Accumulation Regimes, Democracy and Class Structures in Senegal

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Introduction

Senegal has been often hailed as one of the rare examples of successful ‘democracy’ in Africa (Sub-Saharan Africa). This was already the case since a multiparty electoral system was peacefully established in the transition between Senghor’s and Diouf’s regimes in the late 1970s. Senghor was the same Independence leader that had governed the country (1960-1981) in a one-party state system for a large part of his mandate (1966-1976) during the initial Post-independence period (1960-1976). After the restoration of an unlimited multiparty system in 1981, successful elections took place leaving the same party (PS) in place for various mandates in the 1980s and 1990s. Today, almost seventy parties are officially registered and contest in presidential and legislative elections (the next round will be February 2007). In fact, the praise of Senegalese ‘democracy’ reached its peak when A. Wade, the main opposition leader since 1976, and his party, the PDS, won the elections in 2000-2001. This electoral transfer of power, known as ‘alternance’ was quite exceptional for African politics and granted Senegal an image of ‘full-fledged electoral democracy’ (Gellar 2005). Indeed Africanist political scientists, especially from the ‘American’ schools, have devoted much attention to this phenomenon and the Senegalese exception (Cruise O’Brien 2003; Villalón 1995; Gellar 2005; Boone 1992; Vengroff and Creevey 1997).

Gellar describes the historical political evolution of Senegal as one “from predominantly aristocratic order toward a more democratic order” (Gellar 2005: 158). Gellar sees in Senegal’s evolution evidence of change that goes beyond the nature and functioning political institutions. He claims that there is evidence of change toward more social equality, local liberties, associational life and ethnic and religious tolerance. The last two are less contentious trends while the issue of social equality needs to be understood more clearly, since there is also evidence of accelerated social differentiation as a result of economic policy changes and a deterioration of the economic environment for a majority of rural people and a growing mass of urban ‘footloose labour’. By more social quality Gellar (2005) mainly refers to the gradual breakdown of monopoly over local power by a village male gerontocracy and the growing assertiveness of both women and youth. To an extent, the emergence of young people as an electoral force has had a significant effect on political outcomes as we will see below but this is one of many processes that have shaped the political economy of Senegal since Independence.

While most of the evidence seems to suggest that a (liberal) bourgeois democracy has been established in Senegal since Independence, the literature also shows that this has not remained static and domestic politics has evolved in tune with other processes of social and economic change. Some of these significant processes include: the gradual deepening of capitalist development from the 1950s onwards; de-industrialisation and the strengthening of a ‘bazaar’
economy since the 1980s; rapid urbanisation and concentration of higher-value economic activities around Dakar and the immediate hinterland; migration (internal and international), accelerated during the period of adjustment and liberalisation and encompassing a significant rural exodus; emergence/strengthening of different classes/social groups, changes in class formation and concomitant political factions; increasing dependence on external constituencies (aid agencies); liberalisation and changes in the perception of state roles; and stagnation in the agricultural sector and crisis of the ‘groundnut economy’ after institutional failures and the erratic liberalisation and deregulation of markets.

This paper does not attempt to evaluate the ‘democratic’ experience of Senegal or to directly engage with the literature which has focused on the hybrid nature of Senegalese political system. The paper attempts to relate the political processes dealt with in much of the existing politics literature - clientelisation of politics, centralisation of power, followed by dispersion of power and more political liberalisation- with other processes of social and economic change concomitant to the uneven, deepening but incomplete development of capitalism in Senegal and the latter’s insertion in the global capitalist economy. The first section of the paper briefly presents a ‘basic history’ of evolving accumulation regimes, associated with capitalist development and its contradictions in Senegal as well as with the emerging class configurations that have been shaping Senegalese society since Independence. Then the following section addresses the debate on the nature of politics in Senegal and the frequent absence of ‘class’ as a category of analysis in much of this debate. This section looks at the complexities in class configurations, inherent contradictions within emerging and changing class configurations and the effects on the political settlement. The paper deliberately focuses on internal dynamics, which are often put on a subordinate plane in many analyses of Africa and Senegal in particular, but does not follow the usual polarization between ‘internalist’ and ‘externalist’ explanations of African developments. Indeed, the role of foreign players, especially official donors, is not ignored in this discussion, particularly for their impact in the gradually shifting dominant accumulation regime in Senegal from 1980 onwards.

Accumulation regimes and capitalism in Senegal

The development of capitalism in Senegal has been mainly analysed from a Dependentista angle, if one takes the work of Amin (1969) as an example. This is especially because most of the emphasis was placed on the dominance of foreign capital in what was supposed to be the heart of the capitalist economy in Senegal, i.e. an oligopolistic manufacturing and to a lesser extent, mining sector. The collected volume edited by Cruise O’Brien (1979) provides some material in this respect, which shows ways in which France managed to negotiate or ‘impose’ a smooth transition from colonial dominance to political independence. In fact, it is often argued, the French had allowed a significant degree of political participation to Senegalese Africans but much less scope for African indigenous capitalism in the industrial sector and banking services (Freund 1998: 144). This meant that at the time of Independence entire sub-sectors of the industrial, banking, construction and, in general, ‘capitalist’ sectors were in the hands of foreign capital. Moreover a new form of intermediate merchant capital class had also developed with the Syro-Lebanese minority, which controlled some segments of the manufacturing sector, tourism and a great deal of trading business before and after Independence. This reality led many scholars to see Senegal as a typical example of dysfunctional dependent capitalism in which a capitalist ‘enclave’ directly or indirectly dominated by foreign capital coexisted with a large mass of people, especially in rural areas, engaged in non capitalist forms of production. However, the reality is more complex and dynamic than that.

