

does not deal with the role of nationalism in the making of national support for the war. In addition, she does not explain to what extent this “national” ideology took root in the minds of ordinary people.

The final chapter concerns the failure to translate Meishuron Pan-Asianism into practice within the “Sphere.” Noting the unpreparedness of the occupation administrators, Hotta argues that the achievement of the proclaimed “sphere of mutual respect and prosperity” was “a task beyond Japan’s capacity” (p. 199). Indeed, when put into practice, Pan-Asianism became synonymous with Japanization through Japanese language education, production of propaganda pieces, and youth training (pp. 203–4). In studying these Japanese cultural policies and training programs, Hotta could have delved more deeply into the perspectives of the local people. When she does introduce the voices of local “students,” she quotes interviews in secondary sources and does not specify the time and context in which these interviews took place. Moreover, although she discusses the legacies and impact of the Japanese occupation on the Southeast Asia, only in a few cases does she consider the reverse phenomenon. Hotta attributes the failure of the cultural policies to the fact that the Japanese practitioners of Pan-Asianism were unable to overcome their own dilemmas regarding their nationalism and Pan-Asianism (p. 221). A closer look at the mutual influence between the Japanese and the local people could have enriched this final observation. For instance, Gerald Horne’s *Race War: White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire* (New York: New York University Press, 2004), which curiously is not mentioned by Hotta, examines the multidirectional influence among Southeast Asian nationalist aspirations, the white supremacist policies of Western colonialism, and Japanese policies in the region.

Overall, Hotta’s categorization of Pan-Asianism enriches her later examination of the key events of Japan’s Fifteen Years’ War. While the scope of her study is confined to the political and literary elite, Hotta extensively documents the continuing presence of Pan-Asianism in Japan’s policy making. Thus, by taking up the challenge of accounting for the ideological aspect of Japan’s war, the book offers a new insight into an often fragmented history of Japan’s Fifteen Years’ War.

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Soft Power and Its Perils: U.S. Cultural Policy in Early Postwar Japan and Permanent Dependency. By MATSUDA TAKESHI. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007. xx, 372 pp. \$60.00 (cloth).
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This history of cultural relations programming in postwar Japan narrates the intended and unintended impacts of the binational construction of the long,

“soft” peace that defined U.S.–Japan relations after 1945. While aspects of Matsuda Takeshi’s argument are underdeveloped, and a few rudimentary points overly so, the book is nevertheless valuable for its significant realignment of a robust scholarship on U.S. cultural imperialism by placing Japan at the center of the discussion.

Matsuda begins his narrative by recounting the early Cold War context of the Allied occupation and the immediate years after. The book comes into its own in the fourth chapter by engaging the central role of John D. Rockefeller III in developing the institutions that were at the heart of the U.S.–Japan cultural exchange initiatives fostered under the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration. While the purpose of the cultural diplomatic initiative in Japan was to staunch what many Americans thought to be a Red tide flowing from the Soviet Union, the primary impact seems to have been the creation of institutions that fostered the emergence of a trans-Pacific intellectual elite who were unable to perceive Japan’s interests outside the context of U.S. Cold War policy.

Matsuda demonstrates the important role that individuals who were deeply invested in the global U.S. Cold War offensive, such as Rockefeller, Ikeda Hayato, and Ichimada Hisato, played in the development of Japan’s cultural exchange institutions. Matsuda argues that the original initiative was partly a response to the offense taken by many Japanese elites at General Douglas MacArthur’s “patronizing and condescending view of the Japanese rooted in racism.” Rockefeller reasoned that a cultural diplomatic mission would “redress their injured feelings” by showing that “foreigners appreciated and respected their culture” (p. 105). Importantly, Matsuda illustrates how many of the institutions that were at the center of Rockefeller’s plan to shape the U.S.–Japan relationship are still prominent today.

Initially conceived as two separate institutions, one in Tokyo the other in Kyoto, funding concerns forced organizers to build the International House of Japan (Kokusai Bunka Kaikan) as a joint cultural exchange and international student housing facility on a piece of land in the Azabu district of Tokyo. The founding of the International House is assumed by many today to have been a foregone conclusion, but well into the planning process, Rockefeller Foundation president Dean Rusk developed some reservations about the extent to which the affair was going to appear to be a Japanese initiative. The Japanese planning committee, handpicked by Rockefeller, had been slow to submit its proposal to the Rockefeller Foundation, and in April 1952, Rockefeller flew to Japan to broker the final parts of the deal by informally advising the senior members of the planning committee, Matsumoto Shigeharu and Takagai Yasaka, “that the Rockefeller Foundation would be willing to extend financial support of the cultural center project upon receipt of the specific plans for organization” (p. 133). Importantly, Rockefeller had to seal the deal with his family’s foundation in New York by funding the entire \$600,000 matching grant with an anonymous donation from himself.

