















































seed-like particle.<sup>98</sup> In Jaina philosophy of nature, matter, like the soul, is also conceived as an ‘active’ or ‘moving’ (*kriyā*) substance, unlike the other three of altogether five substances (*pañcāstikāya*). It undergoes somewhat similar systemic processes of self-transformation (*pariṇāma*), of aggregation and disaggregation, as does the karman of the embodied soul that automatically come to fruition. Classical Jaina cosmology describes the parallel mechanisms of self-transformation of the embodied soul and of inanimate matter and the results of their interaction.<sup>99</sup>

A few examples illustrate the range of application of the Prakrit terms *suddha* and *subha* as attributes of disembodied matter: Viy<sub>1</sub> 14.2 (634a–636a), a text which Ohira (1994, p. 64) locates in the fourth-fifth canonical stage (4th–5th century C.E.), analyses spirit possession (*ummāya*) as an effect of the penetration of one living body by “inauspicious particles” (*asubha-poggala*) sent off by another; in this case a demon or god. This passage can be interpreted in two ways: Either it suggests that the transmitted particles have moral characteristics, though there is no explicit reference to a ‘transfer of demerit’ (*pāpā*), or, more likely, that the transmitted matter itself has qualities which induces negative or “unpleasant” states. From the point of view of karman doctrine, of course, possession, though experienced as real, is a form of delusion, which can be cured by the application of discriminative knowledge resulting in the ejection of the troublesome particles.<sup>100</sup>

A similar example is the brightness of the day, believed to be caused by the rays of light sent out by the sun (which is conceived as a living god in classical Jaina cosmology). In Viy<sub>1</sub> 5.9.2 (246b) and 14.9.4 (656a), two passages which Ohira (1994, p. 64) located both in the “third canonical stage” (1st century B.C.E.–3rd century C.E.), light is explained in terms of the concept of ‘pure’ or ‘shining’ matter (the same principle is applied to darkness of the night which is interpreted to be the effect of dark matter, *tamas-kāya*). Here, the transmitted energy is not inducing moral states in a living being, but is simply described as a natural phenomenon.<sup>101</sup> According to Ohira (1994, p. 97), the ancient view “that light, darkness and sound are independent entities”, is invoked here, “which seems to have been prevalent in the olden days when these were not yet considered as properties of substance”.

<sup>98</sup> Bhatt (1983, p. 111) located the first appearance of the theory of matter in the second layer and the advanced theory in the last of three “textual layers” of the Viy. The fully developed “system theory” of karman developed from c. the first to fifth centuries C.E. It culminated in the Śvetāmbara tradition on the focus on the distinction between *jīva* and *ajīva* and “the usage of *ajīva* in the sense of the *astikāyas* minus *jīva* and *addhāsamaya*” (Ohira 1994, p. 113). Cf. Werner (1996, p. 76) on Vedic concepts of “individual organisms” as “self-regulatory systems”, as “structural-functional units”.

<sup>99</sup> See *infra* on the theory of transformation.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. Kapferer (1997) for similar methods employed in Sinhalese Buddhist anti-sorcery rites.

<sup>101</sup> The words *subha*- and *asubha-poggala* mentioned in Viy<sub>1</sub> 5.9.2 (246b), 14.8, etc., are ambiguous, and can alternatively be translated as in/auspicious or not/shining, but in this context were rendered by Schubring (1935/2000, § 69, p. 151) and Deleu (1970, p. 204) as “pure” and “impure”. See Sikdar (1987, p. 235 and Tatia 1994, p. 60) who prefer “inauspicious/auspicious”.

## Temporary Bodies Created by Ascetics

The clearest and maybe only unequivocal exposition of the material qualities and powers of ejected particles, their purity or impurity, and of their effects offered by the Jaina scriptures is the analysis of the concepts of *teya-lessā* (Sk. *tejo-leśyā*) and *kamma-less(s)ā* (Sk. *karma-leśyā*) in the *Viy*.<sup>102</sup> Both terms refer to forms of radiating energy generated by the fiery body of advanced Jaina ascetics. According to P 17.1188–1198, the *kamma-lessā*, or karmically produced radiance or personal aura of the ascetic,<sup>103</sup> is intrinsically connected with the quality and quantity of his (her) *iddhis*.<sup>104</sup> In *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 14.9.1 (655a) it is compared with material objects such as the radiance of the sun and moon gods. The commentator Abhayadeva (*ViyVṛ* 14.9.1) noted that the term *sakarma-leśyā* could be interpreted by imperfect monks (*chadmastha*) in the sense that *leśyā* itself is *karman*.<sup>105</sup> But this is not the case, despite the ambiguous compound.<sup>106</sup> Both Schubring (1935/2000, § 89, p. 185), Deleu (1970, p. 212)<sup>107</sup> and Ohira (1994, p. 126) emphasize that the “colouration of the soul”, (*bhāva-*) *leśyā*, “is not karma”, but is only carried by the *kārmaṇa-śarīra* during transmigration. Ohira (ib., p. 127f.) argues that in the theory of the process of transmigration it performs the function of “pinpointing more exactly” a precise place for the rebirth of a soul within a cosmographic region, matching the final *leśyā* of its last incarnation before death. However, in time, this “original function” of the term was forgotten and “*leśyā* as the personality-index of beings came to the fore”

<sup>102</sup> See the proposed chronology of Tsuchihashi (1983, p. 202).

<sup>103</sup> Schubring (1935, p. 267) suggested that this conception stems from the “popular belief in bright good and dark bad hearts”. Mālvaṇiyā (1971, p. 356) translated *leśyā* as “mental temperament” and characterised it as “nothing but a sort of transformation or modification of matter, which takes place depending on the soul” (ib., p. 353). Building on this, Ohira (1994, p. 129) uses the description “psychical and emotional tinges”. Flügel (2008, p. 7) suggested comparison with Heidegger’s analysis of “mood”. Malde (2010, p. 16), who discusses the salient literature, pleads for an “allegorical” understanding of many passages on *leśyā*.

<sup>104</sup> Mālvaṇiyā (1971, p. 353f.). See also Tsuchihashi (1983, p. 195f.).

<sup>105</sup> Deleu’s formulation could lead to the same conclusion. See also Tsuchihashi (1983, pp. 195–202).

<sup>106</sup> See also *ViyBh* 14.9.123–125 on the difference between the two types of meaning of *karma-leśyā*: “*pahlā artha karma ke yogyā leśyā tathā dūsṛā artha karma kī leśyā kiyā hai*”.

<sup>107</sup> The “concrete particles endowed with a karmic lessā (*sarūviṃ sakamma-lessā poggalā*)” (*Viy*<sub>1</sub> 14.9 [655a], tr. Deleu 1970, p. 212) that are radiating out from a living being in the form of brightness or heat are not the *karma-leśyā* itself:

*haṃtā goyamā! aṇagāre bhāviyaṇā appaṇo kammalessaṃ na jāṇai, na pāsai, taṃ puṇa jīvaṃ sarūviṃ sakammalessaṃ jāṇai-pāsai*” (*Viy*<sub>4</sub> 14.9.123)

According to Abhayadeva’s commentary (*ViyVṛ* 14.1) to *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 14.1 (630a), summarised by Deleu (1970, p. 203), *kamma-lessā* refers to “‘Karmic lessā’, i.e. lessā as a condition (*bhāva-leśyā*), not material lessā (*dravya-leśyā*) because the latter is well defined (*avasthita*)”. Mālvaṇiyā (1971, p. 354) suggested that this distinction is rather late, since it cannot be found in the Paṇṇaṇā. See also Ohira (1994, p. 128). The same type of explanation is given by Abhayadeva (*ViyVṛ* 14.9.136) on *teya-lessā* in *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 14.9.5 (656b) (Deleu 1970, p. 212). Schubring 1935 / 2000 § 99: 199, however, noted that the commentaries are often uncertain and sometimes clearly wrong.

(ib., p. 129), now expressing “the total content making up an individual personality”, that is, the “psychical and emotional tinges” (ib.) of the soul.<sup>108</sup>

The ontological status of the *tejo-leśyā* is disputed in Jaina literature. According to the auto-commentary on TS<sub>1</sub> 2.43, summarised by Tatia (1994, p. 57), the fiery power is “only an attribute” of the fiery body, produced by the temporary expansion of the space points of this body, and not a secondary body or entirely separate entity which can be emitted (*nirṛṣṭa*)<sup>109</sup> or hurled intentionally from the body of the ascetic, although this is precisely the impression conveyed by the depiction of Gosāla’s attack on Mahāvīra in Vīy<sub>1</sub> 15.C.7 (678a–b) (using the potentially deadly ‘hot’ form of his *teya-lessā* only to be repelled by Mahāvīra’s ‘cool’ or protective *teya-lessā*).<sup>110</sup> Vīy<sub>1</sub> 7.10.b (326b) similarly states that a monk who sends out a *teya-lessā* composed of non-sentient (*acitta*) particles will produce light and heat where the *teya-lessā* falls down.<sup>111</sup> Tsuchihashi (1983, p. 200) finds this “remarkable” and suspects that here a sentient being, a man, “manifests himself by virtue of his own inborn *leśyā*” in an inanimate entity.

According to the dominant Jaina interpretations, transformation, translocation and fiery bodies that are temporarily created by ascetics are never entirely separate from the soul, but karmically produced by a process of momentary expansion of the space points or *paesas* (Sk. *pradeśa*)<sup>112</sup> occupied by the soul beyond the limits of the gross physical body.<sup>113</sup> This process is called *samugghāya* (Sk. *samudghāta*),<sup>114</sup> of which seven forms are distinguished in P 36. However, in his commentary, the

<sup>108</sup> Ohira (1994, p. 127) argued:

The concept of *leśyā*, which expresses a general index of the total content making up an individual personality, was readily available in the then non-Jaina schools. ... It thus appears that the Jaina theoreticians seized this current concept, and assigned to it a faculty to determine a being’s next birth place. ... This *leśyā* must have been conceived as something material in connection with colour, like shining light tinged with colour.

<sup>109</sup> Pk. *nisaṭṭha*.

<sup>110</sup> Schubring (1954, p. 258) remarked: “[T]eya-lessā ist streng genommen unzutreffend mit *teya* gleichbedeutend gebraucht. Da es kein kalt-heisses *tejas* gibt (schon das kalte ist widersinnig), ist statt *sōsiṇa* ... *sāosiṇa* zu lesen”. He agrees with Abhayadeva’s commentary, on which see also Wiley (2000, p. 146).

<sup>111</sup> See also Vīy<sub>1</sub> 18.10 (757a).

<sup>112</sup> On the Jaina theory of the ‘space points’ or ‘units of mass’, see TS<sub>1,2</sub> 5.7–5.11, 5.14, and Schubring (1935/2000, § 55ff. 126 ff., etc). According to the Jaina theory, material and immaterial objects are constituted temporarily by variable combinations of different elementary substances: the units (*pradeśa*) of space (*ākāśa*) occupied by particles of matter (*pudgala*), the medium of motion (*dharmā*), the medium of rest (*adharmā*), and of the soul (the concept of a unit of time or *kāla* is disputed within the tradition). Inevitably, liberated souls, or *siddhas*, are also imagined as quasi-material entities, endowed with a set of space-points (*jīva-ghana*), which are by definition immaterial, defining a particular occupied space (*avaḡāhanā*) of a definite size in the realm of the liberated souls, or *siddha-loka*, which is predicated on the size of the body of the last rebirth. See Uv<sub>1</sub> 169–177, etc.; and W. Johnson’s (1995, pp. 130, 143, 262f., 304) reflections on the putative ‘original’ concept of the materiality of the soul in early Jainism.

<sup>113</sup> Wiley (2000, pp. 142–152) pointed out that “[i]n such an expansion called *samudghāta*, some of the space-points of the soul (*ātma-pradeśa*) remain in the principal body while others occupy the secondary body, which goes to another location in the universe while the principal body remains behind. ... leaving no physical residue because the matter forming these bodies is very subtle and they lack the impurities such as blood, bones, and flesh found in the *audārika śarīra* of humans and animals” (142f.). For the seven forms of *samudghāta*, see Vīy<sub>1</sub> 2.2 (129a) and P 36.

<sup>114</sup> From the verb *samohaṇai* (S. *samava-hana*).



Prajñāpanāṭikā (Paṇṇī), Ācārya Malayagiri, the twelfth century commentator, equated *samudghāta* with the process of ejection of karmic particles (*nirjarā*) by means of deliberate premature fruition (*udīraṇā*) of karman. While the space points of the temporary bodies retract to the space points of the physical body, the particles of dead karmic matter shed during *samudghāta*, remain outside the body.<sup>115</sup> In *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 2.2 (129a) and P 36.561b–608a and 590a, amongst the seven types of *samudghāta*, *taijasa-samudghāta*, that is, hurling the *taijasa-śārīra-nāma-karman* out of the body, is listed. But it is not included amongst the conscious acts of the soul (*prayoga*) in P 16, as Mālvaṇiyā (1971, p. 346) highlighted in contrast to Malayagiri. Hence, according to P, using a *taijasa-śārīra* as a weapon seems to be ruled out.

Three examples of *samudghāta* are of interest here: (a) *taijasa-samudghāta*, (b) *vaikriya-samudghāta*, (c) *āhāraka-samudghāta*.

(a) The most significant case, elaborated only in *Viy*<sub>1,2</sub> 14.9.1 (655a), are the coloured karmic particles (*sakamma-lessa-poggala*), which emanate from the advanced Jaina ascetic which are compared and contrasted with the bright rays of the sun or the moon.<sup>116</sup> In contrast to the im/pure and in/auspicious particles or the rays of the sun, the bright quality of the *sakarma-leśyā* is characterised as a form of matter which “shines forth” and for a while retains its distinct karman-generated qualities even outside the emitting body.

The differences between *karma-leśyā* and *tejo-leśyā* are not entirely clear. Two different reconstructions of the conceptual evolution have been offered by Tsuchihashi and Ohira.

Tsuchihashi (1983, p. 201f.) proposes four developmental stages of the term *leśyā* in the canon, designating: (1) radiance in general, especially of the deified heavenly bodies (*leśyā*), (2) lustre of an “organic” material substance (*tejo-leśyā*), (3) coloration of the human body (*Ājīvika*), (4) colouration of karmic atoms (Jaina) (*karma-leśyā*). He points to the “remarkable” feature that the *tejo-leśyā* of an animate being penetrates an inanimate entity which is made to shine by “a substance-like lustre”, and derives the term *teya-lessā* in *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 7.10.2b (326b) and *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 15 and the “later” “strictly jainistic” (ib., pp. 197, 200) term *kamma-lessā* in *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 14.9.1 (655a) with Schubring (1935/2000, § 97, pp. 195, “we have reason to believe that an adjective *leśyā* was changed into a substantive”) from the word *leśa*, particle, which he also interprets as a sanskritised form of Prakrit *lesa* (Tsuchihashi 1983, p. 201f.). A. Mette (2010, p. 309) followed this interpretation and added a tentative analysis of the different historical layers of the oldest Jaina text on *leśyā* in *Utt*<sub>1</sub> 34.

<sup>115</sup> According to Mālvaṇiyā’s (1971, p. 420) summary of Malayagiri’s commentary to this text (Paṇṇī), “*samudghāta* is nothing but expulsion (*nirjarā*) of very many particles of the *karmas* of one particular type, causing their early rise through the special process of *udīraṇā*; this necessarily involves the previous refrainment from the experience of the fruits of the *karmas* of all other types”.

<sup>116</sup> Tsuchihashi (1983, p. 199) pointed to M. Hara’s argument on the relatedness of the terms *tapas*, heat-energy, and *tejas*, glow-energy. Schubring (1954, p. 257) suggested, however, that the word *teya* does not designate here a “[concrete fire, but a collected, condensed transmitted energy or magical force] konkretes Feuer, sondern eine gesammelte, geballte ausgesendete Energie oder Kraft”. See note 119.

Ohira (1978–1980, 1994, p. 126), by contrast, argues that the concept of *karma-leśyā* stands for the earlier concept *bhāva-leśyā* (antonym: *dravya-leśyā*), or psychic colour, and is itself older than the concept of the “non-sentient” *tejo-leśyā*, which, according to her, is conceived as “the capacity of a personality index” of an ascetic.<sup>117</sup> In contrast to *karma-leśyā*, *tejo-leśyā* is conceived as a tangible ‘fiery’ ray of energy wilfully produced by an ascetic. It is produced by the<sup>118</sup> fiery body (*taijasa-śarīra*)<sup>119</sup> which itself is generated by extensive austerities (*tapas*). This ray of power can be either hot (*usiṇa*) or cool (*sīya*) (Vi<sub>y</sub><sub>3</sub> 15.65 = Vi<sub>y</sub><sub>1</sub> 15.B.4 [666a]). Because it is associated with “the miraculous powers of ascetics”, Ohira (194, p. 97f.) assumes, it must be later than the theory that “light, darkness and sound are independent entities” rather than “properties of substance”.<sup>120</sup> She, therefore, places the two passages Vi<sub>y</sub><sub>1</sub> 14.9.1 (655a) and Vi<sub>y</sub><sub>1</sub> 7.10.b (326b) respectively between the first century B.C.E. and the third century C.E. and in the late fourth and the fifth century.<sup>121</sup>

(b-c) External matter can be temporarily used by an ascetic to conjure up illusory objects for instrumental purposes. Magical objects such as this are produced through the momentary attraction (*āhāra*) and transformation (*vikriya*) of ‘improper’ or ‘impure’ matter from outside of the body. *Tejo-leśyās*, by contrast, are produced by the extraction of matter from inside. According to Vi<sub>y</sub><sub>1</sub> 3.4 ff. (186a ff.), for creating a magical effect, not a material body or a fiery body but a transformation body (*vaikriya-śarīra*) has to be produced by a monk or a god. The powers associated with these detached objects seem phantastic and are generally described as

<sup>117</sup> On Vi<sub>y</sub>. 14.9: “*Leśyā* was thus understood in terms of *karma-leśyā* in the beginning” (Ohira 1994, p. 129). In Vi<sub>y</sub>. 12.5 *karma-leśyā* is immediately opposed to *dravya-leśyā*, the antonym of *bhāva-leśyā*, which illustrates the substitution of *bhāva-leśyā* by *karma-leśyā* (ib.).

<sup>118</sup> In Vi<sub>y</sub><sub>3</sub> 15.76 = Vi<sub>y</sub><sub>1</sub> 15.B.4 (665b), as pointed out by Schubring (1935/2000, § 181, p. 317), the word *saṃkhiṭta* (Sk. *saṃkṣipta*) describes the compression or accumulation of ascetic energy. See Tsuchihashi (1983, pp. 199–201) on the historical development of the term resulting in the meaning of “*leśyā* as something like cement bringing about ‘union of a being with (infusing) karmic substance’” (p. 201); a process which can be connected with notions of moral fluids in early Jainism, which Schubring (1935/2000, § 10, 15) linked to “primitive sorcery”.

