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The Ideological Discursive Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Press:  
A Comparative Study

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Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in Linguistics

2013

Department of Linguistics  
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## Declaration for PhD thesis

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To Kuwait,  
for always believing in us.

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## **Abstract**

In an increasingly globalised world, dominant social group representations become highly influential agents in the sustenance or impediment of constructive intercultural relations on both a national and international level. Throughout the past decade, Muslims as a social group have been constantly thrust into fierce public debates and discussions stemming from a stream of diverse political and socio-cultural conflicts. This resulted in an amplified presence on various media outlets, developing serious concerns regarding their representation as a social group. In fact, a large body of media and social research argue Muslim representations as leaning towards negative and hostile depictions, emphasising a continued presence of an Orientalist ideology.

In addition to exploring the existence of dominant representations, rooted in the study of discourse, this research is primarily interested in the linguistic construction of these ideological discursive representations, relating them to the wider socio-political context. This was done by conducting a comparative discourse analysis of articles related to major Muslim news events in quality newspapers in the UK and the less explored Arab English language quality press published in the Persian Gulf region.

Through a specifically tailored qualitative/quantitative methodological approach, the research describes how these dominant representations are translated in the text by highlighting the various linguistic constructions and strategies adopted and utilised. By relating the textual findings to reader interpretation and production processes, as well as, the various socio-political contexts, a more comprehensive understanding of the production and interpretation of dominant social meanings was developed.

Anchored in positive self and negative other presentation and utilizing similar micro/macro discursive strategies, both contexts revealed dominant ideological representations of Islam and Muslims with diverging and at times directly antagonistic meanings. Past dominant meanings are argued to persevere, exhibiting new recontextualised forms, while various social and institutional processes are argued to determine and shape the dominant discursive representations proliferating media texts.

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## Notes and Abbreviations

AN	Arab News
CA	Critical Analysis
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CL	Corpus Linguistics
DA	Discourse Analysis
DT	Daily Telegraph
GN	Gulf News
GT	Gulf Times
KT	Kuwait Times
SG	Saudi Gazette
TG	The Guardian
TI	The Independent
TT	The Times

\*added C to newspaper abbreviations indicates articles as relating to the '2006 Danish cartoon controversy' news event corpus.

## Chapter 1

### Introduction

*Say not, 'I have found the truth', but rather, 'I have found a truth.'*

*Gibran Khalil Gibran*

In the final days of writing this thesis, two unrelated events taking place a few weeks and thousands of miles apart saturated the news media worldwide, be it the morning papers, the evening news or our twitter timelines. Unrelated as they may be, the *Boston marathon bombings* and the *murder at Woolwich* have one glaring common thread, those responsible declare themselves Muslims. These events come in the wake of a long series of Muslim related news events that have dominated news media in the past decade or what some may refer to as the post 9/11 era. One recent study on the representation of Islam and Muslims in the British press between 2000-2008 has reported that coverage of Muslim related stories in 2002 is nearly 5 times higher than it was in 2000 and coverage in 2004 doubled the coverage in 2002 (Moore et al., 2008). Similarly, as a consequence of coalition led wars in predominantly Muslim Afghanistan and Iraq, notably tagged worldwide as the 'War on Terror', stories related to these events were of direct concern to media based in the Middle East. Just as there is a clear rise in the coverage of Muslim related stories, there are growing concerns and many questions over how Islam and Muslims are being depicted with many expressing their apprehension of the misrepresentation of Muslims in Western media. Various Western outlets have been at the centre of constant criticism accused of being racist, ideologically driven and assisting in the misrepresentation of Islam and Muslims. These concerns are amplified further by the substantial increase in transnational media flow, a key component of globalisation processes, outstretching the amount of existing permanent foreign correspondents reporting back to various news organisations (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2004). Accordingly, this implies the possibility of a transnational media oligopoly, and thus an imminent risk of particular discourses dominating global news flow.

Indeed, in this high tech age, the power of the media today is undeniable with news and information about the world crossing continents in a matter of seconds. Its potential influence is equally ascertained by the record \$4 million dollars spent on a 30 second advertisement shown during the 2013 Super Bowl (Konrad, 2013) and by the U.S. government led multi-million dollar launch of a series of broadcast programs in the Middle East as part of an official public diplomacy bid to improve its image and the views on American foreign policy in Middle Eastern societies, e.g. *Television Al-Hurra* and *Radio Sawa* (El-Nawawy, 2007: 119). The media connects people with the rest of the world and relays information about the world on a national and international level. Described as an important “social institution” (Bell, 1998: 64), it plays a pivotal role in constructing the images, perceptions and core assumptions about politics, various cultures and societies and therefore, the identity of individuals belonging to those societies and cultures. As Cotter (2001: 416) explains, the media “encodes values and ideologies that impact on and reflect the larger world”. Thus, through discourse, media may produce, reproduce, sustain, change and manipulate power relations, views and ideologies. Reinforcing the powerful effects of the media, Fairclough (1989: 54) describes media discourse as being able to “exercise a pervasive and powerful influence in social reproduction because of the very scale of modern mass media and the extremely high level of exposure of whole populations to a relatively homogenous output”.

News Journalism and the press, which will be the media type focused on in this research, form one of the oldest types of media today and are consumed daily by millions around the world, whether electronically through the internet or in traditional print form. Although quality newspaper circulations have been witnessing a general downward trend, the influence of newspapers should not be underestimated. Newspaper analysis segments, for instance, remain a regular daily feature of major television news channels, reflecting their prominent position in society. In fact, print media in the Middle East is currently described as being healthier than it is in other world markets, experiencing increasing circulation figures in general, and a further 2.3% forecasted increase by the end of 2013 (Dubai Press Club and Value Partners, 2010). The UK quality newspaper circulation figures remain significant as well. In January of 2010, for instance, the *Times* distributed 508,250 copies while the *Daily Telegraph* was found to have distributed 691,128 copies (Tryhorn, 2010).

More importantly, although traditional newspaper circulation may have been generally declining in response to various factors, not least being the loss of readers to the digital revolution, it is this digital migration that may ultimately keep newspaper establishments in business. Newspaper internet sites (which carry much of the same content of the daily print newspapers) have been witnessing a clear and steady rise; in January 2010 alone, on average, the *guardian.co.uk* had 1.9 million unique users per day and the *telegraph.co.uk* was visited by 1.7 million unique users, while the *Timesonline.co.uk* reached 1.1 million unique users (Sweney, 2010). So successful, some UK based newspapers have launched monthly subscriptions for online users, i.e. *The Times*, with others planning to follow suit later in 2013, i.e. *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Sun* (“The Sun joins”, 2013).

As a consequence of the influential nature of media discourse, including the discourse of the press, they are bound to become a chief site for the investigation of how ideologies, beliefs and perceptions are constructed and shaped in today’s society. Research in this area is of great significance, as it can “articulate a better understanding of the news media, the unique handling of language and text, and the impact on thought and culture” (Cotter, 2001: 430). Moreover, it is safe to say negative depictions of Islam and Muslims in the media can have negative effects on opinions, views and attitudes towards Muslim communities around the world. This as a result can further polarize the cultural and social groups involved, leading to continuous conflict, hostile relations and global unrest. More direct and severe consequences can affect the growing number of Muslim minorities living in Europe and beyond, marginalizing and alienating them from mainstream society. This, in turn, can generate sentiments of social inequality and racism, among many other social related predicaments.

With that being said, it is quite evident how analyzing media discourse can assist in developing an understanding of the dominant discourses and meanings of Islam and Muslims disseminating in society today. More importantly, it can be fundamentally important in raising awareness of any social inequality and individual misrepresentation, ultimately calling for change. This forms the key motivating force behind this discourse analysis research which aims to explore the ideological discursive representation of Islam and Muslims in the press by conducting a comparative discursive analytical study of

newspaper reports covering Muslim related stories in major UK and Arab English language quality newspapers.

### **1.1 Research Rationale**

The study will examine the ideological discursive representation of Islam and Muslims in the UK and Arab English language quality press by investigating the reporting of major and controversial Muslim related news events that have and continue to attract opposing views and extensive media coverage worldwide. In doing so, the study aims to:

- (1) Explore the existence of dominant representations of Islam and Muslims in the UK and Arab English language press.
- (2) Uncover the linguistic constructions and strategies used in the dominant ideological representation of Islam and Muslims in newspapers in different contexts.
- (3) Consider the differences and similarities in the representation of Islam and Muslims in newspapers published in the different contextual discourses.
- (4) Examine whether the dominant ideological discursive representation found in the UK press is reproduced, resisted or rejected in the Arab English language press, highlighting the linguistic constructions and strategies used in the process.
- (5) Explore reader interpretation processes of newspaper articles and analyse these interpretations in relation to the researcher's discursive analytical findings and the various implicit and explicit ideological discursive meanings that may be represented in the text.

### **1.2 Significance of Study**

A large body of research has been done on the representation of Islam, Muslims and Muslim practices in the media and various social outlets of discourse. These have generally been based on predominantly Western contexts and have argued and described Muslim social representations as leaning towards negative and hostile depictions (Poole & Richardson, 2006; Richardson, 2004; Poole, 2002; Karim, 2003; Runnymede Trust, 1997; Said, 1997; Oktem, 2009; Baker, 2010; Baker et al, 2013; Morey and Yaqin, 2011; Rosenberger & Sauer,

2012; Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2004). Although the area being examined has attracted much research attention and some studies have substantiated a dominant and at times negative representation of Islam and Muslims in the media, the current multidisciplinary research is of significance based on the following features:

- (1) Most studies conducted on Muslim representation in the media have approached the media content from a media research perspective. This research is primarily rooted in the study of discourse, examining not just the existence of dominant representations, but how these dominant representations are constructed linguistically, relating these representations to the wider socio-political context.
- (2) Excluding a few, most studies depend on quantitative content analysis of manifest meanings in large amounts of media texts or involve non-systematic qualitative analysis. In contrast, this study examines media texts from multiple perspectives by combining both quantitative and detailed qualitative analytical approaches, allowing for the uncovering of both manifest and covert underlying meanings in the texts.
- (3) Although Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (the qualitative analytical approach applied to texts in this study) emphasises the importance of exploring reader interpretation processes as part of the overall analysis of meanings in discourse, very few studies actually explore this area in addition to the researcher's analysis of the text. In this study, reader interpretation processes form another important perspective of which meanings in media texts are explored.
- (4) As mentioned earlier, studies on Muslim representation have largely focused on 'Western' media outlets. In addition to examining the UK press, a major member of 'Western' media, this study will conduct a comparative discourse analysis of the Arab English language press, a genre of newspapers that has attracted very little research attention. Moreover, in adding the comparative element and examining texts produced in predominantly Muslim nations, the analysis may illustrate interesting differences, revealing meanings and discursive constructions in the UK press that may have otherwise not been considered significant. That is, meanings in the texts are not necessarily exposed by what is included in texts, but are equally revealed by what is not.

