
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/13604

Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

When referring to this thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination.
THE SOTERIOLOGICAL ROLE OF THE ṚŚI KAPILA IN THE YUKTIDĪPIKĀ: THE PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION OF LIBERATING KNOWLEDGE IN CLASSICAL SĀṂKHYA

JAMES KIMBALL

Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in the Study of Religions

2011

Department of the Study of Religions
School of Oriental and African Studies
University of London
Declaration for PhD thesis

I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of the School of Oriental and African Studies concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination.

Signed: _____________________ Date: ______________
The seventy-two verses of Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Sāṃkhya-kārikā (ca. 350-550 C.E.) form the core text of the classical school of Sāṃkhya philosophy. Of the classical commentaries on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā, the anonymous Yuktidīpikā (ca. 600-700 C.E.) provides the most extensive information on the rṣi Kapila, the legendary founder of the Sāṃkhya system, known as the paramārṣi or ‘highest seer’.

In the Yuktidīpikā, the circumstances of Kapila’s incarnation and the production of his knowledge are discussed in relation to the epistemological, psychological and phenomenological paradigms of Sāṃkhya. Often the text mentions Kapila in terms of a limit or exception to these paradigms, thereby providing much information on the defining limits of the paradigms, on the apparent connections between them, and on the distinctions between ordinary experience and that of Kapila.

For these reasons, the interpretative implications of the appearances of Kapila in the Yuktidīpikā deserve more consideration than they have generally been given in Sāṃkhya studies. In particular, the importance attributed by the Yuktidīpikā to Kapila’s original formulation of Sāṃkhya knowledge and the circumstances of its production and transmission provide a basis for a re-evaluation of the role of the epistemological notion of āptavacana or ‘authoritative testimony’ in the Sāṃkhya system. In addition, the evidence of the Yuktidīpikā suggests that the purpose behind Kapila’s very incarnation was primarily soteriological.

In this study, my intention is to approach the figure of Kapila in the Yuktidīpikā as an interpretative link between various elements of the Sāṃkhya
system. I will thus take an integral approach to the various occurrences of Kapila in the text, in order to construct a comprehensive picture of the mechanics of the production and transmission of liberating knowledge, and to present a re-evaluation of the importance of doctrinal authority in classical Sāṃkhya.
# CONTENTS

**Outline of Chapters**

**Chapter I: Introduction.**

**Chapter II: Basic Structure of the Classical Sāṃkhya System.**

- §1. Ontology: the twenty-five principles (*tattva*).
- §2. Cosmology: transmigration (*samsāra*) and the phenomenal creation (*bhautika sarga*).
- §3. Teleology/Soteriology: conjunction (*samyoga*), discrimination (*vijñāna*), and isolation (*kaivalya*).
- §4. Epistemology: the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).
- §5. Psychology/Phenomenology: the conditions (*bhāva*) and the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*).

**Chapter III: Literature Review.**

**Chapter IV: A Comparison of the Sāṃkhya Commentators’ Views on Key Interpretative Issues.**

- §1. The commentators’ views on the *pramāṇa* of perception (*drṣṭa*).
- §2. The commentators’ views on the *pramāṇa* of inference (*anumāṇa*).
- §3. The commentators’ views on the *pramāṇa* of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*).
§4. The inclusion of other means of knowledge under the headings of perception, inference, and authoritative testimony.

§5. The means of knowledge as productive of the discrimination (vijñāna) leading to liberation (mokṣa).

§6. The commentators’ views on the results of the conditions (bhāva).

§7. Evidence for the production of merit (dharma), dispassion (vairāgya), lordliness (aiśvarya), and knowledge (jñāna) as a progressive process.

§8. The classification of the conditions into innate (sāṃsiddhika), deriving from primordial Materiality (prākṛtika), and deriving from the products (vaikṛtika).

§9. The commentators’ interpretations of the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga).

§10. The relationship between the conditions (bhāva) and the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga), according to the commentaries.

CHAPTER V: The Soteriological Role of Kapila in the Yuktidīpikā.

§1. The YD-kāra’s attitude to received knowledge.

§2. The YD-kāra’s view of the nature of the Sāṃkhya-kārikā.

§3. Īśvara, devas, yogins and rṣis in the Yuktidīpikā.

§4. The origin, nature and role of Kapila and his knowledge, according to the Yuktidīpikā.

§5. The soteriological role of Kapila in the Yuktidīpikā, in relation to the other classical Sāṃkhya commentaries.
OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

CHAPTER I: Introduction. The short introductory chapter will outline the scope and methodology of the study. It will also formulate the interpretative questions to be explored in the study, with regard to the *Yuktidīpikā*’s portrayal of Kapila and his knowledge.

CHAPTER II: Basic Structure of the Classical Sāṃkhya System. The nature of Kapila and the significance of his original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine present some interpretative difficulties when considered in the context of the systematised framework of classical Sāṃkhya. In order to provide the background necessary for a consideration of the evidence in the *Yuktidīpikā* with regard to these theoretical problems, the second chapter will outline the general features of the system as presented in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*. The various paradigms of Sāṃkhya will be outlined in five sections: ontology (§1), cosmology (§2), teleology/soteriology (§3), epistemology (§4), and psychology/phenomenology (§5). For the sake of simplicity, references to the commentaries and to secondary sources will be kept to a minimum here.

CHAPTER III: Literature Review. This will outline the history of interpretative contributions to the study of classical Sāṃkhya, insofar as they are relevant to the problems formulated in CHAPTER I. The objective of this chapter will be to identify the interpretative gaps in this area yet to be filled and the limits of prior scholarship on the *Yuktidīpikā*. 
CHAPTER IV: A Comparison of the Sāṃkhya Commentators’ Views on Key Interpretative Issues. This chapter will look in more depth at the Sāṃkhya paradigms most relevant to the discussion of the role of Kapila and his knowledge in Sāṃkhya, namely: the epistemological paradigm of the pramāṇas (§1-5) and Sāṃkhya’s two psychological/phenomenological paradigms, the conditions (bhāva) and the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga) (§6-10). These are also the aspects of Sāṃkhya on which there is the most divergence in the views of the classical commentators on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā. The primary objective of this chapter will be to identify evidence in the Yuktidīpikā that may be used to fill certain interpretative gaps apparent in the other commentaries.

CHAPTER V: The Soteriological Role of Kapila in the Yuktidīpikā. This chapter will present an interpretative analysis of the passages relevant to our understanding of the issues identified in the previous chapters. Of primary importance will be the commentator’s understanding of the notion of āptavacana and his attitude to received knowledge in general (§1), and to the Sāṃkhya-kārikā in particular (§2). Links will be drawn between the role of Kapila’s knowledge in the system and the notions of āptavacana, jñāna, and siddhi, as interpreted by the commentator. This chapter will also discuss references in the text to the Lord (īśvara) and to yogins, devas and rṣis in general (§3). The nature and origin of Kapila in particular and the apparent reasons behind his incarnation will be considered (§4). Ultimately, this discussion will construct a comprehensive picture of the text’s treatment of the nature and origin of Kapila and his knowledge, and the significance of his authority to the individual’s attainment of knowledge and consequent liberation. The relation of this portrayal of Kapila to the broader historical development of the figure and to our overall understanding of classical Sāṃkhya will then be considered (§5).
CHAPTER VI: Conclusion. The final chapter will summarise the main findings of the study and suggest possible avenues of further inquiry into the significance of the YD’s views of Kapila and of the production and transmission of knowledge.
CHAPTER I: Introduction.

Since the time of its composition (ca. 350-550 C.E.)¹, Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Āṇḍīvaṇa (SK) has been regarded as the definitive formulation of the Sāṃkhya system of philosophy. Although the tradition testifies to earlier texts belonging to an established school or schools of Sāṃkhya, none of these texts are extant except in fragments found in later Sāṃkhya literature.² The system presented by the SK appears to have become the normative version of the Sāṃkhya doctrine from the time of its composition, and the philosophical content of this text is thus often referred to as ‘classical Sāṃkhya’.³

Although the reasons for the normatisation of Sāṃkhya in Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s text are unclear,⁴ the anonymous author of the Yuktidīpikā (YD), a commentary on the SK, goes to pains to defend the integrity of the system presented by Īśvarakṛṣṇa as the definitive expression of Sāṃkhya doctrine, and also to clarify Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s differences of opinion from some of the earlier Sāṃkhya teachers. Motivated by these concerns, the YD-kāra⁵ presents quite detailed arguments in defense of the doctrines of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. In this connection, an examination of the YD offers the

¹ Larsson and Bhattacharya (1987, p. 15) have suggested the dates 350-450 C.E., but the more recent scholarship of Harzer (2006, pp. 107-109) has placed the Sāṃkhya-kārikā at ‘around 550 A.D.’

² Larsson and Bhattacharya (1987, pp. 3-14) outline the occurrences of ‘Proto-Sāṃkhya’ ideas (in texts such as the Arthaśāstra, Carakasamhitā, Saṃhita, and the Upaniṣads) and the reconstruction of doctrines and texts, such as the Śaṅkaraśrātra, considered to represent ‘Pre-Kārikā Sāṃkhya’ (on the basis of quotations in the Yuktidīpikā and portions of the Mokṣadharma (a section of the Mahābhārata) and early Purāṇas) undertaken by scholars such as Frawallner (1973) and Hacker (1962). Chakravorti (1975) similarly presents an overview of the early development of Sāṃkhya ideas (pp. 4-110) and a reconstruction of the views of early Sāṃkhya teachers, largely based on the evidence of the YD (pp. 111-155). Van Buitenen (1956, 1957) also undertakes a reconstruction of the doctrines of Pre-Kārikā Sāṃkhya (primarily on the basis of passages from the Mokṣadharma and the Upaniṣads) and considers their relation to classical Sāṃkhya.

³ Cf. Larsson (1979)’s definition, p. 4.

⁴ Cf. the discussion in Larsson (1979), pp. 134-135.

⁵ I have used the suffix -kāra in the sense of an ‘author’ of a particular work, in order to refer to the anonymous author of the YD.
opportunity to clarify several major interpretative issues only touched upon by the other classical commentaries on the SK.

The present study is focused primarily on the problem of the role of doctrinal authority in classical Sāṃkhya. The SK calls the founder of Sāṃkhya philosophy the paramarṣi or ‘supreme seer’. According to all of the commentaries on the SK, this figure was named Kapila. SK 70-71 tell us that Kapila’s knowledge was passed down to Īśvarakṛṣṇa through a series of disciples. It is not clear, however, whether an individual might gain Sāṃkhya knowledge independently or must rely on the authoritative Sāṃkhya texts for this.

According to classical Sāṃkhya, the means to liberation (mokṣa, kaivalya) from the cycle of transmigration (saṃsāra), which is characterised by the experience of pain (duḥkha), is the discriminative realisation of the ultimate duality of Materiality (prakṛti) and Consciousness (puruṣa) (see §II.1-3). In general, the Sāṃkhya texts demonstrate that this duality may be inferred by any individual. However, they also ascribe an extraordinary origin and extraordinary capabilities to Kapila, the first to discover this knowledge. They also tend to emphasize the conformity of the SK to Kapila’s original treatise.

---

6 It should be noted that there is no evidence to suggest that there ever was an actual historical figure named Kapila who was the founder of the Sāṃkhya system. LARSON AND BHATTACHARYYA (1987, p. 108) point out that ‘Kapila and [his disciple] Āsurī are only vague memories’ in the Sāṃkhya texts. As CHAKRAVARTI (1975, p. 111) judges, all early references to Kapila ‘clearly point to his mythological origin and he may not be taken as an historical personage’. BRONKHORST (2007, pp. 61-68) suggests that Kapila may even have originated as a deity associated with the ascetic traditions of the region of ‘Greater Magadha’. The issues surrounding the development of the figure of Kapila will be considered in more detail in §V.5.

7 SK 70-71: ‘The sage bestowed this purifying, foremost [knowledge] to Āsurī out of compassion. Āsurī likewise [bestowed this knowledge] to Pañcaśikha, and by him the philosophical system was expanded. It was transmitted through a succession of disciples, and it has been condensed by the noble-minded Īśvaraṃśa in āryā [verses], having completely discerned the established truth.’ (etat pavitraṃ agryaṃ munīr āsuraye nukampayā pradadāu āsurir api pañcaśikhāya tena ca bahudhā kṛtaṃ tantram // śiṣyaparāparāyagatam īśvaraṃśena caitad āryābhīḥ / saṃkṣiptam āryamatinā samyag vijnāya siddhāntaṃ //).

8 I have capitalised ‘Consciousness’ for puruṣa in order to distinguish this term from ‘consciousness’ (cetanā) as the defining characteristic of puruṣa. Likewise, I have capitalised ‘Materiality’ for prakṛti as the other primary principle of Sāṃkhya. Although prakṛti is often translated as ‘Nature’, this term has too many connotations not present in the Sāṃkhya conception of prakṛti.
The central question of this study is: to what extent are individual seekers of liberation considered to be dependent upon Kapila’s original formulation of Sāṃkhya knowledge and the tradition initiated by it? In order to answer this question on the basis of an examination of the evidence of the YD, several related interpretative issues will be explored: 1. How is the Sāṃkhya tradition considered to be related to the epistemological notion of authoritative testimony (āptavacana)? 2. Does inference (anumāna), often used by the texts to establish the existence of Sāṃkhya principles, depend upon the authority of the Sāṃkhya texts for its efficacy, or may it be used independently by an individual to attain the same knowledge attained by Kapila? 3. What is the nature of Kapila and his knowledge, and what are the reasons behind his incarnation and the production of his knowledge?

Two secondary contributions to the study of Sāṃkhya will also be made by this study: 1. a detailed comparison of the classical commentators’ views with regard to the major, as yet unresolved, interpretative problems of classical Sāṃkhya, and 2. a consideration of the place of the YD’s views within the broader historical development of the figure of Kapila. The former will be presented in Chapter IV, while the latter will be presented in §V.5

Of the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries, the YD offers the most interpretative information with regard to Kapila and to the production and transmission of knowledge. Much of this information is found in connection with discussions of the epistemological paradigm of the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and the psychological/phenomenological paradigms of the conditions (bhāva) and the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga). A discussion of these elements of the Sāṃkhya system and a comparison of the YD’s views to those of the other commentators will provide the context for a holistic discussion of the YD’s view of the role of Kapila and the tradition of knowledge initiated by him.
The classical commentaries on the SK agree, with slight variations, on the basic structure of the Sāṃkhya system. *CHAPTER II* of this study will be devoted to a presentation of this structure. This will provide the basic context for a consideration, in *CHAPTER III*, of the contributions of previous scholars to resolving the interpretative issues apparent in the system. *CHAPTER IV* will compare the views of the commentators on the SK with regard to the *pramāṇas*, the *bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga*. In addition to the YD, this discussion will draw on material from the *Gaudapādabhāṣya* (GBh), the *Māṭharavṛtti* (MV), and the *Tattvakaumudī* (TK).

Although it has generally been difficult for scholars to determine the dates of these texts, I have adopted the basic chronology established by LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987): GBh (ca. 500-600 C.E.), YD (ca. 600-700 C.E.), MV (ca. 800 C.E. or later), TK (ca. 850 or 975 C.E.).

The work of SOLOMON (1974) has established the affinities between GBh, MV, *Suvarnasaptati* (SVS) (translated by Paramārtha into Chinese, 557-569 C.E.), *Sāṃkhyavr̥tti* (SV) (ca. 500-600 C.E.), and *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti* (SSV) (ca. 500-600 C.E.). However, it is clear on the basis of the text’s treatment of Kapila that the MV in its present form should be considered to be a relatively late text, as shown by the work of JACOBSEN (1998; 2008). In any case, it appears that GBh, MV, SVS, SV, and SSV all stem from the same text, which SOLOMON tentatively suggests to be SV.

I will thus be taking the GBh as representative of the Sāṃkhya commentaries produced shortly before the YD, and the MV and TK as representative of those

---

10 Ibid., p. 15.
11 Ibid., p. 15.
12 Ibid., p. 16.
produced shortly after.\(^{15}\) The fact that MV differs from GBh largely in terms of its portrayal of Kapila, particularly in its association of Kapila with Viṣṇu, provides an index of the development of this figure within the Sāṃkhya tradition.

It is evident that by the time of the MV and TK, a new mythological view of Kapila had come to be accepted by Sāṃkhya commentators.\(^{16}\) In addition to Vācaspatimiśra’s TK, his *Tattvavaiśāradī* (TV), a commentary on Vyāsa’s *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*, contains valuable information in this regard. **Chapter V** will examine the YD’s references to Kapila, as well as to the Lord (*iśvara*), to gods (*deva*), to *ṛṣis* in general, and to *yogins*, and will then compare this evidence to that found in the GBh, MV, TK and TV, as well as to evidence with regard to Kapila found in earlier texts of the broader Brāhmaṇical tradition.

The primary objective of this study is to clarify the YD’s views on the nature of Kapila and the importance of his original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine with regard to the attainment of liberating knowledge by later individuals. The study will also consider the relation of these views to those of the other classical commentaries on the SK and their place in the broader historical development of the figure of Kapila, in order to construct a picture of the development of the role of Kapila’s knowledge, and of doctrinal authority in general, in the Sāṃkhya texts of the classical period.

---

\(^{15}\) I have not had the opportunity to consult another apparently contemporaneous commentary, the *Jayamaṅgalā* (JM) (ca. 700 or later), but a summary provided in LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, pp. 271-287) shows general agreement with the other commentaries in terms of the basic structure of the system. With regard to the apparent date of this text, CHAKRAVARTI (1975, p. 166) suggests that “the author of the Jayamaṅgalā seems to pre-suppose the existence of the Yukti-dīpakā”.

\(^{16}\) WEZLER (1970, p. 262) suggests that this was due to the influence of the Vaiṣṇavas; JACOBSEN (1998, p. 77-79; 2008, pp. 33-37) discusses this development in some detail.
NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

The primary focus of this study is an interpretative problem: an examination of the YD’s views on the nature and origin of Kapila and the role of his original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine in the attainment of liberating knowledge by later generations of Sāṃkhya seekers. Accordingly, the structure and composition of the YD are not direct concerns, although a brief outline of the structure of the text will be presented at the beginning of CHAPTER IV.

The YD is a very lengthy text, and my intention is not to present a treatment of the text in its entirety. Rather, the choice of passages for analysis will be based upon their relevance to the interpretative issues at hand, which will often mean bringing together references from disparate sections of the text. This approach can be characterised as ‘holistic’ insofar as it draws together relevant information from the contexts of all of the major Sāṃkhya paradigms treated by the YD. As a consequence, connections will be drawn between several Sāṃkhya paradigms—namely, the pramāṇas, the bhāvas and the prayāyasarga—which, as will be made clear in CHAPTER III, have not yet been fully understood by scholars of Sāṃkhya. These are also the Sāṃkhya paradigms upon which there is the most divergence in the views of the classical commentators on the SK. In itself, the detailed comparison of these views in CHAPTER IV will form a secondary contribution of the study, although these paradigms have been chosen for examination primarily due to their relevance to the main interpretative focus of the study.

Nor do I intend to approach the YD primarily from the point of view of the history of textual composition or of the history of Indian philosophy in general. The place of the text’s views within the broader historical development of the figure of
Kapila and the relation of the text’s views on the origination and transmission of knowledge to the evidence of sources beyond the classical Sāṃkhya texts are secondary concerns of the study. Suggestions in this regard will be introduced in Chapter V.

**NOTE ON TRANSLATION**

Unless otherwise specified, all translations and summaries are my own. The summaries of portions of the SK provided in Chapter II are based primarily on the text as attested by the GBh and reproduced in Larson (1979). The text of the SK varies only slightly among the various commentaries, although the YD does not contain extant commentary on all of the verses. In translating the Sāṃkhya commentaries, Mainkar (*Gaudapādabhāṣya* (1972)), Kumar and Bhargava (*Yuktidīpikā* (1990-92)), and Jha (*Tattvakaumudī* (2004)) have been useful as guides, but I have generally endeavoured to be more literal and to be consistent in my translation of technical Sāṃkhya terms. With regard to the YD, my translations and summaries follow the readings established in the critical edition (1998).

---

18 SK 5c, 11-12, 60-63, 64a, 65-66, and 67a are absent from the text of the YD. Also, SK 73 is attested only by the MV.
CHAPTER II: Basic Structure of the Classical Śaṅkhya System.

§1. Ontology: the twenty-five tattvas.

The Śaṅkhya texts posit a basic duality between two existent principles (tattva), Materiality (prakṛti) and Consciousness (puruṣa). These two principles are eternal and all-pervasive (SK 10-11). They are also eternally separate (SK 62); they do not interact, though they do exist in ‘proximity’ or ‘conjunction’ (samyoga: SK 20-21, 66) with one another.

Consciousness (puruṣa) is a passive witness to the activity of Materiality (prakṛti). While prakṛti is active but non-conscious, puruṣa is inactive but conscious (SK 10-11, 19).

Prakṛti is further distinguished as existing in two states, unmanifest (avyakta) and manifest (vyakta). Unmanifest prakṛti (also called mūlaprakṛti or pradhāna) is primordial Materiality, from which the whole of the created world evolves. In this sense, unmanifest prakṛti can be thought of as the raw matter for creation or the potential for creation. It is also the subtle substratum of manifest prakṛti.

When the subtle, inactive form of prakṛti comes into conjunction with puruṣa, the process of the manifestation of prakṛti is triggered. This process is governed by three constituent qualities (guṇa)19 inherent in prakṛti: goodness (sattva), activity (rajas), and inertia (tamas).20 When prakṛti is in its unmanifest

---

19 I have chosen to translate guṇa as ‘constituent quality’ in order to capture two aspects of the concept. While the guṇas represent the ontological components of prakṛti, they are also observable as particular qualities apparent in objects at all levels of experience.

20 In translating the names of the guṇas themselves, I have decided on the most abstract translations rather than those which would reflect certain qualities of the guṇas as manifested in various phenomena, such as ‘illumination’ or ‘buoyancy’ for sattva, ‘darkness’ for tamas, etc.
state, the three gunas are in a state of equilibrium. This balance is upset by the presence of the purusa. When one guna becomes dominant over the others, new principles (tattva) evolve out of prakṛti. This activity leads to the emergence of twenty-three other principles, known collectively as manifest (vyakta) Materiality. The existence of unmanifest prakṛti as the source of these twenty-three principles, the fact that these principles emerge from prakṛti in a fixed order, and the fact that both unmanifest and manifest prakṛti are characterised by the gunas, are supported by the ‘doctrine of the [pre-]existent effect’ (satkāryavāda), according to which every effect exists in its cause in a potential form (SK 9, 14-16).

Unmanifest Materiality gives rise to the intellect (buddhi, mahat)\(^{21}\). Intellect gives rise to the ego (ahamkāra), which is described as self-conceit (abhimāna) (SK 24). Ego is productive in two directions (SK 24-25). When characterised by goodness (sattva), ego gives rise to the eleven organs or faculties (indriya). These are mind (manas); the five faculties of apprehension (buddhīndriya): ears (śrotra), skin (tvac), eyes (cakṣus), tongue (rasana), nose (ghrāṇa); and the five faculties of action (karmendriya): voice (vāc), hands (pāṇi), feet (pāda), anus (pāyu), and genitals (upastha). Mind is considered to be both a faculty of apprehension and a faculty of action (SK 27), since it acts as a superintendent of the activities of both.

When ego is characterised by inertia (tamas), it gives rise to the five subtle elements (tanmātra), namely: sound (śabda), touch (sparśa), form or colour (rūpa), taste (rasa), and scent (gandha). These five subtle elements are described as aviśeṣa or non-specific (SK 38); in other words, they lack the particular qualities of matter.

\(^{21}\) The intellect (buddhi) is also known as ‘the great [principle]’ (mahat), an appellation which might stem from the existence of a separate principle known as ‘the great self’ (mahat ātman) in proto-Sāṃkhya enumerations such as Katha Upaniṣad 6.7-9 (see LARSON (1979, p. 98)). The author of the YD (on SK 22a, p. 187, ll. 25-26) explains: ‘It is great because of being great in [terms of] space and because of being great in [terms of] time. It is great because of being possessed of a greater extent than all produced things.’ (sa tu desāmahattvāti kālamahattvāt ca mahān / sarvotpādebhyyo mahāparimāṇayuktatvān mahāni /).
perceivable in the everyday world, such as sweetness with regard to taste, redness with regard to colour, and so on.

The subtle elements, in turn, give rise to the five great elements (*mahābhūta*): ether (*ākāśa*), air (*vāyu*), fire (*tejas*), water (*ap*), and earth (*prthivī*). In contrast to the subtle elements, these are specific (*viśeṣa*) (SK 38); that is, they are characterised by particular qualities.

These twenty-five principles\(^\text{22}\) are treated as the common framework through which all individuals experience the world; that is, as the substratum of *prakṛti*’s activity as witnessed by the Consciousness (*puruṣa*) of an individual.

\section*{§2. Cosmology: transmigration (*saṃsāra*) and the phenomenal creation (*bhautika sarga*)}

There is only one *prakṛti*, but there are countless *puruṣas*. While there is only one *prakṛti* active with regard to all individuals, there is a distinct *puruṣa* associated with each individual (SK 11, 18). This accounts for the variety of experience in the world (SK 18).

A *puruṣa*, due to conjunction (*saṃyoga*) with *prakṛti*, becomes associated with a subtle body (*liṅga*), consisting of intellect, ego, the eleven faculties, and the subtle elements (SK 40). This subtle body transmigrates (*saṃsṛ-*) from birth to birth (SK 40), taking on various physical bodies composed of the five great elements (SK 39).

The phenomenal universe (*bhautika sarga*) is divided into three levels: the divine (*daiva*), the human (*mānuṣya*), and the animal (*tairyagyona*) (SK 53). These

\(^{22}\) For a chart showing the relationships among the twenty-five *tattvas*, see LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 52.
three levels are described as the upper (ūrdhva), middle (madhya), and lower (mūlata), respectively (SK 54). The upper level is characterised by a predominance of goodness (sattva), the middle by a predominance of activity (rajas), and the lower by a predominance of inertia (tamas) (SK 54).

The level of the cosmos in which one is born and the various circumstances of a particular birth are determined by the conditions (bhāvas) of the intellect (SK 40, 43-45, 52) and the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga) (SK 46-51). These two paradigms and the relationship between them will be discussed below (§II.5, IV.6-10).

While the phenomenal circumstances of an individual’s life change from birth to birth, the structure of the subtle body (liṅga) remains constant. The principles (tattva) which make up the subtle body are thus common to all individuals, while the phenomenal results of the activity of the subtle body vary according to the operation of the bhāvas and pratyayasarga with regard to each individual Consciousness (puruṣa).

The transmigration of the subtle body continues through the periodic dissolution and re-manifestation of prakṛti, during which the manifest principles (buddhi, etc.) are absorbed into the unmanifest and then re-emerge in the same pattern. The subtle body resumes the process of transmigration after these periods of dissolution and continues to transmigrate until the liberation (mokṣa) and isolation (kaivalya) of the particular puruṣa (SK 65-66) with which it is associated. At this point the activity of Materiality (prakṛti) with regard to that puruṣa ceases (SK 59, 23).

23 E.g., GBh on SK 40, p. 146, ll. 8-10: ‘The subtle body, from the intellect down to the subtle elements, possessing the instruments [of apprehension and action], dissolves into primordial Materiality at the time of dissolution. It remains unassociated with transmigration until the time of creation, being bound by the bonds of delusion in Materiality and incapable of actions such as transmigration; then the subtle body transmigrates again at the time of creation.’ (liṅgam iti / pralayakāle mahadādisūkṣmaparyantam karaṇopetam pradhāne liyate / asamsaraṇayuktam sat āsargakālam atra vartate prakṛtimohabandhanabaddhaṃ sat saṃsaraṇādíkriyāsvasamartham iti punaḥ sargakāle saṃsarasāṁ tasmāt liṅgam sūkṣmam //).
Although the body presently associated with that puruṣa continues to exist for some time (SK 67), no further incarnation will take place upon the death of that body (SK 66-67).

§3. Teleology/Soteriology: conjunction (saṃyoga), discrimination (vijñāna), and isolation (kaivalya).

Two reasons are given by Īśvarakṛṣṇa for the conjunction (saṃyoga) of Materiality (prakṛti) and Consciousness (puruṣa): the observation of Materiality’s activity by Consciousness and the eventual isolation (kaivalya) of Consciousness (SK 21, 37). Creation (that is, the manifestation of prakṛti) occurs as a result of this conjunction (SK 21). Thereafter, the activity of prakṛti, as described by the functions of the three constituent qualities (guṇa), is directed entirely towards the dual purpose of the puruṣa (SK 13, 31, 36-37, 56-58, 60).

With regard to the first purpose of the puruṣa, the intellect (buddhi) is described as the locus of all knowledge processes. It is characterised by the determination (adhyavasāya: SK 23) of objects. The ego (ahaṃkāra), mind (manas) and ten faculties (indriya), present all sensory information to the intellect, which illuminates the objects of experience for the passive observation of the puruṣa (SK 31, 36).

The second purpose of the puruṣa is also fulfilled by this illuminative activity of the buddhi (SK 37). In this case, a specific form of knowledge is required for the liberation (mokṣa) or isolation (kaivalya) of the puruṣa. The Sāṃkhya texts reject perceptible (drṣṭa) and scriptural (ānuśravika) forms of knowledge (SK 1-2), prescribing instead the discrimination (vijñāna) between the manifest (vyakta), the
unmanifest (avyakta), and the knower (jña; i.e. the puruṣa) (SK 2). The manner in which this discrimination is attained will be discussed below (§IV.5-10).

Due to the conjunction of prakṛti and puruṣa, they appear to take on each other’s characteristics. That is, the unconscious prakṛti appears to be conscious, and the inactive puruṣa appears to be active (SK 20). This relationship is compared to a partnership between a lame man and a blind man (SK 21). That is, just as the lame man provides the function of sight for the blind man, so does puruṣa lend its consciousness to prakṛti, while just as the blind man provides the function of movement for the lame man, so does prakṛti direct its activity to the needs of the puruṣa. Thus, both consciousness and activity characterise the experience of an incarnated individual.

Due to the illusion of activity on the part of the puruṣa, it is described as experiencing the suffering (duḥkha) which is considered to be the nature of worldly existence (SK 55). Suffering is also given as the reason for undertaking the Sāṃkhya inquiry into the means of liberation (SK 1).

However, due to its complete passivity (SK 60), the puruṣa is never actually bound to worldly existence; that is, it never transmigrates and is thus never in need of liberation (SK 62). Rather, it is prakṛti which, due to the illusion of its own consciousness (in the context of a particular puruṣa), transmigrates and attains liberation (SK 62).

Thus, liberation is attained by the production of the knowledge in buddhi that consciousness is not an attribute of buddhi itself (SK 64). Liberation then takes the form of the cessation of prakṛti’s activity (SK 59, 65, 66, 68) and the consequent isolation (kaivalya) of the puruṣa. This isolation consists in the fact that there is no longer any activity on the part of prakṛti for the puruṣa to witness (SK 65, 68).
Īśvarakṛṣṇa illustrates the conjunction and eventual separation of prakṛti and puruṣa with several analogies. In addition to the analogy of the lame man and the blind man, mentioned above, prakṛti is compared to the milk which unconsciously functions for the benefit of a calf (SK 57). The relationship between prakṛti and puruṣa is also compared to that between a woman and a man. This analogy is facilitated by the fact that prakṛti is a feminine noun, while puruṣa literally means ‘man’. Prakṛti is portrayed as a modest woman who, having realised that she has been observed by a man, withdraws from sight (SK 61). She is also compared to a dancer who leaves the stage after the performance (SK 59), while puruṣa is likened to a member of the audience (SK 65).

These analogies serve to reinforce the fact that the cessation of the process of transmigration is entirely a function of prakṛti, while puruṣa is at all times merely a passive witness. The means by which the discrimination (vijñāna) leading to this cessation is produced within manifest prakṛti will be considered in detail in Chapter IV.


The epistemological notion of authoritative testimony (āptavacana) and its relation to the attainment of liberating knowledge in Sāṃkhya will be a major focus of the discussion of the YD in Chapters IV and V. Of all the elements of the Sāṃkhya system, its epistemological framework is the locus of the most disagreement among the commentators on the SK. In order to provide sufficient background for a discussion of the relationship between āptavacana and the production and transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge, a detailed discussion of the commentator’s
views on Sāṃkhya epistemology will take up a large portion of CHAPTER IV (§1-5).

The current section will be limited mainly to testimony of the SK itself.

As mentioned above (§II.3), Īśvarakṛṣṇa treats the intellect (buddhi) as the locus of knowledge. The process of perception is explained in terms of the function of the principles (tattva) (SK 30-36). In ordinary perception, the great elements (mahābhūta) become the objects of the eleven faculties (indriya), which then present the sensory data to the intellect (SK 34-36).

Īśvarakṛṣṇa includes also non-specific (avišeṣa) objects—i.e. the subtle elements (tanmātra)—as objects of the sense-faculties (buddhīndriya) (SK 34). The GBh and MV both explain that the sense-faculties of human beings apprehend specific (višeṣa) objects, while those of gods (deva) appre hend non-specific objects.24 The YD and TK mention both gods (in the TK, ārdhvasrotas: literally, ‘those having an upward stream’)25 and yogins as those capable of perceiving the subtle elements.26 This extraordinary form of perception will become relevant to the discussion of the commentators’ definition of the pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge) of perception (dṛṣṭa) in §IV.1, as well as to the broader discussion of the YD’s views on the attainment of suprasensuous (atiindriya) knowledge in CHAPTER V.

24 savišeṣavisayam mānuṣānāṁ śabdasparśaeparasagandhān sukhadūkhkhamohayuktān buddhindriyāni prakāsahantyi / devānāṁ nirvišeṣān viśayān prakāṣāvantī / (GBh on SK 34, p. 134, ll. 6-8); atrocyate śabdasparśarasarūpaspandhānā Paśca devānāṁ tannirvāsaṃjñitā nirvišeṣāḥ kevalasukhakhaśanatvāt / ytatasmāt dūkhkhamohau na sthānāṁ nirvišeṣāste iti / tathā hi / viśisyante śāntghamūḍhavādiṃeti višeṣāḥ taḥ saha savišeṣāḥ, devalā nirvišeṣā iti tatparyam / evam śabdādayam manushyaṁ savišeṣāḥ sukhadūkhkhamohayuktā iyarthāḥ / devānāṁ tu buddhindriyāni nirviśeṣāṃ sukhaśakṣam prakāśayanti / (MV on SK 34, p. 50, ll. 14-21).

25 See nn. 484, 488, 489 (§IV.9).

26 tatra devānāṁ yānindriyāni tāni dharmotkarsad viśuddhāni avisesāni api grhaṇti [prāg eva višeṣat] / yoginām ca samprātiprāvesaṁ / asmadādīnāṁ tu višeṣāṁ eva tamasa parivṛt同志们 / (YD on SK 34, p. 218, ll. 3-5); tatrodhvasrotasāṁ yogināḥ ca śrotaram śabdāstanmāraviśayam sthūlaśabdavāṣayam caśamādādīnāṁ tu sthūlasabdaśavāṣayam eva / evam teṣām tvak sthūlasuksam- 

spārśavāṣayaṁ avisesāṁ asmadādīnāṁ tu sthūlasabdaśavāṣayāvita / evam ca kṣurādavo ‘pi teṣāṁ asmadādīnāṁ ca 
rūpādiṣu sukhashāstheśe draṣṭavyāḥ // (TK on SK 34, p. 113, ll. 26-29).
The knowledge of perceived objects (whether specific or non-specific) is presented by the sense-faculties to the mind (manas), ego (ahamkāra), and intellect (buddhi). These latter three principles are common in functioning with regard to every object of knowledge (SK 35), while the sense-faculties function only with regard to particular elements (SK 28).

The relationship between the three-fold internal organ (manas, ahamkāra, and buddhi) and the external organs (the ten sense- and action-faculties) is compared to that between a door-keeper and doors (SK 35). In other words, the internal organs serve to process external information attained through the sense-faculties and to direct the action-faculties on the basis of that information, thus acting as superintendent of the interaction between the subtle body (liṅga) and the phenomenal world.

The knowledge produced in the intellect is then presented to Consciousness (purusa) for its passive observance (SK 36) and ultimate liberation (see §II.3).

In addition to direct perception (drśta), thus explained in terms of the function of the principles of the subtle body (liṅga), Īśvarakṛṣṇa includes inference (anumāna) and authoritative testimony (āptavacana) in his list of accepted means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) (SK 4). The YD clarifies that although there is really only one means of knowledge—that is, the constituent quality of goodness (sattva) in the form of the intellect (buddhi)—the acquisition of knowledge takes on three different forms depending on the circumstances surrounding it. Moreover, Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that all other means of knowledge (accepted by other schools) can

\[27\text{ anenaitad ācaśe: ekam eva buddhilaksanāṁ sattvam nimitṭāntarārugopajānītaḥ bhyaḥ kāryaviśeṣaparicchinmarūpabhedābhiḥ saktibhir upakārād bhinnam āva pratyavabhasamānaṁ dṛṣṭādi-sabdavācyam bhavati / na tu yathā tantrāntarīyāṁ visayopaniṣṭibhir indriyaṁ upajanjū bahvyo buddhayas tathēka vidyante yāḥ parikalpyamānāḥ svatantrāṇi triṇī pramāṇāṁ syah / (YD on SK 4c, p. 69, ll. 2-6)\]
be subsumed under these three headings (SK 4b), as demonstrated by the commentators in various ways.\textsuperscript{28}

The commentators’ views on the respective spheres of perception, inference, and authoritative testimony, and the applicability of these categories to the production and transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge, will be discussed in Chapter IV (§1-5). In addition to the \textit{pramāṇas}, two other Sāṃkhya paradigms, to be introduced below, partly describe the process by which knowledge is produced and transmitted.

\textbf{§5. Psychology/Phenomenology}\textsuperscript{29}: the conditions (\textit{bhāva}) and the intellectual creation (\textit{pratyayasarga}).

The SK presents two paradigms, the conditions (\textit{bhāva}) and the intellectual creation (\textit{pratyayasarga}), that describe the process by which the circumstances of the phenomenal incarnation and experience of an individual subtle body (liṅga, \textit{sūkṣmaśarīra}) are determined. The relationship between these two paradigms is unclear from the text of the SK and has been much debated among scholars.\textsuperscript{30} In §IV.10, it will be shown that the YD provides more evidence linking these two paradigms than do the other classical commentaries on the SK. The implications of this relationship will be discussed further in Chapter V.

\textsuperscript{28} The commentators variously incorporate presumption (\textit{arthāpatti}), equivalence (\textit{sambhava}), negation (\textit{abhāva}), conceptualisation or intuition (\textit{pratibhā}), folklore (\textit{aītīḥya}), comparison (\textit{upamāna}), and gesture (\textit{caesṭa}) into the three \textit{pramāṇas} accepted by the SK (see §IV.4).

\textsuperscript{29} I do not intend here to suggest any parallels with the Western traditions of psychology and phenomenology. My usage of these terms merely reflects the fact that the \textit{bhāvas} and the \textit{pratyayasarga} describe the psychological make-up of the individual and the phenomenal experience of the individual. The respective spheres of these two paradigms and the relationship between them (and attempts by previous scholars to understand them) will be discussed in more detail in §IV.10.

The SK itself provides a good deal of information about the first of these paradigms and its relation to the other elements of the Sāṁkhya system. Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that the intellect (buddhi) is invested (adhivāsita, literally ‘perfumed’) with conditions (bhāva) (SK 40) and specifies that there are eight of these conditions: merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), knowledge (jñāna), ignorance (ajñāna), dispassion (vairāgya), passion (avairāgya), lordliness (aiśvarya)\(^{31}\), and non-lordliness (anaiśvarya) (SK 44-45). Īśvarakṛṣṇa explains that merit, knowledge, dispassion, and lordliness are the forms of intellect characterised by goodness (sāttvika), while demerit, ignorance, passion, and non-lordliness are the forms of intellect characterised by inertia (tāmasa) (SK 23).\(^{32}\) Merit is said to result in upward movement (interpreted by the commentators as transmigrational movement upward in the scale of beings), demerit in downward movement, knowledge in liberation (apavarga), ignorance in bondage (to the cycle of transmigration), dispassion in dissolution into Materiality (or into the eight sources or productive principles; see §IV.6) (prakṛtilaya), passion in transmigration (samsāra), lordliness in non-obstruction (of one’s will), and non-lordliness in obstruction (SK 44-45). In summary, these conditions determine the transmigratory path taken by the individual and the circumstances of a particular incarnation.

With regard to the relationship between these conditions (bhāva) and the subtle body (liṅga), the SK states that they are mutually dependent for their function (SK 52). Specifically, seven of the conditions (merit, demerit, ignorance, dispassion, passion, lordliness, and non-lordliness) serve to maintain the process of

\(^{31}\) I have translated aiśvarya as ‘lordliness’, rather than with the common translation ‘power’, in order to draw attention to the connection of this term with the figure of iśvara, the Lord (see §IV.6, V.3).

\(^{32}\) The fact that the constituent qualities (guna), which are responsible for the manifestation of the other principles (tattva) from the intellect, are thus also responsible for determining the various conditions (bhāva) of the intellect, which themselves are not considered separate principles, presents an interpretative problem of its own. For an in-depth discussion of this problem, see MALINAR (2003).
transmigration, while one condition (knowledge) leads to the cessation of this process (SK 63, 65, 67-68). The condition of knowledge (jñāna) thus provides a link between the paradigm of the bhāvas and the epistemological and soteriological aspects of the system presented in the SK (see §II.3-4).

The SK applies a further threefold division to the conditions, stating that they are sāṃsiddhi, prākṛti, and vaikṛta (SK 43). These terms are usually translated as ‘innate’, ‘natural’, and ‘acquired’, respectively. The interpretation of these three types varies slightly among the commentators, although they all take the labels to refer to the manner of the production of the conditions (see §IV.8). The evidence of the YD suggests the possibility of a novel, but more literal, interpretation of these three types: as ‘innate’ (sāṃsiddhi), ‘deriving from primordial Materiality’ (prākṛti), and ‘deriving from the products’ (vaikṛta) (see §IV.8). The implications of this interpretation will be discussed in further detail in CHAPTER V.

Immediately following the explanation of the conditions (bhāva) and their consequences (SK 43-45), Īśvarakṛṣṇa appears to provide a link between these conditions and the paradigm of the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga): ‘This is the intellectual creation, called error (viparyaya), incapacity (aśakti), contentment (tuṣṭi), and attainment (siddhi); and because of suppression through imbalance of the constituent qualities (guna), it has fifty divisions.’ If we take the term eṣas (‘this’) in this verse to refer back to the substance of the preceding verses, it is, however,
still unclear whether Īśvarakṛṣṇa sees the pratyayasarga as another classification of the conditions (bhāva) themselves or of their phenomenal consequences.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa provides an enumeration of the categories of the pratyayasarga but does not provide much information on their nature. He explains the further fifty-fold division of the four categories of error (viparyaya), incapacity (aśakti), contentment (tuṣṭi), and attainment (siddhi), by listing five varieties of error, twenty-eight of incapacity, nine of contentment, and eight of attainment (SK 47-51). Of these categories, the forms of error (viparyaya) also have further subdivisions; Īśvarakṛṣṇa tells us that there are eight varieties of ignorance (tamas)36, eight varieties of delusion (moha), ten varieties of extreme delusion (mahāmoha), eighteen varieties of gloom (tāmisra)37, and eighteen varieties of blind gloom (andhatāmisra) (SK 48). The twenty-eight varieties of incapacity (aśakti) include injuries to the eleven faculties and the opposites of the nine contentments and eight attainments (SK 49). The nine contentments (tuṣṭi) are divided into four internal contentments, including Materiality (prakṛtī), means (upādāna), time (kāla) and fate (bhāgya), and five external contentments that arise from the abandonment of the objects of the senses (SK 50). The eight attainments (siddhi), which will become a major focus of the study of the YD’s views in Chapters IV and V, are listed as reflection (ūha), speech (śabda), study (adhyayana), the three removals of pain (dukhkhavighāta), attainment of/from friends (suḥṛtpṛāpti)38, and charity (dāna) (SK 51abc).

Īśvarakṛṣṇa also states that error, incapacity, and contentment are hindrances to

---

36 The interpretation of this form of error by the commentators is more precisely conveyed by the translation ‘ignorance’ than by ‘inertia’ (as used to translate tāmas in its technical sense as one of the guṇas).

37 I have adopted the translation of tāmisra used by Mainkar (Gaudapādabhāṣya (1972)), Jha (Tattvakaumudi (2004)), and Larson (1979).

38 suḥṛtpṛāpti is generally interpreted by the commentators as ‘attainment from friends’, but the TK explicitly interprets the compound as ‘acquisition of friends’ (see §IV.9, n. 521).
attainment (SK 51d). The nature of this relationship between the categories of the
pratyayasarga will be considered in §IV.9-10.

Aside from this information, no further explanation of the nature of these
categories of the pratyayasarga, or of their connection with the bhāvas, is given in
the SK itself, and the views of the commentators vary in this respect (see §IV.9-10).
However, it is clear from the SK that both the bhāva of jñāna and the siddhi category
of the pratyayasarga are related to the process of the production of knowledge.
Moreover, the condition of jñāna is specifically connected to the production of
Sāṃkhya knowledge, which leads to liberation. It will be shown below (§IV.10) that
the YD links the concepts of jñāna and siddhi to each other and to the figure of
Kapila.
CHAPTER III: Literature Review.

From the late nineteenth century to the present, a great deal has been written on Śāṁkhyā, particularly with regard to the early history of its development. The present study is concerned primarily with an interpretative rather than historical problem: the YD’s understanding of the nature of the ṛṣi Kapila, and of the role of his knowledge in the Śāṁkhyā system. The study will also consider the place of the YD’s understanding of these issues in relation to the views presented in the other classical commentaries on the SK (§V.5). The historical focus of this study is thus upon the classical period of Śāṁkhyā, rather than on the early development of the school.

LARSON (1979) aptly summarises the contributions of Śāṁkhyā scholarship prior to the publication of the first edition of his work in 1969: ‘Unfortunately, the great strides achieved in sorting out some of the complicated problems in the history of Śāṁkhyā have not been matched on the side of the interpretation of the meaning of classical Śāṁkhyā.’39 Partly as a consequence of this, the present review will be limited mainly to more recent publications.40

Another issue affecting the choice of material for review here is the fact that the text upon which this study is focused has only relatively recently been discovered. The YD was first edited, on the basis of a single manuscript, by Pulinbehari Chakravarti in 1938.41 By the time of the publication of the critical edition by Albrecht Wezler and Shujun Motegi in 1998, which makes use of five

39 LARSON (1979), p. 73.
40 For a review of earlier literature on Śāṁkhyā, from GARBE (1897) to BHATTACHARYA, K.C. (1956), see LARSON (1979), pp. 15-74.
41 Wezler and Motegi, YD, p. IX.
manuscripts, the YD had come to be considered ‘the most important text for understanding the details of the Sāṃkhya system’. Nevertheless, extended studies focused on the YD have so far been very few. In particular, the YD’s apparent understanding of the process of the formulation and transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge deserves a full treatment, though several publications have touched on these issues in passing.

The following review will include not only publications dealing with the YD itself, but also relevant contributions to our understanding of the presentation of Kapila in Sāṃkhya more generally, particularly with regard to the classical commentators’ understanding of the nature and importance of Kapila’s original formulation of Sāṃkhya knowledge. Attention will be given to the treatment of issues related to this problem, including the role of authoritative testimony (āptavacana), the position of the Lord (īśvara) in Sāṃkhya, and the relationship between the intellectual conditions (bhāva) and the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga). One of the aims of the present study is to bring these various contributions together in one place.

Chakrabarti (1975) was one of the first scholars to deal with the YD in depth, and his work remains one of the most satisfactory treatments of the evidence of the YD with regard to many of the major interpretative problems of classical Sāṃkhya doctrine.

42 See YD, pp. XII-XVII.
44 I prefer to translate īśvara as ‘the Lord’ rather than ‘God’ (as Bronkhorst (1983), for instance) for two reasons: 1. ‘God’ has connotations (in the Judeo-Christian context) inappropriate to the Sāṃkhya conception of īśvara, who, although a sort of ‘supreme being’, is uninvolved in the creation of the world; 2. īśvara literally means ‘powerful’ or ‘masterful’ and as an adjective can refer to any powerful individual or ‘lord’ in the sense of ‘sovereign’.
A large portion of Chakrvarti’s publication\(^46\) deals with the origin and early development of Sāṃkhya, in which he makes extensive use of the evidence of the YD with regard to pre-classical Sāṃkhya texts and teachers. He also presents an overview of the major classical and post-classical Sāṃkhya texts\(^47\) and an interpretative analysis of classical Sāṃkhya doctrine,\(^48\) which makes particular use of the detailed discussions found in the YD.

Chakrvarti characterises the YD as a ‘unique commentary’ and the style of the commentator as ‘archaic and highly polemical’.\(^49\) He observes that ‘the main intention of the author was to refute the arguments of the opponents and thereby to establish the validity of the Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa’.\(^50\) The implications of the YD-kāra’s view of the SK will be considered further in §V.2 of the present study. Chakrvarti also notes that ‘our author was not only a philosopher but also a grammarian’.\(^51\) The apparent influences of the grammarian tradition upon the YD-kāra will also be discussed in more detail in §V.2.

In the course of his treatment of Sāṃkhya doctrine, Chakrvarti outlines the YD’s interpretation of the SK’s classification of the conditions (bhāva) into sāṃsiddhika, prākṛtika, and vaikṛta (see §II.5, §IV.8).\(^52\) With regard to the YD’s attribution of innate knowledge (sāṃsiddhika jñāna) to Kapila,\(^53\) he interprets the evidence of the text to mean that ‘in the revered sage, there lies the highest degree of sattva. Thus owing to the absence of rajas and tamas there is no obstruction in him, and knowledge reveals itself automatically.’\(^54\) This is contrasted to the prākṛtika

---

\(^{46}\) Chakrvarti (1975), pp. 1-155.
\(^{47}\) Ibid., pp. 155-171.
\(^{48}\) Ibid., pp. 171-325.
\(^{49}\) Ibid., p. 160.
\(^{50}\) Ibid., p. 150.
\(^{51}\) Ibid., p. 161.
\(^{52}\) Ibid., pp. 183-185.
\(^{53}\) See n. 460 (§IV.8).
\(^{54}\) Chakrvarti (1975), p. 184.
variety of the *bhāvas*, which ‘are those which exist potentially in the substratum, but reveal very quickly whenever there is an external stimulus’.\(^{55}\) In the cases of both *sāmsiddhika* and *prākṛtika bhāvas*, ‘the influx comes directly from the *prakṛti*.\(^{56}\) In the case of *vaikṛta bhāvas*, ‘ordinary individuals with predominance of *tamas* strive to dispel the inertia of the *buddhi* by dint of their own effort and thus *sattva* begins to flow by slow degrees’,\(^{57}\) in which case ‘the flow of *sattva* comes directly from the *buddhi*’\(^{58}\) rather than from *prakṛti*. The *YD-kāra*’s interpretation of the varieties of the *bhāvas* will be used in §IV.8 to support a new translation of these varieties as ‘innate’ (*sāmsiddhika*), ‘deriving from primordial Materiality’ (*prākṛtika*), and ‘deriving from the products’ (*vaikṛta*). The interpretative implications of the ascription of Kapila’s *jñāna* to an unimpeded flow of *sattva* from *prakṛti* will be considered further in *Chapter V*.

With regard to the relationship between the *bhāvas* and the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*; see §II.5), *Chakravarti* recognises that the *YD* presents the *pratyayasarga* as the result (*phala*) of the manifest (*vyakta*), the form (*rūpa*) and function (*pravṛtti*) of which are identified with the principles (*tattva*) and the conditions (*bhāva*) respectively.\(^{59}\) In other words, as *Chakravarti* is the first scholar to note,\(^{60}\) the evidence of the *YD* suggests that the *bhāvas* and the *pratyayasarga* are not alternative explanations of the same theory, but rather that the categories of the *pratyayasarga* represent the phenomenal results of the activity of the *tattvas* as described by the *bhāvas*. However, the present study will argue, in §IV.10, that further evidence found in the *YD* complicates this relationship between

\(^{55}\) Ibid., p. 184.  
\(^{56}\) Ibid., p. 184.  
\(^{57}\) Ibid., p. 185.  
\(^{58}\) Ibid., p. 185.  
\(^{59}\) Ibid., p. 302; see n. 545 (§IV.10).  
\(^{60}\) *Chakravarti* (1975, pp. 302-303) mentions the earlier view of *Keith* (1949, pp. 96-97), who suggests that the verses of the *SK* dealing with the *pratyayasarga* were ‘a later interpolation’.  

35
the bhāvas and the prayāyasarga, insofar as the categories of the prayāyasarga have the capacity to generate new bhāvas, and that the two paradigms thus represent two mutually determinative planes of experience. In the light of this evidence, CHAKRAVARTI’s assumption that the bhāva of jñāna gives rise to siddhi cannot be supported.

CHAKRAVARTI treats the epistemological notion of authoritative testimony (āptavacana) in a single paragraph, offering a general summary of the commentators’ classification of the sources of āptavacana. He does not consider the relation of this concept to the process of the transmission of Śāmkhya doctrine, which will form a major focus of the present study (§IV.3, V.1-2).

With regard to the nature and origin ascribed to Kapila in Śāmkhya texts, CHAKRAVARTI notes that VBh 1.25 identifies Kapila with the Lord (īśvara), who assumes a transformation-mind (nirmāṇacitta) in order to transmit Śāmkhya doctrine to Āsuri. CHAKRAVARTI perhaps takes the implications of this passage too far when he writes: ‘It shows that the teacher assumed a form by dint of his supernatural power and appeared before Āsuri to impart to him the knowledge of Śāmkhya. This shows that Kapila had no physical body and thus he cannot be regarded as an historical person.’ Regardless of whether or not the figure of Kapila actually originated with an historical person, which seems unlikely but would be very difficult to determine with any certainty, he was at least regarded within the tradition as having had a physical human body, despite his supernatural origins. In fact, the YD states that his innate knowledge arose at the same time as the production

61 CHAKRAVARTI (1975), p. 307: ‘And finally it is wisdom which exclusively gives rise to achievement.’
62 Ibid., p. 196; see §IV.3.
63 Ibid., p. 67; see n. 675 (§V.3). CHAKRAVARTI (pp. 84-85) points out the similarity of the concept of nirmāṇacitta to the Buddhist concept of nirmānakāya (‘transformation-body’).
64 Ibid., p. 111.
65 Cf. the reviews of BRONKHORST (2007) and JACOBSEN (2008) below.
of his physical body and intellectual apparatus. Chakravarti is justified, however, in his observation that Kapila’s appearances in the Śaṃkhya texts and other sources all ‘clearly point to his mythological origin’. In his discussion of the nature and origin of Kapila and his relation to other mythological personalities, Chakravarti focuses on the evidence of the YD in particular.

Chakravarti notes that the term māhātmyaśarīra (‘body of greatness’), occurring in the YD, ‘is not found in any other available text of Śaṃkhya’.

He takes the term to refer to an entire category of mythological beings: ‘The term speaks of those divine personalities who by dint of their strong power of will can give rise to various forms of creations. Brahman, or Hiraṇyagarbha, Maheśvara and such other divine beings fall under this category.’ He observes that of such beings, ‘Brahman is held to be the foremost’.

However, the term māhātmyaśarīra does not occur in the plural in the text, and the present study will argue, in § V.3, that it refers to Brahmā alone, as the initiator of the process of the physical manifestation of beings.

Chakravarti observes that Kapila is put on a cosmological par with Brahmā (and, according to Chakravarti, other māhātmyaśarīras), insofar as they both ‘emerge into existence at the beginning of each cycle of creation’, their bodies being produced directly from prakṛti, but that Kapila is in fact ‘the first personality who immerses [sic] into existence at the beginning of creation’ and is ‘distinguished from the rest by the fact that his activity proceeds from an abnormal flow of sattva, while in the case of the māhātmyaśarīra group, both sattva and rajas

---

66 See n. 458, 460 (§ IV.8).
68 Ibid., p. 222.
69 Ibid., p. 222.
70 Ibid., p. 224.
71 Ibid., p. 222.
72 Ibid., pp. 225, 279.
73 Ibid., p. 225.
become equally dominant’. With regard to the apparent reasons behind the production of such figures out of prakṛti, CHAKRAVARTI writes:

The individuals of this order of creation are not born to enjoy the fruits of their previous activities. They are said to possess perfect wisdom, and so the potentiality of their activities is completely destroyed. Of these, some are born with an impersonal disinterested mission of their own in order to render selfless service to the individual selves that would come later on. The case of the revered sage Kapila may be furnished here as an illustration.

CHAKRAVARTI contrasts this ‘mission’ of Kapila with the roles of other divine figures, such as Brahmā, who is ‘vested with the lordship of the universe’, and Maheśvara (Śiva), who is ‘associated with destruction’. The unique soteriological purpose behind Kapila’s embodiment, and its relation to the YD-kāra’s view of the initiation and maintenance of the Sāṃkhya tradition, will be discussed further in CHAPTER V of the present study.

The work of Erich Frauwallner contributed largely to our understanding of the early history of Sāṃkhya. Like CHAKRAVARTI (1975), Frauwallner made extensive use of the evidence found in the YD with regard to early Sāṃkhya teachers and texts. For a review of this contribution as a whole, see LARSON (1979). In the context of the present interpretative study of the YD, a few remarks will suffice.

Concerning the role of authoritative testimony (āptavacana) in the classical Sāṃkhya system, FRAUWALLNER (1973) says, ‘The acceptance of trustworthy communication which includes the holy tradition is a later concession to a growing Brāhmaṇa orthodoxy and is for the system practically unimportant.’ While FRAUWALLNER’s observation is partly valid, the present study will highlight, in

---

74 Ibid., p. 225.
75 Ibid., pp. 282-283.
76 Ibid., p. 283.
77 LARSON (1979), pp. 48-52.
§V.1-2, the attempts by the author of the YD to reconcile Sāṃkhya doctrine with the Vedas and to make room in the notion of authoritative testimony for the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine.

With regard to the relationship between the Sāṃkhya paradigms of the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga) and the conditions (bhāva) (see §II.5), FRAUWALLNER takes the pratyayasarga to be the older doctrine, attributing it, as part of the Śaṣṭitānta, to the Sāṃkhya teacher Vṛṣaṇa.\(^{80}\) He observes that the doctrine of the bhāvas ‘seeks to solve the same questions and takes the same place in the system as the theory of the fifty ideas’ but ‘represents a more advanced stage of development than the theory of fifty ideas’.\(^{81}\) Further, he suggests that the bhāvas were introduced due to the influence of the Vaiṣeṣika school.\(^{82}\) He claims that the relationship between the two doctrines is never adequately explained by the commentaries on the SK: ‘The relation between the two theories remains naturally confused and unclear and the explanations which the commentaries give for their juxtaposition are unsatisfactory and forced.’\(^{83}\) The present work, however, will demonstrate that a clear understanding of the relationship between the two paradigms can be reconstructed from the evidence in the YD (§IV.10).

FRAUWALLNER observes that the doctrines of Vṛṣaṇa tend to use a ‘sectarian terminology’ and to be presented in ‘a drapery of myths’,\(^{84}\) which is apparent in a passage quoted in the YD which relates the categories of the

---

\(^{80}\) Ibid., p. 252. For a discussion of the issues surrounding the possible authorship and date of the Śaṣṭitānta, as well as the question as to whether the term refers to a single text or group of texts, or just a general framework for the discussion of Sāṃkhya, see LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), pp. 125-128.

\(^{81}\) Ibid., p. 268.

\(^{82}\) Ibid., pp. 270-271.

\(^{83}\) Ibid., p. 269.

\(^{84}\) Ibid., p. 260.
pratyayasarga to a series of four ‘streams’ (srotas) produced by Brahmā. The extent to which the YD represents a continuation of this mythological orientation, particularly with regard to the role of deities in relation to the soteriological function of Materiality (prakṛti), will be considered in §V.3-4. One instance in which this orientation is apparent, for example, is the YD’s statement, also noted by FRAUWALLNER, that both Brahmā and Kapila were born directly from primordial Materiality (pradhāna). FRAUWALLNER’s work is thus useful, above all, when considering the relation of the YD’s views on these matters to previous Sāṃkhya thought.