<sup>119</sup> On the concept of *tejas*, in textual Jainism, see Schubring (1935/2000, § 181, pp. 316–319). See also YŚ 1.9, and the commentary of Qvarnström. On the development of the term *tejas* (from the root *tij*, sharpen) from the Vedas to the Purāṇas, see Magnone (1993, 2009a, 2009b). For textual Buddhism, see Tambiah (1984, p. 203f.), citing Griswold. On *tejas* as “raw power” whose “manifold potential is open” in Sinhalese Buddhist sorcery rituals, see Kapferer (1997, p. 261).

<sup>120</sup> Ohira (1994, p. 98) assumes in the context of her discussion of *leśyā* that “talk about the miraculous powers of ascetics” was not part of the older forms of Jainism. However, later in her text, she notes that there is already evidence in the Śvetāmbara scriptures of the existence of two early Jaina treatises on “magical power”, the Cāraṇābhāvaṇā and the Paṇhavāyaraṇa (Prašnavyākaraṇa), which are now believed to be extinct; though Acharya (2007) seems to have discovered a manuscript of the latter. Although Vavahāra 10, the text mentioning the Cāraṇābhāvaṇā, is placed in the period between the third and first centuries B.C.E., Ohira (1994, p. 162) only concedes that the topic of magical power “might have arisen in a slightly earlier age, e.g. the fourth canonical stage”, that is, in the fourth century C.E. See also Ohira (1994, pp. 56, 65).

<sup>121</sup> “XIV.9.533 informs that *sakarma-leśyā-pudgala* discharged from the abodes of the sun and moon gods shine forth. VII.10.307 explains that non-sentient *tejo leśyā* emitted by an angry ascetic shines and burns where it falls. The former belongs to the earlier stratum of the *leśyā* theory in the third stage. The latter idea became popular when the Jainas began to talk about the miraculous power of ascetics. We place this text in the fifth canonical stage (Ohira 1994, p. 97f.)”.

‘miraculous’ (*camatkārika*) or ‘magical’ (*māyika*) in Jaina texts. These effects are just a magical illusion, as Schubring (1935/2000 § 181, p. 318) pointed out:

Viy. 154a; 190a in referring to both the monk and the god insists on saying that it means simply an effect on the senses and nothing real whatever. ... For performing such an effect material particles not proper to the performer have to be attracted, and only by applying them, *bāhiraē poggale pariyāittā*, he will succeed in producing it (Viy. 189a ff.; 283a, 643a; 705b; Jīv. 374b; Thāṇ. 104b) in which case the texts differentiate such *poggala* that adhere to the performer from such adhering to the speaker or else to some third place (*tattha-gaya, iha-g., annattha-g.*).

Though lucid in theory, the dividing line between illusory (‘magical’) and real effects is often hard to discern in the texts describing the extraordinary abilities of Jaina ascetics.<sup>122</sup> The *vaikriya* and *taijasa* powers can be used to produce both illusory and real objects outside the body and either for selfish and potentially harmful or salvific aims.<sup>123</sup> Only the power to create and use the equally ephemeral *āhāraka* or transformation body is said to be solely beneficial.<sup>124</sup>

### Substance and Mode

The power of body relics cannot be explained in the same way as the power of *karma-leśyās* or of objects generated by magical tricks. What kind of material substance then constitutes body relics? Everything that exists is constituted by the five eternal substances (*davva*) known as the “mass of all that is”<sup>125</sup> (*atthikāya*) (Viy. 2.10). The five substances are: medium of motion (*dhamma*), medium of rest (*adhamma*), space (*āgāsa*), souls (*jīva*), and matter (*poggala*). They are all divisible and constituted by elementary units (*paesa*) which are conceived of as the invisible

<sup>122</sup> Glasenapp (1925, p. 404, 1999, p. 446) argued that among the Jainas a dividing line between (Tirthaṅkara) cult and magic is more difficult to draw than elsewhere because they also venerate Hindu gods and goddesses.

<sup>123</sup> The intention of the ascetic thus becomes an important factor for distinguishing Jaina ascetics from non-Jaina ascetics or “magicians”. In the texts, the overall “religious” orientation is identified as the decisive factor, determining the superior power of Jaina ascetics. Viy<sub>1</sub> 3.6 (191b), for instance, informs us that capable (*bhāviya-appa*, Sk. *bhāvita-ātman*) monks can see distant objects via supernatural sight, that is, create a representation of a distant object in their mind; but only the supernatural perception of a righteous (*samma-dīṭṭhi*) monk who is both capable and pure corresponds to reality, not the perception of a non-believing (*micchā-dīṭṭhi*) ascetic, whose powers are weaker due to his fundamental delusion. Similarly, Viy<sub>1</sub> 18.10.1 (757a) states that capable monks are able “of moving in the air without support” (Schubring 1935/2000, § 181, p. 318). By contrast, the commentary of TP II.4.1042–1057 describes the capabilities of moving through the air in realistic terms, as based on the support of living beings inhabiting the air (‘without harming them’).

<sup>124</sup> The use of this body is restricted to ascetics of high purity and one particular purpose only: Unlike other bodies, the conveyance body is very short-lived. When the ascetic has any doubt in his mind about the meaning of a very difficult and obscure issue of the doctrine, he uses the conveyance body, expands his soul into this subtle body, reaches the distant Jina instantly and withdraws to the gross body within an intra-hour (less than forty-eight minutes). The conveyance body is abandoned as soon as the mission is completed (Tatia 1994, p. 60).

<sup>125</sup> Schubring (1935/200, § 57, p. 126).

but theoretically quantifiable space points that are occupied by a particular substance.<sup>126</sup> All substances exist in space and are formless (*arūva*) and hence invisible, with the exception of matter which has a tangible form (*rūva*) (Viy. 1.10).

Disputed is in classical Jaina philosophy the question whether time (*kāla*) can also be categorised as a substance or, if not, what its ontological status could be.<sup>127</sup> The question boils down to the conundrum whether time, like the other five substances, can be reduced to space (as in conventional linear representations of time) or whether it exists only in form of singular discontinuous moments.<sup>128</sup> Most Digambara philosophers argue that time is a substance, because it has auxiliary transformative functions.<sup>129</sup> In their view, the causative function of time alone explains both the continuation of a particular substance over a certain period and its final disappearance. Hence, it should be declared to be a substance (TS<sub>1,2</sub> 5.22 & 5.49, SaSi<sub>1</sub> 569 & 357). Śvetāmbara authors deny this. They argue that because time has no extension in space (like the other formless substances) it cannot be a substance. Time exists only in the form of unconnected moments. A compromise in terms of the two-truth theory is offered by SaSi<sub>1</sub> 569 which distinguishes between conventional (sequential) time (*vyavahāra-kāla*) and absolute (momentary) (*paramartha-kāla*) time, as two different perspectives on two principal aspects of time.

Perspectivism is at the heart of classical Jaina ontology. For classical Jaina philosophy, encapsulated in the famous *tripadī* formula of TS<sub>1(2)</sub> 5.29 (5.30),<sup>130</sup> which Ācārya Umāsvāti created to encompass competing eternalist Hindu and temporalist Buddhist ontologies, existence (*sat*) is constituted by the three causative modes of origination (*utpāda*), persistence (*dhrauvya*), and cessation (*vyaya*). From the perspective of substance (*dravya*) everything that exists is eternal, i.e., is constituted by imperishable elements, but from the perspective of mode (*paryāya*) everything that exists is forever changing. A difference of opinion concerns the mediating concept of *guṇa* which designates the persisting qualities that distinguish different substances or entities. In contrast to the standard Śvetāmbara position, expressed in Utt 28.5 and TS<sub>1</sub> 5.37, that a substance is constituted by both qualities and modes, the Śvetāmbara Ācārya Siddhasenadivākara (STP<sub>3</sub> III.8ff.) argued that the terms *guṇa* and *paryāya* are synonymous, as did Ācārya Malayagiri.<sup>131</sup> Ohira (1994, p. 92) pointed to the significance of the concept of *guṇa* for the theory of material transformation (*pariṇāma*) *cum* motion through processes of atomic

<sup>126</sup> Ohira (1994, p. 99f.), who accomplished her work under D.D Mālvaṇiyā, offers a theory of the evolution of the theoretical concept of *pradeśa* (from *vpra-dīś*, to manifest), the “cause of perceptibility”, starting with the word *a-pradeśa*, non-indication, non-determination, to indicate the invisible nature of the atom.

<sup>127</sup> Pūjyapāda (SaSi<sub>1</sub> 569) and other Digambara commentators on TS 5.22, a verse on the concept of transformation (*parāṇāma*), characterize time in terms of the qualities of non-sentience and immateriality.

<sup>128</sup> Cf. Heidegger (1918–1919/1995, p. 307, etc.), for deliberations on similar questions.

<sup>129</sup> Not as a material but as an instrumental cause: *nimitta-kāraṇa*.

<sup>130</sup> *sad dravyalakṣaṇam |*

*utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvyayuktaṃ sat |*

Existence is the character of a substance.

Origination, cessation and persistence constitute existence. (TS<sub>2</sub> 5.29–30)

<sup>131</sup> See Mālvaṇiyā (1971, p. 246).

attraction and repulsion, “by the degrees of *guṇas* existing in matter itself”,<sup>132</sup> which may be one reason for its incorporation in the classical *dravya-guṇa-paryāya* sequence.

## Modes of Material Transformation

The Jaina concept of continuity through change is further theorised under the title of *pariṇāma* or transformation of substances of entities in P 13, Viy<sub>1</sub> 1.1.3 (23a), 1.3.4 (55a),<sup>133</sup> etc., and TS<sub>1</sub> 5.41 in particular; both with regard to material atoms (*puḍgala*) and aggregates (*skandha*) and to living entities.<sup>134</sup> Viy<sub>3</sub> 14.4.52 states that there are two types of transformations: of animate beings (*jīva-pariṇāma*)<sup>135</sup> and of inanimate beings (*ajīva-pariṇāma*). The theory of transformation is both the foundation of classical Jaina karman theory and of the Jaina theory of matter. The *locus classicus* for the concept of *pariṇāma* in Jaina philosophy is Viy 8.1.<sup>136</sup> Ohira (1994, p. 56) places this chapter and all thematically similar texts of the Viy. in the fifth and last canonical stage of her scheme (4th–5th century C.E.), having located the first appearance of the theory of *puḍgala-pariṇāma* in the second or third centuries C.E. (ib., p. 93). All modern commentators agree that the theory of transformation is late-canonical.

Viy<sub>1,3</sub> 8.1.1 (328a)<sup>137</sup> distinguishes three types of material particles (*poggala*) and Viy<sub>1,3</sub> 8.1.2 (332b) similarly three types of individual entities (*davva*)<sup>138</sup> with reference to distinct modes of transformation—natural, karmic and mixed—that produced them<sup>139</sup>:

<sup>132</sup> Cf. the Vaiśeṣika solution by postulating karman as an independent category of motion. See Ohira (1994, p. 92).

<sup>133</sup> “This *atthitaṃ atthitte pariṇamāi* [= the attribute being existent remains if the entity undergoes transformation] is as elementary a tenet as *calamāṇe calie* etc.” (Deleu 1970, p. 77 on Viy<sub>1</sub> 1.1.3).

<sup>134</sup> See Ohira (1994, p. 99) on the contrast between Jaina *pariṇāmavāda*, which emerged in the “third canonical stage” and the Vaiśeṣika position that existence becomes non-existence after the destruction of an entity in Vaiśeṣikasūtra 9.2.

The practical implications of the once dominant Jaina perspective that atoms change while being changed are illustrated by Jaina critical analysis of the powers of transformation of gods, for instance in Viy<sub>1</sub> 16.5 (704a–708b).

<sup>135</sup> The term *jīva* is ambiguous. In its embodied form it is seen “as somehow indistinguishable from the body” (Ohira 1994, p. 110).

<sup>136</sup> For the sources on *pariṇāma*, see Vijayarājendrasūri 1913–1925/1986 V: 595–614, and on *prayoga-mīśra-vīśrasā pariṇāma pariṇataḥ pudalāḥ* pp. 602–610.

<sup>137</sup> In identical words: Ṭhāna<sub>1</sub> 3.3.401.

<sup>138</sup> A particular object is also called *dravya* albeit being a “substance” of “a second order” (Schubring 1935/2000, § 61, p. 136). On the multiple meanings of the term *dravya* in Indian philosophy, see Halbfass (1992, p. 89f.).

<sup>139</sup> *tivihā poggalā paṇṇattā, taṃ jahā – paoga-pariṇayā, mīśā-pariṇayā vīśasā-pariṇayā* (Ṭhāna<sub>1</sub> 3.3.401 = Viy<sub>3</sub> 8.1.1).

1. Transformed by external (karmic) impulse (*paoga-pariṇaya*, Sk. *prayoga-pariṇata*),
2. Transformed by mixed causes (karmic & natural) (*mīsa-p.*, Sk. *mīśra-p.*),
3. Transformed spontaneously (naturally) (*vīśasā-p.*, Sk. *visrasā-p.*).<sup>140</sup>

The term *prayoga-pariṇāma*, transformation by external impulse, designates changes that are brought about (consciously or unconsciously) by the action of the embodied soul. According to classical Jaina doctrine, this form of karmic causality produces the five bodies of living beings.<sup>141</sup> *Visrasā-pariṇāma*, spontaneous transformation, designates the processes of natural (*svabhāva*) transformation of inanimate atoms, such as aggregation, disaggregation, etc., independent of any interference of embodied consciousness.<sup>142</sup> According to *Viy*<sub>3</sub> 8.1.27, 8.10.467, spontaneous transformation affects the colour, smell, taste, touch and shape of matter.<sup>143</sup> In P 13 the term *pariṇāma* refers to natural processes of atomic aggre-

<sup>140</sup> I follow the terminology of Schubring (1935/2000, § 60, p. 133–136) and Deleu (1970, pp. 145, 154, 206), who also uses “instrumental and automatic process[es]”. Since action (karman) involves conscious and unconscious processes, Lalwani’s (1980 III, p. 103) (*Viy*<sub>6</sub> 8.1.1) translation “conscious transformation” is merely a shortcut.

<sup>141</sup> *Viy*<sub>5</sub> 8.1.50–71 explains how various permutations of karmic activity result in different material transformations. The gross physical body, for instance, is transformed by conscious physical activity (*kāya-payoga-pariṇaya*), resulting in bodies of different degrees of purity (*Viy*<sub>5</sub> 8.1.55 ff.) and power (*vīrya-śakti*) (Amar Muni, commenting on *Viy*<sub>5</sub> 8.1.71). “This threefold activity [paoga]”, of mind, speech and body, though considered to be material, “is considered to be of the soul (*ātmavyāpāra*) because it does not take place in its absence” (Mālvaṇiyā 1971, p. 345). Different interpretations of the term *prayoga*, principally treated in P 16 in the canon and under the title *prayoga-karma* in the Digambara Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama (ib.), have influenced the available translations. *Paoga-pariṇāma* was translated by Amar Muni as “conscious transformation” (*Viy*<sub>5</sub> 8.1, p. 468), while Schubring (1935/2000, §§ 60, 61, pp. 133, 136) and Deleu (1970, pp. 120, 206, 237), preferred the neutral formulation “accidental’ change” (*pariṇāma*) caused by an “impulse from without”, that is, *karman*, an “instrumental process” of mind, speech and body (*Viy*<sub>1</sub> 1.3.3 [254a]).

Mahāprajñā’s commentary (*ViyBh* 8.1.1) to *Viy*<sub>4</sub> 8.1.1 (III, p. 6) summarises divergent interpretations of this passage:

Umāsvāti in his *Bhagavatīvr̥tti* 8.1 focuses on the three different causes of the bondage of material atoms constituting the structure of the molecules of a physical body: 1. *prayoga*: effort of the soul (*jīva-vyāpāreṇa śarīrādītayā pariṇatāḥ*), 2. *mīśra*: a combination of both, 3. *svabhāva*: nature.

Siddhasenagaṇin in *Tattvārthabhāṣyavṛtti* (TBV) 5.17 relates the three types of transformation to the Jaina teaching of the three causes (*kāraṇa*): 1. material (*pariṇāma*) (“=*upādāna*”), 2. final (*nīrvartaka*), 3. instrumental (*nimitta*); different from the Vaiśeṣika triad of causes: 1. inherent (*samavāya*), 2. non-inherent (but closely related) (*asamavāya*), and 3. instrumental (*nimitta*). Cf. Potter (1997, p. 55–57).

Siddhasena Gaṇin defines *prayoga* also as the action of the embodied soul (TBV 5.24: *prayogo jīva-vyāpāras tena ghaṭito bandhaḥ prāyogikah*).

The Digambara philosopher Akalaṅka, by contrast, in his *Tattvārtharajāvartika* (TRV) 5.24, understands it as designating the union (*saṃyoga*) of the human body, speech, and mind (*prayogaḥ puruṣa-kāya-vād-manah saṃyoga-lakṣaṇah*).

<sup>142</sup> Dual causality of nature and karman is well established in Digambara literature as well. See SaSi<sub>1</sub> 529–531.

<sup>143</sup> *pañcavihe poggala-pariṇāme paṇṇatte, taṃ jahā—vanṇa-pariṇāme, gaṇḍha-pariṇāme, phāsa-pariṇāme, saṃthāṇa-pariṇāme* || (*Viy*<sub>3</sub> 8.10.467).

Frequent implicit references to the Paṇṇavaṇā (P) I & XIII are made in the sections on matter in *Viy*. 8.1 & 8.10, *Viy*. 14.4. See Deleu (1970, pp. 145, 206f.).

gation, disaggregation and movement.<sup>144</sup> *Miśra-pariṇāma*, mixed transformation, finally, refers to a combination of karmic and natural processes.<sup>145</sup>

According to *Viy*<sub>3</sub> 8.1.40–41, *miśra-pariṇāma* produces the five bodies of living beings in a similar way as *prayoga-pariṇāma*. Since both karmic and mixed causes are involved in the formation of the five bodies of living beings (Pk. *kāīya*) (*Viy*<sub>3</sub> 8.1.27, 8.1.40f.), the question emerges what exactly the difference between these two forms of transformation is? An indirect answer is given in *Viy*<sub>3</sub> 8.1.43 which states that any particle or aggregate can be transformed karmically, naturally or in both ways combined. Most objects in the world are the product of natural transformation, followed by products of mixed transformation and finally products of karmic transformation (*Viy*<sub>3</sub> 8.1.84). If more than one particle or entity is involved, as in processes of aggregation, then the products of three types of transformation can exist in combination (*Viy*<sub>3</sub> 8.1.73). According to the developed Jaina theory of karman, effectively all living entities are constituted through mixed processes of transformation. Glasenapp (1915/1942, p. xix) called attention to the fact that the summary Karmagranthas of the Śvetāmbara Ācārya Devendrasūri give however only an evasive explanation of how natural processes further differentiate the karmic particles which were attracted by the actions of the living being in such an ingenious way that complex organisms emerge:

I am aware of only one passage wherein the author deliberately raises the question concerning the cause. It is contained in Kg. II., 75a; herein the author raises an objection as to how it is possible that the particle of matter seized in a moment by the soul is capable of transforming itself into the number of particles necessary for the formation of the various species of the *karman*, whereupon he replies that it is performed through the mysterious power of the soul, of which we may not make to ourselves any idea, and through the peculiar quality of the matter itself. It may be observed, he argues, that matter on which no spiritual force is working, is changing into clouds and rainbows; why then could not matter with which a *jīva* is in connection be changed into different kinds of *karman*? All further discussion is cut off by an energetic ‘*alam vistareṇa*’.

