The Foundations Of Hallyu – K-Pop’s Coming Of Age

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We are, collectively, still struggling to come to terms with *Hallyu*, Korean Wave. This is seen in the multitude of contrasting perspectives that have been applied by journalists and academics alike since the turn of the new millennium. There is a lack of consensus, and perspectives run from fear and criticism by what Cho Hae-joang calls the postcolonial camp, through pride and celebration in what is happening (Cho’s nationalist camp), to economic planning (the neoliberal camp; Cho Hae-joang 2005).\(^1\) The three camps seem to trend chronologically in the order given here,\(^2\) but are no longer sufficient now that Korean Wave has spread to the world beyond Asia. Indeed, recent foreign commentaries about the economy of Korean Wave have diverged, often markedly, from Korean accounts of its global popularity. New models are needed, one of which, Ingyu Oh and Gil-Sung Park’s supply chain model (2012), seems to have considerable utility.\(^3\) Their theory throws out existing, albeit dated, accounts of the music industry, and demonstrates how the internationalization of Korean Wave moves the industry from a fan-oriented service business (B2C) to business servicing (B2B). Our accounts do, though, agree on key moments in Korean Wave: 1999, when the term, *hallyu*, began to be used; 2003 when “Winter Sonata” reached Japan; 2008 or shortly after when Korean pop again moved into a global frame; and 2012 as the date when Psy conquered YouTube.

Whatever our perspective, though, let us start with a celebration: a celebration of those in the cultural industries who in recent years have made Korea *cool*. During the more than 30 years of my involvement with Korean Studies, I have always struggled to counter the abiding images of Korea held in Europe and America: images of poverty and destruction in the Korean War that are still perpetuated by repeated broadcasts of MASH, images of a bellicose and threatening North, images of student demonstrations and striking workers, and, in terms of industry, images of cars, computers and mobile phones considered slightly inferior to those made in Japan. This, bluntly, is no longer the case. Korean Wave is so fashionable that its coolness

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\(^1\) The three camps are also discussed by Keehyeung Lee (2008: 180–88), referencing an earlier article by Cho (2002) and a paper by W. Paik (2005).

\(^2\) The three camps all remain, as interviewees in KBS World’s 2013 documentary, “*Hallyu taejŏnhwan*/The Great Transformation of Korean Wave”, illustrate. Documentary available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnmvHf9kIv4&list=PLMf7VY8La5RHiqsrzlNX2O9hD0YOwu_I&index=3 (accessed 5 October 2013). I thank Anna Yates for alerting me to this, which appears in her forthcoming paper, “The Korean Wave in Britain”.

\(^3\) In some ways, this model corresponds to discussions of branding that have featured in a number of conference presentations in recent years; see, e.g., Eunkyoung Han, Woosung Chang and Gabshin Hwang 2008.
has transferred to Korean industrial production, to the products of Samsung, LG, Hyundai, Kia and more, much as if the “Cool Britannia” of 15 years ago in my country is being repeated – but hopefully in a more successful manner – here in Korea. And, as Korea has become cool, so universities around the globe have seen increases in student demand for Korea-related courses. So, as a university professor, I have to start this presentation with a “thank you” for Korean Wave.

Increasingly, the beginnings of Korean Wave are situated within our accounts by the arrival of the term, hallyu, linking to Korean exports to China – where the term originated – and Taiwan. They link to the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, a time when it is said that the devaluation of the Korean won made Korean cultural products affordable across the region. However, the ability of Korea’s cultural producers to take advantage of the opportunities that suddenly appeared was facilitated because they were primed and ready to do so. They were prepared because consumption and production had changed in the early 1990s, making Korea’s recorded music industry, for example, the second largest in Asia. In this paper, then, I am going to track back in time, to explore the foundations of Korean Wave in terms of the seismic shifts that hit Korea’s cultural production around 1990. This was the period when democracy bedded in, and when Korea took its place on the international stage. Commentaries outside Korea on Korean cultural production, though, proved slow to notice any change and, until very recently, have been inadequate, perhaps because the peninsula long remained on the periphery of global consciousness.

