Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East

Cross-Cultural Diplomacy in the Period of the Crusades

By Michael A. Köhler

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Revised, edited and introduced by Konrad Hirschler

BRILL
Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East
The Muslim World in the Age of the Crusades

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Cover illustration: One of the few surviving artifacts linked to Muslim-Frankish relations in the Eastern Mediterranean. This basin with Arabic and French inscription was presumably produced in Egypt (or Syria) for Hugh IV of Lusignan (d. 1359), King of Cyprus and Jerusalem. The Arabic inscription states that it was produced by the order of Hugh and the French inscription was probably subsequently added in Cyprus. Musée du Louvre, MAO101, Dist. RMN-Grand Palais / Hughes Dubois.
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AUTHOR’S PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Some thirty years ago, in 1982, Ludwig Buisson who held the chair in Medieval History at Hamburg University, Germany, drew my attention to the campaigns of Saint Louis, the French Crusader king. It was then when I first came across those striking references in Western sources of the late thirteenth century, most of them in Old French, describing the negotiating procedures and agreements between Crusader/Frankish and Muslim rulers in the years 1249 and 1254, which as a young historian and orientalist immediately caught my attention and fascinated me. I began to consult the early Mamluk historiography in order to improve my understanding of both negotiating techniques and the political strategies that provided the basis for agreements between Franks and Muslims. Under the guidance of Ludwig Buisson and Albrecht Noth, the inspiring head of the Hamburg School of Oriental Studies and great expert of Muslim historiography, this led me to finally conduct a full research into Frankish-Muslim alliances and treaties in the Middle East from the appearance of the first Crusaders in the region to Mamluk rule in Egypt and Syria: I choose to base my work on a comprehensive assessment of both Western and Muslim sources in parallel, and the idea to formulate questions and answers only from the simultaneous analysis of both groups of sources. Hamburg University accepted my study as a PhD thesis in 1987, and De Gruyter published it in German four years later, in 1991, in the series Studies on the Language, History and Culture of the Islamic Orient (vol. 12).¹

In the following years, my academic and other professional career interests developed in other directions, focusing more on contemporary Muslim history and the day-to-day challenges of political and technical cooperation between Europe and the Muslim world, with which today I am dealing both as a professor for Europe and the Mediterranean in Bruges, Belgium, and as an official of the European Commission. It was all the more a surprise, and a delightful and flattering one, when in 2002 Peter M. Holt of the School of Oriental and African Studies in London

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contacted me with the information that he had started to translate my study on Frankish-Muslim alliances and treaties into English in order to enable his non-German speaking students to access the results of my work. Professor Holt soon asked me to authorise the publication of the English translation of the book, which I was only too happy to give. However, it proved unfortunately impossible to finalise the translation and find a suitable publisher before Professor Holt’s death in 2006. This seemed to put the project to a sudden halt.

But the story should continue, with a very pleasant déjà-vu: In 2010 Konrad Hirschler asked me if my book had ever been translated into English, as like Peter M. Holt before him he regretted that the language barrier made it increasingly difficult to make full use of the study in his teaching at the School of Oriental and African Studies. I informed Dr Hirschler of Peter M. Holt’s earlier request and translation work, and Konrad Hirschler was soon able to find and access the still unfinished English manuscript in Harris Manchester College Library, Oxford. He immediately decided to continue where Peter Holt had stopped, to complete the translation and finally submit it to Koninklijke Brill in Leiden for publication.

I am greatly indebted to both the late Peter M. Holt and to Konrad Hirschler and his team at SOAS for their generous work on the English version of this book and their enormous efforts to bring the results of my work to the attention of English language readers. Speakers of both languages will notice that while throughout faithful to the German original, the English version is somewhat shorter and sometimes summarizes the German text; it is also more economic with respect to references and quotes from Latin, Arabic and Old French sources. This makes the text more fluent. Readers who wish to have access to the full text including all references and bibliography may wish to go back to the German version.

Dr Hirschler’s contribution has not been limited to editing and putting the finishing touches on Peter M. Holt’s translation. In his preface he very usefully places the findings of my study in the context of the results of specialist research published in the last two decades, which has shed further light on individual aspects of motivation of alliances and of diplomatic practice. Indeed, there is ample room for further research in this field, and in particular the study of Syrian history under the Bahri Mamluks based on an examination of the many still unedited Arabic sources of the later thirteenth and fourteenth centuries would promise to provide deeper insights.

While I hope I can still add further contributions to this subject of research, I am delighted that today, some 25 years after the conclusion
of work on the original German text, my study on alliances and treaties is still deemed relevant enough to warrant an English translation which will make it available to a wider readership. Political relations between the Muslim world and the West if anything have become ever more complex in the last quarter of a century since this book was written, and confrontation in the region between countries, within societies, and with the involvement of outside players ever more frequent and bitter. Therefore, not only the findings but also the purpose of this book may still have their justification today. As I stated in my concluding remarks: “For better or worse, history is also used or misused for the purpose of legitimization and historical events as well as tendencies are even occasionally understood as direct instructions for dealing with the present. In view of this practical relevance of history, whether intentional or unintentional, it is all the more urgent that what we comprehend as history should be confronted with changed methodologies. Applied to the Frankish-Muslim encounters of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in the Middle East, called the ‘Crusades’ for the lack of a better term, it might happen that both Western and Arabic scholars would no longer read the sources merely as confrontational, but would obtain the formulation of new questions from the Arabic sources in particular. If by this means a small step could be taken towards the separation of ideology from the debate about the encounter of Europe and the Islamic world in the past and a scrap of the historical burden lifted from the dialogue between Europe and the Arabs, much would already have been achieved.”

I would like to take this occasion to thank all those who contributed in one way or another to making this book possible: Ludwig Buisson and Albrecht Noth who guided and advised me, constantly encouraged me and supervised my PhD thesis; Peter M. Holt and Konrad Hirschler for their initiative, all their hard work and enthusiastic support which has made this English translation possible, and Brill Publishers who accepted to make it available to the public; My mother Margret and my father Volkmar Köhler for all their help in every situation and in particular during my student’s years—I would have wished that my father was still with us to see the publication of this book!; And my wife Ina who since we met at university studying Medieval Islam has become my trusted companion for three decades, helped me finish my PhD, went with me to live and work in Northern Africa, and gave birth to our much-loved children.

Michael A. Köhler
Brussels, October 2012
FOREWORD

‘Books of this kind are seldom translated into English. That is a pity, for this work deserves to be widely known not merely among specialists in the history of the crusades, but to all who are interested in East-West relations.’¹ Thus the late James Powell concluded his review of the present work, one that deals with the coexistence of Frankish, that is Latin European, and Muslim states in the Middle East during the period of the Crusades. Although more than two decades have elapsed since the publication of the German version (and Powell’s review) the book’s originality still warrants a translation. Many historical studies have remained bound to the idea that ‘the virtually permanent confrontation [between Muslim and Frankish states] was inevitable’, as a study on the principality of Damascus put it.² This book’s argument questions such a historicization and re-examines the available source material, mainly in Latin, Arabic and Greek. It argues that after their foundation, the Frankish states were swiftly absorbed into the political landscape of Syrian autonomous lordships, wherein a characteristic pattern of alliances and treaties evolved, preventing the intrusion of external powers and the rise of any one particular lordship to a position of dominance. The integration of the Frankish states was facilitated by the development of specific legal instruments, such as the condominium (munasafa) and the suspension clause, which were employed in treaties.

Beyond doubt, research has revised or at least refined some arguments to which the book refers. For example, the motives for individuals to support or join the Crusades, an issue that features prominently in this book’s first chapter, is to a large extent explained here by materialistic factors, be they of an economic, political or social nature. This issue has since been considered in more subtle ways and, in contrast to the explanation offered here, recent work has put more emphasis on spiritual motives—if one wants to adopt such a binary perspective.³ A second example where scholarship has evolved, to take an issue from the field of Arabic/Islamic

³ Cf. the overview in Housley, N.: Contesting the Crusades, Oxford 2006, 75–98.
studies, is the source value of *jihad* treatises and poetry. Writings such as those by Ali ibn Tahir al-Sulami (d. 500/1106), especially his early *jihad* treatise against the Crusaders, have been studied in more detail and in particular Christie has underlined his significance for later writers.\(^4\) The present book’s point on the employment of *jihad*-propaganda is still a crucial contribution to this debate, but needs to be set against more favourable readings of the oeuvre of poets such as Ibn Munir (d. 548/1153) and Ibn al-Qaysarani (d. 548/1154) over the past years.\(^5\)

However, in other regards research over the last two decades has confirmed the book’s main thrust or has advanced arguments that neatly fit into its main thesis. The conquest of Jerusalem in 1099 and the treatment of the local populations by the Crusaders, for instance, have been subject to revisionist studies such as those by Kedar. These studies have argued that the number of victims during the early conquest was lower than previously thought. That the Crusaders did not, even at such an early point, necessarily engage in full-scale massacres of local populations confirms an important argument of this book. In the same vein more studies are now available on a field closely related to the relations between Frankish and Muslim rulers, namely day-to-day relationships between Franks and local populations. The work by Ellenblum on patterns of settlement, for instance, confirms to some extent the close political integration presented in the present book. Just as the Franks did not remain political outsiders to the Syrian political landscape, they also settled well beyond the walls of their fortified cities in the vicinity of (mostly Christian) locales in rural areas.\(^6\)

With this translation the book’s main argument will be accessible to a wider audience and will also be more widely taken up in scholarship. Over the last two decades several studies on diplomatic contacts between Frankish and Muslim states have been published. However, these have


generally been short articles that could neither match the depth and breadth of this book nor offer a comparable conceptualization. Other studies have brought up new issues, but remained typically focused on one set of sources, either Latin or Arabic. Recent textbooks on the Crusades such as those by Tyerman and Phillips certainly pay much more attention to the interaction between Frankish and Muslim states as to the interaction between Franks and indigenous populations, be they Muslim, Christian or Jewish. Yet their main focus is on the internal workings of these states and the history of crusading campaigns so the rich history of the interaction of these states within the Middle East remains rather marginal. It might be expected that a text-book on the Middle East for the period of the Crusades would adopt a different perspective and allow the Frankish states to be seen more as a part of this region’s history rather than first and foremost as part of European medieval history. Yet, such a text-book is still a desideratum and the text-book by Holt is not only outdated, but its title was anyway a misnomer for a book that is basically a (very fine) history of the Mamluk Empire.

If we move away from the academic field towards books specifically authored for non-academic audiences, the framework of presenting the interaction between Frankish and Muslim states is deeply influenced by the approaches of the mid-twentieth century. Such books still reflect the idea of the Crusades as colonial endeavours and the Frankish states as colonial entities that remained fundamentally alien to their Middle Eastern environment throughout their existence, as was argued by Prawer for...
instance. This is even true for the otherwise excellent and well-informed book by Waterson that is underpinned by a teleological narrative of a ‘Muslim resistance’ that crystallises after somewhat hesitant beginnings under the holy trinity of *jihad*-studies, that is Imad al-Din Zengi, his son Nur al-Din and Saladin, from the 1140s onwards. After a temporary relapse under the Ayyubid dynasty in the early thirteenth century, according to this narrative history finds its predestined course in the second half of this century under the Mamluks and their aggressive policies towards the remaining Frankish polities.

Against such a background of historiographical development, this book still makes an important contribution to the field and invites us to rethink modern perceptions and scholarship of these events. Professor Peter Holt of SOAS translated most of the book between 1999 and 2001, but he was not able to revise and publish it before his death in 2006. It was only in 2010 that the manuscript came to my attention and the project could be concluded.

On an editorial note: The number of footnotes of the original has been significantly reduced. References to secondary sources were only adopted if explicitly referred to in the main text or if they are indispensable for following the text’s argument. References to primary sources, however, were generally retained in order to make the text’s line of argument transparent. The bibliography lists all primary and secondary works used in the German original, even if not cited in this translation, to give an insight into the works consulted. Despite the publication of newer editions for many of the primary sources, the original references were retained to ensure consistency. Full transcription of Arabic terms has been limited to the references and some terminological discussion in the main text where it was indispensable. In all other cases diacritics are omitted, though *hamza* (‘) and ‘*ayn* (‘) have been retained throughout the text.

I am thankful to the libraries that made this project possible: Sue Killoran (Harris Manchester College Library, Oxford) generously granted access to Peter Holt’s manuscript and Malcolm Raggett (Centre for Digital Africa, Asia and the Middle East, SOAS library) provided invaluable technical

assistance in digitizing the typewritten manuscript. S. Namir Henrikson (SOAS) meticulously edited the first digital draft of the work and Emma Diab (New York University) and Suzanne Ruggi (Salisbury) saved me from a number of linguistic mistakes and rendered the translation into clearer, more readable English. The Faculty of Arts and Humanities, SOAS, supported this project financially in its initial stages. I am grateful to Michael Brett, Jonathan Phillips, Gerald Hawting, Yehoshua Frenkel, Doris Behrens-Abouseif and the anonymous reader for offering advice at different stages of the project. My thanks go also to Andrew and Harriet Holt and particularly to Michael Köhler who has supported the translation of this book in many ways. I am most profoundly indebted to the late Albrecht Noth, one of the co-supervisors of the PhD thesis underlying this book, who introduced me to it when I was an undergraduate student at the University of Hamburg.

Konrad Hirschler
London, October 2012
‘In the field of Crusades studies the history of institutions has increasingly replaced the history of events. The former has become the dominant approach.’

This assessment of the historiography of Crusades succinctly summarises the development of the field since the 1930s and particularly since the end of the Second World War. Nineteenth-century studies on the crusading period had focused on the critical edition and discussion of the sources. Early overviews of the history of this period, in turn, were characterised by historical positivism and they mainly narrated the history of events, especially the history of specific expeditions to the East, only occasionally combined with cultural history. Since the 1930s, however, research has turned towards the ‘Crusader states’ with a particular emphasis on the legal and social structures of the formation of these states and the history of settlement. In addition, themes such as economy, war, church and art were subject to examination.

This reorientation has significantly expanded our knowledge of the political, legal, administrative, social and economic conditions of the states that were founded in the course of the Crusades. Nevertheless, turning away from the history of events had the effect of virtually stopping research on the Frankish-Muslim relations during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, especially concerning the political and legal history of the relationships of the Frankish states with their Muslim neighbours. An additional reason for this development was that Western historians could—and can—access the Arabic sources from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries only in translation. It is not by chance that the decreased interest in the history of relationships coincided with the point when the information of the two partial translations of Ibn al-Qalanisi (d. 555/1160) had been integrated into scholarship. Since this point no significant translation of Arabic sources pertinent to the Crusades has been published. Those few contributions that have during the last decades advanced our

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1 Mayer, Aspekte, 84.
2 Ibid., 82–5; Cardini, Studi. The best bibliographies are Atiya, Crusade; Mayer, Bibliographie; Mayer, Literaturbericht. The Bulletin of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East (since 1981) contains a regular bibliography of relevant publications.
3 Gibb, Damascus Chronicle and Le Tourneau, Damas.
knowledge on Frankish-Muslim relations were either authored by orientalists or those few medievalists who had Arabic. These studies have especially focused on the period of Saladin (1169–1193), the Ayyubids (1193–1260) and the early Mamluks (1250–1291). However, they primarily deal with specific Frankish-Muslim treaties or are biographies and dynastic histories in which the relationships of the rulers with the Franks are only one among many subjects. Although these studies have elucidated some aspects of the policies and technicalities of treaties they do not offer a continuous history and interpretation of Frankish-Muslim state relations from the First Crusade onwards. The few attempts in this regard have been very brief publications whose medievalist authors have insufficiently taken into account the Arabic sources and no monograph on the development and the context of Frankish-Muslim relations in the Middle East, especially during the twelfth century, has been published yet.

