula are only the effect of Common-law and custom agreed upon by the Arab people themselves, who regarded the natural barrier, the well known one in the Peninsula, namely the mountain range of Surat which separates Ghur, Tehama, from Nejd (see Mujam el-Beldan, page 59 and Sefat Zariat al'Arab, page 48). The Surat mountain range was called Hejaz "\( \LaTeX \) " because it separated two sorts of land: the low one, Tehama, from the high one, Nejd; and, there is nothing in the Arab books or writings to show or can be

Figure 2.25.6 Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen
Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen

The words “Sham” and “Yaman”

The common technical expression agreed upon in the Arab Peninsula is that all lands situated to the south of "AL-HARAM al-MACCI" (The Mecca Sanctuary) are called "Yaman", meaning that such lands are to the right of the "KA’ABA" (The black stone) and all lands situated to the north of al-Haram are called “Sham”. Cities which are situated near or far to the south of Mecca are the same in the eye of that common rule, all are "Yaman". So Lith, Ghamid, Zahran, Qunfuda, Abha and San'a are all supposed to be Yaman with regard to (the situation of) Mecca. The same is said in case of cities situated in the north. So, Medina, Yanbo, Dhaba, 'Ula, Wejh, Damas itself, are all supposed to be "Sham" with regard to the situation of Mecca.

It is understood from this that the words "Sham" and "Yaman" are meant to represent the direction of "Sham" = (Syria) i.e. "the north" and "Yaman meaning south". The use of these words is confirmed by what is mentioned in the geographical books "Al-Bilân" by Ibn al-Faqih, page 33, "Mujam al-Bilân", page 522 and "Sifat Jazirat al’Arab", page 56.

Yaman, 'Asir and Tehama at 'Jahiliya’

Partitions in the time of 'Jahiliya’ were not natural ones though they were based on principles of tribal Governments whose rule prevailed over every part of it. Such division very much resembles that of provinces but does not include all areas (territories).

Yaman, 'Asir and Tehama in the time of Islam

It is mentioned in the book of, "al Masalek wal-Mamalek", pages 135, 137 and 187 that the frontier between the district of Mecca and Yaman was delimited by the Prophet, may prayer and peace of God be upon him, at Talat al-Malek which was between Sarum Rah and al-Hejra. Talat al-Malek was situated at a place where a tree to represent the west was found and by which the Prophet,

* State of infidelity amongst the pagan Arabs before Islam
1 Sarum-Rah is a big village in the desert having springs and vines. From the book of (al-Masalek wal-Mamalek) page 135-189; and (Mujam al-Bildan) Vol. 5, page 258.

Figure 2.25.7 Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen
may prayer and peace of God be upon him, separated between Yaman and Mecca 2.

As regards MAHJARA, Yaqut ar-Rumi mentioned in "Mujam al-Bildan" that it was a city of the first districts of Yaman, twenty "farsakhs" [see footnote] distant from Sa'da. This place is still known up to the present time, and nearby stands Baqum, the first village in the country of Yaman after crossing the frontiers of 'Asir, Surat. There is also another village nearby that place called Suq al-Gharb. It is quite possible that the said Suq was founded in the place of the tree which was afore mentioned as separated Yaman from Mecca.

As to Najran, it was of the districts belonging to Mecca, as was mentioned in the book entitled, "History of Mecca" by Fakihi, printed in Europe, page 50, and the book of Ibn-Khirnazaba entitled, "al-Masalek wal Mamalek", page 133, printed in Europe. It was also mentioned by Ibn Wadh al-Ya'aqubi in his book entitled "Al-Bildan", page 316, printed in Europe, when mentioning the districts belonging to Mecca.

(Translator's marginal note: In Persia a "farsakh" is 4 miles (roughly) or an hour's march of a laden mule (which naturally varies according to the type of road). I am surprised to see the word used here! ASC 9/1.)

Ibn Wadh al-Ya'aqubi also mentioned in the same book, page 316 that 1 Surat and its people entitled Uzd was also of the districts of Mecca.

As regards Tehama and the coast, it is mentioned in the "History of Mecca" by Fakihi, page 50, that 'Ak was amongst the districts of Mecca. Ibn al-Athir said the same thing in his book of complete history "Events of the year 197 Hajira". Ibn Wadh al-Ya'aqubi, the above mentioned again said in page 316 that 2 Bish, ......, 3 Ethr and Jeddah were also of the districts of Mecca.

Frontiers of Yaman since the time of the Prophet up till 204H.

It is well known and established in books of history that the administrative

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2 "Al-Gharb". We say that at present there is a small village called "Suq al-Gharb" above Mazra'a and below al-Qaria, situated near the frontier line between this country from the direction of 'Asir, and Yaman, and is believed to be near the place where the above mentioned tree was found.

1 Yaqut said "Abu 'Amra Ibn Al-Ala states that the Surats people are the most eloquent, and that they are three parts: the mountains above Tehama close to Yaman, of which the first is Hazil, next the plain land of Tehama, then Bujeyla which the middle Surat in which Thaqif has taken part with them at one direction, and then comes Surat al-Azid, Azd-Shanu'a, the Beni Ka'ab Ibn al-Haseth Ibn 'Abdullah Ibn Malek Ibn Nasr Ibn al-Azid (see Mujam al-Bildan, Vol. 5, page 61).

2 Wadi Bish is near Sibia and is still known by this name up to the present time.

3 Ethr is the place known nowadays as "Quz al-Ja'afr'a", 32 kilometers distant to the north of Jizan.
divisions of Yaman in the time of Islam were three "Makhalif". The first "Mikhlafl" was that of Sana'a and Hadda from the northern direction, as above mentioned at "Shagaret al-Gharb", Surum and Talhat al-Malek, the second was that of Hadramaut, and the third was Mikhlafl "al Janad". All this obviously proves the incorrectness of the allegation to the effect that 'Asir and Tehama were belonging to Yaman.

Frontiers of Yaman up to the time of the rise of Al-Sa'ud's Government

Since the year 204 Hajira numerous local Governments arose in Yaman of which the following were some:

- Govt. of Al-Ziyad
- Beni Najah
- Salhiyah
- Al-Ayyub
- Beni Rasul
- Beni 'Amer
- Imams of Zeydies

Then came the Ottoman Govt. and captured the whole of Yaman. The Zeydi Imams was one of those Govts. and located at the area of some mountains which they now occupy, and its centre was most probably Shehara or Sa'ada. It possessed no such authority and influence that can cause it to be counted as a general Govt. including the whole of Yaman.

Since the rise of the Ottoman Govt. and the establishment of its authority in Yaman during the time of Sultan Suleyman the Lawful, Yaman became part of the Ottoman Sultanate and the Zeydi Imams had no longer any right to speak as if they were representing an independent Govt. The Zeydi Imams then withdrew to areas far from civilization and became "Fakihs" and religious Imams (Theologian learned men) having nothing to do with the Govt.

Frontiers of 'Asir and Yaman since the rise of Al-Sa'ud up to the present time

The Turks made 'Asir an independent "Mutasarif" of which the center was Abha, with six districts belonging to it viz: Beni Shela, Ghamed, Rijal al Ma'a, Mahayel, Qunfada and Sibia. These fundamental divisions remained until these days. The frontier line separating between Yaman and 'Asir is stretched from Midi to the north of Sa'ada followed by Wadi Mekhlaf to the borders of Najran and the southern Yam, which are the commonly known frontiers in the latest times.

6.1.34

Figure 2.25.9 Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen
Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen

Figure 2.25.10 Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen
particular and keen of following the dictates of Muhammad, may prayers and peace of God be upon him. The responsibility rests on you more than it does on other people. Islam is your glory and honour as it is said by the Most High, "A Book has been revealed to you and you have therein been mentioned, don't you understand?" He also says, "It is a reminder to you and your people, and you will be questioned about it". So it is hoped of you to rise and undertake to spread the call for the Cause of God. This undertaking is the course of him who follows the Prophet, may prayers and peace of God be upon him, as the Most High says, "Say, this is my path and I call for the Cause of God knowingly, and whoever may follow me". The Most High also says, "Who has ever said anything better than he who called for God, acted beneficially and said that he was amongst Muslims?". We pray God may help us (me and you) to be amongst those who call for His Cause and fight for Him, so that His Command will be the highest and His religion the most brilliant. May prayers and peace of God be upon Muhammad, his family and friends.

(sealed) The dependent on God
Sa'ud

[Translator's remarks]
In comment, Umm al-Qura says that the above mentioned document reveals the reality of Imam "Sa'ud the Great", gives a full description of his character and illustrates the way he was adopting in dealing with his subjects, that it refutes the allegations of which jealous people were accusing the Nejdi people and that it establishes the actual claim of the Nejdi people (to be orthodox Moslems).

It then says that Imam "Sa'ud the Great", when young, showed forth strength and devotion in service. He raided various tribes who were anti Sa'udis and despite their power and strength he used to overcome them.

It goes on to say that in the year 1202 Hijri Sherykh Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab suggested to Imam 'Abdul 'Aziz Ibn Muhammad (the father of Sa'ud the Great) to make Sa'ud his heir-apparent and that the people of Nejd should perform the "Bay'a" to him as Imam, which in fact they did.

It further says that in Rajab 1218, after his father was murdered when he was praying in the mosque of "Dar'iyyah" (which was the capital of Nejd at that time), Sa'ud has had the "Bay'a" renewed to him.

It also says that when Sa'ud took charge, enemies rose against him: Sharif Ghalib from the Hejaz, Suleyman Paşa from 'Iraq and Thweyni Ibn 'Abdullah from Munsafiaq and Basra, but Sa'ud was successful. He captured Mecca and, two years later, Medina, (the Wahhabi) movement having already been spread in 'Asir and Yemen and nearly prevailed all over Tehama. The Nejdi people then advanced to the north, reached in their raids Jauf and Batra'a which they crossed to Huran and Kerak and stood victorious at the doors of Syria and were 68 years old.

Figure 2.25.11 Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen
2.26. The Idrisis surrender their authority to Ibn Saud (October 1930)

It is interesting that there is no mention of Asir as an Idrisi country or Idrisi province. Clearly, the Idrisis had never extended their authority over Asir. And yet, Saudi conquest of the district was legitimised based on the agreements concluded with the Idrisis. Furthermore, in 1930 the Idrisis had lost the area they had expanded into and their actual influence was mainly over their stronghold in Jizan, referred to here as the province or the Idrisi country.

- Telegram from Al-Hassan bin Ali Al-Idrisi, the Idrisis’ chief at the time, in which he confirmed that, with his consent and agreement, he had handed over the administration of his country to Ibn Saud (9 October 1930).

- Ibn Saud’s approval, on 20 November 1930, of the arrangements agreed between the Saudi representatives and those of the Idrisis on 16 November 1930. Among the arrangements agreed upon was the establishment of a legislative council for the Idrisis’ province.

- Rules of administration to be followed in the Idrisi province in which it was agreed in Article 1 that Al-Hassam bin Ali Al-Idrisi would remain the head of the Idrisi Government.

(Green Book, 1934: pp 477-483).
The Idrisis surrender their authority to Ibn Saud (October 1930)

Figure 2.26.1 The Idrisis surrender their authority to Ibn Saud (October 1930)
On the 8th October, 1930, the following telegram from As Sayyid Al-Hasan-al-Idrishi was received by His Majesty the King:

"Your letters by the hand of Al Abdullah have arrived. We have discussed them with your deputation, and it has been decided with our consent and agreement to entrust the administration and finance of our country to your Majesty's charge. We desire thus to inform you."

17th Jumad-al-Awal 1340.

"Al Hasan bin Ali al-Idrishi."

His Majesty sent the following telegram in reply:

"As Sayyid Hasan al-Idrishi, Jizan. Your brother has taken note of your confidence in God, and in him, and of your reliance upon him. This is the hope expected from you and your brotherhood. You will only see from us, by the grace and might of God, that which pleases you. As to us, be sure before God that we will, please God, do in your country only that which improves your affairs, and the following three results will flow: First, your comfort, tranquility and the preservation of your administration to yourself; secondly, the comfort of your subjects; and thirdly, the protection of your honour and the honour of your Province against all aggression. — Abdul Aziz."

As Sayyid Al-Hasan and his Legislative Council then decided to send a special deputation of the Hejaz to present to His Majesty the decisions agreed upon, together with two letters from As Sayyid Al-Hasan al-Idrishi and the Legislative Council.

The letters are as follows:

"Praise be to God alone."

"From Al Hasan bin Ali al-Idrishi to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies, Abdul Aziz bin Abdulrahman al-Faisal al-Saud."

"Peace, mercy and blessings of God be upon you."

"I thank God, who is the only God, and I pray for His last Prophet, his relatives and his friends."

"I enquire about your prosperity, good health and tranquility. I pray God the Almighty that you may be always kept well. If you ask about your affectionate friend, I am, by the grace of God, as well as you wish. There is nothing but good health and prosperity. I have received your Majesty's esteemed favour of the 15th September, 1630, which I have read, thanking you for your kindness and courtesy, may you ever live in happiness and prosperity."

"Your kind letters sent by the hand of the brother, Sheik Hamad al-Abdali, have been received and their contents noted. I thank your Majesty for the advice you have given to my country and for the care you have shown towards our interests and the organisation of our affairs, in a way that will maintain our honour and comfort."

"In compliance with your suggestions and friendly advice, with which I agree, I sent round for your Majesty's deputation, and discussed with them the matters you referred to, of which the principal ones are the administration and the adjustment of the finances of the country. The decision agreed upon is the one communicated to your Majesty in the letter of my council. So there is nothing left undone on my part or on that of my people regarding the measures which have to be undertaken towards the country and its improvement and concerning consultation with your Majesty. I pray God may grant success to all."

"I wish to draw your Majesty's attention to the fact that I, on my part, have proved my friendship and connexion with your Majesty, and I believe that I have increased your Majesty's inconvenience, that is to say, I have laid upon your Majesty's shoulders my task and my hopes for the protection of my honour and the comfort of my country, trusting that your Majesty's endeavour for me in this connexion is better and more hopeful (than mine own). I am therefore confident that your Majesty will act in this respect as you would do for the interests you cherish most, and by this means I would attain the end that I desire and expect."

"In truth your Majesty will realise that our connexion is not of recent date, and it is full only of the faithfulness and the noble character registered in the white pages of your Majesty's prestige."
The Idrisis surrender their authority to Ibn Saud (October 1930)

I swear by God, the only God, that I am keeping faithful and loyal to your Majesty outwardly and inwardly. I have never thought of anything contrary to friendship. Anything attributed to me contrary to friendship and courtesy, is false and groundless. Here I am registering in history an obvious proof of the truth of what I have said by entrusting the protection of my country, my comfort and my honour to the charge of your Majesty's honour, and by making your Majesty responsible for all of this. I am quite sure of your noble and pure character and honour. I await your reply to reassure me as to that which I expect, namely, the maintenance of my rights and my honour, and the regard of my private people and relatives and the appreciation of their connexion with and services to me, your Majesty will then be entitled to whatever facilities the aim and helps the realisation of the desired end. Notwithstanding that I am sure of all this, nevertheless, as Al Khaliil (Abraham) said, I want my heart reassured. God is the best witness to what we say."

The letter of the Legislative Council:

"His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies, Abdul Aziz bin Abdurrahman-al-Faisal-al-Saud. May God help him!

"Peace, mercy and blessings of God be upon you.

"After enquiries about your health and comfort, we hope, please God, that you, your noble sons, and all your friends, are quite well, enjoying the best of health and complete happiness every year. If you ask about your servants, we, by the grace of God the Almighty and your kindness, as well as you may wish, there is nothing but prosperity and good health. We have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your noble letter of the 16th September, 1930, which we gladly read out from, and from which we were delighted to learn of your safety and good health, may you ever live in happiness and prosperity. As regards the discussion with your Majesty's delegation concerning the things necessary for the improvement and organisation of our country, we have immediately conversed with these friends in the presence of the Imam As Sayyid Al Hasan and agreed upon the decision forwarded to you herewith. The Imam telegraphed at once to you accordingly. The friends, your Majesty's delegation, will certainly inform you of this fact. All other of the country's affairs are explained in the letter of the Imam addressed to your Majesty.

"Hoping that you are in the best of health and happiness, please God, may you live long protected, our Master.

"October 10, 1930."

"LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, SABIA.

Copy of the Decision of the Council.

In the name of God the Most Merciful, the Compassionate. This decision is made by our order and approval on the same date.

(Sealed) AL HASAN-BIN-ALI-BIN-MOHAMMED-BIN-IDRISI.

On the 9th October, 1930, we held a meeting with the friends, the delegation of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz bin Abdurrahman-al-Faisal-al-Saud, may God protect him, and conversed in the presence of the Imam As Sayyid Al-Ibn-Al-Ibn, may God preserve him, about the steps that should be taken for the improvement of the country of the Idrisi Government and the organisation of its finances and the putting of everything there in order. After consultation on this subject, and the presentation of the views of both parties, we agreed together with the delegation in question to entrust the administration of the said country and the organisation of its finance to His Majesty our Master, the King of the Hejaz-Nejd, and made this decision by our will and accord as a service to the said question and an advice to the leaders (imams). God is the best help. Written at Sabia.

Members of the Legislative Council at Sabia:

MUHAMMED-AL-AMIN-ASHI-SHAQUTI.
MUHAMMED YAHYA AWADH RASAB.
ABDUL QADER-BIN-MUHAMMED-BIN-
AWADH RASAB.
HAMUD-BIN-ABDULLAH-AL-HAZMI.
YAHYA IBRAHIM ZAKI.

[301 66—1]
The Idrisis surrender their authority to Ibn Saud (October 1930)
The Idrisis surrender their authority to Ibn Saud (October 1930)

Figure 2.26.5 The Idrisis surrender their authority to Ibn Saud (October 1930)
The Idrisis surrender their authority to Ibn Saud (October 1930)

Report.

In view of the provisions of the Treaty of Mecca, concluded on the 22nd September, 1926, between His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies on the one side, and As Sayyid Al-Hasan-al-Idrisi on the other, by which Saudian protection was extended to the Idrisi Province, and, in view of the fact that As Sayyid Al-Hasan-al-Idrisi and his Legislative Council have abdicated the administration of all affairs to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies, according to an official decision issued by the Idrisi Council and approved by As Sayyid Al Hasan on the 9th October, 1930, and in view of the fact that His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies has accepted this abdication, and that His Majesty took upon himself the administration of all affairs, besides the rights and the privileges to which His Majesty is entitled in the Idrisi Province according to the afore-mentioned Treaty of Mecca.

The following have assembled under the presidency of His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal, His Majesty’s Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty’s Government:—

Abdullah-al-Fadhli,
Fuad Hamza,
Yusuf Yasin, and
Abdullah-as-Suleiman-al-Hamdan,

and the following on behalf of As Sayyid Al-Hasan-al-Idrisi:—

As Sayyid Al-Arabi-al-Idrisi,
Sheikh Mustafa-an-Nunini,
Qathi Mohammed Ibrahim Mabjar,
Makki-bin-Yahya Zakari,
Mohammed-bin-Abdullah Ba Sahi, and
As Sayyid Hasan-bin-Zafer,

to lay down the rules of administration to be followed in the Idrisi Province. The following articles have been agreed upon:—

**ARTICLE 1.**

As Sayyid Al-Hasan-al-Idrisi shall remain as head of the Idrisi Government, and all orders are to be issued in his name on behalf of His Majesty the King in that province.

**ARTICLE 2.**

His Majesty the King will appoint an Amir for the administration of affairs in the Idrisi Province and for the supervision of internal improvements, the security of peace and order, and to give effect to the Sharia Laws there, in accordance with the principle mentioned in the first article.

**ARTICLE 3.**

There shall be a Legislative Council for the province to assist the Amir, and its duties shall be to give the necessary advice to the Amir in everything concerning the administration of the country.

**ARTICLE 4.**

His Majesty the King shall appoint a Director of Finance, and his duty shall be expenditure of such money to the general good in accordance with the approved budget.

**ARTICLE 5.**

All civil and military officials, whether appointed direct by His Majesty the As Sayyid Al-Hasan-al-Idrisi in the country, and those of his family in all respects.

Figure 2.26.6 The Idrisis surrender their authority to Ibn Saud (October 1930)
Figure 2.26.7 The Idrisis surrender their authority to Ibn Saud (October 1930)
2.27. Al-‘Arw Treaty, between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (15 December 1931)

Al-‘Arw Treaty, between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (15 December 1931)
Figure 2.27.2 Al-‘Arw Treaty, between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (15 December 1931)
Figure 2.27.3 Al-‘Arw Treaty, between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (15 December 1931)
والاتحاد. وقد كانت بعض مساعدة بيئة وبين مندوب حضر تم الوثابين النبا.
وفا تفرعت ملحظة قارن تضلم برسال أولئك المندوبين مع توضيح خطهم
فلكل الفضل والسلام عليكم.

وسعة : رقم 20

« برقية جلالة الملك بموافقة على طلب الإمام يحيى وطلب تأجيل اتفاق
المندوبين إلى موعود الحج تاريخ 5 شوال 1332هـ 2 ج 1 ج
30 رمضان برقيات السكينة وصلت وأبدأ حضرتم من انا خن
وأتمنى على اتفاق دائم وهذا هو الحكم الذي لا يزالون أن شأ الله بيت تزداد بكل
أوان، وأنا علم أن المائدة ليست بالображات الدولة المصرية، الجدلة
الجديدة التي منها أوزوم من كل شيء، وهي ثلاث الاوول الباضاء الإسلامية
والثانية: الجايمة العربية، والثالثة: هي الراوي الناشطة بيننا وننصحن يا إنشاء الله
لا يمهدان على بطول الزمن. ومثل حوال الله كدهم لا ننصح ب\/دنزح عن ذلك
وأنا ما أبديني من سجايا ك الديدة في حرصكم على الاعادة وطيبكم وصول
مندوبينا الهم لا كمال بعض التزامات ملحظة نحن موافقون على ذلك وهذا
نار من أكبر المصالح ومرت، نتمنى نشجعكم، نحن مستعدون له ونريد
أن نأتي الطب الهم، ولكن وجدنا نندوبين الذين خصروا الغرامات الأولى
فيهم قوما في الوقت الحاضر، ونريد منهم أن يميزوا في سبيل上帝
قدرام الله واتخاذ خلقا لا نثق بهم، ونريد معيشة وأشخاصهم
مرض الحري ونكما واكترنا إغادرة إذا فا نتمنى على تأجيل رسول المندوبين إلى وقت الهج
التي كونوا نشجعهم فنحن مستعدون لارسانهم. نحن كريدونهم مع توضيح
الطلاق لهم كما طلبنا وهذا كث-safe راجع لانجازهم ونودنون واكم حفظكم الله
وابكاد اهـ"
Al-‘Arw Treaty, between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (15 December 1931)

Document No. 16

Telegram from the Imam Yahya to H.M. the King accepting the award dated 27th Rajab 1350.

After the arrival of Your Honour’s award telegraphically we ordered "Nazerat" (administrator) of SAQIN to avoid any diving or discussion into the subject of FIFA and BENI MALEK and the non-acceptance of any of them though our hope was greater than what the award contained as there is nothing to reconsider. It is known to us that the hope of the enemies of Islam is destroyed as agreement has been arrived at between us and Your Honour in pursuance of religion. We however do not lose hope in Your Honour’s favourable consideration. We have recommended your representatives to take advantage of the opportunity of the agreement between themselves and our representatives and to decide in a serious and friendly manner the question of the people of the frontiers and so on, and to consider the question of the Hurrath of KHULAN and BENI-MARAWAN of JIZAN if ever each party is to go back to its own people (owners). This is advisable. May you live long. Ends.

(Marginal note): This telegram is important from many points of [view, of] which the most important is that it deals with a complete recognition of the frontier line between the two countries in an unbreakable manner and with a request to consider BENI-AL-HURRUTH as belonging to Yemen and BENI MARAWAN all to JIZAN.)

Document No. 17

Text of the Treaty signed by the Plenipotentiaries of H.M. the King and the Imam Yahya on 5th Sha’ban 1350.

In compliance with the order of H.H. the greatest Imam Yahya Ibn Muhammad Hamiduddin and H.M. the exalted King ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Ibn ‘Abdurraham al-Faysal Al Sa’ud, we have assembled on behalf of the two Kings in order to conclude an agreement between the two Governments on the articles hereunder mentioned:

Figure 2.27.5 Al-‘Arw Treaty, between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (15 December 1931)
Al-‘Arw Treaty, between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (15 December 1931)

Figure 2.27.6 Al-‘Arw Treaty, between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (15 December 1931)
Al-‘Arw Treaty, between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (15 December 1931)

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Article I. The two powers shall maintain the friendship and bon voisinage, strengthen the bonds of amicability and to avoid bringing harm into the country of each other.

Article II. Each of the two Powers shall have to surrender political and non-political criminals that may happen after this agreement to their Govt. at its request.

Article III. Each of the two Powers shall treat the subjects of the other Power in its country in respect of all rights in accordance with the Sharia' laws.

Article IV. Each of the two Powers shall control and hand over to the subjects of the other Power all legal rights. In case of any difficulty which the Amir or the officials could not settle, it shall be referred to the King or the Imam.

Article V. Each of the two Powers shall refuse fugitives who run away disobeying their Power, whether big or small, employee or otherwise, and shall return him promptly to his Power.

Article VI. In the event of an incident occurring by one of the subjects of either Govts. in the country of the other, the one involved in the incident shall have to be tried by the Courts (of the country) in which the incident occurred.

Article VII. Amirs and officials shall be prevented from interfering with the subjects in a manner that causes anxiety and creates misunderstanding between the two Powers.

Article VIII. Any subjects of each of the two parties who reside in the country of the other after this agreement and summoned by his Govt. they should be sent to his Govt. at once.

This has been decided by mutual agreement of the Representatives of H.H. the Imam and those of H.M. King 'Abdul 'Aziz Ibn Abdurrahman al-Faysal Al-Sa'ud. The putting into force of these eight articles is subject to the sanction and approval of the two great Kings. The above has been written in two copies (originals), each party has had a copy on the fifth day of Sha'ban 1350.

Signatures and seals:
1. Qadhi Abdulla Ibn Ahmed Al 'Arashi
2. Sahar Abdulla Ibn Ali Manna'
3. Abu Taleb Ibn Muhd Muhjeb 1) Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn Mu'ammar
2) Fahd Ibn Zu'eyr
3) Abdul Wahhab Ibn Muhd Abu Mulha
4) Muhammad Ibn Deleim Abu La'tha
5) Hamad al-'Abdali
6) Muhammad Ibn 'Ali al-Hazmi

Document No. 18

Telegram from H.M. the King to Imam Yahya concerning the ratification of the Treaty concluded by the representatives dated 19th Sha'ban 1350.

Figure 2.27.7 Al-‘Arw Treaty, between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (15 December 1931)
Your brother has received from the representatives a copy of the agreement they arrived at. I have approved of what they have agreed upon. So I hope the brother will inform me of his approval, so that the officials on the frontiers may be informed to carry out the terms of that agreement as from date they receive the confirmation. We are glad that such agreement has been arrived at, because it means overcoming those who wish evil for Islam and Muslims and I believe that it will [be] a means of strengthening good relations between us and of the reasons which will cause the Arabs to be in the eyes of people as stones in a building supporting each other.

Document No. 19

Telegram of Imam Yahya to H.M. the King re-ratification of the Treaty dated 15th Ramadhan 1350.

Your telegram of 19th Sha‘ban is received with all respect and regard. In fact we and you are in permanent agreement, God willing, although it may not be arranged in the form of International Treaties and their modern methods. The eight articles drawn up by the representatives are regarded by us before and afterwards, please God, and we do not move away (depart) from it. In any way we like to establish concord and union. Some discussions took place between us and Your Honour’s representatives who came to us and there were some minor points noticed. So if you would be good enough to send those representatives with amplification on the part of your attitude we should be thankful to you. Peace be upon you.

Document No. 20

Telegram of H.M. the King accepting the request of the Imam Yahya and suggesting delay in sending the representatives until after pilgrimage dated 5th Shawwal 1350.