A related question is whether processes of karmic and mixed transformation apply only to matter forming the body of living beings or also to inanimate matter outside the body? This question, which touches at the heart of the conundrum of the status of ‘sacred matter’ in Jaina philosophy, is not clearly addressed in the *Viy*. itself, but was taken up by the commentaries. The term *miśra-pariṇāta* is explained in somewhat greater detail in *Viy*<sub>5</sub> 8.1.46–47 and 8.1.72–73, but remains controversial in the commentary literature.<sup>146</sup> Different opinions are recorded in modern refer-

<sup>144</sup> See Schubring (1935/2000, § 60, p. 133).

<sup>145</sup> Schubring (1935/2000, § 61, p. 136) comments on this passage: Material masses of this kind [inanimate aggregates], together with their shapes, come into being spontaneously, whereas all accumulations furnishing the souls in the world with bodies and opportunities of activity ... result from impulse, i.e., through the working of the Karman. But as these accumulations have concrete qualities, it follows that they represent a mixture of both cases (*Viy*. 332a).

<sup>146</sup> For the following, see Mahāprajña’s summary of the commentaries: *Viy*<sub>4</sub> 8.1.1, pp. 5f.

ence works. Ratnacandra (1923/1988 IV, p. 179f.) defines *mīśa-pariṇaya poggala* as a “molecule which has matured into a mixed state, i.e. has left the soul but has not yet assumed another form”. Deleu (1970, p. 145), by contrast, states unambiguously that it is only the “animate world” which results from conscious and mixed transformation. Natural transformation affects only colour, smell, taste, touch and shape. The assessment of the scope of the category of the *mīśra-pariṇata pudgala* varies even more widely in the classical commentaries. In the older commentaries the paradigmatic examples for products of mixed transformation are material objects outside the body which have been transformed by the activity of living beings who worked on them. In the later commentaries dead bodies or body parts of living beings are cited as examples; that is, either products of mixed transformation within the living organism or products of a two-step sequence of karmic transformation within the body followed by natural transformation outside the living organism. Thus, not only organic-cum-inorganic matter<sup>147</sup>, but also inorganic matter that had once been transformed by the activity of living beings and was then ejected is categorised as a product of mixed processes of transformation.

The Digambara Ācārya Akalaṅka (8th century) in his *Tattvārthavārtika* (TV) 5.24 does not accept mixed transformation as an independent category. Instead, he distinguishes two sub-types of karmic transformation (*prayoga-pariṇāma*): of non-living entities (*ajīva-viśaya*) (for instance wood covered with shellac) and of mixed living-and-not-living entities (*jīvājīva-viśaya*).<sup>148</sup> Akalaṅka further differentiates two types of the latter: *karma-bandha* and *nokarma-bandha*, that is, processes of binding particles that form the karmic body (*kārmaṇa-śarīra*), on the one hand, and processes of binding particles of the gross-, transformation-, transposition- and fiery bodies, on the other hand. The same example of wood covered with shellac for the transformation of non-living matter was selected later by the ca. ninth century Śvetāmbara Ācārya Siddhasenagaṇin in his *Tattvārthasūtrādhigamabhāṣyavṛtti* (TSB) 5.24. Siddhasenagaṇin, however, does accept ‘mixed-transformation’ as a separate category and explains *mīśra-pariṇata* with reference to the examples of the pillar (*stambha*) and of the water pot (*kumbha*) which are both created by a combination of naturally produced clay and form-giving human activity.<sup>149</sup> Siddhasenagaṇin and Akalaṅka both agree that ‘mixed-transformation’ applies only to objects outside the living body if they are shaped not only by natural processes but additionally by the actions of living beings.

The Mūrtipūjaka Ācārya Abhayadevasūri (11th century.), by contrast, in his Sanskrit commentary *Bhagavatīvṛtti* (ViyVṛ) 8.1, chose as examples for products of mixed transformation (1) the corpses of human beings, etc., that naturally decompose (*mukta-kaḍavarādi-rūpa*), and (2) naturally transformed classes of gross, etc., matter (*audārikādi-vargaṇa-rūpa*) that are further transformed by the actions of

<sup>147</sup> Sikdar (1987, pp. 235–237 and 213).

<sup>148</sup> TRV 5.24: *sa dvedhā ajīva-viśayo jīvājīva-viśayaśceti | tatrā’jīva-viśayo jatukāṣṭhāi lakṣaṇaḥ |*

<sup>149</sup> TBV 5.24: *prayoga-visrasābhyāṃ jīva-prayoga-sahacaritūcetanā-dravya-pariṇati-lakṣaṇaḥ stambha-kumbhādi-mīśraḥ |*



living beings.<sup>150</sup> The Sthānakavāsī Pravartaka Amar Muni interpreted the text as follows:

Jointly transformed matter – This is of two types – (1) naturally transformed matter without disintegration of the consciously acquired form, such as a corpse. (2) Naturally transformed species of *karmic* particles, such as those needed to form the gross physical body etc., further transformed consciously, such as the gross physical body of a being (ViyVṛ, according to Amar Muni, Viy<sub>5</sub> 8.1, Vol. 2, p. 468; Translation from Hindī by Surendra Bothra).

The two complementary processes envisaged here are, first, the ejection of karmically transformed matter from the soul and the subsequent natural transformation, and, second, the reverse process of attraction of naturally transformed matter and its further karmic transformation by an embodied soul building up its bodies.<sup>151</sup> In the first case, the transformative actions of living beings are followed by processes of natural transformation. In the second case, processes of natural transformation are followed by actions of living beings.

For Abhayadevasūri it is quite clear that atoms and molecules that form the material body of an acting living being (*jīva*) are also subject to processes of natural transformation. Our question, what exactly the difference is between karmic and mixed transformation is answered by him as follows. The transformation through action (*prayoga*) also involves processes of natural transformation (*visrasā*), and in this sense can be considered as a form of mixed transformation. But natural transformation is not essential (*vivakṣita*) in this context. However, in processes of mixed transformation both *prayoga* and *visrasā* are essential. The same point was made already by Siddhasenagaṇin (TBV 5.24), who argued that the question about the way in which the two processes are combined cannot be settled in abstract terms, but only with reference to a particular context. In processes of transformation through action, the innate effort (*samavāya-kāraṇa*) of the living being alone is sufficient. No external instrumental cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) is necessary. In processes of mixed transformation, an additional external cause is always necessary. Processes of natural transformation, on the other hand, are indifferent (*nirapekṣa*) to both the inherent cause and the instrumental effort of living beings.<sup>152</sup>

<sup>150</sup> *miśraka-pariṇatāḥ prayoga-visrasābhyāḥ pariṇatāḥ | prayoga-pariṇāma-matya-janto visrasayā svabhāvāntaram āpādītāḥ mukta-kādevarādi-rūpāḥ | athav-audārikādi-vargaṇā-rūpā visrasayā niṣpādītāḥ santaḥ jīva-prayogeṅ-aikendriyādi-śarīra-prabhṛti-pariṇāmam āpādītās te miśra-pariṇatāḥ nanu prayoga-pariṇāmo'py evaṃ-vidha eva tataḥ ka eṣāṃ viśeṣaḥ? satyaṃ; kinnu prayoga-pariṇāteṣu visrasā satyapi na vivakṣitā |* (ViyVṛ 8.1).

<sup>151</sup> Cf. Sikdar (1987, p. 327).

<sup>152</sup> Siddhasenagaṇin notes that the process of transformation through inherent causes (*samavāya-kāraṇa*) can be related to concepts of Vaiśeṣika philosophy (ViyBh 8.1.1). See supra for Abhayadeva's reinterpretation of "*samavāya-kāraṇa*" in the sense of "combined causes" in his TVB.

## Dead Bodies and Relics

Viy. 8.1 does not discuss the ontological status of dead bodies.<sup>153</sup> Yet, as we have seen, at least one of the significant commentators, Abhayadeva, points to the dead body as a paradigmatic example for an object produced by mixed karmic and natural causes. Following on from this, I would argue that body parts such as relics can similarly be conceptualised from the perspective of classical Jaina philosophy as material objects which were created by mixed karmic and natural causes. The distinction between insentient matter in general and the matter of dead bodies and relics is that the physical structure of the latter is the product not of natural but of mixed causes of transformation. In fact, it could be argued that from the perspective of classical Jaina philosophy, the material qualities of bone relics differ from qualities of inorganic matter outside the body in a similar way as organic chemical compounds were in Europe once believed to differ from inorganic compounds, until experimental counter evidence was furnished by Friedrich Wöhler in 1828.<sup>154</sup> The relics of Jaina mendicants are special, however, because the material aggregates resulting from ascetic processes of transformation are ideally predicated entirely on wilful instrumental action and hence differ in structure from aggregates that underwent unchecked processes of mixed transformation. Effectively, two types of relics produced by mixed natural and karmic causes are distinguished.<sup>155</sup> In contrast to the matter of common dead bodies, which is shunned, the relics of Jaina ascetics are considered valuable because material results of exemplary renunciatory action are in part crystallised in the living bodies as well as in the remaining dead matter.<sup>156</sup> The bodies and body parts of advanced Jaina ascetics, it is believed, are not constituted by ordinary organic compounds, but by extremely refined matter, like the body secretions and other material particles that are ejected from the ascetic body. Jaina mendicants compare the beneficial physical properties of ascetically distilled “auspicious matter” such as body secretions and physical remains with the properties of medical pills.<sup>157</sup> In contrast to body secretions, the physical qualities of ascetically produced body relics last for some time even after the severance of the gross body from the soul at the point of death.

<sup>153</sup> It refers however to cases of mixed bodies (*mīsa-sarīra*), and of conscious or mixed transformation of gross (etc.)-cum-mixed bodies (*orāliya-mīsa-sarīra-kāya-payoga/mīsa-pariṇae*) (Viy<sub>3</sub> 8.1.49) (etc.).

<sup>154</sup> See Sikdar (1987, p. 237f.). In modern science, the notion of ‘organic compounds’ is still used as a shorthand for certain shared qualities of plant and animal produce, such as the presence of carbon.

<sup>155</sup> Cf. the third of Laidlaw’s (1995, p. 242f.) three styles of Jaina usage of the body, especially the ‘iconic’ style: (1) ‘Indexical’ — ‘normal’ use of the body for the simultaneous pursuit of renunciatory and worldly ends; (2) ‘Dualistic’ — attempt to destroy the body in order to liberate the soul; (3) ‘Iconic’ — representation of the perfect body as an expression of inner purity. Laidlaw’s categories do not form a logical continuum, and indexical and iconic features are not clearly identified in the text. The dualistic path is not “largely” a Jain lay project (ib., pp. 152, 238).

<sup>156</sup> The results of action come to fruition mainly in the process of reincarnation determined by the karmic body.

<sup>157</sup> Personal communication of the Terāpanth mendicants Samaṇī Caitanyaprajñā, London 5.9.2008, and Muni Mahendra Kumār, Lāḍṇūṃ 22.12.2009. Cf. Friedrich (1943, p. 220) on the medical use of pills made of the bones of Tibetan Lamas.

The fact that the different types of dead matter that are distinguished (or distinguishable) in Jaina philosophy have apparently not (yet) been valorised in this way in official Jaina culture, despite the evident options in Jaina ontology, can only be explained by a historical combination of soteriological and social factors. The question of the historical function of the relics of renowned ascetics in Jaina culture can however not be addressed in this article.<sup>158</sup> From a strictly karman theoretical perspective, the material products of ascetic labour may be special and even beneficial for the material wellbeing of living creatures, yet, they can in no way affect the soteriological prospects of the devotee which are entirely determined by his or her own renunciatory practice.

### The Material Qualities of Bone Relics After Cremation

The main argument of this article is that, technically, not only dead bodies but also bone relics of venerable saints, though apparently not mentioned in the commentaries to *Viy.* 8.1 and 18.3.2<sup>159</sup>, belong to the Jaina category of matter formed by mixed karmic and natural causes. The two main transformative processes involved in the production of bone relics are: (a) attraction of exterior matter and constitution of the body through karmic activity and natural causes, (b) death, dissociation of the soul, and either natural decomposition or cremation of the gross body.

An important question is how cremation affects the quality of the physical remains. From the late Vedic period onwards, the process of decomposition of dead bodies was deliberately accelerated through cremation by the majority of the population in South Asia who could afford it. After the incineration of the corpse and the cooling of the ashes, the remaining more or less preserved charred bones (*aṭṭhi-jhāma*) were collected and disposed either on the spot or at 'sacred rivers'. These practices continue even today. What kind of material qualities can be attributed to the charred bones and ashes that remain after cremation from a Jaina philosophical perspective? In which way does the deliberate process of incineration, which itself is of mixed karmic and natural causality, transform the physical structure of the body?

*Viy.* 1.2.2 (213a) tells us that this very question was once put to Mahāvīra by his chief disciple Gautama. Mahāvīra explained that the burning of all physical substances is a process of transformation of matter attracted by fire beings (*tea-kāya*) with the help of wind-beings (*vāu-kāya*), both of which are conceived as living creatures in classical Jaina doctrine (*Viy.* 16.1 [213a]). In the process of cremation, the dead bodies that originally belonged to mobile beings become the bodies of fire beings:

[Q.] *Bhante!* To what category of living beings do the bodies of bone, burnt bone, skin, burnt skin, pelt, burnt pelt, horn, burnt horn, hoof, burnt hoof, nail and burnt nail belong?

<sup>158</sup> Cf. Flügel (2010b).

<sup>159</sup> A comprehensive review of the Jaina commentary literature is beyond the scope of this study.

[Ans.] Gautam! Bone, skin, pelt, horn, hoof, nail these are all bodies of mobile beings (*trasa jiva*). Burnt bone, burnt skin, burnt pelt, burnt horn, burnt hoof, burnt nail are the bodies of mobile beings in terms of their earlier or original state. After that when they are processed with implements and so on up to [*jāva*] fire and undergo transformation they may be called bodies of fire-bodied beings (Viy<sub>5</sub> 5.2.15, translated from Hindī by Surendra Botharā, cf. Viy<sub>8</sub> 5.2.53).<sup>160</sup>

The same answer is given in Viy<sub>5</sub> 5.2.16 in reply to the question as to the nature of ashes (*chāriya*) and other materials fuelling fire, such as cowdung, etc. Similarly, DVS 5.1.7 stresses that a monk should not step on warm ash and other forms of matter recently touched by fire to avoid killing life in the form of fire beings.<sup>161</sup> Cold ash, by contrast, is considered to be dead<sup>162</sup>, and is commonly used by to prevent bleeding in the ritualised periodic plucking of hair and beard (*kesa-loya*) that is obligatory for Jaina mendicants.<sup>163</sup> For Jaina philosophers there was no doubt that the remains left by the cremation fire were aggregates of dead matter; at least for a short period after the flames have died down and before new souls start repopulating the material remains. Within a period of one *muhutta*, that is, less than forty-eight minutes<sup>164</sup>, it is said, dead matter, such as ash, may be repopulated by living souls. In their process of decomposition, bone relics, too, should be able to function as hosts for reincarnating souls and become one-sensed beings (like fire, even stones can be living entities), though no text known to the present writer seems to have dealt with this question. If this is not the case, then a further explanation of the exceptional status of bone and tooth relics, which decompose only slowly, would have been found.<sup>165</sup>

The reliable production of relics is predicated on the practice of cremation, and the aim to produce relics may have been one of the reasons for the introduction of the practice of cremation for prominent saints at least in the case of Buddhism as

<sup>160</sup> The Jaina theory of transformation of ever changing modes of eternal atomic particles in the act of incineration differs from those of the Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika philosophies, as Sikdar (1987, pp. 300–309) and Mahāprajña (ViyBh 5.2.51–54) have pointed out. The Vaiśeṣika philosophers assume that in the process of baking for instance all individual atoms (*pṛṭu-pāka*) are destroyed and recreated in a new form. Naiyāyika thinkers, by contrast, posit that the changes affect the whole body (*piṭhara-pāka*). The individual atoms remain the same in the process of baking, but are mixed with fire particles which accounts for the transformed appearance.

<sup>161</sup> For Vedic views on the fire hidden in the ashes, see Krick (1982, p. 122).

<sup>162</sup> For Manu<sub>1</sub> 3.97, etc., “dead ash” has negative connotations, since it implies the extinction of the life-giving fire. One should not step on it: “A person who wants to live a long life will avoid stepping on hair, ashes, bones, skulls, cotton seeds, and chaff” (Manu<sub>1</sub> 4.78). Hair represents fertility and vitality cross-culturally. This is also the case in the Vedas. See Krick (1982, p. 88f.).

<sup>163</sup> Water mixed with cold ash is considered to be dead and therefore acceptable for mendicants because of the chemical reaction, not because ash is associated with fire. Because water is killed by ash (fire), some Jains believe it to be wrong to immerse the bones and ashes that remain after cremation into rivers.

<sup>164</sup> Ratnacandra (1923/1988 IV, p. 193) explains that a *muhūrta* equals two *ghadīs* or 3,773 breaths.

<sup>165</sup> K. Wiley (personal communication 1.11.2010) remains sceptical: “This would relate to the operation of *nirmāṇa nāma karma* in association with *jāti nāma karma*. In other words, a soul taking birth as an earth-bodied being would form various sorts of bodies, but not one that has the qualities or shape of a ‘bone’”. See also Friedrich’s (1943, p. 201f.) discussion of the unique physiology of bones.

suggested by the famous account of the funeral of the Buddha in the Mahāparinivāṇasutta. However, cremation was not always practiced, certainly not amongst the Nigānṭhas. Canonised scriptures such as the Śvetāmbara Kappasutta and its commentaries and the Dīgambara Bhagavatī Ārādhana describe the ways in which corpses of dead ascetics should be discarded in the wilderness and left to the wolves and vultures, which disperse the remaining fragments of bones in all directions. The comparatively slower process of physical decomposition is also described as staged. The matter produced by five-sensed living beings is re-transformed by karmic activity of one-sensed beings and hence loses many of its previous qualities. As a result of this process of transformation, after a while, a different type of dead matter remains.