For example, there is scarce secondary material to assess the extent to which capitalism has penetrated the rural areas in Senegal, to identify the forms taken by (proto) capitalist

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1 On the pernicious effects of this intellectual polarization in African Studies see Kitching (2000).
tendencies and rural entrepreneurship and to examine the factors fettering a more rapid domination of agriculture by emerging capitalist or semi-capitalist farmers. This has been explained by the absence of a plantation system in the colonial period (from ‘below’ and ‘above’), as happened in Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya in the early periods of capitalist expansion (Rapley 1993; Leys 1994; Kitching 1980, Austin 1996). Some of the choices taken by the colonial administration in Senegal, like relying on petty peasant producers and marabouts for the creation of a ‘groundnut economy’ affected the particular way capitalist relations penetrated and were resisted (Markovitz 1970). As a result, while “pure forms” of capitalist development in farming have been limited to some agricultural sectors (tomato production, sugar (CSS) and some of the most successful horticultural producers/exporters on the Senegal river bank, the Niayes, the immediate hinterland around Dakar and the Casamance) the rest of farmers, far from being a mass of undifferentiated peasants, were historically affected by important dynamics of agrarian change, which include the emergence of (proto) capitalist farmers, development of casual labour markets and the rural exodus to urban areas and abroad. Meanwhile, French settlers restricted themselves to efforts to monopolise trade and to early manufacturing activities based in Dakar (Rapley 1993; Amin 1969; Cruise O’Brien R. 1979). Thus, the bulk of the capitalist grande bourgeoisie in Senegal did not stem from farming but from trade, transport and industrial activities (Diop 1985).

While the development of industrial capital was initially stifled by France’s metropolitan policies, after WWII a more inward strategy and the development of a home market for domestically produced goods began to be politically and economically feasible. In the meantime, the ‘groundnut economy’ became the centre of the accumulation regime in the late colonial and immediate post-Independence periods. Groundnut production systematically increased at a rapid pace until the late 1960s, despite the slump provoked by WWII. According to most secondary sources, in Senegal, traders and middlemen and some African farmers were the main beneficiaries of the early expansion of the ‘groundnut economy’. These included the French petits blancs, who managed commercial houses, but also Lebanese migrants (traders and negociants) who took over many of the private trade channels in rural and urban areas after World War I, combining retail trade in consumer goods, purchasing groundnuts, and money-lending (Cruise O’Brien 1979; Klein 1979). Other venues of accumulation were facilitated by the import of consumer goods and especially rice from Indochina (now Thailand and Vietnam). At the same time, some African retail traders and large farmers were also able to gain from this process. The timid albeit decisive industrialisation process also accelerated the creation of an African urban working class. The expansion of recorded wage labour force was associated with transport, i.e. railways and road transport, and the incipient manufacturing industry in Dakar and Kaolack. The number of the enumerated employed increased from 23,000 in 1934 to 100,000 in 1958 and 125,000 in 1973 (Sender and Smith 1986: 55).

Industrialisation and agricultural modernisation continued with similar rhythm after Independence in 1960. Between the late colonial period and the 1960s there was in fact a remarkable degree of continuity in the accumulation regime, which had centred in the surplus extraction from the groundnut-economy. This accumulation regime was further strengthened and institutionalised with the establishment of several large rural development agencies of

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2 There were some tentative trials of plantations (Groundnut Scheme, Terres Neuves, in Casamance and the Groundnut Basin), that soon failed due to excessive production costs and difficulties in mobilising sufficient labour without using coercion.

3 In Senegal some of the features of the capitalist relations that have emerged from differentiated African farmers resemble those examined by Austin for colonial cocoa-farming Ghana (see Austin 1996).

4 The development of a groundnut crushing industry following the expansion of trade in groundnuts was the most important forward linkage of this process. Hence oil exports increased very significantly and more mills were set up in other parts of French West Africa -FWA-.
which ONCAD was the most famous, for its wide outreach and the significant power it exerted on farmers, with the intermediation of rural notables and marabouts. The story of ONCAD and other rural development agencies during Senghor’s regime is frequently presented as one of clientelist patronage and mismanagement (Caswell 1984), but it is also one of vast transfers from and into the rural sector through different mechanisms: official prices, seasonal credit, input subsidies, rural infrastructure investments, subsidised transport, and extension services and research among others. The Agricultural Programme, to which these mechanisms were ascribed, did push modernisation in certain domains of agricultural production and had some significant effects on production and exchange relations. It also provided more venues of accumulation for the rural elites and small (proto) capitalist farmers, traders and transport entrepreneurs. Obviously, in the difficult contexts of drought and debt defaults, it also became a major drain of state resources, which would have devastating consequences in the late 1970s. However, all in all, the aggregate economic performance and especially that of incipient industrial sectors as well as agriculture (except for some exceptional years) was rather strong (Table 1).

The government tried to affect the ownership structure of industrial capital, partly to accommodate growing demands of ‘Africanisation’ of industrial and financial capital from sectors of an incipient Senegalese educated bourgeoisie, and accelerate its ambitious plans of industrialisation by partly nationalising large industrial companies (SONACOS – groundnuts and vegetable oil- and ICS – phosphate and chemicals), whose plants and equipment remained foreign-owned. According to some accounts, the state created 70 parastatal corporations in the first half of the 1970s, which accounted for nearly 40% of value added in the ‘modern’ sector and employed a large proportion of ‘formal’ employees (Diouf 1993: 247, citing Gellar’s work). This bold move happened, however, during a temporary favourable conjuncture (high international prices for phosphates and groundnuts) but just before the sources of surplus for the existing accumulation regime were exhausted. The demise of the colonial and post-Independence accumulation regime centred on the groundnut economy and state-driven industrialisation, began to take effect when the international conjuncture (groundnut and phosphate prices) and a new clientelist’s crisis erupted as the web of patronage relations within the bureaucratic and administrative system of state institutions (including parastatals) multiplied claims over rents, which reduced the control over clientelism that Senghor’s regime had painfully established since the 1960s. Senghor’s regime had to look for a diversified pool of funding, which eventually led to uncontrolled domestic and foreign indebtedness. Indeed, soon after that, the drive towards industrialisation was halted by the extensive financial and balance of payment crisis that the government faced in the late 1970s.

