“Mirativity” does not exist: ĥ dug in “Lhasa” Tibetan and other suspects

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Abstract

Largely through the efforts of Scott DeLancey the grammatical category “mirative” has gained currency in linguistics. DeLancey bases his elaboration of this category on a misunderstanding of the semantics of ĥ dug in “Lhasa” Tibetan. Rather than showing “surprising information”, linguists working on Tibetan have long described ĥ dug as a sensory evidential. Much of the evidence DeLancey and Aikhenvald present for mirativity in other languages is also susceptible to explanation in terms of sensory evidence or appears close to Lazard’s “mediative” (1999) or Johanson’s “indirective” (2000). Until an independent grammatical category for “new information” is described in a way which precludes analysis in terms of sensory evidence or other well established evidential categories, mirativity should be excluded from the descriptive arsenal of linguistic analysis.

Keywords: evidential, inflection, information structure, mirative, syntax, Tibetan

nisi videro . . . non credam
– Doubting Thomas

1. Introduction

1.1. Advent of mirativity

Although Scott DeLancey did not coin the term “mirative”1 he “was the first scholar to demonstrate that [...] there is enough data to postulate it as a distinct

1. As antecedents DeLancey acknowledges Jacobsen (1964: 630 et passim) and the “admirative” category of Balkan linguistics. However, Jacobsen uses “mirative” to describe a morphosyntactic category specific to Washo and does not promote “mirativity” as a crosslinguistic category.
semantic and grammatical category” (Aikhenvald 2004: 195). The cornerstone of DeLancey’s analysis of mirativity is his description of ḥdug in “Lhasa” Tibetan. Although most researchers describe the Tibetan morpheme ḥdug as a sensory evidential (Bell 1905: 40, Yukawa 1966, Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 23, Chang & Chang 1984: 605, Tournadre 1996: 224–226, Volkart 2000, Garrett 2001: 52–93), DeLancey argues that ḥdug marks an utterance as containing information which is surprising to the speaker, a category which he dubs “mirative” (e.g., 1986, 1997: 44–45, 2001). Because most researchers working on Tibetan have failed to engage DeLancey’s account of ḥdug, there may seem no need to argue against his interpretation. However, DeLancey’s elaboration of the “mirative” is influential beyond Tibetan and Tibeto-Burman, having gained a currency in linguistics at large.

A few searches in Google Scholar (http://scholar.google.com) can be taken to approximately measure the extent of DeLancey’s influence compared to other researchers who have written about ḥdug. DeLancey’s two articles devoted to promoting “mirativity” crosslinguistically (DeLancey 1997, 2001) are cited 119 times and 56 times respectively (site accessed 17 May 2010, 15:03). Volkart’s description of ḥdug (2000) garners a mere two hits (site accessed 17 May 2010, 15:17) and Google’s database appears not to include Yukawa’s (1966) study (site accessed 17 May 2010, 15:18). Given the extent to which the typological literature on “mirativity” depends on DeLancey’s description of the Tibetan morpheme ḥdug this literature deserves to be re-examined. Other evidence for mirativity which DeLancey points to in Hare, Sunwar, Korean, Turkish, and other languages is equally well accounted for with grammatical categories other than mirativity, including sensory evidence. The further examples of mirativity which Aikhenvald points to are also generally best analysed otherwise. Since most instances of mirativity reported in the literature are best analysed otherwise, mirativity should be withdrawn from the theoretical repertoire of descriptive linguistics.

1.2. Previous sceptics

DeLancey’s elaboration of mirativity has not gone unchallenged. In particular, Lazard (1999) suggests that ‘inference’, ‘hearsay’, and ‘unexpected observation/immediate perception’ are but three semantic uses of a broader “mediative” grammatical category and that “mirativity as such is only rarely and

2. DeLancey’s work makes no appearance in the bibliography of Volkart (2000); the writings of Denwood (1999), Garrett (2001), Chonjore (2003), and Tournadre (2008) appear to have been uninfluenced by DeLancey’s thoughts on this topic.

3. In addition to work on Tibetan (e.g., Zaisler 2000) “mirativity” has been employed in the descriptions of Magar (Grunow-Härsta 2007), Tsafiki (Dickinson 2000), Hindi/Urdu (Montaut 2006), and many other languages.
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dubiously grammaticalized” (Lazard 1999: 91). In general I find Lazard’s argument persuasive. However, he accepts DeLancey’s analysis of the Tibetan data (Lazard 1999: 104), which I do not. Furthermore, in describing the third semantic use of the “mediative” Lazard sometimes uses terms such as “unexpected observation” and sometimes “immediate perception”. The latter, sensory evidence, certainly is a grammatical category; it is the category which Tibetan hdup encodes. In contrast, “new information”, although it may occur, as one non-grammaticalized use of a broader “mediative” category as Lazard suggests, is not a valid grammatical category.

Curnow (2001) also expresses scepticism at elements of DeLancey’s account. Specifically, he argues against the explanation of conjunct/disjunct systems as grammaticalized mirativity. Posing the question of whether or not conjunct/disjunct systems can derive from mirativity implicitly accepts that “conjunct/disjunct” and “mirativity” are correct characterizations of certain linguistic phenomena. Tournadre (2008) has already convincingly argued that “conjunct/disjunct” is an ill-advised conceptual apparatus for descriptive linguistics and I avoid here discussion of Tibetan or other languages in such terms. The goal of this essay is to show that looking for mirativity in the world’s languages is equally ill-advised. In this respect, my disagreement with DeLancey is more substantial than Curnow’s.

2. Tibetan hdup and mirativity

2.1. Overview of the “Lhasa” Tibetan verbal system

2.1.1. Verbal categories and constructions. Ideally one should draw a distinction among the language of the city of Lhasa itself, other dialects of Central Tibet, and the lingua franca of the Tibetan diaspora (Miller 1955, Róna-Tas 1985: 160–161). However, because previous authors, including DeLancey, do not clearly maintain these distinctions, it is not possible to do so here. In order to keep the ambiguity of the underlying language in focus I write “Lhasa” with double quotes. The defence of hdup as a sensory evidential presented here makes use of no original fieldwork. The existing literature on “Lhasa” Tibetan is ample enough for the goal at hand.

The verbal system of “Lhasa” Tibetan exhibits a three-way paradigmatic contrast within the forms of the verb ‘to be’ and across all of affixes encoding tense categories. I refer to these three categories as “personal”, “factual”,

4. The “mediative” is not a category which is relevant to the “Lhasa” Tibetan verbal system, although it may be for other languages.

5. A study of available examples using corpus tools may shed great light on the evidential system of “Lhasa” Tibetan in a way impossible through elicitation.
Table 1. The verb ‘to be’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Existential</th>
<th>Copula</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>yod</td>
<td>yin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factual</td>
<td>yod-pa-red</td>
<td>red (yod-pa-red)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testimonial</td>
<td>h’dug</td>
<td>red-b’zag (h’dug)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Verbal auxiliaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Future</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Past</th>
<th>Perfect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>V-gi-yin</td>
<td>V-gi-yod</td>
<td>V-pa-yin / byun²</td>
<td>V-yod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factual</td>
<td>V-gi-red</td>
<td>V-gi-yod-pa-red</td>
<td>V-pa-red</td>
<td>V-yod-pa-red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testimonial</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>V-gi-h’dug</td>
<td>V-soñ</td>
<td>V-b’zag</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The form V-pa-yin is used in volitional sentences whereas the form V-byun is used in non-volitional sentences (cf. Tournadre 1996: 231–235).

and “testimonial” (Table 1). The forms in parentheses do occur as copulas, but they are rare and their usage is not well understood (Garrett 2001: 70, 91; Chonjore 2003: 207). However, it is clear that h’dug as a copula is restricted to use with adjectival predicates (Garrett 2001: 68). The morpheme h’dug paradigmatically contrasts with yod and yod-pa-red in three constructions: the copula and existential verb ‘to be’, and the present auxiliary. In addition, because the morpheme b’zag is negated as mi-h’dug, the perfect can be added as a fourth context in which h’dug contrasts with yod and yod-pa-red. Before attempting to specify the semantics of h’dug and the testimonial, of which it is an exponent, it is useful to provide examples of these four grammatical contexts.

2.1.2. Verbs of existence. In the first construction these morphemes serve as full verbs indicating existence: yod (1), yod-pa-red (2), and h’dug (3).

(1) a. khyod-kyi ra nahi rtsar yod.⁷
    /khyöʔ-kyi ra ngai tsor yöʔ/
    you-gen goat me-gen place-obl exist-per
    ‘I have got your goat.’ (Lewin 1879: 10)

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6. In non-finite clauses the difference among these three is often neutralized in favour of the personal (cf. Chang & Chang 1984: 607–608; DeLancey 1990: 298).
7. I have unified the transliteration of Tibetan examples throughout, provided a transliteration when none was provided in the original and tacitly corrected spelling mistakes. When a source provides a phonetic transcription, I have given this also. I have adjusted these transcriptions to make them more consistent. This I have done by implementing the conventions of Tournadre for velars, retroflex consonants, vowels, and nasalization, but using -ʔ for the glottal stop.
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b.  nga-tshor  phyu-pa  gsar-pa  yod
    / ngants\u02d0  'chupa  'saapa  yö\'i/  
    me-PL-OBL  clothes\u0088  new  exist-PER
    ‘We have new clothes.’ (Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 31)

(2)  bod-la  ẖbrog-pa  ma\'i-po  yod-pa-red
    / phö\'i-lo  'trokpa  'mänku  'yö\'re\’i/  
    Tibet-OBL  nomad  many  exist-FAC
    ‘There are many nomads in Tibet.’ (Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 20)

(3)  a.  thab  hdihi  ste\’-la  ńa  skam-pahi  phyir-du
    / thb  dii  teng-la  nya  kam-pö\u0088  chir-tu
    hearth  this-GEN  above-OBL  fish  dry-GEN  in.order.to
    grab  mi-hdug
    t\b\u008c  mi \’u\’i/  
    method  not-exist-TES
    ‘There are no shelves over the fire for the drying of fish.’ (Lewin 1879: 71)
    b.  sman-kha\’i  pha-gir  h\’dug
    / m\’änk\’an  \’phak\’e\’  tu\’i/  
    hospital  over-there  exist-TES
    ‘There is a hospital over there.’ (Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 10)

2.1.3.  Copula verb.  The copula exhibits a total of five forms: yin (4), red (5), yod-pa-red (6), red-b\’zag (7), and h\’dug (8).

(4)  rku\’n-ma  zin  mkhan  ńa  yin
    thief  catch  the.one.who  me  is-PER
    ‘I am the man who caught the thief.’ (Bell 1905: 36)

(or falling tone) and doubled letters rather than a colon (:) for long vowels. When a source includes more vowels, consonants, or tones than Tournadre I leave them as they are, unless it is straightforward to substitute their notation with symbols from the International Phonetic Alphabet. I have surely introduced errors in some cases; the reader should consult the original in cases of doubt.

In the translation of Tibetan a hyphen is used to transliterate a specific Tibetan character called the tseteg which marks the boundary between two syllables. (This punctuation also occurs between words, but it is only transliterated word-internally.) Normally (more than 80\% of the time) the tseteg corresponds to morpheme breaks, but some morpheme breaks are not marked off. We follow this Tibetan studies convention here, rather than the rules for morphemic glossing.