(5) Finally, analyses of Muslim representation is frequently found to relate to state and political conflicts, i.e. war reporting and acts of terrorism (9/11 attacks, Madrid and 7/7 bombings, Iraq war, among others). This is somewhat expected, since these type of stories tend to be regarded as having the value of 'impact' in news journalism and they are indeed relevant as events. This research has purposely avoided such stories and instead opted to focus on major events of opinion conflict arising from social, cultural and religious differences that may inherently exist between various social groups. Such events attract debates that delve into understanding and creating the 'Other', and thus, their representation. Arguably, reporting on such events can have far reaching consequences on intercultural relations on both a national and international level.

By distinguishing itself with these features, the research hopes to add further insight to the current growing highly relevant scholarly debates on the representation of Islam and Muslims.

### **1.3 Scope and Methodology**

To achieve the aims and objectives set forward, the research conducted quantitative and qualitative discourse analysis on newspaper data made up of British and Arab English language quality newspaper news reports and opinion pieces on the following two events, forming two separate analytical projects:

- **Event A: The 2009 French Face Veil Ban**
- **Event B: The 2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy**

These events have been selected since they both took place post 9/11 and produced a conflict of cultural and political views, creating an "Us" vs. "Them" dichotomy between the social groups involved. In the past decade, the world has witnessed countless examples of such conflicts that are primarily of a social or cultural nature, for instance, *the banning of minarets in Switzerland, the Quran burning controversy in Florida* and the latest debacle over an immature *YouTube video mocking the Muslim Prophet* in 2012. Both events selected for analysis in this study exemplify this form of conflict at its most extreme. Not

only do these events echo past conflicts and controversies, i.e. reactions to Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* in 1988 and the French '*l'affaire du voile*' between 1989 and 1994, they subsequently resulted in multiple cultural, social, political and legal events and conflicts that continue to this day. This in combination with the heated debates and discussions they propelled and which were extensively played out in media worldwide would most likely have a significant effect on some of the general readers' perceptions and understanding of Islam and Muslims.

To analyse the articles collected in relation to these events, the research developed a 3 levelled analytical framework drawing on qualitative and quantitative discourse analytical approaches. The analysis began by applying the qualitative methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) on a selection of newspaper texts. This was followed by the analysis of a much larger sample of newspapers texts drawing on the quantitative methods of Content Analysis and Corpus Linguistics (CL). The analysis also shed some light on reader interpretation processes by conducting reader focus groups, examining the interpretation of meanings on the representation of Muslims in some of the newspaper articles analysed by the researcher using CDA.

#### **1.4 Research Outline**

The research is comprised of two volumes. Volume one presents the main body of research and is made up of seven chapters, including the introduction and conclusion. Volume two is solely dedicated to supplementary materials and data in the form of appendices.

Chapter one is an introductory commentary opening with a description of the context of the study which concurrently highlights its relevance and indicates its purpose, which the rest of the chapter delves into. Following a discussion of the research rationale which sets forward its main aims and objectives, the significance of the study is highlighted. The chapter also gives a general overview of the scope of the study and methodology used to achieve the aims and objectives set forward by the research. The chapter ends with a brief outline of the organisation of the thesis and the remaining chapters.

Chapter two presents the literature review of the various disciplinary areas contextualising the research. Beginning with a historical overview of the representation of Islam and Muslims, the chapter narrates key historical theories and events that have shaped this representation, while highlighting some key studies that have been carried out in the area. Theories on ideology in relation to discourse and how it defined in this study are discussed next. The chapter also sheds some light on journalistic discourse and the various relevant institutional and social processes that are argued to affect newspaper news reporting and production processes in both the UK and Arab context.

Chapter two ends with an extensive discussion of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the main discourse analytical approach adopted in this research. This includes the definition and approach to discourse in CDA, its aims and objectives and the methodological approach in relation to this particular study. Discussion on CDA also highlights some of the criticisms it frequently receives as a discourse analytical approach, demonstrating how these were addressed in the current research through a specifically developed analytical framework.

The methodology adopted to achieve the research aims and objectives is the focus of Chapter three. This chapter begins by presenting the research questions followed by a detailed description of the research design and analytical framework. The chapter also provides detailed description of the data that was examined and the data collection and sampling processes.

Chapters four, five and six are dedicated to presenting the analytical findings. The analysis of articles related to the '2009 French Face Veil Ban' story are presented in chapter four, while the analytical findings related to the '2005 Danish Cartoon Controversy' story are the focus of chapter five. In both chapters, the analytical exploration begins with a general quantitative analysis of the UK and Arab corpus of articles on each news event, describing their contents in terms of the frequency of articles, the genre of news reporting they fall under, and the frequency patterns of bylined sources. This is followed by the detailed analytical findings of the critical discourse analysis of selected articles from the UK and Arab English language press. Both chapters end with a quantitative analysis further examining some of the critical discourse analysis findings on larger corpora of articles. Finally, chapter

six is dedicated to presenting the analytical findings of the reader interpretation study in the UK and Kuwaiti context, followed by a general discussion of the findings.

Chapter seven is the final chapter and begins by a discussion of the findings presented in chapters four and five in relation to the main aims of the study and the relevant literature presented in chapter two. Key findings related to the reader interpretation analysis will also be highlighted in this final discussion. The chapter will then turn to highlighting some of the short comings and limitations of the research, ending with suggestions for future studies.

## Chapter 2

### Literature Review

#### **2.1 Islam and Muslims: Constructing an Image**

The relation between what is known as the 'Muslim World' and what is known as the 'West' has always been a complex one. What constitutes the 'West', 'Islam' and the 'Muslim world' can be up for extensive debates and discussions as well. Indeed, as Ahmed (1992: viii) explains, "the 'West' and 'Islam' are shorthand expressions for complex and mobile formations, the boundaries of which are not given, but rather are political in nature and sites of constant struggle". Therefore, no expression should be viewed through an essentialist perspective, each reflecting one monolithic entity. Accordingly, the use of these labels in the current thesis primarily serves analytical purposes. Nevertheless, it is still vital to define what meaning they will carry in the proposed research. The 'Muslim world' is defined as representing nations and communities around the world where Islam is the main religion practiced. The 'West' is defined following Malek and Wiegand's (1995: 201) definition, whereby it is viewed as comprising all nations who possess dominance as a result of their economic, military and ideological superiority, which are primarily made up of European nations and the United States.

In order to comprehensively analyze and understand how Muslims are depicted and perceived in the West today, an exploration and discussion of key historical events and developments, as well as various socio-political theories that have been argued to have influenced the formation of the perceptions of the Muslim world should be reviewed. This will be the focus of the following sections.

##### **2.1.1 Historical Background: Orientalism**

The formation of the perceptions of Islam and the Muslim world in the West began centuries ago when the earliest encounters between Islam and the West developed as religious scrutiny of Islam from the Christian West (Poole, 2002: 33); the "long standing distrust between Muslims and Christians has defined the pattern" (Malek & Wiegand, 1995:

203). Malek and Wiegand explain this further by describing how in the West, even prior to the Middle Ages, Christianity was formed to be the ideal and honourable way of living, as opposed to the life reflected by Islam. They explain this conflict in relation to religion by giving examples of how the Prophet Mohammed was described during the Crusades, some of which include, as stated by Ahmed (1991: 30) : “false prophet, a sower of discord, a sensualist, a hypocrite, and agent of the devil” (cited in Malek & Wiegand, 1995: 203). Moreover, as a result of the Islamic conquests in Europe during the Ottoman period, further negative attitudes towards Islam as a religion developed. As Watt (1991: 90) explains, advances such as the one made by the Ottomans were viewed as a renewal of Muslim aggression, which reaffirmed the European West’s preconceived idea of Islam as a religion of violence to be ultimately feared. As Turner (1989) explains, the clash between Christianity and Islam paved the way for the development of theories of otherness, where ‘the Other’ is formed and perceived as corrupt morally and ontologically (cited in Poole, 2002: 33).

Another major determining force in the development of the image of Islam and Muslims was the European colonial expansion through colonial and imperial conquests into the East and primarily in Muslim regions in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. It is during this period where the idea of an ‘Orient’, ‘Oriental scholars’ and ‘Orientalism’ as a field developed, bringing with it large bodies of texts describing the Orient. With the colonial expansion, religious factors were not the only area of interest that affected the writings of Orientalist Scholars; political and economical factors in relation to Islam came into play as well. Orientalism, how it is defined and what it encompasses as a field adopted various descriptions and definitions as the field itself developed. Originally, the term Orientalism did not carry any negative connotations; Orientalism was simply an academic label describing disciplines that studied “Eastern societies, histories and languages” (Sayyid, 2003: 31). However, this view towards the field soon changed. With the development of opposition towards colonial power in the Indian subcontinent, questions, ideas and theories regarding the true intentions of Orientalists and their work towards the Orient began to develop, and criticism towards the field escalated even further following the Second World War and the decolonization of the East (Richardson, 2004: 6).

Edward Said's pioneering critical work, "Orientalism" (1978), has been seminal in highlighting and developing this divergent and increasingly negative perspective towards Orientalism and the work it had produced on the East. In this book, where Said analyses various 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century academic texts and writings that describe the Orient and its people, Said questions the validity and neutrality of these works. Said views Orientalism as a "style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and (most of the time) 'the occident'" (1978: 2). In this relationship, the power is viewed as unequal, where the Western culture and people are viewed as superior to the people and culture of the East. According to Said (1978: 3), Orientalism can be described and analyzed as:

*the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient- dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.*

Therefore, Orientalism is viewed as an exercise of power and knowledge by the Western power over the Orient or the Eastern part of the world. Orientalist writings are argued to be the discursive means by which a stereotypical East was created, an East inferior to the superior West, giving the European West the ability to assert their power and domination at the time. Furthermore, as Poole (2002: 33) explains, "comparisons of Europe with the Middle East were based on European definitions of modernity and religion as a personal belief, and this allowed ideas of superiority to circulate".

Central to Said's work on Orientalism are Gramsci's concept of hegemony (1971) and Foucault's notion of discourse and power (1972). Works produced by Orientalism are viewed as discourse that assisted in understanding how "European culture was able to manage and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively" (Said 1978: 7). The discourse and production of knowledge could be viewed to have been used to express and exercise power on the Orient by the colonizing Western political forces. In regard to Gramsci's hegemony, Said (1978: 7) explains, that it is the working of cultural hegemony that in effect has kept Orientalism, its

strength and influence ongoing. Furthermore, according to Sayyid (2003: 31), Said argued that Orientalism developed as a result of Imperialist control and expansion in the Muslim and Eastern world, while concurrently it is Orientalism itself that made this expansion possible. Orientalism dictated and reasserted the need for Western colonial powers to further extend their military, political and economic dominance and control of the East.