In fact, a major failure of the regime was its incapacity to discipline domestic and foreign capital with any kind of performance criteria. Senghor’s bureaucracy was very ‘soft’ vis-à-vis national (including the Lebanese minority) and foreign capitalists who had benefited from various concessions and rents, which were financially costly for the state. Thus both French- and locally-owned enterprises, which benefited from rents, credit and subsidies from the state in the 1960s and 1970s, remained inefficient and avoided any risky long-term investment to increase capacity, invest in technological catching up and enhance competitiveness (Cruise O’Brien 1979). In reality the import-substituting and state-driven industrialisation experiment of the 1970s was short-lived because of a vicious interaction between worsening material conditions, growing contestation, increasing factionalism and low growth-enhancing governance capacities.5

The story after the failure of this accumulation regime is well known. The Senegalese state was forced by the balance of payment and fiscal crisis to resort to external sources of funding

5 See Khan (2006) for an analytical exposition of the crucial distinction between market-enhancing and growth-enhancing governance capacities.
in a rather unfavourable moment, when the international financial institutions (IFIs) were aggressively promoting the establishment of liberal economic regimes through structural adjustment programmes and drastic packages of fiscal austerity. Indeed, over the period 1980-99, i.e. the Diouf regime, Senegal was one of the countries in SSA with the highest number of adjustment loans, a total of 21, only below Ivory Coast and Ghana. Yet, per capita economic growth was virtually zero over this period (Easterly 2006: 59). This also shows how successful the Diouf regime was in negotiating access to foreign support amidst economic stagnation and growing political weakening. During the Diouf era (1981-2000) a ‘technocratic’ state was being implanted on top of an increasingly fragmented political settlement, where past alliances started to crumble, particularly the historical support by the brotherhood hierarchies to the PS (Parti Socialiste), which waned until no more explicit electoral support was granted by the marabout oligarchs in the 1990s. Diouf’s regime had to negotiate an increasingly fragile accumulation regime by leaning to external pressures (aid agencies) and to a growingly complex and contradictory mix of internal claims, from the rural elites, brotherhoods’ leaders, the urban petty bourgeoisie traditionally allied to the PS, the new class of ‘informal urban entrepreneurs’, trade unions and political opposition.6

The trends in the accumulation regime after 1980 can also be observed in terms of some important macroeconomic aggregates. Investment rates, as an indicator of the rate of capital accumulation, varied substantially between periods but between the mid 1970s and the early 1990s, the speed of capital accumulation in terms of investment rates clearly slowed down. In the conditions of Senegal, investment rates below 15% could not create the necessary productive capacities to for growth-enhancing. Not surprisingly, 1976-1993 is a period of stagnation and decline in many aspects (see also Table 1).7 A weak correlation between domestic savings and investment also reflected the fact that capital accumulation was not generally driven by the savings of a domestic capitalist class (Figure 1). During the crisis of the late 1970s and 1980s, before austerity packages were implemented, the government absorbed the savings-investment gap with borrowing to incur unsustainable fiscal deficits, also swollen by the frequent debt defaults affecting rural development agencies. Stabilisation packages compressed consumption demand (including government consumption) and for some time brought domestic and investment savings closer. This, however, had the double effect of compressing investment to low levels (around 10-15%) and repressing consumption, which reinforced the stagnation of the 1980s. In the 1990s, precisely after the 1994 currency devaluation, foreign8 savings became the most significant force in allowing for a slight recovery of investment and the prospects for some faster capital accumulation (Figure 3).

In all this period, the weakness and volatility of the accumulation regime was reflected in a stark evidence of little structural change. Only in the last 20 years, the crisis of the agricultural sector meant that other sectors like construction, services and utilities expanded their share of GDP, but the manufacturing sector rather than developing actually stagnated at least until the late 1990s. There was also little structural change in insertion in the global economy as the structure of exports changed very little between 1980 and 2004, mainly showing slightly more diversification and the collapse of groundnut-related products from the export bill, in favour of other traditional exports like fish, phosphate-related products (including fertilisers), cotton and petroleum-related re-exports (refined petroleum). (}

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7 The more recent recovery of investment rates is rather related to availability of foreign aid and the ambitious expansion of public works/projects that has driven government expenditure, expanding fiscal and current account deficits in the last 5 years, to show visible outcomes for the record of the political ‘alternance’. However, this recent trend has also been due to a private construction boom driven by migrant remittances and the acceleration of rural exodus since the 1980s.
8 Foreign in the sense of generated abroad: this category would include both aid and migrant remittances.
The experience since the late 1970s, and especially the apparent economic recovery of the last 6 years, reflects the existence of some critical cushions on economic stagnation and lack of capitalist dynamism. One has been the capacity of the state to attract foreign savings, especially in the form of official aid. Another one, more recent, has been the management of the diaspora (itself an effect of the socio-economic crisis) and the impact of migrant remittances (Figure 2) on the living standards of households of different classes and also in aggregate terms, easing the foreign constraint that had limited the pace of capital accumulation in the 1970s and 1980s (see Figure 2). These have partly compensated for the sharp shrinkage of the extractible surplus from rural areas, which had been an important element of the accumulation regime in 1950-1980.

Nevertheless, a contradictory feature of the increasing availability of aid flows, associated with the agreements with the WB and the IMF, is that the neoliberal adjustment process reduced state capacities to induce increases in surplus and productive capacities, thereby squeezing future available resources for any bolder growth-enhancing policies. To a large extent, aid has been used to sustain the reorientation of the state, and its rent distribution, to a new (liberal) accumulation regime, and to pay for the stability of the political regime in times of crisis. Since the mid 1980s, as Boone (1992: 258) argues “the fragmentation and privatisation of state power…diminished the usefulness of the state as an instrument for implementing broad-gauged, long-term projects and strategies”. This meant having to accommodate ‘mercenary and disparate’ interests within dominant class coalitions, which straddle between a range of activities, often with short-term interests, that required often contradictory policy measures. These competing claims and the gradual shrinking of policy space as a result of agreements with international creditors and donors were significant drivers of policy incoherence and amounted to greater instability in the accumulation and political regime during the 1990s. In this context of increasing unpredictability and incoherence, import trade and domestic commerce gained in importance as centres of the accumulation regime in the 1990s.

