

Sacred Matter: Reflections on the Relationship of Karmic and Natural Causality in Jaina Philosophy

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Abstract The article examines a fundamental problem in classical Jaina philosophy, namely, the ontological status of dead matter in the hylozoistic and at the same time dualistic Jaina worldview. This question is of particular interest in view of the widespread contemporary Jaina practice of venerating bone relics and stūpas of prominent saints. The main argument proposed in this article is, that, from a classical doctrinal point of view, bone relics of renowned ascetics are valuable for Jainas, if at all, because of their unique physical attributes, rather than the presumed presence of the deceased in the remains as posited in much of the extant literature on relic worship across cultures. The specific focus of the article are Jaina and non-Jaina explanations of the qualities of special matter in terms of karmic and natural processes of transformation.

Keywords Ascetic body · Power · Sacred matter · Relics · *Stūpas* · Jaina karman theory · Theory of *parināma* · Theory of multiple causation · Principle of the excluded third · *do-kiriyā-vāya* · *terāsiyā-vāya* · *cattara-bham.gā*

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This article is about heresy (*mithyātva*).¹ It examines a fundamental problem in classical Jaina philosophy, namely, the ontological status of dead matter in the hylozoistic and at the same time dualistic Jaina worldview. This question is of particular interest in view of the widespread contemporary Jaina practice of venerating bone relics (*asthi*) and *stūpas* of prominent saints.² Of the eight early doctrinal schisms (*pravacana-nihnavā*)³ in the Niggantha (Jaina/Jain) tradition, mentioned in the Śvetāmbara texts Ṭhāṇa₁ 7.140–142⁴ and Uvavāiya (Uv₁) 160, and described in Āvassayanijjuttī⁵ (ĀvN₁) 778–788 and its commentaries,⁶ two will be of significance for the main argument proposed in this article, that, from a classical doctrinal point of view, bone relics of renowned ascetics are valuable for Jains, if at all, because of their unique physical attributes, rather than the presumed presence of the deceased in the remains as posited in much of the extant literature on relic

¹ Prakrit (Pk.) *micchatta*. In the Prakrit texts, the short form *diṭṭhi* is often used, from *micchā-diṭṭhi*, (someone who holds a) wrong-view. Sometimes also *micchā* is used (Jaini 2007, p. 165). In the canon, non-Jaina heresies are discussed in particular in the Sūyagaḍa (Sūy.), in the Viyāhapannatti (Bhagavañ) (Viy.) and in form of a list of Brāhmanical texts, in the Naṃḍī (NS_{1,2}) 67 = NS₃ 77. See Schrader (1902), Folkert (1993), Ohira (1994, pp. 162–164), and Bollée (1999, 2006). Folkert (1993, p. 296f.), compiled a comprehensive list of terms for heretics in the Sūyagaḍa, labelled “non-Jains”, and pointed out that “[t]wo sorts of *mithyādarśana* are postulated, one that is inborn and one that comes from others’ teachings” (ib., p. 295).

² Pk. *pavayana-niṅhava*. For details, see Flügel (2008, 2010b). “Sacred matter” is in the following used as an observer’s gloss for “dead-” or “insentient matter” associated with the bodies of Jaina ascetics. See Jaini (1985, p. 90): “Only ascetics . . . are truly auspicious”.

³ Also Pk. *niṅhaga, niṅhaya*. Sk. *nihnavā*.

⁴ The Ṭhāṇa is a quasi-encyclopaedic canonical (*siddhānta*) Śvetāmbara text.

⁵ On the composite structure and history of the ĀvN, an important Śvetāmbara text going back to the 1st century C.E., traditionally attributed to Bhādrabahu II, whose canonical status is disputed because it was compiled much later, see Leumann (1934, p. 28). The present article focuses mainly on Śvetāmbara sources. However, a brief survey of Digambara texts points to evidence for similar conceptions. See infra the discussion of SaSi₁ 357 for example.

⁶ Leumann (1885, 91ff., 1934, p. 46) refers to the following early Prakrit sources: Ṭhāṇa₁ 7.140–142 (list of names of the officially seven schisms, founders, places) and in prose Viy. 9.33 (the first schism of Jamāli; a text dated by Ohira (1994, p. 148) to the fifth century); Non-canonical: in verse Āvaśyaka 8.56–100 (additional dates of origin, narration of reasons, and final observations) = ĀvN₁ 778–788 and anonymous Mūlabhāṣya 126–148; Jinabhadrā’s sixth to seventh century Visesāvassayabhāsa (ViĀvB) III & IV and in Jaina Māhārāṣṭrī Prakrit and Sanskrit prose Haribhadrā’s eighth century Āvaśyakavṛtti (or *ṭikā*) (ĀvV) in ĀvN₁ II, pp. 312–328. Leumann’s (1885, p. 97) review of the sources does not refer to the Āvassayacuṅṇi (ĀvC) which has been attributed to Ācārya Jinadāsagaṇi Mahattara (593–693 C.E.) and Uttarajjhāyaṇanijjuttī (UttN) 165–178. See Balbir (1993, pp. 67, 146) on parallels in Hemacandra’s twelfth century Triṣaṣṭīśālākāpuruṣacaritra (TŚPC) 10.8.28–108 (Johnson 1931–1962 VI, pp. 193–198). The ĀvN mentions not only the seven heresies but also (according to Leumann 1885, p. 92 with help of interpolations) the more recent heresy of the Boṭikas (Digambaras) which alone led to a sectarian schism persisting until today. Only the first and the eighth schism in particular attracted further attention in the academic literature. On the heresy of Jamāli, see Deleu (1970), Bronkhorst (2003), Dundas (2006). The rebirth prospects of the seven *nihnavā-kāriyas*, who are after all reborn in heaven, are outlined in Uv₁ 160. Leumann’s 1885 German rendition of the ĀvN passage relies on the text transmitted in the commentary of Śāntisūri.

worship across cultures.⁷ The two early schisms are the fifth and the sixth, which, according to the ĀvN, took place 228 and 544 years after Vaddhamāṇa “Mahāvīra’s” death. According to S. Ohira’s (1994, p. 227f.) reconstruction of the history of ideas in early Jainism, the debated philosophical questions emerged in the middle and late-canonical periods, sometime between the first century B.C.E. and the fourth century C.E. Her account broadly matches the traditional dates if the *nirvāṇa* date of Vaddhamāṇa is brought forward to 395 B.C.E., as proposed by K.R. Norman (1991/1993, p. 201).⁸

The heretical ideology attributed to Ajja⁹ Gaṅga, who is said to have caused the fifth schism, is known as the “doctrine of two actions” (*do-kiriyā-vāya*).¹⁰ In the Āvaśyakavṛtti, a commentary on the Āvassayanijjutti composed by Ācārya Hari-bhadra in the eighth century in mixed Prakrit and Sanskrit prose, the following information is given.¹¹ Ajja Gaṅga lived in the town Ullagātūra at the river Ullagā. His guru Dhaṇagutta lived on the other side of the river. To venerate his teacher, Ajja Gaṅga once waded in the autumn midday heat through the cool waters to reach the other side of the river. Because of the simultaneous sensation of the cold water and of the hot sun, he remembered the teaching of the scriptures, that “only one sensation can be experienced at the same time, either a cold or a hot sensation”,¹² which seemed to contradict his experience. He discussed the matter with Dhaṇagutta, who simply dismissed his doubts, and was subsequently forced to leave the order, because was not prepared to change his mind. Sometime after his expulsion, Gaṅga was however reconverted by the polite snake god Nāga of Rāyagiha, who angrily threatened him with death, because of his deviation from Vaddhamāṇa’s beloved teaching. No explanation of the reasons for the reconversion is given.

⁷ See Oldenberg (1894/1917: 586, n. 1) for the Vedic conception “daß in den Gebeinen der Tote gegenwärtig ist [that the deceased is present in the bones]”, and attempts to protect the bones from the cremation fire by covering the corpse with body-parts of a cow (ib., p. 577). For a review, see Flügel (2010b, pp. 468–482). The fact that in practice many Jains have different attitudes (see for instance the ceremonial ‘eye-opening’ on Jina statues in the image-worshipping traditions) is not a philosophical but an anthropological issue.

⁸ According to the Śvetāmbara tradition, Vaddhamāṇa lived 599–527 B.C.E. The Digambara settled for 587–510 B.C.E.

⁹ S. *ārya*, venerable. In the following the original Prakrit is used.

¹⁰ Sk. *dvi-kriyā-vāda*, but in the literature since Haribhadra’s ĀvN 780 (“*gaṅgāt dvaikriyāḥ*”) generally: *dvaikriya-vāda*.

¹¹ Supplementary to ĀvN₁ 780, Mūlabhāṣya 133–134, p. 317. The *do-kiriyā* doctrine is also discussed in the universally accepted parts of the canon (without mentioning the name Gaṅga), in Viy₁ 1.9.3 (98a), 1.10.2 (106a), 2.5.1 (131a), 5.3.1 (214a), 6.10.3 (285b). Bhatt (1983, pp. 113, 111) placed it in the second of three main textual layers and Ohira (1994, p. 227) located the underlying “*kriyā-vedanā* problem” (experience of the fruition of karman) of the first three texts in the third to fourth of her scheme of canonical stages (1st century B.C.E.–4th century C.E.) and the last three texts in the fourth to fifth (4th century C.E.).

¹² *sutte bhaṇiyam jahā egā kiriyā vedijjai – sītā usiṇā vā* (ĀvV 134).

Maybe Gaṅga realised, after all, that feelings of love and hate cannot coexist at the same time.¹³

The sixth schism, the heresy of Chalu(g)a, is briefly listed in Ṭhāṇa₁ 7.141 and in ĀvN₁ 780. According to Haribhadra's commentary on Mūlabhāṣya 140, he was the author of the Vaisesiyasutta (Vaiśeṣikasūtra) (elsewhere known as Kaṇāda)¹⁴ and the first to propose the “doctrine of the triad” (*terāsiyā-vāya*).¹⁵ In contrast to the other

¹³ The Digambara mystic Kundakunda, who has been placed by most scholars in the second century C.E., refuted the *dokiriyā* doctrine in chapter three of his Samayasāra vv. 85–86:

jadi poggalakammamiṇaṃ kuvvadi taṃ ceva vedayadi ādā |
dokiriyāvādittam pasajjadi so jīṇāvamadaṃ ||85||

jahā du attabhāvaṃ poggalabhāvaṃ ca dovi kuvvaṃti |
teṇa du micchādittihī dokiriyāvādiṇo hoṃti ||86||

85. If the *Ātmā* or Self produces these *Karmic* materials (operating as *upādāna kartā* or substantive cause) and enjoys the consequences thereof in the same manner, it will lead to the doctrine of a single cause producing two different effects, which will be in conflict with the Jaina faith.

86. Because they make the modifications of Self as well as modifications of matter to be effects of the same identical *Ātmā* or the Self (operating as *upādāna* cause) the believers in that doctrine of causation (which derives the conflicting effects from the same source), are said to be of erroneous faith” (English rendition by Chakravarti, in SS, p. 73f.).

On this passage, and others, see Upadhye (1935, p. xlviii), who restated that both the Śvetāmbara and the Digambara traditions reject “the tenet that the soul can be the agent of its psychic states and also of karmic modifications”. Chakravarti (1950/1989), in SS: 73f., pointed out that Kundakunda invoked the two-truth theory for making the point that from the conventional point of view the soul is the cause of its own karmas, but not from the transcendental point of view, because of the strict Jaina dualism. Cf. Johnson (1995, p. 260f).

Mālvaṇiyā (1971, p. 418) summarised Malayagiri's commentary on the question of the possibility of simultaneous hot-cold feeling which is also mentioned in the canonical P 36, saying that “though the concerned cognitions take place alternately, their alternation being quick and speedy is not noticed by us; and from this standpoint only the Sūtra considers the cognitions of hotness and coldness to be simultaneous”.

¹⁴ Jacobi (1895, pp. xxxvii–xxxviii) argued that “Rōhagupta did not invent, but only adopted the Vaiśeṣhika philosophy to support his schismatic views”. He etymologically linked Kaṇāda, “crow-eater, owl”, whose system was nicknamed “Aulūkyā Darsana”, with “Rōhagupta's second name, *Khuluya*”, which seems to allude to *ulūka*, “owl”, hence (implausibly) furnishing Sk. Ṣaḍulūka, “six owl”, for Chalu(g)a, as suggested already by Haribhadra (ĀvN 780) and echoed by all Prakrit dictionaries.

¹⁵ Sk. *trirāśī-vāda*, but in the literature since Haribhadra's ĀvN 780 (“*ṣaḍulūkāt trairāśikā-nāmutpatih*”) generally: *trairāśika-vāda*, “doctrine of the three heaps or categories”. A school of this name is also mentioned in the Naṃḍī (NS₄) 77 (No.12) & 104 (No. 7), but without reference to Rohagutta. The equivalent passages of NS₄ 77, NS₁ 72 and NS_{2,3} 67, refer to *vesiyaṃ* instead of *tesiyaṃ* and *terāsiaṃ*, and the equivalent passages of NS₄ 104–NS₁ 106f., NS_{2,3} 101f., refer to *tiṅuṃaṃ* as “*terāsiyāṃ*” rather than to *keubhūaṃ*. Puṇyavijaya, Mālvaṇiyā and Bhojak (1968, pp. 107–109) have discussed the textual history of the “corrupt reading *tesiyaṃ*” and rarely (apparently following the edition of Sāgarānandasūri) *terāsiyaṃ* instead of *vesiyaṃ*, which they interpret as “*vaiśeṣikaṃ*”. They come to the conclusion that the Sthānakavāsī editions by Hastīmal and by Ghāṣīlāl are responsible for the view that both passages (not just the second) refer to the Ājīvikas:

The term *vesiya* was turned into *tesiya* by the copyist reading *ta* instead of *va*; then *tesiyaṃ* became *terāsiyaṃ*; afterwards this *terāsiyaṃ* got equated with *trairāśika*; and at last on the basis of the commentary on *sūtra* 107 it was written that by this term (*sūtra* 72 [1]) the commentator [Malayagiri] means [the] Ājīvika school founded by Gośālaka [rather than the Terāsiya school] (ib., p. 108f.).

Nigganthas, who favoured the ontological dyad of life (*jīva*) and non-life (*ajīva*), he posited three rather than two fundamental categories of reality: life (*jīva*), non-life (*ajīva*), and quasi-life (*nojīva*).¹⁶ The third category designates either an intermediary or mixed state of entities that appear to be temporarily both alive and not-alive, or an ontological entity that is neither *jīva* nor *ajīva*.¹⁷ While the first interpretation was favoured by Leumann (1885, p. 123) and Mehta and Chandra (1970 II, p. 646), the second interpretation is chosen here.¹⁸ In the more detailed accounts in Mūlabhāṣya 135–140¹⁹ and Haribhadra’s commentary, the schism is labelled “heresy of Rohagutta”, a monk who in later Jaina literature is identified with Chaluga.²⁰ Rohagutta once felt the need to challenge a knowledgeable wandering ascetic commonly known as Pottasāla (“Belly-Tree”²¹ or “Drum-Stick”), who was so full of himself that he girded himself with a copper wire, lest his dress would burst because of the abundance of his knowledge, and carried a branch of the Jambu tree (*jambu-dālam*) to indicate that on this Jambu island, at the centre of the middle world, no-one could match his scholarship. The debate was held at the court of king

¹⁶ Leumann (1885, p. 118, n. 8) translated *nojīvā* ambiguously as “halblebende” or “half-living” beings: “*no* hat im Gegensatz zu *a* in Composition nicht privativen, sondern prohibitiven Sinn, und so bezeichnet *nojīvā* Wesen, die obwohl eigentlich *jīva*, nicht dazu gerechnet werden dürfen, sei es nun wegen Verstümmelung oder anderer Ursachen”. In modern Jaina commentaries *no-* is usually translated as “quasi-”, which is somewhat equivocal. Monier-Williams (1899/1986, p. 571) states that Sanskrit *no* stands “in later language” for *na*, “not”. Pischel (1900/1999, § 170, p. 151) points to cases where Prakrit *no* is the result of *na* undergoing *sandhi* with the initial vowel of the next word, which could lend support to the interpretation *no-ajīva*, “not-non-life”, or rather *no-jīvājīva*, “not-life-non-life”, that is “neither life nor non-life”, as the intended meaning. Seth (1928/1986, p. 422) explains *nojīva* in general terms as either an “insubstantial” third category that is different from *jīva* and *ajīva*, or as a synonym of *ajīva* or of *nirjīva*. In his commentary, Haribhadra (ĀvN₁ II: 320) refers to the the “four points of view” of Jaina logic, the *cattara-bhaṅgā*, which Leumann (1885, p. 123 n. 1) interprets as a “later phase of the doctrine of the triad”: “in der eigentlichen Erzählung vom Schism war ... noch keine Hindeutung darauf vorhanden, dass auch den *nojīvā* eine Negation gegenübergestellt werden sollte”. Hence, according to Leumann, Rohagutta must have favoured the third perspective of the tetras-doctrine (“both-and”) rather than the fourth (“neither-nor”). In favour of his interpretation speaks that, even in early texts, the fourth alternative is generally acceptable in Jaina logic and should not have caused a controversy on logical grounds (see Flügel 2010a, pp. 155–180). Yet, it would certainly have been controversial if interpreted ontologically as a third fundamental substance. Notably, apart from *jīva* all other *astikāyas* are treated as sub-categories of *ajīva*. See footnote 18.

¹⁷ Mehta and Chandra (1970 I, p. 347) mention a doctrine, also labelled *terāsiya*, which was in the Jaina commentaries attributed to the Ājīviya (Sk. Ājīvika) Gosāla, who apparently believed “that there are three states of souls, viz., bound, liberated and redefiled (after liberation)” (citing Nandisūtracūṛpi p. 73; Nandisūtravṛtti of Haribhadra, p. 87; Nandisūtravṛtti of Malayagiri, p. 239; Samavāyāṅgavṛtti of Abhayadeva, pp. 42, 130; Sūtrakṛtāṅgavṛtti of Śīlāṅka, p. 393). See footnote 15.

In a different context, Jaini (1979, p. 97) identifies another “third category”: Sk. *arūpi-ajīva*, referring to the substances (*dravya*) space, time, movement, rest which have *neither* form *nor* life. Technically, however, it is a sub-category of *ajīva* and not a third category. See Glasenapp (1925, p. 152). See *infra*. For the same see also P. S. Jain (1999, p. 31)

¹⁸ I am grateful to J. C. Wright for convincing me of the plausibility of the *no’jīvā* = *no-jīvājīvā*, “neither *jīva* nor *ajīva*”, interpretation. For the same see also P.S. Jain (1999: 31).

¹⁹ ĀvN₁ Mūlabhāṣya 135–140, pp. 317–322. For further textual sources, see Mehta and Chandra (1970 II, p. 481).

²⁰ For instance by Muni Nathmal (= Ācārya Mahāprajña) in his Hindī commentary on Ṭhāṇa, 7.140–142 (p. 781).

²¹ Leumann (1885, p. 117): “Kleid-Ast”.

Balasiri of Aṃtaramjijyā. Because Poṭṭasāla anticipated Rohagutta's arguments in favour of the Jaina dyad of *jīva* and *ajīva*, he argued the Jaina case himself, and thereby forced Rohagutta to defend the triad of *jīva*, *ajīva* and *nojīva*.²² The contest was finally won by Rohagutta, not through argument, but through the magical power of his *rayaharaṇa*, the whisk brush used by the itinerant monk or nun to gently remove small living beings away from their path, which is the main *insignium* of the Jaina ascetics. Prior to the contest, the *rayaharaṇa* had been charged with mantras by his preceptor Sirigutta, who was aware of the seven magical powers which Poṭṭasāla was known to employ in debates whose argument he had lost. Sirigutta therefore gave Rohagutta seven forms of counter magic. When Poṭṭasāla's seventh form of magic, the mockingbird magic, was defeated with the “*ulāva*” counter magic, Poṭṭasāla, in desperation, sent a she-ass. But he was beaten back with the *rayaharaṇa*. After his victory Rohagutta continued to favour the *terāsiya* doctrine. According to Haribhadra, he even composed the Vaiśeṣikasūtra, a text whose decisive influence on the formation of classical Jaina atomism was explained in this way as a Jaina creation. Finally, he was defeated in a public debate in the royal court by his old teacher Sirigutta, who finally simply asked him to go to the market (which Jaina monks should not do) and to bring him living, dead and quasi-living things. When Rohagutta requested for quasi-living things he was only presented with dead objects.²³

The morale of both stories is of course that Vaddhamāṇa was right. There should be no conceptual confusion of the fundamental ontological dualism informing his teachings, especially not in the context of epistemology and logic.²⁴ Although at first sight the heresies of Gaṅga and Rohagutta appear to be entirely different (associated with Ājīvika²⁵ and Vaiśeṣika philosophies), both featured “category mistakes” and by elevating ambiguity from a vice to a virtue threatened the very

²² ĀvN₁ II: 319f. (Commentary to Mūlabhāṣya 138): “*do rāsī, taṃ jahā – jīvā ya ajīvā ya, ... tinni rāsī ṭhaviyā – jīvā ajīvā nojīvā, tattha jīvā saṃsārathā, ajīvā ghaḍādi, nojīvā ghīroliyāchinnapucchāi, ...*”. Following this passage, the classical example of “neither life nor non-life” in Jaina texts is the tail of a lizard which still moves for a while even after having been severed from the body.

²³ ĀvN₁ II: 319: “*āṇeha jīve ajīve nojīve ya, tāhe devayāe jīvā ajīvā ya diṇṇā, nojīvā natthi, evam-ādī-coyālasaenaṃ pucchāṇaṃ niggaḥio.*

²⁴ See Flügel (2010, p. 155–162) on the Jaina critique of “partially true speech” (*sacca-mosā-bhāsā*), including category mistakes.