The Orient encompasses various regions of the Eastern part of the world, however, Said pays particular attention to the depiction of Muslim regions of the Orient, which he referred to as the 'near Orient'. He explains that "only the Arab and Islamic Orient presented Europe with an unresolved challenge on the political, intellectual, and for a time economic levels" (1978: 74). As a result, much of Orientalism reflected various negative attitudes towards Islam and the Arab regions in particular. Said (1978: 301) explains that descriptions of Arabs and Islam in studies can be reflected by four main dogmas or themes:

*One is the absolute and systemic difference between the West, which is rational, developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, underdeveloped, inferior. Another dogma is that abstractions about the Orient ... are always preferable to direct evidence drawn from modern Oriental realities. The third dogma is that the Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself... A fourth dogma is that the Orient is at bottom something either to be feared ... or to be controlled...*

In addition, Richardson (2004: 6) explains, the most influential effects of Orientalism according to Said, has been the development of the perception of the Orient as one. The Orient is depicted as a 'single Orient', suggesting that the Muslim Middle East can be viewed and analysed as one entity. This as a result, as Richardson explains, has the effect of essentializing "an image of an archetypal (and usually male) 'Oriental', unchanging in 'His' primitive, culturally specific beliefs and practices" (ibid). Therefore, Islam is constructed to reflect a static and unchanging religion. Indeed, as Watt (1991: 107) explains, Muslim scholars themselves have called out on Orientalists over this idea of Islam as a static religion. Laroui (1976: 44) argues that Islam, in contrast to Orientalist depictions, is not static, but should rather be viewed as in a continuous process of renewal (cited in Watt, 1991: 107). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier and emphasised throughout this thesis,

whether it be Islam, the Muslim World, the West or the Western World, adopting a view of any of these social constructs as representing one monolithic entity, neglects the internal differences, the multi layered realities and the internal complex dynamics within these regions of the world. Acquiring this view allows for irrational sweeping generalizations of hundreds of millions of people who admittedly may share some commonalities, but in fact are living within very different nations, societies, communities that are specific in their internal socio-political and economical circumstances and realities.

It is also worth mentioning that during the time Said wrote the book 'Orientalism' (1978), he argued that unlike other parts of the world that have been on the receiving end of Orientalist scholarship, such as Africa and East Asia, who in the 1960's produced a vast amount of work revising, refuting and challenging 'Orientalist' scholarship, Islamic and Arab scholars have done very little in this regard.

In the post-colonial era, new forms of representation of the Orient and Muslims in particular began taking shape, "a new typology of images emerged to categorize Islam in a way that is altogether different – aggressively militant, intrinsically fundamentalist, ideologically anti-modern and socially repressive" (Brasted, 2009: 62). These forms of representation can be viewed to carry on the classic Orientalist perspective, however, they were also the consequence of complex social and political realities and happenings, in both, the Muslim regions of the world and the West. The following section will tackle some of these aspects that have been seen to influence the continuous formation of the representations of Islam and Muslims today.

### **2.1.2 Orientalism: Modern Day**

In the last 50 years, attention towards the Arab Muslim world has grown considerably. In the years following the early 1970s, many events concerning the Arab and Muslim world gained worldwide attention, some of which include, the oil crises, the Iranian revolution, the civil war in Lebanon, the Iran-Iraq War and the 1990 Gulf War, among others. This attention escalated even further with the devastating effects of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the

various terrorist attacks that followed around the world and the politically coined 'War on Terror' that continues today.

The rise of political Islam or the Islamist movement in the 1970's in various Islamic nations played a major part in the drawing of attention to Muslim communities. This swift sudden up rise was so profoundly noticed that as Sayyid (1997: 18) explains, by the 1980's, approximately 200 books a year were published discussing the reasons for this Islamic resurgence. One of the primary and most vocalised causes for this resurgence, as explained by experts and by Islamists themselves, was the growing and widespread feeling of a loss of Islamic identity among various Muslim communities (Watt, 1991; Sayyid, 1997). Another often discussed cause refers to the failure of secular elites who were instituted by the Western colonizing regimes prior to their departure and who promoted Western models of power and modernity to achieve the hopes and aspirations of the general public (Sayyid, 1997; Ahmed, 1992). In turn, members and supporters of various Islamist movements across various Muslim nations claimed that their policies would improve the current reality of Muslim communities at the time. Also, as Sayyid (1997: 21) explains, the rapid economic growth, i.e. oil industry, and the consequential changes it had on the traditional way of life in the region was another factor leading to the resurgence, according to some theorists. These changes brought along feelings of uncertainty, which in some cases compelled some to return and reaffirm their traditional ways of life, which the Islamist movements so popularly advocated and offered.

Nevertheless, Sayyid (1997) argues that reasons such as the ones discussed above explain the failure of old regimes rather than the reasons for the successful emergence and popularity of Islamism. He explains their popularity as "due to the way in which they are able to combine the deconstructionist logic of the post modern critique of modernity with an attempt to speak from another centre, outside the orbit of the West" (Sayyid, 1997: 120).

The *Rushdie Affair* is argued as the event that brought this developing resurgence of Islam into full scale worldwide attention (Watt, 1991). The consequential 'fatwa' or death sentence issued as a response to the publication of the *Satanic Verses*, by then Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, highlighted a clash between Western views towards

basic principles of the modern world, e.g. freedom of speech, and views of similar concepts displayed by some in the Muslim world. This brings us to some theories brought forward by scholars which claim that various types of rhetoric, events and actions taking place and resulting from Islamist movements in several Muslim communities have assisted in the establishment of Islam as the next villain (after the Communist Soviet Union); Islam was 'Othered' and viewed as a threat that the West would have to ultimately deal with.

With the rise of the Islamist movements, leaders, members and speakers of these movements vocalised their extreme rejection and desire to fight off Western values related to secularism and democracy and the 'Western' way of life in general, i.e. equality of the sexes and of religions. They also asserted the idea of one unchanging essential Islam. These ideas coincided with the developing view of Islam as a threat to the West and the democracy it advocates, reasserting Western views of what Islam allegedly stands for. Consequently, both, the opponents and proponents of the Islamic movement seemed to agree on an essential Islam that is historically unchanging (Halliday, 1996: 111), an Islam supposedly dictating the attitude of all Muslims from very different Muslim societies towards all sorts of social, political and fundamental issues regarding life in general. This ignores the fact that within various Islamic communities, there are internal political and religious conflicts. Various other political parties who form large numbers in Muslim societies and who are rarely reported on in Western writings and the media, are continuously struggling and competing with Islamists for political positions and majority seats in parliaments, e.g., Kuwait. Each community is defined by various realities. Various movements exist in Islamic societies and as Bennet (2005: 22) explains, Islamic societies include radical revisionists, neo traditionalists, traditionalists and modernists or progressive thinkers who agree or disagree on varying social, religious and political issues and concerns, and these vary from one society to the next. Nevertheless, Islamist rhetoric seems to be the centre of attention in the West and as Poole (2002: 35) explains, there is "agreement that the global events that are associated with it have been formulated as a threat in current Western discourse".

As a result, many ideas developed by authors reflect Islam as a threat polarized from the West and all it stands for. Orientalists, such as Bernard Lewis (1990), have stated that "the

Muslim world is again seized by an intense – and violent – resentment of the West. Suddenly America has become the arch-enemy, the incarnation of evil, the diabolic opponent of all that is good, and specifically for Muslims, of Islam” (cited in Richardson, 2004: 12). Amos Perlmutter (1992), another Neo-Orientalist, states, “Is Islam, fundamental or otherwise, compatible with liberal, human rights-oriented Western style representative democracy? The answer is an empathetic No” (cited in Hunter, 1998: 72). Islam is viewed as incapable of co-existing with the West or adapting to Western values and thus, any form of modernity.

Polarization of both regions was advocated further by various scholarly theories and works, such as, Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations?” thesis (1993, 1996). According to Brasted (2009: 63), Huntington drew on an image of Islam developing an aggressive fight against the form of civilization the West represents. This worked to form an image of Islam as a dangerous force against the West and all it stands for, and ultimately values of both civilizations are predicted to collide.

For some analysts, Huntington’s predictions proved right with the events of 9/11 and Al-Qaeda’s rhetoric and the ‘War on Terror’ that followed, thus, resulting in what is considered a war between Islam and the West (Bennett, 2005: 11). However, Bergen (2001: 242) argues against such a conclusion, explaining that the war following 9/11 is not the result of a clash of cultures, rather, the conflict is primarily related to political issues regarding America’s foreign policy in the Middle East and the political decisions it has taken regarding various issues and conflicts in the region. Halliday (1996) adds to this argument by explaining that historically, differences between civilisations had rarely caused conflict internationally. In support of this, he cites conflicts that have had no relation to such differences, such as, the Japan/US Conflict, the Oil Conflict and the international nuclear weapons disputes. Said (1996) described theories such as Huntington’s, as having the effect of prolonging and perpetuating conflicts as well as polarizing both sides of the conflict even further. In addition, Beinin and Stork argue that such a theory “promotes a metaphysical concept of cultural unity and ahistorical notion of fixed civilisational blocs” (1997: 20). This reductionist view by which civilizations are divided into separate entities creates collective identities that can in no way represent the diversity and multilayered realities of the nations and people

that belong to these civilisations. Indeed, such scenarios belie the existing complex realities of the world today (Karim, 2003). Moreover, the potential threat posed by 'political Islam' can arguably be questioned based on the fact that it encompasses more than one political group or movement with extremely varying ideals, i.e. the ideological and political differences, as well as, the economical realities of *Al Qaida* (Wahabi based) and *Hezbollah* (a Shiite movement), arguably weakens any possibility of a real threat to the West.

Moreover, some theories developing from both the 'Islamic world', as well as the 'West', advocate the idea that following the Cold war, a "threat vacuum" was created (Esposito, 1992), which needed to be filled by a "new enemy" after Communism. Muslim nations are argued to have been substituted by the West as the next enemy or subordinated 'Other', reviving the old historical conflict between both regions (Halliday, 1996: 109). Some advocates of this view support their claims by explaining that this is the result of the West's need to maintain hegemonic power over the rest of the world, although this idea has been contested by many as well. In addition, Hippler (1995) explains, Western foreign policy in the Middle East is mainly shaped by their economic and power interests. The Middle East with its vast oil reserves forms a major part of these Western interests. Therefore, the use of the 'threat of Islam' can work to justify any negative action or activity taken by Western governments to accomplish their interests in the region. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, and this is more evident post 9/11, key figures and followers of various organised movements in Muslim societies have affirmed the idea of an eternal Islamic threat and conflict between the two regions, by positioning themselves as 'speakers for Islam' and all Muslims, who primarily exist to fight the West and actually commit various devastating acts, e.g. 9/11 and 7/7, which in fact defy anything that is 'Islamic'. Halliday describes this supposed Islamic threat and eternal confrontation as a constructed myth. This supposed threat by Islam obscures the reality that the majority of Muslims around the world do not support such movements or the concept of political Islam (Halliday, 1996: 107).

Although there are varying scholarly disagreements on the theories mentioned above, there is general agreement that the Muslim world today is widely perceived as posing an ideological and physical homogenous threat to the 'West'. This subsequently creates an 'Us' vs. 'Them' scenario. As Said explains in the preface of the 2003 edition of *Orientalism*, the

general understanding of Arabs, Muslims and the Middle East has not improved to a great extent. This, he explains, is exemplified by demeaning generalizations and continuous attacks on Arab contemporary societies for “their backwardness, lack of democracy, and abrogation of women rights” (1978: xiv). More importantly, he explains that each historical phase, from Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt to more recent times, has produced different themes and images of the ‘Other’, adapting to the specific interests of West in each individual situation. Indeed, social and media research have emphasised the growing and continuously changing stereotypical social representation of Islam and Muslims in general, and this will be the focus of discussion in the following section.