8. This word refers to a specific traditional Tibetan garment.
10. One expects /t\b/ rather than /t\b/.
11. One expects /mi\’u/ rather than /mi du/.
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(5) ʰḍi .deb  red
赁Ł’ th’s.  th’pe.  ᵀeˇ?
this book is-FAC
‘This is a book.’ (Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 3)

(6) ˢraŋ-po skyid-po že-drags yod-pa-red
شاء ’h’kir  ’sh’e.traa  ᵀeˇ?
beggar happy very is-FAC
‘Yes, the beggars are very happy.’ (Chang & Chang 1984: 615)

(7) ｃhū  red-bţāg
شاء ’h’reˇ-shaˇ?
water is-TES
‘[Tiens], c’EST de l’eau. [(Here,) it’s water.]’ (Tournadre 1996: 238)

(8) a. ʒim-po ʰdug
شاء ’h’shimo  duˇ?
tasty is-TES
‘It is pleasing.’ (Lewin 1879: 18).

b. ja ʰdii ʒim-po ʰdug
شاء ’h’th’shimo  ’tuˇ?
tea this delicious is-TES
‘Ce thé est excellent. [This tea is excellent.]’ (Tournadre 1996: 225)

2.1.4. Present auxiliaries. In the second construction these morphemes serve as auxiliary verbs which indicate that the verbal action is ongoing at the time of the utterance:¹² yod (9), yod-pa-red (10), ʰdug (11).

(9) a. ʰna ʰgro-gi-yod
شاء ʰna ʰdro-gi-ｙō/
I go-prs-per
‘I go’ (de Roerich & Phuntshok 1956: 50).

b. ʰna  bod-skad-kyi  slob-deb  klog-gi-yod
شاء ʰna ʰbod-skad-kyi  ʰslob-deb  ʰklog-gi-yod/
I Tibetan-language-gen textbook read-prs-per
‘I’m reading a Tibetan textbook.’ (Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 106)

c. ʰna  pha-gir, ʰa,  sdo-d-kyi-yod
شاء ʰna ʰpha-ɡi  ʰa  ʰsdo-d-kyi-yod/
I over-there, ah, stay-prs-per
‘I’m, ah, staying over there.’ (Chang & Chang 1984: 606)

¹² Hoshi (1994) provides a detailed analysis of the tense and aspect uses of this construction.
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(10) a. lo bži tsam ḥgro-gi-yod-pa-red
   /lo shi-tsdro-gi-yō-wa-re/
   year four about go-PRS-FAC
   ‘it is about four years’ (de Roerich & Phuntshok 1956: 50)
b. za-chas bspon-gi-yod-pa-red
   /sapcää? ʹtsunki’yō?re?/
   food-stuffs sell-PRS-FAC
   ‘They are selling foodstuffs.’ (Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 104)

(11) a. khyed-ran phebs-kyi-hdug
    /khye-rang phe-gi-du/
    you go-PRS-TES
    ‘you go’ (de Roerich & Phuntshok 1956: 50)
b. kho snā-po lai-gi-hdug-gas?
   /ʹkho ʹngapo ʹlanki ʹtukeēl/
   he early get-up-PRS-TES
   ‘Does he get up early?’ (Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 104)

2.1.5. **Perfect auxiliary.** In the third construction these morphemes serve as auxiliary verbs which indicates that the verbal action is complete at the time of the utterance: yod (12), yod-pa-red (13), hdug (14).

(12) bris-yod
    /ʹthri’yō?i/
    write-PRF-PER
    ‘I have written it.’ (Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 88)

(13) spa-gu kha-šas gcig slebs-yod-pa-red
    /ʹpuku ʹkhashā? chi ʹlē? ʹyō? re?/
    boy some one arrive-PRF-FAC
    ‘Several boys have come.’ (Chang & Chang 1984: 622)

(14) a. tsam-pa zas-mi-hdug
    /ʹtsanpa ʹsā?mintu?i/
    Tsampa eat-not-PRS-TES
    ‘He hasn’t eaten Tsam-pa.’ (Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 84)
b. ri-boi ni zin-mi-hdug
    /ʹre’kon ʹni ʹsim ʹmin’tu?i/
    Rabbit TOP catch-not-PRF-TES
    ‘As for the rabbit, you haven’t caught him.’ (Chang & Chang 1984: 621)

2.2. **The traditional explanation of hdug: A sensory evidential**

Most researchers understand hdug as marking direct perception as the source of information for the knowledge conveyed in an utterance. Bell (1905: 40)
was the first to draw attention to the use of *h dug* as a visual evidential, writing that “*h dug* means ‘I saw it there but am not sure whether it is still there or not’.”

Yukawa (1966: 78) confirms the significance of visual evidence in distinguishing *h dug* and *yod-pa-red* as existential copulas:

> duu はその事物が話し手から見えている場合に用いられ *yoo-ree*は見えないが、何からの理由でその事物があるということを話し手が知っている場合に用いられる。

[*h dug* is used in the case where the speaker is able to see the object, and *yod-pa-red* is used in the case where the speaker knows that the object is there for some other reason.]

Yukawa’s explanation is based on the following two examples:

(15) a. *btsoi-khain  hdir  deb  yag-po  yod-pa-red*
   
   /’tsonkan  `deeb  `yago  yoo-ree/
   
   shop  this  book  good  exist-fac
   
   [Speaker A says to speaker B, when neither can see the book before entering:] ‘This shop has good books.’ (Yukawa 1966: 78)

b. *hdir  deb  yag-po  hdir*
   
   /`deeb  `yago  duu/
   
   here  book  good  exist-tes
   
   [Speaker A says after they have entered the shop while looking at the book:] ‘Here is a good book.’ (Yukawa 1966: 78)

Yukawa (1966: 78) further observes that “*duu* は用いられるのは見る場合だけではなく、他の感覚で認識しうる場合もある [*h dug* は不 wake only used in the case of being able to see, there are also cases where the recognition occurs through some other sense]”, as in the following example where “子供たちが外で遊んでいる声を聞けば、姿は見えなくても [one can hear the voices of children playing outside even without seeing their forms]” (Yukawa 1966: 78).

(16) *phyi-logs-la  spu-gu-tsho  hdir*
   
   /´chiloo?  la  `bugu-tso  duu/
   
   outside-obl  child-plr  exist-tes
   
   ‘外に子供たちがいる. [The children are outside.]’ (Yukawa 1966: 78)

13. Bell does not provide examples to demonstrate this claim.

14. In fact he writes “A氏がB氏を案内して「この店にはいい本がある」という場合（その本はまだ見えていない。）” for (15a) and “その店にはいってその本を見ながら、「ここにいい本がある」という時” for (15b).
Yukawa tests the hypothesis that *h dug* is a sensory evidential also for *h dug* and *yod-pa-red* used as present auxiliaries (Yukawa 1966: 79–81), finding that direct perception accounts for the use of *h dug* rather than *yod-pa-red* in all cases.

Much more briefly Goldstein & Nornang (1970: 23) also remark that as opposed to constructions with *yod-pa-red* those with *h dug* “imply actual visual knowledge” (emphasis in original). Although Chang & Chang do not invoke evidentiality as a category per se their description of *h dug* as an existential copula describes clearly the importance of visual evidence: “[t]he speaker commonly uses *h dug* when referring to either that at which he is looking at the moment or that which he has seen in the past” (Chang & Chang 1984: 605).

(17) a. \(t \ddot{e} \ddot{e}, \; 'tsh\dot{a}nto \; 'khashe? \; 'ran \; 'tu?/ there name-register some even exist-tess
[A prospective guest is looking at the list of those invited to a picnic:] 'And then, there are quite a few others on the list of names, too.' (Chang & Chang 1984: 605)

b. \(da \; lhag-ma \; brya-da\ddot{n} \; gsum \; b\ddot{i}-tsam \; cig \; h dug \)
\(t \ddot{e} \ddot{e}, \; lhama? \; 'kya tho sum \; 'shits\ddot{a} \; chi \; 'tu?/ now left-overs hundred and four-some a exist-tess
[A trader knows how many bags of fabric he has because he has counted them:] 'Now, there are a hundred and three or a hundred and four left over.' (Chang & Chang 1984: 605–606)

Tournadre associates each of the morphological categories presented above with an evidential meaning, employing the terminology “egophoric” (*yod*), “factual” (*yod-pa-red*), and “testimonial” (*h dug*). The egophoric (*yod*) reflects knowledge the speaker has through personal involvement (Tournadre 1996: 220–224), the factual knowledge which is well known (Tournadre 1996: 227–231), and the testimonial knowledge gained through direct perception (Tournadre 1996: 224–226). I substitute the term “personal” for “egophoric” because it is elegant to have all three names end with -*al*, similar to how the terms for mood used in Indo-European languages “indicative”, “optative”, and “subjunctive” all end in -*ive*. Two of Tournadre’s examples exhibit the testimonial meaning of *h dug* clearly.

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15. Because of their use of the word “constructions” one can assume that this description holds true as much for the use of these morphemes as existential copula verbs as for their use as auxiliary verbs.

16. They think that visual evidence is however not primary and that the major factor is “certainty”.

In a study of the morpheme \textit{ḥdag} across several Central Tibetan dialects, Volkart (2000: 142–143) concludes that a meaning ‘I can see it’ was “the unified original meaning of the evidential auxiliary morpheme \textit{ḥdag}”. Garrett (2001: 2003) characterizes the testimonial (which he calls “direct”) as indicating “direct perceptual evidence”. Chonjore (2003: xxv) describes \textit{ḥdag} as showing “first-hand knowledge of an incident” or an “eye-witness account of an event”. This survey of previous scholarship on \textit{ḥdag} makes clear that there is a widespread consensus that \textit{ḥdag} is a sensory evidential.

Although all of the examples of \textit{ḥdag} presented in this summary of previous literature are 3rd person, when semantically called for \textit{ḥdag} is used with any of the three persons. Use with the 3rd person is most common because one rarely has need to invoke sensory perception of the speaker or the addressee. However, when context calls for such uses they are not eschewed. Several examples of the testimonial with the 1st person are discussed below; cf. (28), (40a, b), (41). Here are two examples of \textit{ḥdag} used with the 2nd person.

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(19)]
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{khyed-ran-la ca-lag gan-yain ḥdag}
\textit{you-OBL things whatever have-3PRES}
\‘You have everything [all kinds of things].’ (Chonjore 2003: 131)
\item \textit{khyed-ran-tsho dpehī yag-po ḥdag}
\textit{you-PLR very good are-3PRES}
\‘You are extremely / really very good.’ (Chonjore 2003: 131)
\end{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}

In sentence (19b) the speaker compliments the addressee by saying that the speaker himself has direct evidence of the addressee’s goodness, rather than merely knowing of his goodness by reputation. The use of \textit{ḥdag} with any of the three persons shows that it is a mistake to analyse it as part of a conjunct/disjunct system (cf. Tournadre 2008 contra DeLancy 1990, 1992, 2001).
2.3. Possible objections to the traditional account: ʰdug in future and hearsay contexts

Two contexts in which ʰdug occurs may at first blush appear difficult to analyse in terms of sensory evidence. The “Lhasa” Tibetan testimonial does not occur in the future tense. Instead, sentences in the future are restricted to personal and factual forms (Tournadre 1996: 245, Garrett 2001: 65–66). This lack of a testimonial future is quite natural; it is impossible to directly perceive future events through the senses. However, there is one construction using ʰdug, which could be understood as referring to future time.

(20) de-riṅ ſi-ma skyid-po ltas-pa-ʰdug
today sun pleasant appear-tes
‘Today the weather will be good.’ (Garrett 2001: 90, cf. Agha 1993: 227)

Such usage does not conflict with the analysis of ʰdug as a sensory evidential. As Agha explains, in such cases there is “a direct appeal to an external or ‘objective’ evidentiary sign which serves as the warrant for the prediction” (Agha 1993: 227 quoted in Garrett 2001: 90). An English translation which captures this meaning might be ‘It looks like it will be nice and sunny today’.

In the second usage which seems at odds with sensory evidence, ʰdug is used with the 1st person to indicate hearsay.