The groundbreaking studies by Prawer on settlement and by Riley-Smith on administration have shown that the Crusaders adopted a number of existing administrative institutions during the process of state formation. However, with regard to their relationships the view has persisted in the field that the Frankish states remained outposts of the Christian world and foreign elements in the largely Islamic Middle East. The image of the period as one of Christian-Islamic confrontation that the majority of Western sources—less so the work by William of Tyre (d. 1186)—projected reinforced this view. These Latin and Old French sources were for the most part written in Europe often by authors who had previously gone to Syria and Palestine as ‘armed pilgrims’. Modern studies have heavily relied on these sources and Arabic sources—as far as available in translation—have been only used as supplementary material. In addition, the use of these sources has been highly problematic as evident in the history of reception of Usama b. Munqidh’s (488–584/1095–1188) autobiography. Older research considered it as the classical example of the Frankish-Muslim modus vivendi of the twelfth century that displays a spirit of tolerance and proves the acculturation of the Franks in the

4 Most significantly, Cahen, *Syrie* and his subsequent studies.
8 Riley-Smith, *Peace*; Hiestand, *Kreuzzug und Friedens Idee*.
Middle East. More recently this perception was turned around and Usama b. Munqidh re-emerged as the main witness for the cultural discrepancy between the two camps and for the 'spirit of counter-crusading' that supposedly developed on the Islamic side in reaction to the Crusades. The study of the reception of jihad propaganda by Muslim rulers in chronicles and poetry of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, especially by Sivan, has further contributed to interpreting Frankish-Muslim relations as one of a confrontation between Christianity and Islam (cf. chapter II). Interestingly, modern Arabic historiography has adopted this concept and has represented the jihad against the Crusades as a precursor for successfully fighting back European imperialism. The foundation of Israel has only increased the topicality of the Crusades, especially for Middle Eastern authors. Yet, was the history of Frankish-Muslim relations in the Middle East really a confrontation between Christendom and Islam; was it really characterised by the spirit of crusading and counter-crusading as Western sources suggested and as modern historiography partly argued? If this was indeed the case, were the examples of Frankish-Muslim cooperation—that are well known to modern historiography—merely isolated occurrences that should be explained in terms of ‘tolerance’ and ‘policies of modus vivendi’?

Against the background of these questions, the present study analyses the Frankish states’ legal and political relations with their Muslim neighbours in the Middle East. The study's aim is not only to list examples of cooperation documented in Latin, Arabic, Greek and Christian Oriental sources. Rather, the central point is to analyse alliances and treaties involving the Frankish states with regard to their rationale, their supporters and their detractors on both sides. Was there a Frankish or Islamic policy of alliances, what were the underlying political concepts and what developments are traceable? What was the actual relevance of the ideas of crusading and jihad? A final aim of the study is to analyse the legal framework that was used for contacts between Frankish and Muslim rulers. Was there also development over time with regard to the content and instruments of treaties? A crucial point of the method proposed here in order to address these questions is that Arabic sources cannot merely supplement Western sources, but that they have to be used in

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9 Munro, Christian; Duncalf, Influences.
10 Haddad, Muslim Eyes.
11 Sivan, Crusades; Ende, Glaubensheld; Altoma, Treatment; Ochsenwald, Crusader.
conjunction and that they have to be considered to be of equal value. In some regards, the Arabic sources are even to be preferred over the Latin or Old French counterparts. Most of the Frankish and Western sources were either authored with reference to specific Crusades or pilgrimages or they are ‘official’ historiography—as in the case of William of Tyre. The Arabic texts, by contrast, ignore any concept of Crusade or jihad history. Consequently, they offer more than just the Islamic perspective on events and processes that are known from Western sources. Arabic sources are not only more numerous, but their main advantage is that they report on the Franks within the general history of the Middle East. Exactly this advantage disappears in the published translations that often include only those passages that concern the Franks.

The Oriental sources (Arabic, Syriac and Armenian) are particularly rich on account of the plurality of genres and—in the case of chronicles—their annalistic-compilatory character. If the works were not commissioned panegyrics, the authors generally compiled the relevant reports on an event without reworking them or commenting upon them. This is valid for the universal chronicles of Ibn al-Athir (d. 630/1233) and Sibt b. al-Jawzi (d. 654/1262) as well as for the local chronicles—a genre that has no counterpart on the Frankish side—of Ibn al-Qalanisi (Damascus) and Ibn al-‘Adim (d. 660/1262, Aleppo). In addition, we have biographies (e.g. by Baha’ al-Din Ibn Shaddad (d. 632/1234)) on Saladin and by Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir (d. 692/1293) on Baybars and Qalawun, dynastic histories (e.g. Abu Shama’s (d. 665/1268) Rawdatayn), autobiographies (e.g. by ‘Umara al-Yamani (d. 569/1174) and Ibn Munqidh) as well as historical geographies (e.g. by Yaqut al-Rumi (d. 626/1229), ‘Izz al-Din Ibn Shaddad (d. 684/1285) and al-Idrisi (d. 560/1165)). Of particular value are the epistles that have been preserved in manuscripts or that were inserted into narrative sources, especially the letters by the head of Saladin’s chancery, al-Qadi al-Fadil (d. 596/1200), and anthologies of poetry that offer crucial insights into the history of mentalities and sometimes also into the background of specific Frankish-Muslim alliances. Outstanding examples for this are Kharidat al-qasr by ‘Imad al-Din al-Katib al-Isfahani (d. 597/1201) and the Diwan of the Egyptian Wazir Tala’i’ b. Ruzzik (d. 556/1161). The chancery sources, such as al-Qalqashandi’s (d. 821/1418) Subh, are crucial for understanding the technicalities of treaties. Only these texts reproduce
complete texts of Frankish-Muslim treaties and oaths, even though they only go back to the second half of the thirteenth century.12

Thus, Arabic sources do not only offer additional information on cases of Frankish-Muslim cooperation, the Muslim perspective on the Crusades and insights into Frankish-Muslim ‘daily life’. Rather, they provide most crucially the possibility of analysing the history of the Frankish states as part of the Syrian history (i.e. al-Sham, the region between the Sinai, the Cilician Gate and the Euphrates). This approach allows an outright classification of conflicts between Frankish and Muslim rulers as confrontations between Christianity and Islam to be avoided. On this basis, the present study does not start with the First Crusade, but rather three decades earlier as the characteristic constellation of alliances and powers that the Franks encountered had come into being around 1070. The study focuses on the twelfth century, but includes also the thirteenth century for the analysis of Frankish-Muslim treaties’ technicalities. This is because the legal instruments that had been developed in the twelfth century to resolve conflicts continued to be used in the thirteenth century and were to some extent even further developed in this period. The thirteenth century is, however, of less interest for the policies of alliances. After the end of the Third Crusade (1192) the Frankish states mostly stopped playing a major role in the Middle East and became increasingly dependent on European support. Consequently, they ceased to be an important alliance partner for the Muslim states, except for Antioch’s reliance on Aleppo until 1216 and the alliances between the kingdom of Jerusalem and the Ayyubid rulers of Syria between 1240 and 1244.

CHAPTER ONE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYRIAN SYSTEM OF AUTONOMOUS LORDSHIPS (C. 1070–1099)

The Frankish acquisition of territory during the First Crusade and subsequent years unquestionably marks an important turning-point in the history of the Middle East. The Crusaders transplanted legal, administrative, ethical and cultural models and principles into alien surroundings, which had hitherto been characterised by quite other structural elements and mentalities. Nevertheless, the formation of the Crusader states did not lead to a revolutionary change in the structure of Syria and northern Mesopotamia (al-Jazira) for two reasons. Firstly, the wave which founded Frankish lordships and states did not take place in a polity unified legally, ethnically or confessionally, but in an area of extreme diversity. It was to be of crucial significance for the history of the Frankish states that leaders of Turkish origin took power in the great cities of Syria and northern Mesopotamia during the three decades preceding the First Crusade. None of those petty Turkish lordships was capable of sustaining the role of a major power for long, in contrast to the previous period where the Byzantine Empire and Egypt had played this role. In lieu of this, there developed a system of Syrian states (or autonomous lordships), which was marked by the interest of the separate rulers in maintaining their power. This system functioned through the particular structure of rivalries and alliances, which had become well entrenched and which also continued to exist after 1098–99. Secondly, the formation of the Frankish lordships resembled that of their Turkish counterparts in that they were not accompanied by a widespread movement of colonization. In the countryside, neither Turks nor Franks altered the structure of settlement and organization of the land to any significant extent, while occasionally altering them in the towns to various degrees.

The establishment of the Franks in the Middle East thus did not entail a complete reorganization of the region, but for the most part took place within existing structures, as with the Turks. The characteristics of the pre-existing Syrian system of autonomous lordships were crucial for the inter-state relations that developed after 1098–99. The present work therefore does not begin with the year 1098, 1099 or 1100, but includes the last
three decades of the eleventh century. The following two sections will highlight the development of the Syrian system of autonomous lordships with its special characteristics as well as the policy of the Crusaders in regard to alliances and treaties up to 1099 and a consideration of their motives. The resultant findings will be of fundamental significance for understanding Frankish-Muslim relations in Syria after the acquisition of territories by the Crusaders.

THE SYSTEM OF AUTONOMOUS LORDSHIPS BEFORE THE FIRST CRUSADE (C. 1070–1099)

In the introduction to his translation of the chronicle of Ibn al-Qalanisi, Gibb distinguishes the six different powers which competed for lordship and territory directly before the coming of the First Crusade. He identifies long-established rulers, i.e. (1) the Shiite Fatimid dynasty, which had ruled Egypt since 969 and (2) local amirs, judges (qadis) and tribal shaykhs of Arab descent. These were distinct from groups of recent arrivals in Syria, most importantly (3) the Seljuk princes from Mesopotamia, which had been under Seljuk control from 1055, who started to penetrate Syria, (4) the Turkish amirs coming to Syria as tribal chiefs or Seljuk governors and seeking to establish or extend autonomous rule and (5) independent Turcoman tribes, who came to Syria in the last third of the eleventh century in the course of the Turkish migration westwards. Finally, the sixth power was the rural, urban and nomadic population of Syria itself, having greater or less political capacity. In towns, this population was organized in the corporations, the militia (ahdath) and the magistrates, who participated in the newly awakened urban autonomy movement. In the countryside, the population was organized in tribes and self-contained confessional communities. This variety of antagonistic actors stands at the end of a process marked by the regionalization and particularization of the conditions of lordship in the Middle East.

The traditional partition of Syria into an Egyptian-dominated and a Byzantine-dominated sphere had come to an end during the 1160s in consequence of the struggle for power within Egypt and the weakness

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2 Cahen, *Pénétration*.
of the Byzantine Empire due to the victorious advance of the Seljuks. This provided a basis in Syria for a revival of the old movement for urban autonomy. In almost all the great cities the governors, installed by alien lords, were increasingly involved in struggles for supremacy. In some cases, such as Tyre and Tripoli, dynasties of local qadis even superseded the governors. Furthermore, individual governors and amirs strove to make themselves independent. It is of particular significance, however, that the newly awakened particularism and the lack of a strong authority made it possible for individual Seljuk rulers and Turcoman groups, who penetrated Syria as part of the Seljuk armies or on their own initiative, to establish lordships. With them a new external actor appeared in Syria.

The highly sensitive network of relationships and the political landscape in Syria towards the end of the eleventh century were shaped by different factors, such as shifting coalitions, the opportunistic loyalties of the local dynasties and confessional communities, as well as the ambitions of tribal leaders and Seljuk commanders to establish their own spheres of rule. In the course of the First Crusade, it was not a case of the West clashing with the East or faith clashing with infidelity in two blocs, as described in the Frankish chronicles. The penetration of the Crusaders merely added a further factor to the game of the antagonistic powers in Syria. The Crusaders possessed no new political or military qualities in the eyes of Oriental contemporaries. The question of their integration in the previously existing structures, that is the question of confrontation and coexistence, had challenged the Turks just as it did the Franks two or three decades earlier. To analyse the relationship of the Frankish states in Syria with the Islamic world, it is first necessary to consider the constellation of powers which the Crusaders encountered in 1097–98. This constellation had developed in four main phases: The beginning of Fatimid-Turkish antagonism (1070–79), the antagonism between northern and southern Syria and the beginning of the fragmentation of power in central Syria (1079–85), the dissolution of the great lordships in northern Syria through Sultan Malikshah and Fatimid recuperation in the south (1085–92) and finally Aleppo and Damascus under rival Seljuk princes: the formation of coalitions up to the arrival of the First Crusade in Syria (1092–98).

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The Turcoman chief Atsiz b. Abaq succeeded in establishing himself in Palestine at the beginning of the 1070s. In this he was favoured by the anarchic conditions in Egypt and southern Syria and the decline of the Fatimid power in Palestine and southern Syria, exemplified in the rise of local powers in Tyre and Tripoli. By 1074 Atsiz was able to subdue the whole of Palestine as far as Ascalon and in 1076 he even succeeded after five years of warfare in entering Damascus, which until then had remained under Fatimid sovereignty. After treaties with Tyre and Tripoli had given him access to the markets of both these harbour towns, he felt strong enough to attack Egypt by the end of 1076.

This enterprise and its consequences are of interest for the history of the Crusader states for two reasons. First, religious propaganda clearly accompanied the Fatimid defensive struggle against the troops of Atsiz. The Egyptian wazir recruited as warriors 3,000 pilgrims, who were on their way to the Hijaz at the time of the invasion, with the argument that ‘to repulse this enemy is better than the pilgrimage’. During the fighting, fugitives assembled for mourning rituals, supplications and Quran recitations in the mosques in accordance with the Fatimid caliph’s command, ‘Seek refuge with God Most High and flee unto Him; stay in the Friday mosques and other mosques; fast, pray and abstain from alcohol and forbidden things.’ In other words, defence against the Muslim (but not Shiite) intruders was plausibly propagated not only as an Ismaili jihad, but even as being better than one of the five Islamic duties enjoined in the Quran. Second, Palestine immediately revolted against Atsiz after his defeat in Egypt. Of special importance was the rebellion of Jerusalem since the Turcomans had deposited their families and moveable possessions there. The people of Jerusalem divided up the Turcomans’ women among themselves and sold their full-grown sons into slavery. Thereupon Atsiz marched on the city with his last levies and held a gruesome court of criminal justice. Thousands of men fell victim to the victors’ massacre. Only those who had fled to the Holy Places of Islam were spared against the payment of a heavy ransom. A little later, the entire population of Gaza was also slaughtered. The parallel to the subsequent relationship between the Crusader states and their Islamic neighbours is obvious. The conflict between Atsiz and the Fatimids shows clearly that the defensive

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6 Sibṭ b. al-Jawzi, ed. Sevim, 182.
struggle of the established dynasties, particularly of the Shiites against the Turcomans, was conducted under religious auspices and was accompanied by excesses in no way inferior to those which marked the coming of the Crusaders. The appearance of the Franks thus brought merely a new power into play, but no other quality.

After the reduction of Egyptian influence in southern Syria, the emergence of city-states on the coast and the establishment of Turcoman lordships from 1070 onwards, two further components developed in the years from 1079 to 1085 which were to stamp the political history of Syria for decades: first, the antagonism between a strong Damascus and the cities of northern Syria (Aleppo with its catchment area in northern Mesopotamia and Antioch with its hinterland of Cilicia) and second, the regionalization of political rule in central Syria. The revival of the rivalry between Damascus on the one side and Aleppo and Antioch on the other is linked with the formation of Tutush’s power in Syria. Tutush’s brother, the Seljuk Sultan Malikshah (1072–92), had sent him to Syria in response to a call for help from one of the parties contending for power in Aleppo.7 Tutush, however, could not take Aleppo in 1079, but a pressing appeal reached him from Atsiz for support in the south against the Fatimids. Tutush hastened to Damascus, procured the execution of Atsiz and from the end of 1079 found himself in secure possession of the city.8 Tutush’s principal aim in the subsequent period was to control Aleppo, the second great centre of Syria and the springboard to the Seljuk heartlands in Mesopotamia. When, directly after his success in the south, he laid waste to the regions south-west of Aleppo and even briefly besieged the city, the townspeople turned to the Arab governor of Mosul, Muslim b. Quraysh. Muslim thereupon took possession of Aleppo in June 1080 when the Aleppine militia under their chief Ibn al-Hutayti surrendered it to him.9

The subsequent conflict between Muslim b. Quraysh and Tutush is of importance for the later history of the Crusader states because it permitted the survival of different petty powers that were able to shift their allegiance between the two adversaries. Of outstanding significance are the lordships of Shayzar and Hims. In 1081 ʿAli b. Muqallid b. Munqidh, one of the most influential men in Aleppo before it lost its independence in 1080, succeeded in purchasing the fortress of Shayzar from the Greek Orthodox

7 Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Bugḥya, 46–7.
bishop of al-Bara after several months of siege. About the same time
the Turcoman Khalaf b. Mula’ib was able to establish himself in Hims
in central Syria. Muslim b. Quraysh did not succeed in bringing these
two new lordships under his jurisdiction, unlike other minor Turcoman
or Arab lordships or city-states. On the contrary, his struggles with Tutush
compelled him to seek a settlement with them in July 1082. In 1083, he
even ceded Rafaniyya and Salamiyya to Khalaf b. Mula’ib in a peace treaty
(sulh), so that Khalaf could protect his rear against Tutush in his northern
operations.