²⁵ See Viy. V.3 and ViyBh 5.57–58. Basham (1951, pp. 175–181, 274f.) cites the relevant Śvetāmbara *ṭīkā*s on the Sūyagaḍa by Śīlāṅka, on the Naṃḍī by Haribhadra and Malayagiri, and the *vṛtti* on the Samavāya by Abhayadeva which either identify the Ājīvikas with the Jaina *trirāśivādins* (like Hoernle 1908, p. 262) or describe them as another example of a sect propagating this doctrine. A similar position, held by the Buddhist Rājagiriya and Siddhatthikas who in contrast to the Theravādins argued that an act such as a gift can have an effect here and elsewhere, is documented in the Kathāvattu (KV) VII.6. McDermott (1975, p. 431) noted that the argument was used to bolster the disputed doctrine of “merit transfer”.

foundation of the teachings attributed to Mahāvīra in the classical canonical texts.²⁶ Another inference the reader/hearer is invited to draw is that dialectics and magical power may win arguments in scholastic debates, but will not buy real things in the markets.

Ascetic Power and Karman

The extraordinary powers of Jaina ascetics, and of their relics, are attested by numerous Jaina sources. Particular prominence was given to them in texts from the middle and late canonical periods onwards, at a time when the Jaina mendicants faced strong competition from Buddhist and Brāhmanical opponents and classical Jaina doctrine was systematised.²⁷ The following investigation draws mainly on the *Viyāhapannatti* (*Viy.*), the “Exposition of Explanations”, the largest and most unsystematic text of the Śvetāmbara canon, compiled over a period of about six hundred years, in which “Jaina theoreticians” seemed to have “freely experimented to formulate novel ideas” (Ohira 1994, p. 232). Many of these ideas are labelled “heretical” (*annautthiya*)²⁸ in the text and the commentaries, and demonstrated to be incompatible with Mahāvīra’s teaching. Others were assimilated by Jaina philosophy at a later stage. In Deleu’s (1987–1988, p. 178) analysis, the *annautthiya*-texts “form the backbone of the *Viy.*” Most of the heresies are not named. An exception is the heresy of Jamāli, the first of the seven early schisms. Variants of the *dokiriyā* doctrine are also discussed, but Ārya Gaṅga is nowhere mentioned.

According to classical Jaina ontology and mythology, formulated in the later accretions of the *Viyāhapannatti*, and in the secondary *pannatti* texts as well as other late- or post-canonical scriptures,²⁹ ascetic powers, *iḍḍhi*,³⁰ *laddhi*, *siddhi*, and

²⁶ Ohira (1994, p. 237) argued that the main thrust of this period of theorisation (middle and late canonical period, especially third Vallabhī council) was “was to proclaim and authorize that the doctrine of *jīva-ajīva* constitutes the cardinal doctrinal system for all the Jainas”. However, she emphasized that ideas of many “heresies” were later incorporated and distinguishes between two types of *ninhavas*: those who present a clear cut Jaina position and those (like the fifth and the sixth) which do not (ib., p. 164).

²⁷ Ohira (1994, pp. 98, 161f.) places all classical texts detailing the miraculous power of ascetics in the 4th–5th century C.E. See *supra*.

²⁸ Sk. *anyatūthika*.

²⁹ On secondary *pannatti*-texts, see Schubring (1926, p. 10) and Deleu (1970, p. 31). The main systematic text of classical Jainism is Umāsvāti’s Sanskrit *Tattvārthasūtra* (TS), usually dated fourth century C.E. In parts it builds on earlier segments of the *Viy.*

³⁰ Deleu (1987–1988, p. 173f.) argued that there is “a studied logical sequence” connecting the dispersed *iḍḍhi* texts associated with gods *Viy.* II.8 (Camara), X.6 (Sakka), XVI.9 (Bali), XVII.5 (Īsāṇa), and associated with the *logapālas* of Sakka and Īsāṇa III.7–8, IV.1–8, and on the wives and abodes of different types of gods X.5, XIX.7. According to him (and Bhatt and Ohira), the key ontological sections (*uddesa*), which will be discussed in this article, are also late accretions: II.10, XIII.4, XI.10 (*athikāya*, *loga*, etc.), VIII.1 (*poggala-pariṇāma*), VIII.9 (*bandha*).

physical strength (*bala*),³¹ are generated by sustained austerities (*tava*), whose positive effects³² are encoded and stored in distinct sets (*paḡaḡi*) of karmic particles (*kamma-poggala*) of varying subtleness (*suhuma*).³³ The atomistic notion of karmic matter was an innovation at the time.³⁴ It differentiates classical from early voluntaristic Jaina karman theories.³⁵ Like the seeds of a plant, a *karman*-particle embodies action in potentia (*sattā*).³⁶ This potential comes to fruition either naturally (*udaya*),³⁷ under specific conditions and within a karmically determined time frame,³⁸ or by being ripened prematurely (*udīraṇā*) through deliberate

³¹ See Flügel (Forthcoming a) on Jaina concepts of power. The cited terms are the labels used by the lists of ascetic powers in the texts themselves. More terms for power, such as *pabhāva* (*S. prabhāva*), will be introduced at specific junctures of the following discussion. Frauwallner (1953/1997 I: 138f., 142f., II: 255 n. 346) points to the resemblance with “the wonder-powers (*īdhiprabhedāḡ*) which are enumerated by older Buddhism” and Yoga literature; stressing that in “Jain understanding, the individual steps of meditation are connected with the attainment of the different wonder-powers (*īdधिḡ, P. īdधि*)” as in Buddhist (ib. I, p. 142) and possibly older Brahmanical views (ib. I, p. 204), including the theory of ascetically produced secondary spirit bodies (ib. I, p. 142).

³² In later Jaina literature, asceticism is said to have two effects: it destroys accumulated karman (*nirjarā*) and it reduces demerit (*pāpa*) and generates merit (*puṇya*), that is, meritorious karman which consists of refined karmic particles, through a variety of karmic processes.

³³ *Viy*₃ 1.19, cf. *Viy*₁ 1.4 (24b uses the opposition fine (*aṇu*) and gross (*bāyara*)).

³⁴ However, there are precursors and parallel developments in Brāhmanical philosophy (Potter 1980, 2001, p. 235 on *karmāśaya*) and literature (Dundas 2002, p. 290, n. 25) and parallels in contemporary (Tamil) folklore (Daniel 1987, p. 212). Cf. Flügel (Forthcoming b).

³⁵ On voluntaristic or teleological karman theories, see Bronkhorst (2000). On the contrast between voluntaristic and system-theories of karman, see Flügel (2008) on L.C. Jain’s work.

³⁶ See Schubring (1935/2000 § 85, p. 176) on the earlier term *ābhā* (Sk. *ābādhā*), literally pain or oppressive trouble.

³⁷ Cf. Potter’s (1964, p. 44) analogy between the principle of karman and quasi naturalistic habits. Cf. also Bourdieu (1980/1992), who did not cross-reference the concept *karman* to his theory of *habitus*.

³⁸ Classical (Śvetāmbara) Jaina karman theory distinguishes four basic attributes of karman:

1. effect (*prakṛti*),
2. duration (*sthiti*),
3. intensity (*rasa* or *anubhāva*), and
4. quantity (of space units) (*pradeśa*).

Modes of *prakṛti* are:

- (a) bondage (of certain types of karman) (*bandha*),
- (b) latent / potential (existence of karman) (*sattā*), and
- (c) realisation (*udaya*):
 - (i) premature fruition (*udīraṇā*), and
 - (ii) transformation of one type of karman into another (*saṃkrama*).

The principal modes of *sthiti* and *rasa* are:

- (a) quantitative enlargement (*apavartanā*), and
- (b) reduction (*udvartanā*).

These processes are largely depending on the intensity of the passions (*kaṣāya*). Determinism is prevented by positing mechanisms of qualitative transformation of the effects of karman, such as the transformation of one type of karman into another (*saṃkrama*), and automatic (self) transformation (*pariṇāma*) through asceticism. See Glasenapp (1915/1942, pp. 28–39).

ascetic exertions,³⁹ in mind, speech and body.⁴⁰ The doctrine of karman can thus be interpreted as a theory of power. Karmic particles encode specific qualities and potentialities of action (karman). Yet, they are not the source of karmic power. The specific potential stored in karmic particles is said to be predicated on the innate infinite energy (*vīriya*) of the soul (*jīva*),⁴¹ which the karmic process (particle-action) channels into specific forms and hence limits and perverts at the same time.⁴²

In *Viy*₁ 1.3.5 (56b) = *Viy*_{3,4,8} 1.3.144 energy is said to be produced by the body which in turn is produced by the soul (the sequence of causality is: *jīva*>*sarīra*>*vīriya*>*joa*>*pamāda*>*kaṃkhā-mohaṇijja-kamma*; soul>body>energy>activ-

³⁹ On *karaṇa*, the instrumental forces of the embodied soul, mind, speech, body and karman (*maṇa-karaṇe*, *vai-karaṇe*, *kāya-karaṇe*, *kamma-karaṇe*), see *Viy*₃ 6.1.5, cf. *Viy*₁ 6.1.2 (251b).

⁴⁰ The process, here starting with the transformation of already attracted and bound matter, has been summarised already in one of the oldest mnemonic verses of the *Viy*. following *Viy*₃ 1.18:

pariṇaya ‘*ciyā uvaciyā*’, *udīriya veiyā ya nijjīṇṇā* |
ekkekkaṃmi padammi, cauvvīhā poggalā hoṃti ||

There are four queries concerning each of the following expressions related to matter: transformed [*pariṇamai*], stored up [*cinai*], profusely stored up [*uvaciṇai*], prematurely brought to rise [*udīrei*], experienced [*veei*], and worn off [*nijjare*]

(*Viy*₈ 1.18 *Samgahaṇī Gāhā* 1, cf. *Viy*₁ 1.1.3 [23a]).

See Glasenapp (1915/1942, pp. 19, 28–39) and Schubring (1935/2000, §§ 84–86) on the difference between *udaya* (not mentioned in the *gāthā*) und *udīraṇā*, with added historical notes.

Discussions on similar concepts in Buddhism are recorded in the Kathāvatthu (KV). See McDermott (1975, p. 430, etc.) In the Brāhmaṇical tradition, the Pūrvamīmāṃsā concept of *apūrva*, impersonal “potency”, and the Vaiśeṣika concept of *adr̥ṣṭa*, the “invisible” cosmic force relating to karman, were somewhat similarly proposed to explain storable causal potencies which attach to the agent of an (sacrificial) action (*kriyā*), and hence account for the efficacy and power of sacrifices, as Halbfass (1992, p. 298ff.) showed. He emphasized that “*adr̥ṣṭa* seems to function primarily as a principle of physicalistic, naturalistic explanation, and its ethical and soteriological implications remain at least very obscure” (ib., p. 315). On the influence of the concept of *adr̥ṣṭa* on the Jaina concepts of *dharma* and *adharmā*, condition of movement and rest, see Ohira (1994, p. 105f.).

⁴¹ See Glasenapp (1915/1942, p. 45) on *vīrya* (Pk. *vīriya*) as an “innate” quality of the soul:

The soul has *vīrya* ‘energy’ ‘infinite capacities of activity’. This innate quality manifests itself only if the *jīva* is free from all *karman*-matter. As long as the *vīrya-antarāya-k* is operating, the *vīrya* is, although not completely eliminated, nevertheless exceedingly restricted. It does not manifest itself spontaneously, as is the case with released souls, but it is bound to matter. It needs an organ as ‘accompanying cause’ (*sahakārikāraṇa*), in order to be able to act; it needs the medium of the body, the organ of speech and *manas*, in order to manifest itself. This form of *vīrya*, bound to matter, is called *yoga* (activity) (ib.).

Glasenapp (1915/1942, p. 19), Schubring (1935/2000, § 83, p. 172) and Deleu (1970, p. 84) (on *Viy*₁ 1.8 [94a–b]) interpreted *vīriya* predominately as ‘will’ or ‘will-power’. Attributes of the innate will-power (*puruṣārtha*) of the soul are detailed in *Viy*₁ 1.3.5 (56b) = *Viy*_{3,4,8} 1.3.146 in form of a list of terms designating kindred qualities, “synonyms” according to Schubring, which in *Tāṇa*₁ 1.44 are said to become manifest only one at a time: *uṭṭhāṇa*, *kamma*, *bāla*, *vīriya*, *purisakkāra-parakkama* (impetus, action, physical strength, mental energy, self-exertion, capacity of accomplishment). According to the *Naṃḍicuṇṇi* 104, the power (*vīriya*) of inanimate entities was apparently a topic of the “lost” third Pūrvā (Tulsī & Mahāprajā 2009, p. 316). *Viy*₁ 1.4.2 (63b) distinguishes the wise and foolish use of power. See also Utt₁ 28.11. See further Frauwallner (1953/1997 I: 200, 209f.) on the peculiar active nature of souls in Jainism.

⁴² On the process of channelling infinite into limited power, see Tatia’s (1994, p. 151) summary of Umāsvāti’s autocommentary and Pūjyapāda’s commentary on *TS*₁ 6.1.–2.

ity>carelessness>karman of view-deluding inclination). Yet, in the commentaries such as *ViyVṛ* 1.3.146 and in *Thāṇa*₁ 1.44 it is interpreted as an attribute of the soul. In order to solve the conundrum, inactive (*akaraṇa*) and active (*sakaraṇa*) forms of energy, associated with soul and body respectively, were distinguished (*ViyVṛ* 1.3.143f., cf. *ViyBh* 1.3.140-146). Hence, *vīriya* is not merely conceived as presupposition of a particular action, but as a homogenous meta-quality,⁴³ presupposed by all actions.⁴⁴ Not only does it energise, but also transforms, suppresses and destroys all forms of karman that inhibit the soul's path towards self-liberation (*mokkha-magga*). The efficacy of the path of purification through processes of refinement and depletion of karman depends on the degree to which the power-obstructing karman (*vīriya-aṃtarāya-kamma*) is suppressed and removed. Suppression (*uvasama*), destruction (*khava*), and transformation of one karman into another (*saṃkama*) are the elementary purging mechanisms that can be wilfully activated by the soul⁴⁵ through ascetic practice,⁴⁶ including meditation. Together with consciousness (*uvaoga*), the main quality of the soul, *vīrya* represents the quality of free will⁴⁷ which distinguishes Jaina karman theory from deterministic interpretations of karman, such as the Ājīvika doctrine or Śāṅkara's insistence on God as the latent source of karmic power.⁴⁸ *Vīrya* is therefore often translated as "will-power". It is only because of will-power that the ascetic is able to perform austerities to eliminate karman (path of liberation) and to transform gross into subtle karman (path of purification).⁴⁹ A peculiar aspect of the Jaina (and Buddhist) theory of karmic power is that power and purity of an individual are not opposites, as in comparable Hindu conceptions, but two sides of the same coin, as indicated by Dumont (1980, pp. 215f., 300) and Tambiah (1977, p. 43). Through asceticism,

⁴³ Jaini (1979, p. 105f.).

⁴⁴ The compound *vīriya-laddhi*, for instance, designates embodied power, not *vīriya* as such. Cf. *Viy*₅ 3.6.

⁴⁵ The soul itself is seen as active in Jaina philosophy. See for instance Glasenapp (1915/1942, p. 45). In contrast to Sāṃkhya philosophy, for instance, Jaina teaching is therefore referred to as *kriyāvāda* in the canon:

Of one's own accord one makes [karman] effective (*udīrei*) and one repents (*garahai*), checks (*saṃvarai*), suppresses (*uvasāmei*), experiences (*veei*) and annihilates (*nijjarei*) it by an effort of one's own will (*vīriya*) (*Viy*₁ 1.3.6 [56b], rendered into English by Deleu 1970, p. 78).

However, *Viy*₁ 14.10 (657a) and P 22 explicitly state that, in contrast to the still embodied *kevalin*, the *siddha*, or liberated soul, does not act, it is *anuttḥāṇa* (S. *anuṣṭhāṇa* or *anuttḥāṇa*), because it has no will or energy. See Deleu (1970, p. 213).

⁴⁶ This does not mean that an exact prediction of the result of an act of asceticism can be given by a non-omniscient being: "It may well be said that the connections between action and result which Jains set forth often have a rather arbitrary feeling about them" (Jaini 1979, p. 116).

⁴⁷ See *Viy*₁ 2.10.c (149a).

⁴⁸ On Śāṅkara's interpretation in his *Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, on *Brahmasūtra* 3.2.38–41, see Sikdar (1987, p. 97).

⁴⁹ Tabulations of on-to-one correlations between ascetic actions and karmic consequences (which would be hard to justify) do not exist. It is thought that both consequences are produced at the same time by asceticism.

karmic potential is purified and strengthened at the same time. These processes of transformation work both on the physical and mental plane and also at the level of unconscious or automatic actions. The texts explain, for instance, that the natural fruition (*udaya*) of karman manifests itself in painful physical as well as mental experiences (*veyaṇā*) of karman. According to Ohira (1994, p. 195), referring to Vīy. 1.2 and 16.2, this shows that “[*u*]daya and *vedanā* express the same phenomenon by the different agents, i.e. *karma* and the [embodied] soul”.⁵⁰

Power as a generalised potential to act is thus conceptualised as a combination of universal and specific qualities, of free will or raw energy of the embodied soul conditioned by karmic constraints. ‘Raw power’ is, as it were, domesticated by the two-tiered symbolism of this model, which constitutes karman as a system. In system-theoretical terms it is stabilised by a ‘double-coding’ of the concept of potentiality as *vīrya* and as latent *karman*, that is, as the potential to act in general and in particular form.⁵¹ If one of the two components of karmically encoded power is removed, the potential to act disappears. The pure or liberated soul, thought to be active in itself, cannot act in the material world,⁵² because it is disembodied and without a specific intentional object outside itself, and karmic particles disconnected

⁵⁰ Compare the Buddhist debates on *kamma-vipāka*, in KV VIII.9 for instance; and Halbfass (1991/1992, p. 299) on Śāṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta, where “*duḥkha* and *sukha* themselves have objective as well as subjective implications”.

⁵¹ Cf. Luhmann (1975/1979, pp. 34–36/129f). On the method and social function of double-coded binary oppositions as generalised symbolical media, see Luhmann (1975/1979, pp. 31ff./27ff.), and *infra*. Notably, *vīrya* and *karman* do not represent ‘two ideals’ of power in Jainism (cf. Cort 1991a). An interesting question for future research is the investigation of different forms of secondary or tertiary coding in Jaina sectarian traditions.

⁵² This applies already to the last stage of embodied existence before the liberation of an omniscient being: “The holy man has then become an *a-yogi-kevalin*, and possesses henceforth, into all eternity, the infinite *vīrya*, bound to no organ, completely withdrawn from the influence of matter” (Glasenapp 1915/1942, p. 46). The “undifferentiated cognition and the [material] power of the *jīva* has disappeared” (*ib.*, p. 90).

from an external source of energy cannot perpetuate themselves and disintegrate into particles of inanimate matter.⁵³

Objectified Ascetic Power

The special status of Jaina ascetics, explained by classical karman theory, is highlighted in Jaina narrative literature by the fact that in their case alone even body parts that are “out of place”,⁵⁴ and usually create aversion,⁵⁵ are praised for their attractive properties. The late- and post-canonical scriptures abound in lists and stories praising the astonishing qualities not only of living Jaina ascetics, but also of their body secretions and mortal remains, especially their hair, nails and bones, which do not quickly decompose, and of their objects of use.⁵⁶ Benefitting others are the eight powers of healing (*osahi-laddhi/iḍḍhi*), through ascetic touch, phlegm, secretions such as mucus and sweat, waste matter from the tongue, lip, teeth, nose and ear, urine and excrement, and everything that was in contact with the body of

⁵³ There are subtle variations of the Jaina causal theory of power/action. Note the interpretation of “dual causality” in Digambara mysticism: Ācārya Kundakunda’s SS 69–84, especially vv. 83–84 (only from the conventional point of view does it appear as if the soul causes transformations in *poggala-kamma*; tr. Schubring (1957, pp. 356–358); and the Laghutattvasphoṭa (LTS) of the tenth century Ācārya Amṛtandra, which builds on the work of Kundakunda (generally dated second century C.E.). In the words of the editor and translator Jaini (1978/2000):

‘Cause’ is the designation for a complex situation; it involves self and other, i.e. of both material (*upādāna*) and efficient (*nimitta*) causes, which operate in mutual dependence (ib., p. 64).

Being a ‘material’ cause is the prerogative of the substance alone; that is, the substance (*dravya*) in one mode (*pariyāya*) is the material ‘cause’ of the substance in its subsequent mode, which is thus the ‘effect’. There can be neither an addition to nor a subtraction from this innate power of the substance, the power to modify itself in accordance with its potential or ‘upādāna’, regardless of the presence or absence of instrumental (*nimitta*) causes. The Jaina therefore maintains that when the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) is present, instrumental causes (*nimitta-kāraṇas*) will automatically appear; in other words, whatever conditions are present will function as *nimitta-kāraṇa* at the appropriate time. ...

Thus it appears that statements such as ‘bondage of the soul is caused by (*dravya-*) karma’, or ‘the formation of the *dravya*-karma is brought about by the *kaṣāyas* (passions) of the soul’ are purely conventional (*vyavahāra*) ones (ib., p. 48f.).

In a personal communication of 12.11.2011, P. S. Jaini added: “Karma is insentient and has no control over *nimitta-kāraṇa*: the latter is subject to the conditions of *dravya*, *kṣetra*, *kāla* and *bhāva*, in contrast to the conception of the theists who consider Him to be able to *kartum*, *akartum*, *anyathā kartum*, etc.”

⁵⁴ Douglas (1966/1970, pp. 12, 53, cf. 148f).