The power of one-sensed living beings (*egimḍiya*) is, of course, limited and cannot explain the extraordinary energy attributed to relics.<sup>166</sup> Nevertheless, even in their decomposed or cremated form, as physical matter, certain fragments of the body parts created by the actions of the ascetics retain some of their original material properties and hence are said to have healing qualities, like a pill produced by Ayurvedic medicine or the pharmaceutical industry.<sup>167</sup>

### Enduring Power of Body-Parts Outside the Body and Transfer of Power

Another question is how these properties, if indeed they exist, can be transferred to or appropriated by another living being? No satisfying answer, it seems, can be found in the Jaina texts. Evidently, dissociated karmic particles automatically lose their quality as *karmic* matter once severed from the embodied soul: “Karmic particles thus purged are mere matter particles (*puḍgala*) devoid of *karmic* efficacy” (Ohira 1994, p. 196). The question whether karmically transformed matter also immediately loses its powers after being disconnected from the body is disputed within the (Śvetāmbara) Jaina tradition. The concept of the special power of disembodied body parts of ascetics would otherwise play no role. Contrary to this view, it is stated in *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 14.4 (638a–641a) = *Viy*<sub>3</sub> 14.4.44–53 that because atoms are eternal (*sāsaya*) only from the point of view of substance but not eternal from the point of view of mode (colour, etc.), they revert back to their original state once a particular transformation (*pariṇāma*) has been accomplished. Once the atom is reset to its original state a new transformation can start. The same applies to molecules (*khaṃdha*), that is, aggregates of material atoms (in this context called *paramāṇu-poggala*), which (can) combine to form individual objects (*davva*). After the completion of a particular transformation they, too, revert back to their original state. The fact that aggregates will, at some stage, decompose into their elements is

<sup>166</sup> See Wiley (2000, p. 125).

<sup>167</sup> *Uv*<sub>1</sub> 159, however, mentions imperfect Jaina monks (*samaṇa*) who hand out ashes which miraculously cause wellbeing (*bhūi-kammiya*). Cf. Strong (2004, pp. 10–12) on the distinction between “bones and beads” prevalent in contemporary Buddhism in South East- and East Asia (but not in the Pāli canon). He argued that these beads could be interpreted as “the result of a process of metamorphosis brought on not only by the fire of cremation but also by the perfections of the saint (in this case the Buddha) whose body they re-present”. On the process of transformation of ‘bones’ into ‘beads’ brought about by the cremation fire see also Granoff (2008, p. 60).

discussed separately in the texts.<sup>168</sup> The notion of an original unmodified state of an eternal elementary atom with specific qualities (colour, smell, etc.) is, of course, a theoretical limiting case.

## Perception and Reappropriation of Karmically Transformed Particles

It is an open and from the now dominant doctrinal Jaina point of view undoubtedly heretical question whether disembodied ascetically refined particles (*poggala*) can be perceived and re-appropriated by another living being.<sup>169</sup> This interpretation seems however to inform *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 18.3.2 (740b) = *Viy*<sub>2</sub> II.18.3.8–9, a passage summarised by Deleu (1970, p. 237), which tells us that “when a monk who has cultivated his spiritual faculties dies ... the subtle ultimate particles of his *karman* (*je carimā nijjarā-poggalā suhumā*) spread over the whole world (*savvaṃ logaṃ pi ṇaṃ ogāhittāṇaṃ citṭhanti*)” through the process of ejection (*samugghāya*) of the remaining karmic particles. Human beings who are conscious (*sañṇi*) and attentive (*uvautta*) and *Vemāṇiya*<sup>170</sup> gods that are attentive and fully developed (*pajjatta*)<sup>171</sup> “can discern and attract (*jāṇanti pāsanti āhāranti*) these particles”, but not “imperfect” human beings (*chaumattha-mañussa*).<sup>172</sup> The second part of this statement specifies that highly developed Jaina mendicants can and apparently wish to “attract” the final highly purified particles ejected by the soul of an advanced dying Jaina monk. By contrast, particles which are attracted by a living being but not bound and immediately ejected (*nijjarā-poggala*) are said to be without form (*rūva*) and hence intangible (*Viy*<sub>1</sub> 18.3.5 [743b]).<sup>173</sup>

A detailed discussion of the question of the perceptibility of dead karmic particles which are ejected during the process of *samugghāya* (which not every living and omniscient being undergoes) is offered in *Uv*<sub>1</sub> 169–180. Schubring (1935/2000, § 89, p. 184) refers in this context also to P 590a and 496a f. (his manuscript), which considers with regard to an imperfect individual “whether and to what degree the ejecting individual has committed actions to other beings to whom they [the particles] cause an injury”. He argued that “[t]he whole conception doubtlessly comes from the impression which pain, anger, curse and blessings cause within the onlooker” (ib., p. 185).<sup>174</sup>

<sup>168</sup> See *ViyBh* 14.4.44–47. Ohira (1994, p. 56) points out that in the summary of the theory in *Viy*. 14.4 it is stated that when the process of transformation (*pariṇāma*) of matter from one state to another as such comes to an end, a *pudgala* or *skandha* “returns to the state of an atom of one colour, etc.” (ib.).

<sup>169</sup> As the above cited English translation of Amar Muni’s comments on *ViyVr*, 8.1 suggests.

<sup>170</sup> Like humans, *Vemāṇiya* gods are either untruthful and/or heretical or not, as explained in the text.

<sup>171</sup> The term *pajjatti* (Sk. *paryāpti*) refers to the six powers of the *nāma-karman* of the embodied soul (*ātmā-śakti*) to attract and transform different material atoms constituting basic functions of the physical body: *āhāra*, *śarīra*, *indriya*, *svāsocchvāsa*, *bhāṣā*, *manaḥ*. See SAS 8.11.

<sup>172</sup> Deleu (1970, p. 237) refers in this context to P 590b, 596a ff. (Āgamodaya-Samiti Edition) for further details on ejected particles.

<sup>173</sup> Deleu (1970, p. 238) points to *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 7.10.1 (323b) in this context, where Mahāvīra explains to Ājīvika heretics that “bad deeds get their karmic retribution ... only in the living incorporated soul, not in matter”. Cf. P 590b, 596a ff., Deleu (1970, p. 212), Schubring (1935/2000, § 60, p. 134).

<sup>174</sup> Compare the debate on the concept of *vaira* in early Jinism (Jainism).

The commentaries show that the question of the quality and fate of ejected karmic particles preoccupied Jain scholastics for centuries. In *Viy*<sub>1,2</sub> 14.9.2 (655b) a series of asymmetrical oppositions is used to describe qualities of physical matter from the point of view of their utility for living beings, as being favourable/unfavourable (*atta/anatta*), pleasant/unpleasant (*piya/apiya* and *maṇuṇṇa/amaṇuṇṇa*), desirable/undesirable (*iṭṭha/aṇiṭṭha*), etc.

Notable is the parallelism to the question of perceptibility of *leśya*. It is emphasised in *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 14.9.1 (655a) that even an advanced mendicant cannot perceive his own *kamma-lessā* nor can he perceive his soul other than in its embodied state. *Viy* 6.9, by contrast, discusses whether a god with an impure *leśyā* can see the *leśyā* of other gods or goddesses. The answer is no: only a god with a pure *leśyā*. In *JĀA* 103 the same point is echoed with reference to ascetics rather than gods.

The question how subtle lifeless matter can be absorbed and further transformed deserves a separate study. P. Dundas (1998, p. 44) and K. Wiley (2012, p. 185) both pointed to the lack of “any explanation of the karmic processes associated with the powers of healing” in Jaina literature. Wiley (ib.) suspects that “ācāryas were selective regarding the teaching of this material and were hesitant to commit details regarding these powers to writing.” Jaina mendicants, however, invariably point to the commentaries on TS 5.20, which describe the positive or negative contribution of matter (*pudgala*) acting as an instrumental cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) on the body and mind of living beings, if not prevented to do so by the will-power (*puruṣārtha*) of the individual concerned.

## Final Karman, Final Body

Interestingly enough, classical Jaina cosmology seems to envisage not only a soteriological path for souls but also a soteriological path for matter from a transformable to a non-transformable pristine existence. We have mentioned already the theory that after a transformation an atom automatically reverts to its original state unless it is transformed again. The conceptual status of the idea of an original state of an atom seems to be the functional equivalent of the idea of the pure soul in the realm of matter. But the issue is not entirely clear. In P 10 and *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 8.3.3 (365b) the question is treated in terms of the relative location of any object, insentient or sentient, either at the border (*carama* or *carima*) of the material world (*loga*) to the infinite space of the non-world (*aloga*) or within (*acarama* or *acarima*) the world. A liberated being, or *siddha*, is an example of such a *carama* existence of an eternal substance. Abhayadeva’s commentary on *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 7.7.3 (311a) describes the omniscient (*kevali*) as a final body (*carima-sarīra*).<sup>175</sup> The context determines the meaning of the word ‘final’. *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 14.4 (638a–641a)<sup>176</sup> explains that from the point of view of substance (*dravya*) an elementary material atom (*paramāṇu-poggala*) is eternal (*acarima*), but from the point of view of place (*khetta*), time (*kāla*), and condition (*bhāva*) it is not eternal, but either not-final (*acarima*), that is, in the

<sup>175</sup> See Deleu (1970, p. 139).

<sup>176</sup> Especially *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 14.4.3b (640a).

process of being transformed, or final (*carima*), that is, not ever returning to the form of existence it was part of.<sup>177</sup>

What is final or non-final is relative. According to Abhayadeva, commenting on the general rule exposed in *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 14.4 (640a), in the special case of a *kevalin* there are also final atoms which “will never again enter that form of existence after having left it” (Deleu 1970, p. 207). By definition, since at the moment of death, the *kevalin* leaves *saṃsāra* as a whole, the eternal physical atoms he leaves behind are final with regard to the modes of time, place and condition, and thus can never be transformed again. At the point of final *samugghāya* all remaining karmic particles are dissipated throughout the world (*Viy*<sub>1</sub> 18.3.2 [740b]). The question is whether they are final only for the *kevali* or for other beings as well.<sup>178</sup> The texts and commentaries are ambiguous.<sup>179</sup> *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 14.4 (640a) and *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 18.3.2 (740b) discount the possibility of further transformation only in the case of liberated beings whose karman produced particles cannot be appropriated again and are hence called final or *carima sarīra-poggala*.<sup>180</sup>

If indeed this feature applies only to the *kevalin*, then by implication karmically transformed molecules that are ejected or left over by an unliberated soul can be attracted and integrated again by the same soul in another incarnation, and of course by other souls.<sup>181</sup> This lends indirect support to our hypothesis that Jaina scholasticism, in some passages at least, considers the idea that certain karmically acquired properties can be objectified in disembodied material structures and transmitted and re-appropriated in this form, unless they always revert back to their original form and can only be incorporated in this form. The formulation of the “reset rule” in *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 14.4 (638a–641a) must have been motivated by questions such as this.

The question, which desirable physical qualities distinguish karmically transformed ejected particles from plain matter and how they can be advantageous to the one who is able to discern and attract such purified matter would require a separate

<sup>177</sup> *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 18.3.3 (740b) distinguishes between the binding of objects (*davva*) and of the binding of conditions (*bhāva*). The first occurs either spontaneous (*vīśasā-bandha*), with or without a beginning, or is brought about by an external impulse (*paoga-bandha*), resulting in either loosely (*siḍhila*) or tightly (*dhaṇīya*) bound karman. The second relates to the binding of primary karman (*mūla-pagaḍi*) and secondary karman (*uttara-pagaḍi*) as the two principal modes (cf. P 5.465b ff.).

<sup>178</sup> See supra.

<sup>179</sup> See Schubring (1935/2000, § 89), Deleu (1970, p. 207), referring to Abhayadeva.

<sup>180</sup> See Schubring (1935/2000, § 89; 184, n. 1). See also Abhayadeva’s comment in *ViyVṛ* 14.4.51, summarised by Deleu 1970: 207, that atoms that were ejected (*samudghāta*) by an omniscient being at the point of death are an exception, since they will never return to their original condition as far as place, time and condition is concerned. They are therefore “final” (*carima*) in these respects, but not final as far as their substance (*dravya*) is concerned. See also *ViyBh* 14.4.51.

<sup>181</sup> *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 6.104 [286a] says that only particles that are within range are attracted by embodied souls. In this context, the distinction in *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 14.6.1b (644a) between complete- (*avī-*) and defective material substances (*vī-davva*) is also relevant.



study and cannot be answered here.<sup>182</sup> To this category of ejected particles belongs the so-called final karman (*carima kamma*) (Vi<sub>y</sub><sub>1</sub> 5.4.9 [221b]); mentioned also in Vi<sub>y</sub><sub>1</sub> 18.3.2 (740b) as discussed above. Suffice it to say that the process of intentional selection and attraction of particles refined by others, if indeed it ever played a role in lived religion, cannot be compared with Buddhist style merit transfers, whether conceived in terms of *aṇumodaṇa*, empathy, or as a type of exchange where merit functions as a kind of spiritual currency that is transferred by way of offerings to Buddhist monks accompanied by recitations (see Gombrich 1991, pp. 165–181). In the context of Jaina philosophy, the transmission of energy through attraction of particles or contingency is primarily a physical process.

### The Excluded Third in Classical Jaina Ontology

The view that matter itself is the result of karman has been put forward by a variety of philosophical schools in classical India, such as the Buddhist Andhakas (KV 8.9) or the Brāhmaṇical Advaita Vedāntins, who entirely spiritualised the principle of karman.<sup>183</sup> A debate, related in Vi<sub>y</sub><sub>1</sub> 7.101 (323b f.), between Mahāvīra's first disciple Goyama (Gautama) and the householder Kālodāyī (Kālodāyin), who according to Deleu (1970, p. 38) represented a Ājīvika perspective, also concerned the question whether the karmic retribution of bad deeds (*pāva-kamma*) manifests itself in matter or in the embodied soul. Goyama's answer was that only the soul can generate karmic matter.<sup>184</sup>

Classical Jainism is dualistic, at least on the level of the substances, the elementary building blocks of the universe. Hence, not everything is determined by karman.<sup>185</sup> This conclusion, reached by the doctrinal debates in the late first millennium C.E., strongly influenced by Vaiśeṣika philosophy, is still widely shared in Jaina scholastic circles. The fate of the living entity<sup>186</sup> is influenced as much by the

<sup>182</sup> That the karmic particles are very subtle and intangible to the eye (Vi<sub>y</sub><sub>1</sub> 18.3.5 [743b]), so that, according to Abhayadeva, only a *kevalin*, or omniscient being, can discern them, does not affect the basic idea.

<sup>183</sup> See McDermott (1975, p. 429) and Halbfass (1991/1992, p. 327).

<sup>184</sup> The remark in Vi<sub>y</sub><sub>1</sub> 15.C.8 (680a ff.) that Gosāla asked to be buried (not cremated or simply discharged) is most certainly a polemical pun on his interpretation of karman theory. On Kālodāyī see also Schubring (1935/2000, § 57).

<sup>185</sup> This view contrast, for instance, with the stance of the Advaita Vedānta philosophy of Śāṅkara for whom “[t]h whole world ... is itself nothing but a karmic lay” (Halbfass 1991/1992, p. 327). Controversies on karmic determinism are also evident in Buddhist scriptures, such as KV XXI.7 and XVII.1, which records the position of the Andhakas that the results of karman are fixed. See McDermott (1975, p. 431f.).

<sup>186</sup> Cf. Werner's (1996, p. 185) observations on the difference between European and Indic notions of spiritual entities.

given conditions of nature as by its own actions and their consequences.<sup>187</sup> Even if the parameters of rebirth and death are broadly determined by karman, the precise circumstances are not fixed.<sup>188</sup> The concept of *karma-leśyā* may have been invented precisely for bridging this gap. Halbfass (1991/1992: 317) in his pioneering article on the subject of competing causalities in Indian philosophy saw Jainism, one of the few Indian traditions contributing to the philosophy of nature, as a “special case” because it “includes even minerals in its horizon of the living”. Yet, apart from the fact that on the whole animistic theories are more widespread than naturalistic theories, Jaina philosophy always maintained the independence of the realm of material causality,<sup>189</sup> cemented by the classical *astikāya* theory, however much the trend towards the superimposition of “religious and soteriological schemes and perspectives upon biological, zoological, cosmological observations” (ib., p. 320) pulled it away from recognising the existence of inanimate matter for which recognisable empirical examples are hard to find. No doubt, all 5 + 1 substances are either sentient or non-sentient, material or non-material. Yet, for all practical purposes the conceptual distinction between inanimate and animate matter is too abstract if not altogether contradictory and the criteria too imprecise to identify tangible objects composed of dead matter. In late canonical texts, the metaphysical distinction between sentient (*sacitta*) and insentient (*acitta*) bodies (*kāya*)<sup>190</sup> contrasts with a universal animism that is not yet evident in the early Jaina texts, as B. Bhatt (1989, p. 135ff.) has shown. The general attribution of sentience to the material elements of earth, water, fire and wind makes it virtually impossible for mendicants to find a lifeless path or spot, as required by monastic discipline, except by inference based on observed “acts” of “killing”, and hence usually only for

<sup>187</sup> Glasenapp (1925, p. 404f.) notes (in the Chapter “Magic and Mysticism”) that Jaina scholastics, like other Indians, do not see a contradiction between karman and a certain influence of the planets, assuming a deeper inner harmony which can be studied through astrology. An example is the following summary statement by Tatia (1951, p. 220, n. 1):

The doctrine of karman seems to have developed against a number of other doctrines about creation. Some regarded time (*kāla*) as the determinant factor of creation. Every event occurs in time and hence is determined by time. Others believe in nature (*svabhāva*) as the determining factor of creation. Things are determined by their own inherent nature. There is nothing, inside or outside, over and above nature, that determines the course of events. This leads to the doctrine of determinism (*niyati-vāda*). There were others who believed who believed in the fortuitous and accidental nature of the occurrences of events. There were other doctrines as well. (*Vide SvUp*, I.2. *ŚVS*, II.52–64). The believers in karman or the unseen potency (*adr̥ṣṭa*), the after-effect of a good or bad action, regarded these theories as inspired by materialistic tendencies and therefore rejected them as untenable. The Jaina philosophers accord proper place to these doctrines as testified by our experience, while installing karman in the supreme position. Karman is the ultimate determinant of the course of events. Even time, nature and *niyati* are determined by karman and there is no such thing as fortuitism. These factors, in so far as they are given to experience, are only the expressions of the working of the supreme law of karman. (Cf. *STP*, II, 53; *ŚVS*, II.79–81).

<sup>188</sup> Jaini (1979, pp. 115–117) records known problems of Jaina karman theories. For instance that, “[ā]yu [longevity karman] does not precisely determine ... but it establishes a framework or set of limitations within which these can operate (ib., p. 126).