Indeed, my edited volume, Korean Pop Music: Riding the Wave (2006), was the first book-length consideration of Korean pop in English. I noted in its introduction that my inspiration was a feeling of inequity. Until then, international academia, at least in publications, had hardly noticed the vibrancy and importance of Korean Wave. For example, the accounts of Korean pop in standard works such as World Music: The Rough Guide were inadequate; Hideo Kawakami and Paul Fisher, in the first edition – still widely in circulation – told us that Korea had “developed economically at a staggering pace, but in terms of popular music there [was] nothing to match the remarkable contemporary sounds of Indonesia, Okinawa, or Japan” (1994: 470). Okon Hwang provided a more balanced account in the second edition of World Music: The Rough Guide, and for the most recent incarnation of the New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, but only in the form of brief accounts that stopped before the 1990s (2000: 164—5; 2001: 814—5 and 818). John Lent’s Asian Popular Culture (1995) omitted Korea altogether, while Allen Chun, Ned Rossiter and Brian Shoesmith’s Refashioning Pop Music in Asia (2004) claimed to include Korea but did so only in respect to a Korean singer of enka, the colonial-era-originating genre, active in Japan. I had written a chapter in Tim Craig and Richard King’s edited volume, Global Goes Local: Popular Culture in Asia (2002), but in the book this was swamped by the many accounts of Japan, China, India and elsewhere.

Korean Studies specialists, in the main concerned with language, literature and history, also largely failed to notice the emergence of Korean Wave. My first academic paper devoted to Korean pop, given at a 1999 conference of the Association of Korean Studies in Europe held in Hamburg, was greeted as heretical by some established Koreanists: hip hop, reggae and rap were not Korean, they chimed. More recently, Koichi Iwabuchi’s discussions of cultural flows, transnationalism, and
glocalization in East Asia (2002, 2004) begin with Japan not Korea. Our library shelves still stock many more academic articles and books that discuss J-pop and Chinese pop (albeit underground and rock rather than mainstream Chinese pop) than K-pop. In fact, when researching this paper, typing “Korean Wave” into the massive e-publication database EBSCOHost returned just 77 results. And, although *Korean Pop Music: Riding the Wave* is now out of print, apart from Mark Russell’s impressionistic and journalistic *Pop Goes Korea* (2008), about the only other book-length treatment of pop has been Sun Jung’s discussion of masculinity in K-pop idols (2011). But, for the moment, I must resist reprinting *Korean Pop Music*. It needs thorough updating, since today’s K-pop, and Korean Wave more generally, is remarkably different to what existed when we first published in 2006.

If this relative lack of publications suggests an egregious academic oversight, it is worth stating that until the 1990s Korea had not joined the “polylateral” (George Lipsitz 1994; Timothy Taylor 1997; Rebekah Moore 2004) or “transregional” (Mark Slobin 1993). Hence, it was not easily observable by scholars outside the country. The first of these terms, polylateral, and its absence in Korea, suggests a fear of contamination arising from the nationalism fostered during the Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan regimes. The absence of the polylateral was, though, as much part of the protection of small local industries under the state’s export substitution model. These small companies licensed products from international music “majors”, repackaging and distributing them, but were happy to keep those same “majors” at a distance, limiting their investment in and influence on Korea. Bans on Japanese cultural products remained in force until 1999 or later, and in the 1990s when Korean cultural production was still designed for local audiences it was not uncommon for claims to be made that K-pop inappropriately copied foreign songs. It is not surprising that in the new millennium, but not in the 1990s, the concept behind the term “transregional” has become core to many accounts of Korean Wave. Accounts

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4 Search narrowed to publications in art, music, and media and communication; some of my own writing included in this total number.

5 This is not to discount a large number of articles by, amongst others, Shin Hyunjoon, Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, Roald Maliangkay and more.

6 Today, the three remaining “majors” are Universal Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment and Warner Music Group.

7 A ban may have technically been in force, but many Korean musicians recorded in Japan, often with Japanese musicians, and, as I indicate below, Korean satellite dishes picked up Japanese broadcasts long before they were legally allowed to. Bans on Japanese *manga* and some films were lifted from the beginning of 1999, music was allowed in small venues from September and anywhere from June 2000, and all Japanese films were allowed from January 2004, although terrestrial broadcasters were still banned from carrying Japanese music and television dramas.

8 Seo Taiji’s “Come Back Home” (1995) has been claimed by some to be based on Cypress Hill’s *Black Sunday* album (1993), Roo’ra’s “Ch’ŏnsang yuae” (1996) openly but without attribution sampled a Japanese track, and Shinhwa has been said, in its many changes of image, to try to emulate bands such as NSync and Backstreet Boys – but, then, as Korea’s longest-lasting boy band, they have been covered by others, including the Taiwanese groups Energy and 5566 (“Hey, Come on!” and “Dark”, respectively).