⁵⁵ Pk. *viigimchā/vitigicchā*, Sk. *vicikitsā*.

⁵⁶ Strong (2004, p. 72, n. 1) cites an unpublished paper of Swearer reporting on “the Buddha’s excrement and his snot, enshrined in different sanctuaries in Northern Thailand”. In his own analysis, he shows that excretions and hair and nails were treated as ambiguous objects in the Buddhist tradition, sometimes classified as contact relics and sometimes as body relics. However, KV_{1,2} XVIII.4 states the contrary Theravāda view *vis-ā-vis* Buddhist heretics. See footnote 73. See Granoff (2008, p. 65, etc.) on similar examples from Vedic and Hindu literature.

Jaina ascetics (water, wind, hair, nails), as well as their poison-removing words and sight.⁵⁷ To this category also belongs speech, whose sound waves are in P 260b ff. said to be formed by material atoms ejected in form of a thunderbolt (*vajja-samṭhiya*). These atoms are “unconscious (*acitta*) and inanimate (*ajīva*), but yet are inherent in souls” (Schubring 1935/2000, § 61, p. 137).⁵⁸ The utterances of the saint can be either poison-removing (*vayaṇa-nivvīsa*) or poisonous (*āsī-visa*) if indeed used as a curse.⁵⁹ With the exception of the power of touch (*āmosa*), the powers of healing are not associated with living ascetics⁶⁰ but with their secretions and excretions and with the objects touched by them, that is, with physical matter which is technically dead, though as it were containing the “congealed labour” of the *samaṇa*.⁶¹ Current religious practice also shows that the body parts and the paraphernalia used exclusively by Jaina ascetics are treated as embodiments of ascetic energy. These objects are categorised as not just any form of matter, but as matter of a particularly pure and hence powerful⁶² and desirable nature. It is believed that their innate energy can be transferred by mere touch.

⁵⁷ In the Śvetāmbara canon, Uvavāīya (Uv₁) 24, Panhā₁ 6.1.6 and ĀvN 68-70 list five powers (Pk. *laddhi*, Sk. *labdhi*) of healing: 1. *khela* (Sk. *kapha*), 2. *jalla* (Sk. *mala*), 3. *vippusa* (S. *vipruṣa*), drop of urine (and faeces), 4. *āmosa* (Sk. *āmṛśa*), 5. *savva* (S. *sarva*) (Panhā has No. 4 as No. 1). The Śvetāmbara Ācārya Hemacandra, in his twelfth century Yogaśāstra (YŚ) 1.8, mentions seven powers of healing: *kapha*, *vipruṣa*, *jalla*, *mala*, *viṣṭā*, *āmṛśa* and *sarva* (he additionally distinguishes *jalla* and *mala* and adds *viṣṭā*).

The corresponding Digambara list does not use the term *laddhi* but the term *iddhi* (Sk. *ṛddhi*). The list of eight *osahi-iddhis* (Sk. *ausadhī-ṛddhi*) is given in Ācārya Yativṛsabhā's c. 5th century Tiloyapaṇṇatī (TP₁) II.4.1078–1087:

1. touch (Pk. *āmosa*, Sk. *āmarśa/āmṛśa*),
2. phlegm (Pk. *khela*, Sk. *kapha* or “*kṣela*” = *śleṣma*),
3. secretions such as sweat and mucus (*jalla*),
4. waste matter (from the tongue, lip, teeth, nose and ear) (*mala*),
5. excreta (urine and excrement) (*viṣa*),
6. everything (that was in contact with the ascetic body) (Pk. *savva*, Sk. *sarva*),
7. poison-removing words (Pk. *vayaṇa-nivvīsa*, Sk. *vacana-nirviṣa*),
8. poison-removing sight (Pk. *diṭṭhi-nivvīsa*, Sk. *drṣṭī-nirviṣa*).

In this list, no further differentiation of *viṣa* is offered. Instead two somewhat different items (no. 7–8) are added. For a discussion of a similar list in Vīrasena's ninth century commentary on the Śaṅkhaṇḍāgama of Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali, see Wiley (2012, pp. 156–8). Patañjali, in his Yogasūtra (YS) III, lists many superhuman powers acquired through yoga, but not the power of healing.

⁵⁸ See P 260b ff. summarised by Schubring (1935/2000, p. §§ 61, 68f.). For a discussion of Schubring's implicit theory of the Jaina doctrine of influence *qua* karmic binding, see Flügel (2010a, p. 130f.).

⁵⁹ See TP₁ II.4.1088–1098 for instance.

⁶⁰ In the same way as the auto-commentary on TS₁ 10.7, which also mentions the healing powers of the body secretions of the most advanced Jaina ascetics, Āryikā Viśuddhamatī emphasized in her commentary on TP₁ II.4.1086, that this power results from *tapas* which is difficult to accomplish. It is associated in particular with *tapasvinīs*, monks and nuns specialised in long fasts: *jis ṛddhi ke prabhāv se duṣkar tap se yukta munīyoṃ dvārā sparśa kiyā huā jal evaṃ vāyu tathā rom aur nack ādi vyādhi ke haranevāle hī jāte haiṃ, vah sarvausadhī nāmak ṛddhi hai*.

⁶¹ Jain (1947, p. 227) in his discussion of passages mentioning curing by touch, however, points to the role of spells and charms and the help of gods (rather than powerful matter) in the ascetics' exercise of magical powers.

⁶² The constitutive opposition of purity and power, posited by Dumont (1966/1980) for Hinduism, has been transcended by Jaina and Buddhist systems.

The belief in the power (here: *labdhi*) of dissociated body particles of Jaina ascetics is unmistakable in the following passage of Hemacandra's twelfth century Jaina universal history, the *Triṣaṣṭīśalākāpuruṣacaritra* (TŚPC) translated by H. Johnson (1931–1962) as “The Lives of the 63 Illustrious Persons”:

By the power of their yoga all the magic powers [*labdhi*], phlegm, etc., became apparent like mountain herbs by moonlight. The body of a leper, if rubbed with just a particle of their phlegm, became golden like a heap of copper from kotivedha juice. The impurities from their eyes, ears, etc., and from their limbs, having the fragrance of musk, were a medicine for all sick people. Merely from touching their bodies, sick people became well, as if from a bath of nectar. Water, both rain-water and running water of rivers, etc., that had been in contact with their bodies, removed all diseases, as the light of the sun destroys darkness. The bad effects of poison, etc., disappeared from wind that touches their bodies, just as other elephants disappear because of the scent of the ichor of a rutting elephant. Food, etc., infected with poison that was placed in their dishes or mouths, became free from poison like pieces of nectar. By hearing their speech, pain left any one afflicted with a very poisonous disease, as poison disappears by a syllable of a charm. The nails, hair, teeth, and every thing else produced by their bodies became medicines, just as water in pearl-oysters becomes pearls (TŚPC 1. 843–855, translated by Johnson 1931 I, pp. 75–77).⁶³

The contemporary Sthānakavāsī monk Amar Muni pointed to divergent opinions between those who believe that the body parts of Jaina ascetics are themselves powerful, and others who assert that the will of the ascetic alone endows them with energy.⁶⁴ The question is pertinent in the context of the assessment of the powers of healing (*auṣadhi-ṛddhi*). In his explanation of the canonical text *Uvavāya* (Uv₂) 24b–c, Amar Muni refers to a passage in Jinadāsagaṇi Mahattara's seventh century *Āvaśyakacūrṇi* (ĀvC)⁶⁵ which insists that the *auṣadhi-ṛddhis* “are effective only when the ascetic wishes and resolves to use them for the benefit of others” (p. 64).⁶⁶ A different view is expressed, for instance, in Siddhasenasūri's⁶⁷ twelfth century

⁶³ Similar potencies are evident in the Hindu traditions. On the “impersonal potency” of healing attributed to the touch of “royal sages” (*rājarṣi*), see Gonda (1956, p. 45); and Parry (1982, p. 96) on the “miraculous medicinal potencies” of the bodily emissions of Aghorī ascetics, for instance.

⁶⁴ In line with the second interpretation, Uv₃ 24b–c defines the powers of Jaina ascetics not as *iddhis* but as *laddhis*, or attainments, that is, not as intrinsic qualities or properties of a living being, but as consequences of specific austerities, some of which are detailed in Uv₃ 24c. These powers can apparently be conveyed at will upon material atoms disregarding their locating inside or outside the body.

⁶⁵ On dates and author, see Balbir (1993, p. 81).

⁶⁶ The untraced text in “ĀvC I” is cited in Amar Muni's Hindī commentary, also referred to by Wiley (2012, p. 154):

āmosahipattāṇaṃ roḡābhībhūtaṃ attāṇaṃ paraṃ vā javevi tiḡicchāmī |
ti samcīteūṇa āsurati te takkhaṇā ceva vavagayarogātamaṃ karoti ||
(cited in Uv₂, p. 64).

⁶⁷ There are three Siddhasenas mentioned in this article: Siddhasenadvākara (c. 7th century), Siddhasenagaṇi (c. 9th Century) and Siddhasenasūri (12th century) who belonged to the succession of Abhayadevasūri of the Candragaccha/Rājagaccha. The last two are Śvetāmbara. The first is claimed to be Yāpanīya by Upadhye (1974/1983, p. 200) and Jaini (1978/2000, p. 59).

Tattvabodhavikāśinī (TJV) 270–271, a commentary (*vr̥tti*) on Nemicandrasūri’s eleventh century Pravacanasāroddhāra (PS) 270–271, which stresses the intrinsic healing powers of detached body parts of Jaina ascetics.⁶⁸

In part six of the TŚPC, bone relics (*asthi*) of the Jinas are also described as having “power” (*prabhāva*) (TŚPC₁ 6.565) and conveying “good fortune” (*kalyāṇa*) (TŚPC₁ 13.269). The conundrum, how this can be understood in the context of Jaina teachings will be addressed in the remainder of this text.

The Question of the Power of Relics

In which ways can material objects such as bone relics be conceptualised in Jaina philosophical terms as repositories of transmittable living energy of a deceased living being? The standard approach, both scholastic and academic, is to simply dismiss relic practices as delusional forms of ‘popular religion’ or ‘magical thinking’ that deviate from the true teaching of the Jina. Another approach is to accept ‘folk theories’ on the metaphysical presence of the powers of the deceased in the relics at face value without seeking an explanation. By contrast, the main argument of the present article, that in the Jaina doctrinal context bone relics are treated as sacred objects because of their specific material rather than metaphysical qualities, is based on the assumption that relics are conceptualised by participants in the same way as other dissociated body parts of Jaina ascetics, despite the fact that they are not included in the standard *auṣadhi*- or other *ṛddhi/labdhi* lists. The ritual treatment of the dead body of an ascetic, or of parts thereof, as powerful sacred matter, described in the narrative portions of the canon⁶⁹ and in recent ethnography⁷⁰, is also predicated, one would assume, on the implicit presupposition that it is composed of particularly refined karmically produced particles which turn from animated into inanimated matter after being disconnected from the soul, and that the energy stored in these unique particles can somehow be transmitted by physical contiguity, even after death and cremation. Yet, this is rarely, if ever, explicitly

⁶⁸ “As is stated in *Avashyaka Churni* 1 – A *shraman* endowed with *Amarshaushadi labdhi* can cure a person or himself by his touch only when he resolved – ‘I wish to cure him.’ As long as he does not resolve thus this power does not become effective as a cure. However, in many scriptures there are mentions of instances where the smell or touch of the excreta of such accomplished ascetics naturally cure many diseases. More details on this subject are available in the commentaries (*Tika* and *Vyakhya*) of *Dvar 271 of Pravacanasaroddhar* (Amar Muni in *UV*₃, p. 64, translated by S. Bothara)”.

⁶⁹ Jaini (1985, p. 89).

⁷⁰ Flügel (2008, 2010b, 2011).

discussed in the texts, certainly not in karman theoretical terms⁷¹, nor is relic worship a highly rationalised Jaina religious practice, for instance in terms of quasi-contractual forms of merit transfer. The question, how disembodied ascetic power is (or could be) conceptualised in Jaina philosophy is thus, to some extent, an exercise in philosophical speculation, although it will in the following be investigated with reference to relevant Jaina philosophical debates and contemporary Jaina practices.

The question, how the power attributed to relics and other detached body parts of Jaina ascetics can be understood from the point of view of Jaina doctrine has never been raised in the academic literature.⁷² Significant is what Jaina scholasticism has to say about this issue.⁷³ We will find that late canonical Jaina scriptures such as the *Viyāhapannatti* and its commentaries, maybe only these texts, offer ways of understanding materially embodied ascetic power in Jaina doctrinal terms. By contrast, philosophical rationalisations of the process of transmission of ascetic energy via disembodied material objects are very rarely encountered, if at all. These are considered to be heretical, since the existence of ascetic energy is predicated on a connection of karmic matter with the soul. Apocryphal beliefs in the

⁷¹ In this respect only, the dominant strictly dualist Jaina position corresponds to the Theravāda Buddhist view. Cf. KV_{1,2} (XVI.8 for the controversy concerning the “heretical” views of the Saṃmitiya Buddhists that “material qualities are results [of karmas]” (*rūpaṃ [kamma-] vipāko*) and KV_{1,2} (VII.7 for the view of the Andhaka Buddhists that “land is the result of action” *paṭhavi kammavipāko*), that for instance “the earth is a result of the action of a being who is a world-monarch” (*paṭhavi cakkavattisattassa kamma-vipāko*). Halbfass (1991/1992, p. 343, n. 125) also points to the last passage. On the difference between *kamma* and *kammavipāko* see also the Buddhist controversy described in KV VIII.9. In classical Jaina doctrine, one of the terms specifying the results (*phala*) of automatically maturing experienced karman is also *vivāga* (Sk. *vipāka*), not to be confused with karmic particles (*karma-pudgala*) attracted by the resulting action. The dualist position of classical Jainism, mediated by the concept of the karmic particle, contrasts with the later Theravāda position documented in the KV, “that the result of (*vipāka*) of kamma is a matter of subjective experience, that material effects per se do not arise directly because of human action” (McDermott 1975, p. 433).

⁷² Brown (1998, p. 33) asked a similar question with regard to Buddha images: “If the Buddha produced miracles through his power of *iddhi*, for example, is this also what allows an image to produce a miracle?” His answer, like the argument proposed in this article for the case of bone relics, points to the materiality of the sacred object. Granoff (1998a, p. 58), by contrast, pointed out that for the Jaina monk “in many cases an image, particularly a miracle-working image, is not an image but the Jina himself”, although “the modern scholar knows of course that it is the image of the Jina the monk/author of these hymns is seeing”.

⁷³ According to the canonical *Paṇṇavaṇā* (P) 1.84, excreta and body secretions are said to be populated by uncountable *saṃmucchima-maṇussa*, tiny short-lived human beings invisible to the human eye, and should therefore not be touched at all. Buddhist texts report the existence of similar views amongst at least some Buddhist monks. Jaina mendicants are not allowed to study at a site where body parts such as excrement, bones, blood, etc. are close (Tṭhaṇa 475b according to Schubring 1935/2000, § 150, p. 267, cf. Balbir 1990a). At the Spalding symposium, held in Oxford in honour of Professor Karel Werner’s 85th birthday, Lance Cousins kindly pointed me to the late text *Kathāvattthu*, or *Points of Controversy*, of the *Abhidhammapīṭaka* for Buddhist debates on the excrement of the Buddha. Some Buddhist monks, according to the commentary (KVA) to KV_{1,2} XVIII.4 some of the Andhakas and Uttarāpathakas, held the view that “the excreta [uccāra-passāvo] of the Exalted Buddha excelled all other odorous things”. The refutation of this view points to the “fact” that secretions of the Buddha were not collected by anyone to make cosmetics, etc.

transferability of karman from one living being to another can occasionally be encountered⁷⁴, but are a minority view in Jaina discourse. Everyone knows that karman accrues only to the living body of the agent, that is, the embodied soul, and travels with the soul of the deceased to the place of its next incarnation. This leaves only the physical attributes of the detached body parts of the ascetics as the potentially transmittable source of the power of relics.

How then, if at all, can the often reported quasi ‘alchemical’⁷⁵ processes of crystallisation of ascetic energy in bone relics and other body parts be cogitated in Jaina doctrinal terms? It seems, this is only possible if a concept of dead matter is posited that remains charged with the results of karmically generated energy, for some time, even after its dissociation from the embodied soul.

Formation of the Body

Jaina interpretations of the qualities of disembodied material particles presuppose the classical Jaina concept of embodied matter and theoretical analysis of the process of embodiment.⁷⁶ The basic components of body formation are the processes of attraction, bondage, and ejection of inanimate material particles by the embodied soul (Viy₁ 18.3.5 [743b]), that is, the interaction between soul and matter through the inflow and outflow of material particles.⁷⁷ Two types of material particles are strictly distinguished in the texts: matter that constitutes the five bodies (*sarīra*) of the living being, that is, the embodied soul⁷⁸, in accordance with its karmic code⁷⁹, and matter that is drawn from exterior (*bāhira-poggala*) for short moments only without being incorporated. From the point of view of their status in the karmic cycle, the texts further differentiate three modes of material particles:

⁷⁴ See Cort (2003, p. 133ff.), Laughlin (2003, pp. 41, 47f.). Cf. Halbfass (1991/1992, p. 321) on Nyāya conceptions of sharers of karman (*karmabhāgin*) or the obstruction of the ripening of karman through interference of karman of other living beings who are bound to have a shared experience (*samānopabhoga*).

⁷⁵ See Balbir (1990b, 1992), White (1996), and Sikdar (1980). For recent discussions of the lists of the powers of the body of a yogin, though not body relics, which influenced the Jaina conceptions as well, see the articles in Jacobsen (2012).

⁷⁶ For details of the classical Jaina theory of the formation of the body, see Wiley (2000, Ch. p. 3).

⁷⁷ See Schubring (1935/2000, § 60, p. 134) on the process of amalgamating (*sāhaṇa*), retaining (*āhāra* or *āgarisa*) (cf. P 6.683ff., in Mālvaṇiyā 1971, p. 303), and secreting (*bheya*) atoms in Viy₁ 12.4.b–c (567a–569a).

⁷⁸ Viy. 8.1 refers to living beings only, which have a minimum of three bodies: gross, fiery, and karman and a maximum of four at at any specific moment of time.

For the various permutations of body types and classes of beings, see the summary table by Wiley (2000, p. 151). She points to the specifically Digambara distinction between separable (*prthaka-vaikriya-sarīra*) and non-separable (*prthaka-v.-ś.*) transformation bodies (ib., pp. 147–150).

⁷⁹ First matter constituting the karmic body is attracted by the karmic body itself, and then suitable matter for constituting the other bodies which are pruced by different forms of *nāma-karman*.

(1) “attractable particles” (*gahaṇa-poggala/davva*)⁸⁰, (2) “attracted particles” (*āhāra-p.*), that is, particles by means of which the organic body of a living being is gradually built up, and (3) “ejected particles” (*nijjarā-p.*), which were discarded by acts of self-purification or final liberation of the soul. Attractable and unattractable forms of insentient matter are further sub-divided in accordance with the theoretical quantity of their elementary atoms (*paramāṇu-p.*) forming aggregates (*skandha*) of classes (*vaggaṇā*) of equal numerical value. The qualities of such aggregates are also distinguished by their basic physical attributes such as shape, colour, smell, etc.⁸¹

The *locus classicus* for the Jaina doctrine of the five bodies is P₂ 12.5.⁸² The manifest body of a living being is a composite of a minimum of two⁸³ and a maximum of four different types of bodies (*sarīra*) since the *vaikriya* and *āhāraka* bodies cannot co-exist. These are graded in terms of the increasing fineness and density of their elementary material atoms (*poggala*) and molecules (*khamdha*):

- (1) gross body (*urāliya-s./orāliya-s.*, Sk. *audārika-ś.*),
- (2) transformation body (*veuvviya-s.*, Sk. *vaikriya-ś.*),
- (3) translocation body (*āhāraka-s.*, Sk. *āhāraka-ś.*),
- (4) fiery body (*teyaga-s.*, Sk. *taijasa-ś.*), and
- (5) karman body (*kammaga-s.*, Sk. *kārmaṇa-ś.*).

⁸⁰ Cf. the interpretations of TS₁ 8.2 (*sakaṣāyatvāj jīvaḥ karmaṇo yogyān pudgalān ādatte*) by the translator N. Tatia: “Because of its passions, the soul attracts and assimilates the material particles of karmic bondage”; which should better be translated: “... material particles capable of turning into karmic bondage”. Cf. TS₁ 8.24–25. Schubring (1935/2000, § 84, p. 173) emphasized that “matter attracted by soul is not yet Karman, but it comes to be so”. It is not exactly stated in TS₁ 8.2 that “Karmic matter is said to be found ‘floating free’ in every part of occupied space” (Jaini 1979, p. 112). What is meant is that fine matter capable of being transformed into karmic matter (*karmaṇo yogyān-pudgalān*) is everywhere (personal communication Jaini, March 2008). See TS₁₋₂ 8.3 & 8.25, SAS 8.2, and Sikdar (1987, pp. 42, 80f.). Cf. Wiley (2000, pp. 408–410 on types of “graspable” matter. The texts distinguish between attractable/non-attractable matter in terms of degrees of subtlety. Matter capable of being transformed into a karmic body is so refined that it is invisible to the eye.

⁸¹ Sikdar (1987, p. 223–253). Frauwallner (1953/1997 II: 188) finds it “remarkable” that in the Jaina theory of matter the qualities of the elements “occur to all the atoms equally”, while the distinct qualities of aggregates are caused by *pariṇāma*.—See also Schubring (1935/2000, § 60, p. 134), who points to the vocabulary of the self-referential processes of attracting (*sāhaṇaṇa*)—elsewhere called *āgarisa*—and secreting (*bheya*) material atoms in Viy₁ 12.4.b–c (567a–569a), where seven kinds of atomic regroupment (*poggala-pariyaṭṭa*) are distinguished in the context of the theoretical analysis of the mechanisms responsible for building up and transforming the body by changing (*pariṇāma*) and extracting (*nijjarā*) karmic particles.