Alongside the existence of different petty Turcoman and Arab lord-
ships in central Syria, there developed during the period of Muslim b.
Quraysh’s rule a second feature of the constellation of powers which was
to be effective in the following decades. This was the political isolation of
Aleppo, resulting from the endeavours of various Seljuk and Turkish rul-
ers in Damascus, Anatolia or Mesopotamia to seize the town. Egypt alone
was an ally for the rulers of Aleppo and two instances of contact between
Aleppo and Egypt appeared already under Muslim b. Quraysh. In 1083,
Muslim’s plan for the capture of Damascus miscarried as the promised
Egyptian reinforcements failed to appear. In 1083–84 when Sultan Malik-
shah besieged him in Amid/Diyar Bakr, he even offered the Fatimids rec-
ognition of Egyptian suzerainty if they would help him against the sultan.
This step proved to be fruitless only because the sultan had to reach rec-
conciliation with his opponent due to a revolt in eastern Iran, Khurasan.
The strong reservations of Muslim rulers and governors in northern Syria
regarding all Seljuk operations and their occasional approaches to Egypt
continued beyond the time of Muslim b. Quraysh as essential factors
in the mutual relationships of the individual rulers in Syria. After the
establishment of the Crusader states, the ruler of Aleppo’s fear that the
sultan threatened his independence was to be of decisive significance for
the lack of a united Islamic resistance against the Franks.

The clashes between strong power complexes in northern Syria and
the revival of Egyptian influence on the coast and in central Syria marked
the period from 1085 to 1092. Yet, the construction of great lordships and

11 Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 79.
13 Sibt b. al-Jawzī, ed. Sevim, 236; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, II, 84–6. In 1083 there was also a
rapprochement between Tutush and the Fatimids which was to be sealed by a betrothal.
This plan was criticized, and perhaps prevented, by the qadi of Tripoli.
leading powers was prevented and encroachment on Syria was denied to external rulers. The cause of this was that Sultan Malikshah, who won the struggle over power in Aleppo through his campaign of 1086, pursued with his Wazir Nizam al-Mulk a policy of decentralization of power in Syria. This policy aimed at the establishment of a balance of power between the Euphrates and Sinai. Equilibrium between lordships of approximately equal strength, subordinate to Malikshah, should provide for the safeguarding of the sultan's suzerainty over Syria, while preventing further expansion by his brother Tutush.

The background for the sultan's intervention in northern Syria was a conflict that broke out in the first half of 1085 between Muslim b. Quraysh of Aleppo and the Anatolian Seljuk ruler Sulayman b. Qutulmush. Sulayman had occupied Antioch in December 1084, hitherto subject to the Byzantine Philaretes. In June 1085, he defeated and killed Muslim b. Quraysh, but in spite of his success Sulayman was in no position to take possession of Aleppo. Ibn al-Hutayti, the leader of the city militia, refused him entry, calling on Sultan Malikshah and even Tutush of Damascus for help as the sultan's coming was delayed. Only in June 1086 did Sulayman and Tutush meet south of Aleppo. Sulayman lost the battle and did not survive the fight. Tutush, however, was no more successful than his fallen adversary in gaining complete possession of Aleppo. Even after Tutush had made his entry into the city through a surprise attack and had induced the militia to surrender, the commander of the citadel, in accordance with an earlier oath, would only hand over the fortification to the sultan himself. Tutush had to withdraw to Damascus in the first half of August before the vanguard of the army of his brother, the sultan.

After the campaign of the Seljuk sultan, who entered Aleppo on 3 December 1086 and marched into Antioch before his return to Iraq, a completely altered constellation of powers presented itself between the Euphrates and the Mediterranean Sea. Malikshah had handed over all territories on the Euphrates from Saruj and Harran in the north to the River Khabur in the east to the son of Muslim b. Quraysh. The sultan reduced the rule of the Byzantine Philaretes to Marash after the latter
had submitted and accepted conversion to Islam.\textsuperscript{19} Truly loyal governors were appointed to Antioch, Aleppo and Edessa (al-Ruha). The sultan considerably reduced the lordship of the Banu Munqidh of Shayzar on the Orontes, but allowed it to survive.\textsuperscript{20} Finally, extensive territories on the Euphrates around Qalʿat Jaʿbar were handed over to Salim b. Malik, the commandant of the citadel of Aleppo, in return for the surrender of his fortress.\textsuperscript{21} The newly decentralized division of powers prevented any encroachment by Tutush on Mesopotamia during the sultan’s lifetime and remained the most important feature of the political landscape of northern Syria beyond the First Crusade.

At the same time, southern Syria witnessed developments which were of significance for the history of the Frankish states following the First Crusade. At this point, nothing remained of earlier Fatimid rule over the region apart from a coastal strip with probably Caesarea as its most northerly point. The qadis of Tyre and Tripoli had been autonomous since the beginning of the 1070s. Whether they still recognized at least a \textit{de jure} Egyptian suzerainty is not altogether clear. All the remaining territories had gradually come under Tutush’s rule, amongst them the Palestinian hill-country with Jerusalem, which Tutush had granted to the Turcoman Amir Artuq in \textit{iqtaʿ}.\textsuperscript{22} From 1087, however, the situation in Egypt had been consolidated to the point that the Wazir Badr al-Jamali could contemplate new offensives in Syria. Fatimid armies conquered the Palestinian coast and besieged Damascus with the result that Tutush had to seek support even in Aleppo and Edessa.\textsuperscript{23} His situation became even more delicate when in 1089 an Egyptian army not only captured Acre, Sidon and Jubayl but also regained Tyre after some two decades of independence. Thereupon Khalaf b. Mulaʿib of Hims and Famiya also placed himself under Fatimid suzerainty. Tutush had to ask the northern Syrian governors

\textsuperscript{19} Barhebraeus, 231.
\textsuperscript{22} ʿIzz al-Dīn b. Shaddād, \textit{Aʿlāq} (Lubnān), 98–99, 102. Beirut and Sidon appear to have been in Tutush’s possession since 471/1078–79. In 472/1079–80 the Egyptians briefly regained Sidon. Tutush took Baʿlabakk in the summer of 476/1083, after the withdrawal of Muslim b. Quraysh from Damascus. It was under Fatimid suzerainty. Cf. ʿIzz al-Dīn b. Shaddād, \textit{Aʿlāq} (Lubnān), 44–5; Sibt b. al-Jawzī, ed. Sevim, 200; Ibn Taghrībirdī, V, 115–6.
\textsuperscript{23} According to Ibn al-Athīr, \textit{Kāmil}, X, 145, an Egyptian army had already encircled Damascus in Rabiʿ I 478/1085.
once more for help. Khalaf’s contacts with the Fatimids and his raids against the rulers in central Syria had become so threatening that the sultan ordered Tutush to join with the northern Syrian governors to end the rule of Khalaf over Hims and Famiya.

During the subsequent events, however, the political structure created by Malikshah in the north proved itself to be an effective means against Tutush’s endeavours to extend his power. After the capture of Hims, Aqsunqur of Aleppo delivered the city to Tutush only on the sultan’s express instructions. However, he handed over Famiya to the amir of Shayzar, although he had been at war with him in the previous year. The governors of Aleppo and Edessa frustrated the almost certain capture of Tripoli by Tutush a year later. They deserted the besieging army after the ruler of the city, the Qadi Jalal al-Mulk, had bribed them so that they recognized his probably forged diploma of appointment to Tripoli from the sultan. Arguing that an attack on the city would imply rebellion against the sultan, the two governors abandoned Tutush who was forced to give up his project.

The conflict between the various claimants to the succession of Sultan Malikshah, who died in 1092, marked the fourth and final phase from 1092 to 1098. Tutush finally fell victim to this conflict in 1095, following Aqsunqur of Aleppo and Buzan of Edessa, and his sons started to dispute for supremacy. This phase offers a confusing oscillogram of ever-varying coalitions between individual lordships as old lordships survived and new autonomous petty lordships developed. Since the structure of the Syrian system of autonomous lordships assumed during this phase a form current until the first decade of the twelfth century, the development between 1092 and 1098 requires a fuller presentation.

On the death of Malikshah in 1092, Tutush had succeeded his brother as sultan. Accompanied by the north Syrian governors, who complied with him willy-nilly since Malikshah’s sons were still minors, he had himself proclaimed sultan in February 1093 at al-Rahba on the Euphrates, half-way to Baghdad. However, as his followers Aqsunqur and Buzan deserted with their troops in Persia to Berkyaruq, one of Malikshah’s sons on whose

succession the Iranian Seljuks were agreed, Tutush was forced to give up all his conquests and to flee to Damascus.27 His revenge was not slow in coming. In 1094, Tutush defeated the partisans of his rival Berkyaruq near Aleppo, strengthened only by Bedouins and the governor of Antioch, Yaghisiyan who alone remained faithful to him.28 Aqsunqur and Buzan paid for their treachery by death. Just nine months later, however, on 26 February 1095, Tutush encountered Berkyaruq’s army near present-day Tehran where he was defeated and killed.29

For half a century, until 1154, no lordship of comparable strength to Tutush’s realms was to arise. The territories which Tutush had gathered between 1092 and 1095 fell apart once again after his death into the independent and rival power centres which had already existed before 1094–95, before 1086 and partly even before the Turkish invasions. The disputes between the sons of Tutush were decisive for this. Ridwan b. Tutush was the first to return to Syria after his father’s death and he took possession of Aleppo. Shortly afterwards his Atabeg Janah al-Dawla30 and his younger brother Duqaq reached Aleppo, though Duqaq quickly accepted an invitation from his father’s governor in Damascus, where he made himself independent. The sons of Tutush required a year to consolidate their power. Ridwan in Aleppo procured the murder of two of his younger brothers and rivals. Duqaq in Damascus similarly disposed of the governor whose invitation had made possible his access to power. The arrival of Atabeg Tughtegin, already a man of trust under Tutush, strengthened Duqaq. The fraternal struggle which thereafter broke out between Ridwan and Duqaq dominated the political life of Syria up to the time when the first Crusaders arrived.31

The first phase of the dispute saw all the local lords of northern Syria, except Yaghisiyan of Antioch and some Arab tribal chiefs, on Ridwan’s side. Ridwan and his retainer Sukman b. Artuq, to whom he had surrendered Saruj after initial disputes, succeeded in enlarging their possessions, specifically Tall Bashir (the Turbessel of the Crusaders), Manbij,

30 Atabeg was the title of a Turkish officer to whom the tutoring and upbringing of a prince was entrusted. An atabeg often became the husband of the prince’s mother, which might even happen during the lifetime of the prince’s father. Janah al-Dawla was the stepfather and atabeg of Ridwan, as Tughtegin was to Duqaq.
Buza’a and Marra/Ma’arrat al-Nu‘man became theirs. None of the further operations, however, led to an effective resolution of the conflict between Tutush’s sons. Neither Ridwan’s unsuccessful siege of Damascus, nor his subsequent confinement by the Damascenes in Jerusalem, which his partisan Sukman b. Artuq controlled, nor the victory of the north Syrian allies over Duqaq and Yaghisiyan at Qinnasrin to the south of Aleppo in the year 1097 were effective. The reversal of alliances of 1097 was the turning-point to the second phase of the conflicts. A profound alienation developed in the summer of that year between Ridwan and his Atabeg Janah al-Dawla and the atabeg fled in fear for his life with his wife, Ridwan’s mother, to Hims, where he made himself independent of Aleppo. That gave Yaghisiyan of Antioch the opportunity to change front and to go over to Ridwan, where he took the place of the fugitive Janah al-Dawla. Ridwan provided him with a position similar to that of the atabeg and his marriage with the daughter of Yaghisiyan confirmed the alliance.

In order to isolate Duqaq in Damascus, Ridwan undertook an even more risky move. Like Muslim b. Quraysh and Khalaf b. Mula’ib before him he sought an approach to Egypt. On 28 August 1097, the names of the Shi’ite Fatimid Caliph al-Musta‘li (487–95/1094–1101) and of his Wazir al-Afdal were for the first time mentioned in the Friday prayer in Aleppo before that of Ridwan. This subordination of the Sunni Ridwan to the suzerainty of the Ismaili Shi’ite caliph, hoping (admittedly in vain) for rich gifts and armed help against Damascus, had, however, to be withdrawn after a month under pressure from Ridwan’s indignant allies, Sukman and Yaghisiyan. As the north Syrian allies mustered their armies before Shayzar for an operation against Hims a little later, news reached them of the appearance of the first Crusader troops. Ridwan, Sukman and Yaghisiyan could not agree on common action and returned hastily to the territories they held.

The analysis of the phases of development and characteristics of the Syrian system of autonomous lordships and constellations of alliances

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32 Main sources are Ibn al-Qalānisi, 131–3; Ibn al-‘Adīm, Zubda, II, 123–7.
34 Al-‘Aẓīmī, 372; Ibn al-‘Adīm, Zubda, II, 127; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 133.
35 The ‘Abbasid khutba had been the rule in Aleppo since 1070 (Al-‘Aẓīmī, 372; Ibn al-‘Adīm, Zubda, II, 127–9; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 133). The Fatimid khutba was introduced in Shayzar in 1097. Ibn Muyassar, 64, believed that Ridwan proposed this. It is probably correct that, as most other sources suggest, an Egyptian delegation called on him to recognize the suzerainty of the Caliph al-Musta‘li, who had held office since 1095.
36 Ibn al-Qalānisi, 133; Ibn al-‘Adīm, Zubda, II, 129.
between c. 1070 and 1098 permits the establishment of the following three points. Firstly, the periods of weakness of the Byzantine and Fatimid Empires had resulted in phases in which the relationships of rulers were increasingly regionalized and particularized. A common Islamic consciousness was not recognized in view of the variety of antagonistic Egyptian, Arab, Turcoman and Seljuk claims to power. On the contrary, the Fatimid defence of Egypt against the Turcomans was even propagated as a *jihad*. Secondly, none of the rival powers was able to assume the hegemony that Byzantium and Egypt had held earlier. In consequence, the disputes about supremacy in the north and the policy of ‘divide and rule’ enforced by Sultan Malikshah in 1086 permitted the survival of the local lordships which arose after 1070. In addition, it was not possible for anyone from 1095 at the latest to control the Turkish amirs originally appointed as governors. This made it possible for them to emerge as independent lords of cities *de facto* if not *de jure*. Thirdly, the dominant theme of the conflict within Syria was the antagonism between Damascus and Aleppo, which since 1095 had been fought in the form of a Seljuk succession-struggle. All the Turkish amirs and governors who had obtained possession of the most important cities since 1076 became partisans. On the other hand, the Arab local lords in central Syria, on the coast and the Euphrates, and likewise Fatimid Egypt acted in all the disputes largely as neutrals. Besides a few schemes for alliances, they did not directly intervene in the Turkish rivalries.

The important Syrian rulers and their alliance policies in 1097 were as follows: The most powerful north Syrian city-lords, Ridwan of Aleppo and Yaghisiyan of Antioch, were in 1097 in alliance with Sukman b. Artuq of Saruj and Jerusalem against Duqaq of Damascus and Janah al-Dawla of Hims. The north had a majority of Shiites, Antioch of Christians, the Sunnis predominated in the south and Arabs ruled the central Syrian lordships. Apart from Shayzar and Tripoli, which maintained friendly relations with each other, two further lordships existed in 1097, Famiya and Jabala. Khalaf b. Mulaʿib had become the Egyptian governor of Famiya in 1096 after the death of Tutush and had immediately made himself independent.37 Jabala had achieved independence from Tripoli under the Raʾis (headman) Ibn Sulayha shortly before the arrival of the Crusaders.38 These local lords of central Syria maintained as far as possible neutrality in the Turkish and

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Seljuk disputes. The same applied to the Arab lordship of Qal'at Ja'bar on the Euphrates and to the Armenian Toros, who had taken power in Edessa after the death of Tutush. The coastline south of Jubayl was under Egyptian suzerainty. Fatimid rule in the formerly independent port-cities was, however, not firmly established. Tyre in particular, which had only been reconquered in July 1093 from a rebellious governor, remained insecure. Already in February–March 1097, a Fatimid army had again to reconquer it as the new governor had yet again made himself independent of Cairo. After a period of internal disturbances in 1094, due to the deaths of both wazir and caliph, Egypt resumed with this action a more active Syrian policy and endeavoured to use the quarrels among the Seljuks to extend the Fatimid position in Syria. In reality, the Fatimid governors appear to have concluded treaties largely at their own discretion, both with the Turks before 1099 and also with the Franks after the First Crusade. There is hardly any firm information about the extent and position of the second great lordship in Palestine, Jerusalem. Turkish amirs of the Artuqid family held it as an iqtā' subordinate to Damascus since the days of Tutush. However, since Sukman b. Artuq was in alliance with Ridwan of Aleppo in 1097, Jerusalem must have been in reality independent.