9 Note that this paper primarily explores texts written in English. I look forward to having the opportunity to explore additional Korean-language sources.
have taken as their central focus the spread of Korean Wave abroad to, for example, the East Asian region as a whole (Doobo Shin 2006, Chua and Iwabuchi 2008, Sujeong Kim 2009, Younghan Cho 2011), around the globe (Woongjae Ryoo 2009, Shin Hyunjooon 2009 and 2011, David Bevan 2012, Sarah Leung 2012) or, considered more narrowly, China (Li Sheng 2007), Japan (Eun-Young Jung 2009), Taiwan (Sang Yeon Sung 2008 and 2010, Shuling Huang 2011), Hong Kong (Lisa Leung 2009), Singapore (Kelly Fu Sun Yin and Kai Khun Liew 2005, Brenda Chan and Wang Xueli 2011), and so on. These broaden from the theoretical frame of the transregional to typically refer to transnationalism, hybridity, cosmopolitanism, commodification and consumption, and cultural flows – each of these terms referencing theoretical positions that will doubtless characterize discussions at this conference.

We might apply some of these same theoretical positions to Korea in the early 1990s. It would, however, be a mistake to see the development of Korean Wave prior to its transregional export as a matter of “Westernizing Asia” (to cite Bevan 2012); “catch-up” would be a better expression for what happened. During the first decade of my personal engagement with Korea, the 1980s, I found little that was remarkable in Korean pop music, films, or dramas. Pop, with its focus on ballads – then a recent term, but in style and content not much changed since the 1960s – seemed little different to Cantopop or Singapop, or for that matter, to the standard fare of the Eurovision Song Contest. During the 1980s, Korea’s pop stars were framed and controlled by television and radio, singing songs written by others to the accompaniment of studio bands, all too often filmed standing motionless in bland studios. Covering all cultural production, a large body of legislation ensured control: the Publishing and Printing Regulation Act (1961), Screen Arts Promotion Act (1966), Child Protection Law (1966), Customs Law (1967), Law on Recorded Sound (1971), Culture and Arts Promotion Act (1972), Overseas Publication Import and Distribution Act (1973), and so on. This legislation was interpreted in its vagaries by various bodies and ministries, and to an extent it was self-policied by production companies, since the memories of Chun Doo Whan’s crackdown on the media as he assumed the presidency in 1980 were still fresh in the minds of company managers and broadcasting executives.

March 1992 saw the transformation of Korean pop begin: famously, this was when Seo Taiji and Boys burst onto TV screens. During 1992, four of the band’s tracks pushed into the charts: “Nan arayo/I Know”, “Ijaenŭn/Now”, “Hwangsangsok ŭi kŭdae/You in Your Dreams” and “Ibami kip’ŏgajiman/This Night, is Deep, But”. Seo Taiji brought rap to Koreans, but he also introduced a new concept of star based on image, an image controlled by the group rather than the studio, an image that was not reliant on a studio band, backing dancers, and a broadcaster’s hierarchy of writers and arrangers. The standard way to theorize what Seo Taiji achieved is to cite Arjun Appadurai (e.g. 1990: 1–14, 1996), and concepts of imaging embraced by the terms “ideoscape” and “technoscape”. These are framed within “deterritorialization”, a

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10 I acknowledge a personal bias at this point; I am not a fan of the Eurovision Song Contest, but note that for inexplicable reasons some other musicologists and ethnomusicologists are (e.g., Bohlman 2004 and 2010, Raykoff and Tobin 2007, Fricker and Gluhovic 2013).

11 Chun closed down TBS along with many journals (including the cultural magazine, Ppuri kip’ŭın namu).
reflection on the decline of state sovereignty that in this era allowed cultural production to override the control enshrined by broad-ranging legislation.

In quick succession, a veritable explosion of pop followed as many more foreign styles were appropriated: reggae became hip hop starting with Kim Gun Mo’s “P’inggye/Excuse”, interpretations of house and rave started with Noise, rap met reggae in Roo’ra’s “Roots of Reggae”, and jungle arrived in the strangely literal interpretation of Park Mi Kyung’s “Ebŭŭi kyŏnggo/Eve’s Warning”. The heavy metal heard on Seo Taiji’s third album (1994) had actually long been part of the underground with groups such as Shinawi, Sanullim and Baekdoosan, and had morphed into the mainstream not least with Shin Hae Chul’s NEXT (“New Experimental Team”). It is, of course, debatable whether one can tie a specific pop style’s appropriation or introduction in Korea to one artist or group, and although my assignments here may appear reasonable I note that Seo Taiji merely performed the first rap on terrestrial Korean television – others had already experimented with rap in the studio – and, also, that none of the new appropriations would dislodge ballad’s persistence as a mainstay of the music scene.