<sup>189</sup> In *TS* 5.23–24 states that interactions between forms of matter cause both changes in natural phenomena, such as clouds, rainbows etc., and the formation and changes of physical bodies as well as their death (*TS* 5.19–20). Cf. Jaini (1979, pp. 100–102).

<sup>190</sup> See for instance *Viy*<sub>1</sub> 7.7.2 (309b).

short periods after death.<sup>191</sup> In practice, conduct is therefore determined by convention, codified by monastic law, not by actual acts of discrimination between sentient and insentient forms of elementary matter.<sup>192</sup> This particular contradiction has been highlighted by opponents such as the Ājīvikas.<sup>193</sup> The canonisation of the doctrine of dual karmic and natural causalities in classical Jaina treatises such as the Paṇṇavaṇā and the later sections of the Viyāhappannatti, which according to S. Ohira (1994, p. 239) “distinguishes the Jaina school from the other philosophical schools”, rather presented logical dilemmas functioning as *distinctions directrices*<sup>194</sup> which generated disagreements and schisms within the tradition and hence were constitutive for Jaina discourse.

In the Jaina tradition, discussions of the relative influence of karmic and natural causality invariably culminated in the question of the causes of involuntary premature death,<sup>195</sup> if not explicitly of “sacred matter”. In the developed forms of Jaina philosophy these dilemmas were explained away through variants of the two-truth theory. Prior to this sophisticated epistemological solution (or rather: circumvention of the problem),<sup>196</sup> Jaina philosophers generally posited a third, mixed or neutral structure, mediating between the opposites of the asymmetrical religious code of *jīva-ajīva* in one way or another. Multiple ambiguities resulted from the interpolation of mediating categories. An example is the double meaning of the fundamental ontological category of *jīva*, which designates both the “soul” as such and in its embodied, polluted or mixed state as a “living being”.<sup>197</sup>

Despite concerted attempts to suppress explicit *dvikriyā-* and *trirāśī-vādas*, etc., implicitly “the excluded third” lived on in Jaina ontology. It was merely delegated

<sup>191</sup> Bruhn (2007, p. 51) stressed that for practical ethics therefore almost only visible living beings are relevant.

<sup>192</sup> For similar distinctions between “‘Living’, natural soil and of soil that is ‘dead’ ... because it has been worked by digging [etc.]” in Buddhist sources, see Schmithausen (1991, p. 50). The view of universal animism is absent in the oldest surviving text (Āyāra I), as Bhatt 1989: 135ff. pointed out (Schmithausen 1991, p. 3, n. 19). On the problem of elementary or small living beings (and its “solution” through the *kaṣāya* theory), see also Bruhn (2007, pp. 15f., 19, 24–26 ff., 51ff., 60).

<sup>193</sup> “When a monk who has cultivated his spiritual faculties ... walks in the prescribed way ... and a chicken ... or a young quail ... or an antlike insect ... is trodden down ... , he has committed an action in agreement with his religious duties (*īriyāvahiya kiriyā*), not a profane and sinful action)” (Vi<sub>1</sub> 18.8.1–2 [754a], cf. Vi<sub>1</sub> 7.7.1 [309b]). On the problem of elementary beings and its “solution” through the *kaṣāya* theory, see also Bruhn (2007, p. 15f.).

<sup>194</sup> See Luhmann (1987) and Flügel (1995–1996, p. 164f.).

<sup>195</sup> According to the Buddhist KV VII.7–8 and XVII.2, the Rājagirikas and Siddhatthikas of the Andhaka School held that an *arhat* cannot have an untimely death (and hence be liberated) before all accumulated karman has come to fruition. For the Theravādins, by contrast, “old age and death ... are partly due to the physical order” and not “properly ... *kamma-vipāka*”. The commentator (KVU VII.8) tries to solve the dilemma by distinguishing clearly between physical and mental results (*kamma-vipāka*) of action (*kamma*) (McDermott 1975, p. 426, cf. p. 432).

<sup>196</sup> Albert (1968/1991, p. 126).

<sup>197</sup> “The early Jainas ... maintained that a *jīva* is somewhat indistinguishable from its body, but no further thought was given to the nature of *jīva*” (Ohira 1994, p. 113).

to a secondary ontological level,<sup>198</sup> and interpreted as the product of the interaction of the two fundamental ontological substances. The question how *jīva* and *ajīva*, spirit and matter, can interact in the first place has never been convincingly answered by Jaina philosophy, as Jaini (1979, p. 114) pointed out. K. Bruhn (2007, p. 52) remarked that the notion of a “mixed” (*miśra*) state is (also) frequently found in later Jaina dogmatics.<sup>199</sup> The conception of mixed transformation put forward in Vīy. 8.1, for instance, shares certain similarities with the *terāsiya* heresy of Rohagutta who posited the existence of a third principle, *nojīva*, mediating between life and non-life. However, it is characterised as a “combination” of two sequentially distinct processes, not as an independent third type of process. “Mixed” is here a descriptive and not an ontological category. In his *Nandiṭīkā*, the thirteenth century Ācārya Malayagiri details different aspects of the *trirāśī* theory of the “Ājīvikas”, including its application to the theory of standpoints (*naya*), that is, the postulate that an entity may be “of the nature of substance, of mode, or of both”.<sup>200</sup> Without considering the question of the dates of the texts, Basham (1954, p. 275) suspected that the Ājīvikas (like the “Trairāśika Jainas”) “seem to have accepted the basic principle of Jaina epistemology, without going to the over-refined extreme of *saptabhaṅgi*”.

Arguably, the most significant “included third” category in classical Jaina ontology is the concept of *pradeśa*, an elementary individual space unit that mirrors the material atom and the individual soul. It is imagined to be a two-dimensional insentient and non-material square shaped template, which together with other such units forms quantifiable grids that can be occupied by atoms or by entities (*dravya*) formed by aggregates of material and/or spiritual substances (*dravya*).<sup>201</sup>

According to classical Jaina doctrine, even the liberated souls possess an individual “body” shaped by the differential numbers of space units they occupy.<sup>202</sup> At the end of *Viyāhappannatti* (Bhagavaī) 8.10 (423b), Gauyamā (Gautamā) asks Mahāvīra the question whether a living being (*jīva*) is the possessor of matter

<sup>198</sup> The principle of the excluded third is also “violated” by the fourth of the *sapta-bhaṅgīs* of Jaina logic. However, the strategy of hierarchisation secured the non-violation of the law of non-contradiction for each level or perspective. A paraconsistent form of logic as proposed by Priest and Routley (1989, p. 17) is not implied. See Flügel (2010a, p. 168).

<sup>199</sup> In his commentary on Vīy. 8.1, Mahāprajña (ViyBh 8.1) pointed to the distinction between living (*sacitta*), non-living (*acitta*) and mixed (*miśra*) objects in BKB 2693–2697 to distinguish six causes for quarrel:

*saccitte accitte, mīsa vaogaya parihāra desakahā |*  
*sammamṇāuttamṇe, ahigarāṇamo samuppajje || BKB 2693||*

The commentary gives as an example for each of the three: a disciple, his equipment (clothes, begging bowl), and a disciple with his equipment. The commentary explains that the equipment of a monk, though lifeless itself, should never be given away (to laity in particular) because they can become objects for quarrel.

<sup>200</sup> NSBh in Weber (1888 II.1, p. 685, n. 4), translated by Basham (1951, p. 274).

<sup>201</sup> Technically, it belongs to the substance space. Cf. footnote 17.

<sup>202</sup> On the quasi-material concept of the soul in canonical Jainism (can it be conceived otherwise), see Jaini (1979, p. 113f.). (“Just how a nonmaterial thing can in any way interact with a material one is not well clarified. ... Jainas themselves are in fact not absolutely rigid in maintaining the immateriality of the soul”) and Johnson (1995, pp. 128f., 262, 304).

(*poggālī*) or itself matter (*poggala*). The answer is that it is both. Finally, Gauyamā asks the same question concerning the status of the liberated soul (*siddha*):<sup>203</sup>

Question: Bhante! Are the perfected beings *pudgali* or *pudgala*?

Answer: Not *pudgali* but *pudgala*.

Question: Bhante! Why do you say so ... ?

Answer: Gautama! Relative to another living being, a perfected being is a *pudgala*. Hence so (Translated by Lalwani 1980, p. 298).

Schubring (1935/2000, § 59, p. 132), Deleu (1970, p. 158) and Ohira (1994, p. 113) explained that here two meanings of the word *pudgala* come into play: “matter” and “individual” entity (material or immaterial).<sup>204</sup> With regard to the *siddha*, the word is used “in the sense of an individual soul which is a well known Buddhist term”.<sup>205</sup>

Ohira (1994, p. 99) suggested that the Jaina concept of the *pradeśa* must have been proposed as a solution of the theoretical problem how different substances “can interpenetrate in the minutest space”. In her view, without the concept of *pradeśa* “the doctrine of *astikāyas* could not have been formulated” (ib., p. 106f.). The *pradeśa* theory in turn led to the differentiation of “the standpoint of *kṣetra* or space from the standpoint of *dravya* or substance” (ib., p. 100) and to the elevation of *ākāśa* to an independent substance, as in other systems (ib., p. 106f.). “Heretics” questioned the *astikāya* theory (ib., p. 103f.).<sup>206</sup> But it is precisely this theory which must have contributed to the subsequent avoidance of a karman reductionism in the manner of the Andhakas and the Advaitins and hence to subsequent discussions of problems of multiple causalities in the Jaina tradition, echoing similar debates in Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist circles at the time, analysed by Halbfass (1991/1992).

The most influential and essentially unsurpassed solution of the problem of multiple causalities in Jaina philosophy was formulated by Ācārya Siddhasena-divākara, the famous Jaina logician who lived in the fifth and sixth century C.E. He was claimed by both Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras as one of theirs, but linked to

<sup>203</sup> *siddhe naṃ bhaṃte ! kiṃ poggālī? poggale?*

*goyamā ! no poggālī, poggale* ||502||

*se keṇaṭṭheṇaṃ bhaṃte ! evaṃ vuccai –siddhe no poggālī, poggale ?*

*goyamā ! jīvaṃ paḍucca | se teṇaṭṭheṇaṃ goyamā ! evaṃ vuccai – siddhe no poggālī, poggale* ||503|| (Viy<sub>3</sub> 8.10.502f.).

<sup>204</sup> On this passage see Schubring (1935/2000, § 67, p. 147) (*poggālī* = bearer of senses), and Deleu (1970, p. 158) (“The soul (*jīva*) is *poggālī* scil. Possesses atoms of matter, namely in the senses, as well as *poggala*, i.e. individual. This is also true for every being in the *samsāra*, but not for the Siddha who is only *poggala*”). See also Schubring (1935/2000, § 59, p. 132) (“*poggala*, the word for atom, is applied in its basic meaning as a ‘concrete body’ in Viy. 176a, whereas in 240a it means the part of an individual”), and Deleu (1970, p. 116) (“atom”, “object”).

<sup>205</sup> Sikdar (1964, p. 561) notes that “[*poggala*] sometimes stands as synonym for soul”; as in Viy<sub>1</sub> 20.2.2 (775b) = Viy<sub>3</sub> 20.2.17, where *poggala* is listed as one of twenty synonyms (including *āyā*) for the word *jīva*, but “in the sense of body” according to Deleu (1970, p. 253). On the Buddhist Puggalavādins conception of personal entity (*puggala*), see also KV I.1.198 and McDermott (1975, p. 424f.).

<sup>206</sup> See Ohira 1994: 104f. on the Kālodāyī episodes in Viy. 7.10, 13.4, 18.7.

the Yāpanīya tradition by Upadhye (1974/1983, p. 200) because of his “differences with the known doctrines of the Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras”. In his Prakrit Saṃmatitarkaprakaraṇa (STP) III.53, Siddhasenadivākara distinguished five theories of causation (*kāraṇa*) in Indian philosophy: time (*kāla*), nature (*sabhāva*), destiny (*niyati*), (unknown) actions of the past (*purvva-kaya*), and human effort (*purīṣa*).<sup>207</sup> He argued that individually, taken in isolation (*egaṃta*), they are all one-sided and hence false, but if considered together (*samāsa*), from a perspective of synthesis, they are all true.<sup>208</sup> According to this interpretation, not the content of a proposition, but the orienting point of view is decisive for its relative “truth-value”. This is one of the first explicit versions of the philosophy of *anekānta-vāda*, or non-one-sidedness, which is nowadays seen as a trademark of Jaina philosophy. According to Siddhasenadivākara (STP III.46–49),<sup>209</sup> there are as many heresies (*para-samaya*) as there are standpoints (*naya*), because all one-sided standpoints necessarily emphasise contradiction (*pari-virodhana*). The Jaina perspective, by contrast, emphasises synthesis (*samanvaya*). By transcending differences and disputes based on one-sided perspectives through its concept of *anekānta-vāda* Jainism (*jīna-vacana*) encompasses all heresies:

<sup>207</sup> These are well-known and mostly pre- or non-Jaina theories, starting with ŚVUp 1.1.2, have been formally incorporated in Jaina philosophy in form of the so-called “363 account”. See Schrader (1902, pp. 2–4, 17–57), Barua (1921/1970, p. 198), Folkert (1993, p. 233f., 274f., 327–329) (Translation of Haribhadra’s Nandivṛtti).

<sup>208</sup> *kālo sabhāva niyati purvakayaṃ purisa kāraṇegaṃtā |  
micchattaṃ te cevā (va) samāsaḥ hoṃti sammattaṃ || 53||  
(STP<sub>3</sub> III.53)*

In his commentary, Abhayadeva gave the following Sanskrit gloss:

*kāla-svabhāva-niyati-pūrvakṛta-puruṣakāraṇarūpā ekāntāḥ sarve 'pi ekakā  
mīthyātvam ta eva samudītāḥ parasparā'jahaddhattayaḥ samyaktva-rūpatāṃ.  
pratipadyante iti tātparyārthaḥ | (TBV III.53)*

Following the Sanskrit commentary, the Gujarātī editors and commentators Saṅghavī and Doṣī 1932/1952: 171 inserted the word “*adrṣṭa*” after “*pūrvak.ta*” in their Gujarātī translation of Abhayadevasūr’s Sanskrit rendition and give the following equivalent terms for the five causes in their Gujarātī commentary: *kāla*, *svabhāva*, *niyati*, *karma*, *puruṣa*. A. S. Gopani 1939/2000: 127 offered the following English rendition of the *gāthā*:

Kāla (Time), Svabhāva (Nature), Niyati (Destiny), Pūrvakṛta Adṛṣṭa (Unknown actions of the past) and Puruṣārtha (effort) – all these five taken singly are false because they touch only one point. They all are true if they are made use of with reference to each other (STP<sub>3</sub>)

The role of personal effort (*puruṣārtha*) is decisive from the Jaina point of view. See footnote 41. Saṅghavī’s and Doṣī’s 1929: 710, n. 5 note to their edition of the original text with the commentary TBV III.53 point to several other texts that address the problem of different causalities, not all of them Jaina texts, amongst them Haribhadra’s eighth century Śāstravārtāsamuccaya (ŚVS) II.164–174 = II.52–62, II.191–193 = II.79–81 and earlier verses.

<sup>209</sup> Interpreted by Abhayadevasūri and further by Saṅghavī and Doṣī (1939/2000, pp. 121–124).

[Let there be] prosperity to Jina's words that are made of an amassment of false views, that are conducive to immortality, that are venerable, and lead to the salvific happiness (STP III.69,<sup>210</sup> Translated by Balcerowicz 2003, p. 42).<sup>211</sup>

Elaborating on this perspective, the previously mentioned Śvetāmbara Ācārya Abhayadevasūri in his twelfth century commentary Tattvabodhavidhāyini (TBV) pp. 710–717 established “his own Kāraṇa-Samavāya-Vāda”.<sup>212</sup> The terms *samavāya*, “combination”, and *samavāya-buddhi*, “understanding of combination”, are used by Abhayadevasūri (TBV<sub>1</sub>, pp. 106–110, 156f., 700–4) in their literal sense, not in the technical Vaiśeṣika sense of “inseparable concomitance”, “inherent-” or “material cause”, or “inherent relationship” between substance and quality or whole and part,<sup>213</sup> to which they obviously allude. Saṅghavī and Doṣī (1932/1952, p. 312, n. 1//1939/2000, p. 126, n. 1) use the synonym *samanvaya*, “synthesis”,<sup>214</sup> and refer in a footnote (TBV<sub>1</sub>, p. 710, n. 5) to the Sanskrit Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad v. 2, a late text of the Yajurveda tradition<sup>215</sup> addressing the question of the cause of Brahma (*brahma-kāraṇa*),<sup>216</sup> as the likely model for Siddhasenadivākara's Prakrit verse (*gāthā*). Here, the term *saṃyoga*, “junction, union” (MW 1181) is used in a thematically similar context;<sup>217</sup> but rather than “actions of the past” (*pūrva-kṛta-kāraṇa*) listed by Siddhasenadivākara, “chance” (*yadr̥cchā*), is given prominence amongst the causal factors:<sup>218</sup>

Should we regard it [the cause of *Brahman*] as time, as inherent nature, as necessity, as chance, as the elements, as the source of birth, or as the Person?

<sup>210</sup> *baddaṃ micchā-daṃsaṇa-samūha-māyassa amayasārassa |*  
*jiṇa-vayaṇassa bhagavao saṃviggā-suhāhi-gammaṣa ||* [STP III.69]

An alternative rendition into English is offered by A.S. Gopani in STP<sub>3</sub>, p. 136:

Be good to Jainism which is the repository of all heresies and which is the nectar or nectars and which is easily understood by those desirous of liberation.

<sup>211</sup> Mahāprajñā (ViyBh 8.1.1) concludes his own overview of the theoretical debate with the summary statement that the two doctrines of karmic causality (*puruṣārtha-vāda*) and natural causality (*svabhāva-vāda*) are not opposites in Jaina philosophy but integrated through the standpoint of non-one-sidedness (*anekānta-vāda*). This doctrine, one may add, was not yet explicitly formulated in the Prakrit canon, but only in the philosophical treatises of the medieval period.

<sup>212</sup> These are the words of the translators and commentators Saṅghavī and Doṣī (1932/1952, p. 171 // 1939/2000, p. 127). Cf. the Vaiśeṣika concept of *samavāya-kāraṇa*, inherent cause, as one of the *sāmagrī*, or totality of causal conditions (Potter 1977/2004, pp. 54f., 60).

<sup>213</sup> See Monier-Williams (1899/1986, p. 1157f.), Oberhammer, et al. (2006, pp. 227–229).