Reply. 15th Ramadhan. Your kind telegram has been received. Your Honour’s statement to the effect that we and you are in permanent agreement is a true fact which will not cease, God willing, but will increase every now and then. You also state that the Treaty is not (like) the modern International Treaties. Thank God the fraternity in which we are included is stronger and more perfect than every thing. It is of three stages (1) Islamic fraternity, (2) Arab congregation, (3) the spirit developing between us and you and which nothing will change it throughout the time, God willing. And we, by the Might of God, as you stated, will not move away from it. Also regarding your statement which is due to your noble character, namely your earnest desire for union and your request for sending our representatives with a view to completing some minor points observed, we agree to this (suggestion) and consider it of the greatest advantageous matters and is due to your intention and kindness. We are prepared to (meet your wishes) and wish to respond to the request now, but
2.28.  Ibn Saud suggests a defensive convention to the Imam  
(8 October 1932)

This proposal contains eight articles sufficient to establish proper relations between any two neighbouring countries. Only the boundary issue was not given appropriate considerations, however, and was only mentioned in the preface, stressing the necessity for finalising the boundary delimitation. Significantly, Article 4 made arbitration obligatory for solving any future disputes between both countries. The full text is available in the (Green Book, 1934: pp. 35-37 and 433-435).
Ibn Saud suggests a defensive convention to the Imam (8 October 1932)
Ibn Saud suggests a defensive convention to the Imam (8 October 1932)

Figure 2.28.3 Ibn Saud suggests a defensive convention to the Imam (8 October 1932)
Chapter VII

Endeavours for the conclusion of Defensive convention.

Despite the intentions of Imam Yahya as appeared in the incidents of the criminals in the north and south, H.M. the King did not lose hope of arriving at an agreement with him and continued his endeavours with a view to arriving at a conclusion of peaceful treaty for defending their respective countries. In order to attain this end, H.M. the King sent a special messenger with a letter containing the basic points on which the strong agreement is built. The reply arrived in the affirmative and that the Imam awaits the arrival of the delegation that will conduct the negotiations and draw up the provisions of the convention in respect of all matters. The following is the text of the two letters.

Document No. 23

Letter by H.M. the King to Imam Yahya dated 8th Jumad ath-Thani 1351.
Ibn Saud suggests a defensive convention to the Imam (8 October 1932)

Peace, Mercy and Blessings of God may be upon you. I hope that the brother,
members of his family and people in good health and prosperity enjoying the
everything in the world and pray God may grant us and you His Gracious Bounties and save us from
diminution. He is powerful enough to do everything. It has already been
agreed between us and the brother that we should resume discussions with a
view to accomplishing our unity and agreement we desire for the sake of the
Arabs and Islam. Nothing has delayed me to start them again
except the insurrection which took place in the north west of the Hejaz and
on which the enemies of God and His Prophet have stirred up. So I did not like to
write to you at that time in order to avoid misapprehensions which could have
themelves proved failures and all people in general and particular have become
acquainted of the fact that the people of the heart of Arabia are united and
prepared to meet eventualities, I found it an Islamic Arabic duty to return to
all our enemies and yours and of all Muslems, God willing. The brother
and to all our enemies and yours and of all Muslems, God willing. The brother
watched by the enemy and the friend. The friend looks at us with a kind eye,
while the enemy waits for the opportunities to direct his activities against us,
you Islam and Muslems, when we strive and struggle. If we do not unite and
agree to be one hand, our enemy will have means to enable him to realize his
ambitions in us and you. The friend will on their part feel in despair regarding
our matter and that of all the Arabs. I am sure that the brother is certain of this
and that this is an advice to us, to him, to the Arabs and Islam. I have
for this purpose sent our servant Muhammad Ibn Dhawi with this letter to you
in order to explain to you my views about our situation. So when the brother
sees it, I hope he will explain his views so that the matter may be clear, and then
we can agree upon a plain way in the establishment of the result to be achieved
and made public amongst people. I wish the brother to be assured that the
most important thing to us is to have peace and friendship maintained with all
our neighbours in general and with you in particular. I also wish you to be
certain and sure of the fact that we have [sic; 'no intended'] ambition in any
part of the country in your possession; and perhaps if we can be sure of safety
from the insurrections and intrigues of the enemies we should have not taken
possession of many of the dominions in our hands, but we were obliged to take
such action for the protection of the country and on accordance of intrigues and
insurrections. Everything occurs by fate and accident. If we obey the
state today would have been different to that you see, but it is our custom
that we keep away from hostility. So that when we are compelled to take an
action which we dislike and find no escape of undertaking it, we carry it out
relying on the help of God Almighty. Our greatest apprehension at present is
that if matters are left as they are now between us without a decisive settlement,
our enemies and yours in remote places of our respective countries will find a

Figure 2.28.5 Ibn Saud suggests a defensive convention to the Imam (8 October 1932)
Ibn Saud suggests a defensive convention to the Imam (8 October 1932)

Ibn Saud suggests a defensive convention to the Imam (8 October 1932)

 means for instigation and stirring up insurrections between us. Our enemies will deceive you in our frontiers and your enemies will deceive us in your contrary to your desire and ours.

This is the most important thing we are afraid of in case the situation is to be left as it stands at present. This is not advantageous neither at present nor in the future for both of us, the Arabs, Islam and Muslems.

I have, therefore sent those who carry my letter to suggest to the brother the drawing up of a clear agreement in which, first of all, frontiers should be specified in a distinct and plain manner which should not be liable to misinterpretation and doubt; and, secondly, we should agree to help each other and cooperate with each other in all aggression circumstances whether against us or against you internally or externally subject to certain clear conditions and principles and in special cases to be specified. Thirdly, we should specify the state of the relations between our frontier officials and yours as well as their competence in communications and collaborating with each other in matters that come under their provinces. Other higher affairs should be referred to us and you. Fourthly; this agreement should be put into force; and we and you on behalf of ourselves and yourselves, our country and yours and our heirs and yours should undertake to carry it out. Whereupon our order will become one, our word will become one and our families will become as if they are one in confirmation to what God says, "Believers are brothers". These are the most important principal points on which we think it is better that we should arrive at an agreement with the brother. If however the brother has any idea for an increase or modification he might make it out. When we learn of the views of the brother and see his readiness, of which we have no doubt, for the agreement on this matter, we will wait to receive his opinion as to the best way which he thinks fit for putting this agreement into force. We await the brother's suggestion as to the way he thinks best.

In conclusion we pray God may help us and you to work for the strength of the Arabs and Muslems and grant us and you success in the course he likes and approves of.

Figure 2.28.6 Ibn Saud suggests a defensive convention to the Imam (8 October 1932)
Figure 2.28.7 Ibn Saud suggests a defensive convention to the Imam (8 October 1932)
2.29. The Imam’s position towards the proposed convention (4 January 1933)

Imam Yahya accepted the idea, albeit with reservations over the territorial issue being left without a satisfactory solution (Green Book, 1934: pp. 37-38 and 435-436).
Figure 2.29.1 Imam’s position towards the proposed convention (4 January 1933)
The Imam’s position towards the proposed convention (4 January 1933)

Figure 2.29.2 Imam’s position towards the proposed convention (4 January 1933)
Document No. 24

Letter from the Imam Yahya to H.M. the King dated 7th Ramadhan 1351.

Peace, Mercy and Blessings of God may be upon you. We have received your kind letter by the hand of the intelligent Muhammad Ibn Dhawi and we are glad to hear that you are keeping well and enjoying the blessings and bounties of God. If you enquire about us, we are, thank God, in the best of health and enjoying innumerable bounties of God. We have carefully read and considered your letter, become acquainted with its contents and pleased of its comprehensiveness. That which you alluded to is the desired object and the only goal aimed at. We have seen your representative more than once and have been pleased to find him so intelligent and well acquainted with many facts. He has become acquainted with our actual inclination towards the facts indicated in

Figure 2.29.3 Imam’s position towards the proposed convention (4 January 1933)
your gracious friendly letter. Any slightly sensible or faithful one can readily realize and do not deny that by cooperation and collaboration strength increases, and ambitions of enemies vis a vis this power becomes weak. We think we have already stated to you that had the people who adopted European manners not facilitated for foreigners the way which they could not think of to plot against Islam, it (Islam) should have been so strong, powerful and unachievable. All your feelings actuated by Islamic zeal is exactly the same as ours. We hope that you believe this to be a true fact. The wicked misleaders have found us very strict and hard not attending to their vain show and ornamented trifles.

It is quite impossible that the wicked people can succeed in attracting us to their side although we have been met with some harshness. When the late Sheykh Muhammad Ibn Deleym and Sheykh Madhi Ibn Turki and their companions arrived here, we revealed to them some preliminary matters which were like foundation. We agree to the four points explained by you with the addition of what is necessary. The thing which remains in mind and which requires favourable consideration is that of the frontiers. So it is hoped that Your Honour will reconsider that question and to treat it indulgently and to be good enough to send some one with fuller competence whom you trust and who will find us so easy to manage caring for nothing except the welfare and for some conversation in a discussion which was cut short and settling it requires not a short time.

With best salams to yourself and all members of your family from us and our sons. May you live long preserved and protected.

7th Ramadhan 1351.

Figure 2.29.4 Imam’s position towards the proposed convention (4 January 1933)
2.30. **New proposal for a ‘Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity’ (May 1933)**

Ibn Saud put forward a new proposal for a ‘Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity’ on 30 May 1933. However, he informed his delegates not to offer the Imam any recognition as the King of Yemen. The intention was thus to secure a treaty between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Imam Yahya, rather than with ‘the King of Yemen’.

2.30.1. **Instruction to the Saudi delegation with draft treaty**
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Figure 2.30.1.1 Instruction to the Saudi delegation with draft treaty

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New proposal for a ‘Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity’ (May 1933)

Figure 2.30.1.2.30.2 Instruction to the Saudi delegation with draft treaty
يبدو أن الإمام رغبة في ذلك، فإن جلاليه يوافق عليها مع الممتنعة,
لأنها ترفع الارتعاز، ومنع الإختلاف، بين بلاد مقسمة ما بين البلدان.
هذا إذا كان للمندوبين استفاد من المعلومات عن الحدود
والقبائل بروز ذلك في مصلحتنا، وإن كانوا لا بروز ذلك في مصلحتنا
فليأخذوا اقتراح عيب ويرفع جلاليه مع بيان رأيه في ذلك.
وأما مسألة تسلم الهمم التي ثبتت في المعاهدة فإنما نرى الاحتفاظ
والتسك بها تماماً كشرط أساسي لإعادة الثقة والعلاقات الحسنة.
وذلك فإننا نأمل أن موقف سعادته في هذا الأمر مثل موقفنا، وإن
يعلمنا بصراحة على ذلك، لأن موقف سعادته في حوادث الإمبريالية كان
موقفاً ينافق المعاهدة، وبناه على ذلك فإننا نطلب منه يعرفنا رأيه بصراحة.
وبين لنا أمرنا:

1 - هل هو مصمّم على اتفاد النص كما هو؟.
2 - أو أنه لا يريد ذلك ويرى إلغائه، والسهر على الطريق الذي سار
عليها في حوادث الأدارسة، سواء تجاه (السياجين) واتباعهم، أو
الأدارسة أنفسهم.

3 - الحدود والأطراف بها:
ذكرنا فيها سبق كيف أن المعاهدة المعقودة، وحكم (المنزَّل) قد حل
مسألة الحدود بين عسير والمن، وذكرنا رأينا في التعديل الذي يسكت
المواقعة عليه.

وأما حذورنا في وراء عسير من الداخل – الشرق – فإنها كذلك
ميتوت فيها من سنة 1346 حسبًا زار ابن دليم، ابن ناصح الإمام،
وكناهاء بأن أهل (เยيران) تابعون لنجد، وأنهم لأهم لازمون لنجد بموجب
الضرورة، كما بخصوصنا، وأن سيادة الإمام وافقت في ذلك الوقت على أن
ما كان من ييران م هناك فهو عائد لمنا، وما كان من (وائلة) وجوهياً.
Figure 2.300.1.2.30.4 Instruction to the Saudi delegation with draft treaty
فقدموا هذا له وسكون الخبرة ممتلئة بيننا تقدم أو تبديل في رموز:

9. التعاون والتنسيق:
بما أن الذي يظهر لنا من تقريرات الإمام في جميع الوقائع الإدارية
لا يستخدم كثيراً على النشاط بنوايا المذكور المستقبل، فإننا لا نرى بصورة
الم признаة للاتفاق المجري النافذ، من قيمة عملية بيننا على فرص
دعوتنا فيه معه، ومع ذلك فإننا في حالة الدفاع عن سلامة الجزيرة العربية،
لا نرى منا من قبول التعدد مما يأتي:
1- وضع ذلك في المعاهدة، أو في مكانية ملحقة في المعاهدة.
2- وفي حالة حصول اعتماد خارجي على بلاد أحد الفريقين المتعاقدين، يعهد كل فريق بما يأتي:
(أ) الوقف على الحياة التام.
(ب) المعاونة الإدارية والمعنوية.
وفي حالة الاعتداءات الداخلية يعهد كل فريق بما يأتي:
(أ) اتخاذ التدابير الفعالة لعدم تمكين المعادي من الاستفادة من أراضيه.
(ب) منع التجارة اللائقة إلى بلاده.
(د) منع رعاية من الأشخاص أو المعدن أو تشجيعهم أو تعيينهم.
(د) منع الإمدادات والذخائر والمؤن عليهم.
(ه) منع من يفر منهم إلى بلاده أو طرده.

7. التحكيم:
لا معنى لدينا مطلقًا أن نتفق على إلحاء كل علاج خلل في الناديين
على التحكيم الذي يصدر، وبواسطة ذلك نص صريح واضح، في المعاهدة
(كتابة ملحقة) يمكن الاتفاق على النصوص الواقعة في (بروتوكول)
التحكيم المعقود بيننا وبين حكومة العراق، وال موجود في آخر مجموعة
المعاهدات التي نحن م🚴 منها نسخة من قبل.

Figure 2.300.1.2.30.5 Instruction to the Saudi delegation with draft treaty

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Figure 2.300.1.2.30.6 Instruction to the Saudi delegation with draft treaty
New proposal for a 'Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity' (May 1933)

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Figure 2.300.1.2.30.7 Instruction to the Saudi delegation with draft treaty
New proposal for a ‘Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity’ (May 1933)

Figure 2.30.1.2.30.8 Instruction to the Saudi delegation with draft treaty

المادة الأولى:

يسود بين المملكة العربية السعودية، وبين المملكة المتحدة، وبين عواصمهما ورعاياهما سلم دائم، وصداقة خاصة، لا يمكن الإخلال بها.

ويشهد الفريقان المتعاقدان أن يعلا بروح الود والصداقة جميع المفاوضات التي تقع بينهما، وأن يسود علاقهما وروح الإخاء الإسلامي العربي في سائر المراقب والحالات.

المادة الثانية:

تؤمن بين البلدين علاقات التفاهم السياسي والقنصلي، ويكون للمثلين في كل من البلدان حقوق الصيانة التي تقضي بها القوانين العربية والإسلامية وتفق مع الحقوق الدولية.

المادة الثالثة:

يعهد كل من الفريقين بأن يمنح بكل ما لديه من الوسائل استعمال بلاده قاعدة لأي عدل آخر، أو الاستعداد له ضد بلاد الآخر، وكل من يعى لذلك فإنه إن كان من زعيم الحركة التي يعهد بها لحكومة البلد تؤدي أبيها شيئًا، وتردها رعدًا شديدا وإن كان من زعيم البلدين الآخر فإنه ي평가 القضاء عليه وتسليم حكومته التي يعهد ضمنها إليه تقضي به الأحكام الشرعية، وعلى الحكومة التي يعهد ترتيب العدوان في أراضها أن تختار الحكومة الأخرى في الحال عن ذلك، وأن تجري المراجعت الرقية والكتابية عند الزروم لاتفاذا خطة مشتركة رادعة لأعمال أولئك الحركتين.

المادة الرابعة:

يشهد الفريقان السامانين المتعاقدان بأن يلجأ إلى الحكم لاجئ أي نزاع يقع بينهما، وأن يبلغ الحكم الذي يصرفه الحكم، ويبقى للحكم ترتيبًا مفصلا مع كيفية طليبه، وكيفية حصوله.

المادة الخامسة:

إن الفريقين السامانين الذين يجتمعهما الجامعة الإسلامية العربية أمنهما...
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Figure 2.30.1.2.30.9 Instruction to the Saudi delegation with draft treaty
2.30.2. Extract from *Umm-al-Qura*, 24 May 1933. FO 967/52

From the "Uma-al-Qura" of May 26th 1933 (No. 441).

**Official Communique No. 10.**

The Government have selected Their Honours Khaled Abdul-Walid, Hamad as-Suleyman and Turky al-Madhif to proceed to San'a with a view to negotiating with H.H. Imama Yahya in the Treaty of Friendship and Ben Voisinage between the two sides. They will leave from Jizan for San'a in this week.

29th Muharram 1352 (May 24th 1933).

Signed for

[Signature]

Figure 2.300.2.1 Extract from Umm-al-Qura, 24 May 1933. FO 967/52
2.31. A treaty proposal for postponing the boundary settlement

The letter from Fuad Hamzah to the British Chargé d’Affaires in Jeddah, 17 August 1933, confirms that the idea of a treaty featuring the postponement of the settlement over boundaries had been introduced by Imam Yahya. The proposed treaty was intended to postpone agreement over the territorial dispute until a future arrangement. The text and the translation are both available in (FO 967/52, TNA, London).
A treaty proposal for postponing the boundary settlement

Figure 2.31.1 A treaty proposal for postponing the boundary settlement
A treaty proposal for postponing the boundary settlement

Figure 2.31.2 A treaty proposal for postponing the boundary settlement
A treaty proposal for postponing the boundary settlement
2.32. **Imam Yahya to Ibn Saud (28 August 1933)**

Here the Imam accepted Ibn Saud’s proposal of a treaty, but suggested instead a treaty similar to the one that Yemen was negotiating with Britain; namely the Sana’a Treaty, which would be completed in February 1934. The aim was to postpone any agreement over the boundary until a later arrangement to be agreed upon in twenty lunar years (Green Book, 1934: pp. 77-78).
Imam Yahya to Ibn Saud (28 August 1933)

Figure 2.32.1 Imam Yahya to Ibn Saud (28 August 1933)

Figure 2.32.2 Imam Yahya to Ibn Saud (28 August 1933)
2.33. **Imam Yahya to Ibn Saud (17 December 1933)**

Imam Yahya re-affirmed his position towards the postponement of the settlement for the territorial dispute (Green Book, 1934: p. 98).

Figure 2.33.1 Imam Yahya to Ibn Saud (17 December 1933)
2.34.  **Ibn Saud to Imam Yahya (19 December 1933)**

Ibn Saud accepted the Imam’s suggestion of a treaty that postponed the settlement of the boundary dispute for a period of twenty years (Green Book, 1934: pp. 98-99).
Figure 2.34.1 Ibn Saud to Imam Yahya (19 December 1933)
Ibn Saud to Imam Yahya (19 December 1933)

Figure 2.34.2 Ibn Saud to Imam Yahya (19 December 1933)
2.35. The British Minister in Jeddah to the Foreign Office
(26 and 29 December 1933)

In telegrams from the British Minister in Jeddah to the Foreign Office, on 26 and 29 December 1933, the British diplomat confirmed the information concerning a proposed peaceful settlement. This included the prospect of an agreement being reached between Riyadh and Sana’a that postponed the final resolution of the boundary issue until later arrangements after twenty lunar years (FO 967/54, TNA, London).
The British Minister in Jeddah to the Foreign Office (26 and 29 December 1933)

Figure 2.35.1 The British Minister in Jeddah to the Foreign Office (26 and 29 December 1933)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>H.M. MINISTER.</th>
<th>JEDDA.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Despatched</td>
<td>29/12/33 (11-45)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

My telegram No. 226.

1. Idris to be removed to Seifd.
2. Imam to recognise existing position in regard to both parts of 'Asir. Parties to make a treaty affirming this. It would resemble projected Anglo-Yemen treaty inasmuch as it would be concluded for twenty years but according to Pud it would preclude Imam from contesting Ibn Sa'd's rights in 'Asir at any future time. Meeting of delegates to be arranged in due course. Place of meeting not yet fixed.
3. Intrigues of which Ibn Sa'd had complained e.g. among Beni Malik to cease.

This leaves question of Najran unsettled. Puad defined Sa'di proposal in language similar to that reported in my telegram No. 217. Issue of peace or war would depend on its acceptance or rejection by Imam who had been informed in this sense.

Puad was categorical on last point although unofficial informant previously mentioned expressed view on December 24 that neither side would go to war over Najran. Actual situation there seems less certain than would appear from Puad's language on December 10.

/Unofficial

Figure 2.35.2 The British Minister in Jeddah to the Foreign Office (26 and 29 December 1933)
Unofficial informant had heard of recent clash not authorised by King between Wahhabi forces and Yemenis. Foad still denies any direct conflict. He again states that Yemenis have left Wadi Habûna and Badr but cannot say what this amounts to in way of evacuation owing to uncertainty as to geography of region.
2.36. Extract from Umm-al-Qura (16 January 1934)

News confirms that the two parties agreed telegraphically on the question of the Idrisis and their position. It added that the Imam Yahya then agreed that the frontier between the two countries should be delimited and that a ‘Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity’ should be concluded between the two parties for a period of twenty years (FO 141/482, TNA, London).
Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Extract from the Mecca Umm-al-Qura, No. 475 of January 16, 1934.

BETWEEN RIYADH AND SANA.

(Translation.)

THE exchange of telegraphic communications between His Majesty the King and his Highness Imam Yahya to settle the trouble between the two countries is still going on and His Majesty is still strongly persisting in his efforts for a settlement of the questions in dispute. After a long exchange of communications, the two parties agreed telegraphically on the question of the Idrisis and their position. The Imam Yahya then agreed that the frontier between the two countries should be delimited and that a Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity should be concluded between the two parties for a period of twenty years. The question of Najran has remained unsettled up till now. His Majesty the King finally suggested to his Highness the Imam Yahya that the two questions already agreed upon should be definitely settled and that the
treaty should be drawn up, signed and made public immediately. As regards
the question of Najran, negotiations should be conducted in a conference to be
held for that purpose by delegations from the two parties, with a view to settling
it in such a manner as to preserve the interests of both and to prevent harm
befalling them. There is still a strong hope that the proposed conference will
overcome the difficulties and settle the trouble in a way which will preserve the
interests of both parties as well as the interests of the people of Najran
themselves. His Majesty the King sent this suggestion to his Highness the Imam
Yahya on the 17th Ramadan (the 3rd January, 1934), but his Highness the
Imam Yahya, as frequently happens, delayed his reply either accepting or
refusing the suggestion. It happened during that time that certain of those in
the mountains of the Tihamat Asir caused disturbances because of the intrigues
of certain of his Highness the Imam Yahya’s Amirs, which caused a bad effect,
particularly in Nejd. Meanwhile, orders had already been issued to his Highness
the Amir Saud, heir apparent of the Saudi Arab Kingdom, to march south with
a Nejdi force; orders had likewise been issued to his Highness the Amir Feisal
to march south along the Tihama coast. On the 23rd Ramadan (the 9th
January, 1934), however, a message was received from his Highness the Imam
Yahya to the effect that he agreed to the suggestion of His Majesty the King
and that his Highness admitted the activities and interference of his Amirs,
in the matter of stirring up disturbances, amongst the Bani Malik and the Abudil.
He stated that he had issued orders to prevent this and asked His Majesty to
grant pardon to those who had committed these acts; and he manifested readiness
to conclude the treaty and to depute a delegation. Therefore orders were at
once issued to the Amir Feisal to stop his march, but the Amir Saud had already
started with a force in cars, and it was not possible for the orders to return
to reach him; so he continued on his way.

The Government have made certain that the attitude of his Highness the
Amir Saud in that direction of the kingdom will be one ensuring tranquility in
affairs and precluding any aggression or hostility, unless the situation should
necessitate it for purposes of defence, which the Government hope will not be
the case, they hope also that his Highness the Imam Yahya will expedite the
settlement of the matter, so that the Islamic and Arab worlds may repose in
the amicable settlement of this affair.

Figure 2.36.2 Extract from Umm-al-Qura (16 January 1934)
2.37. **The sovereignty of Ibn Saud and the Idrisis: open to question**

It seems that neither Ibn Saud nor the Idrisis had become sovereign prior to 1926. Indeed, Ibn-Saud remained bound by his treaty of 1915 with Britain, asking for permission whenever he intended to establish relations with a foreign country (Sir W. Tyrrell -for the Secretary of State-, to Lloyd (HC, Cairo) 9 January, 1926 (FO 406/57, TNA, London).

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*Figure 2.37.1 The sovereignty of Ibn Saud and the Idrisis: open to question*
2.38. **Britain relinquishes to Saudi Arabia its treaty with Al-Idrisi**

Ibn Saud informed Imam Yahya that Britain had relinquished to Saudi Arabia its treaty with Al-Idrisi. He added that he received the recognition of several other countries, including Italy. 18 August 1933 (Ibn Saud to Imam Yahya, 18 August 1933 (Green Book, 1934: pp. 74-75).
Britain relinquishes to Saudi Arabia its treaty with Al-Idrisi

Figure 2.38.1 Britain relinquishes to Saudi Arabia its treaty with Al-Idrisi
Britain relinquishes to Saudi Arabia its treaty with Al-Idrisi

Figure 2.38.2 Britain relinquishes to Saudi Arabia its treaty with Al-Idrisi
2.39. **The position of the Idrisis’ surrender of authority to Ibn Saud open to question**

The agreements that the Idrisis concluded with the Saudis were seen as grounds in international law for the Saudi position over Asir.

Figure 2.39.1.2.39.1 (Chamberlain to Clayton 27 January 1927 AIR 2/1020, London).
should be added to the staff at Kamran, assuming always that it can be established that the number of Italian personnel remains. Should an Italian doctor be added, it 2.39.1.2.39.2 (Chamberlain to Clayton 27 January 1927 AIR 2/1020, London).

Figure 2.39.1.2.39.2 (Chamberlain to Clayton 27 January 1927 AIR 2/1020, London).
2.39.2. Simon Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Drummond,

Figure 2.39.2.1 Simon Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Drummond, Rome, 15 January 1934, FO 141/482, TNA, London.
The position of the Idrisis’ surrender of authority to Ibn Saud open to question

Ibn Saud acquired full and complete sovereignty over the territories of the Idrisis and its Dependencies, as it was then called.

4. The territories over which King Ibn Saud thus acquired sovereignty were the same territories as those over which he had acquired a protectorate under the Treaty of Mecca of 1926, namely, all the territories which were under the sovereignty of the Idrisis at the moment of the conclusion of the Treaty of Mecca. This appeared to His Majesty’s Government at the time—and still appears to them—to have been the position at that date. They considered further that King Ibn Saud’s sovereignty over these territories was effective in international law and did not require any express or implied recognition by any other power to render it legally complete and effective.

5. It was on these grounds that His Majesty’s Government (when the question was under discussion with the Italian Government in 1931 as a result of a request of the Hejaz Nejd Government, which involved entering into correspondence with them on matters concerning Asir) decided that there could be no question of their declining to recognise the sovereignty of King Ibn Saud over Asir, but that, in deference to the wishes of the Italian Government, they could agree to refrain from sending to the Hejazi Government a formal communication of their recognition. The Italian Government appear to have misunderstood the purport of the Embassy’s note, No. 296, of the 24th July, 1931, a copy of which was enclosed in Sir Ronald Graham’s despatch No. 561 of the same date, and they appear to suggest in paragraph 5 of their note of the 23rd December last that the interpretation of the Embassy’s note, which has now been given to them, involves some degree of conflict with statements made by the British representatives during the conversations held at Rome in 1927 regarding affairs in the Red Sea and South Western Arabia. It was, indeed, precisely because there seemed some danger that the Italian Government might misunderstand the attitude which His Majesty’s Government felt bound to adopt in 1931, in entering into correspondence with Ibn Saud’s Government over Asir, and thus recognising by implication his sovereignty over that territory, that they felt it desirable to explain the position to the Italian Government beforehand. They can only regret that the Italian Government appear to have failed to understand the attitude underlying the course proposed by His Majesty’s Government in the 13th August, 1931, concerning the note.

6. In paragraph 3 of the Italian Government’s undated note of December 1933, they refer to the “well-known rights” of the Imam over Asir. His Majesty’s Government know of no good ground for the claim which the Imam may have put forward before the conclusion of the Treaty of Mecca over which the Idrisis held sovereignty; and they therefore could not agree to any discussion with the Italian Government on the basis of a claim to that area at the present time.

7. It will be seen from the preceding paragraphs that the attitude of His Majesty’s Government, both regarding the legal status of Asir and also regarding the Imam’s claims to that territory, is completely opposed to that of the Italian reason which leads me to consider it inexpedient to hold the proposed conversations.