Appropriation is often criticized as rootless fusion and pastiche; it assumes a postcolonial mentality, in which in this case new Korean pop could be seen as “the embodiment of the West penetrating our bodies” (Seung-mi Han et al 2002, cited in Cho Hae-joang 2005: 163). This, however, sits uncomfortably with Aristotle’s notion of the mimetic, at least when the mimetic is granted the potential to be subversive in the writings of, say, Jacques Derrida (1978) and Michael Taussig (1993). When produced reflectively and with differentiation, the appropriated styles challenge Appadurian perspectives. Hence, as Korean Wave has taken root, it has become commonplace to position discussions by referencing “glocalization” (after, e.g., Iwabuchi 2002, Parks and Kumar 2002 passim) and “reterritorialization” (after Tomlinson 1999). These, when applied to East Asia generally or Korea more specifically, fuse the postcolonial and nationalist camps by arguing for a non-Western modernity founded on regional difference. They challenge Western cultural

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13 It can be argued that scholars tend to ignore the persistent popularity of ballads in East Asia. This seems particularly the case in studies of Chinese pop (see, for example, Baranovitch 2003, Fung 2008, Barmé 2009, De Kloet 2010), although an exception in respect to Korea is Eun-Young Jung (2011).

14 Similar criticisms are widespread, so although they may at root appear to be in harmony with Appadurai’s observations, they will today be frequently heard in respect to the global phenomenon of every aspiring singer having a chance at fame in Pop Idol, X Factor, and their many variants. Indeed, Simon Frith remarked that by the 1980s in British pop it was “no longer possible to make a startling rock statement, and the perceived post-modern condition of fragmentation and breakdown of master narratives [had] led to recyclings and pastiches” (Frith 1987). That, of course, was before the made-for-measure boy band and girl band became such common currency. As a theoretical position, the criticism can be traced back to Adorno and the Frankfurt school in the 1940s (see, e.g., Adorno 1972, 1976).
hegemony (after Cho Uhn 2005: 144) and promote an Asian global. Although such approaches are intrinsically political (after Marwan Kraidy 2005: 16), we now have, for example, accounts of rap that contrast America and Asia, detailing how sonic similarities mask structural differences that became necessary as lyrics moved from American/English to Asian languages (e.g., Manabe 2006). Or, accounts of how rock and hip hop have incorporated localized identities (e.g., Huang 2001, 2003; Fung 2008). We might also note how lyricism was introduced as a foil to rap in, say, Roo’ra’s “Ch’in’gurul ponaemyŏ/Sending Friends on their Way” (1995). Non-Western modernity was able to remove the youth rebellion inherent in global pop, mainstreaming sub-cultures by abandoning the cultural baggage that they carried and ascribing to Asian family values. And so, at least in early 1990s, Korean pop retained the anodyne lyrics of earlier ballads, rather than adopting American street culture. Consider the lyrics to Seo Taiji’s “Nan arayo/I Know”:

I know it as a fact that when tonight is over someone has to leave. I’ve come to realize why this is so.

I didn’t manage to tell her that I loved her. Anyway, it’s too late now. What was I doing? Her smile was so beautiful.

Or Kim Gun Mo’s “P’inggye/Excuse”:

Even now you’re giving me that silly excuse, with that hard-to-believe story.

Don’t give me that excuse. Put yourself in my shoes, just think about it, could you laugh now if you were me?

You just brought it up, as if you were joking, or as if you weren’t joking, saying you would tell me about being left alone.

In the letter hidden deep inside the bouquet of flowers, “Goodbye” were the only two characters deeply engraved.

These are hardly rap and reggae in the Euro-American pop tradition.

Where appropriation is criticized in Korean Wave, so its products are claimed to be “de-Koreanized” (Shin Hyunjoon 2009: 513–5), “culturally odorless” (Sun Jung 2011: 3), “too white” (Tobias Hübinette 2012: 523) or “trapped” as hybrid forms between the national and the global (Younghan Cho 2011: 388). These criticisms are familiar from discourses on the genre of world music, where commentators offer nuanced takes on Said’s Orientalism to challenge Western hegemonic practices (e.g., Erlmann 1996, Taylor 2007, Howard 2010, White 2012). However, for Korean Wave to succeed requires those who produce it and write about it to challenge the standard world systems theories of Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 1979) in which that hegemony is situated. Hence, as scholars have got to grips with glocalization and reterritorialization, so they have argued how East Asia “refashions pop” (Chun, Rossiter and Shoesmith 2004), situating it “beyond subculture” (Huq 2006) in “critical encounters” with globalization (White 2012).15