The changes experienced in the accumulation regime since the late 1970s amounted to a marked tendency towards a ‘bazaarisation’ and informalisation of the economy, i.e. to a growing importance, in terms of aggregate value added and especially of employment and livelihoods, of trade (import trade but especially local petty retail trade), services (to a significant extent in urban and peri-urban informal sectors), construction and transport, as central sites of accumulation. The seeming dynamism of fishing and chemicals in the late 1990s finally proved to be short-lived in light of the current crisis affecting mostly local fishermen (and confirming the control over the fishing industry by joint ventures dominated by European capital to circumvent fishing right licenses) and the phosphate sector (with the near financial collapse of ICS, its flagship company). The crisis in rural-based activities and the concomitant rural exodus in the 1990s have underpinned and reinforced the above tendencies, also spurred by the distribution of migrant remittances, which have basically gone to current consumption of households and to nurture the construction boom and speculation in

9 The more recent process of seemingly accelerated accumulation, concentrated on few sectors, has been mainly facilitated by increasing access to aid flows and by the impact of migrant remittances, which are changing the pace and patterns of accumulation after the stagnation occurred since the exhaustion of the previous accumulation regime in the mid 1970s
10 The surplus from rural areas did not simply go to fund industrialisation and urban activities in a typical ‘urban bias’ fashion, but was also significantly re-invested in the agricultural sector and other rural-based activities through subsidies, debt defaults and investments in rural infrastructure and rural development agencies in support to farmers.
11 For example, the full dismantling of industrial protection during after the promulgation of the NPI (Nouvelle Politique Industrielle) in 1986 finally certified the death of one of the most important manufacturing branches, the textile sector (Boone 1994).
real estate. These changes in the accumulation regime, partly driven by the ‘imposed’ liberalization of the economy, had significant political implications, as we will explain in the following section.

**Patrimonial politics and class relations**

**Neo-Patrimonialism and the challenges of class analysis**

According to the most influential scholars, Senegalese politics is characterised by patrimonial networks, which are overwhelmingly dominated by “two fundamental institutions”: Sufi brotherhoods (especially *Mourides*) and the state. Cruise O’Brien contends that while the ‘social contract’ in Senegal remains as an historic compromise between these two fundamental institutions, its is no longer a deal simply between government leaders and religious hierarchs (Cruise O’Brien 2003: 209). Beck (2002) considers that clientelism and patrimonial politics are essential features of Senegal’s political system insofar as access to state resources (rents and money) are the main objective of Senegal’s political class, the president controls a very large stake and the state remains a significant employer. Gellar, in his more recent contribution, also emphasises the persistence of patrimonialism and clientelism in Senegalese politics asserting that:

> “Senegalese political parties traditionally have regarded control of the presidency as the main stake in politics, access to state resources as the main spoils of victory, and positions as ministers and heads of state agencies as important sources of revenue for party leaders and their parties...while many ordinary citizens expect those in power to be generous in distributing state resources and offices to their families, friends, place of origin, and supporters” (Gellar 2005: 157)

This portrait of Senegalese politics certainly reflects some essential elements of state-society relations in Senegal and patrimonialism and clientelism are well-documented phenomena. However, one problem is that this general description of Senegalese politics fails to clearly explain differences in economic performance and changes in the accumulation regime sketched in the previous section. Nor does it clearly offer an analytically convincing sequence of political evolution in Senegal. In many ways, Senegal’s experience reproduces elements of one of the ‘basic histories’ convincingly put forward by Allen (1995). In his account, Allen discusses evidence of the rise and fall of clientelist politics during the ‘managed’ decolonisation process in many Africa countries and how the ‘crisis of clientelism’, as a result of increasing factionalism and power struggles towards the early period after Independence led to changes in political regimes and the nature of politics. One of the solutions to the crisis was the ‘centralised bureaucratic politics’ which would include the following elements (Allen 1995: 305): a controlled retention of clientelism as a mechanism of legitimacy and support mobilisation; the centralisation of power within the executive presidency, where the president should stay above and manipulate factional politics; the rise of a political-administrative bureaucracy replacing parties as sites of distribution and contestation of clientelist rents; the downgrading or more direct manipulation of representative institutions (parties, elections, parliament, local government, trade unions, cooperatives). The regimes that solved the clientelist crises with a centralised-bureaucratic option became generally stable, at least until the 1980s, when structural adjustment and economic crisis changed again the rules of the

12 See Tall (1994) and Dahou and Foucher (2004). See Figure 2 for a stark evidence of the growth of migrant contributions since the mid 1990s.

13 The emphasis on these institutions and their reflection in class dynamics is also central in Marxist political economy analyses like Markovitz (1970).

14 The idea of ‘significant’ employer is not unproblematic. In fact this assertion is dependent upon a very small size of the ‘formal’ recorded wage employment, which tends to magnify the relative position of the state as an employer.
game. To a large extent, Senghor’s regime in Senegal constituted one of such paths. The strengthening of the executive presidency power and Senghor’s success in managing factions backed by a constitutional rule that prevented a multi-party politics, were key to the stability of Senegal’s democracy in the first 20 years after Independence. Political liberalization became also possible after 1976, once Senghor was preparing the ground for a peaceful transition to his successor, Abdou Diouf, whose survival was also based on the maintenance of the key foundations of the ‘centralised bureaucratic’ regime, despite the serious fiscal and macroeconomic crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s. According to Diop and Diouf (2002), one of the secrets of the survival of Diouf’s regime despite the odds (economic crisis, economic reforms, political pluralism) was the broadening of the ruling class and the space of cooptation, which would eventually mean a dispersion of state resources around various centres of power. More recently, A. Wade, who won as a result of the alliances of various constituencies against Diouf’s regime, has ended up strengthening the executive power of the presidency to the point of personalising public administration (Gellar 2005; Dahou and Foucher 2004; Diop 2004). This return to centralised bureaucratic politics with a strong presidency and a charismatic leader may well be a response by Wade and his entourage to the menace emerging from diverse power centres and to the lessons extracted from the second crisis of clientelism (in the 1990s) that eventually led people to vote Diouf and the PS out of office in 2000/01.