8. In the second place, it appears from Sir Andrew Ryan’s telegram No. 226 of the 26th December, which was repeated to you as my telegram No. 384, of the same date, that a measure of agreement in principle has now been reached between Ibn Saud and the Imam, in particular that the Imam is prepared to recognise the existing position in Asir. If, as may legitimately be supposed, the chief motive of the Italian Government in refusing to recognise King Ibn Saud’s position in Asir was the hope of not being able to strengthen their own influence with him, it would be important for the moment when the Imam himself is prepared to be discussed in the proposed conversations. Moreover, if the Italian Government were able to represent to the Imam that His Majesty’s Government had agreed to discuss this basis, the Imam would naturally form the impression that the status of Asir was still an open question, and would be encouraged to go back.

Figure 2.39.2.2 Simon Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Drummond, Rome, 15 January 1934, FO 141/482, TNA, London.

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the provisional agreement which he has apparently reached with King Ibn Saud and to revive his claims. The projected conversations would thus be likely actually to impede the prospect of a peaceful settlement in regard to Asir. They might also in the same way tend to make the Imam lose ready than he might otherwise be to accept the apparently reasonable proposal which has now been put forward by King Ibn Saud for an agreement in regard to Nejran.

10. Thirdly, His Majesty’s Government are anxious to maintain the relevant parts of the negotiations of the Rome conversations of 1927 as the basis of Anglo-Italian relations in matters concerning the Imam of the Yemen and Ibn Saud. They do not wish to run any risk of this basis being called in question, by discussing any modification of these conclusions at the present time, having regard more especially to the advantages presented by conclusions 2 and 3, in virtue of which the Italian Government are under an obligation to use their influence with the object of restraining the Imam from aggression against Ibn Saud and to refrain from intervention in any conflict between the two rulers. In the third enclosure in your despatch, the Italian Government speak of these conclusions as the starting point of the proposed conversations. This does not entirely exclude the possibility of their modification being discussed, and this consideration is, in my opinion, a further argument against embarking on the proposed discussions.

11. In sum, therefore, I see no advantage to be gained from agreeing to a meeting of experts in Rome to discuss the position in South-Western Arabia at a moment when, since King Ibn Saud and the Imam appear themselves to be moving in the direction of a desirable settlement, no discussion of the situation seems necessary, when His Majesty’s Government are not in a position to discuss what the Italian Government erroneously profess to regard as the main issue, namely, Asir; and when His Majesty’s Government desire to avoid any danger of the fundamental agreement between them and the Italian Government in regard to the Arabian coast of the Red Sea being disturbed. It seems that the proposed discussion would merely serve further to satisfy the Italian ambition to play the leading role among the Powers, without the justification on grounds of practical expediency which was present in the case of the Rome Conference, of my recent visit to Rome, and of the discussions there on the question of the Sudan–Libya boundary.

12. I accordingly request, in the light of the above considerations, that your Excellency will inform the Italian Government, in whatever manner you think least likely to provoke either an unfavourable impression or detailed and useless discussion, that His Majesty’s Government consider that it would be unprofitable and possibly even prejudicial to the prospects of a direct settlement between King Ibn Saud and the Imam to hold the proposed conversations.

13. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty’s Minister at Jeddah. I am, &c.,

JOHN SIMON
3.1. The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (commonly known as the ‘Taif’ Treaty of 1934) was signed on 20 May 1934. It was named after the city of Taif, in Al-Ḥijāz, where negotiations and the preliminary signing of the treaty took place. However, the city of Taif in Al-Ḥijāz has often been mistaken for the village of the same name (Al-Taif) situated close to Al-Hudaydah, and there has thus been some disagreement about this. In fact, the BLJ contributed several important reports with information supporting the view that the ‘Taif’ being referred to in the Treaty was the city of Taif in Al-Ḥijāz. Reportedly, after the Treaty of Taif was signed (in the city of Taif in Al-Ḥijāz) by Ibn Saud, it was taken to Sana’a by Abdullah Al-Wazir, the head of the Imam’s delegation, for it to be signed by Imam Yahya. Al-Wazir left Jeddah on 12 June on the S.S. Al-Haq, bound for Al-Hudaydah. It seems that the final copy of the treaty was written in Jeddah. Indeed, the Treaty itself includes a note (near its end) stating that the Treaty was “written in the city of Jedda [Jeddah]”. Therefore, there are two possibilities regarding where it was signed, either in Jeddah where it was written or in Taif where negotiations took place. The reference to Jeddah in the Treaty was noticed at the time by the translator at the British Legation in Jeddah, who nonetheless noted that this was “probably only a slip”, asserting that the Treaty had been “concluded at Taif”.

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3 The Times, 14 June 1934.
6 Ibid. Mistakenly, certain Arab historians who have analyzed the Treaty regard Jeddah as the place where it was concluded like, Salem ( 1984: p.502).
The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)
The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

Figure 3.1.2 The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)
The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

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Figure 3.1.3 The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)
The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)
The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)
The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

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The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

Figure 3.1.6: The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)
The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

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Figure 3.1.7 The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)
The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)
The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)
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The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

In the Name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

A Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Arab Brotherhood

Between

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

And

The Kingdom of Yemen

****

His Majesty Imam Abdulaziz bin Abdurrahman al-Faisal al-Saud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and His Majesty Imam Yahya bin Muhammad Hamiduddin, King of the Yemen, on the other hand.

Desiring to end the state of war which unfortunately existed between them, their governments and peoples;

Desiring to unite the Islamic Arab nation, improve its standing and maintain its dignity and independence;

In view of the necessity to establish firm treaty relations between them, their governments and countries on a basis of mutual benefits and reciprocal interests;

Desiring to fix the borders between their countries and to establish good-neighborly relations and ties of Islamic friendship between them and to strengthen the foundations of peace and tranquility between their countries and peoples; and

Desiring to act as a united front in the face of unexpected mishaps, and as a solid structure to maintain the security of the Arabian Peninsula:


Figure 3.1.12 The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)
The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the
Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

Article 1:

The state of war existing between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen shall cease upon signing this Treaty, and there shall forthwith be established between their Majesties the Kings and their countries and peoples a state of perpetual peace, firm friendship and everlasting Islamic Arab brotherhood, inviolable in part or in whole. The Two Honorable Contracting Parties undertake to settle in a spirit of amity and friendship all disputes and disagreements which may arise between them, and to ensure that a spirit of Islamic Arab brotherhood shall dominate their relations in all situations and conditions. They call on God to witness the goodness of their intentions and their true desire for harmony and agreement, both secretly and openly. They pray to the Almighty to grant them and their successors, heirs and governments success in the continuance of this sound endeavor, which is pleasing to the Creator and honorable to their peoples and religion.

Article 2:

Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties recognizes the full and absolute independence of each of the two Kingdoms and of the other party’s sovereignty over it. His Majesty Imam Abdulaziz bin Abdurrahman al-Faisal al-Saud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, acknowledges to His Majesty Imam Yahya and his lawful successors the full and absolute independence of the Kingdom of Yemen.
The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

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and his sovereignty over it, and His Majesty Imam Yahya bin Muhammad Hamiduddin, King of Yemen, acknowledges to His Majesty Imam Abdulaziz and his lawful successors the full and absolute independence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and his sovereignty over it. Each shall renounce any claim over part or parts of the other party’s country beyond the borders fixed and defined in the text of this Treaty. His Majesty King Abdulaziz shall renounce by this Treaty any right of protection or occupation, or any other claim in the territories which, according to this Treaty, belong to Yemen and which were formerly in the possession of the Idrisids and other territories. His Majesty Imam Yahya shall similarly renounce by this Treaty any right he claims in the name of Yemeni unity or otherwise, in the territories which according to this Treaty belong to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and which were formerly in the possession of the Idrisids or Al-Aidhi, or in Najran and the Yâm territory.

Article 3:

The Two Honorable Contracting Parties agree to conduct their relations and communications in such a manner as will secure the interests of both parties and cause no harm to either of them, provided that neither of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall concede to the other party less than he concedes to a third party. Neither of the Two Parties shall be bound to concede to the other party more than he receives in return.

Article 4:

The borderline which divides the countries of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties is shown in sufficient detail hereunder. This line is considered a fixed dividing boundary between the territories subject to each of them.

The borderline between the two Kingdoms begins from the dividing point between Mitî and al Muwassam on the coast of the Red Sea, and (runs) up to the Tihâmah mountains in the east. It then turns northwards until it ends at the north-west boundary between Barî Jumâ’ah and all (tribes) that are adjacent to them on the west and north. It then veers eastwards until it ends at a point between the limits of Naqâ’ah and Wi’âr, which belong to the Wâ’ilah tribe, and the limits of Yâm. It then veers until it reaches Mâdiq Marwân and ‘Aqbat Rûfâdah, and then it veers eastwards until it ends, on the east, on the edge of the boundary between those of Hamadân Bin Zayd to Wâ’il, and others who are outside Yâm, and the Yâm. Everything to the right side of the aforementioned line, which runs from the point

Figure 3.1.14 The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)
The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

mentioned on the sea shore up to the end of the borders on all sides of the mountains mentioned, shall belong to the Kingdom of Yemen, and everything to the left of the aforementioned line shall belong to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On the right side are Midī, Ḥaraḍ, part of al Ḥurraṭh tribe, al Mayr, az Zāhir Mountains, Shadhā, ad Dayyah, part of al ‘Abādil, all the territories and mountains of Rāzah, Munabbah, with ‘Ārw al Amshayakh, all the territories and mountains of Bani Juma’ah, Sāḥār ash Shām, Yabbād and its vicinity, the Muraysīghah area of Sāḥār ash Shām, the whole of Sāḥār, Naq’ah, Wī’ār, the whole of Wā’ilah, and also al Far’, with ‘Aqabat Nuhūgah, the whole of Hamadān Bin Zayd, which is outside Yām and Wādí‘at Zahrān. All those mentioned and their territories with their known boundaries, and everything in between the said areas and their vicinities the names of which are not mentioned and which were actually subject to or under the control of the Kingdom of Yemen before the year 1352AH, are on the right side and thus shall be part of the Kingdom of Yemen. On the left side of the aforementioned line are Al Muwassam, Wā’ilah, most of al Ḥurraṭh, Al Khawbah, Al Jabīrī, most of Al ‘Abādil, all of Fayfā, Bani Mālik, Bani Ḥrayay, Al Tafīd, Qaṭīţān, Zahrān Wādí‘ah, all of Wādí‘at Zahrān, together with Maḏiq Marwān, and Aqabat Rufadah, and the area lying beyond them on the east and north of Yām, Najrān, al Ḥaḍān, Zawr Wādí‘ah, all the Wā’ilah in Najrān, and all below the ‘Aqabat Nuhūgah, up to the edges of Najrān and Yām on the east. All these mentioned and their territories with their known boundaries, and everything in between the said areas and their vicinities the names of which are not mentioned and which were actually subject to or under the control of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia before the year 1352AH, are on the left side of the said line and thus shall be part of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. All that is mentioned of Yām, Najrān, al Ḥaḍān, Zawr Wādí‘ah, and all the Wā’ilah in Najrān, shall be in accordance with His Majesty Imam Yahya’s decision to refer the Yām matter to His Majesty King Abdulaziz for judgment, and His Majesty King Abdulaziz arbitral decision that all of Yām shall belong to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; and since al Ḥaḍān and Zawr Wādí‘ah and the Wā’ilah in Najrān belong to Wā’ilah, and their falling within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is due to what has been mentioned above, such shall not prevent them or their brothers of Wā’ilah from enjoying mutual relations and communication and the usual and customary co-operation. This line then extends from the end of the aforementioned limits between the edges of the Saudi Arabian tribal areas and of those of Hamadān Bin Zayd, and all the Yemeni tribes who are outside Yām. All the borders and the Yemeni territories up to the end of the Yemeni border in all directions shall belong to the Kingdom of Yemen; and all the borders and territories up to the end of their boundaries, in all directions, shall belong to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. All points mentioned in this Article, whether north, south, east or west, are to be considered in accordance with the general trend of the borderline in the directions indicated; which often causes it to veer into the territory of either of the two Kingdoms. Designation and demarcation of said line, the separating out of tribes and the proper fixing of the limits of their territories shall, however, be determined

Figure 3.1.15 The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)
The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

by a committee of an equal number of persons from both parties, formed in a friendly and brotherly way and without prejudice, in accordance with established tribal customs and practices.

Article 5:

In view of the desire of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties for the continuance of peace, tranquility and serenity, and for the prevention of anything which may disturb the thoughts of the two Kingdoms, they mutually undertake not to construct any fortified building within a distance of five kilometers on either side of the border, in all locations and directions along the borderline.

Article 6:

Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties undertakes to withdraw its troops immediately from the territory which, by virtue of this Treaty, has become the property of the other party, and to protect the inhabitants and troops from harm.

Article 7:

The Two Honorable Contracting Parties undertake to prevent the people of their respective Kingdoms from committing any harmful or hostile act against the people of the other Kingdom, in any area and route; to prevent raiding between the bedouins on both sides; to return all properties proven by legal investigation to have been seized after the conclusion of this Treaty; to give compensation for damage and, as determined by Shari’ah, for crimes of murder or wounding that have been committed; and to mete out deterring punishment to anyone proved to have committed any hostile act. This Article shall remain in effect until another agreement is drawn between the Two Parties defining the manner of investigating and estimating damage and loss.

Article 8:

The Two Honorable Contracting Parties mutually undertake to refrain from resorting to force to resolve problems between them, and to exert their utmost effort

Figure 3.1.16 The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)
to settle, through friendly negotiations, any dispute which may arise between them as a result of this Treaty or the interpretation of all or any of its Articles or as a result of any other cause. If the dispute is not resolved in this way, each of the Two Parties shall undertake to resort to arbitration, of which the conditions, the manner of demand, and the conduct are to be explained in an appendix to be attached to this Treaty. This appendix shall have the same force and effectiveness as of this Treaty, and shall be considered an integral part of it.

Article 9:

The Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall undertake to prevent, by all tangible and intangible means at their disposal, the use of their territory as a base and center for any hostile action, attempted action or preparations therefor, against the country of the other party. They also shall undertake to take the following measures immediately upon receipt of a written request from the government of the other party:

1) if the person endeavoring to foment insurrection is a subject of the government required to take measures, he, if convicted through legal investigation, shall receive a deterrent punishment which puts an end to his action and prevents the recurrence of similar actions.

2) if the person endeavoring to foment insurrection is a subject of the government requesting the taking of measures, he shall be immediately arrested by the government receiving the request and handed over to the requesting government, of which he is a subject. The government required to extradite him shall have no excuse in not implementing such request and shall take all measures to prevent the person in question from fleeing or enabling him to flee. In cases where the person in question is able to flee, the government from whose territory he has fled shall undertake not to allow him to return to its territory, and if he does so, he shall be arrested and delivered to his government.

3) if the person endeavoring to foment insurrection is a subject of a third government, the government receiving the request, and on whose territory the person is found, shall, immediately upon receipt of the other government’s request, expel him from its country, consider him undesirable and prevent him from returning to it in the future.

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Figure 3.1.17 The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)
The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

Article 10:
The Two Honorable Contracting Parties undertake not to shelter anyone who rebels against his government, whether he is young or old, a government official or not, an individual or a group. Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall take all effective measures, whether administrative, military or otherwise, to prevent those fugitives from entering its country. If any or all manage to cross the borderline and enter into its territory, it shall be obligated to disarm the fugitives, arrest them, and deliver them to the government of the country they are fleeing from. In case of inability to arrest them, it shall use all means to drive them out of the territories to which they defected and back into the territories of the government to which they belong.

Article 11:
The Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall undertake to prevent their emirs, governors and officials from interfering in any way with subjects of the other party, whether in person or by proxy, and shall take all measures to prevent any disturbance or misunderstanding arising from such actions.

Article 12:
Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall acknowledge that the people of all areas accruing to the other party by virtue of this Treaty are subjects of that party.

Each party shall undertake not to accept as its subjects any person or persons who are subjects of the other party except with the consent of that party. The subjects of the Two Parties, when in the country of the other party, shall be treated according to the local law.

Article 13:
Each of the Honorable Contracting Parties shall undertake to declare a full and complete pardon for all crimes and hostile acts which may have been committed by any of the subjects of the other party who are residing in its country (i.e. the country of the party to issue the pardon). It shall also undertake to issue a full,

Figure 3.1.18 The ‘Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood’ between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)
general and complete amnesty to those of its subjects who have defected or taken refuge or joined with the other party in any way for any money they have taken or crimes they have committed from the time they defected to the other party until their return, no matter what or how grave it was, and not to subject them to any harm, pursuit or harassment because of their defection or taking refuge or for the manner by which they joined the other party. If either party suspects that something occurred in violation of this undertaking, it may consult with the other party to arrange for a meeting of the representatives who signed this Treaty. If it is not possible for either of them to attend, he shall deputize another, who has full authority and knowledge as well as the desire and care for peace making and ensuring the rights of the Two Parties, to attend and investigate the matter and ensure that no injustice or dispute may occur. The decision of both representatives is binding.

Article 14:

Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall undertake to return to its subjects who were granted amnesty, or to their heirs, all their properties, upon returning to their country and adhering to its law. The Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall similarly undertake not to seize any properties or possessions belonging to subjects of the other party, and not to create obstacles with regard to their investment or legal disposal thereof.

Article 15:

Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall undertake not to meddle with a third party, be it an individual, an organization or a government, or enter into an agreement therewith on any matter which may prejudice the interest of the other party, cause harm to its country, lead to problems and difficulties, or pose danger to its benefits, interests and entity.

Article 16:

The Two Honorable Contracting Parties, sharing the bonds of Islamic brotherhood and Arab origin, declare that their nation is one and the same, that they do not mean to pose harm to anyone, that they will do their best to promote the interests of their nation in an atmosphere of peace and tranquility, and that they will

Figure 3.1.19 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)
exert their best efforts in all situations for the welfare of their countries and nation, intending no aggression on any nation.

Article 17:
In the event of an external aggression on the country of either of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties, the other party shall be bound to carry out the following undertakings:

(i) Adopt complete neutrality secretly and openly.
(ii) Provide possible moral support.
(iii) Undertake negotiations with the other party to find the best of ways to ensure the security of its country and save it from harm, and to take a stand that can not be interpreted as providing help to the external aggressor.

Article 18:
In the event of insurrection or internal hostilities taking place within the country of one of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties, each of them shall mutually undertake to do as follows:

(i) Take all necessary effective measures to prevent aggressors or rebels from making use of its territories.
(ii) Prevent fugitives from taking refuge in its country and hand them over or expel them, as set forth in Articles (9) and (10) above.
(iii) Prevent his subjects from joining the aggressors or rebels, and refrain from encouraging them or supplying them with provisions.
(iv) Prevent assistance, food supplies, arms and ammunition from reaching the aggressors or rebels.

Article 19:
The Two Honorable Contracting Parties declare their desire to do everything possible to facilitate postal and telegraphic communications between their two countries and increase communications between them, to facilitate the trading of commodities as well as of agricultural and commercial products between them, and
to undertake detailed negotiations to conclude a customs agreement that protects the economic interests of their countries through unifying the customs duties, or formulating a special system that secures the interests of the Two Parties. Nothing in this Article restricts the freedom of either of the Two Honorable Parties on any matter until the agreement referred to has been concluded.

Article 20:

Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties declares its willingness to authorize its representatives and delegates abroad, if any, to represent the other party, whenever the other party desires so, in any matter and at any time. It is understood that whenever representatives of both parties are together in one place, they shall collaborate to unify their policy to serve the interests of their two countries, which are regarded as one nation. It is also understood that this Article does not restrict the freedom of either side in any way with regard to any of its rights. Similarly, it cannot be interpreted as restricting the freedom of either of them or compelling it to adopt this course of action.

Article 21:

The contents of the agreement signed on the 5th of Shaban 1350AH, shall be considered void on the date of the conclusion of this Treaty.

Article 22:

In the interest of the Two Parties, this Treaty shall be concluded and ratified by Their Majesties the two Kings at the earliest possible time. It shall come into force from the date of the exchange of its ratification instruments, except as regards what has been provided for in Article (1), in relation to ending the state of war immediately upon signature. It shall remain effective for twenty complete lunar years and may be renewed or modified during the six-month period preceding its expiration date. If not renewed or modified by that date, it shall remain in force for six months after one of the Two Contracting Parties notifies the other party of its desire for modification.
Article 23:

This Treaty shall be named 'the Treaty of Taif'. It has been drafted in two copies in the noble Arabic language, each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties having one copy. In witness whereof, each of the authorized representatives has signed it.

Drafted in the City of Jeddah on the 6th of Safar, in the year thirteen hundred and fifty three.

Abdullah bin Ahmad al Wazir

Khalid bin Abdulaziz al Saud
3.2. Ratification of the Taif Treaty

The Taif Treaty was signed by the heads of negotiators from both countries, but the exchange of ratifications reportedly took place on 22 June 1934. Yemeni acceptance of the Taif Treaty was confirmed by telegraphic messages from the Yemeni Foreign Minister to Saudi Arabia and some other countries, including Britain. This Appendix shows a report that Imam Yahya did not sign any ratification instruments, which is evident in the copy registered by Saudi Arabia in the United Nations Secretariat. Indeed, the Taif Treaty held there is not a physical document that features an official seal by leaders of either country, nor are there any ratification instruments. Comparison between the ratification of the Sana’a Treaty, concluded in February 1934, and the Taif Treaty in May of the same year is significant here; most importantly because the ratification of the Arabic text of the Sana’a Treaty was confirmed by Imam Yahya and his official seal, while the English ratification instruments were signed by the Yemeni Foreign Minister, though not the Imam himself (see Appendix 4.1).
3.2.1. Approval of the Taif Treaty by Imam Yahya

Telegram from the Yemeni Minister of Foreign Affairs to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 19 June 1934, FO 371/17928, TNA, London.
Ratification of the Taif Treaty

Figure 3.2.1.3.2.1 Approval of the Taif Treaty by Imam Yahya
An official communiqué has been received from al-Qādi Muhammad Rāghib, Yemeni Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the effect that His Majesty the Imam Yahya, King of the Yemen, has this day, the 7th Rabi al-awal 1353 (19/6/34) approved the Treaty of Taif concluded on the 6th Safar (21/5/34) and has affixed his gracious signature on the instrument of ratification.

The publication of the Treaty will take place immediately after the exchange of the ratified copies and the registration of the official procès-verbal of the exchange, which will be done shortly in Jeddah.
3.2.2. Imam Yahya did not sign a ratification of the Taif Treaty


Figure 3.2.2.1 Imam Yahya did not sign a ratification of the Taif Treaty
3.3. **Filing in the United Nations Secretariat (2006)**

Filling and recording the Taif Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations was made by Saudi Arabia, unilaterally, on 9 October 2006. This was possibly due to unproven claims that the Yemeni copy of the Treaty had been missing. Nonetheless, this proves the point made in this thesis that in Yemen, the territorial boundary dispute with the Kingdom was unfortunately not appropriately dealt with. For Yemen, despite having a much more reasonable argument concerning its territorial claims, this has always been ignored. However, the Yemeni reaction has always been to a great extent a reactive rather than a well thought-out and carefully considered one. Nevertheless, one should not ignore the sensitivity of the issue in Yemen.

Riyadh issued *The Saudi Green Book* in April 1934, two months prior to the conclusion of the Taif Treaty. The Saudis were keen to inform the world of their point of view concerning relations with Yemen, and the territorial issue that had led the two neighbouring countries into a short war that year. The Arabic and English version are from the Secretariat of the United Nations.
No. 1297

Saudi Arabia and Yemen

Treaty of Islamic friendship and Arab brotherhood (Treaty of Taif) between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (with appendices and attachment). Jeddah, 20 May 1934

Entry into force: 22 June 1934 by the exchange of instruments of ratification, in accordance with article 22

Authentic text: Arabic

Filing and recording with the Secretariat of the United Nations: Saudi Arabia, 9 October 2006

Arabie saoudite et Yémen

Traité d'amitiéislamique et de fraternité arab (Traité de Taif) entre le Royaume d'Arabie saoudite et le Royaume du Yémen (avec annexes et appendice). Djeddah, 20 mai 1934

Entrée en vigueur : 22 juin 1934 par échange des instruments de ratification, conformément à l'article 22

Texte authentique : arabe

Classement et inscription au répertoire auprès du Secrétariat des Nations Unies :

Arabie saoudite, 9 octobre 2006

Figure 3.3.1 Filing in the United Nations Secretariat (2006)
3.4. **Examples of pan-Arab sentiments during the Saudi-Yemeni territorial conflict**

3.4.1. **Translation of an extract from ‘Saut-al-Hijaz’ (2 January 1933)**

(FO 967/52, TNA, London).
Examples of pan-Arab sentiments during the Saudi-Yemeni territorial conflict

Figure 3.4.1.3.4.1 Translation of an extract from 'Saut-al-Hijaz' (2 January 1933)
3.4.2. Translation of an extract from *Umm-al-Qura* (17 February 1933)

This article was part of a series by this Ḫijāzī newspaper titled ‘On the Path of the Arab Unity-Negotiation with the Yemen’ (FO 967/52, TNA, London).
Figure 3.4.2.1 Translation of an extract from Umm-al-Qura (17 February 1933)
Figure 3.4.2.2 Translation of an extract from Umm-al-Qura (17 February 1933)
Examples of pan-Arab sentiments during the Saudi-Yemeni territorial conflict

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Figure 3.4.2.3 Translation of an extract from Umm-al-Qura (17 February 1933)
upon us by our Lord.

We have carefully read and deeply considered every word of your letter and understood its good purpose and object. The opinion it conveys and its comprehensive programme have pleased us. Your suggestion is the intended aim and the only desired end. We have more than once seen your representative, who pleased us by his comprehensiveness and his acquaintance with many facts.

The serious inclination shown in your kind, friendly letter has become known to us. No one who has a touch of sense or religious belief can deny that by co-operation and collaboration power is strengthened and the ambitions of enemies are weakened. We believe we have already pointed out to you that if those who have imitated the Europeans had not made easy the way for foreigners to conspire against Islam in such manner as they could have never thought of, Islam would have been amply strong and beyond reach. All your feelings which have been actuated by Islamic zeal are exactly the same as ours. We hope that you will believe this to be a fact on our part. Mischiefous deceivers have found us unyielding and ungovernable. We have paid no attention to their decorated trifles. Far be it from the truth that those defeated can be set by us with anything but detestation! Although when the late Sheikh Muhammad ibn Dileym and Sheikh Mādhī ibn Turki and their companions came to us, we found them turning somewhat away from us, yet we revealed to them some primary facts which were the basis of everything. We agree to the four points indicated by you and have added some necessary details."

His Highness has asked His Majesty the King to send authorised delegates who should be empowered with final particulars regarding the agreement. The time when this may be accomplished is probably very near.

Figure 3.4.2.4 Translation of an extract from Umm-al-Qura (17 February 1933)
3.5. Respect for Free Movement

This agreement was reached as part of the Taif Treaty, according to which it was agreed upon that the movements of nationals from either country for trade or Hajj (pilgrimage) would be respected. It was presented by the Saudis to Yemen’s representative as an additional condition prior to finally accepting the Taif Treaty. Although it has always been published as part of the Treaty (see FO 141/482, TNA, London), this agreement was surprisingly not annexed to the treaty submitted to the United Nations’ Secretariat for the filling and recording of the Taif Treaty. This was possibly because the filling with the United Nations Secretariat was made solely by Saudi Arabia on 9 October 2006.
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

من خالد بن عبد العزيزprimeminister من المملكة العربية السعودية وعميد وزارة الداخلية

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته، وبعد بمناسبة توقيع معااهدة الطائف بين مملكتنا وململكة البحرين، بعدها انشأنا عليه بشأن تنفيذ اتفاق أو اتخاذ أو إجراء أو غيرها من الاضرار والمعان، فارجو أن أدل جواكباً الدوام على ما انتقدنا عليه هذا الشأن. وتقوا بلقب قانق الاحترام.

(التوقيع) خالد بن عبد العزيز السعد

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

من عبد الله الوزير إلى مصاحب والملكي الأمير خالد الفيصل، والملكي عبد العزيز صاحب السلام والمملكة العربية السعودية وعميد وزارة الداخلية، ويعتبر ذلك كتاب تنفيذ اتفاق أو إجراء أو غيرها من الاضرار والمعان.

(التوقيع) عبد الله بن أحمد الوزير

Figure 3.5.1 Respect for Free Movement
Figure 3.5.2 Respect for Free Movement

(5) *Khalid-bin-Abdul Aziz to Sayyid Abdullah-at-Wazir, dated the 6th Safar, 1353.*

(After usual compliments.)