MISHRA (1961) offers a novel interpretation of the SK’s classification of the objects of Sāṃkhya’s three accepted means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) and suggests that the classical commentators misinterpreted Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s intention in this regard. MISHRA’s interpretation hinges largely on the argument that Īśvarakṛṣṇa would only have included the means of knowledge necessary for establishing the three major categories—the manifest (vyakta), the unmanifest (avyakta) and the knower (jña) (i.e., puruṣa)—laid out in SK 2 as the objects of the Sāṃkhya inquiry (see §II.3, IV.5). He thus suggests that Īśvarakṛṣṇa included perception (drṣṭa) as a means of establishing the manifest, inference (anumāna) as a means of establishing the unmanifest, and authoritative testimony (āptavacana) as a means of establishing

---

85 Ibid., p. 260-261. For a more detailed analysis of this passage (YD on SK 46ab, p.239, ll. 11-18), see the review of OBERHAMMER (1961) below.
86 Ibid., p. 285.
87 śarīrāṃ pradhānānugrahād yathā paramārṣer viriñcasya ca (YD ad SK 39ab, p. 228, ll. 12-13).
89 I.e., perception (drṣṭa), inference (anumāna), and authoritative testimony (āptavacana) (SK 4); see §II.4.
90 MISHRA (1961), pp. 412-413.
Consciousness.\textsuperscript{91} In connection with this classification, \textsc{Mishra} suggests a reinterpretation of SK 6\textsuperscript{92}. While the commentators take the term \textit{sāmānyato drṣṭa} as a particular type of inference, \textsc{Mishra} takes the phrase \textit{sāmānyatas tu drṣṭād} in this verse to mean that ‘the obvious, ordinary categories recognized by the system are cognized by \textit{drṣṭa}’.\textsuperscript{93} According to \textsc{Mishra}, the verse can thus be read as a correlation between the three Sāṃkhya ontological categories and their respective \textit{pramāṇas}.

Of particular relevance in the context of the present study is \textsc{Mishra}’s reinterpretation of the original significance of authoritative testimony (\textit{āptavacana}) in Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s system. It is true that the commentators usually mention objects peripheral to the concerns of Sāṃkhya (heaven, apsarases, etc.) as the objects of the \textit{pramāṇa} of authoritative testimony (see §IV.3), as \textsc{Mishra} illustrates with a discussion of the interpretations of the GBh, JM and TK.\textsuperscript{94} (\textsc{Mishra} also notes that the SVS translated by Paramārtha and the \textit{Sāṃkhyaśāstra} (ca. 1680-1720 C.E.)\textsuperscript{95} agree with the TK’s explanation.\textsuperscript{96}) However, it should be kept in mind that the possibility of rebirth in the realms of gods (\textit{deva}) and other divine beings, through the cultivation of the condition of merit (\textit{dharma}), is an integral part of the Sāṃkhya discussion (see §IV.6). Perhaps \textsc{Mishra} is thus too hasty to dismiss these commentorial references as departures from Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s intentions. Although his hypothesis is nevertheless somewhat attractive, since it might explain the apparent lack of conformity among the commentators in this regard, it does little, in the

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., pp. 411-413.
\textsuperscript{92} \textit{sāmānyatas tu drṣṭād atīndriyāṇām prasiddhir anumānāt / tasmād api cāsiddhaṃ parokṣam āptāgamāt siddham //} (SK 6).
\textsuperscript{93} \textsc{Mishra} (1961), pp. 411.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., pp. 406-410.
\textsuperscript{95} \textsc{Larson and Bhattacharya} (1987), p. 16.
\textsuperscript{96} \textsc{Mishra} (1961), p. 410.
context of the present study, to help our understanding of the YD’s rather complex attitude towards the significance of āptavacana.

OBERHAMMER (1961)\textsuperscript{97} identifies eleven prose quotations appearing in the YD, which the author of the YD attributes simply to a śāstra.\textsuperscript{98} Based on the similarity in terminology and content in these passages, among other factors, OBERHAMMER concludes that they all belong to the same text.\textsuperscript{99} OBERHAMMER identifies this śāstra as the Śaṣṭitantra,\textsuperscript{100} which, following FRAUWALLNER (1973), he attributes to the Śāṁkhya teacher Vṛṣagaṇa,\textsuperscript{101} who is also often explicitly quoted in the YD, ‘though he is not mentioned as the author of the śāstra’.\textsuperscript{102} OBERHAMMER focuses on the analysis of one of these fragments\textsuperscript{103} and a comparison of this text to several related passages in the Mahābhārata (MBh) and various Purāṇas,\textsuperscript{104} ‘in order to show the interlacing which connects this text with the past and the contemporary Purāṇic literature’.\textsuperscript{105} In this respect, OBERHAMMER takes

---


\textsuperscript{98} OBERHAMMER (1961), pp. 165-170.

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., pp. 133-134.

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., pp. 135-138.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid, p. 131.

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., p. 135.

\textsuperscript{103} mahadādīviśeṣāntaḥ sargo buddhiśvākavatvāt / utpannakāryakaraṇas tu māhāmyaśārīra ekākinam âmānam avekṣyābhidhāhyau hantāham putrān srukṣye ye me karma karisyanti / ye mām paraṇa ca jñāyaṇaḥ / tasyābhidhāhyataḥ pañca mukhyasvādatos devāḥ prādurbhāvāḥ / tesiṭapnaneṣu na tuṣṭim lebbe / tato ‘nye tīryaksrotas ātāvīṃsatiḥ prajājne / teṣy aṣya asya matir naiva tathā, aṭhāpārena vordhavasvādatos devāḥ prādurbhāvāḥ / teṣy aṣya utpanneṣu naiva kṛtāḥtum ātmānam mene / tato ‘nye śāv arvāksrotasa utpeduḥ / (YD on SK 46ab, p.239, ll. 11-18). OBERHAMMER (1961, pp. 139, 168-169) quotes from Chakravarti’s earlier (1938, p. 152, ll. 11-18) edition of the text, which contains only slight variations. OBERHAMMER (p. 168, n. 2) suggests that the first line should be read ‘mahadādīviśeṣāntaḥ (tattvasargaḥ, prayāya)sargo buddhiśvākavatvāt / ’; he thus reads the line (in its hypothetical original context in the Śaṣṭitantra) as a transition from a discussion of the tattvas to a discussion of the prayāyasarga (p. 164).

\textsuperscript{104} MBh 12.310.16-25 (Critical Ed.: 12.298.16-25), 14.35.47 – 14.38.13 (Critical Ed.: 14.35.37 – 14.38.13), 14.39.6-8, 12.314.3-5 (Critical Ed.: 12.302.3-4); Mārkandeyapurāṇa 47.14-36; Viṣṇupurāṇa 1.5.3-26; Padmapurāṇa 5.3.52-75; Vāyupurāṇa 6.35-69; Īrīmapurāṇa 7.1-18; Agnipurāṇa 20.1-6; Bhogavatapurāṇa 3.10.13-28 (OBERHAMMER (1961), pp. 140-165).

\textsuperscript{105} OBERHAMMER (1961), p. 163.
up the reconstruction of Sāṃkhya’s early development in the manner initiated by Frauwallner (1973).\textsuperscript{106}

The fragment which forms the focus of Oberhammer’s study relates the categories of the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga) to a series of four ‘streams’ (srotas) produced by the meditation of a māhātmyaśarīra (‘body of greatness’),\textsuperscript{107} whom the author of the YD takes to be Brahmā.\textsuperscript{108} In the MBh three of the four streams found in the śāstra fragment occur as part of a series of nine creations, which are not yet connected with the meditation of Brahmā or the māhātmyaśarīra.\textsuperscript{109} Oberhammer concludes that the srotas doctrine found in the MBh was taken up by Vṛṣaṇa in the Saṣṭitantra, in which he connected the srotases with his classification of the fifty categories of the pratyayasarga into four groups (viparyaya, aśakti, tuṣṭi, siddhi) (see §II.5). Oberhammer also suggests that Vṛṣaṇa ‘might have introduced into the series of creations also the anugrahasarga’,\textsuperscript{110} a particular creation found in some Purāṇas but absent from the SK.\textsuperscript{111} ‘On account of the great renown of the Saṣṭitantra’, Oberhammer says, this version of the series of creations and the srotas doctrine was introduced into the Purāṇas.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., p. 132: ‘Erich Frauwallner was the first to sketch tentatively a history of the old Sāṃkhya starting from an epic text.’
\textsuperscript{107} On the interpretation of this term, see Chakravarti (1975), Bronkhorst (1983) and further discussion in §V.3.
\textsuperscript{108} evaṃ tasmād brahmaṇo bhidhyānād utpannaḥ, tasmāt pratyayasargagah / (YD on SK 46ab, p. 239, ll.18-19).
\textsuperscript{109} ūrdhvam srotas tathā tiryag utpadyati nārādhipa / aṣṭamaṃ sargam ity āhur etad ārjavakam smṛtam //
    tiryaksrotas tv adhaksrota utpadyati nārādhipa /
In the Critical Ed. this passage (12.298.23-24) reads:
    ūrdhvāsrotas tathā tiryag utpadyati nārādhipa /
    aṣṭamaṃ sargam ity āhur etad ārjavakam budhāḥ //
    tiryaksrotas tv adhaksrota utpadyati nārādhipa /
    navamaṃ sargam ity āhur etad ārjavakam budhāḥ //
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., pp. 152-156.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., p. 163.
Aside from this historical analysis, OBERHAMMER makes several interpretative suggestions of relevance to the present study. He suggests that the *viparyaya*, *tuṣṭi*, and possibly *siddhi* categories of the *pratyayasarga* ‘might have been elaborated in circles connected with Yoga’ as ‘meditative existential attitudes’, at the time of the composition of the MBh.\(^{113}\) With respect to *aṣakti*, he cautions that not much can be known with regard to its development.\(^{114}\) Similarly, with regard to the addition to the *srotas* doctrine of the notion that these streams were caused by the meditation of Brahmā, he says that ‘little can be stated for the moment’\(^{115}\) but suggests that this must have occurred after composition of the MBh passage and prior to that of the *Ṣaṣṭitāntra*.\(^{116}\) These points will be taken into account in §IV.9-10 of the present study, which will reconstruct a coherent picture of the YD-kāra’s interpretation of the nature of the *pratyayasarga*. CHAPTER V will discuss further the relation of this paradigm to figures of cosmological prominence and divine authority (*māhātmyaśarīra*, Brahmā, Kapila).

Of particular relevance to the present study of the YD is OBERHAMMER’S view of the relationship between the *pratyayasarga* and the conditions (*bhāva*) of the intellect. Like FRAUWALLNER (1973), OBERHAMMER views the *bhāvas* as having the same basic function as the *pratyayasarga* and as having been introduced into the Sāṃkhya system after the *Ṣaṣṭitāntra*’s exposition of the *pratyayasarga*.\(^{117}\) He further suggests that SK 52\(^{118}\) can be viewed as an attempt by Īśvarakṛṣṇa to replace the *Ṣaṣṭitāntra*’s treatment of the *anugrahasarga* with that of the new doctrine of the

\(^{113}\) Ibid., pp. 162-163.
\(^{114}\) Ibid., p. 148.
\(^{115}\) Ibid., p. 151.
\(^{116}\) Ibid., p. 163.
\(^{117}\) Ibid., p. 155.
\(^{118}\) *na vinā bhāvair liṅgaṁ na vinā liṅgena bhāvasamsiddhiḥ/
    liṅgākhya bhāvākhyas tasmād dvividhaḥ pravartate sargah //* (SK 52)
bhāvas.\textsuperscript{119} With regard to the evidence in the YD concerning the relationship between the production of the bhāvas and that of the pratyayasarga, OBERHAMMER notes that the processes of the ‘inflow’ of both are described in a similar manner:

[W]e can suppose that the Pratyaya-s are, like the Bhāva-s, innate, i.e. conditioned by Karma, and thus condition the historical existence of beings. On the other hand, they are acquired as ‘habitus’, and thus they lead to salvation.\textsuperscript{120}

OBERHAMMER rightly observes that, according to the YD, the bhāvas partly determine phenomenal experience and are partly determined by it. However, as will be shown in §IV.10, a more precise picture of the relationship between the bhāvas and the pratyayasarga can be reconstructed on the basis of the evidence in the YD, according to which they represent two mutually determinative planes of experience.

OBERHAMMER (2007)\textsuperscript{121} deals mainly with the role of the Lord (īśvara) in the texts of the Yoga school but also touches on the YD’s portrayal of Kapila. OBERHAMMER notes the fact that the Vyāsabhāṣya (VBh) on Yogasūtra (YS) 1.25\textsuperscript{122} refers to Kapila as an incarnation of īśvara.\textsuperscript{123} He compares this to the YD’s presentation of Kapila as consisting entirely of the constituent quality of goodness (sattva),\textsuperscript{124} suggesting that the Yoga school’s view of the nature of īśvara was influenced by the Sāṃkhya system in this regard.\textsuperscript{125} The present study will consider the relationship between īśvara and Kapila in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts in more detail (§V.3-5).

\begin{footnotes}
\item[119] OBERHAMMER (1961), p. 154-156.
\item[120] Ibid., p. 140, n. 1.
\item[122] See n. 675 (§V.3).
\item[124] See n. 695 (§V.3).
\item[125] OBERHAMMER (2007), p. 69-70.
\end{footnotes}
KENGHE (1968) examines the place of the *pratyayasarga* in the classical Sāṃkhya system and the points of connection between the categories of the *pratyayasarga* (see §II.5) and the doctrines of the Yoga school as laid out in the YS and VBh. Throughout this discussion, KENGHE relies heavily on the YD, which tends to provide clearer or more satisfactory explanations of the categories of the *pratyayasarga* than do the other commentaries.

KENGHE demonstrates the relation of the five categories of error (*viparyaya*) in the *pratyayasarga* to the five ‗afflictions‘ (*kleśa*) in Yoga (YS 2.3). He compares the notion of contentment (*tuṣṭi*) as explained by the YD to the ‗state of not having attained a stage [of Yoga]‘ (*alabdhabhūmikatva*), which is mentioned in YS 1.30 as one of nine ‗distractions of thought‘ (*cittavikṣepa*). He further compares the first variety of *tuṣṭi*, called *prakṛti*, to the notion of *prakṛtilaya* (see §IV.6) as it occurs in YS 1.19. With regard to the categories of attainment (*siddhi*) in the *pratyayasarga*, KENGHE notes that the term *siddhi* ‗has got a very much different significance in the Sāṃkhya than in the Yoga‘ and that the *siddhis* of the Yoga school are included in the Sāṃkhya texts as forms of *aiśvarya* (‗lordliness‘; see §IV.6).

KENGHE’s article shows that many of the categories of the *pratyayasarga* can be thought of (especially in the light of the YD) in terms of stages of mental development in the practice of yoga and hindrances to that development. This apparent connection to yogic practice can be compared to OBERHAMMER (1961)’s suggestion that these categories originated as ‗meditative existential attitudes‘ in

---

128 Ibid., p. 369.
129 Ibid., p. 369.
130 Ibid., p. 373.
‘circles connected with Yoga’\textsuperscript{131} (see above). The extent to which the YD accepts yogic practice as conducive to the attainment of Śāṃkhya knowledge and consequent liberation will be considered in more detail in §V.3-4.

KENGHE touches on another aspect of the YD’s presentation of the \textit{pratyayasarga} of particular relevance to the present study. Like CHAKRAVARTI (1975), he observes that the YD presents the \textit{pratyayasarga} as the result (\textit{phala}) of the manifest (\textit{vyakta}), the form (\textit{rūpa}) and function (\textit{pravṛtti}) of which are identified with the principles (\textit{tattva}) and the conditions (\textit{bhāva}) respectively.\textsuperscript{132} An understanding of the interpretative implications of this view of the relationship between the \textit{bhāvas} and the \textit{pratyayasarga} (see §IV.10) will be shown in §V.1-2 to be key to understanding the YD’s view of the process of the production and transmission of liberating knowledge.

LARSON (1979)\textsuperscript{133} represents the first comprehensive interpretative study of classical Śāṃkhya. LARSON presents both an overview of the historical development of the Śāṃkhya system, drawing heavily on the work of earlier Śāṃkhya scholars, and a holistic interpretation of the classical Śāṃkhya system as embodied in the SK and its commentaries. In the course of this interpretation, LARSON makes occasional references to the YD but does not make full use of its evidence with regard to the major interpretative problems of classical Śāṃkhya.\textsuperscript{134} He was familiar enough with

\begin{footnotes}
\item[131] OBERHAMMER (1961), pp. 162-163.
\item[132] KENGHE (1968), p. 366, alluding to the following passage: \textit{evam esa tattvasargo bhāvasargaś ca vyākhyātah / etac ca vyaktaś ca rūpaś ca pravṛttiś ca parikalpyate / phalam idānīṃ vakṣyāmaḥ} // (YD on SK 45d, p. 237, ll. 26-27).
\item[133] LARSON, G.J. (1979). \textit{Classical Śāṃkhya}. Delhi (2\textsuperscript{nd} revised edition; 1\textsuperscript{st} edition, 1969).
\item[134] This is apparent, for instance, in his treatment of Śāṃkhya epistemology, as HARZER (2006, p. 21) observes: ‘Larson did not refer to works which deal with inference in the Śāṅkhyā tradition. He occasionally mentioned the \textit{Yuktidīpikā}, he still did not point out that epistemology and logic are treated here more exhaustively than elsewhere.’
\end{footnotes}
the text to recognise the apparent grammatical leanings of the YD-kāra, but his assessment of the value of the YD with regard to interpretative issues seems ill-judged:

[T]his work is valuable historically in that it offers some information regarding other teachers and schools. Generally, however, the text is quite confusing and problematic. It does contain a number of polemics against various kinds of Buddhism, and may prove valuable as a source for further knowledge concerning various schools or traditions of Buddhism. As a source for understanding the difficult points of Śaṅkhya doctrine, however, it takes one little further than the other commentaries.

Granted that the YD tends to be confusing, perhaps even contradictory at points, the present study will demonstrate that a consideration of the text’s evidence allows for the resolution of several major interpretative problems only touched upon by the other classical commentaries.

With regard to the relationship between the conditions (bhāva) and the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga), LARSON anticipates the interpretation he later develops in LARSON (1984) and LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987) (see below):

It could be the case that the eight bhāvas and the fifty bhāvas or components represent two dimensions or two aspects of the same phenomenon. Whereas the eight bhāvas are the deeper, causal predispositions that determine the future of the liṅga, the fifty bhāvas or components may be the phenomenal, manifest effects of the deeper causal predispositions in one’s present life.

While this interpretation is partially apt, the present study will argue that the evidence of the YD further clarifies the nature of this relationship (§IV.10). Similarly, LARSON’s neglect of the YD leads him to overlook the fact that this text holds the Lord (īśvara) to be a particular Consciousness (puruṣa), mentioning only that ‘the classical Śaṅkhya recognizes no conscious Absolute or Creator God. To be sure, the gods may exist, but they too are simply products of the interaction of

---

135 LARSON (1979, p. 281) observes that ‘one has the impression that the author of the Yuktidīpikā was a grammarian rather than a philosopher since many passages of the text deal with the analysis of Sanskrit compounds together with references to Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya.’
136 LARSON (1979), pp. 149-150.
137 Ibid., p. 194.
138 See §V.3 and the review of BRONKHORST (1983) below.
unconscious *mūlaprakṛti* and the conscious *puruṣa*.\textsuperscript{139} With regard to the epistemological notion of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*), \textsc{Larson} notes only that this ‘is probably used primarily with respect to the tradition of Śaṅkhya teachers’.\textsuperscript{140}

\textsc{Wezler} (1970)\textsuperscript{141} examines a passage of the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* that refers to the fact that the ‘supporters of Kapila’ worship God in the form of the ‘accomplished first knower’ (*ādividvān siddhaḥ*).\textsuperscript{142} \textsc{Wezler} argues that this phrase refers to Kapila, observing that ‘the deification of Kapila, adequately testified in epic and purānic sources, was also a prevalent mythological view of the Śaṅkhya authors’.\textsuperscript{143} He also notes that both the VBh and the TK refer to Kapila as ‘the first knower’ (*ādividvas*)\textsuperscript{144} and suggests that the VBh passage served as the source of the application of the term *ādividvas* to Kapila.\textsuperscript{145} He recognises that the MV views Kapila as an incarnation of Viṣṇu\textsuperscript{146} and suggests that while Kapila had occasionally been identified with Viṣṇu since the time of the MBh, the Śaṅkhya acceptance of this view must have been due to the influence of the Vaiṣṇavas upon the school.\textsuperscript{147} The significance of these references in the Śaṅkhya and Yoga texts will be considered further in §V.3-5 of the present study.

\textsuperscript{139} \textsc{Larson} (1979), p. 198.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., p. 159.
\textsuperscript{142} \textsc{Wezler} (1970), p. 256.
\textsuperscript{143} ‘die in epischen und puranischen Quellen hinlänglich bezeugte Deifizerung Kapila’s auch geltende mythologische Anschauung der Śaṅkhya-Autoren war’ (\textsc{Wezler} (1970), p. 257).
\textsuperscript{144} See n. 675 (§V.3) and nn. 805, 806 (§V.5).
\textsuperscript{145} \textsc{Wezler} (1970), p. 259-260.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., p. 258.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., p. 262.
SOLOMON (1974)\textsuperscript{148} compares the GBh, MV, SVS, SV, and SSV in detail and argues that they all stem from the same text, which she tentatively suggests to be SV: ‘[M]y feeling is that it is the earliest of the commentaries and has the fairest claim to being regarded as the original of the Chinese Version of Paramārtha.’\textsuperscript{149} She observes that in comparison to these five commentaries, the other classical Sāṃkhya commentaries (YD, JM, and TK) ‘do not bear much affinity to the former in point of thought or expression’\textsuperscript{150} In the course of the present study, the lack of connection between the YD and these other texts, with regard to several major interpretative issues, will become apparent.

On the basis of an examination of passages from a variety of texts, mainly from outside of the Sāṃkhya and Pātañjalayoga traditions, BRONKHORST (1981)\textsuperscript{151} argues that ‘until a rather late date “Yoga” and seśvara sāṃkhya did not refer to Patañjali’s philosophy’.\textsuperscript{152} Rather, BRONKHORST suggests, the term yoga in early texts often refers to ‘Nyāya and/or Vaiśeṣika’,\textsuperscript{153} and ‘came to be applied to one form of the Sāṃkhya philosophy owing to Śaṅkara’s incorrect understanding of some Brahmasūtras’.\textsuperscript{154} BRONKHORST notes that the Tattvasaṅgraha and its commentary Pañjika (‘both dating from the 8th century A.D.’\textsuperscript{155}) make a distinction between nirīśvara (‘without the Lord’) and seśvara (‘with the Lord’) Sāṃkhya, and suggests that their definition of seśvara Sāṃkhya corresponds to the Pañcarātra system,\textsuperscript{156} while both Pātañjalayoga and the Sāṃkhya of the commentaries on the SK ‘should

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., p. 1.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid. (1981), p. 309.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., p. 309.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., p. 317.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., p. 315.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., pp. 315-316.
be deemed nirśvara sāṃkhya “Sāṃkhya without God” in the sense of the Tattvasaṅgraha’. In support of this conclusion, he observes that Patañjali’s system ‘was on a par with the Sāṃkhya of the commentaries on the Sāṃkhya-kārīkā in that it accepted the existence of God, but did not consider Him Creator God’, directing the reader to his following publication, BRONKHORST (1983), for evidence of this view of īśvara in classical Sāṃkhya.158

BRONKHORST (1983)159 provides a comprehensive discussion of the classical Sāṃkhya commentators’ views on the nature of the Lord (īśvara), drawing heavily on the YD in particular. BRONKHORST points out that the YD accepts the existence of īśvara but views him as a particular Consciousness (puruṣa) and therefore passive.160 Moreover, BRONKHORST observes, ‘no Sāṃkhya texts of the first millennium deny God’s existence’, and ‘more often than not they give us the impression that they accept God’s existence as a matter of course, but do not accept His causal agency with respect to the world’.161

BRONKHORST notes that the author of the YD specifies that although īśvara is passive, he does incarnate in various forms, including the ‘body of greatness’ (māhātmyaśarīra), to which the characteristics of Śiva seem to be attributed.162 BRONKHORST argues that the evidence of the YD suggests that Kapila is also considered an incarnation of īśvara, primarily on the basis of the commentator’s use of the term īśvaramahārṣi in describing authoritative individuals (āpta).163 He suggests that īśvaramahārṣi could mean either ‘God and the great seers’ or ‘the great seers who are [incorporations of] God’, and makes a case for the latter interpretation,

157 Ibid., p. 316.
158 Ibid., p. 316.
161 Ibid., p. 155.
162 Ibid., p. 152; see n. 661 (§V.3).
163 Ibid., pp. 152-155; see n. 367 (§IV.3).
arguing that, given the YD’s view of īśvara as passive consciousness, the term īśvara alone cannot refer to an authoritative figure, ‘for pure awareness does not possess authoritativeness or opinions’, while the term īśvara does not refer specifically to the māhātmyaśarīra elsewhere in the YD.  

BRONKHORST assumes that Kapila, as ‘the great seer par excellence’, would be included among ‘the great seers who are [incorporations of] God’.  

He finds support for this interpretation in two passages of the MV, which appear to identify Kapila as an incarnation of īśvara.  

While BRONKHORST’s interpretation is plausible, it implies that other great rṣis than Kapila would also be considered incarnations of īśvara, which would be surprising, given Kapila’s privileged position in the YD’s interpretation of Sāṃkhya cosmology (see §V.3-4).  In §V.3, we will examine the relevant passages in detail and consider two alternatives to BRONKHORST’s interpretation of the term īśvaramaharṣi. It should be kept in mind that the YD does not explicitly refer to Kapila as an incarnation of īśvara. As pointed out by WEZLER (1970) and JACOBSEN (2008), the MV actually views Kapila as an incarnation of Viṣṇu in particular, while this Vaiṣṇava influence is not yet apparent in the YD (see §V.5). Moreover, it is not clear that the YD-kāra identifies the māhātmyaśarīra as Śiva in the passage quoted by BRONKHORST, while elsewhere he refers to the māhātmyaśarīra as Brahmā.  

---

164 Ibid., p. 153.  
165 Ibid., p. 153.  
166 Ibid., pp. 156-157; see nn. 684, 686 (§V.3).  
169 See n. 484 (IV.9) and further discussion in §V.3.
LARSON (1984) offers an interpretation of the YD’s treatment of the paradigm of the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga) and its relationship to the conditions (bhāva) of the intellect. With regard to the approach of previous scholars to this interpretative problem in classical Sāṃkhya, LARSON observes that ‘there has been almost a total lack of comprehension of the structural significance of the pratyayasarga in the Sāṃkhya philosophical scheme of things’. On the basis of the evidence of the YD, LARSON argues (contrary to FRAUWALLNER (1973) and OBERHAMMER (1961), for instance) that the pratyayasarga and the bhāvas are ‘not at all the same thing or alternative explanations of the same thing’. Like CHAKRAVARTI (1975) and KENGHE (1968), LARSON observes that the YD refers to the principles (tattva) as the forms of manifest Materiality, the bhāvas as descriptive of its activity, and the pratyayasarga as the result of this activity. LARSON takes this to mean that the particular bhāvas that come to be associated with an individual’s subtle body during one incarnation determine the configuration of the categories of the pratyayasarga encountered in the next incarnation:

The bhāva-s eschew, distort, and blur experience so that my knowledge is insufficiently discriminatory. At the moment of birth the linga is already disposed to a certain life-trajectory by reason of its past lives, and the particular constellation of viparyaya-s, ašakti-s, tuṣṭi-s, and siddhi-s represents the mediating field through which the organism experiences its present life.

On this basis of this structure, LARSON suggests that the attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge is a progressive process, involving an engagement first with the categories of the pratyayasarga, then an understanding and cultivation of the bhāvas which are ‘conducive to continuing discrimination’, and finally an understanding of

---

172 Ibid., p. 61.
173 Ibid., pp. 63-64; see n. 545 (§IV.10).
174 Ibid., p. 70.
the *tattvas* and discrimination between *purusa* and *prakrti*. This interpretation seems to have become the basis for LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987)’s treatment of the relationship between the *pratyayasarga* and the *bhavas* in Sāmkhya.

In §IV.10, we will examine further evidence in the YD that complicates this picture of the relationship between the *pratyayasarga* and the *bhavas*. An alternative interpretation will be presented, according to which these two paradigms represent two mutually determinative planes of experience. The implications of this relationship with regard to the process of the attainment of Sāmkhya knowledge will be considered in §V.1-2.

POLLOCK (1985) provides an interpretative framework that helps us to understand the apparent assumptions of the author of the YD with regard to the origination and transmission of Sāmkhya knowledge. POLLOCK illustrates the widespread assumption, in the texts of the classical period of Indian *śāstra*, of the primordial existence of valid doctrine. He characterises the initial apprehension and articulation of a body of doctrine by a qualified individual as ‘the necessary commencement of the tradition’. Subsequently, the learning of this *śāstra* ‘serves to enhance the efficacy of the practice’ of which it treats. Such a text is considered the ideal prototype for future treatments of its subject. Tradition thus takes the form of a perpetual appeal to this prototype, which is viewed as the vital substance of a particular system of knowledge.

POLLOCK suggests that this view of the nature of doctrine stems from the notion of the primordial existence of the Vedas:

---

175 Ibid., p. 70.
178 Ibid., p. 507.
The *veda*, the transcendent *śāstra*, subsumes all knowledge. It is itself eternal, infallible, the source of the *caturvarga* and thus the basis of all activity. Secular *śāstra* in general, consequently, as a portion of the corpus […] comes to share the *veda*’s transcendent attributes.¹⁷⁹

As will be shown in §V.1-2, the author of the YD appears to similarly emulate the model of Vedic revelation in his conception of the origination and transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine.

POLLOCK further suggests, on the basis of a passage of the *Carakasamhitā*¹⁸⁰ dealing with the nature of *śāstra* in relation to causality, that this view of the primordial existence of knowledge may be related to the ‘doctrine of the [pre-] existent effect’ (*satkāryavāda*), an important doctrine in the Sāṃkhya system (see §II.1).¹⁸¹ With regard to this possibility, POLLOCK notes:

> The epistemological implications of *satkāryavāda* […] seem never to be clearly expressed in Indian philosophical literature, as far as I can tell. But that need not stop us from supposing they could have operated subliminally in the mythic representation of the transcendent provenance and authority of *śāstra*.¹⁸²

Similarly, in §V.2, I will present the possibility that the notion of *satkāryavāda*, though not explicitly connected with the formulation and transmission of knowledge in the YD, bears an implicit relation to the YD’s conception of Sāṃkhya *śāstra*.

Like Vedic doctrine, the knowledge represented by any *śāstra*, according to POLLOCK, is ‘permanently fixed in its dimensions’,¹⁸³ and therefore, ‘the improvement of any given practice lies, not in the future and the discovery of what has never been known before, but in the past and the more complete recovery of

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 519.
¹⁸⁰ *Carakasamhitā* (100-200 C.E.), a text on medicine (*āyurveda*), is a significant early source of what LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 3-15) call ‘proto-Sāṃkhya’ ideas.
¹⁸² Ibid., p. 517-518.
¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 515.
what was known in full in the past.\textsuperscript{184} With regard to the relationship between the initial articulation of a Śāstra and its future manifestations, POLLOCK explains:

Extant Śāstras, consequently, come to view themselves as either the end-point of a slow process of abridgement from earlier, more complete, and divinely inspired prototypes; or as exact reproductions of the divine prototypes obtained through uncontaminated, unexpurgated descent from the original, whether through faithful intermediaries or by sudden revelation.\textsuperscript{185}

In §V.2, we will consider the applicability of this model to the YD’s conception of the relationship between Kapila’s original formulation of Sāṁkhya doctrine and the attainment of this doctrine by later generations.

LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987)\textsuperscript{186} is a comprehensive study of the history of the Sāṁkhya system and an interpretation of its meaning. It includes summaries of all of the major Sāṁkhya texts, including a summary of the YD\textsuperscript{187} attributed to Dayanand Bhargava, Shiv Kumar, and Raghunatha Sharma.\textsuperscript{188} Bhargava and Kumar would go on to publish their translation of the YD (1990-92),\textsuperscript{189} which, though helpful in deciphering the text’s complex arguments, appears to be somewhat flawed. When Bhargava and Kumar encounter a difficult phrase or passage, they generally present an interpretative summary rather than a literal translation; I have noticed that they seem even to amend the text on at least one occasion, where it was

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{184} Ibid., p. 512.
  \item \textsuperscript{185} Ibid., p. 512.
  \item \textsuperscript{187} LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), pp. 230-269.
  \item \textsuperscript{188} The production of this summary was actually a rather complicated collaborative process: ‘First, Pandit Raghunath Sharma of Sampūrṇānanda Sanskrit University in Varanasi prepared a general summary of the entire text in Sanskrit. Then, V.P. Bhatta, a Sanskrit language consultant at the University of California, Berkeley, prepared a rough English rendering of Sharma’s Sanskrit summary. Next, Dayanand Bhargava and S.K. Sharma put together a lengthy summary of the entire text based upon their forthcoming English translation of the text (to be published by Motilal Banarsidass). In addition, Edeltraud Harzer, a doctoral student at the University of Washington, Seattle, who is preparing a dissertation on Sāṁkhya epistemology, offered a number of helpful comments regarding epistemological issues in the text. Finally, Gerald J. Larson and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya put together the final form of the summary.’ (LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 229.)
  \item \textsuperscript{189} Yuktidipikā (1990-1992). Two volumes. Translated by Dr. Shiv Kumar and Dr. D.N Bhargava. Delhi.
\end{itemize}
impossible to make sense of the passage otherwise.¹⁹⁰ In the summary appearing in LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA, this interpretative liberty is even more apparent.¹⁹¹ Both summary and translation might generally have benefitted from the readings later established by Wezler and Motegi in their critical edition of the text (1998).¹⁹² Although LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA make more use of the YD than many earlier Śāṅkhyā scholars, one suspects that they may have relied too heavily upon the summary by Bhargava, Kumar, and Sharma, which would explain their apparent incomplete understanding and occasional misinterpretations¹⁹³ of the YD.¹⁹⁴

Compared to LARSON (1979) (see above), LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA give a much more favourable assessment of the value of the YD in the interpretation of Śāṅkhyā doctrine: ‘The Yuktidīpikā [...] offers several intriguing interpretations that provide a larger view of the Śāṅkhyā system as a whole, certainly more so than the Kārikā itself and all of its other commentaries.’¹⁹⁵ Perhaps the most significant set of interpretative conclusions drawn from the YD by LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA is their interpretation of the nature of the paradigms of the conditions (bhāva) and the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga) and the relationship between them. Drawing largely upon LARSON (1984)’s interpretation of the evidence of the YD with regard to these paradigms, LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA treat the tattvas as the

¹⁹⁰ See n. 734 (§V.4).
¹⁹¹ FRANCO (1991, pp. 133-136), in the course of his review of LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), points out a number of mistakes in the summary of the YD and (p. 132) suggests that this was due to the complex process of summarisation (see n. 188 above): ‘Obviously, a lot could go wrong on the way. And, unfortunately, a lot did go wrong. The fatal mistake was that while summarizing the summaries Larson and Bhattacharya did not take the trouble to check their own summary with the text again.’
¹⁹³ See, for instance, their interpretation of the YD on SK 43d: n. 475 (§IV.8); and their interpretation of the YD’s opening verses: n. 607 (§V.2).
¹⁹⁴ HARZER (2006, pp. 21-22) gives a similar evaluation of LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987)’s treatment of the YD: ‘In it the Yuktidīpikā receives more of its due. [...] But the virtues of philosophy that the Yuktidīpikā is so rich [sic] are not readily apparent.’ FRANCO (1991, p.134) makes a similar judgment: ‘The YD, as Larson rightly recognizes, contains important information about the early history of Śāṅkhyā. Unfortunately, however, one cannot say that such information was given the attention it deserves.’
‘constitutive dimension’ of the Sāṃkhya system, the bhāvas as the ‘projective dimension’, and the prayāyasarga as the ‘consequent dimension’.\(^\text{196}\) They compare these three dimensions, respectively, to the ‘hardware’ of a computer, the ‘software’, and the ‘printout of the functioning system’.\(^\text{197}\) With regard to the relationship between the condition of knowledge (jñāna, a component of the second ‘dimension’) and the attainments (siddhi, a component of the third ‘dimension’), like Chakravarti (1975), they interpret the evidence of the YD to suggest that ‘the predisposition toward knowledge (jñāna) generates the spiritual attainments (siddhi) conducive to final discrimination and release’.\(^\text{198}\) However, as I will argue in §IV.10, further evidence in the YD linking the concepts of jñāna and siddhi complicates this interpretation of the relationship between the bhāvas and the prayāyasarga. Although their classification of the Sāṃkhya paradigms into ‘three dimensions’ agrees with the evidence of the YD, their suggestion that jñāna generates siddhi is contrary to this evidence.

Larson and Bhattacharya downplay the role of authoritative testimony (āptavacana) in Sāṃkhya,\(^\text{199}\) and they do not discuss the YD’s views on this subject in any detail. Similarly, they do not discuss the YD’s portrayal of Kapila in much detail, but they do observe that Kapila is given a similar status to major deities in the YD:

From one point of view, the divine realm is the realm of the māhātmyaśarīras, Brahmā, Hiraṇyagarbha, Prajāpati, and so forth, who perform specific tasks (adhisthāna) in the cosmos and who are able to generate their own bodies by a simple act of will. From another point of view, the divine realm is the realm of

\(^{196}\) Ibid., p. 64. Larson and Bhattacharya (pp. 54-56; 64-65) also discuss the role of the sources of action (karmayoni) and vital breaths (vāyu) according to the YD and group them with the bhāvas as a part of the ‘projective dimension’ of the manifest.

\(^{197}\) Ibid., p. 65.

\(^{198}\) Ibid., p. 58.

\(^{199}\) Ibid., p. 29: ‘Sāṃkhya had never denied reliable verbal testimony (āptavacana or śruti) as a legitimate and important means of knowing, but Sāṃkhya clearly gave pride of place in knowing to independent reasoning, even in the area of samyagdarśana and adhyātmavidyā (that is to say, in the area of ultimate truth and the science of liberation).’
the great Śaṃkhya precursors, especially Kapila who emerges at the beginning of the world cycle fully endowed with the positive fundamental predispositions of meritorious behaviour, knowledge, renunciation, and power.\(^{200}\)

Although, as will become apparent in §V.3-4, there is reason to believe that the YD’s references to māhātmyaśarīra, Brahmā and Hiranyagarbha all refer to the same figure, LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA do recognize the difference between the respective roles of this figure and Kapila in the YD (see §V.4).

LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA also offer a short survey of the textual evidence with regard to the role of Kapila in the history of Śaṃkhya and an interpretation of its significance:

[A]ll that can be said is that Kapila and Āsuri are linked with the beginning of the Śaṃkhya tradition. There is little reliable information about them apart from Kapila’s linkage with ancient ascetic traditions and Āsuri’s association with the brahmanical sacrificial system. That the later Śaṃkhya teachers unanimously refer to Kapila and Āsuri as the founders of the system probably reflects the Śaṃkhya tradition’s attempts to appropriate traditions of ascetic speculation as its own and to relate that ascetic speculation to dissatisfaction with the older sacrificial religion. Moreover, what might be called the upgrading of Kapila to the status of Hiranyagarbha or one or another mythological figure (Agni, Rudra, Śiva, and so forth) together with efforts to list Kapila, Āsuri, and other Śaṃkhya teachers in enumerations of the ‘great seers’ in the epic and Purāṇic literature may be taken as further attempts to establish a proper lineage for the Śaṃkhya philosophy.\(^{201}\)

In §V.5, we will look in more detail at the ways in which Kapila is represented in the classical Śaṃkhya texts and earlier literature, and will compare the YD’s portrayal of Kapila to these occurrences.

\(^{200}\) Ibid., p. 59. This interpretation seems, however, to be partially based on a misunderstanding of YD on SK 52cd, p. 255, ll. 20-21, which states: ‘These [creations] called the subtle body and the conditions arise after the time of the decay of the six attainments. But the [creation] defined as adhikāra [arises] immediately following the constituent qualities.’ (so ‘yaṃ liṅgākhyo bhāvākhyaś ca śatsiddhiḥsatyakātād īrdhvaḥ bhavati / guṇasamanantarām tv adhikāralaksanāḥ /) The term adhikāra must refer to the inherent ‘authority’ or ‘capacity’ of the guṇas to manifest the tattvas, since later in this passage the commentator asks: ‘If the adhikāra alone is sufficient for the manifestation of pradhāna, what [is the purpose] of dharma and adharma?’ (YD on SK 52, p. 256, ll. 2-3: yadi tāvad adhikāra evāya pradhānapravṛttayey ‘laṁ kim dharmādharmābhāyān /) For the preceding portion of this passage, see n. 730 (§V.4). LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA’s interpretation is very similar to CHAKRAVARTI (1975, p. 283)’s interpretation of adhikāra as ‘administrative duties’, as well as to Kumar and Bhargava (Yuktidīpikā (1990-92, p. 359)’s interpretative translation: ‘The body in the form of the adhikara (office bearer like Brahma etc.) are [sic] produced just immediately after the cosmic matter.’

\(^{201}\) Ibid., p. 112.
PARROTT (1990a; 1990b) offers an interpretative reassessment of the value of Materiality (*prakṛti*) in classical Śaṅkhya. PARROTT argues against ‘the commonly held notion that classical Śaṅkhya negatively values the world’\(^{203}\), emphasizing instead the soteriological role of *prakṛti*. He suggests that *prakṛti* is viewed by the Śaṅkhya texts as ‘a guru who teaches Puruṣa through her skilful means’.\(^{204}\)

PARROTT argues that the verses of the SK should be read as progressive aids to a seeker on the path to liberation:

That is, the seeker to whom these teachings are declared must be viewed as evolving during the course of instruction contained in the text. A seeker, on first approach to a preceptor, would experience his reality [...] in one way, and in quite another after long years of practised discipline. Different perspectives would arise as his insight into the nature of things matures.\(^{205}\)

Based on this interpretation, PARROTT suggests that SK 55-61 should be viewed as ‘emotion-filled poetry’ directed towards *prakṛti* by the mature seeker: ‘By expressing deeply felt love, praise and gratitude to Prakṛti, the seeker enters the realm of feeling. These feelings open the heart and bolster him for his death.’\(^{206}\)

Accordingly, he emphasizes the tendency of these verses to personify *prakṛti*, although he admits: ‘Prakṛti is not a person; she is simply a world with a whole lot of personality.’\(^{207}\)

Although PARROTT does not make much use of the YD or discuss the role of Kapila in relation to the soteriological aspect of *prakṛti*, his original interpretation accords with the YD’s apparent view of Kapila as a direct manifestation of *prakṛti*’s soteriological tendency in the form of a guru for all *puruṣas* (see §V.4).


\(^{203}\) PARROTT (1990b), p. 84.

\(^{204}\) PARROTT (1990a), p. 82.

\(^{205}\) PARROTT (1990b), p. 86.

\(^{206}\) Ibid., p. 103.

\(^{207}\) Ibid., p. 105.
NAKADA (1992)’s very brief communication outlines the YD’s defense of authoritative testimony (āptavacana) as a distinct means of knowledge (pramāṇa), separate from inference (anumāna). NAKADA suggests that this argument is a response to the view of the Buddhist Dignāga, who denies the validity of āptavacana as a separate pramāṇa.

MOTEGI (1994) draws several conclusions regarding the YD-kāra’s apparent knowledge of his Vaiṣeṣika opponents. Based on a discussion of the evidence in the YD, he suggests that the commentator refers to an unknown commentary on the Vaiṣeṣikasūtra (VS), as well as to two sūtras from the VS that have been lost. He further identifies a possible original sense of the term vyapadeśa as it occurs in VS 9.1, as a form of inferential mark based on the function of an object. Finally, based on the occurrence of the phrase madhyamaka kāla (‘intermediate time’) in a verse attributed to the Vaiṣeṣika school by the author of the YD, he advances the possibility that this concept, not found in the extant Vaiṣeṣika literature, was used by the Vaiṣeṣikas to support the ‘doctrine of the non-existent effect’ (asatkāryavāda).

MOTEGI also draws attention to the YD’s arguments with the Vaiṣeṣika in regard to other matters, including the nature of the Lord (īśvara), although he does not take

---

213 kriyāguṇavyapadesābāhāvāt prāg asat // (VS 9.1).
215 Ibid., pp. 815-816.
216 Ibid., p. 807.
up the discussion of this subject, which will be discussed in §V.3 of the present study.

JACOBSEN (1998)\textsuperscript{217} is a survey of the occurrences of Kapila in the Indian tradition and an interpretation of the development of this figure, from early occurrences in the Śvetāśvata Upaniṣad (ŚU) and Mahābhārata (MBh),\textsuperscript{218} through his portrayal as the founder of the Śāṁkhya system\textsuperscript{219} and his later portrayal as an incarnation of Viṣṇu in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa and late classical Śāṁkhya texts.\textsuperscript{220} JACOBSEN would later incorporate the bulk of the material in this article into his book, JACOBSEN (2008). We will look in more detail at JACOBSEN’s contribution in the review of this book below, and the majority of references in the main body of this study will be to the later publication.

Like BRONKHORST (1981), HATTORI (1999)\textsuperscript{221} argues that the term seśvara Śāṁkhya did not come to be applied to Pātañjalayoga until a rather late date. HATTORI observes that Mādhava, in his Sarvadarśanasamgraha, refers to the followers of Patañjali as seśvara sāṁkhya and the followers of Kapila as nirīśvara sāṁkhya\textsuperscript{222}, while according to an earlier view (as identified by BRONKHORST (1981) on the basis of the Tattvasaṅgraha), seśvara Sāṁkhya referred to ‘a certain group [of Sāṁkhyas who] admitted the existence of the īśvara as the creator of the world, and formed the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{218} JACOBSEN (1998), pp. 71-75.
\item \textsuperscript{219} Ibid., pp. 75-79.
\item \textsuperscript{220} Ibid., pp. 78-85.
\item \textsuperscript{222} HATTORI (1999), p. 609.
\end{itemize}
theory that explains the process of creation and destruction of the world by the cooperation of the īśvara with the three guṇas of pradhāna’.  

HATTORI discusses the role of ‘devotion to the Lord’ (īśvarapraṇidhāna) in the YS and suggests that the term pranidhāna was adopted from the Buddhists, for whom it signified ‘“fixation of mind” or “taking a vow”’ . Accordingly, he suggests that īśvarapraṇidhāna is of a different nature from devotion (bhakti), consisting rather of a vow directed to īśvara or the concentration of the mind upon īśvara. HATTORI, citing BRONKORST (1983), notes that the role of īśvara in classical Sāṃkhyā is the same as that in Pātañjalayoga. HATTORI concludes that because in the classical Sāṃkhyā texts īśvara, ‘who played not so important role from the beginning, came to be neglected’, while in the YS īśvara is ‘clearly mentioned in several sūtras’, the term seśvara sāṃkhyā came to be applied to the latter school by the time of Mādhava. In summary, HATTORI’s article confirms that although īśvara does not play a prominent role in classical Sāṃkhyā, his nature must be considered the same as in Pātañjalayoga.

MALINAR (1999) is a study of the concepts of generality (sāmānya) and particularity (viśeṣa) in classical Sāṃkhyā. In this course of this study, MALINAR suggests that because yogins have attained an insight into the productive nature of the tattvas as principles common (sāmānya) to all particular (viśeṣa) aspects of the phenomenal world, they are able to influence the particular phenomenal configurations of reality:

223 Ibid., p. 616.
224 Ibid., pp. 611-612.
225 Ibid., p. 612.
226 Ibid., p. 612.
227 Ibid., p. 616.
Insight into the productivity of prakṛti is only ascribed to gods and Yogins. This is one implication of what is designated as aīśvarya. They alone are able to manipulate the common causal potency and to change the arrangement and the formation of the effects, of individual things, without, however, transgressing the scope of ‘natural’, prākṛtic possibilities. In other words, yogic practice may lead to the ability to manifest particular physical effects directly out of the productive potential of pradhāna. This interpretation of the nature of yogic attainment will prove to be applicable to the evidence of the YD with regard to the abilities of yogins and devas (see §V.3-4).

WEZLER (2001) discusses the original significance of a passage of the Nirukta (NU) quoted by the YD in connection with the Sāṃkhya paradigm of the attainments (siddhi). WEZLER interprets this passage as a description of the process by which knowledge of the meaning of the Vedic mantras is transmitted, which ‘deals with the praise of those who know the meaning—of course of the Veda—and the censure of those who do not.’ WEZLER’s insights will be drawn upon in §IV.9, where we will consider the implications of the YD’s quotation of this passage.

WEZLER notes in passing the lack of an extended study of the knowledge of ṛṣis and other supernatural forms of knowledge: ‘Typical of the state of Indological research there is no, at least comprehensive, study of the ideas concerning the manner of cognition of the mantras—or related to the ṛṣi [...] or the means of “supernatural” cognition in general.’ AKLJKAR (2009) (see below) represents a significant contribution to our understanding of the process of Vedic revelation. The present study aims to contribute likewise to our understanding of the knowledge of

---

231 See nn. 510, 518 (§IV.9).  
232 WEZLER (2001), p. 232-233; see nn. 515, 519, 520 (§IV.9)  
233 Ibid., p. 217.  
234 Ibid., p. 226, n. 57.
ṛṣis and their role in the dissemination of doctrine more generally, at least as understood by the Sāṃkhya school.

HARZER (2006)\(^{235}\) is an extended study of Sāṃkhya epistemology as interpreted by the YD. HARZER makes extensive use the works of the Buddhist logician Dignāga (480-540 C.E.)\(^{236}\), an opponent of the Sāṃkhya school: ‘In his critique of the various philosophical schools, Dignāga paid a good deal of attention to the Sāṅkhya.’\(^{237}\) HARZER argues that, in the SK, the Sāṃkhya school ‘formulated anew its epistemological theories as a direct response’ to Dignāga.\(^{238}\) Accordingly, she suggests a new date for the SK, placing it at ‘around 550 A.D.’\(^{239}\)

HARZER examines the YD’s views on perception (pratyakṣa, dṛṣṭa) and inference (anumāna) but does not deal with authoritative testimony (āptavacana), the third means of knowledge (pramāṇa) according to Sāṃkhya, as she explains:

There are two reasons for this: first, since Dignāga’s system has only two instruments of knowledge, he focuses in his criticism of Sāṅkhya on these two, perception and inference. In his opinion, verbal testimony is a part of inference. The second reason is that verbal testimony belongs to two areas of philosophy: epistemology and philosophy of language. The philosophy of language is a distinct discipline of philosophy, not considered for scrutiny in the present volume and therefore verbal testimony is excluded from this study.\(^{240}\)

The present study aims to fill, to some extent, this apparent gap in the study of the YD’s views on epistemology. HARZER’s study, nevertheless, provides several points of clarification that will be drawn upon in the discussion of perception and inference in §IV.1-2. Most notably, HARZER discusses the YD’s classification of inference

\(^{236}\) HARZER (2006), pp. 16-17.
\(^{237}\) Ibid., p. 17.
\(^{238}\) Ibid., p. 16.
\(^{239}\) Ibid., pp. 107-109.
\(^{240}\) Ibid., pp. 18-19.
into direct (vīta) and indirect (avīta) inference,\textsuperscript{241} as well as the ten members (avayava) of formal inference.\textsuperscript{242} She observes that the author of the YD treats the verses of the SK as ‘arguments in accordance with the rules of forming an inference’.\textsuperscript{243} The implications of this view of the SK will be used to suggest a possible interpretation of the relationship between inference and authoritative testimony in §V.2.

\textsc{Motegi} (2006)\textsuperscript{244} examines the YD’s discussions of šabda from two major perspectives: that of sound (šabda) as an object of perception manifested by Materiality (prakṛtī), and that of authoritative testimony (āptavacana, šabda) as a means of correct knowledge (pramāṇa). With regard to the first topic, he discusses the YD’s arguments against the Vaiśeṣika school regarding the attribution of the qualities of pleasure and pain to sound (as a product of prakṛtī characterised by the three guṇas) rather than to the self (ātman) as held by the Vaiśeṣikas.\textsuperscript{245} In the context of this discussion, \textsc{Motegi} points out that ‘whenever the objects of direct perception are at issue, sound is often cited in the \textit{Yuktidīpikā} as an example of the objects of direct perception’.\textsuperscript{246}

This usage of šabda is distinct from its use to refer to authoritative testimony (āptavacana), one of the three means of correct knowledge according to Sāṃkhya. With regard to this latter usage, \textsc{Motegi} focuses on the YD’s treatment of the Vedas as sources of authoritative testimony.\textsuperscript{247} He points out that the author of the YD supports the SK’s rejection of Vedic sacrifice as a means to liberation (SK 2) yet

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{241} Ibid., pp. 93-97.
\bibitem{242} Ibid., pp. 98-102.
\bibitem{243} Ibid., p. 17.
\bibitem{245} \textsc{Motegi} (2006), pp. 40-47.
\bibitem{246} Ibid., p. 46.
\bibitem{247} Ibid., pp. 47-54.
\end{thebibliography}
also maintains ‘that liberation by means of knowledge is supported by the Vedic scriptures’.\textsuperscript{248} In the context of this discussion in the YD, MOTEGI observes, the proponent of the Śaṅkhya viewpoint makes use of grammatical arguments taken from the Mahābhāṣya, while the opponent employs exegetical methods borrowed from Mīmāṁsā.\textsuperscript{249} It is indeed clear throughout the YD that the commentator is largely concerned with reconciling Śaṅkhya ideas with aspects of the greater Brāhmaṇical tradition, particularly with the authority of the Vedas, as MOTEGI suggests:

Especially in the context of its theory of liberation, Śaṅkhya thought is compelled to take a negative view of the Vedas, but the author of the Yuktidīpikā attempts nonetheless to find some way of recognizing their authority. Viewed historically, it could be said that originally Śaṅkhya rejected Vedic ritual and propounded ideas not found in Vedic literature, but later, rather than pitting itself against the Vedas, it made attempts to reconcile its ideas with the Vedas.\textsuperscript{250}

This impulse to acknowledge the authority of the Vedas, MOTEGI suggests, is shown in the YD’s definition of āptavacana under SK 5d (see §IV.3), which accords a special status to the Vedas as being ‘exceptional in their reliability’.\textsuperscript{251}

With regard to the YD’s description of authoritative individuals (āpta; see §IV.3), MOTEGI notes the occurrence of the term īśvaramaharṣi, which he translates as ‘great seers of lord-like power’.\textsuperscript{252} As has been made clear by BRONKHORST (1983) (see above), the interpretation of this term is not a straightforward matter. MOTEGI’s translation is potentially problematic, since, as pointed out by BRONKHORST,\textsuperscript{253} the YD treats īśvara as a particular puruṣa and therefore passive (without power as such). However, MOTEGI’s suggestion that ‘this usage of īśvara is

\textsuperscript{248} Ibid., p. 51.
\textsuperscript{249} Ibid., p. 50.
\textsuperscript{250} Ibid., p. 53.
\textsuperscript{251} Ibid., p. 53.
\textsuperscript{252} Ibid., p. 53, n. 27.
similar to that found in the \textit{Yogasūtra} 1.24\textsuperscript{254} may be apt. Based upon the role of \textit{iśvara} in the Yoga school, and further upon the usage of the term \textit{aiśvarya} in the Sāṃkhya texts, I will outline (in §V.3) the possibility that the term \textit{iśvaramaharṣi} refers to those \textit{rṣis} who, though the practice of \textit{yoga}, have become similar to \textit{iśvara}, who is considered omniscient (YS 1.25).

\textsc{MOTEGI} does not directly address the role of the \textit{rṣi} Kapila with regard to the notion of \textit{āptavacana} in the YD. As will be shown in §V.1-2, the author of the YD appears to model Kapila’s original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine upon the Vedic model, perhaps as a result of the same desire, identified by \textsc{MOTEGI}, to reconcile Sāṃkhya with the Vedic tradition.

\textsc{Bronkhorst} (2007)\textsuperscript{255} argues for the origination of several traditions of asceticism, outside of the Vedic milieu, in the region of ‘Greater Magadha’, drawing on a variety of textual evidence.\textsuperscript{256} He further suggests that Kapila was originally a deity associated with these ascetic traditions.\textsuperscript{257} In support of this theory, he cites a passage of the \textit{Baudhāyanadharmasūtra} (BDhS) in which Kapila is presented as a demon (\textit{asura}) and an opponent of Vedic orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{258} He takes as further evidence of the demonic nature of Kapila an episode in the MBh in which a wrathful Kapila destroys the sons of King Sagara.\textsuperscript{259} He further observes that Kapila is associated with a variety of deities in the MBh, including Viṣṇu, Śiva, Prajāpati and Vīraṇa,\textsuperscript{260} while ‘Kapila’s divine nature may [...] be taken as established for classical

\textsuperscript{254} \textsc{MOTEGI} (2006), p. 53, n. 27.
\textsuperscript{256} \textsc{Bronkhorst} (2007), p. 28: ‘There can be no doubt that the early Jaina and Brahmanical texts examined here describe forms of asceticism which are based on some shared assumptions. These assumptions were not part of the Brahmanical heritage. No, they should be considered as having been current in the spiritual culture of Greater Magadha, before they came to exert an influence on texts that present themselves as belonging to the Brahmanical tradition.’
\textsuperscript{257} Ibid., pp. 61-68.
\textsuperscript{258} Ibid., pp. 61-62; see n. 766 (§V.5).
\textsuperscript{259} Ibid., pp. 64-65.
\textsuperscript{260} Ibid., p. 63.
Sāṃkhya’. He suggests that the fact that Kapila was originally considered a deity would clear up some scholarly confusion regarding a passage of the ŚU, identified by BRONKHorst as ‘perhaps the earliest reference to “the seer Kapila”’. Modern interpreters have not infrequently preferred the translation ‘tawny, red’ to ‘Kapila’, because comparison with other verses of the Upaniṣad (3.4; 4.11-12) shows that this seer Kapila must be identical with Hiranyagarbha and linked to Rudra. This identity poses no problem the moment we abandon the idea that Kapila ever was an ordinary human being.

Although BRONKHorst’s interpretation of the origin of Kapila may be at least partially correct, the development of this figure appears to be more complicated than he allows. Kapila is presented not only as a non-Vedic ascetic and demon in the early texts, but is also associated with elements of Vedic-style asceticism and Vedic orthodoxy, and is even portrayed as a Vedic ṛṣi (see §V.5).

JACOBSEN (2008), incorporating the material covered in JACOBSEN (1998), deals with the occurrences of figures known as Kapila throughout the history of Sanskrit literature. This publication also includes a translation of the Kapilāsurisamvāda, a late addition to the MBh (‘probably C.E. 1400-1500′), and a treatment of the association of Kapila with various places of pilgrimage (tīrtha) in India and of the forms of worship associated with him.

JACOBSEN observes that the earliest text to refer extensively to a ṛṣi (or ṛśis) called Kapila is the MBh. He argues that ‘several Kapilas’ are mentioned in the

261 Ibid., p. 62.
262 See n. 771 (§V.5).
264 Ibid., p. 63.
267 Ibid., pp. 71-148.
268 Ibid., pp. 149-211.
269 Ibid., p. 12.
MBh, identifies two distinct Kapila figures in particular, representing two different forms of ascetic tradition. He cites an episode in which Kapila destroys the sons of King Sagara (MBh 3.3.104-8), and suggests that this Kapila is a representative of the Vedic tradition of asceticism ‘associated with tapas; with the acquisition of powers and immense feats of asceticism’. In contrast, he suggests that the Kapila who converses with Syūmaraśmi in the form of a cow in MBh 12.260-62 represents a tradition that ‘belonged to a different world-view, a world-view that emphasised karma, saṃsāra, punarbhava, and mokṣa’. JACOBSEN suggests that these passages testify to the existence of two different Kapilas or of two stages in the development of the figure:

The contradictory natures of these two Kapilas may be considered evidence of the existence of two different Kapila figures, one a Vedic ascetic and one influenced by Śramaṇa ideas, or they may represent two stages in the history of Kapila, beginning as a Vedic ascetic and thereafter being appropriated by ascetics who had adopted Śramaṇa values. If any of these should be thought of as the Sāmkhya Kapila is not clear.