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15 The works cited here by Huq and White take us beyond East Asia.
In the foundation period, the refashioning, and the critical encounters, may not be seen. A brief detour to Korean cinema will hopefully illustrate. In 1996, the year that Seo Taiji and Boys disbanded, film also remained local in orientation. While 483 films were imported – 56% from America – only 19 of the 55 Korean domestic films shown in local cinemas were exported. The total film market remained small, and was worth $252 million. Discussions commonly asked how Korean production could be improved, and critiqued Hollywood itself, as being unsuitable for local consumption (– here, Franco Moretti’s view, that the flashy commercialism of Hollywood disperses cultural divides by ignoring people’s individual culture, is perhaps pertinent; 2001). However, elements that would be key to the refashioning were already in place. First, a tradition had been established for films to contain social commentary case within a frame of realism, for which consider Chang Sonu’s “Sŏnggong shidae/The age of success” (1988), Pak Chongwŏn’s “Kuro arirang” (1989), Pae Yonggyun’s “Talmaga tongchogūro kan kkadalgŭn?/Why has Bodhi Dharma Left for the East” (1989), and Pak Kwangsu’s “Kŭldŭldo uri chŏrŏm/Black Republic” (1990). Second, more than 90% of the income generated from film exports in 1996 came from the around 20,000 Koreans working in 200 animation companies. Bringing these two together offers an explanation for the characteristic juxtapositions of super-realism, pop realism and hybridity that became so characteristic of Korean Wave film.

So, as the 1990s dawned, a constellation of factors coalesced to provide the foundations for Korean Wave. Simply put, the elements can be summarized as follows:

16 If time permitted, it would be desirable to look at the export of other cultural production in the 1990s. Li Sheng (2007), for example, points out that the first Korean television drama was broadcast in China in 1993.
Two critical events had marked the late 1980s. First, the demonstrations against the government which came to a head in June 1987 when Roh Tae Woo, as the chosen successor to Chun Doo Whan, went on television to announce there would be free and fair presidential elections, began the (gradual) shift from dictatorship to democracy. This would make the maintenance of strict control through legislation impossible. Second, the successful hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games functioned as a coming-of-age for the Republic of Korea, for its government and for its people, under the slogan “Seoul to the World, the World to Seoul”. As Korea emerged as an important part of the world economy, so it tentatively began to open. It allowed a greater freedom for Koreans to travel abroad, and for a youthful Korean diaspora –Seo Taiji among them, though not salmon pink as the colloquial term, yŏnŏjok, might apply – to return. The increased knowledge and awareness about the world outside altered and broadened the sources of information from, for example, AFKN and still-banned Japanese imports, and brought the challenges of competing in the international marketplace into sharper relief. But, it also challenged the conventions of the internal cultural economy.17

17 As already noted, the domestic music industry remained small to this point, licensing and producing local copies of European and American pop and classical music, submitting each release for scrutiny to the Ministry of Culture and Information. Censorship had banned 659 pop songs between 1965 and 1981, largely due to lyrics, but also because of artwork (The Beatles’ “Sergeant Peppers Lonely Hearts Club Band” was banned because the cover featured a tiny, smaller-than-a-postage-stamp, depiction of Marx sitting amongst the assembly of musicians), or morality. Note, too, that the domestic market never warmed to singles: they were costly to press and could never sell enough copies, so albums,
The Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan eras saw the rise of student activism, promoted not least through the minjung munhwa popular cultural consciousness movement. By the end of the 1980s, former activists had become established members of the cultural industries, whether as directors and managers or as journalists and writers. As students, many had been involved in, say, the “song movement” (norae undong) or in producing traditionesque plays, madang kāk. As they sought to challenge the conventions of cultural production, so they found a highly skilled and creative workforce that reflected, in education and training, the centralized drive fostered since the 1960s to develop industry and the economy in a way that promoted exports and restricted imports. In the literature on Korean Wave, the postcolonial camp can be identified as something coming out of this; nationalism required much cultural production to be identified as Korean. Internationalization might appear on the surface to require the opposite, but if the theories of glocalization and reterritorialization are applied, it is ultimately closely related to nationalism.

