Franzén, Johan (2009) 'Development vs. Reform: Attempts at Modernisation During the Twilight of British Influence in Iraq, 1946-58.' The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 37 (1). pp. 77-98.
This study analyses British and local Iraqi elites' efforts to avoid social revolution through promotion of economic development during the last years of the Iraqi monarchy. Discussing the complex set-up of domestic Iraqi elites and their ambiguous relations with British officials in Iraq, it argues that the structural composition of the Iraqi state itself is an important explanatory factor for the swift overthrow of the old regime in 1958. Using British archival records, this article analyses the politics of avoiding reform and promoting economic development to which Iraqi elites and the British were privy. It shows how economistic ideas of 'modernisation' and economic growth were believed to be the solution to Iraq's endemic problems of social unrest and politicisation of large parts of the population. Arguing that increased wealth through oil-fuelled development programmes would ultimately trickle down to all strata of the population and thus stave off the danger of revolution, the British failed to realise that Iraq's structural setup with its unscrupulous politicians and wealthy landowners at the apex of power, along with an all-permeating patronage system, effectively hampered any dispersal of what little new wealth was generated through these projects.
|Keywords:||Iraq, British Empire, reform and revolution|
|SOAS Departments & Centres:||Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Department of History|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform
D History General and Old World > D History (General) > D204 Modern History
D History General and Old World > D History (General) > D839 Post-war History, 1945 on
|ISSN:||17439329 (electronic) 03086534 (paper)|
|Depositing User:||Johan Franzen|
|Date Deposited:||02 Apr 2009 08:54|
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