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Civil Society as a Conflictual Sphere in Post-Liberalization Tanzania: the Roles of NGOs and Trade Unions

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Declaration for PhD Thesis

I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of the School of Oriental and African Studies concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material presented for examination is my work and has not been written for me, in whole or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination.

Signed .......................................................... Date.............................................
Mark McQuinn
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Abstract

This research examines, through a Gramscian perspective, the reconfiguration of civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania, centring on the rationale for the marginalization of trade unions. The liberalization of the Tanzanian economy, which started from the latter half of the 1980s, and was accompanied by a move to multiparty liberal democracy during the 1990s, has led to conflicts in the sphere of civil society. Since liberalization, influential multilateral and bilateral donors have driven the state to reconstitute civil society as an independent variable, based on a de Tocquevillian vision, whereby a wide variety of freely-formed organizations take part in national policy-making processes in a consensual way, to indicate their views and needs to the state. This requires the state to accept and accommodate a plurality of ideas, thereby, avoiding dominance by a small number of well-organized groups of citizens. However, the donors have supported the rise to prominence of a few urban-based non-governmental organizations (composed of well-educated professionals) versed in the hegemonic discourse, which revolves around the concepts of partnership, participation and ownership. In contrast, trade unions have been marginalized by the donors and the state, as they are regarded as a threat to neo-liberal hegemony in Tanzania, since they have engaged in a war of position, by organizing a small number of industrial actions and rhetorically challenging the state’s treatment of the workforce.

In responding to their marginalization, trade unions are hampered by two substantive problems: an ideological vacuum concerning perceptions of their role within the sphere of civil society in the post-liberalization period and structural constraints caused by lack of finance, falling membership and poor facilities. By using a Gramscian framework to analyse the position of trade unions in post-liberalization Tanzania, it is possible to understand how the integral state has maintained hegemony through the combined use of moral and intellectual leadership and coercive legal-bureaucratic means. Thus, the use of a Gramscian analysis provides a considerable amount of explanatory power concerning the ways in which associational life is integrated into national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania, and allows the weaknesses in the prevailing liberal conception, with its de Tocquevillian ideological roots, to be clearly seen.
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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ATE – Association of Tanzanian Employers
BAWATA - Baraza La Wanawake
BINGO – Big International NGO
BSPS – Business Sector Programme Support (DANIDA)
CBAs – Collective Bargaining Agreements
CCM - Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CHODAWU - Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied Workers Union
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
COTWU (T) - Communication and Transport Workers Union of Tanzania
CSO - Civil Society Organization
CTI - Confederation of Tanzanian Industries
DANIDA – Danish International Development Agency
DDT - District Development Trust
DFID - Department for International Development
DOWUTA - Dock Workers Union of Tanzania
DSA-TWG - Dissemination, Sensitization and Advocacy, Technical Working Group of the Poverty Monitoring System
DSM – Dar es Salaam
ECNGO – Elite Centred NGO
ESRF - Economic and Social Research Foundation
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment
FCS – Foundation for Civil Society
FFUNGO - Foreign Funded NGO
FONGO - Foreign NGO
GBS - General Budgetary Support
GONGO - Government-organized NGO
GURN - Global Union Research Network
HIPC – Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (Initiative)
ICFTU - International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ICSID - International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
IDA - International Development Association
IEO – Independent Evaluation Office
IFC – International Finance Corporation
IFIs - International Financial Institutions
IGWUTA - Industrial and General Workers Union of Tanzania
ILO – International Labour Organization
IMF – International Monetary Fund
ITDG – Intermediate Technology Development Group
JICA – Japan International Cooperation Agency
JSA – Joint Staff Assessment
JUWATA - Jumuiya ya Wafanyakazi wa Tanzania
LEAT - Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team
LGP - Learning Group on Participation
LHRC - Legal and Human Rights Centre
LONGO - Local NGO
MKUKUTA - Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania
MKUZA - Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Zanzibar
MCT - Media Council of Tanzania
MNC – Multi National Corporation
NACONGO - National Council for NGOs
NEC – National Electoral Commission (of Tanzania)
NGO - Non-governmental Organization
NNGO – Northern Non-governmental Organization
NSGRP - National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
NUTA - National Union of Tanganyika Workers
NYC - National Youth Council
ODI – Overseas Development Institute
OECD – Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OED – Operations Evaluation Department
PAR - Participatory Action Research
PEDP – Primary Education Development Programme
PF - Policy Forum
PFPs – Policy Framework Papers
PHDRs – Poverty and Human Development Reports (Tanzania)
PINGO - Pastoralist Indigenous Non-Governmental Organization
PLA - Participative Learning and Action
PO - People’s Organization
PPA - Participatory Poverty Assessment
PRA - Participative Rural Appraisal
PREM – Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (Network)
PRGF - Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
PRS - Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP - Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PRSC - Poverty Reduction Support Credit
RAAWU - Researchers Academicians and Allied Workers Union
REBA - Regional Evidence Building Agenda
REPOA - Research on Poverty Alleviation
SAP – Structural Adjustment Programme
SME – Small Medium Enterprise
SNGO – Southern Non-governmental Organization
SOE – State Owned Enterprise
TACOSODE - Tanzania Council for Social Development
TADREG - Tanzania Development Research Group
TAFICAWU - Tanzania Fishing Crew and Allied Workers Union
TALGWU - Tanzania Local Government Workers Union
TAMICO - Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union
TAMWA - Tanzania Media Women’s Association
TANGO - Tanzania Association of NGOs
TANU - Tanzanian African National Union
TAPP - Tanzania Advocacy Partnership Program
TASIWU - Tanzania Social Services Industry Workers Union
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<td>Tanzania Social and Economic Trust</td>
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<td>TAWU</td>
<td>Tanzanian Agricultural Workers Union</td>
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<td>TCDD</td>
<td>Tanzania Coalition for Debt and Development</td>
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<td>TEDG</td>
<td>Tanzania Ecumenical Dialogue Group</td>
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<td>TEN/MET</td>
<td>Tanzania Education Network</td>
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<td>TEWUTA</td>
<td>Telecommunication Workers Union of Tanzania</td>
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<td>TFL</td>
<td>Tanganyikan Federation of Labour</td>
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<td>TGNP</td>
<td>Tanzania Gender Networking Programme</td>
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<td>TMW</td>
<td>Tanzania Media Workers Union</td>
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<td>TPU</td>
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<td>TPAWU</td>
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<td>Tanzanian Teachers Union</td>
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<td>TUGHE</td>
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<td>TUICO</td>
<td>Tanzania Union of Industrial and Commercial Workers</td>
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<td>TUJ</td>
<td>Tanzania Union of Journalists</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUPSE</td>
<td>Tanzania Union of Private Security Employees</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>URT</td>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>VENRO</td>
<td>Verband Entwicklungspolitik Deutscher Nichtregierungs-Organizationen</td>
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<td>VPO</td>
<td>Vice President’s Office</td>
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<td>WDM</td>
<td>World Development Movement</td>
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<td>WFTU</td>
<td>World Federation of Trade Unions</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<td>YPC</td>
<td>Youth Partnership Countryside</td>
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Chapter 1

The Research Problem

1.1 Objectives and Themes

This thesis centres on a Gramscian analysis of the changing position of civil society in Tanzania following the liberalization of the economy which was accompanied by the move to multiparty liberal democracy during the 1990s. The research analyzes, in particular, how these substantive shifts in the political economy of Tanzania have led to conflicts in the sphere of civil society where clear distinctions are made between which groups should, and which should not, play a meaningful role in national policy-making processes. How these changes are having mutually contrasting effects on the participation of two types of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), namely trade unions and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), in national policy-making processes is examined as fieldwork-based case studies. There is also an analysis of the modes of participation by trade unions and NGOs in national policy-making processes and whether these are leading to perceptions of their ownership on the part of these organizations. This focus derives from the importance accorded to these concepts by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) which have largely driven the liberalization of the economy and the move to multiparty democracy in Tanzania.

To accomplish these aims an overarching research question was posited:

How and why have trade unions been largely excluded from ‘civil society’ as it has been constituted practically and rhetorically in post-liberalization Tanzania?

This in turn necessitated examining four sub-questions:

1. Are Tanzanian trade unions representatives of a labour aristocracy in the form of a decreasing number of wage labourers in the formal sector?

2. What possibilities exist for trade unions to embrace ‘social movement unionism’ by forming effective alliances with other associational groups in Tanzania?

3. How and why have NGOs been able to dominate ‘civil society’ input to national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania?
4. How have trade unions and NGOs been included in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) process and with what outcomes?

1.2 Civil society in Tanzania as a Case Study

Tanzania has become an IFI show-case, portrayed as ‘one of the best performers in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2010b: 1). For the IMF (Nord et al 2009: 1), Tanzania has experienced a ‘remarkable turnaround’ characterized by ‘buoyant’ economic growth, ‘booming’ exports and poverty ‘heading downwards.’ Tanzania was listed as one of the top ten reformers in the World Bank’s ‘Pro-Business List’ for 1996 (IFC, World Bank, 1996) and is currently ranked as the best country in Africa in terms of enforcing contracts (International Finance Corporation, World Bank, 2011). For the Tanzanian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, (Kallaghe, 2010) Tanzania is a ‘rising star’ in Africa and has a ‘robust economy.’ Moreover, the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2010) rates Tanzania as the best governed country in East Africa and 12th out of 53 countries ranked Continent-wide. For the donor community, ‘Tanzania serves as evidence that ownership can be constructed through partnership between state and donors’ (Harrison, Mulley and Holtom 2009: 295).

This depiction of Tanzania as a recent ‘success story’ in developmental terms has been problematized in this research through an analysis of changes in civil society. The activities of civil society organizations were circumscribed following the formal move to a one-party state four years after Tanzania gained independence from Britain in 1961. The state maintained firm control over civil society from this period until the adoption of the neo-liberal economic policies and multiparty liberal democracy during the 1990s. In the post-liberalization period civil society has become an arena of struggle in which different types of associational groups have contested the newly available policy spaces. However, only a relatively small number of NGOs have managed to play an active role in national policy-making processes, to a large extent championed and financed by external donors. While the donors argue that their support and funding is important in constituting and cementing a vibrant and varied civil society (Mercer, 1999), this

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1 Key development indicators are listed in Figure 1A at the end of the chapter. Below this, a map showing the large geographical area of Tanzania, which is important to the debate concerning the role of a wide number of civil society organizations in national policy processes, is provided in Figure 1B.
view sits uneasily with their failure in practice to assist and include other types of associational
groups, such as trade unions. The hegemony of neo-liberal policies in Tanzania, driven by the
IFIs, has been consolidated with the active consent (Gramsci, 2011) of most of the leading NGOs
working in the country since the 1990s, which take part in national policy-making debates
through forums created by the IFIs and the government, such as the PRSP process, thus
conferring on them legitimacy (See chapter 5 for details). In contrast, associational groups such
as trade unions, which put forward counter-hegemonic perspectives, unwelcome to the
government, such as the need for tighter regulations regarding the entry of foreign firms into the
domestic economy, are subordinated and struggle to play any role in the formation of national
policies (See chapter 6 for details). Both the winning of active consent from civil society groups
and the subordination – or elimination - of those providing counter-hegemonic perspectives are
equally important in achieving hegemony (Gramsci, 2011). These two strategies have been used
by the state in post-liberalization Tanzania. For the purposes of this research, hegemony is
regarded as being the rule within a culturally diverse society of one group, through the
manipulation of the beliefs, values and perceptions of subaltern classes, so that its worldview is
accepted as a universally valid ideology. The resulting status quo is perceived by all as
benefitting the whole society, whilst in reality only the ruling group gain (Gramsci, 2011).

Trade unions face a narrow range of possibilities in confronting the hegemonic discourse of neo-
liberalism. Revolutionary unionism, through concerted militant confrontations with neo-liberal
hegemony, along with a fully worked-out vision for alternative economic and political policies,
is improbable in Tanzania, given the emasculation of the movement by the state for thirty years
following independence from Britain in 1961. Another option for the labour movement is to
embrace social movement unionism by going beyond the workplace to form strategic alliances
with other civil society organizations, thus creating a ‘historic bloc’ of oppositional groups in
Gramscian terms, capable of forming counter-hegemonic discourses and promulgating them
through institutions which determine the thinking and actions of individuals and groups within
society (Gramsci, 2011). This scenario has precedents in pre-colonial history (See chapter 3 for
details) but after becoming quasi-governmental organizations, as part of state-led development
policies in post-independence Tanzania, trade unions have formed few meaningful relationships
with other civil society organizations (See chapter 6 for details). Thus, while a shift to social
movement unionism has attractions for the labour movement its realization is problematic.

1.3 The Changing Development Context for Civil Society in Tanzania following the rise of Neo-liberalism

The change on the part of the Tanzanian government during the 1990s, manifested in its liberalization of the economy and adoption of multiparty liberal democracy after three decades of statist dirigisme, can best be understood through an examination of the rise to a hegemonic position of neo-liberalism globally, driven by powerful development actors and institutions, notably the IFIs. These institutions made the acceptance of neo-liberal policies, in return for provision of official development assistance and debt relief, difficult to avoid for an aid-dependent country such as Tanzania. These major policy shifts have led to civil society organizations facing a new set of circumstances involving an ideological and physical restructuring of their relationships with the state, private enterprise and supranational organizations.

Neo-liberalism can be defined as a ‘theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade (Harvey, 2009: 2). Neo-liberal policies rose to prominence in the early 1980s with the accession to political power of Thatcher (1979-1990) in Britain and Reagan (1980-1988) in the US and the increasing influence of Milton Friedman and the Chicago school of economists (Mirowski and Plehwe eds, 2009, Friedman, 1968, Friedman and Heller, 1969), advocating monetarist economic policies.

Neo-liberals mounted a concerted attack on pro-state positions throughout the 1980s, based on a distrust of the public sector and an emphasis on the negative effects the state was having on the development process (Little, 1982). According to neo-liberals, the fundamental problem with the public sector – which maintained an iron grip on development policies for three decades in Tanzania following independence - is the lack of institutional incentives to ensure that self-interested bureaucrats behave in ways that enhance the public good (Hayek, 1988). State control

2 See chapter 3 for details.
of the economy inevitably leads to rent seeking (Lal 1997, Kreuger 1974) and other forms of Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) behaviour (Bhagwati 1982). Bates (2005: 8) sums up this position in the context of Africa with the argument that ‘states distort incentives out of regard for their own needs and those of powerful interests in their own societies.’ Even where corruption is not a major problem, neo-liberals argue that public sector officials cannot know enough to predict markets and ‘pick winners’ (UNCTAD, 2007) and that informational asymmetry inevitably results since ‘the totality of resources that one could employ in such a plan is simply not knowable to anybody, and therefore can hardly be centrally controlled’ (Bauer, 1988: 85).

Neo-liberals argue that policy-making should be in the hands of independent institutions, such as central banks, staffed by well-trained technocrats (Easterly, 2002). The IFIs employ such technocrats and argue that they are thus able to put forward universally appropriate policies, signatories to which gain the confidence of domestic and foreign investors. In this way the IFIs assist in closing the ‘expertise gap’ in developing countries. In sum, the neo-liberal position is that, ‘independent domestic and international policy-making institutions ensure that governments pursue economic policies that promote long term economic development [and] prosperity’ (Chang and Grabel 2004: 48).

For neo-liberals, the market mechanism is posited as aligning self-interest with the social good (Myint, 1987). Thus, the optimal role of the state should be limited only to the provision of essential public goods – law and order, defence, education and possibly health; ‘beyond that, economic activities are best left to private agents’ (Lal, 1997: 225). These attacks on arguments in favour of a leading role for the state as an agent of development during the 1980s, led to Williamson (2000) devising a list of specific strategies in 1989 – the Washington Consensus - to overcome problems caused by the previous decade of ‘de-development in Latin America, which has become a neo-liberal template.
Figure 1.1 The Washington Consensus: Key Policy Reforms

(i) Fiscal discipline
(ii) Redirection of public expenditure priorities to areas offering high economic returns and potentially better income distribution, such as primary health care, primary education and infrastructure
(iii) Tax reform
(iv) Liberalization of interest rates
(v) Competitive exchange rates
(vi) Liberalization of trade
(vii) Liberalization of inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
(viii) Increased privatization
(ix) Deregulation (abolition of barriers such as quotas, tariffs and embargoes)
(x) Protection of property rights


The Washington Consensus influenced the content of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), which had been introduced in many developing countries from the early 1980s (Karcher, 2001). SAPs were introduced to remedy the perceived over-extension of the state in Africa and to stop private enterprise being crowded-out by the public sector. This was posited as creating the conditions for the (re)-establishment of ‘homo economicus’ (Bernstein, 2004) in Africa; workers driven by profit maximization and able to achieve this within the institutional conditions of assured property rights and allocatively efficient markets. Inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and international trade were strongly encouraged, while wages were to be set by the market mechanism.

Around the same time as Williamson’s work was published, the World Bank (1989) brought out a report (Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth) which cited the ‘crisis of governance’ as being a significant factor contributing to the hitherto disappointing results of SAPs. The report (1989: 5) emphasized that in Africa there was a need for ‘not just less government but better government – government that concentrates its efforts less on direct interventions and more on enabling others to be productive.’ This was a formative influence on
the 1990s move to a focus on ‘good governance’ in developing countries, in the form of improved public sector management, the creation of robust legal frameworks, increased accountability of public servants and better transparency of public administration, which has come to be accepted by the IFIs as the political remedy for development problems (Minogue, 2002). The attempts to engender neo-liberal economic policies based on private-sector growth along with multiparty liberal democracy in developing countries has been termed the ‘New Policy Agenda’ of the major Western multilateral and bilateral donors and involve a substantive role for civil society in coalescing and advocating the views of citizens. However, by the second half of the 1990s, growth outcomes for countries which had adopted both aspects of the New Policy Agenda were generally poor. Poverty reduction had not happened to any great extent if at all, the liberalization of domestic finance and international capital flows had been partly responsible for global crises, such as Asia in 1997 (Basu, 2006, Chang, 2005, Wade, 1998). Both market and institution failures had occurred in many of those that had applied Washington Consensus policies.

This led to a shift to a Post-Washington Consensus in the form of wider policy prescriptions based on trying to remedy market and institution failure. These changes have become the focus of a battle between orthodox policy makers (senior officials at the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO) and critics (Jomo and Fine eds, 2006, Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus eds, 2001), who want the abandonment of the model on the basis that its policy prescriptions are fundamentally flawed.

The World Bank, IMF and WTO want to build on what they consider to be the successes of ‘first-generation’ Washington Consensus policies and introduce ‘second-generation’ reforms, centring on increasing the efficiency and durability of institutions in the development process in a bid to reduce poverty and inequality (Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003, Kanbur, 1999, Burki and Perry, 1998). This has led to the World Bank broadening the range of its activities from the economic to the political, social and cultural spheres and promoting a stronger regulatory role for the state when pursuing market-oriented reforms. The stress is on a more accommodating

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3 Although the details of the New Policy Agenda vary from donor agency to another a key role is assigned to NGOs in the democratization process. NGOs are an integral part of a vibrant civil society and the promotion of pluralism (Hulme and Edwards, 1996). See chapters 3 and 5 in particular for details of the growing influence of NGOs on development policies in post-liberalization Tanzania.
‘knowledge bank’ (Kapur, 2006, Cohen and Laporte, 2004) advocating national ownership of policies based on the vigorous participation of civil society organizations in their formulation (Pincus and Winters, 2002).

The Post-Washington Consensus concentrates on four main aspects of the development process; addressing institution and market failure, promoting the information-theoretic paradigm, creating a new governance model and developing human and social capital. The latter two of these four elements have been particularly important in providing new opportunities for civil society organizations to contest national policy-making processes.

Regarding the first of these aspects, institution and market failure, the reaction to the lack of success of the original Washington Consensus led to the creation of an ‘augmented’ version based on broader and deeper institutional reform packages (Rodrik, 2006). The policies resulting from these reforms are empirically at odds with the historical experiences of developed countries, since they reflect their contemporary institutional structures and processes rather than those which pertained during the early stages of development. Overall, the ‘augmented’ version of the Washington Consensus is based on a lengthy, vague and technical set of policy prescriptions, which do not accommodate the historical specificity of development processes in individual countries and fail to recognise ‘that institutional reform is deeply political’ (Khan, 2002: 36).

Second, an information-theoretic ‘paradigm’ (Stiglitz (2010, 2002, 2000, 1999) has been devised, which concentrates on remedying problems caused by information asymmetries, whereby groups have varying access to market information and differing transaction costs across regions and countries. The state has been ‘allowed back in’ to remedy these market imperfections. Despite this enhanced role for the state, the information-theoretic paradigm remains – like the original Washington Consensus - based on methodological individualism,

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4 Rodrik’s (2006) ‘augmented’ Washington Consensus comprises corporate governance; anti-corruption; flexible labor markets; WTO agreements; financial codes and standards; ‘prudent’ capital-account opening; independent central banks/inflation targeting; social safety nets; targeted poverty reduction.


6 Advocates of the Post-Washington Consensus stress the need for detailed micro-economic analyses of information to be made available to those participating in the market, which will allow generalizations to be made.
where the focus of analysis is the rational behaviour of singular actors and the economy is posited as comprising no more than an aggregation of utility-maximising agents. There is no examination of how rules and institutions governing markets are created and change through contestations based on class or occupational interests involving levels of power which vary according to the particular development paths of individual countries. In sum, the information-theoretic paradigm is reductionist and based on an ahistorical view of the roles of regulations and institutions governing markets.  

The third key aspect of the Post-Washington Consensus, the new governance model advocated by the IFIs, focuses on developing partnerships between agents of development. This should involve the participation of as wide a variety of civil society organizations in policy discussions as possible, so that governments can be held to account for the progress of national development plans and citizens will feel a sense of ownership and thus be committed to their implementation. However, the ways in which the key issues of participation and ownership are conceptualized and measured by the IFIs are suffused with problems, which are examined in detail in Section 1.4 below.

The fourth distinctive aspect of the Post-Washington Consensus is its placing of greater emphasis on non-economic factors in development, particularly the roles of social and human capital, than was the case with the original Washington Consensus. Using social capital in the locus of civil society organizations to build trust and reciprocal relations in developing countries has become a major part of the donors’ development strategies from the middle of the 1990s, evidenced by the fact that the World Bank has developed an extensive website dedicated to the concept.

Strong social capital is regarded as fostering development but few policy prescriptions are provided in the Post-Washington Consensus literature as to how it can be inculcated. Phrases such as, ‘missing link’ (Schuurman, 2003, Grootaert, 1998) and ‘social glue’ (Narayan, 1999) are used to characterize social capital and to illustrate how the concept provides a complement to the

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economic policy prescriptions of the Post-Washington Consensus. Stress is put on the way building social capital through the work of civil society organizations can play a role in changing societies from ‘low-trust’ to ‘high-trust’ (Fukuyama, 1996). The definitions and views preferred by the World Bank on social capital, come from Coleman (1988) and Putnam (2003, 2000, 1993a, 1993b) and are rooted in a liberal theoretical framework. Coleman (1988) defines social capital as any social arrangement which allows individuals more readily to achieve their goals. In this conception social capital is potentially inherent in all social structures and should not be regarded as a dependent variable. Putnam’s (2003, 2000, 1993a, 1993b) work during the latter half of the 1990s has stimulated much research on how institutionalized forms of civil society can have an impact on increasing social capital, leading to greater trust and connectedness in societies, as well as the development of universal norms and networks. Putnam’s focus is on societal consensus, which can be achieved through the development of universal norms and his work lacks a systematic analysis of sources of conflict between classes, groups and individuals which are imbued with varying levels of power. The flaw in Putnam’s ‘pluralist heaven’ (Schattschneider, 1960) is the failure to address the issue that civil society often represents the interests of powerful classes and/or high income groups, which have the ability to set up organizations with considerable institutional and financial capacity. In contrast, the needs of poor and marginalized groups are downplayed or ignored because they are framed and articulated in loose and informal associational forms, which lack financial capacity and do not attract interest or funding from major donors.

The work of Bourdieu (1990), which stresses the way social capital leads to a reproduction of the dominance of an elite class, is cited rarely by the World Bank. Bourdieu (1990) defines social capital as non-economic processes of stratification by which classes demarcate themselves and reproduce and consolidate advantage. It is an important way by which culture and education are formed and become the preserve of a dominant class. This class and context-based analysis – which has parallels with the Gramscian perspective on civil society (examined in the following chapter) – has been disregarded in much of the literature on social capital and civil society. Bourdieu (1986) makes the point that levels of social capital are inextricably linked to the distribution of resource ownership, wealth, income and power in any society. These substantive factors are largely ignored in the arguments of Putnam, Coleman and other writers using a liberal
theoretical framework, which the World Bank endorses. From such a perspective, civil society is portrayed as a level playing field where a diverse range of associational groups compete freely to put forward the views of citizens.

A related problem, with many analyses of civil society organizations as vehicles for promoting social capital couched within a liberal framework, is the lack of a rigorous examination of what can, and what cannot, be classified as a ‘civil society organization.’ (See, for example, the failure to provide such an analysis in the work of Burawoy, 1996, Evans, 1996a, Evans, 1996b, Heller, 1996, Lam, 1996, Ostrom, 1996). This issue is examined in depth in the following chapter as it is important in regard to which associational groups are able – and which are unable – to insert themselves into national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania and why this should be the case.

This ‘rediscovery’ (Mamdani, 1996) by the IFIs and bilateral donor agencies of civil society organizations as vehicles to increase social capital and thus build trust is based on a narrow view of the range of associational life in developing countries. The IFIs argument that social capital is a valid and important concept because it addresses the ‘neglected’ role of civil society does not stand up to scrutiny. In fact, the literature on civil society is voluminous and covers the key arguments centred on social capital in a thoroughgoing way (See, for example, Howell and Lind, eds 2010, Armstrong et al, eds 2010, Cheema and Popovski, eds, 2010, Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor, eds, 2009, McKeon, 2009, OSSREA, 2009, Jobert and Kohler-Koch, eds, 2008, Edwards, 2004, Van Rooy, 2004, Chandhoke, 2003, Smillie, 2001 and the arguments in chapter 2 for details). 9

The Post-Washington Consensus stresses education as a means for development, focusing on ‘an uncritical faith in the notion of human capital’ (Rose, 2006: 162). Increasing human capital is justified by the World Bank in terms of its ability to raise the productivity of the poor (Rose, 2006, 2003, Becker, 1975). Rose (2003) argues that the emphasis on human capital as part of the Post-Washington Consensus is leading to the marketization and privatization of education, and to a World Bank and WTO-driven global education industry. Analyses based on calculating ‘Rates

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9 See also Fine (2010) on this point.
of Return to Education’ (RORE) are used to justify investment.

The emphasis on RORE has been criticized technically for using flawed data (Bennell, 1996) and conceptually for failing to examine adequately the moral and social impacts of education and not recognizing that education systems are the outcome of historically developed socio-economic practices that are particular to a country (Fine and Rose, 2001). The World Bank (2010c) claims that their approach has broadened in recent years. However, even in 2010, a major World Bank publication (Banerji et al. 2010: 1) outlines an interlinked conceptual framework for education, aimed at fostering economic growth, which focuses on ‘developing the technical, cognitive and behavioural skills conducive to high productivity [author’s emphasis] in the work environment.’ Thus, the Post-Washington Consensus perspective on education remains rooted in human capital theory, justified in terms of a ‘Rates of Return to Education’ framework of analysis.

Overall, the Post-Washington Consensus preserves much of the core elements of the Washington Consensus; a stress on getting the fundamentals of macroeconomic policies ‘right’, a concern with the stabilization of economies and the pre-eminence of the private sector in the development process. It remains economic-reductionist in that it fails examine the foundations upon which groups gain economic, political and social power, and how they maintain it. The core policies of the Post-Washington Consensus encompass the World Bank’s stress on the value of liberal democracy, good governance, education, high levels of social capital and civil society participation in policy debates leading to national ownership as key aspects of development processes. These policies have become largely add-ons to the original policies of the Washington Consensus. However, they do involve an enhanced role for civil society. The most important of these policies in this respect are the building of human and social capital (which draw significantly on an expanded role for civil society in development processes) and the good governance agenda, which focuses on bringing about greater levels of accountability and transparency in the political sphere. Incentives should be provided to act in the public good by minimizing information asymmetries in capitalist markets and increasing participation in - and ownership of – national policies, through the institutionalized means of civil society organizations.
1.4 Civil Society and the Stress on Participation and Ownership

Participation and ownership have become central to the donor discourse in post-liberalization Tanzania. How they are conceptualized and operationalized with regard to civil society organizations thus merits analysis. Summarized as the ‘buzzword of the 1990s’ (Cornwall and Pratt 2003: 1), participation is ‘the process by which stakeholders influence and share control over priority setting, policy-making, resource allocations, and/or program implementations’, according to the World Bank (2004b: 237). This definition links participation to the ‘good governance’ agenda in development with its emphasis on shared responsibility for project creation, implementation and evaluation between donors and participants with civil society expected to play a significant role.

Fundamentally participatory approaches are concerned with power and control over resources and life chances, whereby those with less power struggle to gain more control over their lives (Nelson and Wright, 1995). The concept has become imbued with various ideologies and meanings. Thus, any definition of participation should only be a base from which to explore the meanings attached to it in particular contexts, such as NGO and trade union participation in national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania, and how these are contested and deployed, leading to gains for some and losses for others.

Types and levels of participation in the development process vary markedly, from low-intensity forms, where the target group is provided with information about projects and programmes, to participation as self-mobilization on the part of the intended beneficiaries. A middle ground is commonly occupied, centred on participation-as-consultation, where intended beneficiaries have the opportunity to express their views to donors and other stakeholders, without guarantees or mechanisms to ensure that their perceived needs will be addressed substantively (Pretty, 1995).

The focus of participatory approaches has shifted since the 1980s when Robert Chambers (2008, 2007, 2005, 1999, 1997) was influential in getting actors and institutions to put the views of the poor to the forefront and to take a bottom-up approach to development processes. During the 1980s, ‘first-generation’ participatory approaches were mainstreamed mostly at the

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10 See also Leal (2007).
microeconomic level during the planning and implementation stages of development projects.

The creation of the Learning Group on Participation (LGP) at the World Bank in 1990 provided a fillip to advocates of participatory perspectives. The group produced three influential reports and published the Participation Sourcebook in 1995. The LGP’s 1994 report (World Bank, 1994) called for a new focus, whereby stakeholders in development projects and processes would be identified systematically and divided into two groups - primary (intended beneficiaries) and secondary, including a substantive role for civil society organizations which could show they had technical expertise and links to the primary stakeholders. With this increasing acceptance by mainstream development organizations, the use of participatory perspectives enlarged and spread from a few sectors and countries, with NGOs becoming champions of the approach.

As a result of this expanded vision for participation, ‘second generation’ concerns developed, based on the institutionalization of the concept, as the approach spread to development planning, policy research, monitoring and evaluation. Overall, the ‘participation in projects’ emphasis of the 1980s was challenged during the 1990s by a more radical concept of participatory development. For Chambers (1997) ‘they’ participate in our projects encapsulates the former position while ‘we’ participate in ‘their’ projects sums up the more radical alternative.

From 2000 onwards, ‘third generation’ issues have come to prominence, focusing on governance, ethics and power. The emphasis has changed to how to bring participatory approaches into the areas of governance and rights. The development of the ‘good governance’ agenda and the stress on the developmental benefits of an active civil society have led to a deeper analysis of participatory approaches both in theory and practice, including the emergence of a thoroughgoing critique of the concept (Cooke and Kothari, eds 2002, Mosse, 2002).

Participatory development has been questioned in two main ways. One critique centres on technical limitations concerning the formulation, application and analysis of participatory approaches (Anello, 2003, Anwar, 2003, Clemente, 2003, Malik, 2003, Swantz, 2003). A more radical attack focuses on theoretical, political and conceptual weaknesses and raises the possibility that participatory approaches per se may be the problem (Hickey and Mohan, 2005a and 2005b, Cooke and Kothari eds, 2002, Mosse, 2002).
Concerning the former, there is clearly a need for improvement in the application of participatory development approaches. As Drinkwater (2003: 62) puts it, while the ‘rhetoric of participatory practice abounds, laudatory practice is a great deal thinner.’ Participatory approaches have been denounced for being blind to context and thus mechanistic in their application (Datta, 2003, Mohan, 2002). Regarding the latter, participatory approaches have been criticized for becoming a ‘tyranny’ (Cooke and Kothari, 2002), leading to the exclusion of other development strategies which may be legitimate and effective. They have also been decried for adopting the neo-liberal discourse of individualism and consequently underplaying structural constraints which make groups unequal, which can work against the interests of the poor and marginalized when applied to development projects (Hildyard et al., 2002, Kohl, 2002). Thus, participatory approaches allow target groups to be involved in development processes only within a system where they are systematically disadvantaged, which inevitably maintains their subjugation (Hickey and Mohan, 2005a).

Hickey and Mohan, (2005a, 2005b) make the point that it is not enough to regard institutionalizing participation as expanding political democracy to include more people and places in shaping policy processes and institutions. There is also a need for participatory democracy in the economic sphere, which should lead to a fight for structural reforms. For participatory processes to have a significant impact, they should focus on bringing about long-term social, economic and institutional change. Participatory approaches need to systematically address power relations, which constrain access to resources and opportunities. How these power relations involving the major external donors, the state and civil society have been manifested in post-liberalization Tanzania, leading to the marginalization of trade unions and the dominance of a small group of NGOs, is analysed in chapters five, six and seven.

Along with participation, the IFIs stress that national ownership is the key to the success of national policies in developing countries (IMF, 2010, IDA and IMF, 2002). Fundamentally, ownership is based on the belief that local institutions must be run by locals, since if patterns of

11 Cornwall and Pratt (2003) outline the problem of ‘facipulating’ – the facilitating and manipulating by development professionals of the direction or conclusion of the analysis - after a ‘token’ (Mohan, 2002) participatory process has been utilised.
behaviour have altered only in response to a carrot or a stick, slippage will happen once the carrot or stick is removed (Thomas, 2004). The emphasis on ownership reflects a concern amongst IFI staff that policies, such as SAPs, failed, in no small measure because there was a lack of true national ownership of them on the part of recipient countries.

The rise to prominence of the concept of ownership may be traced back to a major IFI policy document by Johnson and Wasty in 1993, which emphasized the importance of ownership to the credibility of reform programmes, stating that there is a symbiotic relationship between the level of success of a programme outcome and the level of borrower ownership. They posit ownership as a four-dimensional independent variable and outline four levels for each dimension, creating the possibility of sixteen different ratings for reform operations. The four criteria are (i) locus of initiative, (ii) level of intellectual conviction among key policy makers, (iii) expression of political will by top leadership and (iv) efforts toward consensus-building among various constituencies. Applying this classification scheme to eighty one World Bank operations, Johnson and Wasty find a significant degree of positive correlation between programme success and levels of borrower ownership. However, following the publication of their work ownership was ignored in donor literature until the end of the 1990s when it was adopted by the IFIs as a key part of their New Policy Agenda and has since been portrayed largely as a ‘magic bullet’ to solve development problems.


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12 Johnson and Wasty (1993: 1) themselves trace the origin of the concept to the late 1980s when, in the first World Bank Report on Adjustment Lending, it was stated that “progress has been stronger where governments have “owned” the program and hence were committed to carrying it through.”

13 Subsequent attempts to draw up criteria with which to assess levels of ownership, notably Killick (1997) and the World Bank (2004a) have drawn on Johnson and Wasty’s classification scheme.
Radicals make the point that there is a need to address a fundamental contradiction concerning the way ownership is conceptualized and operationalized in national policy-making processes. Ownership is chosen as a concept by external donors which they claim is necessary if effective anti-poverty strategies are to be put in place. However, the concept has been introduced by the donors as *a priori* containing merits in terms of leading to the creation of effective national policies and the recipient countries have no chance to reject it as unsuitable for their particular political and socio-economic environment. They are not allowed to argue that ownership itself – which can only be achieved if civil society organizations play a significant role in national policy-making processes - is a concept being imposed on them by external actors which they reject as being inappropriate in a context-specific environment. Ownership can thus be regarded as a ‘super-conditionality’ (Weeks et al, 2002).

While the donors claim that an important criterion for assessing levels of ownership is the amount of participation of civil society organizations in national policy-making processes, detailed and accurate measurement of the concept has proved problematic. The quantitative measurement of independent variables as formulated by Johnson and Wasty (1993) has been accepted conceptually and developed by the World Bank (2004b). Giving summary answers to key questions in matrix form (Weeks et al, 2002 and Lerche, Pincus and Weeks, 2003) has been put forward as an alternative approach, providing qualitative data. However, since the formal inception of PRSPs in September 1999 - which is the policy most associated with transferring ownership to aid recipients (Weeks et al, 2002) - the World Bank has not used its own measurement of independent variables schema to assess levels of ownership or a matrix format. Instead they measure the concept by employing broad rankings (from 1-5) based on methods which lack rigour, transparency and consistency. In the case of Tanzania, the level of participation of civil society organizations, which contributes to the composite ownership score of between 1 and 5, is summarized in one or two sentences in World Bank/IMF Joint Staff Assessments, which are of such a general nature as to make meaningful analysis impossible.  

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14 The matrix has three dimensions; the range of owners, the stages of the project cycle and the type of aid instrument or modality used. The matrix (set out below in Figure 3.6) is used to summarize the activity assessment of the stakeholders during the various stages of the project cycle. The summaries can be updated as the process moves on, which takes account of its dynamic nature. No numeric values are used.

15 See chapter 7 for details.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
In order to achieve a Gramscian analysis of the reasons for the exclusion of trade unions from the reconfiguration of civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania and to highlight in contrast the leading role played by NGOs, it is necessary to analyze the theorization of civil society, the changing nature of development policies in Tanzania since the onset of colonialism, the historical role of trade unions and of NGOs and the way both groups have taken part in the PRSP process.

To this end, in chapter two the theorization of civil society is analysed, focusing on why liberal perspectives have taken precedence and how this dominance influences the way in which certain civil society organizations are included in national policy-making processes while others are marginalized or excluded. The key argument of the chapter is that a Gramscian perspective has been wrongly neglected, since it has greater explanatory power concerning the ways in which associational life is integrated into national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania than the prevailing liberal conception. A critical appropriation of a Gramscian theory of civil society is then used in the three fieldwork-based chapters (five, six and seven) to provide an understanding of the roles of trade unions and NGOs in national policy-making processes.

In chapter three the history of development policies in Tanzania is examined. An overview is given of developments in the political economy of Tanzania, starting with the period of German colonization, in order to bring out how this has substantively shaped the ways in which civil society organizations take part in national policy-making processes at present. The reasons for Tanzania moving from the left-wing populism of the Nyerere regime after independence in 1961 to accepting the main precepts of the IFI-driven liberalization policies from the latter half of the 1980s are outlined. It is argued that in order to maintain high levels of aid, the Tanzanian government has ceded a large measure of economic and political control to the IFIs. This in turn influences the way the government attempts to determine which civil society organizations participate in national policy-making processes, as well as which groups are excluded.

Chapter four contains an outline of the methodology used for the research, particularly focusing on issues concerning the fieldwork. Chapter five is based on an analysis of the NGO sector in
Tanzania. An assessment of the development of associational life in Tanzania under different periods - classified in terms of political economy - is undertaken, which shows the diverse nature of civil society in the country. The core arguments centre on why and how a small number of well-resourced, urban-based NGOs, staffed by highly-qualified individuals, have come to dominate civil society participation in national policy-making processes. The arguments draw substantively on fieldwork interviews, participant observation and document analysis, focusing on two main areas: the priorities of NGOs in discourses and their relationships with other important development actors.

The main arguments in chapter five are linked to the assessments in chapter six of the role of trade unions in post-liberalization Tanzania. The analysis in this chapter focuses on how and why trade unions have been marginalized as civil society organizations in contrast to the dominant position of NGOs. An overview of the theorization of trade unions is set out. This is followed by an outline of the labour aristocracy debate, which provides the basis for an examination of whether trade unions in Tanzania can be regarded as representing only a small number of relatively privileged wage labourers within the formal sector of the economy. Key aspects of the history of the labour movement in Tanzania are examined. These elements are linked to the fieldwork section. The fieldwork findings reveal three key problems for trade unions; lack of legitimacy, lack of capacity and lack of an ideological vision on the part of the leaders to drive the movement forward. As with NGOs, the fieldwork analysis of trade unions centres on the issues of their priorities in discourses and relationships with other key actors.

Chapter seven takes the PRSP process as a case study which provides a window on the broader processes concerning the participation of civil society organizations as development actors in post-liberalization Tanzania. Drawing on fieldwork findings, the analysis focuses in detail on the processes and ideologies through which a group of elite, urban NGOs, which dominate civil society participation in post-liberalization national policy-making processes, have been able to occupy strategic nodes within the PRSP matrix, while trade unions have been marginalized.

In chapter eight conclusions are drawn from the analysis in the preceding sections, focusing on the point that the contrasting positions of trade unions and NGOs in post-liberalization national
policy-making processes in Tanzania has been shaped by the development of the country into one which embraces a plethora of donor-led programmes employing similar terms as objectives and justifications, as well as de-politicised policies which are articulated through technicist procedures, such as Logical Framework Analysis (LFA). A small group of NGOs, well-funded by foreign donors have the resources and the staff familiar with such procedures and policies to engage in national policy-making processes on these terms. Trade unions, however, lack knowledge of them, as well as resources, and tend to discuss development issues in overtly political terms, which leads to them being marginalized or excluded. Conceptually, the ways in which trade unions and NGOs are integrated into the process can be explained more fully by using Gramscian perspectives on civil society than by employing the dominant liberal conception, favoured by the donors. The latter is based on the view that the various strands of civil society are taking part in post-liberalization national policy-making processes on an equal footing. The Gramscian perspective reveals that the civil society sphere is a ‘public room’ where ideological hegemony is contested and very different levels of power and influence on the part of associational groups are both sourced and realized. A minority of civil society groups have contested hegemonic discourses, rather than accepting them as being apolitical and in the best interests of all, as is portrayed by the donors. However, these counter-hegemonic discourses are not currently leading to significant challenges to the current economic and political orthodoxy or to substantive grassroots campaigns.

1.6 Summary

The central planks of post-liberalization policy processes in Tanzania - greater participation on the part of the wider population within the institutionalized setting of civil society organizations in forming national policies, leading to their ownership – have clearly emerged from the change of ideological emphasis within the IFIs and the major bilateral donors. The state-civil society-policy matrix is mutually constituted (Gramsci, 2011). With the adoption of multi-party liberal democracy and neo-liberal economic policies on the part of the Tanzanian state during the 1990s, changes in its policy orientation at national level have impacted substantively on the position of civil society. The role of civil society organizations in post-liberalization national policy-making processes in Tanzania is therefore of importance. Fine, (2006, 2001), Harriss, (2006), Van Waeyenberge (2006) and Standing (2000), are among analysts who point out that taken overall
the Post-Washington Consensus underplays notions of class, power, conflict and development as a contradictory process involving major social and economic transformation. However, new policy spaces have been opened up through the focus on the four aspects of the development process outlined in this chapter which mark out the Post-Washington Consensus and these changes have given oppositional civil society organizations opportunities to contest the hegemony of neo-liberalism and their own marginalization. Civil society in Tanzania is, in the post-liberalization era, a sphere of confrontation concerning which groups should - and which should not – be classed as ‘civil society organizations’ and included in national policy-making processes by the government, as well as supported by external donors. Civil society organizations with sufficient technical and institutional capacity, allied to a concerted ideological vision, have the opportunity to participate in national policy-making processes in ways that may force governments to confront substantive issues, such as protection of local economies from foreign competition, arguing that failure to do so will result in a lack of national ownership, since these are issues which citizens have evinced as being of vital importance to their lives. An analysis of how successfully trade unions and NGOs are able to insert themselves and their visions into the new policy spaces that have opened up provides a way to examine the limits of the IFIs’ Post-Washington Consensus rhetoric, espousing openness to economic and political heterodoxy if a sufficient level of participation by civil society leading to ownership of national policies, has been demonstrated. The way in which the theorization of civil society in the post-liberalization period has become dominated by a liberal framework and conception, driven by the IFIs, is analyzed in chapter two. The point that the liberal conception posits an erroneous view of civil society as a sphere where in a multi-party liberal democracy, a plurality of associational groups compete consensually and equally to represent the views of citizens, is highlighted. Trade unions and NGOs in post-liberalization Tanzania do not participate in national policy-making processes on an equal basis and a Gramscian perspective, emphasizing how hegemony is continually resisted, modified and challenged – as well as accepted - by different civil society organizations, despite pervasive structural inequalities in the sector, is shown to have greater explanatory power than the liberal perspective.
**Figure 1.2   Tanzania: Basic Indicators**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Demography</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Area</td>
<td>883,749 sq. km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>41,892,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth rate</td>
<td>2.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban growth</td>
<td>4.2% (annual rate of change 2005 – 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Fertility Rate</td>
<td>4.31</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>$57.89 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (PPP)</td>
<td>$1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth rate</td>
<td>4.9% (2009 figure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture as a share of GDP</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry as a share of GDP</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>50.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation rate</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
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<tr>
<td>Literacy rate (total population)</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate (females)</td>
<td>62.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate (males)</td>
<td>77.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary level enrolment rate</td>
<td>99.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population with at least secondary education</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary level enrolment rate</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure on education as a share of GDP</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health</th>
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<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy at birth (total population)</td>
<td>52.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy at birth (females)</td>
<td>54.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy at birth (males)</td>
<td>50.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate</td>
<td>67 (per 100,000 live births)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 5 Mortality Rate</td>
<td>104 (per 100,000 live births)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure on health as a share of GDP</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
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Figure 1.3  Tanzania: Political Map
Chapter 2
Theoretical Approaches to Civil Society

2.1 Introduction
In this chapter an analysis is made of theoretical approaches to civil society, contrasting the liberal view, influenced by the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, which dominates the thinking of the main donors driving the New Policy Agenda, with counter hegemonic views, focusing in particular on the arguments of Gramsci. The following section outlines the rise to prominence of the civil society sector as a driver of development, which became a significant part of the New Policy Agenda during the 1990s, bearing in mind Khilnani’s (2003: 17) point that the ‘rediscoveries of the idea of civil society obscure its historical depth.’ The prevailing liberal view of the role of civil society is then discussed, highlighting important weaknesses. Counter hegemonic views are subsequently examined, centring on the Gramscian perspective, which has a considerable amount of explanatory power concerning the position of civil society organizations in post-liberalization Tanzania. An evaluation is then made of why NGOs in particular have risen to power as civil society actors in development processes. The conclusion outlines both the partial reading and misreading of de Tocqueville’s work by donors involved in promoting the New Policy Agenda, as well as its weaknesses, and summarizes the strengths of a Gramscian approach to understanding the position of the civil society sector in post-liberalization Tanzania.
2.2 The Rise to Prominence of Civil Society in the Development Discourse

The main driving force behind the New Policy Agenda, the World Bank (2010a), defines civil society:

‘the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide array of organizations (NGOs), labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations and foundations.’

The World Bank uses the term ‘civic engagement’ rather than ‘civil society,’ in order to include the actions of informal associations as well as the activities and roles of formally-constituted civil society organizations.

A huge body of work has appeared during the 1990s on civil society and its relationship to development but, as Howell and Pearce (2002: 17) point out, it ‘has not always helped to clarify why civil society should be considered essential to development processes in the South.’

16 Edwards (2004: vi) concurs in stating that civil society has been ‘used to justify radically different ideological agendas, supported by deeply ambiguous evidence, and suffused with many questionable assumptions.’ This assessment resonates with Allen’s (1997: 329) view of the concept in the African context as ‘diffuse, hard to define, empirically imprecise and ideologically laden.’

There are several reasons for the rise of arguments in favour of civil society as a vehicle for development. First, the perceived failure of previous development models – state-led development up to the end of the 1970s and market-led progress during the 1980s - stimulated an interest in civil society as the base of an alternative. Second, global political events in the 1990s,

notably the demise of communism in Eastern Europe and the move towards liberal democracy in Africa and Latin America, focused attention on civil society as a counterweight to an overbearing state and as a means to put pressure on undemocratic governments. Third, the ‘rolling back of the state’ under the sway of neo-liberal economic ideas, led to the view that civil society organizations were necessary in developing countries to fill the ensuing democratic deficit by providing services in the social development arena (Lewis, 2002c).

### 2.3 Key Civil Society Strands

The concept of a ‘sphere of action’ is commonly used to delineate the arena in which civil society operates. To illustrate this, overlapping circles of the same size, representing state, market and civil society are often drawn up indicating similar levels of power, which is usually misleading. In most cases, the state and the market (particularly since the rise of neo-liberalism) have considerably more power than civil society and therefore the overlapping circles should be sized to reflect this (Van Rooy, 2004, Chandhoke, 2003, Smillie, 2001).

Edwards (2004), goes beyond the ‘sphere of action’ conception in outlining three separate but mutually supportive strands in the literature regarding the goals, visions and functions of civil society. First, a body of writing equates civil society with associational life, based around forming non-profit making organizations and stressing the importance of voluntary action. Second, an element focuses on civil society in normative terms, as promoting the ‘good society’, with an emphasis on creating shared values, strategies and joint action to bring about desirable outcomes, such as poverty reduction. A third thread in the literature centres on civil society in the public sphere, promoting access to, and independence for, structures of communication and ways to extend public deliberation. Edwards (ibid) emphasizes the importance of the division between those who see civil society as an independent variable and thus stress the need to build it directly, as is the case with the donors driving the New Policy Agenda, and those who see it as a by-product of other forces and try to manipulate them to build the best overall civil society.
2.4 The Prevailing Paradigm: the Liberal Conception of the Role of Civil Society in Development Processes

Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), the French observer of US democracy, described the associational world in which people decide their wants and needs and ask for them through associations. De Tocqueville’s ideas have been revived by important advocates of the Post-Washington Consensus and have been influential in the debate on donor ideas regarding ways in which mass participation should be institutionalised within post-liberalization Tanzania. For the major donors, civil society is vital in fostering their key development ideas. The UNDP (2010), for example, states that ‘engagement with civil society is critical to national ownership, accountability, good governance, decentralization, democratization of development co-operation and the quantity and relevance of official development programmes.’ This ‘prescriptive universalism’ (Lewis, 2002a) regarding civil society as a vehicle for development has received support from analysts focusing on Africa. Ndewga (1996) and Harbeson (1994), for instance, argue that civil society in Africa is beneficial to development and should be strengthened as a matter of priority.

For de Tocqueville (1845a, 1845b), associations are schools of democracy where open-minded attitudes and behaviour are learned and exercised to protect the rights of individuals. This resonates with the arguments put forward in the seventeenth century by John Locke on civil society (Locke, 1986, Dunn, 2003, Wiarda, 2003, Hardt and Negri, 2000). Associations should be constructed voluntarily at local, regional and national levels. Participation in such associations will lead to the inculcation of important civic virtues, such as tolerance and honesty, which will assist people in being able to put the interests of the group above that of the individual. The building of these civic virtues moderates public opinion and increases levels of trust and confidence in society. The resulting vibrancy of a many layered civil society becomes important in restricting over-weaning power on the part of the state or any other particular group.

De Tocquevillian ideas have been promoted by the World Bank, which provides many sources citing his arguments relating to civil society, on its website. See, for example, Comstock-Gay and Goldman (2008), Chase and Woolcock (2005), McNeil (2002), Brown and Uslaner (2002), Parkison (2001), Satola (1997) and Foley and Edwards (1996). A number of these (McNeil, 2002
and Foley and Edwards, 1996, for example) emphasize the importance of de Tocqueville’s views on civil society to current development processes by starting with a direct quote from his work. Moreover, when advocating a leading role for civil society in development, senior World Bank figures have stressed the importance of de Tocqueville’s ideas. Former President, Paul Wolfowitz, cites de Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* as one of the first books written about a developing country and ‘I still think … one of the best.’ (Wolfowitz, 2006: 5). In outlining how de Tocqueville valued civil society and the impressive nature of associational life in America, which strengthened the development process, Wolfowitz goes as far as conceptualizing civil society as the ‘building block’ of US democracy (Wolfowitz, 2005).

A reading of de Tocqueville’s arguments concerning civil society reveals two central points about the way they are being used by organizations involved in trying to engender participation and ownership as part of the New Policy Agenda. First, the interpretation of de Tocqueville’s ideas is based on a partial reading of his work, which misses important elements of the main arguments. Second, there is a lack of engagement with the fact that the ideas put forward by de Tocqueville relate to the very different circumstances pertaining to associational life in nineteenth century America compared to those which exist in contemporary Africa.

With regard to the former point, de Tocqueville (1845b: 106) was impressed by the way ‘Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations’ and admired ‘the extreme skill with which the inhabitants of the United States succeed in proposing a common object for the exertions of a great many men and in inducing them voluntarily to pursue it’ (ibid). For de Tocqueville, when people are allowed to meet freely for all purposes they regard associations as a universal and the sole means to achieve goals. Consequently, the ‘art of association … becomes … the mother of action, studies and applied by all’ (de Tocqueville 1845b: 117). However, he also recognized the temporal and spatial specificity of the nature of associational life in the United States, pointing out that the right to association is deeply ingrained as it ‘has always existed in America’, so that ‘the exercise of this privilege is now incorporated with the manners and customs of the people’ (de Tocqueville 1845b: 194). This argument implies the need to examine the particular historical processes that have shaped the development of associational life on a case by case basis. Moreover, de Tocqueville drew a
distinction between associational life in Europe and America, which resonates with current debates about the nature of civil society in Africa. In Europe associations were always to be ‘tried in conflict’ (de Tocqueville 1845a: 196), used to ‘march against the enemy’ (ibid) and their object ‘is not to convince but to fight’ (de Tocqueville 1845a: 197). Contrastingly, since in America ‘the differences of opinion are mere differences of hue, the right of association may remain unrestrained without evil consequences’ (ibid). The conception of civil society as put forward by the donors driving the New Policy Agenda corresponds with the American model, as set out by de Tocqueville, while the ‘European tradition’ of civil society as an arena for conflict and contestation between civil society organizations themselves and between civil society organizations and the state over policy, is neglected.

De Tocqueville (1845b: 112) argued that civic associations ‘will advance in number as men become more equal.’ This claim raises a contradiction with regard to the economic policies donors are propounding and their view of the nature of associational life. Since the gap between rich and poor in Tanzania is at present wide under donor driven, neo-liberal policies, then, according to a de Tocquevillian analysis, associational life will not grow. Development indicators produced by the World Bank (World Bank, 2009b) show that the highest earning 20% of the people in Tanzania have a 42.3% share of total income or consumption. The equivalent figure for the highest 10% of income earners is 27.0%, which is large compared to 6.6% in Ethiopia, 13.6% in Kenya, 14.1% in Ghana and 16.6% in Uganda (World Bank, 2009b).

These figures are problematic for the donors, particularly given Tanzania’s heavy reliance on foreign aid (see chapter 3). According to de Tocqueville, growing equality in society is needed for associational life to develop. In Tanzania the substantial share of total national income held by the highest 10% and 20% of earners (World Bank, 2009b), as well as the multi-ethnic composition of the population make it unlikely that differences of opinion between individuals and groups will be merely ‘of hue’. There is, thus, at best a failure to engage with important aspects of de Tocqueville’s ideas concerning civil society on the part of the main donors

17 Tanzania has 120 mega-ethnic groups, excluding minority groups from Asia and Europe, according to government figures - [http://www.tanzania.go.tz/culture.html#Habitation](http://www.tanzania.go.tz/culture.html#Habitation)
promoting the New Policy Agenda and, at worst, an ideological selectiveness on their part in order to provide support for a liberal theoretical framework.

In addition, the IFIs stress the need for complete freedom of association in recipient countries. However, de Tocqueville did ‘not think that a nation is always at liberty to invest its citizens with an absolute right of association … and I doubt whether, in any country or in any age, it is wise to set no limits to freedom of association.’ (de Tocqueville 1845b: 119). For de Tocqueville, at times the right of association has to be ‘confined within narrow limits’ (ibid). De Tocqueville never ‘tried to draw exactly the boundaries between political and social control … and the area in which the individual should be free to act of his own volition’ (Lively, 1961: 10-11). Moreover, he recognized the need for free association and action to be shaped according to the particular needs of societies and admitted that the precise application of association and action ‘must vary with circumstances’ (Lively, 1961: 11).

Donors have drawn heavily on de Tocqueville’s views in stressing the importance of mass participation by citizens, coordinated through civil society organizations, in post-liberalization national policy-making processes. This perspective is premised on the view that only where there is a democratic state in which participation by citizens in political life is valued, will civil society develop and be supportive of democracy. In short, a democratic state is required to create a democratic civil society, which in turn is necessary to sustain the state in that form (Walzer, 2003). ‘This virtuous circle is at the heart of the democratic case for civil society on the neo-Tocquevillian model’ (Goodhart, 2005: 7).

The way this form of associational life is being engendered by donor influence on post-liberalization national policy-making processes prioritizes the role of NGOs and marginalizes many other manifestations of civil society in Tanzania. It also fails to adequately account for the way civil society acts as a ‘public room’ where ideological hegemony is contested, which is a central theme of the neglected perspectives of Gramsci (2011a, 2011b, 1994, 1977).

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18 See chapter 5 for a comparison of the roles of NGOs with other types of associational life and chapter 6 concerning the work of trade unions.
2.5 Countervailing Views to the Liberal Conception of the Role of Civil Society in Development Processes: the Gramscian Perspective

In the nineteenth century Hegel made a pivotal contribution to the debate on civil society, conceptualizing the sphere as being distinct from the state and the family. For Hegel, civil society is not a natural condition of freedom but a historically produced sphere of life, arising from a multi-dimensional process. Civil society is posited as a contradictory combination of forces, involving confrontation between classes and groups themselves as well as continuous conflict between groups and classes and the state (Hegel, 2003). Civil society movements cannot be idealised but demand individual empirical examination as they contain discrepant possibilities.

Hegel idealised the (Prussian) state, positing it as the embodiment of universal interest and arguing that through strong law-governed rule the particular interests of civil society organizations are regulated in the interests of all the good of the whole society. ‘In contrast with the spheres of … the family and civil society, the state [is] … an external necessity and their higher authority; its nature is such that their laws and interests are subordinate to it and dependent on it’ (Hegel, 2003: 95). While de Tocqueville (1845a, 1845b) saw order emerging from unfettered individualism in the economic and political arenas and free competition between civil society groups, Hegel felt that the wants of individuals and civil society groups in such a system would inevitably be unequally fulfilled because of vast existing inequalities.

Hegel argued that the development of a capitalist mode of production leads to the atomization of individual commercial interests and deepening inequality. People increasingly leave the family (which has provided them with moral cohesion) early to work in the capitalist system, where they meet a large number of individuals who are pursuing diverse interests. Civil society in such a system is both the problem, since it is the institutional embodiment of particular interest groups, and also the solution, as it fosters social integration. With strong state oversight based on laws and bureaucratic controls, universality ‘can be developed through civil society, despite the atomizing potential of the commercial self-interest that shapes it’ (Howell and Pearce, 2002: 23).
Marx challenged Hegel’s idealization of the state (Marx, 1970b), arguing that

‘contradictions within civil society are reproduced within the state, at the same time the state reinforces certain interests in civil society and undermines others. Civil society is not just external to the state, rather various and even contradictory groups in civil society differentially penetrate the state’ (Mamdani, 1992:17).

The state does not confront civil society externally but is an arena of struggle for forces whose springboard is civil society.