In this historical sequence class matters, despite the fact that is seldom mentioned in the literature. Class configurations gradually changed and new groups and class factions became contestants to the process of resource distribution in the existing and evolving accumulation regimes. In order to transcend an analysis based on a descriptive account of patronage relations between state officials, political leaders and civil society constituencies (religious brotherhoods, ‘peasants’, urban businessmen, etc.), a class analysis may help in adding texture to the ‘patrimonialist’ descriptions and account for processes of social change that could have an effect on the way politics worked in the country. As Boone (1992) notes, “states are rooted in particular, historically configured social relations of power, production and surplus extraction” so an understanding of the social (class) character and origin of state power is necessary. This is partly what we briefly do in this section.15

The empirical identification of classes is generally a complex exercise and remains a particularly serious challenge in analyses of African social formations that differ in some respects from the realities of advanced capitalist countries. One should avoid oversimplified class analyses, inspired by a relatively abstract and idealistic notion of the opposition between capitalists and proletarians, defined in terms of their relationship to means of production. This dichotomy is essential in theoretical terms, but it needs to be carefully operationalised in a specific context. One could accept the reduction of the concept of class in a Marxian sense as a ‘social grouping with a particular relationship to the means of production (a relationship which must be defined) in a specific mode of production (which must also be defined)’ (Forrest 2004: 96).16 In advanced capitalist contexts, forms of social stratification have been shown to be diverse and complex so that the identification of particular class positions and power relations remains a challenging empirical exercise.17 Class boundaries are not always unambiguous between common categories (small peasants, capitalist farmers, rich traders, etc.) and heterogeneity also exists within them (in terms of labour relation, economic dynamism, origins, livelihood diversification, etc.). Thus, overlaps and a complexity of class

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15 It is a challenging topic that requires empirical evidence that is hard to gather in the Senegalese context and which would require analytical narratives needing far more space than what is granted for this paper.
16 Forrest (2004: 96) also suggested that there is an ‘unfortunate tendency among some Africanists to impose a modified Marxian framework on a social context in which classes are in fact difficult to locate’.
17 Wright 1997.
locations, particularly among broad categories like ‘smallholders’ and ‘middle peasants’, may be very common indeed.\(^18\)

**Social class formation and configurations in Senegal**

Unfortunately, there is very little work on social classes and class formation in Senegal, and the available material tends to focus on urban areas for obvious reasons. Indeed, efforts to identify and describe *social classes* in Senegal in general are not common.\(^19\) In a frequently cited study, Diop devises a classification of *socio-professional categories*, which are combined to conform to certain ‘Western’ types of social classification: *grande, moyenne* and *petite bourgeoisie*, on the one hand and *proletariat* and *peasantry* on the other hand. According to Diop, the bulk of the capitalist *grande bourgeoisie*, i.e. the dominant class together with the *bureaucratic elite* and the religious leaders (*marabouts*), did not stem from farming but from trade, transport and, partly, industrial activities, an opinion shared by other authors who emphasise the prominence of merchant capital in Senegalese society.\(^20\) This shows an important albeit partial picture of domestic class configurations. The main problem in this framework is that Diop considers the ‘peasantry’ as a distinct class, on the grounds that even in pre-colonial Wolof society the peasantry could be considered a solid ‘class’. This is why it is necessary to look into historical processes of rural class formation to shed some light on agrarian structures before summarising the general class configuration of contemporary Senegalese society (Oya 2004).

Historically, like many other African societies, the territories of Senegal had a class society before colonial penetration, in which an aristocratic order tended to prevail, despite some regional differences (Diop 1985; Sender and Smith 1986: 37; Markovitz 1970). The initial conditions of inequality in local social structures, and particularly of Wolof society, together with the new opportunities provided by the monetisation of the economy, the expansion of trade and cash crop production, facilitated a process of growing differentiation and the phenomenon of labour migration (Copans 1980; Cruise O’Brien 1975; ; Markovitz 1970; Venema 1978: 24). In addition, the interventions of the colonial State consolidated differentiation and exploitation, albeit on a new basis (Gentili 1998: 267). The resulting dynamic of rural differentiation was a catalyst of the further expansion of cultivated area, through colonisation of new lands, and through the availability of more labourers, including the migrant *navetanes* (David 1980). These shifting class configurations underpinned the emergence of the ‘groundnut economy’ and provided some basis for further state intervention in its ‘modernisation’ project before and after Independence. Examples from Senegalese history include also elements of “capitalism from above” and “capitalism from below” as defined and emphasised by Lenin (1899) and Byres.\(^21\) However, judging from the results of my study carried out among large and middle-scale farmers in the Groundnut Basin (in 1997-99), the development of forms of capitalism from below does appear to be widespread, though not pervasive, in the Groundnut Basin (Oya 2001). Thus, a differentiated rural population has gradually given rise to a class of farmer-entrepreneurs (*kulaks*), which could already be observed to a lesser extent during the late colonial period (Klein 1979), but that has otherwise disappear from the radar of most scholars interested in Senegal. Their origins are

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\(^18\) Particularly elucidating in this respect is the chapter on classes and exploitation in Kitching 1980 pp. 438—455. See also Bernstein 2000, p. 30.

\(^19\) In much of this literature the concept itself of ‘class’ is not unproblematic. Different methods of classification have been followed by Diop 1985, Boone 1995, Thioub et al. 1998. These methods rely on alternative hypotheses on the determinants of class locations, ranging from caste origin in Diop 1981, professional/occupational categories in Diop 1985, income quintiles, or belonging to ‘interest groups’ in Boone 1992, Thioub et al. 1998.

\(^20\) Boone 1992.

\(^21\) On these concepts see Byres (1996, chapter 2).
diverse, but they are not usually derived from a class of traditional landlords, aristocrats or religious leaders, the archetypal non-capitalist ruling class in rural areas.\textsuperscript{22}

Therefore, the ‘peasantry’ as a category of analysis in the rural Senegalese context, as in most other rural poor contexts, may not be as appropriate as often assumed. It conceals a more complex social fabric that includes, at one extreme, very poor (‘too poor to farm’) agricultural households, which contain many members of a class of ‘footloose’ labour, i.e. engaged in casual labour for others and in precarious forms of self-employment straddling rural and urban areas often ‘on the move’. At the other extreme, a class of farmers-traders-entrepreneurs is discernible, which wields a significant degree of economic, social and political power where they live and beyond, if their connections reach political and administrative institutions (Oya 2001). Between these classes (with their differential status, power and interests), a rather differentiated group of petty commodity producers, traders, artisans and fishermen coexist.