The contradictory nature of these two aspects of Kapila in the MBh will be discussed in relation to the Sāmkhya conception of Kapila in §V.5.

JACOBSEN also notes the non-Vedic, anti-ritual nature of Kapila in the passage of the BDhS discussed by BRONKHORST (2007) (see above). Also like BRONKHORST, he observes that Kapila is associated with a variety of deities in the MBh. In contrast to BRONKHORST’s view that Kapila originated as a deity associated with śramaṇa traditions, JACOBSEN suggests that the early association of Kapila with Rudra and Hiranyagarbha in the ŠU ‘may perhaps have contributed to

---

270 Ibid., p. 13.
271 Ibid., pp. 13-16.
272 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
273 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
274 Ibid., p. 23.
275 Ibid., p. 12.
276 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
the later divinization of Kapila and to the Sāmkhya perception of him having been created at the beginning of each cycle of creation’. With regard to the portrayal of Kapila as a Vedic-style ṛṣi, Jacobson observes that Kapila does not usually appear in the traditional lists of seven ṛṣis, although he does appear in such a list in the MBh.

With regard to the classical Sāmkhya texts’ views on the nature and origin of Kapila, Jacobson observes:

Most commentaries agree that Kapila passed his teaching on to Āsuri, but they offer different versions of Kapila’s origin and nature. One gets the impression that each commentary had to add a new detail or an original interpretation to the body of knowledge regarding the nature and origin of Kapila as part of its general interpretative contribution. There is, in fact, a remarkable variety in the speculations about Kapila in the Sāmkhyakārikā commentaries.

In his discussion of the YD’s views on Kapila, Jacobson notes that the text holds that both Kapila and Brahmā were produced directly out of primordial Materiality (pradhāna) after the production of the tattvas, and that Kapila ‘was born naturally endowed with the means of liberation because of the predominance of sattva in him’, while Brahmā (i.e., the ‘body of greatness’ (māhātmyaśarīra)) was born with an excess of rajas. With regard to the relative roles of Kapila and Brahmā according to the YD, Jacobson concludes: ‘Here the salvific function—the revelation of knowledge that leads to release—and the world creating function are separated. The first function belongs to Kapila, the second to the body of greatness.’ He argues that this distinction is justified by the structure of the Sāmkhya system itself: ‘Since the Sāmkhya system is a dualist system—that it believes in two ultimate principles—and since it also believes in a plurality of selves

278 Ibid., p. 10.
279 Ibid., p. 18; see n. 776 (§V.5).
280 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
281 Ibid., p. 33; see nn. 693, 695, 696 (§V.3); 730 (§V.4).
282 Ibid., p. 45; see n. 695 (§V.3).
283 Ibid., p. 45.
and a plurality of real manifestations of the material principle, it is not forced by the principle of monism to identify these as one and the same principle.\textsuperscript{284} This apparent distinction between the roles of the two figures will be discussed further in §V.4.

JACOBSEN contrasts the YD’s division in labour between Kapila and Brahmā to the Vaiṣṇava view of Kapila as an \textit{avatāra} of Viṣṇu: ‘Making Kapila an \textit{avatāra} of Viṣṇu is a development in the direction of monotheism. The idea of \textit{avatāra} is an elegant way of keeping the divine functions apart and at the same time unifying them.’\textsuperscript{285} He observes that the MV’s identification of Kapila as an \textit{avatāra} of Viṣṇu\textsuperscript{286} is unique among the classical commentaries on the SK: ‘The fact that Kapila was considered the son of Devahūti and Kardama is in accordance with the \textit{Bhāgavatapurāṇa} but this is not stated in the early Śaṁkhya commentaries.’\textsuperscript{287}

JACOBSEN takes this fact, along with a reference by Māṭhara to Viṣṇu’s incarnation as Kalkī,\textsuperscript{288} as evidence of the text’s late date,\textsuperscript{289} citing the dates for the text proposed by LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987) as ‘anywhere from the ninth century onward’.\textsuperscript{290} JACOBSEN also notes that Vācaspatimiśra’s TV, also a late text, similarly refers to Kapila as an incarnation of Viṣṇu in its commentary on VBh 1.25.\textsuperscript{291} With regard to the reason for this development, JACOBSEN suggests: ‘The fact that Kapila was accepted as an \textit{avatāra} of Viṣṇu in these texts probably means that the Śaṁkhya tradition had lost much of its independence by the ninth century.’\textsuperscript{292} He cites the work of WEZLER (1970) in support of this conclusion.\textsuperscript{293}

\textsuperscript{284} Ibid., p. 48.
\textsuperscript{285} Ibid., p. 49.
\textsuperscript{286} See nn. 684, 686 (§V.3).
\textsuperscript{287} JACOBSEN (2008), p. 34.
\textsuperscript{288} \textit{kalkī bhavisyatī bhāvivastu-grāhīṇī} (MV on SK 33, p. 50, l. 4).
\textsuperscript{289} JACOBSEN (2008), p. 34.
\textsuperscript{291} JACOBSEN (2008), pp. 35-36; see n. 803 (§V.5).
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid., p. 36.
The acceptance by the Vaiṣṇavas of Kapila as an avatāra of Viṣṇu, JacobSEN suggests, ‘served the interests of the Vaiṣṇavas in their attempts to make Vaiṣṇavism an all-inclusive religion’. The relation of the YD’s view of the nature of Kapila to this later view of Kapila as an avatāra of Viṣṇu will be considered further in §V.5.

Like Wezler (2001), AKUJKAR (2009) is primarily useful, in the context of the present study, as an aid in understanding the significance of the YD’s quotation of a passage of NU 1.20 in the context of the Sāṃkhya paradigm of the attainments (siddhi). AKUJKAR’s article deals with the grammarian Bhartṛhari’s view of the process of Vedic revelation and transmission. He bases his interpretation of the NU passage primarily upon the context of Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadiyavṛtti (VPV), in which it is quoted. He justifies this interpretative strategy as follows: ‘As there is no other theoretician between Yāska and BH known to us at present who echoes Yāska’s words, it is also commonsense to proceed on the assumption that BH would help us in recovering a part of Yāska’s world.’

AKUJKAR’s interpretation of the NU passage will be utilised in §IV.9 to clarify the YD’s interpretation of the siddhis. The assumptions behind this interpretation with regard to the process of the attainment and transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge will be considered further in §V.1-2. Most significantly, AKUJKAR offers an interpretation of the phrase rṣayah sāksātktadharmāṇah (‘seers who had discovered the (ordinarily imperceptible) properties of things’), which

293 Ibid., p. 37: ‘Wezler has suggested that final acceptance of the idea that Kapila was an incarnation of Viṣṇu marked the take-over of Sāṃkhya by the Vaiṣṇavas.’
294 Ibid., p. 37.
296 See nn. 510, 518 (§IV.9).
297 VPV 1.5, p.24, l. 5 – p. 25, l. 1.
299 Ibid., p. 25.
occurs in the NU passage: ‘The sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmatva of the seers means direct, undistorted and extraordinary knowledge of those properties and actions or processes which make the world what it is.’³⁰⁰ The possibility that the YD-kāra holds a similar view of those ṛṣis who have independently attained Sāṃkhya knowledge will be considered in §V.1.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 17.
CHAPTER IV: A Comparison of the Sāṃkhya Commentators’ Views on Key Interpretative Issues.

As has become evident in the course of the reviews in CHAPTER III, two major interpretative issues in classical Sāṃkhya have not been adequately dealt with in previous scholarship. The first of these issues is the role of authoritative testimony (āptavacana) in relation to the attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge and consequent liberation. The first part of this chapter (§1-5) will examine the classical Sāṃkhya commentators’ views on authoritative testimony and the other two means of knowledge (pramāṇa), perception (pratyakṣa, drṣṭa) and inference (anumāna). This discussion will be directed towards a clearer understanding of the nature of authoritative testimony in relation to the other pramāṇas, and the respective roles of the three pramāṇas in the attainment and transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge.

The second major issue requiring clarification is the relationship between the paradigms of the conditions (bhāva) and the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga). Although Chakrabarti (1975), Larson (1984) and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987) have made strides in understanding the nature of the relationship between these two paradigms, the evidence of the YD suggests a more precise interpretation of this relationship. The second part of this chapter (§6-10) will examine the commentators’ views on the nature and function of these paradigms and the relationship between them.

The presentation of the views of the GBh, MV, and TK on the issues considered in this chapter will serve to aid us in understanding the views of the YD, and to provide an historical context for these views. The conclusions drawn in this
chapter with regard to the YD’s views on the significance of āptavacana and the categories of the bhāvas and the pratyayasarga will be drawn upon in CHAPTER V, which will explore the interpretative implications of these views with regard to the process of the origination and transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine and the nature and origin of the ṛṣi Kapila.

PRELIMINARY MATTERS:

The structure of the Yuktidīpikā and its relation to the other classical commentaries on the Sāṃkhya kārikā.

Like the other classical commentaries on the SK, the YD is structured around the verses of the SK in their standard numerical order (although the YD does not contain extant commentary on all of the verses\(^{301}\)). This makes it fairly easy to compare the views of the various commentators with regard to any point of Sāṃkhya doctrine.

To give an idea of the basic contents of the SK, as well as the basic structure of the commentaries, an outline of the subject matter of the verses may be useful:

SK 1-2 deal with the reasons for initiating the Sāṃkhya inquiry (the experience of pain and inability to dispel this pain by other means) and the goal of the inquiry (knowledge of the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower; see §II.1).

SK 3 summarises the nature of the three categories of manifest, unmanifest and knower.

\(^{301}\) See n. 18 (CHAPTER I).
SK 4-7 deal with the epistemology of the system, specifically the three means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*; see §II.4), their definitions and spheres of applicability.

SK 8-11 deal with the relation between manifest and unmanifest; the doctrine of the (pre-)existent effect (*satkāryavāda*; see §II.1); the characteristics of the three categories of manifest, unmanifest and knower; and the differences between them.

SK 12-16 discuss the nature and function of the constituent qualities (*guna*), their inherence in manifest and unmanifest Materiality (*prakṛti*), and reasons for the existence of the unmanifest.

SK 17-21 give reasons for the existence and plurality of Consciousness (*puruṣa*), list its characteristics, and describe its relationship with *prakṛti*.

SK 22-38 describe the manner and order of the emergence of the manifest principles (*tattva*) from unmanifest *prakṛti*, describe their functions and characteristics (including the conditions (*bhāva*; see §II.5) as forms of the intellect (*buddhi*) (SK 23)), and describe the motivation of their activity as being for the sake of the enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa* (see §II.3).

SK 39-42 deal with the subtle body (*liṅga*) and its relation to the manifest *tattvas* and the physical body (see §II.2).
SK 43-45 list the varieties of the bhāvas (sāmsiddhika, prākṛtika, vaikṛta) and the results of the bhāvas (see §II.5).

SK 46-51 list the categories of the intellectual creation (pratayayasarga; see §II.5).

SK 52 describes the relationship between the liṅga and the bhāvas.

SK 53-54 describe the phenomenal creation (bhautika sarga; see §II.2).

SK 55-68 deal with the relationship between prakṛti and puruṣa and explain the nature of transmigration (sāṃsāra) and liberation (mokṣa, kaivalya) (see §II.3).

SK 69-73 explain that the supreme ṛṣi (Kapila) expounded the Sāṃkhya system and describe the manner in which this knowledge was transmitted through a series of disciples to Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

The discussions in the present chapter will focus mainly on the commentaries on the portions of the SK dealing with the pramāṇas (SK 4-7), the bhāvas (SK 23, 43-45), and the pratayayasarga (SK 46-51), although passages from other portions of the commentaries will be introduced where relevant.

Despite the common framework around which all of the classical commentaries are structured, the YD is unique among the commentaries in its
division of the text of the SK. The YD-κāra applies a form of chapterisation which bears little relation to the structure or content of the SK. The text of the YD is divided into four books (prakaraṇa) and further into eleven chapters (āhnika), which CHAKRAVARTI (1975) characterises as ‘an old-fashioned division’. The YD also divides the verses of the SK themselves into fragments and treats them as sūtras (prose aphorisms) rather than kārikās (verses) (see §V.2).

The YD also contains a long introduction, which deals largely with the commentator’s view of the history and continuity of the Sāmkhya tradition. This portion of the YD, as well as the commentary on SK 69-72, will be utilized in the discussions in CHAP. V of the commentator’s view of the importance of Kapila’s original formulation of Sāmkhya knowledge and the continuity of the tradition of Sāmkhya teachers.

The YD differs from the other commentaries in another important respect. While the other commentaries generally offer short and simple interpretations of the verses of the SK, the YD’s explanations are generally much longer and much more involved. CHAKRAVARTI (1975) has aptly described the YD-κāra’s style of exegesis:

The style of the author is archaic and highly polemical. He first of all puts in a nutshell what he has to say, and then expands the same. In doing so he attacks the view of the opponent who also in his turn re-attacks that of the defendant. In this way attacking, re-attacking and counter-attacking go on continually until the accepted conclusion is reached. This method has sometimes rendered it difficult to trace the place where the version of the opponent begins and that of the defendant ends. 

This type of involved dialectic is unique among the classical commentaries on the SK. In the course of these meandering exchanges, the YD-κāra often refers to verses of the SK (or their subject matter) from outside the immediate context of the verse at hand. This means that in the interpretative analysis undertaken in the present

303 Ibid., pp. 160-161.
chapter, references from widely disparate sections of the YD have sometimes been brought together for the sake of clarifying a particular aspect of the commentator’s views.

Although the YD-kāra does not explicitly engage with the views of the earlier classical commentaries on the SK, and it is thus not clear whether he was familiar with any of these commentaries, his views are often compatible with the views of the other commentators. In general, the evidence of the YD can be used to clarify statements found in the other commentaries and points of doctrine which remain largely obscure in the other commentaries, as will become apparent in the course of the present chapter. The commentators’ views on relevant interpretative issues will be compared point by point in this chapter, in order to establish the YD’s views, and the points of agreement and departure with the views of the other commentaries, with as much clarity as possible. This comparison will be undertaken primarily in preparation for a consideration of the interpretative implications of these views in Chapter V. In addition, the overall relation between the YD’s views to those of the other classical commentaries, and their implications with regard to the historical development of the classical Sāṃkhya tradition, will be considered in §V.5.

§1. The commentators’ views on the pramāṇa of perception (drṣṭa).

The first sections of this chapter (§1-5) will be directed towards a clearer understanding of the means by which a seeker of liberation is held to attain knowledge of the principles (tattva) according to the classical Sāṃkhya texts. These sections will thus focus upon the commentators’ views on the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) accepted by Sāṃkhya, especially with regard to their
applicability to the attainment of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya tattvas. It is generally assumed that inference (anumāṇa) is held as the most important pramāṇa for the attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge. However, the evidence of the commentaries, particularly of the YD, calls this assumption into question.

The first pramāṇa accepted by the Sāṃkhya system is perception (drṣṭa). Although the sphere of perception is usually confined to the everyday objects of experience comprised of the gross elements (mahābhūta), the commentators, as mentioned in §II.4, also allow for the perception of the subtle elements (tanmātra) by gods and yogins. Of the commentaries, the YD provides the most information about how this extraordinary form of perception works.

Perception is defined by Īśvarakṛṣṇa as prativiṣayādhyavasāya (SK 5). As mentioned above (§II.3), the intellect (buddhi) is characterised by determination (adhyavasāya) (SK 23). The interpretation of the term prativiṣaya varies among the commentators. GBh interprets it as ‘with regard to each particular object’, referring to sound (śabda), touch (sparśa), form (rūpa), taste (rasa), and scent (gandha), as apprehended by their corresponding sense-faculties (ears (śrotra), skin (tvak), eyes (cakṣus), tongue (jihvā), and nose (ghrāṇa), respectively). Presumably, this includes both the specific (viśeṣa; mahābhūta) and non-specific (aviśeṣa; tanmātra) forms of these sense-objects (see §II.1).

---

304 E.g., CHAKRAVARTI (1975), p. 191: ‘Its prakṛti, its puruṣa, nay even its theory of causation are established by sheer reasoning and this shows that “inference” played a very important part in the building up of the Sāṃkhya as a system.’ LARSON AND BHATTACHARYYA (1987, p. 29) observe that ‘Sāṃkhya clearly gave pride of place in knowing to independent reasoning’.

305 Ṛṣṭam yathā śrotāṃ tvak cakṣuh jihvā ghrāṇam iti pañca buddhīndriyāni / śabdasparsārūparasagandhā eṣāṃ pañcānām pañचaiva viśaya yathāsāmkhyam / śabdāṃ śrotāṃ ghrṇāti tvak sparsām cakṣām rūpām jihvā rasaṃ ghrāṇam gandham iti / (GBh on SK 4, p. 47, ll. 22-24); prativiṣayesa śrotārdinām śabdādiviṣayesa adhyavasāyaḥ Ṛṣṭam pratyakṣam ity arthaḥ / (GBh on SK 5, p. 51, l. 28).
MV gives a similar explanation for the term *prativiṣayādhyavasāya* as referring to the apprehension of each particular sense-object by its corresponding sense-faculty.\(^{306}\)

TK interprets *prativiṣaya* as a synonym for the faculties (*indriya*)—that is, as that which functions with regard to each (*prati*) object (*viṣaya*).\(^{307}\) The term *prativiṣayādhyavasāya* can thus be understood as ‘determination by appropriate the sense-faculties’. TK includes the great elements (*mahābhūta*), as well as things like pleasure (*sukha*), etc., as the objects (*viṣaya*) of perception for ordinary people. Vācaspati also mentions in this context the fact that yogins and gods (*ūrdhvasrotas*)\(^{308}\) are able to perceive the subtle elements (*tanmāra*).\(^{309}\) It is not clear from the TK, however, in what way things like pleasure and the subtle elements are also considered objects of the sense-faculties.

The YD also mentions in this context the fact that yogins and gods (*deva*) are able to perceive the subtle elements.\(^{310}\) Under SK 34, the YD clarifies how this suprasensuous perception works. The commentator specifies that gods, having had their faculties (*indriya*) purified by an abundance of merit (*dharma*), are able to perceive the subtle elements even prior to perceiving the gross elements, while yogins can perceive the subtle elements only after they have ‘completely attained’ the gross elements.\(^{311}\) The YD interprets the term *prativiṣayādhyavasāya* as an *ekaśeṣa* (literally, ‘single remainder’), an interpretative technique according to which one word denotes two or more different but identical words. According to this

\(^{306}\) viṣayam viṣayam prati yo ‘dhyavasāya netrādīnām īndriyānām pañcānām rūpādi pañcasu tat pratyayās pratipattirīpam āraṇīkhyam / (MV on SK 5, p. 12, ll. 12-14).

\(^{307}\) viṣayam viṣayam prati vartate iti prativiṣayam āndriyam / (TK on SK 5, p. 19, ll. 20-21).

\(^{308}\) See n. 488 (§ IV.9).

\(^{309}\) viṣayāḥ prthivyādayāḥ sukhādayāścāsmadādigamyāḥ asmadāś tānmaṭralakṣaṇāḥ yoginām ūrdhvasrotasām ca viṣayāḥ / (YD on SK 5, p. 76, l. 27 – p. 77, l. 1).

\(^{310}\) tatra devānāṃ yānīndriyānī tānī dharmatkarṣaṇāḥ viśuddhān āpi gṛhanti [prāg eva višeṣāt] / yoginām ca samprāptavišeṣānām / (YD on SK 34ab, p. 218, ll. 3-5).
interpretation, *prativiṣayādhyavasāya* signifies 1. ‘determination by the sense-faculties’ and 2. ‘determination of each particular object’. The second meaning provides for the inclusion of internal forms of perception (including the perception of *yogins* and the perception of emotional states).\(^{312}\)

The YD, like the other commentaries,\(^ {313}\) thus makes room for the direct perception of things beyond ordinary sensory experience. The YD also suggests that this suprasensuous perception is a progressive process in the case of *yogins* and the result of accumulated merit (*dharma*) in the case of gods. This suggests that through yogic practice or the accumulation of *dharma* one may begin to develop knowledge of the Sāṃkhya *tattvas* (beginning with the subtle elements) through the medium of direct perception. This evidence will be taken into account in the broader context of the discussion of the process of the production of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya *tattvas* in Chapter V.\(^ {314}\)

§2. The commentators’ views on the *pramāṇa* of inference (*anumāṇa*).

Inference (*anumāṇa*) is held to make possible the apprehension of objects of knowledge beyond the sphere of perception (see §IV.5) and is generally accorded a privileged place in the Sāṃkhya texts with regard to the establishment of knowledge of the *tattvas*.

\(^{312}\) ucye: astu tarhīndriyāṃ *prativiṣayagrahanāṃ viśeṣānām* / yat tūktam (82.6) rāgādīnām upasaṃkhyaṃ kartavyam iti tatra brūmā ekaśeṣanirdeśāt (cf. MBhāṣya I.88.25 et passim) siddham / evam tarhī prativiṣayādhyavasāyaś ca prativiṣayādhyavasāyaś ca prativiṣayādhyavasāya iti sarāpānām ekaśeṣāh (cf. Pāṇ. 1.2.64) karisyate / tatraikena bahiraṅgasvendriyasya parigrahah / dvitiyenaṁtaraṅgasya pratiḥasyeti rāgādiṣyāyaṃ yogināṃ ca yad viṣṇāṇām tat saṅgrhitāṃ bhavatīti yādyākyāntam pratyaksāyaṃ / (YD on SK 5a, p. 82, ll. 20-26).

\(^{313}\) Cf. nn. 24, 26 (§II.4).

\(^{314}\) See also the discussion below of the commentators’ views on the production of knowledge leading to discrimination (§IV.5).
There are several forms of inference with different spheres of applicability. The commentators vary in their classification and interpretation of the forms of inference. The YD provides a good deal of information on the ways in which inference is used to establish the primary objects of the Sāṃkhya enquiry. The YD is also unique among the commentaries in providing a link between inference and the explanation of philosophical texts (śāstra), which are classed as authoritative testimony (āptavacana; see §IV.3). The present section will compare the commentators’ views on the nature of inference in general and on the particular forms of inference, in order to provide some context for a discussion of the YD’s views on the relationship between inference and authoritative testimony.

Inference in general is said to be dependent upon prior knowledge of a characteristic mark (liṅga) and that which bears the characteristic mark (liṅgin) (SK 5). For instance, TK gives the common example of the inference of fire from smoke, in which fire is considered the liṅgin and smoke the liṅga.315

GBh’s interpretation of the term liṅgalīṅgipūrvaka (‘preceded by a characteristic mark and that which bears the mark’; SK 5) is somewhat different. Gauḍapāda explains that inference can be preceded by either a characteristic mark (liṅga) or that which bears the mark (liṅgin). He gives as examples the inference of a mendicant (yatī), the liṅgin, from his staff (daṇḍa), the liṅga; and the inference of his staff, again the liṅga, from the sight of the mendicant, the liṅgin.316 MV also uses the example of the mendicant and his staff, but only offers the first possibility, that a mendicant, the liṅgin, can be inferred from the sight of his staff, the liṅga.317

315 dhūmādir vyāpyo vahnyādir vyāpaka iti yah prayayasya tatpūrvakam / (TK on SK 5, p. 22, ll. 35).
316 tad anumānaṁ liṅgapūrvakaṁ yatra liṅgena liṅgi anumāyate yathā danḍena yatīḥ / liṅgipūrvakaṁ ca yatra liṅginā liṅgam anumāyate yathā drṣṭvā yatim asvedam triḍaṇḍam iti / (GBh on SK 5, p. 52, ll. 4-6).
317 liṅgena triḍaṇḍāḍidārśanānādṛśto ’pi liṅgi sādhyate nūnam asau parivṛtto ’stī j asvedaṁ triḍaṇḍam iti / (MV on SK 13, ll. 9-11; parivṛtadāsti must be a corrupt reading).
MV’s interpretation is thus closer to that of TK. YD does not comment on the phrase *tal liṅgaṅgilīṅgipurvakam*. In summary, the commentators hold that inferential knowledge is dependent upon prior direct knowledge of the relation between two objects or characteristics.

With regard to the forms of inference, Īśvarakṛṣṇa states simply that inference is threefold (SK 5). The commentators are unanimous in identifying the three forms of inference as *pūrvavat*, *šeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, although the interpretation of these terms varies from text to text.

GBh interprets *pūrvavat* as the inference of an effect from the perception of a cause, based on precedent (*pūrva*), and gives the example of the inference of rain from clouds, based on the prior perception of rain as a result of the accumulation of clouds. As an example of *šeṣavat*, Gauḍapāda gives the inference that the remainder (*šeśa*) of the ocean’s water is salty, based on the perception that a portion of it is salty. He interprets *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* as inference based on a generally perceived correlation, giving two examples: the inference of the movement of the moon and stars from their change in position, based on the perception of the movement of a man from place to place; and the inference of blossoming mango trees in other places from the perception that they have blossomed in one place.

MV begins with an alternative explanation of the SK’s statement that inference is threefold, taking this to refer to three members (*avayava*) of a formal

---

318 *trividham anumānam ākhyātam / pūrvavat śeṣavat sāmānyato dṛṣṭam cetī* / (GBh on SK 5, p. 51, l. 29); *tac ca trividham / pūrvavat śeṣavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭam ca* / (MV on SK 5, p. 13, l. 2); *anumānam triprakāram ācāryair ākhyātam / pūrvavac cheṣavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭam ca* / (YD on SK 5b, p. 83, ll. 1-2); *tat sāmānyatovīṣeṣalaksām traividhyam nulakṣitam anumānam viśeṣatas trividham pūrvavatśeṣavatsāmānyato pūrvavaccheṣavatsāmānyato dṛṣṭam cetī* / (TK on SK 5, p. 23, ll. 34-36).

319 *pūrvam asyāstīti pūrvavad yathā—meghonnatyā vrṣṭiḥ sādhayati pūrvadṛṣṭatvāt / śeṣavad yathā—samudrāḥ ekam jalapalam lavaṇam āsāyaḥ śeṣasyāpy asti lavaṇabhāva iti / sāmānyato dṛṣṭam—deśād deśāntaraṃ prāptam dṛṣṭam gatimac candratārakaṃ, caitravat / yathā caitrānānaṃ deśād deśāntaraṃ prāptam avalokya gatiṃ ayam iti, tadvac candratārakaṃ iti / tathā puspānāmadarsanāḥ anyatra puspāḥ āmrā iti sāmānyato dṛṣṭena sādhayati / yat sāmānyato dṛṣṭam* / (GBh on SK 5, p 51, l. 30 – p. 52, l. 3).
inferential argument: thesis (pakṣa), reason (hetu), and example (drśṭānta). Māṭhara also states that there are nine fallacies (ābhāsa) of thesis, fourteen of reason, and ten of example. An objection is then offered that others hold there to be five members of an inference: thesis (pratijñā), reason (apadeśa), example (nidarśana), application (anusamdhāna), and conclusion (pratyāmnāya). The first three of these correspond to the three previously mentioned (pakṣa, hetu, and drśṭānta), but the application and conclusion are not explained by Māṭhara. Māṭhara accepts these five members of inference, which he then defines as ‘the explanation for the sake of others by one who has determined a view himself’. He then explains that this five-membered inference is threefold, giving the same forms of inference attested by the GBh (pūrvavat, šeṣavat, and sāmānyatodrṣṭa), and interpreting them in basically the same fashion. Māṭhara gives the same example of pūrvavat inference given by Gauḍapāda (of rain from the accumulation of clouds), as well as the additional example of the inference that it has rained from the sight of a swollen river. The latter example illustrates that, according to Māṭhara, pūrvavat inference includes not only the inference of an effect from a perceived cause, but also the inference of a cause from a perceived effect. Māṭhara’s example of šeṣavat is the same as Gauḍapāda’s (of the saltiness of the ocean), while for sāmānyatodrṣṭa he gives Gauḍapāda’s inference of flowering mangoes, as well as the somewhat dissimilar inference that the moon has risen based on the general observation of this fact by others.320

320 anumānaṃ trividham / trisādhanam tryavaya vas pañcāvayava ity apare / tadāhyātam kathitam / pakṣaheturdṛṣṭántá iti tryavayavam / pakṣah pratijñāpadam / yathá—vahnimān ayam pradeśaḥ / sādhyaavastāpānāsā pakṣah / itare pakṣābhāsāḥ prayakṣaviruddhādayo nava / trirūpa hetuḥ / trairūpyam punah pakṣadharmanām sapakṣe sattvam vipakṣe cāsattvam iti / atrodāharaṇam yathā dhimāvattvād iti / anye hettvābhāsāḥ caturdaśa / asiddhānaiṅkāṅkaviruddhādayaḥ / sādharmyavaiḥmaṁvābhāsyām dvividhām nirdarṣantam / yathā mahānaśam / itare nirdarṣābhāsā daśa / evam tryayastrīnśādābhāsāraḥsaḥtrya m tryavayavam anumāṇam / pañcāvayavam ity apare / tad āha—avayavaḥ punah pratijñāpadśanīdharṣanāsānusandhānāpratyāmnāyāḥ / evam pañcāvayavena vākyena svanīcitārthaḥpratīpādaḥam parāṁkham anumāṇam / tac ca trividham / pūrvavat śeṣavat sāmānyatodrṣṭaḥ ca / tatra viśiṣṭameghhonatidarṣanāt bhavitrīṇ vrṣṭin sambhāvayati / pūrvam iyaṃ drṣṭeti pūrvavat / naśnītārṣānād upari vrṣto deva iti vā pratītiḥ / śeṣavat yathā—
The five members (avayava) of inference accepted by the MV correspond to five of the ten members of inference given by the YD.\textsuperscript{321} The first five members of inference according to the YD—desire to know (jījñāsā), uncertainty (saṃśaya), purpose (prayojana), determination of what is possible (śakyaprāpti), and removal of uncertainty (saṃśayavyudāsa)—are described as the ‘members of explanation’ (vyākhyānīga).\textsuperscript{322} These five members are illustrated by a dialogue between a student and a Sāṃkhya teacher whom he approaches for knowledge. The example of inference illustrated by this dialogue is that of the existence of Consciousness (puruṣa).\textsuperscript{323} The latter five members according to the YD—thesis (pratijñā), reason (hetu), example (dṛṣṭānta), application (upasāṃhāra), and conclusion (nigamana)—which correspond to the five members attested by MV, are described as the ‘members of teaching to others’ (parapratipādanāṅga).\textsuperscript{324} These latter five members are not illustrated by the commentator; HARZER (2006) suggests that this is...

\textsuperscript{321} SOLOMON (1974, p. 13) has also noted this discrepancy in the number of members of inference between the two texts.

\textsuperscript{322} tasya punar avayava jījñāsāsatamprāptisatamprāpti (YD on SK 6, p. 89, ll. 16-17).

\textsuperscript{323} tatra jñātum icchā jījñāsā / kaścit kaṃcid upasadyāha—puruṣaṃ jñātum icchāmi kim asti nāstīti / kutaḥ saṃśaya iti paryāvṛttaḥ pratijñāḥ—anupalabhyaṃ arthaśāyam sarvajñaḥ / tānupalabhyaṃ udhayāḥdṛṣṭām sadbhūtam asadbhūtam ceti / sadbhūtam ca saśaṃśaṅnādī / avyākhyānīga (YD on SK 5, p. 12, l. 14 – p. 13, l. 9).

\textsuperscript{324} For an analysis of this conversation, see HARZER (2006), p. 100.
‘perhaps because these latter five are shared with other schools and are common knowledge’.  

Although the names of these latter five members of inference in the YD are different from those cited by the MV, the correspondence shows that the two texts may have been influenced by the same tradition of interpretation in this regard, which would explain the MV’s departure from Gauḍapāda’s interpretation of inference, with which it otherwise generally agrees.

HARZER (2006) has pointed out that the list given by the YD corresponds to a list given in the Nyāyasūrabhāṣya (NSBh) (ca. 450 C.E.) on Nyāyasūtra (NS) 1.32, in which the first five members are rejected ‘as a psychological process unnecessary in an inference’. NS 1.32 gives five members of inference corresponding to the list accepted by the MV and the second group of five in the YD (the members for teaching to others), although the names given in the NS are not all identical to those in either the MV or the YD. The author of the NSBh, Pakṣilasvāmin, mentions that other Naiyāyikas accept ten members of inference, the names of the first five of which are the same as those given in the YD, although the order of the third and fourth members (śakyaprāpti and prayojana) is reversed. HARZER observes that the ten-membered inference is also mentioned in Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya (ca. 2nd cent. B.C.E.) on Pāṇini 5.2.42. It is thus evident that the ten-fold division held by the YD was relatively old and had gone out of fashion by the time of its composition, as perhaps also evidenced by the MV’s acceptance of only five members of inference. HARZER suggests that the YD applied the two-fold division, into members

---

327 pratijñāhetūdāharanopanayanigamanāṇaḥ avayavāḥ // (NS 1.32, p. 36, l. 2).
328 dasāvayavān eke naiyāyikā vākya sančaksate / jijñāṣā samsāvyah śakyaprāptih prayojanam samśayavyudāsa iti // (NSBh on NS 1.32, p. 36, ll. 3-4).
for acquiring knowledge (for oneself from a teacher) and members for explaining
knowledge to others, to this older ten-fold division of inference under the influence
of the Buddhist logician Dignāga, who held a similar two-fold division.\(^{330}\)

The YD argues that the first five members of the ten-fold formal inference
are necessary, despite the fact that they are not considered part of the self-
ascertainment (svaniścaya) of knowledge, since this formal inference is meant for
the benefit of those lacking the intellect of the wise men who have initially
ascertained such knowledge for themselves. The commentator explains that this
assistance to those lacking in insight is in fact the reason for the explanation
(vyākhyāna) of a treatise (śāstra) and points out that this is why these members are
referred to as ‘members of explanation’ (vyākhyāṅga).\(^{331}\) In this passage, the word
used for the ‘assistance’ or ‘favour’ of those who are ‘confused, mistaken and having
an inferior intellect’ is anugraha, a term which will become important in the
discussion of doctrinal authority in the YD in CHAPTER V.

Although the first five members of inference (‘members of explanation’) are
useful from the perspective of the student, while the second five members (‘members
teaching to others’) pertain to the perspective of the teacher, all ten members thus
relate to the explanation to another of inferred knowledge. The reason given by the
commentator for this formulation of an inference in ten members is that the object of
an inference cannot be communicated to another without the use of a statement
(vākyam).\(^{332}\) Moreover, the fact that the first five members are illustrated by a


\(^{331}\) yad ucyate (91.15f.) svaniścaye 'naṅgabhāvagamanāt parapratyāyanārthaṃ jijñāsādy-
anabhidhānām ity atra brūmaḥ: na uktavāt / uktam (89.16ff.) etat purastād vyākhyāṅgam
jijñāsādayaḥ <iti> / sarvasya cāṅgadhiṣṭāḥ kartavya ity evamārthaṃ śaśravyākhyāṇam vipaścidbhīḥ
pratāyate na svārthaṃ svasaṅgabadhyarthāṃ vā / tatraivām kalpyamāne ye vystūddīyād tān prati
<naisām ānarthkayam(?)> / athaitad aniśtaṃ yad uktam sandigdhaṁ ṽāryāyavatpānabuddhy-
anugraḥārtho hi satām viṁśayaḥ esām āvāsyakam abhidhānām ācakṣmahe / (YD on SK 6, p. 93, l.
12 – p. 94, l. 3).

\(^{332}\) vākyam antarenārthasya buddhyantare saṃkrāmayitum aśakyatvāt (YD on SK 6, p. 89, ll. 14-15).
situation involving the teaching of Sāṃkhya knowledge in particular, shows the importance of the formal inference in the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine. This interpretation of inference, as a tool for the exposition of śāstra, will be brought to bear upon the discussion in CHAPTER V of the YD’s conception of the role of authoritative testimony (āptavacana) and its relation to inference.

According to the YD, the ten-membered inference constitutes the direct (vīta) form of inference, as contrasted to the indirect (avīta) form of inference. The direct inference is defined as the employment of a reason (hetu) to prove a thesis (sādhyā), without eliminating other positions (pakṣa). The indirect inference uses the elimination of other possibilities in order to establish the thesis. As an example of indirect inference, the commentator gives the inference that the universe arises from primordial Materiality (pradhāna), based on the elimination of atoms (paramāṇu), Consciousness (puruṣa), the Lord (īśvara), [previous] actions (karma), fate (daiva), time (kāla), innate nature (svabhāva), and chance (yadṛccchā), as possible sources of the universe. As will be shown below, in the discussion of the YD’s definition of śeṣavat inference (under which the above example can be classified), it is evident that, according to the YD, the indirect inference may be used as an aid to establish the thesis of a direct inference. With regard to the example of primordial Materiality, under SK 8 the commentator illustrates the joint use of direct

333 tatra yadā vīto hetuḥ svabhūdāv avahitaviṃśhānasvarūpam vijñānāntaram ādādhānena vaktṛa pratipādyādau vākyabhāvam upānyate—vākyam antareṇārthaḥya buddhyantare samkrāmayitum asākyatvāt—tadāvayavivākyam parikalpyate / (YD on SK 6, p. 89, ll. 12-15).
334 tatra yadā hetuḥ parapakṣam <an>apekṣya yathārthena svarūpena sādhyāsiddhāv apadiśyate tadā vītākhyo bhavati / yadā tu svasādhyād arthāntarabhūtānām prasaṅgīnām kṣepam apohaṃ kṛtvā pariśeṣataḥ sādhyāsiddhāv apadiśyate tadāvītākhyo bhavati tadyathā na cet paramāṇupuruṣeṣvara-karmadavākālasvabhāvädyacchābhhyo jagadutpatti sambhavati pariśeṣataḥ pradhānād iti tadā punar avitākhyo bhavati / (YD on SK 6, p. 89, ll. 7-12).
and indirect inference in establishing that the non-perception of *pradhāna* is due to its subtlety rather than non-existence.\(^{335}\)

The YD also accepts the threefold classification of inference into *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. The commentator interprets *pūrvavat* inference as the inference of an effect from the perception of its cause (or causes),\(^{336}\) *śeṣavat* as the inference of a cause from its effect,\(^{337}\) and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* as inference based on the general perception of the association of two related characteristics.\(^{338}\) The YD’s interpretation of *pūrvavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* is thus essentially the same as that of GBh and MV, although its interpretation of *śeṣavat* is somewhat different; the YD takes the term *śeṣa* to refer to an effect rather than a remainder.

The YD offers several examples of the *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* forms of inference, several of which are dismissed on the basis of an opponent’s objections. For *pūrvavat*, the commentator first offers the example, also given by GBh and MV, of the inference of rain from the perception of clouds. This is rejected by an opponent, since rain does not invariably result from the presence of clouds. A revised definition of *pūrvavat* inference is then accepted, according to which the causal power (*kāraṇaśakti*) must be accompanied by the instrumental or

---

\(^{335}\) aha: evam api pratiṣiṣṭā<y>a> tarānarthakyaṃ ekena kṛṣṭāvāḥ / saukṣmyāḥ tadanupalabdhir ity ukte ganyata etan nābhāvād iti / tasmāt tadvacanam anarthakam iti / ucyate: na viśāyaparigrahāh satvatvāt / evam siddhe yat pratiṣiṣṭāvāyaṃ karoti taj jñāpati acāryo (cf. MBhya 1.33.17, 1.35.9 et passim) viśāyāh bhavyam abhiprārthasiddhiḥ <iti>/ prāk ca saukṣmyāṭāvāyaṃ tadanupalabdhir ity ācāksānāḥ pratipādayati purastād viśāya pravoktavyā c / ekasmiṃ ca viśaye dvau pravuṇjanāḥ samuccayena siddhim dyostayati / kim siddham bhavati / yad uktam tantrāntariyaiḥ na prthakpratipattihetū viśāyau iti tad iṣṭam eva sanghṛitam bhavati / tatra viśāya pratiṣiṣṭāḥ saukṣmyāḥ tadanupalabdhiḥ tatra cāvātāya prasajyidharmāntaranivṛttirūpena nābhāvāt / hetur ubhayayogī / katham / yasya pratyakṣato ‘nupalabdhiḥ (SK8a) drṣṭā tadyathendriyānaṃ / yadi punar asyābhāvad anupalabdhiḥ syāt, kāryaṃ ‘nupalabdhiḥprasadanghaḥ / asti ceyam kāryaṃ upalabdhiḥ / tasmāt nābhāvāt (SK8b) / na ced abhāvāvita pariśeṣyāḥ saukṣmyāḥ tadanupalabdhiḥ (SK 8a) iti / (YD on SK 8ab, p. 106, l. 14 – p. 107, l. 10).

\(^{336}\) tatra pūrvavad yadā kāraṇam abhyuditaṃ drṣṭāvā bhavisyatvam kāryasya pratipadyate (YD on SK 5, p. 83, ll. 6-8).

\(^{337}\) śeṣavat yadā kāryam<r>vṛttinīṃ drṣṭāvā kāraṇasadbhāvaṃ pratipadyate (YD on SK 5, p. 84, ll. 2-3).

\(^{338}\) sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ nāma yatraiṇakāraṇthayā<y<r> avayabhicāram upalabhya deśāntare kālāntare ca tajjātīyayor avayabhicāraṃ pratipadyate (YD on SK 5, p. 85, ll. 4-6).
assisting powers (*kāriśakti*) necessary for bringing about the effect and free from obstructions to the production of the effect. The example given for this is the inference of the production of a pot from the perception of clay possessed by a potter who is working and in possession of a wheel, water, an irod rod and other instruments. The YD thus offers a more sophisticated definition of *pūrvavat* inference than GBh or MV. According to this definition, causality depends upon the fulfillment of certain necessary conditions.

The YD offers three examples of *śeṣavat* inference, interpreted as the inference of a cause from the perception of its effect, that are successively rejected by an opponent. These are the inference of the union of a couple from the perception of a child, the inference that the sun or moon has risen from the perception of a red sky, and lastly the inference, included by Māṭhara under his definition of *pūrvavat* inference, that it has rained from the perception of a flooded river. The opponent objects in each of these cases that the effect does not invariably arise from the particular cause mentioned. The final example offered by the proponent is the inference of a root from the perception of a leaf or the inference of a seed from the perception of a sprout. He then suggests that the three previously rejected examples can be considered valid examples of *śeṣavat* inference if made in conjunction with indirect (*avīta*) inference, through which other possible causes are eliminated by taking into account particularities of place (*deśa*), time (*kāla*), or characteristic marks (*liṅga*).
The YD begins by defining *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* as an inference based on the perception of an invariable association between two objects, offering the stock example of the inference of fire from the perception of smoke, based on their invariable association. An opponent objects that this definition would apply also to inference from cause to effect (*pūrvavat*) and from effect to cause (*šeṣavat*), to which the proponent replies that *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* functions with regard to objects existing simultaneously, giving the example, similar to that given by GBh and MV of the flowering mango trees, of the inference that the fruits of other trees are ripe from the observation of ripe fruit in one tree. The opponent objects that the fruits of all trees do not ripen simultaneously. The proponent then offers a definition of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* equivalent to the definition of *šeṣavat* given by GBh and MV, citing the example of the inference of the saltiness of the ocean based on the taste of one drop, as well as the additional example of the inference that all the rice in a pot has been cooked after tasting one grain. The opponent objects that according to this definition, *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference would not serve as a source of knowledge of Consciousness (*puruṣa*), since there is no object similar to it, thus contradicting the statement in SK 6 that knowledge of suprasensuous things (*atīndriya*) is attained through *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference (see §IV.5). The proponent then offers a definition of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* as the inference of one characteristic (*dhārma*) from

prabhānuraṇjītām antarikṣam drśtvā candrārkayor udāyam pratipadyate tadā śeṣavat / āha: etad api nāsty udāharaṇam anekānāt / na hi prabhāmuraṇgo 'ntarikṣe candrārkanimitta eva bhavati / kim tarhi / digdāhādīnimitto 'pi / ucye: yadā tarhi nadīpuram drśtvā vṛṣṭim pratipadyate tadā śeṣavat / āha:etad api nāsty udāharaṇam anekānāt / nadīpurasya hi nimitmanekevadhim bhavati hiṃvīlayanasetubhasanagajakridādi / tasmād ayuktam etat / ucye: yadā tarhi parṇaṃ drśtvā śālukam pratipadyate 'ṅkurum va drśtvā bijam iti tadā śeṣavat / atihāvā punar astu pūrv<am>

evodāharaṇam / yat tūktam (83.9) anekānāt ityatra brūmah: viśvāsāmarthyāt / viśvāsāhāyām hetubhūtabhyām abhiprātārthasiddhir iti vakṣyāmah / prasadāharmāntaraniyāntumukhena cāvītaprayogaḥ / tatra yadā prasaṅgināṁ himavīlayanādīnāṁ deśaṅkālaṅgaiḥ pratiśedhāḥ kriyate tadā muktasāmśayaṁ pratipattir bhavati / deśitas tāvat tadāyāt dākuśīnāpate nāsti himavīlayanasambhavaḥ / kālato yathā prāvṛtikāle / liṅgato 'pi yasmān mudgagavedhukasamākāṣaḥatraṃprasakṛto bhavati / amupalambhas tathāsūkhaṃ upalambhāḥ / tasmāt parīśeṣato meghanā evāma iti / tasmā nānekāntaḥ / evaṁ kriyā pūrvyaṇaḥ api udāharaṇaṃ upapannāni bhavanti deśādīvīcārasāmrthāḥ / (YD on SK 5, p. 84, l. 2 – p. 85, l. 4).
another, based on their invariable association, giving the example of sāmānyatodrśta
found in the GBh of the inference of the movement of the heavenly bodies from their
change in position, as well as additional example of the inference of growth in the
case of plants and trees from the observation of their height, having already observed
that the height of a building is caused by growth. The opponent objects that these
are merely examples of inference from effect to cause (śeṣavat), thus making śeṣavat
identical with sāmānyatodrśta. The proponent’s reply to this objection is somewhat
obscure. He rejects the opponent’s criticism on the basis of the presence of a rule
(niyama) in śeṣavat inference that is absent from sāmānyatodrśta inference, and
gives as examples of sāmānyatodrśta the inference of the general quality of being for
the sake of another from the general quality of being an aggregate, used to prove the
existence of Consciousness (cf. SK 17a: saṃghātaparārthaḥ), and the inference
that sound (śabda) is non-eternal from the fact that it is produced.341

341 sāmānyatodrśtaṁ nāma yatraṇadārthā<o>r avyabhicāram upalabhyā desāṇtare kālāntare ca
tajjātyayor avyabhicāram pratipadyate tadyathā kvacid dhūmagnisambandhamā dhṛṣṭā
cvacid dhūmāntarāṇyantarāsāṣṭīvum pratipadyate / āha: naitad āsty udāharanaṁ avīśesaprāsangāt /
sarvatraiva hy anumāne kvacid arthayor avyabhicāram upalabhyānyatra tajjātyayor arthayor
avyabhicāram pratipadyate tadyathā kvacit sādhanavatō mṛtipiṇḍūd ghaṭaṁśīptam upalabhyānyatra
sādhanavatō piṇḍāntarād ghaṭāntaranīṃśīptam pratipadyate / tathaikātra nadīpiṇḍūrd vṛṣṭīm
upalabhyānyatra nadīpiṇḍūrd vṛṣṭyantarām avastāye / tathā ca satī trayāṁ avīśesaprāsangāh /
cyate: yadā tarhi saḥabhuvām ekaśya visīṣṭaṇaṁ upalabhyāḥ sesāṁ api tadāvattam anumāṇyate
tadā sāmānyatodrśtaṁ tadyathā vṛksād ekaśya phalasya pākām upalabhyāḥ sesāṁ phalāṁ
vrkṣāntaraṇām ca pāko 'numīyate / āha: etad api nāṣy udāharanam anekāntāt / na hi sarveṣāṁ
phalānām tvakālam pāko bhavati pūrvaparākālānaṁvāt nāmītiḥbhaddac ācārye bhavati
daridrād ekaṁ udābindum prāśya sesāṣya lāvañatānumīyate, saḥāyaṁ vaikam pułākāṁ upalabhyāḥ
sesānāṁ pākā 'numīyate tadā sāmānyatodrśtaṁ / āha: naitad āsty udāharanaṁ akṛtsnasaṅgṛahāt
vāksyeṁ ayaṁ upariṣṭād ācāryaḥ

sāmānyatas tu ṛṣṭād aśāntdyāntāṁ prasiddhir anumāṇāt / (SK6ab)

iti / tatraivaṁ pramāṇe parikalpyamāṁ kārāṇyākāraṇaṁ yataḥ saṅgāhāṇāṁ ca sukhalabhkhamoha-
svabhāvopalamḥāt tanmātrāmāṁkāramahatpradhānāṁ samadhisamāṁ na pariṣyāya
tajjātyārthānupalambhāt / cyate: yadā tarhi kvacid dharmena dharmāntarāsāṣṭīvum
upalabhyākadharmopalamhād bhinnajātaye 'yantānupalabdhāhyasa dharmāntarasya pratipattis tadā
sāmānyatodrśtaṁ tadyathā devadatto gamanāḥ desāntaraṇaprāptim upalabhyāytanāntārāṣṭram jyotisāṁ
desāntaraṇaprāpti gamanam anumāṇyate / tathaḥ prāśāddānāṁ vṛddhipāravakam dīgṛḥavatvam
upalabhyāsādṛśhvanaspītānāṁ dīgṛḥavatvāsam anumāṇyate / āha: naitad āsty udāharanaṁ
pūrvnāvīśeṣāt / kārātā karāṇasādṛśhgamah saśavad iti pūrvāṁ atiśṛṣṭāṁ bhavata /
atāpi ca desāntaraṇaprāptiśākṣaṇāṁ kārāyā gatilakṣaṇāya kārāṇasādṛśhgamāh / tasmaā
cheṣāvatā sāmānyatodrśtaḥ arhadeprasāsīghaḥ / cyate: na anyayām / yatra hi nīyamataḥ kāṛye
kāraṇam adhīghamyate tac cheṣavad iti ayaṁ asmadabhisandhiḥ / na tu tad astī sāmānyatodrśtaṁ
kasmāt / saṃghātavasāmāṇyāt pārārthyaśāmāṇyasadhanam api dhīyate / yathāha—
translates *niyama* as ‘regular causal relation’ and takes the proponent’s point to be that *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference is not based (like *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat*) upon a causal relation, thus making it a key tool in establishing the existence of Consciousness, which is not involved in any causal relation.

Although the YD’s explanations of the forms of inference are generally similar to those of the GBh and MV, the evidence of the YD offers a number of insights absent from the other two texts. The YD offers a most sophisticated definition of *pūrvavat* inference, an additional classification of inference into *vīta* and *avīta*, and an illustration of the ten members of formal inference (five of which are also accepted by the later MV, which otherwise generally follows the GBh). The YD also shows that the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*, *vīta* and *avīta* forms of inference are useful in establishing the existence of the Sāmkhya *tattvas*, particularly of the two primary *tattvas* (*prakṛti* and *puruṣa*).

A noticeable difference in the manner of classification of the forms of inference is apparent from the YD to the later TK, which perhaps testifies to a loss of knowledge of the intricacies of Sāmkhya epistemology after the period in which the YD was composed.

The TK also mentions the twofold division of inference into direct (*vīta*) and indirect (*avīta*) and the threefold division into *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, but does not mention the members (*avayava*) of inference (ten in the YD, five in the MV). Moreover, its interpretation of the relationship between the twofold division (into *vīta* and *avīta*) and the threefold division (into *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*) is somewhat different from that attested by the YD.

---

<vyā>bhicārād viśeṣās tu pratītāḥ pratipādakāḥ // (PS.2.19cd; PSV.:Peking.Ce.32a8-32b1, 113b5-6; Derge.Ce.31a7)

iti / sādhyasādhanasāmānyayor api drśyate / yathānityah śabdah kṛtakatvād iti / tatraivaṃ sati niyamavādīnaḥ pratijñāhānāḥ // (YD on SK 5, p. 85, l. 4 – p. 86, l. 23).

Vācaspati equates *avīta* with *šeṣavat* and *vīta* with *pūrvavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. This correlation is absent from the YD, although the use of *avīta* is mentioned in connection with *šeṣavat* inference in the YD (see above).

The TK interprets *avīta* or *šeṣavat* inference as having ‘that which remains’ as its object and presents an example of this type of inference in the context of its discussion of SK 9, which presents the Sāṃkhya position that an effect pre-exists in its cause (*satkāryavāda*; see §II.1). Here, Vācaspati gives a series of proofs for the identity of cause and effect, based on the example of threads and the cloth which they produce. Each of these reasons consists in the presentation of a relation between two objects different in nature, the inapplicability of which to the case of the threads and cloth is then demonstrated. This is somewhat different from the illustration of *avīta* inference in the YD, where it is used to establish a cause by the elimination of all possible alternative causes (see above). HARZER (2006) suggests that the differences between the YD and TK with regard to the interpretation of *avīta*.

---

344 *tatrāvītam šeṣavat* / (TK on SK 5, p. 24, l. 17).
345 *vītam dvedhā—pūrvavat sāmānyato dṛṣṭam ca* / (TK on SK 5, p. 25, l. 1).
346 *śiṣyate pariśiṣyate iti šeṣah, sa eva viśayatavya yasyāsty anumāṇijñānasya tac cheṣavat* / (TK on SK 5, p. 24, ll. 17-18).
347 SK 9: *asadakaraṇād upādānagranhānta sarvasambhavābhāvāt / saktasya sakyakaraṇād kāraṇabhāvāc ca sat kāryam // ‘Because of the non-production of a non-existent thing, because of the relation of a cause [to its instruments], because of the absence of origination from everything, because of the production of that which it is possible [to produce from a particular cause] by that which is capable [of producing that particular effect], and because of the state of being a cause, the effect is [pre-existent in the cause].’*
348 *kāryasya kāraṇābhedasādhanāni—ca pramāṇāni (1) na paṭas tantubhyo bhidyate, tantudharmatvāt / iha yat yato bhidyate tat tasya dharmo na bhavati, yathā gaur aśvasya dharmaś ca paṭas tantunām, tasmān nārthāntaram / (2) upādānopādeya-bhāvāc ca nārthāntaravat tuntapaṭayoh / yavor arthāntaratvam na tayor upādānopādeyabhāvah, yathā ghatapatayoh / upādānopādeyabhāvāḥ ca tantupaṭayoh / tasmān nārthāntaratvam / (3) itaś ca nārthāntaratvam tantupatayoh, smyogāprāpya-bhāvāḥ ca tantupaṭayoh / arthāntaravat hi smyogā dyoṣo yathā kundabardarayoh, aprāptir vā yathā himavadvindhayoh / na ceha smyogāprāpto, smāśāṃ nārthāntaratvam iti / (4) itaś ca paṭas tantubhyo na bhidyate, guruvāntararakaṁyāvraṇanāt / iha yat yasmād bhinnam, tat tasmat tasya guruvāntararakaṁyāvrahayate, yathākāpalyagasya svastikāsyas guruvāntarakaṁyāvrahayam yanavinivēṣas tasmād dvipalikāsyas vāstikāsyas guruvāntarakaṁyāvah ‘vanatibheda dhikāḥ / na ca tatāḥ tantuguruvāntarakaṁyāvrahayat paṭaguruvāntararakaṁyāvrahayate / tasmād abhinnaṁ tantubhyoh paṭa iti / tāny etāny abhedasādhanāny avitāni / (TK on SK 9, p. 47, ll. 12-24).
inference testify to the loss of knowledge of its original function by Vācaspati’s time.349

The TK defines pūrvavat inference as the inference of a universal (sāmānya) based on the previous perception of a particular individual (svalakṣaṇa), giving the example of the inference of fire (as a universal) on a hill from the perception of smoke, based on the the prior perception of a particular fire in a kitchen. Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, on the other hand, is defined as the inference of a universal of which a specific individual has not been perceived. As an example of sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, Vācaspati gives the inference of the faculties (indriya), the particular individuals of which are by their nature beyond perception, based on the fact that there must be an instrument by which sense-objects are perceived.350

Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa is thus, as in the YD, again presented as a key tool for establishing knowledge of certain Sāṃkhya tattvas.

The TK’s interpretation of inference, perhaps as a reflection of the text’s late date, thus differs greatly from those of the GBh, MV, and YD, although its interpretation of sāmānyatodṛṣṭa is similar to that of the YD and not incompatible with that of GBh and MV. It is this third form of inference which will prove most relevant to the discussion of the production of Sāṃkhya knowledge, since it allows

350 tatvaikam dr̥taśvalakshaṇasāmānyaviṣayaṁ yat tat pūrvavat, pūrvaṃ prasiddham, dr̥taśvalakshaṇasāmānyam iti yāvat, tad asya viśayatvānāstī anumānaṇānāyasyeti pūrvavat / yathā dhūmad vaṁśitvasāmānyaviṣayaḥ parvate 'numiṣate, tasya vaṁśitvasāmānyaviṣayasyasvalakṣaṇam vaṁśitviṣeyaḥ dr̥ṣṭo rasavatyām / aparasaṃ ca viṁśaṇāḥ yatiṣteṣaḥ vahniṣṭhaḥ sāmānyaviṣayam / yathāhṛtiṣṭharṣiṣṭam anumāṇam / atra hi rūpādiṣṭanānām kriyātvena karaṇaḥvattvam anumāṇate / yady api karaṇaṭvaśāmānyasya chirādāpu ṣvaṁśitvaśvalakṣaṇam upalabdhān, tathā 'p' vaṁśiṣṭaṃ rūpādiṣṭiṣṭāne karaṇaṭvaṃ anumāṇate tajjātiṣṭaṃ karaṇaṣṭaṃ na dr̥ṣṭaṁ svalakṣaṇaṃ prayaṣkena / indriyaḥ jātiṣṭaṃ hi tat karaṇaṃ, na cendraṣṭvaśāmānyasya svalakṣaṇaṃ indriyaḥ jātiṣṭaṃ prayakṣaṣgocaro rūpādiṣṭaṃ, yathā vaṁśiṣṭāvaśāmānyasya svalakṣaṇaṃ vahnaḥ / so 'yaṃ pūrvavataḥ sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭāt saty api viṣaytena tulyatvā viṁṣetaḥ / atra ca dr̥ṣṭaḥ darśanam, sāmānyata iti sāmānyasya, sārvaṃśiṣṭaṃ tattvaḥ / adṛṣṭaśvalakṣaṇasya sāmānyaviṣesasya sārvaṃśīṣṭaṃ darśanam sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam anumāṇam ityarthāḥ / sarvaṃśaśiṣṭaṃ asmābhir nyāyaśvārtikatātparyāṭiṣṭhānam vyutpādatītām iti nekhoṣṭam vistarābhivyātā // (TK on SK 5, p. 25, ll. 1-14).
for the ascertainment of objects beyond sensory experience (cf. SK 6 and discussion in §IV.5).

As has been shown above, the YD provides a good deal of information on the ways in which inference is used to establish the primary objects of the Sāṃkhya enquiry. In the YD, sāmānyatodṛṣṭa is presented as the key to establishing the existence of Consciousness (puruṣa), which is by nature exempt from any causal relation. The inference of Consciousness is also used to illustrate the ten-membered formal expression of a direct (vīta) inference. The commentator makes use of the indirect (avīta) inference in establishing the existence of Materiality (prakṛti). The evidence of the YD also shows that the vīta and avīta inferences may be used in conjunction. In addition, the implications of the YD’s presentation of the ten members of formal inference will be used in Chapter V to clarify the commentator’s assumptions with regard to the relationship between inference and authoritative testimony (āptavacana) in the context of the transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge.

§3. The commentators’ views on the pramāṇa of authoritative testimony (āptavacana).

The third and final pramāṇa accepted by the Sāṃkhya tradition is authoritative testimony (āptavacana). The SK tells us that what is beyond the sphere even of sāmānyato dṛṣṭa inference can be apprehended through āptavacana (SK 6; see §IV.5). However, it has generally been assumed that āptavacana holds little value in the Sāṃkhya tradition with regard to the production of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya
Although Larson (1979) speculates that āptavacana ‘is probably used primarily with respect to the tradition of Sāṃkhya teachers’, the general lack of attention in Sāṃkhya studies given to the relation of āptavacana to the production of Sāṃkhya knowledge is primarily a consequence of the fact that the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries have little to say in this respect. However, some of the evidence of the YD suggests links between the notion of āptavacana, the transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge, and the use of inference to establish the existence of the Sāṃkhya tattvas.