### **2.1.3 The Role of the Media**

As a result of some of the incidents described earlier, Islam, Muslims and the Middle East have received much media attention. This naturally developed concerns on how Islam and Muslims are depicted in Western media. Consequently, research on this depiction got much scholarly attention from various academic fields (Said, 1997; Ahmed, 1992; Karim, 2003; Poole, 2002; Farouqi, 2009; Richardson, 2004; Poole & Richardson, 2006; Morey & Yaqin, 2011; Baker et al, 2013, Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2004; Hakam, 2009).

Said (1997: xii) argues that most coverage of Islam in Western media, which he believes escalated dramatically with the events of the 1979 Iranian revolution, have been hostile, highly exaggerated and stereotypical. He describes this hostile negative coverage as displaying a revival of classic Orientalist ideas and themes in the depictions of Islam. Unlike other cultures and religions, depictions of Islam and Muslims contain racial and religious misrepresentations, which Said describes to have “become the last acceptable form of denigration of foreign culture in the West” (1997: xii). Such misrepresentations are argued to have become naturalized features of the media, thus, not questioned or criticised. Ahmed (1992), who throughout his work accentuates the fundamental role media plays in the postmodern world, describes media as defining dominant global civilisations today. He explains that currently the media is a primary source by which Islam is defined to be the enemy or villain. In fact, Ahmed (1992: 223) goes so far as to argue that in the history of relationship and conflict between the West and the Islamic world, Western media has posed

the greatest threat to Islam and Muslims. The criticality of the threat, he argues, is emphasised further by Muslims' inability to fend for themselves against the relentless continuous attacks on Islam in Western dominated media. Indeed, various forms of Western media have been accused of an over reliance on extreme oriented sources and speakers who claim to represent Muslim communities (Poole, 2002: 44-45). This again, gives a very narrow view of Islam and reflects one interpretation, which tends to reaffirm Western misconceptions of Islam and Muslims as one unified unchanging entity. Moreover, Oktem (2009: 31) argues that the lack of sufficiently qualified experts and required finances in the Middle Eastern foreign reporting departments of many dominant Western news agencies can result in the media being "susceptible to public relations of governments and to propaganda", rather than sound representations of events.

Although a dominant negative representation is argued to exist, it is by no means assumed that the media or journalists deliberately and consciously depict Islam or any other issue in a particular way, either negative or positive, or drawing on a particular dominant ideology. Rather, as Hall (1979) explains, it is an unconscious process by media encoders, since the dominant discourses they are surrounded by and select from to depict events in the media appear to be the sole form of discourse available. That is, through the hegemonic processes in society, the discourse of the elite or the dominant ideology is the most prominent, and thus becomes a universalized and naturalized form of discourse that media encoders are faced with and consequently select from. This, for instance, can be exemplified by the selection of the term 'fundamentalist' instead of 'Islamist' to describe an Islamist movement. As Karim (2003: 6) explains, this is especially the case with mainstream media, since it is primarily owned by the dominant socio-economic elite and/or political groups and they are crucial methods by which hegemonic communication functions to attain public consensus. Furthermore, news reports worldwide are highly dependent on Western based news agencies. According to Karim (2003: 14), the Western based "transnational mass media, which have sophisticated hardware and organizational systems, are much more effective than Muslim sources in creating globally dominant interpretations". Although this may be true, the real challenges posed by various forms of new media towards these traditional cultures of information cannot be overlooked. In the past 20 years, the Arab predominantly Muslim media has developed a dominant information culture of its own, be

it by the multiple proliferating non-state controlled news satellite channels ,e.g. *Al-Jazeera* and *Al-Arabiya* or by the populist approach to news displayed by various outlets of new media, i.e. Twitter, Facebook and the internet in general. As Seib argues, both, the Arab state controlled media and Western broadcasting agencies are finding themselves 'at a significant competitive disadvantage' (2007: xiii). This disadvantage may be increasingly felt by the Western media, since for some, they are not considered as credible as media developed from within the region and more importantly, by media professionals of shared cultural and social backgrounds. Having said that, the majority of the press in the Arab nations, specifically, the English Language press, which will form part of the data focused on in the current research, depend highly on Western and 'Euro-centred' news agencies for the flow of international news (Hafez 2001: 15). This consequently formed the interest for the current research to explore the issue of dominant global interpretations and ideologies by investigating the less known discourse of the Arab English language press and whether dominant discourses produced in the UK are reproduced or resisted in the Arab based discourse of news reports on particular foreign and international events.

Karim (2003) who investigated how the transnational Western media depicts Islam and how it constructs events between the West and Islam, from the mid 1980's to 2000, argues that the transnational media follows and is directed by the dominant Western discourse on Islam. He argues that historical and stereotypical images of a violent Islam have continued to have presence in the contemporary media depictions, while no distinction is made among Muslims. In addition, the idea of terrorism is continuously attached to the coverage of Muslim societies and rarely to any other religious societies that may use violence in the name of their religions (Karim, 2003: 175). He also argues that most main stream reporting is presented utilizing polarized frameworks, such as, *Islam vs. West* and *Fundamentalism vs. Modernity*, while the reporting is predominantly in favour of the West. This bi-polar framing of events has continued post 9/11, as Karim explains, where "most media proceeded to conduct their reporting within the broad parameters of this discourse" (2003: ix). Indeed, as Poole (2002: 2) explains, "Us" and "Them" were created in varying forms across the globe. Poole supports this further by describing how the "Us" vs. "Them" dichotomy translated on to a political level when following the 9/11 attacks, George Bush himself stated that "you are either with us (the democratic world) or with them (the terrorists)". This dichotomy is

reflected in the press “along a series of binary oppositions in which the West stands for rational, humane, developed and superior, and Islam for aberrant, underdeveloped and inferior” (Poole, 2002: 43).

In the British context, which is of primary interest in this research, a few important and influential studies have been conducted. The Runnymede Trust (1997), established by the commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, published a report, which was highly influential, as it was one of the first of such reports which highlighted the growing misinterpretation of Islam and the discrimination and exclusion suffered by British Muslims in various fields. It also highlighted the significant role of the media in reinforcing this misrepresentation. The report presented a framework of representations divided in terms of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ views of Islam. The ‘closed’ views and discourse would include viewing Islam as, *monolithic, static, separate, manipulative*, and as a *threatening ‘enemy’*. Furthermore, it is characterised by discourse where *Muslim criticisms of the West are rejected, hostility towards Islam is used to justify discrimination, and Islamophobia is viewed as natural*. Therefore, using media as an example, the more ‘closed’ views reflected in any given report, the more *Islamophobic* the report is. The report argues that while these ‘closed’ views may be applicable to some ‘Islamist’ movements, they should not apply to Muslims in general. Many of these ‘closed’ views coincide with Said’s main themes of Orientalist representation of Islam and the Middle East discussed earlier. Therefore, this can arguably be viewed as a reaffirmation that the Orientalist ideology indeed does continue today, albeit taking different discursive forms. Although the report was paramount in highlighting the growing presence of the misconception of Islam while advocating change, the report and its concept of *Islamophobia* has received much criticism. Robin Richardson (2009), for instance, argues that the term *Islamophobia*, implies an illness or mental disorder involving a minority of people, failing to capture the significance of the social phenomenon and its effects. Moreover, Halliday (1999) argues that it is Muslims who are in fact the target of any existing hostility rather than Islam as a religion, thus, a more accurate reference would be *Anti-Muslimism*. Similarly, Richardson (2009) suggests *anti-Muslim hostility* as a better reference to the phenomenon, since the hostility witnessed is not hostility towards the Muslim religion and practices per se, but rather hostility towards “an ethno-religious identity within western countries”. He argues that the Runnymede (1997)

definition of *Islamophobia* suggests that the hate and hostility towards Islam as a religion prompts the feeling of fear and hate towards the people that practice it, when in fact, a more accurate view of the term is that it is “a shorthand way of referring to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims – and, therefore, dread or hatred of Islam”.

A few other more recent studies focusing on media outlets in particular and their depictions of Islam (post 9/11) include a study published by the Greater London authority (GLA, 2007) and a study developed by the Cardiff School of Journalism (Moore et al, 2008). Both studies highlighted the continuing presence of negative depictions of Islam and Muslims. Coverage is viewed to have increased significantly since 2000, with the majority of reports covering terrorism related events and stories (Moore et al, 2008). In addition, the lack of alternative views and understandings in presenting Muslim related events is argued as likely to trigger insecurity and suspicion by non-Muslims, while causing a sense of alienation by Muslims. It is also argued that news reporting frequently uses hostile language in describing Muslims, who are depicted as a threat to British values (GLA, 2007). In fact, according to Moore et al (2008), there is a clear growing interest in coverage related to cultural and religious differences between Islam and the West, with this theme overtaking terrorism related stories in 2008, emphasising the incompatibility of values between the West and Islam. The same study also argues that the majority of coverage is related to: (1) the threat posed by Muslims and terrorism, (2) a problem in relation to cultural differences, and (3) Muslim extremism; with the most common nouns used regarding British Muslims being “terrorist, extremist, Islamist, suicide bomber and militant” (2008: 3).

Poole (2002), similar to the focus of the proposed research, investigated the representation of Muslims in British press discourse in particular. Poole sees Muslim related coverage as depending highly on the international relations perspective, influenced by the American/Western policy and what it dictates. Moreover, the study argued that Orientalist discourse continues to be a hegemonic force, yet taking various forms. In this particular case, it worked in constructing discourse regarding the “internal other”, British Muslims. This form of Orientalism functions in allowing “the other to be managed and promotes an agreed sense of national identity at the others expense in order to protect and maintain social systems and structures” (Poole, 2002: 251). These finding again seem to confirm

Said's hypothesis discussed earlier, where Orientalism is viewed to be a continuous discursive force, yet taking various forms to fit the interests of a particular situation or context.

Through a large scale detailed qualitative and quantitative analysis of the discursive representation of Islam and Muslims in UK quality newspapers, Richardson's (2004) analysis is one of few that shed some light on the discursive construction of a dominant representation of Islam and Muslims in relation to the wider socio-cultural context. In his study with particular focus on the argumentation strategies used in newspapers, he illustrated the journalistic role in the construction and reproduction of "racist social systems". Echoing earlier argued depictions, Richardson illustrated how representation of Islam and Muslims, depending on the context and event being reported on, revolved around four key prejudicial argumentative strategies that pose Muslims and Islam as a (1) military threat, (2) extremist threat, (3) threat to democracy in their own nations, and as a (4) social threat to women. In relating some of the findings to the broader socio-cultural and political context, Richardson argued the social conditioning of British quality newspapers as money making businesses and as catering mainly to the middle and upper class elite (predominantly White and non-Muslim), ultimately determined the content of coverage related to Islam and Muslims. Anchored in a 'white outlook' these newspapers are argued to distance 'Them' from 'Us' by their approach in writing 'about' Muslims, instead of for them (Richardson, 2004: 229).