In connection with the signature of the Treaty of Taif between our kingdom and that of the Yemen, I hereby confirm our agreement regarding the movement of subjects of the Saudi Arab Kingdom and of the Kingdom of the Yemen in the two countries, namely, that movements at the present time shall continue as in the past until a special agreement is drawn up between the two Governments relative to the method which they jointly agree to adopt in regard to the regulations for such movements, whether for pilgrimage, or for trade, or for any other purpose or reason. I hope to receive your reply agreeing in this matter.

With highest respects,

KHALID-BIN-ABDUL AZIZ.

(6) *Abdullah-at-Wazir to His Royal Highness the Amir Khalid, dated the 6th Safar, 1353.*

(After usual compliments.)

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Highness’s letter, dated the 6th Safar, regarding the movement of the subjects of the two parties between the two countries, and I agree with your Highness that movements at present shall continue as in the past until a special agreement is drawn up relative to the regulations of such movements in the future, and that this will be regarded by our Government as it is by yours.

With highest respects,

ABDULLAH-BIN-AHMED-AL-WAZIR.
3.6. Convention on Arbitration (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

Figure 3.6.1 Convention on Arbitration (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
Figure 3.6.2. Convention on Arbitration (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
In the Name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

Arbitration Covenant

between

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen

Whereas Their Majesties King Abdulaziz, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and King Yahiya, King of Yemen, have agreed, in accordance with Article Eight of the treaty of peace, friendship and good understanding, known as the "Treaty of Taif", signed on the 6th of Safar 1353H, to refer to arbitration any dispute or disagreement which may arise out of the relations between them, their governments and countries, when all amicable negotiations fail to settle it, the Two Honorable Contracting Parties undertake to resort to arbitration in the manner shown in the following articles:

Article 1:

Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall undertake to accept referring the issue subject of dispute to arbitration within one month from the date of receipt of the request for arbitration from the other party.

Article 2:

Arbitration shall be undertaken by a panel composed of an equal number of arbitrators, half of whom shall be selected by each of the Two Parties, and an umpire to be selected by mutual agreement between the Two Honorable Contracting Parties. If they do not agree in this respect, each of them shall nominate a person, and if said person is accepted by the other party, he shall become the umpire. If an agreement cannot be reached in this regard, the umpire shall be decided by ballot, on the understanding that the ballot shall only be drawn on persons acceptable to both parties. The person chosen by ballot shall become the head of the arbitration panel, and shall become the umpire in the case. If, however, no agreement can be reached on the persons acceptable to both parties, negotiations shall continue thereafter until an agreement is reached in this regard.

Article 3:

The selection of the arbitration panel and its head shall be completed within one month from the end of the month fixed for the reply of the party whose acceptance of arbitration was requested by the other party. The arbitration panel shall convene at a venue to be agreed upon within a period not exceeding one month after the expiry of the two months provided for at the beginning of this Article. The arbitration panel shall render its award within a period which may not, in any case, exceed one month from the expiry of the period fixed for

Figure 3.6.3. Convention on Arbitration (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
the meeting, as set forth above. The award of the arbitration panel shall be rendered by majority vote, and shall be binding on both parties. It shall also become enforceable immediately upon issuance and notification thereof. Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties may appoint the person or persons it desires to defend its viewpoint before the arbitration panel and produce the necessary arguments and evidence.

Article 4:

Each Party shall pay for the charges of its respective arbitrators. The charges of the chief-arbitrator shall be paid in half by the Two Parties, and the same applies to the other costs of arbitration proceedings.

Article 5:

This Covenant shall be considered supplementary to the Treaty of Taif signed on this day, the 6th of Safar, 1353H, and shall remain in force during the effectiveness period of the said Treaty. This has been drafted in two copies in the Arabic language, one for each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties.

In witness thereof, it was signed on the sixth day of Safar, of the year thirteen hundred and fifty three.

Abdullah bin Ahmad Al Wazir

Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al Saud

Figure 3.6.4. Convention on Arbitration (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
3.7. The Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

The committee in Tihāmah (which reported in three stages) consisted of a Saudi team that included⁹: Abdulla Almohammed Bin Aqeel (Chairman), Muhammad Al-Suleiman Bin Turki, and Abdulla Kadhi; as well as a Yemeni team, comprising: Abdulla Bin Othman (Chairman), Muhammad Bin Kassim Najmuldeen and Muhammad Bin Dhaif Allah Bin Ghathyay⁹.

The Committee in the mountains consisted of a Saudi team composed of: Abdul Wahab Bin Muhammad Abu Milha (Chairman), Abdul Aziz Bin Abdul Rahman Althamiri, Ibrahim Zain Alabedeen, Duliam Abu La’atha, Husain Bin Mustafa and Talat Wafa; as well as a Yemeni team composed of: Muhammad Bin Hassan Alwadi’ee, Head of Saqeen (Chairman), Ismail Bin Hasan, Wali of Hamdan, Abdulla Bin Mana, Ruler of Sahar, and Abdulla Alghabiri. The text is available in the United Nations’ Secretariat.

Figure 3.7.1 The Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
The Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

Figure 3.7.2 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
تقرير الحدود بين المملكة العربية السعودية وبين المملكة الاماراتية (1)

في اليوم الخامس والعشرين من شهر شعبان 1364 ه م، اجتمعت في طهران، المملكة المتحدة، أعضاء الوكالات من قبل صاحب الجلالة الامام عبد العزيز السعد ملك المملكة العربية السعودية ومن قبل صاحب الجلالة الامام محمد عبد الله ملك المملكة الاماراتي، يعطيان بذلك الملكي المملكتين الاماراتيين أسماءشيء محايدة تسمى أسماء الحدود التي تم الاتفاق عليها.

وكان الاتفاق نتاج من أطراف البلدين المتجاورتين، فيما من جهة الشرق إلى آخر حدودها الغربية حيث يتعذر العمل في ذلك بنظر هيئة نهاية.

وبذلك فإن الاتفاق على أن يكون ركن أول اشارة في الحدود في مكة، جبل النار، بين والثيان وبيت يام.

وبناءً على ذلك، ينظر إلى الحدود على الاقتراض الزمر، بين والثيان، ويبعدها وبدعم المرور لوضع الأراضي فيها، يتأتى ذلك بناءً على السبب، وإذا تحلة اختلاف عليها في المستقبل، بين القبائل فيكون في هذه القاعدة يرجى حماية ماصعين على في مساحة الطائفة.

بما أنها كانت خارقاً عن سلسلة قوانين الامول وما كان شارعاً عنها جعلي بالم، وإذا عقدت المملكة المتحدة، عملاً جلسات دامت حتى تزوج هذه من أجل الخروج الموتى عنه، كما يجوز تفاؤل المبادرات، وتبادل تحقيق مصالح الراقب الذي يكون بجانب وميزة الربما، وما ينعش في سياسة الرسوم، وبدعم لدفن مصالح الربما، ويعود كهوك الذكر في هذه البداية مفصلة في، وقد دونت في عناصر المحصلة النتائج، وصفت من المملكة المتحدة، وأخذت كل هيئة رئيسية بها، وانتخبه المملكة رباً أمام من قبلها تجميعها لوضع علاقات من الحدود بين كل كامبريا، وآخر اشارة فيه، لبناء السلاطين في الوقت الذي يعتز به جميع الأدبيات، وعلى تميزها الإضاءة الإدارية، الذي يقوم بها، ويبعدها وبدعم المشاعر.

وقد أعلن كل قبيلة يانا سماها من المملكة جدد الحدود اسمباً، وفهماً xúcيل تشويش والبيان، ويعبر كل ذي حدود يقف منه، وينبع من تجاذب روابط، على تجارب إنساني أو خليج.

Figure 3.7.3 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
Figure 3.7.4 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
Figure 3.7.5: Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
The Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

Figure 3.7.6 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
The Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

Figure 3.7.7 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
Figure 3.7.8 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
Figure 3.7.9 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
### Figure 3.7.10 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

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<td>7. اسم مشابهين أرض القبوس</td>
<td>من الجدول إلى الشرق</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. اسم مشابهين أرض القبوس</td>
<td>من الجدول إلى الشرق</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. اسم مشابهين أرض القبوس</td>
<td>من الجدول إلى الشرق</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. اسم مشابهين أرض القبوس</td>
<td>من الجدول إلى الشرق</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```
The Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
### Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 5, 1995</td>
<td>Agreement on the end of the war and the establishment of the Transitional Authority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Figure 3.7.12 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Ali Abdullah al-Asad, Abdullah al-Sallal, and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Dr. Hisham al-Habib, Dr. Omar al-Sallal, and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Dr. Ali al-Atrash, Dr. Yasser al-Sallal, and others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes

1. The committees’ reports are annexed to the Taif Treaty.
2. The committee members represent various sectors of society, including political, social, and economic areas.

---

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The Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ملاحظات</th>
<th>الحكومة البلدية</th>
<th>الحكومة البلدية</th>
<th>الحكومة البلدية</th>
<th>الحكومة البلدية</th>
<th>الحكومة البلدية</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>مواقع</td>
<td>من الجنوب إلى الشمال</td>
<td>من الجنوب إلى الشمال</td>
<td>من الجنوب إلى الشمال</td>
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<td>الحرم الحرام</td>
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<td>الحرم الحرام</td>
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<td>من الشرق إلى الغرب</td>
<td>من الشرق إلى الغرب</td>
<td>من الشرق إلى الغرب</td>
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<tr>
<td>الحرم الحرام</td>
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<td>من الغرب إلى الشرق</td>
<td>من الغرب إلى الشرق</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.7.13 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
The Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

### Figure 3.7.14 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
The Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

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Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

Figure 3.7.15 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
### Figure 3.7.16 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)</th>
<th>Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table Description**

The table above details various committees' reports annexed to the Taif Treaty, highlighting their contributions to the political landscape of Saudi Arabia. Each entry in the table corresponds to specific regions and points of interest important in the context of the treaty's implementation. The table's columns likely include geographical locations and their corresponding data points relevant to the committees' focus areas.
Table 3.7.17 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>بناية</th>
<th>المكان الموشوع فيه</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>جنوب</td>
<td>بني حريص</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>جنوب</td>
<td>بني حريص</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>غرب</td>
<td>بني حريص</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>غرب</td>
<td>بني حريص</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>شرق</td>
<td>بني حريص</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>شرق</td>
<td>بني حريص</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>وادي</td>
<td>المضيق</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>وادي</td>
<td>المضيق</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table outlines the committees' reports annexed to the Taif Treaty.
The Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
Figure 3.7.19 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
الملحق (3)

الوسيلة الطرف المناقضة بين المملكة العربية السعودية والمالكية الإيطالية

نظراً لأنه تحقق النزاع فيما عمله المراجعة، بوضعهم المدة المادية عشر رأس عقية موثقة وحيث أن عقية
نوعية تابعة للملكة الإيطالية المركزي بها، في الشرف، للملكة الثمانية من مماثلة الطائف، فلم ينافى الذي يكون
اعتبار، فاصلاً بين المالكين، وذلك اللحل يوضع تحت عقية موثقة ولاجل إزالة النزاع والتصحيح بموجب
نص المعاهدة حسب هذا. و (كما في) معهد لكون نسماً بحري تجاري، للملكة الإيطالية والمالكية
لمهرمة أحسن ذلك

Figure 3.7.20 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
The Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

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In the Name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

Border Reports between
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen

(1)

On the twenty-fifth day of the month of Sha'aban 1354H, the two undersigned committees delegated by His Majesty Imam Abdulaziz Al Saud, the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and by His Majesty Imam Yahya Hamiduddin, the King of the Kingdom of Yemen, convened in Dhahran in order to determine the border line between the two Kingdoms referred to above, in compliance with the provision of Article (4) of the Treaty of Taif.

The starting point was from the outskirts of the two neighboring countries from the east to the last border on the west - where the Tihāmah Committee work ends.

Accordingly, it was agreed to put the first border marker on the peak of Jabal Alh Tha'ib between Wa'ilah and Yām. As to the wasteland called (Gafar Silah) and its vicinities to the east, and because of the dispute over it between Wa'ilah and Yām and as there was no need to put markers thereon, we decided to leave it as it used to be. If a dispute between the two tribes arises over it in the future, it shall be settled in accordance with the principles of Shari'ah as provided for in the Treaty of Taif.

As to the area outside Silah to the south, it shall belong to Wa'ilah and those related to them; the area outside Silah to the north shall belong to Yām.

To prepare this Report for the said purpose, the two mentioned committees held several sessions, in the presence of the chiefs of the neighboring tribes. Upon the investigation and approval of the chiefs of the said tribes, without force or coercion, the border was designated and identified by the names of mountains, hills and valleys known by their names which were not subject to change or modification. These names will be mentioned in detail hereinafter. They were also recorded in minutes of different dates and ratified by the two said committees, of which each committee obtained a copy. The two committees delegated persons of integrity from both sides to put stone marks along the border line at each kilometer as a preliminary step towards building the posts at a time agreed upon by their Majesties the two Kings and the appointment of the persons to carry out such task and the related expenses.

Each tribe was given a statement approved by the two committees showing its border with the opposite tribe in order to eliminate any disagreement and prevent any confusion and ambiguity so that every one becomes aware of the limits of his border, complies with it and does not trespass on his neighbor by grazing or otherwise. Any one who trespasses shall be subject to a deterring punishment by his government.

The border from east to west is as follows:
### Figure 3.7.22 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Key Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jabal Ath Thar</td>
<td>The Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Jabal Al Ayyash</td>
<td>Overlooking the plain extending to Hisū Khujaymī, provided that Yām people have access to the water existing in Hisū Khujaymī as usual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ra’s Markūz ‘Anabān</td>
<td>What flows to the south is for Wā’ilah, to the north for Wādí‘ah, and to the east for Yām.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dhīrā‘ Ash Shi’rā‘ah</td>
<td>Here ends the border between Wā’ilah and Yām.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Qis‘ ‘Uthayyith</td>
<td>The two boundaries are between Wā’ilah and Wādí‘ah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ra’s Al Ablā‘</td>
<td>These two boundaries are between Banī Ḥishayfah and Banī Jam‘ah and between Wādí‘ah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ra’s Al Kawkab</td>
<td>As for as Šukhayrah, it shall remain as it used to be: what is a private property of Ibn Khayr shall belong to him. The rest shall remain with Ibn Khayr and his successors, as it used to be in the past, and he shall pay one seventh of the yield to Šā‘lem Bin Dāmānī and his successors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ra’s Aṣ Sabr</td>
<td>These two boundaries are between Sīḥār Ash Shīm and Wādí‘ah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Al Fakhdhany</td>
<td>Ash Shi’bah Darwiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ra’s ‘Arabah (Sahbāh)</td>
<td>These boundaries are between Sīḥār Ash Shīm and Wādí‘ah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>K’s ‘Ajabat Nuhquiqah</td>
<td>Jabal Wa’a’wa’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>‘Ashāhrah</td>
<td>Ash Shi’bah Darwiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Far’ Madarr</td>
<td>Jabal Farād ar Rikākh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Jabal Thāfhīrah</td>
<td>Jabal ‘Ajīāl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Far’ Ad Daghmat’</td>
<td>Jabal Farād As’ar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Maqbarat Al Thīl‘ah</td>
<td>Jabal Farād Al Mahdath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Maqāshī</td>
<td>Jabal ‘Ablā‘</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Rahvat Darāk</td>
<td>Jabal Al Itim</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Jabal Murshishahah</td>
<td>Ra’s Jabal Ma’dīj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Qarar Farad</td>
<td>Ra’s Al Hjnakah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Shahat (Shibk) Al Ghumayrah</td>
<td>Jabal Al ‘Ar</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Safāf</td>
<td>Jabal Al Hāmād</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hālwaqat Al Hjmad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>Al Jāhilayyah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>ُAl Muzayyir'ah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 38   |Sha'ab Al Qawm                                                                                                                                         | What flows west is for ʿAl Naṣr of Sihār Ash Shām and what flows east and north is for Wādī'ah.  
| 39   |Ra's Jabal 'Alb                                                                                                                                           | (i. e. Ra's bin Ma'll) provided that Al Mahjū, Sanhān and Al Naṣr continue to have right to their properties in the village of Ar Rahwa as they are now and have been. |
| 40   |Ash Sha'īnah                                                                                                                                           | What is to the north is for ʿAl Mahd of Wādī'ah and what is to the south is for ʿAl Naṣr of Sihār Ash Shām.  
| 41   |Ma'da' Al Ḥanakah                                                                                                                                                   | What flows south is for ʿAl Naṣr and the other sides are for ʿAl Mahd of Wādī'ah. Here ends the boundary between Sihār Ash Shām and Wādī'ah.  
| 42   |Aṣ Ǧabrāb                                                                                                                                                        | The southern side is for ʿAl Naṣr of Sihār Ash Shām and the other sides are for Sanhān of Qaḥran.  
| 43   |Talid (Nayd) Al Ku'l                                                                                                                                       | It is the boundary between ʿAl Saṭṭ of Sanhān and Ban Jama'ah. | 44 | Jabal ʿAl Mahd (ʿAl Mitqāq)                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 45   |Wādī ʿAr Rabiqjah ft ʿAl Masna                                                                                                                                     | Thereafter starts the dividing boundary between ʿAl Talid and Ban Jama'ah and it extends from the east to the south-west. |
| 46   |Khāsham Al ʿUqlah ft ʿAl Kharq                                                                                                                                                                                                 |

Figure 3.7.23 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
The Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Jabal As Sulaim</td>
<td>to Ahi Ḥanbah. Each tribe was given a document showing its territory on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the side of the other tribe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Harf Arwahaynah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Nayd Al Makhaṣ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Nayd Al Fasih</td>
<td>What is to the north of it belongs to Āl Yahiṣḥ of Bani Mālik, and what is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to the south belongs to Ahi Jāḥīḥ of Bani Khawli.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Qulā’at Umm Siḥām</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Jabal Al Mīṣār</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Saqīyat Umm Amuqūshayt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Wādī Umm Shurayfah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Naqīḍ At Ta‘fīḥ</td>
<td>What is to the west and north belongs to Āl Zaydān and what is to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>south and east belongs to Bani Khawli. As for Āl Sibīlāh, their houses,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>properties and other possessions in Jabal Shahādān shall remain theirs as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>usual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Nayd Khurūmah</td>
<td>What is to the west and north of it belongs to Āl Zaydān from Āl Yahiṣḥ of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Iyūyd Ar Raddāh</td>
<td>Bani Mālik and what is to the south and east belongs to Ahi Jāḥīḥ of Bani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Bī‘r Ash Sharḥ</td>
<td>Khawli.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Nayd Surmah</td>
<td>What is to the east and south belongs to Āl ‘Ayyāsh and what is to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Nayd Al Wāṣar</td>
<td>north and west belongs to Āl Sa‘īd of Bani Mālik. Āl Sa‘īd shall also</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nayd Al Farw (Al Charw)</td>
<td>continue to have access to Jārā‘ah water located in Nayd Al Farw (Al</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nayd Ath Thaw</td>
<td>Charw) as usual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Majnāb Al Baḥīb</td>
<td>What is to the east and south belongs to Āl ‘Ayyāsh and what is in the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Al Ḥaylur</td>
<td>north and west belongs to Āl Khālid and Āl ‘Azzāz of Bani Mālik.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Wādī Al Khīry</td>
<td>What is to the east and south belongs to Āl Al Iḥābah and Āl Umm Dūshāh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Qarn Makhlūṣ</td>
<td>and what is to the north and west belongs to Āl Khālid and Āl ‘Azzāz of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>Nayd Shawkān</td>
<td>Bani Mālik.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Chabbās</td>
<td>What is south and veers towards the west belongs to Bani Umm Shaykh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>Al Khāq</td>
<td>and what is north and west belongs to Āl Khālid and Āl ‘Azzāz of Bani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Tabrī Umm Thamlīḥ</td>
<td>Mālik.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Jawa‘ Al Waṣīfah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The boundaries between Bani Mālik and Bani Ḥamūrah and Bani Manbah end at this point.

This is the end of the border which the two undersigned committees have determined. All territories located on the northern side of the border line shall belong to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and all territories located on the southern side of the border line shall belong to the Kingdom of Yemen, with the exception of some border points – veering towards the east or the west according to the direction of the border line, as shown in details parallel to each border.

In evidence to the above, this resolution has been issued and signed by the two committees, and has been drawn up in two copies in the Noble Arabic language, each committee being in possession of one copy.

Written in the city of Dhahran on the twenty-first of the month of Shawwāl, the year one thousand three hundred fifty four (21 Shawwāl 1354H).

Figure 3.7.24 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
The Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

The two committees for designation of the border between
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen

The committee representing
the Kingdom of Yemen

Chairman: Muhammad Bin Hasan Al Wadi‘i – Natherat Sāqain
Member: Ismael Bin Hasan – Governor of Hamadan
Member: Abdullah Al Ghubayri
Member: Abdullah Bin Manna‘ – Chief of Sihar

The committee representing
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Chairman: Abdulwahhab Muhammad Abu Meihah
Member: Ibrahim Zein Zainulabdin
Member: Abdalaziz Bin Abdurrahman Al Thumairi
Member: Olama Abu La‘ithah
Member: Husein Bin Mustafa
Member: Tal‘at Wafā

Figure 3.7.25 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
### Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

**Figure 3.7.26 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of Location</th>
<th>Starting Direction</th>
<th>Ending Direction</th>
<th>Names of Tribes belonging to the Government of Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Names of Tribes belonging to Al Mutawakilite Government</th>
<th>Distance in meter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Raqif al Bahar Tamām al Ra's al Mu'awajj Shāmi Li Manfadh Radif Qirād</td>
<td></td>
<td>East</td>
<td>Al 'Urāqī Bani Marwān</td>
<td>Zayla' Bani Marwān</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Taraf ar Rasb ash Shāmi Mi nash Shūrā</td>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Faya Al 'Alam Nimrah 2 Massafat Alf Mitr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Faya Al 'Alam Nimrah 2 Mu'tassil Bi ar Rasb al Oibah Massafat 300 Mitr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mayman Wajāli fi Qādīdat ad Dānpūr</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>South</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mu'tassil Yamanān Nabw ash Shāq Mu'awajj Taraf Shajariat ar Radif</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Maudī Qabil Kafal al Hīfiyah Min al Jihāh al Churfiyyah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mawjūd Shāhī 'An Radif al Qirād</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mawjūd Farq Radif al Qirād</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mawjūd Fi al Naqṣūlāt (at Tafarīđ) Nabw Alf Mitr</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>Al 'Urāqī Bani Marwān</td>
<td>Zayla' Bani Marwān</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Mawjūd Fi al Naqṣūlāt (at Tafarīđ)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Mawjūd Fi al Naqṣūlāt (at Tafarīđ) Muqābil Līf fasālah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Mawjūd Fi Qāzī Mumtad Min al Fasālah Massafat Alf Mitr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Mawjūd Fi Qāzī Mumtad Min al Fasālah Massafat Alf Mitr</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mawjūd Fi Balāsim Mumtad Min al Fasālah Massafat Alf Mitr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Mawjūd Fi Balāsim Mumtad Min al Fasālah Massafat Alf Mitr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Mawjūd Fi Sha'āb um Dhiyābah Massafat Alf Mitr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Mawjūd Fi Sha'āb um Dhiyābah Massafat Alf Mitr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Mawjūd Fi Mashā'ān (Mithān) Massafat Alf Mitr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Figure 3.7.27 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Advocate</th>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Mawdū ʿāl Māshān (Māshān) Ḥadd al Qaṣṣūs</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Al Qaṣṣūs Banī Marwān</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Mawdū ʿāl Māshān (Māshān) Ḥadd al Qaṣṣūs</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>Banī Zayā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Mawdū ʿāl Māshān (Māshān) Ḥadd al Qaṣṣūs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Imām ʿAmīr al-Ṣāḥib (Imām ʿAmīr al-Ṣāḥib) Wa Thamma Yanḥari Qibla Bayn Zayā</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Imām ʿAmīr al-Ṣāḥib (Imām ʿAmīr al-Ṣāḥib) Ard al Ṭayyūs</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>Al Ṭayyūs Banī Marwān</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Imām ʿAmīr al-Ṣāḥib (Imām ʿAmīr al-Ṣāḥib) Ard al Ṭayyūs</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Al Ṭayyūs Banī Marwān</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Wāqiʿ ʿĀlā Khażān Ḥajj Sharqu</td>
<td>Al Ṭayyūs</td>
<td>Al Mughfāl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Wāqiʿ ʿĀlā Khażān Ḥajj Sharqu</td>
<td>Al Ṭayyūs</td>
<td>Al Mughfāl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Wāqiʿ ʿĀlā Khażān Ḥajj Sharqu</td>
<td>Al Ṭayyūs</td>
<td>Al Mughfāl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Wāqiʿ ʿĀlā Khażān Ḥajj Sharqu</td>
<td>Al Ṭayyūs</td>
<td>Al Mughfāl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Wāqiʿ ʿĀlā Khażān Ḥajj Sharqu</td>
<td>Al Ṭayyūs</td>
<td>Al Mughfāl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Wāqiʿ ʿĀlā Khażān Ḥajj Sharqu</td>
<td>Al Ṭayyūs</td>
<td>Al Mughfāl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Wāqiʿ ʿĀlā Khażān Ḥajj Sharqu</td>
<td>Al Ṭayyūs</td>
<td>Al Mughfāl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Wāqiʿ ʿĀlā Khażān Ḥajj Sharqu</td>
<td>Al Ṭayyūs</td>
<td>Al Mughfāl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Wāqiʿ ʿĀlā Khażān Ḥajj Sharqu</td>
<td>Al Ṭayyūs</td>
<td>Al Mughfāl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Wāqiʿ ʿĀlā Khażān Ḥajj Sharqu</td>
<td>Al Ṭayyūs</td>
<td>Al Mughfāl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Wāqiʿ ʿĀlā Khażān Ḥajj Sharqu</td>
<td>Al Ṭayyūs</td>
<td>Al Mughfāl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Wāqiʿ ʿĀlā Khażān Ḥajj Sharqu</td>
<td>Al Ṭayyūs</td>
<td>Al Mughfāl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Wāqiʿ ʿĀlā Khażān Ḥajj Sharqu</td>
<td>Al Ṭayyūs</td>
<td>Al Mughfāl</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Figure 3.7.28 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Wāqi‘ī Fīlmā Bayn ‘Adīyyat Al Khawbih al Yumān Nāwfi al Qibālih</td>
<td>West, East</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Wāqi‘ī Fīlmā Bayn Yamānī Saddād Ad Da’akaysa (Ad Daqīqiyah)</td>
<td>West, East</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Wāqi‘ī Fīlmā Bayn Khaṣīf al Aḥwaṣiyah</td>
<td>West, East</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Wāqi‘ī Fīlmā Bayn Sirābat al Maḥrālal Bayn al Jīdurāh Wā Bani Masayd Wā al Ḫariṣ al Kamāl Ḫuṣayn</td>
<td>West, East</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Wāqi‘ī Fīlmā Bayn Ta’rīq Jāblān ilā Ḫarād al Māṣṣāfah 160 Mīr</td>
<td>West, East</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Wāqī‘ī Fī al Sirābat al Iṣlāl ‘Ālā Ta’rīq Jāblān ilā Ḫarād</td>
<td>West, East</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Wāqī‘ī Fī Maṣṣāṣ ash Shu‘ūb</td>
<td>West, East</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Wāqī‘ī Fī Maṣṣāṣ ash Shu‘ūb</td>
<td>West, East</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Wāqī‘ī Fī al Maḥfūr Ta’rīq Wālān ilā Ḫarād</td>
<td>West, East</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Wāqī‘ī Fī Abī ‘Uḥdī Yumānīn Min Bādrih</td>
<td>West, East</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Mi‘māl Bū Ḫaṣīf</td>
<td>West, East</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Khulaṣat al-Mamshāh</td>
<td>West, East</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Dandīfah as-Ṣaghīrah</td>
<td>West, East</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Shāmi‘ī ad Dandīfah al-Kabīrah</td>
<td>West, East</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Qa‘at Jahlād ad-Dawḥiyah</td>
<td>South, North</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Shāma‘ī adh Dīhrā‘ Bi A‘Tā Ta‘ṣhir Wā minnu Māṣṣalāh Limmār al ilā Bimāh 5000 Mīr</td>
<td>South, North</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Marbūḥ al Ma‘ā’īn Nāwfi ash Sharq Māṣṣalāt 360 Mīr Aṣfāl al Jabal Fawq al Wā’il</td>
<td>West, East</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Mawdū‘ī Fī Khulaṣat al Muṣṭāb</td>
<td>South, North</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Mawdū‘ī Fī Qīlṣat al Ḥaṣṣāfīn</td>
<td>South, North</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Ḳūṣ al-Ḥaṣṣafīn and Umm al-Ẓabīr</td>
<td>South, North</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Sharq al Muṣṭāb al Aṣfāl al Jabal Ilā Manṣūd, ( Manṣūd) Ḥaṣṣafī Bīlā‘ Al Maṣṣāfah</td>
<td>West, East</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>‘Ashshat as-Sayṣid</td>
<td>West, East</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Al Hakimiyah</th>
<th>Hishab Jibal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Jabal Aziziyadi (Azizhadi)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Mawdah 'Ra's al Ta'as Min al Jibal ash Shadiyah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>'Iljim Shariq Qaryat Bani al Jarrab wa Mazari'ilim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Al 'Ashshah Finta Bayn Wadi Dhibba Wa wadi al Qamiri</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Asfal 'Asshat as Siray Shum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Dimmat as Sayid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Al Mulj Shomal al Mighyalah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whereas the list detailed in these tables, which are composed of three pages from No. (1) to No. (68), is a representation of the markers placed on the border between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Mutawakilite Kingdom, from the sea coast to al Mighyalah, which is the last border of Bani Marwan, and whereas these markers for the mentioned border are placed by mutual agreement between the two Governments' delegated committees and whose names are stated in this report, after thorough inspection by experienced tribal chiefs subjects of the two Governments; accordingly, all that is north and west of the mentioned border markers belongs to the Saudi Arabian Government. All that is south and east of the mentioned border markers belongs to the Mutawakilite Government.