For Marx, as with Hegel, civil society is a historically contingent and not a universal concept. Within a capitalist mode of production, civil society is bourgeois society. Pre-capitalist forms of civil society, such as guilds and estates, had a political spirit, which the onset of capitalism broke down, leaving individuals to participate in civil society based on self-interest rather than social or political functions. In a capitalist system individuals treat others as a means to an end based on the dominance of market forces (Marx, 1971). Civil society thus becomes an expression of the separation of individuals from themselves, from others and from their communities. It is ‘the chief source of human alienation’ (Femia, 2001: 136).

Marx rejected claims for the integrative power of the state and argued that unequal and self-interested relationships permeate all its aspects under capitalism, a system which also led to ‘the dissolution of civil society into independent individuals whose relations are regulated by law’ (Marx, 1971: 29). Moreover, ‘egoistic man is the passive, given result of the dissolution of society’ (Marx, 1971: 30). In sum, under a capitalist system, civil society is inextricably bound up with commercial and industrial life where the market economy reduces people to self-centred acquisitors, who relate to each other in contractual and instrumental terms. This leads to the unavoidable atomization of civil society which must, along with political society, therefore be dissolved.

Gramsci goes beyond the classical Marxist conception of civil society, arguing that exploitative capitalist relations are ‘underpinned by a complex of moral injunctions that make these relations
seem right and proper to all parties in the exchange’ (Femia, 2001:139). People define their interests in terms of their own ideas and values, which imbues them with meaning. These might be false, class-biased and may mystify and cloud relations but we can ‘never detach ourselves from some moral perspective or other’ (ibid). This view forms the basis of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony – how a set of ideas put forward by a ruling class become entrenched and explanation as to why capitalism survives even when the objective conditions for a transition to communism are prevalent.19 The concept is based on an analysis of how specific modalities and apparatuses of power work on subjects with particular social identities and material interests. The focus is on the nature of power in modern capitalist social formations where mass politics have developed (Sum, 2003).

Gramsci moves away from an institutionalist, juridico-political and state-centric account of the exercise of power to examine discourse and discursive formations and the articulation of power and knowledge.20 He focuses on how hegemony is created through a multi-faceted dialectical relationship between consent and coercion. Moreover, Gramsci deepened the debate on civil society by analysing the embedding and embodying of power in everyday routines and the role in this of specific institutions and apparatuses. For Gramsci (2011b), it is important for subaltern classes to engage in a war of position in the civil society sphere by challenging the intellectual and moral leadership of the ruling class, which creates its hegemony. Gramsci envisaged the war of position as a process by which subaltern classes would continually confront the norms and values of the ruling class and exercise their own moral and intellectual leadership. In this way the consented coercion through which the ruling class maintains power can be stripped away and its values and norms exposed as bolstering a system in which only the minority holding power benefit, rather than representing universality or common sense (Gramsci, 2011b) These important facets of uses of power are not examined within a liberal perspective. Thus, it is only by employing a Gramscian perspective that a nuanced understanding can be achieved of how certain NGOs have used everyday routines embodying power to embed dominance of civil society input to national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania, while trade unions engage in routines which do not embody and embed power and are thus marginalized.

19 See chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion of Gramsci’s use of the concept of hegemony
20 See Gramsci (2001a) for a discussion of the juridical power of the state.
For Gramsci, in line with Marx, the base of society is made up of the prevailing mode of production and it has a dialectical relationship with the superstructure, although the latter is ultimately an expression of the former. However, while Marx (1970a) delineated the superstructure as comprising key societal arrangements which cement its organisation in the spheres of politics, law, religion, morality, ideology and traditions, Gramsci focused on a key division within the concept. For Gramsci, the superstructure exists at two levels; civil society, which is ‘the ensemble of organisms commonly called “private”’ (Gramsci, 1994: 12) and political society or the state. A balance occurs between direct domination by the state through juridical government and civil society, where there is the ‘hegemony of a social group over the entire national society, exercised through the so-called private organizations, such as the Church, the unions, the schools’ (Gramsci, 1994: 67). Civil society also comprises political parties, the press, publishers and voluntary associations and disseminates the ideology of the dominant class, ensuring its ‘cultural hegemony’ (Gramsci, 2011b: 20), so that subordinate classes consent to their own subordination. It is in the ‘private realm that ruling values seem most natural and therefore unchangeable’ (Jones, 2006: 32). The coercive power of the state is used to enforce discipline when spontaneous consent based on hegemony fails. The multifarious combination of dictatorship with hegemony comprises the ‘integral state,’ formally defined by Gramsci (1978: 263) as ‘political society + civil society, in other words, hegemony protected by the armour of coercion.’

Gramsci (1977: 235) argued that in modern societies, civil society had become a complex structure and is resistant to economic shocks, such as depressions. The power of civil society organizations can be significant and lead to associational groups gradually taking over so many societal functions that there is a ‘withering of the state’. In this view, the state becomes a watchdog in a ‘regulated society’, while still at times acting as a coercive organization when facing particular challenges to its authority. As the growth of civil society continues the state gradually reduces its authoritarian and coercive interventions.

For Gramsci, hegemony in relation to civil society is a vital area of study. Gramsci emphasised the potentially oppositional role of civil society as a ‘public room’ separate from the state and market where hegemony is contested. Civil society contains numerous organizations and
ideologies which both challenge and uphold the existing order. The cultural hegemony of the ruling classes and societal consensus is, thus, formed within civil society. The Gramscian perspective, therefore, accommodates the probability that some civil society groups will challenge hegemony within the existing structure of the political process and others will disengage and work underground to produce anti-hegemonic discourses. Moreover, a Gramscian perspective accommodates the conflictual nature of relationships between civil society organizations, which is not the case with the dominant liberal view. For Gramsci, ‘there are other forms of oppression in civil society which are different from the exploitation of labour by capital. There are local, regional, racial, bureaucratic and other forms of domination in which a certain power is exercised and is given a material form in organisations and institutions of one kind or another’ Simon (1982: 73).

For the donors involved in post-liberalization national policy-making processes, this is a largely undesired version of civil society, since they wish to maintain the perceived dominance of Western economic and cultural institutions and modus operandi. They do not want to embrace a Gramscian view of civil society - based on a struggle for power, influence and resources – but instead put forward a consensual perspective (pace de Tocqueville) where a variety of associational groups debate and advocate policies and programmes in an amicable and tolerant way. Gramsci posits a dichotomy between institutions and ideology within the realm of the superstructure, arguing that subordinated classes should prioritise institutional organization over ideology in the struggle for hegemony. Crucially, to achieve hegemony a civil society group must ‘present its own aims as realizing the universal aims of the community’ (Laclau, 2000: 50).

In accordance with orthodox Marxist views, Gramsci (2011b) contends that a universalistic class must emerge from civil society and not from a separate sphere above, as Hegel (2003) argued. However, Gramsci diverges from orthodox Marxism in arguing that ‘the only universality that society can achieve is a hegemonic universality – a universality contaminated by particularity’ (Laclau, 2000: 51). In contrast, orthodox Marxists argue that universality will occur through the subordinated class becoming fully aware of its exploitation and taking revolutionary action. Gramsci therefore shows that civil society is of great importance since ‘universal emancipation is achieved only through transient identification with the aims of a particular social sector …
requiring political mediation and relations of representation’ (ibid). For Laclau (2000) the rise of global neo-liberalism - predicated on a minimal role for the state and the increasing power of the IFIs and other supranational organizations – means that decision-making processes must be examined in terms which go beyond focusing on designations such as class or ethnicity. Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is thus useful since it stresses the importance of examining the formal determination of spaces in which groups and collective wills compete.

2.6 The Rise of NGOs as Key Civil Society Actors in Development Processes

Despite the diversity of associational life recognized by the World Bank (see section 2.2 above) it is evident that NGOs are regarded by the donors and national governments as the most important civil society actors taking part in post-liberalization national policy-making processes. There was a huge rise in the number, size and level of activity of development-based NGOs during the 1980s and the 1990s and their role has become increasingly important in developing countries. This is indeed the case in the context of Africa, where associational life is rich and varied, but the IFIs and other major bilateral donors concentrate funding and capacity building on formally constituted NGOs. This narrow donor driven vision of civil society is a continuation of a trend starting with the ascendancy of neo-liberalism, leading to the ‘emergence of NGOs floating above … primary associations and GROs. These spoke the language of the donors and tapped into their resource base.’ (Nugent 2004: 384).

Desai (2002: 495) defines NGOs as ‘autonomous, non-membership, relatively permanent or institutionalized, non-profit … intermediary organizations, staffed by professionals or the educated elite, which work with grassroots organizations in a supportive capacity.’ However, as NGOs have risen in number and importance, definitions have become increasingly blurred and caught up in analytical, normative and political notions of development. There are attempts to

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22 African states have also been involved in the formation of NGOs and in stimulating the activities of existing organizations. For example, Thomas (1987) outlines how increasing activity on the part of the ‘Harambee (‘all pull together’) movement’ in Kenya has provided a useful way of mobilizing local resources for the benefit of communities through events to generate funds and raise awareness of self-help strategies. Encouraged by Kenyatta after independence, Harambee was regarded as a way of bringing communities closer through working together on development projects. The government provides start-up funds for these activities (See also Widner, 1992).
define NGOs according to their origins, functions, ownership, approach and scale of operations. There are also definitions of NGOs based on exclusion as much as inclusion. Fowler (1997), for example, has provided acronyms for the many types of organizations which are registered as NGOs but operate in a variety of self-interested ways.

Setting boundaries when defining NGOs is problematic. There are debates, for example, as to whether business-sponsored research organizations should be classed as NGOs. In analytical terms they may merit such a definition, but from a normative perspective - which equates these organizations with acting in benign ways to bring about progress in society - defining them as NGOs can be contested. Some writers (Stewart, 1997, Blair, 1997, Uphoff, 1996) regard NGOs as being essentially market-driven organizations, which do not comprise a ‘third sector’ that can be located as a separate entity from the state and the market. A further complicating factor concerns the ‘growing tendency for people to move back and forth between NGOs, government and … business’ (Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin, 2008: 6). Thus, there is a problem with identifying what are, and what are not, NGOs in a tight and analytically rigorous way.

Hilhorst (2003: 7) attempts to overcome this problem by conceiving of the term ‘NGO’ as a ‘claim-bearing label.’ NGOs claim to be ‘doing good for the development of others’ and Hilhorst (2003) argues that through ‘everyday politics’ such organizations struggle to achieve legitimacy for this assertion. An analysis of NGO attempts to attain legitimacy encompasses the self-referrals of organizations, which definitions imposing boundaries cut across. This is a useful conceptualization in the context of this research, since in interviews with officials from NGOs themselves and with trade unionists the question of the legitimacy of NGOs was a recurrent theme.

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23 First to fourth generation NGOs have been identified by Korten (1990), for example.
24 A division is often made between advocacy-based NGOs and service-delivery NGOs, though this has lost much of its meaning as many NGOs engage in both types of work. See Goodhand (2006) and the discussion below in this chapter.
26 Petras and Veltmeyer (2001), for example, categorize the majority of NGOs as a neo-comprador group which accepts the main precepts of neo-liberalism. A minority of NGOs take a different approach in confronting neo-liberalism and imperialism
27 NGO operations vary from small grassroots-based projects to the large-scale international work of Big International NGOs (BINGOs), such as Oxfam.
There are several important reasons for the increase in the importance of NGOs in development processes. First, during the 1980s - when neo-liberals were promoting the work of de Tocqueville - many development practitioners, driven to a large extent by disenchantment with the inability of the state to address issues of poverty and inequality, were putting their case for NGOs to be the leading civil society actors, and to play a primary role in alternative, bottom-up, participatory approaches to development (see chapter 1). A notable example, at the end of the decade, was Edwards (1989), who, in ‘The Irrelevance of Development Studies’ stated that participatory approaches to development must be adopted. These should be put into practice by NGOs, since they have greater command of the necessary skills and attitudes necessary to do so than states and international organizations. For Edwards (1989: 132), NGOs are ‘better at listening and learning than either government or multilateral agencies.’ Therefore development-based NGOs grew in significance from the 1980s, partly on the back of the perception promulgated by practitioners that they demonstrate flexibility, openness to innovation and the ability to reach the poor through work at the grassroots level and by extension that they have the capability to lead an alternative vision of development to both the prevailing neo-liberal paradigm and state-led models.

Wider political and economic forces also played a role in bringing about the current importance of NGOs in development. With the demise of many authoritarian regimes in Europe at the end of the 1980s, NGOs came to be seen as a vehicle to stimulate self-reliance among citizens in the newly emerging liberal democracies, thereby weaning them away from the nanny-state (Jenei and Kuti, 2008, Osborne et al, 2005, Toepler and Salamon, 2003). In this way NGOs became part of the New Aid Agenda (Fowler, 2002: 509) driven by the IFIs and leading Western bilateral donors, which used aid as a way to influence moves in recipient countries towards the creation of liberal democratic political institutions and an economic system driven by free market ideologies.  

Linked to this, a burgeoning interest across the world during the 1980s in ‘civil society’ also played a role. NGOs became a significant part of this ‘associational revolution’ where people

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28 The New Aid Agenda as set out by Fowler can be regarded as an integral part of the wider New Policy Agenda outlined and discussed in chapter 1.
began forming private, non-profit and voluntary organizations to pursue ‘objectives formerly unattended or left to the state’ (Salamon, 1994: 109). This signified, in developing countries, an escape from the enforced immaturity of statism and a chance for individuals to reclaim responsibility for their lives (Salamon, 1994). Thus, a combination of interest in, and support for, the work of NGOs in the development sector by practitioners, multilateral and bilateral donors and global citizenry led to them gaining in power and influence over the twenty years prior to the inception of the New Policy Agenda.

As NGOs became increasingly favoured by donors at the supranational level to carry forward democratization, marketization and participation agendas in the 1990s they were pressured to scale up their activities. A debate ensued about ways in which NGOs could scale up, and how this strategy could increase their ability to influence the wider systems that produce and solidify poverty, rather than settling for creating ‘small islands of success’ (Hulme, 2008: 338). Uvin et al (2000: 1) make the point that in overall terms scaling up for NGOs is about ‘expanding impact’ rather than increasing size. Various arguments were made as to exactly why and how development-based NGOs should scale up during the 1990s (Uvin and Miller, 1994, Edwards and Hulme, 1992a, Chambers, 1992b, Robinson, 1992, Wils, 1992). First, while the variation in their capacity has been acknowledged (Pearce, 1997), a sizeable number of NGOs in developing countries were too small, underfunded, understaffed and localized to seriously address substantive problems, such as poverty. As Townsend et al (2002: 534) point out, many NGOs in developing countries worked in an environment where they were ‘cut off from access to knowledge and funding.’ Thus, NGO actions often did not live up to their rhetoric, particularly in the areas of community participation, cost-effectiveness and reaching the poorest (Ubels et al eds, 2010).

Furthermore, a significant number of NGOs were unable to effectively absorb the large amounts of money needed to deal with major development problems, as they lacked institutional capacity and skills in the areas of management and strategic planning (Clark, 1997). In addition, many NGOs could not effectively address issues that had policy level causes because they did not have

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29 The pressure on Tanzanian NGOs from external donors to scale up their activities – and how this has influenced their mode of participation in post-liberalization national policy-making processes - is discussed in chapter 5.
a working relationship with the state and lacked a nuanced understanding of broader economic, political and social structures (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). A further problem was the low level of sustainability on the part of many NGOs in developing countries. For Edwards and Hulme (1992a: 53) the impact of NGOs ‘is often transitory.’ In Africa, there has been a problem with projects and programmes not continuing after the operational NGO staff ran out of finance and departed because of a change in funding policy and/or personnel.

In response to these weaknesses, many NGOs during the 1980s began cooperating more with multilateral and bilateral donors in providing services than had previously been the case. NGOs also employed the strategy of networking to scale up and attempts to ‘self spread’ local initiatives (Fowler, 1997, Chambers, 1992b). Receiving more support from powerful donors led to operational scaling up, in the forms of expanding the size of projects, programmes, budgets and target constituencies.

The scaling up of the operations and impact of development-based NGOs gathered pace from the 1980s. Hulme and Edwards (1997) calculated that at the end of the 1950s there were 1,000 NGOs working in developing countries and by the start of the 1990s this had risen to 29,000. By 2004, $24 billion of aid to developing countries – equivalent to over 30% of all ODA - was channelled through NGOs (Riddell, 2007). Furthermore, the amount of income provided for development-based NGOs rose from approximately 1.5% of the total at the start of the 1970s to around 30% by the middle of the 1990s (World Bank, 2010a). According to the UNDP (2010) there are currently 50,000 NGOs working in developing countries, which receive over $10 billion funding from the IFIs - as well as American, Japanese and European governmental agencies - and affect the lives of two hundred and fifty million people. Turning to Africa in particular, by 1996, 30% of all US aid was channelled through NGOs, as part of a policy enshrined in 1992 of moving aid away from control by ‘patrimonial’ states (Chege, 1999). Regarding the consequences of this enhanced role for NGOs in development processes since the 1980s, Hulme (2008: 338) argues that scaling up has been successful in terms of having an impact ‘on the systemic pressures that cause and reinforce poverty,’ while making the point that there remains a lot of competition between NGOs, leading to duplication of work and best practice not being shared.
A significant factor in the scaling up of NGOs has been the increase in their advocacy work. While some opt entirely for one or the other, most NGOs have to choose how to balance service delivery and policy advocacy. As service delivery agents, NGOs provide welfare, technical, legal and financial services to the poor or work with community organizations in basic service and infrastructure provision. Advocacy is concerned with seeking social change by influencing attitudes, policy and practice and lobbying directly for the policy changes (Fowler, 1997).

The neo-liberal attack on statism at the end of the 1970s (See chapter 1), led to a rise in the number of NGOs in developing countries used by governments and donor agencies as service-delivery gap-fillers in order to support those excluded from – or marginalized within – the capitalist free market system (Hulme and Edwards, 1997, Robinson, 1997). NGOs working in this way have been categorised by Korten (1990) as ‘public service contractors’ and accused of being co-opted by the state and donor agencies into propping up a neo-liberal agenda (Pearce, 1997, Gary, 1996).  

The role of service deliverers in such an environment has proved problematic for NGOs. Their work sometimes lacks compatibility and co-ordination with that of national development plans led by the state and is based on the ‘luxury’ of selecting one or two issues to concentrate on and a narrow constituency with which to work (Clark, 1997: 51). Securing funding for their work also became an issue for NGOs (Edwards and Fowler, 2003), along with concerns about the long-term impact of service provision on the sustainability of national systems in developing countries (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). Overdependence on external donors has led ‘perversely’ to a weakening of local NGOs in developing countries, since they do not develop an independent financial base (Riddell, 2007: 395). This led Robinson (1993) to argue that influential and well-funded NGOs often concentrate resources in regions and sectors that are not the most important for national development, thereby contributing to the creation of a ‘patchwork quilt’ of services with some regions not serviced by NGOs and covered only by weak state provision.

Bratton (1989) made the point at the end of the 1980s that NGOs contribution to development processes might be more important in the political rather than the economic sphere. This argument had some influence and led to an increasing interest in the role of NGOs as promoters
of democratic development. Later research on Africa by Bratton and van de Walle (1998) contended that voluntary groups can be vehicles through which popular political demands may be organized and disseminated, leading to mass efforts to bring about bottom-up democracy. Support for this view also came from Silliman and Noble (1998: 306), who argued that ‘NGOs … enhance democracy by expanding the number and range of voices addressing government.’ Moreover, for Fisher (1998: 126), bottom-up democracy stimulated by NGO advocacy has been successful in enough cases to create a tipping point, leading to ‘top-down political change’ becoming possible. In overall terms, for adherents of this view, which developed during the 1990s - and now includes the main donors involved in driving the New Policy Agenda - NGOs are important players in transforming development processes and have a key role to play during and after democratic transitions.

The work of NGOs has thus become inextricably linked to the key Post-Washington Consensus concerns of liberal-democratic transition, increasing good governance and building social capital. Running advocacy campaigns requires technical and financial capacity, so many NGOs are unable to engage in such activities, but there is ‘increasing advocacy and policy assertiveness of a few’ (Fowler, 2002: 512). The rise of long term and costly advocacy work, done mostly by large organizations, and the scaling up of development work on the part of many NGOs, has led to them seeking larger amounts of funding from, and forming closer relationships with, major multilateral and bilateral donors.

While some NGOs are committed to pursuing alternatives to donor driven agendas in developing countries (Baan et al, 2008, Hilhorst, 2003) and to exploring self-financing strategies (Biker, 2008, Hudock, 2001, Davis and Etchant, 2000), most now rely on donors for funds and there has been an increase in the number of NGOs working as public service contractors (Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin, 2008). The World Bank finances civil society organizations through various funding mechanisms, such as the Civil Society Fund and the Development Marketplace. The financing of NGOs centres on particular areas, such as HIV/AIDS, where almost 49,000 grassroots projects in Africa have been funded by the World Bank (World Bank, 2009b). At state level many of the major government departments responsible for overseas development channel a substantial amount of their funds for programmes through NGOs. As Fowler (2002: 509)
states, the relationship between NGOs and donors has changed ‘from separation to convergence, and from mutual mistrust and antagonism to an asymmetric co-optive embrace.’

The World Bank is the primary financier of development projects with developing countries currently owing the institution about $47 billion (World Bank, 2010a). As part of the move to the Post-Washington Consensus, the World Bank shifted from a focus on infrastructure to a stress on projects creating human and social capital (see chapter 1) as well as poverty alleviation under the Presidency of James Wolfensohn from 1995 to 2005 (Kagia ed., 2005, Mallaby, 2005, Wolfensohn, 2005). To roll out such projects, the World Bank increasingly financed civil society organizations. The World Bank (2010a) calculates that 10% of its central portfolio, totalling $2 billion, goes to government-operated community-driven projects. Moreover, there was ‘active CSO involvement’ in 82% of World Bank-run projects in 2006, up from 21% in 1990. For critics, participation remains mostly low-intensity (see chapter 1) in the form of consultation, which ‘is often a ritual that lends legitimacy to the policy process without creating binding commitments’ (Nelson, 2002: 500).

Overall, NGOs have become significant actors in development processes through the move from the Washington Consensus to Post-Washington Consensus policies. As a result their operations and impact have been scaled up, advocacy work linked to good governance has become an important part of their activities and relationships with major donors have grown closer. As well as affecting the ways in which they work on the ground, these changes have also influenced theoretical debates regarding NGOs, which are examined in the next section.

2.7 Critiques of the Liberal Conception of the Role of NGOs

As Post-Washington Consensus policies were implemented towards the latter half of the 1990s a more critical literature on NGOs developed. Clarke (1998: 40) stresses the importance of theorizing the political impact of NGOs, since failure to do this had led to an ‘inadequate, explicitly normative interpretation of NGO ideology.’ It had also encouraged a tendency to take NGOs’ advocacy as self-evidently positive.

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31 The precise meaning of ‘active CSO involvement’ is not outlined by the World Bank.
32 The validity of such criticisms is analysed in regard to the cases of Tanzanian NGOs and trade unions is analysed in chapters 5 and 6 respectively.
Auto-critiques (Hearn, 2007) of the roles of NGOs broadened during the latter half of the 1990s from long-standing analysts of civil society, such as Edwards and Fowler eds, (2002), Edwards and Hulme eds (1996, 1992) and Fowler (2000, 1997), focused on increasing legitimacy, capacity, accountability and sustainability within the dominant paradigm. Fowler (1997: xii) made the point that people working for development NGOs ‘seldom have the time to reflect on their actions’ and thus it is not easy to get a ‘fix’ on the way NGOs perform. Subsequently there needs to be an emphasis on ‘creating virtuous spirals for sustainability’ (Fowler, 2000: 186) driven by NGO leaders.

Edwards (2004: 103-104), has been particularly critical of the role of the IFIs and bilateral donors, arguing that much civil society building since the collapse of communism in 1989 has been a ‘crude attempt to manipulate associational life in line with Western, and specifically North American liberal-democratic templates.’ This has involved pre-selecting organizations that donors think are most important and ignoring domestic expressions of citizen action that do not conform to Western expectations, such as radical social movements, informal village/clan-based organizations or pre-political formations. Mistrust and rivalry have evolved as fledgling civil society organizations compete for foreign aid. In overall terms, during the 1980s and the 1990s there was ‘neglect [by NGOs] of analysing and challenging those who would gain control of both discourse and practice in development’ (Hulme (2008: 340).

Along with these critiques from within, a radical attack on the role of development-based NGOs has developed since the latter half of the 1990s, with Petras and Veltmeyer (2001) prominent in putting forward counter-hegemonic theories. They contend that NGOs are a neo-comprador group, which - through supplying services on behalf of donor countries - are trading in domestic poverty in return for individual advancement. NGOs often have a negative influence on popular communities by directing energy to self-help projects more than social transformations. Moreover, when the majority of development-based NGOs discuss civil society they obscure the profound class divisions and struggles, as well as other forms of stratification, such as caste, that polarise contemporary society. 33 In the context of Africa, Maina (1998) argues that analysts fail

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33 See also Petras (2003) for this view.
to account for the fact that a lot of civil society organizations themselves are actually divided along lines of class and ethnicity.

Tandon (1996) categorises NGOs as ‘missionaries’ of the neo-liberal era, a theme developed by Shivji (2007: vii), who argues that NGOs are not a third sector or independent of the state but are embedded in the neo-liberal project in Africa. For Shivji (2007) this is because most of the NGOs which are currently influential in Africa were founded in the neo-liberal era and are staffed by careerist, urban-based elites who are motivated by material gain. These organizations overwhelmingly receive their funding from Western donor agencies, to which they are upwardly accountable, at the expense of downward accountability to the poor and marginalized. Moreover, the mission statements of these NGOs are ‘vague, amorphous and meaningless’ (Shivji, 2007: 32). 34

Hearn (2007: 1106-1107) has also put forward the case for taking up counter-hegemonic perspectives, arguing that research on African civil society organizations should draw on a Gramscian perspective, given that civil society organizations in developing countries are dependent on external resources and patronage and in return popularize the development policy of donors. This necessitates a close examination of the fluid relationship between the state and civil society in the struggle for hegemony.

Making valid generalisations concerning the nature of the relationship between states and development-NGOs in Africa is difficult. Links diverge from country to country and inevitably change over time. Moreover, NGO connections with separate segments of the same state – politicians, civil servants of line ministries and the military - tend to vary. Finally these relationships can differ markedly across regions and localities of the same country (Hilhorst, 2003). However, the rise of a new group of well funded NGOs in Africa during the 1990s 35 has led to accusations from governments that they are usurping state sovereignty and fomenting unwarranted dissent among citizens (Pinkney, 2009, Fowler, 2002). In a number of African countries, governments have been critical of the NGO sector during the neo-liberal era. Governments have, inter alia, accused NGO officials of forming only to benefit themselves in

34 See chapter 5 for an analysis of the validity of these criticisms with regard to NGOs in Tanzania.
35 See chapter 5 for an analysis of how this happened in Tanzania.
Tanzania (Michael, 2004), being corrupt in Kenya (Chege, 1999), subverting national policies in South Africa (Chege, 1999) and of unwarranted meddling in domestic issues in Ethiopia (Norwegian Council for Africa, 2009). 36

African governments are also aware of the significant amount of finance NGOs attract from Western donors, which can be used to provide services in ‘partnership’ with the state (Clark, 2002). Government authority has come under pressure in a number of African countries as a result of the donor driven agenda - which includes a substantive role for civil society organizations - and they therefore have to be strategic in regard to allowing NGOs to expand their activities (Manji and O’Coill, 2002). Some governments have also tapped into the donor finance available for NGOs through indirectly controlling and/or using state employees to form and run NGOs, such as in the case of the District Development Trusts (DDT) in Tanzania (Mchomvu et al, 1998, Qorro, 1991. 37

As a result of the factors outlined above, African governments have tended to deal with NGOs through carrot-and-stick strategies. These include granting or withholding privileges, such as being able to import equipment duty free (Michael, 2004). Governments also usually insist on the formal registration of NGOs and Codes of Conduct, both of which have become issues of contention in the Tanzanian context (Lawyers Environmental Action Team, 2010, Policy Forum, 2008b). These two forms of regulation are good examples of the way the state delineates the formal spaces in which civil society operates in post-liberalization Tanzania, which Gramsci (2011b) emphasized as vital to an understanding of how hegemony is created and maintained. 38

Apart from dealing with potentially conflictual relationships with the state, the rising NGO sector in Africa faces other obstacles. The scaling-up of their activities and influence has led to accusations that many NGOs have become bureaucratic and top-heavy. In addition, NGO fundraising has been criticized for using paternalistic images and presenting ill-conceived views of reasons for problems in Africa. For De Waal (1997), international humanitarian groups

36 See also on this point the cases of confrontational relations between the state and two development-based NGOs in Tanzania - Hakielimu and the Youth Partnership Countrywide - which are examined in detail in chapter 5.
37 See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the District Development Trusts (DDTs).
38 See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the registration of NGOs and the NGO Code of Conduct in post-liberalization Tanzania.
contribute to difficulties rather than providing solutions, by wrongly focusing on technical, rather than political, issues and over-focusing on certain areas. De Waal’s argument in this regard resonates in Tanzania, where officials from the Foundation for Civil Society (FCS) - a large grant providing body - reported during fieldwork interviews that NGOs flood them with applications for grants to work on HIV/AIDS projects. According to interviewees, this is because they have heard on the ‘development grapevine’ that it is easy to get funding for work in this area. Applications for grants to work on other important areas - such as malaria prevention and treatment - are lacking. 39

The concentration of the Western donors on fostering forms of civil society in Africa with which they are familiar intensified from the mid-1980s, while other important civil society associations have been marginalized. Civil society organizations focusing on women, traders, tribes, clans, credit provision, cooperative activities, death arrangements, culture and sports, for example, have been neglected or ignored by donors (Gibbon, 2001a). The examples of burial societies and sports clubs can be used to show how the complexities of associational life in Africa are underplayed and undervalued through donor insistence on concentrating funding and capacity-building initiatives on formally constituted NGOs.

REBA (2007: 1) points out that, burial societies ‘have become a central part of the social fabric in many African countries.’ However, they feature little in the literature of the donors concerning civil society. Dercon et al (2008), Mapetla et al (2007), Schneider (2008) and Matobo (1998) are amongst other writers who have carried out work on the importance of the activities of burial societies in Africa, showing how these often extend considerably beyond arrangements to cater for the deaths of members and their families to encompass wider aspects of social and economic development.

Moreover, there has been a considerable amount of recent research on the importance of sports clubs in Africa, which provide support and services for citizens extending beyond their ostensible remit. Armstrong and Giulianotti (2004) outline how colonial regimes in Africa used sport as a way of instilling ‘discipline’ in subject peoples, often as part of ‘muscular

39 See chapter 5 for a fuller examination of the work of the FCS.
Christianity.’ Sports clubs formed during the colonial period have often developed complex and powerful leverage over many areas of life and continue to provide support and a sense of identity for many people. For example, Pannenborg, (2008) - in a study of football clubs in Cameroon – shows how ethnic groups use football as a stepping stone to gain political and economic power. 40

Lund (2006) also brings out the influence of traditional civil society associations in Africa, which at times compete with the state to exercise public authority. The ways in which such institutions act highlights the intricacies involved in understanding the concepts of legitimacy, belonging, citizenship and territory. While government institutions are important in setting out and enforcing rules and regulations, the concept of the state is also used to depict ‘what we are not’ by some civil society organizations. In parts of Africa state authority is vigorously challenged by civil society organizations, which at times have shared tactical interests. However, common interests between such groups fluctuate in a constant cycle of reproduction and transformation. Demarcating analytical lines between state and civil society obscures the fluid nature of relationships between the two. Public authority is exercised by bodies that come and go and such ‘institutions operate in the twilight between state and society, between public and private’ (Lund, 2006: 686).

To be effective, institutions must convey meaning to acts of authority through practices which inculcate the idea that their authority is legitimate. In Tanzania, loosely formed community associations repair roads and provide security by patrolling areas regarded as dangerous. They ask for voluntary contributions from citizens in the street and whether such demands are successful depends on their force, the perception on the part of the citizens as to the worth of the services provided and their economic status. For example, in some parts of Dar es Salaam the work of such ‘twilight institutions’ is well regarded and compared favourably to that of the state.

When undertaking fieldwork in Dar es Salaam in 2008 I was often stopped in my local area by a group of men who asked for money, on the basis that they were repairing the roads and cutting back bushes to reduce the number of attacks by people using foliage as cover. On asking local Tanzanians if the group was targeting me as I was the only ‘mzungu’ (see chapter 4) in the area, they said that this was not the case and that they contributed to this ‘local tax,’ as the group ‘did a good job’ and was better respected in the area than state authorities. In sum, this group was considered to be legitimate by the local population and was an effective ‘twilight organization’ (Lund, 2006).

As well as these loosely formed civil society organizations, home associations play a substantive role in some areas of civic life in Tanzania. These associations – often formed by members of the domestic diaspora - take a variety of forms and often contribute to the building of schools in rural home areas. Home association development activities can be consistent with national political policies and leaders are sometimes MPs, using these groups as a vehicle for growth in their local constituencies. However, home associations also present a ‘potential threat to the government’s claim to legitimacy’ (Jennings and Mercer, 2011: 16) through their critiques of state policies, which can be implicit or as direct, in some cases, as the formulation of alternative economic development strategy documents. The activities of twilight organizations and home associations - and the complexities of their relationships with both the state and citizens - are ignored by the donors through their concentration on funding and nurturing a small group of formally constituted NGOs.

For, Mbembe (2001) it is vital to examine efforts to establish new forms of legitimate order and to restructure forms of authority by differing groups. While some of these exertions are circumscribed by the state and others have no lasting impact, there are those that succeed and become self-sustaining through skilful strategies. Using this conception, it is possible to see how challenges can emerge to seemingly solid state structures and to gain insights into ways in which social and political life is governed because it does not make binding assumptions about the state and civil society. The ‘prevalence and persistence of twilight institutional forms … should encourage us to re-investigate the institution and the idea we call state’ (Lund, 2006: 701).
The arguments set out above regarding the particularities of associational life in different African settings provide support for Mamdani’s (1996) argument that a historically formed understanding of the role of civil society organizations is important. Mamdani makes the important point that civil society was used as a significant organizing principle under colonialism, which should thus be used as an analytical starting point for studies of the concept. The current relationship between the state and civil society organizations in Tanzania can only be fully apprehended through an analysis of the way ideologies, strategies and interrelationships have developed from the colonial era onwards. This is why the analyses of NGOs and trade unions (in chapters 5 and 6, respectively) focus on how the perspectives and actions of these two associational groups have been affected by the development of different political and economic formations in Tanzania.

2.8 Summary
This chapter has identified several key issues relating to the rise to prominence of civil society as a concept in development processes as part of the New Policy Agenda and the reasons why NGOs have become the associational form most favoured by donors involved in driving post-liberalization national policy-making processes.

First, weaknesses in the de Tocquevillian perspective on civil society – which is favoured by the IFIs - have been highlighted. Moreover, it has been shown that donor views concerning the way civil society organizations participate in post-liberalization national policy-making processes - and its consequences - can be challenged by an analysis of arguments made by de Tocqueville (1845a, 1845b) himself, the weaknesses in his views notwithstanding. De Tocqueville argued that civil society should be developed organically and become rooted in a society in order to become effective. However, the World Bank and bilateral donors have focused narrowly on fostering NGOs as participants in post-liberalization national policy-making processes, neglecting other organic associational forms, which have roots in African societies. Thus, the way civil society is conceptualized, theorized and fostered by the donors has led to a restricted base of participation by associational groups in post-liberalization national policy-making processes in Africa, which has contributed to weak ownership.
Second, according to de Tocqueville (1845a, 1845b) the number of CSOs in a society expands with growing equality and associational life is likely to be limited and based around conflict if inequality is enhanced. World Bank (2009b) statistics show that income inequality is growing in Tanzania, therefore according to the de Tocquevillian view, it is doubtful that associational life will expand endogenously in these circumstances. Moreover, as a result of this inequality, existing civil society organizations are likely to take part in confrontational activities, rather than harmonious debates with organs of the state, encouraging tolerance, openness and moderate opinion, as envisaged by the donors.

Third, Gramscian arguments concerning the roles and activities of civil society organizations – which are neglected by the donors - have greater explanatory power than liberal views. The strength of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is the way it focuses on the formal determination of the spaces in which civil society groups compete, such as the way the state regulates the registration and conduct of NGOs in post-liberalization Tanzania discussed in section 2.7 above, rather than pre-conceived determinants of attitude, interests and behaviour. Civil society is of importance as the public room where hegemonic and counter-hegemonic views are put forward by civil society organizations, which all identify with the aims of a particular social sector. Framing the participation of Tanzanian civil society organizations in post-liberalization national policy-making processes within a Gramscian approach to civil society - concentrating on how the political space in which they operate is formally determined - allows a more nuanced analysis to emerge than is the case when using the dominant liberal theorization as a model. How the prevailing political spaces, in which civil society and the state contest hegemony, have been shaped by major shifts in the political economy of Tanzania is examined in the following chapter. This is instrumental to a more subtle understanding of why civil society is at present a very uneven playing field where NGOs have greater capacity to insert themselves into national policy-making processes than trade unions.
Chapter 3

The History of Development Policies in Tanzania

3.1 Introduction

This chapter highlights changes in relationships between the core elements of what Gramsci characterized as the integral state (civil society, state institutions and ideology) in Tanzania, from the period of German colonialism to the present. This is done in order to illustrate how changes in the nature of the state crucially affected the perceptions, positions and power of trade unions. The focus is largely on the construction of the neo-liberal power bloc. However, in order to explain its precise form in Tanzania, it is first necessary to review briefly the historical contours of the state. Key changes in the political economy of Tanzania in the post-liberalization period, which have led to the marginalization of trade unions, are assessed. In the economic sphere, these shifts have revolved around the stress on attracting inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), accompanied by the growing informalization of the labour force. In the realm of politics, the transition has taken the form of the adoption of a confusing array of national policy instruments, all driven by the main Post-Washington Consensus issues of achieving good governance through partnership between agents of development, accompanied by mass participation in policy-making debates, in order to bring about national ownership of them.

3.2 German Colonialism

After Chancellor Bismarck changed his attitude from indifference to pro-Colonialism in 1884, Germany played a leading role in the ‘Scramble for Africa’ at the Berlin Conference (1884/1885), whence control over ‘German East Africa’ was claimed as a protectorate. This was ‘a simple assertion of her new position among the world powers’ (Oliver and Atmore, 1994: 106) and thus, as Koponen (1995: 169) puts it, colonial conquest was ‘in essence a political action.’

Mainland Tanganyika was shared between German and British chartered companies. German rule has been divided into two broad periods by Iliffe (1969); from its inception to 1906, where progress was slow through the hostility of native tribes, lack of funds and poor administration,

41 A detailed historically-grounded analysis of trade unions in Tanzania is provided in chapter 6.
and second the ‘age of improvement’ from 1907 until the outbreak of the First World War. Iliffe's division is based on the major reorganization of the colony which occurred after the Maji Maji rebellion of 1905. This started at Kilwa and spread through the south of the country, becoming ‘the most widespread resistance to colonial rule in Africa’ (Coulson, 1985: 31).

The colony used three modes of economic development: trade based on native crops, European plantations for crops needing technical equipment, such as sisal, and farming and ranching by permanent white settlers. With the European community being the most forceful and articulate, concessions made by the ruling administration favoured the second and third approaches. Economic relations between German East Africa and British East Africa were generally good. 42 The onset of the First World War in 1914 signalled the end of German rule. The short period of German control over Tanganyika meant that development processes initiated during this time had not matured enough to make them ‘identifiable and transparent to historical analysis. Most progressed unevenly and were far from completed when German rule was interrupted’ (Koponen, 1995: 557). Infrastructure was built (notably roads and railways) during this period and coffee, cotton and sisal industries became significant export sectors, primarily to the benefit of European plantation owners, traders and a small group of state officials.

Iliffe (1969) points out that the fundamental quandary of German colonialism in Tanganyika, after 1906, was based on a clash between the growing power of settlers, bringing them closer to the machinery of territorial government and the new skills acquired by some Africans during the ‘age of improvement’ which gave them the means to assert control over their own societies more effectively than had previously been the case. This group sought advantage through new modes of behaviour, whereby resistance was replaced by ‘a widespread desire to utilise Western techniques in order to transform African societies’ (Iliffe, 1969: 8). For the colonizers, how to accommodate the aspirations of this group was problematic. The Maji Maji rebellion showed that a serious challenge to colonial rule in Tanganyika was possible. The rebellion had been based on a number of different tribal groups, which did not have a similar vision or over-arching sense of

42 A German administrator at the time argued that, ‘with regard to tropical products, Germany was the teacher of England, while on the question of agriculture and stock-raising Germany can learn much from her English neighbours’ (Brode, 1977: 26).
unity (Giblin and Morison, 2010), drawing on their particular forms of organization to resist the colonizers. While based, overall, on the political marginalization of tribes in the south of Tanganyika and anger at the exploitation of local labour within an extractive colonial economy (Koponen, 1995), the rebellion had particular local triggers.

3.3 British Colonialism up to the end of the Second World War

In succeeding Germany as the colonial power in Tanganyika, on 1 February 1920, the British were aware, through the Maji Maji rebellion, that the integral state needed to rely on ideological hegemony as far as possible, since coercion was a drain on state resources and the morale of its officers. Thus, under the forty one year period of British administration, there was a slow and uneven shift in state ideology, in order to allow Africans to pursue their aspirations through the institutionalized means of civil society. A fluid struggle for ideological hegemony ensued, as state and civil society both endeavoured to frame and control the forms and activities of associational groups in the country.

As the plantations and sisal estates were in a state of disrepair, peasant production became the mainstay of the economy with official policy being premised on non-industrialization. The ruling administration had to maintain a good relationship with the settlers. Although the Governor did not want them to have political power, settlers were given support, whilst, rhetorically, a policy of ‘primarily African development’ (Iliffe, 1989: 262) was maintained. The British introduced a system of Indirect Rule in 1925, based on running the country through local chiefs, who had their own courts and were allowed to keep some of the taxes they collected. Acquiescence to British requirements on the part of the chiefs was required, as a way of maintaining the ideological hegemony of the colonial state, with the result that those adopting too independent a line were replaced. Since many chiefs had been killed or banished by the Germans, the British often created ‘chiefs,’ who were young, educated and easy to influence.

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43 Britain took control of the ‘Tanganyika Territory’ on a League of Nations Mandate.
44 This policy was continued under the leadership of Nyerere after independence (see section 3.4.1 below).
45 Iliffe (1989) and Rodney (1980) argue that the imposition of indirect rule in Tanganyika led to tribalism. For a contrasting view see Willis (1993).
As it became apparent during the 1920s that rule via the chiefs was unlikely to be successful (Coulson, 1985), some colonial administrators argued that civil society should be used to form an institutionalized alliance with the educated African class as an alternative. The co-operative societies were suggested as an appropriate vehicle for this concord, since they operated on a basis close to that of the main principles of Indirect Rule; the teaching of personal responsibility and initiative. Although it was another thirty years before the idea was taken seriously the co-operative societies at independence in 1961 had grown to be a powerful part of civil society in Tanzania, which engaged in a war of position with the colonial state, particularly around the issue of whether Africans could successfully set up and run commercial enterprises within a market economy independently.

Some co-operatives were inaugurated and run by Africans from the early years of British control. The first of these, the Kilimanjaro Native Planters’ Association (KNPA), was formed in 1925. However, the colonial administration was wary of such associations providing a challenge to state hegemony. Consequently government control of these societies was set up through a registrar, who had the power to liquidate any which did not obey the rules. The development of the KNPA, thus, shows the importance to the state of using legislation to win the war of position in Tanganyika, which continues to the present. By 1927 the KNPA had become a marketing co-operative. This was significant, as crop marketing was the Tanganyikan peasant society’s main connection with the larger polity and market. Thus, the marketing system formed an important framework for political organization, which distinguished peasant from tribal societies and is a reason why ‘cash-crop agriculture was so important to Tanganyika’s political history’ (Iliffe, 1989: 277). The KNPA quickly became a political body led by coffee farmers, whose interests clashed with those of the administrators, settlers and tribal chiefs. Under settler pressure, the government discouraged native coffee production and encouraged the cultivation of food crops instead. The collapse of coffee prices in 1929, corruption scandals and replacement of fees by a levy (which was difficult to collect) led to the demise of the KNPA. The government replaced it with the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU), which was seen as a ‘state institution’ by natives and thus distrusted. It was closely controlled by the registrar of societies

46 Furthermore, the registrar could decide on the size of societies and employed a team of inspectors and auditors to check on the way they were being run.
and deliberately decentralised and depoliticised through the influence of central government.

It was not until 1952 when the Victoria Federation of Co-operative Unions (VFCU), which became the largest co-operative society in Africa (Maghimbi, 1990), had its application for registration accepted that the government allowed freer formation of co-operative societies. The co-operatives grew during the 1950s and through this expansion, the ‘alliance between the educated and the colonial state was legitimized’ (Coulson, 1985: 99). While the state regulated the co-operative societies closely they also provided assistance in various ways, notably price regulation, guaranteed markets and subsidised credit (Gibbon, 2001b). The co-operatives can thus be regarded as reliant on the state. However, they were active in the independence struggle, through promoting the expansion of cash cropping in rural areas, thereby raising confidence by showing that Africans could do business successfully. This challenged the ideology of the state that Africans were unable to participate independently within a market economy. On the basis of their positive role in the independence struggle and their substantial economic impact, officials from co-operative societies expected to play a significant and autonomous role in post-colonial Tanzania. Instead, the state increasingly controlled their activities, since (as with trade unions) it was not prepared to tolerate a competing power axis, which was entrenched in key sectors of the economy. Using the argument that co-operative societies were run by exploitative middle-men, they were proscribed in 1976 and replaced with ‘ujamaa organizations,’ reducing the forms of associational life in Tanzania able to play an independent role (Shivji, 2006).

The onset of the Second World War led to an enhancement of civil society activity in Africa by providing a boost to the nationalist and labour movements, as the numbers of workers joining the labour market to provide materials for the Allies increased (Shillington, 1995). In Tanganyika, 86,740 Africans were enlisted in the armed forces, all of whom were conscripts, from 1940 onwards. Conscription was also used to provide labour on plantations, particularly the sisal

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47 The VFCU was very successful in supplying peasants with inputs for the cotton industry and even started its own industrialization process (Maghimbi, 1990).
48 There were 188 co-operatives in 1952 with 153,000 members. By 1957 this had risen to 474 co-operatives with 305,000 members. Two years later, 617 co-operatives had been registered, which marketed all the cotton in Tanganyika and increasing amounts of coffee, paddy and cashews.
49 Shivji (2006) outlines how co-operative societies operated successfully in the Kagera and Kilimanjaro regions during the 1950s.
50 By 1968 the Tanzanian co-operative movement was the largest in Africa and third biggest in the world measured by market share of agricultural exports (Maghimbi, 2010).
estates. As the war continued, ‘discontent with shortages, inflation and regimentation grew’ (Iliffe, 1989: 372). Furthermore, fighting alongside the British led to the ‘mystique of the coloniser’ (Guibernau, 1996) lessening and feelings of inferiority amongst the colonised consequently decreasing, as they became more conscious of the system of consented coercion (Gramsci, 2011) by which their subjugation was maintained.

3.4 The Independence Struggle after the Second World War

Several factors further stimulated African nationalism and the rise of civil society organizations after the Second World War. Key elements of associational life in Tanganyika provided challenges in the public room of civil society during the 1950s to the state’s hegemonic status, as a rising class of educated Africans became increasingly resentful at the way colonial rule was holding them back. First, attempts by the ruling administration to create white settlements - along with evictions of Africans from their land - led to resistance. The number of white settlers rose from 10,648 to 20,958, in the decade after 1948 (Iliffe, 1989). The fluid nature of the contestation of ideological hegemony between the core elements of the integral state, outlined by Gramsci (see chapter two), can be seen by the way evictions galvanised opposition to colonial rule, organized by African political associations and trade unions. Second, agricultural policies were applied in a way which favoured white settlers, leading to a rise in nationalist consciousness and opposition from the labour movement. The disastrous groundnut scheme - started in 1946 and cancelled in 1951 after £49 million had been spent on it – is an example. Rizzo (2006) outlines how the scheme led to a struggle between its managers and state officials for control of the labour market. The scheme caused widespread environmental destruction and led to the ‘extinction of existing land rights’, as farmers became ‘tenants of the state’ (Woodhouse and Chimhowu, 2005; 186). Third, as part of their effort to win the war of position, the colonial state refused to allow Africans to join higher civil service levels. This exclusion from the upper levels of the state machinery led to unrest, as Africans were aware that, as Gramsci (2011b) argued, control of institutions (both in the state and civil society spheres) was vital to the achievement of ideological hegemony. Fourthly, the colonial state attempted to preserve its ideological hegemony by introducing a new system of governance in 1957, whereby the largely African-controlled District Councils had to report to white-dominated Provincial
Councils. This was contested by Africans, who saw it ‘as an attempt to preserve white rule’ (Coulson, 1985: 13).

With regard to the labour movement, Africans were galvanised by the way trade unions demonstrated that they could bring important parts of the economy to a halt after the war. The war itself had led to an improvement in the legal position of trade unions, as administrations in British colonies were ordered from London to regulate labour relations. The British government passed the Development and Welfare Act in 1940, regulating the provision of economic assistance to colonies, which stated that ‘no territory might receive aid under its provisions unless it had in force legislation protecting the rights of trade unions’ (Ikiara, 1988: 2).

Buoyed by this legislation the few existing trade unions became more predisposed to take organized strike action than was the case before the war. A general strike took place in 1947 and three years later a dock strike in Dar es Salaam caused concern amongst the ruling administration, as it illustrated the ability of labour to organize effectively. Despite forcibly disbanding the Dock Workers Union after the strike (Iliffe, 1975), the action helped to make the colonial administration aware of the inevitability of building alliances with educated Africans through the institutionalized means of indigenous civil society organizations in order to maintain ideological hegemony. The Trade Union Ordinance of 1951 formalized the position of labour organizations in the country (Bienefeld, 1979). In 1953 the government accepted the application for registration by the African Commercial Employees Association (ACEA), which stimulated the formation and development of other labour organizations in the country (Coulson, 1985). As Gramsci argued, compromises and alliances are needed on the part of civil society organizations in building counter-hegemonic discourses. Thus, the state attempt to build an alliance of sorts (under its own control as far as possible) with trade unions by allowing greater freedom of registration during the 1950s ultimately was counter-productive. Contrary to its intentions, it led to the trade unions building institutional capacity, as membership rose, and to the formation of an increasingly effective counter-hegemonic alliance with the nationalist

51 See chapter 6 for details.
52 See chapter 6 for details of the course of the Dock Strike and its aftermath.
53 This was one year after the registration of the VFCU had opened the way for a large growth in the co-operative movement.
political movement.

Contemporaneously to this growth of the co-operative movement and trade unions, civil society in the political sphere received a fillip from a group of nationalists, who radicalized the Tanganyikan African Association (TAA). The TAA was founded in Dar es Salaam in 1929 as the ‘African Association’ and was open to Africans of any status and religion in an attempt to avoid tribalism and parochialism. At its 1946 annual conference, the association produced the ‘first coherent demand that the colonial territory of Tanganyika should become an independent nation state’ (Iliffe, 1989: 453). In 1948 it was renamed the Tanganyika African Association. Julius Nyerere became the association’s President in 1953 and successfully led a campaign to turn it into a political party. The TAA formally became the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU) on 7 July 1954. It was officially recognized as the first political party in Tanganyika three months later. Under the leadership of Nyerere, TANU engaged in a war of position with the state, challenging the hegemony of British rule. Nyerere (1976: 29) fought to end colonial ‘interference with African customs’ and to instil a sense of pride in them on the part of Tanzanians. Tanzanian associational groups, such as dance societies, credit associations and clan-based groups were encouraged and supported (see chapter 2).

The British were aware that they were losing ground in the war of position as a result of these actions by TANU, and responded with obstructive legislation (Hubbard, 2011). The control of key superstructure institutions, notably the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, remained a substantive weapon with regard to maintaining the ideological hegemony of the colonial state. In 1954 the Societies Ordinance was put into place, which required all public organizations to be registered and to supply the registrar with a list of members and a copy of the constitution. The creation of the Office of the Registrar has left a lasting legacy, since it led to tight top-down state control of NGOs. The Code of Conduct for NGOs drawn up after 2000 remains a source of conflict between the state and associational groups, which regard it as overly restrictive (see chapter 5). Furthermore, a similar governing body for trade unions was founded, which has continued to exercise similar powers through to the present (See chapter 6). In 1955 an amendment to the Penal Code made it an offence ‘to print, publish … or make any statement likely to raise discontent amongst any inhabitants of the Territory’ (Pratt, 1978: 37). This
substantively restricted the content of TANU pronouncements and publications.

The British also founded a rival political party to TANU in February 1956, based on white settlers and chiefs sympathetic to colonial rule; the United Tanganyika Party (UTP). In Gramscian terms, this was an attempt to maintain the institutional power of the ruling bloc, from which the ideology of the colonial state could be disseminated and hegemony consequently maintained. Franchise was then set on the basis of completion of secondary education and an income of 3,000 shillings per year. When Tanganyika’s first elections were held in 1958, the UTP believed the restricted franchise made it certain that they would win. However, TANU had enrolled 200,000 members by this time, making it ‘a major political force’ (Pratt, 1978: 35). Nyerere organized votes for European and Asian candidates who were sympathetic to the aims of the organization. As a result, TANU sympathisers won all but one of the seats contested and the UTP collapsed soon after (Nugent, 2004).

The challenge to TANU from the UTP was a major reason for TANU increasing its links with the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL) - which had been founded in October 1955. The TANU leadership was well aware that to win the war of position, alliances and compromises had to be made with as many organizations promulgating counter-hegemonic perspectives as possible, thus forming a durable historic bloc (Gramsci, 2011 and see chapter 1). Thus, the two organizations were also drawn closer together by TANU’s commitment to help the labour movement improve the terms and conditions of workers after independence in return for union support in the anti-colonial struggle. In this subsequently broken promise lies the bitterness of many Tanzanian trade unionists to this day.

By the end of the 1950s, most senior trade union officials were also members of TANU. While TANU and the trade union movement were united in pursuit of uhuru (freedom) there was a difference in the way the concept was perceived; for TANU uhuru meant self-determination and the freedom to develop the interests of the people of Tanganyika as a whole, whereas the trade unions envisaged the concept in narrower terms, centred on the Africanization of the economy, higher salaries and an end to discrimination in workplaces (Matiko, 1968). Thus, while there was

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54 See chapter 6 for details.
an alliance between the trade union movement and TANU, both maintained their own agendas.

In December 1959 the British conceded that a majority of ministers needed to be elected as members of parliament and a general election was held in August 1960. TANU won a landslide victory, taking 70 out of the 71 seats which were contested. Nyerere became chief minister and pressed for independence by the end of 1961, which met with agreement from the British. Thus, the victory of the nationalists had been ‘driven primarily by civil society groups’ (Matlosa, 2004: 79), yet they were quickly suppressed and/or subsumed within the organs of the ruling party after independence.

3.4 Independence: From the One Party State to Liberalization of the Economy
Tanganyika formally became independent on 9 December 1961. Following a coup d’état, Zanzibar merged with the Tanganyikan mainland to form the United Republic of Tanzania on 26 April 1964. In the first half of the 1960s Tanzania formally adopted socialist policies (Nyerere, 1967) in its attempts to forge a nation out of territory, citizens out of subjects and a people from a heterogeneous population (Jennings, 2007). However, the country was heavily dependent on external financing in pursuing its development goals. By 1965 foreign aid made up 44% of the national budget, which left the state vulnerable to policy influence from external donors.

The ‘Republican constitution’ was put into place in 1962 to replace the existing ‘Westminster model’ (Shivji, 1986). In the same year all land was nationalized under the Rent Restriction Act (1962) and a tribunal was created to set ‘fair’ rents (Bukuku, 1993). An interim constitution was drawn up in 1964, following the union between the Tanganyikan mainland and Zanzibar. One year later a new ‘One-Party State’ constitution formalized the rule of TANU over the Union and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) in Zanzibar. Nyerere argued that the newly independent country could not afford the luxury of competing political parties playing power games, which would be at the expense of putting into practice a concerted plan for national development (Dowden, 2009). The same rationale was used for the suppression of independent civil society organizations, including trade unions. 55 Nyerere (1976) used the discourse of national liberation to argue that all interest groups, classes and efforts needed to be subordinated to the struggle to

55 This point is examined in detail in chapters 5 and 6.
overcome the iniquitous legacies of colonial repression. When trade unions pressed for substantive improvements in the terms and conditions of members soon after independence, they were accused of being selfish representatives of a labour aristocracy and suppressed to the point where they became quasi-governmental organizations (see chapter 6 for a detailed analysis).

Tanzania’s development was to be led by a ‘state-for-all’ (Havnevik, 2010a), which would engender a broad societal concord concerning the direction of major nation-building policies. Thus, unlike Gramsci (2011b), Nyerere believed that the state could achieve hegemonic universality (see chapter 2) and, therefore, direct the development of all economic, political and social groups, through consensus-based policies. He was, however, also committed to inculcating a participatory culture, whereby Tanzanian citizens, particularly the peasantry, could articulate their needs and wants, to which the state would be responsive. This commitment inevitably led to tension over how far the state was prepared to forgo its developmentalist role and allow a pluralist political system, including advocacy and provision of services by civil society.

Nyerere was well aware of the fact that relying on external donors for finance meant it was impossible for Tanzania to formulate autonomous domestic or foreign policies. He argued that dependence on external donors weakened and distorted national development efforts, particularly since it ‘comes much later than one expected and not always in the form it is wanted’ (Nyerere, 1976: 319). The reliance on foreign finance provided an impetus for the setting out of the Arusha Declaration on 5 February 1967, which fundamentally changed the direction of Tanzania’s development polices. The Arusha Declaration repudiated capitalism and stated that collective ownership of means of production was necessary for the successful development of Tanzania. The declaration led to the nationalization of firms in key economic sectors and entailed the state taking majority shareholdings in subsidiaries of multinational firms, as well as most of the sisal plantations. However, there was no emphasis on the need for central control of the economy or industrialization. Nyerere (1967) prioritized the development of kilimo (agriculture), focusing on improving the lives of smallholder peasants. Yet, Nyerere rejected class struggle as the basis of African socialism and instead regarded its foundation as being ‘the extended family system’ (Ibhawoh and Dibua, 2003: 62). The slavish following of any doctrine was rejected, with Nyerere (1968: 1) arguing that in a ‘socialist society it is the socialist state of mind, and not the
rigid adherence to a standard political pattern, which is needed to ensure that the people care for each other’s welfare.’

Rist (2005) identifies five major principles within the Arusha Declaration. First, self-reliance is stressed, which entails de-linking (following Baran and Sweezy, 1966, Amin, 1990) from the international capitalist economy in order to attain the freedom to put in place autonomous domestic and foreign policies. Second, autarky is rejected and delinking in this context can be regarded as close to Amin's (1990: 62) definition of the concept as the pursuit of ‘rational criteria for economic options founded on a law of value on a national basis with popular relevance, independent of such criteria of economic rationality as flow from the dominance of the capitalist law of value operating on a world scale.’ Third, money is rejected as a driving force in development. The need for a psycho-political change is set out whereby individuals develop the self-confidence to relate to the economy in ways not based around the need to make money. Fourth, measures should be taken to stop exploitation of one group of the population by another and to promote conditions of social equality. Finally, the replication of all foreign economic and political models must be avoided. African values and traditions should form the basis of aspirations and organization.