<sup>214</sup> From the root *sam-anv-* √ *i*, “to go together after, follow, MW.; to infer or ensue as a consequence”: “regular succession or order, connected sequence or consequence, conjunction, mutual or immediate connection” (Monier-Williams 1899/1986, p. 1155). In contrast to *samavāya*, *samanvaya* implies the concept of an ordered sequence; which tallies well with the Jaina doctrine of standpoints.

<sup>215</sup> “composed probably in the last few centuries BCE” (Olivelle 1996/2008, p. xxxvii).

<sup>216</sup> *kālaḥ svabhāvo niyatir yadr̥cchā, bhūtāni yoniḥ puruṣa iti cintyam |*  
*saṃyoga eṣāṃ na tv ātmabhāvāt ātmā py anīśaḥ sukha-duḥkhaheṭoḥ ||*  
(ŚvUp<sub>1</sub> 1.2)

<sup>217</sup> The term also appears in STP III.60! (TBV<sub>1</sub> III.60, p. 727). On the technical term *saṃyoga*, “connection”, as an attribute of an object which serves as an argument in a syllogism in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras, see Oberhammer, et al. (2006, p. 202f.).

<sup>218</sup> The position of the *jaicchāvāis* is mentioned in the Naṃḍī.

Or is it a combination of these? But that can't be, because there is the self (*ātman*). Even the self is not in control, because it is itself subject to pleasure and pain (ŚvUp<sub>2</sub> 1.2, Translated by Olivelle 1996/2008, p. 253).<sup>219</sup>

### Concluding Observations: The Ascetic Body and its Remains

The idea of the transmission of ascetically acquired energy from one individual to another is well established in all Indic religious traditions.<sup>220</sup> Most Jains feel invigorated when they touch the feet of their gurus while receiving their blessings. The same applies to their physical remains. The question how this transfer of energy works is rarely posed both in the Jain tradition and in the academic literature. The belief in the regenerative powers of relatively durable body parts of animals and humans especially bones is attested across cultures. It is evidently particularly significant in hunting societies (Friedrich 1943: 201f. 216f.) but also in the cattle breeding vedic and other societies (Oldenberg 1894/1917: 385f.). In one way or another the manipulation and interpretation of these material objects has therefore played a pivotal role in human history albeit in different degrees. P. Granoff (2008: 60) pointed out that not only in Buddhist contexts but already in the Atharvaveda 4.10.7 “the bones of certain dead individuals had unusual properties and could naturally transform themselves into something else”. The idea that bones and other body parts of extraordinary human and divine beings who died a special death either through sacrifice or self-mortification “transform themselves” into other objects of considerable purity and power that appear worthy of veneration (ib. p. 61, 66), for instance pearls, precious metal, conch shells, etc., is also evident in a wide variety of Hindu narrative texts which seem intent on testifying “the continued presence of the god” in his relics (ib. p. 69). The underlying conception seems to be that not human remains as such, which are considered impure, are powerful and hence worthy or worship, but secondary objects that were created by these remains themselves in unexplained ways. Hence there would be two types of relics, in the Buddhist distinction between “dirty” charred bones (*asthi*) and “jewel-like” relics (*dhātu* or *śarīrāṇi*) remaining after cremation.

Jaina literature generally does not distinguish between two types of relics and speaks generally only about *asthis* in the few texts which deal with relic worship.<sup>221</sup> This article has shown that the Jaina theory of transformation offers also conceptual tools for understanding the distinct power of the bodies and body parts of extraordinary ascetics compared to those of ordinary human beings or of divine beings who according to Jaina metaphysics do not possess gross physical bodies.

<sup>219</sup> I am grateful to P. S. Jaini, who was the first to point me to this passage.

<sup>220</sup> One textual example for this method of transmission of power from a Hindu context will suffice: “the person who touches his limbs with the garland that was taken off by Kṛṣṇa is free from all disease and all sin” (Haribhaktivilāsa 219 cited by Granoff 2008: 69).

<sup>221</sup> The word *sakahā* “thigh” (thigh bone) used for the mythical relics of the Jinas (there are no relics of the Jinas and hence no corresponding relic cult only a relic cult of subsequent monks and nuns) is worth while investigating further from a comparative perspective. Cf. Friedrich (1943 ).



Explanations offered by Jaina mendicants for the transmission and absorption of such powers vary between the indistinct allusion to the miraculous “powers of belief”<sup>222</sup> and claims of “physical transformations” being effected through contact “between *pudgalas*”.<sup>223</sup> For the majority of Jainas, the theology of sacred matter is however not an issue of great concern, despite the fact that the fetishism of sacred objects plays a role in Jaina religious life as well, albeit merely a subordinate one. The prime aim of ascetic practice, they maintain, is the purification of the soul, not the empowerment of the body; an aim which is explicitly associated with Hindu asceticism rather than with Jainism.<sup>224</sup> It is conceded, however, that the acquisition of superhuman mental and physical power is an inevitable side-effect of the practice of asceticism. The use of these powers needs to be renounced.<sup>225</sup>

<sup>222</sup> The Dīgambara *munis* Amodhakīrti and Amarakīrti after going through most of the options of interpretation including the *nikṣepa* of *dravyamaṅgala* finally invoked interpretations why relics of ascetics have no effect on the living: because (1) “it is nowhere written”, (2) the “bones of monks and householders are the same”, (3) the “relics of monks are only touched not eaten (unlike pills)”, (4) “there may or may not be a relic under a *nisidhi*”, (5) “the body can be looked at from two perspectives like a steel vessel containing ghee which can with equal right be labelled ‘steel vessel’ or ‘ghee vessel’” (personal communication Mumbai 1.1.2012).

<sup>223</sup> While not touching on the question of relics and reiterating the standard academic narrative of the suspected presence of metaphysical entities in sacred objects J. Laidlaw (1995: 271) argued that the body of the Jaina ascetic is perceived as an *icon* of perfection in a similar way as Jina statues in the temple and equally worthy of worship:

Reverence for Jain renouncers thus uses the same modes as worship of Jina idols: similar gestures and texts the same emphasis on visual interaction the same concern with bodily contact. Like the Jina idol the renouncer then is a presence though attenuated and partial of the perfect soul. But if idols and renouncers are both in their ways icons of the living Jina the relations between these two icons are curiously complex (ib.).

<sup>224</sup> A classical early Hindu text on the acquisition of superhuman power through ascetic restraint is Patañjali’s *Yogasūtra* (YS):

*tato’nimādirpādurbhāvahkayasampattaddharmānabhighātaśca* ||46||  
*rūpa-lāvaṇya-bala-vajrasaṃghananatvāni kāyasampat* ||47||

Thereform spring up (three perfections i.e.) minute etc. excellence of the body and non-destruction of the merits of it (46).

The excellence of the body consists of colour loveless strength and adamant density (YS 3.46f. rendered into English by J. R. Ballantyne and GovindSastry Deva).

On the influence of the YS and of Śaivism and Tantrism on Hemacandra’s *Yogaśāstra* (YŚ) see Qvarnström 2003: 7 n. 4; 97 n. 2. See also White (1996) and Jacobsen (2012)

<sup>225</sup> This sentiment seems to be particularly strong in the orthodox *Sthānakavāsī* traditions. Considering the question addressed in this article Ācārya Śubhacandra of the Jaymalgacch for instance categorically stated: “Meditation affects only the soul not the body. The body is not purified by meditation only by medicine”; “There is no end to the desires of the body and there are no specific physical powers produced by religious practice”; “The only power that is relevant is the strength of the self or *ātma-bal*” (personal communication Jodhpur 2.1.2010). A lay-women assisting Sādhvī Candrakamitā of the Jñāngacch asserted: “Jainism is not Yoga!” The *sādhvī* agreed and while agreeing that outside matter such as food can be helpful on a material level added that Jaina practice is not oriented toward the body but primarily aims at strengthening the soul to create *ātma-śakti*, power of the self (personal communication Jodhpur 3.1.2010).

## References

### Primary Sources

- ĀvB *Visesāvassayabhāsa (Viṣeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya)* by Jinabhadra. 6th–7th century. Ed. Dalsukh Mālvaṇiyā: Jinabhadragaṇi-  
Kṣamāśramanaviracitaṃ Viṣeṣāvaśyakabhāṣyaṃ Svopajñavṛttisहितam.  
Amadāvād: Lālbhāi Dalpatbhāi Bhāratiya Saṃskṛti Vidyāmandir, 1966/1993.
- ĀvC *Āvassayacūṇi (Āvaśyakacūṇi)* by Jinadāsa Gaṇi Mahattara. 7th century. In: Śrīmadāvaśya-  
kasūtram. 2 Vols. Prakāśikā: Ṛṣabhadeva Keśarīmal. Ratlām: Ṛṣabhadeva Keśarīmala Saṃsthā,  
1928–1929.
- ĀvN<sub>1</sub> *Āvassayanijjuttī (Āvaśyakaniryukti)* by Bhadrabāhu. In: Śrīmad-  
Ācāryavarya-Bhadrabāhu-Tata-Niryuktīyutam Pūrvadhar-Ācārya-Vihita-  
Bhāṣya-Bhūṣitaṃ Śrīmad-Bhavaviraha-Haribhadrasūri-Sūtrita-Vṛtṭy-  
Alaṅkṛtaṃ Śrīmad-Āvaśyakasūtram (Prathamō & Pūrva Vibhāgaḥ).  
Prakāśakaḥ Javherī Cunilāla Pannālāla-Datta-Kiṅcid-Adhikārgaḥa-Dravya-  
Sāhāyena Sāha-Veṇicanda-Sūracanda Asyaikaḥ Kāryavāhakaḥ.Idam  
Pustakaṃ Mumbayyāṃ Nirṇayasāgaramudraṅśpade Kolabhāṭavāthyāṃ  
23 Tame Gṛhe Rāmacandra Yesū Śeḍagedvārā Mudrayitvā Prakāśitam,  
1916 (Āgamodayasamitisiddhāntasamgraha Aṅkaḥ 1).
- ĀvN<sub>2</sub> *Āvassayanijjuttī (Āvaśyakaniryukti)* by Bhadrabāhu. Ed.  
Samaṇī Kusumaprajñā (Sampādikā): *Āvaśyaka Niryukti*. Khaṇḍa 1.  
Lāḍnūṃ: Jaina Viśva Bhārati Saṃsthāna, 2001.
- ĀvND *Āvaśyaka Niryukti Dīpikā* by Māṇikyāśekhara. 15th century.
- ĀvS *Āvassayasutta (Āvaśyakasūtra)*. In: Dasaveyāliyasuttaṃ, Uttaraññhayaṇaṃ, Āvassayasuttaṃ. Ed.  
Muni Puṇyavijaya & Amṛtalāl Mohanlāl Bhojak (Sampādakau) 331–358. Jaina-Āgama-Gran-  
thamālā Granthāṅka 15. Bambaī: Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, 1977.
- ĀvV *Āvaśyakavṛtti* by Haribhadra. In ĀvN<sub>1</sub>.
- BKB *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya*. By Saṅghadāsa. In: BKS.
- BKS *Bṛhatkalpasūtram*. With Niryukti of Bhadrabāhu, Bhāṣya of Saṅghadāsa,  
Tikā of Malayagiri Completed by Kṣemakīrti. Ed. Muni Caturvijaya &  
Muni Puṇyavijaya. Bhāvnagar: Ātmānand Jain Sabhā, 1933–1938/2002  
(Ātmānanda-Jaina-Grantharatnamālā-Ratnam 82).
- DVS *Dasaveyāliya (Daśavaikalika Sūtra)* by Ārya Sayyambhava. In: The  
Dasaveyāliya Sutta. Ed. Ernst Leumann. And Translated, with  
Introduction and Notes, by Walther Schubring. Ahmedabad: The  
Managers of the Sheth Anandji Kalianji, 1932 (Reprinted: *Kleine  
Schriften*. Hg. Klaus Bruhn, 109–248. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1977).
- KG<sub>1</sub> *Karmagrantha*. Devendrasūriviracita-svopajñā-ṭikāyukta. Vol. I–II.  
Bhāvnagar: Jaina-dharma-prasāraka-sabhā, VS 1966–1968 [1910–1912].
- KG<sub>2</sub> Śrīmad Devendrasūri Viracita Karmavipāka Nāmaka *Karmagrantha*.  
Mūla, Gāthārtha, Viṣeṣārtha, Vivecana evaṃ Tippana tathā Paṛiśiṣṭa  
Yukta. In: Jaina Karmaśāstra kā Sarvāṅga Vivecana. Vyākhyāka:  
Marudhar Kesarī Pravartaka Muni Śrī Miśrīmal. Dvitiya Āvṛtti. Jodhpur-  
Byāvar: Marudharakesarī Sāhitya Prakāśan Samiti, 1974/1980.
- KV<sub>1</sub> *Kathāvattu*. Ed. Arnold C. Taylor. Vol. I. London: Pali Text  
Society, 1894.
- KV<sub>2</sub> *Points of Controversy*, or, Subjects of Discourse. *Being a Translation of  
the Kathā-vattu* from the Abhidhamma-piṭaka by Shwe Zan Aung and  
Caroline Augusta Foley Rhys Davids. London: Pali Text Society, 1915.
- KVA *The Debates Commentary (Kathāvattuppakaraṇā-Atṭhakathā)*.  
Translated into English by Bimala Churn Law. London: Pali Text  
Society, 1940.
- LTS *Amṛtacandrasūrikṛtaḥ Laghutattvasphoṭa*. Edited and Translated by  
Padmanabh S. Jaini. L.D. Series 62. Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute, 1978.
- NS<sub>1</sub> *Naṃdisuttaṃ & Aṅuogaddārāṃ*. Sampādakāḥ: Muni Puṇyavijaya, Paṇḍit  
Dalsukh Mālvaṇiyā & Paṇḍit Amṛtalāl Mohanlāl Bhojak, 1–55. Jaina-  
Āgama-Granthamālā Granthāṅka 1. Bambaī: Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya,  
1968.
- NS<sub>2</sub> *Naṃdī (Nandīsūtra)*. In: Navasuttāṇi. Dīṭiya Saṃskaraṇa. Vācanā

- Pramukha: Ācārya Tulsī. Sampādaka: Ācārya Mahāprajña, 245–288. Lāḍnūṃ: Jaina Viśva Bhāratī, 1985/2000.
- NS<sub>3</sub> *Naṃdī* (*Nandīsūtra*). Sampādīt/Vivecit. Vācanā Pramukha: Gaṇadhipati Tulsī. Sampādaka: Ācārya Mahāprajña. Lāḍnūṃ: Jain Viśva Bhāratī Saṃsthāna, 1997.
- NS<sub>4</sub> *Sacitra Śrī Nandīsūtra*. Hindī-Aṅgrezī Bhāṣānuvāda Sahita. Pradhāna Sampādaka: Upapravartaka Amar Muni. Sampādaka: Śrīcand Surānā “Saras”. Dillī: Padma Prakāśana, 1998.
- NSBh *Nandīsūtrabhāṣya* [*Ṭīkā*] by Ācārya Malayagiri. In: Weber 1888 II.1: 672–691.
- P<sub>1</sub> *Paṇṇavaṇā* (*Prajñāpanāsūtra*) by Ārya Śyāma. In: Paṇṇavaṇāsuttam. Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 9, Part 1–2. Ed. Muni Puṇyavijaya, Dalsukh Mālvaṇiyā, Amritlāl Mohanlāl Bhojak. Bombay: Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, 1969, 1971.
- P<sub>2</sub> *Paṇṇavaṇā* (*Prajñāpanāsūtra*) by Ārya Śyāma. In: Uvaṅgasuttāni 2. Vācanā Pramukha: Ācārya Tulsī. Sampādaka: Yuvācārya Mahāprajña, 1–356. Lāḍnūṃ: Jaina Viśva Bhāratī, 2002.
- Panhā<sub>1</sub> *Panhāvāgarāṇīm* (*Praśnavyākaraṇānisūtra*). In: Aṅgasuttāni 3. Vācanā Pramukha: Ācārya Tulsī. Sampādaka: Yuvācārya Mahāprajña, 635–713. Dvītīya Saṃskaraṇa. Lāḍnūṃ: Jaina Viśva Bhāratī Saṃsthāna, 1974/1992.
- Panhā<sub>2</sub> *Panhāvāgarāṇīm* (*Praśnavyākaraṇānisūtra*). In: Sacitra Praśnavyākaraṇa Sūtra. Mūla Pātha: Hindī-Aṅgrezī Bhāvānuvāda, Vivecana tathā Raṅgīna Citroṃ Sahita. Prathama Sampādaka: Pravartaka Amar Muni. Saha-Sampādaka: Varuṇ Muni “Amar Śiṣya” & Sanjay Surānā. Aṅgrezī Anuvāda: Rāj Kumār Jain. Dillī: Padma Prakāśana, 2008.
- PS *Pravacanasāroddhāra* by Nemicaṇḍra (11th century). 110 Dvāroṃ kā Mūla, Gāthārtha evaṃ Āgamajña Śrī Siddhasenaśūri Racit Tattvavikāśinī Ṭīkā kā Hindī Vivecana. Anuvādikā: Sādhvī Hemaprabhā. Sampādaka: Mahopādhyāya Vinaysāgar. Jaypur: Prakṛt Bhāratī Akādāmī, 1999.
- SaSi<sub>1</sub> *Sarvārthasiddhi*. Śrīmad Ācārya Pūjyapāda Viracit. Śrīmad Ācārya Grddhapiṇḍa Praṇīta Tattvārthasūtravṛttī Sahita. Sampādana-Anuvāda: Siddhāntācārya Phūlcand Śāstrī. Twelfth Edition. Nāi Dillī: Bharatīya Jñānpīṭh, 2003.
- SaSi<sub>2</sub> *Sarvārthasiddhi* by Pūjyapāda. In: S.A. Jain 1960/1992.
- SaSi<sub>3</sub> *Sarvārthasiddhi* by Pūjyapāda. In: TS.
- SS *Achārya Kundakunda’s Samayasāra*. Edited and Translated by A. Chakravarti. Third Edition. New Delhi: Bharatīya Jnanpīth, 1950/1989.
- STP<sub>1</sub> *Sammatitarkaprakaraṇam*. Ācārya-Śrī-Siddhasena-Divākara-Praṇītam. Abhayadevasūri-nirmityā Tattva-bodha-vidhāyinyā Vyākhyayā Vibhūṣitam. I–II. Pāthāntara-Tippanyādibhiḥ Pariṣkṛtya Saṃsodhitam: Sukhlāl Saṅghvī & Becardās Doṣī. Amadāvād: Gujarāt Vidyāpīṭh, Gujarāta-purā-tattva-mandira-granthāvalī. Saṃvat 1980–1985 [1924–1929] (Reprint: Amadāvād: Āśāpūraṇ Pārśvanāth Jain Jñānabhaṇḍār, 2011).
- STP<sub>2</sub> *Sammati Prakaraṇa*. Ācārya Siddhasena Divākara Praṇī. Prastāvanā ane Vivecana sāthe Anuvādaka: Sukhlāl Saṅghvī & Becardās Doṣī. Amadāvād: Gujarāt Vidyāpīṭh, Puñjābhāi Jain Granthamālā 6, 1932/1952.
- STP<sub>3</sub> *Siddhasena Divākara’s Sammati Tarka*. With a Critical Introduction and an Original Commentary by Pandita Sukhlālji Saṅghavi and Pandita Becharasji Doshi. Translated from Gujarati: A.B. Athavle (Introduction) & A. S. Gopani (Text & Commentary). Amadāvād: Gujarāt Vidyāpīṭh, 1939 (Cited after the Reprint: Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute, Sukhlālji Series 5, 2000).
- STP<sub>4</sub> *Sammatitarkaprakaraṇam*. Siddhadenadivākarasūri Viracita. Tarkapañcānana-vādimukhya-Abhayadevasūri Viracitā *Tattvabodhavidhāyini Vṛtti*. Ācārya Jayasundarasūri Kṛta Hindī Vivecana. Kalikuṇḍa Tīrtha, Gholkā: Divyadarśana Traṣṭ, Vikram Saṃvat 2066 (2010).
- ŚVS *Ācārya Haribhadrasūri’s Śāstravārtāsamuccaya*. With Hindi Translation, Notes and Introduction. Translated by K.K. Dixit. Second Edition. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute, L.D. Series 128 (22), 1969/2002.
- ŚvUp<sub>1</sub> *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*. TITUS. On the Basis of the Edition by Thomas Oberlies. “Die Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. Einleitung, Edition und