These documents have been executed in two copies, one copy for each Government. Both copies have been cross-examined, one against the other, and found to be accurate. Hence, this decision has been adopted and signed.

Ramadhan, 1354AH

#### The Mutawakilite Committee
- **Member:** Muhammad bin Qasim Najauddin
- **Member:** Abdullah Mustafa
- **Chairman:** Abdullah bin 'Othman

#### The Saudi Arabian Committee
- **Member:** Muhammad Al Suleiman bin Turki
- **Member:** Abdullah Ghudhi
- **Chairman:** Abdullah Al Muhammad bin Ageel

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**Figure 3.7.29 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)**
### Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name of Location</th>
<th>Starting Direction</th>
<th>Ending Direction</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Names of Tribes of the Arabian Government</th>
<th>Names of Tribes of the Mutawakelite Government</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Asfal Mi' (Minbar) 'Aliyy</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Al Hurrath al Hazähliz</td>
<td>Banl Marwân</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Um Libdah</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Al Hurrath al Hazähliz</td>
<td>Banl Marwân</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Juhr al 'Abd</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Al Hurrath al Hazähliz</td>
<td>Banl Marwân</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mafjar Jaddi 'Umm Mirmijjâ</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Al Hurrath al Hazähliz</td>
<td>Banl Marwân</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Al Majlah</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Al Hurrath al Hazähliz</td>
<td>Banl Marwân</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Dâbir Madah Ma'llâ</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Al Hurrath al Hazähliz</td>
<td>Banl Marwân</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Khalifat Mabram Sa'ibâyâ</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Al Hurrath al Hazähliz</td>
<td>Banl Marwân</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mafjar Amhadaaj</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Al Hurrath al Hazähliz</td>
<td>Banl Marwân</td>
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**Figure 3.7.30 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)**
### Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

#### Figure 3.7.31

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**Legend:**

- Opposite to Yahyâ Maftâh Land
- End of Al Hajjah
- The Line veers to the west to the road going west of the Land of Zumar and then returns to the north.
### Figure 3.7.32 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>Ghariib Madba</td>
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<td>Ghariib umm Sawayid (amm Sawaid)</td>
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As the markers listed in those tables from No. (1) to No. (64), according to the data, and which begin from al Mighyabah to as Súdah, represent the dividing border between AI Hurrah who are the subjects of His Majesty King Abdulaziz bin Saud, and AI Hurrah, Bani Dihíl and Bani Saylá who are the subjects of His Majesty Imam Yahya, and all that is west and north of the borderline belongs to the Government of His Majesty King Abdulaziz and what is east and south belongs to the Government of Imam Yahya. As for the villages viewed to be facing one another and their farms interlaced and divided by the border line—namely Al Maqboz and Al Maláh in the first place and then between Mabrukáh, Al Magham and Mujadálah in the second place—these farms shall belong to their respective villages and the zakats of each shall be paid to the government to which each village belongs. This applies to the farm of Ibn Gháshi in the village of Al Maín which has been included as part of the territories of ‘Alíd Jindah village which belongs to King Abdulaziz; so, the zakát of such lands shall follow the zakát of Al Maín. Since these markers were posted according to the judgment of the two committees as well as people of integrity and thus became the dividing border between the two Kingdoms, under the supervision of all concerned parties and after taking all care to become fully aware of the border and after all have become aware of the answer of the tribes’ chiefs of the two Governments. Accordingly, this resolution was taken and dependence is on God.

27 Shawwáli 1354 H.

The Yemeni Mutawakkil Committee
Member: Muhammad Dayfullah bin Gathaysh
Member: Muhammad bin Qásim Najmuddín
Chairman: Abdullah bin ‘Othmán

The Saudi Arabian Committee
Member: Muhammad Al Suleimán bin Turki
Member: Abdullah Gháshi
Chairman: Abdullah bin ‘Aqeel
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Figure 3.7.34 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

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### Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

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<td>W-E-N</td>
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<td>Åsat ‘Ittaf</td>
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*Figure 3.7.35 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)*
The Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
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<td>Nayd Sarirah</td>
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<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Mafad al Haydar</td>
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<td>Ra'is al Diqayiqah</td>
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<td>Al Jabbarah</td>
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<td>71</td>
<td>Khatwat al Quillah</td>
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</tr>
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<td>72</td>
<td>Jiwar al Wadaf</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The above described boundaries have been defined and demarcated between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni Mutawakelite Kingdom among the tribes’ boundaries described above from No. (51) to No. (72), commencing from the beginning Al 'Abdil tribe of the Arabian Government, and Al Waqish tribe of the Mutawakelite Government, extending towards Al 'Abdilii and their adjacent tribes of Qays and Bani Haris along

Figure 3.7.36 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
The Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

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with their adjacent tribes of Al Mushaykh, Al Zuhuri and Al ′Itaif. This was done by the tribal chiefs of the two Governments and people trusted by all parties, under the supervision of the border committees. What is to the west and north belongs to Saudi Arabian Government and what is to the south and east belongs to the Mutawakelites government. As for Al′Itaif of the Mutawakelites Government and Al′Itaif of Ahmad bin Shawqah who are subjects of the Arabian government, and since their lands overlap, the demarcation of the boundaries led to some of the subjects of the Arabian Government to fall within the territories of Mutawakelites Government while they are subjects of the Arabian government. They are: Ahmad bin Shawqah, Yahya bin Shawqah, Yahya bin Ahmad bin Shawqah, Salim Shaiya′a, Jabir Jobran, Jobran Shaiya′a, and also some of the subjects of Mutawakelites Government fell within the territories of the Arabian Kingdom while they are subjects of the Mutawakelites government. They are: Awa′d bin Hassan, Jobran A′lad and Sulaiman A′lad. All of them, along with their farms and zakats shall belong to their respective government. Besides, the lands of Al′Muhammad tribe are also overlapping and the border is defined between them, and accordingly all that is within the territories of the Arabian Kingdom belongs to them and all that is within the territories of Mutawakelites Kingdom is theirs. Each one of them, along with his farms and the zakats, shall belong to his government, except for Hassan bin Ahmad who is within the territories of the Arabian Kingdom but belongs to the Mutawakelites government, along with his farms.

After careful consideration and cross-examination, this resolution was adopted with the agreement of the committees, and may God guide the steps of all.

On 21 Dhu al-Qa′dah 1354H.

The Yemeni Mutawakelites Committee

Member: Muhammad Dasyullah bin Gathayah
Member: Muhammad bin Qasim Najmuddin
Chairman: Abdullah bin ′Othman

The Saudi Arabian Committee

Member: Muhammad Al Sulaiman bin Turki
Member: Abdullah Ghadhi
Chairman: Abdullah bin ′Aqeel

Upon perusal and careful consideration of the abovementioned Reports, we ratified, accepted and approved them, together and separately with respect to each article and paragraph of them. Likewise, we ratify, conclude, undertake and give a royal truthful promise that we will carry out with the help of God all that is mentioned in them with complete honesty and truthfulness, and will not permit – with God′s will- any breach of them in any way, as long as we are capable of doing so. For additional confirmation of the correctness of all that
is mentioned therein, we ordered our stamp to be put on this document and signed it by our hand, and God is the best of witnesses.

On Friday the 3rd of Ramadhan of the year one thousand three hundred fifty six of Hijra (1356H).

The dependent on God, Amirulmu'mineen Yahya, the son of Amirulmu'mineen Muhammad Yahya, may the grace of God be upon them. Amen.
In the Name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

Appendix
(2)
to the Treaty of Taif
between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
and the Kingdom of Yemen

As it is established that a mistake was committed by the two committees in designating the top of 'Aqabat Nahiyah as the Eleventh Landmark, and since 'Aqabat Nahiyah belongs to the Mutawakelite Kingdom of Yemen in accordance with the provision of Article (4) of the Treaty of Taif. Hence, the landmark separating the two Kingdoms shall be placed below 'Aqabat Nahiyah. In order to correct the mistake in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, we have drafted this (Appendix) on Friday the second of the holy month of Ramadhan in the year one thousand three hundred fifty six.

Amirulmu'mineen Yahya the son of Amirulmu'mineen Muhammad Yahya, may the grace of God be upon them. Amen.

Figure 3.7.39 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
In the Name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

Arbitration Covenant

between

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen

Whereas Their Majesties King Abdulaziz, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and King Yahya, King of Yemen, have agreed, in accordance with Article Eight of the treaty of peace, friendship and good understanding, known as the "Treaty of Taif", signed on the 6th of Safar 1353H, to refer to arbitration any dispute or disagreement which may arise out of the relations between them, their governments and countries, when all amicable negotiations fail to settle it, the Two Honorable Contracting Parties undertake to resort to arbitration in the manner shown in the following articles:

Article 1:

Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall undertake to accept referring the issue subject of dispute to arbitration within one month from the date of receipt of the request for arbitration from the other party.

Article 2:

Arbitration shall be undertaken by a panel composed of an equal number of arbitrators, half of whom shall be selected by each of the Two Parties, and an umpire to be selected by mutual agreement between the Two Honorable Contracting Parties. If they do not agree in this respect, each of them shall nominate a person, and if said person is accepted by the other party, he shall become the umpire. If an agreement cannot be reached in this regard, the umpire shall be decided by ballot, on the understanding that the ballot shall only be drawn on persons acceptable to both parties. The person chosen by ballot shall become the head of the arbitration panel, and shall become the umpire in the case. If, however, no agreement can be reached on the persons acceptable to both parties, negotiations shall continue thereafter until an agreement is reached in this regard.

Article 3:

The selection of the arbitration panel and its head shall be completed within one month from the end of the month fixed for the reply of the party whose acceptance of arbitration was requested by the other party. The arbitration panel shall convene at a venue to be agreed upon within a period not exceeding one month after the expiry of the two months provided for at the beginning of this Article. The arbitration panel shall render its award within a period which may not, in any case, exceed one month from the expiry of the period fixed for

Figure 3.7.40 Committees’ Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)
3.8. Renewal of the Taif Treaty in 1953

3.8.1. Communiqué announcing the renewal

M. B. Jacomb, British Minister (Ta'izz) to Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 25 March 1953 (FO 371/104532, TNA, London).
Sir,

I have the honour to state that on the 16th of March the Mecca broadcasting station announced that the Yemeni Saudi Arabian treaty of friendship, which was signed in Taif on 6th Safar 1353 (A.H.), has been renewed for a further period of twenty years. The treaty was originally made to last a period of twenty lunar years and article 22 of it provided for renewal or modification during the six months preceding its expiry. The time of its renewal falls within this six months period.

2. As far as I know the treaty has not been modified in any way. Its renewal was negotiated by direct correspondence between the Kings of the Yemen and Saudi Arabia and the Yemen Ministry of Foreign Affairs played no part in the exchanges.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to H.H. Ambassador in Jeddah.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed)

Figure 3.8.1.1 Communiqué announcing the renewal
Figure 3.8.1.2 Communiqué announcing the renewal
3.8.2. Communiqué published in Yemen

In Sana'a newspaper, the only Yemeni official newspaper at the time, 31 March 1953.

Figure 3.8.2.1 Communiqué published in Yemen
3.8.3. Communiqué of the renewal, published in Saudi Arabia

In *Al-Bīlād as Suʿudiyah*, on 19 March 1953 and *Umm-al-Qura* on 20 March 1953 (G. C. Pelham, British, British Ambassador, Jeddah to Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1 April 1953) (FO 371/104532, TNA, London).
Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a full translation of official

communique No. 164 issued by the Saudi Arabian Government to announce the

extension of the Treaty of Taif for a further period of twenty years. The

communique is unverified but first appeared in the newspaper "Al Bilad Al

Saudiyah" on the 19th March and was repeated the next day in the official

newspaper, "Al al Quasr".

2. The Treaty of Taif was signed at Taif on the 20th May, 1934, after a

swift campaign of a few weeks during which the Saudi forces totally over-
named the forces of the Yemen. The subsequent peace treaty imposed by the

 Saudis was remarkably moderate and brought to them only a comparatively small

section of territory. It seems, however, that it has proved satisfactory to

both parties though the Yemenis, I believe, grumble about it from time

to time. Apart from defining the boundaries the Treaty contains a number of

practical provisions which are of equal advantage to both. It is

interesting to note that Articles 9 and 10 (the Treaty is printed in

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs, Part XXX, pp. 30-45)
in some ways foreshadow the recent proposal in the Arab League for a

convention on extradition. The customs agreement referred to in Article

15 of the Treaty has never been concluded. Though the recent official

communique does not specify so, it is, I think, clear that mention of the

period of twenty years for which it is now agreed to extend the Treaty

refers to lunar years.

3. At this time when the Saudi Arabian Government seems somewhat in its

refusal to accept arbitration in its frontier dispute with the Sheikdoms

of the Trucial Coast and with the Sultan of Muscat, undoubtedly the most

interesting...

The Right Honourable Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.

Etc., Etc., Etc.,

Foreign Office,

LONDON, S.W.1.

Figure 3.8.3.1 Communiqué published in Yemen
interesting aspect of the Treaty of Taif is Article 8 which together with its appendix provides in detail for a resort to arbitration in any dispute which may arise between the two parties, whether resulting from the Treaty or from any other cause. In our propaganda at least, or perhaps at the United Nations Organisation should the case come before the Security Council, it might be a telling point to enquire why the Saudi Arabian Government accepts arbitration with one neighbour but not with another. It is not a point which would in my opinion make much impression upon the Saudis themselves.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to Washington, the United Kingdom Delegation at New York, B.M.E.C. at Payid, Taiz, and to the Governor of Aden.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

[Signature]

(C. C. PEMHAM)
Enclosure to Jeddah despatch No. 46 of 1st April, 1953.

Extract from "Al Bilad as Saudiyah" of 19th March.

OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE NO. 164.

In view of the strong ties of friendship and mutual confidence which exist between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Mutawakilah Government of the Yemen and considering that the validity of the Treaty of Taif concluded on the 1st Rabi’al Awwal 1353 will terminate soon, the two Kings, King Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Faisal Al Saud of Saudi Arabia and King Ahmed bin Yahya Hamid Al Din, King of the Mutawakilah Kingdom of the Yemen, have agreed to extend the Treaty referred to for a further twenty years commencing from the termination of the period of the aforesaid Treaty.

The two countries welcome with all pleasure this act reaffirming the friendship between them.

---oOo---

Figure 3.8.3.3 Communique published in Yemen

3.9.1. The Arabic text of the Communiqué

الملاحق
ملحق (٧)
بيان مشترك

انطلاقًا من إيمان الشعوبين العربين المسلمين في الجمهورية العربية اليمنية والمملكة العربية السعودية وتمسكهما الراسخ بالعئيدة الإسلامية العصامية وحرصهما على تقاليدهما العربية الأصيلة وتطلعهما إلى مستقبل أفضل تسوده روح الأخوة والمودة والتعاون الشامل في جميع مجالات الحياة أمنا وبناءً وتطويراً لرفع مستوى الإنسان العربي المسلم في بلديهما وانهاؤهما من روح البيان المشترك الذي صدر عقب زيارة فخامة الرئيس القاضي عبد الرحمن بن يحيى الأرياني للمملكة العربية السعودية في ١٨ ربيع الثاني ١٣٩١ ه الموافق ١٢ يونيو ١٩٧١ م.

فقد قام دولة الرئيس القاضي عبد الله بن أحمد الحجري عضو المجلس الجمهوري ورئيس وزراء الجمهورية العربية اليمنية بزيارة رسمية للمملكة العربية السعودية في الفترة ما بين اليوم الخامس من شهر صفر ١٣٩٣ ه الموافق العاشر من شهر مارس ١٩٧٣م حتى اليوم الثاني عشر من شهر صفر ١٣٩٣ ه الموافق السابع عشر من شهر مارس ١٩٧٣م على رأس وفد يضم:

نائب رئيس مجلس الوزراء
وزير الخارجية

معالي الاستاذ محمد احمد نعمان

٣٧٩

Figure 3.9.1.1 The Arabic text of the Communiqué
الحدود والعلاقات السعودية اليمنية

معالي السيد عبد الله بن يحي الصعدي
معالي السيد عبد الجبار أحمد المجاهد
معالي السيد عبد العزيز عبد العظي
معالي السيد علي عبد الله المطيري
سعادة السيد غالب علي جميل
سعادة القاضي إسماعيل الجراحي

اليمن في المملكة العربية السعودية

وقد استقبل الوفد اليمني على الصعيدين الشعبي والرسمي استقبالًا
ودياً رائعاً عبر ما يكنه الشعب السعودي من ود عمق لتفهيم الشعب
اليمني الذي يربطه به روابط العقيدة واللغة وتشديد إليه أواصر القربى
والوهج ووحدة الامام والمصير.

كما يؤكد الجانبان اتفاقهما التام مجددًا على اعتبار الحدود بين
اليمني والحدود الفاصلة بصفة نهائية ودائمة وذلك كما نصت عليه
المادتان الثانية والرابعة من معايدها الطائف للصداقة الإسلامية
والأخوة العربية الموقعة في اليوم السادس من شهر صفر سنة ثلاث
وخمسين بعد الثلاثمائة والألف وملحقيه الخاصين بذلك.
الملاحقة

وقد عبر دولة الرئيس القاضي عبد الله الحجري بالأصالة عن نفسه وبالنيابة عن جميع أعضاء الوفد اليمني عن شكرهم العميق لجلالة الملك فيصل المعظم وللشعب السعودي النبيل ولجميع المسؤولين في المملكة على الحفاوة البالغة والترحيب الحار الذي قوبلوا بهما أثناء زيارتهما للمملكة العربية السعودية.

عن الجانب السعودي
عمير السقاف
وزير الدولة للشؤون الخارجية

عن الجانب اليمني
محمد أحمد نعمان
نائب رئيس مجلس الوزراء
وزير الخارجية

Figure 3.9.1.3 The Arabic text of the Communiqué
3.9.2. The BBC Report

20.2.30
Joint communiqué issued on 17 March 1973 by Abdallah al-Hajri, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Yemen Arab Republic and the Saudi Arabian Government: Saudi–Yemen borders (as delimited by the 20 May 1934 Treaty of Taif) considered to be ‘permanent and final’
The BBC Report

Ahmad Abdullah al-Hajri arrives today in Kuwait on an official visit. He will be leading a delegation composed of: Muhammad Ahmad Nu'man, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister; Col. Husayn al-Makkuni, CGS; Ali Ahmad al-Matari, Director of the Premier's Office; Ghali Al Jaml, Under Secretary at the Foreign Ministry; Abdullah Ali adh-Dhabhi, YAR Ambassador to Kuwait; and Muhammad Ali Ahmad of the Protocol Department of the Foreign Ministry (Kuwait home service 1000 gmt 17 Mar 73). On 18th March Shaykh Sabah as-Salim as-Sabah, the Amir of Kuwait, received Abdullah al-Hajri, now on a visit (San'a home service 1700 gmt 18 Mar 73). Hajri left Kuwait on 19th March (Kuwait home service 1000 gmt 19 Mar 73).
4.1. **The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)**

The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty, known as the ‘Sana’a Treaty‘, was signed in Sana’a on 10 February 1934. The ratification instruments were exchanged in Sana’a on 4 September 1934. The Arabic text is available at *The National Archive*, London (FO 94 1261). The English text is at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London (Treaty Series No. 34, 1934).
The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)
Figure 4.1.2 The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)
Figure 4.1.3 The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)
Figure 4.1.4 The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)
Treaty Series No. 34 (1934)

Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Co-operation

between

His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and of India
and the King of the Yemen

(With Exchange of Notes)

San'a, February 11, 1934
[Ratifications exchanged at San'a, September 4, 1934]

Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
to Parliament by Command of His Majesty

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1934
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Cmd. 4752

Figure A.1.5 The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)
TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL CO-OPERATION
BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY IN RESPECT OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND OF INDIA AND THE KING OF THE
YEMEN (WITH EXCHANGE OF NOTES).

San'a, February 11, 1934.

[Ratifications exchanged at San'a, September 4, 1934.]

PREAMBLE.

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of the Yemen, the Imam, on the other part, being desirous of entering into a treaty on a basis of friendship and co-operation for their mutual benefit, have resolved to conclude this treaty and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

For Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard Rawdon Reilly, C.I.E., O.B.E.;

For India:

Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard Rawdon Reilly, C.I.E., O.B.E.;

His Majesty the King of the Yemen, the Imam:

The Qadhi Muhammad Ragheb-bin-Rafiq;

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good order and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1.

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, acknowledges the complete and absolute independence of His Majesty the King of the Yemen, the Imam, and his kingdom in all affairs of whatsoever kind.

ARTICLE 2.

There shall always be peace and friendship between the high contracting parties, who undertake to maintain good relations with each other in every respect.
ARTICLE 3.

The settlement of the question of the southern frontier of the Yemen is deferred pending the conclusion, in whatever way may be agreed upon by both high contracting parties in a spirit of friendship and complete concord, free from any dispute or difference, of the negotiations which shall take place between them before the expiry of the period of the present treaty.

Pending the conclusion of the negotiations referred to in the preceding paragraph, the high contracting parties agree to maintain the situation existing in regard to the frontier on the date of the signature of this treaty, and both high contracting parties undertake that they will prevent, by all means at their disposal, any violation by their forces of the above-mentioned frontier, and any interference by their subjects, or from their side of that frontier, with the affairs of the people inhabiting the other side of the said frontier.

ARTICLE 4.

After the coming into force of the present treaty, the high contracting parties shall, by mutual agreement and concord, enter into such agreements as shall be necessary for the regulation of commercial and economic affairs, based on the principles of general international practice.

ARTICLE 5.

(1) The subjects of each of the high contracting parties who wish to trade in the territories of the other shall be amenable to the local laws and decrees, and shall receive equal treatment to that enjoyed by the subjects of the most favoured Power.
(2) Similarly, the vessels of each of the high contracting parties and their cargoes shall receive, in the ports of the territories of the other, treatment equal to that accorded to the vessels and their cargoes of the most favoured Power, and the passengers in such vessels shall be treated in the ports of the territories of the other party in the same manner as those in the vessels of the most favoured Power therein.

(3) For the purposes of this article in relation to His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

(a) The word "territories" shall be deemed to mean the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, India and all His Majesty’s Colonies, protectorates and all mandated territories in respect of which the mandate is exercised by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom.

(b) The word "subjects" shall be deemed to mean all subjects of His Majesty wherever domiciled, all the inhabitants of countries under His Majesty’s protection, and, similarly, all companies incorporated in any of His Majesty’s territories shall be deemed to be subjects of His Majesty.

(c) The word "vessels" shall be deemed to mean all merchant vessels registered in any part of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

**Article 6.**

This treaty shall be the basis of all subsequent agreements that may be concluded between the high contracting parties now and in the future for the purposes of friendship and amity. The high

Figure 4.1.8 The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)
contracting parties undertake not to assist nor to connive at any action directed against the friendship and concord now sincerely existing between them.

ARTICLE 7.

The present treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible after signature, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at San'a. It shall come into force on the date of the exchange of ratifications, and shall thereafter remain in force for a period of forty years.

And in witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have thereto affixed their seals.

This treaty is done in two copies, in the English and Arabic languages, and, should doubt arise as to the interpretation of any of these articles, both high contracting parties shall rely on the Arabic text. Done at San'a in the Yemen, this eleventh day of February, 1934, A.D. (corresponding to the twenty-sixth day of Shawwal, 1852, A.H.).

MUHAMMAD RAGHEB-BIN-RAFIQ. B. R. REILLY.
(L.S.) (L.S.)
all enlightened nations to co-operate in the suppression of the slave trade, and to enquire whether your Majesty will enable me to convey to His Britannic Majesty's Government your Majesty's assurance that you will by every possible means assist them in their endeavours to prevent the African slave trade by sea.

(Respects.)

B. R. REILLY,
His Britannic Majesty's Commissioner
and Plenipotentiary.

San'a, February 10, 1934 (Shawwal 25, 1352, A.H.).

No. 2.
The Imam to Lieutenant-Colonel Reilly.

With inscription:

In the Name of God the Merciful and Compassionate!

After tendering our sincere respects, in reply to your esteemed note dated the 26th Shawwal, 1352 (corresponding to the 10th February, 1934), wherein you expressed a desire to have assurances from our Government as to the prohibition of the slave trade, we inform your Excellency that we agree to the prohibition of the African slave traffic, and we will command all our `Amils (Governors) to do their utmost to prevent it in all the Mutasawakkil (Yemen) country and ports.

(Respects.)

San'a, Shawwal 26, 1352, A.H. (February 10, 1934).
The Undersigned having met together for the purpose of exchanging the Ratifications of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Co-operation between His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, in respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and also of India, and His Majesty the King of the Yemen, the Imam, signed at San'a on the 11th day of February, 1934, and the respective Ratifications of the said Treaty having been carefully compared, and found to be exactly conformable to each other, the said exchange took place this day in the usual form.

In witness thereof they have signed the present Certificate, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at San'a the Fourth day of September 1934 (corresponding to the 24th day of Ramadan 1353, A.H.).

[Signature]

Figure 4.1.11 The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)
Your Majesty,

I have the honour to refer to my conversations with your Majesty’s plenipotentiary relating to the present common desire of

(Translation.)