As illustrated in this review of some of the relevant studies on the depiction of Islam and Muslims in the media, the role of the media in the misrepresentation of Muslims and the continued presence of an 'Orientalist' ideology in the British media has been thoroughly argued and substantiated. Having said that, most of these and other studies conducted on Muslim representation have been predominantly comprised of media and socio-cultural studies, exclusively examining 'Western' based media outlets. This comparative analysis rooted primarily in the study of discourse and examining newspaper texts produced in varying contexts, will hopefully add to the current literature by exploring and highlighting the discursive constructs and strategies used in the production of any dominant ideological representations of Islam and Muslims.

## 2.2 Ideology

As the main focus of the current research is the discursive ideological representation of Islam and Muslims, it is important to shed some light on ideology as a concept and in relation to discourse. From a vast literature on theories of ideology, the following sections will define and describe ideology as it is approached in this research.

### 2.2.1 Defining Ideology

Since the term ideology was first coined by Destutt de Tracy in 1796 in reference to a ‘Science of Ideas’, it has been defined, used and contested by various social theorists and thinkers from a wide range of academic fields. Throughout the years, it has gone through a series of transformations, developing various compatible and incompatible definitions and meanings that were acquired from extremely different perspectives.

The most common understanding of ideology can be found in the Merriam-Webster dictionary, which defines ‘ideology’ as:

*a: a systematic body of concepts especially about human life or culture b: a manner or the content of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or culture c: the integrated assertions, theories and aims that constitute a sociopolitical program*

Another commonly accepted understanding in the literature discussing ideology, directly relates ideology to ‘legitimizing’ the influence of a social group or class considered to be of significant dominance at any given time (Eagleton, 1991: 5). Thompson advocates this view, which he labels as “a critical conception of ideology”, where it is described as “being used to refer to the ways in which meaning serves, in particular circumstances, to establish and sustain relations of power which are asymmetrical” (1990: 7). Therefore, ideology is viewed as “meaning in the service of power” (ibid.). This serving of power depends significantly on the use of various forms and outlets of discourse in society, one of which would be the media, including newspaper discourse (the main data analyzed in this study). This is especially since media is often controlled by the dominant elite groups in society. Furthermore, dominant groups legitimate and justify their dominance by spreading and promoting their beliefs and values (ideologies), therefore, “naturalizing and universalizing

such beliefs so as to render them self evident and apparently inevitable; denigrating ideas which might challenge it; excluding rival forms of thought ..." (Eagleton, 1991: 5).

This view of ideology is in conflict with the more recent movement in political and social literature to develop a more neutral definition of ideology, which Thompson (1990) believes has removed the long standing negative connotations that come along with it as a concept. Here, ideology is viewed as "purely a descriptive term", it is not related to any particular influences or effects; it is seen as merely a system of thoughts and beliefs that are a product of social and political practices.

### **2.2.2 Ideology and Discourse**

Critical discourse analysis (CDA), which is the discourse analytical approach adopted in this research, seems to employ the more critical perspective described by Thompson (1990) towards defining ideology. Wodak (2002: 10) states, "ideology in CDA is seen as an important aspect of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations". This again is seen as achieved primarily through the use of various discursive structures in society. Similarly, Fairclough explains that unlike the 'descriptive' views of ideology that define it as beliefs and perspectives of social groups minus any reference to power and domination between these social groups, ideologies are "representations of aspects of the world which can be shown to contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power, domination and exploitation" (Fairclough, 2003: 9). The media, for instance, can illustrate particular representations (ideologies) of, e.g. women, Arabs and Jews, that ultimately may establish, contribute to or change their social realities in relation to power and domination.

Fairclough also classifies ideologies as "propositions that generally figure as implicit assumptions in text" (1995b: 140). As assumptions, they are implicit and are taken for granted, becoming naturalized in the text; they are viewed as common sense. To explain this further, the concept of hegemony, which is closely related to ideology, should be explained. Neo Marxist, Antonio Gramsci's (1971) theory of hegemony is "a way of...conceptualizing power and the struggle for power in capitalist societies, which emphasizes how power depends on consent or acquiescence rather than just force..." (Fairclough, 2003: 218). Therefore, the governed and dominated social classes willingly

accept the domination of the ruling class through naturalised persuasion and without the use of force; it is viewed as leadership rather than domination. Hegemony can be viewed as successful when “the ruling class can implant its values with the minimum of force since the ruled acquiesce to the power and political legitimacy of the rulers” (Richardson, 2007: 35), and when “dominated groups are unable to distinguish between their own interests and attitudes and those of dominant groups” (van Dijk, 1998b: 102). At a later stage in the literature regarding hegemony, this form of domination was linked to other forms of social groups, such as, gender and race groups, among others in spreading their ideologies and beliefs (van Dijk, 1998b: 140). Fairclough (2003: 58) relates hegemony to discourse in explaining that having social power, control and hegemony means that the dominating social group has control on what is included in the ‘common ground’ they share with the general public, which is what makes assumptions (presuppositions) influential in ideological work done in discourse. These assumptions can represent what exists, what can exist and what is desirable and should exist, and they are highlighted by particular linguistic features in the text. By making assumptions, the text is indirectly stating what should be viewed as reality or as ‘a given’ and therefore, the representations (ideologies) in the discourse are naturalized. Therefore, “seeking hegemony is a matter of seeking to universalize particular meaning in the service of achieving and maintaining dominance, and this is ideological work” (ibid.). This study explored the existence of naturalized dominant ideologies in regard to the representation of Islam and Muslims by analysing the discourse of newspaper press. Nevertheless, it is important to note, that the general public is not viewed as without control, and public consent to the dominance of the ruling class “is always partial, precarious and fragile state of affairs” (Jones and Collins, forthcoming cited in Richardson 2007: 36), and this would apply to the effects of ideological discourse. In reference to media audience, for instance, interpretations of a text depend and are shaped by multiple social variables (see section 3.5.2).

Teun van Dijk (1998a & 1998b) also developed a comprehensive understanding and framework of ideology which presents a detailed discussion of how ideologies are formed, used and produced. Van Dijk believes that the established fact that ideologies form a ‘system of ideas’ naturally implies that they are ultimately related to human thought and beliefs; and therefore include cognition, a dimension that has not received much attention

in the literature regarding the understanding of ideology. In order to develop a comprehensive understanding of ideology, van Dijk argues, it should be viewed through a multidimensional perspective that includes, cognition, society and discourse:

*Ideologies are both cognitive and social. They essentially function as the 'interface' between cognitive representations and processes underlying discourse and action, on the one hand, and social position and interests of social groups, on the other hand. (1995: 18)*

Therefore, ideologies are socio-cognitive, they are cognitively present in individuals as well as being socially shared beliefs of particular social groups. These shared beliefs form the basis of the development of these social groups. Discourse and language use are one of the primary methods by which these ideologies are reflected and articulated, and thus, reproduced. In addition, as ideologies are viewed to form the social beliefs shared by a social group, they consequently organize and control the social group's opinions and attitudes in regard to the various facets of life, society and other social groups. Therefore, ideologies make up the social representations that form the social identity of a social group.

Regarding the social functions of ideology, similar to Fairclough, van Dijk agrees ideologies can function to legitimate dominance and power. However, it is important to highlight that ideologies are viewed as not being limited to legitimating dominance of a social group, since ideologies may be present in the 'dominated' groups as well, for resistance purposes among other functions (van Dijk, 1998a). Therefore, for instance, in two opposing groups of a conflict, where one is dominating and the other dominated, both groups would possess and reflect different ideologies. So, rather than describing ideologies as having positive or negative connotations, they should be viewed as being "effective in promoting the interests of a group" (1998a: 24). These groups can involve and be represented through institutions, organizations and other structures in society. In regard to this study, Arab and British newspapers may represent different social groups that advocate different and sometimes opposing ideologies through their discourse. Therefore, they may produce, reproduce or resist ideologies depending on the social and political interests of the newspaper establishment, which is of primary interest to this discourse analytical study.

In addition, ideologies are viewed to have the social function of organizing and coordinating the social practices (including discourse) of the individual group members belonging to various social groups, in aim of protecting its particular interests and achieving its goals (van Dijk, 1998a & 1998b). A feminist ideology, for instance, may organize and control the attitudes of its group members regarding inequality at the work place. To explain further using newspapers as an example, an ideologically liberal or conservative newspaper reflecting its ideologies in the opinion pieces of its paper, may function in persuading its readers to adopt the ideologies and views that are shared by members of the social groups behind the newspaper (liberal or conservative). Accordingly, their interests and ultimate goals of spreading their beliefs and persuading readers to adopt them may be realized and fulfilled.

In regard to how ideologies are played out through discourse structures, van Dijk (1998b: 263) emphasizes that no particular discourse structures can be characteristically labelled as serving ideological functions, or be viewed as ideological expressions. Instead, any linguistic structure could be utilized for ideological purposes, depending on the context. More importantly, a particular discursive structure may have ideological implications in one context and not another. However, there are typical structures that have shown to have served ideological purposes, depending on the contexts. One significant concept regarding how ideologies may be structured and organized (cognitively) and later reflected by discourse is the 'polarization schema' (van Dijk, 1998b: 69) or the 'ideological square' (Richardson, 2004: 55). Van Dijk explains, as "ideologies are typically used as foundation for domination and resistance; that is, they represent social struggle" (1998b: 68) between different opposing social groups, and as ideologies are viewed as self serving principles of each social group, this implies that they are polarized. That is, they are organized in an *Us vs. Them* polarization, with positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, e.g. in environmental ideology, 'Them' = producers of pollution, and 'Us' = protectors of the environment against pollution. This is evidenced in discourse, in all levels of text and talk, "interactional, pragmatic, semantic and stylistic strategies that select or emphasize positive information about Us, and negative information about Them" (van Dijk, 2000a: 98). This concept was central in the analysis conducted in this study, as the *Us vs. Them* dichotomy

frequently characterised the newspaper discourse covering Muslim related events in both contexts examined.

### **2.3 News Media: Newspaper Discourse**

In news reporting, journalists have the responsibility of relaying stories from around the world and they do not merely develop articles, they in fact, “write stories-with structure, order, view point and values” (Bell, 1998: 64), which shape ideas and perceptions of the social realities of the world today. There is a professional ethos applied to all news media, including journalism, obligating them to report news stories in a neutral manner and without bias (Fowler, 1991: 1). Indeed, journalists try and proclaim to be in line with this professional ethos, although in some instances, as with opinion pieces and editorials, it is generally accepted and in fact expected for opinions to be clearly expressed (van Dijk, 1998a: 21). These opinions will generally express the various ideological underpinnings and assumptions of a newspaper. Nevertheless, whether in opinion pieces, news articles or any other form of media discourse, Fowler (1991: 1) maintains that “Language is not neutral, but a highly constructive mediator”. That is, since news reporting institutions are usually “socially, economically and politically situated, all news is always reported from some particular angle” (Fowler, 1991: 10). Different newspapers relate to their own institutional, social and economic stance. These would of course vary from one context to the next, and indeed, between different newspapers published in the same context.