Tanzania had two main advantages with regard to getting such a radical national development plan accepted by the people. First, the country was relatively homogeneous socially; 80% lived in rural areas and none of the one hundred and twenty ethnic groups had dominance. Moreover, Swahili was a common language of communication (Roy-Campbell, 1999). Second, Nyerere commanded respect from all sectors of the population. Gramsci (2011b) argued that leaders who do not enjoy the confidence of regional and local institutions, and who do not labour rigorously to make their policies accessible to non-intellectuals, are likely to have them ignored or sabotaged. This was far from the case with Nyerere, who worked hard to ensure that his views could be understood by peasants and the urban working class. Known as ‘mwalimu’ (teacher), Nyerere was a ‘persistently innovative thinker’ (Davidson, 1987: 330) and Tanzanians never doubted that he was ‘a leader of unquestionable integrity, who, whatever his policy errors, was profoundly committed to their welfare’ (Pratt, 1999: 138).
The concept of *ujamaa* was used by Nyerere as the basis of his plan to satisfy the basic needs and aspirations of the peasantry. *Ujamaa* is often translated into English as ‘collectivization of production.’ However, Bryceson (2010: 73) points out that the concept has a wider meaning, symbolizing ‘the national collective, unity of purpose, and cherished way of life.’ In this sense, Nyerere used ‘ujamaa’ fundamentally to build hegemonic universality for his vision of Tanzania’s development trajectory. Villagization began in autumn 1967. Nyerere at first tried to get peasants to form ‘*ujamaa* villages’ through free will. However, with only two million people – out of a total population of 16.9 million - adopting the scheme by 1973, Nyerere turned to the coercive functions of the integral state in the form of ‘Operation Planned Villages,’ which speeded up the process. In 1975, the initiative encompassed nine million people and by 1977 13 million people were residing in 7,684 *ujamaa* villages. That meant 70% of Tanzanians had moved into these villages in three years. As well as his own charismatic authority over the organs of state, Nyerere was able to draw on the influential support of important superstructure institutions, notably the controlling bodies of the protestant and catholic churches, in pursuing *ujamaa* (Ludwig, 1999, Jennings, 2008b).

Flawed state economic policies were clearly a major reason for the lack of success of *ujamaa* (Sender and Smith, 1986). A contradiction that militated against the success of the initiative was the focus on African traditions as its bedrock at the same time as peasants were being taken away from their ancestral lands and exhorted to employ unknown and untried modern agricultural practices (Rist, 2005). For example, peasants developed a ‘parasitic’ relationship to the newly introduced machinery (Hyden, 1980). They would use machines but abandoned them as soon as problems occurred, through lack of training in maintenance. Thus, *ujamaa* led to the alienation of peasants ‘from their cultural and social realities’ (Ibhawoh and Dibua, 2003: 61). Moreover, Nyerere did not foresee that *ujamaa* would not appeal to rural leaders since it ‘blocked their own social ascent and personal enrichment’ (Rist, 2005: 133). Consequently, rural elites started to appropriate the *ujamaa* villages in pursuit of their own interests or ‘undermined collective work’ (Davidson, 1987: 332).

*Ujamaa* as a ‘ populist’ initiative (Campbell and Stein, 1991, Sender and Smith, 1986) remains a controversial vision of development. For Ibhawoh and Dibua (2003: 78), there is a need to go
beyond ideologically driven ‘binary frameworks’ of either romanticizing the initiative or regarding it solely as an economic disaster. *Ujamaa* should be examined as a development strategy, seeking social equity and distributive justice based on self-reliance. In this regard, Jennings (2003: 184) points out that Tanzanian self-help groups during the 1960s engaged in ‘a massive movement of community action …, operating increasingly outside the direct control of the state and implementing schemes largely defined by the community.’ These important aspects of *ujamaa*, showing that ideological hegemony is always contested and modified, have been obscured by the emphasis on its economic dimensions. However, Nyerere admitted that the Arusha Declaration and *ujamaa* did not lead to Tanzania becoming self-reliant or socialist. For example, in Iringa in the early 1970s, 9% of farmers owned 53% of the land and 96% of all capital equipment (Davidson, 1987). 56

A further issue that arose through the policies of *ujamaa* remains pertinent in contemporary Tanzania. The policies were kept going by a number of Western development agencies, which were keen to see the success of Tanzania’s non-capitalist path. Thus, Tanzania received 60% of its budget from foreign aid to support *ujamaa* policies. 57 Moreover, through the 1970s, over 70% of the education budget was funded by external donors (Campbell, 1991). This created a system in Tanzania of foreign ‘domination through giving’ (Rist, 2005: 134).

Overall, *ujamaa* policies failed because it proved impossible to reconcile the tension between ‘an overt ideology stressing popular participation and a more covert reality of strong, highly centralized bureaucratic control’ (Townsend, 1998: 266). Nyerere’s government moved decisively during the 1970s to control development processes and popular participation was reduced to fulfilling legal requirements, rather than a matter of ‘pride, community spirit or local custom’ (Jennings, 2007: 92). Civil society was, from this period, given little formal policy space within which it could challenge the state’s hegemony (see chapters 5 and 6 for details, regarding NGOs and trade unions, respectively).

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56 Moreover, Due (1980: 99) found maize yields to be low and input costs high in Iringa from 1973 to 1976, ‘resulting in average net returns per village which were highly negative.’
57 See also chapter 6 for an analysis of how NGOs, such as Oxfam, aided the imposition of *ujamaa* policies.
In 1977 TANU joined with the Afro-Shirazi Party in Zanzibar to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM - ‘the Party of the Revolution.’ CCM was quickly proclaimed the only legal political party. Tanzania faced substantive economic problems during the latter part of the 1970s through inflation and a decline in export crops. Per capita GDP growth rates averaged 0.2% between 1976 and 1978 and this declined to -2.5% from 1979 to 1984 (Ndulu, 1987). Corruption on the part of state officials was also a problem at this time through ‘an over-regulated economy, with scarcities in officially allocated commodities and a rapid erosion in the real value of official salaries’ (Wangwe and Van Arkadie, 2000: 86). In addition, rising oil prices and war with Uganda contributed to the failure of Nyerere’s vision for Tanzania. Overall, ‘rural producers, urban workers, and upper income earners were all worse off at the end of the 1970s than they had been at the beginning’ (Coulson, 1985: 199).

With the increasing dominance of a neo-liberal policy environment at the IFIs from the end of the 1970s and ‘economic decline’ (Gonza, 2008: 8) apparent in Tanzania, the government gave way to external and internal pressures to soften statist policies and to allow the private sector to play a greater role as an agent of development. Tanzania launched its own ‘National Economic Survival Plan’ (NESP), which failed to have a positive impact on the economy. Consequently, bilateral donors made their continued support conditional on an agreement being reached with the IMF (Harrison, 2001). The increasing pressure on Tanzania to accept IMF policies in return for assistance was an influence on Nyerere’s decision to step down as President, to be replaced by Ali Hassan Mwinyi in 1985. However, Nyerere remained as chair of the party and argued against accepting the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) proposed by the IFIs. In contrast, Mwinyi was in favour of accepting the SAP, leading to a ‘crisis of ideological hegemony in Tanzania’ (Campbell and Stein, 1991: 3).

3.5 The Post-liberalization Period
The Tanzanian government formally agreed to the imposition of a SAP in 1986, leading to levels of aid – which had subsided due to Nyerere’s resistance to neo-liberal reforms - being raised. The signing of the SAP marks the official turn in Tanzania towards accepting economic solutions ‘from without’ (Rusimbi, 2003). Three years later an enhanced SAP (ESAP) was signed, signalling the deepening of neo-liberal reforms and the abandonment of economic nationalism in
return for external funds (Harrison, 2001). Tanzania also faced donor demands to adopt the second main plank of the New Policy agenda, liberal multi-party democracy (Vener, 1996). In response to this pressure, the Political Parties Act, 1992 was brought into force, which allowed for the registration of multiple political parties (Olaleye, 2006). While on the surface, this indicates the rapidity with which the economic and political policies promulgated by external donors became hegemonic in Tanzania following the end of the Nyerere regime, in reality the pace of change was slow and uneven during the 1990s, quickening noticeably from 2000. For trade unions, both the economic and political aspects of this New Policy Agenda have led to their marginalization as the neo-liberal power bloc in Tanzania, comprising external donors, the state and ‘new (largely foreign) investors.’ have excluded them from the realm of civil society as far as possible.

Regarding political aspects, although there were no direct correlations between fluctuations in aid disbursements and moves towards multi-party democracy, the perception of such a link on the part of the Tanzanian leadership was significant in influencing the political transition to multi-partyism which occurred in 1992. The very existence of donor policy stating that aid transfers were contingent on recipient moves towards democratization was enough to stimulate political reform without concrete actions (Vener, 2000). However, implementation of a number of the agreed neo-liberal reforms developed slowly during the early 1990s and the timetable for reform set by political power-holders became so convoluted that a ‘blocked transition’ (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1998) occurred. Consequently, in 1994, donors suspended aid to Tanzania, citing corruption and tax collection failure as the primary reasons (Bigsten et al, 2001), which exacerbated the financial turmoil that had sparked the political crisis (Holtom, 2005). The state and labour at this time had similar interests, since only with a forceful and independent government and well organized workers’ associations were there likely to be effective resistance to the action of the IFIs (Chambua, 1997). However, mutual distrust stopped them from working together to provide a united policy front in response to the donors’ actions. The state gave precedence to improving its relationship with the donor community, with the interests of labour in Tanzania a much lesser concern. This was hardly surprising as an outcome, since over the

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58 The economic and political crises in 1994 led to the first strike organized at national level by the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania in the post-liberalization period, which is discussed in more detail in chapter 6.
previous three decades aid dependence had become ‘part and parcel of the national economic culture’ (Rugumamu, 1997: 10).

From 1970 to 1980 the real value of ODA to Tanzania had quintupled making the country ‘one of the largest aid recipients’ (Svendsen, 1986: 70). Subsequently, net ODA as the ratio of GDP rose from 13.5% during the period 1981-1985 to 34.7% for the period 1986-1990 (Agrawal et al 1993). Thus, Nyerere’s efforts to break Tanzania’s reliance on external financing, through the Arusha Declaration and ujamaa policies, had clearly failed. Acceptance of IFI-driven adjustment policies led to the external debt burden, which had been substantive from independence (see section 3.4 above), increasing even further. The World Bank (2009b) provides figures showing ODA as a percentage of GNI in Tanzania starting from 1988. The figures from 1988 to 1995 - when the influential Helleiner Report (Helleiner et al, 1995) on aid to Tanzania was published – show the high level of aid dependency (see Table 3.1 below). For Mshana (2003: 113), such figures reflect a key macro-level problem that ‘Tanzania depends too much on foreign aid and foreign ideas instead of relying on local ideas and resources.’

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<td>28.6</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank (2009b)

The Helleiner Report (Helleiner et al, 1995) argued that lack of serious attention to reforms in Tanzania was caused by weak government ownership of the process. Being aware that economic reforms have always been heavily influenced by political considerations in Tanzania (Jennings, 2001), donors promoted change by promising increased aid in return for reform, supporting reformers through the provision of training courses and dominating economic analyses of the crisis, which they couched within a neo-liberal framework (Holtom, 2005). This control of formal policy space did much to make the neo-liberal discourse hegemonic in post-liberalization Tanzania. The Helleiner Report pointed in particular to the link between the high transaction costs of aid and low government ownership. With so many donors employing different missions,

59 It was between $50 and 60 million in 1970 and reached $670 million by 1980 (Svendsen, 1986).
procedures and practices, the Tanzanian government was spending a lot of time and money on preparing reports and holding meetings. Consequently, Helleiner et al (1995: 19) emphasized the need for aid from individual donors to be ‘harmonized along the lines of common policies and strategies.’ A Consultative Group (CG) of ‘high-level … experts’ (UNDO, 2003: 292) was formed in 1997 to oversee the implementation of sixteen steps for action set out in the Helleiner Report to improve the performance of aid.

Benjamin Mkapa came into office as president in November 1995 – after CCM had won a resounding election victory in the first multi-party elections held in Tanzania for over 30 years - and prioritized restoring amicable relationships with external donors. Consequently, an agreement between the government and the donor community concerning aid modalities was reached in January 1997. The guiding principle was set as ‘ownership and leadership by Tanzania in policy and development cooperation’ (Wangwe, 2002: vii). On the donor side, the call for harmonization of aid policies was then enshrined in the 1998 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) overview support for Tanzania, which became the core of new modalities of aid and the means by which multi-lateralization was to be achieved.

The move to a multi-party system in Tanzania legitimized CCM rule at national level, at least until the aftermath of the 2010 national elections. In 2005, Mkapa’s successor as the leader of CCM, Jakaya Kikwete, garnered 80.3% of the vote when victorious in the presidential elections. This figure declined to 62.8% when Kikwete won again in the 2010 elections. However, as a party, CCM captured only marginally fewer seats (258 out of 343 in total) in winning the 2010 national parliamentary elections than they did in 2005 (264 out of 324) (URT, 2010, NEC, 2011). Nevertheless, challenges to CCM’s hegemony have arisen in particular regions from opposition parties are emerging. The largest opposition party, Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), has much support in the Mwanza and Arusha areas and deaths occurred following demonstrations organized by the party, to protest against the rising cost of living, in January 2011 (Africa Research Bulletin, 2011). The legitimacy of CCM rule could increasingly be challenged, particularly if the high inflation rates of the past few years\textsuperscript{60} are

\textsuperscript{60} Inflation rates have been 10.1% (2008), 7.4% (2009) and 7.7% (2010). Source: World Bank – Tanzania Country Data Profile.
maintained while most of the rising GDP since 2000 continues to be appropriated by foreign investors and a minority of Tanzanians, who have good connections to the ruling party (Cooksey and Kelsall, 2011). Little trickle-down of wealth⁶¹ generated by increasing exports in the post-liberalization to the vast majority of the population has occurred.⁶² However, CCM has always mobilized successfully to restore unity when its hegemony has been challenged in the past (Havnevik, 2010b) and the party has far greater organizational power than any other, making radical political change, driven by civil society, unlikely in the short to medium term.

The state itself claims to be ‘developmental’ (Leftwich, 2008) in the post-liberalization period (URT, 2009c), which entails navigating the progress of the country towards the achievement of goals set in national policy instruments (see below for an overview of these instruments). However, the state should also ‘acknowledge and promote the private sector as a key (author’s emphasis) partner in national development (URT, 2009c: 181). The state’s views in this regard tally closely with the main policy prescriptions of the Post-Washington Consensus. In reality, MPs at local constituency level tend to form patrimonial relationships with constituents and have to spend money and/or get them control of projects to ensure their compliance (Gould and Ojanen, 2005).⁶³ A ‘transnational policy technocracy’ (Gould and Ojanen, 2005) sets out policy guidelines that lead to implementation in the regions with a high level of oversight from local MPs. This encourages rent-seeking behaviour on the part of MPs, despite a donor-inspired anti-corruption drive in the country (Cooksey, 2011a, Cooksey, 2010, Fjeldstad, 2003, Harrison, 2001). Therefore, a power bloc of supranational organizations and the state create and uphold neo-liberal hegemony. Moreover, continuity with previous periods of political economy is maintained as political power remains based on personal relationships and social networks to a great extent. Such relationships can involve corruption in the form of pay-offs by CCM at the centre to various factions within the ruling party in order to ensure their support.⁶⁴ The strong independent institutional capacity of CCM at regional level across the country and the fact that patron-client networks have similar levels of bargaining power has helped to ‘maintain political

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⁶¹ See chapter 2 for figures on income distribution in Tanzania.
⁶² See below for a discussion of economic developments in post-liberalization Tanzania.
⁶³ See chapter 5 for an overview of how MPs use District Development Trusts (DDTs) as one important way to foster patrimonial relationships with constituents.
⁶⁴ Large-scale corruption has been associated with state officials involved in the privatization of mining, electricity and water enterprises in Tanzania since 2005.
stability by lowering the costs of factional transfers’ (Khan and Gray 2006: 50). Kelsall and Cooksey (2011) argue that this decentralized nature of rent seeking within CCM, whereby particular cadres act independently, is unsustainable and will damage collective interests in the long-term. In overall terms, corruption in Tanzania, which continues ‘to characterize central and local government,’ is a major impediment to the success of all development policies (Cooksey (2010: 189) and the post-liberalization period has witnessed ‘systemic waste and looting’ (Cooksey, 2011a: 82) by the state.

Despite the pervasive nature of corruption in the country, the labour movement has done little work on the phenomenon. Their own institutional structures and procedures, at federation and individual trade union levels, lack transparency (see chapter 6) and senior officials have been suspended and/or dismissed over corruption allegations in the last five years. The lack of attention paid to economic and political corruption by the labour movement since liberalization was raised by many trade unionists during fieldwork interviews and is a contributory factor to the lack of legitimacy of trade unions in the eyes of many of its own officials, rank-and-file members and staff working for NGOs (see chapters 6 for details).

To drive development, CCM has overseen the adoption of ‘home-grown’ policy documents and programmes in the post-liberalization period, premised on mass citizen participation, from which it was argued that higher levels of national ownership would emerge than has been the case in the past. This, sometimes confusingly, has resulted in the drawing up of several linked national policy instruments. In 1995, the government appointed ‘a group of experts to formulate a policy document’ which would serve as a ‘guide for the development effort’ (Mallya, 2000: 1). This resulted in the Tanzania Development Vision (TDV) 2025, which became operational from 1999 and is necessary because (URT, 1999: 1) -

the people of Tanzania, led by their government, recognized the need to prepare a New National Development Vision which will guide economic and social development efforts up to the year 2025. The objective…is to awaken, co-ordinate and direct the people’s efforts, minds and our national resources towards those core sectors that will enable us to attain our development goals.

65 See also Gray and Khan (2010) on this issue.
Essentially, TDV 2025 lays out the overall development framework and long-term social and development goals. In addition, the National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES) came into operation in 1997, aiming to provide ‘guidance to all stakeholders in identifying, formulating, implementing and evaluating their poverty’ (URT, 1997: 1). A third national policy instrument - the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) (URT, 2000b: 1) - was set out in 2000. This is ‘a Government initiative aimed at restoring local ownership and leadership, as well as promoting partnership in designing and executing development programmes. It is also about good governance, transparency, accountability and capacity building and effectiveness of aid.’ In overall terms, TAS (which became the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) in 2006) is the operational framework within which the government manages all the major donor resources it receives. All of these initiatives put a stress on the mantras of the Post-Washington Consensus - partnership, good governance, participation and ownership. They also prioritize the setting and meeting quantifiable targets, necessitating a high degree of proficiency amongst staff involved in the areas of monitoring and evaluation. Such skills are, for the most part, lacking among trade unionists, which is a further reason for their marginalization in post-liberalization period.  

Alongside the formulation of a number of national development policy instruments, a policy of decentralization has been adopted by the government, which entails fostering efficiency and entrepreneurship at the local level (Pallotti, 2008). Decentralization has been championed by the World Bank, in particular, which has adopted the policy in its own operations. To this end, the Tanzania country director was transferred from Washington DC to Dar es Salaam at the end of the 1990s. The country director is a person known to be ‘open to new ideas.’ Since then the World Bank has engaged in ‘a big push to be more transparent than it used to be’ and has ‘tried to provide a window on its world for the Tanzanian people.’  

One of the main objectives of the country director has been to open up the World Bank in Tanzania to discussion and criticism through finding ‘new ways of communicating with civil society organizations and the media’ (Interview with World Bank official). An important way of doing this has been through working more closely with, and learning from, bilateral donors. To

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66 See chapter 6 for further details.
67 Source: interview with World Bank official, 7 October, 2005
68 Source: interview with World Bank official, 7 October, 2005
this end, an official from the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) has been seconded to work at the Dar es Salaam Country Office. DANIDA seconds a number of staff members to country offices where the Danish Embassy believes ‘the World Bank is progressive and receptive to new ideas.’ For DANIDA, the aim is to have ‘more Danish influence on World Bank policies, through the side door.’ DANIDA also perceives the secondment of its officials to the World Bank to be useful because often the Bank is unable to think like a bilateral donor. Thus, these placements are beneficial, as they allow seconded DANIDA staff put forward ideas that the World Bank would not otherwise contemplate. The DANIDA initiative exemplifies the World Bank’s harmonious view of state change in Tanzania, based on inculcating ideological hegemony through a convergence of interests between development agencies and the desire to promote a complementary relationship between an accountable and transparent state, which encourages the active participation of its citizens in forming national development plans, and a market economy.

In regard to maintaining neo-liberal hegemony, the state also needs to pay substantial attention to its relationships with bilateral donors. Bilateral donors are major providers of aid, to a large extent because they concur with the IFIs in regarding the country as a ‘model performer,’ willing to implement Post-Washington Consensus policies with some vigour. In 2008, Tanzania received $2,331,000 billion in ODA, of which $1,375,290 billion (59%) was from bilateral donors. Regarding members of the DAC, in 2008 Tanzania was the primary recipient of aid from Norway ($121 million), Sweden ($117 million), Denmark ($105 million) and Finland ($40 million). The country was also one of the top ten recipients of ODA from the Japanese ($396 million), the British ($243 million), the Dutch ($122 million) and the Irish ($59 million), as well as receiving $207 million from the USA (OECD, 2010a, OECDb).

Bilateral donors have also been influential in creating alternative national development plans for Tanzania since 2000. These include the Tanzania Mini-Tiger Plan 2020 (Japan Development Institute, 2010) backed by Japan, South Korea’s ‘Initiative for Africa’s Development’ started in

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69 Source: interview with DANIDA official, 15 October, 2005
70 Source: interview with DANIDA official, 15 October, 2005
71 One of the main initiatives set up by the World Bank in Tanzania as a result of DANIDA influence – the ‘Coffee Morning Discussions’ – is examined in chapter 5.
72 See chapter 1 for details of why the IFIs regard Tanzania as a ‘model performer.’
2006, which cites Tanzania as being ‘one of the core development partners of Korea’s international cooperation’ (Koo, 2008: x) and Mpango wa Kurasimisha Rasilimali na Biashara za Wanyonge Tanzania (MKURABITA) - ‘the Programme To Formalise the Property and Business of the Poor in Tanzania’ (URT, 2007e) – which draws on the ideas of Hernando de Soto (De Soto, 2001) and receives a substantive amount of support from Norwegian aid (Sundet, 2008). When these initiatives are added to that of the PRSP, the NPES, Vision 2025 and the TAS, there are seven major national level policy instruments in operation in Tanzania (see Table 3.2 below). This puts the government under a substantial amount of ‘ownership stress.’
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Instrument</th>
<th>Time Horizon/Partners</th>
<th>Main objectives</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bilateral donors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKURABITA</td>
<td>2004-ongoing in 4 phases/</td>
<td>Strategy for opening up the formal market economy to those excluded from it. Focus on formalisation of property land rights and businesses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Mini-Tiger Plan 2020</td>
<td>2005-2020/Japan</td>
<td>Strategy for fostering competitiveness in global markets and promoting exports through creation on Special Economic Zones. Linked to MKUKUTA.</td>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
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Overall, the willingness of the Tanzanian government to embrace robustly the main political precepts of the New Policy Agenda, as part of a liberal positive-sum approach to state change (pace De Tocqueville, 1845a, 1845b), is a key reason for its post-liberalization ‘success’ according to IFIs. However, for trade unions, these major political changes have been largely detrimental. Analysis of the national policy instruments reveals that trade unions are not included

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73 See also chapter 1 for an overview of why the IFIs consider Tanzania to be a post-liberalization success story.
in the post-liberalization configuration of ‘civil society’ in Tanzania. The role of labour organizations is not accommodated in any of the seven national policy instruments summarized above, with the exception of the second PRSP document. Trade unions were not included at all as civil society representatives in the first PRSP (1999-2004). Following a concerted campaign by the national federation (the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania), trade unions did play a peripheral role in PRSP II, although fieldwork findings show that trade unionists regard themselves as outsiders in the PRSP process and unable to bring about debates on key issues concerning labour (see chapter 7 for details). The fact that these national policy instruments include analyses of key labour-related issues, such as employment creation, formalizing businesses and increasing competitiveness in export sectors, yet fail to even mention a role for trade unions, shows the extent to which the labour movement has been excluded from civil society, as it has been constituted practically and rhetorically, in the post-liberalization period.

Turning to the economic elements of the New Policy Agenda, the SAP was introduced in three phases. The first of these centred on trade liberalization. During the second phase the focus moved to the deregulation of Foreign Direct Investment, while the third period of adjustment primarily addressed parastatal and civil service reform (Pallotti, 2008). Structural adjustment led to annual GDP growth from 1986 to 1994 of 4% on average and a small improvement in agricultural production during the second half of the 1980s. However, increases in the levels of exports were not substantive. Fluctuating prices for commodities on the world market affected Tanzanian farmers. For example, between 1983 and 1988 the price of tea obtained by farmers in Iringa fell on world markets by 3% (TADREG, 1994). Moreover, the Balance of Payments deteriorated and there was an economic slowdown after 1994 because of the closure or running down of parastatals prior to sale or liquidation, an increase in credit costs and failure to compete with foreign imports, as protection was removed. Overall, the modest economic gains of the 1980s were followed by decline during the 1990s (Chambua, 1997). From 2000 onwards, as inward FDI increased, GDP growth has averaged more than 5 per cent per year. The figure was 6.5 per cent for 2010, although this needs to be set against an inflation rate of 8.9 per cent for the same year (Global Finance, 2011). Despite this high inflation rate, the World Bank (2010e: 1)

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74 The accuracy of these figures is open to question. Jerven (2010: 286) points out that data showing economic growth rates for Tanzania ‘have large statistical errors for the late 1980s.’

75 The World Bank figure is 7.7%. See footnote 15 above.
praises Tanzania for its sound ‘macroeconomic policies, market oriented reforms and debt relief [which] have provided a conducive environment for Tanzania’s steady economic growth.’

However, the fact that much of Tanzania’s GDP growth since 2000 has been based on inward FDI is problematic for the labour movement, since new investors are perceived by trade unionists as overwhelmingly anti-trade union. 76 According to Ngowi (2002), between 1985 and 2001 there were a total of 854 officially approved FDI projects in Tanzania and from 1986-1991 inward FDI averaged only $2 million per year in value. Nevertheless, mainly through the increasing amount of privatization of SOEs and changes in investment laws during the 1990s, Tanzania became the seventh largest destination for inward FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa by the end of the decade. In 1997, the National Investment Act was passed, providing concessionary terms for foreign investors, notably in the area of tax rates. By 1999, inward FDI had increased to $17 million and by 2004 the figure had reached $249 million, making Tanzania one of ‘Africa’s best performing countries in terms of … attracting foreign direct investment’ (MIGA, 2007: 6).

Gibbon (1999: 17) outlines how large-scale FDI in Tanzania since the second half of the 1980s has occurred mostly in the ‘classic colonial/neo-colonial sector of exportable raw materials.’ Regarding ownership, the Africanization of the Tanzanian economy that began after independence with the creation of nationalized enterprises is being reversed. For Gibbon (1999: 17), ‘the colonial/neo-colonial pattern is again reasserting itself’ with former corporate owners featuring prominently as investors. One of the first foreign acquisitions after liberalization of trade and investment occurred was the takeover by Lonhro of the Mifundi Tea Plantations, which it lost in 1978 through nationalization. The World Bank (MIGA, 2007) takes a different view, arguing that inward FDI is diversified, since it encompasses mining (39 per cent), manufacturing (22 per cent), tourism (13 per cent) and agriculture (7 per cent). This is a questionable analysis, given that foreign investment in mining alone equals the percentage of the only other three sectors cited when added together.

76 See chapter 6 for details.
Gold mining, run by large Foreign Mining Companies (FMC), has been vital to Tanzania’s rising GDP figures since 2000. Exports of gold increased in value from $121 million in 2000 to $1,076 million in 2009 (Cooksey, 2011b). The narrowness of Tanzania’s export base, contrary to the claim of the World Bank (MIGA, 2007), cited above, is shown by the fact that in 2009, gold represented the value of more than one third (34.75%) of total exports (Bank of Tanzania, 2011). The FMCs have received a generally less than welcoming reception from the Tanzanian public, linked to the discourse of economic nationalism promulgated during the Nyerere era, which still resonates with many people in the country.  

Nyerere was not prepared to let FMCs dominate mining in the country with the result that under his regime ‘Tanzania’s mining wealth remained buried securely for the future’ (Bryceson, 2010: 72). The arguments for and against the FMCs, in terms of their ability to substantially aid the development process are complex (see Cooksey, 2011b). Industrial relations in the gold mining industry are fractious and, in interviews, officials from the Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union (TAMICO) provided details of numerous breaches of labour laws by the FMCs. They argued that the state had been reluctant to deal with such matters and clearly sided with capital (in the form of the FMC owners) against labour (in the form of Tanzanian miners) in all mining disputes, because of the large amount gold mining contributes to the country’s GDP (see chapter 6 for a detailed analysis). The powerlessness of TAMICO in the face of hostility from major foreign investors, along with the state, exemplifies the marginalization of trade unions in the post-liberalization era in Tanzania, where the interests of capital are prioritized above those of labour.

For the labour movement, a major issue concerning privatization of enterprises leading to a rise in inward FDI, is the large numbers of workers being dismissed, leading to a fall in membership and consequently influence.  

In addition, the labour-force has been negatively affected by the removal of state subsidies as part of neo-liberal policy prescriptions, which has contributed to the rising prices of accommodation, fuel and social services. With regard to the latter, between 1977 and 1991, government expenditure on health declined from 7.2% of total government spending to 4.9% (Rusimbi, 2003). Moreover, privatization has negatively affected institutionalized forms of employee participation, notably the Worker’s Committees, which had

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77 See Shivji (2006) for the argument against FMCs in Tanzania.
78 See chapter 6 for details of the changes in trade union membership patterns in the post-liberalization era.
existed in Tanzania since 1952, with the aim of involving labour in decisions concerning the management of enterprises (Chambua, 1997). Since they lack a legal basis in the newly created private sector, foreign and/or domestic managers are not obliged to continue with such committees (Chambua, 1997, Galarraga and Gogue, 1997). Trade unions have therefore lost an important channel of communication with management in many enterprises since liberalization and the neo-liberal power bloc has one less significant form of challenge to its ideological hegemony.

A further significant consequence of the imposition of neo-liberal policies in Tanzania has been the increasing informalization of the economy (Wuyts, 2001). It is estimated that 34% of households in Tanzania are engaged in informal sector activities and this figure rises to 55% of households in Dar es Salaam (Becker, 2004). Trade liberalization has led to a large rise in foreign imports entering the country in the commodities sector, including ‘massive importation of beer and clothes’ (Ngowi, 2002: 9). This has reduced competition as local firms lack the skills and capacity to compete with imported goods and have to downsize or close. Consequently, there has been a decrease in the formal wage labour sector, including stagnation in the production of traditional export crops, such as coffee, tea, cashew nuts, cotton and tobacco. In response, households have come to depend more on ‘multiple, diversified and spatially extended livelihood strategies, where wages are in part subsidised through other forms of economic security’ (Wuyts, 2001: 435).

The informal sector is dynamic and some of its activities have led to the formation of civil society organizations, such as co-operatives and savings societies, which allow actors to organize their financial assets (Seppala, 2008) and increase their knowledge of markets (Muller, 2005). However, despite its diverse forms (War on Want, 2006), a common feature of the informal economy is that it provides little job security for workers, who are not protected by labour legislation, have no contracts of employment and are subject to intimidation and extortion from officials of the state, such as police officers. Even in sectors, such as public transport, where a state monopoly led to consistent shortages of buses prior to liberalization of the economy,

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79 See chapter 6 for further details of the role of Worker’s Committees in Tanzania.
80 See chapter 6 for further details and figures regarding retrenchment of workers in Tanzania following the onset of the structural adjustment period.
privatization has not led to unambiguous improvements for workers or consumers. Exploitative labour relations have characterized the privatized *daladala* (mini-bus) sector, in the form of long working days and little security of employment being imposed on a mass of casual workers (Rizzo, 2002). Moreover, many *daladalas* remain extremely crowded and poorly maintained. The privatization of the water industry has also been problematic in Tanzania (ICSID, 2008). Privatization led to erratic provision and high charges for water, culminating in an acrimonious dispute between the government and the new foreign investors in the sector (Rice, 2008, 2007). As a result, the number of informal vendors has risen considerably and regulation of this type of provision is non-existent (Bayliss, forthcoming).

However, the trade union movement has done little, beyond the level of rhetoric, to engage with workers in the informal sector. A few unions (TUICO, COTWU(T) and CHODAWU, for example) have supported the informal sector, mostly by assisting in setting up associations. However, the national federation of trade unions (TUCTA) has formulated no overall strategy to engage with the informal sector and in overall terms union work in this area lacks coordination, planning and financial backing (Fischer, 2011). When it is considered that around one third of Tanzanian households - and more than a half of those in Dar es Salaam – engage in informal economic activities, the failure of trade unions to provide this sector of the labour force with any substantive representation has been a significant factor contributing to their marginalization in the post-liberalization period.  

Overall, the post-liberalization period has seen a measure of macro-economic stability emerge in Tanzania from the viewpoint of the IFIs and the state, which together uphold neo-liberal hegemony. Inward FDI, particularly in the mining sector, has been the main driver of increased GDP growth rates since 2000. However, trickle down to the mass of the population is not occurring, to a large degree because the main growth sector – mining – have provided relatively few employment opportunities and lack linkages to the rest of the economy (see chapter 2). The trade union movement has been unable to exert any substantive influence on the government, external donors or new investors to improve the terms and conditions of the work-force in the formal sector. Moreover, it has failed to engage with, and organize, the increasing numbers of

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81 This issue is covered in detail in chapter 6.
Tanzanian workers in the informal sector.

3.7 Summary

Colonial economic policies (German and British) created an export-led economy in Tanzania, which benefitted a minority of largely foreign producers, traders and state officials. It left the country dependent on external finance; from the colonial centre to develop politically and from foreign investors and buyers to progress economically. In post-colonial Tanzania, a concerted attempt, under the left-wing populist regime of Julius Nyerere, to break the political and economic dependence of the country on external agents, failed. By the end of the 1960s the government took control of development processes, tacitly acknowledging that they ‘could not be both state directed and popularly initiated’ (Jennings, 2003: 185). Only the rhetoric of self-reliance continued within development plans. After Nyerere stepped down in 1985, the Tanzanian government has, largely through donor pressure, adopted neo-liberal economic policies, along with a move to multi-party liberal democracy. The implementation of these policies gathered pace from the 2000s to the extent that Tanzania has become one of the ‘developmental stars’ of Africa in the view of the IFIs, whereby key actors from the ruling administration have internalized the main precepts of the New Policy Agenda and little donor oversight is needed to ensure the hegemony of neo-liberalism. However, a ‘developmental state’ in Tanzania is lacking. The ruling party, CCM, is engaged in systemic rent-seeking at national and regional levels and patronage politics is the norm. For trade unions, the major shifts in the political economy of Tanzania in the post-liberalization period have led to their marginalization. The state prioritizes the interests of capital over labour, based on two main premises. First, Tanzania continues to rely substantively on external financing, much of which comes from the IFIs, which promulgate neo-liberal economic policies. Second, the rise in GDP during the 2000s is largely due to inward FDI, concentrated on a small number of economic sectors, the most important of which is mining. The privatization of SOEs during the 1990s also led to the entry of new domestic entrepreneurs as well as foreign ‘new investors.’ Neither of these groups welcomes a substantive role for organized labour in the economy and both have engaged in aggressive and obstructive tactics in dealing with trade unions. For these reasons, neo-liberal policies have become hegemonic in Tanzania over the past twenty years. Hegemony is, however, always contested (Gramsci, 2011) and the ways in which trade unions and NGOs in the post-
liberalization period have contested the new policy spaces that have opened up, forms a major part of the following three fieldwork-based chapters.
Chapter 4

Methodology

4.1 Methodological Approach

In this chapter the research design and methods are outlined and the main aims of the study are discussed, focusing on the processes involved in data collection. The methodology was designed to bring out an effective analysis of the key issues, leading to the drawing of tenable answers to the research questions, based on an examination of data collected during fieldwork. The methodology was predicated on reflecting the voices of participants, in order to achieve a deeper understanding of their views concerning issues affecting civil society organizations in Tanzania. Thus, the methodology was essentially qualitative and comparative, with a degree of triangulation (Jick, 1979) through the quantification of some of the responses of interviewees.

Brockington and Sullivan (2003: 57) emphasise that qualitative research ‘seeks to understand the world through interacting with, empathising with and interpreting the actions and perceptions of its actors’. The use of qualitative methods can help to ‘understand more fully the nature of the problems that social policies had to address and to appraise those policies once implemented’ (Ritchie, 2006: 25-26). Chambers (2008: 107) argues that the principal strengths of qualitative approaches are ‘depth of insight and … being open to the unexpected’. Qualitative approaches allow flexibility in providing responses, and can contribute to the provision of a full overall picture when findings are triangulated effectively with quantitative data. They were, therefore, used in this research as a way to avoid producing a ‘fuzzy quantitative snapshot’ (Oya, 2002: 132), which can be the case with some cross-sectional surveys.

The research also takes a comparative study approach by analysing the interface between present and past with regard to Tanzanian NGOs and trade unions. The institutional structures, capacities, ideologies and modus operandi of Tanzanian NGOs and trade unions are historically derived. For this reason the fieldwork-based chapters on the participation of NGOs and trade unions in national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania draw on an analysis of significant aspects of their historical development, couched within a political-economy
perspective, focusing on processes lying behind changes in their position and behaviour. As Schriewer (1999) points out, this type of analysis is useful in allowing temporal comparison of the processes, organizational models and social relations that exist in a society (see chapter 3).

The key research tools employed were semi-structured interviews and participant observation over three fieldwork sessions, spanning a three year period, in order to go beyond unhistorical knowledge of NGO and trade union officials and their activities as represented statistically, and to capture something of the ‘array of relationships, changes, anecdotes and histories which should not be overlooked’ (Oya, 2002: 132).

4.2 Preliminary Fieldwork Issues

In preparation for the fieldwork a list of NGOs playing a major role in national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania was obtained and contact made with officials from some of them. This led to a snowball effect, as these officials made available the details of other NGOs playing an active role in national policy-making debates. Initial contacts at NGOs also provided details of open monthly discussion meetings arranged by civil society organizations in Dar es Salaam (known as ‘Breakfast Meetings’, as they start at 7.30am) and attended by representatives of large and influential NGOs in the country.

It was more problematic to contact trade unions than NGOs as their offices have, in the main, little modern technology. A list of registered trade unions compiled by the Office of the Registrar of Trade Unions at the Ministry of Labour was obtained. This was a useful starting point and again led to a snowball effect with initial contacts providing details of other trade unions that were difficult to track down. Thus, contacts made before the fieldwork provided a strong base from which to meet all of the participants identified as ‘key’ to the research.

4.3. Fieldwork Experience

As the research was carried out on a part-time basis, fitting in adequate time for fieldwork was problematic. Three fieldwork sessions were undertaken of six months, three months and one month. During the first and longest fieldwork period, voluntary work for an NGO was time-consuming, but beneficial overall with regard to the gathering of data. This allowed participant
observation to take place, which provided insights into all aspects of the work of a Tanzanian NGO. Furthermore, Tanzanian colleagues at the organization became key informants, giving useful advice about how best to obtain interviews with officials from NGOs and trade unions and how to make the most of them with regard to effectively managing their expectations of a researcher from Britain.  

The best advice received in this regard was that if selected interviewees did not respond to emails or phone calls, it would be acceptable to go directly to their places of work, announce myself and then wait. This modus operandi led to meetings with NGO and trade union officials on every occasion when someone did not respond to emails and phone calls.

Interviews were always conducted initially at places of work in an informal and relaxed atmosphere. All interviews were transcribed long-hand and no tape-recordings were made. This decision was taken after advice from Tanzanians that interviewees were likely to be guarded in their responses if they were being recorded, due to many years of strong state control in Tanzania under colonialism and after independence, when dissenting views were not regarded with a great deal of tolerance. It was an arduous task but it proved a useful modus operandi, requiring hard concentration on the words of the interviewees. Writing up the transcripts in the evenings after the interviews allowed further reflection on the issues raised. All participants were asked a checklist of questions which formed a ‘flexible guide’ (Chambers, 2008: 78). However, the interviews could also be situational with regard to the directions in which interviewees wanted to take the answers to the various questions and the time they wanted to spend on particular topics.

The empirical data obtained during the interviews were complemented by analysis of relevant primary documents produced by the organizations for which the respondents worked. Interviewees were generous in providing access to such materials, which were particularly valuable in analysing NGO and trade union written input to national policy-making processes and ascertaining membership numbers for Tanzanian trade unions.

82 This point is discussed in more detail below in Section 46 below.
83 The checklists of questions are set out in Appendices 4.4 and 4.5 at the end of the thesis.
4.4 The Selection of Research Sites and Population Samples

As the main premises of almost all the chosen participants are in Dar es Salaam, selecting research sites was not unduly problematic. All the NGOs which had been selected as participants have head offices in Dar es Salaam, with two Arusha-based exceptions. Moreover, the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania headquarters is in Dar es Salaam, as are the principal offices of all individual trade unions, with one exception.

In order to obtain the fullest possible answers to the main research questions, a purposive sample, where the units are selected ‘because they have particular features or characteristics which will enable detailed exploration and understanding of the central themes which the researcher wishes to study’ (Ritchie, Lewis and Elam, 2006: 78), was selected. Purposive sampling was most relevant for this study, since the research questions centre on addressing issues concerning two types of civil society organizations in Tanzania, which were pre-selected for comparison. Thus, purposive samples were selected from the categories of civil society organizations chosen as case studies – NGOs and trade unions.

With regard to the former category, the ‘Macro Group,’ which coordinates NGO input to the PRSP process was used as a purposive sample. This group discusses and provides input into all aspects of civil society participation in national policy-making processes in an institutionalized setting which ensures regular meetings with the government. It comprises thirteen NGOs and the sample consisted of interviewing senior officials from nine of the group. It was not possible to contact four of the group for logistical reasons. In their place, senior officials from four other influential NGOs which are playing an active part in national policy-making processes, but are not members of the Macro Group, were selected for interview (see chapter 5). While a purposive sample requires ‘subjective judgement’ (Overen and van Diermen, 2003: 43) and is not based on probability, in this research the selection criterion was clear; the significant participation of these NGOs with regard to participating in national policy-making processes.

84 ‘Senior official’ at NGOs is defined as any position conferring substantive control over policy and/or budget. In the majority of cases this was the Head of the Programme under varying titles, depending on the organization – Executive Director, Country Programme Officer, Executive Secretary, for example.
Concerning trade unions, those selected for interview were:

1. The General Secretary.
2. The Deputy General Secretary.
3. Senior officials from all five departments of the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA) head office.  
4. Senior officials from all the state registered trade unions affiliated to TUCTA.
5. Senior officials from all of the state registered trade unions not affiliated to TUCTA.

This covered all the major office holders of the national federation and a senior official from every individual trade union in Tanzania, with the exception of the Tanzanian Agricultural Workers Union (TAWU), a small and inactive organization. The sample therefore covered the arguments of officials from all unions, whether or not affiliated to the national federation.

4.5 Research Instruments

Semi-structured interviews were chosen as a key research instrument since ‘the overpowering positive feature of the interview is the richness and vividness of the material it turns up’ (Gillham, 2000: 10). An important aspect of managing an interview is the establishment of an initial rapport with participants, enabling them to feel at ease and are, thus, more likely to respond openly and fully to questions. Concerning this research, several factors played a role in creating a bond. First, working for a development-based organization over a four year period provided common experiences with participant NGO officials. Similarly, working for a Tanzanian NGO while doing the main period of fieldwork was valuable. In addition, raising issues relating to Tanzanian NGOs and trade unions during introductions and discussing them knowledgeably was beneficial in establishing a rapport.

Ruane (2005) outlines the need for researchers to use probes, verbal mirroring and silence effectively when conducting interviews. Probes, as follow-up techniques used to encourage the respondent to clarify and elaborate, can be implicit, such as a quizzical look or explicit in the form of a direct request to state more. These devices were not needed to a great extent during the research, as the participants were motivated to discuss the interview questions. They were

85 ‘Senior official’ at trade unions is defined as General Secretary, Deputy General Secretary or Head of Department.
employed mostly when asking questions about civil society relations with the state, which produced hesitation in a number of respondents. The use of explicit probes in these cases did lead to respondents lengthening their answers. Verbal mirroring in the form of succinct and non-evaluative paraphrasing of what interviewees had just said was worthwhile. It provided a chance for respondents to think through their utterances and sometimes modify them. It was also motivating for interviewees, as it emphasized the importance of their role. Allowing silences proved beneficial when conducting interviews. This gave respondents time to think through issues and they often then produced interesting insights into the topics under discussion. As Ruane (2005: 154) points out, ‘silences can be a spring board into important topics of conversation.’

Anonymity and confidentiality were further issues which arose in relation to the interviews. During the interview part of the research all participants were informed that the information provided would be treated with confidentiality and their anonymity guaranteed. Time was spent at the start of interviews explaining the position of the researcher, the purposes of the research and why they had been chosen as participants. It was made clear that this was independent research, which was not being carried out on behalf of the government, multilateral or bilateral donors.

**Observation**

Both participant observation, involving immersion into many aspects of the lives of participants, and structured observation, allowing the recording and analysis of behaviour and interactions as they occurred (Ritchie, 2006), were used. It was important to find ways to observe and interact effectively both as a participant observer and when engaging in observation only. Originally the fieldwork plan had been based on only observation but when engaging with NGOs, circumstances led to participant observation being an effective method to employ.

The decision to do voluntary work for an NGO during the first fieldwork period was based on the view that participant observation would add richness and depth as a research tool to the other methods which had been selected. This provided insights into the work of a local organization on a day to day basis. Almost all the staff were Tanzanian, so participant observation increased
awareness, not just into working practices, but also attitudes to the NGO sector. Differences between the elite Dar es Salaam-based NGOs playing a major role in national policy processes and the smaller organization I worked for became apparent on mixing with officials from the former category. During that period power cuts were usually from 7.00 until 19.00 in Dar es Salaam, making a lot of work impossible, as the NGO focused on using information technology to provide education. Large NGOs were not affected by this as the donors provided enough finance for them to buy generators. The power cuts were, however, beneficial to the research as they provided an opportunity to discuss with colleagues their ideas and attitudes concerning the work of NGOs in Tanzania. Work duties involved writing funding proposals, giving presentations on development issues, providing content for the website and contributing articles to the NGO newsletter. These tasks necessitated working with management, IT and administration staff, giving an appreciation of different sides of the work of the NGO.

Going to the ‘Breakfast Meetings’ led to an increased understanding about other open events organised by, and aimed at, NGOs. This networking provided insights into the relatively closed world of the large and well-funded group of NGOs. Networking also led to awareness that the World Bank was starting a ‘Coffee Morning Discussions’ initiative (see chapter 5) to improve perceptions on the part of different stakeholders in the country about their transparency and accountability. These were open events on different aspects of the World Bank’s policies to which civil society organizations were invited, through an online process, which tended to exclude the many associations without internet facilities.

Attendance at the ‘Coffee Morning Discussions’ imitative showed the value of participant observation. Dialogue with staff from other NGOs attending the meeting developed more meaningfully when they became aware that I was working for an NGO and doing some research compared to the way I was received before starting the NGO work when I was perceived as just a researcher. NGO staff talked freely about issues such as the government’s confrontational reaction to criticism by the education-based NGO, Hakielimu (see chapter 5 for details), and what it meant for all of ‘us’ working in the NGO sector and the general day to day travails involved in working for an NGO in Dar es Salaam. Discussion of the two main research questions at such meetings provided information and insights that were complementary to the
data accrued from the semi-structured interviews.

In overall terms, as a participant observer, insights into key aspects of the work of a small NGO in Dar es Salaam, led to a lot of contacts being made with staff from the NGO sector and to invitations to take part in meetings and other events aimed at NGOs. It also provided an understanding in unstructured settings of attitudes towards the ways in which NGOs are involved in national policy-making processes.

Most of the research relating to trade unions was done solely as an observer, with the exception of being a discussant at one TUCTA meeting. All trade union participants were open during meetings and interviews. One factor influencing this may have been that trade unions have been marginalized in national policy making processes in Tanzania and had been involved in largely adversarial relationships with the government, employers – particularly ‘new investors’ – and the World Bank. Thus, they responded positively to somebody being interested in their work.

Observation was helpful in answering the second main research question, in particular, as it provided knowledge of the paucity of resources at most unions and the difficulties staff consequently faced in producing documents and using email. This contrasted markedly with the situation of most of the NGOs interviewed, which were relatively well-resourced. The almost daily power cuts also had a negative impact on the work of trade unions, since they did not possess generators. Thus, it was obvious from this observation that trade unions would have difficulty in receiving communications about national policy making processes and in preparing and circulating documents to members asking for their views.

**Document Analysis**

Document analysis was important to the study and involved examination of unpublished primary materials from multilateral and bilateral donors, the government and civil society organizations. The most important of these were consultancy reports, documents outlining plans for policy reforms within institutions, internal memoranda on institutional restructuring and statistical records relating to memberships. It also entailed studying secondary data in the form of publications by the government and civil society organizations on various aspects of economic,
political and social development in Tanzania.  

The benefits of using secondary data in this research correspond largely to the general advantages of its application set out by Blaxter et al (2006: 171); collection of large amounts of primary data is difficult, time-consuming and costly; if relevant data already exists it is logical to make use of it; it can act as a complement to primary data assembled; it can confirm, modify or contradict primary findings; it allows a focus on analysis and interpretation; research should build on what has already been done where this is relevant and finally more data is collected than is ever used, so it is best to gather as much as possible of what already exists.

Key documents relating to national policy making processes in Tanzania were analysed in order to provide information relevant to the research questions. Government documents on national policy-making processes were relatively easy to obtain, largely because of the donor stress on setting quantitative targets for all aspects of poverty reduction and on monitoring and evaluation. The World Bank had therefore funded the production of government documents (in hard copy and electronic form) on aspects of economic, political and social life in Tanzania, which are published in Swahili and English, and are available free from the Vice President’s Office. The statistics, facts and arguments made in key government and civil society documents used in the research were effective in constructing an overview of levels of economic and social development in Tanzania and particularly helpful in understanding into aspects of national policy-making processes.

These documents were particularly significant in providing data showing which civil society organizations are regarded as important in national policy making processes and which less so by the government. For example, statistics on, and discussion of, trade unions are conspicuous by their absence. The civil society-produced materials also assisted in providing an answer to the first main research question by showing areas of disagreement between NGOs and the government and how organizations in the former sector felt it was best to frame the issues. For example, an examination of Hakielimu’s, ‘Three Years of PEDP Implementation: Key Findings

86 These documents are listed in Appendix 4.7 at the end of the thesis.
from Government Reviews (2005), allowed insights into the sensitivity of state-civil society relations in Tanzania by providing an example of what the government regards as unwarranted criticisms of its policies.  

87 Table 4.1 Description of Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical area of coverage</th>
<th>Dar es Salaam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of respondents</td>
<td>75 Respondents in Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Core Respondents – Purposively Sampled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14 Officials from 9/13 NGOs in PRSP Macro Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Officials from NGOs taking part in national policy-making processes but not part of Macro Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 Officials from TUCTA Head Office (General Secretary and Deputy General Secretary (2) Covering 4/4 Departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 Officials from 14/14 TUCTA Affiliated TUs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 Officials from 6/7 Non-TUCTA Affiliated TUs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Officials from Office of the Registrar of Trade Unions, Ministry of Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Respondents</td>
<td>3 Officials from other NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Officials from Supranational Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Officials from Bilateral Donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Academics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 ‘Others’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Subjects of Study | Multiple Integrated political-economic features of policy-making, state-civil society relations, state-supranational organizations relations, civil society-supranational organizations relations |
| Frequency of enumeration | 1-5 visits per respondent. |
| Data collection methods | Interviews (semi-structured) = 90% Participant Observation and Observation = 10% |

4.6 The Role of the Researcher

Bryman (2001) sets out four key ethical principles with regard to research. First the research should involve no harm to the participants. Second, participants should give informed consent that they wish to take part in the research. Third, the privacy of participants must not be invaded. Fourth, participants should not be deceived. While recognizing that it is not possible to set out clear boundaries for all of these principles, a systematic attempt was made to observe them in the context of this research. Anonymity and confidentiality were provided with regard to all participants. Names of NGOs, trade unions, government Ministries and departments, donors and

87 See chapter 5 for details.
88 TUs = Trade Unions.
academic institutions have been set out but individual participants not named, unless they gave explicit consent. It was important to name institutions because they have very different ways and levels of participating in national policy-making processes and/or attitudes towards it, which have policy implications.

As the Social Research Association (2003: 28) points out, ‘the principle of informed consent is necessarily vague, since it depends for its interpretation on unstated assumptions about the amount of information and the nature of consent required to constitute acceptable practice. All participants were given information about the research in as clear a way as possible and this was based on a careful assessment of what information was likely to be material to an actor’s willingness or unwillingness to take part. In this research, all the main aspects of the study were explained and as much time as individuals wanted was provided for them to ask questions and/or make comments before deciding whether or not to take part in interviews. With regard to privacy, it was made explicit to participants that they could move the topics in directions they preferred and avoid any issue as they felt fit. No participant stated that they felt a question was too private and since all of the participants had an employment role that involved oversight of departments and/or individuals, they were used to setting boundaries and being assertive.

The extent to which a researcher can be, and should be, close to participants in a study always presents a dilemma. Scheyvens and Storey (2003) are among writers who have highlighted the potentially exploitative nature of research, particularly in developing countries. Terms such as ‘new academic tourism’ (Mowforth and Munt, 2009: 194), ‘rural development tourism’ (Chambers, 2008: 25) and ‘research travelers’ (Clifford, 1997: 67) have been used in this regard. It is not possible to evade the issue of ‘otherness’ when doing research, whatever the nationality, ethnicity, age, gender, level of education and social class of the researcher. It was stated that the research would be made available to all participants, and that they were welcome to discuss matters or request information and help at any time during and after the fieldwork periods.

Chambers (2008, 2005, 2004) has argued, along with others (Johnson and Mayoux, 1998, for example), that research should empower participants. Concerning this research, all participants were asked if they needed any professional help, making it clear that this could not be
guaranteed. Most NGO officials said that it was important to highlight issues concerning their participation in national policy-making processes and doing so would be a way to assist them. Trade union officials tended to ask for help with capacity building. As a result, potential sources of funding for labour organizations were gathered from the internet and the ILO offices in Dar es Salaam and the issue was discussed with an academic at the University of Dar es Salaam who had been involved in running courses for trade unions. The information on funding was then sent to all the trade unions which took part in the study and some of them subsequently made successful funding applications to run programmes.

All participants were told that the research was only for academic purposes and would not be passed on to, or published through, the government or any donors involved in national policy-making processes. The nature of the study and the role of the researcher were fully outlined to all participants, followed by the setting out of discussion topics and an explanation of how they related to the research questions.

It is impossible not to make cultural inferences when doing research and researchers need to be aware of their positionality regarding race, ethnicity, age, gender, and social and economic class, since these aspects can influence the data that is provided by participants, as well as the way it is collected and interpreted (Scheyvens and Storey, 2003). The importance of these factors shows that research is ‘presentational,’ as well as having technical, methodological and experiential elements (Roberts, 2007).

In the light of this point, field notes were taken every day, recording the process of data collection, including informal conversations and other interactions with participants. A daily diary was also written, describing and analysing issues that emerged from day-to-day experiences, which aided reflection on the overall progress of the fieldwork. This allowed sharper insights into the lives of participants than would have been the case if a mechanical following of the research plan had occurred, without considered thought about how interactions were affecting relationships and the amount and type of data collected. Taking field notes and keeping a diary allowed a focus on the interpretations and meanings of the participants and was fruitful in ‘asserting the authentic voice of the subjects under study’ (Stephens, 2009: 97).
Cultural considerations inevitably arose during the fieldwork sessions through the position of the researcher as a foreigner and in particular being white and English. White people are called ‘mzungu’, in Tanzania, and meanings attached to the word are complex (Baaz, 2005, Mbele, 2005, Fanon, 2001). For Fanon (2001), colonialism to a large extent led to the ‘mzungu’ being perceived by many Africans as superior to them and the term being associated with virtues, such as honesty, intelligence and punctuality. However, as Mbele (2005) points out, it can also be applied to both white and black people in a negative way - to denote arrogance or delusions of grandeur, for example. Baaz (2005) further examines the complexity of meanings involved in the use of ‘mzungu’ in the context of aid work. For Baaz, overall perceptions by Africans of the superiority of the ‘mzungu’ as a result of colonialism have become fragmented and noticeable differences in meaning when using the word can be discerned, which are dependent on, inter alia, the age, level of education and economic power of the speaker.

Although Baaz’s views concerning the complexity of meanings attached to the use of mzungu are nuanced, Fanon’s analysis still has a degree of explanatory power in the light of the fieldwork experience. For example, Tanzanian colleagues told me that obtaining appointments with staff at the World Bank and the UNDP, as well as with high ranking trade union officials, could be problematic, but not for you ‘because you are a mzungu,’ which proved correct. This raises the question of the extent to which ‘courtesy bias’ (Leon et al, 2007, Hines, 1993, Jones, 1983) may have influenced responses in interviews and during discussions which occurred as part of participant observation. Clearly, interactions with respondents involve issues of power and control, since ‘working with people brings out power relations in a very immediate way’ (Woodhouse, 1998: 127). As the interviewer I had put broad boundaries around how information should be collected and used. The informants in turn made decisions as to how much information they wanted to disclose.

The techniques discussed above - using probes, mirroring and silences – were effective in eliciting information, checking that the meaning intended by the participants was accurately recorded. However, judging what interviewees did not disclose because of courtesy bias and/or affective factors, such as race, gender and social class, is difficult. The interviewees were almost
all people with power in the workplace, who were confident and used to debate. Most of them asked further questions after the nature of the research and its purposes were outlined.

Since the interviews were semi-structured and it was made clear that respondents could avoid and/or bring up any issues they wanted, there were elements of freedom, control and collaboration on their part concerning the ways in which they provided answers. As Woodhouse (1998: 145) argues, ‘establishing a collaborative content is important, whether or not the methods used are specifically labelled “participatory.”’

The time and trouble that participants took to accommodate requests for interviews was humbling. It is pointed out in the Revised Ethical Guidelines for Educational Research (British Educational Research Association, 2004) that ‘researchers must recognise concerns relating to the “bureaucratic burden” of much research, especially survey research, and must seek to minimise the impact of their research on the normal working and workload of participants’. Despite having busy working lives and many other issues to deal with, respondents went out of their way to be constructive as participants in the research and a number engaged in follow-up contacts.

The fieldwork was conducted in English, which along with Swahili, is an official language in Tanzania. This did not present problems as all the participants within the sample groups spoke the language fluently. Despite their joint status as official languages, Swahili is ‘the local lingua franca and national language’, while ‘English is the predominant language of higher learning and to a certain extent of official and commercial business’ (Mkilifi, 1972: 197). There are complexities involved in situating the status of Swahili and English in Tanzania (Blommaert, 2005, Mazrui, 1997), but, in general, fluency in the latter is regarded by many Tanzanians as a sign of status and a high level of education. Since government documents are produced in English and Swahili, as is the case with most of the materials published by civil society organizations, a full-time research assistant was not needed. Key informants provided translations from Swahili to English where necessary.
As with all social science research, this study has to address the issues of generalizability, reliability and validity. For, Blaxter et al (2006: 221), generalizability is ‘whether your findings are likely to have broader applicability beyond the focus of your study’. Reliability refers to consistency of research processes and exists when a piece of research, carried out several times, yields the same results. Validity concerns ‘whether your methods, approaches and techniques actually related to, or measure, the issues you have been exploring’ (ibid). That is, research should be based on methods, techniques and instruments that are trustworthy. The analysis and findings from the data collected should be verifiable by other researchers using the same methods and it should be made clear how far the findings from the population sample can be applied to wider cases or populations.