Figure 4.1.12 The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)
4.2. Will of Sultan Awadh bin Omar bin Awadh Al-Qu‘aiti

This was probably written in January 1899 (CO 725/42/8, TNA, London).
Will of Sultan Awadh bin Omar bin Awadh Al-Qu’aiti

Figure 4.2.1 Will of Sultan Awadh bin Omar bin Awadh Al-Qu’aiti
mentioned one-third and its products. Our late father has granted the power of election etc., as mentioned to us and those whom we elect as a chief after us. My aforesaid two brothers Sālih and Abdulla have already passed away to the mercy of the Almighty God and I remain solely the ruler, protector, administrator, and possessor with full discretion in what my late above-mentioned father bequeathed in his will. That I was and am as long as I am breathing the ruler, protector, administrator, and supervisor, in dealing in all the affairs that depend on the guarded city of Shabam, Hura, Najrain, Shehr, Ukalla, and all their dependencies of ports and cities that are now under my sway. I have granted the order of election, administration etc., after my death to my son Ghalib bin Awadh bin Omar the Kā’ītī during his life-time. I have made him the ruler, administrator, and superior, as aforesaid as well as that which he will occupy and possess after me of lands, countries, etc., and act in my place and do all things that are interesting to him and Government, chieftainship, and subjects, to incur the necessary expenditure without squandering. He is also allowed to use out of the remainder of (the will) one-third and its production the necessary expenditure without squandering and thus use out of the income of the countries such as the customs duties, etc., which have connection with the finance and Government the necessary expenditure that concern the Chieftainship in the way of developing and establishing the countries and cities and for expelling evil-minded persons, invaders, raiders, etc., which may be advantageous and by which disturbances are avoided as above mentioned. I also recommend him to obey me and the commands of the Almighty God and his Prophet upon whom His mercy and Peace be, to do good deeds which be possible, to honour virtuous people, learned men, and Yids; to

Figure 4.2.2 Will of Sultan Awadh bin Omar bin Awadh Al-Qu’aiti
appoint and dismiss servants, and those that are under
his Government; to hear complaints, rule the subjects
justly, dispense the law which God has sent to his
Prophet, His Peace and Mercy be on him upon himself and
those whom God has placed under him, to put in force the
impartial Mahomedan law, to pass orders, prohibit wicked
deeds; and use all possible action in repressing any
mischief that may befall the subjects, to consult his
brother Omar and all those who are his relatives who are
believed to be of good nature upon every subject and
subjects that may be interesting to the Chiefship
position, and upon all important affairs. The adviser of
every ruler must be his successor in all affairs and that
they must assist each other. After the death of the
aforesaid Ghalib bin Awadh his successor in his brother
Omar bin Awadh bin Omar the Kalyti who should be the
ruler and the successor of the said Ghalib bin Awadh over
the aforesaid countries of Shabam, Hura, Hajrain, and the
others that are in the direction of Hadhramaut; also the
ports of Shihir and Mukalla and their dependencies as above
mentioned, and after the death of the aforeaid Omar his
successor is to be Saleh bin Ghalib who should be the
ruler and Chief over the above mentioned countries that
are in the direction of Hadhramaut, Shabam, Hura, Hajrain,
etc., as well as those in the direction of the coast, such
as Mukalla, Shihir, and their dependencies, etc., as above
mentioned. After the death of the aforeaid Salib bin
Ghalib his successor should be the son of Omar bin Awadh
but if he has no son Mahomed bin Ghalib should be the
successor and if he has a young son Mahomed bin Ghalib
should act in his place and thus the succession should be
amongst the sons of Ghalib bin Awadh and Omar bin Awadh
and their descendants to generation and lineage. Every
ruler who will be elected if he makes his residence at

Figure 4.2.3 Will of Sultan Awadh bin Omar bin Awadh Al-Qu’aiti
He should appoint his successor at Mukalla to officiate on his behalf in Government affairs and if he makes Mukalla the place of his residence he should appoint his successor at Shihir to officiate on his behalf in the affairs of Government, if his successor is absent the heir of his successor should act, but if both the successor and his heir are away (the successor or his heir) should appoint any one that the ruler may approve until he returns. In case the ruler be absent on a journey he should appoint in his place his successor to administer the affairs of the Government until he returns, if his successor is also absent he should appoint the heir of his successor but if his successor as well as the heir of his successor are both absent he may appoint any one he may approve until he comes back. As long as Ghalib bin Awadh is a ruler and administrator his successor the aforesaid Omar bin Awadh should be the Chief Official over the goods, properties, their products, the revenues of the countries, etc., in crediting, safeguarding and receiving from any taxes and whatever direction may be and from every person or persons, he also should be under the command of the ruler Ghalib bin Awadh. If Omar bin Awadh becomes the ruler after the aforesaid Ghalib his successor should be the aforesaid Salih bin Ghalib bin Awadh who should be the supervisor receiver and keeper of the properties, etc., above mentioned and concern the chieftainship and Government and in any and whatever direction may be and from any person or persons, he should also be under the command of the aforesaid ruler Awadh bin Omar and thus for every ruler his successor should be the superior receiver and keeper as above mentioned. The supervisor is allowed to appoint and constitute whomever he desires to receive the income keep the goods and their products, to demand, ask and
receive from every person or persons whatever is due to
the Chieftainship, and dispute, legate, satisfy and defend
either personally or by his attorney the recovery of debts
from any person or persons whatever may be due by them to
the Chieftainship in the way of debts, rights, and deposits.
If the successor is absent in the direction of India his
heir should act in the interior of Arabia in administering
receiving and appointing attorneys for the recovery of
debts that are due to the Chieftainship but if the vice his
successor is in the interior of Arabia his heir should act
in his place in the direction of India in administering
receiving and appointing attorneys for the recovery of
what are due in the way of debts; rights; deposits; etc.,
to the Chieftainship; dispute, legate and negotiate
settlement but if both of them (the successor and his heir)
are in one place they should assist each other in the
administration and recovery, also the one that is present
is to be quite efficient to act in the place of the absent.
The successor should be under the orders of the ruler and
the heir of the successor should be under him (successor).
The ruler may appoint in the city of Shabam, Hur, Majrân,
and all the cities that are within the district of
Bhadramaut whom he approves either one or more representa-
tives in each of them to administer on his behalf and be
under his command. The representative should judge
judiciously reign over the subjects justly, hear complaints,
give just orders, prohibit wicked deeds and dispense the
law that the Almighty God has sent to His Prophet, may His
mercy and peace be on him, and endeavour in improving the
affairs of the country and people and to have compassion
and pity on those whom God has made him a superior, such
as the weak and poor persons and others, to give account to
the ruler of the income; outcome; taxes; products and all
things that the ruler appoints him over. If any opposition

Figure 4.2.5 Will of Sultan Awadh bin Omar bin Awadh Al-Qu’aiti
is shown to the representative or if he disobeys the
ruler, does not maintain justice and does wrong and
oppresses and does not give any account etc., the ruler
may dismiss him and appoint any one in his place but if
the ruler wishes to appoint him in another place and does
not want him to act as a representative he may discharge
him and appoint any one in his place. The ruler is at
liberty to appoint whom he likes and dismiss whom he dis-
likes from the cities, etc. The ruler has to provide his
successors their sons and relatives a competent allowance
of food, clothes, riding animals, etc., and to the sons of
the sons of his brother Omar bin Awadh the Kaˈyti and
descendants to generation also the sons of the sons of
Ghalib as well as the sons of his sons and descendants
to generation a fixed allowance of food, clothes, etc.,
and to those who live in the ports of Shihr and Mukalla
and their dependencies as well as Hadhramaut, Shabam and
Hura, and their descendants to generation as the case may
be and consider them as his sons. Every ruler that reigns
over the port of Shihr, Mukalla, and their dependencies, as
well as Shabam, Hadhramaut, etc., should provide all those
who are related to our late father Omar bin Awadh and
the sons of their sons who are living at Shihr Mukalla,
their dependencies, Hadhramaut and Shabam, an allowance
as the time and possibility affords, provided that they
should be under his command and orders; also, they must
obey, comply, submit to him and be his supporters and
assistants. If the ruler becomes insane, or is young in
age though entitled to chieftainship the successor should
act on behalf until recovery, or until he becomes of age;
this is all that should be followed.

I also do hereby say and confirm that I wrote what is
above mentioned and that I am at liberty to revoke, annul,
or modify all or some of it during my life time, but if I

Figure 4.2.6 Will of Sultan Awadh bin Omar bin Awadh Al-Quˈaiti
do not revoke, annul, or modify, all that which has been mentioned should remain in force and effective.

1. I acknowledge all that which this letter comprises and acknowledge the same by own hand.

(Sgd.) Awadh bin Omar bin Awadh the Kalyt.

Sultan Nawar Jung Sham-Shir el Kalk.

Witnesses:

(Sgd.) Hoosain bin Hamed bin Ahmed Al Muhdar

Jabar bin Abdullah Awadhi Al Muslah

Mohamed.

Wali the son of Sultan Salih bin Al Salim bin Al Wali

Abdul Al Gaffar bin Al Wali bin Al Salim bin Al Wali

Salih bin Al Salim bin Al Wali bin Al Wali.

2. Yes that Sultan Umar has succeeded to the state of Wali Al Reli bin Al Salim bin Al Wali is to be his successor the status of the latter shall therefor be the status of the successor to the State shall in his turn, be recognized as the Heir Apparent of his Predecessor. Sultan Umar bin Awadh binds himself to act according to the above stipulation as the will of the late Sultan Awadh. Anything done by him contrary to these documents shall not be acceptable. Each and every Sultan who succeeds in relation to the state of Wali Al Reli shall act according to these two documents.

3. Sultan Umar and Sultan Salih parties to this document, with the signatures of the same.
4.3. Treaty with the Sultan of Shi’hier and Al-Mukallā (13 August 1937)

This is the Treaty between His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and His Highness the Sultan of Shiher [Shi’her] and Mukalla [Al-Mukallā], 13 August 1937. By this agreement the Sultan of Al-Mukallā finally agreed to conclude a treaty with Britain, accepted a British resident and sacrificed his independence. Such a change in the Sultan’s position was linked to his intention to safeguard the succession of his son to the throne and also for securing a loan. London was aware that such development was problematic and this would be the case as noticed among diplomatic correspondences following the conclusion of the treaty of August 1937 (CO 725/42/8, TNA, London).
TREATY BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND HIS HIGNNESS THE SULTAN OF SHIHR AND MUKALLA.

WHEREAS His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and His Highness Sultan Salih bin Shalib al Qu’aiti, Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla, are desirous of strengthening the friendly relations which have long existed between His Majesty’s Government and the Qu’aiti Sultans.

AND WHEREAS His Highness Sultan Salih bin Shalib is desirous of developing and improving his State.

AND WHEREAS His Majesty’s Government are desirous of upholding and strengthening the authority and dignity of the sultan.

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have named and appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Bernard Rawdon Beilby, Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Companion of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Protectorate of Aden to conclude a treaty for this purpose.

Article 1.

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom agree to appoint a Resident Adviser to the Sultan, and the Sultan agrees to provide the said Resident Adviser with a suitable house, and for the welfare of his State to accept his advice in all matters except those concerning Muhammadan religion and custom.

Figure 4.3.1 Treaty with the Sultan of Shiher and Al-Mukalla (13 August 1937)
Figure 4.3.2 Treaty with the Sultan of Shiher and Al-Mukallā (13 August 1937)
4.4. Despatch to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 August 1937.

Despatch from the Sir Bernard Reilly, Governor of Aden to W.G.A. Ormsby Gore, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 August 1937 (CO 725/42/8, TNA, London).
Despatch to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 August 1937.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 12 of 18th August regarding the conclusion of a Treaty with the Sultan of Shihur and Mukalla, and to transmit herewith the original Treaty, copies of the notes exchanged between myself and the Sultan, and a letter from myself to the Sultan, the terms of which were taken from Mr. Cowell's semi-official letter of 3rd June.

2. In your telegram No. 29 of the 18th February, you conveyed to me the approval of His Majesty's Government for the conclusion of a Treaty by which the Sultan would bind himself to receive a British Resident Adviser and to act on his advice in all matters except those concerning Muhammadan religion and customs. In consideration of his signing this Treaty the Sultan was to receive a loan of about three lakhs for approved working development.

3. As I reported to you in my confidential despatch of the 31st March, the Sultan rejected this offer, but at a later date it became evident that although he was not willing to submit to any control of his internal affairs in order to secure the advantages which a loan would have made possible, he was nevertheless probably prepared to do so in order to be able to secure the succession of his son to the

The Right Honourable W. A. Ormsby Gore, P.C.,
H.M.'s Principal Secretary of State
For the Colonies,
Downing Street, S.W.1.
Despatch to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 August 1937.

mentioned one-third and its products. Our late father has granted the power of election etc., as mentioned to us and those whom we elect as a Chief after us. My aforesaid two brothers Salih and Abdulla have already passed away to the mercy of the Almighty God and I remain solely the ruler, protector, administrator, and possessor with full discretion in what my late above-mentioned father bequeathed in bis will. That I was and am as long as I am breathing the ruler, protector, administrator, and supervisor; in dealing in all the affairs that depend on the guarded city of Shabam, hura, Hajrain, Shehr, ukalla, and all their dependencies of ports and cities that are now under my sway. I have granted the order of election, administration etc.; after my death to my son Ghalib bin Awadh bin Usar the Kaiti during his life-time. I have made him the ruler, administrator, and superior, as aforementioned as well as that which he will occupy and possess after me of lands, countries, etc., and act in my place and do all things that are interesting to him and Government, chieftainship, and subjects, to incur the necessary expenditure without squandering. He is also allowed to use out of the remainder of (the will) one-third and its production the necessary expenditure without squandering and thus use out of the income of the countries such as the custom duties, etc., which have connection with the finance and Government the necessary expenditure that concern the Chieftainship in the way of developing and establishing the countries and cities and for expelling evil-minded persons, invaders, raiders, etc., which may be advantageous and by which disturbances are avoided as above mentioned. I also recommend him to obey me and the commands of the Almighty God and His Prophet upon whom His mercy and Peace be, to do good deeds which be possible, to honour virtuous people, learned men, and friends; to

Figure A.4.2 Despatch to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 August 1937
Khan Bahadur Sheikh Ali Ba-Akza to see me the day after the signature to express his apologies for his hesitation, and to say that he was perfectly content with the situation.

6. The Sultan was not particularly anxious to insert in the Treaty provision for the dispossessed heir and for this reason I consented to the arrangement embodied in the Notes which, as you will observe, reserves final approval to His Majesty’s Government.

7. The Sultan was subjected to considerable pressure in the shape of anonymous letters and other reproaches from persons who accused him with selling his State to the British, but he eventually brought himself to a sufficient pitch of courage to sign, and I thought it advisable to conclude the matter at once, subject to the final approval and confirmation of His Majesty’s Government.

8. The Sultan has requested that the Treaty should not be made public for a month, during which time the opposition will get more used to the idea. I have consented, if and when your approval is given, to issue the enclosed Notice, and the Sultan, in consequence of advice he has been given by Mr. Ingrams, decided also to issue a Notice at the same time indicating that he had made a very good bargain with His Majesty’s Government, rather than to leave himself in the undefended position of having gibe made at him by those who have pressed him not to sign. I enclose for your information a copy of the Sultan’s proposed Proclamation.

9. As I was authorised in your telegram No. 23 of the 12th February, I have given the Sultan to understand that the salary of the Adviser will be paid by His Majesty’s Government, and I shall shortly address
you with regard to the establishment required for the Hadramaut.

10. I have not as yet received your approval to the proposal in my despatch Confidential 2 of the 14th April that Mr. Ingrams should be appointed Adviser to the Kathiri Sultan, and I have under consideration at present a proposal that the Kathiri Sultan should also be invited to sign a Treaty of a nature similar to that accepted by the Sultan of Mukalla.

11. Although the Treaty has now been obtained without the promise of a loan, I trust that it will prove possible to grant it, and I propose shortly to address you on this subject also.

I have the honour to be,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

Governor.
4.5. Public notice distributed by the Sultan of Al-Mukallā, August 1937.

(CO 725/42/8, TNA, London).
Public notice distributed by the Sultan of Al-Mukallā, August 1937.

Public Notice.

Now by the grace of God I have returned to my country and people heart and hearty after attending the Coronation of His Majesty the King George VI in London.

During my journey and on my return I heard several rumours which are current everywhere that the British Government has taken possession of my State and my authority and dignity will be suffered. These rumours are entirely false and unfounded. I have already brought to the notice of His Excellency the Governor at Aden about these rumours and His Excellency the Governor has already very kindly published the statement totally denying of such intentions of His Majesty’s Government and declaring all such rumours false and unfounded and you all can read the same in the Aden Protectorate Gazette dated .

The British Government has not the least intention to take even an inch of our land and they have also declared to uphold my authority and dignity.

Under the above circumstances I am now desirous that all such false rumours should forthwith be stopped and if any person or persons after this notice are still found spreading such false rumours which are injurious to my State and myself they will be severely dealt with, punished and transported.

Only for the welfare and vast improvements of our State I have asked the services of Mr. Ingrams from the British Government to work under me as my Resident Adviser because without an expert British officer the British Government will not give us all sorts of help for the vast improvements of our State as our means are limited. You all know very well that Mr. Ingrams during his short stay in my absence, has done well in establishing the peace etc. and I hope he will work...
work sincerely in complete co-operation and harmoniously with me in future under me for the improvements of my State.

Now by the grace of God I will give you a very good piece of information and which is this that according to my powers of the Sultan as the Ruling Chief of Mukalla, Shihr and Hadhramaut and also according to our religious orders of Shafaees I have nominated and declared that my son Prince Sultan Awad bin Saleh bin Ghalib Alkaity to be the heir-apparent of Mukalla, Shihr and Hadhramaut now and the Ruling Sultan of all countries under me mentioned above after me and I have also great pleasure to inform you all that our friend the British Government have already accepted my nomination and declaration that Prince Awad becomes the heir-apparent of my State in my life time and the Ruling Sultan after me. It is a matter of great satisfaction that the succession of Mukalla State has been established in the direct line of the late Sultan Awad for ever which will also be a great benefit to my family as well as the State and my subjects.

Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla and Hadhramaut.

Figure 4.5.2 Public notice distributed by the Sultan of Al-Mukallā, August 1937.
4.6. Public notice distributed by the Governor of Aden (August 1937)

(CO 725/42/8, TNA, London).
NOTICE.

In view of certain rumours having been recently disseminated to the effect that the Qu'aiti Sultanate of Shihr and Mukalla was being annexed, His Excellency the Governor desires it to be categorically stated that this rumour is utterly unfounded and that His Majesty's Government have never entertained any such intention.

On the contrary at the request of His Highness the Sultan, who is extremely desirous of promoting the welfare of his country, His Majesty's Government has agreed to provide the Sultan with the necessary advice and assistance to achieve his desires.

His Excellency desires it to be widely known that the whole policy of His Majesty's Government in the Protectorate is directed towards upholding and strengthening the authority and dignity of the Chiefs and the improvement of their territories.

Figure 3.6.1 Public notice distributed by the Governor of Aden (August 1937)
4.7. Reconstituting the Qu‘aiti-Kathiri Agreement of 1918 (February 1939)

(FO 371/23178, TNA, London).
AGREEMENT RECONSTITUTING THE QU’AITI-KATHIRI AGREEMENT OF 1918.

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

His Highness The Qu’aiti Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla on his own behalf and on behalf of his heirs and successors and

The Kathiri Sultan of Seiyun on behalf of the Sultans of the Family of 'Abdulla al Kathiri, their heirs and successors.

Being desirous of maintaining and strengthening the friendly relations which have long existed between them, and anxious to increase mutual confidence and co-operation between themselves in the development of their territories

Have agreed to reconstitute the agreement providing for mutual co-operation and other things between the Qu’aiti Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla and the Sultans of the Family of 'Abdulla al Kathiri which was executed on the 27th She’ban 1356 corresponding to the 9th June 1918 in the following terms:

I. The Qu’aiti Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla and the Kathiri Sultan of Seiyun recognise that the territories of the Qu’aiti Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla on the one hand and the territories of the Kathiri Sultan of Seiyun on the other hand, which are defined below in Articles II, III and IV, while remaining separate States each under its own ruler, are one province, known as the Hadramaut, the said province being an appanage of the British Empire, and that the Qu’aiti Sultan is the senior Sultan of the said province.

II.
Reconstituting the Qu’aiti-Kathiri Agreement of 1918 (February 1939)

II. The Qu’aiti Sultan of Shihir and Mukalla acknowledges that the Sultans of the Family of 'Abdulla al Kathiri are Sultans of the Shansafir, that the Family of 'Abdulla al Kathiri rule within the Hadramaut over the towns and villages of Seiyun, Taris, Taris, Al Shurf, MAXIMA and Gheit bin RYEMEN; and that the sub-tribes of Shansafir mentioned as follows are under the Sultan of the Family of 'Abdulla al Kathiri; namely the tribes of Al Kathiri, Al Awaer, Al Najiri and Al Jabiri and all that is within their boundaries, as is well-known and recognized.

III. The Qu’aiti Sultan of Shihir and Mukalla contracts on his own behalf and on behalf of his heirs and successors that he acknowledges and recognizes the rights and suzerainty of the Sultans of the Family of 'Abdulla al Kathiri and their heirs and successors over the Kathiri State of Seiyun consisting of the towns and villages as well as the sub-tribes of Shansafir aforesaid in Article II above; and also that he will not interfere with it in any manner whatsoever and that he recognizes them as Sultans absolute in their own country as defined in Article II.

IV. The Kathiri Sultan of Seiyun on behalf of the Sultans of the Family of 'Abdulla al Kathiri admits on their own behalf and on behalf of their heirs and successors that they will not interfere in any way.

Figure 4.7.2 Reconstituting the Qu’aiti-Kathiri Agreement of 1918 (February 1939)
Reconstituting the Qu’aiti-Kathiri Agreement of 1918 (February 1939)

V. The Kathiri Sultan of Seiyun on behalf of the Sultanate of the family of ‘Abdulla al Kathiri reaffirms and recognizes that the treaty signed between the British Government and the Qu’aiti Government in 1838 is binding on them, just as if they had themselves made it and they agree to conform to its conditions faithfully. All the contracting parties to the present agreement agree that they shall keep each other informed on all matters of mutual interest to the States of the Qu’aiti Sultan of Shihhr and Mukalla and the Kathiri Sultan of Seiyun.

VI. The Qu’aiti Sultan of Shihhr and Mukalla and the Kathiri Sultan of Seiyun on behalf of the Sultanate of the family of ‘Abdulla al Kathiri with such co-operation, if any, as His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom consider necessary, agree to suppress disorders both now and in future, immediately, they agree to forgive and forget all that
that has passed and to renounce severally all vendetta or claims for compensation; they agree to preserve in future security on the roads existing within their well-known frontiers, to enforce justice according to the Shari'ah and respect for the higher authority, to succour the oppressed and to maintain the common law within the stated boundary.

VII. The Qu‘aiti Sultan of Shihri and Makalla and the Kathiri Sultan of Saiyun agree to give each other mutual assistance in case of any transgression against their subjects or friends or any persons connected with them, or against a sharif, a wayfarer or any defenceless person. They agree mutually to defend life and property, as well as their followers and subjects and all not being criminals who seek their hospitality as long as the boundaries named shall endure; they further agree to treat them with the same justice and equity that they show towards their friends.

VIII. The aforesaid Sultans agree that, in their respective States, absolute commercial freedom shall prevail and that there shall be no discrimination in the collection or fixing of taxes as between persons who are the subjects of one Sultan or the other.

IX. If either of the aforesaid Sultans desires to visit the other he must give notice of his intention, so that fitting preparations may be made to receive him; and in no case whatsoever must the number of soldiers exceed 50, so as to avoid the occurrence of brawls between the soldiers.
Figure 4.7.5 Reconstituting the Qu‘aiti-Kathiri Agreement of 1918 (February 1939)
4.8. Treaty with the Kathiri Sultan of Seiyun (2 March 1939)

TREATY BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND AND THE KATHIRI SULTAN
OF SEIYUN.

WHEREAS His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Sultan
Ja'far bin Mansur al Kathiri, Sultan of Seiyun, are
desirous of strengthening the friendly relations which
have long existed between His Majesty's Government and
the Kathiri Sultans of the family of 'Abdulla al Kathiri,

AND WHEREAS Kathiri Sultan Ja'far bin Mansur is
desirous of developing and improving his State.

AND WHEREAS His Majesty's Government are desirous
of upholding and strengthening the authority and dignity of
the Sultan.

Article I.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
agree to appoint a Resident Adviser to the Sultan, and the
Sultan agrees for the welfare of his State to accept his
advice in all matters except those concerning Muhammadan
religion and custom.

Article II.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
recognise the right of the Sultans of Seiyun to nominate
their successors, subject to the approval of His Majesty's
Government in each case.

The
The present Treaty, which has been concluded in duplicate in the English and Arabic languages, shall come into force this day.

Done at Aden, in duplicate, and in witness thereof the respective parties have set their seals and signatures this second day of March 1939.

(aged.) B.R. REILLY.
For and on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Witness:

(aged) W.H. INGRAMS.

On his own behalf and on behalf of his heirs and successors.

Witness:

(aged) ........

Sultan of Seiyun.

(aged) ........

(aged) W.H. INGRAMS.
4.9. **Agreement with the chiefs of the Al-Musellem Al-Sāi‘ar (1937)**

This agreement was concluded between the Government of the United Kingdom and the chief of the Al-Musellem Al-Sāi‘ar on 13 December 1937 (FO 371/23178, TNA, London).
Agreement with the chiefs of the Al-Musellem Al-Sā’ar (1937)

We, the undersigned, fathers and Muqaddams of Al Musellem Al Sei’ar admit and recognise the following to the British Government:

1. We are in favour of peace and will help in the maintenance of peace.

2. We like the British Government to look after our affairs and we do not want any foreign Government to interfere with us nor will we have anything to do with any foreign Government.

3. We like the British Government to send people to visit us in our country and we would like landing grounds to be made there so that the aeroplanes of the British Government may visit us.

4. We will appoint a Sheikh on behalf of us to represent us in the Hadramaut and if any matter concerning the Sei’ar shall arise he will have to report on it and inform us and help the Government to take the necessary action.

5. We agree that as far as we are concerned the Government may appoint soldiers to live at Al ’Abr or any other place and we will not interfere with them but will help them if necessary. And the soldiers shall be there not to interfere with our affairs and properties but to guard the road and the country under the protection of the British Government and to render assistance to travellers.

6. The balance of us who have not signed the general truce should do so now.

L.Z.I. of Tamman bin Seholl bin Ruleidan
  " Ali bin 'Aisha bin Tiria
  " Yaseem bin Salih bin Wanas
  " Hasen bin Sa'im bin Hu'aitur
  " Ahmed bin Muhammad bin Doman

Witnessed by

Sheikh Mahrud bin Sa'id Muselli
  Sultan 'Ali bin Mansur al Kathiri
  Seiyid 'Abdulla bin Ahmed al Hamid

Seiyid 'Abdulla

Figure 4.9.1 Agreement with the chiefs of the Al-Musellem Al-Sā’ar (1937)
Agreement with the chiefs of the Al-Musellem Al-Sā’ar (1937)

Seiyid ‘Abdulla bin Salih bin ‘Aidaras al Hamid
‘Abdulla bin Salim al Hamid and wrote it under
his orders Seiyid ‘Abdulla bin Ahmed al Hamid
Sheikh ‘Abdulla bin Juneid bin Sa’id bin Sheikh Ba Waz
Ingrams

DATED. MONDAY 11th SHAWAL 1356 - 13th December 1937.

Figure 4.9.2 Agreement with the chiefs of the Al-Musellem Al-Sā’ar (1937)
4.10. Agreement with the chiefs of the Ḥatims of the Sāiʻars (1938)

This agreement was concluded between the Government of the United Kingdom and the chiefs of the Ḥatims of the Sāiʻars on 5 March 1938 (FO 371/23178, TNA, London).
We, the undersigned, fathers and Muqaddams of Al Hatim, the Sāiʿars, admit and recognise the following to the British Government:-

1. We are in favour of peace and will help in the maintenance of peace.

2. We like the British Government to look after our affairs and we do not want any foreign Government to interfere with us nor will we have anything to do with any foreign Government.

3. We like the British Government to send people to visit us in our country and we would like landing grounds to be made there so that the aeroplanes of the British Government may visit us.

4. We agree that if the Al 'Abdulla bin 'Aun commit any offence against other people they shall not be received by us in our place. If they are and we do not rise against them and turn them out we agree that we shall be liable to be dealt with in any way the Government may see best.

Furthermore we agree to rise with the Government and give any help in our power against the Al 'Abdulla bin 'Aun whether in respect of their present offence or any other.

5. We agree that as far as we are concerned the Government may appoint soldiers to live at Al 'Abr or any other place and we will not interfere with them, but will help them if necessary. And the soldiers shall be there not to interfere with our affairs and properties but to guard the road and the country under the protection of the British Government from foreigners and render assistance to travellers. All shall be at liberty to use the well freely except in the case of offenders against the peace in those cases when called on by the Government we will assist soldiers if necessary to keep the offenders away.

6. The balance of us who have not signed the general truce should do so now.
Agreement with the chiefs of the Ḥatims of the Sāiʿars (1938)

Figure 4.10.2 Agreement with the chiefs of the Ḥatims of the Sāiʿars (1938)
Agreement with the chiefs of the Ḥatims of the Sāiʻars (1938)

1. DATED: 5th MARCH, 1938.

2. We are the undersigned, fathers and Muqaddams of Al Masmoom Al Sab'an, and members of the following:
   - 'Ali bin Saleh
   - 'Awad bin 'Omar bin √ufik
   - Al Sab'an on behalf of Al Sab'an.

3. We will always and will help in the maintenance of peace.

4. We like the British Government to look after our affairs and we do not want any foreign Government to interfere with us nor will we have anything to do with any foreign Government.

5. We like the British Government to send people to visit our country and we would like landing grounds to be made there so that the aeroplanes of the British Government may visit us.

6. We will appoint a sheikh on behalf of us to represent us in the Hadramaut and if any matter concerning the Beitar shall arise he will have to report on it and inform us and help the Government to take the necessary action.

7. We agree that as far as we are concerned the Government may appoint soldiers to live at Al 'Abr or any other place and we will not interfere with them but will help them if necessary. And the soldiers shall be there not to interfere with our affairs and properties but to guard the road and the country under the protection of the British Government and to render assistance to travellers.