(21) a. 1959-la ſņa chun-chuṅ red / de-dus ſņa a-ma-lags
1959-in me small is-fac that-time me mother
miṅ-am-du lha-sar ʰdug
together Lhasa-in exist-tes
‘In 1959 I was young. At that time I was in Lhasa with [my] mother.’ [she told me] (Chonjore 2003: 129)

b. ſņa sion-ma slob-grwar yod-dus slob-sbyoṅ yag-po
me previous at.school was-time study good
byed-kyi-mi-ʰdug
do-prs-bos-tes
‘I didn’t study well when I went [used to go] to school.’ [my father told me] (Chonjore 2003: 186)

Such examples are instances of indirect discourse. Because his parents witnessed their son’s youth it is natural for them to report facts about his childhood with the testimonial. When the speaker restates these sentences in indirect discourse, he leaves unchanged the original evidential marking. Although pronouns are realigned in “Lhasa” Tibetan indirect discourse, evidential markers are not realigned (Tournadre & Dorje 2003: 215).
(22) a. ńa  em-chi  yin  
    me doctor  is-PER  
    ‘I am a doctor.’  
b.  khoń  em-chi  red  
    he doctor  is-FAC  
    ‘He is a doctor.’  
c.  khoń  em-chi  yin  zer  lab-son  
    he doctor  is-PER  RSM  saíd-PST-TES  
    ‘He, says he, is a doctor.’ (cf. Tournadre & Dorje 2003: 214–216)

In cases where more context is provided, this context makes clear that indirect discourse is the correct interpretation of such apparent instances of hearsay.

(23) ńa  lha-sar  bsdad-dus  tshon-khan- gi  las-ka  byed-kyi-hdug  
    me  Lhasa-OBL  stay-time  store-GEN  work  do-PRS-TES  
    a-ma-lags-kyis  ńar  ḥdi-ḥdra  gsun- gi-hdug  
    mother-ERG  me-OBL  like-this  say-PRS-TES  
    ‘When I was living in Lhasa [I] was working in a store. My mother told me that.’ (Chonjore 2003: 189)

The use of ḥdug in future and hearsay contexts is fully consistent with this morpheme’s overall meaning as a sensory evidential.

2.4. DeLancey’s presentation of ḥdug: Mirativity

DeLancey has not published a complete account of his understanding of ḥdug or its place in the “Lhasa” Tibetan verbal system overall. Across his publications he sometimes gives contradictory accounts without stating which of his former views he no longer holds. For example, although he writes that “the mirative distinction […] can be made only for first persons” (DeLancey 1997: 45), one of the examples he initially used to introduce mirativity is the 3rd person sentence ‘There are yaks in Tibet’ (DeLancey 1986: 205). In the absence of an overall account of DeLancey’s views, a historical survey of his contributions will serve best to characterise his understanding of ḥdug.

In his first contribution treating the semantics of ḥdug DeLancey (1985: 70) presents yod and ḥdug as instances of “direct” knowledge and yod-pa-red as showing “indirect” knowledge. In a contribution from 1986 he further specifies this contrast as one of “old/new knowledge” but not yet using the term “mirative”, which makes its début in DeLancey’s writings in 1992. In that paper however he mentions a conference presentation on “mirativity” from 1989. In articles in 1997 and 2001 DeLancey shifts his focus from the description of ḥdug in “Lhasa” Tibetan to the promotion of “mirativity” as a crosslinguistically valid category of which ḥdug is but one instance.
DeLancey acknowledges Goldstein & Nornang’s comment that *hduk* “constructions imply actual visual knowledge” (Goldstein & Nornang 1970: 23 quoted in DeLancey 1986: 205), but presents the following pair of examples which he states prove that “eyewitness knowledge is not the relevant criterion” (DeLancey 1986: 205).

(24) a. *Bod-la g.yag yod*  
    Tibet-obl yak exist-per  
    ‘There are yaks in Tibet.’

b. *Bod-la g.yag hduk*  
    Tibet-obl yak exist-tes  
    ‘There are yaks in Tibet.’ (DeLancey 1986: 204)

DeLancey (1986: 205) points out that “[a]lthough both sentences are grammatical, a Tibetan, who has actual visual knowledge of the presence of yaks in Tibet cannot use *hduk* to report this fact”, and therefore suggests that the important factor is not “the source of the speaker’s knowledge, but rather its relative novelty” (DeLancey 1986: 205), which explains why the second sentence is appropriate as “a response of someone who was fascinated with yaks but knew nothing of where they existed until visiting Tibet and encountering one” (DeLancey 1986: 205). As Garrett (2001: 102–103) observes, the translation DeLancey provides for example (24a) is in error; possible translation include ‘I have yaks in Tibet’ or ‘My yaks are in Tibet’.

DeLancey sees a confirmation for his analysis in the use of *hduk* with the 1st person, which often includes a sense of astonishment.

(25) a. *nahi khan-la zi-mi yod*  
    me-gen house-obl cat exist-per  
    ‘There’s a cat in my house.’ (DeLancey 1986: 212)

b. *nahi khan-la zi-mi hduk*  
    me-gen house-obl cat exist-tes  
    ‘There’s a cat in my house.’ (DeLancey 2001: 373)

In the first example “the cat is presumably mine” (DeLancey 1986: 212) whereas the context for the second is that “I come home and unexpectedly find a strange cat wandering about” (DeLancey 1986: 212).

In 1992, at the point where he introduces the term “mirative”, DeLancey refers to the following two sentences, quoted here from his more thorough presentation of mirativity in 1997.

(26) a. *niar dhol tog-tsam yod*  
    me-obl money some exist-per  
    ‘I have some money [e.g., I brought some with me].’ (DeLancey 1997: 44, cf. DeLancey 1992: 44)
b. \( \dot{n}ar \ \dot{d}niul \ \dot{t}og-tsam \ \dot{h}dug \)
   me-obli money some exist-tes

In his most recent contribution on the topic DeLancey adds one further pair of example sentences:

(27) a. \( \dot{n}ar \ \dot{d}eb \ \dot{de} \ \dot{yod} \)
   me-obli book that exist-per
   ‘I have that book.’

b. \( \dot{n}ar \ \dot{d}eb \ \dot{de} \ \dot{h}dug \)
   me-obli book that exist-tes
   ‘I have that book.’ (DeLancey 2001: 374)

The first example can be said “in answer to someone asking me whether I own a particular book” (DeLancey 2001: 374), whereas the second is more appropriate if, believing I did not own the book, “I returned home and found it on my shelf” (DeLancey 2001: 374).

All of DeLancey’s examples of \( \dot{h}dug \) as a mirative marker are instances of this morpheme as an existential verb. He does not however make clear whether he thinks this semantic description applies only to this one syntactic use, or rather is characteristic of \( \dot{h}dug \) in general. His hypothesis that conjunct/disjunct systems derive from mirativity (DeLancey 1992: 57) suggests perhaps that mirativity is characteristic of \( \dot{h}dug \) in all contexts.

### 2.5. The case against “mirativity” in Tibetan

I generally do not disagree with DeLancey’s interpretation of the meaning of the sentences he cites. However, the characterization of \( \dot{h}dug \) as ‘new information’ is incorrect. Although this description captures part of the meaning of some examples, it is inadequate to capture the Gesamtbedeutung of this morpheme, and is flatly contradicted by some examples. Even those examples most susceptible to analysis in terms of “mirativity” have been equally convincingly explained through an analysis of \( \dot{h}dug \) as a sensory evidential.

#### 2.5.1. “Mirativity” leaves some examples of \( \dot{h}dug \) unaccounted for.

Several examples clearly demonstrate that \( \dot{h}dug \) reports visual information even when the information reported is in no way new. Consequently, even if \( \dot{h}dug \) encodes “mirativity” this category insufficiently accounts for the morpheme’s use to suggest the independence of “mirativity” from “evidentiality” as a grammatical category.

Denwood (1999: 150) points out that a verb “+gi- \( \dot{h}dug \) with first-person subject is unusual, but is heard in cases where the speaker is seeing him/herself
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from an outside viewpoint, for instance in a film, photograph, or dream” (Denwood 1999: 150). He provides the following example:

(28) ˙nas las-ka byed-kyi h dug
     /ˈngāamaged̃kaˈl̩g̃aˈchiɪ̱d̃u̱/
     me-ERG work do-PRS-TES
     ‘I (saw that I) was working (in my dream).’ (Denwood 1999: 150)

At the moment of reporting a dream to someone else the information in the dream is no longer new or surprising. In this example therefore h dug cannot be analysed as a “mirative” marker. The reason for the use of h dug in such as example is that I have come to know about my working through seeing it in a dream. Visual evidence alone is sufficient to account for the semantics of this example.

In the case of involuntary verbs of experience used for the 1st person h dug is the default option. In a well-known case acknowledged by DeLancey the normal way of reporting illness is with h dug.

(29) ˙na na-gi-h dug
     me sick-PRS-TES
     225, Garrett 2001: 79)

It would be hard to argue that whenever someone uttered the sentence ‘I am sick’ he is stressing the novelty of this information.

DeLancey appears to believe that h dug is called for in this case because illness is “beyond control” (1986: 207), whereas yod is used with verbs “which require some degree of control on the part of the subject” (1986: 207).

(30) ˙na las-ka byed-kyi-yod
     me work do-PRS-PER
     ‘I’m working.’ (DeLancey 1986: 207)

An account of h dug versus yod in terms of the controllability of the action is however not possbible, because as Denwood points out, na ‘to be sick’ is compatible with the suffix gi-yod.

(31) a. ˙na na-gi-yod
     /ˈ ngaˈn̩ɡəy̱ʊ̱d̃ /
     me sick-PRS-PER
     ‘I’m chronically sick.’ (Denwood 1999: 151, cf. Tournadre 1996:
     223)\(^{18}\)

18. DeLancey, probably overlooking this interpretation, suggests that this sentence is ungrammatical (DeLancey 1990: 300, example 28).
Denwood introduces the feature of “generality” to account for such examples. This new category is however also unnecessary. The morpheme yod is employed to mark information which one knows through direct personal (usually intentional) involvement whereas h. dug marks information which one comes to know through the senses. Saying ˙na na-gi-yod suggests that one has come to know of one’s illness in a similar way to how one knows of one’s own actions or long term acquaintances.

(32) a. ˙na yi-ge hbre-ge-yod
   me letter write-PRS-PER
   ‘I am writing a letter.’ (cf. Tournadre 2003: 133)

   b. khoi ˙no-šes-yod
   him recognize-PRS-PER

If one says ˙na na-gi-h. dug it shows that one knows one’s illness through direct experience; such examples either reflect an internal sense (endopathic, cf. Tournadre 1996: 226, Garrett 2001: 77–82) or illness is grammatically something that one realizes with the senses, like the presence of a stray cat.

The examples of illness and dreams show that h. dug does not always coincide with “mirative” meanings. In contrast, sensory evidence is fully sufficient to account for these examples. Mirativity is at best insufficient to capture the meaning of h. dug.

2.5.2. “Sensory evidence” suffices to account for all of DeLancey’s examples. Even if h. dug occurs in a number of circumstances which cannot be analysed as “new information”, the category could perhaps be salvaged if it is required in some, albeit not all cases. In fact, all of DeLancey’s examples, surprise at yaks, cats, money, and books, are better explained as visual evidence. Yukawa explains three of DeLancey’s examples (books, yaks, money) in exactly this way.

19. In the case of yod, yod-pa-red, and h. dug used with involuntary verbs Denwood (1999: 150) provides six classifications based on four factors, viz. “person”, “evidentiality”, “viewpoint”, and “generality”. He gives equally elaborate analysis of these morphemes with voluntary verbs (Denwood 1999: 149) and as copulas (Denwood 1999: 124). While this analysis explains the use of these morphemes in a very wide number of contexts it is needlessly complex.