⁸² *paṃca sarīrayā paṇṇattā, taṃ jahā – orālie veuvvie āhārae teyae kammae* (P₂ 12.5). See in Sanskrit TS₁₋₂ 2.37–49.

⁸³ Karman and fiery body, the “bearer of potential energies” (Schubring 1935/2000, § 62, p. 139): “All bodies except the earthly one are closely linked with the soul” (ib.).

The maximal five bodies of a living being⁸⁴ are generated by the *kārmaṇa-śarīra* which is itself composed of invisible subtle particles that attract gross material particles from the exterior and form them into atomic compounds of different quality. According to classical Jaina karman theory, the presence or absence of the capacity (*labdhi*) for the complete development of the personal body, the *pariyāptanāma-karman* (Pk. *pajjatta-nāma-kamma*)⁸⁵, which is a subtle form of karmic matter attached to the unliberated soul from the very beginning, determines the ability to attract from outside and further transform inanimate matter into animate matter and to build up and maintain the maximal five types of bodies that are attached to and obstructing the soul.⁸⁶ It is the quality and quantity of this and other *nāma-karman* which constitutes individual living beings of differential structure and ability.⁸⁷ The soul with the help of its *pariyāptanāma-karman* has the power to attract suitable types of matter from outside the body which were already transformed naturally. The material particles are then further modified within the body by karmic processes.⁸⁸ First, elementary forms of body matter are created which are differentiated into a liquid part (*rasa-bhāga*) and a solid part (*khala-bhāga*). From the two basic varieties seven primary forms of organic matter (*dhātu*) are produced, of which flesh (*māṃsa*) and bones (*asthi* or *sthira*) are the most significant solid varieties. The physical strength of the body is dependent on the quality of the joints connecting the bones, which are determined by the solid joint making karman (*saṃhanana-nāma-karman*), which is considered as a type of physical power (*śakti*) producing karman.⁸⁹ Even the physical attractiveness or repulsiveness, produced by *śubha-* and *aśubha-nāma-karman*, is a product of body forming karman.

Karman (here: action, that is, karman that comes to fruition) attracts matter in a selective way: good karman (*puṇya-karman*) attracts more subtle matter than bad karman (*pāpa-karman*). By means of ascetic practices, including non-action (*ayoga*), the influx of matter from the outside can be stopped (*saṃvara*), gross forms of matter can be transformed (*pariṇāma*) into subtle forms of matter, and matter can be discharged entirely from the body (*nirjarā*). The processes of selective attraction and of karmic transformation and dissociation of matter from the body of the ascetic thus lead to the autocatalytic production of compounds of matter of very subtle and pure quality, and finally to the liberation of the soul from embodiment. When they are removed from the body, dissociated material particles return to their original

⁸⁴ *Viy*₁ 13.7.1c (622b) distinguishes further two further bodies for beings who have not yet been fully embodied in them: transitional transformation body (*veuvviya-mīsaya-kāya*) and transitional transposition body (*āhāraya-mīsaya-kāya*). See Deleu (1970, p. 200), and Schubring (1935/2000, § 62, pp. 137–139) who suggested that instead of “*āhāraka* ‘attracting’ its name should be *ādāhāraka* in that the body represents a ‘vessel’”. On the Jain theory of five bodies see Frauwallner (1953/1997 I: 142). Notably, the heavenly or *vaimānika* gods do not possess a gross body according to classical Jainism. On contrasting Sāṃkhya views compare for instance Oberlies (2006).

⁸⁵ Its opposite is called *apajjatta-nāma-kamma* (Sk. *aparyāptanāma-karman*).

⁸⁶ For details on *nāma-karman*, see TS₁₋₂ 8.12, SAS 8.11, Glasenapp (1915/1942, pp. 11–18) and Wiley (2000, pp. 117–231).

⁸⁷ The body of a Tirthāṅkara is made of the purest gross-body (*parama-audārika*) atoms.

⁸⁸ For details, see Wiley (2000).

⁸⁹ See Glasenapp (1915/1942, p. 14f.), Wiley (2000, pp. 164, 170, 173f., 186, 220).

inanimate state and can then be attracted by another embodied soul. The same applies to aggregates (*skandha*) of material atoms that had been attracted, transformed by their association with the soul, and finally dissociated (Vi_y₁ 14.4).⁹⁰ The question is whether matter that was transformed and refined through karmic processes retains its unique qualities and can be selectively reappropriated again by another living being.

Embodied Pure and Auspicious Matter

Matter (*puḍgala*) that is auspicious (*śubha*) and pure (*śuddha*) is occasionally referred to in late canonical and post-canonical texts to explain special ascetic powers⁹¹ believed to be crystallised in the aggregates of particularly refined matter that constitute the living ascetic body. Most prominent is the following passage in the Śvetāmbara version of Umāsvāti's fourth century Sanskrit Tattvārthasūtra (TS₁) 2.49, the principal text of classical Jaina doctrine accepted by both Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras, which explains the features of the conveyance body (*āhāraka-śarīra*), known to be effective only for very short time⁹², that allows the ascetic to travel to distant places for a short period of time while remaining connected with his physical body (*audārika-śarīra*). The conveyance body is made of a subtle form of matter that is very auspicious and pure (*śubha-viśuddha*) and invisible to the eye:⁹³

The conveyance body is made of auspicious, pure, non-obstructive and non-obstructed matter. It can be created only by a learned ascetic conversant with the fourteen books of the early literature (TS₁ 2.49, translated by N. Tatia).

The Digambara version of the TS that was preserved in the fifth century commentary of Ācārya Pūjyapāda, the Sarvārthasiddhi (SaSi), gives a different ending to the same verse:⁹⁴

The conveyance body is made of auspicious, pure, non-obstructive and non-obstructed matter. Only an ascetic who is self-restrained but prone to laxity uses this body (TS₂ 2.49, in SaSi₃, translated by Jain).

In his commentary, Pūjyapāda focuses not on the creation but on the use of these extraordinary bodies and stresses that it is slightly incorrect to strive for the

⁹⁰ See infra.

⁹¹ For two types of matter used in the magical constitution of temporary bodies, see Schubring (1935/2000, § 181, p. 318).

⁹² The “heretical” view of the Buddhist Mahiṃsāsakas and Saṃmitiyas reported in the commentary KVA to KV_{1,2} VIII.9 and XVI.7, that because “action of body and speech [are] either good or bad” the “material qualities (engaged therein) are also either good or bad”] (*rūpaṃ kusalaṃ pi akusalaṃ pīti*) [is slightly different. What is meant is not a material karmic result (unthinkable for a Buddhist), but “the physical motions engaged therein” (gesticulation, etc.) (KVA XVI.7).]

⁹³ *śubhaṃ viśuddham avyāghāti cāhārakaṃ caturdaśa-pūrvadhara-eva* (TS₁₋₂ 2.49).

⁹⁴ *śubhaṃ viśuddham avyāghāti cāhārakaṃ pramatta-samyatasya-eva* (TS 2.49, in SaSi₃).

accomplishment of a pure and hence powerful body such as this and that one should make use of it if one is not self-restrained. However, the existence of “auspicious” and “pure” matter which creates “merit” (*puṇya-karma*) is not disputed by Pūjyapāda, as his commentary shows:⁹⁵

The expression ‘auspicious matter’ in the sutra means that the clusters of matter that constitute the conveyance body are pleasant in colour, odour, touch and taste and that they produce merit. ‘Pure matter’ implies that the clusters are transparent, shiny and conducive to harmless conduct. ‘Unobstructive and unobstructed matter’ [*avyāghāti*] signifies that these clusters have free unimpeded movement to the destination (SaSi₃ 2.49, summary by Tatia 1994, p. 60).⁹⁶

Since the terms *śubha* and *viśuddha* can equally refer to “wholesome” and to “shining” forms of matter, the passage is somewhat ambiguous. Important for the discussion of sacred matter is that in this context it has been understood to be a merit-producing subtle form of matter. However, it is not explained how this subtle form of matter produces merit.⁹⁷ This form of matter exists only in connection with the body of a living being.

Disembodied Pure and Auspicious Matter

Concepts of disembodied ‘pure-’ and ‘auspicious matter’, contrasted with ‘impure-’ or ‘inauspicious matter’, appear, in different contexts, already in the Prakrit Śvetāmbara Āgamas, especially in the Viyāhapannatti, most prominently in Viy. 5.9 and 14.9; the first being an early passage and the second a late passage representing the most advanced theory of matter in the canon. These passages reflect different stages of the new Jaina conception of matter which co-evolved together with the transition from voluntaristic to systemic conceptions of karman in the middle and late canonical periods. The model of karman as a system works with a concept of action without an agent. It represents action as an objective auto-poietic process, analogous to the agricultural seed-plant cycle, with karmic matter functioning as a

⁹⁵ *śubhakāraṇatvācchubhavyapadeśaḥ | śubhakarmaṇa āhāarakāyayogasya
kāraṇatvācchubhamityucyate annasya prāṇavyapadeśavat |
viśuddhakāryatvādvīśuddhavyapadeśaḥ | viśuddhasya puṇyakarmaṇaḥ
aśabalasya niravadyasya kāryatvādvīśuddhamityucyate tantūnām
kāryāsavyapadeśavat | ... | (SaSi₁ 357).*

⁹⁶ Jain (1960/1992, p. 81), in his even less literal translation, renders the meaning as follows: “Sometimes the cause is identified with the effect. ... Since it (the projectable body) brings about spotless and pure result, it is called pure”. The text explains, however, that a monk who uses these powers comes down to the sixth of the fourteen qualitative stages (*guṇasthāna*) of the path of salvation. On TS₁₋₂ 2.9, see also Jacobi (1906, p. 308).

⁹⁷ See also Wiley (2000, p. 144) on TS 2.49; and Wiley (2012, p. 185f.)

seed-like particle.⁹⁸ In Jaina philosophy of nature, matter, like the soul, is also conceived as an ‘active’ or ‘moving’ (*kriyā*) substance, unlike the other three of altogether five substances (*pañcāstikāya*). It undergoes somewhat similar systemic processes of self-transformation (*pariṇāma*), of aggregation and disaggregation, as does the karman of the embodied soul that automatically come to fruition. Classical Jaina cosmology describes the parallel mechanisms of self-transformation of the embodied soul and of inanimate matter and the results of their interaction.⁹⁹

A few examples illustrate the range of application of the Prakrit terms *suddha* and *subha* as attributes of disembodied matter: *Viy*₁ 14.2 (634a–636a), a text which Ohira (1994, p. 64) locates in the fourth-fifth canonical stage (4th–5th century C.E.), analyses spirit possession (*ummāya*) as an effect of the penetration of one living body by “inauspicious particles” (*asubha-poggala*) sent off by another; in this case a demon or god. This passage can be interpreted in two ways: Either it suggests that the transmitted particles have moral characteristics, though there is no explicit reference to a ‘transfer of demerit’ (*pāpā*), or, more likely, that the transmitted matter itself has qualities which induces negative or “unpleasant” states. From the point of view of karman doctrine, of course, possession, though experienced as real, is a form of delusion, which can be cured by the application of discriminative knowledge resulting in the ejection of the troublesome particles.¹⁰⁰

A similar example is the brightness of the day, believed to be caused by the rays of light sent out by the sun (which is conceived as a living god in classical Jaina cosmology). In *Viy*₁ 5.9.2 (246b) and 14.9.4 (656a), two passages which Ohira (1994, p. 64) located both in the “third canonical stage” (1st century B.C.E.–3rd century C.E.), light is explained in terms of the concept of ‘pure’ or ‘shining’ matter (the same principle is applied to darkness of the night which is interpreted to be the effect of dark matter, *tamas-kāya*). Here, the transmitted energy is not inducing moral states in a living being, but is simply described as a natural phenomenon.¹⁰¹ According to Ohira (1994, p. 97), the ancient view “that light, darkness and sound are independent entities”, is invoked here, “which seems to have been prevalent in the olden days when these were not yet considered as properties of substance”.

⁹⁸ Bhatt (1983, p. 111) located the first appearance of the theory of matter in the second layer and the advanced theory in the last of three “textual layers” of the *Viy*. The fully developed “system theory” of karman developed from c. the first to fifth centuries C.E. It culminated in the Śvetāmbara tradition on the focus on the distinction between *jīva* and *ajīva* and “the usage of *ajīva* in the sense of the *astikāyas* minus *jīva* and *addhāsamaya*” (Ohira 1994, p. 113). Cf. Werner (1996, p. 76) on Vedic concepts of “individual organisms” as “self-regulatory systems”, as “structural-functional units”.

⁹⁹ See *infra* on the theory of transformation.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Kapferer (1997) for similar methods employed in Sinhalese Buddhist anti-sorcery rites.

¹⁰¹ The words *subha*- and *asubha-poggala* mentioned in *Viy*₁ 5.9.2 (246b), 14.8, etc., are ambiguous, and can alternatively be translated as in/auspicious or not/shining, but in this context were rendered by Schubring (1935/2000, § 69, p. 151) and Deleu (1970, p. 204) as “pure” and “impure”. See Sikdar (1987, p. 235 and Tatia 1994, p. 60) who prefer “inauspicious/auspicious”.

Temporary Bodies Created by Ascetics

The clearest and maybe only unequivocal exposition of the material qualities and powers of ejected particles, their purity or impurity, and of their effects offered by the Jaina scriptures is the analysis of the concepts of *teya-lessā* (Sk. *tejo-leśyā*) and *kamma-less(s)ā* (Sk. *karma-leśyā*) in the *Viy*.¹⁰² Both terms refer to forms of radiating energy generated by the fiery body of advanced Jaina ascetics. According to P 17.1188–1198, the *kamma-lessā*, or karmically produced radiance or personal aura of the ascetic,¹⁰³ is intrinsically connected with the quality and quantity of his (her) *iddhis*.¹⁰⁴ In *Viy*₁ 14.9.1 (655a) it is compared with material objects such as the radiance of the sun and moon gods. The commentator Abhayadeva (*ViyVṛ* 14.9.1) noted that the term *sakarma-leśyā* could be interpreted by imperfect monks (*chadmastha*) in the sense that *leśyā* itself is *karman*.¹⁰⁵ But this is not the case, despite the ambiguous compound.¹⁰⁶ Both Schubring (1935/2000, § 89, p. 185), Deleu (1970, p. 212)¹⁰⁷ and Ohira (1994, p. 126) emphasize that the “colouration of the soul”, (*bhāva-*) *leśyā*, “is not karma”, but is only carried by the *kārmaṇa-śarīra* during transmigration. Ohira (ib., p. 127f.) argues that in the theory of the process of transmigration it performs the function of “pinpointing more exactly” a precise place for the rebirth of a soul within a cosmographic region, matching the final *leśyā* of its last incarnation before death. However, in time, this “original function” of the term was forgotten and “*leśyā* as the personality-index of beings came to the fore”

¹⁰² See the proposed chronology of Tsuchihashi (1983, p. 202).

¹⁰³ Schubring (1935, p. 267) suggested that this conception stems from the “popular belief in bright good and dark bad hearts”. Mālvaṇiyā (1971, p. 356) translated *leśyā* as “mental temperament” and characterised it as “nothing but a sort of transformation or modification of matter, which takes place depending on the soul” (ib., p. 353). Building on this, Ohira (1994, p. 129) uses the description “psychical and emotional tinges”. Flügel (2008, p. 7) suggested comparison with Heidegger’s analysis of “mood”. Malde (2010, p. 16), who discusses the salient literature, pleads for an “allegorical” understanding of many passages on *leśyā*.

¹⁰⁴ Mālvaṇiyā (1971, p. 353f.). See also Tsuchihashi (1983, p. 195f.).

¹⁰⁵ Deleu’s formulation could lead to the same conclusion. See also Tsuchihashi (1983, pp. 195–202).

¹⁰⁶ See also *ViyBh* 14.9.123–125 on the difference between the two types of meaning of *karma-leśyā*: “*pahlā artha karma ke yogya leśyā tathā dūsṛā artha karma kī leśyā kiyā hai*”.

¹⁰⁷ The “concrete particles endowed with a karmic lessā (*sarūviṃ sakamma-lessā poggalā*)” (*Viy*₁ 14.9 [655a], tr. Deleu 1970, p. 212) that are radiating out from a living being in the form of brightness or heat are not the *karma-leśyā* itself:

haṃtā goyamā! aṇagāre bhāvīyaṇā appaṇo kammalessaṃ na jāṇai, na pāsai, taṃ puṇa jīvaṃ sarūviṃ sakammalessaṃ jāṇai-pāsai” (*Viy*₄ 14.9.123)

According to Abhayadeva’s commentary (*ViyVṛ* 14.1) to *Viy*₁ 14.1 (630a), summarised by Deleu (1970, p. 203), *kamma-lessā* refers to “‘Karmic lessā’, i.e. lessā as a condition (*bhāva-leśyā*), not material lessā (*dravya-leśyā*) because the latter is well defined (*avasthita*)”. Mālvaṇiyā (1971, p. 354) suggested that this distinction is rather late, since it cannot be found in the Paṇṇaṇā. See also Ohira (1994, p. 128). The same type of explanation is given by Abhayadeva (*ViyVṛ* 14.9.136) on *teya-lessā* in *Viy*₁ 14.9.5 (656b) (Deleu 1970, p. 212). Schubring 1935 / 2000 § 99: 199, however, noted that the commentaries are often uncertain and sometimes clearly wrong.

(ib., p. 129), now expressing “the total content making up an individual personality”, that is, the “psychical and emotional tinges” (ib.) of the soul.¹⁰⁸

The ontological status of the *tejo-leśyā* is disputed in Jaina literature. According to the auto-commentary on TS₁ 2.43, summarised by Tatia (1994, p. 57), the fiery power is “only an attribute” of the fiery body, produced by the temporary expansion of the space points of this body, and not a secondary body or entirely separate entity which can be emitted (*nirṛṣṭa*)¹⁰⁹ or hurled intentionally from the body of the ascetic, although this is precisely the impression conveyed by the depiction of Gosāla’s attack on Mahāvīra in Vīy₁ 15.C.7 (678a–b) (using the potentially deadly ‘hot’ form of his *teya-lessā* only to be repelled by Mahāvīra’s ‘cool’ or protective *teya-lessā*).¹¹⁰ Vīy₁ 7.10.b (326b) similarly states that a monk who sends out a *teya-lessā* composed of non-sentient (*acitta*) particles will produce light and heat where the *teya-lessā* falls down.¹¹¹ Tsuchihashi (1983, p. 200) finds this “remarkable” and suspects that here a sentient being, a man, “manifests himself by virtue of his own inborn *leśyā*” in an inanimate entity.

According to the dominant Jaina interpretations, transformation, translocation and fiery bodies that are temporarily created by ascetics are never entirely separate from the soul, but karmically produced by a process of momentary expansion of the space points or *paesas* (Sk. *pradeśa*)¹¹² occupied by the soul beyond the limits of the gross physical body.¹¹³ This process is called *samugghāya* (Sk. *samudghāta*),¹¹⁴ of which seven forms are distinguished in P 36. However, in his commentary, the

¹⁰⁸ Ohira (1994, p. 127) argued:

The concept of *leśyā*, which expresses a general index of the total content making up an individual personality, was readily available in the then non-Jaina schools. ... It thus appears that the Jaina theoreticians seized this current concept, and assigned to it a faculty to determine a being’s next birth place. ... This *leśyā* must have been conceived as something material in connection with colour, like shining light tinged with colour.

¹⁰⁹ Pk. *nisaṭṭha*.

¹¹⁰ Schubring (1954, p. 258) remarked: “[T]eya-lessā ist streng genommen unzutreffend mit *teya* gleichbedeutend gebraucht. Da es kein kalt-heisses *tejas* gibt (schon das kalte ist widersinnig), ist statt *sōsiṇa* ... *sāosiṇa* zu lesen”. He agrees with Abhayadeva’s commentary, on which see also Wiley (2000, p. 146).

¹¹¹ See also Vīy₁ 18.10 (757a).

¹¹² On the Jaina theory of the ‘space points’ or ‘units of mass’, see TS_{1,2} 5.7–5.11, 5.14, and Schubring (1935/2000, § 55ff. 126 ff., etc). According to the Jaina theory, material and immaterial objects are constituted temporarily by variable combinations of different elementary substances: the units (*pradeśa*) of space (*ākāśa*) occupied by particles of matter (*pudgala*), the medium of motion (*dharma*), the medium of rest (*adhama*), and of the soul (the concept of a unit of time or *kāla* is disputed within the tradition). Inevitably, liberated souls, or *siddhas*, are also imagined as quasi-material entities, endowed with a set of space-points (*jīva-ghana*), which are by definition immaterial, defining a particular occupied space (*avaḡāhanā*) of a definite size in the realm of the liberated souls, or *siddha-loka*, which is predicated on the size of the body of the last rebirth. See Uv₁ 169–177, etc.; and W. Johnson’s (1995, pp. 130, 143, 262f., 304) reflections on the putative ‘original’ concept of the materiality of the soul in early Jainism.

¹¹³ Wiley (2000, pp. 142–152) pointed out that “[i]n such an expansion called *samudghāta*, some of the space-points of the soul (*ātma-pradeśa*) remain in the principal body while others occupy the secondary body, which goes to another location in the universe while the principal body remains behind. ... leaving no physical residue because the matter forming these bodies is very subtle and they lack the impurities such as blood, bones, and flesh found in the *audārika śarīra* of humans and animals” (142f.). For the seven forms of *samudghāta*, see Vīy₁ 2.2 (129a) and P 36.

¹¹⁴ From the verb *samohaṇai* (S. *samava-hana*).