Building the International House was only one part of the overall U.S. cultural offensive in Japan. Many Allied occupation and U.S. State Department officials believed that the Japanese suffered from a “spiritual vacuum” in the wake of

the ultranationalist and militarist ideologies that had dominated public discourse during the war. American officials were further dismayed by the reemerging strength of Marxist scholarship and presumed that it was the result of simple naiveté on the part of an intellectual elite who had lived under a totalitarian state for too long. Oddly, their solution was to sponsor an eerily Orwellian “Campaign of Truth,” which focused on distributing targeted propaganda to Japanese historians who were perceived to labor amid hotbeds of Marxism. The effort met with limited success, but it did lay the groundwork for significant private initiatives that had far longer-lasting influence. Private philanthropic organizations such as the Ford and Rockefeller foundations collaborated with the U.S. State Department initiative by funding Japanese scholars who would promote the ideological viewpoints preferred by American officials.

American philanthropic institutions also funneled funding and institutional support to establish American studies research centers in Tokyo and Kyoto. The semiofficial sponsorship of American studies curricula and scholarship played a crucial role in developing a business and political elite with a strong interest in maintaining the status quo. When the rise of popular antinuclear and anti-Security Treaty movements during the late 1950s threatened to destabilize the U.S.–Japan relationship, prominent members of the American studies seminars attempted to salve relations at the most elite levels. Matsuda argues, however, that their cozy relationships with American organizations that were too closely implicated in the American Cold War effort resulted in a lopsided pro-Americanism that marginalized critique and rewarded subservience to an extent that retarded Japan’s potential to develop as a democratic state.

While not specifically addressing the impact that the U.S.–Japan cultural exchange missions had on popular culture, Matsuda’s study does point toward a much-needed historicization of the culturalist framework for thinking about Japan’s role in the world that seems, even now, to dominate international discourse. In 2008, the Foreign Ministry attempted to appropriate intense international interest in Japanese pop culture by making Hello Kitty its official tourism ambassador, a decision that was greeted with some skepticism and a touch of derision in the popular press outside Japan. Hello Kitty, which celebrated her thirtieth birthday in 2004, has not proven to be the foreign tourism magnate hoped for by the Foreign Ministry. Matsuda’s study might open the door to further investigation into the failure of the Hello Kitty initiative, which may be the result, in part, of institutionalized notions of Japan rooted in the cultural missions of the early postwar era. This book points toward the need for further study into how the global marketplace for Japan as a cultural icon has been influenced by perceptions of “Japaneseness” sculpted by the Cold War.

Matsuda has done a good job of narrating the emergence of the various cultural programming initiatives at the heart of the U.S.–Japan relationship during the early postwar era. Yet the foreword by John W. Dower is crucial to setting the context of Matsuda’s study, and the book would not communicate many of its key points without it. Oddly, Matsuda’s appendix reviewing the state of scholarship on U.S.–Japan relations might have served to overcome some of these shortcomings had it been included as part of the opening chapter. Despite these weaknesses,

this book establishes the significance of American cultural diplomacy initiatives in Japan and serves as an important cautionary tale to those who cite the early postwar U.S.–Japan relationship as a model of how diplomacy in the aftermath of conflict ought to be conducted.

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Ordinary Economies in Japan: A Historical Perspective, 1750–1950. By TETSUO NAJITA. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009. xi, 282 pp. \$50.00 (cloth).
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This book is a superb analysis of the *kō*, or cooperative insurance and loan funds, that were created by Japanese farmers during the early modern era, the core ethos and practices of which have carried over into the contemporary economy. Their emergence, sophistication, ubiquity, and endurance are powerful refutations of views that Japanese commoners were simply the endlessly enduring victims of exploitative governments, on the one hand, or of Mother Nature, on the other. By the middle of the Edo period, at the latest, the people had come to the realization that all types of natural disasters were inevitable, that help was not going to be forthcoming from the government, and that if crop failures, disease, fire, and other crises were not to automatically cause famine, poverty, and misery, then the people were going to have to devise some collective method of breaking that causal chain themselves. That method was the *kō*.

The *kō* did not develop in a vacuum: by the eighteenth century, many writers were articulating views that, in a sense, codified existing commoner values and, further, justified calculated economic behavior that was designed to fulfill those values and ensure survival at the same time. The indivisibility of morality and economics, egalitarian and cooperative commitment to collective goals (including, primarily, survival), and, crucially, the importance of money in general and commerce in particular were all argued by a variety of commoner authors. Money was an essential weapon in the battle against poverty, and commerce—if pursued fairly and aimed at the collective good—was not dirty, nor even just permissible, but essential to a moral life.

Which came first—the *kō* or their justification—is unclear, but in any case, by the late eighteenth century, villagers throughout Japan had created a wide variety—in terms of goals, techniques, and memberships—of groups in which people pooled their contributions and, either in rotation, by application, or in times of crisis, made withdrawals. There were basically three types of *kō*: simple mutual insurance schemes, pools of what one might call venture capital, and quasi-lotteries. Many villagers were members of several at once. They all shared detailed contractual (albeit informal) commitments, careful calculations of