The move to know more about the world benefited from a further, external, development: satellite broadcasting. Satellites, and, during the 1990s, cable broadcasting, were particularly important for Korean pop, since they brought music videos to Korea, challenging the static studio-based pop show monopoly of Korea’s terrestrial broadcasters. I recall how satellite receivers began to appear on Seoul’s rooftops in 1990, within a few months of NHK launching its satellite channels. They were technically illegal at the time. Elsewhere in East Asia, 1990 had seen the establishment of Star TV by Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka Shing. A year later, Star formed a partnership with MTV that essentially brought music television to Asia. Satellite broadcasters needed pop stars to add visual dimensions to their performance, and if Seo Taiji in 1992 provided this through dance and costume, then Kim Gun Mo’s “P’inggye/Excuse” in 1993 came with what is often claimed to have been the first Korean music video – filmed in Jamaica and featuring a dance duo that would later be called CLON.18 In Korea, satellites proved less important than cable television, and the country’s first cable music channel, M-Net, founded in 1993, held Korea’s first VJ (video jockey) contest in 1994, and began commercial cable broadcasts 16-hours daily on Channel 27 in March 1995. M-Net soon broadcast five daily hours of MTV. Backtracking slightly, Star and MTV had cancelled their collaboration in 1994. MTV established its Asian headquarters in Singapore while Star TV developed its own music television, Channel [V]. Channel [V] pioneered local marketing, providing Chinese and later Korean pop to East Asia but Indian pop to India – the global with the local.

Korean pop adapted to this new format quickly, and in so doing, the music industry briefly basked in the popularity of new pop in all its diversity. It played catch-up and, although on a smaller scale, began to resemble European and American “majors” in its operational components. However, satellite and cable music although more difficult to promote on radio or in television shows, were the staple product. Where 1987 saw the first local distribution of jazz and ambient music on the ECM and Wyndham Hill labels, material that had formerly been largely unknown, it was only in the 1990s that foreign music companies attempted to plant themselves on Korean territory. And, their initial forays were short-lived, due to the economic crisis in late 1997.

18 At the time, the duo was known as Hyun Jin Young and Wawa. The name change to CLON came in 1996, when they were managed by Kim Ch’anghwan.
broadcasting began to shift pop away from the production of CDs and cassettes, from the aural to the visual. This sowed the seeds of the recorded music industry’s destruction, seeds that multiplied as the Internet spread. Music videos called for dance and, later, dramatic episodes, while the music itself lost its central importance.

This was starkly illustrated in 1996, the year Seo Taiji and Boys disbanded, when CLON, the dance duo featured in “P’inggye/Excuse”, won a contest that came with a recording contract. The duo, Won Rae and Jun Yup, had already spent almost a decade as professional dancers, but now they had to be singers. In Korea they teamed up with others to bolster their somewhat challenged vocal abilities, in particular with the rock singer Kim Tae Young for their third album. Abroad, in 1999, Jun Yup famously sang a duet, “Can’t Wait”, with the Taiwanese singer Yuki Hsu.

And with this, although the hallyu term is associated more with China and the reception of H.O.T. in the same year, Korean Wave had arrived.

A final, vital, part of the jigsaw must be added: the emergence of SM Entertainment and the other Korean music/media companies. By the new millennium, these were no longer playing catch-up with the music industry abroad, but, rather, allowed Korea to leap-frog forward. Before the European and American “majors” rolled-out 360-degree contracts to counter the decline in sales of pop music recordings, Korea initiated practices that would take music further away from the traditional recording industry, developing models of training, made-for-measure bands, and control over every aspect of a pop star’s life and image. If the foundations of Korean Wave are about appropriation, then SM Entertainment and its compatriots discovered greater innovation. Korean Wave thus managed to render the inherited literature on the music industry redundant – including the Internet/ISP vision of the still widely-cited futurists David Kusek and Gerd Leonhard (2005). In doing so, we have been challenged, even though, and as will have been obvious throughout this paper, we have remained largely reliant on familiar theories. Is any single theory adequate, whether “deterritorialization” or “reterritorialization”, “hybridity”, “transregionalism” or “glocalization”? In the next two days, this congress of the World Association for Hallyu Studies gives us the opportunity to discuss, explore and, hopefully, move our understandings forward.

References


19 This, rather than the widely-held view that the Internet destroyed the recorded music industry.

20 From 1992 onwards I produced regular inflight programs of Korean pop, and so closely followed industry activity. I stopped this work in 1996, partly because as a musicologist I lost interest as pop shifted from the aural to the visual.

21 Recorded on 99 Magic Power 3 (MCD1247).


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