In general, the commentators’ interpretations of āptavacana are similar in their essential aspects, although the evidence of the YD provides more information regarding the sources of āptavacana and suggests links between this pramāṇa and the tradition of Sāṃkhya texts and teachers. A summary of the commentator’s interpretations of āptavacana follows below. A more detailed discussion of the YD’s treatment of this pramāṇa and its applicability to the rṣi Kapila will be presented in Chapter V.

The GBh states that what is not apprehended by perception or inference is apprehended by authoritative testimony and mentions three statements as examples of authoritative testimony: ‘Indra is the king of the gods’; ‘there is [the land of] the northern Kurus’; and ‘there are nymphs (apsaras) in heaven’. These statements are presumably given as examples of the communication of information which cannot be confirmed by perception or inference but which must be taken on trust in the authority of the speaker. This is typical of statements made by the Vedas and their ancillaries—that is, statements which must be taken on trust in the infallibility of

---

351 E.g., FRAUWALLNER (1973), p. 274: ‘The acceptance of trustworthy communication which includes the holy tradition is a later concession to a growing Brāhmaṇa orthodoxy and is for the system practically unimportant.’
352 LARSON (1979), p. 159.
353 The testimony provided by the TK with regard to Kapila in this context will also be introduced in §V.5.
Vedic revelation. Following these statements, Gauḍapāda quotes two verses explaining that authoritative testimony is equivalent to doctrine (āgama), and that an authority (āpta) is one whose faults have been eradicated and who thus would not utter a false statement, who is intent on his own duty, who is free from passion and hatred, and who is always respected by other people of this kind. In other words, the authoritative status of a statement depends on the credentials of the speaker.

SK 5d defines āptavacana as āptaśruti. GBh reads the latter compound as a dvandva, meaning authorities (āpta) and revelation (śruti). Gauḍapāda defines authorities as teachers (ācārya), including Brahmā and others, and revelation simply as the Veda.

The MV mentions Brahmā and Sanatkumāra as examples of authoritative individuals who are free from passion and hatred, and gives the following statements as examples of authoritative testimony: ‘there are nymphs in heaven’; ‘there is a divine grove, where are particular sounds, etc.’; and ‘there is an occupant in the celestial chariot (vimāna)’. Again, these are examples of statements which cannot be confirmed through perception or inference by an ordinary human being.

Māṭhara gives the same interpretation of āptaśruti as the GBh and then adds that an authority (āpta) is one who has directly ascertained objects in accordance with reality, thus has ‘the qualities [of things] placed [directly] before the eyes’

---

354 pratyakṣenānumāṇena vā yo ’rtho na grhyate sa āptavacanād grāhyah / yathā—indro devarājah, uttarāḥ kuravah svaṛgāḥ psarasāḥ ityādī / pratyakṣenānumāṇagṛhīyam athāptavacanād grhyate / api coktām—āgamo hy āptavacanām, āptam doṣakṣayād viduḥ /

ksipadoṣo nṛtāṁ vākyam na brāyād dhetvasambhavāt // svakarmāya abhiyuṅto yah saṅgadveṣa vivarjitaḥ /
pūjītas tadvidyair nityām āpto īṣeyah sa tādṛṣṭāḥ // (GBh on SK 4, p. 47, ll. 25-31).

355 āptasārūtry āptavacanam ca / āptā ācāryā brahmādayaḥ / śrutir vedaḥ / āptāḥ ca śrutis ca āptasārūty, tad uktam āptavacanam iti / (GBh on SK 5, p. 52, ll. 7-8).

356 yathā svargeḥ psarasāḥ saṁti, nandanaṃ vanam, tatra viśeṣāḥ sabdādaya viṣayā, vimāne ’dhīvāsa iti / āptā rāgadveśādirihitā brahmasanatkumārādayaḥ, śrutir vedaḥ, tābhyaṁ upadiṣṭam tatheti śraddheyam āptavacanam / (MV on SK 4, p. 11, ll. 2-5).
(sākṣātkṛtadharman), a term also occurring in the YD; see §IV.9, V.1-2), and grasps the meaning of revelation in accordance with reality. Here, Māṇḍhara quotes the two verses found in the GBh’s commentary on SK 4, explaining that authoritative testimony (āptavacana) is equivalent to doctrine (āgama) and defining an authoritative person (āpta).

The TK interprets the term āpaśruti differently. Vācaspati interprets the term śruti in this context as the knowledge of a statement, produced by that statement. He thus defines āpaśruti as ‘valid knowledge of the meaning of a statement’.

Vācaspati states that authoritative testimony is preceded by the inference of the connection between a statement and its meaning and suggests that this is why authoritative testimony is defined after inference in the SK. But he also clarifies that authoritative testimony is distinct from inference, since a statement cannot be considered a characteristic mark (liṅga) of the object it expresses. He also states that there need not be any previously perceived connection between a statement and its meaning, giving as an example the work of a new poet who formulates statements not seen before.

357 On the interpretation of this term, see the review of AKLUJKAR (2009) in CHAPTER III.
358 āpaśruti āptavacanaṃ tu / tṛtiyāṃ pramāṇam / āptā brahmādāya acāryāḥ, śrutir vedas tad etad ubhayaṃ āptavacanaṃ / āptih sāksādarthaprāptīḥ yathāarthopalambhāḥ tayā vartata ity āptaḥ sāksātkṛtadharmanā yathāarthāpyāḥ śrutārthagrāhīḥ tad uktam āptacanam / tatrāpi prasiddhilakṣaṇāḥ ganayogāt tīraḥ śabdavṛttayaḥ / tatra lākṣaṇātraividhyam / jahallakṣaṇaḥ jahallakṣaṇaḥ jahadajahallakṣaṇaḥ cetyādī pramāṇaśāsṭreṣu bahutaraḥ prapaṇca āste / tatra prakrāntam eva tāvad abhihiyate bhagavataḥ kapilasya matam /
āgamo hy āptavacanam āptam dosakṣayād viduh / kṣiṇadoṣo nṛtṛṃ vākyam na brīyād dhetvasambhavāt // svakarmany abhyuktō yo rāgadesavivarjitaḥ /
pūjitas tadvidhair nityam āpto jīveyaḥ sa tādṛśaḥ // (MKV on SK 5, p. 13, ll. 11-22).
359 āptā prāptā yukteti yāvat / āptā cāsau śrutiś ceti āpaśrutiḥ śrutīḥ vākyajāntiṃ vākyārthatānām / (TK on SK 5, p. 26, ll. 26-27).
360 pravojyavṛdhaprayātprayātyitujñānānāmānānapūrvakatvāc chadārthasambandhagraḥanāsya, svārthasambandhajānānasahakārīṇas ca sābdasyaarthaprātyāyuktāvād anumānānapūrvarkatvam ity anumānānāntaranāṃ sabda lakṣayati—āpaśruti āptavacanaṃ tu iti / (MKV on SK 5, p. 26, ll. 22-25).
361 tu sabdānāmānād vṛṣavacchinti / vākyārthato hi prameyo, na tu taddharmo vākyam, yena tatra liṅgaṃ bhavet / na ca vākyam vākyam vākyārthatām bodhyat sambandhagraḥanām apekṣate,
The TK also states that authoritative testimony is valid because it is grounded in the Veda, which is not composed by humans and free from deficiencies and doubts, and that not only the Veda itself but also the traditional texts (smṛti), epics (itihāsa), and mythological texts (purāṇa) are considered authoritative because they are grounded in the Veda. This twofold classification of authoritative testimony, traditionally formulated as a distinction between Āptavacana does not essentially conflict with that of the previous two commentators.

The YD interprets the term Āptaśruti as an ekaśeṣa ('single remainder'), an interpretative technique also used in the YD's interpretation of the term Āptavacana in the context of its definition of the pramāṇa of perception (see §IV.1). According to this interpretation, the term Āptaśruti refers both to the Veda (Āptavacana), which is by nature authoritative (Āptavacana), and to the statements (Āptavacana) of reliable people (Āptaśruti), which include traditional texts (smṛti), the limbs of the Veda (vedāṅga), texts treating logic (tarka), the epics (itihāsa), and the mythological texts (purāṇa), as well as the statements of learned, good men who are engaged in various arts (śilpa). The commentator also specifies that an authoritative statement is made by one who is free from passion, etc.
Interestingly, given the SK’s rejection of the Veda as a means to liberation (see §II.3), the author of the YD describes the Veda in this context as ‘functioning for the sake of the ultimate bliss of human beings’ (*puruṣaniḥśreyasārtham pravartamānah*). This could be taken as an instance of mere lip-service to the Veda, such as is apparent elsewhere in Śaṅkhyā texts. However, as will be discussed further in §V.1, in another context (under SK 2) the YD goes to great lengths to show that the Veda does not contradict Śaṅkhyā doctrine but in fact supports it.\(^{365}\)

The YD thus promotes a continuity of authority between the Veda and Śaṅkhyā śāstra.

Later in the text, in the context of its commentary on SK 6cd, the YD specifies that the condition of authority (*āptatva*) is applicable to people described as *īśvaramaharṣi*\(^ {366}\), ‘who are free from faults such as passion, who are of undoubted intelligence, and who have seen suprasensuous objects, or to anyone else (i.e. besides an *īśvaramaharṣi*) who has these characteristics’. Further, the statements of a person in his own field of learning are considered necessarily valid. The maintenance of each body of teaching (*śāstra*) is given as the reason for this latter provision.\(^ {367}\) One would assume that Śaṅkhyā śāstra would be included in this provision. The YD-*kāra* thus appears to make room for the transmission of Śaṅkhyā doctrine in his definition of the function of *āptavacana*.

The YD’s classification of the sources of authoritative testimony thus basically accords with those given in the GBh, MV, and TK, although in the latter

---

\(^{365}\) See MOTEGI (2006), pp. 47-52, for an analysis of this discussion in the YD.

\(^{366}\) See CHAPTER III for BRONKHORST (1983)’s contribution to the discussion of this problematic term, and further discussion in §V.3.

\(^{367}\) vyāpatagarāgādidoṣānām asandigdhamatīnām atīndriyārthadrśvanām īśvaramaharsinām āptatvam ācakṣmahe na sarveṣām / yadi vānyo ’py evanṛdharmo ’sti bhavatu pramāṇam / kim cānām / svaviṣaye ca tatprāmāṇyasyādṛśavattvāt / yasya khalv api / yyo viśayās tasya tasmin viśaye vaco ‘ntarenāpi sādhanaṃ pramāṇam ity avaṣyam abhyapagantavyam / itarātha pratiśāstram ācārasthitīniyamānām adṛṣṭārthānām apratipattī syāt / (YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, ll. 4-10).
three texts the provision for the maintenance of śāstra is not explicitly given. As will be discussed further in §V.2, this provision by the YD appears to reflect the text’s broader interpretation of the nature of the transmission of doctrine from generation to generation.

The YD mentions that the objects of authoritative testimony are ‘completely beyond perception’ (atyantaparokṣa). However, later the commentator states that the objects of authoritative testimony include both those objects the knowledge of which is obstructed for some reason and those objects completely beyond perception (atyantaparokṣa) and devoid of any common characteristic (by which they might be inferred). As examples of the latter category, he lists heaven (svarga), liberation (apavarga), and the gods (deva).

The fact that the YD leaves room for the attainment through authoritative testimony of knowledge of things normally capable of being perceived or inferred (this inference being hindered in some way), not just of knowledge of things completely beyond the sphere of perception and inference, will become crucial to the discussion of the transmission of Sāṁkhya doctrine in §V.2, where it will be shown that inference and authoritative testimony tend to overlap with regard to their application in the transmission of doctrine.

However, like the TK, the YD makes a point of distinguishing authoritative testimony from inference. The YD gives as a reason for this the fact that not all statements but only those which are authoritative can be considered valid means of

---

368 āptavacanaṁ tu pramāṇabhūtvādārako 'tyantaparokṣe 'ṛthe niścaya ity uddeśamātram idam / (YD on SK 4ab, p. 70, ll. 14-15).
369 etad uktam bhavati: tasmād api sāmānyatodṛṣṭād anumānād yan na siddhyati prayākṣaṇaṁ api svayam adṛṣṭām kāraṇāntarapratibaddhaviśayabhāvam atyantaparokṣaṁ vā svargāpavarga-devatādi dharmasāmānyarahitaṁ td āptāgamāt sādhyam / (YD on SK6ed, p. 99, ll. 10-13).
knowledge. The commentator later gives a lengthy argument in defense of this distinction.

It is clear from all of the commentaries that the texts of the Sāṃkhya tradition (assuming that they are composed by authoritative individuals) can be classed among the sources of authoritative testimony, although this fact is generally implicit. Although the YD and TK both emphasize the distinction between inference and authoritative testimony, the YD makes clear that formal inference is an essential tool in the explanation of a śāstra (see §IV.2), the maintenance of which is provided for in the YD’s definition of authoritative individuals. Thus, we can say that for an authority such as a Sāṃkhya commentator, formal inference serves as a tool by which to transmit Sāṃkhya doctrine through the medium of authoritative testimony, by demonstrating the inferential process by which Sāṃkhya principles are established. In this and other respects (see §V.1-2), the evidence of the YD suggests that āptavacana can be seen to hold more value in Sāṃkhya than generally assumed.

§4. The inclusion of other means of knowledge under the headings of
perception, inference, and authoritative testimony.

Although the Sāṃkhya tradition accepts only three pramāṇas, various other pramāṇas are accepted by other schools. As mentioned in §II.4, the SK states that all other pramāṇas are included within the three accepted in Sāṃkhya. The manner in which the commentators attempt to illustrate the inclusion of other pramāṇas in

370 tuśabdo 'vadhāraṇārthaḥ / āptaśrutir eva āptavacanaḥ na śabdamātram / evam sati yad uktam tantrāntariyaiḥ śimśapādiśabdānām nirvikalpaṃ anumāne 'ntarbhāvas trilakṣaṇatvāt iti tad ayatnataḥ pratikṣiptaṃ bhavatiḥ vyākhyātāni pramāṇān / (YD on SK 5d, p. 87, ll. 12-16).
371 YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, l. 10 – p. 105, l. 9. NAKADA (1992, p. 485) suggests that this argument is a response to the view of the Buddhist logician Dignāga, who denies the validity of āptavacana as a separate pramāṇa.
perception, inference and authoritative testimony, provides some insight into the respective spheres and limits of these pramānas.

SK 4b\textsuperscript{372} suggests that all valid means of knowledge can be subsumed under the categories of perception, inference, and authoritative testimony. Commenting on this portion of the verse, the GBh, MV, TK, and YD illustrate the ways in which the various pramānas accepted by other schools can be considered to fall into one of these three categories.

GBh mentions presumption (arthāpatti), equivalence (sambhava), negation (abhāva), conceptualisation (pratibhā)\textsuperscript{373}, folklore (aśīhya), and comparison (upamāna), and says that these are held by Jaimini (the author of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra).\textsuperscript{374} However, these do not entirely correspond to the usual Mīmāṃsā list of six valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa): presumption (arthāpatti), inference (anumāna), negation (abhāva), perception (pratyakṣa), doctrine (āgama), and comparison (upamāna). The reasons for this discrepancy are unclear, but the pramāṇas dealt with in the YD, MV, and TK correspond, with slight variations, to Gauḍapāda’s list (see below).

Gauḍapāda explains that presumption is included in inference, while equivalence, negation, conceptualisation, folklore, and comparison are all included

\textsuperscript{372} sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt (SK 4b).

\textsuperscript{373} I have chosen to translate pratibhā as ‘conceptualisation’—in the sense of any mental formation of an object of knowledge independent of the operation of the sense-faculties—because this term seems to best cover the range of meanings (‘memory’, ‘intuition’, and ‘imagination’) ascribed to the term in the YD (see below, n. 390), while the other commentators do not offer interpretations of the term. The second interpretation offered by the YD, ‘intuition’, corresponds to the meaning of the term in the Grammarian (vyākaraṇa) tradition.

\textsuperscript{374} sat pramāṇāṇī jaiminiḥ / atha kāṇī tāṇi pramāṇāṇī / arthāpattīḥ, sambhavaḥ, abhāvaḥ, pratibhā, aśīhyaṃ, upamānaṃ ceti sat pramāṇāṇī / (GBh on SK 4, p. 48, ll. 1-3).
in authoritative testimony.\textsuperscript{375} MV’s list is the same as GBh’s, but Māthara includes all six under the category of inference.\textsuperscript{376}

The TK mentions five of the six pramāṇas listed in the GBh and MV, but deals with them in a different order and under SK 5 rather than SK 4. He first explains that comparison (upamāna) functions by means of a combination of perception, inference, and authoritative testimony.\textsuperscript{377} He then argues that presumption (arthaūpatti) should be included in inference,\textsuperscript{378} negation (abhāva) in perception,\textsuperscript{379} equivalence (sambhava) in inference,\textsuperscript{380} and folklore (aithyā) in authoritative testimony.\textsuperscript{381}

The variety in the commentators’ classifications of these pramāṇas suggests that there was no set tradition of interpretation in this regard, and that they were all unsure as to how to deal with the problem. Very little justification is provided for
these classifications in the commentaries discussed above, but the YD presents a more involved discussion, in the course of which some relevant points are raised with regard to the spheres of perception and inference.

The YD deals with seven separate pramāṇas held by other schools, adding gesture (ceṣṭa) to the list in the GBh and MV. The commentator begins this discussion by responding to an opponent who quotes NS 1.1.3, which asserts perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), and testimony (śabda) as the four accepted means of knowledge according to Nyāya, and then quotes an unidentified verse giving six means of knowledge, corresponding to the six accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), testimony (śabda), comparison (upamāna), presumption (arthāpatti), and negation (abhāva). The opponent also mentions that according to others, there are nine pramāṇas, with the addition of equivalence (sambhava), report (aitihya), and gesture (ceṣṭa). The proponent responds by arguing that comparison (upamāna) and report (aitihya) should be included in authoritative testimony and that presumption (arthāpatti), equivalence (sambhava), negation (abhāva), and gesture (ceṣṭa) should be included in inference.

382 pratyakṣa-anumāna-upamāna-śabdaḥ pramāṇāni / (NS 1.1.3, quoted in YD on SK 4ab, p. 70, ll. 18-19).
383 pratyakṣam anumānaḥ ca śabdaḥ copamayaḥ saha / arthāpattir abhāvas ca hetavaḥ sādhyasādhakāḥ / (YD on SK 4ab, p. 70, ll. 20-21).
384 Based on the example given in the YD (iti ha uvāca yājñavalkyaḥ (Bṛh. U. 2.4.13) (YD on SK 4ab, p. 71, l. 4)), the translation ‘report’ for aitihya seems more appropriate, in contrast to its use (as ‘folklore’) in the example offered by GBh, MV, and TK: bravīti loko yathātra vāya śakīṇī pravasatī (GBh on SK 4, p. 48, l. 13); asmin vāya śakīṇī prativasatī iti janā vadanti ity ukte, sā vi ghnān karoit, dhanādi yacchatīti jñānam (MV on SK 4, p. 11, ll. 18-20); iha vāya śaksah prativasati (TK on SK 5, p. 34, l. 21).
385 etāni sambhavaitihyāceṣṭāsaḥ iti navety apare / (YD on SK 4ab, p. 70, ll. 22).
386 tasmāt suṣṭhūktam (71.1) upamaityāvacanam āptopadeśāt siddher iti / (YD on SK 4ab, p. 72, ll. 20-21).
387 arthāpattisaṁbha-vāceṣṭānāṁ anumānaśiddeḥ avacanam ity anuvartate / (YD on SK 4ab, p. 72, l. 22 – p. 73, l. 1; and see ff.).
The YD’s treatment of ‘conceptualisation’ (pratibhā)\textsuperscript{388} as a potential pramāṇa deserves some attention, since it will become relevant to the discussion of the nature of Kapila’s knowledge in Chapter V. The opponent objects that pratibhā, interpreted firstly as memory, should be considered a separate pramāṇa. The proponent argues that the knowledge of which memory consists is gained originally through perception, inference, or authoritative testimony. The opponent then suggests that the innate knowledge of seers (ārṣaḥ sāṁsiddhikaḥ pratayayah) should be considered pratibhā.\textsuperscript{389} The proponent responds by arguing that Kapila’s knowledge was already established (at his birth; cf. the discussion of innate knowledge (sāṁsiddhika jñāna) in §IV.8), so that Kapila had no need to acquire it through a pramāṇa. No reference to other rṣis (besides Kapila) is made here, but the opponent does then suggest that pratibhā be applied to the knowledge of yogins, to which the proponent replies that the knowledge of yogins is included in perception (see §IV.1). Finally, the opponent suggests that pratibhā refers to ‘worldly’ (laukika) knowledge, interpreted as pure imagination. The proponent dismisses this type of knowledge as invalid.\textsuperscript{390} The YD thus dismisses pratibhā as a potential

\textsuperscript{388} See n. 373 above on the translation of the term pratibhā.

\textsuperscript{389} This interpretation of the term pratibhā corresponds to its use in the Grammarian tradition as ‘intuition’.

\textsuperscript{390} aha: pratibhā tarhi pramanāntaram bhaviyati / ucye: keyam pratibhā nāma / aha: yo 'yam anādau samsāre devamanusyatīrāscām abhinne 'rthe bāhye stīrṇādu pratayaye pūrvābhyaśa-vāsānapakṣaḥ kuṇapakāminibhāskṣyādārabhedabhinmapratyaya itikartavyatāṃgam utpadyate sā hi pratibhā / tathā coktam—

yathābhāyaṃ hi vākyebhyo vināpy arthena jāyate /
svapratyayānukāreṇa pratipattir anekadhā // (PS. 5.47; PSV.:Peking.Ce. 82b6, 168b3; Derge.Ce. 7a5)
yena hi yo 'rtho 'bhastah sukhādītvena tasya vināpy tenārthena sabdamātrāt pratipattir utpadyate /
tadyathā vyāghro 'tra prativasatīty akte vināpy bāhyenārthenaḥbhyaśavaśaśad eva svadevaputhu-prabhṛtayo bhavanti / tasmāt pratibhāya devamanusyatīrāscām itikartavyatāṅgatvāt pramāṇam iti /
aha ca—

pramanatvena tām lokāḥ sarvāḥ samanugacchati /
vyaavahārāḥ pravarantāṃ tīrāscām api tadvāsāt // (cf. VP. II.147)
ucye: pratibhāyā dvāṣājāvyātīreṇaṃ rūpāntarānupapateḥ / avacanam ity anuvartate / yadi pūrvābhyaśaḥvāsanāpeyakṣaḥ pratayayā pratibhēty upagamyate tena tarhy aśau pratyaśāṃ anumānam āśāvacaḥ <v> ety etad āpannam / kasātmā / yato na hi dvāṣājāvyātīreṇaṃ pratayayaṝṇam kādācid apy upalabhāmahe / tasmān na te bhāvyo 'rṇāntaram pratibhā / āśapratyayāsambhāvād ayuktam iti cet / syād etat / asty ārṣo hi dvāṣājāvyātīreṇaṃ sarvapadārtheṣu sāṁsiddhikaḥ pratayayā sa prātibho

109
means of knowledge, and instead positions the supernormal knowledge of yogins within the framework of the pramāṇas and the knowledge of Kapila outside of this framework. As has already been discussed (§IV.1), the YD suggests that yogins may gain the ability to directly perceive the subtle elements (tanmātra) as a result of progressive yogic practice. This form of knowledge is here contrasted with the innate ārṣa knowledge of Kapila, who is exempt from such progressive practice as well as from the need to attain knowledge through any pramāṇa.

A contrast can be drawn between this passage in the YD and a statement by Vācaspati in the TK regarding ārṣa knowledge (the knowledge of ṛṣis). Vācaspati states that the three means of knowledge posited by the SK (perception, inference, and authoritative testimony) are only those which apply to ordinary people, since a philosophical treatise (śāstra) is for their benefit, while the ārṣa discrimination (vijñāna) of yogins and gods is not mentioned, since it does not apply to ordinary people. In contrast to the YD, Vācaspati thus does not distinguish between the knowledge of ṛṣis and the knowledge of yogins, nor does he attempt to reconcile their knowledge with the three pramāṇas. The fact that the YD does address these issues appears to reflect a more elaborate conception of the nature of ārṣa knowledge.

bhaviṣyatīti / etac cāpy ayuktam / kasmāt / uktatvāt / uktam (68.12) etat siddharūpaṃ bhagavataḥ paramarṣer jīnām / ato na pramāṇāpeksaṃ iti / yoginām iti cen na anabhupagamāt / na hi yoginām apramāṇāpūrvaṃ jīnām iti yatā tathā vākṣyāmāḥ / sa laukika iti cen na anīścitatvāt / syād etat asti laukikāḥ pratyayo drṣṭādīvyaśireṇa / tadyathā santamase vrajato drāg iti vijñānam utpadyate / stī me prattīghāti dravyam purastād ārdhvaṃ avasthitam iti / tac ca naivam / kasmāt / anīścitatvāt / na hi tatra niścaya utpadyate idam tad dravyam asti purato vā vyaktam astīti / na cāniścitam pramāṇajñānam isyate / kim cānyat / anavasthāprayānavānte tenānavasthāprāpnoti / kim kāraṇam / anavasthānād dhi viṅkārasya <kāmakrodhalobhabhayāviśādādīdvārako> viṅkārasya / samyava mithyā vā yasmād aneka utpadyate tasmin na laukikāḥ pratyayāḥ pratībhā / yat tu khalv idam ucyaite (75.8) arthābhīṣavāsanāpekyāsate api vāyāhṛādiṣu pratīpattī utpadyate iti / satyaṃ etat / sā tu mithyājñānaṃvatī pramāṇatvena na parigṛhyata ity ayam adosāḥ / tasmāt siddham drṣṭādīvyaśireṇa rū̄pāntarānupapevatī pratybhāyāḥ prthagananabhidhānam / (YD on SK 4ab, p. 74, l. 22 – p. 76, l. 12).

391 etac ca laukikapramāṇābhīpream, lokavyutpādaṇārhatvac chāstrasya, tasyativārādhikārāt / ārṣam tu vijñānam yogināṃ ārdhvāsrotasāṃ na lokavyutpādaṇāyālam iti sad api nābhīhitam, anadhikārāt // (TK on SK 4, p. 17, ll. 22-24).
and its role in the formulation and transmission of Śāṃkhya doctrine, as will be discussed in CHAPTER V.

§5. The means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as productive of the discrimination (*vijñāna*) leading to liberation (*mokṣa*).

With regard to the epistemology of Śāṃkhya, the main concern of this study is the production of knowledge specifically leading to liberation (*mokṣa*) and the process by which such knowledge is transmitted through text and doctrine. Therefore, of paramount concern in the present context are the views of the commentators with regard to which means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) lead to the stated goal of Śāṃkhya, i.e. discrimination (*vijñāna*) between the manifest (*vyakta*), the unmanifest (*avyakta*), and the knower (*jīna*; i.e. *puruṣa*) (SK 2; see §II.3).

This is a complex issue, on which none of the commentators entirely agree, and there are even apparent discrepancies within some of the commentaries themselves. Mishra (1961) suggests that none of the commentators grasped the original intent of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, which was to correlate the three *pramāṇas* (perception, inference and authoritative testimony) with the three objects of the Śāṃkhya inquiry: manifest, unmanifest and knower.\(^{392}\) Whatever the merits of Mishra’s hypothesis, which would be difficult to determine with certainty, the evidence of the commentaries provides us with a much more complex picture of the relation of the *pramāṇas* to the attainment of Śāṃkhya knowledge. This issue, particularly in the YD, is also connected with the Śāṃkhya paradigms of the conditions (*bhāva*) and the intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*), to be treated in the second half of this

\(^{392}\) Mishra (1961), pp. 411-413.
The passages examined in the present section will be confined to those which offer explicit connections between the respective spheres of the pramāṇas and the attainment of knowledge of the Śaṁkhya tattvas.

The GBh introduces SK 4 as an explanation of the means of knowledge of the manifest, unmanifest, and knower, and clarifies that some of the tattvas are established through perception, some through inference, and some through authoritative testimony. Strangely, though, in this context Gauḍapāda does not specify which principles are established through which means of knowledge.

However, in his commentary on SK 6, which states that suprasensuous objects are established through sāmānyatadṛṣṭa inference and those not established even through this are established through authoritative doctrine, Gauḍapāda explains that primordial Materiality (pradhāna) and Consciousness (puruṣa) are established through sāmānyatadṛṣṭa inference, while the manifest (vyakta)—presumably including the manifest principles of intellect (buddhi), ego (ahaṅkāra), the five subtle elements (tanmātra), the eleven faculties (indriya), and the five gross elements (mahābhūta)—is established through perception. As examples of the objects to be established through authoritative testimony, he gives the stock examples: ‘Indra is the king of the gods’, ‘there is [the land of] the northern Kurus’, and ‘there are nymphs (apsaras) in heaven’. This interpretation seems to conflict...

393 *evam esāṁ vyaktāvyaktajñānāṁ trayānāṁ padārthānāṁ kaiḥ kiyadbhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ, kena kasya vā pramāṇena siddhir bhavati* // (GBh on SK 4, p. 47, ll. 15-16).
394 *prameyaṁ—pradhānaṁ, buddhiḥ, ahaṅkāraḥ, paṅca tanmātraṁ, ekādaśendriyaṁ, paṅca mahābhūtāṁ, puruṣa iti / etāni paṅcavimśatis tattvāni vyaktāvyaktajñā ity ucyante / tatra kiṁcit pratyakṣena sādhyaṁ, kiṁcid anumāṇena, kiṁcid āgamenetī trividhaṁ pramāṇaṁ uktam //* (GBh on SK 4, p. 48, ll. 18-21).
395 *sāmānyatas tu dyṛṣṭād atiṁdiṛyaṁ prasiddhir anumāṇāṁ / tasmād api ātivaśam parokṣam āptāgamāṁ siddham //* (SK 6); see MISHRA (1961) for an alternative interpretation of the original meaning of this verse.
396 *pradhānapuruṣāv atiṁdiṛyaṁ sāmānyatodṛṣṭānumāṇena sādhyaṁ yasmin mahadādi liṅgaṁ triguṇaṁ / yasyedam triguṇaṁ kāryaṁ tat pradhānam iti / yataḥ cācetanāṁ cetanaṁ ivābhāti, ato ‘nyo dhīśhūtā puruṣa iti / vyaktam prayatnaśaṁsādyam / tasmād api ātivaśam parokṣam āptāgamāṁ siddham / yathā indro devārāhāḥ, uttarāḥ kuravaḥ, svarge ‘apsaras iti parokṣam āptavačanāṁ siddham //* (GBh on SK 6, ll. 7-11).
with his statement under SK 4 that some of the \textit{tattvas} are to be established through authoritative testimony,\textsuperscript{397} as well as with the general Sāṃkhya view that of the manifest principles, only the gross elements (\textit{mahābhūta}) are open to perception by ordinary people. The GBh offers no further evidence to explain these discrepancies.

This classification of the objects of the \textit{pramāṇas} also leaves open the question: what role do the Sāṃkhya texts themselves, presumably to be classed as authoritative testimony, play in the attainment of knowledge of the \textit{tattvas}?

The MV follows the GBh in treating SK 4 as an exposition of the means of knowledge of the manifest, unmanifest, and knower,\textsuperscript{398} but differs from Gauḍapāda by stating that some of the principles are established through perception, some through inference, and some through both authorities (\textit{āpta}) and inference.\textsuperscript{399} If we interpret this to mean that some of the principles can be established either by inference or by authoritative testimony, it would seem to resolve one of the discrepancies apparent in Gauḍapāda’s classification of the principles into objects of perception and inference, which Māṭhara follows.\textsuperscript{400} In this case, we might assume that knowledge of the Sāṃkhya principles normally established through inference (\textit{i.e. prakṛti} and \textit{puruṣa}) could also be gained from the authoritative testimony of a Sāṃkhya teacher. The MV’s commentary on SK 6 also differs from that of the GBh.

\textsuperscript{397} SOLOMON (1974, p. 12 ) notes that the SVS, SV, and SSV bear the same discrepancy: ‘It may be noted that all the commentators say that of the 25 Sāṃkhya principles some are established by pratyakṣa, some by anumāna and some by āgama; but none has mentioned even later what is established by āgama.’

\textsuperscript{398} \textit{eṣām vyaktāvyaktajñānāṃ prameyāṇāṃ sādhanāya pramāṇāṇy āha pramāṇaprameyāpramātr- pramitikramena hi sakalasya siddhir ċṛṣṭā /} (MV on SK 4, p. 4, ll. 13-14).

\textsuperscript{399} \textit{prameyā vyaktāvyaktajñāḥ / pramātā ātmā / tatra trayoviṇātikṣam vyaktam / avyaktam pradhānān / jñāh kṣetrajñāḥ / tad amiśām madhye kiṃcit pratyakṣeṇānyad anumānenetarad āptānāmāṭhambhāyāṃ prāmīyate} (MV on SK 4, p. 10, ll. 13-14).

\textsuperscript{400} \textit{atra pradhānapuruṣaḥ ajñāntāraya tayoḥ sāmānyato dṛṣṭād anumānāt sādhiḥ} / \text{yasmān mahādi līniṣṭam triguṇaḥ dṛṣṭād kāryaṃ takaranam adṛṣṭām āpy asti triguṇaṃ ceta sādhyate pradhānām / na hy asata sadutpattī syād iti / na ca kāraṇāsādṛṣṭam kāryaṃ syād iti / vyaktam tu pratyakṣaṇāvai sādhiḥ iti tadarthe na prayatnaḥ / yasmāj jaḍamākriyāśākṣṭhitucakavāvad avaśyam puruṣa iti jñāsiddhiḥ} // (MV on SK 6, p. 14, ll. 5-11).
in not offering any examples of the objects of authoritative testimony, so Māthara’s intentions with regard to the nature of āptavacana are not entirely clear.

The TK offers yet another classification of the respective spheres of the pramāṇas. Introducing SK 6, Vācaspati states that the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) have been explained (in the previous two verses) for the purpose of establishing the existence of the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower. Vācaspati then explains that the manifest, which he takes to refer to the five gross elements (mahābhūta), is known directly through perception, while pūrvavat inference is used to establish such things as the existence of fire from the presence of smoke. He then introduces SK 6 as an explanation of the means used to establish objects of knowledge difficult to establish by ordinary means and suggests that this explanation is an important function of a philosophical treatise (śāstra).

Although SK 6 mentions only the sāmānyatodṛṣṭa form of inference, Vācaspati takes also śeṣavat inference to be implied (by the use of the particle ca in the verse) as a means of establishing suprasensuous objects of knowledge. Strangely, he does not comment on the establishment of suprasensuous objects through authoritative testimony, but rather lists heaven (svarga), the unseen force of action and consequence (apūrva), deities (devatā), and the order of the manifestation of the manifest principles (intellect, etc.) as objects established through śeṣavat inference (equated by Vācaspati with indirect (avīta) inference; see §IV.2). Thus, according to the TK, the gross elements (mahābhūta) are established through perception,

401 evaṃ tāvad vyakta-vyaktajñalakṣaṇaprameyasyākṣaṇaṃ pramāṇāni lakṣitāni / tatra vyaktāṃ prthivyādi svarūpadāḥ pāṃśulapādākhyā hālikā āṃtā pratyakṣataḥ pratipadāyate, pūrvavatā cānumānāhena dhūmādarśanaṃ vahyādi cāsvarūpaḥ pāṃśulāpi bahucharaḥ pratyakṣaḥ śāstram iti duradhigamam anena vyutpādyām / tatra yat pramāṇam yatra sāktaḥ tad uktakṣaṇe bhayaḥ pramāṇe bhyaḥ niskṛṣya darśayati / (TK on SK 6, p. 35, ll. 1-5).

402 upalaśaṇam caitatt, śeṣavad ity api draṣṭavyam / (TK on SK 6, p. 35, ll. 31-32); tat kiṃ sarveṣv atindriyeṣu sāmānyātō dṛṣṭam eva pravartate / tathā ca yatra tan nāstī mahādādyārambhakrame svargāpūrvavarūpadāhau ca, tatra teṣām abhāvah prāpta ity ata āha—tasmād api iti / tasmād ity etāvataiva siddha ca kāreṇa śeṣavad ity api samuccitam / (TK on SK 6, p. 36, ll. 14-15).
primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*) and Consciousness (*puruṣa*) are established through *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference, and the rest of the principles are established through *šeṣavat* inference. Vācaspati thus seems to have no use for authoritative testimony, at least insofar as the establishment of Sāmkhya knowledge is concerned. It is perhaps significant, though, that he holds the explanation of the inference of these principles to be an important function of the SK as a philosophical treatise (*śāstra*). This can be compared to the YD’s statement that the ‘members of explanation’ (*vyākhyāṅga*) used in formal inference fulfill an important role in the explanation of *śāstra* to those of lesser intellectual capacity.\(^{403}\)

As discussed above (§IV.2-3), the YD makes a provision for the transmission of *śāstra* as a part of the function of authoritative testimony (*āptavacana*) and treats the ten members (*avayava*) of formal inference as a tool for the exposition of *śāstra*, as illustrated by the commentator’s establishment of the existence of Consciousness (*puruṣa*) by means of this formal inference. This suggests that authoritative testimony may serve as the medium by which inferential Sāmkhya knowledge is transmitted from teacher to pupil.

It has also been shown that, according to the YD, the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* form of inference, in particular, is a key tool in the establishing the existence of Consciousness, which is not involved in any relationship of cause and effect, while the indirect (*avīta*) form of inference is used to the establish the thesis that primordial Materiality is the source of the manifest universe (§IV.2). In addition, we have seen that the YD allows for the perception of the subtle elements (*tanmātra*), in addition to the gross elements (*mahābhūta*), by yogins and gods (§IV.1). In summary, several forms of inference are treated by the YD as cooperative tools in the acquisition of

\(^{403}\) See n. 331 (§IV.2).
knowledge of the Sāṃkhya tattvas, although authoritative testimony also appears to play a role in connection with inference, while direct perception of at least some of the higher tattvas is a possibility for extraordinary individuals.

Aside from the evidence discussed above, the YD does not, in the manner of the other commentaries, offer a direct correlation between the various means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) and the manifest, unmanifest and knower as objects of knowledge. However, in the context of another Sāṃkhya paradigm, that of the conditions (bhāva) of the intellect, the commentator distinguishes between ordinary knowledge, which is gained by means of perception, inference, and authoritative testimony, and the extraordinary knowledge of the distinction between Materiality and Consciousness.404 This paradigm, along with the related paradigm of the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga), provides further clarification of the process by which the discrimination (vijñāna) leading to liberation (mokṣa) is attained. The views of the commentators with regard to these two paradigms will be outlined in the following sections (§IV.6-10). The conclusions drawn in these sections with regard to the YD’s views will be explored further in the discussions in CHAPTER V of the commentator’s views on the importance of Kapila’s original formulation of Sāṃkhya knowledge and the tradition to which it gave rise.

404 jñānam dvividham śabdādyupalabdhilaṅkanam guṇapurusāntaropalabdhilaṅkanam ca / tatra śabdādyupalabdhilaṅkanam pratyakṣāntaropalabdhilaṅkanam ca dvividham apūrvam abhyāsajām ca / tayor aprīvam itih śābdo ’dhayānam (SK 51a) iti sādhdhikāntāntiyānti pramāṇāni / abhyāsajām punar vairāgyaparvāvayaparṣṭalabdham śāntam amalam dhruvam sakalabhavābhavapratiṣṭahbhūtaṃ / yad ācāryo vakyatī—
evāṁ tattvābhāṣān nāsmi na me nāham iti aparīśeṣam / aviparyayād visuddham kevalam utpadyate jñānam // (SK 64) iti / (YD on SK 23bc, p. 192, ll. 7-14).
§6. The commentators’ views on the results of the conditions (bhāva).

In the Sāṃkhya system, knowledge of the principles (tattva) underlying the experiential world is considered the only means to liberation (mokṣa). As outlined in Chapter I, the present study seeks to determine how the production of this knowledge in individual seekers is considered to be related to the tradition of Sāṃkhya teachers and texts initiated by the rṣi Kapila. In addition to the paradigm of the three means of knowledge (pramāṇa), which deals with the production of knowledge in general, two other paradigms treated by the Sāṃkhya texts are connected with the production of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya tattvas in particular.

These are the conditions (bhāva) and the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga). Of these, the former also contains information regarding the results of certain objectives often emphasized in other schools of Indian philosophy: the attainment of merit (dharma) through Vedic ritual and ethical conduct, the maintenance of an attitude of dispassion (vairāgya) with regard to the objects of experience, and the attainment of a set of supernatural powers, termed lordliness (aiśvarya) in Sāṃkhya, as a result of yogic discipline.

As outlined in §II.5, Īśvarakṛṣṇa holds that there are eight conditions (bhāva) of the intellect (buddhi): merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), knowledge (jñāna), ignorance (ajñāna), dispassion (vairāgya), passion (avairāgya), lordliness (aiśvarya), and non-lordliness (anaiśvarya). Of these conditions, only knowledge leads to liberation from the cycle of transmigration (samsāra), while the other seven conditions serve to maintain this cycle, determining the circumstances of the subsequent incarnation of the subtle body (liṅga). It is unclear from the SK, however, how the bhāva of jñāna is produced in relation to the operation of the three
pramāṇas accepted in Sāṃkhya. It is also unclear whether any of the other bhāvas may assist in the production of jñāna.

The commentators generally agree in their interpretations of the results of the bhāvas. The YD, however, provides much information not found in the other commentaries, particularly with regard to the bhāva of jñāna and the relationship between jñāna and the other bhāvas (see §IV.7). The function of jñāna in relation to Kapila in the YD will be explored further in Chapter V. Below follows a summary of the commentators’ views on the results of the bhāvas, with attention drawn to the YD’s interpretative contributions.

The GBh explains that the merit (dharma) results in the transmigration of the subtle body (sūkṣmaśarīra) to the worlds of eight kinds of supernatural beings, but mentions only seven in this context: the worlds of Brahmā, Prajāpati, Soma, Indra, the gandharvas, the rākṣasas, and the pīśācas. According to Gauḍapāda, demerit (adharma) results in rebirth in the bodies of cattle, deer, birds, reptiles, and inanimate objects. The MV presents nearly identical lists, with the omission of the world of Soma and the addition of the worlds of the ancestors (pītṛ) and of the yakṣas. The YD also states that eight divine levels can be attained through merit, and five animal levels through demerit, though it does not list them in

---

405 GBh adds the world of the yakṣas as an eighth to this list under SK 53.
406 dharmo nimittam kṛtvā ārdhvaṁ upayāti / ārdhvaṁ ity aṣṭau sthānāni grhyante / tad yathā—brāhmaṁ, prājāpātyaṁ, saumyaṁ, aindraṁ, gāndharvaṁ, rākṣasaṁ, paś只要是īcam iti / tat sūkṣmaśarīraṁ gacchati / pāśurangapakṣisaraṁrasthvāvarṇanteṣv adharmo nimittam / (GBh on SK 44, p. 155, ll.33-35).
407 tatra dharmaṁ nimittam / iha loke dharmo yaḥ kurute tan nimittam kṛtvā sūkṣmaśarīram ārdhvaṁ gacchati / ārdhvaṁ iti aṣṭānāṁ devayanīṁ graham / tatra ādyāṇāṁ brāhmaṁ / prājāpātyaṁ, aindraṁ, pītyaṁ, gāndharvaṁ, yākṣaṁ, rākṣasaṁ paścācam ity etāṁ aṣṭau sthānāṁi sūkṣmaśarīram gacchati / tatra dharmaṁ nimittam, ārdhvaṁgamanāṁ naimittikaṁ / (MV on SK 44, p. 61, ll. 10-14).
408 ukto dharmoḥ / tadanuṣṭhānād aṣṭavikalpāyām tiryaghbhmāv utpattir bhavati / (YD on SK 44a, p. 235, l. 8).
409 adharmaḥ 'py uktaḥ / tadanuṣṭhānāt paṇcavidikalpāyām tiryaghbhmāv utpattir bhavati / (YD on SK 44b, p. 235, ll. 10-11).
this context.\(^{410}\) This classification of beings corresponds to that of the phenomenal creation (\textit{bhautika sarga}) in SK 53, which states that there are eight divine levels, five animal levels, and one human level (see §II.2). The TK offers a slightly different interpretation of the effects of merit and demerit, mentioning only that worlds such as heaven (\textit{dyu}) are attained through merit, while worlds such as \textit{sutala} (a subterranean region) are attained through demerit.\(^{411}\) It is unclear from the text of the TK how this scheme is related to the threefold classification of the \textit{bhautika sarga} in SK 53. In any case, in all of the commentaries it is clear that merit and demerit determine the level of the phenomenal cosmos on which the subtle body is reincarnated. The YD further clarifies that merit and demerit are also responsible for the relative circumstances of one’s birth—in terms of social position, appearance, disposition, benefits, and disease—within a single level of the cosmos.\(^{412}\)

As discussed in §II.5, SK 44 states that the condition of knowledge (\textit{jñāna}) results in liberation. The GBh and MV specify that this condition refers to the knowledge of the twenty-five principles (\textit{tattva}),\(^{413}\) held by the Śāṅkhya texts to be the only means to liberation (see §II.3). This interpretation also seems to be implicit in the commentary of the TK and the YD on SK 44.

Under SK 23, however, the YD specifies that the condition of knowledge is twofold; it includes both the knowledge of words (\textit{śabda}), etc., which is gained

---

\(^{410}\) Under SK 53, the YD lists Brahmā, Prajāpati, Indra, the ancestors (\textit{pitr}), the Gandharvas, the Nāgas, the Rakṣases, and the Piśācas as the eight divine beings, and cattle, deer, birds, reptiles, and inanimate objects as the five levels of animal life (YD on SK 53abc, p. 256, ll. 12-15).

\(^{411}\) dharmena gamanam ērđhvan dyuprabhrītu lokesu / gamanam adhastād bhavaty adharṣena sultalādi lokesu / (TK on SK 44, p. 129, ll. 14-15).


\(^{413}\) kiṁ ca, jñānena cāpavargah / apavargah ca pañcaviṃśatattvajñānām / tena nimittenāpavargo mokṣah / (GBh on SK 44, p. 156, ll. 1-2); kiṁ cānayaḥ—jñānena cāpavargah / yat pañcaviṃśatattvajñānāṁ tena jñānena tat sūkṣmaśarīravāṁ nivartate / (MV on SK 44, p. 61, ll. 19-20).
through perception, inference, and authoritative testimony (see §II.4), as well as the knowledge of the difference between Materiality and Consciousness. This latter form of knowledge is further divided into that which is unprecedented (apūrva) and that which is generated through practice (abhyaśaja). The commentator equates the unprecedented form with ‘the means of knowledge discussed under the heading of the attainments (siddhi), including reflection (ūha)\(^{414}\), speech (śabda), and study (adhyayana)’ (these are part of the pratyayasarga; see §IV.9-10).\(^{415}\) He refers to these attainments as means of knowledge (pramāṇa), although the context suggests that these are considered different in nature from the normal three pramāṇas of perception, inference, and authoritative testimony. This supposition may be supported by reference to a statement made by the commentator under SK 51, that the first attainment, reflection (ūha), occurs in the absence of perception, inference, or authoritative testimony.\(^{416}\)

The commentator’s definition of the second form of liberating knowledge, that which is generated through practice (abhyaśaja), is somewhat obscure. He says that this form of knowledge is vairāgyaparvāvajayaprśṭhalabdha.\(^{417}\) Immediately prior to this discussion of the forms of knowledge, the commentator uses the term parvan to refer to a particular form of merit (dharma) as a ‘step’ on a stairway to elevation and ultimate bliss, via the other bhāvas characterised by the constituent quality of goodness (sāttvika):

Through the performance of these [yamas and niyamas as a form of dharma\(^{418}\)], the quality of sattva, in such an ascendance (uttaraṇa)\(^{419}\) of an

\(^{414}\) On the YD’s interpretation of the term ūha, see §IV.9, n. 507.

\(^{415}\) jñānaṁ dvividham śabdādyupalabdhilaksanam guṇapurusāntarapalabdhilaksanam ca / tatra śabdādyupalabdhilaksanam pratyakṣaṇumāṇāgamarūpam / guṇapurusāntarapalabdhilaksanam ca dvividham apūrvam abhyāsajen ca / tayor apūrvam ūhaḥ śabdo ’dhyayanam (SK 51a) iti siddhikāṇḍānupatītāni pramāṇāni / (YD on SK 23bc, p. 192, ll. 6-11).

\(^{416}\) tatroho nāma yadā pratyakṣaṇumāṇāgamaṇvātirekeśaṃ āhīṣṭasvāyam pratipadyate sādyā siddhīs tārakam ity apadīṣyate / (YD on SK 51abc, p. 251, ll. 12-13).

\(^{417}\) abhyāsa jen punar vairāgyaparvāvajayaprśṭhalabdham (YD on SK 23ab, p. 192, l. 11).

\(^{418}\) See §IV.7, nn. 444, 445.
ascetic (yati), attains the state of being an impression (āśayatā), which causes an increase of the forms [i.e. bhāvas] such as knowledge (jñāna). This first step (parvan) becomes a stairway (sopāna) to elevation (abhyaudyaya) and ultimate bliss (nihśreyasa), engaged in which this ascetic becomes qualified for undertaking the other steps.

Based on this usage of the term parvan, the compound vairāgyaparvāvajayapṛṣṭha-labdha, as a description of abhyāsaja jñāna, might be translated as ‘attained upon the height of winning’ the step of dispassion’. This suggests that this form of liberating knowledge is considered the result of a progressive form of practice, perhaps involving the generation of both merit and dispassion (see §IV.7) as ‘steps’ to knowledge. The commentator goes on to describe knowledge generated through practice as ‘peaceful, pure, eternal, and being the opposite of all existence and non-existence’. In this connection, the commentator quotes SK 64, which describes liberating knowledge as arising from ‘the practice of truth (or of the tattvas)’

(tattvābhyāsa).

---

419 The root ut-tṝ- can mean ‘to cross over’ or ‘to arise out of’ [water]. Here, the term uttaraṇa probably alludes to the common Śaṅkhyā image of the cycle of transmigration (samsāra) as an ocean. Cf., for instance, the YD’s explanation of the name tāraka for the first siddhi (ūha): tāraka carries one over the ocean of samsāra’ (tārayati saṁsārārnavād iti tāraka / (YD on SK 51, p. 251, ll. 13-14)). In keeping with the image in the present passage of the bhāvas as a ‘stairway’ (by which one would ‘arise out of’ the ocean of samsāra), I have translated uttaraṇa as ‘ascendance’.

420 The entry for parvan in MONIER-WILLIAMS testifies to its use as ‘the step of a staircase’ also in the Rāghuvaṃśa.

421 This use of the term abhyudaya probably encompasses both its literal meaning, as the ‘elevation’ attained by climbing a stairway, and its figurative meaning of ‘prosperity’ or ‘happiness’.

422 I have used ‘winning’ for avajaya here as in ‘winning a foothold’. The term avajaya means ‘overcoming’, ‘conquering’ or ‘winning through conquest’. The implication here seems to be that one has gained through effort or ‘won’ the vairāgya step. From the ‘height’ or ‘top’ (prṣṭha) of this conquest, the jñāna step is attained next.

423 The significance of the phrase tattvābhyāsa in its original context is probably ‘repeated study of the tattvas’, but in the present passage the YD-kāra seems to take abhyāsa as ‘practice’ in a broader sense.

424 abhyāsajaṃ punar vairāgyaparvāvajayapṛṣṭhalabdham śoṇtam amalam dhruvam sakalabhavābhavapratikṣabhitam īyad ācāryo vakṣyati—
evam tattvābhyaśānāṃ naṃsu na me nāham iti aparīṣeṣam / aviparyayād viśuddham kevalam utpadyate jñānam || (SK 64) iti /

(YD on SK 23bc, p. 192, ll. 11-14).
In summary, the YD divides the condition of knowledge into 1. the ordinary knowledge gained through perception, inference, and authoritative testimony; 2. liberating knowledge attained suddenly (apūrva) through one of the attainments (siddhi; see §IV.9-10); 3. liberating knowledge resulting from a progressive form of practice (abhyaśaja).

This classification of the forms of the condition of knowledge presents some interpretative problems when considered in connection with several other passages of the YD. The relation between these forms and the threefold division of the bhāvas into innate (sāṃsiddhika), deriving from Materiality (prākṛtika), and deriving from the products (vaikṛta) in SK 43 (see §IV.8) is unclear. In its commentary on SK 43, the YD equates the vaikṛta form of knowledge, like the unprecedented (apūrva) form mentioned under SK 23, with the attainments (siddhi) (see §IV.10 and CHAPTER V), but it is unclear if a precise identification of vaikṛta with apūrva is to be supposed. Also, the suggestion that the liberating knowledge of the distinction between Materiality and Consciousness is attained without the use of the normal pramāṇas of perception, inference, and authoritative testimony, appears to conflict with the general position of the Śaṅkhya commentators that knowledge of these principles is established through inference, as demonstrated by the YD’s illustrations of the ten-membered inference, the sāmānyatodṛṣṭa form of inference, and the indirect (avīta) inference (see §IV.2, IV.5). It is probably the case that the YD-kāra does not always consider the implications of his views outside of their immediate interpretative context. Nevertheless, several apparent assumptions behind these views can be established with some certainty, as will be demonstrated in §IV.10 and §V.1-2.

Aside from the passage discussed above, the YD does not discuss the bhāva of knowledge (jñāna) as representative of forms of knowledge apart from the
liberating knowledge of the Sāṃkhya principles (tattva), while the issue is not raised in the other commentaries. In most contexts, the commentators focus on the fact that the condition of knowledge leads to liberation (SK 44c), while its opposite, the condition of ignorance (ajñāna), is a precondition of bondage to transmigration (SK 44d).

The commentators are unanimous in listing three forms of the bondage resulting from ignorance: deriving from Materiality (prākṛta, prākṛtika, prakṛtibandha), deriving from the products (vaikārika, vaikṛtika, vaikārikabandha), and deriving from sacrifice (dākṣinīka, dākṣinaka, dākṣinābandha). This classification may appear to conflict with the classification of the conditions (bhāva) in general into innate (sāṃsiddhika), deriving from Materiality (prākṛta, prākṛtika), and deriving from the products (vaikṛtika, vaikṛtika) (see §IV.8). It should perhaps be kept in mind, though, that the three forms of bondage refer to the phenomenal consequences of one of the bhāvas (ignorance, in this case) rather than to the bhāva itself. In any case, no attempt is made by the commentators to reconcile these two classifications.

The MV provides a brief explanation of the three forms of bondage resulting from the condition of ignorance. Māṭhara interprets the first form, prakṛtibandha, as self-identification with the eight sources (prakṛti) or productive principles, that is, with primordial Materiality, intellect, ego, and the five subtle elements. According
to the MV, bondage to the products (vaikārikabandha) is the idea of ultimate bliss in the worlds of Brahmā, etc. In other words, according to Māṭhara, this second form of bondage lies in the misconception that the ultimate goal of life is rebirth at a higher level of the cosmos, rather than liberation from the cycle of transmigration altogether. Māṭhara interprets the third form of bondage, dakṣinābandha, simply as resulting from the sacrifice of cows, etc.  

The TK offers a slightly different interpretation of the first two forms of bondage. According to Vācaspati, prākṛtika bondage applies to those who worship primordial Materiality (prakṛti) as the self (ātman). Vācaspati mentions that those under this first form of bondage are called prakṛtilaya, ‘dissolved into the sources’, referring to the result of the condition of dispassion (vairāgya) (SK 45; see below). According to Vācaspati, vaikārika bondage applies to those who worship the evolutes (vikāra), including the elements, faculties, ego, and intellect, as Consciousness (puruṣa). Like Māṭhara, Vācaspati interprets the dākṣiṇaka form of bondage as resulting from sacrificial acts.

The YD treats SK 45abc as an explanation of the three forms of bondage (mentioned as the result of the condition of ignorance under SK 44). The commentator equates prakṛtibandha with prakṛtilaya (interpreted as dissolution into

---

427 tatra prakṛtibandho nāmaśāsu prakṛtiṣu paratvenābhimānah / vaikārikabandho nāma brahmādisthāneṣu śreyobuddhiḥ / dakṣinābandho nāma gavādiṃvajānāmānāḥ / (MV on SK 44, p. 62, ll. 2-5).
428 prakṛtāv ōttmajānād ye prakṛtim upāsate teṣām prākṛtiko bandhāh, yah purāne prakṛtilayān pratyucyate pūrṇaṁ satasahasraṁ hi tiṣṭhante avyaktacintakāḥ iti / vaikāriko bandhas teṣām ye vikārān eva bhūtendriyāhāntakārabuddhiḥ puruṣadhiyopāsate tān pratīdham ucyate—
daśa manvantarānāḥāḥ tiṣṭhāntindriyacintakāḥ / bhautikās tu śatam pūrṇaṁ, sahasraṁ tv ābhimānikāḥ // bauddhā dāsa sahasrāṁ tiṣṭhante vigatajvarāḥ / te khalv anūṁ videhāḥ yeśām vaikārikān bandhāḥ iti // īṣṭāpārtena dākṣiṇakāḥ / puruṣatattvānabhinijīto hiṣṭāpūrtakārī kāmapahatamanā badhyate iti // (TK on SK 44, p. 130, ll. 5-15).
the eight sources), as the result of the condition of dispassion (vairāgya) (SK 45a).\footnote{āha: kasmād bhāvāt prakṛtibandho bhavati <iti> / ucyate: vairāgyāt prakṛtilayaḥ (SK 45a) vairāgyād aṣṭasau prakṛtiṣu layāṃ gacchatī / asāv ucyate prakṛtibandha iti / (YD on SK 45a, p. 236, ll. 7-10).} In this passage, he mentions that dispassion falls under the heading of contentment (tuṣṭi),\footnote{tatas ca viparītaṃ yad eva vairāgyaṃ tuṣṭikāṇḍānapatitam prakṛtyādiṣu paratvābhimāṇāḥ / tata eva prakṛtyād bhavati nānyasmāt / (YD on SK 45a, p. 236, ll. 16-18).} one of the four divisions of the pratyayasarga, thus providing an important link between the two paradigms (see §IV.10). The commentator then equates bondage to sacrifice (dakṣinābandha) with the performance of sacrifice leading to transmigration (samsāra) as the result of the condition of passion (rāga, avairāgya) (SK 45b).\footnote{āha: atha daksinābandhaḥ kutaḥ / ucyate: samsāro bhavati rājasād rāgāt / (SK 45b) yo 'yaṃ dṛṣṭānusravikāvyabhilāṣāḥ sa rāgāḥ / tatra dṛṣṭaḥ svarūpārāgāḥ tatkāśāt prāptinirvartakaṁ karmā karoti tataś ca tatropapadyate / ānuśravakāvyabhilāṣād agnihatād bhavati / (YD on SK 45b, p. 236, l. 23 – p. 237, l. 2).} He equates bondage to the products (vaikārikabandha) with the pleasure taken in the non-obstruction (avighāta) (of one’s will) resulting from the condition of lordliness (aiśvarya).\footnote{ayad aṣṭaṇgam aśvīryām aninmādi prāg upadīṣtām (193.1) tasmāt sve sve viśaye 'vighāta utpadyate / tadabhiratīrī vākāriko bandhaḥ / (YD on SK 45c, p. 237, ll. 12-13).} No connection is made between the forms of bondage and the remaining condition, non-lordliness (anaiśvarya).

The YD’s interpretation of prakṛtibandha is thus similar to that of the TK, while its interpretation of daksinābandha is compatible with that of the TK and MV, although the latter commentaries do not provide any of the correlations between the forms of bondage and the results of the conditions of dispassion, passion, and lordliness. The fact that the YD does provide this correlation between the results of ignorance and the results of the other conditions shows that the conditions overlap with regard to their functions. The YD addresses this issue by explaining that ignorance serves as a precondition for the results brought about by the other conditions (besides knowledge). The commentator also explains that in the case of someone, such as Kapila (see Chapter V), who has attained the condition of...
knowledge (jñāna), the other conditions (such as dispassion) do not lead to the results described (such as dissolution in Materiality). In other words, the conditions determine the path of the subtle body only for so long as one has not attained knowledge. As we have seen above, the YD also suggests that the other sāttvika conditions may even serve as steps to the attainment of knowledge in a particular incarnation (see further discussion in §IV.7).