News discourse as a genre is also characterised by features and a culture that are particular to it as a discourse. In January 2010, Kurt Westergaard, one of the cartoonists behind the series of cartoons involved in the ‘2006 Danish cartoon controversy’ (one of the events analysed in this research), was the subject of a serious attempt on his life by an intruder in his home in Denmark. He currently remains under special police protection. As Richardson (2007: 76) explains, news discourse, unlike other forms of discourse can and have attracted such extreme reactions by various parties towards the producers or journalists producing newspaper texts; being bullied, harassed and threatened are some of these more negative reactions. Such reactions, Richardson convincingly explains, highlight one of many aspects that characterise the distinctive nature of news media. As described by Fairclough (1995b), mass media are made of communicative events characterised by specific properties that

make them distinct from any other form of communication. The communicative events in the media are distinguished by their time and space parameters, where the decoding and encoding, in most cases, take place at different times and contexts, and the production of media content is also usually 'spatially and temporally disjointed' (Fairclough 1995b: 37). In this process of media production that can take place over different periods of time, the media content to be published go through a series of discursive and journalistic practices and processes that ultimately shape the end product, or in the case of this research, the newspaper article. In agreement with various researchers and the CDA approach to discourse, the analysis of news media texts should be approached in consideration of these various social and discursive processes and practices involved in and around their production. This is in addition to considering the unique format and linguistic structure of newspaper articles.

Having stated the importance of examining these processes, it is worth mentioning that although media discourse as a product has received extensive research interest by discourse analysts, the discursive processes and practices directly involved in news production and consumption have not attracted as much attention (Cotter, 2010; Bell & Garrett, 1998). Thus, despite scholarly emphasis on the importance of examining these processes in the analysis of discourse, a significant gap in the literature for future research in this area remains. This applies to the literature on the institutional, editorial and journalistic processes related to the Arab media, and specifically, the foreign language Arab media to a much greater extent.

Nevertheless, general key aspects related to newspaper production, regarding media sources, news values, economic influences and ties, media ownership and censorship have been discussed extensively. The following sections will attempt to give a brief overview of the UK and Arab English language quality press, discussing the various institutional, professional and production processes that may affect news journalism in both contexts, relating where possible how this may in turn guide and shape news reporting on Muslims and Islam.

### **2.3.1 British Quality Press**

Despite predictions of their demise in the face of fierce development of alternative media choices, British newspapers remain an extremely relevant and influential media force (Seymour-Ure, 1996), with the majority of papers continuing to be profitable enterprises (McNair, 2003: 15). Although all UK newspapers, including the quality papers examined in this study have been witnessing a decline in circulation figures, their relevance is arguably sustained further by their online versions, which have provided media platforms catering to a much larger and far reaching audience base. As McNair (2009: 2) explains, at one point in 2009, the *Guardian* had a print circulation of 310,000 in the UK, while the online version of the newspaper, *Guardian.co.uk*, was attracting more than 25 million regular users globally, in effect diminishing traditional market boundaries.

The process of news production in the UK context is influenced and shaped by a multitude of social, structural and professional processes. The factors highlighted and discussed here form just a few of those that may directly or indirectly influence the representation of Islam and Muslims.

#### **2.3.1.1 Economic Ties and Profit**

Since the 'Gazette', a single sheeted weekly on military and political news from across Europe sold in the streets of Venice in the 16<sup>th</sup> century (Allan, 2004: 10), newspapers were produced as a commodity targeting potential consumers. As Fowler (1991: 20) explains, some of the key influences on the output of the press are the need to make profit, the institution's economic organisation and its external commitments and relations with other industries. These influences can have very real constraints on the contents of what is finally published in the newspapers.

Liberal pluralists assert the role of mass media as the protector of citizens' freedom of speech and the sustainers of the democratic process by offering the public a plurality of viewpoints of which they can make informed political and economic choices (McNair, 2003: 23). However, despite this position's 'saliency' in public debates, it has come under criticism from various parties over the years (Allan, 2004: 48). Modern political economists, for instance, adopting Marx's theories regarding the detrimental effects of the capitalist ruling

class and the reproduction of their dominant ideas and views in society, beg to differ. They base their argument on the premise that mass media institutions are generally owned and controlled by members of the ruling elite (mainly white males), whose ideas and beliefs tend to take centre stage as the commonsensical truths of the masses. One way the liberal pluralists negate these claims is by arguing that “economic ownership of the media has become increasingly separated from managerial control due to the growing dispersal of share ownership” (Curran, 1990: 143), thus unlikely to affect newspaper editorial processes. Having said that, political economic theorists, supported by several examples from the UK press argue that the profit oriented journalistic institutions and their financial connections and obligations do ultimately constrain and shape news output (Richardson, 2004; McNair, 2003; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Curran & Seaton, 1997). McNair (2003: 56) lists several such cases, citing examples of major media moguls, such as, Rupert Murdoch and Robert Maxwell intervening in the editorial practices of their media institutions in the interests of their political and business relations. It is worth noting, however, although some of these examples on media proprietors are seen as credible, they are often described as anecdotal (McQuail, 2000: 260). Finally, the excessive pressure placed upon newspaper editors by various financial aids and partners, i.e. stockholders and bankers, to focus on ‘the bottom line’ is another example of external forces having real influence on news production (Allan, 2004: 53).

A profit seeking press also dictates that newspapers publish what their identified consumers would like to read in their daily paper in aim of securing the highest sales. The identified set of media consumers or the ‘gratification set’, as McQuail (2000: 373) describes them, are sets of individuals with no mutual ties who share ‘a particular need or type need’ (ibid.) fulfilled by a particular media outlet. The “recognition of such a market engaging in the same consumer behaviour, in turn, encourages the creation and proliferation of options to satisfy these preferences” (Richardson, 2007: 78). In reference to the British quality newspapers examined in this research, according to various media surveys, the majority of consumers have continually been found to be of middle and more elite upper classes. This is illustrated for instance in the readership survey (National Readership Survey, 2012) results of some of the UK quality newspapers analysed in this research and presented in table 2.1.

Quality Paper	Total	%	ABC1	%	C2DE	%
The Guardian	1050	2.1	943	3.5	107	0.5
The Independent	490	1.0	392	1.4	99	0.4
The Times	1358	2.6	1147	4.2	164	0.7
Daily Telegraph	1346	2.7	1167	4.3	178	0.8

Table 2.1 UK newspaper national readership class survey figures for 2012

These figures reflect readership patterns for the year 2012, clearly illustrating the predominant popularity of quality press between members of the upper and middle class (ABC1), while working and lower class (C2DE) are reflected as much less interested towards this particular genre of newspapers. The majority of middle and upper class members are assumed to be of high educated background with stable economic and professional positions. The journalistic content of these quality papers would be expected to meet the powerful status and preferences of such readers, as swaying away from these preferences may mean a decline in sales. Muslims, the social group focused upon in this research, do not form a particularly large percentage of the middle and upper class groups in the UK. As Richardson (2004: 36) explains, they “are over-represented in the poorer, less well educated, disempowered sections of British society”, and this ultimately may lead to less interest by the quality press to ‘appeal’ to this particular audience in their news reporting.

Moving on, a discussion of the economic influences on media output would not be sufficient without highlighting some of the possible implications of advertising revenues on journalistic processes. It does after all form one of the two main sources of income for media institutions (the other being, newspaper sales revenues). More importantly, not adopting advertising as a source of revenue for newspapers in today’s market is argued to extensively reduce their chances of survival as media publishing houses.

The impact of advertising revenues on shaping media content is often argued as a fact of journalism in capitalist societies today (McNair, 2003; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Baker, 1994). However, as explained by McQuail (2000: 261), illustrating how this influence by advertising executives directly affects editorial decisions can be rather complex.

Nevertheless, there are aspects advertisers are argued to be particularly fixed about, which in turn, may have direct influence on newspaper content, such as: (1) advertisers are mainly interested in high income readers because of their “purchasing power” (Herman & Chomsky, 1988), and (2) advertisers tend to favour the avoidance of publications of a controversial nature or that which is not fitting with their image or the values they advocate, as it can negatively affect consumer activity (Bogart, 1995; Herman & Chomsky, 1988). As a consequence of advertisers’ focus on the smaller group of high income readers of a much larger population and the awareness of the media institutions of this fact, in addition to their willingness to keep advertisers interested, news content that may attract or cover stories related to other less advantaged or minority groups may be neglected. As one may expect, this may influence quality newspapers to a much greater extent than it would with tabloids, as their readers tend to represent the more affluent classes of society, as discussed earlier.

### **2.3.1.2 News Values**

‘News values’ or the set of factors that determine the newsworthiness of a story (Cotter, 2010: 67) are one of the most influential forces in journalism in determining what newspapers publish and how the contents of the publications are shaped and constructed. Some of the values that have been found to play a significant role in this process include: *Relevance, Timeliness, conflict, frequency, reference to elite nations and persons, negativity, usefulness and impact* (Allan, 2004; Cotter, 2010; Galtung & Ruge, 1965a, 1965b). The more of these qualities the story is viewed as possessing, the more likely it will be reported. Such values are imperative to journalists, as they allow them to pinpoint what would be considered *actual* news to their target audience. Although some key news values lists were published based on studies of the media, such as Galtung and Ruge (1965a), they have come under much scrutiny from various other researchers, some of whom put these values to the test on other newspapers and contexts (see Harcup and O’Neil (2001) cited in Richardson, 2007; and Brighton & Foy, 2007). The inadequacy of the values compiled was mainly blamed on the type of stories examined, the limited number of publications analysed and the focus on publications in one context. Indeed, as Allan (2004: 58) explains, news values do in fact change over time and vary depending on the news organisation. They are also, as Richardson (2007: 92) explains, highly dependent on the ‘imagined’ target audience of any

given news venue. Based on this description, the news values would vary between all the newspapers establishments examined in this research. Differences would be expected between UK quality newspapers with various political underpinnings, and consequently their target audience. They would also differ between the various Arab English language newspapers published in different nations around the Persian Gulf. More importantly, general variations would most likely exist between quality newspapers in the UK and those published in Arab nations, specifically related to stories referring to Islam and Muslims, since both contexts vary significantly in the proportion of Muslim populations, and thus, the newspapers' target audience.

In specifically discussing the representation of minority groups in UK media, Richardson (2004: 49-50) gives an interesting account of some stereotypical representations of these groups as being part of the news values inherent of British media, whereby stereotypical representations of the 'Other' are 'facilitated' and 'maintained'. Richardson supports this by citing Fowler (1991), who characterises stereotypes and stereotypical anti-theses as a part of the news value of 'meaningfulness', which relates to the identification of the audience with a reported topic. Fowler states:

*'Meaningfulness', with its subsections 'cultural proximity' and 'relevance', is founded on an ideology of ethnocentrism, or [...] more inclusively, homocentrism: a preoccupation with countries, societies and individuals perceived to be like oneself; [...and] with defining groups felt to be unlike oneself.*

(Fowler, 1991: 16 cited in Richardson 2004: 50)

This would mean that in relation to the representation of Muslims in the UK Press, topics and events may be divided in the discourse based on an *Us* and *Them* dichotomy, highlighting *their* bad qualities in opposition to *our* good ones. Moreover, as Fowler (1991: 17) explains, certain news events may reaffirm a stereotype already existing about a social group, and the more this stereotype reoccurs the more newsworthy related events become. Based on this discussion, one can argue that these particular values may play a significant role in the stories related to cultural conflict, as in the topics that will be examined in this

research, the 'French face veil ban' and the 'Danish cartoon controversy'. In both events, arguments may delve into cultural, social and religious differences of the defined social groups, and these would differ based on context and media institution.