- Übersetzung." *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 32 (1988) 35–62, 39 (1995) 61–102, 40 (1996) 123–160, 42 (1998) 77–138.  
<http://titus.uni-frankfurt.de/texte/etcs/ind/aind/ved/yvs/upanisad/svetup/svetu.htm> and [http://fiindolo.sub.uni-goettingen.de/grettil/1\\_sanskrit/1\\_veda/4\\_upa/svetu\\_pu.htm](http://fiindolo.sub.uni-goettingen.de/grettil/1_sanskrit/1_veda/4_upa/svetu_pu.htm)
- ŚvUp<sub>2</sub> *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*. In: Upaniṣads. A New Translation by Patrick Olivelle, 252–265. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Sūy *Sūyagaḍa (Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra)*. In: *Jaina Sūtras II*. Translated by Hermann Jacobi. Sacred Books of the East Vol. 45. Ed. Max Müller, 233–435. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895.
- TBV<sub>1</sub> *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī* by Abhayadevasūri. In: STP<sub>1</sub>
- TBV<sub>2</sub> *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī* by Abhayadevasūri. In: STP<sub>4</sub>
- Thāna<sub>1</sub> *Thāna (Shhānāngasūtra)*. Mūla-Pāṭha, Saṃskṛta Chāyā, Hindī Anuvāda tathā Ṭippana. Vācanā Pramukha: Ācārya Tulsī. Sampādaka Vivecaka: Muni Nathmal. Lādnūm: Jaina Viśva Bhāratī, 1976.
- Thāna<sub>2</sub> *Sacitra Śrī Shhānānga Sūtra*. Mūla-Pāṭha, Hindī-Āṅgrezī Anuvāda, Vivecana tathā Raṅgīna Citrom Sahita. Pradhāna Sampādaka: Pravartaka Amar Muni. Saha-Sampādaka: Taruṅ Muni & Śrīcand Surānā 'Saras'. Āṅgrezī Anuvādaka: Surendra Botharā. Dillī: Padma Prakāśana, 2004.
- TJV *Tattvajñānavikāśinī* by Siddhasenasūri (1185 C.E.). In: PS.
- TP<sub>1</sub> *Tiloyapaṇṇattī* by Ācārya Yativṛṣabha. 5th–7th century. Khaṇḍa I–III. Purovāk: Pannālāla Jaina. Anuvādikā: Āryikā Viśuddhamatī. Ṭṛṭiya Saṃskaraṇa. Deharā-Tijārā: Candraprabha Digambara Jaina Atiśaya Ksetra, 1984/1997.
- TP<sub>2</sub> *Tiloyapaṇṇattī* by Ācārya Yativṛṣabha. 5th–7th century Translated by Laxmi Chandra Jain. With the Collaboration of Prabha Jain. In: *The Exact Sciences in the Karma Antiquity*. Volume 1. Mathematical Sciences of the Tiloyapaṇṇattī (Information of the Three Universes). Jabalpur: Brāhmī Sundarī Prasthāśram Samitī, 2003.
- TRV *Tattvārtharājavārtika* by Akalaṅka. In: VīyBh.
- TS<sub>1</sub> *Tattvārthasūtra* by Umāsvatī. In: That Which is. *Tattvārthasūtra of Umāsvatī / Umāsvāmī* with the Combined Commentaries of Umāsvatī/Umāsvāmī, Pūjyapāda and Siddhasenagaṇi, Translated with an Introduction by Nathmal Tatia. San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1994.
- TS<sub>2</sub> *Tattvārthasūtra* by Umāsvāmī. In: SaSi<sub>12</sub>
- TSB *Tattvārthasūtrādhigamabhāgyavṛtti* by Siddhasenagaṇin (c. 9th century).
- TŚPC<sub>1</sub> *Triṣaṣṭīśalākāpuruṣacaritramahākāvyam*. Kalikālasarvajña Hemacandrācāryaviracitaṃ. 1 Parvāṇī, Sampādaka: Muni Caraṇavijaya. 2–3–4 Parvāṇī, Sampādaka: Muni Puṇyavijaya. 5–6–7 Parvāṇī & 8–9 Parvāṇī, Sampādakauḥ Ramaṇikavijaya Gaṇi & Vijayaśilacandrasūri. Ahmadābād: Kalikālasarvajña Śrī Hemacandrācārya Navama Janmaśatābdi Smṛti Śikṣaṇa Saṃskaranidhi, 1990, 2001, 2006.
- TŚPC<sub>2</sub> *Triṣaṣṭīśalākāpuruṣacaritramahākāvyam*. Śrīmad Hemacandrasūriśvaraviracitaṃ. Daśam Parva. Saṃśodhaka-Sampādaka: Subodhacandra Nānālāla Śāh. Mumbaī: Śrīmatī Gaṅgābhārī Jain Ceritābal Ṭraṣṭ, 1977.
- TŚPC<sub>3</sub> *Triṣaṣṭīśalākāpuruṣacaritra* by Hemacandra. Translated by Helen M. Johnson as *The Lives of Sixty-three Illustrious Persons* (6 Vols.). Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1931–1962.
- TV *Tattvārthavārtika* by Akalaṅka (8th century). 2 Vols. Hindīśārasahitam. Sampādana-Anuvāda: Mahendrakumār Jain. Cāhā Saṃskaraṇa. Mūrtidevī Jaina Granthamālā, Saṃskṛt Granthāṃkara 20. Nayī Dillī: Bhāratīya Jñānapāṭha, 2001.
- Utt<sub>1</sub> *Uttarajjhayana (Uttarādhyanasūtra)*. In: *Jaina Sūtras II*. Translated by Hermann Jacobi. Sacred Books of the East Vol. 45. Ed. Max Müller, 1–232. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895.
- Utt<sub>2</sub> *Uttarajjhayanāṇī* (Mūlapāṭha, Saṃkṣipta Chāyā, Hindī Anuvāda, Tulanātmaka Ṭippana). Vācanā-Pramukha: Ācārya Tulsī. Sampādaka & Vivecaka: Ācārya Mahāprajā. Ṭṛṭiya Saṃskaraṇ. Lādnūm: Jaina Viśva Bhāratī, 1967/2000.
- UttN *Uttarajjhayananijjutti*. In: Bollée, W. B. (1995). *The Nijjuttis on the Seniors of the Śvetāmbara Siddhānta*. Āyāraṅga, Dasaveyāliya, Uttarajjhāyā and Sūyagaḍa. Text and Selective Glossary (pp. 75–117). Beiträge zur Südasiensforschung Südasiens-Institut Heidelberg 169. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
- Uv<sub>1</sub> *Ovāiyam (Aupapātikasūtra)*. In: Uvaṃgasuttāṇi. 4.1. Vācanā Pramukha:

- Gaṇādhīpati Tulsī. Sampādaka: Ācārya Mahāprajña, 1–77. Lāḍnūṃ: Jaina Viśva Bhāratī, 2002.
- Uv<sub>2</sub> *Uvavāyīya (Aupapātikasūtra)*. In: Sacitra Aupapātika Sūtra (Caturdaśa Pūrvadhara Sthavira Praṇīta Prathama Upāṅga). Mūla-Pāṭha, Hindī-Āṅgrezī Anuvāda, Vivecana Tathā Raṅgīna Citrom Sahita. Prathama Sampādaka: Uttara Bhāratīya Pravartaka Bhaṇḍārī Padmacandra Suśiṣya Upapravartaka Amar Muni. Saha-Sampādaka: Śrīcand Surānā ‘Saras’. Āṅgrezī Anuvādaka: Surendra Botharā. Dillī: Padma Prakāśana, 2003.
- ViĀvB *Visesāvassayabhāsa (Viśeśāvśyakabhāṣya)* by Jinabhadra. 6th–7th century. Ed. Dalsukh Mālvaṇīyā: Śrī-Jinabhadragaṇi-Kṣamāśramaṇa-Viracitaṃ Viśeśāvśyakabhāṣyaṃ Svopajñāvṛttisahitam. Amadāvād: Lālbhāī Dalpatbhāī Bhāratīya Sṃskṛti Vidyāmandir, 1966/1993.
- Viy<sub>1</sub> *Viyāhapannattī (Bhagavaī)*. The Fifth Anga of the Jaina Canon. Introduction, Critical Analysis, Commentary & Indexes by Josef Deleu. Brugge: Rijksuniversiteit de Gent, 1970.
- Viy<sub>2</sub> *Viyāhapannattīsuttam*. Bhāga 1–2. Sampādaka: Becardās Jīvarāj Dośī. Sahāyaka: Amṛtalāl Mohanlāl Bhojak. Jaina-Āgama-Granthamālā 4, 1–2. Bambaī: Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, 1978.
- Viy<sub>3</sub> *Bhagavaī. Viāhapannattī*. In: Āṅgasuttāṇī 2. Vācanā Pramukha: Ācārya Tulsī. Sampādaka: Yūvācārya Mahāprajña. Lāḍnūṃ: Jaina Viśva Bhāratī Saṃsthāna, 1992.
- Viy<sub>4</sub> *Bhagavaī. Viāhapannattī*. Khaṇḍa 1–4 (Śataka 1–16). Mūla-Pāṭha, Saṃskṛta Chāyā, Hindī Anuvāda, Bhāṣya Tathā Abhayadevasūri-Kṛta Vṛtti Evaṃ Parīṣiṣṭa-Śabdānukrama Ādī Sahit. Vācanā-Pramukha: Ācārya Tulsī. Sampādaka/Bhāṣyakāra: Ācārya Mahāprajña. Lāḍnūṃ: Jaina Viśva Bhāratī, 1994, 2000, 2005, 2007.
- Viy<sub>5</sub> *Sacitra Bhagavaī Sūtra (Vyākhyāprajñapti)*. Mūla-Pāṭha, Hindī-Āṅgrezī Bhāvānuvāda, Vivecana Tathā Citrom Sahita. Prathama Sampādaka: Uttara Bhāratīya Pravartaka Amar Muni. Saha-Sampādaka: Śrīcand Surānā ‘Saras’. Khaṇḍa 1–2 (Śataka 1–8). Āṅgrezī Anuvādaka: Surendra Botharā. Dillī: Padma Prakāśana, 2005–2006.
- Viy<sub>6</sub> *Sudharma Svāmī’s Bhagavaī-Sūtra*. Śataka 1–11. See Lalwani 1973–1985.
- Viy<sub>7</sub> *Śrī Bhagavaīsūtram*. Tṛtīyom Bhāgaḥ. Jainācārya-Jainadharmadivākara-Pūjyaśrī-Ghāṣīlālājī-Mahārāja Viracitaya Prameyacandrikākhyayā Yyākhyayā Samalankṛtam Hindīgurjarabhāṣā-nuvadasahitam. Niyojakaḥ: Saṃskṛta-Prākṛtajña-Jaināgamaṇiṣṭa-Priyavyākhyāni-Paṇḍitamuni-Kanhaiyālālājī-Mahārājaḥ. Prakāśaka: Rāmājībhāī Velajībhāī Vīrīṇī & Kaḍavibāī Vīrāṇī Tṛaṣṭ Pradatta-Dravyasāhāyena Akhil Bhāratāya Śvetāmbara Sthānakavāśī Jainaśāstrodhārasamitīpramukhaḥ Śreṣṭhī-ŚrīŚāntilāla-Maṅgaladāsabhāī-Mahodaya. Rājkoṭ: Akhil Bhāratīya Śvetāmbara Sthānakavāśī Jainaśāstrodhārasamitī, 1963.
- Viy<sub>8</sub> *Bhagavaī Viāhapannattī*. Prakṛit Text in Roman Script, English Translation of the Text and Ācārya Mahāprajña’s Bhāṣya. Vols. 1–4: Śataka I–II, Vol. 2: Śataka III–VII. Synod Chief (Vācanā Pramukha): Gaṇādhīpati Tulsī. Editor & Annotator (Bhāṣyakāra): Ācārya Mahāprajña. English Translator & Editor: Muni Mahendra Kumār. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati, 2005, 2009.
- ViyBh *Bhagavaī Viāhapannattī Bhāṣya* by Ācārya Mahāprajña. In: Viy<sub>4</sub>
- ViyVṛ *Bhagavaīvṛttī* (Śataka 1–16) by Abhayadevasūri (Pāṭaṇ 1072). In Viy<sub>4</sub>
- YŚ *The Yogaśāstra of Hemacandra. A Twelfth Century Handbook on Śvetāmbara Jainism*. Translated with an introduction by O. Qvarnström. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Oriental Series Vol. 61 2002.
- YS *Yoga-Sūtras of Patañjali*. With Bhojavṛtti called Rājamārtaṇa (In English translation of J. R. Ballantyne ind Satry Deva). Edited with introduction by A. C. Shastri. Delhi: Parimal Publications 1990.

## Secondary Sources

- Acharya, D. (2007). The original *Paṅhavāyaraṇa/Praśnavyākaraṇa* discovered. *International Journal of Jaina Studies (Online)*, 3(6), 1–10. <http://www.soas.ac.uk/research/publications/journals/ijjs/file40439.pdf>

- Albert, H. (1968/1991). *Traktat über kritische Vernunft*. Fünfte erweiterte und verbesserte Auflage. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). (English translation *Treatise on critical reason*, M. V. Rorty, Ed., 1985, Princeton: Princeton University Press.)
- Balbir, N. (1990a). *Anadhya* as a Jaina Topic. *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie*, 34, 49–77.
- Balbir, N. (1990b). Scènes d'alchimie dans la littérature jaina. *Journal of the European Ayurvedic Society*, 1, 149–164.
- Balbir, N. (1992). La fascination jaina pour d'alchimie. *Journal of the European Ayurvedic Society*, 2, 134–150.
- Balbir, N. (1993). *Āvaśyaka-Studien. Introduction Générale et Traductions*. Alt- und Neuindische Studien 45, 1. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
- Balcerowicz, P. (2003). Some remarks on the *Naya* method. In P. Balcerowicz (Ed.), *Essays in Jaina philosophy and religion* (pp. 37–70). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas.
- Basham, A. L. (1951). *History and doctrine of the Ājīvikas*. London: Luzac.
- Bhatt, B. (1983). Stratification in *Satakas* 1–20 of the *Viyāhapannatti*. *Indologica Taurinensia*, 11, 109–118.
- Bhatt, B. (1989). The concept of the self. In *Self and consciousness. Indian interpretation* (pp. 132–172). Rome: Centre for Indian and Interreligious Studies.
- Bollée, W. B. (1999). Adda or the oldest extant dispute between Jains and Heretics (Sūyagaḍa 2, 6) Part Two. *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 27, 411–437.
- Bollée, W. B. (2006). Adda or the oldest extant dispute between Jains and Heretics (Sūyagaḍa 2, 6) Part One. In P. Flügel (Ed.), *Studies in Jaina history and culture: Doctrines and dialogues* (pp. 3–32). London: Routledge.
- Bourdieu, P. (1980). *Le sens pratique*. Paris: Éditions de Minuit (Translated from *The logic of practice*, by R. Nice, Ed., 1980, Cambridge: Polity Press.)
- Bronkhorst, J. (2000). *Karma and teleology: A problem and its solutions in Indian Philosophy*. Studia Philologica Buddhica Monograph Series XV. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies.
- Bronkhorst, J. (2003). Jainism's first heretic and the origin of Anekānta-vāda. In O. Qvarnström (Ed.), *Jainism and early Buddhism. Essays in honor of Padmanabh S. Jaini* (pp. 95–112). Fremont: Asian Humanities Press.
- Brown, R. L. (1998). Expected miracles: The unsurprisingly miraculous nature of Buddhist images and relics. In R. H. Davis (Ed.), *Images, miracles, and authority in Asian religious traditions*. (pp. 23–35). Boulder: Westview.
- Bruhn, K. (2007). Die Ahimsā in der Ethik des Jaina-Autors Amṛtacandra. *Berliner Indologische Studien*, 18, 1–78.
- Chakravarti, A. (1950/1989). Introduction. In A. Chakravarti (Ed., Trans.), *Achārya Kundakunda's Samayasāra* (3rd ed., pp. 1–100). New Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanpith.
- Cort J. E. (1991). Two Ideals of the Svetāmbar Mūrtipūjak Jain Layman. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 19 (1991) 391–420.
- Cort, J. E. (2003). Doing for others: Merit transfer and Karma mobility in Jainism. In O. Qvarnström (Ed.), *Jainism and early Buddhism. Essays in honor of Padmanabh S. Jaini* (pp. 129–150). Fremont: Asian Humanities Press.
- Daniel, E. V. (1987). *Fluid signs: Being a person the Tamil way* (First Paperback Printing). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Deleu, J. (1970). *Viyāhapannatti (Bhagavāi). The fifth Anga of the Jaina Canon. Introduction, critical analysis, commentary & indexes*. Brugge: Rijksuniversiteit de Gent.
- Deleu, J. (1987–1988). A further inquiry into the nucleus of the *Viyāhapannatti*. *Indologica Taurinensia*, 14, 168–179.
- Douglas, M. (1966/1970). *Purity and danger: An analysis of concepts of pollution and taboo*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Dumont, L. (1966/1980). *Homo Hierarchicus: The caste system and its implications* (Complete revised English edition). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Dundas, P. (1998). Becoming Gautama: Mantra and History in Svetāmbara Jainism. In J. E. Cort (Ed.), *Open boundaries: Jain communities and culture in Indian History* (pp. 31–52). Albany: SUNY.
- Dundas, P. (2006). The later fortunes of Jamāli. In P. Flügel (Ed.), *Studies in Jaina history and culture: Disputes and dialogues* (pp. 33–60). London: Routledge.
- Flügel, P. (2008). Prologue. *Gommaṣāsāra (Jīva-Kāṇḍa). The summary of the revelation (bio-section)*. Mathematical sciences in the Karma antiquity (Vol. 1, pp. 1–15). (L. C. Jain with the collaboration of