Although the YD differs substantially from the other commentaries in correlating the condition of lordliness (aiśvarya) with the vaikṛta form of bondage, the commentators all agree with regard to the interpretation of lordliness itself. GBh, YD, MV, and TK all equate lordliness with eight traditional supernatural powers, commonly referred to as siddhi in the Yoga school but also referred to as aiśvarya in the Vyāsabhāṣya (ca. 500-700) on Yogasūtra 3.45. Vyāsa enumerates these as atomisation (aṇimā), lightness of weight (laghimā), magnification (mahimā), acquisition (prāpti), irresistibility (prākāmya), control (vaśīva), lordship (īśitṛtva), and transportation to wherever one likes (yatrikāmāvasāyītva).

The TK’s interpretation of these powers is closest to the VBh, although like the other commentators, Vācaspati states that there are eight but lists nine, adding heaviness (garimā). Gaudapāda provides explanations for eight of the nine listed, leaving out

433 āha: yadi [tribhis] tribhir nimittair vairāgyādibhis trividho bandho nirvartyate yad uktam (236.5) ajñānād bandha iti tad ayuktam / bhāvānām hy ajñānam / atah phalāntareṇa bhavitvam iti / ucycate: na mūlakāraṇatvāt / jñānavarjitaṁ hi bhāvānām yat phalam tatra jñānānām mūlam tattānimittvāt sarvesām / na hi jñānavairāgyam ālaṃ prákṛtīlayāya, tathetarāṇi paramāsya đāv adṛṣṭatvāt / vicītram kāryam ekām mū lam kāraṇād ayuktām iti. Tathādīnā prakṛtikārya satyasaṅkalpatā / bhūtabhautikeṣu vaśībhavaty avaśyaś cānyeṣe / yatra kāmāvasāyitvāṃ satyasaṅkalpātvāṃ sthānānām / tathābhūteṣu saṃkalpād iti / etān aṣṭāv aśvāryāni / (YS on SK 3.45, p. 371, ll. 13-19); I have adopted the translations for the first seven of these terms from LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (2008), p. 210.
heaviness, while Vācaspati provides explanations for all nine. The YD states simply that atomisation, magnification, lightness, and heaviness are characteristics of the elements (bhūta), while the rest are characteristics of the intellect (buddhi). In other words, some of these abilities are physical while others intellectual. The GBh and MV provide an etymological gloss of the term aiśvarya as the ‘condition of the Lord’ (īśvarabhāva). 436 The TK connects these abilities with yogins. 437 While it is thus apparent that the powers of lordliness are generally connected with some form of spiritual attainment in the Sāṃkhya texts, it should be kept in mind that the YD equates the pleasure taken in these abilities with bondage to the products (vaikārikabandha), which is considered a hindrance to liberation.

Similarly, the condition of dispassion (vairāgya), resulting in dissolution into the eight productive principles (prakṛtilaya), is presented by the Sāṃkhya commentators in terms of a certain degree of spiritual attainment but also as a hindrance to liberation. In this respect, the Sāṃkhya system differs from

436 See §V.3 for a discussion of the role of īśvara in classical Sāṃkhya and in the YD in particular.
437 Vācaspati āsīvaryaṃ īśvarabhāvah / tae cāṣṭagunaṃ—animā, mahimā, garimā, laghimā, prāptih, prākāmyam iṣītvam, vaṣītvam yatrakāmāvasāyītvam cett / anor bhaavo ’nimā, sūkṣmo bhūtvā jagati vicarātiti / mahimā, mahān bhūtvā vicarātiti, laghimā, mṛṣṭīlāvayavād api laghatyā puspakaresagrey api tiṣṭhati / prāptih, abhimataṃ vaṣṭi yatratarvavasthitam prāpnoti / prākāmyam, prākāmato yad evecchati tad eva vidadhātī / iṣītvam, prabhūtayā trailokyam api iṣṭe / vaṣītvam, sarvaṃ vaśībhavati yatrakāmāvasāyītvam, brahmādīstambaparyantam yatra kāmas tatraśāṣṭra vsecchayā śhāṃdānasvahāran ācaratiti / (YD on SK 23, p. 107, ll. 21-28); tathā aiśvayād avighātah / etad aiśvayam, aṣṭagunam animādiyuktam / (YD on SK 45, p. 158, l. 1); aiśvayam apratīgātalakṣaṇam / <t> at punar aṣṭavidham aṣimā mahimā laghimā prāptih prākāmyam iṣītvam vaṣītvam yatrakāmāvasāyītvam iti / tatrānimā mahimā laghimā garimā bhūtvāvaiśēṣikam / buddhes tu präptyādi / (YD on SK 23c, p. 193, ll. 1-4); yad aṣṭagunam aiśvayam animādi prāg upadīṣṭam (193.1) tasmāt sve sve visaye ’vighāta updayate / (YD 45c, p. 237, ll. 12-13); aiśvayam īśvarabhāvenet yasthadham / animā laghimā garimā mahimā prāptih prākāmyam iṣītvam vaṣītvam yatrakāmāvasāyītvam iti / (MV on SK 23, p. 40, l. 22, p. 41, l. 2); kim cānyat—aiśvayād avighātah yat pūrvam aiśvayam animādiyakam aṣṭavidham niḍiṣṭam tasmād aiśvayāt prārthitānām avighāto bhavati na muktiḥ / (MV on SK 45, p. 62, ll. 20-22); aiśvayam api buddhīdharmaḥ, yato ’nimādiprādhūbhāvah / atṛāṇīmā ’nubhāvo yataḥ śilāṃ api pravīṣati / laghimā laghatbhāvah, yat, sūryamaricitān ālāmya sūryalokak yāti / garimā gurubhāvah yat, guruv bhavati / mahimā mahato bhāvah, yato mahān bhavati / prāptih, yato ’ugulayextern spṛṣṭi candramasam / prākāmyam techānaabhihītā yo, bhūtvā unnajaji nirajajā ca yathodake / vaṣītvam yato bhūtaubhāvah samuṣṭaya vaśīvam / iṣītvam yato bhūtaubhāuktānām prabhuvasthitīm iṣṭe / yac ca kāmāvasāyītvam sā satyasaṅkālpatā, yena yathā ’sya sankalpo bhavati bhūteṣu tathaiva bhūtāti bhavanti / anyeṣaṃ manuṣyaśānam niṣcayāḥ niṣcetayam anuvadhiyante, yoginās tu niṣcetayāḥ padārthāḥ niṣcayam iti (TK on SK 23, p. 95, ll. 16-25).
renunciatory traditions, which focus on dispassion or non-attachment as the means to liberation, as the YD-kāra points out:

That which has been said by other teachers—‘the liberation of Consciousness is from dispassion or from [a combination of] knowledge and dispassion’—is contradicted.\(^{438}\)

As discussed above, the YD equates prakṛtilaya with prakṛtibandha, one of the results of the condition of ignorance (ajñāna). The GBh and MV describe prakṛtilaya as absorption into the eight productive principles (prakṛti)—that is, into primordial Materiality (pradhāna), intellect (buddhi), ego (ahamkāra), and the five subtle elements (tanmātra)—after death. This applies to one who is endowed with the condition of dispassion but also ignorance. After this absorption, transmigration continues. The MV adds that an individual who has attained prakṛtilaya believes that he has attained liberation.\(^{439}\) The YD and TK also interpret prakṛtilaya as dissolution into the eight productive principles, the TK adding that the individual worships these principles as the self.\(^{440}\) Like the GBh and MV, the TK states that one who has attained prakṛtilaya is subsequently reborn.\(^{441}\) Thus, although it is passion (rāga) that is said to lead to transmigration (samsāra) (SK 45), the commentators clarify that its opposite, dispassion (vairāgya), if not accompanied by the condition of knowledge (jñāna), is also followed by transmigration after a period of dissolution in the productive principles.

---

\(^{438}\) yad uktam anyair ācāryaiḥ vairāgyaiḥ puruṣakaivalyaiḥ jñānavairāgyābhyyām ca iti tatpratiśiddham bhavati / (YD on SK 44c, p. 235, ll. 20-22).

\(^{439}\) yathā kasyacid vairāgyam asti na tattvajñānam / tasmāt ajñānapūrvād vairāgyāt prakṛtilayaiḥ / (GBh on SK 45, p. 157, ll. 30-32); yathā kasyacid vairāgyam asti jñānavairāgyam prakṛtilayaḥ, mṛto śāśu prakṛitiṣu pradhānabuddhyahankārakhāyātanmātreṣu līyate na mokṣaḥ / tato bhūyaḥ 'pi samāsaraḥ / (MV on SK 45, p. 62, ll. 10-16).

\(^{440}\) vairāgyaiḥ astaṣau prakṛtiṣu layaṃ gacchati / (YD on SK 45a, p. 236, l. 10); vairāgyaiḥ prakṛtilayaiḥ iti—puruṣaattatvābhikāhārayaiḥ vairāgyamātraiḥ prakṛtilayaiḥ, prakṛtiṣheṣayaḥ prakṛtimahadahankāra-bhitendriyaiḥ grhyante, teṣyātāṁbuddhyopāsyanāśena layaḥ / (TK on SK 45, p. 131, ll. 17-19).

\(^{441}\) kālāntareṇa ca punar āvirbhavati (TK on SK 45, p. 131, l. 19).
Although vairāgya is thus generally considered to hinder liberation through a false identification with the productive principles of Materiality, there is also evidence in the commentaries that it may eventually lead to the condition of jñāna and consequent liberation. As will be discussed in the following section, the YD appears to view both vairāgya and a form of dharma gained through yogic practices as potentially cooperative with the production of jñāna.

As we have seen, the YD provides more information than the other commentaries concerning the nature of the bhāva of jñāna. According to the YD-kāra, jñāna in the form of liberating knowledge of the tattvas can be attained either through the unprecedented (apūrva) means identified with the attainments (siddhi), or as a result of the practice of the other sāttvika bhāvas, which themselves are not directly related to the acquisition of knowledge. The siddhis will later be shown to be connected with the transmission of knowledge from teacher to pupil, thus providing key information with regard to the importance of the Sāṃkhya tradition to the individual’s attainment of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya tattvas (§IV.9-10, V.1-2). The possibility that a seeker of liberation may, on the other hand, independently undergo a progressive practice leading to liberating knowledge ‘generated through practice’ (abhyāsaja) will be discussed in more detail in the following section.

§7. Evidence for the production of merit (dharma), dispassion (vairāgya), lordliness (aśvarya), and knowledge (jñāna) as a progressive process.

Although the Sāṃkhya texts hold that the liberation gained though the condition (bhāva) of knowledge (jñāna) is hindered by the other seven conditions, there is some evidence in the commentaries that the conditions of merit (dharma), dispassion
(vairāgya), and lordliness (aiśvarya) may also be considered conducive to the attainment of the condition of knowledge.

As mentioned above (§IV.6), the YD explains, under SK 23, that a particular form of merit (dharma) is conducive to the attainment of the other conditions characterised by goodness (sāttvika), including knowledge. The commentator explains that dharma in general is generated by the performance of actions prescribed by revelation (śruti) and traditional texts (smṛti) (which are considered by the Śāṃkhya commentators to be the two main sources of authoritative testimony (see §IV.3)). The commentator then divides dharma into two forms. The first form brings about the enjoyment of desirable body, faculties, and objects in the worlds of Brahmā, etc.—that is, in higher levels of the phenomenal cosmos—and is considered secondary or unessential (aṅgabhūta) to knowledge (jñāna), etc. The implication seems to be that this first form of merit does not lead to the other sāttvika bhāvas.

The second form of merit, on the other hand, is said to lead to the other sāttvika bhāvas (knowledge, etc.) becoming a first step toward elevation (abhyudaya) and ultimate bliss (niḥśreyasa).

According to the text of the critical edition, the commentator appears to state, after his description of the first form of dharma, that the second form of dharma is produced by sacrificial oblations and by the performance of restraints (yama) and observances (niyama). However, since the commentator has at this point given no explanation of the means by which the first form of merit is cultivated, we might be justified in slightly amending the text so that the term agnihotrahavanādikriyānusthānasādhanaḥ (‘the means to which is the performance of [sacrificial]
actions such as the offering of oblations to the sacrificial fire’) is read as part of the preceding line and therefore descriptive of the first form of merit, while the second form (which is conducive to the production of jñāna) is described in terms of the performance of the yogic activities of yama and niyama. This interpretation would agree with that of the TK (see below).

The author of the YD enumerates the restraints (yama) as non-violence (ahiṃsā), truth (satya), not stealing (asteya), non-wickedness (akalkatā), and chastity (brahmacarya), and the observances (niyama) as non-anger (akrodha), service to one’s teacher (guruśuśrūśā), purity (śauca), lightness of eating (āhāralāghava), and cautiousness (apramāda). These differ somewhat from the usual lists given by the texts of the Yoga school: non-violence (ahiṃsā), truth (satya), not stealing (asteya), chastity (brahmacarya), and non-greed (aparigraha) for the restraints, and purity (śauca), contentment (saṃtoṣa), asceticism (tapas), recitation (svādhya), and devotion to the Lord (īśvarapraṇidhāna) for the observances. The GBh and MV quote these lists from the YS and include them as forms of merit, the GBh adding compassion (dayā) and charity (dāna) as productive of merit.

The TK is similar to the YD in dividing merit into two types. The first is generated by the performance of sacrifice (yāga) and charity (dāna) and leads to prosperity (abhyudaya), while the second is generated by the performance of the

---

445 tatrāhiṃsā satyam asteyam akalkatā brahmacaryam iti pañca yamāḥ (cf. YS 2.30) / akrodho gurusuśrūśā saucaṃ āhāralāghavam apramāḍa iti pañca niyamāḥ / (YD on SK 23bc, p. 191, l. 33 – p. 192, l. 6).
446 ahiṃsāsatyāsteyabrahmacaryāparīghrāḥ yamāḥ // (YS 2.30, p. 242, l. 27).
447 śaucasantoṣaśvādyāvedyaśvarapraṇidhānāni niyamāḥ // (YS 2.32, p. 247, l. 26).
448 tatra dharma nāma dayādānayamānimālaṃkāraḥ / tatra yamā niyamāḥ ca pātañjale bhīhitāḥ / ahiṃsāsatyāsteyabrahmacaryāparīghrāḥ yamāḥ (YS 2.30) / śaucasantoṣaśvādyāvedyaśvarapraṇidhānāni niyamāḥ / (GBh on SK 23, p. 107, ll. 11-14); tatra dharma nāma varṇinām āśraṁitaḥ ca sa mahāyāvirodhenā yaḥ pṛkto yamānimālakaṃsah sa dharma / tatra pañca yamāḥ pañca niyamāḥ / ahiṃsāsatyāsteyabrahmacaryāparīghrāḥ yamāḥ / śaucasantoṣaśvādyāvedyaśvarapraṇidhānāni niyamāḥ / (MV on SK 23, p. 38, l. 12-15).
eightfold yoga (referring again to Patañjali’s system) and leads to ultimate bliss (nihśreyasa). The commentators thus include such yogic practices as productive of dharma and, in the case of the YD and TK, as steps toward liberation. The YD’s explicit identification of the sources of these practices with the main categories of authoritative testimony (āptavacana) provides a reference point by which to reconstruct the commentator’s views with regard to the role of such doctrine in the generation of liberating knowledge (see §V.1-2).

As discussed above (§IV.6), the YD also suggests that a particular form of liberating knowledge (abhyāsaja, ‘generated through practice’) is brought about by the attainment of dispassion (vairāgya). This suggestion is complicated by the commentator’s definition of dispassion, also under SK 23, as a ‘clarity of intellect brought about by the practice of knowledge’. Evidently, the commentator holds the conditions of knowledge and dispassion to be mutually cooperative. The phrase ‘practice of knowledge’ (jñānābhyāsa) suggests that the condition of jñāna itself may develop progressively (perhaps in conjunction with the development of dharma and vairāgya), rather than arising as a sudden and complete enlightenment as in the case of the apūrva form of jñāna (see §IV.6).

The YD is not alone among the commentaries in suggesting the possibility of the progressive development of the condition of jñāna. The GBh and MV provide a specific order of progression of the four sāttvika conditions. According to these texts, in the case of the form of jñāna derived from the products (vaikṛta; see §IV.8), one first obtains knowledge from a teacher, which leads to dispassion, then merit,
then lordliness. This progression accords with the above-mentioned statement by
the YD that dispassion results from the practice of knowledge. In addition, the fact
that this progression applies only to one form of jñāna (vaikṛta) and that the bhāvas
may therefore be produced either progressively or not, can be compared to the YD’s
statement that knowledge may be produced suddenly or as the result of a progressive
practice.

In summary, the evidence of the GBh, MV, YD and TK suggests that the
production of the four sāttvika conditions may occur in a progressive manner, though
this is not always the case. The YD testifies that knowledge may be unprecedented
(apūrva) or may result from the practice of the other conditions, while the practice of
knowledge may lead to the acquisition of other sāttvika conditions (which thus, in
combination with knowledge, do not result in further transmigration; see §IV.6). This
evidence will be taken into account throughout the discussions in CHAPTER V of
the relationship between Sāṃkhya doctrine and practice according to the YD.

§8. The classification of the conditions into innate (sāṃsiddhika), deriving from
primordial Materiality (prākṛtika), and deriving from the products
(vaikṛta).

The Sāṃkhya commentators’ views on the manner in which the bhāva of jñāna is
produced are complicated by another classification of the bhāvas in the SK. In the
context of this classification, the commentators make special reference to the rṣi
Kapila, who is singled out from all other beings in terms of the manner in which his

451 tathā vaikṛtā yathā—ācāryamūrtim nimittam krtvā asmadādīnām jñānam utpadyate, jñānād
vairāgyam, vairāgyād dharmāḥ, dharmād aiśvaryam iti / (GBh on SK 43, p. 153, ll. 7-8); vaikṛtikā
yathā—ācaryādīmitṛūm adhikṛtya utpannā vaikṛtikā ity ucyante / ācaryaṃ nimittam kṛtvā jñānam
utpadyate / jñānāt vairāgyām, vairāgyād dharmo, dharmād aiśvaryam / (MV on SK 43, p. 60, ll. 12-
15).
knowledge of the Sāṃkhya tattvas was produced. The YD’s discussion of this classification of the bhāvas also provides a link between the bhāvas and the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga; see §IV.9-10), by extension providing a clearer picture of the role of the Sāṃkhya tradition of texts and teachers in the attainment of liberating knowledge by individual seekers (see §V.1-2).

As mentioned above (§II.5), Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that the conditions (bhāva) are threefold: sāṃsiddhika, prākṛtika, and vaikṛta (SK 43). These terms are usually translated as ‘innate’, ‘natural’, and ‘acquired’, respectively. Although I will retain the translation of sāṃsiddhika as ‘innate’, alternative translations of the latter two terms, closer to their etymological significance, can be proposed on the basis of the commentaries. This section will highlight the interpretation of these terms by the YD in particular, in order to provide context for a discussion of the relationship between the bhāvas and the pratyayasarga in §IV.10, as well as for further discussion in CHAPTER V of the YD’s views on the production of the bhāva of jñāna in relation to Kapila and his role in the initiation of the Sāṃkhya tradition.

The commentators all agree that sāṃsiddhika, prākṛtika, and vaikṛta refer to the manner in which the bhāvas are produced, although their interpretations of the terms vary slightly. The argument for revising the translations of these terms must be made on the basis of the commentators’ illustrations of the three modes of production of the bhāvas.

The GBh and MV give as an example of the sāṃsiddhika variety of the conditions the production of the sāttvika conditions of the rṣi Kapila (see CHAPTER V): Kapila was endowed with merit (dharma), knowledge (jñāna), dispassion (vairāgya), and lordliness (aiśvarya) as he was born at the time of the first creation

452 sāṃsiddhikaḥ ca bhāvāḥ prākṛtikaḥ vaikṛtaḥ ca dharmādyāḥ / drṣṭāḥ karmaśrayināḥ kāryāśrayinaḥ ca kalalādyāḥ / (SK 43).
As examples of prākṛtika conditions, Gauḍapāda and Māthara give the conditions of four sons of Brahmā, named by Gauḍapāda as Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, and Sanatkumāra. The two commentators state that these four beings were endowed with the four sāttvika conditions when their bodies were sixteen years of age. The MV adds that these conditions arose suddenly, ‘like the sight of a treasure’. This description suggests that these conditions were latent in the individuals, though their manifestation was delayed until a certain age, and justifies the usual translation of prākṛtika (or prākṛta) as ‘natural’. In contrast, the vaikṛta form of the conditions is interpreted by the GBh and MV as applicable to ordinary people, who acquire knowledge from a teacher, leading to the production of the other three sāttvika conditions (see §IV.7). Gauḍapāda explains the term vaikṛta by the fact that the body of a teacher is a product (vikrīti). Although it is clear from these texts that the vaikṛta conditions are considered to be ‘acquired’ rather than latent in

453 tatra sāmsiddhiḥ yatāḥ bhagavatāḥ kapilasyād disarge utpadyamānasya catvāro bhāvāḥ sahotpannāḥ—dharmāḥ, jñānām, vairāgyaṃ aśīryaṃ iti (GBh on SK 43, p. 153, ll. 3-5); tatra sāmsiddhiḥs tāvat yatāḥ kapilasya bhagavatāḥ paramarṣer ādīsarge utpannya ime catvāro bhāvāḥ sahotpannāḥ dharma jñānām vairāgyaṃ aśīryaṃ iti (tatra sāmsiddhiḥ ucyante) (MV on SK 43, p. 60, ll. 6-9).

454 These figures also appear in a list of seven rṣis, including Kapila, found in MBh 12.327.64-65, a variation of which occurs in the GBh:

sanaḥ satarkūjātā ca sanakaḥ sasanandanaḥ / sanatkumāraḥ kapilaḥ saptamaḥ ca sanātanaḥ // saptatri mānasāḥ prakṛtāḥ rṣayo brahmaṃ sa utpadyate, jñānād vairāgyam iti (MBh 12.327.64-65); sanakaḥ ca sanandanaḥ ca trīṇyaḥ ca sanātanaḥ / āsuriḥ kapilaḥ caiva vṛddhah paścamaṃkhas tathā / ity ācāryaṃ putrāḥ sapta prakṛtāḥ mahāsavyataḥ (GBh on SK 1, p. 35, ll. 16-18).

It is not clear whether the term brahmaṇ in these verses is to be taken as masculine or neuter, but the mythological subject matter probably makes a case for these rṣis, in contrast to the YD’s elevation of Kapila to a special status.

455 prākṛtikāḥ kathante—brahmaṇaḥ catvāraḥ putrāḥ sanakasasanandaḥ satrānoḥ satrānām ācāryaṃ utpadyate, jñānād vairāgyam, vairāgyaḥ dharmāḥ, dharmāḥ aśīryaṃ iti / ācāryaṃ utpadyate, jñānād vairāgyam, vairāgyaḥ dharmāḥ, dharmāḥ aśīryaṃ iti / (MV on SK 43, p. 153, ll. 5-7); prākṛtikāḥ nāma brahmaṇaḥ putrāḥ kila sanakādayaḥ babhūvah / teṣām utpandhāḥ ācāryaṃ utpadyate, jñānād vairāgyam, vairāgyaḥ dharmāḥ, dharmāḥ aśīryaṃ iti / (MV on SK 43, p. 60, ll. 9-12).

456 tathā vaikṛtā yathā—ācāryaṃ utpadyate, jñānād vairāgyam, vairāgyaḥ dharmāḥ, dharmāḥ aśīryaṃ iti / (GBh on SK 43, p. 153, ll. 7-9); vaikṛtikāḥ yathā—ācāryaṃ utpadyate, jñānād vairāgyam, vairāgyaḥ dharmāḥ, dharmāḥ aśīryaṃ iti / (MV on SK 43, p. 60, ll. 12-16).
the individual (as are the prākṛti variety), according to Gauḍapāda’s etymological explanation a literal translation of the term would be ‘deriving from a product’. Although Gauḍapāda does not specify the source of this product, according to Śaṅkhya cosmology this would ultimately be primordial Materiality (pradhāna). Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s classification of the principles (tattva) into sources (prakṛti) and products (vikṛti) (SK 3) may be relevant to Gauḍapāda’s interpretation of the term vaikṛta, insofar as the gross elements (mahābhūta) that make up a teacher’s body are classed as products (vikṛti).

In the context of its discussion of these three types of the bhāvas, the YD mentions only innate knowledge as possessed by Kapila, although elsewhere the text (like the other classical commentaries) mentions that he was endowed also with innate merit, dispassion, and lordliness. In explanation of his sāṃsiddhikā jñāna, the text explains that since he was not encumbered by wickedness (khalatva), there was no hindrance to the production of his knowledge at the same time as the manifestation of his psycho-physical body (kāryakaraṇa). The commentator goes on to say that for others, due to an obscuration of the constituent quality of goodness (sattva), the condition of knowledge results from a ‘flowing’ (abhyās) from Materiality (prakṛti) after some time; this is the prākṛta variety. The assumption

457 mūlaprakṛtir avikṛtir mahādādyāḥ prakṛtivikṛtāyah sapta / śodāsaṅkas tu vikāro na vikṛtibhāvaḥ puruṣah // (SK 3).
458 paramārṣir bhagavān sāṃsiddhikār dharmaśādhanāvairāgyaśvarvair āviṣpatīndo viśvāgraṇaḥ kapilamuniiḥ / (YD on SK 69b, p. 267, ll. 13-14).
459 The term kāryakaraṇa occurs very frequently in the YD. In the same context (of the discussion of the forms of the bhāvas), GBh appears to gloss utpannakāryakaraṇa as śarīrin (‘embodied’) (see n. 455 above). In the YD, kāryakaraṇa usually occurs in the singular (cf. n. 695 (§V.3)) and appears to refer simply to the ‘body’, but in this passage it also occurs in the dual (p. 234, l. 3; see n. 460 below), in which case it would literally translate ‘the effect and the instrument’. Presumably, the term refers to the combination of the subtle body (the ‘instrument’) and the physical body (the ‘effect’). (Cf. SK 43c: [‘The bhāvas] are seen to be located in the instrument; the embryo, etc., are located in the effect.’ (dṛṣṭāḥ karanaśrivaśvāḥ kāryāsrayinaḥ ca kalalādyāḥ.) I thus use the term ‘psycho-physical body’ here in the sense of the entire intellectual and physical organism.
460 tathā cārṣer iḥo napatyaḥ / pratibandhāhāvī / na ha asyā kāryakaraṇāvāha- / samakājānāśaḥ / na kṣeṣe prātibhādo ‘sti / aparivṛttaḥkhalatvād yataḥ kālāntaraṁ prākṛtika / tasmād asyā sahaiva kāryakaraṇābhyaṁ jñānam abhinipātyate pradīpaprakāśavat / ity atah
that *prakṛti* as used in the singular here refers specifically to primordial Materiality (*mūlaprakṛti; pradhāna*) can be supported with reference to the YD’s application of the term *prākṛta*, later in the commentary on SK 43, to the production of physical bodies (see below), in which they are said to arise out of *pradhāna*. According to this definition, then, the term *prākṛta* may be interpreted as ‘deriving from primordial Materiality’.

The YD also gives several examples of individuals born with innate (*sāṃsiddhika*) conditions other than knowledge, as well as several in whom there arose *sāttvika* conditions deriving from primordial Materiality (*prākṛta*). As an illustration of the production of *prākṛta* conditions, the text describes the dispassion of Āsuri (Kapila’s disciple), which arose when he was ‘favoured’ (*anugṛhīta*) by a ‘stream of purity’ (*śuddhisrotas*) from *prakṛti*. This description further supports the above translation of *prākṛta* as ‘deriving from primordial Materiality’.

In summary, according to the YD, not only do *prākṛta* conditions arise ‘naturally’, but they arise specifically due to a flowing (*abhijyanda*) or stream (*srotas*) from Materiality (*prakṛti*). The implications of this definition will be discussed further in CHAPTER V. No explanation of the term *vaikṛta* is provided by the YD, but as in the GBh and MV, the YD states that *vaikṛta* conditions are
applicable to ordinary people,\(^{463}\) and the YD’s interpretation of the prākṛta conditions as ‘deriving from Materiality’ would accord with the GBh’s interpretation of vaikṛta as ‘deriving from the products’.

The YD also outlines the views of two Śāṅkhya teachers preceding Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Pañcādhikaraṇa and Vindhyavāsin,\(^{464}\) with regard to the classification of the forms of the conditions. According to the YD, Pañcādhikaraṇa held a twofold division of the conditions, into prākṛtika and vaikṛtika. He divided the former into three types: ‘simultaneous with the principles’ (tattvasamakāla), ‘innate’ (sāmsiddhika), and ‘flowing’ (ābhisyandika). He divided the latter into ‘self-acquired’ (svavaikṛta) and ‘acquired from others’ (paravaikṛta).\(^{465}\)

The YD follows this description of Pañcādhikaraṇa’s views with those of Vindhyavāsin with regard to the forms of the conditions. The description of the latter’s views, however, is somewhat unclear. The commentator states that Vindhyavāsin rejects knowledge that is simultaneous with the principles (tattvasama) and innate (sāmsiddhika) knowledge and accepts only knowledge that is attained (siddha). This includes even Kapila’s knowledge, which arises after the manifestation of the objects of creation, although Kapila’s knowledge is of a clearer kind than that of others. The commentator also mentions that, according to

\(^{463}\) vaikṛtās tu bhāvā asmadādānām / (YD on SK 43, p. 234, l. 14).

\(^{464}\) The views of these two teachers are known only through fragments in later texts; for summaries of this evidence, see LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), pp. 129-131, 141-146.

\(^{465}\) pañcādhikaranasya tāvad dvividham jñānam prākritikāṃ vaikṛtikāṃ ca / prākritikāṃ trividhām tattvasamakālāṃ sāṃkhasī ca mahāḥm tattvātmanā mahāt ca pratyayo bhavati / utpannakāryakaraṇāsya tu sāmsiddhiḥkām ābhissyandikām ca bhavati / utpannakāryakaraṇāsya tu sāmsiddhiḥkām ābhissyandikāṃ ca bhavati / sāmsiddhiḥkām yat saṃhatavyāhasamakālāṃ nispadyate yathā paramarṣer jñānam / ābhissyandikāṃ ca saṃsidhakāryakaraṇāsya kāraṇāntarenopadāyate / vaikṛtam tu dvividham / svavaikṛtam paravaikṛtam ca / svavaikṛtam tārakam / paravaikṛtam siddhyantarāṇī / āha ca—

tattvasamam vaivartam tatrabhissyandikam dvitiyam syāt / vaikṛtam atas tritiyam ūṣṭk<au> śikam etad ākhyātam //

atra tu tattvāt sahotpatyāvīśeśat sāmsiddhiḥkām abhedenāha—

vaikṛtam api ca dvividham svavaikṛtam tatra tārakam bhavati / syāt saptavidham paravaikṛtam <su> tārādi nīrīṣṭām //

iti / yathā jñānam evaṃ dharmaṃ pṛiti / (YD on SK 43abc, p. 233, ll. 6-19).
Vindhyavāsin, the vaikṛtika forms of knowledge (tāraka, etc.; see §IV.10) are common to everyone.466 Since no mention is made in this passage of Paṅcādhikaraṇa’s ābhisyandika form of knowledge, it is not clear whether Vindhyavāsin’s attained (siddha) form encompasses both the ābhisyandika and vaikṛtika forms or only the vaikṛta form. The former seems more likely, though, since we are told that Vindhyavāsin rejects tattvasama and sāṃsiddhika but not ābhisyandika.

The author of the YD explains that Īśvarakṛṣṇa rejects the possibility of knowledge arising simultaneously with the principles (as held by Paṅcādhikaraṇa).467 The YD’s description of the production of prākṛta knowledge as the result of a flowing (abhiṣyanda) from Materiality (prakṛtī) (see above) suggests an equivalence between Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s prākṛta and Paṅcādhikaraṇa’s ābhisyandika. Furthermore, the fact that Paṅcādhikaraṇa placed innate (sāṃsiddhika) knowledge under the heading of natural (prākṛtika), and the YD’s explanation of the distinction between these two types (see above), suggest that sāṃsiddhika knowledge is essentially of the same nature as prākṛtika knowledge, except that in Kapila’s unique case there was no hindrance to the production of this condition from Materiality. Later in this passage, the YD-kāra also suggests that Īśvarakṛṣṇa accepts Paṅcādhikaraṇa’s division of

---

466 vindhyavāsinas tu nāsti tattvasamaṃ sāṃsiddhiṃ ca / kiṃ tarhi / siddh<e>-a>rūpaṃ nispadyate yasmād gurumukhābhītpatiṭ̄e pratiṭ̄eṣyata ity <etad apy> āha siddham nimittām naimittakasyāṅugraham kurute nāpūrṇam utpādayati iti (cf. YBh on YS 4.12) / nimitta-naimittikahāvāc caivaṃ upapadyate / tatra paramarṣeḥ pātur ūho ‘nyesāṃ kliṣṭa ity ayaṃ viśeṣah / sarveṣāṁ eva tu tārakādyaviṣisṭam / (YD on SK 43abc, p. 233, ll. 20-26). In the critical edition, Wezler and Motegi have amended the phrase siddhirūpa (in all manuscripts) to siddharūpa (as above); the original reading, however, would also make sense if we assume the identity of vaikṛta jñāna with siddhi (see §IV.10).

467 ācārya āha trividhā bhāvāḥ sāṃsiddhiḥ prākṛtikā vaikṛtikāḥ ca (cf. SK 43ab) iti / tatra sāṃsiddhiḥkaraṇat tattvasamatāḥ pratīyācaṣte naiva tad asti / kathāḥ / yadi hi tathā syāt tattvāntarānuṣpattiḥ / sanghātaḥ vyāhaḥ cānarthah prākṛtikāḥ syāt / mahaty utpānano jñānaṃ tatraivopalabdham iti kah saṅghātārthah / (YD on SK 43abc, p. 233, ll. 27-31).
vaikṛta knowledge into svavaikṛta and paravaikṛta, stating that ‘vaikṛta is twofold, as before’.  

The YD is unique among the commentaries in taking the threefold classification into sāmsiddhika, prākṛti, and vaikṛta to apply not only to the production of the bhāvas but also to the production of the physical body. SK 43cd states that ‘[the bhāvas] are seen to be located in the instrument [i.e., either the intellect (buddhi) or the internal instrument plus the faculties]; the embryo, etc., are located in the effect [i.e., the body].’ GBh, MV and TK take the term ‘embryo, etc.’ (kalalādi) to refer to a series of stages in the development of the physical body. The YD does not mention these stages, discussing instead the manner in which the body and its characteristics are produced. In this connection, the YD-kāra takes the threefold division applied to the bhāvas in SK 43ab to apply also to ‘the embryo, etc.’ As examples of the sāmsiddhika category, he mentions the bodies of planets, stars, and asterisms, and the particular innate characteristics of species, such as the whiteness of swans and the variegated colours of partridges and peacocks. He interprets the prākṛta category to refer to the ability of gods to produce

468 vaikṛtam tu dvividham pūrvavat/ (YD on SK 43abc, p. 234, ll. 5-6).

469 GBh glosses karaṇa as buddhi (GBh on SK 43, p. 153, l.13: buddhiḥ karaṇam taddāśrayinah), while MV identifies the ‘instruments’ (karaṇān) with the sense- and action-faculties and the threefold internal instrument of buddhi, ahamkāra, and manas (MV on SK 43, p. 60, ll. 19-21: karaṇān ucyante buddhi-karmāntaḥkaraṇabhedāḥ trayodāsaḥ (tāny āśrityāṣau bhāvāḥ pravartante /); cf. SK 33ab, which presents this division into internal and external instruments: antahkaraṇaḥ trividham daśadhā bāyāḥ bhāvāḥ trayasya visāyākhyam.

470 dhṛṣṭaḥ karaṇāśrayāṇaḥ kāryāśrayāsan ca kalalādyāḥ (SK 43cd).

471 kāryam dehas taddāśrayāḥ kalalādyāḥ, ye mātrā ity uktāḥ / sukraśonitasamyogye vivṛddhihetukāḥ kalalādyāḥ budbudamāṃsapeśīprabhṛtyayaḥ, tathā kaumārāyavanatvaḥvātavādayo bhāvāḥ, annapānaranamittāḥ nispadyante / ataḥ kāryāśrayaṁ ucye annaśiṣvabhogamāṃsādhatvāya āśrayeta / (GBh on SK 43, p. 153, ll. 15-18); yathā sūkṣmaśarīram utpattikāle mātur udarajā nyaya pravīṣati / mātau ruddhirām pītah sukram tasya sūkṣmaśarīranyapacayam kurute / kalalābudbudamāṃsapeśīgarbhakārmanāya=#a=vanatvātvaḥvādayo ‘nnapānaranamittāṁ utpadyante / (MV on SK 43, p. 60, l. 23 – p. 61, l. 3); kāryam sarvam taddāśrayinah, tasāvasthāḥ, kalalābudbudamāṃsapeśikarṇaḍaḥānanti-garbhasasihathāya, tato nirgatasa bhāsya bhāyākaṃṭhaṃdhamāṃśapeśikarṇaḍaḥānanti / (TK on SK 43, p. 128, ll. 22-24).

472 The term vaivarta, literally meaning ‘revolution’, must refer to ‘revolving heavenly bodies’ here, since it is glossed as grahanakṣatraṛādi, ‘planets, asterisms and stars’. According to MONIER-WILLIAMS, the term vivarta is similarly attested as a name of the sky, ‘the revolving one’, in Vedic literature. Perhaps the bodies of stars and planets are considered innate in the sense that they have always existed?
bodies that arise directly out of primordial Materiality (pradhāna). As examples of this, he refers to a mythological story (reproduced in full by the YD-kāra in the context of his discussion of the pratayayasarga; see §IV.9) in which a māhātmyaśarīra (‘body of greatness’) \(^{473}\) produces sons simply by thinking about them, and also to the production of millions of Rudras by Śiva (maheśvara).\(^ {474}\) As an example of the vaikṛta form of the production of bodies, the commentator describes a pregnant woman who gives birth after drinking milk, ‘as described in the science of medicine (bhiṣagveda)’.\(^ {475}\)

In this passage, the description of the māhātmyaśarīra’s sons as arising out of pradhāna supports the translation of prākṛtika as ‘deriving from primordial Materiality’ (see above). Moreover, since milk can be considered a product (vikṛti), like the body of a teacher as mentioned by GBh (see above), the translation of vaikṛta as ‘deriving from the products’ would be appropriate in this instance as well.

The TK’s interpretation of the SK’s classification of the forms of the conditions (SK 43) differs from that of the other commentaries. Vācaspati takes the

\(^{473}\) On the apparent identification of the māhātmyaśarīra with either Brahmā or Śiva, see the review in CHAPTER III of BRONKHORST (1983) and the discussion in §V.3.

\(^{474}\) Since two separate mythological stories are referenced in this passage, there is no reason to take māhātmyaśarīra and maheśvara to refer to the same figure, despite the evidence presented by BRONKHORST (1983, p. 152) for the identity of māhātmyaśarīra with Śiva (cf. §V.3).

\(^{475}\) yathā caite tathā—kāryāśrayiṇaḥ ca kalalādyāḥ // (SK 43d) trividhaiveti / kalalādigrahaṇena śarīrāḥ āha / teṣām ākṛtivaśvarīpyam catuardaśavidhe samsāre trividham / tatra sāṃsiddhikas tāvat vaivartāṇāṃ grahanaksatrātārādīnām / jātikṛtaḥ ca višeṣaḥ <yathā(?)> hamsānām sauklyamittirimeyārādīnāṃ citracchadatvam iti / prākṛtaṃ yathā māhātmyaśaḥṣaḥ <dhy> āṇat tasya hy abhi<dhy>aḥno bhavati hantiḥam putrān <sra>kṣye ye me karma kariṣyanti ye māṃ param <cāparam> ca jñāyante (cf. 239.13) / sa yādṛk sargam abhīdhyāyati tādṛk pradhānān utpadyate tadyathā maheśvarasya rudraścaraḥ <dhy>bṛh <rasyaḥ ca kalalādyāḥ yathā bhīṣagvede bhūhitam kṣiromaśaḥ gauram putrāṃ janayati (cf. Brh. U. 6.4.14) iti / (YD on SK 43d, p. 234, l. 20 – p. 235, l. 2). LARSON AND BHATTAZHARYA (1987, p. 60) appear to have fundamentally misinterpreted this passage by correlating the three forms of the production of bodies with the possession of the three forms of the bhāvas: ‘The author of the Yuktidīpikā, in explaining the adjectives “sāṃsiddhika,” “prākṛta,” and “vaikṛta” as modifiers of the term “bhāva” in verse 43 of the Kārikā […] comments that those beings endowed with “modified” (vaikṛta) predispositions transmigrate in the usual fashion through a continuing process of rebirth, (b) those beings endowed with “inherently powerful” (prākṛta) predispositions (namely, the māhātmyaśarīras, or Great Beings) can generate whatever bodies they wish; and (c) those beings endowed with “innate” (sāṃsiddhika) or perfect predispositions have subtle bodies that transmigrate among “the planets, the lunar mansions, and the stars” (grahaṇaκṣatratārādī).’
term sāṃsiddhika as a gloss on prākr̥ti, thus making the classification twofold: prākr̥ti and vaikr̥ti. He describes the prākr̥ti variety as ‘natural’ (svābhāvika) and ‘innate’ (sāṃsiddhika) and offers the stock example of Kapila’s innate merit, knowledge, dispassion, and lordliness.\footnote{vaikr̥tikāḥ naimittikāḥ puruṣasya jātasyottarakāladevatārādhanādinoṣṭaḥ / prākr̥tikāḥ svābhāvikā bhāvāḥ sāṃsiddhiḥkāḥ / tathā hi—sargādāv ādividvān atra bhagavān kapilo mahāmunir dharmajñāna-vairāgyaiśvaryasampannāḥ prādurbaḥhīvīti smaranti / (TK on SK 43, p. 128, ll. 1-4)} Although this equivalence of prākr̥ti and sāṃsiddhika is clearly a departure from the views of the earlier commentators, it does call to mind the essential similarity between the two suggested by the YD. Vācaspati explains the vaikr̥ti variety as being brought about after the individual’s birth, by means of the performance of activities such as the worship of deities. As an example of vaikr̥ti conditions, he mentions the sāttvika conditions of the great seers (maharṣi) such as Prācetasa\footnote{Jha (Tattvakaumudi (2004), p. 128) identifies prācetasa as an epithet of Vālmīki, although it could also refer to Manu or (perhaps less likely) Dakṣa.} \footnote{vaikr̥tāḥ ca bhāvā asāṃsiddhiḥkāḥ, ye upāyāṇuṣṭhānen-otpannāḥ, yathā prācetasa-prabhṛtīnām maharṣīṇām / evam adharmajñānāvairāgyaiśvaryasampannāḥ / (TK on SK 43, p. 128, ll. 5-7).} It is significant that, following the general trend of the earlier commentators, Vācaspati distinguishes between Kapila and other rṣis in this respect (see Chapter V).

In summary, the YD provides a more elaborate interpretation of the nature of the sāṃsiddhika and prākr̥ti forms of the bhāvas than do the other commentaries. This interpretation is compatible with the explanations of GBh and MV. The evidence of the YD suggests that prākr̥ti conditions are the result of a flowing (abhiṣyanda) or stream (srotas) from Materiality (prakṛti), that the term prākr̥ti thus be translated as ‘deriving from primordial Materiality’, and that sāṃsiddhika conditions are also of a prākr̥ti nature but differ in being produced at the birth of an individual. The fact that, according to the YD’s interpretation of the term prākr̥ti, physical bodies, like the bhāvas, can be produced directly from pradhāna, will be discussed further in §V.4, in connection with the circumstances surrounding
the birth of Kapila himself. The GBh’s explanation of the term *vaikṛta* suggests that it be similarly interpreted as ‘deriving from the products’, which accords with the YD’s interpretation of the *vaikṛta* production of physical characteristics. The TK, like the other commentaries, affords a special status to Kapila in terms of the production of his *bhāvas*. However, the TK differs fundamentally from the other commentaries in its classification of the forms of the conditions, suggesting a break in the tradition of interpretation.

Although, as discussed in §IV.6-7, in the context of SK 23 the YD-*kāra* explains that liberating knowledge may either be produced suddenly (*apūrva*) through the attainments (*siddhi*) or may be generated through practice (*abhyāsaja*), we have seen that under SK 43 the commentator also allows for the ‘flowing’ of this knowledge directly from primordial Materiality, which in the case of Kapila occurred at the time of his birth. It would seem logical to assume that the *sāmsiddhika* and *prākṛtika* modes of production of *jñāna* apply only to the kind of extraordinary individuals who are mentioned by the YD-*kāra* in this context, while most seekers are considered capable of attaining only *vaikṛta jñāna* either in a sudden fashion or through progressive practice. One would expect the Sāṃkhya texts themselves to play a prominent role in informing such ordinary individuals of the existence of the Sāṃkhya *tattvas*. The commentator’s discussion of the modes of production of the *bhāvas* does not tell us much about the role of the Sāṃkhya tradition in the production of *jñāna*. However, as will be shown in §IV.10, this discussion does provide a link to the Sāṃkhya paradigm of the *pratyayasarga*, which directly concerns the transmission of knowledge through teacher and text.
§9. The commentators’ interpretations of the intellectual creation

(pratyayasarga).

The manner in which the condition (bhāva) of knowledge (jñāna) is attained by ordinary seekers of liberation, and the role of the tradition of Sāṃkhya texts and teachers in producing such knowledge, can be clarified by reference to the YD’s treatment of the related Sāṃkhya paradigm of the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga).

The commentators’ interpretations of the four categories and fifty subcategories of the pratyayasarga follow the classifications given in SK 46-51 (see §II.5), although these interpretations vary. After a discussion of the commentators’ views on the general nature of the pratyayasarga, this section will focus specifically on the commentators’ explanations of the forms of attainment (siddhi), one of the four main divisions of the pratyayasarga. Attainment is associated by the commentators with the production of knowledge leading to liberation (mokṣa, kaivalya) and with the transmission of knowledge from teacher to pupil. The discussion of attainment, particularly in the YD, thus provides some key information with regard to the nature of Kapila’s knowledge and the importance of his authority in the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine.

GBh, MV and TK are unanimous in glossing the term pratyaya as buddhi (intellect) and explaining the term pratyayasarga as thus ‘the creation of the intellect’.\footnote{pratyayo buddhir ity uktā, adhyāvasāyo buddhir dharmo jñānam ity ādi / (GBh on SK 46, p. 160, l. 4); pratyayı buddhir uppanno āsmaṁ tasmāt pratyayasaṁga ity ucyate / (MV on SK 46, p. 63, ll. 8-9); pratiyate ‘neneti pratyayo buddhiḥ, tasya sargah / (TK on SK 46, p. 133, l. 1).} The YD offers three alternative explanations of the term. First, the commentator gives padārtha and lakṣaṇa as synonyms of pratyaya, indicating that pratyayasarga refers to the ‘creation of categories [i.e. of the fifty categories
The second explanation corresponds to that of the GBh, MV and TK, but the YD adds that sarga (creation) refers to the effect or function of the intellect. Lastly, the commentator suggests that the term could be interpreted as ‘the creation caused by an intellect’.

In connection with the third explanation of the term pratyayasarga, the YD-kāra quotes a passage (arguably from the pre-classical Sāṃkhya text Śaṣṭitantra) relating a mythological story in which a māhātmyaśarīra (‘body of greatness’) referred to by the YD-kāra as Brahmā, produces as his sons, by means of his thought alone, a series of gods (deva) associated with particular streams (srotas): five gods having ‘primary streams’ (mukhyasrotas), twenty-eight having ‘horizontal streams’ (tiryaksrotas), nine having ‘upward streams’ (ūrdhvasrotas), and eight having ‘downward streams’ (arvāksrotas). The YD-kāra equates these with the five forms of error (viparyaya), the twenty-eight forms of incapacity (aśakti), the nine forms of contentment (tuṣṭi), and the eight forms of attainment (siddhi), respectively.

Elsewhere, he mentions that the māhātmyaśarīra’s sons arise out of primordial

---

480 As outlined in §II.5, the pratyayasarga is divided into four main categories—error (viparyaya), incapacity (aśakti), contentment (tuṣṭi) and attainment (siddhi)—which are subdivided into fifty categories (padārtha).

481 pratyayasarga iti pratyayaḥ padārtho lakṣaṇam iti paryāyāḥ / pratyayānāṁ sargāḥ pratyayasargah padārthasargaḥ lakṣaṇasargaḥ ity arthaḥ / athāvā pratyayo buddhiḥ niścayo 'dhyavasyāya iti paryāyāḥ / tasya sargo 'yam, ataḥ pratyayasargah pratyayakāryam pratyaya vyapāra ity arthaḥ / athāvā pratyayapūrvakāḥ sargāḥ pratyayasargah / buddhipūrvaka ity uktāḥ / (YD on SK 46āb, p. 239, ll. 6-10).

482 On the apparent origin of this passage in the Śaṣṭitantra, see the reviews in CHAPTER III of FRAUWALLNER (1973) and OBERHAMMER (1961).

483 On the identification of the māhātmyaśarīra with either Brahmā or Śiva, see the review in CHAPTER III of BRONKHORST (1983) and further discussion in §V.3.

484 evaḥ hi śastraṁ mahādādiviśesāntah sargo buddhipūrvavatvāt / utpannākāryakaranas tu māhātmyaśarīra ekākīnām ātmānaṁ avesyābhhidadhyau hantāham putrān sa prādurbhāvah / teṣu utpannesu na tuṣṭiś ca ātmaḥ / tato 'nīc tiryakṣrotasāt stāvānīśīyāt prajātī / teṣāḥ apy asya naiva taṣṭhe, athāprena vordhvasrotasāt devāḥ prādurbhāvah / teṣāḥ apy utpannesu naiva krān thātām ātmānaṁ mene / tato 'nīc śātvārāksrotasāt utpadaḥ / evaṁ tuṣmād brahmaḥ / 'bhidhyānād utpannah, taṁcit pratyayasargah / sa vipyāvākhya śaktyākhyas tuṣṭyākhyasāt siddhyākhyas ātmaḥ / (YD on SK 46āb, p.239, ll. 11-20).
Materiality (pradhāna) (see §IV.8).\textsuperscript{485} Moreover, in his discussion of the function of siddhi in particular, the commentator states: ‘The stream of attainment (siddhisrotas) which is always issuing out of primordial Materiality (pradhāna) does not function in all beings, on account of the interference of error, incapacity, and contentment.’\textsuperscript{486} As discussed by Oberhammer (1961)\textsuperscript{487}, it is significant that thus, according to the YD, the categories of the pratayāsarga, like the prākṛtika variety of the bhāvas (see §IV.8), arise as a stream out of pradhāna. This and other evidence in the YD of the relationship between the bhāvas and the pratayāsarga will be discussed in §IV.10.

In his commentary on SK 51, the YD-kāra correlates the four streams mentioned above to four classes of beings. Inanimate objects (sthāvara) have ‘primary streams’ (mukhyasrotas) and are thus characterised by error (viparyaya). Animals (tiryaṅc) have ‘horizontal streams’ (tiryaksrotas) and are thus characterised by incapacity (aśakti). Gods (deva) have ‘upward streams’ (ūrdhvasrotas) and are thus characterised by contentment (tuṣṭī). Human beings (māṇuṣa) have ‘downward streams’ (arvāksrotas) and are thus characterised by attainment (siddhi). Human beings therefore progress toward attainment but are hindered by error, incapacity, and contentment.\textsuperscript{488} The GBh, however, appears to conflict with this scheme by defining siddhi as ‘knowledge characterised by the constituent quality of goodness (sāttvika) in one with an upward stream (ūrdhvasrotas)’.\textsuperscript{489} It is unclear whether Gauḍapāda holds gods rather than human beings to be capable of attainment, or

\textsuperscript{485} prākṛtam yathā māhāmya\textless a\textgreater sarābhāhi\textless dhy\textgreater ānāt tasya ha\textless dhy\textgreater āno bhavati hantāham putrān\textless sra\textgreater kṣye ye me karma karisyanti ye māṃ parama\textless cāparam\textgreater ca jñāsyanti (cf. 239.13) / sa yādṛk sargam abhirhāyati tādṛk pradhānād utpadyate tadyathā mahēśvarasya rudrakoṭisrṣṭau iti / (YD on SK 43d, p. 234, ll. 25-29).

\textsuperscript{486} nityapravṛttasyāpi pradhānāt siddhisrotaso viparyāṣaktiṣṭuprātipravṛttir bhavati / (YD on SK 51d, p. 252, l. 30 – p. 253, l. 1).

\textsuperscript{487} Oberhammer (1961), pp. 139-140.

\textsuperscript{488} viparyayāt tāvat sthāvareśu / te hi mukhy\textless a\textgreater srotaso viparyayātmānaḥ / aśaktes tiryakṣu / te hi tiryakṣrotaso ‘ṣaktātmānah / tuṣṭer deveśu / te hy ārūrdhvasrotasas tuṣṭātmānah / mānuṣās tv arvāksrotsaṣah samśiddhyātmānah / tasmāt ta eva tārakādi pravartante savattvarajastamasāṁ cāṅgāgābhavātyāmād viparyayāṣaktiṣṭubhiḥ pratītyanta iti na sarveṣām sarvadā siddhir bhavati / (YD on SK 51, p. 253, ll. 1-6).

\textsuperscript{489} tathā aṣṭavidhā siddhiḥ / sāttvikāni jñānāni tatraivordhvasrotasi / (GBh on SK 47, p. 162, l. 16).
rather holds human beings rather than gods to be characterised by upward streams. There is no evidence available to explain this discrepancy between the evidence of the GBh and the YD. The YD, however, provides a more complete and elaborate picture of the relation of the categories of the pratyayasarga to the four classes of beings.

In summary, the pratyayasarga can be defined as a creation of fifty categories, representing the various effects or functions of the intellect, and applicable in different degrees to different classes of beings. The mythological dimension of the production of these categories, added by the YD, is representative of a general tendency on the part of the YD-kāra—a tendency, at least in this instance, which seems to be carried on from the Saṣṭitantra to incorporate figures of divine authority or prominence into discussions of Sāṃkhya doctrine (see §V.3-5).

With regard to the four divisions of the pratyayasarga, GBh and MV illustrate the relationship between them with an example involving the perception of a post (sthāṇu). In this situation, error (viparyaya) is described as a doubt as to whether it is a post or a person. Incapacity (aśakti) is the inability to dispel this doubt, even when the post is seen clearly. Contentment (tuṣṭi) applies to one who does not care about knowing whether it is a post or not. Attainment (siddhi) is the realisation that it is in fact a post, when one sees a creeper or a bird upon it.

490 Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1973), p. 260: ‘Religious sects present their theories not in the abstract objective form like the philosophical schools. They would rather like to clothe them in the form of stories and they especially give them a drapery of myths. […] The influence of such a myth-making kind shows itself in many parts of the Sāṃkhya theory of the old school of Vṛṣāṇa.’

491 tatra saṃśayo jñānaṃ viparyayaḥ / yathā sthāṇiudarśane sthāṇur āyaṃ puruṣo vetti samśayaḥ / aśaktir yathā—tam eva sthāṇum samyag drṣṭvā samśayaṃ chetum na śāknośty aśaktiḥ / eva tuṣṭīyas tuṣṭākhyo yathā—tam eva sthāṇum jñātum saṃśayitum vā necchati, kim anenāśmākam ity eṣā tuṣṭiḥ / caturthaḥ sidhyākhyo yathā—ānanditendriyāḥ sthāṇum ārūḍhām vallīṃ paśyati śakunīm vā, tasya siddhir bhavati sthāṇur āyaṃ iti / (GBh on SK 46, p. 160, ll. 5-10); samśayabuddhir viparyayaḥ sthāṇur āyaṃ puruṣo vetti / bhūyo 'pi sthāṇum prasamākṣya na śāknośty antaraṃ gantum evam asyāśaktir utpannā / talas tuṣṭīḥ tam eva sthāṇum jñātum saṃśayitum vā necchati kim anenāśmākam
In a similar manner, YD uses the example of the attainment of merit (dharma) to illustrate the categories of the pratrayasarga. When one engaged in the pursuit of dharma, abandoning sacrifices like the agniṣṭoma, creates confusion (saṃkara)\(^{492}\), this is considered error (viparyaya). In this context, incapacity (aśakti) is the inability [to perform sacrifice] due to a deficiency in the means [of sacrifice]. Contentment (tuṣṭi) is satisfaction with merely lighting [the sacred fire] (ādhāna). Attainment (siddhi) is the performance of the particular [sacrificial] act in its entirety. The commentator adds that these categories are applicable in the same way to the pursuit of other objects.\(^{493}\) In his commentary on SK 51, the YD-kāra describes siddhi as the attainment of abhipretam artham.\(^{494}\) The significance of this phrase is not clear from the context, but in its broadest, most literal sense it translates as ‘an intended object’.\(^{495}\)

These passages suggest that the categories of the pratrayasarga describe potentially any situation in which the attainment of an object is considered to be hindered by error, incapacity and contentment (cf. SK 51d).\(^{496}\) However, the

\(^{492}\) The term saṃkara usually refers to the intermixture of castes through indiscriminate marriage, but it could alternatively refer simply to confusion of the elements of the ritual act. Kumar and Bhargava (Yuktidīpakā (1990-1992), p.322) follow the former interpretation, while KENGHE (1968, p. 366) follows the latter. KENGHE’s interpretation seems more likely, given the context of the performance of ritual.

\(^{493}\) tadyathā dharmārthapravṛtyto ‘gniṣṭomādīn parityajya saṃkaram kurvā so ‘syā viparyayah, sādhanayaikalyād asāmarthyaṃ aśaktiḥ, ādhaṇamātrasantoṣṭaṃ tuṣṭiḥ, kriśnasya kriyāviśeṣasyāṁśhiḥ ānusādhinaḥ saṃkaraḥ / evam <anyā>-ṛthādiṣu yajyam / yaś cāyaṃ catuvirāḥ phalaviśēṣo viparyayādīr akhyataḥ (YD on SK 46ab, p. 239, l. 22 – p. 240, l. 2). My interpretation follows the emendation of the text by Wezler and Motegi. The phrase arthādiṣu in all manuscripts, coming after the illustration of dharma, could alternatively suggest that the passage refers to the traditional four ‘goals of man’ (purusārtha): dharma, artha, kāma, and mokṣa.

\(^{494}\) tatroho nāma yaddā pratyaṇānamāṇagamavatirekenābhīpṛtam artham vicāraṇābalaṇaiva pratiṣṭhāte sādyā saṃkaraṃ kurvā ity apadīṣyate / (YD on SK 51abc, p. 252, ll. 12-13); etāśām samāśrayenābhīpṛtam artham yataḥ sansādhatvaṁ atah pūrvācāryagatāṃ mārgam ārurukṣus tatpravarṇaḥ syād iti / (YD on SK 51abc, p. 252, ll. 22-24).

\(^{495}\) For a possible alternative explanation of the phrase abhipṛtam artham, see §V.1.

\(^{496}\) Siddhe pūrvo ‘ikusas trivividhāḥ / (SK 51d): ‘The previous are the threefold curb to attainment.’ GBh, MV, and TK explain the term ankuśa (literally, ‘hook’) using the metaphor of an elephant which is restrained by a hook; e.g.: yathā hastā gṛhitānkuṣena vaśo bhave, evam viparyayāsaktītuṣṭibhir gṛhito loko ‘jñānaṃ prāpnoti / (GBh on SK 51, p. 171, ll. 19-20).
commentators generally discuss *siddhi* in terms of the attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge and stress that, like the condition of *jñāna* (see §IV.6), *siddhi* leads ultimately to the attainment of liberation (*kaivalya*). For instance, YD refers to liberation as the ‘highest attainment’.\(^{497}\) GBh and MV say that *siddhi* leads to knowledge of the principles (*tattva*), which in turn results in liberation.\(^{498}\) Given this concern with the production of Sāṃkhya knowledge in particular, it is possible that the term *abhipretārtham* in the YD refers more specifically to the ‘intended goal’ of Sāṃkhya—that is, to liberation through knowledge.