Another matter of debate is whether there is such a thing as a ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’ or whether the political elite can be considered a ‘ruling class’ in a Marxist sense (Forrest 2004). The fact that significant power is wielded by individuals with positions in the state apparatus does not presume a belonging to a form of ruling bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Possession of private property, control over production processes and appropriation of surplus in the form of profits and rents do not seem to converge in the case of bureaucratic elites. It is true however, that many individuals with public office do come from bourgeois or proprietor backgrounds and straddle economic and political power by being at the same time a bourgeoisie in the classical sense and a bureaucratic elite. Some of the farmers-traders-entrepreneurs mentioned above have access to state power through public office or mediating roles between the state and other constituencies. What comes first (economic accumulation or public office) is a matter of empirical investigation rather than premise.

Another particular group, which can be considered part of the national (petty) bourgeoisie, is the Lebanese petty bourgeoisie, which historically adapted to changes in the accumulation regime and state policies. As a result of state policies directed to exert control over the ‘groundnut economy’ and its surplus distribution in the 1960s and 1970s, Lebanese middlemen gradually positioned themselves from rural-based trading networks in which they had held local monopoly positions that provided venues of primitive accumulation, to various urban sectors, especially in wholesale and retail cloth trade and grocery chains, where they concentrated on maximising short term profits at low risk (Cruise O’Brien 1979). Some of the most successful accumulators within the Lebanese capitalist class reinvested in real estate, restaurants and entertainment, becoming rather dominant in the latter two sectors even today.

\textit{Pari passu} the evolution of accumulation regimes and both partly as a consequence and cause, new social class locations have been emerging since Independence, as a result of interplay of challenges, constraints, opportunities and historical conjunctures. From the discussion about processes of rural class formation above, and the results of some of the studies cited, we can characterise contemporary society in Senegal as a complex web of class formations and locations with shifting interests and various linkages to the state and the centres of the evolving accumulation regimes. A summary of this structure as a non-exhaustive list of various ‘class locations’, which distinguish people in terms of their occupations, access to means of production, wealth, origins and location is presented below:

1. Mainly \textit{rural}-based classes
   a) Small-scale poorer farmers (often too poor to farm), frequently forced to have members of their households as ‘footloose’ labour in quest for casual and/or

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\textsuperscript{22} See M. Diop (1985: 17-65) and Markovitz (1970) on different social origins in rural society and the formation of ruling elites within this social structure.
seasonal means of survival; many of the households can be characterised as essentially semi-proletarians and subject to significant seasonal variations in their welfare.

b) Average small-scale peasant farmers, significantly integrated into the market economy through marketing boards (before) and private traders (now), as well as via linkages with capitalist companies; these peasant-farmers are usually food self-sufficient or do not suffer from significant seasonal variations in welfare as they may be involved in other dry-season income generating activities (normally petty trade or transport).

c) Middle-to-large-scale (semi) capitalist farmers, with one foot in ‘traditional’ production relations and another in processes of gradual capitalist accumulation through straddling of economic activities and reinvestment in farming, trade and transport; some of them have become successful accumulators with significant economic and political power.

d) Rural notables, some of them marabouts, with decision-making position at local and regional level (Rural Councils), mid-large-scale farms, easy mobilisation of labour through capitalist and non-capitalist relations and often involved in rural transport, trade and/or construction. This group is often overlapped with the one above (1.c).

2. Predominantly urban-based class locations
   a) Urban working class (with rural connections), a heterogeneous group formed by two main sub-classes:
      - At the poorer end, poor young workers straddling activities between urban and rural areas (in rainy season) as casual workers, hawkers (bana-bana) and/or apprentices; this is a rather amorphous and unorganised mass of ‘footloose’ semi-proletarians; this includes also a significant proportion of women in urban petty trade.
      - At the less poor end, traditional urban working class, with jobs in manufacturing and services (including public sector), usually ‘formal’ or organised although not necessarily trade union militants. Some individuals in this class may also have a foot in self-employment (trade, transport, other services) to complement earnings. This important class-location would include a range of civil servants, like teachers, health workers, low and middle-level administrators among others.

   b) An urban-based wealthy grande bourgeoisie, made up of mainly:
      - Industrial capitalists with assets and decision-making power in the largest industrial companies (CSS, SONACOS, ICS, SONATEL, etc.), some with a foot in the state administration;
      - Financiers/financial capitalists, with assets and decision-making power in the banking sector and significant business connections abroad;
      - Diversified investors, with business interests across a range of activities, including entertainment, tourism, construction and manufacturing; some of these may include a sub-class of successful capitalists of Lebanese origin.

   c) Urban transport entrepreneurs, a growing group that has been nurtured by the effects of the agrarian crises on the venues of accumulation in rural areas; some of these include marabouts or people with power within the Islamic brotherhoods who have taken the road of investing in urban activities, of which transport has
become one of the most profitable; some of these entrepreneurs may be amongst the richest businessmen in the country.

d) Import trade dealers and urban-based retail traders, with access to capital, many of whom have organised creating one of the most powerful lobbies in the country, UNACOIS. This ‘class’ of urbanised merchant capital, some of Lebanese origins, some with external links through the Senegalese diaspora in Europe and New York, many belonging to the Mouride brotherhood, have increased their political presence and power with the process of economic liberalization, accelerated since the 1990s.

e) Highly-skilled (often University-trained) urban-based professionals, workers and job seekers, some increasingly engaged in ‘professional services’ and particularly in the consultancy business. This class location of literati may also include some journalists and indeed academics.

3. Cutting across rural-urban divides:
   a) Moodu-Moodu, or successful ‘transnational’ migrants with connections with local business and protagonists of the last wave of capital inflows into the country, which have maintained levels of consumption for part of Senegalese society and boosted some business, notably the construction sector, which has been one of the drivers of growth in the past ten years.
   b) High-level religious leaders/marabouts with positions of power within brotherhood hierarchies (especially Mourides). Although some do not explicitly engage in business or economic activities and live on the ‘centralised’ resources of the brotherhood establishment (via direct donations from followers), many have a foot in the business sector, traditionally in groundnut farming and over the last thirty years increasingly in urban activities, particularly transport.

Mingled with this social fabric of groups and classes (some not yet ‘in themselves’ in terms of production relations and implicit/explicit interest conflict) appears a group of higher level bureaucrats, advisors, part of the so-called ‘political class’, often with a foot in the business sector through family or client links, who mediate links and venues accumulation between foreign donors, the state and domestic business (Beck 2002). In this sense, they can also be considered part of an urban bourgeoisie involved in business with high short-term profits and low risk activities. But, deliberately and in line with Forrest’s insights, we do not consider them as a ‘social class’ in its strict sense, although they may be part of one or more of the class locations mentioned above.