Generalizability can be tested with regard to this research by carrying out similar studies of NGO and trade union participation in national policy-making processes in Tanzania or other countries. At present, almost seventy countries have produced PRSPs. Reliability can also be checked, since the population samples still exist and the same research instruments – interviews, observation and document analysis – can be utilised by other researchers. Finally, with regard to validity, the triangulation of appropriate qualitative and quantitative methods has been employed to establish the credibility of the research findings.

4.7 Procedures of Data Analysis
The data gathered were processed in the following way:

1. Raw quantitative data from interviews were assigned frequency values using Excel spreadsheets.

2. Tables and figures were constructed to organise and examine components of the quantitative data obtained from the interviews.

3. Interview notes, which had been written out in clear handwriting on the same day as the notes had been originally made, were typed up after fieldwork sessions and stored in electronic and hard copy forms. The typed transcripts were scrutinized in order to sort out data relevant and irrelevant to the research. The relevant data were coded manually according to categorizations established on the basis of the core themes of the research.
4. The coded data were printed out and refined in order to categorize information in a concentrated way. From here, interpretation was used in highlighting key points and issues under the same ‘thick descriptive’ (Geertz, 1973) categories for NGOs and trade unions – Priorities in Discourses and Key Relationships.

4.8 Summary
This chapter outlined the rationale for the methodology used in the research and examined issues concerning the process of data collection. It also contained self-reflective sections on undertaking the field research and data analysis involved in this project. Moreover, how the data collected were then processed for analysis, in order to provide insights into answering the research questions, was discussed. The methodology was reviewed to show how it contributed to the provision of effective answers to the main research questions.

The methodology discussed in this chapter was used in the analysis of civil society in Tanzania, based on the three periods of fieldwork outlined above, which is discussed in the following three chapters. Chapter 5 focuses on the contestation of policy space by NGOs in post-liberalization Tanzania. How a small group of NGOs have come to dominate the civil society sector is a key area of analysis. In chapter 6 the main research question is addressed. That is, how and why have trade unions been excluded from the reconfiguration of ‘civil society’ in post-liberalization Tanzania? This requires an examination of whether trade unions are currently representatives of a labour aristocracy in the formal sector, rather than the workforce as a whole and the extent to which trade unions could and should adopt 'social movement unionism’ in order to strengthen their voice in post-liberalization national policy-making processes Chapter 7 contain an outline and analysis of how have trade unions and NGOs been included in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) process and with what outcomes.
Chapter 5
The NGO Sector in Tanzania

5.1 Overview of the Development of NGOs in Tanzania
In this chapter, central issues regarding the conceptualization and theorization of civil society, which were examined in chapter 3, are framed within the historical development of NGOs in Tanzania, starting from the period of British colonialism. This is followed by a discussion of fieldwork findings. The historical grounding of the development of NGOs shows that their room for manoeuvre as part of civil society was limited in the war of position under colonial rule and during control by the one-party state after independence. Throughout these periods, the key aspects of the integral state - ideological hegemony supported by coercion (Gramsci, 1978) - were used to close down spaces where policies and ideologies could be contested by civil society. The state maintained tight control of key superstructure institutions, notably the judiciary, the legislature, the executive, the military and the church, thereby dominating the war of position in civil society with potential or actual opponents. As a result, NGOs had few opportunities to formulate and promulgate counter-hegemonic discourses. In the post-liberalization period, civil society has been reconfigured, with a small group of large, urban-based NGOs rising to power, largely through the funding and patronage of multilateral and bilateral donors, which pressured the state to relinquish its dominant position as an agent of development in favour of a prominent role for market forces. As the market-led model was unable to meet the social and economic needs of the population, NGOs became both service-providers to fill in the gaps and standard bearers of the newly configured civil society, which donors were keen to make a key part of the socio-political landscape in post-liberalization Tanzania. The state was reluctant to allow NGOs a significant role in providing services and in national policy-making processes, but had little choice but to acquiesce, given their indebtedness to the donors and the need to fill in shortfalls in the provision of social services to the mass of citizens. Other forms of civil society in Tanzania that have legitimacy with citizens have been marginalized, whilst the donors have instead championed a small number of elite urban-based NGOs.

89 The fieldwork findings are based primarily on interviews with officials from NGOs that have taken part in national policy-making processes in the post-liberalization period, as well as participant observation and document analysis. See chapter 4 for details of the methodology used.
NGOs, staffed by well-educated professionals with whom they share the dominant development discourse. This group, therefore, has some leverage vis-à-vis the state, regarding input to national-policy making processes. However, the state has used legal-bureaucratic means in the form of legislation, codes of conduct and the creation of an oversight body, to circumscribe the remit of NGOs in post-liberalization Tanzania. These means have served to ensure that the work of NGOs is largely apolitical and confined to the social sphere. The state claims these legal-bureaucratic measures embody the national interest, represented more widely by neo-liberal policies in the economic sector linked to multi-party liberal democracy and an apolitical civil society, which shares the concerns of the state in forming policies and programmes. In short, these policies and programmes are portrayed by the state as ‘common sense’ (Gramsci, 2011). In the context of this neo-liberal hegemony, a small number of NGOs have formed counter-hegemonic discourses. However, in doing so, these organizations face the powerful accusation that they are acting against the national interest and common sense. In addition, these counter-hegemonic discourses are not based on a concerted strategy or vision and fail to involve sizeable grassroots campaigns. Thus, they do not constitute a substantive challenge to the hegemony of the state at present.

5.2 Tanzanian NGOs during the period of British Colonialism

The formation and activities of NGOs were tightly constrained by the colonial authorities in Tanzania. Kiondo (1992) records the founding of nineteen NGOs under colonial rule and revises this down to just eleven in a later piece of work (Kiondo, 1993). The few active NGOs were mostly national chapters of existing British associations, providing social services, such as the Tanzania Society for the Blind. The other main type of NGO operating in Tanzania at this time was based on bourgeois economic interests, notably the Tanganyikan Farmers Association (TFA), a membership requirement of which was ownership of at least five acres of developed land or a number of livestock. Race and ethnicity were fault lines for NGO membership during this period. The TFA and other influential NGOs, such as the Dar es Salaam Round Table, were dominated by Asians. The majority of Africans lacked the economic means to join such organizations and instead developed associations based on adapting to life in urban areas, notably burial societies, loans associations, faith-based organizations and groups centred on regions of the country (Tripp, 1992).
The independence struggle stimulated increasing activity in the civil society sector, which engaged in a concerted struggle for ideological hegemony with the state, based on the Tanzanian African National Union (TANU) in the political arena, the cooperative movement in the agricultural sector and a growing labour movement, organized by the Tanganyikan Federation of Labour (TFL). NGOs were not active during this period, although some Parents’ Associations and Youth Leagues took part in associational life from the 1940s onwards (Kiondo, 1993). However, Gibbon (2001: 822) shows how other elements of civil society did pose a threat to state hegemony. Chieftaincies in northern Tanzania during the colonial era contained a kaleidoscope of associational life, including lineages, clans, age-sets, credit groups (upatu), sports clubs, dance societies, faith-based organizations and courts of elders. Above this, at tribal level, were some large rural-based civil society associations, notably cooperative unions and tribal unions, along with more informal ‘non-compliance movements.’ All of these groups contested state hegemony to some degree. The anti-colonial activities of non-compliance movements were directed mainly against land use regulations, taxes, alienation of land and the racial composition of local councils. Tribal unions took part in actions contesting the regulations opposed by the non-compliance movements but also were concerned with wider issues of ‘development’, such as educational provision. The struggles of the large non-compliance movements did have links to similar protests by more locally-based peasant groups and with the work of some TANU branches.

5.3 Tanzanian NGOs from Independence to the New Policy Agenda

Following independence in 1961, the Tanzanian state rapidly became a hegemon, through firmly imposed policies (see chapter 3), supported by the international donor community and influential foreign NGOs, which led to a situation where independent associational life was limited during the 1960s and the 1970s. From 1961 to 1978 only seventeen new NGOs were registered, through the Societies Act, in the country (Kiondo, 1993). The use of the 1954 Societies Act to register NGOs remained a vital legal-bureaucratic means of state control over which elements of civil

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90 See chapter 3 for an overview of the development of TANU.
91 See chapter 3 for an overview of the development of Co-operative Societies.
92 See chapter 6 for an overview of the development of the TFL.
society could exist and in what form after independence. The fact that registration of any NGO could be refused because it was ‘in the opinion of the registrar, undesirable’ (URT, 1954) and that an existing organization could be de-registered if its actions were prejudicial to ‘good government’ (URT, 1954), gave the state substantive power and control over civil society. With the dissolution of the TFL in 1964, state control became pervasive and associational life ‘at the national level was effectively crippled’ (Tripp, 2000: 197). This control of civil society by the one party state from 1965 was instrumental in narrowing and overseeing who could participate in the political life of Tanzania, and how. For Shivji (1991: 85), the ‘destruction of autonomous organized expression of the differences in civil society is the first profound effect of the monopoly of politics by the state-party.’ Tanzania became a closed society ‘where the members of the public are spectators and rumour-mongers rather than actors and commentators’ (Shivji, 1991: 86). The Arusha Declaration of 1967 (see chapter 3) led to state structures gradually replacing the major voluntary associations operating in the rural areas, notably the co-operative societies, which were banned in 1976. Within a further year, remaining civil society organizations of substance, such as the Dar es Salaam Student Association (DUSO), were brought under state control. Worsening economic conditions during the 1970s (see chapter 3) were a major influence on the state’s decision to further tighten its control over development activities. This led to a ‘removal of space for independent activity’ (Jennings, 2007: 92-93).

Thus, while the charismatic leadership of Nyerere was important in maintaining the authority of the ruling party (as it rolled out its developmental vision for Tanzania) in the forms of the Arusha Declaration and ujamaa (see chapter 3), the coercive element of the integral state was also used effectively and rapidly after independence to limit the autonomy of civil society.

Although service provision in areas like health and education was uneven during this period, a high level of foreign donor funding and support for government policies were significant in upholding the hegemony of the state. The IFIs and leading bilateral donors were at this time keen to support what they perceived as ‘progressive non-communist development models’ (Kiondo, 1993: 166). Tanzania received the highest level of official development assistance in Africa from 1977 to 1979, the majority being in grant form, which made it easy for the government to

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93 See chapter 3 for a discussion of the lasting significance of the Societies Act.
leverage. In addition, the ideologies of foreign NGOs during the *ujamaa* period limited the ability of civil society to operate autonomously. Jennings (2008a, 2001) shows how Oxfam supported the *ujamaa* programme on ideological grounds, and operations such as the Chunya Integrated Development Project, were created overtly to assist in its implementation. In doing so, Oxfam, as well as other foreign NGOs, became ‘surrogates of the state’ and ‘part of a process that withdrew power and representation from the grass roots’ (Jennings, 2001: 131). Thus, assistance from external donors and foreign civil society organizations was useful to the state in winning the war of position in Tanzanian civil society.

However, with the adoption of neo-liberalism on the part of the IFIs from the end of the 1970s, Tanzania’s statist policies came under pressure, given the large dependence of the government on external financing. The government’s acceptance of a SAP in 1986 (see chapter 3) changed the dynamic between the state and civil society in Tanzania. Under the SAP, externally driven neo-liberal policies replaced statism and the ideology of *ujamaa* was rolled back. This resulted in NGOs gaining space in which to provide a challenge to state hegemony, should they so wish. As the democratic deficit, brought about by the newly-imposed market-driven model, became apparent during the 1980s, NGOs increasingly filled in the gaps by providing social services. NGOs were seen by the major donors as more efficient, less bureaucratic and less corrupt than the state sector. This led to increasing numbers of NGOs entering the development arena in Tanzania, with forty one registered between 1980 and 1990 (Kiondo, 1992). The doubling of the social service sector NGOs registering during the 1980s in comparison to the 1970s reflected the ‘tremendous erosion of government capacity in social service provision’ (Kiondo, 1993: 171).

The failure of state dirigisme to provide adequate social services was a significant factor leading to the creation of a special category of NGO, District Development Trusts (DDTs), from the late 1970s, which were granted powers by the official District Councils and permitted to raise revenues through local taxes and crops. DDTs mainly provided services in the areas of education, health and infrastructure (Mchomvu et al, 1998). Foreign NGOs and donor agencies helped fund the activities of DDTs, which were often set up by political and business elites in urban areas. Many DDTs had national political figures as patrons, who could leverage funding

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94 See chapter 3 for an overview of, and figures for, ODA to Tanzania.
and state resources and in return guarantee loyalty to the government and increase their support from constituents. Thus, the government approved of these organizations and more than two hundred came into existence (Nugent, 2004). For Qorro (1991), DDTs represented not just the need for NGOs to fill in the democratic deficit but also enabled the people running them to be registered and approved by the state when they could not legally be placed within the ambit of official government bodies, such as the District Councils. In this way DDTs started to run many secondary schools from the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1990 the number of state secondary schools rose from eighty three to one hundred and thirty five, whereas secondary schools run by non-state actors rose significantly faster; from seventy one to one hundred and ninety five (Lugalla, 1993). In this way, state hegemony was bolstered in the face of the increasing power of donor-driven neo-liberal policies in Tanzania, which included an enlarged role for an ‘independent’ civil society sector. The state felt threatened by this expansion of civil society and reacted with various strategies as part of the war of position, including co-option of civil society. In the case of the DDTs, it was successful.

The challenge to state hegemony from the enlarging NGO sector during the 1980s has led to attempts at classification of different types of NGOs operating in the country. Shivji (1991) identifies four categories of NGOs according to their socio-political alignment that emerged during this period; government-organized NGOs (GONGOs), foreign NGOs (FONGOs), local NGOs (LONGOs) - the majority of which were foreign funded (FFUNGOs) - and People’s Organizations (POs). The rise of GONGOs is related to the recognition of the government that NGOs were attracting a substantial amount of foreign funding. This stimulated efforts on the part of the Tanzanian government to maintain hegemony by coordinating, monitoring and evaluating the work of NGOs, in order to obtain access to donor financing, establish patron-client relationships with intended beneficiaries of the work of NGOs and provide a local power base for individual politicians, who could claim credit for successful work by the NGO with their constituents (Kiondo, 1993). Prominent GONGOs were quasi-governmental mass organizations, such as the Women’s Movement (Umoja wa Wanawake), which had been co-opted by the ruling party as part of the move to an all-encompassing statism after independence. FONGOs are mostly Tanzanian branches of Big International NGOs (BINGOs) and function to channel external donor financing into the operation of local initiatives or support for the existing work of
indigenous NGOs. LONGOs are closely related to FONGOs in comprising local NGOs, formed and funded largely or wholly through international donor financing. FONGOs and LONGOs have in common a socio-political alignment to BINGOs. People’s Organizations (POs) are often grassroots groups, which are self-financing or use international funding only as a supplement to their own fund-raising strategies. Some POs have confronted government policies and stood up for the interests of those being oppressed, such as the Tanzania Environmental Society (TESO), which fought against government confiscation of public land in Arusha. Government antagonism towards POs which challenged state hegemony by criticizing their policies was ameliorated during the 1980s by the need to have as many development agents as possible supplementing the increasingly beleaguered state provision. Thus, with regard to the war of position, the state gave strategic ground to civil society, by allowing some NGO criticism of its policies, through a need to ensure that external donors would continue to fund non-state actors, which would engage in service delivery where gaps existed in public sector provision.

Overall, the number and the activities of NGOs increased markedly in Tanzania from the 1970s, as the IFI-influenced move to neo-liberal policies led to the rolling back of state activities. While the government was forced to acquiesce to the ideology of neo-liberalism, largely through its financial dependence on external donors (see chapter 3), it used the coercive aspect of the integral state in an effort to uphold its hegemony in the face of actual and potential opposition from civil society. This centred on the continued use of the Societies Act, which the state had used effectively to circumscribe the activities of NGOs since its enactment in 1954. As well as allowing the registrar to refuse applications for registration and to de-register existing organizations (see above in this section), the act also required all NGOs to supply the registrar with a list of officers and members, as well as a copy of the constitution. This allowed the state to monitor individuals and organizations working in ‘sensitive’ sectors carefully. ‘Sensitive’ sectors included all advocacy work, human rights and organizations working in areas where CCM had dedicated wings of the party; notably gender and youth. Therefore, while the state’s position as the dominant agent of development was threatened by the increase in NGO activity from the 1970s up to liberalization in the mid-1980s, it employed legal-bureaucratic means plus co-option of important elements of civil society, as in the case of the DDTs, as effective weapons in the war of position.
5.4 NGOs in Post-liberalization Tanzania

Tanzanian government statistics (URT, 1995) show that while only twenty five NGOs were registered in the country between 1986 and 1990, the figure increased to six hundred and four registrations between 1990 and 1995. Influential NGOs became concentrated in urban areas and in the main were ‘established by educated elites who have the knowledge and contacts to start an NGO successfully’ Mercer (1999: 249). The state, in keeping with historical tradition, reacted to this challenge to its hegemony by using legislation as a weapon in the war of position, therefore, obstructing through legal-bureaucratic means the ‘gradual shift of power and prestige away from the bureaucracy to the civil society’ (Mwapachu, 1998: xviii).

Research on NGO growth, activities and ideologies from 1990 to the present reveals several key aspects. First, the donor-driven nature of NGO work is apparent, with upward accountability to funders, through reliance on external finance, being more important than downward accountability to intended beneficiaries. Second, the new NGO sector is not organic in the sense of associations being created in response to the perceived needs of Tanzanian citizens (Pender, 2005, Shivji, 2004). NGOs were scaled up in Tanzania from the 1990s, largely through the patronage of external donors, which provided most of the funding for this expansion. Third, the majority of the most influential NGOs in Tanzania are urban based and run by well educated, middle class professionals. Fourth, NGOs tend not to have grand visions of how Tanzanian society should be configured in economic, political and social terms. There is a concentration instead on day-to-day activities (Mushi, forthcoming, Shivji, 2004).

The influence of donors and the difficulties involved in forming and maintaining effective NGOs outside urban areas are illustrated by the struggles to create organizations representing the concerns of pastoralists in Tanzania. The prioritization of donor interests above those of the pastoralists themselves and the need for good connections with state actors in order for NGOs to operate effectively is shown by the studies of Plastow (2005), Igoe (2003) and Cameron (2001). Cameron (2001) outlines how the Pastoralist Indigenous Non-Governmental Organization (PINGOs) Forum, founded in 1994 became over-laden with structures, driven by donor priorities, and was captured by a particular faction, leading to the withdrawal of external funding in 1999. Igoe (2003: 881) demonstrates that external aid from the international donors ‘actually
undermined the formation of civil society in pastoralist communities.’ Too much time was spent on activities involving upward accountability to donors. Despite the rhetoric of ‘partnership’ and ‘local ownership’ of programmes, the old top down relationship between northern donors and local NGOs remains largely unchanged. For Plastow (2005: 1), substantive change is only likely to be achieved if a range of powerful actors can be brought on board to lobby for the interests of pastoralists, allies found within the government and empirical evidence to support arguments is produced. This scenario requires time, money and a variety of technical skills on the part of pastoralist groups, which are currently lacking.

Furthermore, Mercer (2002b: 124), drawing on a study of village-based women’s groups on Mount Kilimanjaro, points to the romanticizing of the concepts of participation and the empowerment of local communities in much Western development literature and the failure to take account of the way ‘local social, cultural, political and economic conditions influence people’s agendas and motivations for getting involved.’ Women’s groups were used to consolidate the interests of certain individuals and to attain status rather than through a desire for empowerment. This exemplifies the need for historically-grounded studies of civil society, which take into account the way power has been created and maintained by particular groups of people in communities. The attempts by donors to map development concepts (in this case, a participatory approach) onto projects and programmes without knowledge of how the local political economy has been shaped historically is a major reason for their failure.

A more positive view of the influence of Tanzanian civil society in the post-liberalization period can be gained from the way that land and sexual harassment policies were changed as a result of concerted efforts by NGOs. Consequently, the enactment of the Sexual Offences Special Provisions Act (1998) and the Land Act (1999) ‘are the most significant achievement of the activities of civil organizations’ (Mallya, 2001: 27). Nevertheless, the relationship between the NGO sector and the government during the 1990s, can be characterized as a series of ‘performative rituals’ (Mercer, 2003) which legitimized continued economic liberalization policies and the discourse of good governance, based on partnership and participatory development. For Kelsall (2002: 598), this period saw the ‘building of an ersatz, air-conditioned civil society’ in Tanzania by donors keen to fund NGOs, following structural adjustment and the
move to multi-party politics. Little challenge to state hegemony emerged from this newly created sector.

The onset of the PRSP process (see chapter 7) in October 1999 led to changes in the composition, power dynamics and trajectories of the NGO sector in Tanzania, with FFUNGOS and FONGOS coming to the fore and, through donor influence, a new umbrella group, the Policy Forum, created, in order to coordinate NGO work. Donor influence has also led to advocacy work becoming more prominent than had previously been the case (Gould and Ojanen, 2005, Pender, 2005) and an attempt to modernize and professionalize a group of influential urban-based NGOs, through capacity building and the use of Information Communication Technologies (ICTs). The state’s response to these challenges to its hegemony from civil society has again been to use legislation and regulation of the policy space available to the NGO sector. First, a formal policy with regard to NGO work in the country was created. Second, in 2002, new legislation covering the work of NGOs - the Non-Governmental Organizations Act (No. 24) (URT, 2002b) - was enacted. Third, a coordination body – the National Council for NGOs (NACONGO) (URT, 20101) – was set up. These three new fronts in the war of position show how the government has fought to maintain its hegemony in the post-liberalization period through using the coercive legal-bureaucratic elements of the integral state.

Upholding its position as a hegemon in post-liberalization Tanzania is complicated for the state by the increasing influence of transnational actors, particularly the IFIs. The IFIs (and to a lesser extent, bilateral donors) drive the ideology and policy directions of both the state and civil society. Multilateral and bilateral donors have provided substantive funding and support for NGOs in Tanzania since liberalization. For example, Mercer (2005, 2004) outlines how donors have funded and promoted ICTs in Tanzania since 2000 as a way of strengthening civil society by attempting to broaden participation in development debates, disseminate information to a wide audience and foster alliances. While this has stimulated some networking among well-resourced NGOs, only a small number of FONGOS and FFUNGOS have access to ICT amenities, and the Internet is far from being an inclusive development tool. These findings can be supported by the fact that only six per cent of the population has access to electricity (African Rural Energy Enterprise Development (AREED), 2010). Thus, any potential challenge to state
hegemony from NGOs using modern communication technologies is extremely narrowly-based. ICTs are used for exchanges of information between this small group of elite NGOs, such as notices concerning the schedules of the ‘Breakfast Meetings’ between NGOs (see chapter 4). They are also used to upload national policy instrument documents for comment and discussion, such as the PRSP. Policy Forum, 2010, has for example, the third phase PRSP document (2010-2015) on its website (URT, 2010b). However, ICTs are not used to instigate grassroots campaigns and, since ninety four per cent of people in the country have no access to electricity they are anything but a vehicle with which to engage the mass of the Tanzanian population. The improvement of ICTs at the small number of elite urban-based NGOs can, thus, be seen as the provision of another trapping, along with air-conditioning and land cruisers. It has not been useful, however, in formulating and sustaining counter-hegemonic discourses.

Moreover, Gould and Ojanen (2005) show how a donor-driven emphasis on advocacy work by NGOs emerged at the end of the 1990s with the establishment of dedicated positions in major organizations that had hitherto concentrated on service delivery. This was a significant shift, since, at the start of the new millennium, few Tanzanian NGOs had developed the capacity to engage in ‘policy analysis and advocacy’ in ways that applied ‘any real pressure on the government’ (Evans and Ngalewa, 2003: 251). DFID commissioned research on civil society in Tanzania in 2000 (Alloo, 2000, Dangor and Nadison, 2000), which highlighted the importance of advocacy work. However, donor efforts to fund and support advocacy work, as a way of inculcating a stronger challenge from civil society to state hegemony in post-liberalization Tanzania has been problematic. The main obstacle to the development of advocacy work among Tanzanian NGOs is the prevailing belief on the part of state institutions and civil society organizations themselves that it is ‘political,’ whereas ‘true’ civil society activities should be apolitical. 95 This viewpoint, influenced by years of state hegemony during colonialism and the post-independence period of one-party rule, is limiting, given that by its very nature advocacy involves recommending or supporting a particular cause or policy, making it necessarily political. The state’s use of legal-bureaucratic means since 2000 to capture the terms and conditions by which NGOs operate (in the form of the creation of an NGO policy, an NGO Act of Parliament and NACONGO as a coordinating body) has allowed the state to take itself out of

95 See below section 5.5 for details relating to this point from the fieldwork interviews with NGO officials.
the equation regarding political and ideological discourses. The state claims that these legal-bureaucratic measures are not based on a political ideology but simply represent the best practice in terms of framing the form civil society should take and the parameters of its activities in the post-liberalization era. Thus, the measures are based on common sense (Gramsci, 2011) and to contest them is not to engage in political debate but to go against the national interest. Given the power of the state’s perspective in this regard, it is not surprising that few counter-hegemonic discourses have been created through advocacy work on the part of Tanzanian NGOs in the post-liberalization period.

NACONGO set up an ‘NGO Code of Conduct’ (TANGO, 2010, Hakikazi Catalyst, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d) also called ‘NGO Code of Ethics’ (Policy Forum, 2008b), the main aim of which is ‘to establish core values and principles that shall guide the conduct and operations of all NGOs working in Tanzania’ (Policy Forum, 2008b: 1). The code focuses on the technical aspects of NGO work - governance, accountability, financial transparency, human resources, communication and information sharing - and the relationship between NGOs and other stakeholders. NACONGO is working on developing rewards for NGOs which comply with the code and sanctions for organizations breaking it, primarily to pre-empt state enforcement, which would imply ‘weak ownership’ on the part of NGOs (Policy Forum, 2008b: 2). Ensuring compliance with the code in this way indicates that NACONGO has internalized the donor-driven liberal view of the role of civil society organizations in Tanzania, which is based on achieving consensus through amicable debates between a variety of associational groups and the state. The point made by writers such as Cramer (2002) that ‘ownership’ is likely to involve conflicting positions and actions among both civil society and state organizations (which would mean having to fundamentally rethink the liberal-consensus model) is not taken into consideration.

5.5 NGOs in Tanzania: Key Fieldwork Findings
The ‘privatization of the notion of public interest’ (Kamet, 2002: 156) under neo-liberalism, leading to the concentration of power and resources, is evident in the way NGOs participate in

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96 See chapter 1.
97 See also Kamat (2004) on this point.
the Tanzanian PRSP, the national policy instrument introduced in 1999 and since strongly supported ideologically and financially by the IFIs. In post-liberalization Tanzania, the state has been forced by donor pressure to allow the public interest to be debated and determined in the private sphere by citizens operating through the institutionalized means of civil society organizations. The state, in response, has applied common sense legal-bureaucratic measures to regulate civil society, which it claims are technical common-sense measure, representing the national interest. According to this donor-driven perspective, the views of Tanzanian citizens are, *pace* deTocqueville, formulated through free and fair debate, involving mass participation. In reality, ‘civil society,’ as a designated sector taking part in PRSP process, is dominated by just a small number of influential NGOs. A core group of thirteen NGOs are involved as members of the macro working group. The process by which NGOs became part of the macro working group is not transparent but it is clear that all members are from the elite, urban-based NGOs, staffed by well-educated professionals. This group also comprises representatives from the Ministry of Finance, sectoral ministries, the donor community, research institutes, the President’s Office, Regional Administration and Local Government (PORALG) and the Local Government Reform Programme (Alonso and Utz, 2004). There are also sub-groups of NGOs which work on particular areas of development: Agriculture; Rural Development and Water; Governance; Education; Health; HIV/AIDS; Roads and Regions/Other Groups. Nine NGOs from the macro working group, along with four non-members, were selected for interview, as a purposive sample (see chapter 4). Regarding the four non-members of the macro working group, Tanzania Education Network (TEN/MET) was chosen, as it is an influential umbrella organization (see discussion below in this section). Second, Oxfam Tanzania was selected, as it played an active role in supporting the Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development (TCDD) as a coordinator of NGO input to the first PRSP (1999-2004). PACT Tanzania was interviewed, as it is a well resourced and influential NGO, financed primarily by USAID. Finally, Youth Partnership Countryside (YPC) was selected, as the organization had been involved in a serious dispute with the government in the recent past, under its previous name, leading to it being deregistered. The key findings are summarized under two themes; NGO Priorities in Discourses and Key NGO Relationships.

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98 See chapter 7 for a detailed analysis of civil society participation in the PRSP process.
99 Source: Interview with former Oxfam Country Director, 10 November, 2005
The annual budgets of a number of the Macro Group of NGOs are considerable, providing them with a capacity far beyond that of trade unions and other forms of associational life in Tanzania. The budgets of the two most influential think tanks in the country – REPOA and ESRF – are substantive at $251,656 and $342,624 respectively. The size of these budgets can be judged from a comparison with total state revenues in 2009, which were $4.3 billion. Most of this funding comes from external donor agencies, which are named as financial supporters in the accounts sections of annual reports, although the specific amounts of donations are, in the main, not recorded. Thus, the donors are expending a substantive amount of finance on just a few NGOs, as a major part of their effort to build a ‘new’ civil society in their own image. The heavy reliance on external funding has been used by the state as evidence that the ‘new’ NGOs, which dominate civil society in the post-liberalization period, are pawns of, and mouthpieces for, the major international donor agencies, rather than organizations which have developed organically to respond to perceived needs of Tanzanian citizens.

Table 5.1 **Budget Analysis of NGOs Interviewed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of NGO</th>
<th>Budget (in US dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy Forum</td>
<td>598,928 (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TGNP</td>
<td>Not supplied – Grant of 197,872 provided by Norwegian Embassy (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN/MET</td>
<td>250 (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACOSODE</td>
<td>Not supplied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESRF</td>
<td>251,656 (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPOA</td>
<td>342,624 (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHRC</td>
<td>Not supplied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam Tanzania</td>
<td>1,141 (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakielimu</td>
<td>2,498 (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCF Tanzania</td>
<td>13,264 in ‘Restricted Funds’ category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11,561 in grant from the CEF (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ActionAid Tanzania</td>
<td>4,413 (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACT Tanzania</td>
<td>12,350 (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YPC</td>
<td>Not supplied</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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100 The budgets of NGOs interviewed as part of the research are set out below in Table 5.1.
### Table 5.2  Website Analysis of NGOs which are part of the Macro Working Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Mission Statement</th>
<th>Statement of Vision/Core Values</th>
<th>Annual Reports Published</th>
<th>Main Donors Stated</th>
<th>Advocacy Emphasis</th>
<th>Major Content in Kiswahili</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HakiElimu</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Social and Economic Trust (TASOET)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakikazi Catalyst</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Agriculture Development Research Group (TADREG)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care International</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children Fund (SCF)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Council for Social Development (TACOSODE)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ActionAid</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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101  TASOET has no website.
102  TADREG has no website.
The contrast between the resources of NGOs and Tanzanian trade unions is striking. All the NGOs interviewed have websites, which are regularly maintained and updated. This can be contrasted with the fact that only the largest individual trade union – the Tanzania Teacher’s Union (TTU) - has a website, and even this barely functions. Moreover, all the NGOs interviewed produce their own publications, ranging from academic textbooks to reports and newsletters. With regard to trade unions, only two out of twenty one produce regular publications.

**NGO Priorities in Discourses**

The issues highlighted as priorities for NGOs focus first on legitimacy and then on capacity. The legitimacy of development-based NGOs as representatives of poor and marginalized groups has been much debated (Steffek et al, 2010, Baan et al, 2008, Jordan and Van Tuijl, 2003, Riddell, 2007, Hilhorst, 2003, Pearce, 2002, Hudock, 2001, Hashemi and Hassan, 1999, Clark, 1997). For Steffek et al (2010: 105) the legitimacy of any CSO is based on putting the ‘participation of, and accountability to, its members, supporters and beneficiaries centre stage.’ More specifically, legitimacy should be evaluated according to levels of participation, inclusion, responsiveness, transparency and independence. However, Steffek et al (2010) do not set out any ways to measure these five dimensions of legitimacy. None of the other analyses of legitimacy cited above provide a means of measuring the concept. Legitimacy in the context of the fieldwork findings section centres on how NGO officials themselves, in qualitative terms, view the participation of, and accountability to, intended beneficiaries. It also addresses the issue of how legitimate, as representatives of the poor and marginalized in Tanzania, NGO officials perceive themselves to be in the eyes of officials from other branches of civil society and the state, as well as the wider public.

**Legitimacy Issues**

There is considerable variance amongst NGOs as to how far their focus should be on building upward legitimacy, with the government and the donors, and to what extent their stress should be on creating downward legitimacy with the intended beneficiaries. The latter emphasis is closely related to a point raised by a number of interviewees; the need to build a positive profile not just

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103 See Chapter 6 - Table 6.2 for a summary of trade union resources.
with intended beneficiaries but also the general public in Tanzania. This is inextricably linked to the perception of Tanzanian NGO officials that civil society is a ‘new sector’. Civil society is regarded by the vast majority of NGO officials interviewed as starting with the new policy agenda. Most interviewees specifically stated that the civil society sector in Tanzania is only ten – fifteen years old. It was notable that interviewees did not recognize the current configuration of civil society as having any continuities with its form during the colonial era or under the post-independence one-party state. This was shown by the way interviewees did not state that civil society organizations are different in their current forms and ideologies to those existing in the past, but instead put forward the unequivocal view that civil society is a ‘new sector in Tanzania.’

Such views must be seen in the light of the fact that all but one of the thirteen NGOs interviewed had been formed after 1990 and are part of the donors’ desire to create an associational life, based on the free and fair exchange of ideas. The ideas put forward by NGOs will consequently make a significant contribution to the formation of policies based on the mass participation of the citizens and consequently a perception of ownership of national policy instruments. Almost all the interviewees felt that their organizations had no profile whatsoever with members of the public. Where they were recognized, this was largely in a negative way; as well-paid careerists, operating primarily in order to tap into foreign donor and government finance or simply as corrupt organizations, which solicit funds for their own use. ‘Careerist’ was used by a number of interviewees, from both NGOs and trade unions (see chapter 6) to describe the way they believe NGO staff are perceived by the public in Tanzania. The phrase ‘briefcase NGOs’ was used a number of times during interviews, when respondents were asked about the way their organizations are regarded by the public. The term has become known in Tanzania through media popularization. In response to negative perceptions of their work several leading NGOs had designed a billboard campaign in Dar es Salaam with the aim of fostering more positive views on the part of citizens. The billboards featured pictures showing different aspects of the work of NGOs which all had the same heading ‘NGOs are Good’ printed in Swahili and English. No monitoring and evaluation of the campaign or follow-up work was set up and interviewees felt that it was difficult to accurately gauge any affects of the campaign.
For almost every interviewee, the power of external donors to influence the Tanzanian NGO movement in the post-liberalization period is summed up by the leading role they played in the creation of Policy Forum as an apex organization, despite the fact that two NGO umbrella groups already existed. One of them, TACOSODE, was set up in 1965 as a joint government-civil society initiative. TACOSODE’s main functions are to foster cooperation between NGOs and the government, represent NGOs at national level, to link NGOs at local, national and regional levels and to act as a clearing house for donors. The organization has three hundred members and facilitates the provision of funds from international donors to grassroots organizations. As well as TACOSODE, the donors could have chosen to build the capacity of the Tanzanian Association of NGOs (TANGO), ‘the largest and oldest NGO umbrella organization in Tanzania,’ according to an official interviewed, as a lead umbrella organization for the sector. TANGO was formed in 1988 and now has seven hundred members. Some NGOs are members by proxy; as they belong to networks that have joined TANGO. Thus, according to an interviewee from TANGO, every NGO in Tanzania is linked to the organization in some way. TANGO runs three main programmes; policy advocacy, capacity building and information dissemination, which are all interrelated.

None of the interviewees could give a certain answer as to why external donors (principally Care International) had moved to set up the Policy Forum, when TACOSODE and TANGO already existed. It was suggested by several interviewees that TACOSODE was based on service delivery and the BINGOs wanted an umbrella group centred on advocacy work. However, if this is the case, then TANGO would have been a suitable choice, as it works exclusively on advocacy issues. Given the prior existence of these two experienced NGO umbrella organizations, the decision of the donors to expend a lot of energy and finance on creating another umbrella association, points to the desire to create a ‘new’ Tanzanian civil society in their own image. For interviewees the creation, through the influence of external donors, of Policy Forum as its preferred apex organization has led to confusing and contradictory structures and relationships in the NGO sector, which weakens its legitimacy. The founding of Policy Forum illustrates the

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104 Since TACOSODE used to be a quasi-governmental organization, it is not considered by interviewees to be an older NGO umbrella group than TANGO. This is an example of why the civil society sector in Tanzania is considered to be ‘new’ by officials from NGOs interviewed.
point that, while civil society is able to counter state hegemony more vigorously than in any previous period of Tanzanian history, the form of this contestation is shaped substantively by external donors, driving their (mis)interpretation of a de Tocquevillian view of civil society (see chapter 2), and not by the perceived needs of Tanzanian citizens. It also highlights the fact that the war of position in Tanzania for hegemony, involves not just the state and civil society, but also important actors at the transnational level. These actors are primarily the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and bilateral donors, which are framing a neo-liberal economic order and multi-party liberal democracy, along with a corresponding re-organization of civil society in line with their interpretation of de-Tocquevillian ideas. These donor-propelled shifts in the political economy of Tanzania are being repeated across the developing world as part of a move to make neo-liberalism hegemonic globally (Cox, 1983).

Along with the attempts of external donors to influence the composition and modus operandi of the NGO sector, the government’s use of legal-bureaucratic means move to maintain hegemony was cited by every interviewee as being of concern. NACONGO, created and empowered by an Act of Parliament to coordinate and provide policy guidelines for the role of NGOs in Tanzania, was seen in an overwhelmingly negative light by interviewees; ‘it is not working,’ as one put it, summing up the general view. Many interviewees argued that the role of NACONGO clashes with that of the Policy Forum and the foundation of the former is an attempt by the government to undermine the influence of the latter. The formation of NACONGO is also clearly seen as a threat to other umbrella NGO organizations. For example, officials at TACOSODE were worried that they could be banned in the future, as the state might rule that only one NGO coordinating body should be allowed. Structured power dynamics play a significant role in making NACONGO an influential organization; several interviewees argued that their organizations prefer to cooperate with Policy Forum in principle but regard having connections with NACONGO as a useful conduit to obtain information on what is happening with regard to NGOs within the ambit of the state. Thus, they maintain cordial relations with NACONGO, as doing so may provide them with access to information useful in contesting the war of position.

This perceived clash between the work of NACONGO and the Policy Forum illustrates the weakness of the de Tocquevillian vision of civil society being promulgated by the donors in
post-liberalization Tanzania. Rather than seeing an open and tolerant debate involving NACONGO and Policy Forum, aimed at fostering a constructive relationship between the key elements of the integral state, respondents regarded the two organizations as representing opposite sides in the war of position involving the state and civil society. NACONGO is regarded overwhelmingly as representing the interests of the state in restricting the power of NGOs to work autonomously. NGO officials interviewed pointed out that they had not been asked to take part in the formation of NACONGO. Thus, they regarded the organization as being an unwarranted external imposition on their work, which had been created in an undemocratic way. In addition, all the interviewees felt uneasy about relations with NACONGO, as they believed it had overseen the creation of an overly restrictive NGO Act in 2002. This view was unanimous among interviewees, despite the fact that pressure from NGOs forced key amendments to the 2002 NGO Act, notably having the need for annual registration deleted, which was inhibiting the founding and growth of associations. For the interviewees, NACONGO is there to ensure an unwarranted degree of oversight of their work and to make sure their activities remain largely apolitical. Their views, in this regard, show that the donors de Tocquevillian vision of state-civil society relations, based on openness, tolerance and trust, is far from reality in post-liberalization Tanzania. In fact, the polarized way in which interviewees perceived the positions of, and relationship between, NACONGO and the Policy Forum shows that a war of position is being fought. The majority of interviewees cited the history of coercive control by the Registrar of Societies over NGOs (see chapter 3 and section 5.4 above in this chapter) and the Registrar of Trade Unions over labour organizations (see chapter 6) as a significant cause of their misgivings about the position of NACONGO. Thus, most interviewees contended that the state was fighting to maintain hegemony in post-liberalization Tanzania in the face of rising civil society power, by using coercive legal-bureaucratic elements of the integral state in the form of an NGO policy, new legislation concerning NGOs and, above all the creation of NACONGO, as a supervisory body.

A further issue raised by interviewees concerning legitimacy was how far the minority of well funded and powerful NGOs are able to represent effectively the views of small NGOs outside urban centres. Part of the remit of the Policy Forum is the gathering and presenting the views of grassroots organizations nationwide. When interviewed, a Policy Forum official outlined how
hard it was for them to represent the views of grassroots organizations. The large geographical size of Tanzania (see figure and map at the end of chapter 1) makes it impossible for Policy Forum staff to visit many NGOs. Other forms of contact are also difficult, as the vast majority of small NGOs outside urban centres have no websites and do not use email regularly, if at all. The Policy Forum also reported difficulties in making telephone contact with such organizations. There is thus a problem with the argument that an umbrella organization is able to put forward the views of members effectively, so that a wide range of opinions from civil society groups in Tanzania are represented in national policy-making processes. This donor-driven perspective fails to take into account how demographic factors and the lack of communications infrastructure in the country hinder civil society participation in national policy-making processes.

A final major concern, regarding legitimacy, for NGO officials when interviewed was the use of the growing amount of data on poverty reduction. One interviewee summed up the general perspective in stating that ‘the information is geared to donors and written in a way only they can understand.’ The data was presented in ways that are intelligible to the intended beneficiaries, according to all respondents. The technical approach to poverty reduction, which is fundamental to all national policy instruments in post-liberalization Tanzania (see chapter 3), thus, hinders the understanding of issues on the part of the most marginalized and vulnerable groups in the country. By extension, it stops them from participating in an informed way. This lack of capacity on the part of intended beneficiaries, leads to their inability to participate meaningfully in national policy-making processes, which, therefore, lack legitimacy, according to almost every NGO official interviewed. Furthermore, interviews revealed that NGO officials regard the donors and the government as having little interest in making the conceptual framework and the data used in national policy-making processes intelligible to the most vulnerable groups in Tanzania. Instead they were regarded as having mainly technical concerns, centred around the effective collection, storage and presentation of data on poverty alleviation. Interviewees also argued that the state refused to discuss neo-liberal macroeconomic fundamentals with NGOs. Thus, even for the minority of individuals who could understand the technicalities relating to data collection and presentation, there was little room for meaningful debate around statistics on different aspects of poverty in Tanzania. Overall, interviewees were concerned that intended beneficiaries had little chance of participating meaningfully in national policy-making processes.
Thus, the interviews revealed that mass participation on the part of Tanzanian citizens, and by extension ownership of national policy-making processes, was largely absent.

**Capacity Issues**

Although an overall vision and strategy on the part of NGOs had not been formed, poverty alleviation was identified as the central issue concerning their work by the majority of NGO officials interviewed, in line with the donor discourse. Work in this area often focused on awareness-raising campaigns, which take place under various names, (Civic Education in the case of the Policy Forum and YPC and Civic Awareness with regard to PACT, for example). However, a small minority of organizations, notably TGNP and Hakielimu, have attempted to formulate a more fundamental challenge to the donor-driven focus on poverty alleviation. The lack of both financial and technical capacity, hampering the finding of effective ways to reduce poverty, were significant themes running through the interviews. Funding was a concern for many NGOs, with lack of financial capacity regarded as a major impediment to meaningful participation in national policy-making processes. Moreover, the need for NGOs to get access to relevant information and data that would inform their arguments was also regarded as important. Thus, both financial and technical capacity-building for NGOs were significant issues for interviewees and the perceived lack of detailed attention to these issues on the part of donors was also raised as a matter of concern. For example, when interviewed, a TGNP official outlined how she had been approached by a representative from one of the donors involved in national policy-making processes who wanted to provide help in ‘capacity building.’ The TGNP official replied by asking the representative to give an assessment of TGNP’s current ‘capacity.’ When the representative was unable to do so, the TGNP official asked why they wanted to do ‘capacity building’ work when they did not know the current capacity of TGNP, to which the answer was silence.

Despite the confrontations with the state in post-liberalization Tanzania experienced by Hakielimu and YPC, some NGOs saw their role in de Tocquevillian terms, as an equal partnership with the donors and the state. Respondents from these organizations rejected the argument that they were likely to be aggressively confronted or co-opted by the state, if they challenged its hegemony. These NGOs were principally from the small number close to the
government and the donors. Interviewees from these well-resourced organizations discussed national policy-making processes primarily in terms of how to gather and assess data efficiently. They also argued that it is important for NGOs to work as partners of the government on all aspects of national policy-making processes. Therefore, a minority of NGOs in post-liberalization Tanzania have accepted the premise that state can accommodate the views of civil society and encompass a universal form of hegemony, which represents the national interest. The views of interviewees from these organizations were not shared by all NGOs officials. However, the majority of respondents have internalized the donor discourse in post-liberalization Tanzania, in regarding their role vis-à-vis the state as that of watchdog combined with partner. They saw no contradictions between these two positions. This perspective can be juxtaposed with the criticisms of NACONGO, the NGO Act of 2002 and the new NGO Policy by the majority of the interviewees, which showed contradictory tendencies in their views. That is, while these legal-bureaucratic measures were seen as an attempt to capture the terms and conditions by which civil society participates in national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania, interviewees, nevertheless, believed that ‘partnership’ with the state was possible. Such a view is clearly beneficial to the state in maintaining hegemony in post-liberalization Tanzania.

Thus, there is an uncritical assumption on the part of officials interviewed that NGOs can, pace de Tocqueville, be both watchdogs and partners in the creation of national policy instruments. Resolving the conflicts that inevitably arise from the co-existence of these two roles in the war of position is not debated in any thoroughgoing way among NGOs. This was a reason for the frustration of an interviewee from TANGO, who had not been able to engender such a discussion among NGOs taking part in national-policy making processes. 105 Most interviewees argued that the ‘new’ NGO sector ‘needs time’ to build up its constituencies and to set out a clear vision and strategy, while admitting that their organizations had not made substantial progress in either of these areas. However, a minority of NGOs have attempted to develop counter-hegemonic discourses. An example in this regard is the ‘Open Sheraton’ meetings run weekly by the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP).

105 See below under Key NGO Relationships, for details.
NGO Counter-hegemonic Discourses

Case Study One – The ‘Open Sheraton’ Meetings

The ‘Open Sheraton’ Meetings are organized by TGNP and held weekly throughout the year in the open air outside the office of the organization in Mabibo, a working class area of Dar es Salaam. The term ‘Open Sheraton’ is a mocking reference to the fact that the donors and many FONGOs in Tanzania always hold conferences and other meetings in five star hotels. The meetings are held to identify the issues that most affect the lives of members of the public and from there to generate activism to bring about changes. Through these meetings TGNP have tried to involve poor and marginalized individuals and groups in national policy-making processes by awareness-raising and trying to give them a voice. It is important to TGNP how much national policy-making processes allow space for the voices of the people and how the stated needs of the people are met by the ‘owners’ of the process.

The meetings are based on the principle of inclusivity. Facilities and support are available for the disabled. Moreover, as the meetings are held in Swahili, the facilitator always asks at the start if anyone present is not fluent in the language. If that is the case, translators are assigned to such people and they are encouraged to contribute. Meetings last for several hours and attendance is on average two to three hundred. People are invited to the meetings by fly posting and word of mouth. This contrasts with the format of online invitations used by donors and FONGOs, which exclude the many people who are technologically disconnected (see section 5.4 above). The sensitivity of state-civil society relations can be judged by the dispute over the provision of refreshments at these meetings. One free soda per person is given out at each meeting, which has led to criticism from the government that participants are being induced to attend. The meetings have been running for ten years and TGNP has published the results of some of the themes (see, for example, Mbilinyi et al (Eds), 2003). People have also taken ideas raised at the meetings and put them into theatre and other performances.

Concerning the organization, chairs are arranged in banks on three sides with the fourth left for the facilitator, who stands next to a whiteboard. The facilitator engages with people as they arrive, asking questions and starting small discussions. A presenter, who has been invited by TGNP to give a talk on a topic, works with the facilitator. The meetings have drawn criticism
from the government for fomenting dissent amongst people. World Bank officials in Dar es Salaam have been invited to attend but declined on the grounds that Mabibo is not a safe area. Topics on economic, political and social themes are debated at meetings, such as participating in the democratic process, making politicians accountable to their constituents, the role of the media in society, housing issues, the provision of water and other utilities and problems with transport.

With a view to avoiding compartmentalized thinking, topics discussed at meetings are linked; participating in the political process and the role of the media, for example. A stress is put on the use of the philosophy of praxis, whereby reflection and debate on issues are followed up by actions, which in turn leads to further consideration of the outcomes, which can heighten people’s consciousness of their social position within the sphere of civil society (Gramsci, 2011). Volunteers try out the strategies (how best to make candidates respond effectively to questions from the public at campaign meetings, for example) and report back on whether they worked. Following reflections on activism, tasks are set out on the whiteboard for particular individuals to undertake during the week. The fact that the government has challenged their legitimacy on the grounds that one free drink is provided to participants per meeting gives an indication that some degree of success has been achieved in engendering counter-hegemonic discourses. These meetings have led to grassroots campaigns relating to, inter alia, accountability of public servants to citizens, education provision, infrastructure improvements, gender issues and the role of the media. However, despite the effective use of praxis to refine objectives and actions, such campaigns have not generated a coherent and cohesive challenge to state hegemony. Numbers involved in the grassroots campaigns are small and consequently the counter-hegemonic discourses generated through the Open Sheraton meetings provide little systematic challenge to state power.

**Key NGO Relationships**

It is clear from the interviewees that the most important relationship for NGOs is with the government, as it has the power to circumscribe, and even eliminate, their work, followed by the donors, as they provide funding and support. Relationships with other NGOs, civil society organizations and intended beneficiaries were considered of lesser importance by the
interviewees. Overall, the focus of Tanzanian NGOs involved in national policy-making processes is on upward accountability to the government and the donors. National policy-making processes are regarded by all interviewees as top-down and driven by donors and the government. The current development discourse buzzwords of ‘partnership’, ‘ownership’ and ‘participation’ were regarded as being confined largely to rhetoric by all the interviewees. However, it was also recognized that the stress on these concepts had opened up new possibilities in the war of position between civil society and the state. Interviewees overwhelmingly believed that new policy spaces for NGOs had been created through the donor-driven stress on participation, ownership and partnership. Nevertheless, NGOs had not considered how to contest these new spaces in any detailed and strategic way, with two exceptions.

First, an interviewee at TANGO outlined how his organization was forming a new strategy as a result of NGO participation in national policy-making processes, based explicitly on narrowing its focus to an analysis of two ‘key questions’:

1. What type of space is the government allowing NGOs?
2. How is the government encouraging NGOs to move into that space?

The interviewee had a high level of formal education and was well aware of conceptual issues concerning the role of NGOs as agents of development, as well as the practical problems involved in forming effective working relationships with the state and donor agencies. He was particularly concerned about the lack of strategic planning capacity and overall vision of the NGO sector in the light of an agenda on the part of donor agencies to make NGOs the standard bearers of a Tanzanian civil society based on a consensual, pluralist perspective. Second, an interviewee at Hakielimu outlined how the organization had analysed strategically ways of contesting the new policy space created by participation in national policy-making processes. He felt that civil society was contesting issues on terms dictated by the donors and needed to find innovative ways of challenging state hegemony in post-liberalization Tanzania. This required new ways of thinking and needed to be based on thoroughgoing independent research, which the NGO was prioritizing. As with the respondent at TANGO, the interviewee at Hakielimu had an understanding of overarching conceptual debates regarding the role of NGOs as agents of
development and was acutely aware of the problems involved in forming effective working relationships with the state in Tanzania, as Hakielimu was at that time engaged in a serious dispute with the government. These two interviewees were committed to the cause of NGOs and well-read in the areas of development theory and practice. Their high levels of commitment and knowledge of development issues were clearly significant factors in stimulating a move to formulate overall strategies regarding the contestation of policy space. However, neither had been able to engender a concerted counter-hegemonic vision at the institutional level and both felt that this was hard to accomplish, since their organizations concentrated primarily on operational practicalities. For this reason, as well as the history of subjugation of civil society by the state in Tanzania, both interviewees doubted the ability of Tanzanian NGOs to provide substantive counter-hegemonic discourses in the short to medium term.

**NGO - State Relations in Tanzania**

The current relationship between NGOs and the state is substantively influenced by the history of the war of position between the state and opposing political forces, waged through civil society in Tanzania (see chapter 3). This has resulted in the government taking a top-down attitude to NGOs in the post-liberalization period, rather than regarding them as ‘partners’, in line with the donors de-Tocquevillian vision of state-civil society relations in Tanzania. This can be seen most clearly in the way the state confronts NGOs which are critical of its policies. For almost every interviewee these conflicts were incontrovertible proof that the government is not prepared to tolerate substantive criticisms of its policies and thus no ‘partnership’ relationship between NGOs and the state exists, despite donor-driven efforts to create this through national policy-making processes.

The dispute between the government and leading education-sector NGO, Hakielimu was raised by every interviewee as a matter of concern. Many interviewees also put forward the fact that other NGOs apart from Hakielimu have clashed with the government, notably Youth Partnership Countrywide (YPC) (which is also examined as a case study), the Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team (LEAT) and the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC). As a result, a number

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106 See case study two: The Clash between Hakielimu and the State.
107 See case study two – The Clash between Hakielimu and the State.
of NGOs in the post-liberalization period have formed defensive survival strategies in the war of position with the state. These include widening the constituency and/or support base, bringing on board powerful people, who the government may be reluctant to confront, such as high-ranking members of the clergy, and using the media, particularly non-Tanzanian outlets, to ‘shout very loudly’ if they are threatened. Moreover, a few NGOs had addressed these issues by engaging in publicity campaigns and increasing the number of regions in which they were active in order to widen their constituencies and support bases. The Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC), for example, has increased its work in remote rural areas and provides free clinics for poor and marginalized groups, advising them on their legal and human rights, as well as assisting them with particular cases.

Furthermore, the LHRC has drawn up a list of important and influential people it aims to recruit in honorary and/or senior advisory roles if the attitude of the government towards civil society organizations becomes more hostile. Those on the list include senior figures from the clergy and District Commissioners. All the figures on the list have good offices with some senior government officials and could, therefore, use patronage to defend LHRC against attacks and/or restrictions on its work. Thus, the LHRC is combining top-down and bottom-up approaches in its war of position with the state. Many interviewees were, however, concerned about using the media, pointing to cases in the post-liberalization period where newspapers had been closed down temporarily by the government after publishing material deemed ‘inappropriate’ and to a journalist who was jailed for one year after writing an article about hunger in the Songea region, which annoyed government officials. A number of interviewees also felt that using foreign media to highlight their causes was risky, as it left them open to charges of being unpatriotic and forming alliances with donors and other outsiders in the pursuit of money and status. Indeed, these charges were levelled at Hakielimu in its clash with the Tanzanian government.

Overall, the interviews revealed that the strategies used by Tanzanian NGOs in their war of position with the state are defensive and used primarily to ensure the survival of organizations at an individual level. This overriding concern with the level of the individual organization means that there is little chance of a historic bloc of disparate forms of civil society forming in Tanzania in the short term which could gain the consent of significant strata of the population and
systematically challenge neo-liberal hegemony.

**Case Study Two - The Clash between Hakielimu and the State**

The government threatened to de-register Hakielimu following its criticism in 2005 of the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP). Under section 17 of the Societies Ordinance (URT, 1954), an organization must cease all activities immediately upon receiving notice from the Registrar that its registration has been cancelled. Hakielimu is well-financed, mainly by Western donors. Through its strong funding base the organization is able to employ highly-qualified staff, who are able to do independent research and produce publications with high production values (See, for example Hakielimu, 2005b). It is also able to run a well-equipped office and has modern motor vehicles at its disposal. In short, it has the trappings which, as outlined in the chapter 3, are seen by critics of the ‘new’ NGOs in Africa as the main reason people want to work in the sector.

The state used various arguments against Hakielimu in its war of position. It claimed that Hakielimu’s analysis of PEDP (Hakielimu, 2005b) was biased; overstating criticisms of education policy and underplaying its successes. It also argued that Hakielimu was dominated by an individual and therefore an undemocratic ‘one-man show.’ It further contended that Hakielimu acted primarily in the interests of its Western funders, that it aimed mainly for self-publicity, since its television advertisements featured schoolchildren wearing Hakielimu t-shirts and shouting ‘Hakielimu’, and that it misrepresented problems in schools by showing a spelling mistake on a blackboard on the front cover of one of its publications that is not typical of Tanzanian primary schoolchildren in general but one that occurs largely amongst pupils in a part of the country where the dialect makes it hard for them to distinguish ‘r’ from ‘l’. According to a minister, the government ban was for ‘disparaging the image and ridiculing the education ministry, education officers and teachers’ (Yunus, 2005). Another government officer involved stated that the ban was because Hakielimu focused on shortcomings in the education sector and ignored recorded achievements (Lipili, 2005). Hakielimu counter-argued that it had been largely positive about PEDP in its literature and had been constructive in identifying certain areas where improvements could be made. Hakielimu also claimed to have self-censored its report in an

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108 Source: Interview with Professor of Education, 16 September, 2005,
attempt to avoid being overly critical of the government. The debate was prominent in the media, occupying the front page of many national newspapers for some time and strong views on both sides were expressed in letters and articles in the inside pages. The focus of the debate ranged from the legalistic (whether the law used to ban Hakielimu from working in educational institutions actually remains in existence) to a wider analysis of the appropriate roles for the state and NGOs.

Discourse analysis of the PEDP Report (Hakielimu, 2005b) shows the sensitive nature of state-civil society relations in Tanzania. The report is based largely on an examination of government documents relating to the status of PEDP, which has four main components; enrolment expansion, quality improvement, capacity building and strengthening institutional arrangements. The report starts by highlighting general issues common to social science research in most circumstances, such as ‘inconsistency of data’ (Hakielimu, 2005b: 2). In the report’s specific ‘conclusions’ section, the first paragraph of seven lines summarizes the successes, citing six particular aspects that are ‘all clear achievements of PEDP’ (Hakielimu, 2005b: 18). The following two paragraphs, comprising ten full lines in total, set out the need for more classrooms, more teachers and more textbooks, as well as stressing that the quality of education should be improved. Concerning proposed ways forward, it is stated that ‘distressingly, many issues raised and recommendations made in the [government] reviews appear to be neglected’ (Hakielimu, 2005b: 18). The report concludes by outlining seven action points which need to be prioritized if PEDP is to fully achieve its goals.

Polarization occurred in the conflict with, on the one hand, the President supporting the Minister of Education’s attacks on Hakielimu, whilst on the other, most of the leading NGO sector and the main Western donors coming together to defend the organization. That civil society participation in national policy-making processes is donor-driven can be seen from the discussion amongst multilateral and bilateral donors as to what line to take in the dispute. Some of the donors favoured writing to the government in support of Hakielimu but this was rejected on the grounds that it would be likely to produce a backlash against the organization and the wider NGO community. The Acting World Bank Country Director was ‘dismayed by the ban’ and argued that what ‘has happened should not be happening at all in this country right now,
where democracy and accountability is taking root’ (Lipili, 2005).