The picture as outlined encompasses solely the ruling centres of trans-regional political importance. The extent of urban control over rural districts and the position of the alien Turkish rulers vis-à-vis the native urban population depended entirely on the wavering power of the city-lords and the accessibility of the respective territories. It is especially worthy of notice for Aleppo and Damascus that their lords had to reckon in their policies with the opposition of the magistrates and the city militia and furthermore, in Aleppo, the added opposition of the confessional groups. The inconsistency and vagueness of the chronicles and geographical works does not allow definite statements, even about important regional centres such as Hamah or Tiberias. From local chronicles, the autobiography of Usama b. Munqidh and Western sources further minor lords are known at least by name. These include, for example, the amir families of Marda and Buhtur of the Lebanese Gharb, the Banu Muhriz of Qadmus,

39 William of Tyre, VII, XXI, 310, mentions the place as belonging to Tripoli, although it was taken by Egypt in 1089.
40 Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 124–5; Ibn Muyassar, 51.
41 Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 133–4; Ibn Muyassar, 64.
42 Cahen, Syrie, 38–9. Local Damascenes chronicles, such as the one by Ibn al-Qalānīsī, also have little information about events beyond the authors' hometown.
the lords of castles whom the Franks encountered in central Syria and the amir ‘Amrun of Kahf in north Palestine and east of Jordan, called ‘the great countryman’ (\textit{glossus rusticus}) by the Franks.\footnote{Usâma b. Munqidh, \textit{Iʿtibār}, 87; Albert of Aix, VII, XVII–XVIII, 518–9.} As well as Bedouin groups, self-contained settled religious minorities were of particular significance as treaty partners or opponents; the Druze in Jabal Summaq and southern Lebanon, Shiite Nusayris in Jabal Bahra and Christian minorities such as the Maronites in northern Lebanon.\footnote{In 1099 Maronites advised the Franks to take the coastal route to Jerusalem. Nothing is known of the internal organization of the Maronites in this period. On the Maronites and the Crusades cf. Salibi, \textit{Buḥturids}; Salibi, \textit{Maronites}.} The regionalization of political power since the Turkish invasions allowed these groupings to form more or less independent petty lordships in their regions. They did not always succeed in completely freeing themselves from the local city-lords; their permanent pressure for autonomy is, however, a constant factor in the development of political relations among Syrian states. The most significant of these groups, were the Nizari Ismailis (‘Assasins’ or ‘Batinīyya’), which had split off in 1094 from the Egyptian Fatimids and were attempting to establish a foothold in Syria at the same time as the Crusaders. Although they first succeeded in founding a lasting complex of lordships in the 1130s, they were already able in the first decade of the century to win over parts of the Shiite population of northern Syria, under the protection of Ridwan, through the operation of agents from a missionary and propaganda base in Aleppo. One of their first centres was Sarmin, where such a base continued to exist until the last third of the thirteenth century.\footnote{Ibn Shiḥna, 164; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, \textit{Zubda}, II, 151.} The temporary rule of the Franks over Sarmin, which repeatedly changed its possessor in the time of Ridwan, appears not to have disturbed the continuing presence of the Nizaris.

**Frankish-Muslim Alliances and Treaties during the First Crusade (1097–99)**

On account of the complex political situation in Syria in 1098, the Franks did not confront an Islamic bloc in Syria, but an abundance of rival lordships under amirs and rulers of different ethnic and religious affiliations. At this point, it must be asked who the Crusaders actually were, what aims they pursued and how the relations of the Crusaders with the Muslim...
rulers of Syria were formed. Although the First Crusade is unusually well documented in primary sources and its historical background has been thoroughly discussed, there are still difficulties in defining the actual goal of the Crusades. This rests to some extent in the fact that the numerous sources which provide information on the Councils of Piacenza and Clermont in 1095, on the preaching of the Crusade in the year 1096 and on the various expeditions to Asia Minor were all recorded after, sometimes considerably after, the events which they report. In every case we have thus to deal with interpretation through hindsight. Yet, the difficulties in defining the actual goal of the Crusades rest also in the fact that completely different groups undertook the First Crusade.

The Crusade was not an organized campaign under unopposed military or ecclesiastical leadership but a movement, supported by individuals whose motivations for taking the cross were as varied as their social and ethnic ties. The influence of the individual groups participating in the Crusade on its actual form, the formulation of its goals, the ways to accomplish these goals and on the relationships with the Muslim opponents differs to a large extent over the successive phases of the movement between 1095 and 1099. By the time the crusading princes wrote to the pope from northern Syria on 11 September 1098, after the battles in Asia Minor, the capture of Antioch, the victory over the Turkish relieving force under Kirbogha and not least the death of the papal legate Adhemar of Le Puy on 1 August 1098, their army had other structures and motives from those of the people at the Council of Clermont three years before. It was also only partially identical with the bands of the People’s Crusade, which the Rum Seljuks had already destroyed in October 1096 at Civetot on the Sea of Marmara.46 It may thus be asked what goals the Crusaders had at the moment they reached the frontier of that region where all their conquests were to be restored to the Byzantine Empire in accordance with the arrangement with Alexius Comnenus? Furthermore, what knowledge did they have of the religious and political situation in Syria? By what criteria was the amorphous mass of the Crusaders structured? Is it possible to discover mutually differing interests and ways of acting and did this influence the possible conclusion of treaties with Muslim rulers?

In the past, attempts were made to single out the profile of ‘the true Crusader’, who set out as an armed pilgrim in the service of the spiritual

46 Hagenmeyer, Epistulae, 161–5. The remainder of the People’s Crusade under Peter the Hermit attached themselves to the princes’ armies (Hagenmeyer, Chronologie, VI, 255).
authority and without any ambition to rule, a selfless athlete of Christ on the way to Jerusalem to free the sepulchre of Christ. Whoever did not correspond to this pattern could simply be regarded as a deviant or a false pilgrim. Such an interpretation, which is already discernible in sources with a strong religious impetus, meets the objection that the motive to preach the Crusade, to support it or even to take the way to Syria oneself, was not based on one and the same religious enthusiasm for all contemporaries, as is shown in the chronicle of Raymond of Aguilers.\(^{47}\) The necessary premise for a sharp differentiation between true and false Crusaders would lie in the existence of a clear and generally accepted programme for the Crusade. It appears that a programme of this kind—the Crusade as an armed pilgrimage to free the Holy Places—was not presented to the Crusaders from the outset. What was for the Normans and Bohemond little more than an extensive conquering expedition, which happened to be sustained by religious sentiment, was for a clerical participant in the Crusade such as Raymond of Aguilers (or the later editors of his *Gesta Francorum*) an *opus Dei*, prefigured in the Bible and part of salvation history.\(^{48}\)

What interest groups and conceptions then influenced the First Crusade? For the initiator of the First Crusade, Pope Urban II (1088–99), the conquest of the Holy Places was seemingly not a primary objective. His summons to take the cross is to be seen in the wider framework of the papal endeavours for union between the Roman and Eastern Churches, separated by schism since 1054. Urban’s historical achievement lies in his having linked together the theory of Holy Church with popular thinking about the penitential pilgrimage to acquire religious merit or an indulgence for ecclesiastical penance. With the Crusade, the pope brought about the synthesis of both elements while also fulfilling the Byzantines’ request for help in 1095–96. Urban was concerned in the first place with help for the brothers-in-faith in the East, the union of the Churches and also support of the Truce of God movement. An ecclesiastical expedition to liberate Jerusalem was probably only one of his aims in Clermont. There is much evidence that the idea of the liberation of Jerusalem was pushed into the foreground only through the momentum and subsequent development of the crusading propaganda that Urban had initiated. Although in the pope’s view, Jerusalem as the goal of the march was presumably

\(^{47}\) Raim. Aguil., 137.
\(^{48}\) Rousset, *Origines*, 134–51.
subordinate to the actual point of the Crusade, the provision of help for Byzantium, the thought of Jerusalem was already implicitly included in the planning of the Crusade in regard to the organization of the undertaking as an armed pilgrimage. Among the masses, where the idea of the Crusade was transformed in the years 1095–96 from an initiative by the papal curia into an idea supported by mass enthusiasm, and in the propaganda the boundary between the indulgence for ecclesiastical penance and the remission of the punishment of temporal sins in the world to come (remissio peccatorum) was blurred. As a consequence, the original plan for the reconquest of lost Anatolian provinces was changed into a campaign of revenge against the heathen. The end of this development was for many Crusaders the idea of a just war to drive the enemies of God out of the proper seat of Christianity, hallowed by the life of the Saviour himself.49

This conception had little in common with Urban’s intentions and nothing at all with that of the Byzantine emperor. At the court of Alexius Comnenus there was a complete lack of understanding of the mentality of the groups of Crusaders who had been arriving in Constantinople since 1096. Alexius had been able to secure the continued existence of the Empire in Anatolia since his accession in 1081 through numerous alliances with the Turkish amirs of Asia Minor and the Seljuk Sultan Malikshah.50 His alliance with Qilij Arslan of Konya even survived the Crusade and helped him to fend off the Norman Bohemond of Antioch when the latter invaded the Balkans in 1106–7. A pragmatic procedure marked the emperor’s policy, rather than the mentality of the crowds of pilgrims coming from Europe who had set out to combat the heathen. His request to the pope at the Council of Piacenza for help from Western troops thus merely signified the emperor’s resumption of the Byzantine tradition of increasing the number and effectiveness of the imperial troops by contingents of foreign soldiers. For his part, Pope Urban at the Council of Clermont in 1095 had called on the poor as well as the knightly nobility to make the expedition to the East, perhaps in order to emphasize the pilgrimage character of the Crusade. However, he had demanded that wealthy Crusaders should provide those who could not equip themselves appropriately with weapons. In addition to the unforeseen resonance of the preaching of the

49 Rousset, Origines, 72–87; Hehl, Kirche, 82–89; Russel, Just War.
50 Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 72–86. Vryonis, Decline, 103–117; Zbinden, Ritter, 95–98; Cahen, Pénétration, 51–2.
Crusade, this appeal to the poor contributed to the fact that the Crusaders who arrived in Constantinople were considerably different from the soldiers whom Alexius awaited. That the crusading movement took a direction that neither Rome nor Byzantium had wished meant that pope and emperor were no longer capable of organizing it. Thus it is necessary to ask whether it was possible that Urban II and Alexius Comnenus could have influenced the Crusade after the Crusaders had left the region under actual Byzantine rule in June 1097.

For the Byzantine side the answer was not difficult. In the winter of 1096–97 and the following spring months, the Byzantine emperor had succeeded in insisting that most of the Frankish leaders arriving in Constantinople should swear homage and fealty to him. In this way, Alexius subordinated the princes in the crusading army as vassals. Accordingly, at the siege of Nicaea, which the Byzantines and Crusaders carried out together, the role of commander clearly fell to the emperor. After its successful conclusion, the position of Alexius was so strong that on this occasion he was able to move all the Crusader chiefs (except Bohemond’s subordinate Tancred) to accept homage and fealty. In the subsequent period, up to the siege of Antioch, the army of the Crusaders included a force under Tatikios, which influenced the progress of the enterprise and could oversee the observance of the legal relations established between Alexius and the Crusaders. However, the Byzantine position no longer had any representative with the Crusaders after the departure of the Byzantine contingent under Tatikios at the beginning of February 1098. The emperor himself turned back while advancing on Antioch when Frankish fugitives informed him in June 1098 of the alleged annihilation of the crusading army in Philomelium (Akshehir) by the Turkish relieving force under Kirbogha of Mosul.51 Only Raymond of Toulouse unambiguously kept to the oath he had sworn to Alexius—possibly more in consequence of his enmity to Bohemond than out of a feeling of personal responsibility to the emperor. Alexius had no success thereafter in influencing the course of the campaign and in accompanying it with diplomatic initiatives to make it useful to Byzantine external policy. Neither by the promise of a new auxiliary force, which imperial envoys presented in April 1099 to the Crusaders outside ʿArqa (while demanding that they should await the coming of this force),52 nor through the advocacy of Raymond of

51 Hagenmeyer, Chronologie, VI, 532 and VII, 305–6.
Toulouse, could Alexius regain influence among the Crusaders. The decision to break off the siege of ‘Arqa and to advance ‘under God’s leadership’ directly to Jerusalem fell directly against the count’s advice and regardless of the emperor’s auxiliaries, as the eyewitness Raymond of Aguilers makes credible. Raymond, influenced by Byzantine gifts and anxious about his lines of supply, could not make headway against the common opinion, which reproached Alexius with continuous deceit.53

With the dissension between Franks and Byzantines, the Crusade had developed in another direction than Urban II and Alexius Comnenus planned. However, the transformation of the papal project was due not least to the fact that the position of the supporters of the papal concept was anything but dominant in the army, although for different reasons. To all appearances, the pope had entrusted the overall management of the Crusade to Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy as his deputy and the military leadership to Raymond of Toulouse. In fact, Adhemar also played a significant role as mediator, propagandist and mentor of those fighting pilgrims who were not of knightly status (as a military-leader he did not stand out particularly); but he died as early as 1 August 1098 in Antioch and thereby the army lost the leader appointed by the pope.54 The other legates of Urban II in the crusading army, Arnulf of Choques and Alexander, did not occupy a position as high as Adhemar. As chaplains, they clearly belonged to the households of their lords, Robert of Normandy and Stephen of Blois, and they had no authority over the Crusaders in general. Until the arrival of the new legate in the autumn of 1099, Archbishop Daimbert of Pisa, Rome no longer had anyone among the Crusaders to represent its concept of the course of the Crusade. Urban could not comply with the request of the crusading princes, expressed in their letter of 11 September 1098, to place himself at the head of the expedition to Jerusalem.55 The pope died on 29 July 1099, having already planned in April to proceed in person to the East. If after Adhemar’s death there was anyone at all who could still have influenced the Crusade according to Urban’s ideas, the count of Toulouse, chosen by the pope in 1095 for the military leadership, was the man. Raymond of Toulouse was, however, never in a position to assume the role of supreme commander in the army. When the ambitions of the Normans from southern Italy to set up their own principality in Antioch

55 Hagenmeyer, Epistulae, 164.
and Cilicia became clear during the march through Anatolia in 1097, it was not Raymond, but Godfrey of Bouillon who was the protagonist of the anti-Norman party. Even after the departure of important princes such as Hugh of Vermandois (who during the advance through Italy had received a papal banner of St. Peter, which could have been interpreted as meaning a special designation by Urban) and Stephen of Blois, chosen as dominus and gubernator, Raymond possessed no paramount position. Certainly at the end of December 1098 in Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman he placed himself at the head of the pauperes as dux et dominus, who pressed for the continuance of the march to Jerusalem while the princes were discussing the right to the possession of Antioch. Raymond also endeavoured by means of payments, to move the other princes (with the exception of Bohemond) to advance. However, the count of Toulouse could not assert himself thereafter either against the body of the Crusaders or against the other princes.

As this survey shows, the pope’s and the emperor’s concepts of the Crusade no longer had any significance, at the latest from the summer of 1098. Of decisive importance for the further management of the project and relations with the Muslims was rather the dialectic of interests between the two remaining groups of supporters, the body of simple pilgrims and the knightly aristocracy, who were not united by a single high command. The non-combatants, whom the eyewitness Fulcher of Chartres already during the siege of Nicaea in 1097 estimates at five-sixths of the Crusaders capable of fighting, stood rather in the tradition of the pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Yet, for the knights, and especially for the princes in the army, material interests were at least equally decisive. Hence, on several occasions after the conquest of Cilicia, open conflict appeared between the army leaders who were pursuing competing interests and the pauperes or peregrini, as the author of Gesta Francorum called them in contrast to the princes.