Generally, rich rural notables and entrepreneurs, high-ranking marabouts, the grande bourgeoisie, wealthy import trade dealers, and the professional literati (many of which holding public office) constitute factions of the ruling elites, thus those with a strong grip on economic and political power, directly or indirectly. Within these classes, different factions can be identified with interests that may clash with one another, especially for example between industrial capitalists seeking market protection from the government (sugar, vegetable oil production, textiles, etc.) and wealthy traders, especially those involved in the import business who are strong advocates of trade liberalization and the removal of duties and barriers. As a result of frequent straddling of occupations, individuals within these class factions may well hold contradictory interests, like rural entrepreneurs with interests in farming, transport and rural trade, who may well defend different positions vis-à-vis

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23 See Copans (2000). In 1970 Markovitz (1970: 93) has already anticipated these phenomena, and noted ‘religious leaders…are not a traditional class in the sense of opposing innovation, change, or modernisation…they can best be understood as a conservative class’ in the sense of seeking to maintain their established positions of power.

24 See also Marfaing and Sow (1999).


agricultural policies and state regulation depending on the issue at stake and complicating the
determinacy of interests and class locations.

**Accumulation regimes, class relations and political change**

The changes in accumulation regimes described before shaped the emergence of new classes
(*Moodu-Moodu*, transport entrepreneurs, new urban and organised merchant capital) in ways
that have affected the web of patronage relations often emphasised by most scholars. In this
regard, Boone’s (1992) treatment of patronal politics within a class analytic framework is
more convincing than standard accounts of clientelism and patrimonialism. Her basic
argument is that the state chose to control commercial circuits to extract surplus and distribute
resources and rents, which formed the material base for a ruling class constituted by rather
disparate elements, factions and interests. The result was a lack of a coherent class-based
project, which resulted in economic stagnation as a contradictory and unintended effect,
which would eventually shrink the material base of the ruling class. While the ruling class,
according to Boone, did not show signs of acting for itself, the Senegalese state did not
emerge as a Bonapartist state intervening on its behalf.

This has meant that none of the classes mentioned above has managed to control a large
proportion of state-mediated resources or to clearly influence the direction of their
distribution and the overall policy framework. Instead, various class factions with economic
and political power have managed to influence more concrete policy decisions and measures
at particular times. The state, permeated by factions coming from some of the classes
mentioned above, has not been able either to control completely the emergence of new social
factions and claims from old ones. At the same time, the grievance voiced actively and
passively but other social groups (including for example the unemployed urban youth) also
affected the social basis of political power and its viability. In a sense, the state in the 1980s
was caught in an endlessly growing web of claims and power contestations and could not
deliver accordingly. In fact, the lack of ‘autonomy’ of the state and its incapacity to create
incentives and discipline capital is explained by Boone (1992: 263) in terms of the absence of
a “social class with interest, collective need, or power to forge a state that was autonomous in
these ways”. This would explain, she argues, the lack of capitalist development in Senegal.
Instead, we argue that this failure can only partly account for the lack of a more dynamic and
viable form of capitalist development in the long term.

Arguably, the various centres of power, facilitated by the increasing diffusion of control over
economic resources to include groups outside the influence of the state, are associated in
complex ways with the three main sources and forms of power in Senegal, namely the state
power, the religious and the donors’ power (Marfaing and Sow 1999: 233; Villalón 1995).
Moreover, accelerated liberalization and privatization in the 1990s, encompassing a
narrowing of the State’s economic control and prerogatives, also gave rise to additional
independent centres of economic clout and power, which resulted in a further limitation of
hegemonic controls (Thioub et al. 1998: 82).27 The liberalization and privatization process has
certainly opened new opportunities for primitive accumulation (for some) and for deepening
business concentration (for others), in trade, transport, cereal and groundnut
storage/marketing, telecommunications, construction and agro-processing, while maintaining
part of the preferential treatment by state sponsored agencies. Nevertheless, these
opportunities have often been erratic, and have exacerbated the short-termist approach of
many domestic capitalists belonging to the wide merchant capital class. The crisis of the

27 The ascendance of UNACOIS and its growing militancy is given as an example of the new centres of
power and lobbying. However, Thioub et al. argue that its internal pyramidal structure still reflect
patronage links, personal loyalty and dependency (Thioub et al. 1999: 82). At the top of this pyramid,
some of the *grandes fortunes* that emerged during the *liberalization renforcée* of the 1990s are strongly
represented (Thioub et al. 1998: 75; Copans 2000: 30-31)
manufacturing sector has also hindered the privatisation process, which has been dominated, in the case of the best pieces of the cake (SONATEL, SONACOS, now ICS), by foreign capital.

In addition, a diversion from production and industrialisation, especially during the process of structural adjustment, meant a deepening of dependence on a basic comparative advantage that was being eroded by the institutional failures in agriculture and agro-processing and the growing competition from the rest of the world. This effected and compounded growing urbanisation, informalisation, the increasing reliance on a precarious and ‘bazaar economy’ as a place of both bare day-to-day survival for many and substantial accumulation for few, which, compounded by the increasing loss of policy space by the state vis-à-vis international donors, have finally constituted determinant processes of political change in Senegal. Class reconfigurations and the exhaustion of a regime that eventually had little to offer to most powerful ruling class factions and the mass of disaffected urban youth and peasants on the brink of exodus, were consistent with a change that at least was to shake the foundations of the ‘social contract’ mentioned by Cruise O’Brien (2003).

The exceptional electoral transfer of power from the PS to the opposition in 2000 was largely the result of these processes of social and economic change, even if various triggers of a political nature also played a role. However, changes after the 2000 elections do not seem to have affected the perception that patrimonialism best describes Senegalese democracy. As Gellar (2005: 157) puts it: ‘Paradoxically, the 2000 presidential elections that established Senegal’s credentials as a full-fledged electoral democracy also led to a surge in mores typical of neopatrimonial regimes’. In other words, Wade’s regime may be more neopatrimonial than Senghor’s and Diouf’s. But does this explain the gradually shifting accumulation regime and the trends in the political economy of the country? Probably not. However, the declining enthusiasm over the benefits of electoral change have cast doubts over the value of Western-type electoral democracy as a driver of change in a positive direction. Today, the deepening of electoral democracy in a context of economic liberalisation and increasing ‘spoils’ politics is making a myth of the alternance.