Despite such support for Hakielimu, the government sent a circular to every educational institution in the country telling them not to have any dealings with the NGO and to take down any materials from them displayed on their walls. Experienced figures from the Tanzanian NGO sector interviewed as part of this research were worried about the possible outcome, both for Hakielimu and for the future of NGOs in general in the country. They pointed out that the government’s dispute with Hakielimu was not the first such occurrence during the post-liberalization period. Baraza La Wanawake (BAWATA)/National Women’s Council was deregistered in 1997, after the government accused the organization of operating as a political party. The dispute centred on government claims that BAWATA was being ‘too political’ and challenging the work done by its own women’s wing. The government’s action against BAWATA sent ‘a message to all NGOs that they potentially can be deregistered at any time if they do not support the government positions’ (Nahala, 1997: 4).

Case Study Three - The Clash between the National Youth Council and the State
Another NGO which was deregistered by the government now operates under the name of Youth Partnership Countrywide (YPC), formerly the National Youth Council (NYC). The NYC was threatened with closure by the government several times, on the grounds that its activities were ‘too political’ (pace the Baraza La Wanawake case) and challenged the work done by the ruling party’s own youth wing. This is an example of the state’s move to de-politicize civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania in order to negate challenges to its hegemony. The state presents legislation and policies, as well as the work of NACONGO, as being effective technical measures which represent the common interests of all citizens. Contestation of this legislation and these policies by groups such as BAWATA and the NYC are then attacked as going against the national interest. The activities of the NYC led to confrontations with the police at their conferences in Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam, leading to both being brought to a premature end. The breaking up of the Zanzibar conference in 2001 by the police was particularly sensitive, since there was an international presence. The dispute between the government and the NYC came to a head at the 2002 NYC Annual Conference in Mwanza on the ‘Role of Youth in Democracy Building’, which was attended by around 1,000 people. The government considered
the agenda of the Conference to be ‘threatening’ and afterwards deregistered the NYC for ‘failing to submit proper accounts.’ The deep level of concern on the part of the government about counter-hegemonic discourses from civil society can be seen through events surrounding the Mwanza Conference. Five members of the NYC’s organising committee had booked a bus to take themselves and other delegates from Dar es Salaam to Mwanza but, on going to catch the vehicle, were told that it was no longer available. Moreover, food ordered for the conference was not delivered and management at the University of Mwanza, where conference delegates were staying, refused to let delegates cook their own food in the canteen. It later transpired that the food supplier had been told not to support the conference delegates by providing them with food. The fact that the state is able to use catchall phrases to describe the work of NGOs such as the National Youth Council (as well as Baraka la Wanawake) as ‘too political’ and ‘threatening,’ without providing further detailed evidence, shows how sensitive it is to perceived challenges to its hegemony in post-liberalization Tanzania. These cases demonstrate that the idea of partnership between the state and NGOs (driven by the de Tocquevillian notion of civil society on the part of donors) has no basis in reality and is part of an attempt to map idealized Western ideologies, practices and structures onto Tanzania with no attempt to understand and accommodate previous periods of political economy in the country.

**NGO -World Bank Relations in Tanzania**

Many of the larger NGOs in Tanzania are critical of the World Bank, which is aware of this, and has made it a priority to build better relations with civil society in the post-liberalization period. To this end, the World Bank ran a series of meetings on key aspects of its work in Tanzania, aimed at ‘opening a development dialogue with the press and CSOs.’ The meetings (named Coffee Morning Discussions) were held at the World Bank’s Dar es Salaam office. The venue was chosen partly as a way of familiarizing Tanzanian citizens with the building and thus breaking down perceptions that the organization is faceless and remote. For the Country Director, it is important that Tanzanians recognize that ‘the World Bank is not one individual, one entity or one voice.’

**Case Study 4 – NGOs and the World Bank’s Coffee Morning Discussions**

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109 Sources: Interviews with World Bank officials, 7 October, 2005 and 15 October, 2005.
110 Source: Presentation by World Bank Country Director, 21 September, 2005.
The Communications Team at the World Bank decided on the theme for the Coffee Morning Discussions, although the state had some input. The topics for the initial series, reflecting ‘priority concerns’ for Tanzania, were economic growth, the marine environment, education and rural development linked to the Tanzania Social Action Fund.

The session on education provides an example of how the meetings are structured and the way participation takes place. The education session was run by a World Bank education specialist, whose presentation centred on which levels and types of education should form the focus of policy, how education can help to alleviate poverty and how it can be used to increase female empowerment and well-being. In terms of achieving the World Bank’s objective of breaking down barriers with civil society, the meeting failed completely. First, notice of the meeting was sent out electronically, so many small organizations, without computers, received no invitation. Second, the meeting was held at 9.00 in the morning on a weekday, which meant that many of the staff at small CSOs would not have been able to afford to take time off to attend even if they had known about it and were interested in the issues being discussed. Most of those attending were from large and well-funded NGOs based in Dar es Salaam and a lively debate ensued. However, it was a discussion in English between representatives of the self-referential and self-perpetuating development community. The narrow civil society base in attendance was illustrated by a point made from the floor, expressing disquiet concerning the fact that representatives of the Tanzania Teacher’s Union (TTU), the largest trade union in the country, had not been invited to a meeting on education. World Bank officials could not provide reasons why the TTU had not been invited, providing another indication that trade unions have been excluded from civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania.

The essence of the presentation was (in line with the World Bank’s stress on human capital theory, outlined in chapter 1) that major changes are needed in the education sector in Tanzania. First, greater provision of technical and vocational education is required, as ‘there are currently too many philosophy and history graduates.’ Second, too much of the education budget is spent on funding Masters and PhD students, whose subjects are ‘out of line with Tanzania’s education needs.’ This led to a discussant asking whether the World Bank wanted Tanzania to have less people with Masters and PhDs in order to ensure that the country has to continue to rely on
expensive Western consultants to tell us how to run our education policies. The reply was silence. Another discussant then asked whether the World Bank wants Tanzania to have less philosophy and history graduates so people from Western countries ‘can explain our past to us and provide us with frameworks for thinking about and organizing our society.’ The reply was again silence.

The presentation on the role of rural development, focusing on women, was different in format and tone. It took place on Rural Women’s Day in Tanzania (15 October) and was combined with an overview of the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF), which meant the structure was unwieldly and the focus unclear. TASAF is a part of the donor-driven agenda for development in Tanzania and a controversial initiative. The Fund has $120 million available, which is provided jointly by the World Bank and the government, to disburse on social projects. The majority of attendees were again officials from well resourced NGOs based in Dar es Salaam. However, twelve representatives from rural women’s groups were also present to showcase their produce. The PowerPoint presentation was made in English and translated into Swahili, as the representatives of rural women’s groups had little command of the former language. In contrast to the presentation on education, questions and debate did not flow naturally from the floor. The disjointed nature of the presentation and its tortuous progress (as there had to be continual stoppages for translations) dampened enthusiasm. Moreover, the representatives from rural women’s groups were ill at ease in the environs of the World Bank meeting room, and stood uncomfortably around the back walls with their fruit, vegetables, textiles and chickens in cages. A discussant questioned the value of the meeting, on the grounds that the poor only have labour as an asset and are thus too busy to attend. The presenter replied by stating that TASAF does provide jobs for the ‘very poor’ by creating public works projects and offering employment on these schemes at wages which are 10-20% below the (unspecified) market rate. This attracts only the most impoverished people, as others are not willing to work for such a low wage. Thus, according to the presenter, it is the poorest that benefit from TASAF.

Whatever the wider aims of the meeting, the representatives of the rural women’s groups were

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111 See Blommaert (2005) and the discussion in chapter 4 of the status of Swahili and English in Tanzania in relation to social class and level of education.
objectified. They were treated as ‘objects’ who had been identified by development professionals as ‘poor’ people worthy of assistance, rather than ‘subjects’ who have nuanced understanding of their positions, which they can explain in their own time and way. None of the representatives from the rural women’s groups addressed the meeting. The overriding concern of the meeting was to set out the benefits of the TASAF and link it to the virtues of wider aspects of the neo-liberal and good governance agendas in the country; individual enterprise, partnership and participation. The representatives from rural women’s groups had been brought to the meeting to provide tangible evidence that the ‘poor’ benefit from TASAF. However, their agency was subsumed within the structural requirements of the World Bank, concerning the format and agenda of the meeting, as well as the mode of participation. None of the women attending were able to make points about the scheme or any other aspect of their lives.

The extent to which the World Bank is concerned with controlling development processes in Tanzania is shown by the fact that the External Affairs Department (EAD) in Washington DC monitors the ‘Coffee Morning Discussions.’ All feedback on the meetings is tracked by a team at the Tanzania Country Office, which then informs the EAD. Any negative coverage of the coffee mornings results in the World Bank calling those responsible for a ‘discussion.’ From these contacts the World Bank often finds the negative coverage was a result of the issues ‘not being understood properly’ by the media in question. This view gives the lie to the stated aim of the donors to accept wider debates on development issues, including policy heterodoxy, as part of the move to a Post-Washington ‘Consensus’.

5.6 Summary
The rise to prominence of NGOs is linked to macroeconomic and political processes in Tanzania going back to the 1980s when donors pressured the country to roll back the state and bring in a market driven model. The ensuing democratic deficit in the 1990s led to NGOs being fostered by major donors as service-providing gap fillers and evidence of the existence of a vibrant associational life, as part of the new policy agenda. It also led to donors influencing the Tanzanian government to include NGOs in national policy-making processes as the vanguard of civil society. The donors prioritize the participation of NGOs in national policy-making.

112 Source: Interview with World Bank official, 7 October, 2005
processes, as they fit in with their own understandings of, and visions for, civil society. Important elements of associational life have been left out of national policy-making processes. Tanzanian associational groups which have histories of participation in the sphere of civil society, such as trade unions, burial societies, sports clubs, credit associations, tribal and clan-based organizations, have been marginalized. The adoption of a Gramscian perspective provides insights into the importance of civil society in Tanzania as a public room where counter-hegemonic views are being put forward by a small number of NGOs, such as TGNP. Through the use of a Gramscian perspective in the case of Tanzania it is possible to gain insights into how NGOs are applying ideologies and strategies which both uphold and confront the prevailing order. Thus, hegemony is being formed in a fluid way as part of a continuous war of position involving the state and both supportive and oppositional civil society groups. Current counter-hegemonic discourses within the NGO sector could gain momentum and provide a greater challenge to the dominant neo-liberal discourse than is currently the case and new ideologies and strategies may emerge. These possibilities can be encompassed within a Gramscian framework, but not the liberal de Tocquevillian view (rooted in a narrow and consensual vision of the relationship between state and civil society) whereby a win-win scenario is the pre-determined outcome of participation in debates on national policies. However, at present counter-hegemonic discourses from NGOs are very limited, as organizations are constrained by the state’s use of legal-bureaucratic means and concentrate on the practical provision of services, rather than focusing on wider strategies and visions for the sector.

The small number of NGOs which play a leading part in national policy-making processes have the power, through external donor support, to make the state engage with their arguments. However, the views of these organizations do not systematically question and counter state hegemony in post-liberalization Tanzania for several reasons. First, macroeconomic policies are excluded from discussions taking place within the format of national policy instruments. As a result, NGO work tends to focus on the social sphere of development, notably health and education issues. Second, NGOs are fearful of the state’s reaction to criticism of its policies, particularly in the light of what happened to Baraza la Wanawake, Youth Partnership Countrywide and Hakielimu during disputes with the state. Their work, therefore, tends to be apolitical. Third, the majority of NGOs taking part in national policy-making processes reject the
need to engage in a war of position with the state and instead frame their role within the conventional liberal discourse on civil society, based on free and open debate between NGOs and the state with policy outcomes reflecting a partnership between the core elements of the integral state. In contrast to NGOs, the labour movement has faced continual struggles to have any voice in national policy-making processes. Why trade unions, as membership organizations with a history of struggle against colonialism and, thus, roots in Tanzanian society, have been marginalized, and what this means for national policy-making processes, is examined in the following chapter.
Chapter 6
Trade Unions in Tanzania

6.1 Introduction
In this chapter a detailed analytical and empirical examination is made of how Tanzanian trade unions have participated in national policy-making processes, from the 1930s to the present and the reasons for their relative marginalization in the post-liberalization period are evaluated. The assessment of the current situation of trade unions in Tanzania is based on fieldwork interviews carried out with senior officials in the Tanzanian trade union movement, as well as observation and document assessment. First, the theorization of trade unions is outlined, focusing on the point that it is unlikely, in the short or medium term, that the labour movement in Tanzania will adopt social movement unionism and thereby form a historic bloc with other civil society organizations in confronting neo-liberal hegemony in post-liberalization Tanzania. This is due to the lack of systematic contacts between trade unions and other elements of civil society, caused to a significant degree by suspicions on the part of the latter that the thinking of the labour movement remains rooted in the pre-liberalization era, when it was subsumed within the ambit of the state. The labour aristocracy debate is then assessed, as it furnishes a framework for analysing the validity of arguments that the Tanzanian trade union movement is unlikely to form counter-hegemonic discourses because it acts for an elite minority of workers in the formal sector, and thus lacks legitimacy as a representative of the poor in national policy-making processes. Fieldwork findings reveal that in the case of Tanzania the aristocracy thesis is overly determinist and cannot account for the heterogeneity of the attitudes and actions of trade unions in the post-liberalization period. Subsequently, the historical development of trade unionism in Tanzania is outlined. As with NGOs (see chapter 5), the main elements of the integral state - ideological hegemony supported by coercion (Gramsci, 1978) - were used to limit spaces where policies and ideologies could be contested by trade unions during the colonial period and after independence. From 1961 until the early 1990s the state dominated the labour movement to the

113 See chapter 4 for details of the methodology used.
extent that it was virtually impossible for trade unions to develop counter-hegemonic discourses. Two main weapons were used by the state in this war of position; repressive legal-bureaucratic measures and the discourse of national liberation, centred on the argument that the perceived needs of trade unions had to be subordinated to the overarching struggle to overcome the legacies of colonial repression. The state vigorously put forward the perspective that the national liberation struggle was of much greater importance than the sectional interests of trade unions. In the post-liberalization period, trade unions have regained the freedom of association that was taken away from them by the state soon after independence. However, the state’s exclusion of trade unions from national policy-making processes and its continued employment of coercive control by legal-bureaucratic measures has pushed the labour movement to the margins of civil society in the post-liberalization period. In response, unions have used strikes and other forms of industrial action as tactics in the war of position. Nevertheless, lack of capacity (financial, technical and institutional) and ideological vision on the part of the trade unions has led to the labour movement being unable to form a systematic and effective counter-hegemonic discourse to that of neo-liberalism, which is driven energetically by key integral state actors in alliance with external donors.

6.2 Theorizing Trade Unions

Hyman (2001) identifies three main types of trade unionism. First, business unionism, focused on trade unions largely accepting the existing relations of market power and embracing the discourse of ‘flexible’ working practices and ‘partnership’ between capital and labour, leading to an emphasis on representing the interests of members mainly through collective bargaining. Second, revolutionary unionism, which stresses the representation of the working class through militant anti-capitalist opposition. Third, some trade unions have moved towards social movement unionism (Bezuidenhout, 2002), which is a strategy where ‘labour goes beyond the workplace … to form links with communities … while also working space through networking place to place within the same global corporation’ (Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout, 2008: 160). For trade unions in Africa, adopting any of these three approaches clearly and consistently is problematic, since an interregnum exists in the labour movement

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114 Other analysts take a broader approach. Poole (1981) outlines five main schools of thought concerning the theorization of trade unions: First, the ethical or moral school. Second, the revolutionary approach. Third, the conservative position. Fourth, the economic Implications school. Fifth, the political perspective.
marked by disorder, disorientation and dislocation, following the wave of economic liberalization which occurred across the continent from the late 1980s onwards (Von Holdt, 2003). This situation is reflected in contrasting views of the current state of, and possibilities for, trade unions. Thomas (1995a, 1995b), Lambert (2002) and Baskin (2000) are among those who tend towards pessimism regarding the ability of African labour organizations to bring about substantive change in industrial relations and the condition of the workers. However, the analyses of Kraus (2007a, 2007b), Kester (2007) and Kester and Sidibe (1997) take a more positive view in regard to these two key issues.

Thomas (1995b) contends that despite the spread of privatization in Africa and consequent dismissals of public sector workers, trade union membership remains concentrated in the state sector. Moreover, there has been a decrease in earnings and an absence of job creation in Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in Africa. These factors have ‘destroyed any possibility of the trade union movement’s acting as a stable institution in labour-market development and transformation’ (Thomas, 1995b: 239). Furthermore, Lambert (2002: 186) argues that labour organizations are characterized by organizational decline. While some individual unions and federations have attacked the negative effects of global neo-liberalism on workers, these efforts lack rigour and have not had any ‘significant impact or attract [ed] citizens into their ranks’. For Baskin (2000: 54), to be successful a labour movement requires ‘the capacity to service its members and promote their interests’ and a more centralized and structured collective bargaining environment than currently exists in Africa.

In contrast, Kester (2007: 3) argues that trade unions in Africa are very important in campaigning for institutional democracy based on balancing ownership with other social concerns and are ‘ideally placed to contribute to the democratization of the economy.’ In addition, Kraus (2007a) points out that unions in many African countries played key roles in organizing protests and strikes during the 1980s and 1990s which were significant in overthrowing authoritarian regimes. Through such actions unions also created political space which other CSOs could use to confront monolithic states. These actions have continued in a number of countries as neoliberal policies exacerbate existing inequalities. Furthermore, trade unions are the largest organizations that represent the working class in Africa. Von Holdt (2003: 304) argues that in South Africa there
has been a move from ‘militant resistance of workers excluded both politically and in the workplace, to a new form of unionism characterized by participation and engagement with both the state and management.’ This has led to contradiction, ambiguity and uncertainty in forming strategies, which has weakened solidarity and cohesion in the movement. Contrasting pressures brought about by competitive globalization and the ongoing attempts at political and economic change by Western donors have led to erratic responses by unions, covering ‘quiescence, defensive strategies, wildcat militancy, and attempts at proactive engagement with reconstruction’ (Von Holdt, 2003: 306).

For Jose (2002: 1), trade unions worldwide have constantly adapted in the face of globalization over the past three decades, combining strategies for changing labour into non-competing social groups. Trade unions thus ‘occupy a unique position as purveyors of social cohesion in all societies’. However, union enlargement has been slowed by the upsurge in individual company-unions which ‘represent highly skilled workers effectively but insulate them from a sense of collective identity or solidarity amongst workers’ (Jose, 2002: 6). Unions have been forced to adapt to the political ramifications of globalization by addressing the needs of constituents who they have not traditionally represented systematically. The most important of these groups are the increasing numbers of casualized labour, women and youth. Globalization is forcing trade unions increasingly to compete to represent these (as well as their traditional) constituents, which necessitates changing their modus operandi and structures. As this research shows, NGOs have become service-providing competitors to trade unions in Tanzania. 115 Trade unions also face the problem that their traditional platforms for representation increasingly do not match the structures of the new investors in developing countries. These are often multi-national companies which prefer to deal only with national or international union bodies and ignore the branch and district levels (Kester, 2007).

The arguments of writers such as Van Holdt (2003) that new forms of unionism are emerging in Africa, characterized by constructive engagement with the state and management as ‘partners,’ raise important issues. One of these is whether trade unions adopting such a position have become representatives of a labour aristocracy in the form of a small group of relatively well

115 See the fieldwork findings section below for details.
paid formal sector workers who have survived the mass dismissals precipitated by SAPs, while the majority of the workforce are poor, landless rural labourers or engaged in precarious informal sector activities.

6.3 The Labour Aristocracy Debate

The term ‘labour aristocracy’ has been interpreted in various ways during different time periods. Its origins have been traced by Lapides (1987) to usage by William Thompson in 1827 of the term ‘aristocracy of trades,’ based on exclusivity. His views influenced Marx and Engels, who employed the phrase in writings from 1850 onwards. In 1885, Engels (1999: 321) described a sector of the English proletariat as having greatly improved their position since 1848, being on very good terms with their employers and comprising an ‘aristocracy among the working class’, who had attained a relatively comfortable position that they regarded as permanent. ¹¹⁶ Lenin (1996) developed the theory of the labour aristocracy, attributing the emergence of an elite group of workers in imperialist countries to the ‘super-profits’ made through exploiting colonies. These profits allowed employers to buy off labour leaders with high levels of earnings and job security, thus gaining their support for capital and ensuring that labour would follow a reformist path. Working class opportunism and the labour aristocracy were particularly marked in Great Britain, since the country achieved a dominant position in the world market for decades, before being challenged by rival powers. For Lenin (ibid: 110) the effects of this monopoly were such that a ‘section of the British proletariat becomes bourgeois … [and a] section of the proletariat permits itself to be led by men sold to, or at least paid by, the bourgeoisie.’ Later versions of the labour aristocracy thesis (Elbaum and Seltzer, 2004, for example) focus on the monopolist exploitation by multi-national companies in certain economic sectors that allows them to make huge profits, some of which are used to provide a small group of privileged workers with secure jobs based on high levels of earnings and benefits. These workers constitute an aristocracy of labour and their existence is dependent on the super-exploitation of workers in competitive sectors of the advanced capitalist economies. Designating which criteria should be used to ascertain membership of the labour aristocracy is complicated. Hobsbawn (1976) outlines six pertinent

¹¹⁶ In a different interpretation of the origins of the concept, Peace (1975) argues that the colonial authorities were the first to use and discuss ‘the labour aristocracy’, based on a concern that early wage earners in the colonies could use their position to force up their earnings by collective actions.
factors, the most significant of which is the level of earnings of a worker. Post (2006) also emphasizes the importance of the level of earnings in the labour aristocracy thesis, which he summarizes as based on the view that well paid workers are more conformist and politically conservative than those receiving low levels of remuneration.

A problem in forming a convincing labour aristocracy thesis lies in the tension between structure and agency. The labour aristocracy are identified as a high stratum of the working class, which can be partly delineated structurally by the terms and conditions of their work, centred on their receipt of relatively large wages and benefits. However, they are also partly located by their attitudes and their reputation with other social classes as ‘respectable’ and ‘trustworthy’ people. Thus, their ‘structural class position is imbued with certain behavioural patterns’ (Parpart, 1982: 1). These two key elements involved in determining which groups can be classed as a labour aristocracy inevitably co-exist and interrelate in complex and fluid ways, making objective definition difficult. Katz (1976), for example, outlines how white miners in South Africa at the turn of the twentieth century can be classed as a labour aristocracy partly because of the high wages they earned but also due to the fact that they refused to do menial work, were unsympathetic to, and discriminated against, unskilled workers, and had ‘notions of gentility which were reflected in their lifestyle’ (Katz, 1976: 8).

In Africa the labour aristocracy thesis has been put forward to explain the lack of revolutionary consciousness on the part of workers by radical left-wing analysts in the main but also by liberals, such as Berg and Butler (1964), who argue that economic and political power structures in Africa have been centralized by states since independence and are weighted overwhelmingly towards capital, making revolutionary action on the part of the working class difficult. The radical perspective draws on Fanon (2001), who regarded African wage labourers as lacking the will to take up revolutionary paths, though he did recognize the power of trade unions in urban centres to mount effective direct actions. Overall, the waged labour force in Africa after

117 The five other five factors identified by Hobsbawn (1976) are; first, the regularity of wages paid as well as levels of social security. Second, the terms and conditions of employment, including the amount of respect afforded the worker by superiors. Third, the way the worker interacts with the social levels both above and below. Fourth, the worker’s overall standard of living. Fifth, the prospects for advancement of the worker and his/her offspring.

118 This example also indicates that race can be a factor in labour aristocracy debates.

119 See below for examples of such actions by trade unions in Tanzania during the colonial period.
independence from colonial rule has become ‘the most favoured section of the population, and represent the most comfortably off section of the people’ (Fanon, 2001: 97).

Arrighi and Saul (1973) produced an influential analysis from the radical perspective, premised on their identification of a small class, created under colonialism, which stabilized after independence, developing specialized skills and relatively strong bargaining power. ‘These workers enjoy incomes three or more times higher than those of unskilled labourers and together with the elites and sub-elites in bureaucratic employment in the civil service and expatriate concerns, constitute what we call the labour aristocracy of tropical Africa’ (Arrighi and Saul, 1973: 149).

The labour aristocracy thesis in the African context has been subjected to criticism from a number of sources. Jeffries (1975: 275) argues that in Ghana a number of the marginalized urban masses looked to the unionized working class as ‘their spokesmen rather than as a purely self-interested labour aristocracy.’ Parpart (1982: 16) contends that ‘the labor aristocracy thesis has little predictive value for understanding the behaviour of the upper stratum on the [Zambian] copperbelt.’ Miners vary their behaviour and tactics according to what they perceive to be the best ways to gain advantages in the struggle with capital. Peace (1975), argues that the Arrighi-Saul thesis fails to account for the way in which incremental earnings to workers in African urban centres actively promote closer economic and political ties between the labour force and non-wage earners. For Peace (ibid), wage earners in Nigeria express generalized grievances as a consequence of perceived social injustice and have not developed sectional interests. Moreover, the Arrighi-Saul model needs to pay more attention to both the scale and the methods of exploitation of the labour aristocrats used by capitalists in the urban areas. For Peace, the level of surplus extraction in Nigeria is so great in these areas that it promotes a common identity between wage labourers and the marginalized rural majority, rather than distance.

Saul (1975: 308) accepts the thrust of Peace’s points and argues that the African working class must not be prematurely labelled and concentration must occur on “the processes which are at work in specific African settings. This means identifying, analytically, the objective conditions under which a more conservative or a more radical stance towards the neo-colonial situation is
likely to be adopted by the working class.' Consequently, it is important to study the particular historical development of the trade union movement in order to adequately assess the explanatory power of the labour aristocracy thesis in the context of Tanzania. The legitimacy (based on their claims to represent labour) and the capacity (to set out ideologies and to organize actions) of the Tanzanian trade union movement have been shaped by a long process of development under different periods of political economy.

6.4 The Trade Union Movement in Tanzania from the Origins to Independence

Trade unions started to organize in Tanzania in 1931 as a result of unrest among African workers reacting to alienation from traditional cultural practices, low wages and poor living conditions. Unions were legally recognized by the Trade Union Ordinance of 1932, which enshrined the principle of freedom of association. The need for effective labour organizations to represent workers during the 1930s and 1940s is illustrated by Cooper (1996: 326), who points out that ‘wages in East Africa generally made it impossible for workers to separate themselves from the rural economy.’ Wage labourers needed the hidden subsidy from subsistence in order to be able to survive.

Much of the labour unrest in Tanzania in the 1940s and the early 1950s centred on the dock industry. A serious dock strike took place in Dar es Salaam in 1943 with the state deploying troops. This led to one hundred and forty two arrests but also to the setting up of a tribunal, which raised the wages of full-time dockers (Coulson, 1985). Further strikes over terms and conditions towards the end of the 1940s met with a hard-line state response, since leaders would not bow to the demands made of them and dockers occupied an important strategic position in an export-oriented economy (Barker et al 1986: 47). By 1947, the dock industry was unionized with a working class leadership, which initiated a general strike in September 1947. While the strike broke down after just over a fortnight in Dar es Salaam it continued to spread throughout the country. This led to the formation of a labour tribunal, which introduced a pay increase of between forty and fifty per cent. Moreover, channels of communication were set up between representative organs of capital and labour primarily to ensure that ‘grievances could be dealt

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120 Hundreds of workers died in 1930, for example, in the Lupa goldfields, as a result of scurvy (Rodney, 1972).
121 There were precedents. For example, dockers went on strike in Tanga in 1937 over poor terms and conditions of employment.
with before they reached explosive levels’ (Bienefeld, 1979: 557). However, another dock strike occurred in 1950, during which the use of casual labour precipitated rioting, leading to the deaths of at least two people. 122

This violence and a more general fear of expanded trade union activity in Tanzania led to a shift on the part of the state in its war of position. Legal-bureaucratic measures (cf. NGOs, examined in chapter 5) were enhanced to control the formation of, and the work of, existing trade unions. The Dockers Union was first to feel the effects of this change, when it was dissolved by a High Court order in 1950 for not conducting itself responsibly. For Iliffe (1975: 69) this not only ended the Dockers Union but also ‘a whole period of labour history in Tanzania.’ One year later the Trade Union Ordinance was enacted, which formalized and regulated the position of labour organizations in the country. The Ordinance required all trade unions to register with the state, thereby facilitating greater knowledge of, and control over, their officials and work. However, as is the case in post-liberalization Tanzania, the state was influenced by transnational actors, in its struggle with oppositional civil society forces. The British government based in London was the most influential of these actors. It passed the Development and Welfare Act in 1940, requiring all colonies to enact laws enshrining the rights of trade unions, as a condition of the provision of economic aid (see chapter 3). The state, therefore, had to be seen to be acting in accordance with this directive. Thus, while the Trade Union Ordinance was primarily a way for the state to control the formation and the remit of labour associations, such organizations were able to use the legislation to gain formal status in the civil society sphere. Thus, the registration of the African Commercial Employees Association (ACEA) in 1953 (see also chapter 3) provided a springboard for the foundation of a number of other trade unions.

Challenges to state hegemony were also influenced by transnational actors. A visit to Tanganyika by Tom Mboya, the Head of the Kenyan Federation of Labour, in 1955, constituted an impetus to the formation of the Tanganyikan Federation of Labour (TFL) on 7 October of the same year, at a Dar es Salaam conference. Julius Nyerere, the President of TANU, addressed the conference and a full time General Secretary, Mr Kawawa was elected. The TFL was charged with two main

122 The state even used the feared Motorised Unit (MU) of the military ‘against striking workers … during the 1950 dockworkers strike’ (Shivji, 1990: 19).
tasks; to organize and place workers in relevant affiliate unions and to amalgamate all small craft unions which shared a similarity of purpose into larger industrial unions (Kitine, 1976). The TFL’s work during the latter half of the 1950s was largely economistic in nature. However, the organization’s attempts to improve terms and conditions of employment met with little success, since power resided with the state and capital. One of the main ways in which the state maintained hegemony in the face of challenges from the TFL was the direct transference of key features of the British model of trade unionism to Tanganyika. This led to the British national structure, rules for leaders and the rank-and-file members and bargaining methods being imposed on the federation via the Tanganyika Department of Labour (Friedland, 1969), which were difficult for trade union officials to understand. While these structural measures ensured that senior trade union officials struggled to operate effectively on behalf of labour, individual actions by workers provided a significant challenge to the interests of capital and the state in certain sectors of the economy. For example, on the economically important sisal plantations, ‘absenteeism, strikes, property destruction and the organised evasion of taxes’ (Bolton, 1978: 176) showed that workers were conscious of being exploited by management. The state responded with further legal-bureaucratic measures. For example, it refused to let the Tanganyikan Sisal Plantation Workers Union (TSPWU) form on a national basis, restricting it to the status of a provincial organization, which was inaugurated in March 1956. By April 1958 the union had only three representatives on the Central Joint Council, a statutory body covering the sisal industry, while twenty four members were employer controlled (Bolton, 1978).

6.5 National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA)

The advent of independence on 9 December 1961 led to almost total defeat for trade unions in their war of position with the state. 123 TFL leaders pressed the state for greater autonomy, which was rejected, leading to a series of strikes during 1962. The state reacted by passing a law requiring all trade unions to affiliate to the TFL if they wanted to retain legal status, thus facilitating close supervision. It also passed legislation making strikes almost impossible without the permission of the Ministry of Labour (Mwakyembe, 1986, Shivji, 1986). The Preventative Detention Act of 1962 also presaged the emasculation of the trade union movement. This act

123 Ananaba (1979) points out that this was the case in many African countries following independence from colonial rule.
allowed unlimited detention at the President’s discretion of anyone acting in a manner prejudicial to state security. The fact that the first person to be detained under the act was the then President of the TFL, Victor Mkello, showed that ‘the government was looking for an opportunity to snuff out the trade union movement’ (Kapinga, 1986: 89). The final incident which led to the state dissolving the TFL was a mutiny by soldiers demanding the Africanization of the Officers Corps. The TFL issued a statement in support of improved pay and conditions for the rebels, which infuriated the state, and ensured that ‘its fate was sealed’ (Rupiya, Lwehabura and Le Roux, 2006: 77). Trade unionists were accused by the state of being involved in an attempted coup and over two hundred of them subsequently arrested. As well as legal-bureaucratic means in the forms of detention and new legislation, the state used dispersal tactics to dissipate the power of the trade unions. Some ‘difficult’ trade union leaders were given diplomatic posts abroad. Thus, the effective use of a combination of coercive aspects of the integral state, ‘marked the end of trade union autonomy’ in Tanzania (Kitindi, 1999: 56). The formation by the state of the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) to replace the TFL occurred in February 1964. The state tightly controlled NUTA and prevented the organization acting in ways inimical to its interests. Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) could only be struck between the government and NUTA, and individual trade unions could not even exist as separate legal entities outside NUTA. These measures made it almost impossible for trade unions to challenge state hegemony.

Rank-and-file union members did little in the face of the emasculation of the movement after independence. This was due to a lack of contact between the grassroots union membership and the leadership. For Bienefeld (1972: 24), no ‘better illustration of the isolation of the trade union leadership from their members can be found than the bald fact that the arrest of the bulk of the trade union leadership brought no response.’ Effective opposition to state control and the interests of capital had often been based on the actions of workers at individual places of employment. There is continuity between the nature of these actions and ones that are occurring in contemporary Tanzania. In 2011, the ITUC (2011: 2) reported that ‘workers tend to stage illegal wildcat strikes and walkouts.’ Most disputes centred on the particular nature of the work and workers’ responses to their situations. Thus, as Iliffe (1975: 119) points out, to view the actions of Tanzanian trade unions ‘solely “from the top” is to miss the dynamic that powers the
movement.’ Bolton (1978: 199) argues that by the 1950s sisal workers acted in solidarity with one another on particular plantations but, despite union efforts to quicken a sense of consciousness in workers, they were not, at the time when NUTA was inaugurated, ‘ready to act as a united labour force in opposition to the employer class’ and ‘not yet committed to national class action.’ Thus, trade union leaders in Tanzania during the 1960s lost the war of position with the state not only through the latter’s use of repressive legal-bureaucratic measures, but also because they failed to form the basis for a historic bloc of oppositional groups by building a close relationship with their own rank-and-file members. They had few contacts with the rank-and-file trade unionists and were not responsive to members’ needs. In Gramscian terms, trade union leaders were a ‘caste’ of reformist bureaucrats, who did not have the interests of the workers at heart (Gramsci, 1919). These two issues remain salient with regard to the current situation of the labour movement (see below in this section and the fieldwork findings section, for details).

The state also used the discourse of national liberation effectively in maintaining hegemony in the face of challenges from trade unions after independence. TANU operated an effective divide and rule policy in resisting trade union pay claims, which stifled the ‘revolution of rising expectations’ (Tumbo, 1969: 30), on the part of workers. They did this by invoking the need for self-sacrifice on the part of all civil society organizations, including trade unions, in order to achieve true national liberation from the repressive legacies of colonialism. It was stressed by the ruling party that the majority of employees in the country were poor agricultural workers, who had no comparable voice to trade unions to stand up for their interests. For example, at the Second Annual Conference of NUTA in 1967, Nyerere argued that unionized workers were improving their terms and conditions of employment at the expense of impoverished farmers, which was insupportable (Nyerere, 1976, Matiko, 1968). Thus, whenever trade unions made substantial claims on behalf of their members, the argument that they were egotistical representatives of a labour aristocracy was used against them as a powerful weapon by the state as part of its war of position.

In practice, NUTA did not represent workers’ interests. None of its leaders were chosen by workers and its structures and objectives were defined by the legislature. At plant level NUTA
provided for the existence of Workers Committees but these were often close to management and commanded little respect from the shop floor. Critics (as is the case in contemporary Tanzania) accused the state of making deals with foreign capital on terms favourable to the investors and their own officials and argued that NUTA’s primary roles were to 'discipline and control workers... [and to] serve the interests of the ruling class' (Rwechungura, 1976: 51). NUTA was forced continually to confront the paradox of the government’s efforts to ‘serve both the interests of its population and those of foreign capital’ (Bienefeld, 1977: 33). Thus, under NUTA, the state used trade unions to discipline the working class and in return granted leaders at the centre tangible benefits in the form of regular salaries, reasonably well-equipped offices and status. Consequently, working class opposition to state hegemony was neutered by tactics which led to the labour movement conceding a large amount of ground in the war of position.

Nevertheless, the publication by the state of Mwongozo (TANU Guidelines) in 1971 led to a period where workers were able to exercise a degree of power vis-à-vis management. Mwongozo contained clauses stipulating the need to eradicate corruption and waste and stated that party officials and managers should set good examples to others through their lifestyles. Clause 15 of Mwongozo stated that ‘there must be a deliberate effort to build equality between the leaders and those they lead’ (Davidson, 1987: 332). These were used by workers to instigate actions against the abuse of the trappings of management power, which again resonates with contemporary events in Tanzania, where there is anger about the way wealth is paraded and power used by managers working for ‘new [often foreign] investors’ in the country (see chapter 3). Between the publication of Mwongozo in February 1971 and September 1973, Davidson (1987) records thirty one strikes occurring, which ‘strained relations between management and workers in enterprises’ (Mihyo, 1979: 270). Of these actions, the dispute at the Mount Carmel rubber plant from 1972 to 1973 (Tarimo, 1977, Mihyo, 1975) was decisive in making the government move against Mwongozo’s adoption as a ‘workers charter.’

This was because the Tanganyika Development Finance Company (TDFL) was an investor in the Mount Carmel factory and British, German and Dutch development corporations were TDFL shareholders. Thus, a clash with the TDFL meant

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124 Other significant industrial actions during this period included strikes at the Sungura Textiles plant in 1972, (Chachage and Chachage, 2005, Mihyo, 1975), the British American Tobacco factory in 1973 (Musoke, 1978) and the Kioo Soft Drinks Company from 1974 to 1975 (Msuku, 1976), which all centred on worker anger at management extravagance and misuse of resources.
opposing powerful capitalist countries, which the state was not prepared to risk.

In the months following the end of the Mount Carmel dispute, therefore, the Tanzanian state moved to take control of factories away from workers. This showed clearly the limits to the participatory culture in Tanzania, to which Nyerere (1976) was committed. He wanted the people to articulate their needs through channels to which the state had to respond. However, Nyerere also recognized that raising economic productivity was paramount and the introduction of Mwongozo had led to a situation where this was put at risk. Nyerere (1976: 315) had made it clear that both the workers and NUTA must not ‘allow industrial disputes of any kind to jeopardize production.’ Thus, in the aftermath of the Mount Carmel conflict, official permission from TANU was made necessary before any industrial dispute could take place and workers’ representatives deemed ‘militant’ were sacked and in some cases imprisoned (Bienefeld, 1979). It became evident that workers ‘would not control their factories and they would have little or no power over the Tanzanian state’ (Coulson, 1985: 289). As Davidson (1987) argues, the attempt through Mwongozo to build a party of mass participation against the power of state bureaucrats was a fraught process, illustrating the difficulty of bringing about systemic change within and against an established neo-colonial culture and structure.

6.6 Jumuiya ya Wafanyakazi wa Tanzania (JUWATA)

As a result of the formal merger between the ruling parties on the Tanzanian mainland and Zanzibar (Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP) respectively) in 1977, the state decided to form a new trade union federation to represent the whole republic. To this end they disestablished NUTA and created Jumuiya ya Wafanyakazi wa Tanzania (JUWATA) in 1979. Nyerere oversaw the appointment of trade union leaders and was able to exclude and therefore silence potential dissenters to state policies. Under JUWATA trade unions were subject to even greater state control than had been the case with NUTA. JUWATA was forced to operate under CCM's constitution, whereas NUTA had at least worked under its own. The General Secretary of JUWATA was also the Minister of Labour and a labyrinthine system of regulations made strikes impossible. In these ways, the state gave the labour movement no room to manoeuvre in the war of position and trade unions lacked any opportunity to form a counter-hegemonic discourse. JUWATA, like NUTA, was placed in the untenable position of trying to
defend the interests of both the state and labour. An example of the contradictory nature of JUWATA’s position occurred from 1979 to 1980 when the union brokered an annual bonus of TZS 6,720 to the Bank of Tanzania workers which the government subsequently reduced to TZS 2,500 for ‘economic and unavoidable reasons’ (Duma 1990: 186). In the ensuing dispute JUWATA supported the workers claims for the original amount at branch level but at the same time argued in favour of the government’s reduction at its Head Office. The government position inevitably prevailed.

6.7 Trade Unions in Post-liberalization Tanzania

The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) period¹²⁵ from the mid-1980s was difficult for the labour movement in Tanzania, since the IFIs were ‘openly hostile to trade union organizations’ (Chambua, 1997: 309). Trade union membership was concentrated in the state sector, where, by the time the third phase of the SAP had taken effect during the second half of the 1990s, dismissals had been substantive. Between 1993 and 1997 the public sector payroll was cut by twenty seven per cent from 355,000 to 260,000 (World Bank, 2000). Mistrust between the state and representatives of labour remained during the SAP period with the state worried by the prospect of a strong and independent union movement that could form a sustainable counter-hegemonic discourse in response to the policies being promulgated. Trade unions were bypassed in discussions on policy formation and SAPs were constructed and put into practice in a way which excluded the ‘vast majority of the population (the urban poor, public servants and rural dwellers) from decision-making processes’ (Rusimbi, 2003: 102).

Interviews conducted as part of this research show that state acceptance of structural adjustment in Tanzania provided trade unions, almost inadvertently, with a counter-hegemonic discourse, since they became regarded by members and the wider citizenry as guardians of welfarism. Therefore, while unions provided opposition to SAPs partly to protect their own corporate interests in SOEs, they also voiced popular anxiety about the future of social services. For example, in interviews, leaders of the larger trade unions stressed how they had argued that sectors such as water, health and education, should never be privatized, as they were concerned with public goods, equitable access to which must be seen as a human right for all Tanzanians.

¹²⁵ See chapter 3 – section 3.5, for an overview of the period of SAPs in Tanzania.
This struck a chord with the Tanzanian public, who, ironically, had heard similar arguments for years from state officials and Nyerere himself. However, although the Tanzanian labour movement did mount protests against the negative effects of structural adjustment on workers, it failed to address three vital issues. First, it did not systematically put forward alternative policies to SAPs. Second, it failed to develop detailed analyses of the relationship between multiparty liberal democracy and economic development in the country. Third, it was slow to adopt a participatory approach towards rank-and-file union members. These failures stemmed fundamentally from lack of capacity and vision on the part of the labour movement and meant that a chance to form a counter-hegemonic discourse, which had the potential to carry with it the mood of the public, was lost.

At the 1991 JUWATA Annual Congress, workers called for more freedom for trade union activities and separation from the state. This pressure influenced the creation of the Tanzanian Trade Union Act of 1991, which contained a provision allowing trade unions to be formed individually and separately from the structures of the federation, leading to the creation of the Organization of Tanzanian Trade Unions (OTTU) in 1992. All members of JUWATA automatically became members of OTTU and newly-formed trade unions were required to affiliate to OTTU. OTTU was, however, allowed to have its own constitution and was free from direct political control by the government. This meant that more policy space opened up than had existed previously in the post-independence period and trade unionists were able to work towards the creation of 'free' trade unions, which could choose whether to affiliate to OTTU. From 1992 until 1995 ten sector-based trade unions drew up constitutions, held their own elections and were formally registered. However, the state’s use of legal-bureaucratic methods as a weapon in the war of position remained significant; both the struggle to be recognized as a trade union and the registration process were made cumbersome. Despite these measures OTTU organized a short-lived general strike in 1994. While the federation made a solid case for the need to improve the terms of conditions of employment for the majority of workers, the economic crisis in Tanzania at the time meant that there were no funds available to finance the

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126 The old guard leaders of TUGHE and TALGWU expressed this view with particular conviction.
127 This contravened the right to Freedom of Association set out in United Nations Conventions and caused friction between the government and the Western donors, as it was not in line with the ‘New Policy Agenda.’
128 For example, the Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU) was formed on 1 November 1993 only after a long struggle, culminating in strikes by teachers (Michael, 2001).
demands without printing more money. This was the first major action at a national level organized by the trade union movement since One Party rule was established in 1965. At its 1995 Congress OTTU changed its name to the Tanzania Federation of Free Trade Unions (TFTU). However, the TFTU had an unclear status because under the provisions of the OTTU Act, OTTU was the only lawfully recognized Trade Union Federation (Kitindi, 1999, Mukandala, 1999).

Tanzania’s adoption of multi-party liberal democracy led to national elections being held in 1995. This development indicated a significant shift in the war of position, driven to a large extent by transnational actors trying to inculcate Post-Washington Consensus (PWC) policies in Tanzania. The PWC stresses the need to pay more attention to the sequencing of reforms than the original Washington Consensus (see chapter 1) and emphasizes the need to build durable and effective institutions before wider reforms, such as privatization, can be put in place (Stiglitz, 2010, Stiglitz, 2002, Burki and Perry, 1998). However, in the case of Tanzania, the donors required the state to act in haste to bring in legislation based on the PWC reforms. Donor agencies pressed, in particular, for freedom of association to be allowed in Tanzania, as a key plank of the wider move towards embracing liberal democracy. As a result, the state came under pressure to rescind the OTTU Act, but had little time to conduct research on a replacement. Thus, the promulgation in 1998 of new trade union legislation was rushed. While the reforms, in general, and the new law, in particular, led to the state losing some ground to the labour movement in the war of position, the results were confusing and contradictory, with two trade union federations operating, both of which had an unclear legal status.

The Trade Union Act 1998 (URT, 1998) came into force on 1 July 2000, replacing the 1991 OTTU Act, and formally recognized freedom of association on the part of trade unions. Thus, it signified a formal split between the labour movement and the state (Chambua, 2002a). and marked a new phase of trade unionism in Tanzania. The 1998 act was incorporated into the Labour and Industrial Relations Act (2004) and defined unions in Tanzania as ‘any combination, either temporary or permanent, of 20 or more employees … the principle purposes of which is

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129 Source: Interview with Professor Samuel Chambua, 2006.
130 Both the OTTU and the TFTU were de-registered as federations as part of the Trade Union Act 1998.
131 See Table 6.1 below for a summary of all the phases of trade unionism in Tanzania.
the regulation of the relations between employers and employees’ (URT, 1998: 4). This piece of legislation marked an important shift in the labour movement’s war of position with the state. Under its terms, workers were allowed, for the first time in more than thirty five years in Tanzania, to organize trade unions which had their own constitutions, rules and elections. However, other aspects of the legislation showed that the state was able to continue its history of using legal-bureaucratic measures to maintain hegemony in Tanzania. For example, the law requires trade unions to register with the Office of the Registrar of Trade Unions (ORTU), which is part of the Ministry of Labour, within one month of formation, in order to acquire legal status. The ORTU has been criticized for possessing excessive powers (ICFTU, 2011), particularly concerning its freedom to register (and de-register) trade unions (see the fieldwork findings section below for details). The powers of the Registrar of the ORTU are wide-ranging and not dissimilar to those possessed by the Registrar of Societies, who oversaw the registration and operations of NGOs from 1954 until changes in legislation during the post-liberalization period (see chapter 5 for details).

As well as altering the relationship between the labour movement and the state, the law also led to a substantial change for trade unions in terms of their relations with transnational actors. Individual trade unions and federations gained the right under the 1998 act to affiliate with, or be a member of, any consultative body registered inside or outside Tanzania. In the pre-liberalization period, the state used legal-bureaucratic measures to prevent trade unions from affiliating with influential organizations based outside Tanzania, such as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) or the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), both of which had resources available to assist labour movements in developing countries. Here, the state used the discourse of national liberation effectively as a tactic against the trade unions in the war of position. It achieved this by arguing that reliance on outside financial support would leave unions in a dependent position, leading to pressure on them to implement policies and actions which could jeopardize the national liberation struggle, which was of paramount importance (Musoke 1978).

132 See also section 6.1 above for details of how this discourse was employed.
However, although the labour movement gained the freedom under the 1998 Trade Union Act to access foreign funding and support for their work in the post-liberalization era, little has been forthcoming in practice, with the notable exception of assistance from the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). Since 2000, DANIDA has given technical and financial support with the aim of making TUCTA a ‘fully functioning organization.’ DANIDA works with all the trade unions affiliated to TUCTA as part of its overall remit to improve the labour market in Tanzania through its Business Sector Programme Support (BSPS) (DANIDA, 2002). Starting in 2000, Phase 1 (BSPS I) of DANIDA’s work focused on revision of the labour laws and lasted three years. During Phase 2 (BSPS II), work on reforming the main central organizations of TUCTA took centre stage for a five year period. From 1 July 2008, DANIDA moved to the third phase (BSPS III) of its work, focusing on the technical capacity-building of unions in the regions. By the completion of BSPS III, ‘the trade unions of Tanzania mainland affiliated with TUCTA will be able to provide effective services to their members in Collective Bargaining Agreements and dispute settlement and effectively advocate the interests of the members in bi- and tripartite and international forums’ (Hansen, 2008b: 3). BPS III also aims to bring about greater social dialogue involving representatives of labour, capital and the state and to develop corporate social responsibility. BPS III is, therefore, premised on the business unionism approach to labour movements. In overall terms, assistance aims to build up physical and communications infrastructure of the trade union movement along with more efficient service delivery than currently exists. These objectives are not proving easy to accomplish, with achievements from the end of one DANIDA planning-retreat in 2008 (focused on increasing the effectiveness of inter-departmental cooperation at TUCTA’s head office) to the start of another, summarized by an official as ‘minimal’ (Hansen, 2008a; 1). According to DANIDA officials interviewed as part of this research, trade union departments at the federation head office lack the technical capacity and vision to cooperate effectively in driving the movement forward. There is little cohesion between departments, which do not keep each other systematically informed of their projects, programmes or policies. This fundamental lack of co-ordination among trade union departments at the federation’s head office is a significant reason for the failure of the

133 Support from transnational organizations for particular projects involving Tanzanian trade unions has come from LO-TCO (Sweden), LO-Norway, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, The Canadian Labour Federation and ICFTU-AFRO, LO/FTF Council (Denmark), the Danish Union of Teachers and the Danish General Workers Union.

134 Source: Interview with DANIDA official, 2008.
labour movement to form a counter-hegemonic discourse in the post-liberalization period.

Table 6.1  Phases of Trade Unionism in Tanzania

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-independence (from TU Ordinance 1932)</td>
<td>1932-1961</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes – Tanganyikan Federation of Labour (TFL)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early period of independence (TU Amendment Act, 1962)</td>
<td>1962-1964</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No – only United Federation allowed by state</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Union of Tanganyikan Workers (NUTA) Act, 1964</td>
<td>1964-1979</td>
<td>No – unions could not exist as separate legal entities outside NUTA</td>
<td>No – only NUTA (state - controlled) allowed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jumuiya ya Wafanyakazi wa Tanzania (JUWATA) Act, 1979</td>
<td>1979-1991</td>
<td>No – unions could not exist as separate legal entities outside JUWATA</td>
<td>No – only JUWATA (state-controlled) allowed</td>
<td>No – JUWATA forced to operate under constitution of ruling party - CCM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions Act, 1998</td>
<td>1998-Present</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes – Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
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Source: McQuinn (2011)

All trade unions were dissolved following the enactment of the 1998 Trade Union law, and had to re-apply for membership of the new federation – the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA). The old trade unions successfully applied to join TUCTA and the ‘old guard’ leaders mostly remained in place. However, some freshly created unions emerged with ‘new guard’ leaders. A number of these unions attempted to form a separate federation, which they proposed to name the Tanzania Federation of Labour, after the organization which existed prior to independence. This attempt to form an alternative power centre to TUCTA continues to the present and is the source of rancour and division within the movement (see the examination of the proposed May Day strike in 2010 below in this section).

The TUCTA headquarters in Dar es Salaam contains the offices of its main departments and eight out of its fourteen affiliate unions. TUCTA also has a college at Mbeya which runs courses on labour-related issues but lacks the financial and technical capacity to operate it effectively.

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135 ‘Old guard’ refers to union leader who held positions of power in the movement prior to the substantive changes which occurred with the advent of liberalization at the end of the 1980s.

136 ‘New guard’ refers to both to senior union officials at TUCTA and leaders of individual trade unions appointed after the changes which occurred in the labour movement caused by the advent liberalization at the end of the 1980s.
(Chambua, 2002b). In overall terms, TUCTA has the task of reorganizing and leading the trade union movement in the post-liberalization era. This primarily involves the re-setting of relationships with the state and representatives of capital to form a tripartite arrangement in which the interests of labour are addressed. It also necessitates finding ways to serve the needs of workers in dealings with the influential external donors operating in Tanzania and the foreign new investors who are particularly important in the mining sector of the economy (see chapter 3).

TUCTA is headed by a General Secretary, supported by a Deputy General Secretary, who is responsible for the day to day operations of the organization and cooperation between departments. The work of the General Secretary is more externally oriented. The organization has four main departments – Economics and Research, Education, Gender and Youth Issues and Occupational Health and Safety, Environment and HIV/AIDS. Of the twenty one trade unions in Tanzania registered by the Office of the Registrar (as at April 2011), fourteen are affiliated to TUCTA. TUCTA has been offered a free website by the ICFTU and has a domain space, but lacks the finance to set up and maintain the site. It does not produce a regular journal or newsletter. Heads of department have computers and email addresses, though communication has been hampered in recent years by regular power cuts.

Currently, according to officials at TUCTA Head Office, one third of workers in the formal sector are unionized and the total trade union membership is around 800,000. However, the membership figures obtained from those interviews (provided from membership lists which are submitted to the Office of the Registrar of Trade Unions and from the documents and personal knowledge of senior union officials) show a total trade union membership of 352,458, which is 447,542 less than the TUCTA estimate. According to the latest Integrated Labour Force Survey (URT, 2007a) the total labour force in Tanzania is 20.6 million, of which 15,759,000 (76.5%) are involved in agriculture and 4,841,000 (23.5%) in industry or services. This means that from the figures obtained as part of this research, 1.71% of the total workforce is unionized. Breaking the figures down further provides deeper insights into the density of trade union

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137 See also TUCTA (2004b) for trade union membership profiles and figures.
138 The findings for this research on total trade union membership are closer to the number of 407,000 provided in 2003 by the World Bank (World Bank, 2003c) than they are to TUCTA figures.
membership. Of the 76.5% (17,759,000) who comprise the agricultural sector, 67.2% (11,934,048) work on their own farms or shambas and thus have little incentive to join a trade union. Only 18.4% (3,267,656) of the agricultural sector are paid employees and, thus, have a substantial potential interest in joining a trade union. All twenty one unions in Tanzania draw members from the industry or services sectors, with the exception of the Tanzania Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union (TPAWU) and the very small Tanzania Agroforestry Workers Union (TAWU), which have a combined membership of 26,482. Taking the combined figures for TPAWU and TAWU as representing unionized workers in agriculture in relation to the total number of wage labourers (3,267,656) in the sector, then 8.7% are unionized. Subtracting the memberships of TPAWU and TAWU from the total number of trade unionists in the country, produces a figure of 325,976 wage labourers in the nineteen unions covering the industrial and service sectors. This equates to a union membership of 6.73% in the industrial and services sectors. Thus, findings from this research show that there is a significant percentage of unionized workers in both the formal industrial and service sectors and amongst wage labourers in the agricultural sphere. These findings (based on a total trade union membership of 352,458) are summarized in Table 6.2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage unionized</th>
<th>No. of trade unions representing workers in these sectors</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total labour force</td>
<td>20,600,000</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total labour force in agricultural sector</td>
<td>15,759,000</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total wage labourers in agricultural sector</td>
<td>3,267,656</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total labour force in industry and services</td>
<td>4,841000</td>
<td>6.73</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: URT, (2007a), McQuinn, (2011)

As Figure 6.1 below shows, the trade union membership in Tanzania is concentrated, with 75.86% of the total belonging to just four unions – the Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU) - 157,000 (44.54% of the total); the Tanzania Local Government Workers Union (TALGWU) – 37,493 (10.64%), the Tanzania Union of Industrial and Commercial Workers (TUICO) – 37,022 (10.5%) and the Tanzania Union of Government and Health Employees (TUGHE) – 35,868 (10.18%). This means that there are seventeen other unions, which make up only 24.14% of the total membership between them. Therefore, the outcome of the 1998 Trade Union Act has been,
somewhat paradoxically, both the proliferation of trade unions and the concentration of membership.

Figure 6.1  Tanzanian Trade Unions – Membership Concentration

Source: McQuinn (2011) 139

139 See appendix 6.3 for details of the membership numbers of every trade union in Tanzania.
Of the four biggest unions, the TTU is by far the largest, partly through the stress placed on the importance of education, and hence the widespread building of schools and training of teachers, under the Nyerere regime from the 1960s onwards, when union membership was compulsory. The TTU has also increased its numbers as a result of the Post-Washington Consensus emphasis on human capital,\(^\text{140}\) which has led to rises in funding for education from donors and, consequently, to the training of new teachers, who the TTU have recruited into the union with a considerable degree of success. The TTU has modern and well-equipped premises in Dar es Salaam. It has been involved in regular disputes with the state in the post-liberalization period, particularly over back payments of salaries and expenses owed to teachers. The second and fourth biggest unions, TALGWU and TUGHE, are made up of civil servants and frontline workers from the health sector. While their numbers declined as a consequence of the dismissals which followed the imposition of SAPs (see chapter 3), they retain larger memberships than most of the existing unions, have experienced leaderships and offices in the TUCTA Headquarters. They are, therefore, close to the national leadership of the labour movement. Consequently, the bulk of trade union membership in Tanzania is white collar, with the exception of the third biggest union, TUICO, which draws its members from the industrial and commercial sectors. TUICO has an active leadership and produces newsletters on important issues for members.

Concerning the remaining seventeen organizations, TPAWU, which has the fifth largest membership of 26,461, is a dynamic organization. One of its officials contributes to international newsletters on health and safety concerns in the cut flower industry, which the state has targeted as an important sector to develop. Major problems for TPAWU officials are the dispersed nature of the membership, which makes it difficult to maintain clarity and cohesion in the union and the casualization of the workforce, which has occurred since liberalization.\(^\text{141}\) Beneath TPAWU in size, come a group of five unions, which are medium-sized in the context of the Tanzanian labour movement, with memberships of between 5,000 and 15,000. Three of these unions, the Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied Workers Union (CHODAWU), the Tanzanian Railway Workers Union (TRAWU) and the Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union

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\(^{140}\) See chapter 1 for a discussion of the importance of human capital as part of the Post-Washington Consensus and, in particular, the work of Rose, (2006, 2003) and Fine and Rose (2001) on the topic.

\(^{141}\) See Fischer (2011) for figures.
(TAMICO), are involved in complex struggles to protect members’ interests in the face of assertive entry into the sectors in which they operate by largely foreign new investors in Tanzania. Officials from all three unions feel strongly that the state sides markedly with the interests of new investors and provides little practical help or support for their members or leaders. This is linked to a rising nationalist discourse in the trade union movement, stimulated by the refusal of the state to make transparent the details of contracts it has signed from the second half of the 1990s onwards with major foreign investors, particularly in the mining, tourism and transport sectors. Another member of this medium sized group, the Researchers, Academicians and Allied Workers Union (RAAWU) contains a large number of highly qualified members, many of whom are lecturers at universities.