Similarly, the commentators’ explanations of the subdivisions of *viparyaya*, *aśakti*, and *tuṣṭi* generally focus upon their role as hindrances to the production of Sāṃkhya knowledge. For a discussion of the views of GBh, YD, JM and TK (with a focus on the YD) on these subdivisions, see KENGHE (1968). KENGHE has demonstrated the relation of the categories of *viparyaya* and *tuṣṭi* to the doctrines of Pātañjalayoga (see CHAPTER III). Moreover, OBERHAMMER (1961) has suggested that the categories of the *pratyayasarga* had their origins as ‘meditative existential attitudes’ in ‘circles connected with Yoga’.\(^{499}\) Accordingly, the YD’s explanation of the way in which *siddhi* eliminates *viparyaya*, *aśakti*, and *tuṣṭi* seems to reflect a view of *siddhi* as the result of yogic practice. The YD-*kāra* explains that because *siddhi* results in unrestricted knowledge, it eliminates error. Similarly, because *siddhi* results in non-obstruction with regard to things past, present and future, things near and remote, and things grasped by the senses and suprasensuous (*atīndriya*), it eliminates incapacity. These abilities recall the supernormal powers termed *siddhi* in

\[^{497}\] *eteṣāṁ mārge ’vasthāpanāt paraṁ siddhiṁ kaivalyalakṣaṇāṁ acireṇa prāprnoti /* (YD on SK 51d, p. 253, ll. 12-13).

\[^{498}\] *sasiddhes tattvajñānam utpadyate / tasmāt mokṣa iti /* (GBh on SK 51, p. 171, l. 21); *siddhes tattvajñānam tasmāc ca mokṣā iti* (MV on SK 51, p. 69, l. 19).

Yoga and associated with aśvarya (also said to result in non-obstruction)\(^{500}\) in Sāṃkhya (see §IV.6), as well as the fact that yogins are said to be able to perceive suprasensuous objects (see §IV.1). Moreover, the YD continues, because siddhi leads to knowledge of the distinction between Materiality and Consciousness, it dispels contentment (tuṣṭi) with any lesser stage of accomplishment (bhūmi). This accords with KENGHE’s\(^{501}\) comparison of tuṣṭi with the notion of alabdhabhūmikatva (‘the state of not having attained a stage’) in Yoga.\(^{502}\)

It thus seems reasonable to conclude that this passage of the YD reflects, in some sense, the original association of the categories of the prayayasarga with stages of yogic practice. However, the commentators’ descriptions of the subdivisions of siddhi do not mention the practices of Yoga but rather deal largely with the production and transmission of knowledge. As KENGHE notes,\(^{503}\) the notion of siddhi in Sāṃkhya can thus be sharply contrasted with the notion of siddhi or aśvarya in Pātañjalayoga, which is generally held by the Sāṃkhya texts to be a hindrance to liberation through knowledge (see §IV.6). The Sāṃkhya commentators’ association of siddhi with the attainment of knowledge, rather than of supernatural abilities, reflects the system’s emphasis on knowledge as the sole means to liberation. The remainder of this section will be devoted to a discussion of the subdivisions of siddhi and their relation to the production and transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge.

As outlined in §II.5, SK 51 lists the eight varieties of siddhi as reflection (ūha), speech (śabda), study (adhyayana), the three removals of pain

---

\(^{500}\) SK 45c: aśvaryaṇād avighāto.

\(^{501}\) KENGHE (1968), p. 369.

\(^{502}\) yathā ca siddheḥ viparyayāsaktituṣṭayaḥ pratipakṣā evam siddhir api viparyayādīnām / sā hy utpānā sarvān etān nivartayati / kathām / aviparīṭajñānām viparyayam, attānāgatavartamāneṣu sannikṛṣṭasvā viprakṣṛṣṭasvā indriyārūṣaśvā atindriyāṣvā ca prātiṣṭhātād asaktim, puruṣasya prakṛtvikāravatārıkṣaya darśāṇāt sarvās bhūmiṣu tuṣṭim / (YD on SK 51d, p. 253, ll. 7-11).

\(^{503}\) KENGHE (1968), p. 373.
(duḥkhavighāta), attainment of/from friends (suhṛtprāpti), and charity (dāna). GBh explains each of these as a distinct means of attaining liberation. Reflection (ūha) is described as the reflection by an individual on the questions: ‘What is the truth here? What is the highest? What leads to the ultimate? Doing what will I have attained my goal?’ This reflection leads to the knowledge of the distinctions between the principles (tattva) and resultant liberation. Knowledge gained through speech or language (śabda) produces the same knowledge of the principles and liberation. Likewise, study (adhyayana) of texts (śāstra) such as the Veda leads to the same result. (This point is surprising, given Sāṃkhya’s rejection of scriptural (ānuśravika) means to liberation (SK 2; see §II.3.).) The three pains are listed as personal (ādhyātmika), external (ādhibhautika) and divine (ādhidaivika), which are explained by the commentators under SK 1 in connection with the reason given for initiating the Sāṃkhya enquiry.504 These pains motivate one to approach a teacher (guru), from whose teachings one attains liberation. The seventh siddhi, suhṛtprāpti, is described simply as the attainment of knowledge from a friend, which likewise leads to liberation. Lastly, charity (dāna) is the attainment of liberating knowledge from a holy man (bhagavat) whom one has given gifts such as shelter, medicine, staff, bowl, food or clothing.505 Although Gauḍapāda thus explains each of these

504 E.g., GBh on SK 1, p. 36, ll. 1-6: tatra duḥkhatrayam—ādhyātmikam, ādhibhautikam, ādhyātivikam ceti / tatrodhyātmikam dvividham—sārīram, mānasaṃ ceti / sārīram vātapittasvāvakeyakram tvarātisārdhi / mānasaṃ priyaviyogapratyayasyogādi / ādhibhautikam catuvrhadhātagnimanitam / manuṣyasamāpanryapaksarśpadamsaśakaykāmakumatsya-makaragrhasyāvarebhyo jārāyāndajasvedajodbhiprahyāh sakāśād upajayate / ādhyātivikam—devānām idam daivam, divah prabhavatīti vā daivam /.

505 ūho yathā kaścin nityam āhate—kim tā satyam, kim param, kim naiśreyasam, kim kṛta kṛtrāḥ syām—iti cintayato jñānam utpadyate pradhānād anya eva puruṣa iti, anyā buddhiḥ, anyo hanikāraḥ, anyāni tannātrangāndriyāni pānca mahābhūtānity evam tatvajñānam utpadyate yena mokṣa bhavati / esā uāhākiḥ prathamā siddhiḥ / tathā sābdajñānāt pradhānānupariṣabuddhyāhānakāratamāścendriyapañcamahābhūtavisayam jñānam bhavati, tato mokṣa ity esā sābdākhyā siddhiḥ / adhyayanaḥ vedādhyāyanaḥ paṇcvimśatitattvajñānam prāpya mokṣam yāti, ity esā tṛṭyā siddhiḥ / duḥkhavighātātrayam / ādhyātmikādhibhautikādhyātavikaduḥkhavighātāya gurum samapagamyata upadesān mokṣam yāti / esā caturthi siddhiḥ / esāviva duḥkhavighātabhedāt tridhā kalpañāyā / iti śat siddhiḥ / tathā suhṛtprāptiḥ / yathā kaścit suhṛtrjñānam adhigamyam mokṣam gacchati / esā saptamī siddhiḥ / dānam / yathā kaścid bhagavatām pratvāsrayauṣadhī-
siddhis in terms of a separate means of attaining liberating knowledge, he does not explain the specific nature of śabda, and it seems as though duḥkhavigāta, suhṛprāpti, dāna, and perhaps adhyayana would fall under the general category of śabda, given that they all involve the transmission of knowledge through the medium of language.

The explanation of the siddhis given by MV includes some elements found in GBh but differs in important respects. Māṭhara also mentions the questions considered by one engaged in reflection (ūha), but adds that thinking thus, one obtains knowledge from oneself, from a teacher (guru), or from a text (śāstra). The second siddhi is explained as the attainment of liberating knowledge upon hearing the words (śabda) of someone reciting [a text]. One obtains this knowledge through study (adhyayana) when by serving a guru one is able to study and understand Sāṃkhya knowledge. In contrast to GBh, MV treats the three removals of pain (duḥkhavighāta) as preliminary steps to attaining knowledge through one of the first three siddhis. In explanation of attainment of/from friends (suhṛtprāpti), Māṭhara says that someone who is foolish does not come to understand through the presence of a guru, and that suhṛtprāpti is when such a person is taught Sāṃkhya knowledge by a compassionate friend using language that is easy to understand, so that ‘even stones would understand’. MV’s explanation of charity (dāna) accords with that of GBh: one attains Sāṃkhya knowledge by propitiating gurus by means of various gifts.⁵⁰⁶
Insofar as the MV includes attainment from oneself, from a guru, and from a śāstra in its definition of ūha, there seems to be some overlap in terms of the nature of the various siddhis, as was also apparent in GBh. In general, both texts emphasize the role of a guru and the power of language in the transmission of Śaṃkhya knowledge. The MV suggests that even a foolish person may attain such knowledge with the help of a compassionate friend who is willing to use simple language.

In contrast to these texts, the YD does not define the siddhis in terms of the attainment specifically of Śaṃkhya knowledge, but it does offer a clearer explanation of the differences in the functions of the siddhis in relation to the transmission of knowledge. Reflection (ūha) is explained as the attainment of the intended object (abhīpretam artham) through the power of reflection (vicāraṇa) without recourse to perception, inference, or doctrine (the normal means of knowledge (pramāṇa); see §II.4, IV.1.1-5). Both ūha and vicāraṇa usually indicate a process of logical reasoning, which here must nevertheless function independently of the pramāṇa of inference (anumāṇa). This ceases to be a problem when we

---

sambodhito yad aham sarvaṃ jānāmi amī caurā ayaṃ sādhur eva tatārthānuvartati / evam caurasthānīyo buddhyahankāratānamātrendriyādbhibhūtasamavāyaḥ, sādhusthānīyaś ca puruṣaḥ, tadauṣūmānīsāntaḥ śiṣyo, bhedena bodhyāḥ / pathikasthānīyo guruḥ / tasmā jñānam pratikratrayenāvāgamya—gurutāḥ, śāstratāḥ, svataḥ ity uhasiddhiḥ prathamoktā / śābdo nāma yathā kasyacit pātāhataḥ (tām asya janaṃ) śabdāṃ śrutvā ‘nyat pradhānam anyo ‘ham iti tamārgaprajñāntāntaḥ mokṣaṃ gacchati evam eṣā dvitiyā siddhiḥ śabdātra utpānḥ / kaścit gurupāsanaṇāyā tato ‘dhītyāvāgamya sakalam jñānam āpnoti / tṛṣṭīdhīyanasiddhiḥ śaṅkhyaśuddīnām adhīnya saṅjātā / evam etās tīraḥ siddhyah / eṣā vyūkhāvante / duḥkhavighātāravatam iti / yathā kaścid ādāv abhihitādhyātmikādī-duḥkhatrayenāvābhūto ’syā pratikārya uham śabdām adhyayanam vā pratipadā jñānam adhigamyam mokṣaṃ yātī duḥkhavighātāya yatrohādītāram adhikurute tad api siddhyah / evam śat siddhyah / ca kaścid duḥmedhā guruḥ sākāṣāt nāvadhrayati / tat kenacit pratyapakāraṇaṃ ekṣena suhṛdaḥ tasmāt suṣmāsaṅkṣipat ujjhīrśuṣā / tadanukālatayā kṛpāvatah sugamavacobhir vairāgyapūrvarākmaṃ guṇapurusāṃtāropanāladyācāraṁ śaṅkhyaśuddīnaṃ upadīṣataḥ samuddhṛtaḥ ālokoṣyābhagaṃ saṅkṣaraṇaḥ suhṛtra-prāptiḥ iti / te hi suhṛdaḥ tathopadīṣyaṇi suhṛtraṇaḥ yathā pāṣāṇā ’py avabuddhyate / uktam ca—eṣa āturaciṣṭānāṃ mātrāsparśačayaya vībhūḥ / bhavasindhipravo ārdo yad ācāryanuvartanaḥ // eṣā saptami siddhiḥ / kaścid āvāhanasāṃvāvanabhikṣāpāṭravacchakramatraṇaṁdaśeḥprabhrītādīnena gurīn ārādhya sāṅkhyaṃ adhigamyā mokṣaṃ gacchahity ēṣā ’ṣṭamī siddhiḥ dānādibhir upāyair niśpanṇā / (MV on SK 51, p. 67, l. 20 – p. 69, l. 7).

507 taroḥo nāma yadā ṭrptayaksānumānāgamaṇavatiśreṇīabhīpretam artham vićāraṇābalaścita pratipadāie sādhya siddhiṣ tārakam ity apadīṣyate / tārayati sāmśārāṇāvādī tārakam / (YD on SK 51, p. 251, lI, 12-14).
consider that inference is generally presented by the YD as an aid in the communication of knowledge to another (see §IV.2). Īśa must, in contrast, represent some sort of independent mental activity.

Speech (śabda) is explained by the YD as attainment from the teaching of a guru by one who is frustrated from attaining the object oneself. Study (adhyayana) is similarly a means of attainment for one who is unable to attain even from another’s teaching.508 The YD-kāra says that beings up to Brahmā attain the intended object (abhipretam artham) through these three means of attainment.509 He then quotes a passage from the Nirukta (NU), apparently to illustrate the nature of these three siddhis (see below).510 Like the MV, the YD treats the three removals of pain (duḥkhavighāta) as preliminary steps to attainment through one of the first three siddhis. The YD describes attainment of/from friends (suḥṛtrāpīti) as the removal of doubts after recourse to a good friend who is endowed with happiness. The final siddhi is described as attainment through one of the first three siddhis after overcoming misfortune through charity (dāna).511 The commentator closes this

508 yaḍā tu svayam pratipattau pratihanyamāno gurūpadesāt pratipadyate su dvitiyaḥ siddhiḥ suṛaram ity apadīṣyate / katham / sukham aneṇādīyatvā ’pi bhavaṃṣaṅkajāt taranṭīti / yaḍā tu anyopadesād apy asamartaraḥ pratipattum adhyayanena sādhayati su tṛtiyaḥ siddhiḥ tārayantam ity apadīṣyate / tad etat tārayakriyāyā adīvatvā ’y pravṛttihāṃ saṃbhavaspariyāvatvā tārayantam ity apadīṣyate / (YD on SK 51, p. 251, ll. 15-21).

509 ta ete trayah sādhanopāyāḥ—yāyā brahmaṇaḥ prāṇino ’bhipretam artham prāpnuvanti / (YD on SK 51, p. 251, ll. 21-22).

510 aha ca sāksātkṛtadharmāṇaḥ tāyā babhāvuh / te ’parebhītya sāksātkṛtadharmabhya upadesena mantrān samprāduḥ / upadeśāya glāyanto ’pare bilmagrahaṇaṃ granthāṃ samāmnāṣitvā vedhān ca vedāṅgān ca (Nir. 1.20) iti / bilmāṃ bhāsanaṃ samyakprabhāṣāya viśiṣṭāḥ samketa uktāḥ / (YD on SK 51, p. 252, l. 22 – p. 252, l. 2).

511 eṣām tu sādhanopāyānāṃ pratyanikarapratisedhāya duḥkhavighātatrayam / duḥkhāni trīyā adhyātmikādīni / tatra cādhyātmikānāṃ vālādīnāṃ siddhiḥpratyanikānāṃ āyurvedavāyānāśhānena vighātaṃ kṛtvā pūrvesāṃ trayāṇam anyatatvā svābhāvikānāṃ ity abhidhīyate / kathāṃ / nirṛtarogāḥ prītaḥ pramodayanta iti kṛtvā ity abhidhīyate / kathāṃ / nīvṛtta-arogāḥ / prāṇāḥ / tārayāḥ / tārayantam ity apadiśyate / (YD on SK 51, p. 251, l. 22).
discussion with the following statement: ‘Since [people] accomplish the intended object by recourse to these [siddhis], one desirous to advance upon the path travelled by previous teachers (ācārya) should be intent upon them.’

Since the YD-kāra states that all beings attain the intended object through one of the first three siddhis, it seems reasonable to assume that suhṛtprāpti, like duḥkhavigāta and dāna, is considered a preliminary step to attainment through one of the first three siddhis. Thus, according to the YD, the three primary siddhis are reflection (ūha), speech (śabda), and study (adhyayana). The nature of these three siddhis, and the commentator’s statement that the siddhis allow one to follow the path travelled by previous teachers, suggest that these three primary siddhis describe the process by which knowledge has been produced and transmitted from guru to disciple. Moreover, the term ācārya (‘teacher’) usually refers to Śāṃkhya teachers (especially Īśvarakṛṣṇa) in the YD. The use of this term here could thus be taken to imply that the siddhis are important primarily insofar as they describe the transmission of Śāṅkhya knowledge. This supposition may be supported by reference to the commentator’s classification of the forms of knowledge under SK 23, in which he refers to the first three siddhis as the means to unprecedented (apūrva) knowledge of the distinction between Materiality and Consciousness.

The distinction in the same passage between this apūrva form of knowledge and knowledge attained by means of the usual pramāṇas accords with the commentator’s definition of āha.

---

512 YD on SK 51, p. 252, ll. 2-22.
513 Cf., for example, the YD’s discussion of the forms of the bhāvas, in which ācārya is used to refer both to Śāṅkhya teachers in general (YD on SK 43, p. 23, ll. 5-6: tatrācāryaḥ tā� bhāvaṁ vipratipattih) and to Īśvarakṛṣṇa in particular (YD on SK 43, p. 23, ll. 27-28: ācārya āha trividhā bhāvaḥ śāṃsiddhikāh prākritikāva vairāgyānāṁ dviśāntaḥ sādānāṁ ārādhyaḥ / (cf. SK 43ab) iī /). The commentator also refers to Kapila himself as an ācārya in the context of SK 70 (see §IV.4, n. 754).
514 YD on SK 23, p. 192, ll. 7-11; see §IV.6, n. 415.
More information on the nature of these three primary siddhis can be ascertained from the YD-kāra’s use of the NU quotation. In its original context, this passage\(^{515}\) occurs in a section of the NU devoted to the praise of those who know the proper, etymological meanings of words. WEZLER (2001) argues that this passage thus ‘also deals with the praise of those who know the meaning—of course of the Veda—and the censure of those who do not.’\(^{516}\) The passage in question is also notably quoted in the Vākyapadiyavṛtti (VPV).\(^{517}\) AKLUJKAR (2009) offers a translation of the NU passage, based on interpretative information obtained largely from the context of the VPV in which it is quoted:

There came about (or there were) (at a distant time) seers who had discovered the (ordinarily imperceptible) properties of things. Through instruction, they have entrusted materially effective speech formations to others who had not discovered the (ordinarily imperceptible) properties of things. The others experiencing fatigue toward instruction, have set down for transmission this corpus (i.e., the commentandum of the Nirukta, the Nighaṇṭus etc...) and the Veda and the Veda ancillaries in order to grasp the image. (The word) bilma is (to be thought of as) bhilma or (as) bhāsana.\(^{518}\)

The YD-kāra’s use of this quotation reflects his tendency to appropriate the Vedic model of transmission when discussing the manner in which Sāṃkhya knowledge is produced and transmitted (see §V.1-2). Evidently, the YD-kāra views reflection (ūha) as comparable to the abilities of the ‘seers who had discovered the (ordinarily

\(^{515}\) sāksātkṛtadharmaṇa ṛṣayo bahūvuh / te 'varebhyaḥ 'sāksātkṛtadharmaḥbhya upadeśena mantraḥ samprāduḥ / upadeśāya glāyanto 'vare bilmagrahanaṇyemāṃ grantham samāmnāsiṣūḥ / vedam ca vedāṅgāni ca / bilmaḥ bhilmaḥ bhāsanāṃ iti vá / (NU 1.20, p. 41, l. 17 – p. 42, l. 2). YD (see n. 510), like the Vṛtti on Vākyapadiya 1.5 (p.24, l. 5 – p. 25, l. 1) has ‘parebhya’ and ‘pare’ for ‘varebhya’ and ‘vare’. WEZLER (2001, p. 218, n. 19) observes that ‘apara’ is not semantically clearer than avara, and both words mean “low, inferior” and suggests that “[t]he secondarily attested reading, not found in mss. of the Nir. itself, is hence most probably due to a scribal mistake.” However, AKLUJKAR (2009, p. 85-86) argues: ‘avara’ has a strong association with “later” and “inferior”…whereas apara does not. One would thus be justified in suspecting that the avara: apara variation reflects a consciously and/or carefully maintained tradition.’


\(^{517}\) VPV 1.5, p.24, l. 5 – p. 25, l. 1.

\(^{518}\) AKLUJKAR (2009), pp. 25-26. With regard to the meaning of the obscure term bilma, glossed by the YD as ‘a particular hint for a complete similitude’ (sāmyakpratibhāsāya viṣiṣṭah samketah; see n. 510 above), AKLUJKAR argues (pp. 23-24): ‘The entity it refers to must either consist of the mantras or be a means to the mantras. Under the first alternative, it would be a collection, recasting (rearrangement, redaction, etc.) or reflection of the mantras (the entity received by or revealed to the s-k-d ṛṣis); under the second, at least, something that follows the lead or determining status of the mantras.’
imperceptible) properties of things’ (sākṣātkṛtadharmaṇa ṛṣayāḥ), speech (śabda) as comparable to the instruction and transmission (i.e. to a pupil by a sākṣātkṛtadharman ṛṣi) of ‘materially effective speech formations’ (mantra),519 and study (adhyayana) (i.e. of Sāṃkhya texts) as comparable to study of the Veda (i.e. the collected and organised mantras) and the Vedāṅgas (including the NU).520 The significance of this understanding of the siddhis in relation to the knowledge of Kapila and the tradition initiated by him must be considered in the light of the YD-kāra’s apparent view of the relationship between the siddhis and the bhāvas, to be discussed below (§IV.10).

The TK’s treatment of the siddhis differs substantially from those of the earlier commentators. Vācaspati presents the three removals of pain (duḥkha-vighāta) as the three primary siddhis, and offers two alternative explanations of the other five. According to the first interpretation, they are progressive steps to the removals of pain. Study (adhyayana) of philosophical texts with a guru leads to ‘speech’ (śabda), which Vācaspati interprets as the knowledge of the meaning [of the texts studied] gained from the speech [of the guru]. These two siddhis, adhyayana and śabda, are grouped together as ‘hearing’ (śravaṇa). Reflection (īśha) is described as an investigation into the meaning of doctrine (āgama) through logic (nyāya) that is not inconsistent with the doctrine itself, in order to establish a conclusion (uttarapakṣa) by removing doubts (samśaya) and objections

519 WEZLER (2001, pp. 232-233) suggests that upadeśena in the NU passage (n. 515) be taken as a ‘comitative instrumental’—i.e. that “‘oral instruction” accompanied the delivering over of the mantras by the “seers”’—and that “what is meant by upadeśa is “a method of teaching students” [...] which aims at a correct and full understanding of the wording of a mantra, the syntax and the semantics at least of some of the expressions used, and above all, of the meaning of the mantra as a whole’.

520 With regard to the discontinuation of ‘oral instruction’, WEZLER (2001, p. 233) observes: ‘That the avare failed to continue the sacred tradition in this regard is tantamount to the contention, i.e. awareness, or feeling, of an important loss in this sacred tradition. But it does not imply that there are no means at all that would enable a student to find out the “meaning of the Veda”; it is however of an essentially different nature: not an “oral instruction” which can be traced back to the sākṣātkṛtadharmaṇa ṛṣayo themselves [...] but ancillary texts only, the Vedāṅgas, compiled by human beings [...]’
(pūrvapakṣa). According to Vācaspati, āha is also known as manana (‘thought’ or ‘reflection’). Suḥṛtprāpti is interpreted as the acquisition of friends (such as a guru, pupils, and fellow students) with whom one can discuss the conclusions drawn through āha. Dāna is glossed as ‘purity’, specifically ‘purity of discriminative knowledge’, as the result of a long period of practice (abhyāsa), which leads to the removal of the three forms of pain.\footnote{āha iti / vihanyamānasasya duḥkhasya trītyāv tadvaighāṭas traya itīmā mukhyās tisrāḥ siddhayāh, tadupāyatayā tv itarā gauṇyaḥ paśca siddhayāh, tā api hetuhetumattaya vyavasthitāḥ / tatrāduḥhyānālakṣaṇā siddhir hetu eva / mukhyās tu siddhayo hetumata eva / madhyamās tu hetuhetumataḥ / vidhvad guruṃukhād adhyātmavidyānāṃ aksarasvarṣipagranhānam adhyayanam prathamam siddhis tāram ucyate / tatkāryam saṁbhaḥ, saṁbhaḥ iti padam saṁbajānitaṁ arthañānāṃ upalaksayati, kāryam kāraṇopacārāt / sā dvitīya siddhiś satārām ucyate / bhavatīti dānena (vivekakhyātir).

The TK’s second explanation of the five secondary siddhis basically accords with the MV’s interpretations of these siddhis, with the exception of āha. According to this scheme, Vācaspati interprets āha as the ascertainment of truth without instruction, etc., as the result of practice (abhyāsa) undertaken in previous lives.\footnote{Of course, this scheme also differs from that of the MV in that the three removals of pain are considered primary rather than secondary attainments.}

Following his presentation of these alternative explanations of the siddhis, Vācaspati makes a remark that reflects his distance and detachment from the issues under discussion:

\footnote{āha iti / vihanyamānasasya duḥkhasya trītyāv tadvaighāṭas traya itīmā mukhyās tisrāḥ siddhayāh, tadupāyatayā tv itarā gauṇyaḥ paśca siddhayāh, tā api hetuhetumattaya vyavasthitāḥ / tatrāduḥhyānālakṣaṇā siddhir hetu eva / mukhyās tu siddhayo hetumata eva / madhyamās tu hetuhetumataḥ / vidhvad guruṃukhād adhyātmavidyānāṃ aksarasvarṣipagranhānam adhyayanam prathamam siddhis tāram ucyate / tatkāryam saṁbhaḥ, saṁbhaḥ iti padam saṁbajānitaṁ arthañānāṃ upalaksayati, kāryam kāraṇopacārāt / sā dvitīya siddhiś satārām ucyate / bhavatīti dānena (vivekakhyātir).}

\footnote{Of course, this scheme also differs from that of the MV in that the three removals of pain are considered primary rather than secondary attainments.}

\footnote{According to Vācaspati, āha is also known as manana (‘thought’ or ‘reflection’). Suḥṛtprāpti is interpreted as the acquisition of friends (such as a guru, pupils, and fellow students) with whom one can discuss the conclusions drawn through āha. Dāna is glossed as ‘purity’, specifically ‘purity of discriminative knowledge’, as the result of a long period of practice (abhyāsa), which leads to the removal of the three forms of pain.}

\footnote{The TK’s second explanation of the five secondary siddhis basically accords with the MV’s interpretations of these siddhis, with the exception of āha. According to this scheme, Vācaspati interprets āha as the ascertainment of truth without instruction, etc., as the result of practice (abhyāsa) undertaken in previous lives. Of course, this scheme also differs from that of the MV in that the three removals of pain are considered primary rather than secondary attainments.}

\footnote{Following his presentation of these alternative explanations of the siddhis, Vācaspati makes a remark that reflects his distance and detachment from the issues under discussion:}
We, who are concerned with the explanation merely of settled opinions (siddhānta), with disregard for the faults of others, say that the propriety or impropriety of this should be judged only by the learned.\textsuperscript{523}

This approach can be contrasted to that of the YD-kāra, who, when presenting alternative interpretations of a particular doctrine, usually makes a point of specifying the view established by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the SK,\textsuperscript{524} which he regards as the definitive expression of Sāṃkhya doctrine (see §V.2).\textsuperscript{525} This difference in attitude, generally apparent when comparing the YD and TK, reflects the fact that, as suggested by JACOBSEN (2008), ‘the Sāṃkhya tradition had lost much of its independence by the ninth century’.\textsuperscript{526} Vācaspati himself, as is well known, was a Vedāntin, and he seems to have maintained an interpretative distance in his discussions of Sāṃkhya doctrine.

While there is thus a great deal of divergence in the classical commentators’ interpretations of the siddhis, they are unanimous in providing a series of alternative names for the siddhis, although these names vary slightly from text to text. According to G Bh, ūha, śabda, adhyayana, ādhyātmikaduḥkhavighāta, ādhibhautikaduḥkhavighāta, ādhi daivikaduḥkhavighāta, suḥtṛptāpti, and dāna are ‘in another text (śāstra)’ respectively named tāra, sutāra, tāratāra, pramoda, pramudita, pramodamāna, ramyaka, and sadāpramudita.\textsuperscript{527} The MV gives the same names, with the exception of mohana instead of pramodamāna for the sixth siddhi.\textsuperscript{528} The YD’s list contains several variations: tāraka, sutāra, tārayanta,
pramoda, pramudita, modamāna, ramyaka, and sadāpramudita. The YD also provides explanations of the significance of these names. For example, āha is known as ‘carrying over’ (tāraka) because it ‘carries one over (tārayati) the ocean of transmigration (saṁsāra)’. The TK provides similar names in the course of its first alternative explanation of the siddhis: tāratāra, sutāra, tāra, pramoda, mudita, modamāna, ramyaka, and sadāmudita. Evidently, Vācaspati was familiar with a list basically the same as those used by the other commentators but was unsure as to which name correlated with which particular siddhi, so that in changing the order of the first three siddhis he confused their corresponding names. Overall, the variations among the commentators with regard to these names suggest that they represent an older stratum of tradition. FRAUWALLNER (1973) argues that the explanations of these names provided by the YD-kāra reflect a ‘sectarian terminology’ apparent in the doctrines of the Śaṣṭitantra.

Whatever the origins of these alternative names for the siddhis, the fact that they are well-established in the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries is significant for our present purpose, for they provide a link in the YD between this paradigm and that of the conditions (bhāva) of the intellect. The following section (§IV.10) will present this and other evidence in the commentaries of the relationship between the bhāvas and the pratyayasarga. Ultimately, this will serve to clarify the applicability of the YD’s version of the siddhi model to the production and transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge, and the role of Kapila in terms of this model.

529 See nn. 507, 508, 511 above.
530 tārayati saṁsārārṇavaḥ iti tārakam / (YD on SK 51, p. 251, ll. 13-14).
531 See n. 521 above.
532 FRAUWALLNER (1973), p. 260; see CHAPTER III and §V.3.
§10. The relationship between the conditions (bhāva) and the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga), according to the commentaries.

The discussions in the preceding sections have shown that the condition (bhāva) of knowledge (jñāna) represents the primary goal of the Sāṃkhya path, that the evidence of the YD clarifies the ways in which this condition is produced in both extraordinary and ordinary individuals, and that the YD-kāra considers the paradigm of the attainments (siddhi), a part of the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga), to be descriptive of the acquisition of Sāṃkhya knowledge by individuals with extraordinary insight and the transmission of this knowledge to later generations through direct teaching and the formulation of written texts. The relation of the process of transmission through siddhi to the modes of production of jñāna, and thus the importance of the tradition of Sāṃkhya teachers and texts to the acquisition of Sāṃkhya knowledge by successive generations of seekers, remains to be clarified.

The relationship between the two paradigms of the bhāvas and the pratyayasarga is unclear from the text of the SK and has generated much discussion among scholars. As outlined in CHAPTER III, FRAUWALLNER (1973)\textsuperscript{533} and OBERHAMMER (1961)\textsuperscript{534} view the bhāvas as a newer doctrine playing the same role in the system as the pratyayasarga. FRAUWALLNER observes that thus ‘the explanations which the commentaries give for their juxtaposition are unsatisfactory and forced’.\textsuperscript{535} However, the evidence of the YD has more recently been shown to suggest a more satisfactory and more elaborate interpretation of this relationship.

\textsuperscript{533} Ibid., p. 268.
\textsuperscript{534} OBERHAMMER (1961), p. 155.
\textsuperscript{535} FRAUWALLNER (1973), p. 269.
CHAKRAVARTI (1975)\textsuperscript{536}, KENGHE (1968)\textsuperscript{537}, and LARSON (1984)\textsuperscript{538} have all rightly observed that the YD treats the principles (\textit{tattva}) as the forms of manifest Materiality, the \textit{bhāvas} as descriptive of its activity, and the \textit{pratyaysarga} as the phenomenal result of this activity. LARSON’s interpretation of this relationship became the basis for LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987)’s treatment of these paradigms, in which the \textit{tattvas} are presented as the ‘constitutive dimension’ of the Sāṃkhya system, the \textit{bhāvas} as the ‘projective dimension’, and the \textit{pratyayasarga} as the ‘consequent dimension’.\textsuperscript{539} LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA compare these three dimensions, respectively, to the ‘hardware’ of a computer, the ‘software’, and the ‘printout of the functioning system’.\textsuperscript{540} With regard to the relationship between the condition of knowledge (\textit{jñāna}, a component of the second ‘dimension’) and the attainments (\textit{siddhi}, a component of the third ‘dimension’), they interpret the evidence of the YD to suggest that ‘the predisposition toward knowledge (\textit{jñāna}) generates the spiritual attainments (\textit{siddhi}) conducive to final discrimination and release’.\textsuperscript{541} However, as I will argue in the present section, further evidence in the YD linking the concepts of \textit{jñāna} and \textit{siddhi} complicates this interpretation of the relationship between the \textit{bhāvas} and the \textit{pratyayasarga}.

Before moving on to a consideration of the evidence of the YD with regard to this relationship, it will be helpful to examine the other commentators’ attempts to connect the two paradigms, in order to provide some context for this discussion. The GBh and MV suggest that the \textit{pratyayasarga} explains the nature of the eight instrumental causes (\textit{nimitta}, i.e. the \textit{bhāvas}) and their eight phenomenal effects

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{536} CHAKRAVARTI (1975), p. 302.
\item \textsuperscript{537} KENGHE (1968), p. 366.
\item \textsuperscript{538} LARSON (1984), pp. 63-64.
\item \textsuperscript{539} LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 64.
\item \textsuperscript{540} Ibid., p. 65.
\item \textsuperscript{541} Ibid., p. 58.
\end{itemize}
(naimittika, i.e. ‘upward movement’, etc.; see SK 44-45 and §IV.6).\textsuperscript{542} In other words, the pratyayasarga is presented as, in some sense, a reclassification of the bhāvas and their results, but no further explanation of this relationship or correlation between the bhāvas and the categories of the pratyayasarga is given in these texts. The TK refers to the pratyayasarga as a description of the eight bhāvas\textsuperscript{543} and specifies that the bhāva of knowledge (jñāna) is included in attainment (siddhi), while the other seven bhāvas—merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), ignorance (ajñāna), dispassion (vairāgya), passion (avairāgya), lordliness (aiśvarya), and non-lordliness (anaiśvarya)—are included in error (viparyaya), incapacity (aśakti), and contentment (tuṣṭi).\textsuperscript{544} Vācaspati, however, does not provide any more specific correlation between these sets of categories, and the nature of this equivalence is unclear. Does this scheme imply that the process of siddhi is identical with jñāna, or does siddhi lead to jñāna, or vice versa?

As has become evident, the YD’s basic view of the relationship between the bhāvas and the pratyayasarga differs fundamentally from the simple equivalence suggested by the other commentators. The YD’s view, as discussed by Chakravarti (1975), Kenghe (1968) and Larson (1984), is made apparent at the end of the commentary on SK 45, preceding the discussion of the pratyayasarga, in which the YD-kāra equates the tattvas with the forms (rūpa) of the manifest (vyakta) and the bhāvas with the activity (pravṛtti) of the manifest, and states that the result

\textsuperscript{542} eṣa nimittaiḥ saha naimittikāḥ śoḍaśavidhoh vyākhyātah, sa kimātmaka ity āha—eṣa pratyayasargo viparyāśaktītusīddhyākhyah / guṇavaiśamayavimarddena tasya bhedās tu pañcāsati //46/ yathā eṣa śoḍaśavidho nimittanaimittikabhedah vyākhyātah, eṣa pratyayasarga ucyate / (GBh on SK 46, p. 159, l. 28 – p. 160, l. 4); nanu nimittanaimittikaprasaṅgaḥ kimātmaka iti ? atrocitae—eṣa pratyayasargo viparyāśaktītusīddhyākhyah / guṇavaiśamayavimardena tasya bhedās tu pañcāsati //46[6]/ eṣa iti / āryādyavayaḥ śoḍaśavidho naimittikāḥ sarga uktaḥ / pratyayasarga ucyate / (MV on SK 46, p. 63, ll. 4-8).

\textsuperscript{543} buddhādharman āśtau bhāvān samāsavyāśbhayaḥ mumukṣūnāṁ heyopādeyān darśayitum prathaman tāvat samāsām āha—(TK on SK 46, p. 132, ll. 20-21).

\textsuperscript{544} tatra viparyāśaktītisūryaḥ tathāyogam saṭṭānāṁ ca dharmādīnaṁ jñānavarjāṁ antarbhāvāḥ, siddhau ca jñānavyeti / (TK on SK 46, p. 133, ll. 4-5).
(phala) of the manifest is about to be described.\textsuperscript{545} A slightly different scheme is laid out in the commentary on SK 2:

Of these [the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower], the manifest is characterised by form, activity, and result. The form is the intellect, ego, the five subtle elements, the eleven faculties, and the five gross elements. Generally, the activity is twofold: [activity] the purpose of which is desire for what is beneficial, and [activity] the purpose of which is prevention of what is unbene\textsuperscript{ficial.} Specifically, [activity] is the five sources of action (karmayoni)—perseverance, etc.—and the five vital breaths (vāyu)—prāṇa, etc. The result is twofold: perceptible and imperceptible. Of these, the perceptible [result] is defined as attainment, contentment, incapacity, and error, and the imperceptible [result] is the obtaining of a body in the cycle of transmigration (samsāra), from Brahmā down to a tuft of grass.\textsuperscript{546}

While this passage does not mention the bhāvas in connection with the activity of the manifest, it does allude to their results, in terms of the trajectory of an individual in the cycle of transmigration (see §IV.6). Evidently, both this trajectory and the categories of the pratyayasarga are considered aspects of the result of the activity of the manifest. \textsc{Larson and Bhattacharya} (1987) discuss the role of the sources of action (karmayoni) and vital breaths (vāyu) according to the YD and group them with the bhāvas as a part of the ‘projective dimension’ of the manifest.\textsuperscript{547} While the relations among these various aspects of the system presented by the YD are not entirely clear, it is clear that the bhāvas are considered at least an aspect of the activity of the manifest, while the pratyayasarga is considered at least an aspect of the result of this activity.

Some passages of the YD could be taken to indicate a simple equivalence between the bhāvas and the pratyayasarga, similar to that suggested by the other

\textsuperscript{545} evam eṣa tatvasarga bhāvasargaś ca vyākhyaṭah / etac ca vyaktaśca rūpaṃ pravṛttīś ca parikalpyate / phalam idānīṃ vaṣṭyāmah // (YD on SK 45d, p. 237, ll. 26-27)

\textsuperscript{546} tatra rūpapravṛttiphalalaksanaṃ vyaktam / rūpaṃ punar maḥān uhaṃkāraḥ pañca tanmātrāny ekādaśendriyāni pañca mahābhūtāni / sāmānyataḥ pravṛtti dvividhā hitakāmapravṛtyoṣaḥ cāhita-pratisedhapravṛtyoṣaḥ ca / višeṣataḥ pañca karmayanayo <dh>ṛtyādyāḥ / prāṇādyāḥ ca pañca vāyavaḥ / phalam dvividham / drṣṭam adṛṣṭam ca / tatra drṣṭam siddhiḥuyāt̄vaśaktivaparyavalkṣaṇam adṛṣṭam brahmādau stambhaparyante samsāre sārīrapratilambha ity etad vyaktam / (YD on SK 2d, p. 49, ll. 8-14)

\textsuperscript{547} \textsc{Larson and Bhattacharya} (1987), pp. 54-56, 64-65.
commentaries. As mentioned in §IV.6, under SK 23 the YD-kāra associates the unprecedented (apiṛvyā) form of the bhāva of jñāna with the siddhis,

while under SK 45 he mentions that vairāgya falls under the heading of tuṣṭi. An (at least partial) equivalence between vairāgya and tuṣṭi is also suggested by the YD-kāra’s explanation of the first form of tuṣṭi, which results in dissolution in Materiality (prakṛtilaya), also held to be the result of vairāgya (SK 45; see §IV.6).

These statements, however, do not preclude the possibility that a cause-effect relationship is implied. Rather, since the siddhis are referred to as ‘means of knowledge’ (pramāṇa) in the passage on SK 23, it seems reasonable to assume that they lead to the condition of jñāna. This would be an instance of the ‘result’ realm affecting the ‘activity’ realm. Similarly, the YD-kāra’s descriptions of tuṣṭi as the result of a yogin’s activity in the phenomenal realm of experience would seem to suggest that this contentment results in the production of the condition of vairāgya in the intellect (see SK 43, §IV.8) which in turn leads to such results as dissolution in prakṛti.

This interpretation of the function of siddhi and tuṣṭi in relation to the production of the bhāvas suggests that Larson and Bhattacharya (1987)’s interpretation of the relationship between the pratayagasarga and the bhāvas must be revised. Although the pratayagasarga is considered, in some sense, to be the result (phala) of the activity (pravṛtti) described by the bhāvas, nevertheless at least some

548 jñānam dvividham śabdādyupalabdhilakṣanam guṇapurusāntarapalabdhilakṣanam ca / tatra śabdādyupalabdhilakṣanam pratayakśānāmānāgamaraṇāpam / guṇapurusāntarapalabdhilakṣanam ca dvividham apiṛvyā abhyāsajam ca / tayor apiṛvyām uhaḥ śabdo āḥhyayanam (SK 51a) iti siddhi-kāndānupatiti pramāṇā / (YD on SK 23bc, p. 192, ll. 7-11).

549 vairāgyam tuṣṭikāndānupatīla (YD on SK 45a, p. 236, 1. 17).

550 sa khalva ayam yogi pradhānālakṣanām bhūmin avajītya tanmahinā <jagad> aśīnyam dṛṣṭyā vyattiriktaṣya padārthāntaraśāyābhāvam manyamānas tām eva bhūmin kaivalyam iti gṛhnātai / bhinnē ca dehe prakṛtō layām gacchati tataḥ ca punar āvartate / (YD on SK 50ab, p. 244, ll. 16-19).

551 Cf., for example, the description of the production of the first tuṣṭi (n. 550 above). As mentioned in §IV.9, Kenghe (1968) has documented the YD’s association of the tuṣṭis with stages of yogic practice.
of the categories of the \textit{pratyayasarga} are also able to lead to the production of new bhāvas. The possibility that the YD-\textit{kāra} thus considers these two realms to be mutually determinative finds further support elsewhere in the text.

As discussed in §IV.8, according to the YD, the \textit{prākṛtika} form (and probably by implication the \textit{sāmsiddhika} form) of the bhāvas arises as a stream from primordial Materiality (\textit{prakṛti}, \textit{pradhāna}), in contrast to the \textit{vaikṛta} form, which pertains to `ordinary people'\footnote{See n. 463 (§IV.8).} and is either `self-acquired' (\textit{svavaikṛta}) or `acquired from others' (\textit{paravaikṛta}).\footnote{See nn. 465, 468 (§IV.8).} Like \textit{prākṛtika} bhāvas, the categories of the \textit{pratyayasarga} are described as arising in streams from Materiality (§IV.9).\footnote{See nn. 484, 485, 486 (§IV.9).}

\textsc{Oberhammer (1961) takes the similarity in the mode of production of \textit{prākṛtika} bhāvas and the \textit{pratyayasarga} as an indication that the two paradigms have the same function, and suggests that the categories of the \textit{pratyayasarga}, like the bhāvas, are partly pre-determined and partly acquired:} \footnote{OBERHAMMER (1961), p. 140, n. 1.}

\begin{quote}
[We] can suppose that the Pratyaya-s are, like the Bhāva-s, innate, i.e. conditioned by Karma, and thus condition the historical existence of beings. On the other hand, they are acquired as `habitus', and thus they lead to salvation.\footnote{\textit{vaikṛtam tu dvividham / svavaikṛtam paravaikṛtam ca} / (YD on SK 43, p. 233, l. 12).}
\end{quote}

\textsc{Oberhammer recognizes that the categories of the \textit{pratyayasarga} must, in some way, be considered both determined and determining, but he fails to take into account another statement by the commentator which clarifies the relationship between the \textit{pratyayasarga} and the bhāvas.}

Again, as discussed in §IV.8, according to the YD’s commentary on SK 43, the Śāṅkhya teacher Pañcādhikaraṇa held the \textit{vaikṛta} form of the bhāva of \textit{jñāna} to be twofold: `self-acquired' (\textit{svavaikṛta}), and `acquired from others' (\textit{paravaikṛta}),\footnote{\textit{vaikṛtam tu dvividham / svavaikṛtam paravaikṛtam ca} / (YD on SK 43, p. 233, l. 12).}
and Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s system agrees with this classification.

In the same passage, the YD-kāra equates the svavaikṛta form with tāraka and the paravaikṛta form with ‘the other siddhis’. The commentator then quotes a verse (perhaps to be taken as attributed to Pañcādhikaraṇa himself) that equates svavaikṛta with tāraka and states that paravaikṛta is ‘seven-fold—sutāra, etc.’. As shown in §IV.9, the terms tāraka, etc., are well-established in the Śaṅkhya tradition as alternative names for the eight siddhis listed in SK 51. According to this scheme, then, ūha is svavaikṛta jñāna, while the other siddhis are paravaikṛta jñāna. This classification agrees with the YD-kāra’s description of the siddhis, insofar as ūha is attainment [by oneself] ‘through the power of reflection’, while the other two primary siddhis involve attainment from others through direct teaching (śabda) or study of transmitted texts (adhyayana), the secondary siddhis also involving interaction with others.

The YD’s exposition of Pañcādhikaraṇa’s classification of the bhāvas ends with the statement that, ‘as is the bhāva of jñāna, so are the other bhāvas—dharma, etc.’ This does not necessarily mean that the siddhis also describe the attainment of other vaikṛta bhāvas than jñāna. As we have seen, the production of vairāgya seems to be associated with tuṣṭi rather than siddhi, in which case tuṣṭi might represent vaikṛta vairāgya, in contrast, for instance, to the prākṛta vairāgya of Kapila’s disciple Āsuri.

On the other hand, the commentator’s use of the attainment of dharma to illustrate the categories of the pratyayasarga, as well as

---

557 vaikṛtam tu dvividham pūrvavat / (YD on SK 43, p. 234, ll. 5-6).
558 svavaikṛtam tārakam / paravaikṛtam siddhyantarāṇi / (YD on SK 43, p. 233, ll. 12-13).
559 vaikṛtam api ca dvividham svavaikṛtam tatra tārakaṃ bhavati / svāt saaptavidham paravaikṛtam <su>tārādi nirdiśṭam // (YD on SK 43, p. 233, ll. 17-18).
560 See nn. 507, 508, 511 (§IV.9).
561 yathā jñānam evam dharmādayo ‘pīṭi / (YD on SK 43, p. 233, l. 19).
562 See n. 462 (§IV.8).
563 tadyathā dharmārthapravṛtyto ‘gniṣṭomādin pariṣṭiyāya samkaram kurvita so ‘sya viparyayaḥ, sādhanaivaikalyād asāṃartham asaktiḥ, ādhamātrasantoṣas tuṣṭiḥ, kṛṣṇasya kriyāviśeṣasyāṅuṣṭhaḥ samkaraṃ bhavati / evam <anyā>-ṛthaδiṣu yojayam / yaś cāyaṃ caturvidhān phalavīṣeṣo viparyayādir akhyataḥ (YD on SK 46ab, p. 239, l. 22 – p. 240, l. 2).
his reference simply to an ‘intended object’ (abhipretam artham)\textsuperscript{564} as the object of siddhi (§IV.9), might suggest that siddhi does describe the attainment of at least some other bhāvas. The commentator’s position on this issue is never clarified, and it seems not to be a concern in the text. Rather, the YD-kāra focuses his discussion of the production of the bhāvas mainly on jñāna, and his discussion of the siddhis also seems to reflect a concern with the production and transmission of knowledge.

For our present purposes, then, it can be said with some certainty that the YD-kāra views siddhi as the vaikṛta form of jñāna. How does this form of jñāna differ from the sāṃsiddhi and prākṛta forms? Since it is clear that siddhi is part of the ‘perceptible result’\textsuperscript{565} of the activity of manifest Materiality, we can conclude that this vaikṛta jñāna is produced in the phenomenal realm of ordinary experience, in contrast to the sāṃsiddhi and prākṛta forms of jñāna, which are produced directly from primordial Materiality (pradhāna). This conclusion agrees with the interpretation, suggested by the GBh, of the term vaikṛta as ‘deriving from the products’,\textsuperscript{566} i.e. deriving from the phenomenal (vaikṛta) realm of manifest Materiality. Further support for this conclusion is provided by the YD-kāra’s statement that the vaikṛta bhāvas are applicable to ordinary people.\textsuperscript{567} This suggests that for those without special, direct access to the stream flowing from pradhāna, jñāna must be attained in the vaikṛta realm. In this ordinary, phenomenal realm of

\textsuperscript{564} tatroho nāma yadā pratyaksānumānāgamavyātrekaṇābhāpāpāpāśrīgaṇī pratyakṣam abhipretam artham vicāranābalaśūnya pratipadyate sādhā sidhāśā rākṣam ity apadiṣyate / (YD on SK 51abc, p. 251, l. 12-13); eṇām saṁśrayena bhāpāpyāpyāpyā artham yatāḥ saṁśādhanāntity atāḥ pūrva-cārya-yājnam mārgam āturvakṣus tatpravayāḥ syād iti / (YD on SK 51abc, p. 252, l. 22-24). For a possible alternative explanation of the phrase abhipretam artham, see §V.1.

\textsuperscript{565} See n. 546 above.
\textsuperscript{566} See n. 456 (§IV.8).
\textsuperscript{567} vaikṛtās tu bhāvā asmadādīnām / (YD on SK 43, p. 234, l. 14).
experience, the ‘stream of attainment from Materiality’ is obstructed by error, incapacity and contentment.\footnote{568}

With regard to the nature of Kapila’s knowledge and his role in the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine, this equivalence of siddhi with vaikṛta jñāna holds an important implication. The production of Kapila’s sāmsiddhika jñāna must be removed from the context of siddhi, as the YD-kāra makes clear:

And thus ūha is not applicable to the ṛṣi, because of an absence of hindrance. There is no hindrance to the production of his jñāna at the same time as the manifestation of his body.\footnote{569}

Although the term ṛṣi, rather than paramarṣi (‘supreme ṛṣi’), is used in this passage, the context suggests that Kapila alone is meant, since only he is said to have been born with innate jñāna, while everyone else is born with innate ajñāna.\footnote{570} Thus, the process of the production of knowledge as described by ūha does not apply to Kapila’s original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine. This is despite the fact that ūha, like Kapila’s knowledge,\footnote{571} is said to occur in the absence of the usual pramāṇas of perception, inference, or authoritative testimony,\footnote{572} and also despite the fact that the YD-kāra seems to compare ūha to the abilities of the sākṣātkṛtadharman ṛṣis in NU 1.20.\footnote{573} Evidently, if the YD-kāra does see ūha as applicable to ṛṣis, it must be to lesser ṛṣis than Kapila.

Of course, the distinction between ūha and Kapila’s sāmsiddhika jñāna does not mean that Kapila might not have transmitted his knowledge to Āsuri by means of the second siddhi, śabda, or even that someone else might not attain the same knowledge through ūha. It is also likely, based on the content of the NU passage
quoted in this connection, that the YD-kāra views the third siddhi, adhyayana, as the consequence of the transition from direct guru-disciple transmission of Śaṃkhya doctrine to the composition of Śaṃkhya texts like the SK. The YD-kāra’s apparent view of the nature of the SK in relation to Kapila’s original formulation of Śaṃkhya doctrine will be discussed further in §V.2. The implications of the special status assigned to Kapila’s knowledge as a direct product of unmanifest prakṛti will be considered in §V.4.

The discussions in this chapter have clarified several points with regard to the process by which liberating Śaṃkhya knowledge is produced and transmitted, according to the Śaṃkhya commentaries in general and the YD in particular. In the context of the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) accepted by Śaṃkhya, inference (anumāṇa) is generally emphasized by the commentators as a means of establishing the existence of the Śaṃkhya principles (tattva). This might suggest that independent reasoning is privileged over received knowledge in Śaṃkhya. The YD, however, treats inference as a tool in the exposition of philosophical texts (śāstra) to ordinary seekers. The maintenance of the traditions of transmission of such śāstras is provided for by the YD’s definition of the pramāṇa of authoritative testimony (āptavacana). Thus, inference and authoritative testimony seem to work together in the transmission of Śaṃkhya knowledge from guru to disciple. That is, logic is used to validate Śaṃkhya doctrine.

In addition, the YD, like the other Śaṃkhya commentaries, allows for the direct perception (drṣṭa, pratyakṣa) of the subtle elements (tanmātra) by gods and yogins. The YD specifies that the perception of these normally suprasensuous tattvas is enabled either by progressive yogic practice or, in the case of the gods, by the accumulation of merit (dharma). This extraordinary perception, in contrast to the
YD’s portrayal of inference, would appear to function independently of authoritative testimony and the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine.

The YD’s exposition of the modes of production of the condition (bhāva) of knowledge (jñāna), which is held by the Sāṃkhya texts to result in liberation, suggests that this condition may arise in extraordinary individuals as the result of a direct stream (srotas, abhisyanda) from primordial Materiality (prakṛti, pradhāna), and that in the case of the rṣi Kapila this condition was manifested from prakṛti at the time of his birth. In the case of ordinary individuals, the condition of jñāna is attained in the phenomenal (vaikṛta) sphere of experience, either suddenly (apūrva) through the attainments (siddhi), which are associated with the transmission of knowledge through teaching and texts, or as the result of a progressive practice (abhyāsaja), which involves the yogic practices of the restraints (yama) and observances (niyama) and consequently the attainment of merit (dharma) and dispassion (vairāgya). The latter mode of production can be compared to the text’s suggestion that the perception of the subtle elements is enabled through yogic practice and the accumulation of merit, while inference and authoritative testimony, like the siddhis, are connected with the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine.

We can thus conclude that, according to the evidence of the YD, the texts of the Sāṃkhya tradition and the explanation of these texts through the traditional guru-disciple relationship are considered to play an important role in the production of liberating knowledge in ordinary seekers. While the YD does admit the possibility of attaining this knowledge independently of the Sāṃkhya tradition, this would not seem to involve independent logical thought but rather the performance of yogic practices as a means of developing merit and dispassion as steps to the attainment of knowledge. The rṣi Kapila, the founder of the Sāṃkhya tradition, is unique in being exempt from the need to acquire knowledge of the tattvas either through the siddhis
or through independent yogic practice. The following chapter will discuss in more
detail the YD’s view of the nature and origin of Kapila and the importance of his
original formulation of Sāṃkhya knowledge to the continued maintenance of the
Sāṃkhya tradition.
CHAPTER V: The Soteriological Role of Kapila in the Yuktidīpikā.

As outlined in the preceding chapter, the evidence of the YD appears to resolve several interpretative issues apparent in the classical Sāṃkhya system. The commentator’s definition of authoritative testimony (āptavacana) makes a provision for the maintenance of every śāstra (§IV.3). The YD also appears to treat inference (anumāna) primarily as a tool for the transmission of doctrine through the elucidation of śāstra (§IV.2). The text suggests a novel interpretation of the three forms of the conditions (bhāva) as ‘innate’ (sāṃsiddhika), ‘deriving from primordial Materiality’ (prākṛtika) and ‘deriving from the products’ (vaikṛta) (§IV.8). A connection between the condition of knowledge (jñāna) and the attainments (siddhi) is apparent in the text, which allows for a clearer conception of the relationship between the Sāṃkhya paradigms of the conditions (bhāva) and the intellectual creation (pratayasarga) (§IV.10). According to this relationship, Kapila, whose jñāna is produced directly from pradhāna at the time of his birth, is unique in being exempt from the need to attain knowledge through one of the siddhis. This chapter will explore the implications of all of these points with regard to the YD’s view of the process of the production and transmission of knowledge (§1), the importance of Kapila’s original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine (§2), and the nature and origin of Kapila and his knowledge (§3-5).
§1. The YD-kāra’s attitude to received knowledge.

As has become apparent in the course of the preceding chapter, many passages of the YD contain evidence of the author’s view of the process by which knowledge is produced and transmitted. In general, the YD places more importance upon the continuity of tradition than do the other classical commentaries. This emphasis on continuity is apparent with regard both to the Sāṃkhya tradition in itself and to the relationship of the Sāṃkhya tradition to the broader Brāhmaṇical tradition, particularly to the Vedas. The first section of this chapter will examine the passages in which this emphasis on continuity is apparent and will consider the interpretative strategies employed by the commentator to account for the uninterrupted transmission of knowledge.

As discussed by MOTEGI (2006), the YD attempts to reconcile Sāṃkhya doctrine with the Vedas and to acknowledge their authority. MOTEGI analyses a lengthy debate on the nature of the Vedas, presented in the commentary on SK 2, in which the YD-kāra argues ‘that there are no inconsistencies in the scriptural statements of the Vedas’ and ‘that liberation by means of knowledge is supported by the Vedic scriptures’. That is, according to the YD-kāra, although the Vedas prescribe ritual activity leading to rebirth at a higher level of the phenomenal cosmos, they also prescribe the preferable path of knowledge leading to liberation.

574 YD on SK 2, p. 31, l. 14 – p. 54, l. 16; see MOTEGI (2006), pp. 48-52.
576 E.g., YD on SK 2b, p. 34, ll. 13-15: ‘Though it is a cause of attaining heaven, the performance of [ritual] action prescribed by the Vedas is not possible without injury to living beings, so it is disregarded by those desirous of benefitting [living beings].’ (sati svargapratiprakáśitvān vedavihitasya karmadhānam samanuṣṭhānam prāṇāḥ m upaghātām antareṇa na sambhavatāḥ hitakāmair apy upeksyate ā).
577 E.g., YD on SK 2d, p. 50, ll. 13-14: ‘This goal, liberation through knowledge, is supported by the Vedas, not unfounded.’ (āmnāyanibandhano hy ayam artho jñānān mokṣā iti na yādṛccchikāḥ ā).
As also noted by MotoGi, this tendency to acknowledge the authority of the Vedas is also evident in the YD’s definition of the pramāṇa of authoritative testimony (āptavacana), which includes the Vedas as authoritative by nature, as well as the statements of authoritative persons (āpta), which include the traditional texts (smṛti) of the Brāhmaṇical tradition. In terms of authoritative sources of doctrine, this definition puts the Vedic texts on a par with the texts of the Sāṃkhya tradition. With regard to Sāṃkhya teachers, we can assume that the commentator’s mention of ṭiśvaramaharṣis as authoritative figures (āpta) would include at least Kapila, the paramarṣi (see §IV.3, V.3). Sāṃkhya texts composed by later teachers would be implicitly included in āptavacana by the YD-kāra’s provision for the maintenance of every body of knowledge (śāstra).

In addition to this continuity of doctrinal authority between the Vedic tradition and the Sāṃkhya tradition, the YD reflects a Vedic influence in its conception of the nature of tradition itself. The commentator appears to model his presentation of the process by which Sāṃkhya knowledge is produced and transmitted upon the process of Vedic revelation and transmission. This is apparent in the commentator’s use of the quotation from NU 1.20 to illustrate the nature of the three primary siddhis, which are associated with the unprecedented (apūrva) production of Sāṃkhya knowledge. According to this interpretation of the siddhis, some extraordinary individuals have the ability to independently attain Sāṃkhya knowledge through mental reflection (ūha, vicāraṇa), without the use of the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) by which knowledge is ordinarily attained. This is compared to the ability of the Vedic rṣis who have intuitive insight into the

---

579 See n. 364 (§IV.3).
580 See n. 367 (§IV.3).
581 See n. 367 (§IV.3).
582 See nn. 510, 518, 519, 520 (§IV.9).
583 See n. 425 (§IV.6).
properties of things (sāksātkṛtadharman ṛṣi). The teaching of Sāṃkhya knowledge to others by those who have attained it through ūha is compared to the transmission of Vedic mantras through teaching (upadeśa). The formulation of Sāṃkhya texts for the transmission of knowledge through study (adhyayana) is compared to the formulation of the collected and assembled Vedas and Vedāṅgas, which, as we have seen, have the same authoritative status as Sāṃkhya texts.