1 November, the deadline fixed for the southward advance after the victory over the Turkish relieving-force outside Antioch in July 1098, had passed without the princes making any preparations for departure as they were occupied with territorial conquests. At this point, the mass of simple pilgrims under the newly installed bishop of al-Bara put Raymond under

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57 Raim. Aguil., 100.
58 Fulcher, Carnot., I, X, 4, 183.
59 For instance Gesta Francorum, XXXIV, 2, p. 412.
pressure. He should either make himself the leader of the expedition to Jerusalem or the people would demand of him the Holy Lance found in Antioch and proceed southwards under God’s leadership.\(^6^0\) Already in the first half of November 1098, when a princely court of arbitration sought to settle the quarrel between Raymond and Bohemond over Antioch, voices were raised in the army that the place under dispute should simply be razed to the ground in order to allow their departure.\(^6^1\) When Raymond added a further element to the quarrels with his wish to garrison Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman, which had been captured in the meantime, the \textit{pauperes} demolished the place, thus compelling departure for the south.\(^6^2\) Before ‘Arqa and Tripoli, the count of Toulouse was again unable to assert himself against the majority, who were unwilling to defer the march to Jerusalem to capture the two places.\(^6^3\)

These events make the conflict of interests between the ‘poor pilgrims’ and the knightly aristocracy sufficiently clear. Raymond of Aguilers, whose \textit{Historia Francorum} most clearly reflects the standpoint of the simple pilgrims and clerics, laments that the knights repeatedly set their private interest in making conquests above the common goal.\(^6^4\) The chronicler’s reproach does not only touch the princes, but the knightly aristocracy in general. Already during the blockade of Antioch, which lasted from the end of October 1097 to June 1098, the leaders of the individual contingents had established their spheres of influence in the surrounding countryside. All the princes had incurred quite considerable expenditure in equipping their followers and in accordance with the pope’s word in Clermont that they might expect also an earthly reward they covered the costs from their conquests.\(^6^5\) Among them were the duke of Normandy and the counts of Flanders and Blois, wealthy ruling princes, who out of piety or because of a difficult political situation in their homelands were induced to take the cross. However, the nobles who had decided to use the Crusade to establish their own lordships constituted a special group. They took this decision either because they held only the rank of non-ruling princes or vassals by birth like Bohemond, Tancred and Baldwin, or because their

\(^{60}\) Raim. Aguil., 99.
\(^{62}\) Raim. Aguil., 100. The pressure of the \textit{pauperes} is partly to be explained by the catastrophic lack of provisions.
\(^{63}\) Raim. Aguil., 126–7, 131. According to Albert of Aix, V, XL, 458, the longing to proceed to Jerusalem prevented a siege of the town.
\(^{64}\) Raim. Aguil., 48–9.
\(^{65}\) Baldric of Dol, I, IV, 15; Hagenmeyer, \textit{Epistulae}, 149.
age and religiosity (like Raymond) or the giving up of their possessions for the purpose of going on the Crusade (like Godfrey) compelled them to acquire new material resources in the East.\(^{66}\) If the First Crusade did not constitute a project of colonization, as the small number of Europeans who actually remained in the East after 1099 indicated, the most important princes of the crusading army used the opportunity for the establishment of lordships and social climbing. The primary goal of the Crusade for the simple pilgrims, the fulfilment of the vow of pilgrimage by going to Jerusalem, became thus a sort of luxury for individual nobles. For these nobles the securing of newly acquired individual lordships against Turkish, Greek or competing Frankish claims enjoyed priority. This applied to Bohemond, the first prince of Antioch, and Count Baldwin I of Edessa, who first visited the Holy Places half a year after their capture; and it was exactly the case for Raymond, who only under pressure from the simple pilgrims in Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman, ‘Arqa and Tripoli, renounced the idea of establishing a lordship of his own.\(^{67}\)

Of the lords going to Jerusalem as armed pilgrims, the duke and counts of Normandy, Flanders, Vermandois and Blois, three parties were distinct and they were endeavouring already before July 1099 in reciprocal rivalry to establish permanent lordships. They were (1) Duke Geofffrey of Lower Lorraine and his brother Baldwin, (2) Bohemond of Tarento and his nephew Tancred and finally (3) Count Raymond of Toulouse and his retainer Raymond Pilet. The establishment of the Lorrainers in Edessa had for the time being resolved the antagonism between Normans and Lorrainers, which at the end of October 1097 had led to continuous quarrels at al-Massisa over the Cilician towns and even to open hostilities between the soldiers of Tancred and Baldwin. Yet the opposition between Normans and Provençals remained over the turn of the century. In January 1099 Raymond lost his position in Antioch to Bohemond.\(^{68}\) After the resistance of peregrini and princes had already repeatedly frustrated his plans, he had to surrender the citadel of Jerusalem to Godfrey in July 1099. A little

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\(^{66}\) Cf. Yewdale, *Bohemond I*, 23–4; Nicholson, *Tancred*, 16; Hill, *Raymond IV*, 36–7. Raymond had been regarded since 1079 as a promoter of ecclesiastical reform (with which Urban II was also proceeding), although he had twice been excommunicated by Gregory VII on account of an uncanonical marriage and simony. Godfrey of Bouillon also has a bad reputation earlier in the monastic chronicles of his homeland, in spite of lavish gifts, because of attacks on ecclesiastical property.

\(^{67}\) Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie*, VII, 497–9.

\(^{68}\) According to Raymond of Aguilers (Raim. Aguil., 83), Bohemond had driven the Lorrainers, Flemings and Provençals out of the citadel of Antioch in July 1098.
later in mid-August, after the victory of the Franks over the Egyptians, he failed in his attempt to obtain the town of Ascalon through Godfrey's objection.69 Tancred took Raymond prisoner in 1101 and made him swear not to undertake the establishment of a lordship in northern Syria. Raymond was under further pressure from the peregrini, whose leadership he had assumed, than were his rivals. Thus, the Crusade, following the death of the papal legate Adhemar of Le Puy and the withdrawal of the Byzantine contingent at the latest, was formed of only two groups. In order to understand the relations of the Crusaders with the Muslims in the following months up to the taking of Jerusalem, it must be asked whether the duality of interests shown to exist between the peregrini and the nobility, with their propensity to establish lordships, is again to be found in the image that the Crusaders formed of Islam and the Muslims.

A sharp antagonism between the world of populus Dei and heathendom characterised the crusading propaganda in the contemporary sources of whatever provenance. In the interpretation of Western Christendom the Crusades are regarded as struggles of universal historical, even eschatological, significance between belief and unbelief. 'Verily the West rose up against the East, a little people against a numerous nation, Europe against Asia, yea even Africa, Belief against Unbelief; we were protected by Faith, they were enshrouded in Error.'70 Thus, a sermon on the occasion of an anniversary of the taking of Jerusalem ascribed to Fulcher of Chartres. Latin chronicles of the Crusade, vernacular epics of chivalry of the early crusading period, recorded papal speeches—all uniformly convey the picture of a sharp contrast between milites, fideles, coadiutores Christi, gens sancta71 and their Muslim adversaries, described at best as pagani, infideles and gentiles, but often enough as excommunicata generatio, gens barbara, nefaria, nefanda, perfida or gentes immundae. Especially hostile authors such as Fulcher of Chartres and Walter the Chancellor even stigmatize the Muslims as ‘gens […] spreta, degener et daemonum ancilla’ and ‘satellites daemonum, erroris cariae imbuti’.72 The uniform harmony of the sources gives rise to the supposition that this pattern of black and

69 Hagenmeyer, Chronologie, VII, 432, 492.
70 Scriptum Galeranni, 162.
71 Cf. for instance Rousset, Origines, 71; Riley-Smith, First Crusade, 59–61; Fulcher, Carnot., 901.
72 To cite but a few examples: Gesta Francorum, VIII, 2, p. 179 and IX, 7, pp. 203–4; Robert the Monk, I, I, p. 728; Fulcher, Carnot., I, III, 6, 135; Walter the Chancellor, I, VI, 4, p. 75 and II, XVI, 7, p. 113. Cf. Rousset, Origines, 104–5; Darbishire, Idea, 116; Schwartz, Bild; Schwinges, Kreuzzugsiedeologie, 105.
white corresponds to the common opinion within the crusading army. Similarly, the motive of the savage heathen, which had been characteristic of Latin chronicles since the Carolingian period, dominated in chronicles and epics of the early twelfth century.

One root of this demonizing of heathendom in propaganda was the slight knowledge available in Europe and among the Crusaders of Islam. Even in the predominantly clerical sector of the highly educated, the state of knowledge about Islam was rudimentary and was fed more from legends and reports of Saracen atrocities than from the study of Eastern Christian, Byzantine or Spanish apologetics that were largely unknown. The generally low level of information in Europe outside the Iberian Peninsula is reflected also in the accounts of those who participated in the Crusade. They are a mixture of scanty information from legend and folklore. None of the historiographers of the Crusade who personally visited the Holy Land gives a discriminating presentation of Islam or political conditions in Syria. Two clerics who were not eyewitnesses of the Crusade, Ekkehard of Aura, a pilgrim to Jerusalem in 1101, and Guibert of Nogent, showed at least some interest. Guibert presented Islam as a Christian heresy in his *Historia*, written in the first decade of the twelfth century, a revision of the anonymous *Gesta Francorum*. In his presentation of the origin of Islam, he certainly follows a current legend, but he is correctly informed about the prophethood of Muhammad as not being the Saracens’ god, the strict monotheism of Islam and its rejection of orthodox Christology and Trinitarianism.73

Among the participants in the Crusade, on the other hand, the Muslims were clearly considered not as heretics, but rather as heathens. The sources originating in their ranks employ an undifferentiated terminology (*pagani, gentiles, increduli, perfidi, . . .*), which takes no account of the Isidorian distinction between *gentiles* as ‘those still unconverted’ and *pagani* as adherents of a deliberately anti-Christian religious system. An eloquent example is the letter that the leaders of the Crusade sent on 11 September 1098 from Antioch to Pope Urban II. This letter explicitly separates ‘Turks and Pagans’, who are to be combated, from ‘Greek, Armenian and Syrian Jacobite [. . .] heretics’, whom one would not harm.74

Common to all the sources is the ethnical differentiation of the enemy into Turks, Persians, Arabs or Saracens, Ethiopians and others. The Franks

74 Hagenmeyer, *Epistulae*, 164; Isidor of Seville, VIII, 10, 2.
were also aware of the political fragmentation of the Islamic lands into autonomous territorial lordships, of the antagonism between Turks and Fatimids and of the linked confessional separation between Sunnis and Shiites, the theological or historical grounds of which were, however, not appreciated. The picture of Islam in the Chanson d’Antioche of the Crusader Richard, in the version of Graindors of Douai originating at the end of the twelfth century, which Darbishire has researched, is identical with the level of knowledge of contemporary chronicles and travel literature: Islam was conceived of as a religious community, its structure was, however, not analysed. The Crusaders’ idea of the constellation of powers and the constitutional classification of the individual territories and rulers in Syria also remained nebulous. Caliph and sultan were mentioned as much as Mecca was known as the goal of the Islamic pilgrimage. Topographical terms such as Baudas, Rohais, Caliptum and Coroscane or rulers’ names such as Sansodine, Malquidant, Corboran, Aoxianus and Lavedelius were reproduced more or less correctly phonetically, so far as the Crusaders came directly into contact with them. On the whole, however, it was a matter of haphazard recording, not of an analytical, systematic and inquiring interest in understanding. Accordingly, abundant phenomena were noted which appeared as curiosities to the Westerners, but geographical information not derived from the Bible, antiquity or patristic tradition was rare. The works of Raymond of Aguilers and Ekkehard of Aura reveal only some knowledge of the political situation in the Middle East following the Turkish invasion.

This low level of interest and knowledge was not only unsuitable to a diplomatic and political outlook, but furthered the emphasis on the distance from the enemy and hence his demonization. Yet, there existed two correctives which could facilitate a link between the knightly element and the unbelievers. One was the identification of Islam with the paganism of antiquity or at least the approximation of Islam to the pantheon of the ancient religions in the mentality of the medieval West. The other was the assumed analogy between the structure of rule and religion in the West and the Orient. Both elements are marked above all in the courtly epics of the twelfth century, produced by laymen for an aristocratic public. There was a tendency during the period to subsume the whole world of religions, apart from the sphere of Christianity and Judaism, under an

75 Darbishire, Idea, 115–22; Hill, Views, 6; Schwartz, Bild; 144.
76 Raim. Aguil., 64, 109–110; Ekkehard of Aura, II, 1, p. 54–V, 1, p. 80.
undifferentiated concept as heathens and to include the Muslims as a whole in the category of heathens without distinguishing them from other current forms of heathendom. This opened the way to the identification of Islam with the cults of classical antiquity and the Old Testament, the content and varied forms of which had been handed down to the West. The mixture of ancient polytheistic religions and monotheistic Islam in the intellectual world of the West led indeed on the one hand to the idea that Muslims worshiped the whole ancient pantheon with the inclusion of a deified Muhammad.77 On the other hand it allowed the positive appreciation of the high cultural level of Islam and outstanding personalities, like famous pagans of antiquity.78

Seeing Islam in the tradition of pagan antiquity thus suggested to the Christians of the beginning of the twelfth century a certain understanding of Islam as a religion. But it was still more significant for the Western perception of Islam as an institutional and political system that the enemy’s culture was not thought of as a unique phenomenon, but as something parallel to the ordering of the Christian commonwealth. The striking symmetry in description when Christian and Muslim war-standards, battle-cries, knightly society or sacred books are compared in the sources provides sufficient proof of this.79 The slighter a Frankish historian’s actual knowledge of Islam, the more he tended to employ analogies to Western institutions. This is clearest in the sources which stand in the tradition of Gesta Francorum, according to which in 1098 Kirbogha of Mosul is said to have begun a fictional letter as follows: ‘To the caliph our pope and the lord sultan our king, that most valiant warrior and to the most valiant knights of Khurasan.’80 The pope of the Turks (papa Turcorum)81 together with heathen priests not only incites to combat against the Christians in the contemporary Western accounts, but promises the forgiveness of sins and grants ‘permission to slay the Christians’.82 Beside him stands the sultan, who as the emperor of the Persians (sultanus, scilicet imperator Persidis)

77 For instance Gesta Francorum, XXI, 9, p. 322, XXII, 1, p. 323 and XXXIX, 17, p. 497/8; Tudebod, 80; Fulcher Carnot., I, XV, 7, p. 220.
78 This tendency only appeared in the course of the twelfth century (Schwartz, Bild, 38–9). From it developed the concept of the noble heathen, which appears explicitly only at the turn of the thirteenth century and not in the period of the First Crusade.
79 Plocher, Studien, 16–20; Hagenmeyer, Epistulae, 159.
sends out his generalissimo (princeps militiae soldani Persiae) against the Crusaders. Princes subordinate to the caliph and the sultan were designated as reges if they held positions as amirs, although the terminology differs with individual chroniclers.

Islam was obviously understood not as existing in its own right, but as an anti-commonwealth analogous to the Christian commonwealth. In the eyes of the Crusaders the European feudal system logically provided the structure for the reciprocal legal relations of Islamic princes. Thus, Gesta Francorum reports that the son of the Turkish lord of Antioch had to render homage to Kirbogha of Mosul in 1098 and that an oath of allegiance was demanded of Ahmad b. Marwan before Kirbogha would appoint him as castellan of the citadel of Antioch. The ambivalent picture of the Muslims, here as servants of Satan, there as heathens of equal knightly status, may with some care be assigned to the interest groups in the crusading army which have already been investigated. The picture of classical paganism may have strongly influenced clerics and peregrine, but knights and princes assumed or recognized among the Muslim warriors and rulers, especially the Turks, related ethical and legal ideas. According to Guibert, the Turks thus surpassed the Egyptians in such qualities as fitness for war, chivalry and personal virtue. According to the Gesta, the formerly Christian Turks were even descended from the Franks. Chivalry, it says in the same place, is naturally reserved to Turks and Franks alone. Had those people only the true Faith, there would be none so fit for warfare in the world. The hypothesis of a genealogical relationship between Turks and Franks found further extension in the West following the Crusade and in the thirteenth century even emerges in the French chansons de geste.

The picture of knightly equality was not only a literary commonplace but also the common opinion among the princes of the Crusade when beleaguered in Antioch. This is proved by the fact that the crusading

84 Gesta Francorum, XXI, 1, pp. 313–5, XXXIV, 4, p. 415, XXXIV, 10, pp. 422–4, XX, 1, p. 293; XXI, 5, p. 318; Albert of Aix, III, LIX, 379; Hagenmeyer, Epistulae, 150 (Stephen of Blois); Guibert of Nogent, V, X, 191.
86 Guibert of Nogent, I, V, 131.
88 Rigord, 38, pp. 55–6.
princes’ envoys, Peter the Hermit and his interpreter Herluin, proposed on 27 June 1098 to Kirbogha, the commander of the Turkish relieving army, that knighthly duels should decide the future possession of the city.89 The Turks had previously rejected an invitation to conversion. According to Albert of Aix, who wrote the relevant part of his chronicle in Europe c. 1102 on the basis of Lorrainer eyewitness accounts, mutual oath-taking and exchange of hostages were to safeguard the duels (reminiscent of a divine judgment). Even though this proposal was made in a supposedly hopeless military position, a different picture of the Muslims emerges here. According to the *jus gentium*, the ‘law of nations’, the heathen Kirbogha is a valid partner in negotiations and potentially in a treaty.90 Certainly according to Isidore of Seville, whose definition of *jus gentium* was to find entry as the medieval *locus classicus* into the *Decretum Gratianum* and thereby into canonical tradition, agreements between states did not depend on the confessional status of the treaty partner. Peace treaties (*foedera pacis*), armistices (*indutiae*) and immunities of envoys belong exactly for this reason to *jus gentium*, because these legal institutions are known to almost all peoples regardless of their religious affiliations.91

Thus, the question arises of whether and how the interest groups in the crusading army were actually ready to enter into treaty relations with the Muslims in favour of the realization of their different aims. Or did the idea of demonizing and exterminating the heathen, in combination with the prefiguration of the Crusades by the Israelites’ acquisition of Canaan according to Urban’s speech in Clermont and as held by the simple *peregrini*, forbid all Crusaders alike to come to terms with Muslim princes—even while recognizing their equality of status?92 It has often been observed that participants in the First Crusade did understand it as a missionary enterprise, unlike its interpretation in memoranda about the Crusade that authors such as Raymond Lull, Marino Sanudo and Pierre Dubois wrote later at the end of the thirteenth century.93 Nevertheless,

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89 Raim. Aguil., 79, 81; Fulcher Carnot., I, XXI, 1, p. 248; Albert of Aix, IV, XLV, 420–1; Ralph of Caen, LXXXI, 663–4; Caffaro, I, 54.
90 Cf. Albert of Aix, IV, XLV, 420–1.
91 Isidore of Seville, V, 6 and V, 7.
92 Baldric of Dol, I, IV, 15. Urban’s interpretation of the acquisition of the land by the Israelites as prefiguring the Crusade must indeed have hindered treaty relations between Franks and Muslims. The Bible asserts that the Israelites had to lay almost all of their conquests under the ban, and it expressly includes the interdiction both of marriage and of the conclusion of covenants (Deut. 7, 2–5; Joshua 6, 17, 10, 28).
some remarks in the sources seem to point to the Crusaders having made the conversion of Muslim partners to treaties an indispensable condition. Thus, the *Historia belli sacri*, originating after 1131, gives an account of a Frankish embassy which departed for Egypt before the conquest of Nicaea in May or June 1097 to set before the Fatimid Wazir al-Afdal the choice of conversion and friendship or war. On the march southwards from Antioch at the beginning of February 1099, according to another account, Raymond of Toulouse refused the treaty desired by the *qadi* of Tripoli, allegedly because the *qadi* had first to be converted. On the capture of Antioch in 1098 on two occasions Muslim commanders changed to the Christian faith: first the commandant of a tower, Firuz, whose treachery had enabled the Franks to capture the town. Shortly later, after the victory over the Turkish relieving army, there was a similar development. In view of the Frankish victory, the commandant appointed by Kirbogha, Ahmad b. Marwan, surrendered the citadel to Bohemond’s Normans, accepted baptism with the majority of his men and obtained for those who wished to remain Muslims safe conduct to Aleppo.