Prajñāpanāṭikā (Paṇṇī), Ācārya Malayagiri, the twelfth century commentator, equated *samudghāta* with the process of ejection of karmic particles (*nirjarā*) by means of deliberate premature fruition (*udīraṇā*) of karman. While the space points of the temporary bodies retract to the space points of the physical body, the particles of dead karmic matter shed during *samudghāta*, remain outside the body.¹¹⁵ In Vīy₁ 2.2 (129a) and P 36.561b–608a and 590a, amongst the seven types of *samudghāta*, *taijasa-samudghāta*, that is, hurling the *taijasa-śarīra-nāma-karman* out of the body, is listed. But it is not included amongst the conscious acts of the soul (*prayoga*) in P 16, as Mālvaṇiyā (1971, p. 346) highlighted in contrast to Malayagiri. Hence, according to P, using a *taijasa-śarīra* as a weapon seems to be ruled out.

Three examples of *samudghāta* are of interest here: (a) *taijasa-samudghāta*, (b) *vaikriya-samudghāta*, (c) *āhāraka-samudghāta*.

(a) The most significant case, elaborated only in Vīy_{1,2} 14.9.1 (655a), are the coloured karmic particles (*sakamma-lessa-poggala*), which emanate from the advanced Jaina ascetic which are compared and contrasted with the bright rays of the sun or the moon.¹¹⁶ In contrast to the im/pure and in/auspicious particles or the rays of the sun, the bright quality of the *sakarma-leśyā* is characterised as a form of matter which “shines forth” and for a while retains its distinct karman-generated qualities even outside the emitting body.

The differences between *karma-leśyā* and *tejo-leśyā* are not entirely clear. Two different reconstructions of the conceptual evolution have been offered by Tsuchihashi and Ohira.

Tsuchihashi (1983, p. 201f.) proposes four developmental stages of the term *leśyā* in the canon, designating: (1) radiance in general, especially of the deified heavenly bodies (*leśyā*), (2) lustre of an “organic” material substance (*tejo-leśyā*), (3) coloration of the human body (Ājīvika), (4) colouration of karmic atoms (Jaina) (*karma-leśyā*). He points to the “remarkable” feature that the *tejo-leśyā* of an animate being penetrates an inanimate entity which is made to shine by “a substance-like lustre”, and derives the term *teya-lessā* in Vīy₁ 7.10.2b (326b) and Vīy₁ 15 and the “later” “strictly jainistic” (ib., pp. 197, 200) term *kamma-lessā* in Vīy₁ 14.9.1 (655a) with Schubring (1935/2000, § 97, pp. 195, “we have reason to believe that an adjective *leśyā* was changed into a substantive”) from the word *leśa*, particle, which he also interprets as a sanskritised form of Prakrit *lesa* (Tsuchihashi 1983, p. 201f.). A. Mette (2010, p. 309) followed this interpretation and added a tentative analysis of the different historical layers of the oldest Jaina text on *leśyā* in Utt₁ 34.

¹¹⁵ According to Mālvaṇiyā’s (1971, p. 420) summary of Malayagiri’s commentary to this text (Paṇṇī), “*samudghāta* is nothing but expulsion (*nirjarā*) of very many particles of the *karmas* of one particular type, causing their early rise through the special process of *udīraṇā*; this necessarily involves the previous refrainment from the experience of the fruits of the *karmas* of all other types”.

¹¹⁶ Tsuchihashi (1983, p. 199) pointed to M. Hara’s argument on the relatedness of the terms *tapas*, heat-energy, and *tejas*, glow-energy. Schubring (1954, p. 257) suggested, however, that the word *teya* does not designate here a “[concrete fire, but a collected, condensed transmitted energy or magical force] konkretes Feuer, sondern eine gesammelte, geballte ausgesendete Energie oder Kraft”. See note 119.

Ohira (1978–1980, 1994, p. 126), by contrast, argues that the concept of *karma-leśyā* stands for the earlier concept *bhāva-leśyā* (antonym: *dravya-leśyā*), or psychic colour, and is itself older than the concept of the “non-sentient” *tejo-leśyā*, which, according to her, is conceived as “the capacity of a personality index” of an ascetic.¹¹⁷ In contrast to *karma-leśyā*, *tejo-leśyā* is conceived as a tangible ‘fiery’ ray of energy wilfully produced by an ascetic. It is produced by the¹¹⁸ fiery body (*taijasa-śarīra*)¹¹⁹ which itself is generated by extensive austerities (*tapas*). This ray of power can be either hot (*usiṇa*) or cool (*sīya*) (Vi₃ 15.65 = Vi₁ 15.B.4 [666a]). Because it is associated with “the miraculous powers of ascetics”, Ohira (194, p. 97f.) assumes, it must be later than the theory that “light, darkness and sound are independent entities” rather than “properties of substance”.¹²⁰ She, therefore, places the two passages Vi₁ 14.9.1 (655a) and Vi₁ 7.10.b (326b) respectively between the first century B.C.E. and the third century C.E. and in the late fourth and the fifth century.¹²¹

(b-c) External matter can be temporarily used by an ascetic to conjure up illusory objects for instrumental purposes. Magical objects such as this are produced through the momentary attraction (*āhāra*) and transformation (*vikriya*) of ‘improper’ or ‘impure’ matter from outside of the body. *Tejo-leśyās*, by contrast, are produced by the extraction of matter from inside. According to Vi₁ 3.4 ff. (186a ff.), for creating a magical effect, not a material body or a fiery body but a transformation body (*vaikriya-śarīra*) has to be produced by a monk or a god. The powers associated with these detached objects seem phantastic and are generally described as

¹¹⁷ On Vi₁. 14.9: “*Leśyā* was thus understood in terms of *karma-leśyā* in the beginning” (Ohira 1994, p. 129). In Vi₁. 12.5 *karma-leśyā* is immediately opposed to *dravya-leśyā*, the antonym of *bhāva-leśyā*, which illustrates the substitution of *bhāva-leśyā* by *karma-leśyā* (ib.).

¹¹⁸ In Vi₃ 15.76 = Vi₁ 15.B.4 (665b), as pointed out by Schubring (1935/2000, § 181, p. 317), the word *saṃkhitta* (Sk. *saṃkṣipta*) describes the compression or accumulation of ascetic energy. See Tsuchihashi (1983, pp. 199–201) on the historical development of the term resulting in the meaning of “*leśyā* as something like cement bringing about ‘union of a being with (infusing) karmic substance’” (p. 201); a process which can be connected with notions of moral fluids in early Jainism, which Schubring (1935/2000, § 10, 15) linked to “primitive sorcery”.

¹¹⁹ On the concept of *tejas*, in textual Jainism, see Schubring (1935/2000, § 181, pp. 316–319). See also YŚ 1.9, and the commentary of Qvarnström. On the development of the term *tejas* (from the root *tij*, sharpen) from the Vedas to the Purāṇas, see Magnone (1993, 2009a, 2009b). For textual Buddhism, see Tambiah (1984, p. 203f.), citing Griswold. On *tejas* as “raw power” whose “manifold potential is open” in Sinhalese Buddhist sorcery rituals, see Kapferer (1997, p. 261).

¹²⁰ Ohira (1994, p. 98) assumes in the context of her discussion of *leśyā* that “talk about the miraculous powers of ascetics” was not part of the older forms of Jainism. However, later in her text, she notes that there is already evidence in the Śvetāmbara scriptures of the existence of two early Jaina treatises on “magical power”, the Cāraṇābhāvaṇā and the Paṇhavāyaraṇa (Prašnavyākaraṇa), which are now believed to be extinct; though Acharya (2007) seems to have discovered a manuscript of the latter. Although Vavahāra 10, the text mentioning the Cāraṇābhāvaṇā, is placed in the period between the third and first centuries B.C.E., Ohira (1994, p. 162) only concedes that the topic of magical power “might have arisen in a slightly earlier age, e.g. the fourth canonical stage”, that is, in the fourth century C.E. See also Ohira (1994, pp. 56, 65).

¹²¹ “XIV.9.533 informs that *sakarma-leśyā-pudgala* discharged from the abodes of the sun and moon gods shine forth. VII.10.307 explains that non-sentient *tejo leśyā* emitted by an angry ascetic shines and burns where it falls. The former belongs to the earlier stratum of the *leśyā* theory in the third stage. The latter idea became popular when the Jainas began to talk about the miraculous power of ascetics. We place this text in the fifth canonical stage (Ohira 1994, p. 97f.)”.

‘miraculous’ (*camatkārika*) or ‘magical’ (*māyika*) in Jaina texts. These effects are just a magical illusion, as Schubring (1935/2000 § 181, p. 318) pointed out:

Viy. 154a; 190a in referring to both the monk and the god insists on saying that it means simply an effect on the senses and nothing real whatever. ... For performing such an effect material particles not proper to the performer have to be attracted, and only by applying them, *bāhiraē poggale pariyāittā*, he will succeed in producing it (Viy. 189a ff.; 283a, 643a; 705b; Jīv. 374b; Ṭhāṇ. 104b) in which case the texts differentiate such *poggala* that adhere to the performer from such adhering to the speaker or else to some third place (*tattha-gaya, iha-g., annattha-g.*).

Though lucid in theory, the dividing line between illusory (‘magical’) and real effects is often hard to discern in the texts describing the extraordinary abilities of Jaina ascetics.¹²² The *vaikriya* and *taijasa* powers can be used to produce both illusory and real objects outside the body and either for selfish and potentially harmful or salvific aims.¹²³ Only the power to create and use the equally ephemeral *āhāraka* or transformation body is said to be solely beneficial.¹²⁴

Substance and Mode

The power of body relics cannot be explained in the same way as the power of *karma-leśyās* or of objects generated by magical tricks. What kind of material substance then constitutes body relics? Everything that exists is constituted by the five eternal substances (*davva*) known as the “mass of all that is”¹²⁵ (*atthikāya*) (Viy. 2.10). The five substances are: medium of motion (*dhamma*), medium of rest (*adhamma*), space (*āgāsa*), souls (*jīva*), and matter (*poggala*). They are all divisible and constituted by elementary units (*paesa*) which are conceived of as the invisible

¹²² Glasenapp (1925, p. 404, 1999, p. 446) argued that among the Jainas a dividing line between (Tirthaṅkara) cult and magic is more difficult to draw than elsewhere because they also venerate Hindu gods and goddesses.

¹²³ The intention of the ascetic thus becomes an important factor for distinguishing Jaina ascetics from non-Jaina ascetics or “magicians”. In the texts, the overall “religious” orientation is identified as the decisive factor, determining the superior power of Jaina ascetics. Viy₁ 3.6 (191b), for instance, informs us that capable (*bhāviya-appa*, Sk. *bhāvita-ātman*) monks can see distant objects via supernatural sight, that is, create a representation of a distant object in their mind; but only the supernatural perception of a righteous (*samma-dīṭṭhi*) monk who is both capable and pure corresponds to reality, not the perception of a non-believing (*micchā-dīṭṭhi*) ascetic, whose powers are weaker due to his fundamental delusion. Similarly, Viy₁ 18.10.1 (757a) states that capable monks are able “of moving in the air without support” (Schubring 1935/2000, § 181, p. 318). By contrast, the commentary of TP II.4.1042–1057 describes the capabilities of moving through the air in realistic terms, as based on the support of living beings inhabiting the air (‘without harming them’).

¹²⁴ The use of this body is restricted to ascetics of high purity and one particular purpose only: Unlike other bodies, the conveyance body is very short-lived. When the ascetic has any doubt in his mind about the meaning of a very difficult and obscure issue of the doctrine, he uses the conveyance body, expands his soul into this subtle body, reaches the distant Jina instantly and withdraws to the gross body within an intra-hour (less than forty-eight minutes). The conveyance body is abandoned as soon as the mission is completed (Tatia 1994, p. 60).

¹²⁵ Schubring (1935/200, § 57, p. 126).

but theoretically quantifiable space points that are occupied by a particular substance.¹²⁶ All substances exist in space and are formless (*arūva*) and hence invisible, with the exception of matter which has a tangible form (*rūva*) (Viy. 1.10).

Disputed is in classical Jaina philosophy the question whether time (*kāla*) can also be categorised as a substance or, if not, what its ontological status could be.¹²⁷ The question boils down to the conundrum whether time, like the other five substances, can be reduced to space (as in conventional linear representations of time) or whether it exists only in form of singular discontinuous moments.¹²⁸ Most Digambara philosophers argue that time is a substance, because it has auxiliary transformative functions.¹²⁹ In their view, the causative function of time alone explains both the continuation of a particular substance over a certain period and its final disappearance. Hence, it should be declared to be a substance (TS_{1,2} 5.22 & 5.49, SaSi₁ 569 & 357). Śvetāmbara authors deny this. They argue that because time has no extension in space (like the other formless substances) it cannot be a substance. Time exists only in the form of unconnected moments. A compromise in terms of the two-truth theory is offered by SaSi₁ 569 which distinguishes between conventional (sequential) time (*vyavahāra-kāla*) and absolute (momentary) (*paramartha-kāla*) time, as two different perspectives on two principal aspects of time.

Perspectivism is at the heart of classical Jaina ontology. For classical Jaina philosophy, encapsulated in the famous *tripadī* formula of TS₁₍₂₎ 5.29 (5.30),¹³⁰ which Ācārya Umāsvāti created to encompass competing eternalist Hindu and temporalist Buddhist ontologies, existence (*sat*) is constituted by the three causative modes of origination (*utpāda*), persistence (*dhrauvya*), and cessation (*vyaya*). From the perspective of substance (*dravya*) everything that exists is eternal, i.e., is constituted by imperishable elements, but from the perspective of mode (*pariyāya*) everything that exists is forever changing. A difference of opinion concerns the mediating concept of *guṇa* which designates the persisting qualities that distinguish different substances or entities. In contrast to the standard Śvetāmbara position, expressed in Utt 28.5 and TS₁ 5.37, that a substance is constituted by both qualities and modes, the Śvetāmbara Ācārya Siddhasenadiivākara (STP₃ III.8ff.) argued that the terms *guṇa* and *pariyāya* are synonymous, as did Ācārya Malayagiri.¹³¹ Ohira (1994, p. 92) pointed to the significance of the concept of *guṇa* for the theory of material transformation (*pariṇāma*) *cum* motion through processes of atomic

¹²⁶ Ohira (1994, p. 99f.), who accomplished her work under D.D Mālvaṇiyā, offers a theory of the evolution of the theoretical concept of *pradeśa* (from *vpra-dīś*, to manifest), the “cause of perceptibility”, starting with the word *a-pradeśa*, non-indication, non-determination, to indicate the invisible nature of the atom.

¹²⁷ Pūjyapāda (SaSi₁ 569) and other Digambara commentators on TS 5.22, a verse on the concept of transformation (*parāṇāma*), characterize time in terms of the qualities of non-sentience and immateriality.

¹²⁸ Cf. Heidegger (1918–1919/1995, p. 307, etc.), for deliberations on similar questions.

¹²⁹ Not as a material but as an instrumental cause: *nimitta-kāraṇa*.

¹³⁰ *sad dravyalakṣaṇam |*

utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvyayuktaṃ sat |

Existence is the character of a substance.

Origination, cessation and persistence constitute existence. (TS₂ 5.29–30)

¹³¹ See Mālvaṇiyā (1971, p. 246).

attraction and repulsion, “by the degrees of *guṇas* existing in matter itself”,¹³² which may be one reason for its incorporation in the classical *dravya-guṇa-paryāya* sequence.

Modes of Material Transformation

The Jaina concept of continuity through change is further theorised under the title of *pariṇāma* or transformation of substances of entities in P 13, Viy₁ 1.1.3 (23a), 1.3.4 (55a),¹³³ etc., and TS₁ 5.41 in particular; both with regard to material atoms (*puḍgala*) and aggregates (*skandha*) and to living entities.¹³⁴ Viy₃ 14.4.52 states that there are two types of transformations: of animate beings (*jīva-pariṇāma*)¹³⁵ and of inanimate beings (*ajīva-pariṇāma*). The theory of transformation is both the foundation of classical Jaina karman theory and of the Jaina theory of matter. The *locus classicus* for the concept of *pariṇāma* in Jaina philosophy is Viy 8.1.¹³⁶ Ohira (1994, p. 56) places this chapter and all thematically similar texts of the Viy. in the fifth and last canonical stage of her scheme (4th–5th century C.E.), having located the first appearance of the theory of *puḍgala-pariṇāma* in the second or third centuries C.E. (ib., p. 93). All modern commentators agree that the theory of transformation is late-canonical.

Viy_{1,3} 8.1.1 (328a)¹³⁷ distinguishes three types of material particles (*poggala*) and Viy_{1,3} 8.1.2 (332b) similarly three types of individual entities (*davva*)¹³⁸ with reference to distinct modes of transformation—natural, karmic and mixed—that produced them¹³⁹:

¹³² Cf. the Vaiśeṣika solution by postulating karman as an independent category of motion. See Ohira (1994, p. 92).

¹³³ “This *atthitaṃ atthitte pariṇamāi* [= the attribute being existent remains if the entity undergoes transformation] is as elementary a tenet as *calamāṇe calie* etc.” (Deleu 1970, p. 77 on Viy₁ 1.1.3).

¹³⁴ See Ohira (1994, p. 99) on the contrast between Jaina *pariṇāmavāda*, which emerged in the “third canonical stage” and the Vaiśeṣika position that existence becomes non-existence after the destruction of an entity in Vaiśeṣikasūtra 9.2.

The practical implications of the once dominant Jaina perspective that atoms change while being changed are illustrated by Jaina critical analysis of the powers of transformation of gods, for instance in Viy₁ 16.5 (704a–708b).

¹³⁵ The term *jīva* is ambiguous. In its embodied form it is seen “as somehow indistinguishable from the body” (Ohira 1994, p. 110).

¹³⁶ For the sources on *pariṇāma*, see Vijayarājendrasūri 1913–1925/1986 V: 595–614, and on *prayoga-mīśra-vīśrasā pariṇāma pariṇataḥ pudalah* pp. 602–610.

¹³⁷ In identical words: Ṭhāna₁ 3.3.401.

¹³⁸ A particular object is also called *dravya* albeit being a “substance” of “a second order” (Schubring 1935/2000, § 61, p. 136). On the multiple meanings of the term *dravya* in Indian philosophy, see Halbfass (1992, p. 89f.).

¹³⁹ *tivihā poggalā paṇṇattā, taṃ jahā – paoga-pariṇayā, mīśā-pariṇayā vīśasā-pariṇayā* (Ṭhāna₁ 3.3.401 = Viy₃ 8.1.1).

1. Transformed by external (karmic) impulse (*paoga-pariṇaya*, Sk. *prayoga-pariṇata*),
2. Transformed by mixed causes (karmic & natural) (*mīsa-p.*, Sk. *mīśra-p.*),
3. Transformed spontaneously (naturally) (*vīśasā-p.*, Sk. *visrasā-p.*).¹⁴⁰

The term *prayoga-pariṇāma*, transformation by external impulse, designates changes that are brought about (consciously or unconsciously) by the action of the embodied soul. According to classical Jaina doctrine, this form of karmic causality produces the five bodies of living beings.¹⁴¹ *Visrasā-pariṇāma*, spontaneous transformation, designates the processes of natural (*svabhāva*) transformation of inanimate atoms, such as aggregation, disaggregation, etc., independent of any interference of embodied consciousness.¹⁴² According to *Viy*₃ 8.1.27, 8.10.467, spontaneous transformation affects the colour, smell, taste, touch and shape of matter.¹⁴³ In P 13 the term *pariṇāma* refers to natural processes of atomic aggre-

¹⁴⁰ I follow the terminology of Schubring (1935/2000, § 60, p. 133–136) and Deleu (1970, pp. 145, 154, 206), who also uses “instrumental and automatic process[es]”. Since action (karman) involves conscious and unconscious processes, Lalwani’s (1980 III, p. 103) (*Viy*₆ 8.1.1) translation “conscious transformation” is merely a shortcut.

¹⁴¹ *Viy*₅ 8.1.50–71 explains how various permutations of karmic activity result in different material transformations. The gross physical body, for instance, is transformed by conscious physical activity (*kāya-payoga-pariṇaya*), resulting in bodies of different degrees of purity (*Viy*₅ 8.1.55 ff.) and power (*vīrya-śakti*) (Amar Muni, commenting on *Viy*₅ 8.1.71). “This threefold activity [paoga]”, of mind, speech and body, though considered to be material, “is considered to be of the soul (*ātmavyāpāra*) because it does not take place in its absence” (Mālvaṇiyā 1971, p. 345). Different interpretations of the term *prayoga*, principally treated in P 16 in the canon and under the title *prayoga-karma* in the Digambara Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama (ib.), have influenced the available translations. *Paoga-pariṇāma* was translated by Amar Muni as “conscious transformation” (*Viy*₅ 8.1, p. 468), while Schubring (1935/2000, §§ 60, 61, pp. 133, 136) and Deleu (1970, pp. 120, 206, 237), preferred the neutral formulation “accidental’ change” (*pariṇāma*) caused by an “impulse from without”, that is, *karman*, an “instrumental process” of mind, speech and body (*Viy*₁ 1.3.3 [254a]).

Mahāprajñā’s commentary (*ViyBh* 8.1.1) to *Viy*₄ 8.1.1 (III, p. 6) summarises divergent interpretations of this passage:

Umāsvāti in his *Bhagavatīvr̥tti* 8.1 focuses on the three different causes of the bondage of material atoms constituting the structure of the molecules of a physical body: 1. *prayoga*: effort of the soul (*jīva-vyāpāreṇa śarīrādīṭayā pariṇatāḥ*), 2. *mīśra*: a combination of both, 3. *svabhāva*: nature.