The remaining eleven unions, making up more than half of the total number registered, are small, having less than 3,000 members each. From this group, some significant issues can be highlighted. The Tanzania Union of Private Security Employees (TUPSE) operates in a sector which is growing rapidly in the country and has attracted considerable foreign investment. Many members of TUPSE are engaged in guarding the new businesses in the country, mostly in the telecommunications, mining and tourism sectors. Officials expressed great concern at the aggressively anti-union stance of employers in this sector and at the lack of support from the state in dealing with issues arising from this attitude. The Telecommunications Workers Union of Tanzania (TEWUTA) operates in a sector which is one of the ‘success stories’ of economic development in the country. However, the union has been involved in disputes with employers over privatization in the sector, as well as the terms and conditions under which members work. Officials from the Tanzania Pilots Union argued that investment in areas such as expanding training for pilots and routes flown was inadequate. They set these arguments in the context of much-publicized state plans to bring about growth in the tourism industry. For a TPU official, the fact that the organization had never been invited to discuss schemes for the expansion of the airlines in Tanzania, showed that the state is not serious about its own plans to develop the tourism industry and produces plans for the sector mainly because it is a favourite of the IFIs.
Irrespective of the sizes of the twenty one trade unions registered in Tanzania, they lack institutional and financial capacity, with the important exception of the TTU. Where almost all the NGOs taking part in national policy-making processes have functioning websites, to which content is regularly added, the TTU is the only union to have such a facility, although it contains little information and is not updated. Only three unions have a Research and Economics Department and two, an Education/Training Department. Thus, unions lack the capacity to provide members systematically with relevant information and arguments concerning their interests, which could help in raising the consciousness needed to gain support for a counter-hegemonic discourse to neo-liberalism. Moreover, trade unions lack creativity in countering neo-liberal hegemony compared to other forms of associational life, such as NGOs. For example, Hakielimu (2005) produced a booklet entitled ‘Sera Poa… Lakini Utekelezaji?’ (‘Great Policies… but Implementation?’), featuring a satirical series of cartoons mocking the contradictions in development initiatives in the country and the disconnect between policy and practice. The cartoons (two of which are reproduced below in Figures 6.2 and 6.3) drew much debate in the media and among the public, as well as trenchant criticism from the state. No trade unions have engaged in such imaginative ways to engender a counter-hegemonic discourse.

Despite the labour movement’s lack of capacity and vision in the post-liberalization era, both TUCTA and individual trade unions have organized strikes and other forms of industrial action, particularly from the latter half of the 2000s. However, the ‘excessive restrictions’ (ITUC, 2011: 1) embodied in the legal-bureaucratic measures created and enforced by the state make successful industrial action hard to achieve. While trade unions in the post-liberalization period have regained freedom of association, laws, regulations and the powers of regulatory bodies continue to constrain their activities to a significant degree. As in previous periods of political economy, strikes are difficult to mount, as they are only permitted as a ‘last resort’ after a mandatory thirty day mediation period has passed.

A proposed indefinite general strike, organized by TUCTA, and scheduled to start on May Day 2010, was the biggest action taken in the post-liberalization era. TUCTA called the strike to protest against the failure of the state to increase wages, including the minimum wage, and to reduce income tax rates. All the major TUCTA-affiliated unions, covering the private and public
sectors, supported the planned action. In response, the state invoked stipulations contained in its legal-bureaucratic measures relating to labour issues, to claim the proposed action was illegal and threatened TUCTA officials with court action, if they did not call off the action. In April 2010, senior state officials argued that the compulsory mediation process was ongoing and, thus, TUCTA had no legal right to call for a strike. This position was then articulated by President Kikwete in his monthly address to the nation and by officials from the Confederation of Tanzanian Industries (CTI) and the Association of Tanzanian Employers (ATE). The ATE argued that employers should sue striking workers in order to recover any losses incurred as a result of their actions. Various other state and quasi-state bodies then became involved, making the processes complex and time consuming. The decision as to whether the mandatory mediation period had closed, and the strike consequently legal, was then referred to the Labour Division of the High Court of Tanzania (LDHCT). The conclusion of the court would be based on whether the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (CMA) (a body set up under section 12 of the 2004 labour law, and confusingly called an ‘independent government institution’ by the state) considered that negotiations between TUCTA, representatives of capital and the state had been exhausted and if the federation had followed the other legal steps necessary before a strike could be called. In addition, the Labour, Economic and Social Council (LESCO) (also formed under the 2004 labour law) and composed of representatives of the state, capital and labour, organized mediation meetings in the run up to the proposed strike day. The decision of the LDHCT was not needed in the end, as TUCTA called off the strike after Kikwete made a further speech forcefully reiterating the point that the action was illegal. The traditional May Day parade went ahead but in a form different to any before in two respects. First, TUCTA itself broke with precedent by not inviting the Head of State to speak at their parade. Second, Non TUCTA-affiliated unions, showed their intention to move power away from the national federation, by organizing their own celebrations for the first time.

Analyzing the action in overall terms, it is clear that the state’s use of legal-bureaucratic measures gave it huge power. The labour movement was locked into complex and restrictive processes in trying to mount a strike. Added to this were attacks, widely reported in the media, on the labour movement’s actions from senior state officials and representatives of capital. Despite high levels of unemployment and widespread poverty (see chapter 3 for details) which
led to sympathy for union demands amongst much of the population, TUCTA was unable to seriously challenge state hegemony during the period of the proposed strike. With regard to trade union theory, TUCTA officials clearly did not want to pursue a revolutionary unionism path by exhorting workers to engage in militant anti-capitalist direct actions. They were ideologically at odds with such a position and it would have produced a hostile response from the government, which would certainly have used the coercive aspects of the integral state to confront such actions. TUCTA also eschewed following a social movement unionism perspective, by forming alliances with other forms of associational life, in mounting the action. This revealed the lack of serious contacts trade unions have with other types of civil society organization in Tanzania (see below section 6.9 for further analysis of this point and figure 6.3, summarizing reasons for mutual distrust between trade unions and NGOs). Instead they were forced into a default business unionism approach, based on technical arguments concerning both the terms and conditions of employment of rank-and-file members and the legal processes relating to industrial action. TUCTA officials admitted that it was hard for them to understand the new laws and regulations relating to labour that have been introduced in the post-liberalization period, which hampered the effectiveness of the industrial action. Moreover, they found dealing with recently created bodies (LESCO and the CMA, in particular), time-consuming and difficult.

The example of the aborted general strike in 2010 reveals two central points about the labour movement in Tanzania in the post-liberalization era. First, TUCTA officials lack a concerted vision, along with strategies, for the labour movement. Second, most trade unionists lack detailed understanding of the legal-bureaucratic framework relating to labour which has been imposed by the state since liberalization. They are, therefore, contesting the war of position from a weak knowledge base concerning the technical mechanisms of control over labour which currently pertain and they have not developed a grounded counter-hegemonic discourse to neo-liberalism. Gramsci (2011b) (in arguing for labour organizations to take a revolutionary unionism approach) made the point that trade union officials tend to become focused on the technicalities concerning legal-bureaucratic issues, when involved in labour disputes. In doing so, they form similar

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142 Source: Personal communication from trade union officials.
143 Source: Interviews with senior TUCTA officials.
overall perspectives to those of representatives of capital and the state, with the result that arguments centre on details within a mutually accepted discourse. This leads to the leadership of the mass of workers by authoritarian pressure from senior trade union officials, resulting in inertia within labour movements (Gramsci, 1919). Given the complexities involved in mounting industrial action in contemporary Tanzania, highlighted by the failure of the 2010 general strike, there is a case for arguing that the labour movement should adopt a social movement unionism approach if it wants to enhance its effectiveness. This would, for example, provide opportunities for union officials to form alliances with NGOs, such as the Legal and Human Rights Centres (LHRC) and the Lawyers Environmental Action Trust (LEAT). Both of these NGOs are active and can offer legal expertise on labour issues, thus, enabling both a broader form of opposition to the state and deeper knowledge for union officials of technicalities. This may be a more effective way for trade unions to take part in labour disputes than the current mode, which involves acting alone and contesting technicalities, which were framed by state bodies. However, following Kikwete’s victory in the 2010 presidential elections (see chapter 3 for details), there has been a rapprochement between CCM and the labour movement and an adoption of the discourse of business unionism by TUCTA. Kikwete held a series of meetings with senior TUCTA officials, beginning in April 2011, based around the slogan, ‘let bygones be bygones.’ Following the meetings, TUCTA leaders stated that they now regarded the government as one of their ‘social partners’ with which they could work constructively, without, however, compromising the interests of workers. This showed that TUCTA as an institution had internalized the discourse of business unionism, as it was unusual for the organization to make a formal statement at the highest level using the term ‘social partners’ to refer to the government.

Another way in which the trade union movement could build alliances is through formal links with opposition political parties. In interviews, TUCTA officials revealed that this option has become a serious consideration, but is clearly problematic for several reasons. First, many interviewees (TUCTA officials at head office as well as leaders of TUCTA-affiliated and non TUCTA-affiliated unions) expressed disquiet about the labour movement linking itself formally to any political party, so soon after emerging from a period of control by CCM, which lasted more than thirty years. A number of interviewees argued that CCM would use this as a weapon.

144 Source: Personal communication (April, 2011).
in the war of position to accuse the trade union movement of partisanship. It was pointed out that when TUCTA proposed to formally name their preferred candidate for the 2010 presidential elections, this was exactly how they were criticized in response by state officials. The acting permanent secretary at the President’s Office, for example, argued that this action by TUCTA violated the code of conduct applying to civil servants. In addition, he stated that TUCTA should be protecting the interests of workers and that it was unethical for the organization to influence its members as to which political party and leader they should vote for.  

Both the acting permanent secretary and later ministers then made the attack on TUCTA’s acting general secretary personal and called for him to leave the labour movement and join the presidential race if he was serious about becoming involved in politics.  

Second, a number of old guard leaders have connections with CCM leaders which go back to the pre-liberalization period. An element of patronage remains in these relationships and, consequently, these leaders resist a formal move to support opposition political parties. Third, it is not clear that any opposition political parties have policies concerning labour issues that are substantively different to those of CCM. Thus, the labour movement would not be allying themselves with a coherent counter-hegemonic discourse by forming an alliance with opposition parties.

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145 Source: Interviews with TUCTA officials and This Day (14 August 2010).
146 Source: This Day (15 August 2010)
**Translation - Cartoon on left**
Teacher (with crutch) – ‘I have health insurance.’
The Receptionist replies – ‘That’s nothing to do with us. Pay 5,000 in cash or no service.’
Sign on front of the reception desk – ‘Money first.’

**Cartoon on right**
Sign above the serving hatch ‘Medicine.’
Sign below the serving hatch ‘Give thanks for whatever you get.’

Person giving the medicine through the hatch – ‘Take these few, the rest you will have to buy somewhere else.’
Teacher ‘I have to walk seven kilometres just to get some Panadol.’

Caption pointing to the teacher’s trousers – ‘Empty pockets.’
Aside from small creature - ‘If this is the situation, then how is having health insurance going to help us’?
Figure 6.3  Hakielimu Cartoon: At the School

Teacher (on the table) – ‘When will this situation for teachers end? We are tired.’

Announcement on radio (under the table) – ‘The government has just released one billion Tanzanian shillings for the refurbishment of Dar es Salaam bank …’

Aside from small creature -
‘Bah! It is better being under a mango tree than living in this situation.’
6.9 Trade Unions in Tanzania: Key Fieldwork Findings

The key findings are summarized under two main themes; Trade Union Priorities in Discourses and Key Trade Union Relationships. With regard to the former, the issues highlighted as priorities for trade unions are divided into three sub-categories: first, structuring, resources and mergers, second, economic issues and third, political issues. The points raised within these separate categories are interrelated and overlap in places. However, separation into sub-categories is useful in providing a clear structure for all the findings.

Structuring, Resources and Mergers

For senior TUCTA Officials the need for capacity-building is the main priority of the labour movement. It was stated forcefully by the vast majority of interviewees that technical and financial capacity must be built if the trade union movement is to have an influence on economic, political and social policies affecting the lives of workers. Poor technological resources, particularly a lack of their own websites, seriously hamper communications between and within unions. Email contact is difficult due to low rates of computer ownership and power cuts. These structural problems are, for a considerable number of interviewees, compounded by issues of agency. Several of the new guard senior officials argued that many old guard union leaders look to the past and find it hard to keep up to date with emerging realities of importance to the labour movement, particularly the growing casualization of the labour force, gender issues, the ‘brain drain’ from Tanzania and the consequences of the high incidence of HIV/AIDS amongst workers and their dependents. For one such official, ‘trade unionists don’t read.’ They have papers and documents from conferences but these are just badges of status to be displayed in their offices. They do not engage substantively with important issues or keep up to date with new ideas. Overall, ‘they want routine things.’ Several other officials at TUCTA-affiliated unions argued that the thinking and actions of the federation’s old guard leadership are rooted in the pre-liberalization period. One official outlined how collecting dues through the top-down check-off system introduced after independence, where two per cent of the wages of all union members are deducted at source, has led to a situation where union leaders do not know ‘the art,

147 Well qualified and experienced union members are emigrating from Tanzania and their abilities are thus lost to the movement. Exact numbers are hard to ascertain given the clandestine nature of some of this emigration. See Naud (2010) and UNCTAD (2007) for general overviews of the ‘brain drain’ from Africa and Lucas (2006) for an analysis which includes a discussion of issues concerning the ‘brain drain’ from Tanzania.
tactics, methods and techniques of organizing, persuading and soliciting for membership.’ For this official the check off system has led to the leadership lacking ‘the most crucial trade union asset - negotiating skills.’ Moreover, for a number of interviewees, the lack of skills in these areas on the part of union leaders is not being addressed. TUCTA has failed to establish a centralized collective bargaining centre/unit, which would train officials in the skills necessary to negotiate effectively and serve as a repository of knowledge and materials. Other interviewees pointed out that the TUCTA old guard fails to use experienced and well educated unionists from individual trade unions when negotiating CBAs through an ‘egocentric’ desire to hold on to the machinery of power. Old guard union leaders were also criticized by a considerable number of interviewees for lacking ‘creativity,’ ‘commitment’ and ‘tenacity’ in addressing key issues relating to the labour movement. These views reveal a clear frustration on the part of TUCTA officials appointed after 1998 with the old guard amongst the leadership.

Issues of structure and agency also combine to make the work of trade unions ineffective in the regions, according to most interviewees. Many respondents made the point that Tanzania is a large country with poor infrastructure and inadequate communications outside urban areas, making it hard to work in the regions. In addition, it was argued by a significant number of interviewees that trade union officials at branch level have few resources, are not effectively trained and cannot read documents relating to national policy-making processes well because their command of English is limited. They are in need of capacity-building initiatives run from trade union head offices, which are not forthcoming. Many interviewees contended that a vicious circle has developed, characterized by a lack of commitment to branches outside Dar es Salaam on the part of TUCTA which creates resentment about paying fees to an ‘unresponsive centre’ on the part of regional union offices. This leads to apathy and inertia at regional offices, which in turn makes the federation at the centre reluctant to set up and fund initiatives outside Dar es Salaam. There has been a failure on the part of TUCTA to ‘institutionalize a spirit of teamwork between the centre and regions’ was the summary of a senior TUCTA-affiliated trade union official. Overall there is a ‘dire lack of communication both vertical and horizontal’ was how one trade union official summarized issues concerning internal relationships within the trade union movement.
A difficulty relating to both capacity and legitimacy raised by a large number of interviewees is the inability of unions, through lack of finance and qualified personnel, to conduct thoroughgoing independent research into important areas, leading to their arguments being dismissed by the state and employers as not proven. Several interviewees pointed out that although the saying in Tanzania, ‘no research no right to speak’ is well known, unions do hardly any analysis of labour issues or monitoring and evaluation of key trends relating to employment, which could be used to support their positions in debates with state officials, representatives of capital and other civil society organizations. Thus, both the leadership and the rank-and-file members of most unions have little detailed knowledge of issues, and consequently are only able to discuss them in very broad terms. The RAAWU membership has been identified by TUCTA officials at head office, as containing people who have the skills to do rigorous independent research, which could put the labour movement in a much stronger position to create a counter-hegemonic discourse to neo-liberalism than is currently the case. However, due to lack of finance, effective planning and a concerted will, such research has not been undertaken. This is an example of the disconnect between the theory and the practice of trade unions in post-liberalization Tanzania, which is hindering the effectiveness of the labour movement.

Mergers
Mergers between trade unions are seen as desirable by senior TUCTA officials, mainly because small trade unions do not provide adequate services to their members. The fact that more than half of Tanzanian trade unions have less than 3,000 members is a major reason for calls from TUCTA officials for mergers in order to create large organizations, capable of representing the interests of labour vis-à-vis capital and the state effectively. For one official, ‘mergers are vital if trade unions are to become more efficient and to work in a more focused way and get their issues settled quicker and better than is currently the case.’ However, another new guard TUCTA official, argued that such views remain at the level of rhetoric and in practice the old guard leaders are ‘power-mongers’ who have made no concrete moves towards mergers. This research

148 For example, the phrase was used by Anne Makinda in December 2010, during an interview she gave after becoming the Speaker of Parliament (East African, 2010) Available at - http://allafrica.com/stories/201012201456.html
corroborated this claim in finding that no practical steps regarding mergers have been
documented.

A senior TUCTA outlined the argument against mergers, which is related to the fact that the
work of Tanzanian trade unions was subsumed within a monolithic state system for more than
thirty years after independence. Through the 1998 Trade Union Act, unions became independent
again and are understandably ‘keen to guard this freedom.’ For this official, therefore, it is better
to keep unions individually independent and to develop an overall solidarity movement which
will provide strong mutual support for trade unions. The majority, however, disagreed with this
perspective, arguing that the small trade unions do not have the capability ‘to service their
members or deliver anything to them.’

It was clear from the interviews with officials from TUCTA-affiliated trade unions that mergers
were a divisive issue. For some (27%), mergers are necessary as they will make trade union work
more effective and will stop small unions dividing the movement by fighting over recruitment of
members. Disputes over demarcation of membership were cited as serious issues by a number of
interviewees. Interviews revealed that there are tensions between TUGHE and TALGWU
regarding which of the two unions employees of district health authorities should join. Moreover,
both TAMICO and TUICO lay membership claims to workers in the cement and woodwork
industries. A further example of such a dispute is the clash between the TTU and RAAWU over
which union teachers in vocational education centres should join. These intra-union conflicts
have demoralized members according to many interviewees and led to the perception on the part
of the public that labour organizations are more interested in power and money than providing
effective services for their members. Other points put forward by interviewees were that small
trade unions should merge as they are not financially viable (30%) and have low visibility (20%).
These views are typified by the claim of one official that there are ‘dead unions’ in Tanzania and
mergers would lead to the dynamic officials in the movement emerging to head bigger, and thus
more effective, unions. Moreover, an official at TUGHE argued that mergers are a good idea as
having many individual trade unions plays into the hands of the employers who then use a divide
and rule policy that ‘lessens solidarity in the trade union movement as a whole.’
In contrast, the mainly small unions formed as a result of the enshrining of freedom of association under the 1998 Trade Union Act, argued strongly against mergers. For them, mergers would be undemocratic, as the rank-and-file are against such a move. In addition, the new unions need time to consolidate their work and build activities and memberships. It was also stated that rather than mergers leading to dynamic officials coming to the forefront, in fact old guard leaders would use their networks of power and patronage to gain control of these large unions and run them in the same top-down unaccountable way as they did under the monolithic system. Debates over mergers were not solely based on whether unions were formed pre or post-1998. Two pre-1998 unions (TTU and RAAWU) are currently holding talks with a view to a merger. TTU officials are aware that they have to overcome the fears of RAAWU officials that ‘their members will be used to undertake research and to present papers where necessary but would not be included in the democratic structures and processes of the union.’ RAAWU officials were worried that the TTU officials would dominate the upper echelons of a merged union and concentrate on issues concerning primary and secondary education, at the expense of tertiary level concerns, which are the focus of their own membership. This example highlights the general worry on the part of TUCTA-affiliated trade unionists of whether smaller unions would have the interests of their members represented effectively in larger merged unions.

For non TUCTA-affiliated trade unions the issue of mergers is a sensitive and complicated one, which divided opinion equally. The arguments in favour were based on the fact that mergers will lead to larger trade unions which will thus have more power in dealing with employers and the government. However, mergers were recognized as being impossible at present for non-TUCTA affiliated unions, as they are not allowed to merge with TUCTA-affiliated trade unions. The case against mergers was based on the argument that non-TUCTA affiliated unions had been created as breakaways from what members perceived to be poorly functioning larger unions and thus demanded a separate organization which would be receptive to their concerns. Clearly fragmentation of the movement is a danger given the current structure and condition of trade unions.
Economic Issues

Privatization was cited as the root cause of trade union problems by almost all officials during interviews. One official summed up the general concern about privatization in stating that the ‘new private sector in Tanzania is mostly anti-union and tries to negotiate with the individual. Because of poverty, workers are easily bought by employers.’ All the officials interviewed expressed disquiet at the aggressive attitudes of employers in the private sector towards employees and the failure of the government to address the matter. Senior TUCTA officials overwhelmingly argued that they should have a voice in all labour market issues since these contribute to poverty reduction and are troubled that this is not happening at present. They were particularly worried about the ‘unwarranted’ attention paid to privatization, while there is much less focus on employment creation, the quality of work, labour standards, child labour, wages policies and occupational health and safety.

The casualization of labour \(^{149}\) as a result of trade liberalization leading to an increase in cheap manufactured imports and the harmful employment strategies of the new investors are other important topics of concern for the trade unions. It was pointed out, for example, that contracts in the hotel industry are short-term and must be renewed annually. This discourages workers from joining a trade union and leads to casualization of the workforce, which is a deliberate strategy aimed at achieving more profit through use of cheap labour. This practice has slashed the membership of the Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied Workers Union (CHODAWU) and consequently weakened its power to operate effectively. Trade union officials also argued that the claims of donors that the government’s restructuring of the economy would lead to redeployment of workers who lost their jobs in SOEs are false. This is due to the capital intensive nature of the jobs created by the new investors in Tanzania which has led to only a few workers being re-employed after losing their jobs.

For officials at individual TUCTA-affiliated trade unions the priorities outlined in interviews are closely interrelated – privatization (stressed by 80% of officials interviewed), the need for capacity-building (80%), high levels of unemployment (60%), lack of finance (47%) and inability to reach members in the regions (33%). A further priority in the discourse of trade

\(^{149}\) See Wuyts (2001), discussed in Chapter 3.
unions is the ‘vicious circle’ which lowers capacity and legitimacy. Many officials made the point that privatization has led to unemployment, precipitating a fall in membership, which means less finance comes into the unions and leads to diminished capacity to operate effectively, thus lowering legitimacy of the union in the eyes of members. For some TUCTA-affiliated trade unions the fall in membership has reached crisis proportions. For example, the Tanzanian Union of Journalists (TUJ) was described as ‘a dying union’ by its General Secretary and has less than two hundred members.

For officials of non-TUCTA affiliated trade unions the major priorities were the same as those cited by officials at TUCTA and individual TUCTA affiliated unions – the need for both technical and financial capacity-building and the attitude of management in privatized industries. These problems were emphasised by the officials of all six of the non-TUCTA affiliated trade unionists interviewed. All non-TUCTA affiliated trade unions only draw members from the private sector, as state sector workers were placed in unions under government direction as part of the monolithic post-colonial trade union system and were automatically re-enrolled as members when these unions re-registered as independent organizations after the 1998 Trade Union Act. Officials at non-affiliated unions regard private enterprises as under the control of anti-union management. Ship owners were cited as particularly exploitative employers, who act as a cartel to keep wages down and are aggressively anti-union; ‘Every day they try to kill us [the trade union]’ was the view of one official who had regular dealings with management in the shipping industry.

Moreover, union officials struggled with the problem that workers in privatized enterprises ‘do not see the point of joining a trade union,’ to quote one interviewee. This is a central point concerning legitimacy. Many officials interviewed stated that employees in the private sector knew little about the work of trade unions or regarded them as part of the state, because of the way they were organized under the one-party state, and thus were unconvinced about joining. A further factor militating against becoming a union member was fear on the part of employees in the private sector that they would be victimised or dismissed by employers.
An important related point made by several officials interviewed is most trade unions continue to follow the check off system by taking 2% of members’ salaries in dues, which is ‘exorbitant’ for the majority, who are not well paid. The 2004 Employment and Labour Relations Act specifies that trade unions have the freedom to set union dues at any rates they wish, but, as one interviewee pointed out, ‘many, if not all unions, continue to take 2% of salaries, which is a major reason for non-members shying away from joining trade unions.’

**Political Issues**

The view that trade unionists are a labour aristocracy (Engels, 1999, Lenin, 1996, Elbaum and Seltzer, 2004, Fanon, 2001, Arrighi and Saul, 1973, Saul, 1975) and thus lack legitimacy in national policy-making processes as representatives of the poor, was refuted by many interviewees. TTU officials cited the study they had organized and funded with Hakielimu by Sumra (2004), which found that teachers had a low status largely because of the poor salaries paid to them. A teacher on Grade A at that time earned TZS 70,000 a month and for Sumra (2004: 33) even a 100% increase on this would ‘put the salary at only 150,000, which seems to be the bare minimum to live in at least a little comfort.’ Sumra (2004: 12) also found that teaching is increasingly ‘viewed as a last resort, when other options have failed’, which has lowered the status of teachers in their own eyes as well as those of Tanzanian citizens who are not part of the profession. Bearing in mind the arguments of Katz (1976) that a labour aristocracy is created from both structure (where good terms and conditions of employment are important) and agency (based on the perception of the labour group by others in society and by the group itself) then members of the TTU are anything but a labour aristocracy. Teaching is regarded by many Tanzanian citizens as a ‘last resort, low status and low-paid job’ (Towse et al, 2002: 637).

Interviews also revealed that unions containing well educated and/or relatively highly paid members recognize commonalities with labour as a whole in Tanzania and have taken part in actions that are not solely based on the immediate concerns of members. The TTU, for example, played an active role in the fight to have school fees abolished at primary level and to make the state address the quality of education, rather than concentrating on increasing enrolments, numbers of teachers in training and the construction of school infrastructure. In addition, officials from the Tanzania Fishing Crew and Allied Workers Union (TAFICAWU) cited a
government document on wage rates in the fishing industry for 2006 (URT, 2006) which imposed a salary increase from the original settlement between employers and TAFICAWU of 15%. The raised salaries ranged from TZS 59,064 per month (which was below the minimum wage at the time of TZS 62,000 per month) for a deck boy to TZS 79,675 for a bosun. These salaries can be seen in the light of Suma’s argument two years earlier that TZS 70,000 per month as a salary for teachers hardly amounted to a living wage.

Moreover, TEWUTA, whose members are relatively well-paid workers in the telecommunications sector, have been active in anti-privatization campaigns and the struggle against the ‘anti-union’ stance of the new employers, who have responded by dividing telecommunications workers into separate categories of ‘unionizable’ and ‘non-unionizable’. As Gramsci (1977) argued, such actions by civil society groups are important in increasing their organizational ability, which in turn raises consciousness levels and hence the possibility of forming and developing wider counter-hegemonic discourses. Dissenting ideologies and actions can emerge from groups of workers with relatively good terms and conditions of employment, depending on the particular political-economy conditions prevailing in a country. Thus, on the evidence of the interviews conducted with trade union officials, the labour aristocracy thesis is overly determinist in arguing that the more well paid the workers are, the less they will formulate and/or engage with counter-hegemonic discourses.

Unpublished trade union research cited by interviewees was also used to support criticisms of the labour aristocracy thesis. This reveals that one wage labourer in the formal sector in Tanzania supports between six and twenty family members, many of whom are self-employed rural poor. Moreover, a number of vulnerable, low income workers in the informal sector are either former union members, who lost their jobs as a result of privatization or relatives of current union members. Thus, as one TUCTA official put it, ‘workers and peasants interests are closely interrelated.’ Even groups of workers that have obtained relatively good terms and conditions of employment, such as telecommunications workers, do not exhibit attitudes and patterns of behaviour associated with the labour aristocracy and have not allied themselves with capital and/or the state to a great extent.
Criticism of the labour aristocracy thesis on the grounds that it needs to pay more attention to both the scale and the methods of exploitation of the ‘labour aristocrats’ (Peace, 1975) resonates in the context of Tanzania. In the mines run by foreign new investors in Tanzania, where, although wages are relatively high compared to workers in agricultural and manufacturing sectors, industrial relations have been largely confrontational. TAMICO has been engaged in continual disputes on behalf of its members, contesting the policies and actions of foreign investors and the state, which the union claims, allies itself with the interests of management. Miners have varied their behaviour and tactics in the struggle with management. There are currently more than twenty cases before the Arbitration Commission concerning disputes between Barrick, the Canadian mining enterprise, which runs some of the largest mines in the country, and ex-employees. The level of surplus extraction in the mining sector is large, which has been a major cause of acrimonious labour relations, characterized by disputes over recognition of unions, strikes, dismissals and legal claims by workers against employers. For example, a strike in 2007 at the Bulyankulu Gold Mine run by Barrick, centred on the huge disparity in wages between Tanzanian and foreign workers. It was claimed in interviews that Tanzanian miners received a minimum wage of TZS 200,000 per month while foreign workers earned TZS 24 million per month.

Finally regarding the labour aristocracy debate, a number of trade union officials argued that there is a considerable presence among agricultural self-producers and those working in the informal sector of former trade unionists, as well as family members of current trade unionists. This creates a sense of common identity among these groups. Overall, the interviews with trade unionists conducted for this research confirm the validity of Post’s (2006) argument that the labour aristocracy thesis is not theoretically rigorous or supported by empirical evidence and that careful individual studies are needed, focusing on the objective relations pertaining between labour and capital, if meaningful analyses are to emerge.

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150 The national minimum wage in Tanzania is TZS104, 000 per month. In 2007 Tanzanian mine workers received a minimum of TZS 200,000 per month (Source – TAMICO officials). The National Poverty Line (set in 2007) is TZS 13,998 per month (Policy Forum, 2008a). In 2007, 37.6% of all rural households were living below this line.
However, while not acting on behalf of a labour aristocracy, trade unions in Tanzania take part in national policy-making debates within the hegemonic discourse. This form of participation betokens a fundamental acceptance of the prevailing neo-liberal order. Thus, trade unions, which make a claim to be of, and for, the working class, can only be of, and for, it up to the point of a political challenge to the integral state. The trade union movement has failed to provide such a challenge and, therefore, has to operate on terrain laid out by the integral state, particularly the ideological terrain. Unless the labour movement can formulate a concerted counter-hegemonic discourse it will continue to operate on the basis of economism, whereby debates focus narrowly on improving the terms and conditions of workers within an accepted hegemonic neo-liberal order.

**Key Trade Union Relationships**

Trade unions have traditionally operated in a tripartite system in Tanzania, where their key relationships are with the state and Employers Associations. However, the neo-liberal era has witnessed the rise of other major development agents, which affect the work of trade unions. The most significant of these are NGOs and new investors in the privatized economy. Relationships with these two groups have thus become increasingly important for trade unions, with the latter rivalling Employers Associations as major representatives of the interests of capital. The findings show juxtaposition between the attitudes of old guard trade union officials and those of the new guard towards new investors and NGOs. Recently appointed TUCTA officials were more ready to accept these groups as ‘social partners’ rather than the old guard, who categorize them as adversaries.

Senior officials at TUCTA were understandably circumspect when discussing trade union relations with the state. For such officials, the state always sides with the interests of capital in general, not just the employers associations in the post-liberalization era. Capitalists work in tandem with the state to ‘force through laws which are favourable to businesses and are at the expense of workers’ was the way one TUCTA official put it. All the old guard TUCTA officials saw the state as wanting to control unions in the interests of capital rather than negotiate with them fairly. They cited the many years of union emasculation by the state after independence as a strong influence on this view. These officials all argue that the state had not changed its attitude
to unions following 1998 and paid only lip service to their views, while allowing new investors
to dictate the terms of their entry into the Tanzanian labour market. For old guard TUCTA
officials, these state attitudes make the work of the Employers Association and new investors
easy, as it knows the state sides with capital against labour in disputes.

New guard TUCTA officials were less equivocal in their opinion of employers associations and
employers in general. One such official stated that trade unions are learning to see employers as
‘social partners’ and to take part in ‘social dialogue’, rather than regarding them as exploiters.
This view has been put forward as the most constructive way for unions to envisage their
relationship with representatives of capital at one of the annual courses run by the Office of the
Registrar, showing that the state is actively promoting a business unionism approach in post-
liberalization Tanzania. The fact that, at head office, some of the new guard officials interviewed
have internalized the discourse of business unionism was revealed by their acceptance of the
concept of the state and employers as ‘social partners’ of workers. One interviewee stated that
the trade union movement must not just engage, but ‘proactively initiate meaningful dialogue
with the state and employers as social partners.’ Thus, such leaders are operating within the
hegemonic discourse, thereby strengthening the core elements of the integral state. By the same
token the chances of a substantive challenge to state hegemony emerging from the rank-and-file
are weakened, since they absorb only a hegemonic discourse from their union leaders rather than
an ideological challenge to the discourse of neo-liberalism.

The most commonly expressed view from officials at TUCTA-affiliated unions concerning trade
union relations with the state was that the President talks positively about the rights of workers
and about the role of trade unions, but these exhortations do not move beyond the rhetorical
and there has been no discernible improvements in the position of labour since he came to
power. As the interviews progressed, many officials tended to become more open and expressed
the view that the state is too close to the new investors and has done little to assist workers.

\footnote{For example, the President has made direct calls to employers to increase salaries in low paid sectors, such as
textiles (The Citizen, 2006) but claimed that TUCTA’s demands concerning the raising of the minimum wage in
2010 were unrealistic and impossible to meet.}
The relationship between development NGOs and trade unions in general has been characterized by a large measure of distrust (Leather, 2005, Spooner, 2004). In the case of Tanzania, the interviews revealed that NGOs are regarded with a mixture of suspicion and envy by trade union officials, who perceive an increasing ‘NGOization’ of development work, which is cutting into areas where the labour movement has traditionally been active.

The most commonly made point was that both donors and the state favour NGOs over trade unions. None of the interviewees made distinctions between types of NGOs. Although Baraza La Wanawake, Hakielimu and the National Youth Council had all been deregistered (or threatened with deregistration) as NGOs by the state following disputes, NGOs were invariably perceived as a homogenous group which had harmonious relationships with the state and international donor agencies. It was also argued by the vast majority of interviewees that NGOs are more fashionable and popular than trade unions, that NGOs duplicate the work of trade unions, that NGOs have better contacts than trade unions and that NGOs are upwardly accountable to donors, while trade unions are downwardly accountable to members. With regard to NGO duplication of trade union work, an official argued that there is a danger that the situation in Tanzania might replicate that in Kenya, where NGOs have been encroaching on the work of labour organizations with no mandate but some success. NGOs have been quite successful in working to protect the rights of domestic servants, for example, while trade unions argue that they are more legitimate as representatives of this group. Another trade union official pointed out that Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP) has campaigning vigorously for the rights of women in the workplace, the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) has fought for basic employment rights for workers and the Savings and Credit Co-operative Organization (SACCOS) has addressed legal issues concerning children, the disabled and the elderly. Such activities have led to a loss of space for the labour movement, which trade unions are becoming increasingly aware of, as more NGOs obtain finance to run high profile programmes in the areas of child labour and HIV/AIDS, while funding proposals for such work from trade unions are rejected.

154 See chapter 6 for details.
TRAWU officials, for example, pointed out that they had specialist knowledge of how HIV/AIDS was spread along railway routes and was leading to a high incidence of the disease amongst their members. Despite making this clear in funding proposals to different donor groups their applications had been rejected. At the same time, NGOs with little specialist knowledge of key issues concerning HIV/AIDS in Tanzania had received funding from the same donors to run projects and programmes. However, one trade union official made the point that no trade union had set up its own internal unit to address issues relating to HIV/AIDS, despite considerable losses of trade union members to the disease. This official argued that trade unions would stand more chance of both getting funds to address issues concerning HIV/AIDS amongst members and using them effectively if they started their own work in the area, rather than looking immediately for help from donors. This would also lead to union leaders getting more respect from rank-and-file members, who regard the many donor-funded projects and programmes in Tanzania as gravy trains for local budget holders, who run projects with negligible transparency and accountability.

Another issue clouding the relationship between trade unions and NGOs outlined by TUCTA officials is state ring-fencing of funds for ‘civil society development’ and then giving it only to NGOs. Trade unions were told they were not eligible to apply for these funds. TUCTA officials pointed out that the refusal of funding prevented capacity-building on the part of the labour movement and, thus, hindered their ability to challenge state hegemony. Through its control of funding mechanisms the state is able to manipulate civil society into a form it finds acceptable. In this way, legal-bureaucratic measures are employed to strengthen the integral state and to weaken opportunities for a counter-hegemonic discourse to be formulated by trade unions. Moreover, control over funding mechanisms in this way shows the close connections between the state, civil society and ideology. Through its power over finance, needed by associational groups to operate meaningfully in post-liberalization Tanzania, the state is able to reformulate which groups are included in civil society, and which excluded. The exclusion of trade unions by the state as an organization eligible to apply for funds from a tranche set up in the post-liberalization period with the specific aim of ‘developing’ civil society reveals their marginalization within a hegemonic discourse driven by the ideology of neo-liberalism.
TUCTA-affiliated trade unions do little work with NGOs. Only one trade union works regularly with NGOs. TPAWU works with NGOs in the UK, Holland and Germany on issues concerning pesticide control, the cut flower industry and Occupational Health and Safety. The Head of Research, Planning and Credit at TPAWU contributes to the sector publication (GOHNET) and argues that other trade unions should take this route and involve trained people in a wide variety of activities. CHODAWU had worked with a local NGO on a child labour project that was praised by officials as a ‘good partner.’ The problem with the project from the union point of view was its sustainability; a limited budget and time period for the project meant that the children who were taken from their places of work and reintegrated into the school system were not going to be supported until they had finished at primary level. The only way to make the project sustainable was to get more funding but applications were refused. Moreover, the TTU has done joint research with Hakielimu.\footnote{155 The two organizations collaborated to do research, leading to the publication of ‘The Living and Working Conditions of Teachers in Tanzania’ (Sumra, 2004).} The work of TPAWU, CHODAWU and the TTU with NGOs is unusual. Most TUCTA-affiliated trade unions work occasionally with NGOs (53%) or never (33%). Many officials of TUCTA-affiliated trade unions were negative in their attitude to NGOs and did not show interest in learning how to raise funds by replicating their strategies, despite the fact that almost half of all the interviewees from the labour movement argued that ‘NGOs are better at raising funds than trade unions.’

Donors are regarded by TUCTA-affiliated trade union officials as preferring NGOs to trade unions. This point was made by officials at the TTU, who saw different sides of NGO work. The efforts of Hakielimu in highlighting education issues in the country were praised but it was also argued that NGOs lack popular accountability, in contrast to trade unions. Moreover, NGOs are seen as more aggressive than trade unions in their work and in pursuing relationships with other key agents of development, notably the state. An official from the General Secretary of TUICO captured the views of many trade unionists in asserting that ‘NGOs chase donors much more widely and aggressively than trade unions.’ Corruption in the NGO sector and the prevalence of ‘briefcase NGOs,’ in particular, was also an issue raised by a number of trade union officials, one of whom contended that many ‘NGOs do not work. The leaders get funds from donors … but they do not use them in the regions. They keep the funds for themselves.’
Non TUCTA-affiliated trade unions have very few contacts with NGOs. Eighty three per cent of interviewees from non TUCTA-affiliated trade unions reported that their union had never worked with an NGO. Officials at one of the largest non-TUCTA affiliated trade unions argued that NGOs have no membership and are included in national debates through ‘making more noise’ than trade unions.

A different view was put forward by one of the new guard TUCTA officials interviewed, who was concerned about the suspicion many trade unionists have about NGOs and argued that the unions must actively forge links with them to strengthen the overall work of the civil society sector in Tanzania. Such connections are important for this official, as trade unions can use them to learn how NGOs act effectively in pursuance of their own interests when working with international donors and state officials, as well as using the media to their advantage and pursuing funding sources efficiently. A related argument was made by another official in an interview, who pointed out that trade unions wrongly have not forged links with, or learnt skills from, the influential professional associations in the country.\(^\text{156}\)

NGOs are attractive potentially as partners for trade unions wishing to move to a social movement unionism strategy, through their financial capacity and closeness to the donors and the state. However, the findings from this research indicate that mutual suspicion between NGO and trade union officials makes close collaboration problematic. The main reasons for this mutual suspicion are summarized in Table 6.3 below.

\(^\text{156}\) Influential professional associations include notably the University of Dar es Salaam Staff Association (UDASA), the professional association of teachers, Kitaaluma cha Walimu Tanzania (CHAKIWATA) and the Tanzania Registered Nurses Association (TARENA).
## Table 6.3 Barriers to Effective NGO-Trade Union Collaboration in Tanzania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>NGO Perception of Trade Unions</th>
<th>Trade Union Perception of NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Narrow accountability base – to members only. Do not represent the rank-and-file effectively. Poor methods of communication with members. Top down ethos.</td>
<td>No popular accountability, thus no democratic mandate. Not membership organizations. Impose themselves on constituencies Focus on upward accountability to donors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Do not make information and accounts readily available to members.</td>
<td>Produce reports and accounts for donors but not for intended beneficiaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roots in Tanzanian Society</td>
<td>Historically linked closely to the state. Have alienated the workers as a result. Still living in the past era of the One Party State.</td>
<td>No roots in Tanzanian society, so do not understand their constituencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Lack of transparency and top down way of operating make corruption likely and difficult to detect.</td>
<td>Endemic corruption in NGO sector – many ‘briefcase’ NGOs. NGO and state sectors inextricably interlinked. Thus, rent seeking a major motivation for forming NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Unwilling to share ideas with other CSOs.</td>
<td>Participate largely in work with donors and the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Limited, as it comes mainly from members.</td>
<td>From international donors, so NGO orientation and accountability upward.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: McQuinn (2011)

Trade unions feel frustrated that ‘new [mainly foreign] investors treat them and the workers with contempt. However, they are being exhorted by the donors and the state to adopt a business unionism approach, based on treating the new investors as social partners with whom they can engage in a mutually beneficial social dialogue, as part of embracing the new policy agenda. The role of new investors in Tanzania is perceived as threatening by the majority of both old guard and new guard TUCTA officials. The flouting of national laws by new investors was a significant factor contributing to this view, whilst the provision of poor working conditions and loss of jobs through the capital intensive nature of work provided were also of major concern. For one senior official at TUCTA the Tanzanian state has ‘signalled to foreign investors that they could forgo the labour movement’. The state is aware that the mass dismissals of workers that followed the imposition of SAPs led to a rise in unemployment in Tanzania, culminating in more
crime and social instability and, thus, threatened state credibility. Consequently, there is little political will to confront ‘new foreign investors’ which ignore labour legislation, such as minimum wage rates. A TUCTA official summed up this point by stating that labour ‘laws are relaxed and not enforced for fear of FDI being withdrawn by these new investors.’

Officials of TUCTA-affiliated trade unions have an overwhelmingly negative view of the role of new investors in Tanzania. Ironically, it is perceived by many interviewees that new investors create unemployment, through providing mostly capital intensive work and using foreign managers and technicians. It is also argued that new investors provide poor working conditions for employees, that their operations lack transparency and that they are anti-union. TAMICO had the most negative views of new investors in the mining sector, with Barrick being singled out as a particularly bad employer in its provision of working conditions and its attitude to trade unions. ‘Every time TAMICO gets into a position to form a CBA, Barrick terminates the agreement’ was how one TAMICO official summed up dealings with the company. Labour disputes are also common at other gold mines. On 19 May 2011, just after Kikwete had spoken out against exploitation of mineworkers in his May Day speech, two TAMICO leaders working at the Geita Gold Mine were suspended. TAMICO, and then TUCTA officials at head office, claimed the suspension was a result of their work in trying to recruit union members. They were supported in this claim by evidence from a report on conditions at the mine compiled by the Legal and Human Rights Centre.

The situation at the Geita Gold Mine highlighted a significant wider issue for trade unions in post-liberalization Tanzania. First, it was an NGO which compiled the report on conditions at the mine. A major problem for trade unions is their own lack of detailed evidence-based research on new investors. On one hand, lack of transparency on the part of both state and the new investors is an issue. Though the different percentages of royalties received by the Tanzanian state for various types of minerals extracted by foreign investors are known, full details of the terms and conditions of contracts negotiated between the state and foreign enterprises are not put into the public domain or made accessible to trade union officials. On the other hand unions lack the financial and organizational ability at present to undertake research on the terms and conditions whereby new investors enter key sectors of the Tanzanian economy (notably, mining and
tourism). Such research would be very useful as the basis of potential challenges to the state and the donor positions on the impacts of new investors on the labour force in Tanzania. Interviewees criticized the new investors in Tanzania on several key grounds; excessive subcontracting of work, which is leading to the casualization of the workforce, failing to honour negotiated CBAs and giving jobs to Tanzanian nationals on significantly worse terms and conditions of employment than those contained in contracts awarded to foreigners with equivalent skills and qualifications. However, unions have done little, if any, recent specific research themselves on any of these key areas and thus have no quantifiable evidence to support their views. Moreover, the fact that TAMICO, and subsequently TUCTA, had to rely on a study by an NGO (LHRC) in putting their case over suspended members provided concrete evidence of how a concerted move to adopt a social movement unionism approach could make the work of trade unions more effective in the post-liberalization era.

A nationalist discourse ran strongly through the interviews, grounded in opposition to perceived exploitation of Tanzanian labour and resources by new foreign investors in lucrative sectors of the economy, particularly mining. The wisdom of Nyerere’s (1976) argument that minerals should be left untouched until they could be used for the benefit of all Tanzanians was constantly cited by interviewees. The rise of this discourse on the part of the labour movement is problematic for the donors, the state and representatives of capital. This research showed that the donors, the state and the new investors in Tanzania clearly want trade unions to embrace a business unionism approach, since this neutralises their ability to deploy nationalist vocabulary within a counter-hegemonic political discourse. By deploying such a tactic trade unions threaten to transcend the state’s monopoly of the discourse of national liberation in Tanzania. The argument on the part of trade unions that they are the guardians of national assets and the interests of workers, while the state is prioritising the interests of foreign capitalists, who are appropriating national assets and exploiting Tanzanian labour, provides the basis of a substantive counter-hegemonic challenge to the prevailing orthodoxy. Furthermore, this nationalist discourse clearly strikes a chord with the wider citizenry in Tanzania. In contrast, the endorsement of a business unionism approach would locate the labour movement in post-liberalization Tanzania firmly within the hegemonic neo-liberal discourse. Thus, the adoption by the Tanzanian labour movement of a business unionism or a social movement unionism approach is a vital
While some of the new guard officials at TUCTA head office and at individual trade unions used the discourse of business unionism in interviews (for example, by referring to the state and employers as ‘social partners’), a majority indicated that social movement unionism is the best direction for the labour movement. While interviewees did not use the term ‘social movement unionism’ explicitly during interviews, a considerable number stated that pursuing union strategies in conjunction with other civil society organizations should be an important part of the work of the Tanzanian labour movement.

As part of tentative steps towards forming a social movement unionism strategy, trade unions are starting to ally themselves with marginalized groups in the economy, particularly workers in the informal sector, women and youth. All the senior officials at TUCTA stressed in interviews the importance of working with these three groups and TUCTA agreed from 2008 to elect a delegate from the Youth Wing onto the National Executive. The Gender and Youth Department was started at TUCTA in 1986 and gathered a great deal of baseline data on the position of women in the labour force. Using this data to highlight women’s issues was difficult during the late 1980s and the 1990s as TUCTA was male-dominated and, according to an official from the Gender and Youth Department, ‘men laughed when women’s issues were raised at union meetings.’ The same official outlined how the situation has improved from 2000 onwards and now all trade unions have an official gender policy and three unions (TTU, TPAWU and RAAWU) have a budget allocation for women’s issues. TUCTA has set a target with no time limit for 30% of the total trade union membership to be female.

However, these moves cannot be seen as originating from trade unions. Instead they reflect donor-driven mainstreaming of gender and youth issues across civil society and the Tanzanian state. Despite the top-down nature of the way these issues have been pushed up the agenda, adopting a Gramscian framework provides insights into the way trade unions could adopt them to form counter-hegemonic discourses. A central point of the Gramscian analysis (Gramsci, 1994, 1977) is that the struggle for hegemony is fluid, with both the state and civil society organizations (albeit from different positions of structural power) able to seize on changing

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This is not to exclude the possibility that the labour movement could adopt a revolutionary unionism approach at some stage in the future. However, during the interviews, such an approach was not considered either possible or desirable by any of the respondents.
processes or new initiatives and promulgate versions of them as realizing the aims of universal benefit for society. There is, from this perspective, the chance for gender or youth issues to become a focus for counter-hegemonic discourses.

These measures on the part of trade unions towards embracing social movement unionism have important implications for their mode of participation in national policy-making processes. Social movement unionism is predicated on substantive collaboration between trade unions and other civil society organizations, which is not occurring in Tanzania at present. The interviews reveal the opposite to be the case. That is, trade unionists in general regard other types of civil society organizations, particularly NGOs, with suspicion and do little collaborative work with them. Thus, there is a clear disconnect between the stated aim of moving towards social movement unionism and the current state of the relationship between trade unions and other civil society organizations in Tanzania.

6.10 Summary
This chapter highlighted significant theoretical, structural and ideological problems facing Tanzanian trade unions, which have negatively affected their participation in national policy-making processes, and led to the marginalization in post-liberalization Tanzania. Unless unions can draw on their experience under colonialism of social movement unionism (when they worked successfully with TANU and the co-operative movement) they are unlikely to be able to effectively fight state and corporate reorganization of labour in the post-liberalization period. The research shows that unions are caught in a contradictory situation, where an increasing number of union officials are advocating the need for a move towards the adoption of social movement unionism, but at the same time are distrustful of having close relationships with other civil society organizations and lack a sense of common purpose with them. In addition, trade unions are viewed with suspicion by other civil society groups, due to their close association with the state in pre-liberalization Tanzania. Thus, the chances of trade unions being instrumental in the formation of a historic bloc of oppositional groups, which could provide a substantive challenge to the prevailing neo-liberal order are slight at present. While the fieldwork for this research revealed that trade unions do represent a relatively small percentage of the total

158 See chapter 3 for details.
labour force, it is difficult to sustain the labour aristocracy thesis in the case of Tanzania. The attitudes, behaviour and actions of unions show a heterogeneity which casts doubt on the validity of the labour aristocracy thesis. The research showed that it is important to examine the objective conditions which make a certain stance towards capital likely to be adopted by the workforce. The most important of the structural problems facing trade unions is insufficient capacity, which, in turn, leads to a lack of legitimacy. The majority of interviewees made the point that the shortage of financial capacity in the trade union movement is severely restricting the ability of officials to build technical and institutional capability. The IFIs and the state regard labour organizations as a disruptive presence in national policy-making processes and, consequently, attempt to erode their legitimacy. Furthermore, trade unionists are concerned that their legitimacy is being compromised by lack of downward accountability. That is, they have ineffective contact with the rank-and-file membership and are, thus, unable to represent their concerns effectively.

In addition to the recognition of structural problems, there is a concern on the part of many trade unionists about the lack of a coherent ideology in the movement. While trade unions in the post-liberalization era have protested against the negative effects on workers of neo-liberal economic policies, a considerable number of officials argue that the movement needs to work out an ideology based on an overall vision of the role of the labour movement in Tanzanian society, rather than being reactive and taking predominantly piecemeal actions, as is currently the case. These findings reveal the strength of the Gramscian perspective on the nature of civil society-state relations, wherein the struggle for hegemony is fluid and contingent on the visions, capacities and motivations of associational groups, such as trade unions. These key factors in turn shape possibilities for such groups to promulgate counter-hegemonic views to those of the prevailing neo-liberal power bloc. Struggles organized by unions, even on a piecemeal basis, can be important in developing the consciousness, the resolve and the organizational ability necessary to formulate and then sustain a counter-hegemonic discourse. Thus, the abortive general strike organized by TUCTA in 2010, TAMICO-organized industrial action in the Bulyankulu Gold Mine, anti-privatization struggles, co-ordinated by TEWUTA, in the telecommunications sector and conflict between the state and the TPU over strategies to develop the tourism sector show that a wider vision on the part of trade unions, regarding their role, is
starting to emerge in Tanzania following the shocks to the labour movement resulting from the profound structural changes it has undergone in the neo-liberal era. These actions could lead to trade unionists, and the wider citizenry, becoming more aware of alternatives to neo-liberal hegemony.

Regarding theoretical debates, the fieldwork findings showed that the prevailing liberal conception of civil society (see chapter 2 for details), predicated on a consensus model, whereby relations between associational groups and the state are regarded as harmonious, has little explanatory strength in Tanzania. The actions of trade unions in post-liberalization Tanzania highlighted the strengths of analysing civil society within a Gramscian framework, since it allows insights into how some trade union actions and ideologies are confronting the prevailing order. While trade unions lack an overall vision, and have not systematically set out a counter-hegemonic discourse to the dominant neo-liberal perspective driven by the donors and the core elements of the integral state, it is possible that new strategies and increasing organizational ability will emerge from their practical struggles and actions. An important aspect of the Gramscian view is that institutional organization is more important than ideology in the struggle for hegemony. Therefore, the more actions are co-ordinated by individual trade unions and/or the national federation, the greater the possibility for the labour movement to develop and to effectively present the ‘particularity’ of its counter-hegemonic views as beneficial for Tanzanian society as a whole and the more its organizational ability will increase. However, power currently lies overwhelmingly with capital vis-à-vis labour in Tanzania and, therefore, the development of new strategies and actions by unions are thus of paramount importance.

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159 See chapter 2 for details.
Chapter 7

NGOs, Trade Unions and the PRSP Process in Tanzania

7.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the ways in which NGOs and trade unions have taken part in the Tanzanian Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process, from its inception in 1999 until the end of its second phase in 2010, in order to illustrate wider and deeper issues relating to the participation of civil society organizations in the post-liberalization era. An overview of PRSPs is provided to highlight the key role for civil society organizations, which is stressed by the donors driving the process. This is followed by a summary of supportive (World Bank, 2010d, for example) and critical (Harrison, 2010a, for example) perspectives on PRSPs in terms of their ability to reduce poverty and stimulate viable development trajectories. An assessment is subsequently made of the Tanzanian PRSP, drawing on key background events and issues which contextualize the current engagement of NGOs and trade unions in the process. Fieldwork findings, based on interviews with NGO and trade union officials (as well as the Registrar of Trade Unions at the Ministry of Labour), are then discussed. The analysis focuses in detail on the processes and ideologies through which a small number of NGOs have come to occupy cardinal positions within the PRSP matrix, while trade unions have been largely excluded. Obtaining positions of strategic significance in superstructure institutions is vital to winning the war of position (Gramsci, 2011). Institutions of strategic importance can be used as a fountain-head by civil society organizations from which to present ideologies as representing the universal societal good. This is why gaining control of key institutions and policy instruments is, for oppositional civil society groups, more important in winning the war of position than the quality or detail of the ideology they promulgate (Gramsci, 2011). It is only by exercising ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ (Gramsci, 2011) as part of a historic bloc that oppositional groups can win the war of position and become capable of establishing a new ideological settlement. Thus, the Tanzanian PRSP, as a key policy instrument for the state and the donors, was selected as a case study regarding the ways in which civil society groups contest strategic policy spaces. Concerning the former, Tanzania became one of the first countries to complete the requisite steps under the PRSP process enabling the country to obtain substantive debt relief and a further tranche of
official development assistance. Regarding the latter, the PRSP process has become the touchstone for the harmonization of aid to the extent that by 2003 it provided the ‘policy framework for all donors’ (DAC, 2003: 7). The PRSP receives more financial as well as other forms of support from external donors than any other national policy instrument in Tanzania. A fast-track PRSP for Tanzania was endorsed by the IFIs in 2000 with a second generation initiative, known by its Swahili acronym, MKUKUTA, put into operation in 2005. Currently (2011), Tanzania’s third generation PRSP (URT, 2010b) is being rolled out. Thus, in the short to medium term, the initiative is likely to remain a key driver of economic and social policies at national level. The fieldwork findings revealed that NGOs have not used their position of dominance as civil society representatives within the PRSP process to formulate counter-hegemonic discourses. Their views are disseminated largely within a framework created and controlled by the core elements of the integral state in alliance with the donors. Regarding trade unions, the IFIs at first ignored them and then carefully managed their mode of participation in the PRSP process, in general. The state mirrored this strategy concerning the way trade unions have taken part in the Tanzanian PRSP process. However, agency has been a significant factor regarding trade union participation, in that a small number of officials from the labour movement have made articulate and forceful contributions to debates concerning PRSP issues. These contributions were not part of a formulated trade union strategy and have been managed by the state and the donors in ways that minimize the opportunities for them to be developed into counter-hegemonic discourses. Given the substantive amount of control exercised over the PRSP process by the state and the donors, it is unlikely that NGOs or trade unions could use positions of strategic importance within its structures to formulate a sustainable counter-hegemonic discourse.

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160 See chapter 3 for details.
161 See chapter 3 for details.
162 The first PRSP (1999-2004) was called PRSP I. The second PRSP (2005-2010) was given the Swahili name - Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini- and is most commonly known by the acronym MKUKUTA. It is translated into English as National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP). The third PRSP (2010-2015) is called MKUKUTA II or NSGRP II. State documents in English sometimes use MKUKUTA and on other occasions NSGRP. MKUZA is the Swahili acronym for the PRSP on Zanzibar - Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Zanzibar.
7.2 Overview of the Role of Civil Society in the PRSP Process

Since their origin in 1999, the key development actors driving the liberalization process in Tanzania (the World Bank, the IMF and major bilateral donors), have acknowledged PRSPs as the requisite policy framework within which to deliver assistance and to deal with recipient states.\(^{163}\) PRSPs replaced Policy Framework Papers (PFPs) as the required statement of recipient state objectives for purposes of adjustment lending by the IMF and concessional credits from the World Bank. Moreover, bilateral donors have increasingly set up or rearranged Country Programmes with reference to PRSPs. DFID (2003: 3), for example, tries to ‘align its own country programmes with PRS[P]s and to influence other donors to do the same.’ Civil society organizations have also paid significant attention to PRSPs, producing summaries (Bretton Woods Project, 2003), critiques (Oxfam, 2004, Rowden and Irama (ActionAid), 2004, O’Malley, (Save the Children) 2004, Malaluan and Guttal, (Focus on the Global South), 2003) and websites, such as ‘PRSP-Watch’ (VENRO).

According to the IFIs, PRSPs should be country-driven to promote national ownership and comprehensive in terms of analysing poverty. They also need to be based on partnerships formed through coordinated mass participation of stakeholders (which entails a substantive role for civil society), results-oriented and long-term in their approach to poverty reduction (IMF, 2010: 1). The World Bank (2010d) states that there is no blueprint for a PRSP and the individual circumstances of each country must be recognised. However, IFI prescription is apparent through the listing, by the World Bank, of four key steps to be taken in the process of drawing up a PRSP. First, there should be a full description of the participatory process used. Second, an outline of the ways in which poverty has been diagnosed, recognising the multidimensional nature of the concept, should be set out. Third, clearly presented and costed priorities for macroeconomic, structural and social policies are necessary, so that ‘wish lists’ are avoided. Finally, it is important to create appropriate targets, indicators and systems for monitoring and evaluating progress (Booth, 2005, Booth and Lucas, 2002). Thus, PRSPs (which according to the World Bank (2010d) should be drawn up every three to five years) require recipient states to follow certain procedural steps rather than accepting specific policies. This aims to create a greater commitment to poverty reduction than was the case with previous forms of conditional

\(^{163}\) Recipient states have been renamed as ‘partners’ in the PRSP process.