Closer consideration, however, shows that in all these cases conversion was not an essential condition for the conclusion of a treaty. Raymond’s refusal to conclude a peace with the ruler of Tripoli can be explained (as will be shown) not out of religious sensibility, but out of his interest in founding a lordship of his own in the *qadi*’s sphere of influence. In the cases of Firuz and Ahmad b. Marwan, according to the tenor of the sources, conversion was merely something additional to the treaty, not its condition. The change of religion might, however, seem opportune to both the converts. Firuz himself, a former Christian and an apostate of Armenian origin, might have had under Bohemond’s protection little good to expect for himself and his extensive estates from the fanaticism of the *peregrini*, had he remained Muslim. For Ahmad b. Marwan, it was

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94 Hist. bell. sacri, XX, 181.
97 Cutler, *Conversion*, 155–8. Ibn al-ʿAdim, *Zubda*, II, 137–8 confirms the versions of those Western sources mentioned in Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie*, VII, 310–1, but says nothing of a change of religion by Ahmad b. Marwan. After the capitulation on 5 July 1098, he is said to have lived in a house in Antioch. After the garrison left for Aleppo, however, it was almost completely demolished by the Armenians.
98 According to Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, X, 274, Firuz received an *iqta*` from Bohemond. Did he receive it according to Western forms? Nothing is known as to his fate thereafter. If his Christian name was indeed Bohemond, as Albert of Aix, IV, XV, 399 says, he was identical
probably the case that in his desperate situation he would receive better conditions—if we do not suppose with Cutler that the victory of the Christians over Kirbogha, achieved with enormous religious enthusiasm after the discovery of the Holy Lance, had proved to him the superiority of the Christian God. The example of Jerusalem a year later shows that the surrender of a citadel against free withdrawal could be accomplished entirely pragmatically and without conditions of a religious nature. After the capture of the city, Raymond of Toulouse took possession of the Tower of David on 13 July 1099 and allowed the Egyptian garrison to be conducted safely to Ascalon in accordance with his oath. Finally, the appeal to al-Afdal and Kirbogha to change their religion and the corresponding counter-offer of Kirbogha to Peter the Hermit had in the given circumstances a clearly rhetorical character and surely do not constitute the actual contents of the negotiations.

The examples cited already indicate that on the First Crusade there were contacts with hostile powers. What role did diplomacy play in the crusading army and how did the diplomatic connections with Middle Eastern states and rulers correlate with the interest groups among the Crusaders? After the capture of Antioch in 1098 and the victory over the relieving army, the council of the crusading princes decided at the beginning of July to continue the march on Jerusalem at the beginning of November. The Lorrainers, concerned with setting up territories, the Normans of Bohemond and the Provençals used the intervening time for the extension and consolidation of the lands already in their possession. Bohemond and Raymond operated in regions with a power vacuum after the death of Yaghisiyan that were mostly inhabited by Christians. On the other hand, the newly acquired positions of the Lorrainers in Edessa, Turbessel and Ravendel (al-Rawandan) were extraordinarily exposed. Since February 1098, probably before the advance of Kirbogha’s relieving army, Godfrey of Bouillon’s brother Baldwin had succeeded in reinforcing his position in Edessa as sole ruler after the townspeople’s revolt against his adoptive

to the convert Bohemond, the dragoman and agent of the Provençals mentioned by Raim. Aguil., 158–9.

101 The shari‘a recognizes an invitation to conversion before a struggle with non-Muslims. The Hanafi madhhab, to which Kirbogha as a Turk probably belonged, virtually makes the summons to Islam a duty (cf. Khaddouri, War, 95ff.).
father Toros. In consequence of his meagre military capacities, however, he was in need of diplomatic means to secure this.

Directly after his arrival in Edessa, Baldwin, together with an Armenian contingent under Toros’ subordinate Constantine of Gargar, marched against Sumaysat, lying to the north-west, where he had been attacked on his way to Edessa. The operation ended unfortunately. Nevertheless, it succeeded in placing a large part of the heavily armed Lorrainers in the nearby castle of St. John. They made trouble subsequently for their enemy, the Amir Balduq of Sumaysat, through guerrilla warfare. Albert of Aix describes that after the murder of Toros, the amir realized that he could no longer oppose the constant growth of Baldwin’s power and offered him the sale of Sumaysat for 10,000 bezants and furthermore volunteered to serve him faithfully as a mercenary. Baldwin at first appeared unimpressed by this offer, since Balduq had shortly before wrongfully occupied Sumaysat, a possession of Edessa. Only on the advice of his men did Baldwin decide to conclude a treaty as the period of Balduq’s ultimatum was threatening to run out. After its lapse, Balduq threatened that not only would he no longer keep the peace he would also burn his fortress to the ground and behead the hostages whom he had taken as security for an annual tribute from Edessa. Thereupon the business was settled. The count installed his knights in Sumaysat; Balduq went to Edessa as condomesticus and familiaris and promised in accordance with Baldwin’s request to provide his wife and sons as hostages because of mistrust and in order to establish faith. The promise, however, was not fulfilled.

A little later the Franks brought Saruj, the neighbour of Edessa to the south-west, under their control. It was at the time in the possession of the Artuqid Belek, a nephew of the Amir Sukman of Jerusalem. According to the version of the Chronicon ad A.C. 1234 pertinens, when Saruj appeared to be no longer tenable owing to the constant Frankish and Armenian raids, a delegation from Belek offered its surrender to Count Baldwin against certain promises, which were sworn and exchanged—perhaps in writing. Albert of Aix states the matter differently. According to him, Belek had concluded an alliance with the count against Saruj, which had rebelled against him. The people of the threatened city had indeed first attempted to engage Turkish mercenaries for the defence, but then in view of the

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103 Albert of Aix, III, XXI, 353–4; Matthew of Edessa, 218–9.
104 Albert of Aix, III, XXIV, 355–6.
105 Chronicon ad A.C. 1234 pertinens, II, 47.
Frankish advance, had sought a peaceful settlement. Gifts were sent to Baldwin and the payment of tribute promised. According to Albert, Baldwin fixed a day for the official conclusion of the treaty and handed over the city and the citadel to a knight called Fulcher of Chartres. The tenor of both sources is similar. According to both accounts, this resulted in the conclusion of a peace treaty secured by oaths between Franks and Turks, which included (perhaps financial) promises. Still more remarkable, and this might have been particularly scandalous for both pious Muslims and pious Christians, is that Saruj, a city inhabited by Muslims, was surrendered to Christians. The latter did indeed levy tribute, but practised no kind of forcible conversion, nor did they make other religious demands. There can be no doubt of the historicity of these events in spite of the silence of such well-informed chroniclers as Fulcher of Chartres and Matthew of Edessa, since Ekkehard of Aura seemingly also heard of them in the Holy Land three years later.

The undoubtedly most spectacular instance of cooperation between Lorrainers and Turks during the First Crusade is better documented. At the end of August or beginning of September 1098, a call for help from ʿUmar, the governor of ʿAzaz, reached Baldwin in Edessa and Godfrey, whose location at the time is not quite clear. ʿUmar had rebelled against Ridwan of Aleppo and needed help against a threatened punitive expedition. This offered Godfrey the opportunity of neutralizing ʿAzaz, strategically significant as a link between the Lorrainers and almost half-way between Antioch and Edessa. If Albert of Aix is purged of all panegyrics on behalf of Godfrey, the three authoritative sources provide an almost uniform picture of the event. Either threatened or already beleaguered by Ridwan, ʿUmar asked for peace and support through a Syrian Christian, whereupon Godfrey was said to have reacted at first with reserve owing to mistrust of the Turk. When his envoys informed him about Godfrey’s hesitation, ʿUmar sent his son Muhammad as a hostage with a second embassy so that Godfrey was reassured and concluded a treaty of peace and alliance. For reasons of security and speed, the written draft was transmitted to ʿAzaz by pigeon-post. In mid-September Godfrey and Baldwin relieved the beleaguered place, after additional Turks

106 Albert of Aix, III, XXV, 356.
107 Ekkehard of Aura, XXI, 3, pp. 211–3.
had reinforced it. Under pressure from Godfrey, Raymond of Toulouse and Bohemond joined them after initial reserve. ‘Umar’s sworn promise of allegiance (but seemingly not of vassalage) renewed the alliance between Franks and Turks after their victory. In a heavily symbolic ceremony, Godfrey presented to ‘Umar outside the fortress a valuable helmet and a lance. While Muhammad remained in Antioch under Lorrainer guardianship as a hostage, Godfrey proceeded forthwith to Edessa.

For our investigation of the existence of alliances during the First Crusade, the way in which the chronicler Raymond of Aguilers explains the count of Toulouse’s hesitant provision of aid is most instructive. After the garrison of ‘Azaz had promised the surrender of the fortress to Godfrey in recompense for his support, he hastened to Antioch to mobilize the other Crusaders there. Raymond, just convalescent, only set out when Godfrey brought religious arguments into play: Raymond should help the heathen Turks for God, the fame of the Franks, and for Godfrey’s sake, especially as they held out the cross against the siege-engines set up against them. Was it then that Raymond, unlike Geoffrey, made the conversion of a potential treaty partner a condition of the pact? The exceedingly condensed description of the matter by Raymond of Aguilers is not, however, completely convincing. The alleged offer by the governor, ‘Umar, to surrender his fortress is suspect to begin with, in spite of the successful conclusion of the alliance, nothing further is heard of it afterwards, even in Raymond of Aguilers’ report. Would ‘Umar really have rebelled with the view of surrendering his fortress to another lord within a month? Albert of Aix, who knows nothing of such an offer, presents on the contrary the legal relationship between Godfrey and ‘Umar as a military alliance between partners of equal legal, but not of equal social standing, as foedus aequum in the terminology of Roman law, for which the inferior party had to provide hostages. This obviously corresponds to the course of the affair: it was a matter of establishing Lorrainer suzerainty over ‘Azaz.111

Equally unconvincing is Raymond’s argument concerning conversion. Neither Albert nor the local historian of Aleppo Ibn al-ʿAdim knows anything of crosses or an offer of conversion. Raymond also does not mention that the Provençals later insisted on the baptism of the freed garrison. If such a religious demand may be credited to the count of Toulouse, certainly it may not to Bohemond, who had hesitated equally long to march

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to ‘Azaz. The true reason why the other princes first put off Godfrey after he had asked for help may have been that they felt no necessity to support him in the foundation of a territorial lordship relatively near to Antioch in the face of rival self-interests. This is evidenced on the one hand by the fact that only Godfrey’s very heavy pressure on Bohemond and Raymond, i.e. the threat of enmity and the denial of any further help, brought about a joint operation. On the other hand, the remark of Raymond of Aguilers shows that the count of Toulouse had at the same time planned on his own account a raid to the south in the same direction.\textsuperscript{112} The instances of Sumaysat, Saruj and ‘Azaz emphasize that both Godfrey and Baldwin were pragmatic in their policy and were prepared for cooperation with Muslim princes when it seemed profitable to them. Since Bohemond’s actions during the First Crusade are almost completely irrelevant to the question of cooperation, the policy of Raymond of Toulouse in regard to treaties and conquests remains to be investigated.

The Provençals strove to establish a foothold south-east of Antioch in the frontier region of Aleppo and Shayzar directly after the victory over Kirbogha. In mid-July 1098, the Christian population of Tall Man纳斯 had opened the gates to a patrolling force under Raymond Pilet. A neighbouring fortress held by Muslims was stormed on the initiative of Syrian Christians in cooperation with the Franks on the 25\textsuperscript{th} of the same month. According to the \textit{Gesta Francorum}, the sole contemporary source to mention this, there occurred on this occasion a hitherto unique scene: Pilet had all the Muslims who refused conversion massacred. The Franks suffered a painful defeat from a Turkish detachment from Aleppo when they proceeded against Ma’arrat al-Nu’man two days later.\textsuperscript{113} Nevertheless, Raymond of Toulouse resumed his strategy after the relief of ‘Azaz with the capture of nearby al-Bara. He had Peter of Narbonne installed as bishop and endowed him with half of the town and its vicinity.\textsuperscript{114} After the lapse of the November date, agreed in July 1098, for the march to Jerusalem, the pressure of the \textit{peregrini} on the princes clearly became stronger. As already indicated, Raymond had no choice, but to put himself at the head of the pilgrim movement, in order not to forfeit his influence. This, however, indicated a conflict of interests, since the leadership of the \textit{peregrini} did not automatically signify for Raymond the surrender of his


\textsuperscript{114} Raim. Aguil., 91–2.
territorial ambitions for which he (albeit not so extensively as Godfrey) had arranged diplomatic contacts. The three stages of his advance southwards make this clear.

First, on 27 November 1098, the siege of Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman began after the conclusion of the delicate agreement between Bohemond and Raymond in favour of the departure for Jerusalem. Provençal and Flemish troops participated in it and later Bohemond’s army as well. The well-known circumstances of the siege, ending in one of the worst massacres of the crusading period, do not require further comment here. All the sources mention that Bohemond, in breach of his guarantee of safety (aman), slew, enslaved and pillaged numerous inhabitants gathered in a safe house.115 A highly informative piece of information by the Damascene contemporary, Ibn al-Qalānisī is, however, not found in the other sources. According to this, the Franks had, before the capture of the place, frequently offered an agreement through envoys, which simply stipulated the stationing of a garrison and the sparing of lives and property in return for the surrender of Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman. Since, however, the besieged were disunited over its acceptance (probably expecting further relief from Ridwan of Aleppo), no treaty was concluded.116 Unfortunately, the report of this reliable chronicler stands alone and lacks confirmation on the Frankish side. If it is correct, two conclusions result: first, that Raymond had in mind for Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman a legal status modelled on that of Saruj, without the extermination or expulsion of the Muslim population; secondly, that perhaps he used diplomatic means in order to gain sole possession of the town before Bohemond’s arrival. We stand on firmer ground with the events of the following weeks.