Siddhasenagaṇin in *Tattvārthabhāṣyavṛtti* (TBV) 5.17 relates the three types of transformation to the Jaina teaching of the three causes (*kāraṇa*): 1. material (*pariṇāma*) (“=*upādāna*”), 2. final (*nīrvartaka*), 3. instrumental (*nimitta*); different from the Vaiśeṣika triad of causes: 1. inherent (*samavāya*), 2. non-inherent (but closely related) (*asamavāya*), and 3. instrumental (*nimitta*). Cf. Potter (1997, p. 55–57).

Siddhasena Gaṇin defines *prayoga* also as the action of the embodied soul (TBV 5.24: *prayogo jīva-vyāpāras tena ghaṭito bandhaḥ prāyogikah*).

The Digambara philosopher Akalaṅka, by contrast, in his *Tattvārtharajāvartika* (TRV) 5.24, understands it as designating the union (*saṃyoga*) of the human body, speech, and mind (*prayogaḥ puruṣa-kāya-vād-maṇaḥ saṃyoga-lakṣaṇaḥ*).

¹⁴² Dual causality of nature and karman is well established in Digambara literature as well. See SaSi₁ 529–531.

¹⁴³ *pañcavihe poggala-pariṇāme paṇṇatte, taṃ jahā—vanṇa-pariṇāme, gaṇḍha-pariṇāme, phāsa-pariṇāme, saṃthāṇa-pariṇāme* || (*Viy*₃ 8.10.467).

Frequent implicit references to the Paṇṇavaṇā (P) I & XIII are made in the sections on matter in *Viy*. 8.1 & 8.10, *Viy*. 14.4. See Deleu (1970, pp. 145, 206f.).

gation, disaggregation and movement.¹⁴⁴ *Miśra-pariṇāma*, mixed transformation, finally, refers to a combination of karmic and natural processes.¹⁴⁵

According to *Viy*₃ 8.1.40–41, *miśra-pariṇāma* produces the five bodies of living beings in a similar way as *prayoga-pariṇāma*. Since both karmic and mixed causes are involved in the formation of the five bodies of living beings (Pk. *kāīya*) (*Viy*₃ 8.1.27, 8.1.40f.), the question emerges what exactly the difference between these two forms of transformation is? An indirect answer is given in *Viy*₃ 8.1.43 which states that any particle or aggregate can be transformed karmically, naturally or in both ways combined. Most objects in the world are the product of natural transformation, followed by products of mixed transformation and finally products of karmic transformation (*Viy*₃ 8.1.84). If more than one particle or entity is involved, as in processes of aggregation, then the products of three types of transformation can exist in combination (*Viy*₃ 8.1.73). According to the developed Jaina theory of *karman*, effectively all living entities are constituted through mixed processes of transformation. Glasenapp (1915/1942, p. xix) called attention to the fact that the summary *Karmagranthas* of the Śvetāmbara Ācārya Devendrasūri give however only an evasive explanation of how natural processes further differentiate the karmic particles which were attracted by the actions of the living being in such an ingenious way that complex organisms emerge:

I am aware of only one passage wherein the author deliberately raises the question concerning the cause. It is contained in Kg. II., 75a; herein the author raises an objection as to how it is possible that the particle of matter seized in a moment by the soul is capable of transforming itself into the number of particles necessary for the formation of the various species of the *karman*, whereupon he replies that it is performed through the mysterious power of the soul, of which we may not make to ourselves any idea, and through the peculiar quality of the matter itself. It may be observed, he argues, that matter on which no spiritual force is working, is changing into clouds and rainbows; why then could not matter with which a *jīva* is in connection be changed into different kinds of *karman*? All further discussion is cut off by an energetic ‘*alam vistareṇa*’.

A related question is whether processes of karmic and mixed transformation apply only to matter forming the body of living beings or also to inanimate matter outside the body? This question, which touches at the heart of the conundrum of the status of ‘sacred matter’ in Jaina philosophy, is not clearly addressed in the *Viy*. itself, but was taken up by the commentaries. The term *miśra-pariṇāta* is explained in somewhat greater detail in *Viy*₅ 8.1.46–47 and 8.1.72–73, but remains controversial in the commentary literature.¹⁴⁶ Different opinions are recorded in modern refer-

¹⁴⁴ See Schubring (1935/2000, § 60, p. 133).

¹⁴⁵ Schubring (1935/2000, § 61, p. 136) comments on this passage: Material masses of this kind [inanimate aggregates], together with their shapes, come into being spontaneously, whereas all accumulations furnishing the souls in the world with bodies and opportunities of activity ... result from impulse, i.e., through the working of the *Karman*. But as these accumulations have concrete qualities, it follows that they represent a mixture of both cases (*Viy*. 332a).

¹⁴⁶ For the following, see Mahāprajñā’s summary of the commentaries: *Viy*₄ 8.1.1, pp. 5f.

ence works. Ratnacandra (1923/1988 IV, p. 179f.) defines *mīśa-pariṇaya poggala* as a “molecule which has matured into a mixed state, i.e. has left the soul but has not yet assumed another form”. Deleu (1970, p. 145), by contrast, states unambiguously that it is only the “animate world” which results from conscious and mixed transformation. Natural transformation affects only colour, smell, taste, touch and shape. The assessment of the scope of the category of the *mīśa-pariṇata pudgala* varies even more widely in the classical commentaries. In the older commentaries the paradigmatic examples for products of mixed transformation are material objects outside the body which have been transformed by the activity of living beings who worked on them. In the later commentaries dead bodies or body parts of living beings are cited as examples; that is, either products of mixed transformation within the living organism or products of a two-step sequence of karmic transformation within the body followed by natural transformation outside the living organism. Thus, not only organic-cum-inorganic matter¹⁴⁷, but also inorganic matter that had once been transformed by the activity of living beings and was then ejected is categorised as a product of mixed processes of transformation.

The Digambara Ācārya Akalaṅka (8th century) in his *Tattvārthavārtika* (TV) 5.24 does not accept mixed transformation as an independent category. Instead, he distinguishes two sub-types of karmic transformation (*prayoga-pariṇāma*): of non-living entities (*ajīva-viśaya*) (for instance wood covered with shellac) and of mixed living-and-not-living entities (*jīvājīva-viśaya*).¹⁴⁸ Akalaṅka further differentiates two types of the latter: *karma-bandha* and *nokarma-bandha*, that is, processes of binding particles that form the karmic body (*kārmaṇa-śarīra*), on the one hand, and processes of binding particles of the gross-, transformation-, transposition- and fiery bodies, on the other hand. The same example of wood covered with shellac for the transformation of non-living matter was selected later by the ca. ninth century Śvetāmbara Ācārya Siddhasenagaṇin in his *Tattvārthasūtrādhigamabhāṣyavṛtti* (TSB) 5.24. Siddhasenagaṇin, however, does accept ‘mixed-transformation’ as a separate category and explains *mīśa-pariṇata* with reference to the examples of the pillar (*stambha*) and of the water pot (*kumbha*) which are both created by a combination of naturally produced clay and form-giving human activity.¹⁴⁹ Siddhasenagaṇin and Akalaṅka both agree that ‘mixed-transformation’ applies only to objects outside the living body if they are shaped not only by natural processes but additionally by the actions of living beings.

The Mūrtipūjaka Ācārya Abhayadevasūri (11th century.), by contrast, in his Sanskrit commentary *Bhagavatīvṛtti* (VyVṛ) 8.1, chose as examples for products of mixed transformation (1) the corpses of human beings, etc., that naturally decompose (*mukta-kaḍavarādi-rūpa*), and (2) naturally transformed classes of gross, etc., matter (*audārikādi-vargaṇa-rūpa*) that are further transformed by the actions of

¹⁴⁷ Sikdar (1987, pp. 235–237 and 213).

¹⁴⁸ TRV 5.24: *sa dvedhā ajīva-viśayo jīvājīva-viśayaśceti | tatrā’jīva-viśayo jatukāṣṭhāi lakṣaṇaḥ |*

¹⁴⁹ TBV 5.24: *prayoga-visrasābhyāṃ jīva-prayoga-sahacaritūcetanā-dravya-pariṇati-lakṣaṇaḥ stambha-kumbhādi-mīśaḥ |*

living beings.¹⁵⁰ The Sthānakavāsī Pravartaka Amar Muni interpreted the text as follows:

Jointly transformed matter – This is of two types – (1) naturally transformed matter without disintegration of the consciously acquired form, such as a corpse. (2) Naturally transformed species of *karmic* particles, such as those needed to form the gross physical body etc., further transformed consciously, such as the gross physical body of a being (ViyVṛ, according to Amar Muni, Viy₅ 8.1, Vol. 2, p. 468; Translation from Hindī by Surendra Bothra).

The two complementary processes envisaged here are, first, the ejection of karmically transformed matter from the soul and the subsequent natural transformation, and, second, the reverse process of attraction of naturally transformed matter and its further karmic transformation by an embodied soul building up its bodies.¹⁵¹ In the first case, the transformative actions of living beings are followed by processes of natural transformation. In the second case, processes of natural transformation are followed by actions of living beings.

For Abhayadevasūri it is quite clear that atoms and molecules that form the material body of an acting living being (*jīva*) are also subject to processes of natural transformation. Our question, what exactly the difference is between karmic and mixed transformation is answered by him as follows. The transformation through action (*prayoga*) also involves processes of natural transformation (*visrasā*), and in this sense can be considered as a form of mixed transformation. But natural transformation is not essential (*vivakṣita*) in this context. However, in processes of mixed transformation both *prayoga* and *visrasā* are essential. The same point was made already by Siddhasenagaṇin (TBV 5.24), who argued that the question about the way in which the two processes are combined cannot be settled in abstract terms, but only with reference to a particular context. In processes of transformation through action, the innate effort (*samavāya-kāraṇa*) of the living being alone is sufficient. No external instrumental cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) is necessary. In processes of mixed transformation, an additional external cause is always necessary. Processes of natural transformation, on the other hand, are indifferent (*nirapekṣa*) to both the inherent cause and the instrumental effort of living beings.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ *miśraka-pariṇatāḥ prayoga-visrasābhyāḥ pariṇatāḥ | prayoga-pariṇāma-matya-janto visrasayā svabhāvāntaram āpādītāḥ mukta-kādevarādi-rūpāḥ | athav-audārikādi-vargaṇā-rūpā visrasayā niṣpādītāḥ santāḥ jīva-prayogeṅ-aikendriyādi-śarīra-prabhṛti-pariṇāmam āpādītās te miśra-pariṇatāḥ nanu prayoga-pariṇāmo'py evaṃ-vidha eva tataḥ ka eṣāṃ viśeṣaḥ? satyaṃ; kinnu prayoga-pariṇāteṣu visrasā satyapi na vivakṣitā |* (ViyVṛ 8.1).

¹⁵¹ Cf. Sikdar (1987, p. 327).

¹⁵² Siddhasenagaṇin notes that the process of transformation through inherent causes (*samavāya-kāraṇa*) can be related to concepts of Vaiśeṣika philosophy (ViyBh 8.1.1). See supra for Abhayadeva's reinterpretation of "*samavāya-kāraṇa*" in the sense of "combined causes" in his TVB.

Dead Bodies and Relics

Viy. 8.1 does not discuss the ontological status of dead bodies.¹⁵³ Yet, as we have seen, at least one of the significant commentators, Abhayadeva, points to the dead body as a paradigmatic example for an object produced by mixed karmic and natural causes. Following on from this, I would argue that body parts such as relics can similarly be conceptualised from the perspective of classical Jaina philosophy as material objects which were created by mixed karmic and natural causes. The distinction between insentient matter in general and the matter of dead bodies and relics is that the physical structure of the latter is the product not of natural but of mixed causes of transformation. In fact, it could be argued that from the perspective of classical Jaina philosophy, the material qualities of bone relics differ from qualities of inorganic matter outside the body in a similar way as organic chemical compounds were in Europe once believed to differ from inorganic compounds, until experimental counter evidence was furnished by Friedrich Wöhler in 1828.¹⁵⁴ The relics of Jaina mendicants are special, however, because the material aggregates resulting from ascetic processes of transformation are ideally predicated entirely on wilful instrumental action and hence differ in structure from aggregates that underwent unchecked processes of mixed transformation. Effectively, two types of relics produced by mixed natural and karmic causes are distinguished.¹⁵⁵ In contrast to the matter of common dead bodies, which is shunned, the relics of Jaina ascetics are considered valuable because material results of exemplary renunciatory action are in part crystallised in the living bodies as well as in the remaining dead matter.¹⁵⁶ The bodies and body parts of advanced Jaina ascetics, it is believed, are not constituted by ordinary organic compounds, but by extremely refined matter, like the body secretions and other material particles that are ejected from the ascetic body. Jaina mendicants compare the beneficial physical properties of ascetically distilled “auspicious matter” such as body secretions and physical remains with the properties of medical pills.¹⁵⁷ In contrast to body secretions, the physical qualities of ascetically produced body relics last for some time even after the severance of the gross body from the soul at the point of death.

¹⁵³ It refers however to cases of mixed bodies (*mīsa-sarīra*), and of conscious or mixed transformation of gross (etc.)-cum-mixed bodies (*orāliya-mīsa-sarīra-kāya-payoga/mīsa-pariṇae*) (Viy₃ 8.1.49) (etc.).

¹⁵⁴ See Sikdar (1987, p. 237f.). In modern science, the notion of ‘organic compounds’ is still used as a shorthand for certain shared qualities of plant and animal produce, such as the presence of carbon.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. the third of Laidlaw’s (1995, p. 242f.) three styles of Jaina usage of the body, especially the ‘iconic’ style: (1) ‘Indexical’ — ‘normal’ use of the body for the simultaneous pursuit of renunciatory and worldly ends; (2) ‘Dualistic’ — attempt to destroy the body in order to liberate the soul; (3) ‘Iconic’ — representation of the perfect body as an expression of inner purity. Laidlaw’s categories do not form a logical continuum, and indexical and iconic features are not clearly identified in the text. The dualistic path is not “largely” a Jain lay project (ib., pp. 152, 238).

¹⁵⁶ The results of action come to fruition mainly in the process of reincarnation determined by the karmic body.

¹⁵⁷ Personal communication of the Terāpanth mendicants Samaṇī Caitanyaprajñā, London 5.9.2008, and Muni Mahendra Kumār, Lāḍhūṃ 22.12.2009. Cf. Friedrich (1943, p. 220) on the medical use of pills made of the bones of Tibetan Lamas.

The fact that the different types of dead matter that are distinguished (or distinguishable) in Jaina philosophy have apparently not (yet) been valorised in this way in official Jaina culture, despite the evident options in Jaina ontology, can only be explained by a historical combination of soteriological and social factors. The question of the historical function of the relics of renowned ascetics in Jaina culture can however not be addressed in this article.¹⁵⁸ From a strictly karman theoretical perspective, the material products of ascetic labour may be special and even beneficial for the material wellbeing of living creatures, yet, they can in no way affect the soteriological prospects of the devotee which are entirely determined by his or her own renunciatory practice.

The Material Qualities of Bone Relics After Cremation

The main argument of this article is that, technically, not only dead bodies but also bone relics of venerable saints, though apparently not mentioned in the commentaries to *Viy*. 8.1 and 18.3.2¹⁵⁹, belong to the Jaina category of matter formed by mixed karmic and natural causes. The two main transformative processes involved in the production of bone relics are: (a) attraction of exterior matter and constitution of the body through karmic activity and natural causes, (b) death, dissociation of the soul, and either natural decomposition or cremation of the gross body.

An important question is how cremation affects the quality of the physical remains. From the late Vedic period onwards, the process of decomposition of dead bodies was deliberately accelerated through cremation by the majority of the population in South Asia who could afford it. After the incineration of the corpse and the cooling of the ashes, the remaining more or less preserved charred bones (*aṭṭhi-jhāma*) were collected and disposed either on the spot or at 'sacred rivers'. These practices continue even today. What kind of material qualities can be attributed to the charred bones and ashes that remain after cremation from a Jaina philosophical perspective? In which way does the deliberate process of incineration, which itself is of mixed karmic and natural causality, transform the physical structure of the body?

*Viy*₁ 1.2.2 (213a) tells us that this very question was once put to Mahāvīra by his chief disciple Gautama. Mahāvīra explained that the burning of all physical substances is a process of transformation of matter attracted by fire beings (*tea-kāya*) with the help of wind-beings (*vāu-kāya*), both of which are conceived as living creatures in classical Jaina doctrine (*Viy*₁ 16.1 [213a]). In the process of cremation, the dead bodies that originally belonged to mobile beings become the bodies of fire beings:

[Q.] *Bhante!* To what category of living beings do the bodies of bone, burnt bone, skin, burnt skin, pelt, burnt pelt, horn, burnt horn, hoof, burnt hoof, nail and burnt nail belong?

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Flügel (2010b).

¹⁵⁹ A comprehensive review of the Jaina commentary literature is beyond the scope of this study.

[Ans.] Gautam! Bone, skin, pelt, horn, hoof, nail these are all bodies of mobile beings (*trasa jiva*). Burnt bone, burnt skin, burnt pelt, burnt horn, burnt hoof, burnt nail are the bodies of mobile beings in terms of their earlier or original state. After that when they are processed with implements and so on up to [*jāva*] fire and undergo transformation they may be called bodies of fire-bodied beings (Viy₅ 5.2.15, translated from Hindī by Surendra Botharā, cf. Viy₈ 5.2.53).¹⁶⁰

The same answer is given in Viy₅ 5.2.16 in reply to the question as to the nature of ashes (*chāriya*) and other materials fuelling fire, such as cowdung, etc. Similarly, DVS 5.1.7 stresses that a monk should not step on warm ash and other forms of matter recently touched by fire to avoid killing life in the form of fire beings.¹⁶¹ Cold ash, by contrast, is considered to be dead¹⁶², and is commonly used by to prevent bleeding in the ritualised periodic plucking of hair and beard (*kesa-loya*) that is obligatory for Jaina mendicants.¹⁶³ For Jaina philosophers there was no doubt that the remains left by the cremation fire were aggregates of dead matter; at least for a short period after the flames have died down and before new souls start repopulating the material remains. Within a period of one *muhutta*, that is, less than forty-eight minutes¹⁶⁴, it is said, dead matter, such as ash, may be repopulated by living souls. In their process of decomposition, bone relics, too, should be able to function as hosts for reincarnating souls and become one-sensed beings (like fire, even stones can be living entities), though no text known to the present writer seems to have dealt with this question. If this is not the case, then a further explanation of the exceptional status of bone and tooth relics, which decompose only slowly, would have been found.¹⁶⁵

The reliable production of relics is predicated on the practice of cremation, and the aim to produce relics may have been one of the reasons for the introduction of the practice of cremation for prominent saints at least in the case of Buddhism as

¹⁶⁰ The Jaina theory of transformation of ever changing modes of eternal atomic particles in the act of incineration differs from those of the Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika philosophies, as Sikdar (1987, pp. 300–309) and Mahāprajña (ViyBh 5.2.51–54) have pointed out. The Vaiśeṣika philosophers assume that in the process of baking for instance all individual atoms (*pṛṭu-pāka*) are destroyed and recreated in a new form. Naiyāyika thinkers, by contrast, posit that the changes affect the whole body (*piṭhara-pāka*). The individual atoms remain the same in the process of baking, but are mixed with fire particles which accounts for the transformed appearance.

¹⁶¹ For Vedic views on the fire hidden in the ashes, see Krick (1982, p. 122).

¹⁶² For Manu₁ 3.97, etc., “dead ash” has negative connotations, since it implies the extinction of the life-giving fire. One should not step on it: “A person who wants to live a long life will avoid stepping on hair, ashes, bones, skulls, cotton seeds, and chaff” (Manu₁ 4.78). Hair represents fertility and vitality cross-culturally. This is also the case in the Vedas. See Krick (1982, p. 88f.).

¹⁶³ Water mixed with cold ash is considered to be dead and therefore acceptable for mendicants because of the chemical reaction, not because ash is associated with fire. Because water is killed by ash (fire), some Jains believe it to be wrong to immerse the bones and ashes that remain after cremation into rivers.

¹⁶⁴ Ratnacandra (1923/1988 IV, p. 193) explains that a *muhūrta* equals two *ghadīs* or 3,773 breaths.

¹⁶⁵ K. Wiley (personal communication 1.11.2010) remains sceptical: “This would relate to the operation of *nirmāṇa nāma karma* in association with *jāti nāma karma*. In other words, a soul taking birth as an earth-bodied being would form various sorts of bodies, but not one that has the qualities or shape of a ‘bone’”. See also Friedrich’s (1943, p. 201f.) discussion of the unique physiology of bones.

suggested by the famous account of the funeral of the Buddha in the Mahāparinivāṇasutta. However, cremation was not always practiced, certainly not amongst the Nigānṭhas. Canonised scriptures such as the Śvetāmbara Kappasutta and its commentaries and the Dīgambara Bhagavatī Ārādhana describe the ways in which corpses of dead ascetics should be discarded in the wilderness and left to the wolves and vultures, which disperse the remaining fragments of bones in all directions. The comparatively slower process of physical decomposition is also described as staged. The matter produced by five-sensed living beings is re-transformed by karmic activity of one-sensed beings and hence loses many of its previous qualities. As a result of this process of transformation, after a while, a different type of dead matter remains.