20. These two examples do not fully characterise the meaning of yod, which is unnecessary for the topic at hand. For more detail consult Tournadre (1996: 223–224, 2003: 145).
In (15), Yukawa’s example of two people discussing books in a shop, *yod-pa-red* is used when the knowledge is derived from reputation (15a) whereas *hdug* is used when one has physically set eyes on a book (15b). In contrast, DeLancey’s example of a book (27) employs *yod* when the speaker is describing the content of his own library (27a) and *hdug* when he is shocked to find a particular book on his shelf (27b). Yukawa’s explanation of *hdug* to show visual evidence can easily account for DeLancey’s example. When describing the content of my library, as in (27a), I know which books I have because I was directly involved in their procurement. Because of this direct personal involvement the “personal” verb *yod* is called for. When describing my shock at the discovery that I own a particular book, as in (27b), my knowledge comes not from my personal involvement (which I have lost track of) but rather from the visual evidence of the book on my shelf. The implication of surprise arises as a result of using a sensory evidential in a circumstance when the use of the personal would be more conventional.

Yukawa (1966: 79) interprets DeLancey’s example of yaks, not as showing new information, but rather as showing that "は過去のことについてもそのままの形で用いられう [can be used in the same form with reference to a past event]."

(33) \( \text{bod-la g.yag ma-n-po hdug} \)
\( \text{'pöö la 'ya? 'manggo duu/} \)
\( \text{Tibet-obl yak many exist-tes} \)

‘チベットにはヤクが多い. [In Tibet there are many Yaks.]’
(Yukawa 1966: 79)

Such sentences occur in “過去にその事物を見た（他の感覚で認識した）場合 [situations where one has seen (or recognized through another sense) that thing in the past]” (Yukawa 1966: 79). Visual evidence, not new information, is key. DeLancey’s observation (1986: 205) that “a Tibetan, who has actual visual knowledge of the presence of yaks in Tibet cannot use *hdug* to report this fact” misunderstands the relationship among the three-termed evidential system. A Tibetan would normally know of the presence of yaks in Tibet, through his personal involvement, through the general knowledge available to him and his culture, and through direct sensory observation. Yet when uttering a sentence he must choose exactly one of these three means of knowledge to present to his audience as the source of his information. It is certainly not the case that *hdug* must be used obligatorily for all situations for which one has sensory evidence, far from this proving that *hdug* is not a sensory evidential it demonstrates only that sometimes there is more than one way to say something. By presenting his knowledge of yaks in Tibet as deriving from the evidence of his senses a speaker implies a lack of personal involvement or gen-
eral knowledge; it is this implication which results in the connotation of “new information”.

In the case of money, Yukawa gives the following example to demonstrate that the bearing witness through the senses marked by *hdug* can occur based on senses (in this case touch) other than the visual.

(34)  *hdik d惘 hbug*

*‘ここにお金がある’ ([Here is some money.]’ (Yukawa 1966: 79)*

A person usually knows that he has money because he put it in his pocket himself (26a). But sometimes, having forgotten he has done so, he learns that he has money in his pocket form the sensory evidence of touching it (26b, 34). In those cases where “new information” is included in the pragmatic use of a sentence containing *hdug* it is contextually derived from its opposition to the other epistemic moods. Rather than a grammatical category in its own right “mirativity” is a pragmatic effect in certain uses of sensory evidence.

An implication of surprise arising from the presentation of knowledge as deriving from visual evidence occurs in English just like in Tibetan. This is clear if one translates DeLancey’s examples *nar d惘 tog-tsang hbug* (DeLancey 1997: 44) and *na/-h/-i nari-la zi-mi hbug* as ‘I see I have some money’ and ‘I see there’s a cat in my house’ or *Bod-la g.yag hbug* ‘I see there are yaks in Tibet’. In these English sentences the visual component of the evidence is obvious from the etymological meaning of the verb *see*, however, the pragmatic force of such a sentence is not to comment on what I see, but rather to emphasize the shock of either having money or there being a cat in the house. One would usually know about one’s money or cat because it is one’s business to know; one would usually know about the fauna of Tibet because it is well known. By invoking sensory evidence instead of one of the other potential evidential categories the speaker emphasizes that he did not expect what he sees. The grammatical meaning of *hdug* is sensory evidence, not new or surprising information.

2.6. Conclusion

The morpheme *hdug* is an evidential. Although it is most characteristically used for visual evidence, it can also be used with sound (16), taste (18a),

21. If one saw “mirative” as derived from Latin mirō ‘I see’ it would be an apt term for the Tibetan testimonial. However, “mirative” in fact is derived by clipping “admirative”, itself derived from admirō ‘to wonder’. This terminology appears to originate in Dozon’s Albanian grammar, in which he uses “admiratif” as a translation for ἀπροσδόχητος ‘unexpected’ (Dozon 1879: 226).
When used in a context where another modal auxiliary would be expected it can have an implication of surprise. This implication is however not a part of the morpheme’s grammatical meaning.

DeLancey himself accepted visual evidence as the meaning of *h. dug* in 1985 writing that “the sentences with the direct gloss report information which the speaker has obtained through direct sensory perception (through any sense channel)” (DeLancey 1985: 65).

(35)  
\[\text{bsod-nams-gyis thang-ga hgel-gyi-hdag}\]
\[\text{Sonam-erg thangka hang-pres-tes}\]
\[\text{‘Sonam is hanging a thangka/thangkas [direct perception].’}\]

(DeLancey 1985: 65)

It appears that in 1986 DeLancey became aware of several examples which made him change his mind. After finding discussions of “admiring” and “mirative” in other languages, he chose to analyze *h. dug* in similar terms. Unbeknownst to DeLancey, Yukawa had already analyzed in terms of “visual evidence” the same examples which turned DeLancey against visual evidence.

Subsequent typological research, such as Aikhenvald (2004), has accepted DeLancey’s account of *h. dug* at face value without recourse to the larger body of secondary literature on *h. dug*.

In her survey of morphological categories used for mirative meaning Aikhenvald (2004: 210) concludes that “any evidential except for visual and firsthand, can acquire mirative extensions”. In fact, “Lhasa” Tibetan *h. dug*, the touchstone for the entire typological discussion of mirativity, is a visual and first-hand evidential which has acquired mirative extensions; *h. dug* is a highly atypical example of the very category invented to describe it.

3. Mirativity in other languages

Under the influence of DeLancey’s writings morphemes in many languages are now thought of as mirative markers; it is not feasible to discuss and refute every such case in an article of reasonable length. Instead, it must suffice to treat the terminological antecedents of DeLancey’s use of “mirativity” and the phenomena outside of Tibetan which he describes as mirative. In order to give due consideration to arguments for mirativity presented after DeLancey’s (2001) most recent relevant contribution, an additional section considers the phenomena which Aikhenvald (2004) connects with mirativity.

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22. I have not come across an example with smell discussed in the previous literature. In a letter however (12 April 2010), Nicolas Tournadre draws my attention to this example: *dri-ma kha-gi-hdag* ‘The odour is bitter.’
3.1. Antecedents of DeLancey’s mirativity

DeLancey associates his description of *h. dug* as a “mirative” in Tibetan, with previous descriptions of the “admirative” in Albanian and the “mirative” in Washo. If one investigates the “admirative” and “mirative” in these two languages this similarity disappears. Friedman (1986: 180), whom DeLancey cites, writes as follows about the admirative in Albanian:

> Although the admirative is traditionally defined as a mood expressing surprise, it is also used to express irony, doubt, reportedness, etc. In all its uses the admirative somehow refers to the speaker’s present or past nonconfirmation of the truth of a statement.

In an earlier paper Friedman (1981: 12) writes more explicitly of the Albanian admirative that “surprise is clearly not its basic or invariant meaning”. The following example demonstrates that both surprise and first-hand testimony are not the core meanings of the Albanian admirative.

(36)  

\[
\text{në lidhje me pohimi që forma analitike e përmbysur e tipit “qëne kam” paska pasur dikur vlerën e së ardhmes}
\]

‘in connection with the idea that the inverted analytic form of the type “qëne kam” was supposed to have had at one time the value of the future’ (Friedman 1982: 22)

In (36) “the author is using the perfect admirative *paska pasur* in a quotative fashion which emphasizes his nonacceptance of the truth of what he is reporting without irony or sarcasm” (Friedman 1982: 22). In his most recent contribution on the Albanian admirative, Friedman (2003: 190) refers to it as “nonconfirmative”, “for which ‘surprise’ (mirativity) is one of the contextual variant meanings” (Friedman 2003: 192). The admirative in Albanian, reporting the nonconfirmation of the speaker, is the direct opposite of *h. dug* in Tibetan which indicates explicitly that the speaker can confirm the truth of a statement with his senses.

Jacobsen (1964: 630) writes that in Washo the mirative “indicates that the speaker knows of the action described by the verb, not from having observed it occur, but only inferentially from observation of its effects”.

(37)  

\[
dímeʔ ʔíhu ʔáʔ yíʔi
\]

‘The spring has dried up.’ (Jacobsen 1964: 630)

---

23. If “nonconfirmation” is the basic meaning of the Albanian admirative, it is a bit surprising that Friedman’s examples include direct observation on the basis of vision (2003: 197, example 15), smell (2003: 197, example 16), and taste (2003: 200, example 23). Perhaps, following the implication of Friedman’s discussion of Turkish as comparable to Albanian, one may suggest that Albanian like Turkish exhibits a “mediative” (Lazard 1999) or “indirective” (Johanson 2000) meaning rather than “nonconfirmation” per se (see Section 3.2.4 below).
The Washo “mirative” exists in paradigmatic contrast to “visual” and “audative” evidentials (Jacobsen 1964: 626–629). Again, in direct contrast to Tibetan the Washo mirative implies lack of observation rather than direct sensory perception. Inference is one use of Tibetan h ḏug among many, but in Tibetan the interpretation of inference is a consequence of combining the evidential meaning of direct witness with the perfect tense. Aikhenvald (2004: 210) concludes that the Washo mirative is not a mirative in DeLancey’s sense, but rather an “inferential evidential”.

DeLancey accepts and cites the analyses of Friedman and Jacobsen and builds his own conception of “mirativity” in Tibetan on analogy to their descriptions. However, not only is there no ground for such an analogy: the admirative in Albanian and mirative in Washo are quite at odds with the meaning of “Lhasa” Tibetan h ḏug. Tibetan h ḏug reports the sense experience of the speaker, the Albanian admirative and Washo mirative report the non-confirmation or lack of observation; none of the three exhibit a grammatical category for surprise or new information; none of the three are mirative markers.

3.2. DeLancey’s other examples of mirativity

In his 1997 article proposing mirativity as a crosslinguistic category, in addition to Tibetan, DeLancey discusses evidence from Hare, Sunwar, Korean, Turkish, and Kalasha, and lists but does not discuss “several languages with mirative-like constructions” (DeLancey 1997: 47).24 Even if Tibetan h ḏug is not a mirative marker, and neither the “admirative” in Albanian nor the “mirative” in Washo are mirative markers, perhaps the evidence DeLancey presents from these five languages compels the acknowledgement of an independent grammatical category to encode the speaker’s surprise.

3.2.1. Hare. According to DeLancey the Hare suffix -lō is typically used in inferential and hearsay contexts, but can be used with mirative force when a person directly perceives an event (DeLancey 1997: 38). All of the examples which DeLancey provides are easily accounted for in terms of visual evidence.

(38) jūhye sa k’iŋayeda lō hereabout bear walk.around.IMPF lō

‘I see there was a bear walking around here.’ (DeLancey 1997: 38, cf. DeLancey 2001: 375)

24. Several of the Hare examples reoccur in his 2001 article.
As DeLancey’s English translation indicates, lô could as easily indicate that the source of the information is visual evidence as to indicate that the stated conclusion required inference.

(39)  libo sít’ lô
cup drop.PERF lô
‘I dropped a cup.’ (DeLancey 1997: 39)

Example (39) can be used “if the speaker were watching TV with a cup in her hand, and when the show was over looked down and saw the cup on the floor, without having been aware of it slipping from her grasp” (DeLancey 1997: 39). DeLancey notices that lô is used with the 1st person only with “a context involving inattention or lack of consciousness” (DeLancey 1997: 38). The interpretation of lô as a sensory evidential accounts sensibly for such usage. It is only when one acts involuntarily that it is sensible to describe sense perception as the source of the knowledge of one’s own actions. Unsurprisingly, the Tibetan testimonial (soñ rather than hdug being the marker in the past tense) is also used to describe the speaker’s unobserved or accidental actions.