8. The balance of us who have not signed the general terms should do so now.

Signed on behalf of the following:

- 'Ali bin 'Aiden bin √ufik
- Yadan bin Ali bin 'Umar
- Saleh bin Salih bin 'Ali
- 'Abdul bin 'Abdul bin 'Ali
- 'Abdul bin 'Abdul bin √ufik

Witnessed by:

- Sheikh Saleh
- Sultan 'Ali bin 'Abdul
- Sultan 'Ali bin 'Abdul
- 'Abdul 'Ali bin 'Abdul

Figure 4.10.3 Agreement with the chiefs of the Ḥatims of the Sāiʻars (1938)
4.11. Despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (9 May 1938)

Despatch from Sir Bernard Reilly, Governor of Aden to W.G.A. Ormsby Gore, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (The GA to the CS, 9 May 1938, CO 725/59/18, TNA, London).
Despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (9 May 1938)

Figure 4.11.1 Despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (9 May 1938)


The Anglo-Yemeni *Modus Vivendi*, reached in London on 20 January 1951, though intended to signal the beginning of a new era in Anglo-Yemeni relations, crucially represented a change in the Yemeni position concerning the territorial issue, despite the absence of significant developments. For London, this agreement was of significance and was regarded as an agreement defining the disputed areas.¹⁰ The understanding prevalent at the Foreign Office was that the agreement, “despite the vagueness of the wording, maybe was regarded as recognition that a de facto boundary existed”.¹¹ The text is available at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, Treaty Series No. 42 (1952).

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¹⁰ See 'Minutes of Meeting between the Yemeni Minister to London Mr. Hassan Ibrahim and Mr Fry from the FO', 18 February 1954, FO 371/109976, TNA, London.

Treaty Series No. 42 (1952)

Exchange of Notes
regarding relations between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Yemen

London, 20th January, 1951

Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty August 1952

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Figure 4.12.1.1 The Anglo-Yemeni Modus Vivendi (20 January 1951)
EXCHANGE OF NOTES REGARDING RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE YEMEN

London, 20th January, 1951

No. 1

The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Yemen to the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Grosvenor House,
Park Lane,
London, W.1,

Your Excellency,

20th January, 1951.

I have the honour to refer to the negotiations which took place
between the representatives of the Government of His Majesty the King of Yemen
and representatives of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom,
which commenced on 29th August, 1950, and ended on 12th October, 1950,
as a result of which an agreement was reached to submit to the Governments
of the two countries recommendations for a modus vivendi composed of
ten articles the text of which is as follows:

1. That diplomatic representation shall be established between the two
countries according to normal practice, as soon as possible before the
end of 1951.

2. That His Majesty’s Government should co-operate with the Govern-
ment of His Majesty the Imam on economic development, culture,
education, hygiene and other matters in the Yemen on which the
Government of His Majesty the Imam might wish to seek such
co-operation. His Majesty’s Government should, if the Yemen
Government so wish, provide to the best of their ability the
assistance of experts or any other technical assistance which may
be required in these matters.

3. That for the purpose of settling certain incidents or disputes which
have occurred at various places in the limitrophe areas and which
have already been the subject of discussions between the two
Governments, they should agree to set up a joint commission, com-
posed of an equal number of representatives of the two Governments,
with the following terms of reference:

To demarcate on the ground in all the disputed areas, without
prejudice to the reservations laid down in paragraph 7 of this
modus vivendi, the position of each party as it existed at the time
of the signature of the 1934 Treaty(*) and as it exists at the
present time and to recommend on the basis of their findings such
solutions of these incidents or disputes as may be required by the
application of the 1934 Treaty or by equitable considerations, as
appropriate.

(*) “Treaty Series No. 34 (1934),” Cmd. 4752.

Figure 4.12.1.2 The Anglo-Yemeni Modus Vivendi (20 January 1951)
4. That in the event of the commission failing to agree in regard to any of the matters submitted to it under the terms of the preceding paragraph, the two Governments may, in consultation, co-opt an impartial commissioner or may appoint each an impartial commissioner, who shall assist the commission to reach a unanimous recommendation.

5. That the commission be appointed and plan its method of work as soon as possible and that the Governments thereupon fix a date for the commencement of its work. The commission shall from time to time submit reports of progress to both Governments.

6. That it be agreed by the two Governments that, pending the conclusion of the work of the commission both Governments will refrain from taking any action which may alter the status quo existing in the disputed areas at the present time.

For the purposes of this article it is understood that in the town of Shabwa there are no military forces or administrative services at the present time.

7. That it be understood between the two Governments that their acceptance of any finding or recommendation by the commission under paragraph 3 shall not prejudice the claims of either Government based on that Government’s interpretation of the de jure position, nor any claims in connection with the final settlement which is provided for in Article 3 of the 1934 Treaty.

In case of disagreement between the two Governments on the commission’s findings or recommendations each party shall continue to pursue a settlement in accordance with Article 33 of the United Nations Charter. (*)

8. That the two Governments should take appropriate measures, within the framework of their existing law and with the due regard to the local situation, to check any propaganda, which by its seditious or subversive character tends to impair the friendly relations between the two countries or which tends to defame their sovereigns or Royal Families.

9. That the two Governments will consider at an appropriate time any specific proposals put forward by either with a view to reaching an agreement relating to fugitive offenders.

10. That as soon as the commission provided for in paragraph 3 of this Agreement begins its work, and pending conclusion of its work, His Majesty’s Government shall agree to the evacuation of the customs house at Nagd Marqad. The Yemeni Government shall agree during the same period not to re-occupy the demolished building in the vicinity of the customs house.

M. A. 

G. W. F.

The Yemen delegation submitted this proposal to the Government of His Majesty the King of Yemen, Imam Ahmed.

The Government of His Majesty the King of Yemen, Imam Ahmed, confirmed this proposal, the terms of which were approved by His Majesty, Imam Ahmed.

My Government instructed me to inform your Excellency officially of the final approval to these terms by the Government of Yemen.

(*) “Treaty Series No. 67 (1946),” Cmd. 7015.

Figure 4.12.1.3 The Anglo-Yemeni Modus Vivendi (20 January 1951)
Moreover, the Government of His Majesty the King of the Yemen are prepared to start negotiations for the necessary measures required to implement the said agreement.

If His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom also approve the said recommendations, I have the honour to suggest that the present Note and your Excellency's reply to that effect should be regarded as constituting an agreement between the two Governments.

Please accept, &c.

ALKADI AL-AMRI,

Minister of State, Acting Foreign Minister of the Government of Yemen.

Figure 4.12.1.4 The Anglo-Yemeni Modus Vivendi (20 January 1951)
No. 2

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Acting Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Yemen

Foreign Office, S.W. 1,
20th January, 1951.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency’s Note of
to-day’s date couched in the following terms:—

[As in No. 1.]

2. In reply I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have also approved the
recommendations of the Anglo-Yemeni Conference as set forth in your Note
and are prepared to enter into negotiations forthwith with a view to their
implementation. They will regard your Note and this reply as constituting
an agreement between the two Governments.

I have, &c.
(for the Secretary of State),

G. W. FURLONGE.

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Figure 4.12.1.6 The Anglo-Yemeni Modus Vivendi (20 January 1951)
Figure 4.12.1.7 The Anglo-Yemeni Modus Vivendi (20 January 1951)
4.12.2. On British Policy towards Yemen

Despatch ‘on the British Policy towards Yemen’ from Anthony Eden (later Sir Anthony Eden (1954) and Earl of Avon) to Mr Jacomb (Sana’a), 8 December 1951. The text is available in (Gökay, 2005: Vol.5. pp. 75-77).
Chapter III - The Yemen

Policy of His Majesty's Government Towards the Yemen

Mr. Eden to Mr. Jacomb (San'a)

(No. 4. Secret)

Foreign Office,
Sir,

8th December, 1951

On your appointment as His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires a.i. in the Yemen, I wish to set out the main objectives of His Majesty's Government's policy towards the Yemen and to give you guidance as to the course you should adopt during the interim period before the appointment of a Minister at San'a.

2. It will be your first duty to establish as close and friendly relations as possible with the Imam and with the members of the Yemeni Government, in order to prepare the way for the appointment of His Majesty's Minister, and to ensure that His Majesty's Government's point of view is represented to the Yemeni Government and their interests defended.

3. You are already familiar with the events which led to a serious deterioration in Anglo-Yemen relations during 1949, to the subsequent invitation by His Majesty's Government to the Yemeni Government to send a Mission to London in 1950 to discuss matters outstanding between the two Governments, and to the conclusion of the modus vivendi signed on 20th January, 1951. By this instrument, taken in conjunction with the Anglo-Yemen Treaty of San'a of 1934, His Majesty's Government's relations with the Government of the Yemen are regulated.

4. United Kingdom interests in the Yemen are at present small and seem likely to remain so unless and until oil or other important mineral deposits may be found in that country. Failing such a development, the policy of His Majesty's Government towards the Yemen must be primarily concerned, negatively, with the avoidance of any friction, particularly along the frontier between the Yemen and the Aden Protectorate, which might be liable to induce the Yemeni Government to make trouble for His Majesty's Government either in the United Nations or in the Arab League, and, positively, with the establishment and maintenance of the best possible relations with the Yemeni Government.

5. It seems probable that for some time to come at least most of your efforts will have to be directed towards the attainment of the former objective. The Yemeni Government's pretensions to sovereignty over large areas of the Aden Protectorate are already known to you. I am advised that these pretensions could well be resisted in international law, and I have consequently no intention of admitting any part of them. It is, however, to be anticipated that the Yemeni Government will from time to time revert to them, and may also encourage or connive at encroachments on Aden Protectorate territory in the frontier areas. It will be your duty, in close co-operation with His Excellency the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Aden, to make prompt and firm representations to the Yemeni Government when appropriate and, failing satisfaction, to report the matter to me for instructions. Any communications you may have occasion to address to the Governor of Aden on such matters should in general be repeated to me. It is, however, my hope that your personal relations with the Yemeni authorities will enable you to dissipate misunderstandings, especially those based on false information, and thus to contribute to the speedy liquidation of incidents of minor importance.

6. In this connexion, it is necessary here to consider the relevant articles of the Anglo-Yemen modus vivendi of 1951. With the establishment of His Majesty's Legation at San'a and of a Yemeni Minister in London, Article I of this instrument has been carried out. His Majesty's Government's policy in regard to the remaining Articles is as set out below.

7. Articles 3 to 7: His Majesty's Government have agreed to the establishment of a frontier commission with the terms of reference defined in Article 3 of the Agreement. Pending further instructions, however, you should not press the Yemen Government to implement this decision, since it appears that a gradual stabilisation of the position on the frontier is in fact taking place, and the Yemen Government themselves have so far shown no disposition to see the commission established in the immediate future. There may be considerable advantage in allowing

Figure 4.12.2.1 On British Policy towards Yemen
matters to follow this course, since it is unlikely that the commission will be able to agree on many of the points at issue, and it seems advisable that controversies, which might otherwise die down as a result of the better relations which you will promote, should be unnecessarily revived. Nevertheless, if the Yemeni Government should raise the matter, you should inform them that His Majesty’s Government stand ready that His Majesty’s Government so desire, and will be glad to entertain any proposals which may be put forward.

8. Article 6 of the Agreement merits special attention, and it is here necessary to make reference to Article 3 of the Anglo-Yemeni Treaty of 1934, which refers also to the maintenance of the status quo. Despite this similarity, a clear distinction must be drawn between Article 3 of the 1934 Treaty and Article 6 of the 1951 Agreement. The former, as is plainly stated in the text, refers only to the maintenance of the status quo in regard to the frontier. The Yemeni Government has persistently sought to maintain an interpretation of this Article whereby the maintenance of the status quo should apply not only to the frontier line itself but also the entire frontier areas on the Aden side of the boundary. Their attitude has been that while they have been prepared to leave their claims to the Protectorate territory beyond the frontier in abeyance for the time being, those claims nevertheless remain, and therefore the Aden authorities must refrain from taking any action in the frontier areas which might tend to consolidate their position there and prejudice eventual Yemeni claims. His Majesty’s Government have always rejected the line that such an interpretation is inadmissible from the text of the clause of the Article in question, which must be construed as referring to the frontier line only, and they have consequently refused to entertain any Yemeni complaints about internal measures in the Aden Protectorate which the Yemeni Government have based on their interpretation of this Article.

9. Article 6 of the 1951 Agreement, however, does provide that pending the conclusion of the work of the frontier commission, both Governments will refrain from taking any action which may alter the status quo existing at the time of the signature of the 1951 Agreement. In His Majesty’s Government’s view, this provision applies only to places in the immediate vicinity of the frontier, particularly those which were the subject of discussion during the Anglo-Yemeni Conference of 1950. His Majesty’s Government have faithfully observed the provisions of the Article and will continue to do so.

10. Article 8: The Yemeni Government, basing themselves on Article 6 of the 1951 Agreement, have made frequent complaints about anti-Yemeni propaganda in a newspaper published at Cardiff and in newspapers at Aden. Until now, His Majesty’s Government have been able to offer no satisfaction on this score, since the Article in question provides that such propaganda should be checked within the framework of the existing law of the country concerned. Thus, in view of the tradition of free speech in the United Kingdom and the territories which it administers abroad, and the strict legal protection which it is accorded, it has not been possible or desirable for His Majesty’s Government to intervene in the cases raised, particularly since no question of active incitement to sedition was involved. It is probable that you will find the Imam particularly sensitive on this point, and you should answer any representations that may be made to you in the foregoing sense.

11. Article 9: During the Conference of 1950, the Yemeni Delegation showed some anxiety to provide on this Article, have made an extradition agreement covering the Yemeni and the Aden Protectorate. You should know that this subject is being considered as it involves an extradition agreement and that it may be made to you in the following sense.

12. I turn now to the positive side of His Majesty’s Government’s policy. Article 2 of the modus vivendi refers to assistance by His Majesty’s Government to the Yemeni Government in economic and technical matters. It is not the intention that His Majesty’s Government should furnish financial assistance to the Yemeni Government, but that the services of the experts in the British Middle East Office should be offered to investigate questions on which the Yemeni Government think that such assistance would be valuable, and to facilitate the implementation of any recommendations that these experts may make by putting the Yemeni authorities in touch with commercial enterprises in the United Kingdom who might be prepared to carry out the work.
involved. An example of the form which assistance to the Yemeni Government under this Article may take was the provision in August of this year of medical supplies to combat an outbreak of plague, as a result of an urgent request by the Yemeni Government. On that occasion, it was possible to make a free gift of those supplies, but the Yemeni authorities should not be encouraged to expect that this will be so in every case. On all such matters you should keep in close touch with the Head of the British Middle East Office.

13. Finally, it should be noted that, owing to the previous inaccessibility of the Yemen, little information exists regarding the internal conditions of this country and it is desirable that this information should be supplemented and built up so far as conditions allow. You should, however, bear in mind that the isolation in which the population has hitherto lived, and the suspicions of foreign influence which are believed to be prevalent, are likely to make it necessary for you to proceed with considerable caution in extending your knowledge of the country by journeys and personal contacts. You should be careful to keep in the closest possible touch with the appropriate Yemeni authorities and to do everything in your power to avoid rousing suspicions that any journeys or enquiries which you may think it necessary to undertake have any motives other than the gathering of information. This applies particularly to the areas adjacent to the frontier with the Aden Protectorate. It seems probable that the provision of technical assistance referred to in the previous paragraph may on occasion provide useful opportunities for such journeys or contacts.

14. To sum up, your objectives during the coming months should be—

(a) to establish the closest possible contact with the Imam and his Ministers with a view to:

(i) resolving causes of friction, particularly in regard to the frontier with the Aden Protectorate; and

(ii) preparing the way for an eventual settlement of the frontier question between the two Governments;

(b) to prepare the way for the establishment of a duly accredited Minister to the Yemen;

(c) provide openings for technical and economic assistance which will facilitate the enhancement of British influence in the Yemen;

(d) amass information on internal conditions in the Yemen.

15. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Excellency the Governor of Aden and the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.
5.1. International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (the ‘Jeddah Treaty’ and its appendices)

The Jeddah Treaty was signed on behalf of the Yemeni Government by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning and Development, Abdul-Kader Ba-Jamal. It was ratified by the Yemeni Parliament in an exchange of ratifications.
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN AND THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA

With a view to cementing the ties of brotherhood and friendship and the links of kinship that bind the two fraternal peoples of the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,

Invoking the norms and principles of the Islamic faith they share and whose foundation is cooperation for the sake of piety and godliness,

Proceeding from the bonds woven by a common history based on cooperation and solidarity and on the promotion of security, peace and tranquillity,

Building on the distinctive character of the brotherly relations obtaining between the leaders of the two fraternal countries, namely His Excellency President Ali Abdullah Saleh of the Republic of Yemen and his fellow leader the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahd Bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia (may God preserve them), in terms of regard, candour and commitment to every means of further enhancing and strengthening the intimate relations between the two fraternal peoples, and given their concern to devise a permanent solution to the question of the land and maritime boundaries between their two countries that will be found to be satisfactory and will be preserved by succeeding generations, present and future, with respect to both the boundaries determined by the Treaty of Taif signed by the two kingdoms in A.H. 1353, corresponding to A.D. 1934, and delimited by joint commissions in the manner set forth in the boundary reports annexed to that Treaty and to those that have yet to be delimited,

Agreement has been reached as follows:

Article 1

The two contracting parties affirm that the Treaty of Taif and its annexes, including the boundary reports appended thereto, are binding and valid. They also affirm their commitment to the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the two countries on 27 Ramadan A.H. 1415 [26 February A.D. 1995].

Article 2

The definitive and permanent boundary line between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall be established as follows:

(a) First section: This section begins at the coastal marker on the Red Sea (precisely at the sea wall, Ra's al-Mu'wajj Shami, Radif Qarad outlet) at latitude 16° 24' 14.8" north and longitude 42° 46' 19.7" east, and it ends at the Jabal al-Tha'r marker at coordinates 44° 21' 58.0" east and 17° 26' 00.0" north. The coordinates [of the intermediate markers] are given in detail in annex I. The identity of the villages located along the path of the line in this section, including their tribal affiliation, shall be determined in accordance with the
provisions of the Treaty of Taif and its annexes. In the event that any of the coordinates should coincide with the location of a village, the frame of reference for establishing its possession shall be its association with one of the parties and the path of the line shall be modified accordingly when boundary markers are put in place.

(b) Second section: This is the section of the boundary line which has not been delimited. The two contracting parties have agreed to delimit this section in an amicable manner. This section begins at Jabal al-Tha’r, the coordinates of which are given above, and it ends at the intersection of latitude 19 north and longitude 52 east. Detailed coordinates [of the intermediate markers] are given in annex II.

(c) Third section: This is the maritime section of the boundary. It begins at the onshore marker on the sea coast (precisely at the sea wall, Ra’s al-Mu’awaj Shami, Radif Qarad outlet), the coordinates of which are specified above, and it terminates at the extremity of the maritime boundaries between the two countries. Detailed coordinates [of the intermediate points] are given in annex III.

Article 3

1. For the purpose of placing markers (pillars) along the boundary line beginning at the tripoint of the two countries with the Sultanate of Oman at the intersection of latitude 19 north and longitude 52 east and ending precisely at the sea wall, Ra’s Al-Muwwaj Shami, Radif Qarad outlet, the coordinates of which are given in annex I and annex II, the two contracting parties shall engage an international company to conduct a field survey of the full length of the land and maritime boundaries. The company concerned and the joint team of the two contracting parties shall adhere strictly to the distances and bearings from one point to the next and to the other specifications set forth in the boundary reports annexed to the Treaty of Taif, these provisions being binding on both parties.

2. The company concerned shall prepare detailed maps of the land boundary between the two countries, and these maps, once signed by representatives of the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, shall be recognized as official maps indicating the boundary between the two countries and shall be an integral part of this Treaty. The two contracting parties shall conclude an agreement on meeting the costs of work undertaken by the company engaged to erect the markers along the land boundary between the two countries.

Article 4

The two contracting parties undertake to abide by the terms of article 5 of the Treaty of Taif as they relate to the removal of any military position located less than five kilometres from the boundary line delimited on the basis of the boundary reports annexed to the same Treaty of Taif. The boundary line that has yet to be delimited, from Jabal al-Tha’r to the point of intersection of latitude 19 north and longitude 52 east, shall be governed by the terms of annex IV to this Treaty.
Article 5

This Treaty shall enter into force following its ratification in accordance with the procedures in effect in each of the contracting countries and the exchange of instruments of ratification by them.

For the Republic of Yemen:
ABDUL-QADER ABDUL-RAHMAN BA-JAMMAL
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:
SAUD AL-FAISAL

Minister for Foreign Affairs
Jeddah, 10 Rabı’ 1 A.H. 1421
corresponding to 12 June A.D. 2000
Annex I

Geographical coordinates of the marker positions stipulated in the boundary reports annexed to the Treaty of Taif.

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Figure 5.1.4 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (the ‘Jeddah Treaty’ and its appendices)

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### Figure 5.1.6 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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Figure 5.1.7 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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### Annex I

#### Schedule 1

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Figure 5.1.8 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Figure 5.1.9 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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Figure 5.1.10 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
### Annex I

#### Schedule 3

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**Figure 5.1.11 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**
### International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (the ‘Jeddah Treaty’ and its appendices)

**Figure 5.1.12** International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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### Figure 5.1.13 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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Annex I
Schedule 4

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Figure 5.1.14 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
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Figure 5.1.15 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
### Figure 5.1.16 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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Jabal al-Tha'r

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Figure 5.1.17 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
ANNEX III

MARITIME BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN AND THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA

1. The line begins at the onshore point along the sea coast "precisely at the sea wall, Ra's al-Muxwajj Shami, Radif Qarad outlet" at coordinates 16° 24' 14.8" north and 42° 46' 19.7" east.

2. It proceeds in a straight line parallel to the lines of latitude until it reaches the point at coordinates 16° 24' 14.8" north and 42° 09' 00.0" east.

3. It then turns to the south-west as far as the point at coordinates 16° 17' 24.0" north and 41° 47' 00.0" east.

4. From there it proceeds in a straight line parallel to the lines of latitude in a westerly direction to the extremity of the maritime boundary between the two countries.
INTERNATIONAL BORDER TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN AND THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA

ANNEX IV TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER TREATY BETWEEN THE
REPUBLIC OF YEMEN AND THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA,
CONCERNING THE REGULATION OF RIGHTS TO PASTURE, THE
POSITIONING OF ARMED FORCES BY BOTH SIDES ALONG THE SECOND
SECTION OF THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AS
ESTABLISHED BY THIS TREATY, AND THE EXPLOITATION OF SHARED
NATURAL RESOURCES ALONG THE LAND BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE
TWO COUNTRIES

Article 1

(a) The grazing zone on each side in the second section of the boundary-line indicated
in this treaty shall be established as 20 kilometres.

(b) The herdsman of the two countries may use the grazing zones and water sources
on both sides of the boundary line in this section in accordance with prevailing tribal
traditions and customs up to a depth of not more than 20 kilometres.

(c) The two contracting parties shall hold annual consultations for the designation of
crossing points for grazing purposes in accordance with prevailing conditions and pros-
pects for pasture.

Article 2

Herdsmen who are nationals of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or nationals of the Rep-
public of Yemen shall be exempt from:

(a) The regulations governing residence and passports. Such herdsmen shall be is-
issued with a transit document by their own authorities;

(b) Taxes and duties on the personal effects, foodstuffs and consumer goods that they
carry with them. This shall not prevent either of the parties from imposing customs duties
on livestock or merchandise crossing for purposes of trade.

Article 3

Each contracting party may impose the restrictions and controls it deems appropriate
on the number of vehicles crossing into its territory with the herdsmen and on the type and
number of firearms that may be carried subject to their licensing by the relevant authorities
of the two countries and the identification of those carrying them.

Article 4

In the event of an outbreak of contagious disease in livestock, each party may take the
necessary preventive measures and impose restrictions on the importation and exportation
of infected animals. The relevant authorities in both countries shall cooperate to the extent
possible in limiting the spread of the disease.
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Article 5

Neither contracting party may deploy its armed forces within 20 kilometres of the second section of the boundary line indicated in this Treaty. Activity by either party on either side shall be limited to the dispatch of mobile security patrols armed with regular weapons.

Article 6

In the event of the discovery of a recoverable and exploitable shared natural resource on the boundary line between the two countries from precisely at the sea wall, Ra's al-Mu'waj Shami, Radif Qarad outlet, to the point of intersection of latitude 19 north and longitude 52 east the two contracting parties shall undertake the necessary negotiations between them for the joint exploitation of that resource.

Article 7

This annex shall be an integral part of the Treaty and shall be ratified in accordance with the procedures in effect in each country.

Figure 5.1.20 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
PROCÈS-VERBAL OF RECTIFICATION

In view of the fact that there are certain typographical in the text of the International Boundary Treaty between the and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and in its four annexes, the corresponding corrections being as follows:

1. In article 3, paragraph 1, of the Treaty - the omission of the words "and annex II" after "annex I"; and their handwritten insertion, with accompanying signatures, into the body of the Treaty;

2. In annex II - the transposition of the words "North" and "East"; and the reversal of this transposition;

3. In annex III - the formally incorrect sequence in which the elements of the coordinates for the maritime boundary are given (in the Arabic text); and its reversal;

4. In annex IV - the occurrence, by typographical error of the word "Agreement" in place of the word "Treaty"; and its correction - and the transposition of the words "North" and "East"; and its reversal;

The necessary corrections have accordingly been made to of the Treaty and its annexes.

In Witness Whereof, this Procès-verbal was signed in two be retained by each State, on Tuesday, 2 Rabi' II A.D. 1421, corresponding to 4 July A.D. 2000.

Signed at Sana'a,

For the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:
SAUD AL-FAISAL
Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the Government of the Republic of Yemen:
ABDUL-QADER ABDUL - RAHMAN BA - JAMMAL
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (the ‘Jeddah Treaty’ and its appendices)

Figure 5.1.22 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Figure 5.1.23 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (the 'Jeddah Treaty' and its appendices)

Figure 5.1.24 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Figure 5.1.24 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
الحدود الفاصلة بين البلدين وتصبح جزءاً لا يتجزأً من هذه المعاهدة،
وعن موقع الطرفان المعاهدان على اتفاق حول تحليته تكاليف أعمال
الشركة المكلفة بتشكيل العلامات على طول خط الحدود البرية الفاصل بين
البلدين،

المادة (4) :

تؤكد الطرفان المعاهدان التزامهما بالأخلاقيات ومعاهدة الالتزامات
كما أنها تتعلق بإخلاء أي موقع عسكري تقل مساحته عن خمسة كيلومترات
على طول خط الحدود المرسم بناءً على تقارير الحدود الملحقة بمعاهدة الالتزامات.
أما بالنسبة لخط الحدود الذي لم يتم ترميمه بدأ من جبل النار حتى نقطة تقاطع
خط عرض (91) شمالاً مع خط طول (52) شرقاً في حكم ملحق رقم (44)
المرفق بهذه المعاهدة.

المادة (5) :

توصى هذه المعاهدة طابع المفعول بعد التصديق عليها طبقاً للإجراءات
المتبعة في كل من البلدين المعاهدين وتبادل رغبات التصديق عليها من قبل
الدولتين.

من المملكة العربية السعودية

السعود الفيصل
وزير الخارجية

محمد بن نايف بن عبد العزيز
نائب رئيس مجلس الوزراء
وزير الداخلية

جدة 1431/6/16
الموافق 2012/8/26م

Figure 5.1.25 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
محضر اجتماع

 بشأن إجراء بعض التصحيحات

نظراً لوجود بعض الأخطاء المطبعية والشكلية في معاهدة الحدود الدولية بين الجمهورية اليمنية والملكة العربية السعودية وملحقاتها الأربعة، وتمثل هذه الأخطاء التي جرى تصويبها على النحو التالي:

1- في نص المعاهدة المادة رقم (3) فقرة (1) وهو عدم وضع [والملحق رقم (2)] بعد الملحق رقم (1)، وقد جرى إضافة ذلك بخط اليد في صلب المعاهدة، وجرى التوقيع عليه.

2- في الملحق رقم (2) ورد خطأً مطبعي بوضع كلمة [شماليات] وكلمة [شرقية] كلها مكان الأخر، وتم التصحيح.

3- في الملحق رقم (3) وجد خطأ شرقي ب عدم ترتيب إحداثيات خط الحدود البحرية، وقد تم ترنيتها على النحو الصحيح.