An important question remains as to whether, given the political settlement in the country and the degree of factionalism in claims over rents in a context of dwindling state resources, the state had the appropriate governance capabilities for a growth-enhancing strategy. In the last two decades, political fragmentation and the concomitant dispersion of power forced the Diouf regime to spread dwindling state resources too thin. Moreover, managing and redistributing aid flows proved harder than doing the same with agricultural surplus, as a result of the external conditionality framework and the increasing interference of donors in policy processes and outcomes. Finally, the convergence of interests between particular factions of rural and urban capitalist classes (dominated by merchant capital) and other ‘conservative’ constituencies, like religious leaders and rural petty-commodity producers, may also underlie the recent shift in the State’s discourse in favour of even more far-reaching liberalization, even if, as Boone (1992) correctly argues, this did not finally correspond to any coherent class-based political-economic project. Thus, against this background and the emerging contradictions between support of market liberalization and demands for protection, a progressively weakened State, lacking a consistent policy agenda, is unable to ‘nurture’ and ‘discipline’ domestic capital.

28 Notably, the growing internal divisions within the ruling party in the 1990s, which, we would argue, also reflected the gradual dispersion of power centres and the shrinking of state resources to pay for political stability.

29 Moreover, Wade’s mix of populism with economic liberalism seems to create more enemies than friends and its reliance on external finance to sustain a great deal of the major projects in which the state embarked is a source of vulnerability.

30 Term used by Markovitz (1970) to denote the religious hierarchs.
Conclusions

This paper has attempted to bring two fundamental elements into the discussion of political changes in Senegal since Independence. First, the nature and evolution of accumulation regimes and the role of the state and accumulation classes in their reproduction or exhaustion. Second, the nature and evolution of social class structures and their relationship with processes of socio-economic and political change. We have not dwelled on the particulars of political changes in Senegal and the evolution of Senegalese democracy. This has been dealt with extensively by a rich cluster of political and social scientists (Diop 2004; Cruise O’Brien 2003; Gellar 2005).

Instead, our emphasis has been placed on accumulation regimes concomitant with the uneven but gradual development of capitalism. There are important historical continuities in the sense that the accumulation regime of Senghor’s era in 1960-1980 built on the legacy of the colonial period, ideologically and administratively. This accumulation regime, based on surplus generated in the agricultural sector and on policies to promote the emergence of industrial capital, eventually waned in the 1970s as a result of a complex conjunction of factors, some external (drought, international market vagaries, etc.) and some certainly internal. The internal dynamics of state-capital relations and the ‘centralised bureaucratic politics’ solution to the ‘clientelist crisis’ of the pre- and early post-Independence period created some initial favourable conditions for more rapid capitalist accumulation via industrialisation and agricultural modernisation, but eventually Senghor’s regime failed to ‘discipline’ capital in a way that was necessary to sustain such regime. Finally, the accumulation regime of the 1960s and 1970s collapsed as a result of inefficiencies and vulnerability at various levels, and the incapacity of the state to control the distribution of state resources and rents in a more effective manner. The fiscal and balance of payments crisis of the 1970s led to a change in the accumulation regime, associated with the recourse to foreign financing and the conditionality framework imposed to grant access to additional resources.

The accumulation regime post-1980 exposed some critical vulnerabilities of the political economy of Senegal and exacerbated the weakness of the state in nurturing and disciplining domestic capital. Scarcer resources, existing rents and economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s created new spaces of accumulation and an unintended dispersion in centres of power, which would eventually have negative consequences for the survival of Diouf’s regime. Despite the odds, Diouf’s regime resisted for a long time, partly paradoxically as a result of power dispersion and lack of organised contestation and partly as a result of much improved access to aid flows and assistance from IFIs and bilateral donors. This enhanced foreign assistance unwillingly allowed the delay of some economic and administrative reforms and the maintenance of elements of the status quo for some time. However, this was at the cost of economic stagnation, increasing vulnerability, de-industrialisation, deepening agrarian crisis (especially the gradual but systematic decline of the ‘groundnut economy’) and growing urbanisation cum informalisation. The emergence of new classes (particularly in urban areas), class factions and centres of power, and the decline of the traditional political support from rural areas in a context of a weakened state eventually led to an exceptional electoral-based power change in 2000.

In this article we have also put emphasis on the importance of carefully analysing existing social class structures, especially in rural areas, and their evolution in order to understand political change and the effects of different accumulation regimes on society and the economy, despite evident pervasiveness of forms of patrimonial politics. We have stressed the fact that patrimonial politics, per se, cannot explain political, economic and social changes in Senegal from the colonial period onwards and that a more careful understanding of political sequencing and its basic histories’, accumulation regimes and shifting class structures is a
necessary requirement. What matters is the way in which patrimonial practice sits in an overall regime of accumulation and the nature and unintended or intended consequences of patrimonial-based resource allocation on politics and social change (Khan 2006).

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Figure 1. Capital accumulation in the long-term: saving and investment dynamics

Table 1. Economic growth and main political-economic trends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Economic growth rate</th>
<th>Selected processes and trends</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-68</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>Post-independence expansion, Agricultural programme, industrial investments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-73</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>Malaise paysan (agricultural crisis), drought, first oil-shock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-76</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>Industrial expansion, government investments, high groundnut prices, higher inflation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-79</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>Growing fiscal and current account deficits, exhaustion of ISI, debt defaults, public management crisis, end of agricultural programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-84</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>Second oil shock, higher inflation, disorganised agricultural sector, macroeconomic instability, large imbalances, beginning of fiscal austerity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-90</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>Beginning of structural reforms, more aid inflows,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-93</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>Post-elections instability, de-industrialisation, drought, export stagnation,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-99</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>Post-devaluation and bolder liberalisation and privatisation, more aid flows, groundnut crisis but transitory export dynamism in chemicals (phosphates), fish and tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2004</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>Political change, growing public investments (infrastructure) with increasing aid flows, booming migrant remittances, construction bonanza, agricultural instability and continuing rural exodus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2. Migrant remittances trends