- P. Jain). Jabalpur: Gulab Rani Karma Science Museum & Shri Brahmi Sundari Prasthashram. <https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/7437/>.
- Flügel, P. (2010a). Power and insight in Jaina discourse. In P. Balcerowicz (Ed.), *Logic and belief in Indian philosophy* (pp. 85–217). Warsaw: Oriental Institute (Warsaw Indological studies, Vol. 3)/ Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas (Complete revised version: <http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/8209/>).
- Flügel, P. (2010b). The Jaina cult of relic stūpas. *Numen*, 57, 3–4 (Special issue on Relic Worship, Ed. K. Trainor), 389–504.
- Flügel, P. (Forthcoming a). Concepts of power in the Jaina tradition. In F. Sin, N. Balbir, & P. Flügel (Eds.), *Kyoto papers in Jaina studies*. Papers of the Jaina Panel at the 14th World Sanskrit Conference in Kyoto 2009. Kyoto: Society for Jaina Studies.
- Flügel, P. (Forthcoming b). Reflections of the origins of the Jaina doctrine of Karman. In P. Flügel & O. Qvarnström (Eds.), *Jaina Scriptures and Philosophy*.
- Folkert, K. W. (1993). *Scripture and community: Collected essays on the Jains*. (J. E. Cort Ed.), Atlanta: Scholars Press.
- Frauwallner, E. (1953/1997). *History of Indian Philosophy*. Vol. I–II. (Translated from the original German by V. M. Bedekar). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas.
- Friedrich, A. (1943). Knochen und Skelett in der Vorstellungswelt Nordasiens. *Wiener Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte und Linguistik* 5, 189–247.
- Glasenapp, H. v. (1915). *Die Lehre vom Karma in der Philosophie der Jainas*. Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz.
- Glasenapp, H. v. (1925). *Der Jainismus: Eine indische Erlösungsreligion*. Berlin: Alf Häger Verlag.
- Glasenapp, H. v. (1942). *The doctrine of Karman in Jain philosophy*. (Translated from the original German by B. Gifford and revised by the author. H. r. Kapadia Ed.) Bombay: Bai Vijibai Jivanlal Panalal Charity Fund.
- Glasenapp, H. v. (1999). *Jainism: An Indian religion of salvation* (S. B. Shrotri, Trans.). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas.
- Gonda, J. (1956). Ancient Indian Kingship from the religious point of view. *Numen*, 3(1), 36–71.
- Granoff, P. (1998). Divine delicacies: Monks, images, and miracles in the contest between Jainism and Buddhism. In R. H. Davis (Ed.), *Images, miracles, and authority in Asian religious traditions* (pp. 55–95). Boulder: Westview Press.
- Granoff, P. (2008). Relics, rubies and ritual: Some comments on the distinctiveness of the Buddhist relic cult. *Rivista Degli Studi Orientali* 81(1–4), 59–72.
- Halbfass, W. (1991/1992). Competing causalities: Karma, Vedic rituals, and the natural world. In *Tradition and reflection: Explorations in Indian thought* (pp. 291–245). Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.
- Halbfass, W. (1992). *On being and what there is: Classical Vaiśeṣika and the history of Indian Ontology*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Heidegger, M. (1995). *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*. Gesamtausgabe Band 60. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. (English translation *The phenomenology of religious life*, by M. Fritsch & J. A. Gosetti-Ferencei, Ed., 2004, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.)
- Hoernle, A. F. R. (1908). Ājīvikas. *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, 1, 259–268.
- Jacobi, H. (1895). Introduction. In M. Müller (Ed.), *Jaina Sūtras II. Sacred books of the east* (Vol. 45, pp. i–xlii). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jacobi, H. (1906). Eine Jaina Dogmatik. Umāsvāti's Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra. Übersetzt und erläutert. *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 60, 287–325, 512–551.
- Jacobsen, K. A. (Ed.) (2012). *Yoga powers: Extraordinary Capacities attained through meditation and concentration*. Leiden: Brill.
- Jain, J. C. (1947). *Life in ancient India as depicted in the Jain Canons*. Bombay: New Book Company.
- Jain, S. A. (1960/1992). *Reality*. English translation of Srīmat Puṅgyapadacharya's Sarvarthasiddhi by S. A. Jain. Madras: Jwalamalini Trust.
- Jain, P. S. (1999). *Jain Literature and Philosophy: A Critical Approach*. Varanasi: Pārśvanātha Vidyāpīṭha.
- Jaini, P. S. (1978/2000). Amṛtacandra Sūri's exposition on reality (Abridged version of the Introduction to Amṛtacandra Sūri's Laghutattvasphoṭa). In *Collected papers on Jaina studies* (pp. 39–82). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas.
- Jaini, P. S. (1979). *The Jaina path of purification*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Jaini, P. S. (1985). The pure and the auspicious in the Jaina tradition. In J. B. Carman & F. A. Marglin (Eds.), *Purity and auspiciousness in Indian Society* (pp. 84–93). Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Jaini, P. S. (2007). A note on micchādīṭhi in Mahāvamsa 25.110. *The Journal of the Pali Text Society*, 29, 153–168.

- Jhaveri, I. H. (1990). *The Sāṅkhyā-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Pariṇāma*. Ahmedabad: Gujarat University.
- Johnson, H. M. (1931–1962). See TŚPC.
- Johnson, W. J. (1995). *Harmless souls. Karmic bondage and religious change in Early Jainism with special reference to Umāsvāī and Kundakunda*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas.
- Kapferer, B. (1997). *The feast of the sorcerer: Practices of consciousness and power*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Krick, H. (1982). *Das Ritual der Feuergründung (Agnýādheya)*. Herausgegeben von Gerhard Oberhammer. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens 16. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Laidlaw, J. (1995). *Riches and renunciation: Religion, economy, and society among the Jains*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Lalwani, K. C. (1973–1985). *Sudharma Svāmi's Bhagavatī Sūtra*. Vols. I–IV [Śataka 1–12]. Prakrit Text with English Translation and notes based on the commentary of Abhayadeva Sūri. Calcutta: Jain Bhawan.
- Laughlin, J. C. (2003). *Ārādhakamūrti/Adhiṣṭhāyakamūrti—Popular piety, politics, and the Medieval Jain Temple Portrait*. Bern: Peter Lang.
- Leumann, E. (1833/1966). *Das Aupapātika-Sūtra*, erstes Upāṅga der Jaina. I. Theil. Einleitung, Text und Glossar. Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes VIII, 2. Hrg. von der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft. Nachdruck. Nedeln (Lichtenstein).
- Leumann, E. (1885a). Beziehungen der Jaina-Literatur zu anderen Literaturkreisen Indiens. *Actes du Sixième Congrès International des Orientalistes, Tenu en 1883 à Leide* (pp. 469–564). Troisième Partie, Section 2: Aryenne. Leide: E.J. Brill.
- Leumann, E. (1885b). Die alten Berichte von den Schismen der Jaina. *Indische Studien*, 17, 91–135.
- Leumann, E. (1934). *Übersicht über die Āvaśyaka Literatur*. Aus dem Nachlass herausgegeben von Walther Schubring. Alt- und Neuindische Studien 4. Hamburg: De Gruyter (English translation *An Outline of the Āvaśyaka Literature* by G. Baumann, Introductory Essay by N. Balbir. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute, 2010).
- Luhmann, N. (1962). Funktion und Kausalität. *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 14, 617–644. (Reprinted from: *Soziologische Aufklärung* 1, pp. 12–38. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1970.)
- Luhmann, N. (1987). Distinctions directrices. Über Codierung von Semantiken. *Soziologische Aufklärung 4: Beiträge zur funktionalen Differenzierung der Gesellschaft*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987, pp. 13–31 (English in: *Theories of distinction: Redescribing the descriptions of modernity*. Edited with an Introduction by W. Rasch. Translations by J. O'Neil, E. Schreiber, K. Behnke, & W. Whobrey, 2002, Stanford: Stanford University Press).
- Magnone, P. (1993). The Development of 'Tejas' from the Vedas to the Purāṇas. *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 36 (Suppl.), 137–147.
- Magnone, P. (2009a). Patterns of Tejas (and Kṣamā) in the Epics. In R. Goldman & M. Tokunaga (Eds.), *Epic Undertakings*, Papers of the 12th World Sanskrit Conference. Vol. 2 (pp. 283–307). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas.
- Magnone, P. (2009b). Tejas (and Śakti) Mythologemes in the Purāṇas. In P. Koskikallio (Ed.), *Parallels and Comparisons. Proceedings of the Fourth Dubrovnik International Conference on the Sanskrit Epics and Purāṇas*. September 2005, Zagreb (pp. 235–256). Zagreb: Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts.
- Mahāprajāña, Ā. See ViyBh.
- Malde, S. (2010). *The concept of Leśyā in Jaina Literature*. M.A. dissertation, SOAS, London.
- Mālvaṇīyā, D. D. (1971). Introduction. In M. Puṇyavijaya, D. Mālvaṇīyā, & A. M. Bhojak (Eds.), *Paṇḍavaṇāsuttam*. Jaina-Āgama-Series No. 9, Part 2 (pp. 201–487). Bombay: Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya.
- McDermott, J. P. (1975). The Kathāvattu Kamma Debates. *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 95(3), 424–433.
- McDermott, J. P. (1976). Is there group Karma in Theravāda Buddhism? *Numen*, 23, 67–79.
- Mehta, M. L., & Chandra, K. R. (1970–1972). *Prakrit Proper Names* (Vols. I–II). Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute.
- Mette, A. (2010). *Erlösungslehre der Jains: Legenden, Parabeln, Erzählungen*. Berlin: Verlag der Weltreligionen im Insel Verlag.
- Monier-Williams, M. (1899/1986). *A Sanskrit-English dictionary*. Etymologically and Philologically Arranged. With Special Reference to Cognate Indo-European Languages. New Edition, greatly



- enlarged and improved with the collaboration of E. Leumann & C. Cappeller and other scholars. (Reprint, New Delhi: Marwah Publications.)
- Norman, K. R. (1991/1993). Observations on the dates of the Jina and the Buddha. In *Collected papers* (Vol. IV, pp. 185–201). Oxford: Pali Text Society.
- Oberhammer, G., Prets, E., & Prandstetter, J. (1991, 1996, 2006). *Terminologie der frühen philosophischen Scholastik in Indien*. Band 1–3. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Oberlies, T. (2006). Vom 'Stoff' der Körper der Götter. *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 50, 177–197.
- Ohira, S. (1978–1980). 978–1980). Evolution of the Jaina theory of Leśyā. *Jain Journal*, 13–14, 119–126.
- Ohira, S. (1994). *A study of the Bhagavatsūtra: A chronological analysis*. Ahmedabad: Prakrit Text Society.
- Oldenberg H. (1894/1917). *Die Religion des Veda*. Zweite Auflage. Stuttgart lin: J. G.Cottaische Buchhandlung Nachfolge (The religion of the Veda. Translated by S. B. Shrotri: Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas 1988).
- Olivelle, P. (1996/2008). Introduction. *Upaniṣads*. A new translation by P. Olivelle, pp. i–ix. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Parry, J. P. (1982). Sacrificial death and the necrophagous ascetic. In M. Bloch & J. Parry (Eds.), *Death and the regeneration of life* (pp. 74–110). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Potter, K. H. (1964). The naturalistic principle of Karma. *Philosophy East and West*, 14, 39–50.
- Potter, K. H. (2001). How many Karma theories are there? *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 29, 231–239.
- Priest, G., & Routley, R. (1989). First historical introduction: A preliminary history of paraconsistent and dialectic approaches. In G. Priest, R. Routley, & J. Norman (Eds.), *Paraconsistent logic: Essays on the inconsistent* (pp. 3–75). München: Philosophia Verlag.
- Punyavijaya, M., Mālvaṇiyā, D., & Bhojak, A. M. (1968). Introduction. In *NS<sub>1</sub> Part I*, 1–127.
- Qvarnström, O. (2003). See: YŚ (Introduction and footnotes).
- Ratnacandra, M. (comp.). (1923/1988). *An illustrated Arḍha Magadhi dictionary*. With Sanskrit, Gujarati, Hindi and English Equivalents, References to the texts and copious quotations (Vols. I–V). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas.
- Saṅghavī, S., & Doṣī, B. (1932/1952). Prastāvan. In STP<sub>2</sub>, 1–192.
- Saṅghavī, S., & Doṣī, B. (1939/2000). Introduction. In STP<sub>3</sub>, 1–162.
- Schmithausen, L. (1991). *The problem of the sentience of plants in earliest Buddhism*. Studia Philologica Buddhica Monograph Series VI. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies.
- Schrader, F. O. (1902). *Über den Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahāvīras und Buddhas*. Leipzig: Harrassowitz.
- Schubring, W. (1935). Eine alte Aufgabe der Jaina-Forschung. *Forschungen und Fortschritte*, 11, 20–21, 266–268 (Reprint: *Kleine Schriften*. Hg. K. Bruhn, 1977, pp. 311–313, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag).
- Schubring, W. (1954). Review: A. L. Basham, history and doctrines of the Ājīvikas. *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 104, 256–263 (Reprint: *Kleine Schriften*. Hg. Klaus Bruhn, 1977, pp. 468–475. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag).
- Schubring, W. (1957). Kundakunda echt und unecht. *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 107, 537–574.
- Schubring, W. (2004). *Worte Mahāvīras: Kritische Übersetzungen aus dem Kanon der Jaina*. Göttingen, 1926 (*Mahāvīra's Words*. Translated from the German with much Added Material by W. Bollée & J. Soni. Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute.
- Seth, H. T. (1928/1986). *Pāia-Sadda-Mahaṇṇavo*. Dillī: Motilāl Banārsīdās.
- Sikdar, J. C. (1964). *Studies in the Bhagavatsūtra*. Vaishali: Research Institute of Prakrit, Jainology & Ahimsa.
- Sikdar, J. C. (1980). Jaina Alchemy. *Indian Journal of History of Science*, 15(1), 6–17.
- Strong, J. S. (2004). *The relics of the Buddha*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tambiah, S. J. (1976/1977). *World conqueror and world renouncer: A study of Buddhism and polity in Thailand against a historical background*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tambiah, S. J. (1984). *The Buddhist Saints of the forest and the Cult of Amulets*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tatia, N. (1951). *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*. Varanasi: Jain Cultural Research Society.
- Tsuchihashi, K. (1983). On the literal meaning of Leśyā. *Indologica Taurinensia*, 11, 195–202.
- Tulsī, Ā. (Vācanā Pramukha), & Mahāprajña, Ā., (Pradhāna Sampādaka). (1996). *Śrī Bhikṣu Āgama Viśaya Kośa I*. (Pañc Āgamoḃ – Āvaśyaka, Daśavaikālika, Uttarādhyaṇa, Nandī aur Anuyo-

- gadvēra tathā unke Vyākhyā-Granthom ke Ādhār par). Nirdeśana: Muni Dulaharāja & Satya Rañjan Banarjī. Saṃgrahaṇa/Anuvādana/Sampādana: Sādhvī Vimalaprajñā & Sādhvī Siddhaprajñā. Lāḍnūm: Jain Viśva Bhāratī.
- Tulsī, Ā. (Vācanā Pramukha), & Mahāprajñā, Ā., (Pradhāna Sampādaka). (2005). *Śrī Bhikṣu Āgama Viśaya Kośa* 2. (Pañc Āgama– Ācāraṭulā, Niśītha, Daśā, Kalpa aur Vyavahāra tathā inke Vyākhyā-Granthom ke Ādhār par). Nirdeśana: ‘Āgam Manīṣī’ Muni Dulaharāja. Saṃgrahaṇa / Anuvādana / Sampādana: Sādhvī Vimalaprajñā & Sādhvī Siddhaprajñā. Lāḍnūm: Jain Viśva Bhāratī.
- Tulsī, Ā. (Synod Chief), & Mahāprajñā, Ā., (Lexicographer) (2009). *Jaina Pāribhāṣika śabdakośa: Dictionary of Technical Terms of Jainism*. Edited by Sādhvī Viśrutvibhā. Translated from the Original Hindi by Muni Mahendra Kumār. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati va Bharati University.
- Upadhye, A. N. (1935). Introduction. *Śrī Kundakundācārya’s Pravacanasāra (Pavayaṇasāra)*. A pro-canonical text of the Jainas. (Second revised edition, i–cxxxvi). Bombay: Sheth Manilal Revashankar Jhaveri (Rāyacandra-Jaina-Śāstra-Mālā 9, 1930).
- Upadhye, A. N. (1936). Jainism and Karma Doctrine. *The Jaina Antiquary*, 2(1), 1–28.
- Upadhye, A. N. (1974). More light on the Yāpanīya Saṅgha. *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, 55, 1–4, 9–22. (Reprint from: *Upadhye: Papers*, 1983, pp. 192–201, Mysore: University of Mysore.)
- Vijayarājendrasūri, Muni (comp.). (1913–1925/1986). *Abhidhānarājendra Kośa*. Dvīṭiya Saṃskaraṇa (7 Vols.). Ahmadābād: Abhidhāna Rājendra Kośa Prakāśana Samsthā.
- Weber, A. (1865–1866). *Über ein Fragment der Bhagavatī*. Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der heiligen Sprache und Literatur der Jaina. Aus den Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Erster Theil & Zweiter Theil. Berlin: Königlische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1866–1867.
- Werner, K. (1988). Indian concepts of human personality in relation to the doctrine of the soul. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1, 73–97.
- Werner, K. (1996). Indian conceptions of human personality. *Asian Philosophy*, 6(2), 93–107.
- White, D. (1996). *The alchemical body: Siddha traditions in Medieval India*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Wiley, K. L. (2000a). *Aghātiyā Karmas: Agents of embodiment in Jainism*. Doctoral Dissertation, Berkeley, University of California.
- Wiley, K. L. (2000b). Colors of the soul: By-products of activity or passions? *Philosophy East and West*, 50(3), 348–366.
- Wiley, K. L. (2012). Supernatural powers and their attainment in Jainism. In K. A. Jacobsen (Ed.), *Yoga powers: Extraordinary capacities attained through meditation and concentration* (pp. 145–94). Leiden: Brill.
- Williams, R. H. B. (1963/1983). *Jaina Yoga*. A survey of the Medieval Śrāvākācāras. London: Oxford University Press.