(40)  a. ˙nas sā bzas-soñ
     /`ngä? ‘śa ‘sā?-song/
     I-ERG meat ate-PST-TES
     ‘(Dammit) I ate meat.’ (Tournadre & Dorje 2003: 167)

b. ˙nas hbu bsad-soñ
     /`ngä? ‘pu ‘sā?-song/
     I-ERG insect killed-PST-TES
     ‘I killed an insect [accidentally].’ (Tournadre & Dorje 2003: 167)

DeLancey (1997: 45) notes this use of the Tibetan testimonial in an example which is very similar to the Hare example (39). Without noting the similarity between the two examples, he analyses the Hare example as inference (DeLancey 1997: 39), whereas the Tibetan example he analyses as mirative (DeLancey 1997: 45).

(41)  ˙nas ja bos-soñ
     I-ERG tea spilled-PST-TES
     ‘I spilled tea [inadvertently].’ (DeLancey 1997: 45)

I interpret the similarity between (39) and (41) as showing that both Hare lô and the testimonial in Tibetan encode visual evidence.

In the following example, an ogre is speaking about a man who had been throwing branches at him. DeLancey presents this sentence in order to show that inference or hearsay cannot sufficiently account for Hare lô and instead mirativity is at play.
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(42) heee, gühde daweda! ch’ifi dach’ cháda lō!
heey up.there sit guy sit lō
‘Heey, (he’s) sitting up there! The guy is sitting up there!’ (DeLancey 1997: 39, cf. DeLancey 2001: 376)

Although it is not possible to see lō as a marker of inference of hearsay, because “the context explicitly makes clear that the sentence reports direct perception on the part of the speaker” (DeLancey 1997: 39), there is no obstacle to analyse lō as a sensory evidential.

Other examples which DeLancey points to as mirative are equally well accounted for by sensory evidence.

(43) Mary e-wé’ ghálayeda lō
Mary its-hide work.IMPF lō

Such a sentence is most plausible “when the speaker has just gone to Mary’s house and found her working on a hide” (DeLancey 1997: 39). Although he emphasizes the newness of the information, DeLancey (1997: 39) explicitly mentions that in such an example “the speaker has first-hand knowledge”.25

Sentences in which the actor is 2nd person “virtually always have the sense of surprise at an unanticipated situation” (DeLancey 2001: 376).

(44) e-wé’ ghálayëdá lō
its-hide work.2SG.SUBJ.IMPF lō
‘I see you’re working on hides.’ (DeLancey 2001: 376)

In this example, again the English translation draws attention to the possibility lō encodes visual evidence rather than surprise. The fact that “a statement about the addressee is generally conversationally relevant only if it is new information to the speaker” (DeLancey 2001: 376) is what gives the visual evidential its connotation of surprise, i.e., mirativity is a pragmatic effect and not a component of the grammatical meaning.

DeLancey finds compliments particularly diagnostic of mirativity, but in this situation also sensory evidence is equally persuasive.

(45) deshita yedaniyie lō
bush smart lō

25. Although first-hand knowledge is present in all of the examples of Hare lō provided here, Aikhenvald (2004: 197) analyzes the morpheme as a “non-firsthand marker” which can be used “to cover new information”. She does not elaborate on the reasons for her analysis.
‘You’re smart for the bush [i.e., are competent at bushcraft and good at dealing improvisatorily with situation that come up in the wild]!’


DeLancey (1997: 40) suggests that such a sentence “might be said to someone who has just demonstrated more wilderness knowledge than the speaker thought”. I am unfamiliar with the social mores of the Hare, but if lô is indeed a marker of “new information” its use in compliments would always suggest low initial expectations and consequently only shabby compliments of the “not bad for a girl” variety. I instead suggest that lô indicates that the speaker can testify to what he is complimenting through first-hand experience. A simple test could adjudicate between DeLancey’s analysis and that proposed here. A Hare speaker attends a concert of Itzhak Perlman playing the Paganini solo violin caprices and, introduced to Mr Perlman at a reception after the concert, says ‘You play the violin well’. Mr Perlman’s skill at the violin is not new information. DeLancey would predict that lô would not be grammatical in this sentence, whereas if lô is a sensory evidential, it would be called for in this compliment also.

DeLancey does not give an example of lô to mark hearsay. Rice (1989: 410) describes one use of this morpheme as ‘apparently, reported, uncertainty’. The four examples she gives of this usage however in her own explanation rely on visual (46a, b, c) or auditory evidence (46d).26

(46) a. t’asf whekw’êle lô something 3.hears.NEG DUB
   ‘s/he apparently does not hear anything’ [accompanying a picture of a sleeping boy and a raven crowing] (Rice 1989: 410)

b. tabâ missão dahet’î lô
   father net 3.is.setting DUB
   ‘my father is apparently setting nets’ [accompanying a picture where the man seems to be setting nets, but since the speaker is not there, he could be doing something else] (Rice 1989: 410)

c. Margaret ledi tarîyunê xadehts’e nô
   Margaret tea all 3.drank.up DUB
   ‘Margaret apparently drank up the tea.’ [the speaker sees that there is no more tea and surmises that since Margaret is the only one around, she must have been the one to drink it] (Rice 1989: 410)

26. (46c, d) come from another dialect in which the same morpheme is pronounced nô.
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Rice describes lô as an evidential, giving examples of inference (1989: 408–409, examples 39 through 46), i.e., where it “specifies that the outcome of an event is an observed fact although the event that actually lead up to this outcome was not itself observed” (Rice 1989: 408) and involuntary 1st person action (Rice 1989: 409–410, examples 50 through 54). In addition, she gives three examples (Rice 1989: 409, examples 47 through 49) in which lô “indicates that some activity other than the one that had been expected will take place” (Rice 1989: 409). This usage appears to come close to mirativity. However, since none of DeLancey’s examples of lô (or other morphemes which he analyses as a mirative) refer to future time, it is hard to know whether he would analyse these examples as miratives.

(47) hjît xuhts’é sho ‘adee gha són’é yenehwé jé
now evening show 3.go COMP doubt 1sg.think PST
‘I thought that there would be a show this evening but they’ll play ball instead.’ (Rice 1989: 409)

Such a usage is still consistent with an explanation in terms of sensory evidence. One makes a prediction about the future on the basis of visual evidence, similarly to the Tibetan example (20) predicting the weather. Such an analysis is made clear by a translation like ‘I thought that there would be a show this evening but it looks like they will play ball instead’. All of DeLancey’s and Rice’s examples of lô, whether indicating direct observation, a compliment, future predictions, inference, or involuntary 1st person actions, can be explained as examples of sensory evidence. Hearsay might be difficult to explain as sensory evidence, but conveniently no examples of hearsay are available. It is best to conclude that, like ḡdag in Tibetan, lô is a sensory evidential.

3.2.2. Sunwar. DeLancey’s evidence for mirativity in Sunwar comes from the distinction between two copula verbs /tshâ/ and /’baak-/. Whereas /tshâ/ “indicates a proposition which the speaker knows simply because he knows

27. Compare the very similar Tibetan example (16).
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/\baak-/ expresses “information which the speaker knows only by recent
discovery” (DeLancey 1997: 41).

(48) a. Tangka Kathmandu-m tsha\u0102
   Tangka Kathmandu-LOC tsha\u0102.3SG
   ‘Tangka is in Kathmandu.’ (DeLancey 1997: 41)

b. Tangka Kathmandu-m ba\u0102-t\u017ba
   Tangka Kathmandu-LOC exist-3SG.PST
   ‘Tangka is in Kathmandu.’ (DeLancey 1997: 42)

While (48a) “could be said by someone who has been living in Kathmandu, and
is aware that Tangka has been there for some time” (DeLancey 1997: 41), (48b)
“would be said by someone who had seen Tangka in Kathmandu, not having
known previously that he was there” (DeLancey 1997: 41), or in some cases
when this information has been gained through hearsay. DeLancey singles out
as an example “a situation in which the speaker has just learned of Tangka’s
whereabouts through a telephone conversation” (DeLancey 1997: 42). He does
not specify how long after the speaker has learned of Tangka’s whereabouts
sentence (48b) remains grammatical. If two weeks after seeing Tangka or learning
of his whereabouts through a telephone conversation a speaker is still per-
mitted to say (48b), the morpheme /\baak-/ does not express “new information”
in the same sense as an exclamation of surprise at seeing a strange cat in one’s
home (25b) or a strange book on one’s shelf (26b). Seeing Tangka with one’s
own eyes can be accounted for by analysing /\baak-/ as a sensory evidential
in (48b). Such an analysis also accounts for the following example, which is
comparable to example (28) of Tibetan h\u0102ug given above.

(49) go Kathmandu-m ba\u0102-t\u017bi
   I Kathmandu-LOC exist-1SG.PST
   ‘I saw myself in Kathmandu [as in a dream].’ (DeLancey 1997: 42)

In this instance DeLancey chooses to express the component of visual evidence
in his translation and admits that “we associate evidentiality” (DeLancey 1997:
42) with such examples. However, for reasons he does not make explicit he
prefers to analyse this example as mirative. It is not possible to understand a
dream as new information at the time of relating it another person, and for this
reason I gave example (28) of Tibetan h\u0102ug as counterevidence to DeLancey’s
account of mirativity in Tibetan.

Mirativity in Sunwar has not been confirmed in more recent work; in her
Sunwar grammar Dörte Borchers writes that his “analysis of the difference
between the copulas b\u0102c\u0102a and cha does not fit the data collected from speakers
of Sunwar from Râmechâp” (Borchers 2008: 164). I conclude that mirativity
is no more helpful in describing Sunwar /\baak-/ than it was in accounting for
the use of Tibetan h\u0102ug or Hare lô.
3.2.3. **Korean.** DeLancey’s evidence for mirativity in Korean is drawn from the analysis of the morpheme -*kun* by Ho Sang Lee (1985, 1993) and Kyounghee Ko (1989). Of these three sources only Lee (1993) is available to me. DeLancey (1997: 45) stresses the following two examples as “illustrating the irrelevance of evidential categories per se to the use of -*kun*”.

(50) a. *cikûm i sikan oppa-nûn class-e tûlô-ka now this hour brother-top class-LOC enter-go
    *iss-kess-kun be-CONJ-N1
    [A note left by someone who had come to visit the addressee
    and found him not at home:] ‘Right now, you must be in class.’
    (DeLancey 1997: 45, after Lee 1993: 147)

b. *cany’ak tuu-si-nûn-kun-yo
    dinner take-HON-PRES-NI-DEF
    [Said by a visitor who enters the house to find the family at din-
    ner:] ‘(I see) you are eating dinner.’ (DeLancey 1997: 45)

Both of these sentences are easily interpreted as cases of visual evidence. DeLancey’s translation of (50b) suggests this immediately and a translation such as ‘I see you must be in class now’ for (50a) demonstrates that in English as much as in Korean, the visual evidence of a person’s absence can in an appropriate context constitute evidence that the person is in some specific other place. Lee himself explicitly adds either ‘I see’ or ‘I saw’ to the glosses of six of the eight examples of -*kun* he discusses (his examples 17f, 19h, 22, 23, 24, 25).28 The description of -*kun* as a sensory evidential coincides with Sohn’s account that -*kun* “denotes one’s instantaneous perception” (Sohn 1999: 356). Until some linguist specifically argues against the feasibility of analysing -*kun* as a sensory evidential, Korean should not be taken as evidence for the existence of “mirativity”. Lazard (1999: 104) and Aikhenvald (2004: 214) also reject the analysis of -*kun* as a mirative marker.