The power of one-sensed living beings (*egimḍiya*) is, of course, limited and cannot explain the extraordinary energy attributed to relics.¹⁶⁶ Nevertheless, even in their decomposed or cremated form, as physical matter, certain fragments of the body parts created by the actions of the ascetics retain some of their original material properties and hence are said to have healing qualities, like a pill produced by Ayurvedic medicine or the pharmaceutical industry.¹⁶⁷

Enduring Power of Body-Parts Outside the Body and Transfer of Power

Another question is how these properties, if indeed they exist, can be transferred to or appropriated by another living being? No satisfying answer, it seems, can be found in the Jaina texts. Evidently, dissociated karmic particles automatically lose their quality as *karmic* matter once severed from the embodied soul: “Karmic particles thus purged are mere matter particles (*puḍgala*) devoid of *karmic* efficacy” (Ohira 1994, p. 196). The question whether karmically transformed matter also immediately loses its powers after being disconnected from the body is disputed within the (Śvetāmbara) Jaina tradition. The concept of the special power of disembodied body parts of ascetics would otherwise play no role. Contrary to this view, it is stated in *Viy*₁ 14.4 (638a–641a) = *Viy*₃ 14.4.44–53 that because atoms are eternal (*sāsaya*) only from the point of view of substance but not eternal from the point of view of mode (colour, etc.), they revert back to their original state once a particular transformation (*pariṇāma*) has been accomplished. Once the atom is reset to its original state a new transformation can start. The same applies to molecules (*khaṃdha*), that is, aggregates of material atoms (in this context called *paramāṇu-poggala*), which (can) combine to form individual objects (*davva*). After the completion of a particular transformation they, too, revert back to their original state. The fact that aggregates will, at some stage, decompose into their elements is

¹⁶⁶ See Wiley (2000, p. 125).

¹⁶⁷ *Uv*₁ 159, however, mentions imperfect Jaina monks (*samaṇa*) who hand out ashes which miraculously cause wellbeing (*bhūi-kammiya*). Cf. Strong (2004, pp. 10–12) on the distinction between “bones and beads” prevalent in contemporary Buddhism in South East- and East Asia (but not in the Pāli canon). He argued that these beads could be interpreted as “the result of a process of metamorphosis brought on not only by the fire of cremation but also by the perfections of the saint (in this case the Buddha) whose body they re-present”. On the process of transformation of ‘bones’ into ‘beads’ brought about by the cremation fire see also Granoff (2008, p. 60).

discussed separately in the texts.¹⁶⁸ The notion of an original unmodified state of an eternal elementary atom with specific qualities (colour, smell, etc.) is, of course, a theoretical limiting case.

Perception and Reappropriation of Karmically Transformed Particles

It is an open and from the now dominant doctrinal Jaina point of view undoubtedly heretical question whether disembodied ascetically refined particles (*poggala*) can be perceived and re-appropriated by another living being.¹⁶⁹ This interpretation seems however to inform *Viy*₁ 18.3.2 (740b) = *Viy*₂ II.18.3.8–9, a passage summarised by Deleu (1970, p. 237), which tells us that “when a monk who has cultivated his spiritual faculties dies ... the subtle ultimate particles of his *karman* (*je carimā nijjarā-poggalā suhumā*) spread over the whole world (*savvaṃ logaṃ pi ṇaṃ ogāhittāṇaṃ citṭhanti*)” through the process of ejection (*samugghāya*) of the remaining karmic particles. Human beings who are conscious (*sañṇi*) and attentive (*uvautta*) and *Vemāṇiya*¹⁷⁰ gods that are attentive and fully developed (*pajjatta*)¹⁷¹ “can discern and attract (*jāṇanti pāsanti āhāraṇti*) these particles”, but not “imperfect” human beings (*chaumattha-mañussa*).¹⁷² The second part of this statement specifies that highly developed Jaina mendicants can and apparently wish to “attract” the final highly purified particles ejected by the soul of an advanced dying Jaina monk. By contrast, particles which are attracted by a living being but not bound and immediately ejected (*nijjarā-poggala*) are said to be without form (*rūva*) and hence intangible (*Viy*₁ 18.3.5 [743b]).¹⁷³

A detailed discussion of the question of the perceptibility of dead karmic particles which are ejected during the process of *samugghāya* (which not every living and omniscient being undergoes) is offered in *Uv*₁ 169–180. Schubring (1935/2000, § 89, p. 184) refers in this context also to P 590a and 496a f. (his manuscript), which considers with regard to an imperfect individual “whether and to what degree the ejecting individual has committed actions to other beings to whom they [the particles] cause an injury”. He argued that “[t]he whole conception doubtlessly comes from the impression which pain, anger, curse and blessings cause within the onlooker” (ib., p. 185).¹⁷⁴

¹⁶⁸ See *ViyBh* 14.4.44–47. Ohira (1994, p. 56) points out that in the summary of the theory in *Viy*. 14.4 it is stated that when the process of transformation (*pariṇāma*) of matter from one state to another as such comes to an end, a *pudgala* or *skandha* “returns to the state of an atom of one colour, etc.” (ib.).

¹⁶⁹ As the above cited English translation of Amar Muni’s comments on *ViyVr*, 8.1 suggests.

¹⁷⁰ Like humans, *Vemāṇiya* gods are either untruthful and/or heretical or not, as explained in the text.

¹⁷¹ The term *pajjatti* (Sk. *pariyāpti*) refers to the six powers of the *nāma-karman* of the embodied soul (*ātmā-śakti*) to attract and transform different material atoms constituting basic functions of the physical body: *āhāra*, *śarīra*, *indriya*, *svāsocchvāsa*, *bhāṣā*, *manaḥ*. See SAS 8.11.

¹⁷² Deleu (1970, p. 237) refers in this context to P 590b, 596a ff. (Āgamodaya-Samiti Edition) for further details on ejected particles.

¹⁷³ Deleu (1970, p. 238) points to *Viy*₁ 7.10.1 (323b) in this context, where Mahāvīra explains to Ājīvika heretics that “bad deeds get their karmic retribution ... only in the living incorporated soul, not in matter”. Cf. P 590b, 596a ff., Deleu (1970, p. 212), Schubring (1935/2000, § 60, p. 134).

¹⁷⁴ Compare the debate on the concept of *vaira* in early Jinism (Jainism).

The commentaries show that the question of the quality and fate of ejected karmic particles preoccupied Jain scholastics for centuries. In *Viy*_{1,2} 14.9.2 (655b) a series of asymmetrical oppositions is used to describe qualities of physical matter from the point of view of their utility for living beings, as being favourable/unfavourable (*atta/anatta*), pleasant/unpleasant (*piya/apiya* and *maṇuṇṇa/amaṇuṇṇa*), desirable/undesirable (*iṭṭha/aṇiṭṭha*), etc.

Notable is the parallelism to the question of perceptibility of *leśya*. It is emphasised in *Viy*₁ 14.9.1 (655a) that even an advanced mendicant cannot perceive his own *kamma-lessā* nor can he perceive his soul other than in its embodied state. *Viy* 6.9, by contrast, discusses whether a god with an impure *leśyā* can see the *leśyā* of other gods or goddesses. The answer is no: only a god with a pure *leśyā*. In *JĀA* 103 the same point is echoed with reference to ascetics rather than gods.

The question how subtle lifeless matter can be absorbed and further transformed deserves a separate study. P. Dundas (1998, p. 44) and K. Wiley (2012, p. 185) both pointed to the lack of “any explanation of the karmic processes associated with the powers of healing” in Jaina literature. Wiley (ib.) suspects that “ācāryas were selective regarding the teaching of this material and were hesitant to commit details regarding these powers to writing.” Jaina mendicants, however, invariably point to the commentaries on TS 5.20, which describe the positive or negative contribution of matter (*pudgala*) acting as an instrumental cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) on the body and mind of living beings, if not prevented to do so by the will-power (*puruṣārtha*) of the individual concerned.

Final Karman, Final Body

Interestingly enough, classical Jaina cosmology seems to envisage not only a soteriological path for souls but also a soteriological path for matter from a transformable to a non-transformable pristine existence. We have mentioned already the theory that after a transformation an atom automatically reverts to its original state unless it is transformed again. The conceptual status of the idea of an original state of an atom seems to be the functional equivalent of the idea of the pure soul in the realm of matter. But the issue is not entirely clear. In P 10 and *Viy*₁ 8.3.3 (365b) the question is treated in terms of the relative location of any object, insentient or sentient, either at the border (*carama* or *carima*) of the material world (*loga*) to the infinite space of the non-world (*aloga*) or within (*acarama* or *acarima*) the world. A liberated being, or *siddha*, is an example of such a *carama* existence of an eternal substance. Abhayadeva’s commentary on *Viy*₁ 7.7.3 (311a) describes the omniscient (*kevali*) as a final body (*carima-sarīra*).¹⁷⁵ The context determines the meaning of the word ‘final’. *Viy*₁ 14.4 (638a–641a)¹⁷⁶ explains that from the point of view of substance (*dravya*) an elementary material atom (*paramāṇu-poggala*) is eternal (*acarima*), but from the point of view of place (*khetta*), time (*kāla*), and condition (*bhāva*) it is not eternal, but either not-final (*acarima*), that is, in the

¹⁷⁵ See Deleu (1970, p. 139).

¹⁷⁶ Especially *Viy*₁ 14.4.3b (640a).

process of being transformed, or final (*carima*), that is, not ever returning to the form of existence it was part of.¹⁷⁷

What is final or non-final is relative. According to Abhayadeva, commenting on the general rule exposed in Viy₁ 14.4 (640a), in the special case of a *kevalin* there are also final atoms which “will never again enter that form of existence after having left it” (Deleu 1970, p. 207). By definition, since at the moment of death, the *kevalin* leaves *saṃsāra* as a whole, the eternal physical atoms he leaves behind are final with regard to the modes of time, place and condition, and thus can never be transformed again. At the point of final *samugghāya* all remaining karmic particles are dissipated throughout the world (Viy₁ 18.3.2 [740b]). The question is whether they are final only for the *kevali* or for other beings as well.¹⁷⁸ The texts and commentaries are ambiguous.¹⁷⁹ Viy₁ 14.4 (640a) and Viy₁ 18.3.2 (740b) discount the possibility of further transformation only in the case of liberated beings whose karman produced particles cannot be appropriated again and are hence called final or *carima sarīra-poggala*.¹⁸⁰

If indeed this feature applies only to the *kevalin*, then by implication karmically transformed molecules that are ejected or left over by an unliberated soul can be attracted and integrated again by the same soul in another incarnation, and of course by other souls.¹⁸¹ This lends indirect support to our hypothesis that Jaina scholasticism, in some passages at least, considers the idea that certain karmically acquired properties can be objectified in disembodied material structures and transmitted and re-appropriated in this form, unless they always revert back to their original form and can only be incorporated in this form. The formulation of the “reset rule” in Viy₁ 14.4 (638a–641a) must have been motivated by questions such as this.

The question, which desirable physical qualities distinguish karmically transformed ejected particles from plain matter and how they can be advantageous to the one who is able to discern and attract such purified matter would require a separate

¹⁷⁷ Viy₁ 18.3.3 (740b) distinguishes between the binding of objects (*davva*) and of the binding of conditions (*bhāva*). The first occurs either spontaneous (*vīśasā-bandha*), with or without a beginning, or is brought about by an external impulse (*paoga-bandha*), resulting in either loosely (*siḍhila*) or tightly (*dhaṇīya*) bound karman. The second relates to the binding of primary karman (*mūla-pagaḍi*) and secondary karman (*uttara-pagaḍi*) as the two principal modes (cf. P 5.465b ff.).

¹⁷⁸ See supra.

¹⁷⁹ See Schubring (1935/2000, § 89), Deleu (1970, p. 207), referring to Abhayadeva.

¹⁸⁰ See Schubring (1935/2000, § 89; 184, n. 1). See also Abhayadeva’s comment in ViyVṛ 14.4.51, summarised by Deleu 1970: 207, that atoms that were ejected (*samudghāta*) by an omniscient being at the point of death are an exception, since they will never return to their original condition as far as place, time and condition is concerned. They are therefore “final” (*carima*) in these respects, but not final as far as their substance (*dravya*) is concerned. See also ViyBh 14.4.51.

¹⁸¹ Viy₁ 6.104 [286a] says that only particles that are within range are attracted by embodied souls. In this context, the distinction in Viy₁ 14.6.1b (644a) between complete- (*avī-*) and defective material substances (*vī-davva*) is also relevant.

study and cannot be answered here.¹⁸² To this category of ejected particles belongs the so-called final karman (*carima kamma*) (Vi_y₁ 5.4.9 [221b]); mentioned also in Vi_y₁ 18.3.2 (740b) as discussed above. Suffice it to say that the process of intentional selection and attraction of particles refined by others, if indeed it ever played a role in lived religion, cannot be compared with Buddhist style merit transfers, whether conceived in terms of *aṇumodaṇa*, empathy, or as a type of exchange where merit functions as a kind of spiritual currency that is transferred by way of offerings to Buddhist monks accompanied by recitations (see Gombrich 1991, pp. 165–181). In the context of Jaina philosophy, the transmission of energy through attraction of particles or contingency is primarily a physical process.

The Excluded Third in Classical Jaina Ontology

The view that matter itself is the result of karman has been put forward by a variety of philosophical schools in classical India, such as the Buddhist Andhakas (KV 8.9) or the Brāhmaṇical Advaita Vedāntins, who entirely spiritualised the principle of karman.¹⁸³ A debate, related in Vi_y₁ 7.101 (323b f.), between Mahāvīra's first disciple Goyama (Gautama) and the householder Kālodāyi (Kālodāyin), who according to Deleu (1970, p. 38) represented a Ājīvika perspective, also concerned the question whether the karmic retribution of bad deeds (*pāva-kamma*) manifests itself in matter or in the embodied soul. Goyama's answer was that only the soul can generate karmic matter.¹⁸⁴

Classical Jainism is dualistic, at least on the level of the substances, the elementary building blocks of the universe. Hence, not everything is determined by karman.¹⁸⁵ This conclusion, reached by the doctrinal debates in the late first millennium C.E., strongly influenced by Vaiśeṣika philosophy, is still widely shared in Jaina scholastic circles. The fate of the living entity¹⁸⁶ is influenced as much by the

¹⁸² That the karmic particles are very subtle and intangible to the eye (Vi_y₁ 18.3.5 [743b]), so that, according to Abhayadeva, only a *kevalin*, or omniscient being, can discern them, does not affect the basic idea.

¹⁸³ See McDermott (1975, p. 429) and Halbfass (1991/1992, p. 327).

¹⁸⁴ The remark in Vi_y₁ 15.C.8 (680a ff.) that Gosāla asked to be buried (not cremated or simply discharged) is most certainly a polemical pun on his interpretation of karman theory. On Kālodāyi see also Schubring (1935/2000, § 57).

¹⁸⁵ This view contrast, for instance, with the stance of the Advaita Vedānta philosophy of Śāṅkara for whom “[t]h whole world ... is itself nothing but a karmic lay” (Halbfass 1991/1992, p. 327). Controversies on karmic determinism are also evident in Buddhist scriptures, such as KV XXI.7 and XVII.1, which records the position of the Andhakas that the results of karman are fixed. See McDermott (1975, p. 431f.).

¹⁸⁶ Cf. Werner's (1996, p. 185) observations on the difference between European and Indic notions of spiritual entities.

given conditions of nature as by its own actions and their consequences.¹⁸⁷ Even if the parameters of rebirth and death are broadly determined by karman, the precise circumstances are not fixed.¹⁸⁸ The concept of *karma-leśyā* may have been invented precisely for bridging this gap. Halbfass (1991/1992: 317) in his pioneering article on the subject of competing causalities in Indian philosophy saw Jainism, one of the few Indian traditions contributing to the philosophy of nature, as a “special case” because it “includes even minerals in its horizon of the living”. Yet, apart from the fact that on the whole animistic theories are more widespread than naturalistic theories, Jaina philosophy always maintained the independence of the realm of material causality,¹⁸⁹ cemented by the classical *astikāya* theory, however much the trend towards the superimposition of “religious and soteriological schemes and perspectives upon biological, zoological, cosmological observations” (ib., p. 320) pulled it away from recognising the existence of inanimate matter for which recognisable empirical examples are hard to find. No doubt, all 5 + 1 substances are either sentient or non-sentient, material or non-material. Yet, for all practical purposes the conceptual distinction between inanimate and animate matter is too abstract if not altogether contradictory and the criteria too imprecise to identify tangible objects composed of dead matter. In late canonical texts, the metaphysical distinction between sentient (*sacitta*) and insentient (*acitta*) bodies (*kāya*)¹⁹⁰ contrasts with a universal animism that is not yet evident in the early Jaina texts, as B. Bhatt (1989, p. 135ff.) has shown. The general attribution of sentience to the material elements of earth, water, fire and wind makes it virtually impossible for mendicants to find a lifeless path or spot, as required by monastic discipline, except by inference based on observed “acts” of “killing”, and hence usually only for

¹⁸⁷ Glasenapp (1925, p. 404f.) notes (in the Chapter “Magic and Mysticism”) that Jaina scholastics, like other Indians, do not see a contradiction between karman and a certain influence of the planets, assuming a deeper inner harmony which can be studied through astrology. An example is the following summary statement by Tatia (1951, p. 220, n. 1):

The doctrine of karman seems to have developed against a number of other doctrines about creation. Some regarded time (*kāla*) as the determinant factor of creation. Every event occurs in time and hence is determined by time. Others believe in nature (*svabhāva*) as the determining factor of creation. Things are determined by their own inherent nature. There is nothing, inside or outside, over and above nature, that determines the course of events. This leads to the doctrine of determinism (*niyati-vāda*). There were others who believed who believed in the fortuitous and accidental nature of the occurrences of events. There were other doctrines as well. (*Vide SvUp*, I.2. *ŚVS*, II.52–64). The believers in karman or the unseen potency (*adr̥ṣṭa*), the after-effect of a good or bad action, regarded these theories as inspired by materialistic tendencies and therefore rejected them as untenable. The Jaina philosophers accord proper place to these doctrines as testified by our experience, while installing karman in the supreme position. Karman is the ultimate determinant of the course of events. Even time, nature and *niyati* are determined by karman and there is no such thing as fortuitism. These factors, in so far as they are given to experience, are only the expressions of the working of the supreme law of karman. (Cf. STP, II, 53; *ŚVS*, II.79–81).

¹⁸⁸ Jaini (1979, pp. 115–117) records known problems of Jaina karman theories. For instance that, “[ā]yu [longevity karman] does not precisely determine ... but it establishes a framework or set of limitations within which these can operate (ib., p. 126).

¹⁸⁹ In TS 5.23–24 states that interactions between forms of matter cause both changes in natural phenomena, such as clouds, rainbows etc., and the formation and changes of physical bodies as well as their death (TS 5.19–20). Cf. Jaini (1979, pp. 100–102).

¹⁹⁰ See for instance *Viy*₁ 7.7.2 (309b).

short periods after death.¹⁹¹ In practice, conduct is therefore determined by convention, codified by monastic law, not by actual acts of discrimination between sentient and insentient forms of elementary matter.¹⁹² This particular contradiction has been highlighted by opponents such as the Ājīvikas.¹⁹³ The canonisation of the doctrine of dual karmic and natural causalities in classical Jaina treatises such as the Paṇṇavaṇā and the later sections of the Viyāhappannatti, which according to S. Ohira (1994, p. 239) “distinguishes the Jaina school from the other philosophical schools”, rather presented logical dilemmas functioning as *distinctions directrices*¹⁹⁴ which generated disagreements and schisms within the tradition and hence were constitutive for Jaina discourse.

In the Jaina tradition, discussions of the relative influence of karmic and natural causality invariably culminated in the question of the causes of involuntary premature death,¹⁹⁵ if not explicitly of “sacred matter”. In the developed forms of Jaina philosophy these dilemmas were explained away through variants of the two-truth theory. Prior to this sophisticated epistemological solution (or rather: circumvention of the problem),¹⁹⁶ Jaina philosophers generally posited a third, mixed or neutral structure, mediating between the opposites of the asymmetrical religious code of *jīva-ajīva* in one way or another. Multiple ambiguities resulted from the interpolation of mediating categories. An example is the double meaning of the fundamental ontological category of *jīva*, which designates both the “soul” as such and in its embodied, polluted or mixed state as a “living being”.¹⁹⁷

Despite concerted attempts to suppress explicit *dvikriyā-* and *trirāśī-vādas*, etc., implicitly “the excluded third” lived on in Jaina ontology. It was merely delegated

¹⁹¹ Bruhn (2007, p. 51) stressed that for practical ethics therefore almost only visible living beings are relevant.

¹⁹² For similar distinctions between “‘Living’, natural soil and of soil that is ‘dead’ ... because it has been worked by digging [etc.]” in Buddhist sources, see Schmithausen (1991, p. 50). The view of universal animism is absent in the oldest surviving text (Āyāra I), as Bhatt 1989: 135ff. pointed out (Schmithausen 1991, p. 3, n. 19). On the problem of elementary or small living beings (and its “solution” through the *kaṣāya* theory), see also Bruhn (2007, pp. 15f., 19, 24–26 ff., 51ff., 60).

¹⁹³ “When a monk who has cultivated his spiritual faculties ... walks in the prescribed way ... and a chicken ... or a young quail ... or an antlike insect ... is trodden down ... , he has committed an action in agreement with his religious duties (*īriyāvahiyā kiriyā*), not a profane and sinful action)” (Vi₁ 18.8.1–2 [754a], cf. Vi₁ 7.7.1 [309b]). On the problem of elementary beings and its “solution” through the *kaṣāya* theory, see also Bruhn (2007, p. 15f.).

¹⁹⁴ See Luhmann (1987) and Flügel (1995–1996, p. 164f.).

¹⁹⁵ According to the Buddhist KV VII.7–8 and XVII.2, the Rājagirikas and Siddhatthikas of the Andhaka School held that an *arhat* cannot have an untimely death (and hence be liberated) before all accumulated karman has come to fruition. For the Theravādins, by contrast, “old age and death ... are partly due to the physical order” and not “properly ... *kamma-vipāka*”. The commentator (KVU VII.8) tries to solve the dilemma by distinguishing clearly between physical and mental results (*kamma-vipāka*) of action (*kamma*) (McDermott 1975, p. 426, cf. p. 432).

¹⁹⁶ Albert (1968/1991, p. 126).