### **2.3.1.3 Political Stance and Ownership**

The media market in the UK has long been characterised by a concentration of ownership by a selected few media moguls (McNair, 2003; Sparks, 1999). Accordingly, concerns naturally develop regarding the over representation of certain political and social view points at the expense of others (Doyle, 2002: 6). However, this may not certainly be the case, others argue that a concentrated media ownership landscape with reduced competition may offer newspapers "more cost effective use of resources" (ibid.), allowing them to represent a wide range of viewpoints.

Nevertheless, the concentration of ownership has been argued to influence media content in the UK. Powerful newspaper barons in the 1980s are described by McNair (2003: 156) as being mainly politically centre right, in support of the conservative government and its policies at the time. So much so, they were accused by observers as overtly exercising political bias, e.g. Rupert Murdoch and *The Times*. Official reports on the UK press emphasised this further, arguing that the Labour party undoubtedly received less attention from the press, who clearly displayed right wing tendencies and reported unfavourably on the activities of the Labour movement (McGregor, 1977). However, this all changed in the 1990's, where a clear shift in allegiances was witnessed by previous Tory supporting newspapers (McNair, 2003: 159). This was exemplified for instance by *The Times* criticism of the Major government and later support of Blair's government. Therefore, although newspapers are generally viewed as having particular political tendencies, these should not be viewed as fixed, since various factors, such as, commercial interests and reader reactions, can have real impact on how newspapers go by with their political relations.

This research has examines 4 of the 5 main quality newspapers (including their sister Sunday papers) published in the UK, ensuring the inclusion of newspapers that are viewed to be of diverging political and ideological underpinnings. In general, the four quality newspapers examined in this research are viewed as:

- (1) *The Guardian*: Centre-Left, Liberal
- (2) *The Independent*: Radical-Centre, Liberal
- (3) *The Times*: Centre-Right, Conservative
- (4) *The Daily Telegraph*: Centre-Right, Conservative

### **2.3.2 The Arab Press: Arab English Language Quality Newspapers**

Media produced in Arab nations are influenced by various historical, social and economic factors specific to their geographical area. Despite the common features of language and a dominant religion, Arab nations vary extensively in their economic development, political systems and journalistic traditions, which ultimately determine the extent of media development; they have generally been viewed as comparatively slow to other parts of the world (Rugh, 2004; Amin, 2001; Amin, 2010; Kalb & Socolovsky, 1999).

The five quality English language newspapers examined in this research are published in four countries around the Persian Gulf (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Qatar), frequently described as “wealthy petroleum-exporting states” (Rugh, 2004: 4). The economic status of these nations sets them apart in terms of the rate of media development compared to other Arab nations. They also have the highest rates of foreign workforce, who are considered the primary readers of the Arab English language newspapers, catering to them as the target audience (Rugh, 2004: 21).

The following sections will explore some of the key factors that have and continue to shape the production of news media in the Middle East, such as, (1) low economic base and governmental influence, (2) censorship policies, and (3) news sources.

#### **2.3.2.1 Low Economic Base and Governmental Influences**

Since the establishment of the first newspaper publications in various Arab nations in the 1800’s (Amin, 2001), through to more recent times, Arab news media and the press in particular have been plagued by a low economic base. As Rugh (2004: 5) explains, a combination of social factors, such as, high illiteracy rates, low national incomes and smaller

populations, led to the earlier weak economic standing of newspaper institutions. This naturally resulted in low publication sales and advertising revenue, the two main sources of income for most well established news outlets. This weak economic base has had a long lasting impact. In fact, one survey conducted in 1997, showed that the income of the *New York Times, Inc., The Washington Post Co., and Dow Jones & Co.* individually reached revenues higher or approximately equating to the total revenues of all Arab media combined (Khazen, 1999: 89). Other factors argued to add to the lack of financial development in Arab media include, political turmoil and tensions, rigid censorship policies and distribution difficulties (Amin, 2001: 24).

The divergent economic realities of various Arab countries did mean, however, that various regions witnessed dramatically different trends and phases in media development specific to their economic conditions. With the oil boom came a gleam of hope for newspaper establishments and journalists for the future development of news journalism in the Gulf States. Newspapers in this particular region (the focus of this study) witnessed rapid growth and development (Rugh, 2004: 5), as a result of oil wealth which meant the acquiring of up to date equipment and facilities. In fact, this sudden growth was met by a flood of news journalists from other Arab nations moving into the region in hope of better more promising journalistic opportunities (S. Essoulami personal interview cited in Amin, 2010). Although media development remained limited primarily by strict censorship policies and high illiteracy rates, currently, the press in the Gulf region has been described “among the most advanced of its Arab counterparts” (Dajani, 2011: 54).

The low income and revenue forced many of the privately owned newspapers to turn to government sources for financial support. This request for financial support was welcomed by government officials, who recognized the importance and potential of the media in protecting and endorsing their political interests. After all, many of the earlier newspapers in the region were owned and controlled by governments and political parties, utilised as mouth pieces for their political policies, views and achievements (Alterman, 1998). This also centralised the main focus of newspapers in the Arab region, as newspapers predominantly characterised by regional politics. As a result of these earlier events, government patronization still plays a major role in Arab press today (Rugh, 2004: 9), increasing their editorial power and possible influence on newspaper content. The degree of governmental

interest in subsidizing English language Arab press in the Gulf market (the newspaper discourse examined in this study) is questionable though. This particular genre of newspapers targets foreign residents, mainly from South Asian backgrounds and the news values caters to their interests, such as, international events with particular focus on news from their home towns (Rugh, 2004: 21). Accordingly, the target readership and contents of these papers arguably do not directly correspond with local governmental political concerns and interests, thus, not attracting much of their influence on the papers' contents.

### **2.3.2.2 Censorship Policies**

Until recently, most books on Arab Media dedicate large sections of initial chapters tackling the concept of censorship in Arab news journalism, emphasising its power and extensive impact on media content. Indeed, censorship in the Arab media is described as “easily tolerated and even expected as a form of civic responsibility” (Amin, 2010: 39). However, with globalization in full swing in addition to the fast development and expansion of communication technology, censorship policies have been substantially challenged (Seib, 2007; Kalb & Socolovsky, 1999; Khazen, 1999; Amin, 2010; Dajani, 2011). The utilization of the internet and social media to trigger and accelerate the recent ‘Arab Spring’ in Egypt, calling for political reform, is arguably one glaring example of these existing challenges.

More importantly, the transnational media boom in the region or what has been described as the “Al-Jazeera effect” (Seib, 2007: 1), has been argued to have effectively loosened the traditional governmental constraints, allowing for a significant increase of freedom in the press (Saleh, 2007: 21). Transnational media organisations can bypass government censorship and media control policies, since they do not fall under any particular local or regional political jurisdiction that national media institutions have to abide by. Discussing and exposing political issues and views previously controlled, these genre of news media have placed immense pressure on local governments to re-examine and modify their censorship policies, practicing more freedom in their national media outlets, including the press. As Fahmy and Johnson (2007: 82) explain, these developments in media have encouraged Arab governments to support local news outlets in adopting “a more professional style mirroring Western networks within a continued government monopoly”;

while others have developed media 'free zones' advocated by the government as zones where media can operate with no legal constraints.

Still, other media analysts, such as Gody (2007), argue that such developments in the press have pushed some governments to further increase media control. Censorship remains a powerful force in Arab media, specifically on internal national press (the genre of newspapers examined in this research), and media control policies differ according to each region/country and the politics unique to those areas. The powerful effects of censorship are even experienced by the transnational media. As Jihad Khazen (1999), the previous chief editor of the popular London based transnational *Al-Hayat Newspaper* explains, 'state censorship' and more importantly 'self censorship' are very much alive in media, transnational or not. Self censorship, as Khazen explains, is driven by the sense of responsibility editors may feel towards the possible repercussions of running a story, for instance, the banning of their newspaper in a particular country/market which may have detrimental effects on the financial status of the newspaper establishment. State censorship, on the other hand, is determined by each nation's internal social, political and religious dynamics and policies; what might be published and discussed in one nation may not necessarily be in another. Censorship also generally applies to certain religious and sex related topics in most Arab nations (Fahmy & Johnson, 2007: 83). This leads us to another important factor to take into account, the views of locals on censorship. As mentioned earlier, censorship is expected by some and viewed as a form of 'civic responsibility', and as Fahmy and Johnson (2007: 83) argue based on published surveys, public attitudes towards supporting complete freedom in the press vary significantly from one nation to the next. Therefore, it could also be argued that in some areas of discussion, censorship is promoted not just by the governments in the region, but by the majority of the public as well. One example was the negative reaction by the public towards the publication of the cartoons depicting the prophet in what is now popularly known as, the 'Danish cartoon controversy'.

Rugh's (2004) classification of the Arab print media gives a clearer view of the degrees of media freedoms in various Arab regions. In this classification, Rugh divides the Arab media into:

(1) *Mobilization press*

(2) *Loyalist Press*

(3) *Diverse press*

(4) *Transitional Press*

Arab nations characterised as having *mobilization press*, such as, Iraq and Syria, are countries which have gone through extensive political changes, from colonization to political turmoil, nationalist and anti-imperialist movements, and the rise and fall of political parties (Rugh, 2004: 25). This led to the nationalisation of the media by the regime. Rugh (2004: 26) describes the mobilization press as in direct and full control by the regime, dictating their content, main focus and presentation style.

The *loyalist press* is characterised as “consistently loyal to and supportive of the regime in power” (Rugh, 2004: 59). However, newspapers in these countries, which are mainly made up of oil producing Gulf States, have not been affected by political parties and are mainly privately owned institutions. Four of the English language Arab newspapers analysed in this research fall under this category, the *Saudi Gazette* and *Arab News* of Saudi Arabia, *The Gulf News* of the United Arab Emirates and the Qatari *Gulf Times*. Although all these nations have witnessed media reform post 1991 with governments publically pushing for increased freedom in response to developments in communication technology (ibid.), newspapers do abide by certain censorship rules in varying degrees, depending on each context. In all three loyalist press nations included in this study, there are official and non-official laws against criticising Islam, government officials and policies, and countries considered allies (Rugh, 2004). In most contexts, editors are described as practicing self censorship, fully aware of their publication limits. In addition, the monitoring and censoring of foreign media and news by government officials are also routinely practiced (Amin 2001, Rugh 2004). The common political environment shared by all three nations, characterised by “no independent parliament, and no institutionalised political opposition” (Rugh, 2004: 79), also results in a non-diverse conformist press, free of political debates. Newspapers do not have a particular political stance or leaning. Furthermore, the prominence and strong link with culture is also shared by these Gulf States and has been argued to be employed to justify further media restrictions in the region (Hafez, 2001: 12). These restrictions are advocated as protection from a Western ‘cultural invasion’.