3.2.4. **Turkish.** Already in the eleventh century al-Kāšgārī described the distinction between the past tense markers -*mI¸s* and -*dI* as an opposition between unwitnessed and witnessed events (Dankoff 1982: 412, quoted in Friedman 2003: 189). The terminology for the distinction in Ottoman and Republican grammatical literature conforms to the same analysis (Bazin & Feuillet 1980: 12). Bazin (1968: 78–80) refers to the two morphemes respectively as the “parfait de non-constatation” and “parfait de constatation”. Aikhenvald (2004:

28. Of the two remaining examples, one is the example here numbered (50a), which I have just argued is easily analysable in terms of visual evidence.
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210) regards Turkish -miš as a “non-firsthand” evidential. The difficulty with this tradition of analysis is that -miš occurs with direct observation.

(51) a. Bu çocuk ne de güzel-miş
dem child quantif pretty-miš
‘Qu’il est beau, cet enfant! [How beautiful this child is?]’ (Meydan 1996: 135)

b. Baksana! Ne kadar kar yağ-miş!
dem quantif snow fall-miš
‘Regarde comme il a neigé! [Look how it has snowed!]’ (Meydan 1996: 137)

c. Çorba çok güzel ol-muş
soup very good is-miš
‘This soup is [as I perceive by tasting] very good.’ (Johanson 2000: 82)

A number of scholars divide the uses of -miš into three categories: hearsay, inference, and surprise (Slobin & Aksu-Koç 1982: 187, Meydan 1996: 127, Johanson 2000: 65–66). However, this tripartite categorization is a heuristic and not an elaboration of three morphosyntactically distinct structures. For example, inadvertent 1st person actions are equally amenable to an explanation as inference or surprise.

(52) a. Uyu-muş-um
sleep-miš-1sg
‘I must have fallen asleep.’ (Slobin & Aksu-Koç 1982: 192)

elbow-1sg.poss ACC hit-miš-2sg
‘I must have hit my elbow.’ (Slobin & Aksu-Koç 1982: 192)

DeLancey follows Slobin & Aksu-Koç (1982, 1986)29 in suggesting that the use of miš to mark inference or hearsay are extensions of the morpheme’s basic meaning to mark surprise. Lazard (1999) and Johanson (2000) hold that all three uses are instances of a larger category, which they refer to respectively as “mediative” and “indirective”.

Considering the evidence which Slobin & Aksu-Koç (1982) put forward in favour of ‘surprise’ as the basic meaning, I like DeLancey am struck by the similarity to the “Lhasa” Tibetan testimonial. Tibetan demonstrates that examples

29. Because Slobin & Aksu-Koç (1986) is in the words of the authors “based on Slobin & Aksu 1982” to which “the reader is referred […] for full details” (Slobin & Aksu-Koç 1986: 159), the later paper does not need to be considered here.
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of inadvertent 1st person action such as (52a, b) are amenable to interpretation as sensory evidentials. Similarly to the Tibetan examples (40a, b) it is the evidence of “waking over one’s books” or “feeling a bruised elbow” (Slobin & Aksu-Koç 1982: 192) which could provide the sensory evidence which motivates \textit{mfş} in these two examples.

For both Slobin & Aksu-Koç and DeLancey, the supposition that surprise is the core meaning of \textit{mfş} relies particularly on one example, which cannot be interpreted as inference or hearsay.

\begin{align*}
(53) & \text{kız-ınız \textit{çok iyi piyano çal-iyor-muş}} \\
& \text{daughter-your very good piano play-PRES-MIR} \\
& \text{‘Your daughter plays piano very well!’ (DeLancey 1997: 38, Slobin & Aksu-Koç 1982: 197)}
\end{align*}

There is nothing to hinder an interpretation of (53) in terms of sensory evidence. As opposed to DeLancey’s paraphrase “No matter how high my expectations might have been, what I have just heard exceeded them” (1997: 38) one could offer “I know because I have heard her excellent playing with my own ears” as Johanson (2000: 83) also suggests. Like in Hare one can distinguish between ‘surprise’ and ‘sensory evidence’ in the context of complimenting a well-known musician. I have put this question to Professor Balkız Öztürk-Başaran of Boğaziçi University, who in a letter (29 May 2011) confirms that “one can say this even if the piano player is a famous one” and provides an expanded version of the example which makes this context explicit: \textit{Kızınız gerçeken çok iyi piyano calıyor-muş. Bu kadar meşhur olmasız çok doğal.} ‘Your daughter really plays the piano so well. It is very natural that she is so famous.’ This presumed premier instance of mirativity can be analysed in terms of “sense evidence” but not in terms of “mirativity”.

The use of \textit{-mfş} with the 1st person in the reporting of dreams is also similar to \textit{hдут} as seen in (28) above.

\begin{align*}
(54) & \text{Bu gece \textit{çok güzel bir rüya gör-dü-m. Büyük bir} } \\
& \text{dem night very pretty a dream see-D-1SG big a} \\
& \text{bahçe-dey-miş-im. gardin-LOC-mfş-1SG} \\
& \text{‘Cette nuit, j’ai fait un très beau rêve. J’étais dans un jardin immense.} \\
& \text{[Last night I had a very beautiful dream. I was in a large garden.]’} \\
& \text{(Meydan 1996: 131)}
\end{align*}

Other examples demonstrate that an analysis of \textit{-mfş} as a sensory evidential cannot be correct. Whereas \textit{hдут} can be used in a sentence meaning ‘it looks like it is going to rain’ (20), \textit{-mfş} cannot be.
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(55) Yağmur yağ-acak-mlş
    rain(N) rain(V)-FUT-mlş

    ‘It is reported that it will rain.’ (Slobin & Aksu-Koç 1982: 193)

A sentence such as (55) cannot be used “on seeing a cloudy sky” but is “appropriate in predicting rain on the basis of hearsay” (Slobin & Aksu-Koç 1982: 193). If both ḥdag and -mlş were mirative markers, it is rather surprising that -mlş cannot be used in (55) to say ‘I am surprised it is going to rain’, since ḥdag can be used in the sentence ‘it looks like it is going to rain’ (20), which DeLancey would presumably have translated ‘I am surprised it is going to be sunny’.

Another potential discrepancy between ḥdag and -mlş is the use of the endopathic. Lazard (1999: 100) cites Meydan (1996: 140) to the effect that “expressions of perception and feeling in the 1st person normally exclude the mediative or evidential [i.e., -mlş] in Turkish”. In contrast, Tibetan ḥdag is obligatory in expressions of the endopathic; cf. (28). A close examination of the examples however shows that Meydan (1996: 140) prohibits -mlş with the verbs ‘see’ and ‘hear’ whereas the typical example of the endopathic in Tibetan is ‘be sick’. The exact constraints of -mlş and ḥdag with verba sentiendi merit further study.

Because it is implausible that both members of a morphologically contrasting set mark the same grammatical category, the use of -dl to mark “hot news” (Csató 2000: 32, Johanson 2000: 83) proves that -mlş is not a marker of new information.

(56) Otobüs gel-dl!
    bus arrive-dl.pst

    ‘The bus has arrived!’ (Csató 2000: 32).

The most substantial difference between -mlş and ḥdag is that, whereas ḥdag can only make limited appearance in hearsay contexts (which are best interpreted as indirect discourse, cf. Section 2.3) hearsay is a common function of -mlş.30

(57) a. Fatma, garip bir rüya gör-muş
    Fatma strange a dream see-mlş

    ‘Fatma a fait une rêve étrange. [Fatma had a strange dream.]’
    (Bazin 1968: 79)

30. Johanson (2000: 65) argues against hearsay as the “central” meaning of -mlş, but the point here is merely that -mlş occurs frequently in hearsay contexts.
b.  

Beni çekiştir misiniz
me pull bad you.get
'Vous avez dit du mal du moi (en mon absence). [You have spoken ill of me (in my absence).]' (Bazin & Feuillet 1980: 13)

The meanings of \textit{hduq} and \textit{-mls} are thus quite different; such differences show that \textit{-mls} is neither a mirative nor a sensory evidential.

Because it is “not possible to interpret the reportative and inferential uses as deriving from a central notion such as ‘surprise’” (Johanson 2000: 83), the conclusion of Slobin & Aksu-Koç (1982: 198) that \textit{-mls} marks the speaker’s “unprepared mind” cannot be followed. Instead, the initial suggestion of Slobin & Aksu-Koç (1982: 187) that \textit{-mls} is “used for a range of functions encoding events to which the speaker was not a direct or fully conscious participant” is more sufficient, the category thus described can be referred to as “mediative” following Lazard (1999) or “indirective” following Johanson (2000).

3.2.5. \textit{Kalasha}. In addition to making explicit arguments for mirativity in Tibetan, Kare, Sunwar, Korean, and Turkish DeLancey mentions “several languages with mirative-like constructions which are attested in the literature” (DeLancey 1997: 47). He discusses four examples from Kalasha showing inference (1997: 47, example 44), a compliment (1997: 47, example 46), and involuntary 1st person action (1997: 48, example 47). These uses are indeed similar to uses of Tibetan \textit{hduq} and Hare \textit{lõ}, suggesting that Kalasha too probably has a sensory evidential. DeLancey’s example of “surprise” in Kalasha is also amenable to explanation as a sensory evidential.

\begin{minipage}{\textwidth}
\begin{verbatim}
Amerika' bo hu'tala dur kai si'-an
America very high house make PST.PERF-3PL
hu'la
become.PST.INFER.3
'In America there are very tall buildings.' (DeLancey 1997: 47)
\end{verbatim}
\end{minipage}

Such an example “could be said by someone who is returning from the wide world with stories for his fellow villagers” (DeLancey 1997: 47). In America the speaker would have had ample opportunities to gain first-hand sensory experience of tall buildings, and appeal to this experience when assuring his audience of the veracity of his fabulous account, but I do not understand how DeLancey sees this example as showing ‘surprise’. The speaker may have been surprised by America’s architecture some weeks ago when he first saw it, but his mind is now fully prepared for the now rather old information which he relates. The Kalasha form \textit{-la}’ may mark sensory evidence, but cannot mark ‘unprepared mind’ or ‘new information’.
3.2.6. Conclusion: DeLancey’s examples of mirativity outside Tibetan are unconvincing. A category to encode ‘new information’, ‘surprise’, or ‘unprepared mind’ is not necessary to account for any of the data DeLancey presents in order to posit mirativity as a grammatical category. In Sunwar (49) and Kalasha (58) the very sentences which DeLancey cites preclude interpretation as ‘new’ or ‘surprising’. One may tentatively conclude that Hare, Sunwar, Korean, and Kalasha, like Tibetan, have a sensory evidential. The same analysis is inappropriate for Turkish, which is probably better described as having a “mediative” (Lazard 1999) or “indirective” (Johanson 2000).

3.3. Aikhenvald’s evidence for mirativity

Even if DeLancey’s characterization of Tibetan ʰdʌg is mistaken and his evidence for mirativity in other languages is best interpreted otherwise, it is still imaginable that his characterization of a grammatical category encoding surprise provides a conceptual framework which is uniquely well suited for the description of a morphosyntactic category somewhere in some language. The Ptolemaic model described the astronomical data available to Copernicus more accurately than his heliocentric proposal, yet he was right in the end. Perhaps DeLancey has the perspicacity to perceive a valid grammatical category despite himself lacking evidence for it. In order to investigate this possibility one must turn to more recent work on mirativity, and observe whether or not the phenomena described as mirative subsequent to DeLancey’s work better match his definition of the category than the evidence which he himself puts forward.

Aikhenvald (2004: 210) hopes “to present examples demonstrating that mirativity can be independent of any other category”. She mentions phenomena in eight languages (Kham, Cupeño, Tarma Quechua, Tariana, Makah, Choctaw, Wichita, and Tsakhur). Primarily her presentation relies on Watters’ description of Kham (five examples discussed); she also discusses two examples from Tariana and one from Cupeño. She provides no examples or discussion for Quechua, Makah, Choctaw, or Wichita. I will treat the evidence of each language respectively.