Secondly, after the renewed disagreement with Bohemond and the pressure of the peregrini had prevented Raymond from establishing himself in Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman, he advanced further south from mid-January 1099 after a foraging operation against the territories of Aleppo. Accompanied by Robert of Normandy and Tancred, whom he had taken into his employ, Raymond and the Crusaders marched by way of Kafartab, which they captured, to Shayzar and Masyaf. They stormed Hisn al-Akrad (the later Crac des Chevaliers) and a month after their departure the protracted siege of ʿArqa began. They concluded a series of treaties with Muslim rulers during these weeks. Shortly after the departure, probably

in Kafartab, the Crusaders made peace (\textit{pax}) with Abu al-ʿAsakir Sultan, the ruler of Shayzar. In addition to a money-payment, the amir of Shayzar undertook not to molest the Franks within his lordship and to sell them horses and food. The course of relations with Shayzar was certainly not without problems—the amir had the land cleared of men and animals and threatened the Crusaders with a ban on trading if they did not withdraw further from the suburbs of his fortress. Nevertheless, the Franks were able to proceed unmolested, led across the Orontes by two guides from Shayzar. In addition, two non-aggression pacts were entered into with Muslim petty lords or governors, with whom treaties were concluded (against payments of cash and horses) with a sworn undertaking not to attack pilgrims.\textsuperscript{117}

Thirdly, the following two and a half months up to the departure from Tripoli in mid-May 1099 can be called with complete justification the heyday of diplomatic contacts during the First Crusade. Already during the storming of Hisn al-Akrad, envoys from Hims and Tripoli had been in the Frankish camp—obviously to sound out a treaty. Impressed by the rapidity of its capture, they returned with Raymond’s permission to their lords in order to bring yet more gifts in return for the expected conclusion of a treaty. With Janah al-Dawla of Hims, who had hitherto belonged to the most decided opponents of the Crusaders along with Kirbogha, Duqaq and Ridwan, there was obviously no problem in reaching agreement over the same conditions as with Shayzar.\textsuperscript{118} However, Raymond of Toulouse reacted otherwise to the offer of a treaty by the Qadi Jalal al-Mulk of Tripoli, who declared himself ready to enter faithfully into a pact and to establish friendship.\textsuperscript{119} According to Raymond of Aguilers, Raymond sent a Provençal counter-embassy to Tripoli on the qadi’s initiative. They are said to have been so impressed by the riches of the city that they successfully urged their count to extort a higher tribute by besieging ‘Arqa. The anonymous author of the \textit{Gesta} even reports that Raymond made the conversion of Jalal al-Mulk the requirement for a treaty.\textsuperscript{120} Considering the high authority of the \textit{Gesta}, this report is quite credible, although Raymond of Aguilers does not mention it and although it appears surprising after the previous conclusions of treaties. Possibly, Raymond of Aguilers, the Provençal chronicler who as court chaplain was in the circle closest

\textsuperscript{117} Gesta Francorum, XXXIV, 4–7, pp. 415–9; Raim. Aguil., 102–6.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibn al-Athīr, \textit{Kāmil}, X, 278.
\textsuperscript{119} Gesta Francorum, XXXIV, 4–7, pp. 415–9; Raim. Aguil., 107.
\textsuperscript{120} Gesta Francorum, XXXVI, 1, p. 438.
to the count, wished to protect his lord by silence from the reproach that he subsequently let the demand for conversion drop when concluding the treaty. Another explanation is still more plausible. Does the *Gesta* perhaps repeat the gossip going the rounds in the crusading army, possibly circulated by the leadership, as to the cause of the refusal of the treaty? The desire of the *peregrini* for Jerusalem, regardless of any strategic or political consideration, had already caused Raymond trouble in Antioch and Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman and was to do so again after the siege of ʿArqa. Taking account of this, it is conceivable that his henchmen attempted to find a religious legitimization for the delay in the advance to Jerusalem caused by the siege. In the end, whichever of the two sources was correct, Raymond’s actual motives for the rejection of Tripoli’s offer of a treaty lay more deeply than in religious scruples. Raymond wanted to round out his possessions south of Antioch. Further developments make this clear. While for weeks the siege of ʿArqa made no progress, the Provençals, well provided for from Cyprus, displayed a lively activity in the conquest of new territories. This included the occupation of Antartus (Tortosa), the placing of the lord of Maraqiyya (Maraclea) under Frankish suzerainty and the launching of raids against the rule of the ʿAmmar family, *qadis* of Tripoli, in spite of tempting offers of a treaty.\(^\text{121}\)

Raymond’s lack of interest in a treaty and his choice of further time-consuming military operations was, in contrast to the opinion of the majority of the Crusaders, also not linked to the fact that he declared himself in agreement with the Byzantine envoys to await the arrival of an army under the Emperor Alexius. His alleged attempt to incite the other princes to storm Tripoli, even after the raising of the siege of ʿArqa, is not the sole indication of his position. After the princes had marched from ʿArqa, they were to conclude a treaty on the conditions submitted by Jalal al-Mulk that would facilitate their march to Jerusalem. The vision of the priest Peter Desiderius, which Raymond of Aguilers reported, is truly revealing. St. Andrew warned Raymond of Toulouse not to think of ʿArqa and other places. God would cause Jerusalem, Alexandria, Cairo and others to fall to him, if only he would faithfully proceed to the Holy Places.\(^\text{122}\) The wording of this heavenly message, so little comforting in spite of everything, most clearly emphasizes how the establishment of a lordship on the coast of

\(^{122}\) Raim. Aguil., 131.
southern Syria obsessed Raymond of Toulouse and it explains his moral attitude towards a treaty with Tripoli.

After the preceding analysis of Frankish policy in regard to alliances and treaties on a regional basis, the question remains whether the Crusaders also had an active supra-regional diplomacy towards states and lordships which were not of direct importance to the Frankish interest in conquest, but which served their aims. In connection with this, all the states neighbouring the route of the Crusaders, the Armenian principalities, Egypt, Aleppo and Damascus, come into consideration. Already during the 'Byzantine' phase of the Crusade, i.e. even before the taking of Nicaea, the Crusaders had their first contacts with the Armenian principalities of Cilicia and northern Mesopotamia. In consequence, the operations of the different parts of the army were carried out together with the Armenian princes, especially Baldwin’s advance half a year later. According to the *Historia belli sacri* (c. 1140), an embassy was also sent to Egypt on the advice of the Byzantine emperor. It was composed of three Frankish envoys: Hugh of Bellafayre, Bertram of Scabrica and Peter of Picca. They were commissioned to deliver letters to the Fatimid Wazir al-Afdal, informing him of the Crusaders’ intention to liberate the pilgrims’ way to Jerusalem from the hands of the Muslims. Al-Afdal was given the choice of accepting conversion and becoming a brother and friend to the Christians or, if he preferred the friendship of the heathens, of becoming their enemy.123 The passage is, unfortunately, found only in the *Historia*. It is, however, known to all the sources that an Egyptian embassy visited the crusading army when outside Antioch. This embassy sought to encourage the Christians in their struggle against the Turks and to provide help in the acquisition of Jerusalem in return for a non-aggression pact. Although the other sources say nothing of an embassy sent from Nicaea, the account in the *Historia* is indirectly confirmed since the Fatimid counter-embassy obviously attempted to conceal the religious gap between the two partners. The Egyptians praised Christ for the victory over the Turkish relieving army under Ridwan and Sukman b. Artuq, which they had witnessed. They furthermore emphasized the friendliness of the Fatimid regime towards both native Christians and Frankish pilgrims.124 After the conclusion of the deliberations, the envoys set out on 5 March 1098 together with

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123 Hist. bell. sacri, XXII, 181. Albert of Aix, III, LIX, 379–80 seems to allude to a similar embassy. Cf. also Köhler, Jerusalem.

high-ranking Frankish ambassadors for Latakia and took ship for Egypt. The purpose of the Frankish delegation, whose safety the Egyptians had guaranteed by oath, was obviously to reach the official conclusion of a treaty in Cairo.

More than a year passed after the departure of the ambassadors. New movement in the negotiations came only when they returned in the spring of 1099 in the company of Egyptian envoys to the Crusaders, who meanwhile were at a stand outside ‘Arqa. They reported that al-Afdal had forbidden an earlier return. After the Crusaders' victory over the Turkish relieving army outside Antioch, the capture of Jerusalem by the Fatimid wazir in the late summer of 1098 and the Frankish advance, the atmosphere between the two sides had become decidedly cooler. Certainly, Egypt displayed a friendliness of tone and sent exceedingly valuable presents to the princes, but it remained essentially tough. There was no longer any idea of a surrender of Jerusalem. Al-Afdal would merely allow unarmed groups of two to three hundred Franks admission to the Holy Places. The indignant Crusaders threatened to march on Egypt in a counter-move if Jerusalem were not ceded. This final (for the time being) round of negotiations between Franks and Fatimids led to no outcome. In July and August 1099 the Crusaders captured Jerusalem and achieved victory over al-Afdal at al-Bissa, near Ascalon. The exchange of embassies with Egypt is, as a rule, far from thoroughly dealt with in the secondary literature and the Islamic sources are not taken into consideration—arguably because the exchange led nowhere and it did not correspond to the concept of the Crusade as a war against Islam for the conquest of Palestine. For this reason, it is of especial value to have a source-critical analysis, since just at this point in the First Crusade the possibilities and limitations of Frankish cooperation in Palestine were manifested.

According to the traditional interpretation, al-Afdal had wrongly regarded the crusading army as acting on behalf of the Byzantines and

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126 Raim. Aguil., 58.
127 Raim. Aguil., 110.
128 Sybel, Geschichte, 352, 403–4; Röhrich, Geschichte, 122–3, 177–9 merely reformulate the sources. Runciman, History, 1, 229, 273 and Runciman, First Crusade, 315–6, 329 has some brief comments. Gibb, Caliphate, 95 rejects the idea of an entente. More detailed are Grousset, Histoire, I, 82–5, 143–9 and Chalandon, Comnène, I, 206–7. Hamblin, Army, 214–20 is the only author to have systematically discussed the pertinent Islamic sources, but he does not focus on Frankish-Fatimid contacts.
had proposed an entente aiming at the ending of Seljuk rule in Syria as well as the reconstitution of the old partition of Syria into a northern Byzantine and a southern Fatimid sphere of hegemony. However, the Crusaders' intention to take possession of Jerusalem and thus of southern Syria wrecked this concept of restoration of the *status quo ante* 1070.129 This interpretation, while certainly not altogether erroneous, does not provide satisfactory answers to a number of questions. How, in spite of such competing interests generally, was a Frankish-Fatimid agreement reached in March 1098? Why did Frankish delegates remain with the Fatimids for more than a year? Finally, why did al-Afdal, having captured Jerusalem in the late summer of 1098, subsequently defend Jerusalem and Palestine so ineffectively against the further advance of the Crusaders? If the Arabic chronicles are utilized beside the known Frankish sources, it appears possible to answer these questions. The main source for the contents of the Frankish-Fatimid negotiations is the account by the Provençal priest, Raymond of Aguilers. In a passage about the return of the Frankish envoys to the crusading army at ‘Arqa, the chronicler describes the crux of the negotiations with Egypt as follows:

> He [the lord of Egypt, probably the wazir] had, that is to say, doubted whether he should conclude friendship (*amicitiam*) with us or the Turks. We would agree with him as follows: if he gave us help at Jerusalem or surrendered Jerusalem with its dependent territories (*pertinenciis*), we would restore to him all his towns which the Turks had seized from him, if we captured them. But the other towns of the Turks which did not belong to his realm, we would share between us (*inter nos partiremur*). But the Turks, as was reported to us, would [...] fulfil this to him: if he engages with them in combat against us, they would venerate 'Ali, who is of the Prophet's family, grant him a certain tribute and concede to him many other things in addition as is not sufficiently known to us.130

In other words, the Franks and the Fatimids negotiated common military operations against the Turks who had penetrated Syria some three decades previously. In a counter-move, the Turkish rulers of Syrian cities, or individuals among them, were ready for the sake of an alliance with Egypt to submit themselves to Egyptian sovereignty and to name the Fatimid caliph in the Islamic Friday prayer. This latter appears to be entirely credible. Only a year previously, in fact, Ridwan b. Tutush of Aleppo, although himself a Sunni, had attempted to introduce the Fatimid

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130 Raim. Aguil., 109–10 (indirectly confirmed by Hist. bell. sacri, XCIX, 212).
khutba in northern and central Syria, in order to secure Egyptian help against his brother Duqaq in Damascus. The exact description of the different negotiating positions demonstrates the high reliability of Raymond of Aguiler’s statements: he may himself have spoken to the Frankish envoys. Unfortunately, it is not possible to date the Frankish offer more exactly. Apparently, al-Afdal did not react to the Seljuk offer of alliance that the Latin chronicler described. This corroborates the seriousness of the Egyptian negotiations with the Franks, which obviously seemed more profitable to the wazir than an alliance with the Turks.

The decisive factor against the Frankish offer was, according to Raymond, letters from the Byzantine emperor to the Egyptian court informing them of the weakness of the crusading army and of Alexius Comnenus’ hatred of the Franks. These letters were captured when the Egyptian camp was plundered after the battle al-Bissa near Ascalon on 12 August 1099.\footnote{Raim. Aguil., 109–10.} There can be no doubt about Raymond’s central statement, especially as he was not just an eyewitness, but the count of Toulouse’s chaplain and probably also occupied with chancery business.\footnote{He composed at least the count’s letter of 1099 (Hagenmeyer, Epistulae, 167–74). Cf. Hagenmeyer, Brief.} It has more than once been established that although the Egyptians were aware of the ethnic distinction between Franks and Greeks, they regarded the Crusade as a Byzantine undertaking in the old style.\footnote{Gibb, Notes, 740–1; Sivan, L’Islam, 25–6; Gabrieli, Introduction, 224–5.} It was not only the course of the clashes up to the summer of 1098 which must have led al-Afdal to this conclusion. His envoys also found Byzantine troops in the crusading army before Antioch. The Franks were supplied from Byzantine Cyprus, mostly by Byzantine ships. The emperor himself carried out operations in Anatolia and in July 1098 while on march to Antioch. Since the Frankish embassy from Nicaea had travelled to Egypt on Alexius’ advice and by way of sea, for which a Greek ship was needed, it is quite possible that the Crusaders’ emissaries were joined to a Byzantine embassy. In any case, Greek seamen and interpreters must have accompanied them and for this reason it must have looked like a Byzantine embassy. Probably Alexius had informed the Fatimids even before this of his undertakings against the common Turkish enemies. So al-Afdal probably considered the Franks as being in the service of the Byzantines and consequently as serious treaty partners. Therefore, he sent a counter-embassy to make soundings in the Frankish camp outside Antioch. There a sort of draft treaty was obviously

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negotiated, which promised the Crusaders help and indicated a concession in the question of Jerusalem. That al-Afdal, in order to gain as much as possible from the new situation, should also have ties with neighbouring Muslim states (as the Provençal chronicler reported) is only natural. But it is of primary interest that the Crusaders, like the Egyptians, seemingly engaged in serious negotiations.\footnote{134}

What was the course of the contacts between Franks and Fatimids in the following months? On 5 March 1098 Egyptian and Frankish envoys departed together for Egypt, where they must have arrived a few weeks later. In Sha‘ban 491/4 July–1 August 1098, certainly after the arrival of the Christian envoys, al-Afdal left Cairo with a strong army, besieged Jerusalem, granted very generous terms for capitulation some forty days later to the city’s rulers, Sukman and Ilghazi, and returned home after a short stay in Ascalon.\footnote{135} That Egypt attempted to profit from the weakness of the Turks, brought about by the Frankish invasion, is not sufficient explanation for this expedition.\footnote{136} Most notably it falls completely outside the existing framework of Fatimid policy in Syria. This, as already shown, had had three objectives in the previous fifteen years: direct rule over the coastal zone, the winning of recognition for the Fatimid caliphate in northern and central Syria and expansion in the south Syrian interior with Damascus rather than Jerusalem as its goal.

An attack on Damascus must have seemed promising in 1098 to a force such as that of al-Afdal. Duqaq must surely have seemed as feeble an opponent to the Egyptians as the Artuqid amirs of Jerusalem after his two heavy battles with the Crusaders. This first was on New Year’s Eve of 1097 in combination with Janah al-Dawla at al-Bara and the second on 28 June 1098 with Kirbogha before Antioch. Although Damascus must have had quite another attraction for the Fatimids than the economically and politically insignificant Jerusalem, in 1098 al-Afdal gave priority to the difficult siege of Jerusalem in its arid hills over an attack on Damascus.\footnote{137}
Even if al-Afdal had been interested in the conquest of the Palestinian highlands with a view to securing the coast held by Egypt, an operation against weak Damascus would have been more sensible, because after its conquest Jerusalem would have been completely isolated and unable to hold out very long.\textsuperscript{138} What, then, was the attraction for al-Afdal of the capture of Jerusalem, since he thereby placed himself in dispute with the Crusaders? The wazir knew from his conversations with the envoys sent from Nicaea, if not earlier, that Jerusalem was the goal of the Franks and he was also aware that Jerusalem was worthless to impede an attack on Egypt. In general, it is remarkable that in spite of the momentary strength of Egypt, no adequate defending force opposed the Franks during their entry into the region of Fatimid suzerainty. It is interesting that in one line of Islamic historical tradition, al-Afdal would have allowed not Jerusalem, but Damascus to be captured in 1098. This report is quite obviously incorrect. It is, however, evidence that some chroniclers could envision Egyptian policy in 1098 only as following the customary course of the previous decades, i.e. as being directed against Damascus.\textsuperscript{139}

Both Ekkehard of Aura, who as a pilgrim visited the site of the event two years later, and also the Historia belli sacri (c. 1140), report that the members of the Frankish embassy sent to Egypt in March 1098 visited Jerusalem during their absence from the crusading army. Ekkehard says that the ambassadors were present in al-Afdal’s besieging army and that he threatened the Artuqid lords of the city, alluding to his Frankish allies, that if they did not surrender the city to him, the Crusaders would fall upon them. On the other hand, the Historia says that al-Afdal and a Frankish delegation had seen the miracle of the Holy Fire in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Easter (10 April 1099). The ambassadors may have believed that the purpose of the capture of Jerusalem in their presence was to hand it over to the Crusaders. The wazir, however, had put Jerusalem in a position of defence and then dismissed them with his own ambassadors to ‘Arqa.\textsuperscript{140} It is not clear how reliable these accounts are, especially as the Historia may not be completely independent of Ekkehard. It is known, however, from other sources that after the taking of the city, al-Afdal

\textsuperscript{138} To besiege Jerusalem was in any case technically difficult, as the Crusaders were to discover, since the barrenness and lack of water presented logistical problems. For this reason al-Afdal sought from the outset to move the Artuqids to surrender by generous terms such as gifts and freedom to withdraw.