Although Kapila’s innate knowledge is distinguished from the knowledge attained through ūha, these two forms of knowledge appear to share some characteristics. Like the knowledge attained through ūha, Kapila’s knowledge does not require any pramāṇa. Both forms of knowledge have the same object, insofar as both are identified with forms of the bhāva of jñāna, which is described primarily in terms of Sāṃkhya knowledge leading to liberation. Kapila’s initiation of a tradition by imparting his knowledge to Āsuri can be compared to the transmission of knowledge through the second siddhi, śabda. Thus, although Kapila is singled out (apparently even from other ṛṣis) in terms of the production of his knowledge, the tradition of knowledge initiated by him can be compared to the paradigm of the siddhis, and therefore to the process of Vedic revelation and transmission.

Another possible connection can be drawn between the YD’s presentation of the siddhis and Kapila’s initial formulation of Sāṃkhya knowledge. As mentioned in §IV.9, the NU passage quoted in connection with the siddhis originally occurs in a section of the NU devoted to the praise of those who know the proper, etymological meanings of words. A similar concern is reflected in a passage of the

---

384 See n. 569 (§IV.10).
385 See n. 390 (§IV.4); n. 507 (§IV.9).
386 See nn. 425 (§IV.6); 558, 559 (§IV.10); cf. SK 44c: jñānena cāpavargaḥ ī.
387 SK 70ab: etat pavitrām agravāṃ munir āsuraye ’nukampayā pradādu ī.
388 See nn. 510, 418, 519, 520 (§IV.9).
YD, in which the commentator emphasizes the fact that Kapila’s initial articulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine involved only etymologically significant names for the *tattvas*. These names are considered *arthanibandha*, ‘dependent on meaning’, rather than *svarūpabandha*, ‘dependent on their own form’ or ‘conventional’:

A name (saṃjñā) is a word (śabda) the purpose of which is the conveyance of what is signified (saṃjñin). This is twofold: dependent on meaning (*arthanibandha*) and conventional (*svarūpabandha*). [...] There is no conventional word of the glorious supreme rṣi, who, having diligently ascertained the inherent form of all the principles (*tattva*) by means of ārṣa knowledge, bestowed names. For example, primordial Materiality (*pradhāna*): ‘the products are put forth (pradhīyante) in it’; Consciousness (*puruṣa*): ‘in the body (pur) it lies (śete)’; and so on. Also for the teachers (*ācārya*) who follow his views, there is no regard for the assignment of new names, on account of the complete communication through these same [names].

The efficacy of Kapila’s original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine is established here in terms of his concern for linguistic precision. Given this concern with the meanings (*artha*) of the names of the *tattvas*, it is possible that the phrase *abhipretam artham* as it occurs in the YD’s explanation of the *siddhis*, refers not simply to an ‘intended object’ but more specifically to ‘approved meaning’—that is, to the etymological meanings behind the names of the *tattvas*.

According to this interpretation, which is only a possibility, the names of the *tattvas* would be viewed as the essence of the Sāṃkhya system. For those without direct access—through ūha or ārṣa jñāna (in the case of Kapila)—to the objects of knowledge behind these names, either teaching (śabda) by a guru or study (adhyayana) of Sāṃkhya śāstra would serve to clarify them. This interpretation

589 The term ārṣa (‘pertaining to rṣis’) is also used to refer to Kapila’s innate knowledge in the context of the YD’s discussion of the *pramāṇas* (§IV.4, n. 390).

590 *saṃjñipratyāyānārthrāḥ śabdāḥ samjñāḥ* (cf. MBhāṣya I.38.20) / *sā ca dvividhā / arthanibandhanā svarūpabandhanā ca / (YD Intrō., p. 7, ll. 16-17); *prayatnato bhagavataḥ paramarṣer ārṣena jñānena sarvavaituttvānām svarūpam upalabhya samjñāṁ vidadhato nāsti svarūpanibandhanāḥ śabdāḥ / tadyathā pradhīyante ‘tra vikārā iti pradhānam / “puri śete” (cf. e.g. Gop. Br. 1.1.39) iti puruṣa ityādi / tanmatānusārānām apy ācāryānāṁ tābhir eva saṃvyavahārān nāsti apūrvasaṃjñāvidhihānāṁ praty ādaraḥ / (YD Intrō., p. 7, ll. 23-27). The use of the feminine tābhīḥ (‘through these’) in the last line must refer to saṃjñā rather than to the masculine śabda.

591 See nn. 507, 509 (§IV.9).
would agree with WEZLER (2001)’s interpretation of the significance of the NU passage as a description of the process by which knowledge of the meaning of the Vedic mantras is transmitted.⁵⁹² The ṛṣis who initially formulate the mantras (or in our case, the names of the tattvas), do so based upon their direct knowledge of the principles underlying reality, as AKLJUKAR (2009) explains: ‘The sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmatva of the seers means direct, undistorted and extraordinary knowledge of those properties and actions or processes which make the world what it is.’⁵⁹³ For later generations, without direct knowledge of these principles, an understanding of the meaning (artha) of the mantras (or of the names of the tattvas) would serve to produce the same knowledge.

The above discussion of the etymological significance of Kapila’s names for the tattvas also demonstrates the importance placed by the YD on the linguistic conformity of subsequent Sāṃkhya teachers to Kapila’s original śāstra. The names of the tattvas are considered the core of Kapila’s system, to which all subsequent Sāṃkhya teachers have appealed. In this and other respects, the commentator shows a concern for establishing the conformity of the SK, in particular, to Kapila’s original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine.

§2. The YD-kāra’s view of the nature of the Sāṃkhya-kārikā.

At many points in the YD, the commentator shows a concern for establishing the efficacy of the SK to produce Sāṃkhya knowledge. In effect, the commentator seeks to show that study (adhyayana) of this text is a valid means of attaining the

---

⁵⁹² WEZLER (2001), p. 232-233; see nn. 516, 519, 520 (§IV.9)
⁵⁹³ AKLJUKAR (2009), p. 17.
knowledge originally formulated by Kapila and passed down to others originally through direct teaching (upadeśa, śabda).

In the introductory verses of the text, the commentator discusses the process of transmission by which the system founded by Kapila came to be summarised in the SK. The first stage of this development describes the transition from direct teaching (from Kapila to his disciple) to the composition of a fixed Śāṃkhya text:

Thinking that, on account of its immensity, it would not be possible, even in hundreds of years, to complete the learning of that great philosophical system (tantra) for the cessation of the three pains, which the sage (muni) proclaimed to the wise Āsuri, who desired to know the truth, sages whose intellects were subtle and whose wisdom was flawless, summarising it by means of a short text (grantha), set down that ārṣa teaching out of a desire for the welfare of pupils (śisya). 598

This ‘short text’ represents the first fixed formulation of Kapila’s original system.

The next stage in the development of the Śāṃkhya tradition describes the expansion of this original formulation by later teachers:

But the proponents of the theories of Consciousness (puruṣa), the Lord (īṣa), or atoms (aṇu) [as the source of the universe]596, and the Buddhists (vaināśika),597 materialists (prākritika),598 and perverted people (vikārapuruṣa)599 were opponents of that [system]. For the sake of thwarting

594 The term nibaddha must be used here in the sense ‘composed’ or ‘set down’, though this does not necessarily mean ‘written down’. Likewise the term grantha (‘text’) does not necessarily refer to a written text, but rather to a fixed, formulated composition.
595 tatvam jīñāsamāṇāya viprāyāsuraye munīḥ / yad uvāca mahat tantraṃ duḥkhhatrayanivruttaye /2/ na tasyādīhigamaḥ śakyaḥ kartum varṣaṣataīr api / bhūyastvād iti sāmcentya munibhiḥ sūkṣmaubuddhibhiḥ /3/ granthenālpena saṃkṣipya tad ārṣam anuśāsanam / nibbaddham amalaprajñaiḥ sīsyānām hitakāmyayā /4/ (YD Intro., p. 1, l. 7 – p. 2, l. 1).
596 Cf. the YD’s use of indirect (avīta) inference to establish pradhāna as the source of the universe (§IV.2, n. 334). Kumar and Bhargava (Yuktidipikā (1990-1992, Vol. 1, p. 2)) identify the puruṣāvādins as ‘non-dualists’, the iṣāvādins as ‘theists’, and the anuvādins as ‘the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika’.
597 Kumar and Bhargava (Yuktidipikā (1990-1992, Vol. 1, p. 2)) translate the term vaināśikāḥ as ‘nihilists’ and specify that this refers to the Buddhists.
598 Kumar and Bhargava (Yuktidipikā (1990-1992, Vol. 1, p. 2)) translate the term prākritikāḥ as ‘materialists’ and specify that this refers to the Cārvākas, although this does not seem to be an attested sense of the term. Presumably the term refers to those who hold prakṛti to be the only real entity.
599 Kumar and Bhargava (Yuktidipikā (1990-1992, Vol. 1, p. 2)) translate the term vikārapuruṣāḥ as ‘perverted persons’, apparently taking vikāra in the same sense as vikārita, but it is not clear precisely to whom this refers. Given the usual technical use of the terms vikāra and puruṣa in Śāṃkhya, perhaps another alternative would be that the term refers to vikārapuruṣāvādins—that is, to those who hold that the puruṣa is a product (vikāra) of prakṛti—but more evidence would be required to establish this.
the desires of those [opponents], thickets\textsuperscript{600} of logic (tarka), difficult to traverse, were fashioned by teachers (ācārya), whose intellects were subtle, in their own philosophical systems (tantra).\textsuperscript{601}

At this stage, the Śāṅkhya system takes the form of a school represented by various teachers in debate with other schools. The commentator next identifies the SK as a summary of the various arguments put forward by these teachers, which are classified according to a system of sixty categories of discussion:

These [thickets of logic] are inaccessible to those pupils whose intellects are confused with regard to the truth. Therefore, this handbook (prakarana)—or even complete treatise (śāstra)—its meaning condensed, called the ‘Seventy [Verses]’ (saptati), was composed by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, on the basis of which, all of the categories (padārtha) will be explained in this [commentary]. The existence of primordial Materiality (pradhāna), oneness, purposefulness, difference, subservience to another, plurality, disjunction, conjunction, continuation of the remaining [body after discrimination], and non-agency, have been handed down as the ten fundamental topics (cūlikārtha).\textsuperscript{602} Error (viparyaya) is five-fold, and there are said to be nine contentments (tuṣṭi). Incapacity (asāmarthya) of the instruments is considered twenty-eight-fold. Along with the eight attainments (siddhi), these sixty categories (padārtha) will be fully explained by definition and in due succession in this [commentary]. Hence, this treatise (śāstra) is adequate for establishing multiplicity.\textsuperscript{603, 604}

\textsuperscript{600} Kumar and Bhargava (\textit{Yuktidīpikā} (1990-1992, Vol. 1, p. 2)) translate the term gahvarāh as ‘ditches’, but the usual sense of the term is ‘thicket’, which would agree with the imagery of the first introductory verse of the text, which in some manuscripts is repeated after the present verse: ‘Insults to the elephant of Śāṅkhya, whose tusks are the direct and indirect [inferences], who inhabits the forest of debate, are as flimsy as a thicket of sūllakī ‘trees.’ (\textit{vitāvītaśvāsya pakṣatāvanasevinah} / pravādāh sāṃkhyaśakaraiṣa sallakśaṇaśabhangaiṣa // (YD Intro., p. 1, ll. 3-4; p. 2, ll. 6-7).

\textsuperscript{601} pratipakṣaḥ punas tasya puruṣeśānvādānaiḥ / vāṃśikāh prākrītikā vikārapuruṣās tathā /5/ teśām icchāvighātarām ācāraśāvī sūkṣmabuddhibhiḥ / racitāh svēṣu tantreṣu viṣamās tarkagahvarāh /6/ (YD Intro., p. 2, ll. 2-5).\textsuperscript{602}

\textsuperscript{602} For an overview of the significance of these ten fundamental topics, usually known as mūlikārtha (cf. TK on SK 72, p. 173, ll. 16-18), see \textsc{Larson and Bhattacharya} (1987), pp. 93-94. Marginal notes in two of the YD manuscripts gloss cūlaśīva with pradhāṇa (‘prevalence’ or ‘supreme importance’) explain that the ten manuscripts gloss cūlaśīva with pradhāṇa (‘prevalence’ or ‘supreme importance’) explain that the ten manuscripts gloss cūlaśīva because they are similar to a cūlaśīva, which usually refers to a bird’s crest (YD Intro., p. 2, n.1).

\textsuperscript{603} This ‘multiplicity’ (nānātva) probably refers to the distinctions between the manifest (vyakta), the unmanifest (avyakta), and Consciousness (puruṣa) (cf. SK 2).

\textsuperscript{604} śīyair duravagāhaḥ te tattvārthhabhrāntabuddhibhiḥ / tasmād īśvarakṛṣṇena samkṣiptārtham idam kṛtam /7/ saptatayāhyaṃ prakaraṇaṃ sakalam śāstraṃ eva vá / yasmāt sarvapadārthānām iha vyākhyā karisyate /8/ pradhāṇāstītvam ekatvam arhavattvam athānayātā / pārārthān ca tathānaikāṃ viyoga yogā eva ca /9/ śeṣavrīttiv arkaśirvānāṃ ciuliārthāḥ śmrātā daśā / viparyayāḥ patiścavdhis tathoktiṇaeva tuṣṭaye /10/ karaṇānaṃ aśāmārthaṃ aṣṭāvīṁśatīdhā matam / iti śaṣṭiḥ padārthānām aṣṭāḥbhīḥ saha siddhiḥ /11/
These sixty topics form the basic framework of the Ṣaṣṭitantra (‘System of Sixty [Categories]’). From these verses, it is not clear whether the YD-kāra views these categories as an aspect of Kapila’s original system or as a product of the later teachers mentioned in the previous verses. Elsewhere, however, the commentator mentions that Kapila had innate knowledge of ‘all categories’. As suggested by Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), it appears that the YD thus views the Ṣaṣṭitantra as a system initiated by Kapila himself and reflected in Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s summary of Sāṃkhya doctrine. Thus, Kapila’s original system (apparently featuring sixty categories), after being summarised in a fixed composition and then expanded upon by later teachers in debate with other schools, was re-summarised by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the SK.

In the last of the YD’s introductory verses, the commentator explicitly asserts that the SK is an authoritative expression of the system founded by Kapila, and explains his own function as a commentator:

[This] short text, not short in meaning, is possessed of all the characteristics of a philosophical system (tantra), just like an image in a mirror of the philosophical system of the supreme ṛṣi. I will undertake an explanation of it for the sake of justification according to logic. May wise men receive it well, out of compassion even if it is incorrect.
The commentator sees his task as to prove the authoritative status of the SK as a complete tantra, to ‘unpack’ the meaning behind the verses through logical argument and thereby to demonstrate the continuity between Kapila’s original system and Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s summary. The reference to the SK as ‘an image in a mirror’ in this passage can be compared to SK 73, a verse added to the end of the SK by the MV: ‘Thus, this brief śāstra is not deficient with respect to meaning, and is just like an image reflected in a mirror of the great body of the tantra.’ However, the YD’s explicit statement of purpose, and its realisation in the YD-kāra’s lengthy dialogical debates in defence of what he perceives as Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s views, have no parallel in any of the other classical commentaries. At the opposite extreme from the YD-kāra’s attitude lies the detached reporting of Vācaspatiṃśra.

The remainder of the introductory section of the YD is devoted to an explanation in prose of the characteristics of a proper tantra, which include proper ‘naming’ (saṃjñā) according to etymological significance. As discussed above (§V.1), the commentator views Kapila’s names for the tattvas as a point of continuity in the Śāṅkhyā tradition. Thus, the SK conforms to Kapila’s original system both in its utilisation of the sixty categories (padārtha) for the discussion of doctrine and in its preservation of the key technical terminology of the system. The other key characteristics of a tantra discussed by the commentator are adequacy of aphorisms (śūtra), adequacy of means of knowledge (pramāṇa), adequacy of the

610 MV, p. 85, ll. 12-13: tasmāt samāsadṛṣṭaṃ śāstram idam nārthataś ca parihīnam / tantrasya ca byraṃmūrter darpaṇasankrāntam iva bimbam //73//. MV (p. 85, ll. 19-20) explains that tantra refers to the ṣaṣṭītantra: ‘Thus, in [this] short text, the manifestation of the entire system of sixty [topics] is effected. This is the sense [of the verse].’ (evam alpaśāstre ṣaṣṭītantrasya kṛtsnasyāpi vyaktir abhiḥhitety arthāḥ /).

611 Vācaspati says that he is ‘concerned with the explanation merely of settled opinions (siddhānta), with disregard for the faults of others’ (see §IV.9, n. 523).

612 YD Intro., p. 3, l. 6 – p. 8, l. 16.

613 See n. 590 (§V.1).
members [of formal inference] (avayava), completeness (anyūnatā), statement of uncertainty and determination (saṃśayanirṇayokti), brief statement (uddeśa), detailed statement (nirdeśa), succession [of categories discussed] (anukrama), and instruction (upadeśa).

With regard to the form of the SK, the YD breaks up the kārikās (verses) of the text and treats them as sūtras (short aphorisms). In their critical edition of the YD, Wezler and Motegi have established that the text of the YD itself consists of a short vārttika text with a bhāṣya text layered around it, but that both are the product of the same author, ‘who wanted thus to follow the model of Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya embodying the work of Kātyāyana, and hence ultimately to create a kind of counterpart, within the tradition of Sāṃkhya, to the works of the famous trimunis of Vyākaraṇa, thus raising the Sāṃkhya-kārikā to the status of a Sūtra’. The YD-kāra’s use of the NU passage in explaining the siddhis, his concern for the etymological significance of the names of the tattvas, and his frequent interpretative analysis of Sanskrit compounds could also be taken to reflect his emulation of the Grammrian tradition.

The commentator’s interest in etymology is also displayed in his explanation of the term sūtra. First he suggests that a sūtra ‘indicates’ (sūcayati) particular objects, illustrating this with an example from the SK. Secondly, he suggests that,
more specifically, a sūtra ‘indicates the knowledge (buddhi) of a mendicant (bhikṣu) whose outer and inner organs\(^{622}\) have been withdrawn, with regard even to various suprasensuous (atīndriya) objects, such as primordial Materiality (pradhāna)\(^{623}\).

This knowledge corresponds to that of the figures known as īśvaramaharṣi\(^{624}\) from the passage of the YD that deals with the definition of authoritative figures (āpta),\(^{625}\) ‘who are free from faults such as passion, of undoubted intelligence, and who have seen suprasensuous (atīndriya) objects’\(^{626}\). As discussed in §IV.3, this passage also makes a provision for the maintenance of each śāstra by individuals recognised as authorities in their own fields of learning.\(^{627}\) The commentator’s definition of the term sūtra thus provides a link between his view of the SK and his definition of authoritative testimony (āptavacana). The SK can be considered to fall under the category of authoritative testimony insofar as it provides a means for later generations to access Kapila’s firsthand knowledge of the suprasensuous tattvas.

The commentator’s inclusion of ‘adequacy of the members [of formal inference]’ (avayavopapatti)\(^{628}\) in the characteristics of a proper tantra is also significant with regard to his view of the function of the SK. The commentator specifies that this refers to the ten members (avayava) of formal inference, including the five ‘members of explanation’ (vyākhyānga) and the five ‘members of teaching

\(^{622}\) See §II.4 and SK 33, 35.

\(^{623}\) athavā bhikṣor upasamḥrtaḥ saṃkarāntahkaranasya teṣu teṣv atīndriyesv api pradhānādīśv artheṣu buddhiṃ sūcayatīti sūtram / (YD Intro., p. 3, ll. 20-25).

\(^{624}\) See n. 367 (§IV.3).

\(^{625}\) vyapagatarāgādido āṇām a\(\text{andigdhamatīnām atīndriyārthadṛṣṭāṃ śvaramaharsṇāṃ āptatvam ācākṣmahe na sarvesaṁ / (YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, ll. 7-10).}

\(^{626}\) See above, nn. 612, 615.
to others’ (parapratipādanāṅga). As discussed in §IV.2, these ten members constitute the direct (vīta) inference and are considered necessary because ‘it is impossible to transmit meaning (artha) to another intellect (buddhi) without [the use of] a statement (vākyam).’ In particular, the commentator argues that the members of explanation (vyākhyāṅga) are necessary for the sake of the favour (anugraha) of those of ordinary intellect, which is considered the reason for the explanation of śāstra.

The commentator defends his attribution of these ten members of inference to the SK in a series of exchanges with an opponent, in which he argues that although they are not mentioned in the SK, their use is implied by Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s mention of inference (anumāna) and demonstrated by his doctrinal statements.

As discussed by HARZER (2006), the commentator thus treats the so-called sūtras of the SK as ‘arguments in accordance with the rules of forming an inference’. As discussed in §IV.2, the YD-kāra demonstrates the use of not only direct (vīta) inference, but also indirect (avīta) inference and inference from general correlation

---

629 avayavāḥ punar jijñāsādayaḥ pratijñādayaś ca / tatra jijñāsādayo vyākhyaṁgam pratijñādayaḥ parapratyāyanāṅgaṃ / tān uttaratra vaksyaṁmah (89.16f.) / (YD Intro., p. 4, II. 6-8). Cf. nn. 322, 324 (§IV.2).
630 See n. 333 (§IV.2).
631 vākyam antare ṣaṃkrāmayitum aśakyatvāt (YD on SK 6ab, p. 89, ll. 14-15).
632 ‘The favour of all should be effected. For this purpose, the explanation of śāstra is practiced by the learned, not for their own sake or for the sake of those with intellects similar to their own.’ (sarvasya cānugrahaḥ kartavya ity evamartham śāstravyākhyānam vipaścidbhīḥ pratāyate na svārthaṃ svasadṛśabuddhyartham vā / (YD on SK 6, p. 93, II. 14-15).) For context, see n. 331 (§IV.2).
633 YD Intro., p. 4, l. 9 – p. 6, l. 11.
634 ucyate: pramāṇaṁantarbhāva eṣām ity ayam upadiśto hetur asmābhīḥ / anumānaṁgam hi jijñāsādayah / tasmāt tadantarbhāttās ta iti na prthāg upadīṣyante / (YD Intro., p. 5, II. 4-6).
635 naivad yuktam anupadesān na santi jijñāsādayaḥ / kim tarhi / anupadiṣṭam apy eṣām astitvam lingāt pratipadyāmahe yad ayam acāryaḥ—dukhkhatrayābhābhīhādi jijñāsā tadapagātake hetau / (SK 1ab) iti jijñāsāman ācāste / kāraṇam asty avyaktaṁ (SK 16a) iti pratijñān karoti / bhedānām parimānāt (SK 15a) iti hetum vyapadesāti / naṣṭavaḥ vyavatiśhate lingām (SK 42d) iti drśṭānām dyotayati / kṣīraśva yathā tahā pravṛtiḥ pradhānasayā (SK 57bd) ity upaṣaṁharati / tasmāt trivedāṃ karaṇam dvāri (SK 35cd) iti nigamayati / na cānubhipretair acāryānam sāstre vyavahāro lakṣyate / tena vayaṃ lingāt pratipadyāmahe santi jijñāsādayaḥ ‘vayavāḥ śāstra iti / (YD Intro., p. 4, II. 16-26).
(sāmānyatodrṣṭa), in establishing the doctrines laid out in the SK.637 The commentator’s primary concern is thus to show that the SK illustrates the processes of inference by which the Sāṃkhya tattvas are established.

As discussed in §IV.3, the YD leaves room for the transmission through authoritative testimony (āptavacana) of objects of knowledge also knowable through perception or inference.638 Evidently, the commentator views the communication of Sāṃkhya doctrine, through the medium of formal inference, as the function of the SK as an authoritative tantra. In other words, we might say that the SK is treated as a manual for the inference of Sāṃkhya knowledge. Although the pramāṇa of inference is treated as a key tool for establishing Sāṃkhya doctrine, the pramāṇa of authoritative testimony is required to demonstrate the inference of this doctrine to those of ordinary cognitive capacity. Those individuals of extraordinary cognitive capacity may be able to grasp this doctrine independently through reflection (ūha). Although āha is said to occur independently of the pramāṇas,639 it can perhaps be thought of as a kind of independent inferential process, since the pramāṇa of inference is rather treated in terms of the formulation and communication of an inferential statement.

The YD’s view of the relationship between the SK and Kapila’s original tantra seems to fit a model identified by POLLOCK (1985) as prevalent in the classical period of Indian śāstra. POLLOCK illustrates the widespread assumption, in the texts of this period, of the primordial existence of valid doctrine. He characterises the initial apprehension and articulation of a body of doctrine by a qualified individual as ‘the necessary commencement of the tradition’.640 Subsequently, the learning of

---

637 See nn. 323, 334, 335, 341 (§IV.2).
638 See n. 369 (§IV.3).
639 See n. 507 (§IV.6).
this šāstra ‘serves to enhance the efficacy of the practice’ of which it treats.\textsuperscript{641} Such a text is considered the ideal prototype for future treatments of its subject. Tradition thus takes the form of a perpetual appeal to this prototype, which is viewed as the vital substance of a particular system of knowledge.\textsuperscript{642}

As we have seen, the YD treats the names of the tattvas as an essential point of continuity in the Sāṃkhya tradition. Insofar as these names conform to the significance (artha) of the tattvas themselves—in other words, to the fundamental properties (dharman) of reality\textsuperscript{643}—they can be considered to exist primordially in a potential form. According to this interpretation, Kapila’s initial manifestation of the primordial Sāṃkhya šāstra corresponds to Pollock’s ‘commencement of the tradition’, while Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s conformity to that original šāstra ‘serves to enhance the efficacy of the practice’ of the inference of the Sāṃkhya tattvas by later individuals. In this sense, the authoritative testimony given by Īśvarakṛṣṇa serves as a blueprint for the attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge. The suggestion that other rṣis may attain the same knowledge independently through āhā conforms with Pollock’s observation that an original šāstra may be made accessible to later generations either ‘through faithful intermediaries’ or ‘by sudden revelation’.\textsuperscript{644}

Moreover, Pollock observes that this view of the origination and transmission of knowledge stems from the notion that the Vedas are primordially existent\textsuperscript{645} and may be related to the doctrine of the pre-existent effect (satkāryavāda).\textsuperscript{646} As we have seen (§V.1), the YD-kāra appears to emulate the

\textsuperscript{641} Ibid., p. 507.
\textsuperscript{642} Similarly, AKLUJKAR (2009, p. 11) notes that ‘almost all accounts of getting back a lost fundamental teaching have reference to that teaching’s survival somewhere in a hidden or unidentified form. The very logic of the situation can be said to demand the assumption of a lost yet not-completely-lost original.’
\textsuperscript{643} Cf. the YD’s use of NU 1.20: nn. 510, 515, 518, 519, 520 (§IV.9).
\textsuperscript{644} POLLOCK (1985), p. 512.
\textsuperscript{645} Ibid., p. 519.
\textsuperscript{646} Ibid., pp. 517-518.
model of Vedic revelation in his conception of the Śaṅkhya tradition. The notion of satkāryavāda is also a key doctrine in the Śaṅkhya system, used to account for the creation of the manifest tattvas out of primordial Materiality (pradhāna). It seems plausible that the YD-kāra would assume that just as a fixed number of tattvas pre-exist in pradhāna, so does the knowledge of these tattvas pre-exist in a fixed formulation. We will find support for this interpretation in connection with the origination of Kapila and his knowledge in §V.4.

This view of the function of the SK would resolve a potential tension between Śaṅkhya doctrine and its legitimising mechanism, between the fact that the tattvas may presumably be inferred by any individual and the fact that they were originally intuited by an individual with extraordinary abilities. According to the view implicit in the YD’s treatment of the SK, these two facts mutually validate one another. Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s conformity to Kapila’s original śāstra serves to assist later generations in the practice of Śaṅkhya, while at the same time, the practice of Śaṅkhya inference, as embodied in the SK and demonstrated by the YD, serves to validate the assertion of the universal reality of the tattvas and thus the universal applicability of Kapila’s śāstra.

The YD’s view of the origination and transmission of Śaṅkhya doctrine thus conforms to a model prevalent in the broader Brāhmaṇical tradition, emulating the model of the Vedic rṣis in its conception of Kapila’s role in the initiation of the Śaṅkhya tradition. However, the YD also clearly elevates Kapila above other rṣis.

---

647 SK 9: ‘Because of the non-production of a non-existent thing, because of the relation of a cause [to its instruments], because of the absence of origination from everything, because of the production of that which it is possible [to produce from a particular cause] by that which is capable [of producing that particular effect], and because of the state of being a cause, the effect is [pre-existent] in the cause.’ (asadakaraṇād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavabhāvāt / saktasya sakyakaranāt kāraṇabhāvāc ca sat kāryam //). The commentators use this doctrine to prove that the manifest tattvas exist in pradhāna in an unmanifest form; e.g., YD on SK 9, p. 109, ll. 12-13: ‘We assert that there would be no manifestation of the products, beginning with the intellect, out of prordial Materiality if they were non-existent.’ (nāvidyamānasya mahādāder vikārasya pradhānād āvirbhāva tīti pratijāniṁāhe /)
Kapila is treated as the only rṣi born with innate (sāṃsiddhika) Sāṃkhya knowledge and as therefore exempt from the need even to grasp this knowledge through reflection (ūha). The YD recognises the existence of other rṣis, as well as of yogins, devas, and the Lord (īśvara). The following section will present an overview of the evidence in the YD with regard to the nature and status of these figures, in order to provide some context for a discussion of the significance of the special status afforded Kapila (§V.4-5).

§3. Īśvara, devas, yogins and rṣis in the Yuktidīpikā.

References to several classes of extraordinary or divine beings occur in the YD. In large part, the subject matter discussed in connection with these figures is peripheral to the concerns of the Sāṃkhya system as presented in the SK. As we have seen, rebirth in the realms of deities (deva), at higher levels of the phenomenal cosmos, is considered a possibility as the result of the condition of merit (dharma), but this is considered inferior to the goal of liberation through the condition of knowledge (jñāna) (§IV.6). In general, the commentators hold that devas and yogins are able to directly perceive the subtle elements (tanmātra) (§II.4, IV.1), although this fact is not discussed in connection with the pursuit of liberation through Sāṃkhya knowledge. Kapila, the founder of Sāṃkhya, is known as the supreme rṣi (paramarṣi), and occasional references to other rṣis are found in the commentaries. The nature of rṣis and the relative status of Kapila, however, are not discussed in detail in the commentaries.

648 See n. 569 (§IV.10).
649 E.g., GBh’s mention of the seven rṣis who are sons of Brahmā (§IV.8, n. 454), YD’s plural use of the term īśvaramahārṣi (§IV.3, n. 367), and YD’s quotation of NU 1.20 (§IV.9, n. 510). See further discussion below.
Of the classical Śāṁkhya commentaries, the YD contains the most evidence regarding the nature and status of such extraordinary figures. As apparent in some of the passages analysed in Chapter IV, the YD reveals a mythological orientation in its explanation of certain doctrines. In particular, the YD incorporates figures of cosmological prominence into the Śāṁkhya discussion more often than do the other commentaries. This is apparent, for example, in the commentator’s repeated references to a māhātmyaśarīra (‘body of greatness’).

Frauwallner (1973) argues that the passage, quoted by the YD, relating the māhātmyaśarīra’s production of the categories of the pratayasarga as his sons, reflects a mythological orientation apparent in the doctrines of Vṛṣaṅga’s Šaṣṭitantra, stemming from the influence of ‘religious sects’ on early Śāṁkhya. Oberhammer (1961) attributes eleven quotations found in the YD to the Šaṣṭitantra, although it is not clear whether the Šaṣṭitantra is in fact a single text, a group of texts, or just a general framework for the discussion of Śāṁkhya doctrine. Given the YD-kāra’s apparent familiarity with the Šaṣṭitantra—or, at any rate, with earlier sources of Śāṁkhya doctrine—it is possible that the YD’s presentation of divine figures in general reveals elements of earlier Śāṁkhya tradition not found in the other classical commentaries.

As discussed in §IV.9, the YD-kāra refers to the māhātmyaśarīra as Brahṃ and elsewhere states that his sons arose out of primordial Nature.

---

650 See n. 484 (§IV.9).
651 On the identification of this passage as a quotation from Vṛṣaṅga’s Šaṣṭitantra, see the reviews in Chapter III of Frauwallner (1973) and Oberhammer (1961).
655 The other commentators, for example, class such statements as ‘Indra is king of the gods’ in the category of authoritative testimony (āptavacana) (§IV.3, nn. 354, 356), which they present as practically unimportant in the context of the Śāṁkhya inquiry, while the YD, as we shall see below, discusses divine figures in connection with several aspects of the system.
656 See n. 484 (§IV.9).
(pradhāna), an instance of the prākṛtika form of the production of physical bodies. More information on the māhātmyaśarīra is found in another passage of the YD, in which the commentator clarifies his position on the nature of the Lord (īśvara), in response to arguments for the Lord’s role as creator, as held by the Pāśupatas and Vaiśeṣikas, who serve as opponents to the Sāṃkhya viewpoint in this passage.

[Opponent:] And the scripture (śruti) also describes [the Lord’s] embodiment (mūrti), clothed in skins, trident in hand, bow stretched, having black locks of hair, and so on. If [it is argued that] because of admitting to this, there is the relinquishment of your position, [this] would be the idea: if, due to the statements of scripture, the Lord (īśvara) is regarded as having embodiments (mūrtimat), by this his existence is established.

[Proponent:] Why?

[Opponent:] Because the quality of having embodiments is not applicable to a non-existent thing.

[Proponent:] This is also irrelevant.

[Opponent:] Why?

[Proponent:] On account of [your] non-understanding of [our] intention. For we do not reject the particular power of the glorious one (bhagavat) absolutely, on account of [his] acquisition of a body of greatness (māhātmyaśarīra), etc. This is our intention: there is no initiator (prayoktṛ) of primordial Materiality (pradhāna) and Consciousness (puruṣa) that is distinct from the two, as you have said.

---

657 See n. 485 (§IV.9).
658 aha: asty evam iśvara iti pāśupatavaiśeṣikāḥ / kasmāt / kāryaviśeṣasyātiśayabuddhipūrvvakatvāt / (YD on SK 15, p. 157, ll. 13-14).
659 The concept of ‘embodiment’ (mūrti) should be distinguished from that of the ‘incarnations’ or ‘descents’ (avatāra) of Viṣṇu, who is not mentioned in the text. As will become clear below, iśvara’s embodiment consists in his appropriation of a psycho-physical body (kāryakāraṇa) composed of the tattvas of prakṛti. The use of the term mūrti does not imply that iśvara takes on such a body in order to fulfill any specific purpose as in the case of Viṣṇu’s avatāras.
660 It is unlikely that bhagavat is used specifically as an epithet of Kṛṣṇa/Viṣṇu here, since nowhere else in the text does Viṣṇu appear to be mentioned, nor are the embodiments of iśvara ever termed avatāra, and elsewhere bhagavat is used simply as an adjective applied to figures such as Kapila and Āsuri (cf. n. 462 (§IV.8) and n. 754 (§V.4)).
As noted by Bronkhorst (1983),\textsuperscript{662} the characteristics of Śiva are attributed to īśvara’s embodiment here. This apparent association of the māhātmyaśarīra with Śiva would appear to conflict with the commentator’s reference to the māhātmyaśarīra as Brahmā (see above). Moreover, in the passage of the YD dealing with the prākṛtika production of physical bodies, Śiva is referred to as maheśvara (‘Great Lord’) but mentioned separately from the māhātmyaśarīra.\textsuperscript{663} Perhaps we are to understand an implicit identity between Śiva and Brahmā, or rather that māhātmyaśarīra refers to an incarnation of īśvara in the form of either Śiva or Brahmā (that is, both are possessors of a ‘body of greatness’). This would agree with the interpretation of Chakravarti (1975), who assumes a plurality of māhātmyaśarīras.\textsuperscript{664} Alternatively, since only the opponent refers to Śiva in the above passage, perhaps the proponent rather accepts only Brahmā (equated with the māhātmyaśarīra) as a form of īśvara. This would be consistent with the fact that the opponent represents a Pāśupata viewpoint, while elsewhere in the text only Brahmā is associated with the māhātmyaśarīra. Whatever the explanation, it is perhaps significant that Viṣṇu is never associated with īśvara in the YD, while in later Saṅkhya and Yoga texts an explicit identification is made between īśvara and Viṣṇu (see §V.5). Since the term māhātmyaśarīra never occurs in the plural, I will assume in the following that only one māhātmyaśarīra is referred to in the YD. The above passage does suggest, though, that īśvara takes on not only the form of the māhātmyaśarīra, but other forms as well.

As apparent from the passage quoted above, the YD accepts the existence of īśvara but denies him any role in the process of creation, such as that attributed to him by the Pāśupatas and Vaiśeṣikas. Bronkhorst (1983) observes that, in fact,

\textsuperscript{662} Bronkhorst (1983), p. 152.
\textsuperscript{663} See nn. 474, 475 (§IV.8).
\textsuperscript{664} Chakravarti (1975), p. 222.
‘no Sāṃkhya texts of the first millennium deny God’s existence’, and that ‘more often than not they give us the impression that they accept God’s existence as a matter of course, but do not accept His causal agency with respect to the world’.

With regard to the evidence in the YD for this view of īśvara, BRONKHORST draws attention to the fact that the commentator treats īśvara as a form of pure consciousness, like puruṣa, and therefore passive.

We will establish the non-agency of Consciousness (puruṣa) in [the verse]: ‘And from that opposition…’ [SK 19a]. This same rule is to be observed in the negation of the causality of the Lord also, on account of non-difference with regard to consciousness.

The YD thus accepts the existence of īśvara, but denies him any activity, including any role in the creation of the cosmos. This corresponds to the view of īśvara in the YS, where he is presented as a particular puruṣa who serves as a model for the aspiring yogin:

Or [absorption (samādhi) can be attained] through devotion to the Lord (īśvarapraṇidhāna). The Lord is a particular puruṣa, untouched by the stores of affliction, action, and fruition. In him is the pre-eminent seed of omniscience (sarvajñabīja). [He is] the guru even of earlier [gurus], on account of not being limited by time.

---

666 Ibid., p. 149.
667 SK 19: ‘And from that opposition [of puruṣa and prakṛti], the puruṣa’s state of being a witness, isolation, indifference, state of being an observer, and non-agency are established.’ (tasmāc ca viparyāsāt siddham sākṣitvam asya puruṣasya / kaivalyaṁ mādhyasīṁ draṣṭṛtvam akarṭḥbhāvaṁ ca //).
668 “tasmāc ca viparyāsāt” (SK 19a) ity atra puruṣasyākārṣṭtvam upapādayisyāmaḥ / caitanyāviśeṣād iśvarasyaśāp sa eva vidhiḥ kāraṇatvapratisṛṣṭe booddhavyaḥ / (YD on SK 15, p. 157, 10-12).
669 Cf. TK on SK 56, p. 152: ‘It is not from Materiality superintended by the Lord, on account of the absence of the superintendence of one who is inactive. For an inactive carpenter does not superintend his axe, etc.’ (neśvarādhiṣṭhitaprakṛtkto nirvaiyāpārasādhēṣṇādhiṣṭtvōṣ⁹ṭḥvāt / na hi nirvaiyāpāras taksā vāśyād adhitिःḥ //).
670 VBh on YS 1.23, p. 65, ll. 6-7: kim etasmād evāsannataḥ samādhir bhavati / athāśya lābhe bhavaty anyo ’pi kaścid upāyo na vetti /
671 VBh on YS 1.26, p. 81, ll. 5-6: pūrve hi guravaḥ kālenāvacchidyante / yatāvacchedārthena kālo nopāvartate sa esa pūrvesām api guruh /
672 īśvarapraṇidḥānād vā //23//
673 klesākarmavipākāśayayāt aparāmrṣṭaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaraḥ //24//
tatra niratisyaṁ sarvaḥāṃbījaḥ //25//
pūrvesām api guruh kālenāvacchidāt //26// (YS 1.23-26).
The YS’s characterisation of īśvara as a guru associated with omniscience places him in the category of figures of doctrinal authority and calls to mind the YD’s portrayal of Kapila, who was born with ‘innate knowledge of all categories’. The VBh, a text roughly contemporary with the YD, makes this association explicit:

Even in the absence of his own favour (anugraha), the favour (anugraha) of beings is his motive: ‘I will lift up the transmigrating puruṣas through the teaching of knowledge (jñāna) and merit (dharma) in the ages (kalpa), dissolutions (pralaya), and great dissolutions (mahāpralaya).’ And thus it has been said: ‘The first knower (ādividvas), the glorious supreme ṛṣi, taking control of a transformation-mind (nirmāṇacitta) out of compassion taught the philosophical system (tantra) to Āsuri, who desired to know.’

This passage explicitly associates īśvara with Kapila, who was prompted to take on a created mind (as an aspect of prakṛti) and to impart the Śaṃkhya system out of compassion for other beings. Although the YD does not explicitly associate īśvara with Kapila or even refer to īśvara as a guru, the general similarity between the YD’s view of īśvara and that of the Yoga school could be taken to suggest that, according to the YD, the other forms taken on by īśvara (besides the māhātmyaśarīra) might include Kapila.

BRONKHORST’s article argues that the YD-kāra does appear to view Kapila as an embodiment of īśvara, primarily on the basis of the commentator’s use of the term īśvaramaharṣi in describing authoritative individuals (āpta). The term īśvaramaharṣi occurs twice in the text, both times in the context of the YD’s

673 asy ārṣo hi dṛṣṭādvivatirekena sarvapadārtheśu sāṁśiddhikāḥ pratyayaḥ sa prātifho bhaviṣyatī / (YD on SK 4, p. 75, ll. 19-21).
674 CHAKRAVARTI (1975, p. 85) points out the similarity of the concept of nirmāṇacitta to the Buddhist concept of nirmāṇakāya (‘transformation-body’) as it occurs in Dīgha Nikāya 2.86: ‘Buddha also speaks of nirmāṇa-kāya i.e. the calling up of a mental image while describing the immediate fruits of the life of a recluse who has entered into and abides in the supreme meditation.’
675 tasāyānāduṇgūrahābhāve pi bhū nighttime pravojanam / jñānādharmpadeśena kalpaprālaya-

mahāpralayesaṃsārīnāḥ puruṣān uddharisvāmīti tathā coktam / ādivivdvaṁ nirmāṇacitam

adhiśṭhāya kāraṇyād bhagavān paramarṣir āsuraye jñānādharmpadeśena kalpaprālaya-

mahāpralayesaṃsārīnāḥ puruṣān uddharisvāmīti tathā coktam / ādivivdvaṁ nirmāṇacitam

adhiśṭhāya kāraṇyād bhagavān paramarṣir āsuraye jñānādharmpadeśena kalpaprālaya-

mahāpralayesaṃsārīnāḥ puruṣān uddharisvāmīti tathā coktam / ādivivdvaṁ nirmāṇacitam

adhiśṭhāya kāraṇyād bhagavān paramarṣir āsuraye jñānādharmpadeśena kalpaprālaya-

mahāpralayesaṃsārīnāḥ puruṣān uddharisvāmīti tathā coktam / ādivivdvaṁ nirmāṇacitam

adhiśṭhāya kāraṇyād bhagavān paramarṣir āsuraye jñānādharmpadeśena kalpaprālaya-

mahāpralayesaṃsārīnāḥ puruṣān uddharisvāmīti tathā coktam / ādivivdvaṁ nirmāṇacitam

adhiśṭhāya kāraṇyād bhagavān paramarṣir āsuraye jñānādharmpadeśena kalpaprālaya-

mahāpralayesaṃsārīnāḥ puruṣān uddharisvāmīti tathā coktam / ādivivdvaṁ nirmāṇacitam

adhiśṭhāya kāraṇyād bhagavān paramarṣir āsuraye jñānādharmpadeśena kalpaprālaya-

mahāpralayesaṃsārīnāḥ puruṣān uddharisvāmīti tathā coktam / ādivivdvaṁ nirmāṇacitam

adhiśṭhāya kāraṇyād bhagavān paramarṣir āsuraye jñānādharmpadeśena kalpaprālaya-

mahāpralayesaṃsārīnāḥ puruṣān uddharisvāmīti tathā coktam / ādivivdvaṁ nirmāṇacitam

676 See n. 367 (§IV.3).
discussion of authoritative individuals and both times in the plural.\textsuperscript{678} The term could mean either ‘the Lord and great ṛṣis’ (as a dvandva compound) or ‘great ṛṣis who are the Lord’ (as a karmadhāraya compound).\textsuperscript{679} BRONKHorST prefers the latter interpretation, arguing that, given the YD’s view of īśvara as passive consciousness, the term īśvara alone cannot refer to an authoritative figure, ‘for pure awareness does not possess authoritativeness or opinions’.\textsuperscript{680} BRONKHorST further supports his preference for the interpretation ‘great ṛṣis who are īśvara’ by suggesting that it is unlikely that īśvara here refers to an embodiment of the Lord in the form of a māhātmyaśarīra, since the term īśvara does not appear to designate a māhātmyaśarīra anywhere else in the YD.\textsuperscript{681}

BRONKHorST finds support for his argument that īśvaramahārṣi refers to ‘the great seers who are [incorporations of] God’ in two passages of the MV.\textsuperscript{682} The first of these passages is the opening verse of the MV, where we find that Kapila is explicitly connected with īśvara:

\begin{quote}
I bow down, with the highest devotion, to the Lord, the light of Kapila, the bestower of all knowledge, who abides in the sun, eternal.
\end{quote}

As BRONKHorST suggests, the equation of īśvara with the ‘light’ of Kapila agrees with the fact that in Sāṃkhya and Yoga īśvara usually designates a particular

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[678] YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, l. 4-5 (see n. 367 (§IV.3)) and about twenty lines later in an objection to the proponent’s position: ‘[Opponent:] On account of the similarity of authoritative statements and incontrovertible statements. Just as the statements of authorities such as a goldsmith are unfailing, so are īśvaramahārṣis authoritative. Therefore, their statements are also unfailing. Here, the quality of being similar objects can be supposed. Thus, doctrine is only inference.’ (āha: āpta-v<ādā>visamvādasāmānyāt / yathā hairanyakapрабhrīśrēnām āptāṁmām vākyam avyabhicāry evam īśvaramahārṣayo ‘pi cāptāh / tasmād eśām api vākyam avyabhicārīti śakyam atrāpi sāmānya-viśayatvam kalpayitum / evam anumānam evāgama iti / (YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, l. 22 – p. 101, l. 3)).
\item[679] BRONKHorST (1983, p. 153, n. 6) argues that a third possibility, ‘the seers, who are Gods’, is ruled out by the YD’s ‘consistent use of singular endings after īśvara...and bhagavat’.
\item[681] Ibid., p. 153.
\item[682] Ibid., p. 153.
\item[683] Ibid., pp. 156-157.
\item[684] sarvavidyāvidhātāram ādityasthaṃ sanātanaṃ / nato ’śmi parayā bhaktiyā kāpilaṃ jyotir īśvaram // (MV Intro., p. 1, ll. 3-4).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
purusa—according to this passage, the purusa belonging to Kapila.685 In other words, the MV suggests that īśvara becomes associated with Kapila in the same way that other puruṣas become associated with subtle and physical bodies due to conjunction with prakṛti (see §II.2). This is confirmed by the other passage of the MV to which BRONKHORST refers, which presents a mythological account of the circumstances of Kapila’s birth:

For the glorious maharṣi, endowed with innate merit (dharma), knowledge (jñāna), dispassion (vairāgya), and power (aiśvarya), an incarnation (avatāra) of the glorious ancient puruṣa, out of a desire to show kindness to the world, the son of Prajāpati Kardama, named Kapila, came here in Devahūti, the daughter of Svāyambhuva Manu.686

The suggestion in this passage that Kapila did not merely transmit the Sāṃkhya doctrine out of compassion, as the SK itself testifies, 687 but actually incarnated solely for this purpose, provides an answer to the question of the reason for Kapila’s incarnation with innate Sāṃkhya knowledge. We will return to this passage in the discussions in §V.4-5 of the YD’s view of the soteriological purpose behind Kapila’s incarnation and the relation of this view to the evidence of the other classical Sāṃkhya commentaries.

BRONKHORST suggests that the ‘glorious ancient puruṣa’ to whom Māṭhara refers ‘is, of course, God (īśvara)’688 and takes the passage as confirmation of the assumption that Kapila is one of the īśvaramarhaṣis to whom the YD ascribes authority. However, there is nothing in either of the MV passages to suggest that īśvara incarnates in the bodies of other maharṣis than Kapila.

685 BRONKHORST (1983), p. 157: ‘God is the light of Kapila. What this means is clear: God is the Self which resides, shines, in Kapila.’
686 iha hi bhagavān maharṣiḥ sāṁsiddhikadharmanāvairāgyaiśvāryasampanno bhagavataḥ purāṇa-puruṣasyāvatāro jagadānajighṛkṣayā prajāpateḥ kardamasya putraḥ svāyambhuvasya manor duhitari devahūtyaṁ kapilo nāma babhūva / (MV on SK 1, p. 1, ll. 14-17).
687 SK 70ab: ‘The sage transmitted this purifying, foremost [knowledge] to Āsuri out of compassion.’ (etat pavitram agryaṁ munir āṣuraye ‘nukampayā pradadau ‘).
Two possible alternatives to BRONKHORST’s interpretation of the term īśvaramaharṣi can be proposed. Firstly, given the fact that the YD clearly elevates Kapila above other ṛṣis in terms of his possession of innate (sāṃsiddhi) knowledge, īśvaramaharṣi could be taken as a dvandva compound. According to this interpretation, ‘the Lord (in the form of Kapila) and the (other) great ṛṣis’ would be considered firsthand authorities on suprasensuous matters.

This interpretation is supported by the fact that Kapila and Brahmā are given equal cosmological status in the YD, as apparent in a passage describing the bodies of the various classes of beings:

Of these, the bodies of gods (deva) are of four kinds: due to the favour (anugraha) of primordial Materiality (pradhāna), like those of the supreme ṛṣi and Brahmā (viriñca)690, due to their attainments (siddhi),691 like those of Brahmā’s sons and grandsons;692 from mother and father, like those of the sons of Aditi and Kaśyapa; or only from fathers, like that of Vasiṣṭha from Mitra and Varuṇa.693 This passage suggests that because Kapila’s body is produced in the same manner as that of Brahmā (i.e. the māhāātmyaśarīra), he is also likely to be considered an incarnation of īśvara. The significance of the fact that the bodies of Kapila and Brahmā were created out of the ‘favour’ (anugraha) of pradhāna will be discussed in the following section. While Kapila is here classed as a deva and mentioned alongside Brahmā, there is no evidence to suggest that other ṛṣis might be given the same status.

689 See n. 569 (§IV.10).
690 The term viriñca usually refers to Brahmā, but it may also be applied to Viṣṇu or Śiva, according to MONIER-WILLIAMS. The fact that Brahmā is mentioned later in this passage, as well as elsewhere in the text (cf. §V.4, n. 729), suggests that the same figure is meant here. JACOBSEN (2008, p. 48) likewise assumes that viriñca refers to Brahmā.
691 The nature of the siddhis whereby bodies are produced will be discussed in the following section; see n. 735 (§V.4).
692 See §V.5 for a discussion of the identity of Brahmā’s sons and grandsons.
693 tatra devānāṃ catuvvidham śarīram pradhānānugrahabād yathā paramarṣer viriñcasya ca, tattādhibhyo yathā brahmānaḥ putrāṇāṃ tatputrāpatruṇāṃ ca, mātāpitṛto yathādite kāśyapasya ca putrāṇāṃ kevalād vā yathā pitṛto mitrāvaruṇāḥbhāyāṃ vasiṣṭhasya / (YD on SK 39, p. 228, ll. 12-15).
The differences between Kapila and the māhātmyaśarīra are made clear in two passages of the YD. The first passage describes the make-up of their bodies in terms of the three constituent qualities (guna):

Of these, he whose psycho-physical body (kāryakarana) is primarily goodness (sattva) is the supreme rṣi. He whose [psycho-physical body] is abundant in goodness (sattva) and activity (rajas) is the māhātmyaśarīra.695

The implications of this distinction with regard to the intellectual characteristics of each of these figures are made clear in the YD’s illustration of the innate (sāṃsiddhika) variety of the conditions (bhāva):

And just as the knowledge (jñāna) of the supreme rṣi is innate, so is the lordliness (aiśvarya) of the māhātmyaśarīra.696

This makes it clear that Kapila would be more likely than the māhātmyaśarīra (who is possessed of the powers of lordliness rather than knowledge) to be considered an authoritative figure by the author of the YD. Kapila thus shares the māhātmyaśarīra’s cosmological status but is unique in his possession of innate Śaṃkhya knowledge.

Given the evidence of the YD, the VBh and the MV, it seems likely that Kapila would be considered an embodiment of īśvara by the YD-kāra, although this cannot be established definitively. However, there is nothing in any of these texts to suggest that other great rṣis might also be considered embodiments of īśvara, and the unique position afforded Kapila in terms of his cosmological status and his possession of innate jñāna suggests that the association with īśvara would be confined to the supreme rṣi alone. As discussed in §V.1, the YD’s treatment of the


695 tatra yasya sattvaradvāhānaṃ kāryakaranaṃ sa paramarśiḥ / yasya sattvarajorahulam sar māhātmyaśarīraḥ / (YD on SK 15, p. 161, ll. 17-18).

696 yathā ca paramarṣer jñānam sāṃsiddhikam evam māhātmyaśarirasyaiśvaryam (YD on SK 43, p. 234, ll. 6-7).
siddhis suggests that other rṣis might attain through reflection (ūha) the same knowledge that was innate in Kapila. According to the interpretation of īśvaramahārṣi as a dvandva, then, these maharṣis would equally be considered sources of authoritative testimony, though distinguished from Kapila as an embodiment of īśvara.

The other alternative interpretation of the term īśvaramahārṣi is suggested by MOTEGI (2006)’s translation of the term as ‘great seers of lord-like power’. première Presumably, MOTEGI takes īśvara in its adjectival sense, meaning ‘capable’ or ‘powerful’. Despite the fact that elsewhere in the YD the term īśvara always seems to be used as a noun referring specifically to ‘the Lord’, this reading is perhaps the most simple, since it does not require us to conjecture that the Lord takes on the form of Kapila and/or other rṣis. According to this interpretation of the term (as a karmadhāraya), īśvaramahārṣis would be those great rṣis who are ‘lordly’ (īśvara)—in other words, who have attained the condition of lordliness (aiśvarya).

As discussed in §IV.9, according to the YD, siddhi, like the condition of aiśvarya, results in ‘non-obstruction’ (avighāta, apratighāta), and there is evidence that siddhi and the other categories of the pratyayasarga were originally associated with stages of yogic practice. Similarly, in the third chapter of the YS and VBh, the supernatural powers of aiśvarya are presented as a result of a yogin’s development. An explicit connection between the abilities of īśvara and yogins is found in the YD’s commentary on SK 56, which mentions in passing that ‘a single

---

698 Cf. n. 679 above.
699 See nn. 500, 502 (§IV.9).
700 See nn. 499, 501 (§IV.9) and the reviews of OBERHAMMER (1961) and KENGHE (1968) in CHAPTER III.
701 Cf. YS 3.44-45: ‘From concentration on the grossness, inherent form, subtlety and purposiveness [of the elements], there is victory over the elements. Then there is the manifestation of [the powers of] atomisation, etc., perfection of the body, and non-injury from the qualities of [the physical body].’ (sthūlasvarūpasūkṣmānāsvārthavatvasamāyamād bhūtajayaḥ //44// tato ’nimādipradurbhāvaḥ kāyasampat taddharmānabhi ghaṭā tata //45//).
īśvara or yogin has a multitude of bodies due [merely] to the application of desire’ (see further discussion in §V.4). Moreover, īśvara is associated with omniscience in the YS, while ‘unrestricted knowledge’ (aviparītajñānam) (in other words, omniscience) is presented as a result of siddhi in the YD. On the basis of this evidence, it is possible that the term īśvaramahārṣi refers to those rṣis who, through yogic practice resulting in siddhi, have become similar to īśvara in terms of their omniscience, which thus qualifies them to be authoritative figures (āpta). Of course, this definition of īśvaramahārṣi would also include Kapila, who is born with such knowledge (as well as aiśvarya and the other sāttvika bhāvas).

That the YD accepts progressive yogic practice as conducive to the attainment of Śaṃkhya knowledge is apparent in the text’s treatment of the merit (dharma) attained through the yogic practices of yama and niyama as a step on a path to knowledge and liberation, also apparently involving the generation of dispassion (vairāgya). Moreover, the fact that the perception of the subtle elements by yogins is possible only after the gross elements have been ‘completely attained’ (samprāpta) by them (see §IV.3) suggests that yogic practice is a progressive activity, which may perhaps eventually lead to a yogin to independently attain Śaṃkhya knowledge through reflection (ūha) and thereby become qualified as an authoritative figure (āpta), an ‘īśvaramahārṣi who is free from faults such as

---

702 ekasyeśvarasya yogino vecchāyogād anekaśarīratvam (YD on SK 56, p. 262, ll. 22-23).
703 See n. 672 above.
704 See n. 502 (§IV.9).
705 See n. 696 above; n. 458 (§IV.8).
706 See nn. 422, 425 (§IV.6) and nn. 442, 444 (§IV.7).
707 devānāṃ yānindriyānī tāni dharmotkarṣād visūdhāny aviśeṣān api grhanti [prāg eva viśeṣāt] / yoginām ca samprāptavīśeṣānām / (YD on SK 34ab, p. 218, ll. 3-5). This can be compared to the YS’s statement that ‘victory over the elements’ leads to various supernormal abilities (cf. n. 701 above).
passion, who is of undoubted intelligence, and who has seen suprasensuous objects.\(^{708}\)

However, the YD also makes a clear distinction between the knowledge of yogins and the knowledge of \(\text{ṛṣīs}\). Yogic perception is included in the framework of the \(\text{pramāṇas}\),\(^{709}\) while the knowledge of Kapila,\(^{710}\) as well as the knowledge attained through \(ā\text{ūha}\) (apparently associated with other \(\text{ṛṣīs}\)),\(^{711}\) falls outside of this framework. Similarly, Sāṃkhya knowledge generated through practice \(\text{(abhyaśaja)}\) is distinguished from the unprecedented \(\text{(apurva)}\) knowledge attained through the \(\text{siddhis}\) (which include \(ā\text{ūha}\)).\(^{712}\) This suggests that \(ā\text{ūha}\) is not an ability that results from yogic practice but is rather a spontaneous occurrence, perhaps the fulfilment of a potential inherent in \(\text{ṛṣīs}\) alone.

In the absence of further evidence, it is impossible to determine which interpretation of the term \(\text{īśvaramaharṣī}\) is assumed by the YD-\(\text{kāra}\). On account of the lack of definitive evidence in the text that \(\text{īśvara}\) takes on a body in the form of Kapila and/or other \(\text{ṛṣīs}\), I would be inclined to take the term as a \(\text{karmadhāraya}\) meaning ‘lordly great \(\text{ṛṣīs}\)’, whether this refers to \(\text{ṛṣīs}\) who have become lordly through yogic practice or who are inherently lordly. The choice of interpretation, however, does not affect the fact that while other \(\text{ṛṣīs}\) and \(\text{yogins}\) may be able to attain Sāṃkhya knowledge independently, Kapila is clearly distinguished from them in terms of his innate knowledge.

Kapila is unique among \(\text{ṛṣīs}\), insofar as the YD elevates him to the status of a deity \(\text{(deva)}\)—possibly even an embodiment of \(\text{īśvara}\)—whose body, endowed with innate knowledge of the Sāṃkhya categories, was produced ‘due to the favour

\(^{708}\) \text{vyapagatarāgādidosānām asandigdhamatānām atīndriyārthārāmanām īśvaramaharṣīnām āptatvaṁ ācaksmahe na sarveśām i (YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, ll. 4-5). For context, see n. 367 (§IV.3).}
\(^{709}\) See n. 390 (§IV.4).
\(^{710}\) See n. 390 (§IV.4).
\(^{711}\) See n. 507, 510 (§IV.9).
\(^{712}\) See n. 415 (§IV.6).
(anugraha) of primordial Materiality (pradhāna). The implications of this fact, in terms of the apparent purpose behind Kapila’s birth, will be considered in the following section.