3.3.1. Kham. David Watters provides a detailed discussion of őleo in Kham, which he labels “the mirative” (Watters 2002: 288). Although he devotes some discussion toward demonstrating that őleo is not an inferential marker (Watters 2002: 288–290), he does not give any examples inconsistent with an interpretation as sensory evidence.

(59)  kāhbul  u-ɾʰːh-zya-o  őleo

blanket 3SG-weave-CONT-NML MIR

‘She’s weaving a blanket!’ (Watters 2002: 290)
Watters provides two possible contexts for sentence (59): either “upon entering an unoccupied room in Maya’s house and finding a partially made blanket still attached to the loom” (Watters 2002: 289) or “when the speaker enters the room and finds Maya sitting at the loom weaving” (Watters 2002: 290). In either setting the speaker has recourse to the evidence of his own eyes.

In some of his examples the visual source of the evidence is very clear. For example, when “Tipalkya, the speaker, spots the leopard lying beneath a boulder” (Watters 2002: 291), he says to his companion:

(60) monal-lai ta ‘e baboi monal na-ko zo ci Manlal-obj foc hey man Manlal dist-at emph cep sya-d’o u-li-zya-o oleo sani’ sleep-NF 3SG-be-CONT-NML MIR confirm

‘(I said) to Manlal, “Hey man, Manlal, he’s right there sleeping, see!”’

(Watters 2002: 291)

Like in Tibetan, the evidence is not necessarily visual. Although Watters provides no specific context for example (61), presumably the speaker has just reached into his pocket and found his knife missing.

(61) qa-khurja qa-sa-mai-wo oleo my-knife 1SG-CAUS-LOSE-NML MIR

‘I lost my knife! [I just discovered it]’ (Watters 2002: 292)

In keeping with Yukawa’s analysis of the Tibetan example (34) one is entitled to suggest that tactile evidence is what calls for oleo in this example.

Watters (2002: 296) claims that the mirative is also used when the source of knowledge is hearsay; he does not however provide examples of such a usage and the language does have a separate morpheme for reported speech. Because Watters does not present examples inexplicable in terms of sensory evidence, the prominent place Aikhenvald gives Kham in her argument for mirativity is unjustified.

3.3.2. Cupeño. Jane Hill (2005: 66) describes the modal clitic =a)m as “used to express that the utterance is based on unimpeachable firsthand knowledge”. In addition to the mirative, such a description would be consistent with an explanation either as a sensory evidential or long standing personal involvement or familiarity of the type marked by the ‘personal’ in “Lhasa” Tibetan. The tendency of the clitic to be used “in the moment of discovery” (J. Hill 2005: 66) is probably the reason why Hill choose to adopt DeLancey’s term “mirative”. The following example “in which Coyote has arrived, uninvited, at a church service conducted by birds”, Hill (2005: 66) draws attention to as a particularly clear case of a “firsthand, new discovery, surprise” meaning; Aikhenvald (2004: 213) also cites this example.
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(62) Mu=ku’ut “Isk-ly=am!” pe-yax=ku’ut
and=REP coyote-NPN=MIR 3SG-say=REP
‘And it is said, “It’s Coyote!” he said it is said.’ (J. Hill 2005: 66)

However, Hill is herself sceptical of the comparison with the phenomena DeLancey described, which her choice of terminology invites, writing that the “Cupeño clitic does not in every instance exactly satisfy this characterization” (J. Hill 2005: 66). The use of =(a)m in a sentence such as the following, which reports a general (and probably well-known) truth seems particularly at odds with the interpretation of the morpheme as a mirative marker.

(63) Paana-t=am-el ku-t-im
tarantula-NPN=MIR-3PL.ABS fire-NPN-PL
‘Tarantulas are dangerous.’ (J. Hill 2005: 67)

J. Hill (2005: 66) specifies that “=(a)m is restricted to contexts where the referent about which the conclusions are drawn is not a discourse participant”. This restriction sets =(a)m apart from many of the other phenomena which have been labelled “mirative”. Tibetan ḡlug (19a, b), Hare lō (44, 45), and Korean kun (50a, b) can be used with the 2nd person. Tibetan ḡlug (28, 29, 40a, b, 41), Hare lō (39), Sunwar ‘baak (49), and Turkish -muṣ (52a, b) can be used with the 1st person. Despite her stipulation Hill (2005: 67) gives the following example of =(a)m used with the 1st person:

(64) Suplewet=am=’ep amay=’ep ne-mivax-wen ne-ye
one=MIR=R just=R 1SG-be-PST 1SG-mother
pe-na’aqwa.
3SG-child
‘I was my mother’s only child.’ (J. Hill 2005: 67)

Whereas when in the languages discussed so far sentences with the 1st person and a “mirative” marker have either the sense of observing one’s self in a dream (Tibetan ḡlug (28), Sunwar ‘baak (49)) or describe an inadvertent action (Tibetan ḡlug (40a, b, 41), Hale lō (39), Turkish -muṣ (52a, b)), both such connotations are lacking in this Cupeño example. Aikhenvald’s appeal to =(a)m in Cupeño as a demonstration of an unambiguous mirativity marker used independently of evidentials (Aikhenvald 2004: 213) is unconvincing. Although the clitic =(a)m occurs independently of evidentials and is labelled as “mirative” by Hill, its use is quite distinct from the already heterogeneous assemblages of morphemes which DeLancey used to define mirativity as a category.

3.3.3. Tarma Quechua. Willem Adelaar describes a “sudden discovery” category in the verbal system of Tarma Quechua, which is marked with the morpheme -na-. He writes that the "SUDDEN DISCOVERY series refers to events
which have been going on unnoticed and which are suddenly discovered by the
speaker or by another person playing a central role in the narrative (English
examples of this category. Without more context it is difficult to evaluate these
eamples.

(65) a. yargara:rina: masya:du karutam
we.had.climbed very far
‘We suddenly realized we had climbed very far.’ (Adelaar 1977: 98)

b. čawraqa ča:qa kakuna alqu
then that he.was dog
‘So it turned out that he was a dog.’ (Adelaar 1977: 98)

c. tutumanya intíum muyaraya:nax
rainbow sun it.was.encircling
‘A rainbow was encircling the sun.’ (Adelaar 1977: 98)

Although Adelaar’s description of the semantics of -na- conforms very closely
to DeLancey and Aikhenvald’s proposed mirative category, positing mirativity
on the basis of these three short examples would be premature.

3.3.4. Makah. Aikhenvald cites Davidson’s mention of a “mirative” in
Makah (Davidson 2002: 276). Davidson (2002) refers to an unpublished pa-
per of Jacobsen presented at a conference in 1973. However, Jacobsen (1986:
19–20) also describes the suffix in question more recently; it is a form which
“indicates that the speaker has only belatedly become aware of a fact or an
event” (Jacobsen 1986: 19), although this description does suggest “new infor-
mation” it does not necessarily imply “surprise”. The two examples for which
the source of information is made explicit show visual evidence.

(66) a. capaca škub
‘It’s a canoe [after you finally make out what it is].’ (Jacobsen
1986: 19)

b. hitaqyalara:škub
‘[I see] you have arrived.’ (Jacobsen 1986: 20)

Jacobsen (1986) does not choose to describe this form as a “mirative” although
he invented the term in his description of Washo (1964); I defer to his judg-
ment.

31. This example I have located in the texts provided (Adelaar 1977: 410).
3.3.5. **Choctaw.** In his description of Choctaw Broadwell (1991), never suggests that -chih is used to indicate new information or surprise, but only ‘wonder’.

(67) a. *oba-tok-chih*
    rain-pt-wonder
    ‘I wonder if it rained.’ (Broadwell 1991: 412)

b. *Pam-at tamaaha iya-tok-chih*
    Pam-nom town go-pt-wonder
    ‘I wonder if Pam went to town.’ (Broadwell 1991: 417)


3.3.6. **Wichita.** Rood identifies a verbal prefix *iskira*- in Wichita, which he dubs "exclamatory" (Rood 1976: 87, 1996: 589). He gives only one example *ískirá:rásis* which he translates ‘There she goes, cooking it!’ (Rood 1976: 95) and ‘Look! She’s cooking it!’ (Rood 1996: 591). No conclusion is possible on the basis of such fragmentary evidence.

3.3.7. **Tsakhur.** Aikhenvald (2004: 214) draws attention to Tsakhur as a language with "mirative as a separate category". The title of Tatevosov & Majsak’s (1999) chapter “Средств выражения адвиритивной семантики [Means of expressing admirative semantics]” makes clear that they take “mirativity” for granted as a semantic category. Consequently, they do not devote any argumentation to prove that -öx=ud and -ëx=id cannot be analysed as inferentials, sensory evidentials, or other categories. Many examples are consistent with an interpretation of visual evidence.

(68) “malhammad-in Gelj jug-qixa ejx-id!” – haraj
    Muhammad-a leg.4 good-4.be.pf ADM=COH.4 cry
    *ha=w=?’-u wuʒ-ę*
    3=do-pf himself.1-erg
    ‘“It turns out, Muhammad’s leg was healed!” – he shouted.’ (Tatevosov & Majsak 1999: 290)

In (68) the speaker “[в]ернувшихся друзей встречает товарищ, остававшийся со сломавшим ногу Магомедом [returning to friends meets his companion Muhammad who had been left behind with a broken leg]” (Tatevosov & Majsak 1999: 290).

In a similar unexpected encounter, if I “думал, Тимур на свадьбе не будет, но встретил егo [thought that Timur would not be at the wedding but met him]” (Tatevosov & Majsak 1999: 291), I might say:
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(69) \[ \text{timur} \ \text{sa} \ \text{wo}=\text{r}=\text{ôx}=\text{ur}=\text{i} \]
Timur there was=1=adm=conh.1=em1
'A Timur там был, оказывается. [But Timur was there, it turns out.]' (Tatevosov & Majsak 1999: 291)

In example (70), "[M]не говорили, что в магазине есть мука. Однако я сходил в магазин и выяснил [I was told that the store has flour. However, I went to the store and found out]" (Tatevosov & Majsak 1999: 291).

(70) \[ \text{xol} \ \text{deš}=\text{ôx}=\text{ub}=\text{i} \]
Timur not.be-adm=conh.3=em1 shop-in
‘Муки-то ведь нет в магазине. [In fact there is no flour in the store.]’ (Tatevosov & Majsak 1999: 291)

In one example however, the evidence comes from hearsay. "Мне сын говорил, что на свадьбу не пойдёт. Но мне рассказали, что он там был, и я ему говорю [My son said that he would not go to the wedding. But they told me that he was there, and I tell him]" (Tatevosov & Majsak 1999: 291):

(71) \[ \text{ru-na}=\text{r} \ \text{ixa}=\text{ôx}=\text{ur}=\text{i} \]
you.1-na=conh.1 1.be-adm=conh.1=em1 there
‘Ты там был, оказывается! [You were there, turns out!]’ (Tatevosov & Majsak 1999: 291)

Tsakhur as described by Tatevosov & Majsak demonstrates the danger of accepting that certain semantic classes exist a priori. Content to describe -ôx=ud and -êx=id as “admirative” markers, these two authors give little actual information about their occurrence. Can they be used in compliments, in predications, as endopathics, in dreams? Some of the phenomena called “mirative” or “admirative” have these uses and others do not. Assuming mirative rather than arguing for it, does not, as Aikhenvald (2004: 214) claims, allow one to posit the independence of this category.