\textsuperscript{139} The oldest source is ‘Imād al-Dīn, Bustān, 115. Cf. Ibn Abī al-Dam, 138v–39r and Ibn al-Dawādārī, VI, 450.

\textsuperscript{140} Ekkehard of Aura, XVI, 3–4, pp. 171–2; Hist. bell. sacri, CII–CIII, 214–5.
paid special attention to the Holy Places and the native Christians.\footnote{Raim. Aguil., 110; Albert of Aix, VI, XXXII, 485. According to William of Tyre, VII, XXIII, 314–5, there was discrimination against the Christians before the Crusaders’ attack, as it was feared that they would collaborate with the Franks.} All this indicates that Egypt examined very seriously the Crusaders’ offer as reported by Raymond of Aguilers. The capture of Jerusalem conformed to the content of the conversations before Antioch and the proposals of the Frankish envoys in Cairo. Al-Afdal attacked the Artuqid lords of Jerusalem, who in the region of Edessa and as allies of Kirbogha had proved themselves to be keen opponents of the Crusaders. As the new lord of Jerusalem, al-Afdal had the chance to purchase concessions with regard to the support of the Crusaders for his plans of revenge against the Turks. It cannot be determined whether al-Afdal had got as far as surrendering the city, granting the Christians a special legal status or only offering freedom of entry for pilgrims and an absence of discrimination against Christians. Even in the first case the gain from an alliance with the Crusaders would have far outweighed the loss of Jerusalem for the Fatimids. It seems plausible that al-Afdal possibly captured Jerusalem in order to be in a better position for negotiating with the Crusaders if two premises are taken into consideration; namely, that already during the eleventh century Jerusalem and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre had played an important part in negotiations between the Byzantines and the Fatimids and furthermore that since al-Afdal saw the Crusade as a Byzantine undertaking, he had no fear of the establishment of a kingdom of Jerusalem as a new political power in Palestine.

Until the summer of 1099, the talk among the Franks was still only of the liberation of the Holy Places. The phrase *terra sancta*, by contrast, implying a Christian claim to the possession of all Palestine and the coastal region of northern Syria, still makes no appearance whatsoever in the accounts by eyewitnesses of the First Crusade. Relevant to this is the demand of the Franks to al-Afdal, according to Raymond of Aguilers, for the cession of Jerusalem *cum pertinenciis suis*, which in accordance with the contemporary administrative structure could mean, not the whole of Palestine, but at most the non-Egyptian Palestinian highlands, i.e. the Artuqid lordship. Various elements indicate that no clear ideas held sway among the Crusaders concerning Jerusalem and that they might possibly have been satisfied with the cession of those territories near to Jerusalem that the Emperor Frederick II obtained in his treaty of 1229 with the
Ayyubid Sultan al-Malik al-Kamil. These elements include the speedy advance of the crusading army on Jerusalem without any methodical conquest of Palestine as a whole, the fact that until immediately before the taking of the city there were no legal notions about its later fate, the low number of Franks staying there as well as the previous realization of the territorial ambitions of individual Frankish princes in northern Syria.

In this connection it is instructive that Muslim chroniclers beginning with Ibn Zařir, one of the earliest and best reporters of this period, also believed in an Egyptian interest in cooperation with the Crusaders. The Wazir al-Afdal, it is said, regretted after the creation of a Frankish state in Jerusalem that he had weakened the Muslim cause with his operations of 1098. This regret, thinks Ibn Zařir, was thoroughly out of place, since al-Afdal himself had shown a sympathetic attitude to the Frankish invasion of the Palestinian coastal region, as he wished to install them as a buffer against renewed Turkish attacks on the Nile valley. Al-Afdal therefore did not want to limit the Crusaders to northern Syria; on the other hand, he was not interested in a strong Frankish state that would threaten Egypt no less than the Turks. This position no longer appears so inconsistent as it seemed at first sight, if one calls to mind the previous findings: that al-Afdal's negotiations with the Franks seemed to enable him to restore Egyptian rule in Syria, that the Franks had still no idea of setting up a strong state in Palestine, but were solely concerned with Jerusalem as a holy city and finally that in the preceding decades there had been precedents for negotiations with the Byzantines over the status of the Holy Places. As mentioned, the wazir had every reason to connect the Crusade with Byzantium.

Nevertheless, the negotiations between the Franks and the Fatimids came to nothing. The Frankish embassy was detained in Egypt, which Raymond of Aguilers ascribes to the Byzantine emperor's letters to al-Afdal. Lilie has cast doubt on the existence of this correspondence and of the whole of Raymond's account, ascribing it to the anti-Greek bias of the chronicler. He argues that no other sources confirm Raymond and that his report is illogical, firstly because Byzantium had no reason to incite Egypt against the Crusaders and the Fatimids would not have agreed to a proposal such as Raymond described, since it would have violated their

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142 The Christian sources express disappointment that al-Afdal did not voluntarily give away Jerusalem: Raim. Aguil., 110; Ekkehard of Aura, XVI, 4, p. 171; Albert of Aix, VI, XXXII, 485.
hemisphere; secondly, because there is no reason for al-Afdal to have taken the emperor’s letters with him to Ascalon, where they are said to have been captured. These arguments against Raymond are unconvincing. It has already been shown that Egypt could have drawn much profit from the Crusaders’ offer and also Byzantine diplomacy had taken up the question of the Holy Places before the Crusade. Al-Afdal’s capture of Jerusalem is only to be understood against the background of the Frankish offers. Furthermore, Raymond possessed in his position all the prerequisites to be well informed. Had his account of the capture of the Byzantine letters rested on invention pure and simple, such an audacious untruth would surely not have remained uncontradicted among the numerous eyewitnesses who read his work. That other sources give no information about the letters proves little. By contrast, Oriental sources believe that Alexius repeatedly conspired against the Crusaders, although on other occasions.

Furthermore, the Byzantines no longer had any control over the Crusade after July 1098. The Byzantine troops in the army had withdrawn before Kirbogha’s arrival. Thereafter Alexius Comnenus was concerned to prevent the creation of autonomous Frankish lordships, as Lilie himself observes. He demanded the handing over of Antioch without allowing it to come to an open breach and endeavoured to hinder the departure of the Crusade. Hence, it is only natural that Alexius was also interested from 1098 in preventing a possible alliance between the Crusaders and the Egyptians. Finally, that al-Afdal brought the Byzantine correspondence to Ascalon is more probable than otherwise. Although the Crusaders first rejected at ‘Arqa his offer to allow unarmed pilgrims free access to Jerusalem and developments moved towards a conflict between Franks and Fatimids, the Egyptians seemed not to have given up hope of a diplomatic solution. Ibn al-Athir and Ibn Muyassar (d. 677/1278), who are among the best informed chroniclers of the history of the period, report that directly before the battle of al-Bissa an envoy was sent to the Franks, censuring them for the taking of Jerusalem. In spite of the hardening of the Egyptian position during the conversations at ‘Arqa, the Fatimids probably still

144 Lilie, Byzanz, 51–2.
145 Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 273; Chronicon ad A.C. 1234 pertinens, II, 40.
146 Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 286 and Ibn Muyassar, 67, lack corroboration. However, since both conform fully with Christian sources in regard to the events of the conquest of Jerusalem, the statement has a certain value.
believed in a negotiated solution until the summer of 1099. Apparently, the Frankish siege of Jerusalem surprised them. It is thus plausible that al-Afdal should have brought the papers concerning the Franks with him from his chancery.

Having regard to the state of the sources, all considerations of supra-regional relationships during the First Crusade rest on circumstantial evidence. Raymond of Aguilers’ description of the course of negotiations, however, seems well-founded. As long as Egypt judged the Crusade to be a Byzantine undertaking for the recovery of territory, al-Afdal was ready to resume the entente with Byzantium, which had been effective as late as the second third of the eleventh century. He was also prepared to make some concessions in regard to Jerusalem which would hardly have been painful compared to the expected profit. A letter from the emperor dating from late summer or early autumn 1098 had made the Fatimids aware of the breach between Byzantium and Crusaders in the meantime. From the Egyptian point of view, the Franks had become a freely acting power which no longer had full Byzantine support. Since Egypt had as little interest as Byzantium in the founding of Frankish states, which would threaten Egypt like the creation of the Turkish lordships two decades before, al-Afdal gave up his plans for an alliance. The Frankish envoys lost their accreditation in al-Afdal’s eyes with the letter from Byzantium and were detained following Islamic usage, which stipulated the nullification of the immunity of unaccredited envoys. Only when the Crusaders began to penetrate the Fatimid sphere of influence at ‘Arqa did al-Afdal endeavour to neutralize the danger arising from the Franks. For this he not only made military preparations in Palestine, but he also sent gifts, released the envoys and offered freedom of pilgrimage for the Crusaders. However, he could not surrender Jerusalem, since an autonomous Frankish state founded in the south would most probably not be satisfied with Jerusalem. The Crusaders reacted sharply to the wazir’s offer that was, compared with his earlier promises, very limited. They deemed themselves betrayed and seriously discussed an attack on Egypt at al-Ramla at the beginning of June 1099. This scheme failed on account of the weakness of the available forces and of the peregrinis’ pressure finally to proceed to Jerusalem. For this reason the Franks also left the Fatimid coastal towns south of Tripoli unmolested.147 The Crusaders were uninterested in attacks on

147 Al-Ramla: Raim. Aguil., 136–7. With ‘Arqa and Antartus the Crusaders reached the region in which the Fatimid khutba was recognized.
these places and skirmishes occurred only in the surroundings of Sidon. During the fortnight the Franks needed to travel from ‘Arqa to al-Ramla, treaties were concluded with Beirut and Acre. In both cases, the Crusaders were provided with food after they had promised not to destroy the crop. The Crusaders obtained assurance on oath that in the event of their victory over the Fatimids, those places would be surrendered or at least placed under Frankish suzerainty. Nothing more clearly demonstrates that under the pressure of the peregrini the advance to Jerusalem had precedence. Since the treaty with Tripoli, the princes were forced to set aside their endeavours to establish states and to be satisfied with unsure promises of later surrender.

In summary, at the time of the arrival of the First Crusade in northern Syria Pope Urban II and the Emperor Alexius Comnenus lost all direct influence on the execution of the enterprise. In the course of the preaching of the Crusade since 1095, the idea of the liberation of Jerusalem had taken the place of the original plan of coming to the help of Byzantium against the Turkish attacks. The religious emotions aroused by the propaganda for the Crusade, as well as the dire economic situation in France at the end of the eleventh century and ever-present feuds, inadequately restrained by the Truce of God movement, resulted in the inclusion in the crusading movement of great bodies of unarmed pilgrims to Jerusalem, pauperes or peregrini. From the summer of 1097 and the taking of Nicaea, the remainder of these bands together with the contingents of knights of the different princes formed the crusading army, in which their numbers surpassed those of the knights many times. The Crusaders of knightly and aristocratic origin were differentiated into two groups, one which understood the Crusade as above all an armed pilgrimage and another which was primarily concerned with the taking of land and the foundation of lordships. To the latter belonged the Lorrainers Godfrey and Baldwin, the Norman Bohemond and the Provençal Raymond. It became clear that the divergence of interests between these two groups stamped the further course of the Crusade, at latest from the siege of Antioch in the winter of 1097–98. As leader of the peregrini, Raymond of Toulouse found himself in a particularly precarious situation. The pressure of the pilgrims to advance on Jerusalem made it impossible for him to establish a lordship in the north.

What does this signify for the relations of the Crusaders with the indigenous peoples and the amirs and rulers of the Muslim states in the Middle East? Obviously, the Crusaders did indeed regard the Muslims as heathen and the idea of slaying the heathen was thoroughly pervasive in the treatment of defeated Muslims, especially among the pauperes, peregrini and the Provençals. Frankish conduct was more flexible only if it was a case, as in Saruj, of the foundation of a lordship and if there was no pressure from the part of the simple pilgrims. Yet on the other hand, similar structures were ascribed to the Islamic world and to the Christian commonwealth. Not least because there was supposed to be a genealogical relationship between Franks and Turks, and the military performance of the Turks was impressive, it was not hard for the Frankish chivalry to recognize their opponents as of equal status. The consciousness of this equality of status among knights probably made it simpler to enter into treaty relations with individual Muslim rulers in spite of the widespread heathen-killing mentality among the Crusaders. For this there were two motives. In the first place, Frankish-Muslim treaties served the purpose of the foundation of states. In both cases in which the acquisition of land took place in the neighbourhood of Muslim lordships, alliances and treaties accompanied this, which came into existence from a position of Frankish strength and from Muslim initiative. Oaths and hostages secured these treaties and they mostly included the Muslim payment of tribute. The conversion of the Muslim party might have been made a requirement for the conclusion of the treaty only in the case of Tripoli—but it is very significant that this served tactical aims only and was not grounded on religious scruples. The demand was later allowed to lapse. In the second place, several treaties secured the unhindered advance of the Franks to Jerusalem on which the peregrini insisted. In some cases this resulted in the placing of Muslim lordships under Frankish suzerainty, quite certainly in the case of Maraqiyya, possibly also in that of Tripoli and Beirut. This was manifested in the payment of tribute and the raising of Frankish banners on the city walls. It is difficult to decide whether the treaties were purely a matter of neutrality and peace or whether the Muslim party understood these treaties (which have been transmitted only in Latin sources) also as subordination to Frankish overlordship. The Crusaders themselves always considered all treaty partners as their tributaries and justified the conclusion of the agreements to the pope by the small number of their troops.149

149 Hagenmeyer, Epistulae, 170.
Equally, no hesitation in the conclusion of treaties with the Crusaders can be ascertained on the Muslim side. Small lordships offered little resistance to the Crusade; they provided guides as well as hostages and even sold military goods. In this way they continued their policy of neutrality, which in the three previous decades they had pursued during the conflicts among the Seljuks and those between the Turks and the Fatimids. Aleppo and Damascus concluded no agreements with the Franks.\textsuperscript{150} If, however, the evidence of the sources is not misleading, the Crusader princes were also ready for supra-regional diplomatic contacts to secure the success of their undertaking. The first impulse to this came very probably from Byzantium. If the relevant circumstantial evidence is close to the actual development, the Franks and Egypt were ready for a far-reaching alliance against the Turks; even the ways of partitioning rule and the joint possession of captured cities were discussed. Egypt integrated the Crusade into its conception of the recovery of the Syrian possessions lost to the Turks. The taking of Jerusalem by the Wazir al-Afdal in the summer of 1098 can plausibly be explained only as the consequence of an alliance between the Franks and the Fatimids. The causes of the failure of these contacts are to be found in the fact that the Egyptians were informed of the discord between Byzantium and the Crusaders and started to fear the establishment of a Crusader lordship in Palestine. It was not the princes who aspired to establish states, but the mass of simple pilgrims who urged on the march to Jerusalem who prevented a union with Egypt.

Thus, an abundance of relations through treaties, alliances and perhaps even suzerainty arose already during the First Crusade. The variety of interests of the groups participating in the Crusade and the idea of the equality of status between Frankish and Turkish knights facilitated this development. The Syrian system of autonomous lordships in 1098–99, in turn, favoured the treaty policy of individual Frankish leaders. The rivalry between the great metropolitan cities and the lack of a supreme power contributed to the fact that the Crusaders did not confront a united Muslim Syria. The traditional policy of neutrality of the petty Arab lordships of central Syria and the antagonism between Fatimids and Turks (both marked out as specific characteristics of this system) were congenial to the Frankish interest in treaties. The Crusaders were integrated as a new element in the structure of alliances and conflicts in the Middle East—and apparently allowed themselves to be integrated without difficulty.

\textsuperscript{150} Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, X, 275.
The factors which favoured or impeded the treaty policy during the First Crusade—such as the endeavour to extend and secure states or the difference of interests between founders of states and pilgrims—must be kept in mind when investigating Frankish-Muslim relationships in the twelfth century. The events from 1097 to 1099 give a first impression of the subsequent Frankish-Muslim relationships in the twelfth century.