وإلى ذلك تم توقيع هذا المعهد من نسختين آصليتين احتفظت كل دولة بنسخة منهما، وذلك في يوم الثلاثاء الثاني من شهر ربيع الآخر من عام 1421 هـ الموافق لليوم الرابع من شهر يوليو من عام 2000 م.

وقت بصنعاء:

الجمهورية اليمنية

عبد القادر عبد الرؤف باجمل
نائب رئيس الوزراء - وزير الخارجية

الملكة العربية السعودية

سعود الويصل
وزير الخارجية

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Figure 5.1.26 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
5.2. Memorandum of Understanding (26 April 1995)

The MoU was formally accepted by the two governments, and signed by only one representative of each country. It was signed on behalf of the Yemeni Government by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning and Development, Abdul-Kader Ba-Jamal. It was however not treated as an international treaty and was consequently not ratified by the Yemeni Parliament.
Memorandum of Understanding (26 April 1995)

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
مذكرة تفاهم

بين حكومة المملكة العربية السعودية وحكومة الجمهورية اليمنية
رغبة في تسهيل وتحسن أوضاع العلاقات الأخوية بين المملكة
العربية السعودية والجمهورية اليمنية وتعزيزهما المشترك.
فقد اتفق الطران على ما يلي:

المادة الأولى:

. يؤكد الطران تمسكهما بشرعية والزامية للاطاعة للمعاوضة الموقعة في
النادي من شعب صفر سنة ١٣٥٢ ه. الموافق ٧ مايو لسنة ١٩٣٤م
وملاحظها وهي المعروفة باسم "المعاهدة الطائف" (التي يشار إليها
لاحقا باسم المعاهدة).

المادة الثانية:

. تشكل لجنة مشتركة من عدد مشاو من الطرفين خلال مدة لاتتجاوز
ثلاثين يوماً لتحديد الاتصالات المشتركة طبقاً لتقارير
الحدود الملحقة بالمذكرة المذكورة متوافقة منها والمتذكرة وذلك ابتداء من
نقطة الحدود (رصيف البحر) تمامًا رأس المعوض شامي ومنفذ ريف
قراز) بين ميدي والموسوس وحتى آخر نقطة بين تسعونها في جبل
الثام. واستخدام الوسائل العلمية الحديثة للاطاعة للعلامات (البارات)
عليها وذلك بالاتفاق مع شركة متخصصة لتفتيش ذلك يتم اختيارها
من قبل الطرفين وتقوم الشركة بعملها تحت إشراف اللجنة.

المادة الثالثة:

. تستمر اللجنة الحالية المشتركة من البلدين في عملها لتحديد
الإجراءات اللازمة والعوامل التي تؤدي إلى ترميم ماتبقى من

Figure 5.2.1 Memorandum of Understanding (26 April 1995)
Memorandum of Understanding (26 April 1995)

Figure 5.2.2 Memorandum of Understanding (26 April 1995)
Figure 5.2.3 Memorandum of Understanding (26 April 1995)
No. 43166

Saudi Arabia
and
Yemen

Memorandum of understanding between the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the Republic of Yemen. Mecca, 26 February 1995

Entry into force: 15 May 1995 by the exchange of instruments of ratification, in accordance with article 10

Authentic text: Arabic

Registration with the Secretariat of the United Nations: Saudi Arabia, 9 October 2006

Arabie saoudite
et
Yémen

Mémorandum d’accord entre le Gouvernement du Royaume d’Arabie saoudite et le Gouvernement de la République du Yémen. La Mecque, 26 février 1995

Entrée en vigueur : 15 mai 1995 par échange des instruments de ratification, conformément à l’article 10

Texte authentique : arabe


Figure 5.2.4 Memorandum of Understanding (26 April 1995)
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARAB AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Desiring to promote and strengthen the brotherly bonds between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen and their brotherly peoples, the Two Parties have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Two Parties confirm their commitment to the legality and binding Treaty of Taif signed on the 6th of Safar 1353H, corresponding to the 20th of May 1934, and its annexes, which is known as "Treaty of Taif" (referred to hereinafter as "the Treaty").

Article 2

A joint committee of an equal number of members from the two parties shall be formed within a period not exceeding thirty days. Its task shall be to renew existing and erased markers established in accordance with the border reports annexed to the Treaty, starting from the border point (Rasif al Bahar Tamaman Ra'sal Mu'awwaj Shami Li Manfadh Radif Qirad) between Midi and al Muwassam until the last point previously demarcated at Jabal ath Thar, and to use modern scientific means to install the marks (pillars) thereon. A specialized company, chosen by the Two Parties, shall be contracted to execute the said task under the committee's supervision.

Article 3

The current committee formed by the two countries shall continue its work to determine the necessary procedures and steps which lead to the demarcation of the rest of the borders starting from Jabal ath Thar until the end of the borders of the two countries, including agreement on how to seek arbitration in case of disagreement between the two countries.

Article 4

A joint committee shall be formed to negotiate the designation of maritime borders in accordance with international law, starting from the border point on coast mentioned in Article 2 above.
Article 5

A joint high-ranking military committee from both parties shall be formed to ensure that no installations or military movements or others take place on the borders between the two countries.

Article 6

A joint ministerial committee shall be formed to promote economic, commercial and cultural ties between the two countries and to enhance mutual cooperation between them. This committee shall start its work within thirty days from the date of signing this Memorandum of Understanding "Memorandum".

Article 7

A joint high committee shall be appointed to work towards achieving the aforementioned, facilitate the work of the said committees, and remove any obstacles or difficulties that might arise during the course of their assignments.

Article 8

Each of the two countries affirms its commitment not to permit the use of its country as a base and center for carrying out aggression against the other staging any political, military or propaganda activities against the other.

Article 9

In order to continue maintaining the friendly atmosphere necessary for the success of talks, each party shall be obliged not to carry out any hostile propaganda against the other party.

Article 10

This Memorandum contains no amendment to the "Treaty of Taif" and its annexes, including the border reports.

Article 11

All matters discussed by the said committees shall be recorded in signed by the officials of the two sides.
This Memorandum was signed in Mecca on Sunday, the 27th of Ramadhan 1415AH, corresponding to the 26th of February 1995, and shall become effective date of exchanging its ratification documents.

For the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:
Special Advisor to the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques
IBRAHIM BIN ABDULLAH AL ANGERI

For the Government of the Republic of Yemen:
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning and Development
ABDULQADER ABDURRAHMAN BAJAMMAL
[Signed on 27/9/1415 SH]

Figure 5.2.7 Memorandum of Understanding (26 April 1995)
5.3. Daham Tribe Rejects the Jeddah Border Treaty and Threatens Demarcation Companies

This statement, issued by the Dahm Al-Ḥamraa tribe, affirms that the tribe would not allow any demarcation company to work on its land according to the Jeddah border treaty signed between Yemen and Saudi Arabia in 2000.

Here is a summary of the statement:

“We are awaiting a just solution to the issue of our land and tribal borders as illustrated by the documents beforehand, a copy of which has been handed to the President, which includes: verdicts by the Sheriff of Nijran In 1027 and 1130 Hijirah, a verdict by the Sheriff of Mecca Abdulqader bin Abdulhameed in 1182, etc. and other documents. After we have notified the leadership of Saudi Arabia about our legal and ancestral right to our land that we inherited from our grandfathers 400 years ago, we were totally surprised to hear about the company assigned to demarcate the borders. Despite our appeal to the leadership of the two countries to seriously consider our problem we have been ignored and neglected. Therefore, we find ourselves forced to forbid any company from working on our land. At the same time we trust that there are still opportunities for those who are determined to solve the problem before the aforementioned company starts its activities”.

For and on behalf of Sheikhs and tribesmen of Daham Al-Ḥamraa Tribe Yahya b. Abdullah Al-Shayef (Yemen Times, 18- April 2001).
Daham Tribe Rejects the Jeddah Border Treaty and Threatens Demarcation Companies

Figure 5.3.1 Daham Tribe Rejects the Jeddah Border Treaty and Threatens Demarcation Companies
6.1. **Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)**

Unlike the years since June 2000, 2012 was completely different. Several groups of Yemeni activists and lawyers announced the establishment of what they called the ‘Asir Movement’ and the ‘Yemeni Organisation for the Restoration of Sovereignty’ (*siadah*). It defines its aims as the liberation the Yemeni territories from Saudi Arabian occupation and to enhance Yemeni domestic awareness of their rights to the territories under Saudi occupation as a prelude to the establishment of civil and public rejection of both the Taif and Jeddah Treaties.

The inflammation of the situation in 2012 is certainly linked to the uncertainty regarding the Saudi position towards the revolt against President Saleh that erupted in 2011, and which culminated in him being forced to step down from power by the end of that year. This was despite the fact that Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries played a significant role in precipitating Saleh’s departure, including in their GCC initiative and its operational mechanism (based upon which President Ali Abdullah Saleh transferred his authorities to Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, the Vice President). Despite the importance of the Saudi role and support during such a difficult time the territorial issue resurfaced onto the political arena.

These developments, however, prove the argument advanced in this thesis that the Saudi-Yemeni dilemma is more than just a boundary dispute. Significantly, Saudi Arabia was blamed because the developments in June and July 2012 had coincided with the publication of reports detailing (by *Al-Ahali* newspaper) the amounts the Saudis had been spending through ‘The Special Office for Yemen Affairs’. It is alleged that the list of names receiving such a regular payment comprises important politicians in Yemen, including the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the sons of Sheikh Al-Ahmer, as well as many others.
Nevertheless, those who denounced the agreement over the boundary dispute made explicit the links between their position on the treaty and their views on a number of other matters. For instance, among the issues brought to light in addition to the territorial issue was the legality of Saudi Arabia’s building of a barrier along its boundary with Yemen. In addition, attention was drawn to reports of Saudi mistreatment of Yemeni migrants in the Kingdom.
Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)

Figure 6.1.1 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)
Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)
Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)
Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)

Figure 6.1.4 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)
Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)
Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)

Figure 6.1.6 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)
Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)
Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)

Figure 6.1.8 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)
Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)
Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)

اسأل نفسك: ما هو دور المساند في مشوارنا؟

مراجعات مرجعية:

Yemen Organization for the restoration of soverignty

Figure 6.1.10 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)
Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)
Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)
Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)

Figure 6.1.13 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)
Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)
Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)
Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)

Figure 6.1.16 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)
Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)

Figure 6.1.17 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)
Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)

Figure 6.1.18 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)
Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)

Figure 6.1.19 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called ‘The Asir Movement’, Sana (June and July 2012)
6.2. Minutes of meeting between Prince Muhammed bin Naif, Saudi Assistant Minister of Interior, and James B. Smith, U.S. Ambassador at Riyadh (12 January 2010)
Figure 6.2.1 Minutes of meeting between Prince Muhammed bin Naif, Saudi Assistant Minister of Interior, and James B. Smith, U.S. Ambassador at Riyadh (12 January 2010)
about Al-Qaeda operations originating from Yemen and praised the Yemeni government’s successful December attacks against Al-Qaeda operatives. The meeting was followed by a lunch and a briefing on the situation on the Saudi-Yemeni border.

WE MUST KEEP AL-QAIDA ON THE RUN

2. (S) General Jones noted that the attempted bombing of a U.S. aircraft on December 25 is another reminder that we are passing through difficult times. He assured Prince Mohammed that while the U.S. recognizes that screening procedures can be improved, the U.S. has confidence that the systems in place are basically sound. The General also noted that terrorism concerns seem to be spreading beyond Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, and now are being heard from governments in North Africa, particularly Niger, Mali, Morocco, and Algeria.

3. (S) Prince Mohammed responded that we are likely to see many more attacks like the December 25 incident. He also noted that the Saudi experience against Al-Qaeda demonstrates that the best response is to "keep them on the run." Right after the 9/11 attacks, he noted, nearly eighty percent of the mosques in Saudi Arabia voiced support for Bin Laden. That is when the Saudi leadership realized how dire the problem they faced was. Over the last 6 years of combating Al-Qaeda inside Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom has foiled many Al-Qaeda plots and in the process learned that we must not only to fight Al-Qaeda "in the field," but also to counter their ideology in order to curtail recruitment.

4. (S/NI) In this light, the recent attack against Al-Qaeda in Yemen "was very positive." Prince Mohammed noted that the Saudis have been monitoring conversations of Al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen very closely, and whereas before the attack they were hearing relaxed 20-minute phone conversations over cell phones, after the attack the phones went virtually silent. This suggests that at least for now these operatives are more focused on their own security rather than on planning operations.

SAUDI CONCERNS ON YEMEN
that it is willing to effectively trade a guaranteed oil supply in return for Chinese pressure on Iran to develop nuclear weapons.

79. (S/NF) COUNTERING IRAN: We expect that Saudi Arabia will continue to develop its ties with China, in part to counterbalance relations with the West. While the King's preference is to cooperate with the U.S., he has concluded that he needs to proceed with his own strategy to counter the perceived threat of Iran. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia are working to establish an informal Riyadh-Cairo-Damascus coordination, supporting Palestinian reconciliation, and expanding relations with non-traditional partners such as Russia, China, and India to create diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran that do not directly depend on U.S. help.

The King told General Jones that if Iran succeeded in developing nuclear weapons, everyone in the region would do the same, including Saudi Arabia.

110. (S/NF) The King is convinced that current U.S. engagement efforts with Tehran will not succeed; he is likely to feel that the U.S. needs to focus more on pressuring Iran to the point that having successfully enriched uranium to a level of 20% by the end of 2010, Iran is now a nuclear nation. The King further told General Jones that Iran's internal turmoil presented an opportunity to weaken the regime—which he described as not being productive. He also urged that this be done covertly and stressed to the public statements in support of the reformers were counterproductive. The King assessed that sanctions could help weaken the government, but only if they were sustained. The King will want to elaborate on the statement that the time for sanctions is over.

111. (C) CLIMATE CHANGE: Your visit offers an important opportunity to head off a serious clash over climate change. Saudi officials are very concerned that a climate change treaty would significantly reduce their income just as they face significant costs to diversify their economy. We want to get beyond the obstructionism that Saudi negotiators have shown during the negotiations and persuade leaders to work with us in a partnership to meet a range of challenges, including by cooperating in developing renewable energy sources and seeking to avoid Saudi Arabia being singled out as the bad actor, particularly on environmental issues. Your conveying the importance of the President's places on working as partners with Saudi Arabia on the Copenhagen process will be important in making this dialogue more constructive. Secretary Chu intends to explore specific areas of collaboration during his February 21-22 visit.

SAUDI REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

112. (S) PREVENTING A COLLAPSE OF YEMEN: Saudi participation in bilateral and multilateral efforts to stabilize Yemen reflects Saudi fears that instability on its southern border is clear and presents risks to the country. The King will stress that Yemen's strategic location makes an Al-Qaeda presence more threatening than in Afghanistan; he will stress the need to support Yemeni unity, despite his mistrust of President Saleh's regime. With respect to Saudi involvement in supporting the Houthis, the King will stress that the SAG's willingness to support Al-Qaeda facilitates the spread of the threat. The Houthis, he will say, are not a threat to the Kingdom's security. On the other hand, the Houthis are posing a significant threat to Yemeni unity, and this is a major concern for the King.

113. (C) GEOSTRATEGY AFTER ALL?: The King appreciates the President's commitment to Middle East peace and the fact that the U.S. can bring sufficient and sustained pressure to bear on Iran, especially regarding settlements. The King told General Jones that he was not sure if President Obama was willing to pressure Israel, and that Saudi officials have rebuffed U.S. requests to help in the Middle East peace process. The King has been cautious in his approach to confidence-building gestures to help restart negotiations. Despite his adamant rhetoric, however, several senior Saudi officials have hinted at a willingness to make some gestures, possibly including an offer of a private Jeddah-based tank run by a retired Saudi general, who has been quietly participating in several of these discussions, apparently with SAG knowledge, and even put forward a proposal on a GAZA encounter that has provoked some controversy in the region, former Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Prince Turki Al-Faisal, and now Prime Minister, has been participating in these discussions with his close ties to Saudi Arabia and his past role in Middle East peace efforts. The King has also been working with the U.S. to build a “senior Saudi diplomat” issuing a statement urging the U.S. to continue its diplomatic efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement.

114. (S/NF) AFGHANISTAN/Pakistan: King Abdullah firmly believes that Asif Zardari is the primary obstacle to the government's ability to move unilaterally to end terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan, which he described as being controlled by the Taliban. The King told General Jones that his development assistance would rebuild trust with the Army, which he asserted was staying out of politics in deference to the government's ability to move unilaterally to end terrorist safe havens there. The King has expressed support for the new U.S.
10. (C) General Jones described the administration's current thinking on Iran, noting that Iran has failed to enter into a serious dialogue with the international community about its nuclear program. With the deadline of the end of the year now passed, it is time to start looking at sanctions. Prince Mohammed said Saudi Arabia remains greatly concerned about Iran's nuclear program and noted that there is now a big crack in the Iranian government, particularly following the recent attack on Karroubi. (Embassy note: Opposition leader Mehdi Karroubi's car was fired upon on January 9, an attack that oppositionist attribute to Iran's Revolutionary Guard. End note.)

High Marks for U.S.-Saudi Counterterrorism Cooperation

11. (C) General Jones asked Prince Mohammed if there was anything needed from the U.S. to improve our counterterrorism coordination. Prince Mohammed responded that King Abdullah has made very clear that U.S.-Saudi security cooperation must remain independent of political buffeting. He said that our cooperation is very good, and has developed to the point that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are in "simultaneous mode" regarding the sharing of raw data and threat information. Gen. Jones remarked that Prince Mohammed has played an important role in bringing about this strong security relationship, and conveyed President Obama's appreciation for this strong partnership.

Comment

12. (S) We note that Prince Mohammed did not raise the matter of recently introduced heightened screening procedures on Saudi citizens. While we have heard that these new measures provoked strong reactions from some in the Saudi leadership, the absence of any expressions of concern or upset on Prince Mohammed part is fully in keeping with his reputation as one who fully understands the difficulty of maneuvering against extremist elements to prevent attacks. The Embassy views this meeting as
5. (S) Prince Mohammed said that the Saudi government has been watching with great concern Al-Qaida’s growth in Yemen over the last five years. Yemen’s geography makes it a much more convenient place for Al-Qaida operations. Not only does the mountainous terrain help them hide, but the shoreline also gives them an ability to move over the water - extending their potential reach much further abroad.

6. (C) One of Al-Qaida’s objectives in its confrontation with Saudi Arabia, Prince Mohammed explained is "to control Mecca and Medina." He said that they want to be able to control who makes the Hajj, and if they were able to do so, they would limit the visits of those coming to the Hajj to one week, something that could cause chaos. (Embassy note: Among Al-Qaida’s basic objectives is its call to "liberate" the Islamic holy sites from the corrupt hands of the Al Saud, but this is the first time we have heard a Saudi official point out the more specific goal of limiting how long Muslims can visit the holy places as part of their Hajj. End note.)

7. (C) Prince Mohammed also noted that Saudi Arabia has been making an effort to seal the Saudi-Yemen border, noting that "we have been arresting between one to two thousand people each day." He also admitted that the Saudis have maintained a common practice of feeding those caught crossing before transporting them back across the border. "We need to change that," he went on, since many may be crossing the border only to get a meal. Prince Mohammed pointed out that a key feature of the Saudi approach to undermine Al-Qaida’s growth in Yemen is to bolster the central government, in particular with substantial financial assistance. A Saudi-Yemeni Council meets twice a year to review development projects in Yemen funded by Saudi Arabia. However, up to now, he reported, the Saudis have not been satisfied with the distribution of these development and infrastructure projects because the Yemeni government has been concentrating them in Sanaa and other urban areas. The Saudis now insist on having a say in distributing these infrastructure investments with remote areas receiving priority "to give the
accomplishing the important objective of reinforcing our strong counterterrorism cooperation. As is evident from his brief responses to Gen. Jones' briefs on Iran and Afghanistan/Pakistan, these issues are ones on which Prince Mohammed carefully defers to the King. SMITH

Figure 6.2.6 Minutes of meeting between Prince Muhammed bin Naif, Saudi Assistant Minister of Interior, and James B. Smith, U.S. Ambassador at Riyadh (12 January 2010)
6.3. **Despatch from the U.S. Ambassador at Riyadh to Secretary Clinton on her visit to Saudi Arabia in February 2010 (10 February 2010)**
Despatch from the U.S. Ambassador at Riyadh to Secretary Clinton on her visit to Saudi Arabia in February 2010 (10 February 2010)
acknowledged the pressing need for systemic reforms to combat extremist ideology and provide for a rapidly expanding population. The annual growth rate is about 2 percent. King Abdullah’s strategy is two-pronged: he has attacked the roots of extremism by implementing a series of education, judicial, and social reforms to weaken the influence of the most reactionary elements of Saudi Arabia’s religious establishment. He is also promoting economic diversification. The King is keenly aware of the urgent need to make Saudi education more relevant to today’s workplace and increase the role of women in the economy, goals which remain controversial in this deeply conservative, inward-looking desert kingdom. Guided by a vision that embraces modernity and pragmatism, albeit within the bounds of the royal family’s personal code of conduct, King Abdullah has begun to implement an ambitious plan to transform Saudi Arabia’s economy away from excessive reliance on hydrocarbons and towards a knowledge-based economy that can provide sustainable development for the long-term. Achieving these goals will require nothing short of a permanent and comprehensive transformation of state and society, and changes in most aspects of Saudi society, especially the status of women.

65. (9) Seen from the outside, the pace of political reform remains glacial; it is notable exception is that achieved after the WTO negotiations have been very fast for any country; regulatory agencies are also standing up quickly. Yet for certain elements of Saudi society, the changes are coming too fast. Whatever the pace, however, the reality is that Saudi interests now shape the debate over the country’s future. Recent political and social reforms include a re-shuffling the Ministry of Education’s leadership last February (including in the King’s pro-reform son-in-law as the new minister); a top-to-bottom restructuring of the country’s courts to include, among other things, review of judicial decisions and more professional training for Shari’a judges; the creation of a new investment promotion agency to overhaul the once-corrupt process of starting a business here; the launch of a bold project to build on the previous period’s success in the construction of the King Abdullah University for Science and Technology (the country’s new flagship and controversially-oodles institution for advanced scientific research) and a substantial budgeted investment in educating the workforce for future jobs. The Saudi government is also encouraging the development of non-hydrocarbon sectors in which the Kingdom has a comparative advantage, including mining, solar energy, and religious tourism. The investment in the religious infrastructure is particularly notable. The King has increased the country’s total budgeted expenditure by 25 percent is devoted to education alone -- and amounts to a significant economic stimulus package.

U.S. PARTNERSHIPS TO SUPPORT \n\nPEACE & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

77. (BU) Saudi officials have been candid in stressing the importance they place on strong ties to help them meet reform challenges, both through increased engagement with the international community, including new strategic partnerships, exchanges and more TDI, particularly in energy, high tech, and manufacturing. The past year has seen several investments by prominent U.S. firms in advanced technology areas, and we are working to raise the profile of our trade and investment relations, including through a major Saudi exhibition in Chicago at the end of April. The Saudi government has also increased its cooperation in health, science & technology, entrepreneurship, and civil society, with a new agreement in the offing. There are now more than 25,000 Saudi students studying in the US, exceeding pre-9/11 levels. Public health engagement has included breast cancer awareness campaigns, cooperation to set up an advanced epidemic screening network that protected this year, a 3 million Hajj pilgrimage. Our Science & Technology umbrella agreement is already expanding cooperation, including new projects with NASA. Continuing conversations about American values and in fact a broader portfolio of Saudi judges, leadership development for women, prevention of violence against women and children, and youth engagement and study. One female participant in our Social Entrepreneurship Forum was a finalist in the 2009 Global Student Entrepreneur Awards. She and seven other Saudi entrepreneurs will attend the President’s April summit. Mosaic elements have also provided training to help the SAG implement a new law to combat trafficking in personsabroad. The King has also taken steps to toughen the Saudi legal system. You will want to congratulate Saudi officials for the significant progress Saudi Arabia has made over the last several years in improving IPP protection, which resulted in the Special 301 Committee deciding to remove Saudi Arabia from the Watch List.

SAUDI STRATEGIC CALCULATIONS

78. (C) TURNING EAST: Saudi Arabia is trying to come to terms with the shift in global energy and trade ties towards Asia, with significant investments in Pakistan and China, which has both political and economic consequences. Bilateral trade with China has more than tripled, and China will soon be Saudi Arabia’s largest importer. Saudi Arabia has also committed significant investments in China, including the $8 billion Fujian refinery. Increased trade has also brought increased friction, including anti-dumping complaints from both sides. Saudi Arabia is China’s largest supplier of oil, which is a key location for these expanded trade ties to achieve important political goals. In this regard, Saudi Arabia has told the Chinese
Despatch from the U.S. Ambassador at Riyadh to Secretary Clinton on her visit to Saudi Arabia in February 2010 (10 February 2010)

that it is willing to effectively trade a guaranteed oil supply in return for Chinese pressure on Iran not to develop nuclear weapons.

SARGODHA: We expect that Saudi Arabia will continue to develop its ties with China, in part to counterbalance relations with the West. While the King's preference is to cooperate with the U.S, he has concluded that he needs to proceed with his own strategy to counterbalance the West. He has been particularly critical of the U.S. Ambassador, who has been a vocal critic of his regime. The King told General Jones that if Iran succeeded in developing nuclear weapons, everyone in the region would do the same.

10. (DF/PP) The King is convinced that current U.S. engagement efforts with Tehran will not succeed; he is likely to feel grimly vindicated in his view by Ahmadinejad's February 11. Boost that having successfully enriched uranium to a level of 3.5% before May 2010, Iran will be able to use its own technology to produce bomb-grade plutonium. The King also expects that the U.S. will be less willing to help weaken the government, but only if they are strong and sustained. The King will want to emphasize this point in his upcoming discussions with Secretary Clinton. The King would not want to have any plan for stabilizing Gulf or global oil prices. For that, he can rely on the U.S. to have invited General Petraeus to his desert camp for discussion on this topic on Tuesday. You will offer an important opportunity to head off a serious clash over climate change. Saudi officials are very concerned that a climate change treaty would significantly reduce their income just as they face significant costs to diversify their economy. We want to make clear that while the same are important, they have often been shown during the negotiations and persuade senior leaders to work with us in a partnership to meet their strategic concerns, including by cooperating on developing solar and nuclear energy. The King is particularly sensitive to the issue of nuclear energy and has been active in international deals on energy cooperation, particularly on environmental issues. Your convey the importance in the President's places on working a partners with our government to ensure that the outcome of this summit will be beneficial to all. You will also discuss this during your meeting with Secretary Clinton in making this dialogue with constructive. I hope to explore specific areas of collaboration during his February 21-23 visit.

SAUDI REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

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strategy, saying that spending on roads, schools, hospitals and mosques would dissipate popular mistrust and help rebuild the country. The King has not yet acknowledged the Saudi role in Taliban mediation in conversations with USG officials; GIP Director Prince Muqrin has explained to several recent USG visitors that the SAG prefers to keep such discussions in intelligence channels until any agreement is reached. Perhaps reflecting this, the Saudi media downplayed President Karzai’s recent visit and the Afghan Ambassador reported that the meeting with the King lasted only ten minutes.

A NOTE ABOUT THE KING

§15. (C) The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques will offer you a traditional Saudi welcome at the desert “encampment” outside Riyadh, where he likes to spend his winter vacations. You will find in 86-year old King Abdullah a wry and forthright interlocutor. Having struggled with a speech impediment throughout his life, he tends to express himself tersely. Reflecting his Bedouin roots, he judges his counterparts on the basis of character, honesty, and trust. He expects commitments to be respected and sees actions, not words, as the true test of commitment; and he expects good-faith consultations, not surprises. Once the King has lost trust in a counterpart, as has been the case with Nouri Al-Maliki or Asif Zardari, his personal antipathy can become a serious obstacle to bilateral relations. On the other hand, as with President Obama, the King’s esteem will help navigate differences and at times change policies. The King is undoubtedly looking forward to his discussions with you, and Mission Saudi Arabia enthusiastically looks forward to supporting your visit.

MISSION STAFFING

§16. (U) The U.S. Mission in Saudi Arabia includes Embassy Riyadh, and Consulates General in Jeddah and Dammam. The entire Mission, representing ten agencies, consists of 605 staff (212 U.S. Direct Hire (USDH) and 393 Locally Engaged RYADH 000000178 005 OF 005 (LR) staff).

SMITH

Figure 6.3.4 Despatch from the U.S. Ambassador at Riyadh to Secretary Clinton on her visit to Saudi Arabia in February 2010 (10 February 2010)