The move from SAPs to PRSPs reflects the broader shift from the policies of the Washington Consensus to those of the Post-Washington Consensus in the latter half of the 1990s (see chapter 1 for details). This raises the question of the extent to which the PRSP process commits participating states to new and/or different methods of governance, as is claimed by the IFIs. Much has been written on what PRSPs are supposed to achieve with regard to poverty reduction and national development and about the way civil society organizations should be included in the process (in general and technicist terms) from the point of view of the donors (IMF, 2010, 2004, World Bank, 2010a, 2010b, 2005b, 2004b). Such views put a stress on the core concepts of the donor discourse – partnership, ownership, participation, capacity building, dialogue and good governance. For example, with regard to its relationships with civil society, the World Bank (2005a: 51) concentrates on increasing dialogue and consultations with the trade union movement, ‘including technical level meetings on policy issues of mutual interest, such as … PRSPs.’ Critiques have tended to focus on wide conceptualizations of the process (Craig and Porter, 2006, 2003, Zack-Williams and Mohan, 2005, Booth, 2003a, Stewart and Wang, 2003) and structural and systemic obstacles to effective participation and ownership on the part of civil society, such as donor refusal to allow debate on macroeconomic policies and shortage of time to engage meaningfully with the main issues (Dewachter, 2007, Oxfam, 2004, Whaites, 2000).

These broad-based conceptions of the mechanisms of the PRSP process have led to well-argued perspectives emerging on the inclusion of associational groups. (Gould, 2005, for example shows how civil society has been instrumentalized). However, in depth studies of what is happening in particular countries with regard to the inclusion and exclusion in the PRSP process of certain types of civil society organizations, focusing on their perspectives, are lacking (Fraser, 2005).

Much of the debate on PRSPs centres on what effects the linking of participation and ownership are having on economic, political and social policies in recipient countries, since the focus on

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164 See chapters 3, 5 and 6 for an analysis of the effects of SAPs on Tanzania, economically, politically and socially.
these two concepts is cited by the IFIs as evidence of an advancement on the one-size-fits-all neo-liberal policies which characterized the preceding period of SAPs (World Bank, 2010d, IMF, 2010, Wilks and Lefrancois, 2002). The way participation and ownership are connected in the PRSP process with regard to the involvement of civil society is pertinent, since -

‘the importance attached to country ownership and civil society participation, and the attention given to the voices of the poor, have all been met with enthusiasm as important steps in improving the design and implementation of policies needed to accelerate development and reduce poverty’ (UNCTAD, 2002: 57).

Since participation and ownership are the core concepts behind the donor vision for the PRSP process, the initiative is an important testing ground, within which their limits, as imposed by external donors (as drivers) and states (as owners), can be analysed. Whether or not the stress on country ownership and mass participation of stakeholders in PRSP processes can be regarded as indicating a long-term change in policy orientation on the part of the IMF and the World Bank, and a willingness to accept policy heterodoxy from recipient countries, has become a matter of contention (Harrison, 2010a, Dewachter, 2007, Craig and Porter, 2006, 2003, Gould, 2005, Fraser, 2005, Zack-Williams and Mohan, 2005, Gottschalk, 2004, Booth, 2003a, Stewart and Wang, 2003, Whaites, 2000). An examination of the reasons for the implementation of PRSPs sheds some light on this debate. First, the PRSP initiative emerged out of the need for new instruments to justify the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, aimed at debt reduction. To qualify for HIPC, recipient countries must draw up a PRSP, outlining how they intend to fight poverty, as well as the goals, priorities and instruments involved. Second, evidence pointed to poor poverty-reduction outcomes in many aid-dependent countries prior to 1999. Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pederson (2003: 285) state that even ‘the most convinced advocates of foreign aid have had to acknowledge that the results have often been disappointing and have not at all lived up to expectations.’ Aid dependency had become institutionalised through high volumes, with Tanzania being a case in point (See the analysis in chapter 3 and Engel, Erdmann and Mehler eds, 2006).  

A number of writers have outlined how the institutionalization of aid dependency is a major cause of the ineffectiveness of aid in Africa (See, for example, Gumede, 2009, Glennie, 2008).
(which failed) as it diverted attention away from the processes of development management in the recipient country and incentives for officials to spend time on reforming strategic thinking at the centre were undermined (White and Dijkstra, 2003). Moreover, the dominance of project aid fitted easily into the prevailing system of patron-client relations and helped to fuel it institutionally (Moyo, 2010, Easterly, 2006, Bauer, 1976). The recognition of these factors led to greater analysis during the 1990s of how to make the national policy context conducive to aid effectiveness (De Renzio and Krafchik, 2008, Brautigam and Knack, 2004, Van de Walle, Ball and Ramachandran (eds), 2003). Research in this area influenced donor moves toward sector-wide approaches (Brown et al, 2001, Foster, 2000) and ‘partnership general budgetary support’ (PGBS) during the late 1990s, where a relationship based on cooperation between donors and recipients can be ‘contrasted with the imposed conditionality of the structural adjustment era’ (Dom, 2007: 1). Third, PRSPs were created in response to the increasing amount of evidence that emerged during the 1990s showing the limits of conventional conditionalities, particularly those associated with SAPs, in leveraging positive change (Stein, 2008, Killick, 2002, Leandro et al., 1999, Mohan, Brown, Millward and Zack-Williams, 1999, Hussain and Faruqee (eds), 1994, Mahjoub (ed.), 1990). Stein (2008: 4) outlined how the consequences of SAPs in Africa were ‘terrible’ in both economic and social terms, evidenced by an increase in absolute and relative poverty and a decline in average life expectancy from fifty to forty six between 1980 and 2003. Influenced by such trenchant criticisms of SAPs, ‘poverty reduction’ per se became an increasing part of the World Bank agenda during the 1990s and led to a focus, in particular, on the ‘social dimensions of adjustment’ (World Bank, 1993, Hutchful, 1994, Jayarajah, Brown and Sen, 1996). Fourth, PRSPs came into being in part through recognition of the weaknesses involved in the common practice prior to 1999 of regarding poverty reduction as a special activity, which was added to existing programmes, requiring particular structures and activities. The resulting focus of poverty reduction policies was on project funding rather than processes of public resource allocation through the national exchequer. Thus, there was no connection to the macro-economic framework and a lack of an institutional link with the budget or overall management of public expenditure (Booth, 2003a).
7.3 Conceptualizing Civil Society Participation in the PRSP Process

Booth (2003a) sets out a typology of PRSPs with supporters, such as the IFIs, at one end of a spectrum (who downplay the structural obstacles to improvement possibilities in Africa via domestic politics) and radical sceptics at the other extreme, who regard PRSPs as SAPs with superficial changes (Standing, 2000, for example). The radical sceptics include Craig and Porter (2003: 57), who contend that ‘much of PRSP seems little more than re-labelling, often performed somewhat cynically.’ Forms of participation can be regarded as technologies of control since they mystify power relations, depoliticize negotiations and therefore secure IFI control of outcomes (see also Gould and Ojanen, 2005 on this point). Booth (2003a) himself adopts a third position, regarding PRSPs as a ‘non-trivial’ change informing the delivery of poverty support. They proffer an opportunity to address critical problems and in particular provide a chance to stop aid conditionalities creating a situation where recipient states are undermined.

In respect of the role of civil society, PRSP supporters, such as the IFIs, see this in de Tocquevillian terms (see chapter 2 for details). That is, the PRSP process allows a variety of forms of associational life to participate freely, through stimulating and amicable debates, which lead to the views of the wider citizenry being recognized and incorporated into national policies by a responsive state. Radical sceptics dismiss this perspective as having little basis in reality. For them, a small number of NGOs dominate civil society input to the PRSP process. These are elite, urban-based organizations, which are unrepresentative of the views of the majority of associational groups (See, for example, Craig and Porter, 2006). According to the third way position adopted by Booth (2003), civil society actors have the opportunity to use PRSPs as a vehicle to move away from a situation where there is a generalized and internationalized

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167 See also Fraser (2005), who delineates four main perspectives on PRSPs. First, that they are a sham and a public relations exercise. Second, they are leading to substantive possibilities for policy change. However, the limited alterations to PRSP policies compared to those previously adopted show states have learned that international economic realities offer few choices other than to embrace liberal democracy and free market reforms. Third, PRSP participation offers possibilities to transform relations between donors and recipients, so the focus should be on the processes of participation. Fourth, participation in PRSP processes does not result in gradual empowerment, because of the underlying principles of the concept itself, rather than through any processes of implementation.

168 In a variation of the radical sceptic view, Stewart and Wang (2003) set out a moral hazard position regarding PRSPs, whereby if recipients own poverty reduction strategies and there is little progress in alleviating poverty, they, including the indigenous civil society organizations which took part in the process, can be blamed and donors largely absolved.

169 Booth’s position is supported by other contributors to Booth, D (2003a) (ed.) Fighting Poverty In Africa: Are PRSPs Making a Difference?
responsibility for fighting poverty to a position where there is a more specific and local accountability, opening up the possibilities for these agents to play a substantive role in contesting policy spaces.

7.4 Measuring Civil Society Participation in, and Ownership of, the PRSP Process

Measuring Civil Society Participation
There is a stress on outcomes with regard to measuring civil society participation in PRSPs. ‘In planning a participatory process, it is important to keep in mind that the outcome-based approaches that are initiated and the institutional arrangements that support them can have an enduring influence over policymaking and implementation’ (World Bank, 2004b: 237). The type of outcomes which emerge from civil society input is an important part of the debate about the strengths and weaknesses of participatory approaches in the context of the PRSP process. McGee (2002) regards PRSPs as the acid test for southern states’ commitment to participation and ownership. A key aspect of this test is whether civil society organizations regard the forms and levels of participation afforded them as providing an opportunity to promulgate a counter-hegemonic discourse to that of neo-liberalism.

The key donor documents for assessing levels of participation in the PRSP process are the Joint Staff Assessments (JSAs) of the World Bank and the IMF. They ‘act as a signalling device for the Executive Boards of the IMF and World Bank that the strategy produced by the state provides a sound basis for providing concessional assistance’ (ODI, 2005: 3). The way participation is evaluated in the JSAs has been much criticised. Independent reviews by the IMF (IEO, 2004) and the World Bank (OED, 2004) did not find any procedures for assessing levels of participation set out in advance and stated that it was unclear as to whether different PRSPs were being assessed using the same criteria. JSAs were also critiqued for being essentially ‘insider documents’, despite the fact that one of their stated objectives is to inform stakeholders in the PRSP process and the general public. Finally, the JSAs are attacked for portraying participation in PRSPs in an overly favourable light, using broad terms of praise. This is the case with regard to JSAs of the Tanzanian PRSP. The IEO, (2004) and OED (2004) reports ranked levels of ‘Ownership and Participation’ the least transparent and accountable sphere of
assessment in the JSAs. The World Bank provides ‘guidelines’ for analysing participation. These are based on answering four questions, outlined in Figure 7.1, below.

**Figure 7.1 JSA Guidelines for Assessing Participation in the PRSP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the PRSP describe the participatory processes that the state conducted to design and to build ownership for the strategy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the PRSP summarize major issues raised during the participatory process and the impacts of the process on the content of the strategy? How has the participatory process evolved over time?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How closely is the PRSP related to any other current state document that set forth national or sectoral development plans and/or budgets?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the plans for public dissemination of the PRSP?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IMF and World Bank (2001: 20)

With regard to qualitative aspects of the participatory process, JSAs rank this from 1-5, with 1 being ‘poor’, 3 ‘moderate’ and 5 ‘good’. Moreover, a yes-no answer is required to the question, ‘was participation mentioned as one of the strong points of the PRSP process?’

As Thomas (2004), points out, a problem with the JSA Guidelines is that there is a built-in prejudice towards approval. The questions focus on the quality of the description of participatory processes involved in formulating a PRSP, not on an assessment of the processes themselves. If the quality of participatory approaches were examined it would be harder to get approval from the Executive Boards of the IFIs than simply requiring an adequate description of the processes. Furthermore, Dewatcher (2005: 30) found that the criteria used in compiling different JSAs were not clear, comparable or verifiable. These inconsistencies ‘contribute to the fuzziness and possible euphemisms that are instrumental in rating all PRSPs as acceptable.’

The typology for assessing civil society participation in the PRSP process provided by Tikare et al. (2004) in the World Bank’s ‘PRSP Sourcebook’ is also open to criticism for being vague. Only three ‘Country Types’ are set out with regard to the status of participation and the descriptions are so broad as to provide little explanatory power.
In sum, civil society participation in PRSP processes is not measured robustly or consistently. The ways in which civil society participation are assessed both in the World Bank’s participation sourcebook and in the JSAs are marked by a lack of analytical rigour and transparency. Since participation is inextricably linked to ownership in the PRSP process, there have also been various attempts to measure levels of the latter concept (Johnson and Wasty 1993, Killick 1997, World Bank 2004b). However, as Entwistle and Cavassini (2005) point out, since the operationalization of ownership as a concept is difficult, the level of participation on the part of stakeholders in the PRSP process is often used as a proxy.

Measuring Civil Society Ownership
As Weeks et al. (2002: 72) point out, ‘no single policy was more associated with transferring ownership to aid recipients than the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.’ The dynamic nature of ownership means that levels and types of ownership are constantly changing in countries taking part in the PRSP process. However, it is unlikely that countries receiving aid will be allowed to assume ownership of national policies if these run counter to the agenda of donors. Donors need to show domestic constituencies that they are using assistance effectively. This is a problem if donors and recipients have different views on policies and their capacity for implementation. Hayman (2003: 53), focusing on Eritrea, provides support for this analysis, arguing that ‘the donor community is ruled by its own agenda and is clearly not ready to concede the necessary control to allow real recipient ownership.’ Moreover, in a wider study, Nkombo (2008: 6) concluded that ‘ownership in most African countries is still very poor.’

There is a need to address a fundamental contradiction concerning the way ownership and participation are applied in the PRSP process. Ownership is chosen as a concept by external donors which they claim is necessary if effective anti-poverty strategies are to be put in place and
can be proved by a high level of participation in drawing up the policies. However, both of these concepts are introduced by the donors as *a priori*, containing merits in terms of leading to the alleviation of poverty, and the recipient countries have no chance to reject them (as unsuitable for their particular political and socio-economic environment) based on the history of development in that country. They are not allowed to state that ownership itself is a concept being imposed on them by external actors which they reject as being inappropriate in a context-specific environment. Ownership can thus be regarded as a ‘super-conditionality’ (Weeks et al., 2002) determining the parameters of participation for all actors taking part in the PRSP process.

With regard to practical ways to measure ownership, Weeks et al. (2002) take a matrix approach, which they use to measure ownership qualitatively. The matrix has three dimensions; the range of owners, the stages of the project cycle and the type of aid instrument or modality used. The matrix (set out below in Table 7.1) is used to summarise the activity assessment of the stakeholders (including those in the civil society sphere) during the various stages of the project cycle. The summaries can be updated as the process moves on, which takes account of its dynamic nature. No numeric values are used.

**Table 7.1 Basic Ownership Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Owners</th>
<th>Identification</th>
<th>Selection</th>
<th>Formulation</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partner state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiaries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other groups…</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Weeks et al. (2002)

Lerche, Pincus and Weeks (2003) also adopt a qualitative approach in assessing whether the PRSP process adds value to existing poverty reduction strategies, which is set out below in Table 7.2, using India as a case study.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Necessary Condition</th>
<th>Sufficient Conditions</th>
<th>Overall conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>A more poverty focused policy framework?</td>
<td>Integrated into the national planning framework?</td>
<td>No value added</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationally-owned and country-driven, including participation and awareness?</td>
<td>Consistent with capacity to implement?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes and Yes – long-standing practice of state</td>
<td>Yes – national plan and PRSP are the same. The latter derivative of the former</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No – long-standing experience in poverty-reduction strategies</td>
<td>Yes – much stronger at national than state level</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Providing summary answers to key questions in matrix form, (Weeks et al., 2002 and Lerche, Pincus and Weeks, 2003) may be worthwhile in assessing levels of ownership and could be triangulated with measurement of independent variables as formulated by Johnson and Wasty (1993) and developed further by Killick (1997) and the World Bank (2004b). However, since the formal inception of PRSPs in September 1999, the IFIs have not used the classification scheme devised by Johnson and Wasty to measure levels of ownership. Instead they measure the concept by employing broad rankings (from 1-5), assessing participation as a proxy for ownership, based on methods which lack rigour and transparency. Furthermore, in utilizing this method, the IFIs fail to take into account the fact that the trajectories of socio-economic and political processes over time are context-specific and, consequently, the way participation and ownership play out in particular countries is likely to be very different. Thus, the method employed by the IFIs of assigning broad numeric values in assessing levels of civil society participation in PRSP processes, which also acts as a proxy measurement of the degree of ownership, is virtually meaningless.

7.5 The Tanzanian PRSP Process

Tanzania is one of thirty four sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries (out of a total of forty seven) that have PRSPs, leaving less than that number (thirty three) in operation throughout the rest of the world (World Bank, 2010a). A major aspect of the Tanzanian PRSP at its inception in 1999, in line with the initiative across SSA, was the attempt to instil the institutions, procedures and norms of multiparty liberal democracy, as part of the World Bank’s good governance agenda,
which included a substantive role for civil society organizations (Harrison, 2010a, 2004a, 2004b, Zack-Williams and Harrison, 2009, Girdwood, 2007, Fukuda-Parr and Ponzio, 2002, Nelson, 2000). Civil society in Tanzania was characterized as weak because of state intolerance towards oversight and criticism of its policies on the part of associational groups (see chapter 3 for details). Thus, a key aspect of the PRSP process in Tanzania was the attempt to open up the policy-making process to the mass participation of citizens in the institutionalised context of civil society organizations, leading to increased accountability on the part of the state. The Tanzanian PRSP has been regarded as a success by the IFIs and a number of independent analysts. For example, Holtom (2007: 245) argues that the PRSP process has led to Tanzania securing aid and debt-relief and has engendered a stronger state-donor partnership than existed during the 1990s, which is to be ‘celebrated’, as it has led to macroeconomic stability and economic growth. However, such analyses fail to encompass in any detail the way the participation of civil society in the initiative has occurred and do not assess the way the processes were viewed from the perspectives of civil society organizations, such as NGOs and trade unions, themselves. The fieldwork, thus, focused on these two areas.

### 7.6 NGO Engagement in the PRSP Process

The PRSP I process (1999 to 2004) for NGOs, involved the managed participation of a small number of organizations, which were invited to take part in ‘zonal workshops’ where consultations took place with state officials. With regard to Cluster 1 (Growth and Reduction of Poverty), little civil society input was allowed on key issues (notably macroeconomic policy fundamentals) which were set by the state and beyond substantive discussion. NGO input was thus concentrated on Clusters 2 and 3 (Quality of Life and Social Well Being and Governance and Accountability, respectively).

The President’s Office produced the first budget guidelines for the PRSP, but costing was not done for the implementation phase. REPOA (an organization with a track record as a specialist research organization on poverty issues) was given the position of secretariat for civil

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170 See chapter 1 for an analysis of the origins of the good governance agenda in the general context of a shift from the policies of the Washington Consensus to those of the Post-Washington Consensus.
171 Officials from ESRF (one of two major ‘think tank’ NGOs in Tanzania, along with REPOA) was selected by the state to do the costing post facto.
society input, while also contributing ideas as an individual NGO as to what should be included in the PRSP. Moreover a small number of umbrella NGOs were commissioned and funded by the Vice President’s Office (VPO), which is the state department responsible for co-ordinating the PRSP process, to canvass the views of their member organizations. At the start of the PRSP I process, the Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development (TCDD) was championed by Oxfam as the lead association for NGO input. As Oxfam moved to a focus on how to get its own programmes put into practice on the ground, the organization became less interested in the PRSP process and provided a reduced amount of support for TCDD, which, consequently, lost its importance as a coordinating body. This is an indication of the need, on the part of Tanzanian NGOs, for financing and support from foreign donors if they are to have the capacity to take part in national policy-making processes effectively. It also indicates the weakness of the de Tocquevillian vision, which informs the perspective of the donors, regarding civil society. Contrary to this vision, which is based on a wide variety of civil society organizations taking part freely in debates, Tanzanian associational groups lack the capacity to engage in an important and influential national policy instrument, such as the PRSP, without the patronage of foreign donors. Other international donors then moved to set up a Tanzanian apex organization, the Policy Forum, to oversee NGO input to the PRSP process, which became operational in November 2001. The interviews showed that a considerable amount of finance was used, and effort expended, by donors (Care International, in particular) to create the Policy Forum (now often called PF), as an umbrella organization which could coordinate the ideas and policies of all Tanzanian NGOs.

The Policy Forum worked alongside other NGO umbrella organizations - Tanzania Council for Social Development (TACOSDE), Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO) and Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP) - in coordinating the NGO input (Policy Forum, 2002a). The state and the donors used the documents provided through the co-ordinating work of the umbrella NGOs to claim that civil society input to the PRSP I process was extensive. The Policy Forum and TGNP set out policies and programmes in formal written submissions to the VPO, many of which were incorporated verbatim into the PRSP document sent to the IFIs in Washington for approval. However, in interviews, officials from the NGOs concerned outlined how this meant little, since strategies for the implementation of the proposed policies and
programmes were not created. Officials from the NGOs which made the submissions felt that the state used them primarily to gain credibility with the IFIs concerning the ‘participatory nature’ of the PRSP process. In reality, the lack of time allowed for NGO input and the failure to provide any institutionalised means for NGOs to take part in the implementation stage meant that the PRSP I process was far from participatory. The entire participatory process was completed in just six months. A key feature of this process were the discussions between NGOs and state officials at zonal workshops, which lasted one month (May 2000) with only around fifty NGOs participating. Moreover, little time was available to follow up on the work started as a result of issues raised at those meetings. Thus, NGO input was made in constrained circumstances, which did not allow well-researched and clearly thought out positions to be formulated. Nevertheless, a full PRSP was approved by the IFIs in December 2000, leading to debt relief and a new tranche of loans being granted as part of HIPC. Clearly these two factors were the state’s highest priority in regard to desired outcomes from the PRSP I process.

At the end of the PRSP I process a large-scale evaluation took place. This was led by the VPO and took one year. The review featured pre-designed questionnaires in newspapers for people to comment on what they wanted to be improved in Tanzania. An NGO was commissioned to analyse the replies to the 30,000 questionnaires. Summaries of the replies were put into a booklet, which is available free from the VPO. However, the feedback from these questionnaires was not incorporated into the PRSP I process, as it was only analysed after the documents had been finalized. This is evident from the fact that the key PRSP I documents remained completely unaltered from the first draft to the final version and, therefore, could not have incorporated any of the findings from the survey. Several interviewees provided documents which showed that much of the content of Clusters 2 and 3 of PRSP I had been taken directly from the Policy Forum submissions, which made the document ‘seem more like a wish list’ than an actionable strategic plan. According to an interviewee from Policy Forum, NGO input, in the form of written submissions, was significant in Clusters 2 and 3, but only from the few organizations with good connections to the drafters. This reveals that the Policy Forum itself was well aware that it was unable to fulfil the mandate of the state by canvassing the views of a large number of grassroots

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172 Sources: Interviews with a number of NGO officials (2005 and 2006), who all made this point.
173 Sources: Interviews with a number of NGO officials (2005 and 2006), who all made this point.
associational groups, given the time and resources at its disposal. For another interviewee, who was the executive director of a well-funded organization, there ‘was little to get excited about, as macroeconomic policy was dictated from the top’ and civil society influence on this key area (Cluster 1) relating to poverty reduction was, consequently ‘negligible.’ The majority of interviewees pointed out that NGOs were frustrated at being regarded primarily as service delivery gap fillers in the social sector by the state and the donors. This was manifest from their exclusion from any debates of fundamental importance to the development of the country, notably those regarding macroeconomic policies. The state’s refusal to allow civil society organizations to debate macroeconomic policy within the setting of the PRSP process was an effective strategy as part of the war of position. Through this strategy, the state was able to substantially limit a challenge to its hegemony.

A small number of interviewees argued that the PRSP I process merely provided a framework to ‘manage the donors.’ That is, the Tanzanian state adopted it and played along with it as a way of guaranteeing funds from donors, while, in reality, it was not committed to implementation and, therefore, did not take civil society participation seriously. In short, the state just ticked the boxes required by the donors to meet the minimum standards of civil society participation within the hegemonic neo-liberal discourse. This finding provides a challenge in some respects to the arguments of Holtom (2007), Harrison (2005) and Gould and Ojanen (2003) that governance reforms have been accepted and internalized by powerful state officials, particularly within the Ministry of Finance. Whether Tanzanian state officials in positions of policy-making power are ‘true believers’ in the new policy agenda or simply ‘managing the donors,’ has significance. If they are true believers, the reforms are likely to remain in place for some time, whatever the policy outcomes. However, if the ‘managing the donors’ perspective put forward by some NGO officials in this research has validity, the reforms may be amended substantively or abandoned rapidly in the face of negative results.

Overall, the interviews showed that all NGOs regarded participation in PRSP I as rushed and heavily managed by the state, in order to get the document accepted by the IFIs and, hence, obtain a debt relief package under HIPC as quickly as possible. All the NGO officials

174 See chapter 4 for details.
interviewed pointed out that the limited timelines for civil society participation set by the state and the lack of an effective and concerted vision on the part of NGOs meant that (even in Dar es Salaam and Arusha) only a few large organizations could take part in the process in ways overwhelmingly dictated by the state. A few interviewees argued that the majority of NGO officials participating were content that they had been included at all and even felt flattered at being asked to play a role in discussing the formation of national policies. They were not concerned to look deeply at whether their mode of participation was meaningful in terms of getting the needs of their members or constituencies addressed. Thus, the NGO sector was successfully co-opted by the state through its use of a low-intensity ‘participation-as-consultation’ model (see chapter 1 for an analysis of different models of participation). It was clear to the vast majority of interviewees that the state wanted the NGO participation to focus on the social sector and, in particular, on non-income variables in the areas of health, education and water. Where NGOs were involved in income-based sectors affecting the poor, this was ‘not substantive’ through weak capacity and vision, in the words of one NGO official interviewed, who played an active role in the process. That is, NGOs did not present well-researched papers outlining a counter-hegemonic discourse. They lacked both information on income-based sectors and a collaborative vision, which could have been used as the basis from which to formulate alternatives to the neo-liberal discourse. However, there was a division between the views of Big International NGOs (BINGOs) and local organizations regarding this issue, as illustrated by the claim of interviewees from Oxfam that the officials from local NGOs ‘did not know how to participate, so we recruited in-house experts to show them how to engage in policy dialogue.’ From this example, it can be seen that Oxfam uncritically regarded the donor-set modus operandi of the PRSP process as completely appropriate and believed that Tanzanian NGOs which were unfamiliar with this mode were lacking. This revealed the BINGOs, as well as the state and donors, work within a dominant discourse, which also entails an accepted method of operating. Organizations unfamiliar with this orthodoxy, thus, require ‘training.’

The majority of the interviewees felt that the second PRSP (MKUKUTA), which was rolled out from 2005, had involved more state consultation with NGOs. Therefore, the quantity of NGO participation increased. However, many interviewees pointed out that who exactly participates in development processes, and in what ways, are key factors in terms of influencing outcomes,
rather than the overall number of civil society organizations which are engaged. In this regard, most interviewees argued that while MKUKUTA was based on a more participatory process than PRSP I, since there was a greater amount of civil society involvement, qualification is needed, as NGOs remained relatively disorganized and did not engage effectively. Few NGOs interviewed had analysed the type and level of NGO participation in the PRSP process in depth and worked out a strategy for their own organization, or one based on systematic collaboration with other NGOs or other forms of civil society, regarding how to participate and with what objectives. Moreover, many interviewees pointed out that the majority of NGO officials involved in MKUKUTA do not know the issues facing the mass of people at the grassroots anyway, irrespective of their lack of ability to formulate effective strategies per se. Given this lack of coherence and cohesion in the NGO sector, it was impossible for them to formulate a sustainable counter-hegemonic discourse and there was no substantive move towards the formation of a historic bloc of oppositional groups, which could challenge the rule of the state.

An example of the need for the Tanzanian NGO sector to review participation strategies was provided by an interviewee from TANGO. Representatives of NGOs went to the capital city, Dodoma to discuss with parliamentarians how to participate more effectively in the PRSP process. They were told by MPs that they would be better off back in Dar es Salaam spending time with the technocrats who draw up budgets for the civil society sector, as they have significant power and it would thus be more productive for NGOs to enter discussions with them than to be in Dodoma with ordinary MPs, who have little influence on matters relating to NGOs. For the interviewee, this typified the fact that NGOs tend to participate in the PRSP process without researching and planning how to maximize their effectiveness. A considerable amount of time and money was spent on the Dodoma meeting. For this interviewee, NGOs need a concerted strategy to be effective. The failure to target Dar es Salaam-based state technocrats and instead to wrongly focus on Dodoma parliamentarians was an example of the inadequate strategies that typify NGO participation in MKUKUTA. What participation in the PRSP process means for NGOs (and the state) remain uncertain. For this interviewee, the key challenge for NGOs is how to make participation effective. For many NGOs in Tanzania, having been invited to meetings means they have ‘participated’ and it is disappointing to see that this is the limit of NGO expectations. NGOs have no clear perspective regarding what participation should and
should not mean. A lot of the NGO arguments are based on blaming the state for creating a lack of serious participation on the part of CSOs. There is a need for NGOs themselves to understand issues relating to participation at a deeper level than is the case at present. It is also necessary to go beyond complaining about donor and state constraints on NGO participation in the MKUKUTA process and to develop a vision and strategy for the sector, rather than waiting for an agenda to be set and then adjusted ‘from above,’ as happens at present.

This interviewee was the only one who formally outlined the need for Tanzanian NGOs to formulate a clear and sustainable counter-hegemonic discourse. Moreover, this perspective recognizes the importance of Gramsci’s (2011) argument that to be successful, oppositional groups must exercise ‘intellectual and moral leadership,’ since, without these elements, the achievement of hegemony is impossible. It is not enough for such a group merely to criticize the key tenets of state hegemony. A historic bloc of civil society groups needs to present its aims as representing the universal good of the society in question if it is to successfully challenge state hegemony. This involves using a variety of means, including publications, demonstrations, meetings and the media to persuade other classes and groups to accept their moral, social and political values. At present, NGO taking part in MKUKUTA do not use these methods but are overwhelmingly reactive, rather than proactive, to the way the state has constituted the process and the ensuing strategies, targets and policies. A number of interviewees made the point that this situation has occurred to some extent as a result of MKUKUTA being externally imposed and put into practice with the intention of obtaining short-term results. Consequently, it was argued that NGOs are not reflecting on their participation in the MKUKUTA process and their focus is too much on piecemeal criticisms of the state. Therefore, NGOs need to collaborate in creating and sustaining a counter-hegemonic vision. In this regard, a number of interviewees made the point that the state itself does not know how to use MKUKUTA mechanisms and channels concerning participation on the part of civil society organizations, to a large extent as a result of the initiative being externally imposed. Thus, NGOs had an opportunity to take advantage of this uncertainty on the part of the state about the nature of participation, by putting forward a coherent and cohesive counter-hegemonic discourse. The fact that they have not done so is, consequently, a missed opportunity.
Another interviewee outlined a different issue concerning the lack of coherence in the NGO position on participation, by arguing that there was a big question as to where the focus of the concept lay; with the people, as intended beneficiaries, or with the NGOs themselves. For this interviewee, the PRSP process must allow continuous engagement on the part of NGOs, which requires multi-channels that are open, non-bureaucratic and can involve informal discussions with power-holders as issues arise. This would be better than always having a formal meeting framework where the same people attend every meeting in a ritualized manner. A significant problem remains how to provide effective feedback mechanisms concerning MKUKUTA processes so that NGOs and their constituents can then act on key issues and present their own arguments and strategies.

A crucial aspect relating to the provision of effective feedback mechanism concerns language. Interviewees pointed out that in the rural areas people do not speak English well enough to understand the issues involved in the PRSP process. Thus, having PRSP documents and meetings in Swahili is very important, but the problem remains that many materials are not translated well from English into Swahili so there is little reach of the documents, and the process itself, up country. This, for a considerable number of interviewees, is a deliberate state strategy, which is used in order to win the war of position. A related point, outlined by several interviewees, was that much work has been done on participation in MKUKUTA but remains on shelves and is never used to stimulate discussions or inform practice. As a result, state hegemony is maintained partly by narrowing down the number who can access materials related to MKUKUTA and by restricting the distribution of documents based on debates with this relatively small group of people, who have been able to read them.

A number of interviewees made the point that the preponderance of umbrella groups makes the structure of the NGO sector unwieldy. TANGO (2010: 1) (which is the largest umbrella group) argued that despite the existence of a number of umbrella groups in the NGO sector ‘not much has been done in terms of fostering ethical conduct and adherence to the principles of good governance among CSO.’ Since 2003, the work of the influential Foundation for Civil Society (FCS) has added to the complex and unwieldy structure of CSOs in Tanzania. FCS operates as a support organization aiming to ‘empower citizens through the provision of grants, facilitating
linkages and enabling a culture of ongoing learning to civil society’ (FCS, 2008). The work of FCS is explicitly aligned with the PRSP process, in focusing on the provision of intermediary support mechanisms for CSOs to enable them to reduce poverty effectively as set out in the MKUKUTA and Vision 2025. A final important point outlined by several interviewees regarding participation is the arcane and lengthy funding application processes to bilateral donors and the Foundation for Civil Society, which means that few people can understand them fully. This undermines the ability of many civil society organizations to participate in the PRSP process and militates against perceptions of ownership of processes and policies.

Most NGO officials argued that processes involved in participating in the PRSP are complicated and limit the effectiveness of their contributions. The majority of NGO officials were concerned with processes more than questions of policy substance. For a minority of interviewees it is vital that NGOs taking part in the PRSP process change their focus from processes to substantive policy-making issues if their participation is to be meaningful. This is difficult as it requires NGOs to formulate both individual strategies and coordinated input on policy-making across all members of the Macro Group. The umbrella groups also have the added difficulty of trying to put forward the views of their memberships, which are spread across the entire country. MKUKUTA has been characterized by the rise of a small group of NGOs, which have a significant influence on civil society input but also by an increase in the organization and presentation of counter-hegemonic discourses by a number of NGOs. The amount of lobbying and advocacy activities engaged in by elite Tanzanian NGOs has increased appreciably since the inception of MKUKUTA (See chapter 5 for details of the rise of advocacy and lobbying among Tanzanian NGOs, in general). For example, two large NGOs, TGNP and Hakikazi Catalyst, reviewed the national budget for 2005/2006, producing critiques and suggested alternatives after convening a series of seminars with the public and involving the media (Mbilinyi and Rusimbi, 2005).

As PRSP II was rolled out, a small group of NGOs consolidated their powerful position within the civil society sector. At the same time other associational groups were marginalized, to a large extent because they do not have ‘forms amenable to development contracting’ (Green, Mercer and Mesaki, 2010: 40), which is the preferred modus operandi of the donors. Furthermore, rural-
based NGOs continue to have little input into PRSP processes. The level of access to basic social services, notably education and health, at the district level remains ‘poor’ (Semkwiji, 2009: 8). However, the participation of associations from rural areas at the 2010 Civil Society Organizations’ National Consultative Meeting on the PRSP was ‘weak’ (Policy Forum, 2010: 13). Thus, there is a lack of activity on the part of NGOs precisely where facilities and services are most ineffective in the country. Nevertheless, the donors involved in the PRSP process continue to concentrate their funding on a small number of urban-based associational groups.

Overall, PRSP II was characterized by the intensification of donor efforts to move Tanzania from a Gemeinschaft (Community) to a Gesellschaft (Association) type of society, where the former is ‘characterized by the social will as concord, folkways, mores and religion’ and the latter by the social will as ‘convention, legislation and public opinion’ (Tonnies, 1955: 270). The extent to which this aim is being realized is examined in the Fieldwork Findings section. In the Tanzanian PRSP process, NGOs provide a challenge to the state in such a way, as they have access to finance and power, through the patronage of foreign donors. They also have control of an important institutional apparatus, through their dominance of the Civil Society sector, which directs input to the PRSP process from associational groups in Tanzania. This control of the institutional apparatus within which civil society organizations take part in the PRSP process in Tanzania and the patronage of the external donors (which drive the process) allows NGOs to present their views on poverty reduction as representing the universal interests of citizens in Tanzania.

NGOs regarded the level and type of their participation in MKUKUTA as quantitatively and qualitatively better in comparison to PRSP I. For the PF, which became the leading NGO player in the MKUKUTA process, ‘the state, and the VPO in particular, was much more open than during PRSP I.’ However, the interviews show that donor and state management of the process remained substantial. The first MKUKUTA meeting to review the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) was set up by the state and the donors. The PF sent three uninvited delegates to this meeting, who were allowed to contribute and argued that civil society should be allowed to organise its input to MKUKUTA independently of the state. This was agreed by the state and the donors.
Civil society organizations were involved in the Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) process and had input into the PRS Technical Working Group, subsequently producing its own review document of the process. However, the PRSP was published before this civil society document was finished. Thus, as with the PRSP I, inputs from civil society and the public were rendered largely irrelevant and these inputs were not taken into account at all.

The PF managed to get two people onto the MKUKUTA drafting group and were disappointed with the way the process operated, since in their view the team created the ideas first and then tried to find evidence to support these perspectives. When the first draft of MKUKUTA came out it was in English only. The PF offered to translate the document into Swahili and to simplify the content, as it was couched in very technical terms. After doing the translation, the PF succeeded in having the document inserted into four Kiswahili language newspapers and one English language newspaper as a way of increasing the transparency of the process by bringing MKUKUTA issues to the attention of the (literate) public.

The PF pressured the state to publish the second draft of the document in Swahili, but claimed the state reneged on this, after initially agreeing, and published the second draft of the document on the web in English only. The state then said they would conduct consultations outside Dar es Salaam, but the PF dissuaded them, as they felt it would be disastrous because the document used a lot of technical English, which was difficult to understand. In the end, the PF did a straight translation of the second draft into Swahili with no simplification.

Interviewees stated that another reason for the top-down nature of the PRSP process in Tanzania is concentration of power with the Executive. Many rank-and-file parliamentarians cannot read English well. They get a one page Swahili summary of every law, while full drafts are published only in English. Thus, many parliamentarians cannot and/or do not read them and the debate on legislation, including laws related to poverty reduction, is consequently narrowly based. This is, for the majority of interviewees, another important reason why both national and state ownership of MKUKUTA is lacking. ‘A small band of key actors and authors within the state write the documents,’ was the summary of one interviewee on this point.
The PF’s own contribution to the first draft of MKUKUTA was a formal paper, which was included as one of the key documents in the process. PF officials felt that their recommendations were taken on board, particularly concerning the income versus non-income poverty debate and in the areas of governance and indicators. Partly as a result of the PF document, governance was elevated to become a separate pillar in MKUKUTA and thus required outcomes and measurements of progress. This is exactly in line with the donor agenda. For the donors the inadequacy of governance in Tanzania has been identified as a fundamental cause of lack of ‘development.’ Thus, having ‘governance’ as a separate pillar in the PRSP allows donors to focus on whether targets and benchmarks in this sphere have been met and to relate any failures to bring about poverty reduction directly to ‘poor governance’ rather than macroeconomic policy.

The fact that the PF’s formal submission, along with others from major NGOs involved in the process, have been included in full, means that the document is unwieldy. The PF, therefore, has been pushing for prioritisation and simplification of points and indicators in order to make it actionable. However, the state’s position is that civil society has been consulted and that part of the process is finished. Thus, one of the core principles of PRSPs - that there should be tightly formulated and costed poverty reduction plans, rather than ‘wish lists’ - is almost completely ignored in practice, through state desire to show the donors that there is an acceptable level and type of civil society participation in MKUKUTA.

Many interviewees stressed the confusion they felt over ownership in the MKUKUTA process. It was pointed out that the poverty reduction procedure is supposed to be owned by the country with the state acting as ‘caretaker,’ by implementing what has been agreed by the stakeholders. Thus, MKUKUTA should be owned by the stakeholders but it is the state that puts MKUKUTA into practice. For most interviewees, therefore, it is the state which is the real ‘owner’ of the process and the document and the views of NGOs have little impact in terms of influencing policy formation.

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175 It was less than twenty years ago (in 1994) when the main donors suspended aid to Tanzania, citing governance failure as the core reason. See chapter 3 for details.
176 See chapter 3.
For NGO officials interviewed it is difficult to separate out these different aspects of ownership. Interviewees argued that the criteria used by the state in accepting or rejecting what is put forward by NGOs and other stakeholders as part of the PRSP process is not clear and this leads to participation and ownership being nebulous and largely meaningless concepts. One interviewee gave an example of the general concerns of NGO officials regarding this point in stating that ideas are important only if the people with them are convinced of their worth and have the will and the power to promote them. If NGOs state that they want the infrastructure to be improved in order to boost the economy then there should be clearly stated processes involved through which the state has to respond to this ‘participation.’ However, for the interviewee, it is clear that the state will act only if they are convinced by the idea themselves and believe that they will meet the approval of the external donors. There are no formal institutional means in the PRSP process to challenge state rejection of ideas put forward by civil society organizations and, thus, participation and ownership mean little to them.

For a considerable number of interviewees, the main point of the PRSP process is that the state should be open to ideas from Tanzanian individuals and groups and will act on them. However, interviewees argued that in reality, ownership is a very political concept and donors play a controlling role. It was pointed out, in this regard, that FONGOs in the country run some good projects with grassroots groups, which benefit poor and marginalized peoples, but there is no national ‘ownership,’ since the state has no say in where the funds go and how they are utilized. FONGOs are unlikely to transfer ‘ownership’ of finance for such projects, since they are not convinced that state accountability is better than it has been in the past. The state is unlikely to challenge the way they operate, as they play a valuable service delivery role and are well connected to powerful donors.

For most of the interviewees, creating greater levels of trust between the state and NGOs, will take a long time and involve the creation of robust public-management systems, capacity building and political will. Increasing the partnership aspect of the PRSP process will therefore take time. Though this is obvious to all participants, the donors want relations between major stakeholders to be changed and rebuilt overnight. The long-term aspect of change in political processes and relationships between different agents of development is not accommodated by the
donors. They require quick results, based on superficial ‘participation’ from NGOs in order to satisfy tick-box procedures. This perception reveals that most NGO officials taking part in the PRSP process argue within the conventional liberal discourse; the concentration is on temporal and spatial issues (lack of ability for NGOs outside urban centres to participate), while substantive policy alternatives are not proposed.

In overall terms, MKUKUTA is regarded as involving quantitatively and qualitatively better participation on the part of NGOs than PRSP I. However, the majority of NGO officials interviewed argue that participation remains a vague concept and it is not clear to any of the stakeholders taking part in the PRSP process how it should occur and with what outcomes. Moreover, the other core concepts of the PRSP process, ‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’ are also unclearly conceptualized and require long-term changes, which the donors fail to appreciate in their desire to bring about quick results, in order to show that Post-Washington Consensus policies are effective. In addition, the ability of state officials to comprehend the new discourse, systems and policies, which have been adopted as part of the PRSP process, continues to be weak, according to most interviewees. Consequently, MKUKUTA is characterized by a lack of coherence and cohesion, as was the case with PRSP I.

### 7.7 Trade Union Engagement in the PRSP Process

Since the World Bank and the IMF were founded in 1944, their relationship with trade unions has been largely non-existent for much of the time. The work of trade unions has only become of concern to the IFIs since the imposition of SAPs during the early 1980s, when conditions ‘were perceived by many developing country trade unions to negatively affect employment and conditions of work in formal labour markets’ (World Bank, 2007: 1 emphasis added). Since the 1990s, dialogue between the IFIs and the global labour movement has increased but trade unions remain suspicious of the IFIs following the consequences of SAPs. The 1995 World Development Report - ‘Workers in an Integrating World’ - has a chapter on the work of trade unions, which outlines opposition to structural adjustment programmes as a ‘negative effect’ of their work, ‘despite the apparent success of many of these initiatives since 1991’ (World Bank, 1995: 81). No analysis is provided of why unions have opposed SAPs and no evidence is set out to show how the ‘success’ of structural adjustment has been measured. Moreover, the use of the
The IFIs state (World Bank, 2007) that they have increased interactions with trade unions, through meetings with global federations because they recognized their representative mandate and because they were experienced in debating economic issues. This can be seen as disingenuous at best, since if these are the real reasons, why were they not recognized many years before by staff at the IFIs? Other reasons for not engaging trade unions in dialogue before the 1990s are alluded to later in the document, where it is stated that, for the IFIs ‘trade union confederations were overly critical of their economic policies and failed to recognize many instances where sound economic policies led to sustained economic growth, sustained job creation and poverty reduction’ (World Bank, 2007: 1 emphasis added). Therefore, engagement did not occur because the World Bank regarded the stance of trade unions towards their policies as overly confrontational. It is also argued in the same document that, states in developing countries, have deflected trade union criticisms of ‘the impact of IFI-sponsored structural reforms’ (ibid) by claiming that they had no control over the conditionalities attached to them, when in fact they do have responsibility for decisions taken on economic matters.

Thus, the IFIs are arguing that many of their policies produce excellent economic results in developing countries (though no empirical examples are cited) and unions are wrongly critical of them. Furthermore, when policies do produce negative results for the labour market it is due to the way they have been implemented at national level, therefore union criticisms should be directed toward their own states. This does not sit easily with the title of such World Bank documents as ‘Essential Action: Structural Adjustment and Labour – Tanzania’ (World Bank, 2000 emphasis added), which includes a series of references to the Tanzanian state’s adoption of privatization programmes ‘in consultation’ with the World Bank and asserts that the state ‘has agreed to’ privatize the Dar es Salaam container terminal, rather than ‘has decided to.’

By the end of the 1990s meetings between the IFIs and global labour federations had become regular and in 2002 a formal protocol was adopted for biennial meetings with ‘enhanced dialogue’ (World Bank, 2007: 2) and follow-up mechanisms to ensure that commitments were being honoured. The biennial meetings have continued since their inception and at the 2009
meeting the shift of the IFIs (from the hard line neo-liberal policies that characterized the original Washington Consensus) is apparent in the discussion when their officials state, ‘smart subsidies’ that are ‘well-targeted, time-bound and had a low fiscal cost were acceptable’ as a means to help the poor who were most affected by the economic crisis (World Bank, 2009a: 4). Union representatives at the discussion concluded by stating that through interacting ‘better’ and in a more ‘informed way’ with the IFIs, they could go on to ‘make a difference’ which was their yardstick for participation (World Bank, 2009a: 14).

The difficulties involved in ‘making a difference’ are highlighted by the response of the World Bank when pressed by union representatives to make the inclusion of a labour clause in public procurement a mandatory requirement. The reply was that this would be very unlikely, as it required the approval of the Executive Directorate in order to amend World Bank policy, which would be hard to obtain (World Bank, 2009a).

The international trade unions bodies were positive about the PRSP initiative when it was formally instigated in September 1999, arguing that despite its limitations, unions should get involved as much as their capacity allowed, since ignoring the process could lead to a ‘PRSP that undermines workers rights’ (ICFTU, 2001: 8). The World Confederation of Labour (WCL, 2002: 3) ‘welcomed the intention of the IMF and the World Bank to focus on poverty reduction and participation.’ However, they became increasingly critical of the IFIs failures to bring about the participation of labour movements in PRSP processes after 2001 (GURN, 2011, ICFTU, 2001).

These criticisms provided the impetus for a ten-month study from January to October 2003 by the IFIs and the global unions on the nature and extent of trade union participation (Egulu, 2004a, Egulu, 2004b). For the Global Union Research Network (GURN), this study was of significance, since independent trade union research on the PRSPs is vital in order to put ‘in place policy alternatives to those that are advanced by the Washington-based institutions.’ (GURN, 2011: 1). The study was also timely, as many PRSPs were moving into their second phase with new documents in train, which had the potential to provide findings capable of informing the way processes might be amended to include more effective labour movement

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177 See chapter3 for an analysis relating to Tanzania
participation than had been the case with the first phase of PRSPs. This study took the form of a ten-point questionnaire administered by the World Bank, the ICFTU and the WCL, which was used as the basis for a scorecard on trade union participation in the PRSP process, centred on three main themes (Egulu, 2004a). First, the ‘State of Social Dialogue’ assessed the enabling environment for consultations. Second, trade union ‘Participation’ was analysed, focusing on the level of consultation involved. Third, the ‘Labour Content’ of the PRSP was examined, centring on the way labour market issues were covered (Egulu, 2003).178

Several key findings emerged from the survey. First, trade unions remain sceptical of an initiative instigated by the IFIs. Second, lack of capacity within unions limits the effectiveness of their participation. Third, shallow and ill-prepared consultation deters effective union engagement. Fourth, trade unions are grouped in the ‘CSOs Stakeholder Group’ in the World Bank’s PRSP Sourcebook but lack ties and identification with other civil society groups. Fifth, labour market interventions are not covered centrally in the PRSP process. Key concerns for unions, such as ways in which high levels of unemployment lead to poverty and the policy implications of this, are often inadequately covered or absent from the PRSP process (Egulu, 2004a and 2004b).

The heightened interest in trade unions on the part of the IFIs can also be seen from the way the World Bank has increased the content of its documentation on trade union participation in the PRSP process, which used to be minimal. The Bank now states that trade unions ‘are encouraged’ to participate in the PRSP process and regards them as ‘key organizations’ in the public and private sector, as well as members of civil society (World Bank, 2010b: 1). Trade unions are also recognized as ‘economic as well as political actors that can change power relationships in the way by which wealth is both created and shared’ (World Bank, 2010a: 2). These views contrast markedly with the neglect of trade unions in very important IFI-documents relating to the PRSP process, such as the PRSP Sourcebook (World Bank, 2004b).

178 The particular issues covered by the three core themes relating to trade union participation in the PRSP process - the State of Social Dialogue, the level of Trade Union Participation and the Labour Content of the PRSP - are set out in appendices 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6, respectively.
Some of the bilateral donors have also produced work on the subject of trade unions but these contain questionable arguments. The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), for example, published ‘How to work with Trade Unions’ in 2005 (revised in 2009). Some of its claims are misleading. It is stated for example, that in contrast to ‘many other civil society organizations in DFID’s partner countries, free trade unions are democratically accountable and financially self-reliant’ (DFID, 2009: 1). While the former point is briefly qualified, the latter claim is left to stand. Findings from this research in the context of Tanzania, as well as evidence from wider surveys (Egulu, 2004a, 2004b), reveal that weak financial capacity is one of the key problems facing trade unions in developing countries. DFID’s failure to discuss fully the financial state of trade unions in developing countries reveals their fundamental lack of understanding of a key issue and is an illustration of the failure on the part of most major bilateral donors involved in the PRSP process to pay more than lip service to the work of labour organizations.

Trade unions were not invited to take part in PRSP I when it was introduced in October 1999 and played no role in the zonal workshops, where consultation with CSOs took place. Moreover, they were not asked to take part in PRSP reviews. For the General Secretary of TUCTA, this was the start of what has been continual hesitation about including the labour movement in the PRSP process and also indicates that to become involved unions ‘have got to kick at their [the Tanzanian state] door every time.’ This view tallies with the perspectives of all the trade union officials interviewed for this research. In this regard, the arguments of trade union officials interviewed run sharply counter to those expressed in the JSAs and reports by bilateral donors, which claim high levels of civil society participation in, and national ownership of, the Tanzanian PRSP process. Interviews with World Bank and NGO officials conducted as part of this research revealed an indifference or opposition to trade union participation within the PRSP process in Tanzania. This contrasts strongly with the new World Bank rhetoric of inclusion in regard to trade union participation in the PRSP process. The disparity between World Bank rhetoric and practice was a major finding of the fieldwork and ran through the arguments of the vast majority of interviewees from the trade union movement.
After a case for trade union participation in the PRSP process had been formally set out in the work of Egulu (2004a, 2004b, 2003), the World Bank moved to capture the terms and conditions of that inclusion. The World Bank has set the agenda in terms of issues that trade unions should be raising in relation to the PRSP process, which precludes discussion on what, for trade unions, is the most important aspect of the PRSP; the fundamentals of macro-economic policies. In the case of Tanzania, the state also limited trade union effectiveness by determining the manner of their participation. Most importantly, this has involved trade unions placed within a catch-all ‘CSO Stakeholders’ group, dominated by NGOs. Consequently, the possibilities for labour associations to adapt and subvert the dominant discourse are limited, as many issues are raised in the forum by NGOs which are not a priority for trade unions. and require a clear vision, a considerable amount of financial and technical capacity and a concerted will on the part of the trade union movement if counter-hegemonic views are to be put forward effectively. This example highlights how the war of position for trade unions in Tanzania involves a struggle with the state, powerful transnational actors and, to some extent other civil society organizations, making autonomous actions on their part very difficult to mount. Moreover, this case shows that the de Tocquevillian perspective regarding civil society, which informs the modus operandi of the donors, possesses little explanatory power (see chapters 5 and 6 for other examples where this is the case). Trade unions clearly do not participate in the PRSP process in the consensual and independent way de Tocqueville saw associational groups engaging with the state in the US during the nineteenth century. The Gramscian view of civil society, based on the argument that associational groups struggle with the state in a constantly shifting war of position, explains the position of trade unions in the PRSP process more accurately. This perspective recognizes that the level and type of participation of civil society groups in national policy-making processes depends on the amount of power and resources both they, and the state, possess. The lack of capacity and the political will to form a collective vision on the part of the labour movement, therefore, are substantive obstacles to the formation of a counter-hegemonic discourse. However, the war of position is always fluid (Gramsci, 2011). Consequently, the Gramscian approach allows for new actors, from the labour movement, and strategies to emerge from praxis (see chapter 5), which can substantially influence the war of position.
The disrespect shown to labour organizations by the state is summed up for many unionists by the statements made by the permanent secretary for finance (who is also chair of the steering committee for the PRSP) to TUCTA officials when questioned about the absence of a formal invitation to trade unions. The permanent secretary claimed that trade unions had taken part, since some state employees who had played a role in drawing up and/or processing documents relating to the PRSP were members of the Tanzanian Union of State and Health Employees (TUGHE). The permanent secretary also informed trade union officials that ‘if you are not involved we expect you to gatecrash’; a statement which has been a source of much annoyance to trade unionists. In interviews, the comment was raised by a number of TUCTA officials at head office and by officials at individual trade unions. In response to their lack of involvement in the PRSP, TUCTA asked the ILO for assistance, which reacted by using Tanzania as a pilot country for its Project on Capacity Building for Effective Social Dialogue in the PRSP. This was based on emphasising social dialogue as a way to put into practice the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda (DWA) as a key part of the PRSP and as a means of stimulating representatives of both labour and capital to participate in the formulation of social and economic policies. Between September and December 2001 the ILO ran programmes for TUCTA, as well as the state and the Association of Tanzanian Employers (ATE), encouraging the three groups to set up a tripartite forum, which would formulate its own dialogue with other PRSP stakeholders (Egulu, 2004a).

However, the ILO (2001: 15) pointed out that although key employment and decent work issues were contained in the Interim-PRSP, they had ‘largely disappeared from the final version of the PRSP.’ Overall, ‘labor issues do not feature prominently in the 53-page PRSP’ (Egulu, 2004a; 73). The state responded in 2001 by providing add-ons in an attempt to create employment. First, it set up supplementary programmes to create jobs and to address the problem of child labour. Second, (in line with donor-driven economic policies) it launched a microfinance initiative in February 2002. This was aimed at providing start-up capital for the poor as a way of generating employment in the private sector in rural areas (Wangwe, 2004, Yaron, 2004). Third, the state instigated a review of its National Employment Policy (URT, 2000b).

Few tangible benefits occurred as a result of these initiatives from the point of view of the unions. The state’s Second Progress Report on the PRSP (2001/2002), does not refer to trade
unions at all. The report limits itself to stating the need for the ‘mainstreaming’ of civil society participation in the PRSP process and capacity building of CSOs in general (URT, 2003b: 76).

Research and analysis by the state (URT, 2004a) and NGOs (Hakikazi Catalyst, 2002a) highlights issues regarding poverty reduction, which are integral to the work of trade unions, such as the need to focus on improving the terms and conditions of employment for the workforce. Despite the publication of this research, possible roles for trade unions in poverty reduction strategies are not discussed. This situation spurred the trade union movement into doing its own research and in September 2004 TUCTA published ‘Trade Unions Input into the PRSP Process’ (TUCTA, 2004a). The publication of this document marked a watershed in the state-trade union relations in post-liberalization Tanzania. Key arguments put forward in the paper clearly showed that the trade union movement was willing to engage in a war of position with the state. It argued that the PRSP has been ‘super-imposed’ on Tanzania by the IFIs (TUCTA, 2004a: viii), and castigated the World Bank for concentrating on economic growth ‘without looking at who gets what or produce [sic] what’ (ibid). It also pointed out that ‘workers were not involved in contributing towards documentation of PRS I’ (ibid). The report concluded that the PRSP process has ‘made more people poorer and poorer’ (TUCTA, 2004a: ix) and failed to create employment. However, no counter-hegemonic discourse from the labour movement was put forward in the document and no follow-up research was done by trade unionists to this end. The state ignored the document and the failure of the trade unions to build on their claims with further research and publications meant that no subsequent discussion of the main arguments ensued.

This shows the importance of Gramsci’s (2011) argument that to win the war of position, civil society must engage in a protracted struggle, which entails continually building on actions, such as the publication of documents. The trade union movement lacked both the capacity and the vision to follow-up on the publication of the document by outlining a counter-hegemonic discourse of its own. These limitations on the part of the labour movement notwithstanding, agency has been a significant factor in the war of position between trade unions and the state. That is, a small number of dynamic trade unionists have confronted the hegemonic discourse of neo-liberalism, as put forward in the PRSP process, forcing a response from the state and the
donors. The strategic interventions by these actors have met by confrontation and attempts at co-option by the state. For example, one senior TUCTA official was outspoken in criticisms of the way the first PRSP was drawn up, arguing that it was a World Bank-led document and copied from the *Voices of the Poor* initiative in its language and ideas. The official also argued that the state and the World Bank were manipulating figures used in the PRSP. The figures used as baselines, from which targets for improvements were set in various sections of the PRSP, were largely taken from the 1988 census. However, the state, with tacit World Bank approval, claimed they were from the 2001 census. Thus, the baseline figures had lower values than was the reality in 2001, making improvements seem to be greater achievements than was actually the case. As a result of his interventions, the official was at first confronted by state and World Bank officials and formally reprimanded for participating ‘inappropriately’ in the PRSP process. When the official refused to retract his claims and continued to attend PRSP meetings at his own behest, the state moved to a strategy of co-option by inviting him to serve on PRSP committees and the World Bank financed his travel to Zambia for a meeting. However, the official was informed that his formal inclusion in the PRSP process was on an individual basis and that he was not an official representative of the trade union movement. Consequently, when the official is unable to attend meetings, nobody from the trade union movement is allowed to deputise. For the official, this shows that the participation of stakeholders in the PRSP process lacks transparency and accountability. ‘Who gets to be a representative on MKUKUTA committees is not dependent on the importance of the organization they represent but how they are regarded by those in power and how committed they are to trying to become a representative,’ was how this official summarized participation.