¹⁹⁷ “The early Jains ... maintained that a *jīva* is somewhat indistinguishable from its body, but no further thought was given to the nature of *jīva*” (Ohira 1994, p. 113).

to a secondary ontological level,¹⁹⁸ and interpreted as the product of the interaction of the two fundamental ontological substances. The question how *jīva* and *ajīva*, spirit and matter, can interact in the first place has never been convincingly answered by Jaina philosophy, as Jaini (1979, p. 114) pointed out. K. Bruhn (2007, p. 52) remarked that the notion of a “mixed” (*miśra*) state is (also) frequently found in later Jaina dogmatics.¹⁹⁹ The conception of mixed transformation put forward in Vīy. 8.1, for instance, shares certain similarities with the *terāsiya* heresy of Rohagutta who posited the existence of a third principle, *nojīva*, mediating between life and non-life. However, it is characterised as a “combination” of two sequentially distinct processes, not as an independent third type of process. “Mixed” is here a descriptive and not an ontological category. In his *Nandiṭīkā*, the thirteenth century Ācārya Malayagiri details different aspects of the *trirāśī* theory of the “Ājīvikas”, including its application to the theory of standpoints (*naya*), that is, the postulate that an entity may be “of the nature of substance, of mode, or of both”.²⁰⁰ Without considering the question of the dates of the texts, Basham (1954, p. 275) suspected that the Ājīvikas (like the “Trairāśika Jainas”) “seem to have accepted the basic principle of Jaina epistemology, without going to the over-refined extreme of *saptabhaṅgi*”.

Arguably, the most significant “included third” category in classical Jaina ontology is the concept of *pradeśa*, an elementary individual space unit that mirrors the material atom and the individual soul. It is imagined to be a two-dimensional insentient and non-material square shaped template, which together with other such units forms quantifiable grids that can be occupied by atoms or by entities (*dravya*) formed by aggregates of material and/or spiritual substances (*dravya*).²⁰¹

According to classical Jaina doctrine, even the liberated souls possess an individual “body” shaped by the differential numbers of space units they occupy.²⁰² At the end of *Viyāhappannatti* (Bhagavaī) 8.10 (423b), Gauyamā (Gautamā) asks Mahāvīra the question whether a living being (*jīva*) is the possessor of matter

¹⁹⁸ The principle of the excluded third is also “violated” by the fourth of the *sapta-bhaṅgīs* of Jaina logic. However, the strategy of hierarchisation secured the non-violation of the law of non-contradiction for each level or perspective. A paraconsistent form of logic as proposed by Priest and Routley (1989, p. 17) is not implied. See Flügel (2010a, p. 168).

¹⁹⁹ In his commentary on Vīy. 8.1, Mahāprajña (VīyBh 8.1) pointed to the distinction between living (*sacitta*), non-living (*acitta*) and mixed (*miśra*) objects in BKB 2693–2697 to distinguish six causes for quarrel:

saccitte accitte, mīsa vaogaya parihāra desakahā |
sammamñāuttaṅṭe, ahigarāṇamo samuppajje || BKB 2693||

The commentary gives as an example for each of the three: a disciple, his equipment (clothes, begging bowl), and a disciple with his equipment. The commentary explains that the equipment of a monk, though lifeless itself, should never be given away (to laity in particular) because they can become objects for quarrel.

²⁰⁰ NSBh in Weber (1888 II.1, p. 685, n. 4), translated by Basham (1951, p. 274).

²⁰¹ Technically, it belongs to the substance space. Cf. footnote 17.

²⁰² On the quasi-material concept of the soul in canonical Jainism (can it be conceived otherwise), see Jaini (1979, p. 113f.). (“Just how a nonmaterial thing can in any way interact with a material one is not well clarified. ... Jainas themselves are in fact not absolutely rigid in maintaining the immateriality of the soul”) and Johnson (1995, pp. 128f., 262, 304).

(*poggālī*) or itself matter (*poggala*). The answer is that it is both. Finally, Gauyamā asks the same question concerning the status of the liberated soul (*siddha*):²⁰³

Question: Bhante! Are the perfected beings *pudgali* or *pudgala*?

Answer: Not *pudgali* but *pudgala*.

Question: Bhante! Why do you say so ... ?

Answer: Gautama! Relative to another living being, a perfected being is a *pudgala*. Hence so (Translated by Lalwani 1980, p. 298).

Schubring (1935/2000, § 59, p. 132), Deleu (1970, p. 158) and Ohira (1994, p. 113) explained that here two meanings of the word *pudgala* come into play: “matter” and “individual” entity (material or immaterial).²⁰⁴ With regard to the *siddha*, the word is used “in the sense of an individual soul which is a well known Buddhist term”.²⁰⁵

Ohira (1994, p. 99) suggested that the Jaina concept of the *pradeśa* must have been proposed as a solution of the theoretical problem how different substances “can interpenetrate in the minutest space”. In her view, without the concept of *pradeśa* “the doctrine of *astikāyas* could not have been formulated” (ib., p. 106f.). The *pradeśa* theory in turn led to the differentiation of “the standpoint of *kṣetra* or space from the standpoint of *dravya* or substance” (ib., p. 100) and to the elevation of *ākāśa* to an independent substance, as in other systems (ib., p. 106f.). “Heretics” questioned the *astikāya* theory (ib., p. 103f.).²⁰⁶ But it is precisely this theory which must have contributed to the subsequent avoidance of a karman reductionism in the manner of the Andhakas and the Advaitins and hence to subsequent discussions of problems of multiple causalities in the Jaina tradition, echoing similar debates in Brāhmanical and Buddhist circles at the time, analysed by Halbfass (1991/1992).

The most influential and essentially unsurpassed solution of the problem of multiple causalities in Jaina philosophy was formulated by Ācārya Siddhasena-divākara, the famous Jaina logician who lived in the fifth and sixth century C.E. He was claimed by both Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras as one of theirs, but linked to

²⁰³ *siddhe naṃ bhaṃte ! kiṃ poggālī? poggale?*

goyamā ! no poggālī, poggale ||502||

se keṇaṭṭheṇaṃ bhaṃte ! evaṃ vuccai –siddhe no poggālī, poggale ?

goyamā ! jīvaṃ paḍucca | se teṇaṭṭheṇaṃ goyamā ! evaṃ vuccai – siddhe no poggālī, poggale ||503|| (Viy₃ 8.10.502f.).

²⁰⁴ On this passage see Schubring (1935/2000, § 67, p. 147) (*poggālī* = bearer of senses), and Deleu (1970, p. 158) (“The soul (*jīva*) is *poggālī* scil. Possesses atoms of matter, namely in the senses, as well as *poggala*, i.e. individual. This is also true for every being in the *samsāra*, but not for the Siddha who is only *poggala*”). See also Schubring (1935/2000, § 59, p. 132) (“*poggala*, the word for atom, is applied in its basic meaning as a ‘concrete body’ in Viy. 176a, whereas in 240a it means the part of an individual”), and Deleu (1970, p. 116) (“atom”, “object”).

²⁰⁵ Sikdar (1964, p. 561) notes that “[*poggala*] sometimes stands as synonym for soul”; as in Viy₁ 20.2.2 (775b) = Viy₃ 20.2.17, where *poggala* is listed as one of twenty synonyms (including *āyā*) for the word *jīva*, but “in the sense of body” according to Deleu (1970, p. 253). On the Buddhist Puggalavādins conception of personal entity (*puggala*), see also KV I.1.198 and McDermott (1975, p. 424f.).

²⁰⁶ See Ohira 1994: 104f. on the Kālodāyī episodes in Viy. 7.10, 13.4, 18.7.

the Yāpanīya tradition by Upadhye (1974/1983, p. 200) because of his “differences with the known doctrines of the Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras”. In his Prakrit Saṃmatitarkaprakaraṇa (STP) III.53, Siddhasenadivākara distinguished five theories of causation (*kāraṇa*) in Indian philosophy: time (*kāla*), nature (*sabhāva*), destiny (*niyati*), (unknown) actions of the past (*purvva-kaya*), and human effort (*purīṣa*).²⁰⁷ He argued that individually, taken in isolation (*egaṃta*), they are all one-sided and hence false, but if considered together (*samāsa*), from a perspective of synthesis, they are all true.²⁰⁸ According to this interpretation, not the content of a proposition, but the orienting point of view is decisive for its relative “truth-value”. This is one of the first explicit versions of the philosophy of *anekānta-vāda*, or non-one-sidedness, which is nowadays seen as a trademark of Jaina philosophy. According to Siddhasenadivākara (STP III.46–49),²⁰⁹ there are as many heresies (*para-samaya*) as there are standpoints (*naya*), because all one-sided standpoints necessarily emphasise contradiction (*pari-virodhana*). The Jaina perspective, by contrast, emphasises synthesis (*samanvaya*). By transcending differences and disputes based on one-sided perspectives through its concept of *anekānta-vāda* Jainism (*jīna-vacana*) encompasses all heresies:

²⁰⁷ These are well-known and mostly pre- or non-Jaina theories, starting with ŚVUp 1.1.2, have been formally incorporated in Jaina philosophy in form of the so-called “363 account”. See Schrader (1902, pp. 2–4, 17–57), Barua (1921/1970, p. 198), Folkert (1993, p. 233f., 274f., 327–329) (Translation of Haribhadra’s Nandivṛtti).

²⁰⁸ *kālo sabhāva niyati purvakayaṃ purisa kāraṇegaṃtā |
micchattaṃ te cevā (va) samāsaḥ hoṃti sammattaṃ || 53||
(STP₃ III.53)*

In his commentary, Abhayadeva gave the following Sanskrit gloss:

*kāla-svabhāva-niyati-pūrvakṛta-puruṣakāraṇarūpā ekāntāḥ sarve 'pi ekakā
mithyātvam ta eva samudītāḥ parasparā'jahaddhattayaḥ samyaktva-rūpatāṃ.
pratipadyante iti tātparyārthaḥ | (TBV III.53)*

Following the Sanskrit commentary, the Gujarātī editors and commentators Saṅghavī and Dośī 1932/1952: 171 inserted the word “*adrṣṭa*” after “*pūrvakṛta*” in their Gujarātī translation of Abhayadevasūr’s Sanskrit rendition and give the following equivalent terms for the five causes in their Gujarātī commentary: *kāla*, *svabhāva*, *niyati*, *karma*, *puruṣa*. A. S. Gopani 1939/2000: 127 offered the following English rendition of the *gāthā*:

Kāla (Time), Svabhāva (Nature), Niyati (Destiny), Pūrvakṛta Adṛṣṭa (Unknown actions of the past) and Puruṣārtha (effort) – all these five taken singly are false because they touch only one point. They all are true if they are made use of with reference to each other (STP₃)

The role of personal effort (*puruṣārtha*) is decisive from the Jaina point of view. See footnote 41. Saṅghavī’s and Dośī’s 1929: 710, n. 5 note to their edition of the original text with the commentary TBV III.53 point to several other texts that address the problem of different causalities, not all of them Jaina texts, amongst them Haribhadra’s eighth century Śāstravārtāsamuccaya (ŚVS) II.164–174 = II.52–62, II.191–193 = II.79–81 and earlier verses.

²⁰⁹ Interpreted by Abhayadevasūri and further by Saṅghavī and Dośī (1939/2000, pp. 121–124).

[Let there be] prosperity to Jina's words that are made of an amassment of false views, that are conducive to immortality, that are venerable, and lead to the salvific happiness (STP III.69,²¹⁰ Translated by Balcerowicz 2003, p. 42).²¹¹

Elaborating on this perspective, the previously mentioned Śvetāmbara Ācārya Abhayadevasūri in his twelfth century commentary Tattvabodhavidhāyini (TBV) pp. 710–717 established “his own Kāraṇa-Samavāya-Vāda”.²¹² The terms *samavāya*, “combination”, and *samavāya-buddhi*, “understanding of combination”, are used by Abhayadevasūri (TBV₁, pp. 106–110, 156f., 700–4) in their literal sense, not in the technical Vaiśeṣika sense of “inseparable concomitance”, “inherent-” or “material cause”, or “inherent relationship” between substance and quality or whole and part,²¹³ to which they obviously allude. Saṅghavī and Doṣī (1932/1952, p. 312, n. 1//1939/2000, p. 126, n. 1) use the synonym *samanvaya*, “synthesis”,²¹⁴ and refer in a footnote (TBV₁, p. 710, n. 5) to the Sanskrit Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad v. 2, a late text of the Yajurveda tradition²¹⁵ addressing the question of the cause of Brahma (*brahma-kāraṇa*),²¹⁶ as the likely model for Sidhasenadivākara's Prakrit verse (*gāthā*). Here, the term *saṃyoga*, “junction, union” (MW 1181) is used in a thematically similar context;²¹⁷ but rather than “actions of the past” (*pūrva-kṛta-kāraṇa*) listed by Sidhasenadivākara, “chance” (*yadr̥cchā*), is given prominence amongst the causal factors:²¹⁸

Should we regard it [the cause of *Brahman*] as time, as inherent nature, as necessity, as chance, as the elements, as the source of birth, or as the Person?

²¹⁰ *baddaṃ micchā-daṃsaṇa-samūha-māyassa amayasārassa |*
jiṇa-vayaṇassa bhagavao saṃviggā-suhāhi-gammaṣa ||STP III.69||

An alternative rendition into English is offered by A.S. Gopani in STP₃, p. 136:

Be good to Jainism which is the repository of all heresies and which is the nectar or nectars and which is easily understood by those desirous of liberation.

²¹¹ Mahāprajñā (ViyBh 8.1.1) concludes his own overview of the theoretical debate with the summary statement that the two doctrines of karmic causality (*puruṣārtha-vāda*) and natural causality (*svabhāva-vāda*) are not opposites in Jaina philosophy but integrated through the standpoint of non-one-sidedness (*anekānta-vāda*). This doctrine, one may add, was not yet explicitly formulated in the Prakrit canon, but only in the philosophical treatises of the medieval period.

²¹² These are the words of the translators and commentators Saṅghavī and Doṣī (1932/1952, p. 171 // 1939/2000, p. 127). Cf. the Vaiśeṣika concept of *samavāya-kāraṇa*, inherent cause, as one of the *sāmagrī*, or totality of causal conditions (Potter 1977/2004, pp. 54f., 60).

²¹³ See Monier-Williams (1899/1986, p. 1157f.), Oberhammer, et al. (2006, pp. 227–229).

²¹⁴ From the root *sam-anv-* √ *i*, “to go together after, follow, MW.; to infer or ensue as a consequence”: “regular succession or order, connected sequence or consequence, conjunction, mutual or immediate connection” (Monier-Williams 1899/1986, p. 1155). In contrast to *samavāya*, *samanvaya* implies the concept of an ordered sequence; which tallies well with the Jaina doctrine of standpoints.

²¹⁵ “composed probably in the last few centuries BCE” (Olivelle 1996/2008, p. xxxvii).

²¹⁶ *kālaḥ svabhāvo niyatir yadr̥cchā, bhūtāni yoniḥ puruṣa iti cintyam |*
saṃyoga eṣāṃ na tv ātmabhāvāt ātmā py anīśaḥ sukha-duḥkhaheṭoḥ ||
(ŚvUp₁ 1.2)

²¹⁷ The term also appears in STP III.60! (TBV₁ III.60, p. 727). On the technical term *saṃyoga*, “connection”, as an attribute of an object which serves as an argument in a syllogism in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras, see Oberhammer, et al. (2006, p. 202f.).

²¹⁸ The position of the *jaicchāvāis* is mentioned in the Naṃḍī.

Or is it a combination of these? But that can't be, because there is the self (*ātman*). Even the self is not in control, because it is itself subject to pleasure and pain (ŚvUp₂ 1.2, Translated by Olivelle 1996/2008, p. 253).²¹⁹

Concluding Observations: The Ascetic Body and its Remains

The idea of the transmission of ascetically acquired energy from one individual to another is well established in all Indic religious traditions.²²⁰ Most Jains feel invigorated when they touch the feet of their gurus while receiving their blessings. The same applies to their physical remains. The question how this transfer of energy works is rarely posed both in the Jain tradition and in the academic literature. The belief in the regenerative powers of relatively durable body parts of animals and humans especially bones is attested across cultures. It is evidently particularly significant in hunting societies (Friedrich 1943: 201f. 216f.) but also in the cattle breeding vedic and other societies (Oldenberg 1894/1917: 385f.). In one way or another the manipulation and interpretation of these material objects has therefore played a pivotal role in human history albeit in different degrees. P. Granoff (2008: 60) pointed out that not only in Buddhist contexts but already in the Atharvaveda 4.10.7 “the bones of certain dead individuals had unusual properties and could naturally transform themselves into something else”. The idea that bones and other body parts of extraordinary human and divine beings who died a special death either through sacrifice or self-mortification “transform themselves” into other objects of considerable purity and power that appear worthy of veneration (ib. p. 61, 66), for instance pearls, precious metal, conch shells, etc., is also evident in a wide variety of Hindu narrative texts which seem intent on testifying “the continued presence of the god” in his relics (ib. p. 69). The underlying conception seems to be that not human remains as such, which are considered impure, are powerful and hence worthy or worship, but secondary objects that were created by these remains themselves in unexplained ways. Hence there would be two types of relics, in the Buddhist distinction between “dirty” charred bones (*asthi*) and “jewel-like” relics (*dhātu* or *śarīrāṇi*) remaining after cremation.

Jaina literature generally does not distinguish between two types of relics and speaks generally only about *asthis* in the few texts which deal with relic worship.²²¹ This article has shown that the Jaina theory of transformation offers also conceptual tools for understanding the distinct power of the bodies and body parts of extraordinary ascetics compared to those of ordinary human beings or of divine beings who according to Jaina metaphysics do not possess gross physical bodies.

²¹⁹ I am grateful to P. S. Jaini, who was the first to point me to this passage.

²²⁰ One textual example for this method of transmission of power from a Hindu context will suffice: “the person who touches his limbs with the garland that was taken off by Kṛṣṇa is free from all disease and all sin” (Haribhaktivilāsa 219 cited by Granoff 2008: 69).

²²¹ The word *sakahā* “thigh” (thigh bone) used for the mythical relics of the Jinās (there are no relics of the Jinās and hence no corresponding relic cult only a relic cult of subsequent monks and nuns) is worth while investigating further from a comparative perspective. Cf. Friedrich (1943).

Explanations offered by Jaina mendicants for the transmission and absorption of such powers vary between the indistinct allusion to the miraculous “powers of belief”²²² and claims of “physical transformations” being effected through contact “between *pudgalas*”.²²³ For the majority of Jainas, the theology of sacred matter is however not an issue of great concern, despite the fact that the fetishism of sacred objects plays a role in Jaina religious life as well, albeit merely a subordinate one. The prime aim of ascetic practice, they maintain, is the purification of the soul, not the empowerment of the body; an aim which is explicitly associated with Hindu asceticism rather than with Jainism.²²⁴ It is conceded, however, that the acquisition of superhuman mental and physical power is an inevitable side-effect of the practice of asceticism. The use of these powers needs to be renounced.²²⁵

²²² The Dīgambara *munis* Amodhakīrti and Amarakīrti after going through most of the options of interpretation including the *nikṣepa* of *dravyamaṅgala* finally invoked interpretations why relics of ascetics have no effect on the living: because (1) “it is nowhere written”, (2) the “bones of monks and householders are the same”, (3) the “relics of monks are only touched not eaten (unlike pills)”, (4) “there may or may not be a relic under a *nisidhi*”, (5) “the body can be looked at from two perspectives like a steel vessel containing ghee which can with equal right be labelled ‘steel vessel’ or ‘ghee vessel’” (personal communication Mumbai 1.1.2012).

²²³ While not touching on the question of relics and reiterating the standard academic narrative of the suspected presence of metaphysical entities in sacred objects J. Laidlaw (1995: 271) argued that the body of the Jaina ascetic is perceived as an *icon* of perfection in a similar way as Jina statues in the temple and equally worthy of worship:

Reverence for Jain renunciators thus uses the same modes as worship of Jina idols: similar gestures and texts the same emphasis on visual interaction the same concern with bodily contact. Like the Jina idol the renouncer then is a presence though attenuated and partial of the perfect soul. But if idols and renunciators are both in their ways icons of the living Jina the relations between these two icons are curiously complex (ib.).

²²⁴ A classical early Hindu text on the acquisition of superhuman power through ascetic restraint is Patañjali’s *Yogasūtra* (YS):

tato’nimādirpādurbhāvahkayasampattaddharmānabhighātaśca ||46||
rūpa-lāvaṇya-bala-vajrasaṃghananatvāni kāyasampat ||47||

Thereform spring up (three perfections i.e.) minute etc. excellence of the body and non-destruction of the merits of it (46).

The excellence of the body consists of colour loveless strength and adamant density (YS 3.46f. rendered into English by J. R. Ballantyne and GovindSastry Deva).

On the influence of the YS and of Śaivism and Tantrism on Hemacandra’s *Yogaśāstra* (YŚ) see Qvarnström 2003: 7 n. 4; 97 n. 2. See also White (1996) and Jacobsen (2012)

²²⁵ This sentiment seems to be particularly strong in the orthodox *Sthānakavāsī* traditions. Considering the question addressed in this article Ācārya Śubhacandra of the Jaymalgacch for instance categorically stated: “Meditation affects only the soul not the body. The body is not purified by meditation only by medicine”; “There is no end to the desires of the body and there are no specific physical powers produced by religious practice”; “The only power that is relevant is the strength of the self or *ātma-bal*” (personal communication Jodhpur 2.1.2010). A lay-women assisting Sādhvī Candrakamitā of the Jñāngacch asserted: “Jainism is not Yoga!” The *sādhvī* agreed and while agreeing that outside matter such as food can be helpful on a material level added that Jaina practice is not oriented toward the body but primarily aims at strengthening the soul to create *ātma-śakti*, power of the self (personal communication Jodhpur 3.1.2010).

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