§4. The origin, nature and role of Kapila and his knowledge, according to the Yuktidīpikā.

The fact that, according to the YD, Kapila was born with innate knowledge of the distinction between Materiality (prakṛti) and Consciousness (puruṣa) presents an interpretative problem when considered in the context of the basic teleology of Sāṃkhya. In order to reiterate this aspect of the Sāṃkhya system, it will be helpful to introduce an analogy.

The relationship between prakṛti and puruṣa can be illustrated by the image of an audience of puruṣas in a cinema watching a screen on which is projected the activity of prakṛti. The objectives of this film are two: first, the enjoyment or entertainment of the puruṣas, and second, the realisation of the nature of the viewing experience (see §II.3). That is, at first prakṛti’s activity takes the form of escapism, in which each puruṣa identifies himself with the actions on screen, but its ultimate objective is to attain a kind of self-reflexivity, drawing attention to the fact that it is actually only a film, at which point the film ends and the puruṣas are left in a darkened cinema; that is, they are liberated from the viewing experience.

This analogy is somewhat complicated by the fact that prakṛti functions differently with regard to each particular puruṣa. That is, despite the fact that there is only one screen, the viewing experience is so subjective that every puruṣa

---

713 See n. 693 above, n. 460 (§IV.8) and n. 606 (§V.2).
714 I.e., as a result of the conditions (bhāva), which determine the phenomenal circumstances of an individual’s incarnation (see §II.5, IV.6).
sees something different, depending upon which stage in the process of realisation it has reached. This process may in fact require multiple viewings. Each phenomenal reincarnation of an individual can be thought of as a return to the cinema for another viewing. Prakṛti writes a new character into its film for the benefit of each puruṣa entering the cinema. If the character on screen with whom a puruṣa identifies is killed off before the realisation of separation sets in, the puruṣa leaves briefly and returns to identify with a new character. When eventually the self-reflexive aspect of the film sinks in and the puruṣa ceases to identify with any of the characters, the film ends once and for all for that particular puruṣa, although it continues for others.

This understanding of the process central to Śāṃkhya meets with an interesting problem when we consider the leading actor in prakṛti’s film, Kapila, who was born with innate knowledge of the fact that he was only a character in this film. Since it is this knowledge that is held to result in the liberation of the puruṣa identified with a particular character in the film, we might ask why Kapila was written into the film in the first place. That is, if the puruṣa with which Kapila is associated has no need for further experience of prakṛti’s activity, what is the purpose of Kapila’s birth?

The evidence of the YD suggests a unique explanation of Kapila’s role on the Śāṃkhya screen. As noted in the previous section, the VBh and MV associate Kapila with īśvara, who incarnated out of compassion for transmigrating beings. While it is possible that the YD also views Kapila as an embodiment of īśvara, this association is not explicit, and the YD mentions pradhāna rather than īśvara in connection with Kapila’s birth.

As already discussed, according to the YD, the bodies of both Kapila and Brahmā were born ‘due to the favour (anugraha) of primordial Materiality

715 See nn. 675, 684, 686 (§V.3).
Kapila’s disciple, Åsuri, was also ‘favoured’ (*anugrhīta*) by a stream (*srotas*) of purity from *pradhāna*, which led to the production of his ‘dispassion deriving from (primordial) Materiality’ (*prākṛtika vairāgya*). Moreover, the *anugraha* of everyone, including those of inferior intellectual capacity, is given as the reason for the explanation of *śāstra* by means of formal inference.

It is clear that the notion of *anugraha* in the YD is connected with *prakṛti*’s activity and with the production of such things as dispassion and knowledge. Beyond these suggestions, the YD does not explain the nature of *anugraha*. In the *Mahābhārata* (*MBh*), however, the term is often used in the context of the duties proper to a king. For example, in Book 3 of the epic, Hanumān, in conversation with Bhīma, refers to *nigraha*, ‘repression’ or ‘punishment’, and *anugraha*, ‘favour’, shown towards one’s subjects, as two complementary duties of a king:

> When a king correctly proceeds with repression and favour, then the limits of the people are well established.

It is possible to draw an analogy between these two duties of a king and the two purposes of *prakṛti*. Just as a king both represses and favours his people, *prakṛti* both binds the *puruṣas* by the illusion of identification with the phenomenal world and liberates them by producing the knowledge of their actual difference from *prakṛti*.

---

716 See n. 693 (§V.3).
717 See n. 462 (§IV.8).
718 See n. 331 (§IV.2). Cf. VBh’s mention of the *anugraha* of beings as the motivation behind Īśvara’s incarnation (§V.3, n. 675).
719 It should also be noted that Oberhammer (1961, pp. 152-163) argues that a particular creation of *prakṛti*, the *anugrahasarga*, may have been introduced into the Śāmkhya system in the *Ṣaṭītantra* (although the YD’s *śāstra* quotations do not make reference to it) and then replaced with the paradigm of the *bhāvas* in the SK. It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this study to determine whether the YD’s use of the term *anugraha* bears any connection to the *anugrahasarga*.
720 I thank Prof. James Fitzgerald for drawing my attention to this usage of the term.
721 *nigrahānugrahaḥ samyag yadā rājā pravartate / tadā bhavāti lokasya maryādā suvyavasthitā //* (MBh 3.149.39).
It thus seems plausible that the term *anugraha* in the YD refers to the manifestation of *prakṛti*'s soteriological purpose. The process by which this purpose is manifested in the phenomenal sphere is consistently described in terms of a ‘stream’ or ‘flowing’ (*srotas, abhīsyanda*). Āsuri is favoured by a ‘stream of purity’ (*śuddhisrotas*) from *pradhāna*.

The ‘stream of attainment’ (*siddhisrotas*) always flows from *pradhāna* but is hindered by error, incapacity, and contentment. (The latter three categories can be thought of as representing ‘repression’ (*nigraha*), also manifested in streams from *pradhāna* by the *māhāmyaśarīra*.) The *prākṛtika* form of the condition of knowledge (*jñāna*) arises as a ‘flowing’ (*abhīsyanda*) from *prakṛti*.

Under SK 69, the commentator even refers to the Sāṃkhya system itself as a ‘stream of science’ (*vidyāsrotas*).

This imagery suggests that *prakṛti*'s soteriological tendency can be manifested as a stream flowing directly from its primordial, unmanifest aspect (*pradhāna*) into the phenomenal sphere of experience, where it takes on a variety of forms conducive to the liberation of particular *puruṣas*. The manifestation of Kapila’s physical body appears to be an instance of this manifestation of *anugraha*. Since Kapila was born with innate *jñāna*, we can assume that this knowledge itself was also a result of *prakṛti*'s *anugraha*. This assumption is supported by the argument, presented in §IV.8, that Kapila’s *sāmsiddhika* knowledge was essentially of a *prākṛtika* character, except that in Kapila’s unique case there was no hindrance to the production of this knowledge directly from *pradhāna*.

---

722 See n. 462 (§IV.8).
723 See n. 486 (§IV.9).
724 See nn. 484, 485 (§IV.9).
725 See n. 460 (§IV.8).
726 YD on SK 69b, p. 267, ll. 14-16: ‘[The Sāṃkhya system] was expounded—i.e., completely explained—by this sage Kapila because he was capable of interpreting the stream of science practiced since long ago.’ (tena kapilamuninā samākhyātaṃ samyag ākhyātaṃ cirābhīyastasya vidyāsrotaso nirvacanasāmarthyāt/).
727 See nn. 460, 462, 465 (§IV.8).
§V.2, the original Sāmkhya śāstra may be considered to pre-exist in pradhāna in a potential form, which would agree with the fact that Kapila was born directly from pradhāna with innate knowledge of the substance of this śāstra.

Both Kapila and the knowledge with which he was born thus seem to be viewed as a direct manifestation of prakṛti’s soteriological tendency. Since Kapila himself was born with none of the hindering intellectual conditions (tāmasa bhāva) which would account for his embodiment, we can assume that this manifestation was for the general anugraha of other embodied puruṣas. This is confirmed by the YD’s explanation of the difference between the embodiment of Kapila and Hiranyakagṛbha (i.e., Brahmā) and embodiment as the result of one’s intellectual conditions (bhāva):

Before the manifestation of primordial Materiality (pradhāna), there was no possibility of merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma), on account of the fact that these are qualities of the intellect (buddhi), and [the intellect] is a product (vikāra) of primordial Materiality (pradhāna). Then, without those [bhāvas], [the constituent qualities] of goodness (sattva), etc., aiming at the [dual] purpose of the experience of [the sensory objects of] sound (śabda), etc., and the realisation of the difference between the constituent qualities (guna) and Consciousness (puruṣa), remaining in the state of the intellect (mahat), ego (ahaṁkāra), subtle elements (tanmātra), faculties (indriya), and elements (bhūta), produced bodies (śarīra) beginning with those of supreme ṛṣi and Hiranyakagṛbha. But after the time of the decay of the six attainments (saṁsārācakra), the cycle of transmigration began as a result of the functioning of activity (rajas) and inertia (tamas) due to the interaction and variegation of the constituent qualities (guna).

The embodiment of Kapila and Brahmā is here presented as prior to the initiation of the cycle of transmigration and associated explicitly with the two general reasons given by the SK for the activity of prakṛti in relation to puruṣa: observation of that

728 paramārṣir bhagavān sāṃsiddhikair dharmajñānāvairāgyaiśvāvaityā aviṣṭatapito viśvāgrañjī kapilamuniiḥ / (YD on SK 69b, p. 267, ll. 13-14).
729 Given that viriñca and hiranyakagṛbha are both common epithets of Brahmā, and both are mentioned together with Kapila, it is likely that they refer to the same figure.
730 prāk pradhānapravṛtyāt dharmādharmavat asambhavo buddhidharmatvāt tasyās ca pradhānavikā<ra>tvāt / tatā tadvyatiśrīaktam śabdādyapar<bhoga>lakṣaṇam guṇapurusāntaropa-labhilakṣaṇam cārtham uddśīya sattvādayo mahadahaṁkāratañgātvedivahātvaḥ śāyasthāya paramārṣijñānāvakāḥśājñānam śarīram upadāyantā / saṁsārācakraḥ saṁsāra-viṣayād rajastamārtvāsanūpātī / (YD on SK 52, p. 255, ll. 8-13).
activity and the eventual realisation of the distinction between prakṛti and puruṣa.  

Later in this passage, the commentator reiterates that the bhāvas begin to function in connection with the subtle body (and thus to direct its transmigratory path) only after the time of the decay of the ‘six attainments’. These ‘six attainments’ are different from the eight attainments comprising the siddhi category of the pratyayasarga and are explained in another passage of the YD as six extraordinary forms of reproduction:

In the first creation, offspring and the like were manifested by the beings produced out of Materiality (prakṛti) by the mind (manas) alone, as desired, without the union of a couple, due to an abundance of the quality of goodness (sattva). This occurs even today, as the tortoise bears her eggs through thought (nirūpita) [alone]. Even then, having looked at one’s beloved with the eyes, one [would] consider his purpose accomplished. When this [ability] was diminished, attainment through speech (vāksiddhi) came into being. After speaking [together], whatever the beings desire is produced. This occurs even today, as having looked at one’s beloved for a long a time and having touched hands, there arises pleasure. When this [ability] was diminished, attainment through embracing (aśleṣasiddhi) came into being. By embracing, beings attain what is desired. This occurs even today, as embracing one’s beloved, there is delight. When this [ability] was diminished, attainment by copulation (dvandvasiddhi) began. A man and a woman, coming together, would produce offspring, and [the notion of] possession—‘this is mine, this is mine’—came

371 Cf. SK 37: ‘Because the intellect produces every experience of the puruṣa and also [because] it distinguishes the subtle difference between pradhāna and puruṣa.’ (sarvam pratyupabhogaṃ yasmāt puruṣasya sādhayati buddhiḥ / saiva ca viśinaṣṭi punah pradhānapuruṣāntaraṃ sūkṣmam //).

372 so ‘yam lingākhyo bhāvākhyāḥ ca saṃsiddhikṣayakālaḥ undhvaṃ bhavati / (YD on SK 52cd, p. 256, l. 20).

733 I follow LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 60) in interpreting this line as a description of a separate siddhi, since attainment through sight is clearly different from attainment through the mind alone, and without this assumption there would be only five siddhis in this passage. However, given the context of the rest of the passage, it would be more natural to take this line as an illustration of the preceding siddhi. It is probable that the text is corrupt here and an explanation of ‘attainment through sight’ is missing from the preceding portion of the passage, in which case the tortoise’s nirūpita might refer not to ‘thought’ but to ‘sight’. It is also strange that the first two siddhis have not been named, as the last four have.

734 The Critical Ed. has vitatena here, which makes no sense in this context. vitata is an adjective meaning ‘spread out’, ‘bent’, or ‘wide’. Three manuscripts attest to the reading vikṛtena (YD, p. 229, n. 9), which also makes no sense. Kumar and Bhargava (YD (1990-92), p. 293) amend the text to viruta, which they translate as ‘crying’; for lack of a better alternative, I have followed this suggestion.
into being. Only at this time is transmigration (sāṃsāra) explained [to have begun]. Evidently, these forms of reproduction apply to those beings who existed between the time of the production of Kapila and Brahmā from prakṛti and the time of the onset of sāṃsāra. As mentioned in §V.3, the bodies of Brahmā’s sons and grandsons are said to have been produced by means of siddhis. Taken together, these passages suggest that Kapila and Brahmā were produced first, directly out of primordial Materiality, for the purpose of manifesting the two primary purposes of prakṛti’s activity. Brahmā then produced offspring by means of the first form of attainment (by thought alone). The powers of attainment of the generations succeeding Brahmā gradually deteriorated until the normal cycle of transmigration (according to the bhāvas) began.

Some major interpretative conclusions can be drawn from the evidence of the YD presented so far. Given the fact that Brahmā appears to initiate the physical creation of succeeding generations of beings, he seems to fulfill the first purpose of prakṛti, the experience of prakṛti’s activity (in the form of bodily incarnation) by various puruṣas. Moreover, Brahmā’s creation of the categories of the pratyayasarga as streams out of pradhāna would also be conducive to the

735 pūrvesarge prakṛte utpannāṁ prāṇināṁ sattvadharmanārśad antareṇa dvayasamāpattīṁ manasaivāpatayaṁ anyad vā yatheṣṣiṣya prāduḥbhāva / tad etad adyāpi cānuvartate yat kacchapikā nirūpītendādharanāṁ karoti / priyam khalv api caṅkṣusā nirīkṣya kṛtārtham ātmānāṁ manyaṁ / tasyāṁ api kṣīnāyāṁ vāksiddhir bābhāva / abhībhāṣya prāṇino yad icchanti tadāpādayanti / tad adyāpy anuvartate yac chānkhī vitātenāpatayaṁ bibharti / priyam khalv api sambhāṣya mahaṁ prātiṁ anuvhavati / tasyāṁ upakṣīnāyāṁ hastasiddhir bābhāva / sāṃsāṇāyaṁ pāṇīṁ īśitaṁ artham upapādayanti / tad etad adyāpy anuvartate yat priyam cirād ālokya pāṇīṁ sāṃsāṇāyaṁ pṛśīr bhavati / tasyāṁ upakṣīnāyāṁ āśreṣṭasiddhir bābhāva / āśleṣanena prāṇīnaṁ īśitaṁ labhante / tad etad adyāpy anuvartate yat priyam āśreṣṭaṁ nirvīrīr bhavatī / tasyāṁ upakṣīnāyāṁ dvandvasiddhir dārabhā striṣपुṁsau saṅgheṣṭyāpatayaṁ utpādayetāṁ mamedaṁ mamedaṁ iti ca parigrahāḥ pravṛttāḥ / ītāṁ evāvase na samsāro vānyate / (YD on SK 39cd, p. 229, ll. 4-17).

736 See n. 693 (§V.3).

737 This is supported by the fact that the māhātmyaśarīra’s production of his sons out of pradhāna by thought alone is mentioned by the YD-kāra as an instance of the prākṛta production of physical bodies (see §IV.8, n. 475).

738 LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 60) suggest that this scheme ‘was presumably an ancient way of explaining the manner in which divine realm reproduction differs from natural reproduction’.

739 Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1973, p. 284): ‘The God Brahmā not only creates the worlds, he also creates beings who populate them.’
experience of puruṣas in the phenomenal realm. This agrees with the fact that Brahmā (identified with the māhātmyaśarīra) was born with innate aiśvarya—in other words, with the power to manifest his will in the world by thought alone.

Although, as apparent from the discussion in §V.3, īśvara plays no role in the initial manifestation of the tattvas from pradhāna, it seems that once he has become embodied in the form of the māhātmyaśarīra he has the power to influence the shape taken by this manifestation in the phenomenal realm. This ability, however, is apparently not confined to the māhātmyaśarīra or other deities. The YD also tells us that ‘a single īśvara or yogin has a multitude of bodies due [merely] to the application of desire’. It is perhaps significant in this connection that both gods and yogins are also able to perceive the subtle elements (tanmātra), the non-specific (aviśeṣa) forms of the specific (viśeṣa) elements which compose the phenomenal level of experience. MALINAR (1999) suggests that yogins are able to influence the particular phenomenal configurations of reality precisely because they have attained an insight into the productive nature of the tattvas as principles common (sāmānya) to all particular (viśeṣa) aspects of the phenomenal world:

Insight into the productivity of prakṛti is only ascribed to gods and Yogins. This is one implication of what is designated as aiśvarya. They alone are able to manipulate the common causal potency and to change the arrangement and the formation of the effects, of individual things, without, however, transgressing the scope of ‘natural’, prākṛtic possibilities.

In other words, yogic practice may lead to the same ability, innate in the māhātmyaśarīra, to manifest physical bodies directly out of the productive potential of pradhāna. One suspects that such an ability would be designated by the YD-kāra,
according to the scheme outlined in §IV.8, as vaikṛta aiśvarya—as lordliness deriving from a practice undertaken in the phenomenal (vaikṛta) realm of experience.

Kapila, on the other hand, who was born with innate jñāna, would appear to fulfill the second primary purpose of prakṛti; by disseminating his knowledge of the distinction between prakṛti and puruṣa, he effects the salvation of embodied beings. This interpretation agrees with PARROTT (1990a)’s argument that prakṛti is viewed by the Sāṃkhya texts as ‘a guru who teaches Puruṣa through her skilful means’.  

It seems that Kapila fulfills prakṛti’s role as a guru with regard to all puruṣas.

JACOBSEN (2008) draws a similar conclusion regarding the relative roles of Kapila and Brahmā according to the YD: ‘Here the salvific function—the revelation of knowledge that leads to release—and the world creating function are separated. The first function belongs to Kapila, the second to the body of greatness.’

JACOBSEN contrasts this division in labour between Kapila and Brahmā with the later view of Kapila as an avatāra of Viṣṇu (see §V.5): ‘Polytheism means that the divine functions are divided between several gods. […] Making Kapila an avatāra of Viṣṇu is a development in the direction of monotheism.’ In other words, in the context of the YD, the Sāṃkhya system’s acceptance of a plurality of deities (as different manifestations of the interaction between puruṣa and prakṛti) allows for the two primary purposes of prakṛti—embodiment and salvation—to be fulfilled by two separate figures.

In terms of his innate knowledge, Kapila is effectively assigned a higher status even than Brahmā, which would explain the commentator’s statement that ‘all beings up to Brahmā’ must attain the ‘intended goal’ of (or ‘intended meaning

---

745 PARROTT (1990a), p. 82.
746 JACOBSEN (2008), p. 45. CHAKRAVARTI (1975, pp. 282-283) suggests a similar division in labour, contrasting Kapila’s salvific function to the duties of other deities (interpreted by CHAKRAVARTI as an entire class of māhāmyasarīras).
747 JACOBSEN (2008), p. 49.
Sāṃkhya by means of one of the three primary siddhis, by which the knowledge innate in Kapila is transmitted to later generations. In fact, Kapila is elsewhere said to have been born ‘first’ or ‘chief’ among all (viśvāgraja). This unique soteriological purpose behind Kapila’s manifestation is reflected in the commentator’s expression of homage to Kapila at the beginning of the text:

Homage to the supreme rṣi, the guru whose splendour is equal to the rays of the sun, who is a sun for the deep darkness of saṃsāra.

Kapila, initially born out of the favour (anugraha) of prakṛti, continues to manifest this soteriological tendency through his role as a guru, initiating a tradition of knowledge and becoming an icon and exemplar to which later seekers aspire. In the commentator’s description of the onset of Āsuri’s prākṛtika vairāgya, for example, Āsuri’s esteem for Kapila serves as the initiating factor that leads to his inclination toward knowledge as a result of the anugraha of pradhāna.

Of course, Kapila does not impart his knowledge with a view to self-aggrandizement. The commentator stresses that Kapila’s motivation in disseminating his knowledge has nothing to do with any of the reasons that usually motivate individuals:

[Opponent:] There is no reason for the transmission, on account of the inapplicability of the causes (nimitta) such as merit (dharma). The transmission of the philosophical system (śāstra) for the sake of merit

---

748 See n. 590 (§V.1).
749 See n. 509 (§IV.9).
750 YD on SK 1, p. 8, l. 20; on SK 69, p. 267, l. 14. Although the term viśvāgraja could refer simply to the fact that Kapila was born ‘at the beginning of the universe’, the term agra usually has a connotation of superiority or prominence.
751 rṣaye paramāyārkaṁäricäsamatejase
        samsāragahanaadhvāntastīryāya gurave namah // (YD Intro., p. 1, ll. 5-6). WEZLER (1970, p. 258) notes this passage in his discussion of the deity-like nature of Kapila in Sāṃkhya.
752 YD on SK 43, p. 234, ll. 9-13: ‘But the prākṛtika [conditions] are those like the dispassion of the glorious Āsuri. For his merit, produced due to his esteem for the supreme rṣi, destroyed his impurity, because of being opposed [to it]. When this was destroyed, a stream of purity came forth from prakṛti, favoured by which, having become a mendicant, the desire to know arose in him, due to affliction from the three forms of suffering.’ (prākṛtās tu tadyathā vairāgyaṁ bhagavadāsūreṝḥ / tasya hi paramaryāśambhāvāṁ utpanno dharmo ‘suddhim pratidvandvabhāvāṁ apaja<ghāna> / tasyāṁ apaḥtāyāṁ prakṛteḥ suddhisrotah pravṛttam yenānugṛho duhkhatrayābhīghāṁ utpaññajīfāṁ pravrajitaḥ /).
(dharma) is not applicable to the supreme ṛṣi, on account of [his] non-attachment to the results [of merit]. It is not for the sake of profit (artha) or pleasure (kāma), on account of the contingency of the neglect of pupils. It is not for the sake of liberation (mokṣa), on account of the attainment of that from innate knowledge (sāmsiddhika jñāna) itself. It is not for the sake of the opposites of these [potential causes], because this is impossible. Consequently, the teacher (acārya) imparted the treasure of the philosophical system (śāstra) for no reason.

[Proponent:] It was not for no reason. Rather, he imparted it out of compassion (anukampā). Seeing Āsuri being oppressed by the personal, divine, and external pains (duḥkha), ascertaining the non-functioning of the pains (duḥkha) in himself, who was endowed with a psycho-physical body (kāryakaraṇa), due to the power of knowledge (jñāna), and [ascertaining] the virtues of his disciple, [thinking] ‘How can Āsuri, and other people by way of him, have the same equanimity that I have with regard to pleasure (sukha) and pain (duḥkha) due to the presence of knowledge (jñāna)?’, the glorious supreme ṛṣi thus declared the philosophical system (śāstra) out of compassion (anukampā).

Once the Sāṃkhya śāstra has thus been manifested by Kapila out of compassion, it continues to effect ‘the anugraha of everyone’ through the explication of its categories by later Sāṃkhya teachers such as Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the YD-kāra. Kapila’s original śāstra continues to serve as the ideal prototype of the system and the ultimate source of authority for Sāṃkhya teachers. However, as discussed in §V.2-3, it is apparently also possible for other ṛṣis to access this śāstra independently through mental reflection (ūha), through an extraordinary capacity inherent in ṛsis, or possibly as a result of their progressive practice of yogic

753 The significance of the phrase nārthakāmārthaṃ śīṣyānāṃ anāyāsaprasaṅgat is unclear, but it most likely implies that Kapila would be neglectful of pupils if he was motivated by profit and pleasure. Alternatively, it might mean that pupils would be neglectful (i.e., not willing to study with Kapila) if they had to pay for it.

754 āha: sampradānasyākasmikitvam dharmaṁ mārthaḥ śīṣyānāṃ aṅgān āparradānam ud-padyate phalenānabhiṣvargat / nārthakāmārthaṃ śīṣyānāṃ anāyāsaprasaṅgat / na mokṣānām sāṃsiddhikenaiva jñānena tatprāptah / na tadviparītaṁ asambhavāt / pareṇa akṣamādy ācāryaḥ śāstranidhiḥ āṇam pradadāt iti / ucyate: na akṣamāt kim tarhi anukampayā pradadau / ādyātmikādīvi kādhakāhautikār duḥkhaḥ pāyanām āsūryām upalabhyām / svātmani ca jñānasāmarthyāt satī kāryakaraṇasamprayogyāh dekkhānām apravyṛtān pariṣṭhitāḥ śīṣyagunanāṃ ca, kathāṃ nāma yathā māma sukhāduḥkheṣu jñānaprāṇām śāmyām evam āsūryām api syat, tadāvadyānāyām api puruṣānām <īty> evam anukampayā bhagavān paramarṣiḥ śāstram ākhyātavān / (YD on SK 70ab, p. 268, l. 20 – p. 269, l. 3).

755 See n. 331 (§IV.2); cf. nn. 595, 604, 609 (§V.2).

756 See n. 590 (§V.1) and n. 609 (§V.2).
discipline. This would not invalidate the significance of Kapila’s original manifestation of the śāstra, but would rather confirm the universality of that śāstra.

Assuming that these conclusions are valid, there remains an interpretative problem with regard to the position of the puruṣa with which Kapila is associated. To return to the cinema image: is there a liberated puruṣa behind Kapila still in the audience, watching the film projected by prakṛti for the benefit of other puruṣas? Or, perhaps, is Kapila without his own particular puruṣa but rather projected onto the screen for the benefit of all puruṣas?

As discussed in §V.3, there is some evidence to suggest that Kapila might be considered an embodiment of īśvara. The soteriological conception of Kapila apparent in the YD would be compatible with the VBh’s reference to ‘the anugraha of beings’ as the motivation behind īśvara’s embodiment as Kapila. The fact that, according to the YD, Kapila is manifested from pradhāna in the same manner as Brahmā, who is considered an embodiment of īśvara, might suggest that Kapila is regarded as a similar embodiment.

On the other hand, given the veneration with which Kapila is treated in the YD, if he were considered an embodiment of īśvara, one would expect the commentator to make this explicit. Moreover, as we have seen, Kapila’s manifestation is explicitly associated only with the soteriological purpose of prakṛti, which is directed towards all beings except for Kapila. It thus seems plausible that Kapila, the bearer of a primordial Sāṃkhya śāstra, is considered a direct manifestation of prakṛti in its primordial, universal aspect, before the activity of prakṛti becomes differentiated according to the intellectual conditions (bhāva) associated with particular puruṣas. In other words, in a postmodern twist, the

---

757 See n. 675 (§V.3).
director makes an appearance in his own film in order to remind the other characters of the fact that it is only a film.

§5. The soteriological role of Kapila in the *Yuktidīpikā*, in relation to the other classical Sāṃkhya commentaries.

This view of the nature of Kapila and the role of his knowledge in relation to subsequent Sāṃkhya tradition is unique among the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries examined in this study. The relative terseness of these other commentaries, especially with regard to the issues surrounding doctrinal authority, would make it difficult to determine whether they assume a similar view of the origination and transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine. Moreover, as the comparison of these texts in Chapter IV has made clear, the YD’s views generally bear little relation to those of the other commentaries. However, a few major points of difference can be observed, which make it possible to offer some tentative conclusions with regard to the place of the YD’s views in the context of the historical development of the Sāṃkhya school.

In order to provide some context for this discussion, a few words must first be said about the origins of the figure of Kapila. JACOBSEN (2008) presents a comprehensive discussion of the history of the occurrences of Kapila in Sanskrit literature. The earliest text to refer extensively to a ṛṣi (or ṛṣis) called Kapila is the MBh. JACOBSEN argues that ‘several Kapilas’ are mentioned in the MBh, and

---

758 There is nothing in the YD to suggest that the commentator was familiar with the earlier GBh, and it is my general feeling that the YD-kāra was unaware of the commentarial tradition of which both GBh and MV are representative. The MV likewise does not explicitly refer to the views of the YD. Similarly, although, as LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, pp. 227-228) observe, Vācaspati appears to quote directly from the YD on one occasion (TK on SK 72, p. 173, ll. 16-17; cf. n. 604, §V.2), he does not appear to make use of the YD’s views in his interpretation of the SK.

identifies two distinct Kapila figures in particular, representing two different forms of ascetic tradition:761

The contradictory natures of these two Kapilas may be considered evidence of the existence of two different Kapila figures, one a Vedic ascetic and one influenced by Śramaṇa ideas, or they may represent two stages in the history of Kapila, beginning as a Vedic ascetic and thereafter being appropriated by ascetics who had adopted Śramaṇa values. If any of these should be thought of as the Śāṃkhya Kapila is not clear.762

In some respects, the Kapila associated with non-Vedic asceticism seems to most obviously prefigure the Śāṃkhya Kapila.763 In the MBh, this Kapila rejects the authority of śāstra in favour of first-hand experience.764 This can be compared to the classical Śāṃkhya rejection of scriptural (ānuśravika) means to liberation.765

Similarly, in the Baudhāyanadharmasūtra (BDhS), Kapila is presented as a demon (asura) and founder of the ascetic stages of life (āśrama)—in other words, as an opponent of the Vedic tradition.766 BRONKHORST (2007) cites this BDhS passage as evidence for his argument that Kapila was originally a deity associated with the

761 JACOBSEN (2008, pp. 13-16) cites the episode in which Kapila destroys the sons of King Sagara in MBh 3.3.104-8, and suggests that this Kapila represents the Vedic tradition of asceticism ‘associated with tapas; with the acquisition of powers and immense feats of asceticism’ (pp. 22-23), in contrast to the Kapila who converses with Sūmaraśmi in the form of a cow in MBh 12.260-62 (see JACOBSEN, pp. 16-18), who represents a tradition that ‘belonged to a different world-view, a world-view that emphasised karma, samsāra, punarbhava, and mokṣa’ (pp. 22-23).

763 Similarly, JACOBSEN (1998, p. 85) concludes: ‘Judging from the content of Śāṃkhya and Yoga, it seems probable that its founder was similar in many ways to the Buddha or Mahāvīra. He was an extraordinary human being, who by himself realized the form of liberation that could be attained by oneself by means of discriminative knowledge.’

764 MBh 12.260.17: ‘If you see anything perceptible here that is considered superior to non-violence, besides treatises on doctrine, speak it.’ (yad atra kīṃcit pratyākṣam ahiṃsāyāḥ param matam / rte tv āgamasāstrebrhyo brūhi tad yādi paśyasi //).

765 Sk 2ab: ‘The scriptural [means] are like the perceptible, for they are connected with impurity, decay, and excess.’ (dṛṣṭavād ānuśravikāh sa hy aviśuddhikṣayātikṣayuktah).

766 BDhS 2.11.27-28 (Olivelle’s translation): ‘There is, however, only a single order of life, the teachers maintain, because no offspring is produced in the others. With respect to the above position they cite this: “There was once a demon named Kapila, the son of Prahlāda. It was he who created these divisions in his campaign against the gods. No wise man should pay any heed to them.” ’ (ekāśramyaṁ tv acāryā aprajāntavāḥ itaresāṁ // tatraḥdarantī prahlādir ha vai kapilo nāṃdāsura āśa / sa etān bhedāṁ cakārā devaḥ saha spardhamānaḥ / tān māṇiṣī nādīryet //). JACOBSEN (2008, p. 12) notes the anti-ritual nature of Kapila in this passage. As noted by both BRONKHORST (2007, p. 68) and JACOBSEN (2008, p. 12), Kapila is also associated with the founding of renunciatory practices in Baudhāyanagṛhivasūtra 4.17.
ascetic traditions of the region of ‘Greater Magadha’—traditions which, BRONKHORST argues, originated outside of the Vedic milieu.

As discussed by both BRONKHORST and JACOBSEN, Kapila is associated with a variety of deities in the MBh, including Viṣṇu, Śiva, Prajāpati and Viriñca. He is also mentioned in a passage of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad (ŚU)—identified by BRONKHORST as ‘perhaps the earliest reference to “the seer Kapila” ’—in which he appears to be associated with Hiranyakarbh and Rudra. JACOBSEN suggests that this early association ‘may perhaps have contributed to the later divinization of Kapila and to the Śaṃkhya perception of him having been created at the beginning of each cycle of creation’. BRONKHORST, on the other hand, argues that Kapila was considered a deity even prior his appearance in the ŚU.

While the divine associations of Kapila are apparent from early in the tradition, the development of the figure is not straightforward, as JACOBSEN’s study makes clear. Not only is Kapila associated with various deities and presented as a non-Vedic ascetic, as BRONKHORST emphasizes, but he also occurs as a Vedic-style

---

767 BRONKHORST (2007), pp. 61-68.
768 BRONKHORST (2007), p. 28: ‘There can be no doubt that the early Jaina and Brahmanical texts examined here describe forms of asceticism which are based on some shared assumptions. These assumptions were not part of the Brahmanical heritage. No, they should be considered as having been current in the spiritual culture of Greater Magadha, before they came to exert an influence on texts that present themselves as belonging to the Brahmanical tradition.’
771 ŚU 5.1-2 (Olivelle’s translation): ‘Two things, knowledge and ignorance, are set down in the imperishable and infinite fort of brahman, where they lie hidden. Now, ignorance is the perishable and knowledge is the immortal. But the one who rules over both knowledge and ignorance is another—who alone presides over womb after womb, and thus over all visible forms and all the sources of birth; who in the beginning carried this Kapila born of the seer together with his body of knowledge and would look on him as he was being born.’ (dve aksare brahmapure tv anante vidyāvidyā nihite yatra gādhe /kṣaraṁ tv avidyā hy amṛtam tu vidyā vidyāvidyā lśate yas tu so ’nyāḥ // yo yonim yonim adhitisñhaty eko viśvāni rūpāni yonīṣ ca sarvāḥ / ṛṣiprasūtaṁ kapilam yas tam agre jñānaṁ bibharti jāyamānanma ca paśyet //). Olivelle (ŚU, p. 625, n. 2) suggests that this may be a reference to the Śaṃkhya Kapila in particular.
773 BRONKHORST (2007), p. 63: ‘Modern interpreters have no infrequently preferred the translation “tawny, red” to “Kapila”, because comparison with other verses of the Upaniṣad (3.4; 4.11-12) shows that this seer Kapila must be identical with Hiranyakarbh and linked to Rudra. This identity poses no problem the moment we abandon the idea that Kapila ever was an ordinary human being.’
ascetic\textsuperscript{774} and even a Vedic ṛṣi. As JACOBSEN observes, Kapila does not usually appear in the traditional lists of seven ṛśis, although he does appear in such a list in the MBh:\textsuperscript{775}

Sana, Sanatsujāta, Sanaka, together with Sanandana, Sanatkumāra, Kapila, and the seventh, Saṅkata—these seven ṛśis are declared the mental sons of Brāhma, whose discrimination (vijñāna) has come of its own accord, who dwell in the renunciatory (nivṛttta) dharma.\textsuperscript{776}

The association of Kapila with renunciation in this verse conforms with his portrayal elsewhere as an ascetic associated with śramaṇa ideals, while the mention of discrimination (vijñāna) recalls the primary objective of the Śāṅkhya system: ‘discrimination between the manifest, the unmanifest and the knower’ (vyaktāvyaktajñavijñāna).\textsuperscript{777} Nevertheless, the fact that Kapila is presented in this verse as a ṛṣi and a son of Brāhma reflects a degree of assimilation into the Vedic world-view.\textsuperscript{778} As JACOBSEN suggests,\textsuperscript{779} the statement that Kapila’s discrimination ‘has come of its own accord’ seems to prefigure the classical Śāṅkhya view that Kapila was born with innate (sāṁsiddhika) knowledge.\textsuperscript{780} In other words, according to this conception, Kapila and his knowledge are part of a top-down process of manifestation, rather than a bottom-up pursuit of liberation (through individual ascetic practice and first-hand experience). These two dynamics apparent in the references to Kapila in the early literature seem to anticipate an apparent

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{774} See n. 761 above. BRONKHORST (2007, pp. 64-65), on the other hand, presents the Kapila and King Sagara episode as support for the view that Kapila was originally considered a demon opposed to the Brāhmaṇical tradition (cf. n. 766 above).
  \item \textsuperscript{775} JACOBSEN (2008), p. 18.
  \item \textsuperscript{776} sanah sanatkujātaś ca sanakaḥ sasanandanaḥ / sanatkumāraḥ kapilah saṁtamaś ca sanātanaḥ // saptai te mānasah prakātā rṣayo brahmaṇaḥ sutāḥ / svayamāgatavijñānā nivṛttah dharmam āsthitā // (MBh 12.327.64-65).
  \item \textsuperscript{777} SK 2d; see §II.3.
  \item \textsuperscript{778} LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 112) suggest that ‘what might be called the uprading of Kapila to the status of Hiranyakarṣikesha or one or another mythological figure (Agni, Rudra, Śiva, and so forth) together with efforts to list Kapila, Āsuri, and other Śāṅkhya teachers in enumerations of the “great seers” in the epic and Purāṇic literature may be taken as further attempts to establish a proper lineage for the Śāṅkhya philosophy.’
  \item \textsuperscript{779} JACOBSEN (2008), pp. 18-19.
  \item \textsuperscript{780} Cf. nn. 453, 458, 462, 476 (§IV.8).
\end{itemize}
contradiction in classical Sāṃkhya between, on the one hand, the rejection of Vedic scripture and emphasis on a bottom-up inferential process, and on the other hand, the importance of Kapila’s original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine and the top-down dissemination of this doctrine.

The evidence of the YD alone, among the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries, suggests a resolution to this contradiction. The YD-kāra makes an effort to reconcile Sāṃkhya doctrine with the Vedas and to acknowledge their authority (§V.1). In addition, he seems to emulate the model of Vedic revelation in his conception of the production and transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine (§V.2). According to this conception, Kapila’s initial articulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine represents the manifestation of a universal, primordial Sāṃkhya śāstra. This original śāstra remains the primary point of reference for later Sāṃkhya teachers, assisting later generations in the inferential process by which Sāṃkhya knowledge is attained, although some extraordinary individuals may also be able to attain this knowledge independently. The evidence of the YD thus suggests that the concept of authoritative testimony (āptavacana) holds more value in classical Sāṃkhya than has been generally assumed. 781

The complexity of the picture of Kapila’s development presented by the early texts is echoed in a survey of his occurrences in the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries. Although, speaking generally, the commentators stress the significance of Kapila’s original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine, and as BRONKhorst observes, ‘Kapila’s divine nature may [...] be taken as established for

781 Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1973), p. 274: ‘The acceptance of trustworthy communication which includes the holy tradition is a later concession to a growing Brāhmaṇa orthodoxy and is for the system practically unimportant.’ Similarly, LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 29: ‘Sāṃkhya had never denied reliable testimony (āptavacana or śruti) as a legitimate and important means of knowing, but Sāṃkhya clearly gave pride of place in knowing to independent reasoning.’
classical Sāṃkhya’, the commentators’ views on the precise origin and nature of Kapila vary. As discussed in §IV.8, the GBh, YD, MV, and TK agree that Kapila was born with innate (sāṃsidhika) merit, knowledge, dispassion, and lordliness. The SK itself states that Kapila transmitted his knowledge out of compassion (anukampā) to Āsuri, and that this knowledge was then passed down to Īśvarakṛṣṇa through a succession of disciples. Beyond these points of agreement, a distinct development can be traced in the commentaries, whereby Kapila’s status has changed over time.

Although the GBh specifies that only Kapila was born with innate sāttvika bhāvas, while the four sons of Brahmā—Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, and Sanatkumāra’ were endowed with sāttvika bhāvas ‘deriving from Materiality’ (prākṛta) at sixteen years of age, elsewhere Gauḍapāda groups Kapila among the sons of Brahmā and quotes a verse similar to the MBh passage mentioned above:

In this world, there was a glorious son of Brahmā named Kapila, as here follows: ‘Sanaka, Sanandana, and the third, Sanātana, Āsuri, Kapila, Voḍhu, and Pañcaśikha—These seven great rṣis have been declared the sons of Brahmā.’

---

782 BRONKHORST (2007), p. 62. Similarly, WEZLER (1970, p. 257) observes that ‘the deification of Kapila, adequately testified in epic and purāṇic sources, was also a prevalent mythological view of the Sāṃkhya authors’ (‘die in epischen und purānischen Quellen hinlänglich bezeugte Deifizierung Kapila’s auch geltende mythologische Anschauung der Sāṃkhya-Autoren war’).

783 JACOBSEN (2008, pp. 32-33) observes: ‘Most commentaries agree that Kapila passed his teaching on to Āsuri, but they offer different versions of Kapila’s origin and nature. One gets the impression that each commentary had to add a new detail or an original interpretation to the body of knowledge regarding the nature and origin of Kapila as part of its general interpretative contribution. There is, in fact, a remarkable variety in the speculations about Kapila in the Sāṃkhya-kārikā commentaries.’

784 See nn. 453, 458, 462, 476 (§IV.8).

785 JACOBSEN (2008, p. 18-19) notes this point of continuity between the MBh and GBh.

786 See nn. 453, 455 (§IV.8).

787 iha bhagavān brahmasutaḥ kapilo nāma / tadyathā— sanakaś ca sanandaṇaś ca tṛtiyāś ca sanātanaḥ / āsuriḥ kapilāś caiva voḍhūḥ pañcaśikhas tathāḥ / ity ete brahmanāḥ putrāḥ sapta prakāṭa mahārāṣṭrayāḥ // (GBh on SK 1, p. 35, ll. 13-17).
Āsuri and Pañcaśikha are well-known as early Sāṃkhya teachers. Their assimilation (and perhaps that of Voḍhu) into this list of seven rṣis probably reflects an attempt to further legitimize the lineage of Sāṃkhya teachers within the framework of the Brāhmaṇical tradition. However, at no point does Gauḍapāda elevate Kapila above the ontological status of other rṣis, nor does he associate Kapila with any deity.

As discussed in §V.3-4, the YD elevates Kapila above the status of Brahmā’s sons and grandsons, placing him on a par with Brahmā in terms of the circumstances of his birth. Both Kapila and Brahmā were manifested out of the favour (anugraha) of primordial Materiality at the time of the first creation, before the onset of the cycle of transmigration (samsāra). Moreover, as discussed in §IV.10, the YD is unique among the Sāṃkhya commentaries in its clear conception of the relationship between the paradigms of the bhāvas and the pratyayasarga. According to this relationship, Kapila is unique in being exempt from the need to attain the condition of knowledge (jñāna) through one of the three primary attainments (siddhis), through which all other beings ‘up to Brahmā’ must attain Sāṃkhya knowledge. This suggests that Kapila is also elevated above other rṣis (perhaps Brahmā’s sons), who seem to be associated with the attainment of knowledge through reflection (ūha). Kapila thus fulfills a unique soteriological role according to the YD. He appears to represent a direct manifestation of prakṛti’s soteriological tendency for the benefit of other beings (§V.4), though it is not clear whether he might be also considered an embodiment of īśvara (§V.3).

789 As far as I am aware, Voḍhu does not appear elsewhere either as a Sāṃkhya teacher or in the usual lists of seven rṣis.
790 See n. 693 (§V.3) and nn. 730, 735 (§V.4).
791 See n. 509 (§IV.9) and n. 569 (§IV.10).
792 See nn. 507, 508, 510 (§IV.9).
It is possible that the YD’s view of Kapila’s origin represents a deliberate attempt to elevate Kapila beyond his earlier status as one of Brahmā’s sons, as attested by the GBh, although the YD does not otherwise seem to be aware of the views expressed by the GBh. Alternatively, given the commentator’s apparent familiarity with the views of Śaṅkhya teachers prior to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, especially in connection with mythological subject matter, the evidence of the YD might reflect an earlier conception of the nature and role of Kapila. It is also possible that the YD’s presentation of Kapila somehow anticipates his later elevation to the status of an incarnation of Viṣṇu in later Śaṅkhya and Yoga texts.

As mentioned in §V.3, VBh 1.25 presents Kapila as an incarnation of īśvara, while the MV refers to īśvara as ‘the light of Kapila’ and relates a mythological account of the birth of Kapila as an incarnation of the ‘ancient puruṣa’ (purāṇapurūṣa). The term purāṇapurūṣa is a common epithet of Viṣṇu. As JACOBSEN (2008) observes, this account of Kapila’s birth is unique among the classical commentaries on the SK: ‘The fact that Kapila was considered the son of Devahūti and Kardama is in accordance with the Bhāgavatapurāṇa but this is not stated in the early Śaṅkhya commentaries.’ JACOBSEN takes this fact, along with a reference by Māthara to Viṣṇu’s incarnation as Kalki, as evidence of the text’s late date, citing the dates for the text proposed by LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987) as ‘anywhere from the ninth century onward’. With regard to its

---

793 Cf. the YD’s discussion of the views of Pañcādhikaraṇa and Vindhyavāsin on the bhāvas (§IV.8, nn. 465, 466) and OBERHAMMER (1961)’s discussion of the YD’s quotations (arguably) from the Śaṣṭītantra (CHAPTER III).
794 This possibility might be supported by Vācaspati’s attribution of the passage quoted by VBh 1.25 (see §V.3, n. 675) to Pañcaśikha.
795 See n. 675 (§V.3).
796 See n. 684 (§V.3).
797 See n. 686 (§V.3).
798 JACOBSEN (2008), p. 34.
799 kalkī bhavisyatī bhāvivastugrāhini / (MV on SK 33, p. 50, l. 4).
800 JACOBSEN (2008), p. 34.
identification of Kapila with Viṣṇu, the MV differs most noticeably from the GBh, with which it otherwise generally agrees, as apparent in the discussion of these texts in CHAPTER IV.

As JACOBSEN also observes, Vācaspati’s TV, also a late text, similarly refers to Kapila as an incarnation of Viṣṇu in its commentary on VBh 1.25:

It is taught that Kapila attained knowledge (jñāna) as he was being born, due simply to the favour (anugraha) of the great Lord (maheśvara). By the name Kapila he is known as a particular incarnation (avatāra) of Viṣṇu.

While in the YD Kapila’s birth (and by extension the production of his knowledge) is said to be due to the anugraha of pradhāna, the TV suggests that this was due rather to the anugraha of Viṣṇu.

In the TK, Vācaspati echoes VBh 1.25 by referring to Kapila as ‘the first knower’ (ādividvas) but does not suggest that Kapila was an incarnation of Viṣṇu. Rather, the TK’s discussion of the applicability of authoritative testimony (āptavacana) to Kapila suggests that Kapila’s knowledge was the result not of any anugraha, but of his experience in past incarnations:

There is a possibility that at the beginning of an age (kalpa), Kapila, the first knower, has a remembrance of the revelation (śruti) learned during previous ages, just as one awakened from sleep has a [remembrance] of things learned on the previous day.

This passage suggests that Kapila’s inherent authoritative status is not the result of a soteriological inclination on the part of any deity (or of pradhāna, as in the YD), but rather the result of his own study of śruti in previous incarnations.

802 JACOBSEN (2008), pp. 35-36.
803 kapilasyāpi jāyamāṇasya maheśvarānugrahād eva jñānaprāptih śrūyata iti / kapila nāma viṣṇor avatāraviśeṣaḥ prasiddhah / (TV on VBh 1.25, p. 78, ll. 22-23).
804 Cf. nn. 458, 459 (§ IV.8); 693 (§ V.3).
805 TK on SK 5, p. 27, l. 22 (see n. 806 below) and TK on SK 43, p. 128, ll. 3-4: sargādāv ādividvān atrabhagavān kapilo mahāmuniḥ dharmaḥśrūyata eva pravṛttah / (TV on VBh 1.25, p. 78, ll. 22-23).
806 ādividvasaḥ ca kapilasya kalpādau kalpāntarādhitōśrūyata eva śrūyata eva / (TK on SK 5, p. 27, ll. 22-23).
While it is thus apparent that the view of Kapila as an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu was not firmly established by Vācaspati’s time, the MV and TV testify that it was beginning to be acknowledged by Śāmkhya authors. With regard to the reason for this development, JACOBSEN suggests: ‘The fact that Kapila was accepted as an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu in these texts probably means that the Śāmkhya tradition had lost much of its independence by the ninth century.’\(^{807}\) Similarly, WEZLER (1970) suggests that while Kapila had occasionally been identified with Viṣṇu since the time of the MBh, the Śāmkhya acceptance of this view must have been due to the influence of the Vaiṣṇavas upon the school.\(^{808}\)

There is no evidence in the YD to suggest an identification of Kapila with Viṣṇu,\(^{809}\) although the commentator presents a similar paradigm for the production of Kapila and his knowledge—due to the *anugraha* of *pradhāna* rather than of Viṣṇu. We can probably say that the YD represents a transitional stage in the Śāmkhya conception of the nature of Kapila. He has been given a key soteriological role in the Śāmkhya system and has been elevated in status beyond other *ṛṣis*, but he has not yet come to be considered an incarnation of Viṣṇu and thereby ultimately to become secondary in importance to Viṣṇu himself. While the YD shows various signs of an effort to integrate both Śāmkhya doctrine and the lineage of Śāmkhya teachers into the framework of the broader Brāhmaṇical tradition, it does not yet show signs of the influence of Vaiṣṇavism.

With regard to the possible influence of the YD upon the later classical Śāmkhya texts, this appears to have been minimal. Although, as LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987) observe,\(^{810}\) Vācaspati appears to quote directly from the YD

---

\(^{807}\) JACOBSEN (2008), p. 36.
\(^{809}\) Rather, as discussed in §V.3, all references to major deities seem to be to either Brahmā or Śiva.
on one occasion,\(^{811}\) he does not seem to make much use of the YD’s views in his interpretation of the SK. The TK’s interpretation of the viṣṇa and avīṣṇa inferences, for example, testifies to a lack of understanding of their original significance as attested by the YD.\(^{812}\) Although the MV does not display any explicit familiarity with the YD’s views, it does contain some statements reminiscent of these views. Māṭhara refers to those for whom ‘the qualities [of things] are placed [directly] before the eyes’ (sākṣātkṛtadharman) in his definition of authoritative individuals (āpta).\(^{813}\) He also accepts five of the ten members (avayava) of inference accepted by the YD.\(^{814}\) Like the YD (in the opening verses of the text), SK 73 (added to the text by the MV) refers to the SK as ‘an image in a mirror’ of an earlier tantra.\(^{815}\) It is possible that the YD and MV were influenced by the same trends of interpretation in some respects, but Māṭhara does not appear to have been aware of the YD itself.

The YD’s view that Kapila was born due to the anugraha of prakṛti is probably related to the evidently old conception of prakṛti’s ability to manifest itself in ‘streams’ (srotas, abhisyanda) flowing directly into the phenomenal sphere of experience (see §IV.8-10; V.4).\(^{816}\) This view is apparent nowhere else in the classical Sāṃkhya texts. It is possible that the VBh’s view that Kapila was born out of the anugraha of iśvara is somehow related to the YD’s use of anugraha, and that Vācaspati’s interpretation of the VBh passage represents an adaptation of this concept to the context of Vaiṣṇava soteriology. Otherwise, though, the YD’s view of

\(^{811}\) TK on SK 72, p. 173, ll. 16-17; cf. n. 604, §V.2.
\(^{812}\) See nn. 334, 344, 345, 348, 349 (§IV.2).
\(^{813}\) See n. 358 (§IV.3).
\(^{814}\) See nn. 320, 322, 324 (§IV.2).
\(^{815}\) See nn. 609, 610 (§V.2).
\(^{816}\) The abhisyandika form of the condition of jñāna is attributed to the early Sāṃkhya teacher Pañcādhikaraṇa (see §IV.8, n. 465), while the passage relating the māhāmyaśaritra’s production of streams (srotas) from pradhāna is attributed to a sāstra (see §IV.9, n. 484), perhaps to be identified as the Śaṣṭitantra, as argued by OBERHAMMER (1961, pp. 135-138).
the origin of Kapila and his role in the formulation and transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine seems to have been lost to later Sāṃkhya authors.
CHAPTER VI: Conclusion.

This study has demonstrated that, according to the YD, ordinary seekers of liberation are generally considered to be dependent upon the Sāṃkhya tradition initiated by the ṛṣi Kapila for the attainment of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya tattvas. The author of the YD appears to emulate the model of Vedic revelation in his conception of the origination and transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine. According to this conception, Kapila’s initial articulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine represents the manifestation of a universal, primordial Sāṃkhya śāstra. This original śāstra remains the primary point of reference for later Sāṃkhya teachers, assisting later generations in the inferential process by which Sāṃkhya knowledge is attained. Some extraordinary individuals may also be able to attain this knowledge independently, either as the result of yogic practice or through a faculty of reflection (ūha) attributed to ṛsis. This fact does not contradict the authority of Kapila’s original Sāṃkhya śāstra but rather affirms the universality of that śāstra.

The evidence of the YD thus suggests that the concept of authoritative testimony (āptavacana) holds more value in classical Sāṃkhya than has been generally assumed. The text’s definition of āptavacana allows for the maintenance of the tradition of Sāṃkhya texts and teachers. Inference (anumāna), which is used to logically prove the existence of the Sāṃkhya tattvas, is viewed by the author of the YD not as an independent means to Sāṃkhya knowledge, but rather as a formal tool for the exposition of Sāṃkhya śāstra to ordinary seekers.

The YD views Kapila as a direct manifestation of the soteriological tendency of primordial Materiality (pradhāna), produced at the beginning of the process of
creation, with innate knowledge of the Sāṃkhya tattvas. Kapila serves as initiator of the Sāṃkhya tradition and as an exemplar to which later seekers aspire. He thus effects the favour (anugraha) of all embodied puruṣas on behalf of prakṛti.

The comparison of the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries in CHAPTER IV has demonstrated that the evidence of the YD resolves several interpretative issues which remain obscure in the other commentaries. These include not only the role of āptavacana in relation to the production of Sāṃkhya knowledge, but also the relationship between the conditions (bhāva) and the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga), and the nature of the various modes of production of the condition of knowledge (jñāna). The discussions in CHAPTER V have shown that the YD represents a transitional stage in the conception of Kapila in the classical Sāṃkhya tradition. In the YD, Kapila has been given a key soteriological role in the Sāṃkhya system and has been elevated in status beyond other rṣis and even major deities, but he has not yet come to be identified as an incarnation (avatāra) of Viṣṇu as attested in the later MV and TV.

The evidence presented in the course of this study suggests several avenues of further inquiry into the significance of the YD’s views of Kapila and of the production and transmission of knowledge. The relation of these views to earlier, proto-Sāṃkhya and pre-classical Sāṃkhya views, especially as reconstructed from portions of the MBh and the YD’s references to earlier Sāṃkhya authors, deserves a separate study.817 For instance, it has been beyond the scope of this study to determine whether a connection exists between the YD’s notion of the anugraha of prakṛti and the early Sāṃkhya concept of the anugrahasarga, which, OBERHAMMER

817 On the work done by previous scholars on the reconstruction of early Sāṃkhya views, see n. 2 (CHAPTER I).
(1961) suggests, was introduced into Sāṃkhya in the Șaṣṭiṭantra.\textsuperscript{818} The anugrahasarga, OBERHAMMER notes, also occurs in several Purāṇas.\textsuperscript{819} An examination of this and other Sāṃkhya ideas found in the Purāṇas and other non-technical Sāṃkhya texts contemporary with the YD may serve to clarify the sources of the YD’s portrayal of Kapila and other figures of cosmological prominence. Likewise, a consideration of the relation of the YD’s views to later, post-classical Sāṃkhya texts might prove fruitful.

The apparent influence of the Grammarian (vyākaraṇa) tradition on the author of the YD could become the focus of a significant study.\textsuperscript{820} More generally, the evidence of the YD provides an insight into the process by which the disparate philosophical views of various schools have come to be integrated within the broader Brāhmaṇical tradition. In particular, the conclusions drawn in this study may contribute to our understanding of general assumptions in the tradition with regard to the nature of the knowledge of ṛṣis and other supernormal forms of knowledge,\textsuperscript{821} and with regard to the primordial origination of śāstra.\textsuperscript{822} The manner in which these assumptions have influenced the YD’s views provides a particularly striking case in point, given the generally assumed emphasis in Sāṃkhya upon logical thought rather than tradition.

\textsuperscript{818} OBERHAMMER (1961), p. 163.
\textsuperscript{819} Ibid., pp. 152-156.
\textsuperscript{820} Cf. nn. 312 (§IV.1); 364 (§IV.3); 590 (§V.1); 616, 620 (§V.2). MOTEGI (2006, p. 54) likewise suggests that this aspect of the YD deserves further study.
\textsuperscript{821} See the reviews of WEZLER (2001) and AKLJIKAR (2009) in CHAPTER III.
\textsuperscript{822} See the review of POLLOCK (1985) in CHAPTER III.
ABBREVIATIONS

References are made to the following editions, unless otherwise noted:

BDhS = Baudhāyanadhartamasūtra (2000)
GBh = Gaudapādabhāṣya (1972)
MBh = Mahābhārata (1999)
MV = Māṭharavṛtti (1922)
NS = Nyāyasūtra (1986)
NSBh = Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya (1986)
NU = Nirukta (1998)
SK = Sāṃkhyakārikā (1979)
SSV = Sāṃkhyasaptatvṛtti
ŚU = Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad (1998)
SV = Sāṃkhyavr̥tti (1978)
SVS = Suvarṇasaptati
TK = Tattvakaumudī (2004)
TV = Tattvavaiśāradī (1971)
Vbh = Vyāsabhāṣya (1971)
VP = Vākyapadīya (1966)
VPV = Vākyapadiyavr̥tti (1966)
VS = Vaiśeṣikasūtra (1975)
YD = Yuktidīpiṣā (1998)
YS = Yogasūtra (1971)
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Gauḍapādabhāṣya (1972). Sāṃkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with the commentary of Gauḍapāda. Translated by Dr. T.G. Mainkar. Poona.


(Reprint: Delhi, 2006).


*Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* (1986). See NS.


PARROTT, R.J. (1986). ‘The problem of the Sāṃkhya tattvas as both cosmic and psychological phenomena.’ In: Journal of Indian Philosophy 14: 55-78.


Sāṃkhya-kārikā (1979). See LARSON (1979), Appendix B.

Sāṃkhya-kārikā (1998). See YD, Appendix II.


Sāṃkhya-vṛttiḥ (1978). Edited by Naomichi Nakada under the guidance of Prof. Dr. V.V. Gokhale. Tokyo.

Translated by M.N. Dutt. Edited and Revised by Dr. Ishwar Chandra Sharma and Dr. O.N. Bimali. Delhi (2nd revised edition).


Tattvavaiśāradī (1971). See YS.


Vākyapadīyavṛtti (1966). See VP.


Vyāsabhāṣya (1971). See YS.


Kāśīhīrviśvavidyālayasya kalā-saṃkāye saṃskṛtvibhāge ‘dhyāpakena śrīnāraṇaṃśreṇa tippanipariśīṭādibhiḥ saha sampāditam. Vārāṇasī.


Yuktidīpikā (1982). Sāṅkhyaśāstra (With Tatwa Prabhā Saṅskrit and Hindi Commentary by Dr. R.S. Tripāthi and Yuktidīpikā Vivṛti by unknown author) of Īśwar Kṛṣṇa. Edited by Dr. R.S. Tripathi. Varanasi.

Yuktidīpikā (1990-1992). Two volumes. Translated by Dr. Shiv Kumar and Dr. D.N. Bhargava. Delhi.

Yuktidīpikā (1998). The most significant Commentary on the Sāṅkhyaśāstra.