MKUKUTA objectives and policies have been amended in the light of the experience of PRSP I. However, as with PRSP I, labour is included in MKUKUTA as a cross-cutting, rather than a core, issue, which remains a major source of contention between the trade unions and the state. Moreover, trade union participation remains subsumed within the ‘Civil Society Stakeholders’ group, dominated by NGOs. In addition, macroeconomic issues, which have vital consequences for the workforce, are still not amenable to substantive discussion concerning possible reforms. Thus, as all the interviews revealed, trade unions are marginalized and frustrated participants in MKUKUTA.
For trade unions the gap between the stated policies of MKUKUTA and practice is a fundamental problem. In interviews with trade unions officials, both at the TUCTA head office and individual unions, a common theme was the ‘reasonable’ rhetoric concerning policies set out in MKUKUTA but significant disquiet at the lack of action by the state regarding implementation. For example, although trade unions are designated, on its Poverty Monitoring website, as one of the six specific types of non-state actors with which the state works, in practice, no initiatives with labour associations have been implemented. Thus, TUCTA (2004a: xi) argues that the PRSP is ‘an academic manual to be used as a reference and not a strategy to mitigate poverty.’

Subsequent research by the state and civil society organizations shows the claim made by TUCTA in their 2004 report, that the incidence of poverty is increasing in Tanzania, has some credence. According to state statistics the absolute number of people in poverty rose from 11.5 million to 12.8 million from 2001 to 2007 (Policy Forum, 2008a). Furthermore, the poorest 10% of the population were worse off in 2007 than in 2001; their consumption levels fell by over 5% (Policy Forum, 2008a). Income inequality worsened in Dar es Salaam from 1991 to 2007 and (with regard to figures for 2007) ‘the economy’s significant growth since 2000/01 has not translated into income poverty reduction’ (URT, 2009b: 13). Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy, yet for TUCTA (2004: ix), the strategies endorsed by the PRSP in this sector ‘do not favour the poor, rather constraints [sic] the development of small producers.’ Statistical evidence supports this view. For example, the state’s PHDR 2009 states that ‘a drop in the share of agriculture in total GDP in Tanzania seems to be largely the result of poor sectoral performance rather than productivity growth’ (URT, 2009b: 6). Furthermore, when the population growth rate (2.9%) is taken into consideration, the number of rural poor increased between 2001 and 2007, despite a small decline in the incidence of poverty (TEDG, 2009).

The fact that labour is treated as a cross-cutting, rather than core, issue in MKUKUTA was cited by many TUCTA officials as a key point. Officials argued that the Ministry of Labour should be assigned ‘core’ status in the process, rather than a ‘cross-cutting’ position. This is the basis for the arguments on the part of unions that they do not participate fairly in the PRSP process and are wrongly assigned to the catch-all ‘civil society stakeholders’ category, where their views are
marginalized by the dominance of NGO perspectives. As a result of this marginalization, trade union ownership of the PRSP is lacking. TUCTA officials contended that the World Bank has ensured that labour is only classed as a cross-cutting issue, as part of a deliberate strategy aimed at winning the war of position. This is because the organization does not want to plan for and include labour systematically in the PRSP process but instead would like to see it dealt with piecemeal. A TUCTA official argued that the PRSP ‘only talks about labour as something to be exploited and used to raise productivity. No other aspects of labour are discussed in MKUKUTA.’

For officials of TUCTA-affiliated trade unions 179 two major problems stand out concerning trade union participation in MKUKUTA. The fact that trade union input is left out of the final document is of most concern, followed by the perception of MKUKUTA as a top-down state-controlled process. Thus, trade unions have to continually wait for, and rely on, reports from the state, which therefore dominates the process. These points are similar to criticisms made by NGO officials (see chapter 5). The major disparity in the views of NGOs and trade union officials in this regard relates to the claim of the latter that the labour movement is always excluded from state initiatives (the PRSP process being merely one more example) while NGOs are invariably included in policy debates with the state but do not contest the parameters set around the mode of their participation.

A counterpoint was made by an official at TPAWU, who argued that it was TUCTA’s decision to represent the trade union movement collectively in the MKUKUTA process, collating the views of individual unions. This limits trade union involvement and can be contrasted unfavourably with the approach taken by NGOs, which apply to sit on MKUKUTA Committees individually, and, thus, get more overall representation than trade unions. This argument was supported by an officer of the Tanzania Seamen’s Union (TASU), who stated that TASU has not been able to put forward the particular concerns of seamen regarding poverty reduction, as trade union input to MKUKUTA is decided on and represented centrally by TUCTA. Moreover, an

179 MKUKUTA is not of central concern to officials from non –TUCTA trade unions, as they have little or no chance to take part in the process, since trade union participation is coordinated through the TUCTA Head Office. This issue was raised by all the interviewees.
official at the Tanzania Local Government Workers Union (TALGWU) stated that the union has not been involved with MKUKUTA at all and that ‘TALGWU only hears about MKUKUTA from the speeches of the state’. These answers reveal that TUCTA’s failure to garner the views of individual trade unions on issues relating to MKUKUTA has contributed to a lack of cohesion in the labour movement, which has hindered its ability both to form an effective historic bloc of oppositional groups and to create a sustainable counter-hegemonic discourse.

Officials from the Tanzania Media Workers Union (TMW), made the point that members of their union, as media personnel, must be included in MKUKUTA, since they are vital in disseminating knowledge and ideas to the public. However, neither the TMW nor the Tanzania Union of Journalists (TUJ) have the capacity to raise member-awareness of poverty reduction strategies effectively, and knowledge of MKUKUTA is low in general amongst journalists. There are no concerted media campaigns on MKUKUTA.

The use of English in PRSP documents was cited by trade union officials as a barrier to many of the members participating in the process, as they are not proficient in the language. As all the senior trade union officials can speak the language fluently, they did not regard dealing with trade union matters in English at TUCTA Head Office as a problem. Moreover, since CBAs are negotiated through TUCTA’s Head Office there are no drawbacks in dealing with employers over this issue. One of the new guard TUCTA officials made the point that trade unionists find it taxing to write funding proposals in English which require ‘knowledge of precise and technical language, and is difficult’. Capacity building is thus needed in this area as ‘most of us [trade unions] are failing to get funds.’ For sixty per cent of TUCTA-affiliated trade unions, using English is a significant problem, mainly at branch level. It is particularly onerous when dealing with new investors, as their management teams do not usually speak Swahili and can be dismissive of people who are not fluent in English. For one trade union officer, the lack of proficiency in English by trade union officials ‘is a very big obstacle’ to helping workers in the plantation and agricultural sectors, as most of the new investors will only negotiate in English. Thus, trade union representatives ‘fear meetings with management of newly privatized industries.’ The ‘vicious circle’ problem is relevant here. Falling union membership, means less funding is available to send union officials on courses to learn English and thus capacity is
Weakened, which in turn makes it harder to recruit members. Use of English rather than Swahili in conducting union business reduces participation in the PRSP process and, thus, is a significant contributory factor in the lack of trade union ownership of the PRSP.

7.8 Summary
The attempt in the PRSP process to incorporate the views of civil society organizations through a participatory approach to policy creation, which will in turn inculcate national ownership, is part of changing modalities of intervention in political processes, aimed in particular at controlling groups with low levels of allegiance to the state. Institution building and governance are at the heart of the Post-Washington Consensus and this plays out through the PRSP process in the form of conflict being eradicated from governing institutions and competing ideas being restricted to an arena within the consensus framework on macroeconomic fundamentals. Thus, the PRSP process has become a major vehicle to build consensus, pace de Tocqueville, through participation and ownership based on the World Bank’s vision of a depoliticised and bureaucratic developmental state. PRSPs are based on the recognition by the World Bank that external support for change and development can achieve little if the domestic will to reform is missing. External support from the World Bank comes in the form of technical advice and financial assistance. Domestically political leaders must build consensus and ownership through participatory processes, which inevitably means compensating, neutralizing or marginalizing groups that lose out in the process. Therefore, the attempt in the PRSP process to incorporate the views of civil society organizations through a participatory approach to policy creation can be regarded as part of the move to minimise opposition from dissenting groups. Underlying causes of political struggles and resistance to change are not addressed.

Practically, this means the Tanzanian state has to ensure that at the micro-level of policy and strategy implementation, the PRSP process is run in a way acceptable to the influential multilateral donors, thus, guaranteeing that the final document will be approved at the Joint Staff Assessment (JSA) of the IFIs in Washington and receive the support of the major bilateral donors, which remain a vital source of finance for the country. The fact that Tanzania remains an aid-dependent country (ODA makes up 65.8% of Tanzania’s gross capital formation) is very important in shaping relations between the donors and the state. As a result, civil society
organizations regarded as disruptive to the process, such as trade unions, are marginalized. There is no reference to trade unions in any of the JSAs or Poverty and Human Development Reports (URT, 2009c, 2007e, 2005b, 2003a) produced by the state.

The donors increasingly regard the Tanzanian state as a reliable partner and the country as one where they can disburse large amount of aid quickly and effectively. This causes the Tanzanian state to have ‘ever-increasing influence with its donors’ (Harrison, Mulley and Holtom, 2009: 295). Consequently, for the state, relations with external donors, as well as the new investors in the economy, carry a lot more weight than connections with civil society organizations. However, CSOs are of instrumental importance to the state, as their participation in the formation of the PRSP must occur in a way which satisfies the donors before funds will be disbursed. The publication of its third phase (MKUKUTA II, covering the period from 2010 to 2015) indicates that the PRSP will continue to be the dominant national development plan in Tanzania in the short to medium term, at least. The state has firmly linked MKUKUTA to previous national initiatives, stating that it ‘is a continuation of the long standing national commitments to fighting poverty initiated at independence in 1961’ (URT, 2010b: 1). Gramsci (2011b) made the point that, for oppositional civil society groups, a war of position is inevitably drawn out. Civil society organizations in Tanzania have now been operating within the PRSP framework for over ten years and a number are starting to apply praxis (Gramsci, 2011b), by analysing why certain strategies have not worked effectively in the war of position and subsequently altering them in an attempt to increase their impact. Consequently, the longer the PRSP process continues in Tanzania, the greater the opportunities are for associational groups to use strategies effectively within the limited policy space opened up via the PRSP process to provide a counter-hegemonic discourse. This could threaten the donor-driven agenda and stretch the limits of IFI tolerance for participation on the part of civil society organizations. Therefore, while at present, civil society institutions are participating in debates as part of the PRSP process within narrowly construed donor-driven confines, they have an opportunity to use the new spaces where policies can be contested to open up new fronts in the war of position.
8.1 The Position of Civil Society Organizations in Post-liberalization Tanzania

In this chapter a summary is made of the main research outcomes, followed by an analysis of policy implications arising from the findings. This research has examined, through a Gramscian lens, the reconfiguration of civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania, centring on the rationale for the marginalization of trade unions. This focus required an analysis of four related research questions. First, whether Tanzanian trade unions in the post-liberalization period have been confined to representing a minority of wage labourers in the formal sector, which, therefore, constitute a labour aristocracy. Second, the extent to which the labour movement has created alliances with other forms of civil society (thereby embracing social movement unionism) with the potential to form a historic bloc of oppositional groups, which is able to provide a substantive challenge to neoliberal hegemony in the post-liberalization era. Third, the reasons why NGOs have come to dominate civil society input to national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania. Fourth, how trade unions and NGOs have engaged in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers process (the national policy-making instrument which has most support from external donors) and with what consequences. First, the main findings from the analysis of the central research question are discussed, followed by a critical assessment in turn of the major outcomes from the examination of the four related issues. A key conclusion arising from the analysis of all the research questions is that a Gramscian approach has considerably more explanatory power regarding the role of civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania than the dominant liberal conception, which draws to a large extent on a misconception of the de Tocquevillian perspective.

It is clear from this research that civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania is being reconstructed as an independent variable, largely through the influence of multilateral and bilateral donors. These external donors are promulgating a de Tocquevillian view of civil society in Tanzania, based on a vision of a wide variety of freely-formed organizations taking part in national policy-making processes in a consensual way, to indicate their views and needs to the
state. This requires the state to accept and accommodate a plurality of ideas, thereby, avoiding dominance by a small number of well-organized groups of citizens. In reality, however, the donors have managed a situation where civil society input to national policy-making processes comes overwhelmingly from a few, largely Dar es Salaam-based, NGOs, which are externally funded and composed of well-educated professionals, who are versed in the hegemonic discourse (which revolves around the concepts of partnership, participation and ownership) in the post-liberalization period. Apex associations (notably Policy Forum, TANGO and TGNP) have been tasked with drawing into national policy-making processes the participation of grassroots forms of associational life, which has proved impossible, through their lack of financial and technical capacity, as well as the poor communications infrastructure in Tanzania. Thus, the donors have engaged in social engineering, through shaping and controlling which elements of civic life can (and which cannot) participate in debates concerning national policy formulation and development in post-liberalization Tanzania. Therefore, a civil society based around the extensive engagement of associational groups in national policy-making processes, is not emerging. This is exemplified by the marginalization of trade unions, which reflects the power of external donors to influence the state, concerning which groups it includes (and which it marginalizes) within the sphere of civil society, as it has been reconstituted in post-liberalization Tanzania.

8.2 The Marginalization of Trade Unions in Post-liberalization Tanzania

With regard to the rationale for the marginalization of trade unions in post-liberalization Tanzania (the main research question), this study showed that a historically-grounded analysis is necessary if the reasons for this situation are to be understood in a nuanced way (see chapter 6 for details). Trade unions developed a culture under colonialism that fostered solidarity and led to sustained conflict with state officials and representatives of capital. Therefore, they have experience of struggle on behalf of their members and historically have proved capable of effective organization and action. However, the legitimacy of trade unions as representatives of labour was eroded after independence. The legacy of more than thirty years of one-party rule, involving tight control over the labour movement, leading to trade unions being regarded as branches of the state, has proved difficult to overcome in the post-liberalization era. It is, therefore, evident that civil society in Tanzania has long been germane to debates regarding
participation and citizenship, since key elements of associational life, were used as a tool of organization and discipline by both the colonial administration and the one-party state, which emerged after independence. Consequently, the legacy of colonialism must be the basis of any analysis of civil society in Tanzania. However, this is not the case with regard to the donors, which have much influence over national policy-making processes in the post-liberalization period (see chapter 3 for details). They have, from the 1990s, eschewed a historically-informed strategy and instead tried to build a ‘new’ civil society in the country. This approach has failed to take into account how the development of Tanzanian civil society from the colonial period has affected the current composition and ideologies of various important associational groups, as well as their interrelationships and levels of capacity and legitimacy. Thus, participation in national policy-making processes is focused on the new, and carefully managed, NGO sector, while other forms of civil society are marginalized.

Regarding the position of labour, the ascendancy of market forces that gathered pace under SAPs in the 1980s left many Tanzanian workers vulnerable, particularly after liberalization and privatization of the economy during the 1990s led to large numbers of redundancies (see chapter 3 for details). Trade unions have protested against the negative effects of these changes on workers and organized a small number of mass actions (notably the short-lived general strike in 1994 and the aborted general strike in 2010). These actions had little substantive effect on the position of the Tanzanian workforce. However, they were, in Gramscian terms (Gramsci, 2011), important in terms of praxis. That is, such processes increased the organizational ability of the trade union movement and heightened levels of reflection about the effectiveness of their actions among officials and workers, thereby enhancing the possibility of them forming a counter-hegemonic discourse. Furthermore, to some extent trade unions in the post-liberalization period have become champions of greater state regulation of the economy in the national (rather than the international) interest and of the provision of public goods, in the face of opposition from the state and the external donors, which seek to maintain neo-liberal hegemony. For example, senior TUCTA officials were shocked at the strength of the World Bank’s opposition to the creation of a minimum wage in Tanzania during negotiations. TUCTA contested the World Bank’s rejection of a proposed minimum wage, pointing out to their officials that unless there were some agreements on basic costs of living and the wages required to meet them, there would be
difficulty in finding a starting position when representatives of the state, employers and unions convened to negotiate. A national minimum wage was introduced, partly as a result of union pressure, though World Bank officials argued that its imposition was an unwarranted interference in the workings of the free market and a potential deterrent to inward FDI.

Such arguments on the part of the Tanzanian trade union movement in the post-liberalization era, as well as the actions they organized, have been a significant cause of their marginalization. That is, these arguments and actions led the major external donors (the World Bank, in particular) and the state to regard trade unions as a threat to neo-liberal hegemony in Tanzania. A neo-liberal hegemony which is based on attracting inward FDI and giving domestic entrepreneurs the maximum opportunity to operate in an economic climate free from ‘inefficiencies’ created by demands for market distorting policies, such as regulated labour markets. Thus, the Gramscian argument, that oppositional civil society groups inevitably have to engage in a war of position with the state if a sustainable counter-hegemonic discourse is to be formed, is persuasive with regard to trade union engagement in national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania. In addition, the situation has required trade unions to expand their war of position in order to encompass an ideological struggle with transnational actors (notably the World Bank), which are influential promoters of neo-liberal hegemony at a global level and drive the entrenching of a market-driven model in Tanzania (see chapter 3 for details). In contrast, the de Tocquevillian view of the relationship between civil society and the state, drawing overwhelmingly on his observations of the US during the nineteenth century, has minimal explanatory power in the case of post-liberalization Tanzania. The integral state in Tanzania has used moral and intellectual leadership and coercive legal-bureaucratic means, both of which, Gramsci argued, were necessary if the state was to become hegemonic (Gramsci, 2011).

Concerning the former, trade unions have been constantly attacked verbally by the state, representatives of capital (the ATE\textsuperscript{180} and the CTI\textsuperscript{181}, in particular) and, to some extent, by the external donors in the post-liberalization period for their ‘irresponsible’ and ‘unnecessary’ calls for pay rises and industrial actions. In 2010, President Kikwete ‘lambasted’ the trade union leaders for demanding pay rises, which were beyond the budget of the state.\textsuperscript{182} With regard to

\textsuperscript{180} See for example, ‘ATE: TUCTA will pay for strike losses’ in This Day, 6 April, 2010
\textsuperscript{181} See for example, ‘Call of the strike, CTI urges TUCTA’ in This Day, 9 April, 2010
\textsuperscript{182} See ‘TUCTA in new strike ultimatum’ in This Day, 6 June 2010.
the latter element of the integral state, trade unions were threatened with coercive legal-bureaucratic measures when mounting actions. Senior state officials, including the president, declared the proposed general strike in 2010 illegal, and threatened to take TUCTA officials to court if they continued to press for the action (see chapter 6 for details). Moreover, trade unions were declared ineligible to apply for state funding sources earmarked for ‘civil society’ and marginalized in all national policy instruments, including the PRSP, which receives the most funding and other forms of support from external donors (see chapters 3, 6 and 7 for details). Thus, civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania is clearly not a level playing-field, since the donors and the state have made it impossible for trade unions to take part in national policy-making processes in an autonomous and consensual manner (pace de Tocqueville).

In responding to their marginalization in the post-liberalization period by the integral state and transnational actors, this research showed that Tanzanian labour movement faces two major issues; an ideological vacuum concerning perceptions of their role within the sphere of civil society and structural constraints caused by lack of finance, falling membership and poor facilities.

### 8.3 Tanzanian Trade Unions and the Labour Aristocracy Debate

The first issue related to the main research question examined in this thesis concerned the extent to which trade unions in post-liberalization Tanzania can be regarded as representing a labour aristocracy. This research demonstrated that the attitudes, behaviour and actions of unions show a heterogeneity which casts much doubt on the validity of the labour aristocracy thesis. The labour aristocracy thesis in the case of Tanzanian trade unions can be criticized in terms of both structural and agency-related factors. Concerning the former, a considerable number of trade unionists work in jobs with relatively poor terms and conditions of employment, such as plantation workers, represented by the Tanzanian Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union (TPAWU). In respect of the latter, perceptions of many professions with a high degree of unionization by other groups in Tanzania are negative. For example, teachers, represented by the largest labour organization in the country, the Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU), work in a profession regarded as a last resort because of low salaries and status.
Furthermore, even in fairly well paid sectors of the economy, such as mining, labour relations are confrontational and workers face constant struggles with representatives of capital, who are assertively anti-union. The research showed that the Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union (TAMICO) has been involved in continual disputes with mine managers and owners, as well as state officials, over the treatment of its members. Conflicts centre on the high level of surplus extraction which characterizes work in the mining sector. This creates feelings of solidarity between miners and much less well-paid workers, including those in the informal and rural sectors. Moreover, research undertaken by the labour movement revealed that many Tanzanian trade unionists provide much support for family and friends in the informal and rural sectors and have experience of work in both these spheres themselves (see chapter 6 for details). As a result, the interests of relatively well-paid trade unionists and marginalized members of the workforce are intertwined to a considerable degree. In arguing, therefore, that workers in the formal sector of the economy are invariably an elite minority, distanced from the majority of the casualized and rural workforce (see chapter 6 for details), the labour aristocracy thesis lacks nuance in the case of post-liberalization Tanzania. Moreover, the contention of advocates of the labour aristocracy thesis that highly paid sectors of the workforce are inevitably conservative and unwilling to formulate, or engage with, a counter-hegemonic discourse was shown to be overly determinist in the case of trade unionists in post-liberalization Tanzania. Overall, this research found that trade unions and trade unionists in Tanzania have drawn on heterogeneous ideologies, livelihoods and actions in the post-liberalization period, which cannot be accommodated within the framework of the labour aristocracy thesis.

8.4 Tanzanian Trade Unions and Social Movement Unionism

Regarding the second issue related to the main research question, labour organizations in post-liberalization Tanzania have formed few alliances with other civil society groups in post-liberalization Tanzania and, therefore, social movement unionism has not been adopted (see chapter 6 for details). The research found that a few tentative moves on the part of trade unions towards forming alliances with marginalized groups in the workforce have occurred. These have predominantly taken the form of some individual unions paying greater attention to the organization of women and youth members, while, at the centre, TUCTA has created a permanent space for a delegate from the youth wing of the movement on its executive.
Moreover, a few unions (notably TUICO) have attempted to ally themselves with workers in the informal sector (see chapter 6 for details). However, no enduring coalitions between trade unions and other civil society groups have been formed in the post-liberalization period. For example, trade unions did not work closely with other civil society organizations when engaging in actions, such as the proposed general strike in 2010. There is, consequently, little chance at present of trade unions collaborating to form a historic bloc of oppositional groups, capable of challenging state hegemony.

The research revealed that the dominant form of civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania, NGOs, (see section 8.5 below) are indifferent (and in some cases opposed) to trade union participation in national policy-making processes in Tanzania (see chapter 5 for details). To a large extent, such views are caused by the perception that trade union structures and perspectives remain rooted in the past, when they were subsumed within the apparatus of the state. Moreover, many trade unionists themselves remain suspicious of NGOs, regarding them as too closely allied to the post-liberalization state and to external donors. The research also showed that trade unionists tend to regard NGOs as corrupt and aggressive, as well as lacking roots in Tanzanian society and accountability to their constituencies. Thus, trade unions in post-liberalization Tanzania lack a sense of unity with NGOs, as well as other forms of civil society, which makes the adoption of social movement unionism problematic in the short to medium-term. Since revolutionary unionism was unanimously rejected as a viable trajectory by all labour movement officials interviewed as part of this research, trade unions in Tanzania are left with the probability of adopting a business unionism approach by default. If this is to be avoided, the leadership needs to show clarity of vision in formulating an ideology and strategies for the labour movement that have hitherto been lacking in the post-liberalization period.

8.5 The NGO Dominance of Civil Society in Post-liberalization Tanzania

Regarding the third issue related to the main research question examined in this thesis, NGOs have been nurtured by the donors following liberalization in Tanzania, as their preferred type of civil society organization. A small number of large, urban-based NGOs have received a substantive amount of financial and technical support from external donors (see chapter 5 for details). The multilateral and bilateral donors are ostensibly fostering a model of liberal
pluralism, based on cultivating a large and diverse number of individual civil society organizations in Tanzania. However, they have *de facto* played a substantive role (through being the driving force behind the formation of an NGO apex organization, when others already existed and the funding of a few elite Dar es Salaam-based organizations) in creating elements of a corporatist civil society model (see chapter 5 for details). As a result of this funding and support, a small number of influential NGOs nominally represent the views of the many grassroots groups operating outside the urban centres, which do not have the capacity to make their perspectives known to the state. These umbrella groups have little contact with grassroots groups, which lack the necessary means (such as, email and mobile telephones) to communicate effectively. As a result, the mode of participation of civil society organizations in national policy-making processes belies the de Tocquevillian vision on which it is based, since a diversity of views from citizens’ groups is lacking and civil society input to national policy-making processes is dominated by a small number of well-organized and resourced NGOs. Alternative sorts of associational life in Tanzania, which have developed roots as by-products of economic, political, social and cultural forces, and, thus, do not need to be created by donors, are marginalized. These types of civil society (often in the form of twilight associations) are important to many Tanzanians, in providing financial support, employment opportunities and social solidarity (see chapter 2 for details). The fact that they have been almost entirely ignored in national policy-making processes shows that the external donors are intent on creating a version of civil society in Tanzania in their own image, dominated by actors who come from within the hegemonic discourse.

NGOs have not provided a serious and sustained challenge to hegemony of neo-liberalism in Tanzania during the post-liberalization period, for several significant reasons. First, a number of the elite NGOs accept the de Tocquevillian perspective that civil society organizations assist in forming policies which represent hegemonic universalism, through discussions with state representatives, which take place in a trusting, tolerant and transparent political environment. That is, these organizations regard themselves as partners of the state in contributing to the formation of national policies. Thus, they have accepted the de Tocquevillian discourse, based on the belief that all civil society organizations take part in debates with the state concerning national policy formation in a free and equal way. Second, while not actively embracing the de
Tocquevillian perspective on civil society participation in national policy-making processes, in post-liberalization Tanzania, the majority of NGOs have not considered ways to form a concerted counter-hegemonic discourse. The interviews revealed that most NGOs concentrate overwhelmingly on day-to-day service delivery activities and, while most have recently created advocacy departments, these have achieved little in terms of setting up and sustaining a collective NGO vision capable of countering neo-liberal hegemony. Third, many NGOs are reluctant to confront neo-liberal hegemony, through their concerns about the state’s reaction to criticism (as evidenced by its attacks on, and suppression of, Hakielimu and Youth Partnership Countrywide, analysed as case studies in chapter 5). Such fears on the part of NGOs have led to them self-censoring the way they participate in national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania.

A few strategies and actions on the part of NGOs have confronted the hegemony of neo-liberalism. The Open Sheraton meetings (TGNP) and press campaigns (Hakielimu) are examples in this regard (see chapter 5 for details). However, such strategies and actions do not constitute a coherent and sustained counter-hegemonic discourse. As with the case of trade unions, a Gramscian analysis provides useful insights into the ways in which NGOs have participated in national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania, which are not possible through the application of a de Tocquevillian lens. The de Tocquevillian perspective, based on the characterization of consensual civil society-state relations in the formation of national policies, which results in a win-win situation, is unable to explain the confrontational reaction of the state to TGNP’s Open Sheraton meetings, including the threat of the use of coercive legal-bureaucratic measures, based on the claim that the provision of a free drink at these events was an illegal inducement to attend. Furthermore, the de Tocquevillian approach cannot accommodate the aggressive reaction of the state to the publications of Hakielimu, the platform put forward by Baraza la Wanawake and the meetings held by Youth Partnership Countrywide (see chapter 5 for details). In contrast, a Gramscian perspective, based on oppositional civil society groups engaging in a fluid war of position, is able to provide valid explanations as to why the strategies and actions of TGNP, Hakielimu, Baraza la Wanawake and Youth Partnership Countrywide drew a response from the integral state encompassing both ‘moral and intellectual leadership’ (Gramsci, 2011) and coercive legal-bureaucratic means (Gramsci, 2011), as was the
case with its response to trade union strategies and actions (see section 8.2 above). The use of moral and intellectual leadership took the form of arguments, on the part of the state, that its vision and strategies were informed by evidence-based research and represented the universal good for Tanzanian society, while dissenting civil society voices were based on uniformed contentions, driven largely by the interests of their foreign funding agencies. The employment by the integral state of coercive legal-bureaucratic measures was manifested in the de-registration of Youth Partnership Countrywide and Baraza la Wanawake, so they could no longer function as civil society organizations, and the banning of all Hakielimu materials from Tanzanian educational establishments.

8.6 Trade Unions and NGOs in the Tanzanian PRSP process

The fourth issue related to the main research question examined in this thesis, focused on how trade unions and NGOs have participated in the PRSP process in Tanzania. The Tanzanian PRSP process is premised on the participation of a mass of citizens, resulting in widespread national ownership of the policy outcomes.

Regarding participation, TUCTA officials argued that the Tanzanian state formed a Civil Society Stakeholders (CSS) group within the PRSP process to present a single view, which weakens trade union arguments, as they are filtered through one large and undifferentiated civil society voice. The state created the CSS group despite the fact that officially it defines civil society as consisting of four separate sections; the private sector, NGOs, community based organizations and trade unions. Consequently, conflicting civil society perspectives are lost in the PRSP process, where outcomes are presented as being based on ‘consensus’ and ‘win-win scenarios.’ For TUCTA officials, trade unions should be included in the PRSP process (as well as all national policy-making processes) in a separate section, as their work is vital to poverty reduction since, ‘we represent labour, which is the most crucial aspect of productivity,’ in the words of one interviewee. However, the PRSP process is based on the designation by the donors and the state of the ‘poor’ as ‘objects’ who can be ‘known’ and ‘acted upon’ (Wignaraja 2006, 1992). They are not conceived of as ‘subjects’ who ‘know themselves’ and ‘can act for themselves.’ The donors and the state believe that, having identified these objects, they can then act on their behalf to bring them development through national policies, which have been derived
from listening to their perceived needs expressed in the institutionalized context of civil society organizations. Leaders of the Tanzanian trade union movement argue that they are legitimate representatives of many poor trade unionists. However, they are unable to adequately represent their needs, since input from trade unions has to be filtered through the CSS group, which is dominated by NGOs. Thus, labour issues, central to poverty reduction, such as enforcement of minimum wage legislation, do not receive a platform.

While the structured way in which the labour movement is forced to take part in the PRSP process has limited their opportunities to formulate a counter-hegemonic discourse, certain individual trade unionists (both from TUCTA’s head office and from individual trade unions, such as TPAWU) have inserted themselves, uninvited, into the PRSP process and driven discussions in a more politicized direction than was originally the case in Tanzania (see chapter 7 for details). The state used various strategies in its war of position to marginalize the influence of these actors, including refusing permission for the most dynamic of these individuals to formally claim affiliation to the trade union movement during participation in PRSP processes.

The donors driving the PRSP process, and the state (as its owner) have made no efforts to draw on participatory models and methods which have a history in Tanzania, such as the self-help movement in the 1960s (which drew the rural population into negotiating their developmental needs with state officials on a large scale) and clauses from Mwongozo (dating back to 1971) relating to the need for managers to lead by example, for ostentation to be eschewed and for personal behaviour to be ethical. These clauses are close in form to positions put forward as part of ‘third generation’ participatory development concerns, stressing the need for ethical behaviour by officials involved in development processes (see chapter 1 for details). Workers’ committees were also institutionalized in many workplaces following independence. Whilst regarded as too close to management in a lot of cases, they did create an indigenous participatory culture of sorts, parts of which could be drawn on in debates about poverty reduction and economic growth. Instead of looking for ways to draw on such relevant examples from the past in Tanzania, the donors prefer to use a small group of westernised NGOs as a vanguard to put forward the views of Tanzanian citizens.
Regarding ownership, this research revealed that the concept is flawed on two levels. First, requiring the Tanzanian state to show national ownership of policies is an imposition by external donors, which acts as an over-arching conditionality. The state is unable to reject ownership of policies as a condition, on the grounds that it is inappropriate in the particular socio-economic and political circumstances pertaining in Tanzania, if the country wants to receive aid and debt relief. Second, even if the merits of ownership are accepted as beneficial to Tanzania, its conceptualization and measurement within the Tanzanian PRSP process are questionable.

Analytical frameworks to measure levels of ownership have been developed by the World Bank (World Bank, 2004b, Johnson and Wasty, 1993). However, measurement of levels of ownership in the Joint Staff Assessments relies on assigning numerical values from 1-5 with no detailed descriptors for the different rankings being provided. The assessments thus lack both rigour and transparency (see chapter 7 for details). Overall, the narrow base of civil society participation results a lack of widespread ownership of the Tanzanian PRSP process. Furthermore, the positive numerical scores awarded within the category of ‘civil society participation’ in the Joint Staff Assessments of the IFIs, are meaningless.

8.7 Policy Implications

The research has centred on the rationale for the marginalization of trade unions in post-liberalization Tanzania. In order to play a more meaningful role in civil society, the labour movement could adopt various policies.

First, trade unions could use the limited amount of impetus that actions, such as the proposed general strike in 2010, has generated, to concentrate on forming a coherent and sustainable vision for the labour movement in post-liberalization Tanzania, which is currently lacking. In this regard, a focus on re-framing industrial relations within a tripartite system, involving trade unions, representatives of capital (in the form of employers associations) and the state, might have utility. Key issues, such as employment and livelihoods creation would then be based around the arguments and interests of domestic agents, rather than those of external donors, intent on establishing the global hegemony of neo-liberalism. An obstacle to the realization of such a policy is the continuing aid dependency of the Tanzanian state (see chapter 3 for details). This gives the donors substantive leverage over national policies and it is possible that they
would put pressure on the state to reduce the influence of trade unions in debates concerning the labour market. The opposition of the World Bank to trade union arguments in favour of the introduction of a minimum wage in Tanzania provides an illustration, in this regard. This example shows the difficulty for trade unions in winning the war of position, since they are facing not just the Tanzanian state, but, also the allied power of transnational actors, intent on fostering the hegemony of neo-liberalism at a global level.

Second, the Tanzanian trade union movement could attempt to increase its currently weak financial capacity through a concerted attempt to raise funds from external sources, particularly the international trade union movement. Such forms of support were denied the trade union movement by the state following independence, on the grounds that it would lead to the undue influence of alien ideas. For such a strategy to succeed, it would necessitate, first, building the technical capacity of trade union officials, particularly in terms of training in the area of writing funding proposals. This research showed that trade union leaders are becoming increasingly aware of how difficult it is to complete complex funding proposals and, in particular, the problems involved in using the current key terminology and concepts from the ‘dominant development discourse in ways which will meet with the approval of the donors, who are its gatekeepers.

The World Bank and the ILO 183 currently do not provide funds for the Tanzanian labour movement and the bilateral donors (with the notable exception of DANIDA) remain indifferent to the trade unions, preferring to focus on NGOs as civil society partners. For example, although DFID has produced ‘How to work with Trade Unions’ (DFID, 2009), they have no contacts with the Tanzanian labour movement. The same is true for USAID and JICA. Overall, trade union leaders would be in a stronger position to submit effective funding proposals to major external donors if they had training in how to focus the content and, in particular, how to use the key discourse terms of the post-liberalization period; partnership, participation and ownership.

Third, Tanzanian trade unions in the main have been losing members in considerable number

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183 The ILO has funded projects to assist Tanzanian trade unions in the post-liberalization period (see chapter 3 for details).
since liberalization, with the exception of the Tanzania Teachers Union (see chapter 6 for details). Campaigns to attract new members could revitalize the movement. Such an initiative could involve the systematic targeting of workers in the informal sector, women and youth, which would enhance the ability of trade unions to refute the claim that currently they represent a labour aristocracy. Evidence from this research revealed that trade unions do not represent a labour aristocracy. Nevertheless, the claim that trade unions represent a relatively privileged minority of wage labourers in the formal sector has been used by the state as a strategy in its war of position since the colonial period. It was employed with particular effectiveness by the one-party state in post-independence Tanzania to divide and rule the workforce (see chapter 7 for details). Thus, initiatives aimed at working with marginalized groups, may enhance the legitimacy of trade unions as representatives of the Tanzanian workforce and counter the views of citizens (derived residually from arguments put forward by senior officials, including Nyerere, during the period of one-party rule) that the labour movement represents an elite minority of formal sector workers. Moreover, increasing the membership base would raise income, thus, increasing the capacity of trade unions.

Fourth, in addition to working more closely with marginalized sectors of the workforce, trade unions could also make attempts to increase cohesion and mutual support within the labour movement, as well as collaboration with other forms of civil society, particularly NGOs, as part of a move to embrace social movement unionism. Regarding the former, a considerable number of the individual trade unions are small and lack the capacity to provide services. Of the twenty-one trade unions registered with the Office of the Registrar, more than half have less than three thousand members and five have fewer than three hundred. For the members of some of these small unions the situation is worse than it was when trade unions were part of a monolithic structure in Tanzania. Polarization has occurred; a few trade unions are doing reasonably well under the new system while others are doing worse than when trade unions were part of a state-controlled structure, as they have to fight for funding and recognition on their own and are not apportioned resources from the centre in the way they were under the one-party system. There is a danger that small unions will struggle on with little finance and few resources and that this will fragment and weaken the trade union movement in Tanzania as a whole. The same argument applies to the formation of trade union federations. Multiple federations can be formed under the
provision of the 1998 Trade Union Act and the possibility of having several centres of power
could make the trade union movement less coherent and cohesive and lead to solidarity breaking
down. Consequently, there is a case for TUCTA to make a concerted effort to increase contacts
between unions and to formulate an overall vision for the movement which could assist in
uniting individual organizations. This would require a considerable amount of financial and
technical capacity, as well as political will, making it important for TUCTA leaders to find
effective ways to raise funds (see point two above in this section for details). Concerning the
latter, given the mutual misgivings between officials of trade unions and NGOs in Tanzania (as
outlined in section 8.4) increasing collaborative work between them requires concerted will and
imagination on both sides, which is presently lacking.

The focus of this research has been on two types of civil society organizations and accordingly
the final words should go to their officials. The pressing need for both NGOs and trade unions to
clarify their positions within the political economy of Tanzania was made apparent during
interviews and participant observation. A similar point made by a senior official from an NGO
and from a trade union in different contexts is significant for the future of both of these types of
civil society organizations in post-liberalization Tanzania. For the former, far too much time is
taken up by the NGO sector complaining about the role of the state in national policy-making
processes. The focus of NGOs must shift from this ‘negativity’ to an emphasis on forming their
own strategies and effective participation techniques. It is vital for NGOs ‘to reflect on their
work seriously and to form an overall strategic plan. This is not happening currently.’ According
to the latter, trade unions over-concentrate on the point that they are marginalized by the state
through coercive legal-bureaucratic measures, aggressive verbal attacks by senior government
officials when defending the interests of the workforce and by being subsumed within an
undifferentiated mass of civil society organizations, when taking part in national policy-making
processes, such as the PRSP. These are all state strategies (as part of its war of position,
Gramscian terms) aimed at marginalizing the labour movement. Trade unions should respond
less with angry statements about how it is treated unfairly and instead should ‘come up with a
very strong and clear position as to how they stand within the civil society sector in Tanzania’
and ‘why their vision and views merit their separation from the rest of the civil society
stakeholders’ when taking part in national policy-making processes.
The need for strategic action based on a clear vision of their roles is vital to the future of NGOs and trade unions in Tanzania, and by extension, the whole civil society sector. The importance of this is evidenced by the reply of a senior trade union official at TUCTA when asked about the current level of surplus extraction on the part of the foreign ‘new investors’ and the position of the external donors and the state regarding this issue. His reply was that all of them are concerned only with creating ‘a profit-driven society, which is draining the blood from Tanzanian workers.’ This view, notwithstanding, Tanzanian trade unions have more possibilities to form a sustainable counter-hegemonic discourse than at any previous time during the post-liberalization period. This could be built around a nationalist discourse, focusing on the high level of surplus extraction by foreign new investors in lucrative sectors of the economy, notably mining. Hitherto, the post-colonial state in Tanzania has appropriated the discourse of national liberation. It has argued forcefully, since 1961, that all classes and groups, including trade unions, must subordinate their narrow, sectional interests to the greater good: building a strong and independent nation, following years of colonial exploitation and repression. In doing so, the state has exercised moral and intellectual leadership (in Gramscian terms) to create hegemony. However, the state’s lack of transparency and accountability regarding its stance towards the mining industry has been used by the labour movement to claim that it is colluding with foreign capital in the appropriation of valuable Tanzanian assets, such as gold and diamonds, which belong to the people. This is being done through the exploitation of Tanzanian labour, which endures oppressive terms and conditions of labour in these mines, including suppression of trade union activities. Whether these claims stand up to close scrutiny is debatable (see chapter 7 for details). Nevertheless, they have provided some leverage for the trade union movement in its war of position with the state and could lead to the formation of a wider counter-hegemonic discourse. As Gramsci pointed out, the war of position is always fluid and the state is clearly uncomfortable in dealing with the nationalist rhetoric of the trade union movement, when it focuses on the appropriation of lucrative Tanzanian minerals.
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Appendices

Appendices 4.1 to 4.7 - Sources of Information for the Research

Appendix 4.1: Overview of NGO-related Respondents (Purposive Samples)

Interviews, respondents and institutions visited during 10 months of Fieldwork in 3 sessions

1-5 interviews with –

**NGO Officials from Members of the Civil Society Stakeholders ‘Macro Group’**
- Policy Forum (PF)
- Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP)
- Tanzania Council for Social Development (TACOSODE)
- Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF)
- Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA)
- Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC)
- Hakielimu
- Save the Children Tanzania
- ActionAid Tanzania

**NGO Officials from Non-Members of the Civil Society Stakeholders ‘Macro Group’ but taking part in PRSP process**
- Tanzania Education Network (TEN/MET)
- Pact Tanzania
- Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO)
- Oxfam Tanzania

**Official from NGO not taking part in the PRSP process**
- Youth Partnership Countrywide (YPC)

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184 All appendices concerning the sources of information for the research start with 4, as they are linked closely to issues analyzed in chapter 4.
Appendix 4.2: Overview of Trade Union-related Respondents (Purposive Samples)

1-5 interviews with -

**Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA)**
- General Secretary
- Deputy General Secretary (x2) - the post-holder changed between the second and third fieldwork periods
- Director of Economics and Research
- Director of Education
- Director of Gender and Youth Issues
- Adviser on Gender Issues
- Director of Occupational Health and Safety, Environment and HIV/AIDS
- Senior Adviser DANIDA (seconded to TUCTA on fixed-term contract)

**TUCTA-Affiliated Trade Unions**
- Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied Workers Union
- Communication and Transport Workers Union of Tanzania
- Dock Workers Union of Tanzania
- Researchers Academicians and Allied Workers Union
- Tanzania Local Government Workers Union
- Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union
- Tanzania Seamen’s Union
- Telecommunication Workers Union of Tanzania
- Tanzania Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union
- Tanzania Railway Workers Union
- Tanzania Teachers Union
- Tanzania Union of Industrial and Commercial Workers
- Tanzania Union of Journalists
- Tanzania Union of Government and Health Workers

**Non TUCTA-Affiliated Trade Unions**
- Tanzania Union of Private Security Employees
- Industrial and General Workers Union of Tanzania
- Tanzania Social Services Industry Workers Union
- Tanzania Media Workers Union
- Tanzania Fishing Crew and Allied Workers Union
- Tanzania Pilots Union
### Appendix 4.3: Overview of Other Respondents

1-5 interviews with -

**Ministry of Labour Officials**
- Registrar of Trade Unions
- Deputy Registrar of Trade Unions

**Academics**
- Professor at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam – specialist in labour market issues and work on trade unions
- Senior Lecturer at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam – specialist in civil society, poverty and gender issues
- Professor of Education - University of Dar es Salaam – working on civil society issues

**Donors**
- Public Information Officer – World Bank
- Education Policy Officer – World Bank
- Senior Adviser – World Bank (seconded from DANIDA)
- Team Leader – Pro-poor Policy and Poverty Monitoring Unit - UNDP
- HIV/AIDS Policy Specialist - UNDP
- Poverty Monitoring Adviser - JICA
- Education Adviser – JICA

**Others**
- Interviews were conducted with officials from Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Tanzania
- Media Council of Tanzania (MCT), Mkombozi, Aga Khan University, Independent Development Consultant (former Country Programme Director, Oxfam Tanzania).
Appendix 4.4: Full List of Respondents

Officals from ‘Macro Group’ NGOs Purposively Sampled
1. Patrick Ngowi - Commonwealth Education Fund (CEF) Tanzania Programme Coordinator, Save the Children (SCF)
2. Mrs Theofrida Kapinga - Executive Secretary, Tanzania Council for Social Development (TACOSODE)
3. Andrew Mushi - Policy and Advocacy Programme Officer, Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO)
4. Professor Haidari Amani - Executive Director, Economic and Social Research Foundation Council (ESRF)
5. Dr Oswald Mashindano - Senior Research Fellow, Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF)
6. Mary Rusimbi - Executive Director, Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP)
7. Gemma Akilimali - Senior Programme Officer - Activism, Lobbying and Advocacy, Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP)
8. Gertrude Mugizi - Executive Director, Policy Forum
9. Rakesh Rajani - Executive Director, Hakielimu
10. Donald Mmari - Consultancy Coordinator, Researcher, Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA)
11. Luca Katera - Researcher, Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA)
12. Ms Rose Mushi - Country Programme Director, ActionAid
13. Mrs Helen Kijo-Bisimba - Executive Director, Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC)
14. Daniel Mvella - Programme Manager, Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC)

Officials from ‘Non-Macro Group’ NGOs Purposively Sampled
1. Fred Kwame - Country Programme Manager, Oxfam
2. Silas Likasi – Deputy Country Programme Manager, Oxfam
3. Nora Pendaeli-Mhina – Program Manager, Pact Tanzania
4. Theo Macha - Program Officer, Pact Tanzania
5. Dr Joseph Kisanji – Coordinator, Tanzania Education Network (TEN/MET)
6. Israel Ilunde - Executive Director, Youth Partnership Countrywide (YPC)

Officials from the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA) – Head Office
1. Mr Nestory Ngulla - General Secretary (x2)
2. Mr Hassan Raha – ex-Deputy General Secretary
3. Mr Nicholas Ernest Mgaya - Deputy General Secretary
4. Mr John Gonza - Director of Economics and Research (x2)
5. Mrs Margaret Mandago - Director of Education (x4)
6. Mrs Sihan Ahmed - Director of Gender and Youth Issues (x3)
7. Dr Kassim Meja Kapalata - Director Occupational Health and Safety, Environment and HIV/AIDS
8. Dr Chande - Adviser on Gender Issues  
9. Mr Holger Hansen - Senior Adviser – DANIDA (Trade Union Component – seconded to TUCTA)

**Officials from Trade Unions Affiliated to the Trade Unions Congress of Tanzania**
1. Mr Said S. Wamba - General Secretary, Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied Workers Union (CHODWAU)  
2. Mr C. M. Samang’ombe - General Secretary, Communication and Transport Workers Union of Tanzania (COTWU(T))  
3. Mrs Debora Lutwaza - Head of Public Relations, Education and Training, Dock Workers Union of Tanzania (DOWUTA)  
4. Mr Godwin Ndone - Legal and Administrative Officer, Dock Workers Union of Tanzania (DOWUTA)  
5. Mrs Mgaya - General Secretary, Researchers Academicians and Allied Workers Union (RAAWU)  
6. Mr Hezron Julius Kaaya - Deputy General Secretary, Researchers Academicians and Allied Workers Union (RAAWU)  
7. Mr J. S. Makongwa - General Secretary, Tanzania Local Government Workers Union (TALGWU)  
8. Mr Hassan Khamis Ameir - General Secretary, Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union (TAMICO)  
9. Mr Makwaya Musu Pingu – ex-General Secretary, Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union (TAMICO)  
10. Mr Mbao J. S. Saad – ex-Deputy General Secretary, Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union (TAMICO)  
11. Accountant - Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union (TAMICO). The respondent did not want to be named.  
12. Mr Mchafu Ahmed Chakoma - General Secretary, Tanzania Seamen’s Union (TASU)  
13. Mr W Kashanda - Head of Research, Loans and Economy, Telecommunication Workers Union of Tanzania (TEWUTA)  
14. Mr Yahaya Msangi - Head of Research, Planning and Credit, Tanzania Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union (TPAWU)  
15. Mrs Helen Katala - Head of Education and Gender, Tanzania Railway Workers Union (TRAWU) (x2)  
16. Mr Y. B. K. Msulwa - General Secretary, Tanzania Teachers Union  
17. Mr Anthony Mtavangu - Head of Education and Training, Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU) (x2)  
18. Mr Boniface Y. Nkakatisi - General Secretary, Tanzania Union of Industrial and Commercial Workers (TUICO)  
19. Mr Godfrey Kambenga - General Secretary, Tanzania Union of Journalists (TUJ) (x2)

**Officials from Trade Unions Not Affiliated to the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania**
1. Mr Eugene Aloyse Kazoka - General Secretary, Tanzania Union of Private Security Employees (TUPSE)
2. Mr S. S. Marenda - General Secretary, Industrial and General Workers Union of Tanzania (IGWUTA)
3. Mr Michael Kashemba - Deputy General Secretary, Industrial and General Workers Union of Tanzania (IGWUTA)
4. Mr C. N. Nakuhwa - General Secretary, Tanzania Social Services Industry Workers Union (TASIWU)
5. Mr Juvenalis Lesia - General Secretary, Tanzania Media Workers Union (TMW)
6. Mr Songoro Mynonge - National Chairperson, Tanzania Media Workers Union (TMW)
7. Mr Hamid Yassin - National Treasurer, Tanzania Media Workers Union (TMW)
8. Mr Joseph Maseke - General Secretary, Tanzania Fishing Crew and Allied Workers Union (WAMEUTA)
9. Captain Joseph Ibanda - General Secretary, Tanzania Pilots Union (TPU)

**Government Officials**
1. Mrs Dorothy Uiso - Registrar of Trade Unions, Office of the Registrar of Trade Unions, Ministry of Labour (x3)
2. Mr Gabriel Murumbe – Deputy Registrar of Trade Unions Office of the Registrar of Trade Unions, Ministry of Labour (x3)

**Officials from Other NGOs**
1. Mrs Pili Mtambalike - Programme Officer, Media Council of Tanzania
2. Ms Claire Lwehabura - Project Officer, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
3. Ms Elsie Downham - Official, Mkombozi (Liberator)

**Officials from Supranational Organizations**
1. Catriona Byrne - HIV/AIDS Specialist, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
2. Rosalie Ferrao - Public Information Officer, Public Information Office, World Bank
3. Rest Lasway - Education Specialist, World Bank
4. Astrid Ruge - Special Assistant to the World Bank Country Programme Manager (Seconded from DANIDA)
5. Amon Manyama - Team Leader - Pro-Poor Policy and Poverty Monitoring, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

**Officials from Bilateral Donors**
1. Tamahi Yamauchi - Poverty Monitoring Adviser, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
2. Kazuyo Igarashi - Education Adviser, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

**Academics**
1. Professor Samuel Chambua - Acting Head of Department, Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam (x2)
2. Professor Issa Mcholo Omari - Professor of Educational Research and Private Consultant, University of Dar es Salaam
3. Dr M. K. Ngaiza - Senior Lecturer in Poverty, Gender and Development, Institute of Development Studies (IDS), University of Dar es Salaam
4. Dr Euan Davidson – Lecturer, Aga Khan University, Dar es Salaam

Others
1. Mark Waite - Development Consultant (Former Country Programme Director of Oxfam)
2. Mr Omar Faruk Osman - Secretary General - Eastern Africa Journalists Association

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185 The recording of the titles of interviewees reflects the way they were given during interviews. All interviewees were post-holders at the time of interviews. Where the job title has ‘ex’ as a prefix, this reflects the fact that at the time of subsequent interviews, the post-holder had changed.
Appendix 4.5: Questions to NGO Officials

1. What are the main issues facing NGOs in Tanzania?
2. What are the main issues concerning the PRSP process from the point of view of NGOs in Tanzania?
3. What are the main issues concerning the relationship between NGOs and the trade union movement in Tanzania?
4. What are your views concerning use of English when dealing with NGO issues in Tanzania?
5. What are your views on the relationship between NGOs and the government in Tanzania?
Appendix 4.6: Questions to TUCTA Officials, TUCTA-Affiliated Trade Union Officials and Non TUCTA-Affiliated Trade Union Officials

1. What are the main issues facing the trade union movement in Tanzania?
2. What are the main issues concerning the PRSP process from the point of view of the trade union movement in Tanzania?
3. What are the main issues concerning the relationship between the trade union movement and NGOs in Tanzania?
4. What are the main issues concerning the relationship between ‘new investors’ and the trade union movement in Tanzania?
5. What are your views on mergers between trade unions in Tanzania?
6. What are your views concerning the use of English when dealing with trade union issues in Tanzania?
7. What are your views on the relationship between the trade union movement and the government in Tanzania?
### Appendix 4.7 Key Government and Civil Society Documents used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>PRSP-related</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MKUKUTA and MKUZA Review (2009)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MKUKUTA Annual Implementation Report 2007/08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKUKUTA Annual Implementation Report 2006/07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKUKUTA Monitoring Highlights: Issue 7 (2007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKUKUTA Monitoring Highlights: Issue 6 (2007)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Strategy For Growth And Reduction Of Poverty (NSGRP II) (2010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Strategy For Growth And Reduction Of Poverty (NSGRP) (2005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy: The Second Progress Report 2001/02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) (2000)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Government - Poverty and Human Development Reports (biannual)</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and Human Development Report 2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and Human Development Report 2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and Human Development Report 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and Human Development Report 2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Government - Other</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment and Labour Relations Act No. 6 (2004b)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACONGO (2010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedures For Registration Of Non Governmental Organizations Under The Non Governmental Organizations Act No. 24/20002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Tanzania Development Vision 2025 (1999)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions Act, 1998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Views Of The People 2007</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Civil Society</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hakielimu - Three Years of PEDP Implementation: Key Findings from Government Reviews (2005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakielimu, Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) and Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) - Access to Information in Tanzania: Still a Problem (2005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakikazi Catalyst - Bouncing Back: Some Grassroots Responses To The PRSP (2002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakikazi Catalyst - Plain Language Guides (2010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 5.1  Overview of NGOs Interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Macro Group</th>
<th>Type of NGO</th>
<th>Focus of Work</th>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>Publications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP) Founded – 1993</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Umbrella</td>
<td>Advocacy and Training 1. Gender 2. Social transformation to enhance equity</td>
<td>DSM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes – books, journal articles and own papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Education Network (TEN/MET) Founded – 1999</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Umbrella</td>
<td>Advocacy 1. Education – furtherance of quality basic education for all</td>
<td>DSM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes – Reports and newsletters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) Founded – 1995</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>Research, Training and Policy Dev. 1. Legal/Human Rights issues</td>
<td>DSM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes – own research-based papers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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186 As the appendix relates to the work of NGOs in Tanzania and is linked closely to issues analyzed in chapter 5 (The NGO Sector in Tanzania) it starts with 5.
187 TACOSODE has existed since 1965 under another name as a joint government- voluntary sector organization.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Branch of BINGO</th>
<th>DSM</th>
<th>OVC = Orphans and Vulnerable Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oxfam Tanzania</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Own research-based papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active since early 1970s.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current strategic plan: 2007–2017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hakielimu</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Own, books, articles, own research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founded – 2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>based papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Save the Children Tanzania</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Own, research-based papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founded – 2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ActionAid Tanzania</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Own, research-based papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founded – 1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pact Tanzania</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Own, research-based papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founded – 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth Partnership Countrywide</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>booklets and reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(YPC) Founded – 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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188 OVC = Orphans and Vulnerable Children.
Appendices 6.1 to 6.6 – Information and Issues Concerning Trade Unions

Appendix 6.1  Tanzanian Unions Registered with the Office of the Registrar of Trade Unions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Trade Union</th>
<th>TUCTA Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Local Government Workers Union (TALGWU)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Union of Industrial and Commercial Workers (TUICO)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Union of Government and Health Employees (TUGHE)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union (TPAWU)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied Workers Union (CHODAWU)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researchers, Academicians and Allied Workers Union (RAAWU)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication and Transport Workers Union (Tanzania) (COTWU–T)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Railway Workers Union (TRAWU)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union (TAMICO)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dock Workers Union of Tanzania (DOWUTA)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania Social Services Industry Workers Union (TASIWU)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Fishing Crew and Allied Workers Union (TAFICAWU)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications Workers Union of Tanzania (TEWUTA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industrial and General Workers union of Tanzania (IGWUTA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania Union of Private Security Employees (TUPSE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania Seamen’s Union (TASU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania Union of Journalists TUJ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania Media Workers Union (TMW)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania Pilots Union TPU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania Agroforestry Workers Union (TAWU)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: McQuinn (2011)

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189 All appendices containing information and issues relating to trade unions start with 6, as they are linked closely to issues analyzed in chapter 6 (Trade Unions in Tanzania).
## Appendix 6.2 Tanzanian Trade Unions – Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade Union</th>
<th>Education/Training Department</th>
<th>Research/Economics Department</th>
<th>Gender Department or Officer</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>Journal or Newsletter</th>
<th>Email</th>
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<tr>
<td>TTU</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>TALGWU</td>
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<td>TUICO</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUGHE</td>
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<td>TPAWU</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRAAWU</td>
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<td>COTWU–T</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>TRAWE</td>
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<td>TAMICO</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No*</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOWUTA</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>TASIWU</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAFICAWU</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEWUTA</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGWUTA</td>
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<td>TTUJ</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMW</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPU</td>
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<tr>
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Source: McQuinn, (2011, 2009). For purposes of identification, full names of trade unions with their abbreviations in brackets are provided in appendix 6.1 above.
### Appendix 6.3 Tanzanian Trade Unions – Membership Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Trade Union</th>
<th>Number of Members</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU)</td>
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<td>Tanzania Local Government Workers Union (TALGWU)</td>
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<td>Tanzania Union of Industrial and Commercial Workers (TUICO)</td>
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<td>Tanzania Union of Government and Health Employees (TUGHE)</td>
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<td>Tanzania Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union (TPAWU)</td>
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<td>Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied Workers Union (CHODAWU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Researchers, Academicians and Allied Workers Union (RAAWU)</td>
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<td>Communication and Transport Workers Union (Tanzania) (COTWU–T)</td>
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<td>Tanzania Railway Workers Union (TRAWU)</td>
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<td>Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union (TAMICO)</td>
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<td>Dock Workers Union of Tanzania (DOWUTA)</td>
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<td>Tanzania Fishing Crew and Allied Workers Union (TAFICAWU)</td>
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Source – McQuinn (2011)
Appendix 6.4

Scorecard on Trade Union Participation in the PRSP (1)

The State of Social Dialogue: looks at the enabling environment for consultations in a particular country, focusing on:

- The trade union situation
- Violations of trade union rights
- Constitutional provisions
- Labour legislation
- Ratification of ILO core conventions

Appendix 6.5

Scorecard on Trade Union Participation in the PRSP (2)

Trade Union Participation in the PRSP process: looks at the level of consultations with trade unions, focusing on:

- At what stage were trade unions invited – at the very start, mid-point or not at all?
- Did trade unions make ‘noise’ before being invited?
- Did the labour ministry help?
- If not invited at all, what steps did trade unions take? With what results?
- Participation/chairing of thematic groups?
- What views were espoused? Written document?
- Does the PRSP contain trade union views?
- If not, what have trade unions done?
- Alliances with civil society organizations?
- Alliances with employer federations/
- Involvement of the ILO?

Appendix 6.6

Scorecard on TU Participation in the PRSP (3)

Labour Content of the PRSP: centres on the labour market issues covered in the PRSPs:

- Employment
- Pensions reforms
- Social security measures
- Wage policies
- Human resource development
- Technical, entrepreneurial vocational education and training (TEVET)
- Labour code changes
- Informal sector politics
- Core labour standards
- Anti-child labour policies
- Micro finance
- Occupational health and safety for workers