3.3.8. Tariana. Tariana has “a number of complex predicates with modality-like meanings” (Aikhenvald 2003b: 152), one of which Aikhenvald calls the “admirative” (2003a, 2003b) or “mirative” (2004). In examples (72a, b) the form in question encodes the surprise not of the speaker but of the subject of the sentence; the construction is thus not a marker of information “new to the speaker” (DeLancey 1997: 36), and consequently not a “mirative” marker.
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(72) a. 

\[ \text{Oli yarusi ma-weni-de-ka [du-ka-mhe] } \]
\[ \text{Oli thing-NPOSS NEG-pay-NEG-SUB 3SG.F-SEE-ADM du-a-ka] } \]
\[ 3SG.F-AUX-REC.P. VIS \]

‘Olivia was surprised at things being so cheap [lit., Olivia, things being cheap, looked (at this) in admiration].’ (Aikhenvald 2003a: 454, 2003b: 152, 2004: 213)

b. 

\[ \text{dihá-dapana-se-pidana naha matja-dapana-se} \]
\[ \text{ART-CL.HAB-LOC-REMP.REP they good/proper-CL.HAB-LOC} \]
\[ \text{kawhi naka-niki kawhi naka wake.up 3PL.arrive-COMPL wake-up 3PL.arrive} \]
\[ \text{měda-pidana [na:ka-mhe na:-da-niki]} \]
\[ \text{so-REMP.REP 3PL.ATRIVE-ADM 3PL.AUX-DOUBT-COMPL} \]
\[ \text{naka 3PL.arrive} \]

‘They woke up in a beautiful house, they woke up and could hardly believe their eyes.’ (Aikhenvald 2003a: 454)

3.3.9. Conclusion: Aikhenvald’s evidence for mirativity is inconclusive. It is easy to agree with Aikhenvald’s observation (2004: 210) that “[t]he term ‘(ad)mirative’ is sometimes used for categories which have nothing to do with DeLancey’s […] semantics of mirativity”. She mentions the “admirative” in Archi as one such inaptly named phenomenon. Cupeño, Choctaw, and Tariana are additional instances. Quechua, Wichita, and Tsakhur may have a grammatical category denoting surprise, but it would be hasty to conclude this on the basis of the available data.

Table 3 compares the various uses of the morphemes in Tibetan, Hare, Sun-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use</th>
<th>Tibetan</th>
<th>Hare</th>
<th>Sunwar</th>
<th>Korean</th>
<th>Kalasha</th>
<th>Kham</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct perception</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In a compliment</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In a dream</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictions</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inference</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st person</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hearsay</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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war, Korean, Turkish, and Kham which DeLancey and Aikhenvald describe as “mirative”. Tibetan \textit{h}dug is a sensory evidential; its use in statements of direct perception requires no comment. In compliments the speaker relates his direct perception of the remarkable quality or achievement. When directly perceiving himself in a dream or photograph the speaker uses \textit{h}dug to refer to his direct perception of himself. If the speaker directly perceives the evidence of future weather patterns, he can employ \textit{h}dug in reference to future time. Direct perception of his own physical or mental state also employs this form (endopathic). If the speaker directly perceives the result of past action, he bears witness to this evidence in the testimonial. In reference to the initial event which bore fruit in the evidence which is directly perceived, this usage can be regarded as inference. There is no obstacle to the speaker drawing inferences about himself. If he directly perceives the evidence of his own action he relates this with the testimonial. However, because in the case of volitional actions the speaker would know of them primarily through his own involvement and not through the evidence of his senses, this use is restricted to involuntary actions. Finally, in indirect discourse one can use \textit{h}dug with reference to the speaker, if \textit{h}dug is the evidential used in the direct discourse equivalent of a particular sentence. The non-alignment of evidentials in indirect discourse is a well-known feature of “Lhasa” Tibetan grammar. These seven seemingly disparate uses of the testimonial are direct consequence of the various pragmatic circumstances in which a speaker wants to appeal to the evidence of his senses.

The many question marks in Table 3 make clear that much research remains to be done on the evidential systems of Hare, Sunwar, Korean, Kalasha, Kham, and Turkish. The discussion presented here suggests that those phenomena regarded by DeLancey or Aikhenvald as mirative in Hare, Sunwar, Korean, Kalasha, and Kham are sensory evidentials. The use of \textit{-mIs} in Turkish is more likely an instance of the “mediative”. The case of Lhasa \textit{h}dug makes clear that all of the “mirative” uses identified in these languages can be encoded by a sensory evidential. The range of pragmatic circumstances in which a sensory evidential can be deployed will naturally depend on the overall structural relationships which the category bearing the sensory evidential meaning is in opposition to. If, for example, a language has an explicit marker for inference, it would not be surprising to see a sensory evidential barred from this usage. The correct explanation of all of the phenomena which have so far been called “mirative” lies outside of my powers. The evidence hitherto presented in favour of portraying these phenomena as miratives is unsatisfactory.
3.4. **Concluding methodological meditation: Does mirativity lurk yet somewhere?**

When found inadequate, the technical terms of science are refined or rejected. The term “planet” has been continually refined without losing utility. In the Ptolemaic system the moon and the sun were planets, objects orbiting the earth. With the advent of the heliocentric model the sun and moon lost their status, but the earth became a planet. The nineteenth century saw the proliferation of objects discovered to orbit the sun, planets such as Juno, Ceres, Pallas, and Uranus were born. The introduction of the term “asteroid” removed Juno, Ceres, and Pallas from the company of the planets. Pluto was introduced as a ninth planet in 1930, but the advent of the concept “dwarf planet” in 2006 moved Pluto, Ceres, and the newly discovered Eris into this category. Improved understanding of the solar system lead to profound changes to the notion “planet” but as a term for astronomical inquiry it has not lost its salience. Perhaps “mirativity” like “planet” captures an important notion, which however must be refined to satisfy an increasingly nuanced understanding of linguistic reality.

Mirativity as described by DeLancey is insufficiently precise and requires refinement. Although it is defined as a category to encode information which is “new or surprising to the speaker” (DeLancey 1997: 33) and for which he has “no psychological preparation” (DeLancey 1997: 35), when reporting dreams, as in (49), or trips to America, as in (58), the information reported has ample opportunity to grow stale in the speaker’s mind. To decide whether or not “mirativity” is a useful addition to the repertoire of grammatical categories available to descriptive linguists and typologists, one must first have an account of mirativity which precludes such anomalies.

I remain sceptical that reformulation of mirativity with an eye to greater precision will ultimately succeed. The linguist operates at a disadvantage when compared to his colleagues in physics or chemistry; the semantic categories employed in his analysis are not instrumentally verifiable. There is consequently no way to be certain that a reformulation of a category is a refinement. Perhaps the new formulation is just a different beast which implies different consequences. Lacking intersubjectively verifiable minimal units of semantic analysis, when a linguist chooses to provide a semantic label to a morphosyntactic phenomenon, he does this on analogy to the use of that label in the description of other languages. There is a tendency in the minds of some to believe a linguist directly apprehends a Platonic semantic reality which may be present in other languages, like a geologist verifies the presence of sodium in a certain rock. However, linguists lack labs or machines to determine the

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32. With the possible exception of Wierzbicka’s natural semantic metalanguage (Wierzbicka 1988).
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presence or non-presence of a particular purported meaning; in the words of Haspelmath (2007), “pre-established categories don’t exist”. Thus, if a student working on a far-flung language finds a grammatical phenomenon he is unsure how to describe, he rummages through the linguistic literature for analogues to serve as inspiration.

There is nothing wrong with inspirational analogues; notions like “perfect”, although they have no Platonic existence outside of their application to the analysis of a specific languages, have demonstrated their utility. However, an analogy must be rooted in the description of a particular language or particular languages. In the absence of instrumental semantics, mooring a semantic term to a particular morphosyntactic phenomenon is the only means to ensure that the term denotes a thing in this world. The grammatical term “aspect” Carl Philipp Reiff (1860) first elaborated to capture the difference between pairs such as smotret’ and posmotret’ in Russian. By analogy to Russian other phenomena in other languages have come to be similarly described. However, some linguists, building their analogies from discussion of aspect in English and not Russian, have gradually allowed the significat to wander through a chain of analogies away from its signifié.33 Dahl (1985: 69) has even come to the bizarre conclusion that Slavic aspect systems are “rather idiosyncratic”. When “aspect” was unmoored from Russian, it came to mean all things to all men. Haspelmath (2006) shows how “markedness” has fallen prey to the same tragedy and consequently lost all predictive or explanatory power. If in a few decades of use the significat of the technical term ‘two’ gradually drifted to what we currently call ‘three’, mathematics as a science would be crippled. Linguistics is frequently crippled by just this problem.

If the champagne from Champagne is not champagne, then the champagne from California cannot be. If the difference between smotret’ and posmotret’ in Russian is not one of “aspect”, the difference between English went and have gone cannot be; the category has become meaningless. If DeLancey’s understanding of h. dug is incorrect, then the ensemble of phenomena in diverse languages, which have been held to the rubric “mirative” on analogy with “Lhasa” Tibetan h. dug must fall their separate ways. This is all the more the case since none of the phenomena which DeLancey calls “mirative” are independent grammatical categories which encode “surprise” or “new information”.

That morphemes around the world can be pressed into service in certain contexts to have a connotation of surprise, is hardly surprising; all languages must have some way for people to say that things are surprising. These “surprising” uses of morphemes should be described as part of a full description of their

33. See van Driem (2001: 648–661) for an excellent discussion of this Irrweg.
semantics, but do not suggest that there is a crosslinguistically valid category of “mirativity”. All languages have some way of saying ‘I did something’, but only some languages have grammatical 1st person. All languages have some way to say ‘I am disappointed that . . .’, but “the disappointment” is not thereby a crosslinguistically independent grammatical category. A grammatical category exists only to the extent it is definable through structural morphosyntactic criteria within one language. The extent to which one can claim that two languages employ the same category (such as person), the claim is that both languages have structurally definable form classes whose semantics are similar enough that it is convenient to label the categories similarly. Perhaps there are languages which have a separate morphosyntactic category used for surprising information; I remain unconvinced. If languages are found which encode ‘new information’ in an identifiable morphosyntactic category of its own, in order to avoid the false analogies that the moniker “mirativity” would necessarily invoke, that category should bear some other name. Until the day such a languages comes to light we “must leave to philosophers the task of clarifying the status of semantic, i.e., conceptual categories considered independently of their linguistic embodiment” (Lazard 1999: 105).

The case of “mirativity” is less like “planet” and closer to aether or phlogiston. Relativity explains the behaviour of light without requiring clear, massless, yet rigid, luminiferous aether as a medium through which light travels. Holding out hope to find something for aether to explain would be quixotic and anti-empirical. The analysis of combustion as oxidization rather than the liberation of phlogiston from combustible substances explains, among other things, why magnesium gains weight as it burns. Like aether or phlogiston, “mirative” does not accurately describe the very phenomena it was invented to describe; it should, like aether and phlogiston, be gently retired from scientific discourse. To insist that we may yet find a need for mirativity is similar to suggesting that some forms of combustion may yet be found for which phlogiston must be presumed. Of course this is always possible, but it is better for researchers to look for theories to account for realia than to look for realia to satisfy a pre-existing theory.

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Abbreviations: 1/2/3 1st/2nd/3rd person; abs absolutive; adm admirative; art article; aux auxiliary; caus causative; cep counter-expectancy particle; cl class; compl completive; confirm confirmative; cont continuous aspect; def definite; dem demonstrative; dist distal; dub dubitative; emp emphatic; erg ergative; fac factual; fut future; gen genitive; hab habitat; hon honorific; imp imperative; inf fer reciprocal; loc locative; mir mirative; neg negative; nf non-final marker; ni new information; nml nominalizer; nom nominative; npn non-possessed; obj object; obl oblique; per personal; pst past imperfective stative; pl plural; prf perfect; prs present; pst past; pt past/perfect; quant quantifier; r realis; recip reciprocal; rep remote past; rept reported; rsm reported speech marker; sg singular; subj subject; tes testimonial; top topic; vis visual. Any Tibetan noun phrase not specified for case should be construed as absolutive. Some abbreviations from original sources remain unresolved.

References


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