In the midst of these similarities, however, there are some key differences in the degrees of governmental control, even between these three nations. Saudi Arabia, which is considered by far the most conservative Muslim country in the region (Amin, 2001: 27) is argued to have the most controlled media system. According to Freedom's house ranking of press freedoms, Saudi Arabia and Libya topped the list of countries described as having non free media (Fahmy & Johnson, 2007: 83). Moreover, although all newspaper institutions have to be private enterprises as stipulated by Saudi law, ironically, it is the government officials who select the newspaper's board chairman and editor-in-chief. The government also holds the right to veto members from the board of directors (Rugh, 2004: 71). This arguably highlights the amount of direct and indirect control in Saudi media.

The *diverse press* is described as "considerably less authoritarian in nature than others, it exhibits a clear degree of diversity and freedom of expression not found elsewhere in the Arab world' (Rugh, 2004: 26). This means that government control is limited and action against newspapers is usually guided by a legal process. Countries such as, Lebanon, Morocco and Kuwait (the fourth Arab English language newspaper context examined in this study) fall under this category. Similarly, the political environments in these regions seem to fall in line with the nature of news reporting. Kuwait, often described as one of the more liberal states in the Gulf region (Amin, 2001: 27), enjoys certain degrees of democracy not practiced in the other Gulf States. Although similar to other Gulf States in being a constitutional monarchy, legislative control is dependent on the Emir and the Kuwaiti public represented by 50 elected members in Kuwait's National Assembly. This is reflected in the local press, which has been described as "showing a significant degree of diversity" (Rugh, 2004: 99). Having said that, the newspapers' particular editorial orientations are not as clear, since they have been witnessed to defend and criticise the national assembly and the government, depending on the issue discussed. In fact, in terms of freedom of press and opinion, the Kuwaiti press is frequently characterised as one of the most free in the Arab region (Dajani, 2011; Rugh, 2004). Nonetheless, firm censorship laws against the offence of Islam and the Amir do exist. The *Kuwait Times*, the newspaper examined in this research, is described generally as representing a "moderate liberal point of view" (Rugh 2004: 101). However, as mentioned earlier, as all the English language newspapers examined in this study focus on expatriates as the target readership, the focus of news stories tend to be on

international events, rather than local news reports. Accordingly, local politics is expectedly less influential on this particular genre of newspapers.

Finally, *the transnational press* which is mainly found in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Jordan is developed and characterised by the constant change these countries have undergone for decades (Rugh, 2004: 121). In an environment of constant change and political instability, the press in these regions illustrate excessive governmental control, as well as, varying degrees of freedom of expression. Most of the newspapers are governmentally owned and are argued to be the most influential in society. However, there are others that are privately owned or run by political parties.

### **2.3.2.3 External News Sourcing**

A final factor that may play an influential role on the contents of Arab English language newspapers is their predominant dependence on international news agencies in news reporting. As discussed earlier, catering primarily to foreign nationals in the various Arab nations, this particular genre is less interested in local news and instead dedicates the bulk of its newspaper content to international news and events. As a result, there is a predominant dependence on Western and 'Euro-centred' news agencies, or what are also referred to as the 'Big Four' (Bell, 1991): the *Associated Press (AP)*, *Reuters*, *Agence France Press (AFP)* and *United Press International (UPI)*.

Indeed, the dependence on Western news agencies does not only include this genre of newspapers, but much of the locally situated Arab press in general. This is partly due to the financially limited comparatively smaller sized Arab local newspaper establishments, which do not share the rather sophisticated organisational structures of larger press houses, e.g. access to foreign correspondence offices. Consequently, the newspaper discourse is argued to be characterised by globally dominant interpretations of the news events (Karim, 2003).

### **2.3.3 Quality Newspapers: Structure and Organisation**

Be it a doctor-patient conversation or a novel, discourse depending on the genre and context, functions under certain norms and guidelines, forming a conventional overall format unique to it. This overall form of discourse or 'schemata', as van Dijk (1991) refers to it, can define how a text is structured and presented in different types of discourse. Just by

scanning a newspaper, one immediately detects organizational and structural formatting specific to newspaper reporting, e.g. headlines and leads, these of course may vary according to context. The quality press (UK and Arab English language newspapers) examined in this research share most of the general journalistic guidelines and structuring format prevalent in 'Western' news reporting, and these play a significant role in determining how the texts are organised and ordered in the newspaper articles. Moreover, they are also characterised by their formal serious news reporting, as opposed to popular less serious press represented by tabloids.

News reporting in these newspapers is generally divided into 'hard' and 'soft' news. 'Hard' news refers to up-to-date news articles covering current events; news stories designed to focus exclusively and objectively on the facts of the event being reported on (Cotter, 2010: 145). In contrast, 'soft' news or news features are "not time-bound to immediacy" (Bell, 1991: 14). They are usually lengthier articles involving background material on the main events with emphasis on broader interest, such as, human interest, and the influences of 'hard' news events on society (Cotter, 2010: 145). In such articles, writers enjoy greater liberties in applying their own journalistic styles, as well as, 'editorializing' the news content with their own opinion (Bell, 1991: 14).

Opinion pieces and editorials form another major component of newspapers. Articles characterised as such, are "generally expected to express opinions" (van Dijk, 1998a: 21). They form a space in newspapers where opinions and views on current and relevant issues can be directly expressed and discussed. Keeping in line with the objectivity value inhibiting news reporting, opinion articles are usually restricted to a few pages and are labelled accordingly (Cotter, 2010: 145). Moreover, as van Dijk (1998a) explains depending on the type of newspaper and its political stance, the opinions presented in these articles can vary quite drastically in their 'ideological presuppositions'. Editorials are particularly revealing in that regard, where they are viewed as "an unsigned statement by the editorial board of a newspaper" (Kershner, 2012: 102).

In terms of the structure of news stories, they are traditionally governed by a hierarchy of importance or the 'inverted pyramid' (Cotter, 2010: 140); the news aspects considered most important are positioned towards the beginning of the article and less important aspects

would follow accordingly. This applies to the newspaper as whole, i.e. front page being most important, as well as to individual articles; the information deemed most important is usually placed in the headline, lead and opening paragraph. Indeed, the headline and lead are commonly viewed as expressing the gist of the news report and even orienting the reader “to process the text in a pre-determined direction”, forming “a cognitive macro-structure that serves as an important strategic cue to control the way readers process and make sense of the report” (Teo, 2000: 13-14). Also, on a cognitive level, these initial parts of the article are argued to trigger relevant background knowledge in readers’ memory in order to comprehend the rest of the article. In addition, they are viewed to contain the information “best recalled by the reader” (van Dijk, 1991: 50-51). This ordering of information, according to newsworthiness, indicates the significance of headlines and the opening paragraph to journalists, and thus, any analysis examining newspaper reporting. This is especially the case, when what is made prominent in news reports through the headline and opening paragraph is the result of choices made by the newspapers, possibly based on their own subjective interests and values.

Furthermore, in reporting news events, journalists are expected to abide by certain linguistic style standardization. Therefore, the repeated use of a particular term or phrase may be due to standardised policies set forward by the newspaper, rather than the writer’s own political or ideological stance or assumptions (Richardson, 2007: 96). These policies or guidelines are usually offered and explained by style guides or manuals published by each newspaper (Cotter, 2010; Richardson, 2007), illustrating their linguistic and stylistic preferences, i.e. spelling and use of profanity guidelines. Generally, these guide books are aimed at achieving style and presentation consistency. Nevertheless, such linguistic preferences are arguably ideological themselves, as they alter based on the contextual circumstances (Cameron, 1996: 315-316, cited in Richardson, 2010), e.g. politics and reader reactions. This also suggests they are not time bound and do alter over time.

Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, most major newspapers have an internet presence today, through websites carrying the same content and fulfilling the same function of these newspapers in their traditional form. All newspapers analysed in this study have online versions, which coincidentally made the newspaper data to be collected more readily attainable; all the articles were collected through these websites. On newspaper websites,

headlines may be viewed to have an even more significant impact, where in most of these websites, the front page or layer is usually used solely as a platform for headlines and news capsules, allowing readers to scan and select what they would like to read (Greer & Mensing, 2006: 28). A relatively recent addition to internet newspapers in the UK and even more recently to the Arab online newspaper websites are news in the form of 'blog' posts. These are "explicitly authored by one or more individuals, often associated with a set of interests or opinions" (Hermida & Thurman, 2007: 8). Blogs have proven to be quite popular with more and more newspapers adopting blogs as part of their internet newspaper content. They provide opinions on various news events, traditionally known to be provided by newspaper opinion pieces and editorials. In fact, their popularity was highlighted in one study examining format changes in UK online newspapers between 2005 and 2006. The amounts of blogs featured on these websites increased from 7 to 118 in 18 months (Hermida & Thurman, 2007: 8). As with regular newspaper articles, blog post headlines are regular features on the main page of newspaper websites. Therefore, articles in the form of blog posts were also collected as part of the data, categorised as opinion pieces.

## **2.4 Analysing Discourse: A Critical Perspective**

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which quickly became one of the most influential and widely used branches of Discourse Analysis (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000: 447), is the approach selected to analyse the newspaper discourse in this study. The following sections will explore CDA further, discussing its core principles and aims and the analytical framework and categorisations relevant to this research. The discussion will end by highlighting some of the criticisms raised towards CDA and how these were addressed in the current research through a specifically developed analytical framework.

### **2.4.1 Defining 'Discourse' in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)**

In order to better understand CDA, the term 'discourse' and what it means in CDA and in this study should be examined and discussed. 'Discourse' as a term is very popular and is

used quite frequently in extremely different disciplines and fields, which can make defining it problematic. The problematic nature of the term is reflected by the fact that views on what the term actually means and implies is one of the first and main subjects tackled and discussed in the introduction of most books discussing the study of Discourse Analysis. Nevertheless, there is a general understanding that it deals mainly with language, meaning and context (Jaworski & Coupland, 1999: XI).

In linguistics, discourse, like most other main concepts related to language has a formalist and functionalist definition; each of these perspectives offers quite different views of what the term means. Formalists view discourse as “language above the sentence or above the clause” (Stubbs, 1983: 1), it is “a level of structure higher than sentences” (Schiffrin, 1994: 26). The focus here is on form and structure and “specifically how discourse attains the quality of being unified and meaningful” (Richardson, 2007: 22). Analysing discourse in this sense would focus on the formal features in the language that work to connect and link phrases and sentences to form the larger units of language, and thus, meaningful discourse. This approach to understanding discourse, focusing purely on linguistic form, does not take into account how social structures and the context surrounding the discourse inform and add to the overall interpretation and understanding of meaning.

On the other hand, as one may expect, the functionalist approach to discourse does just that. Central to the functionalist definition of discourse is that without taking into account the social context when analysing linguistic forms, one cannot fully or adequately analyse and understand discourse. Functionalists define discourse as “language in use” (Brown & Yule, 1983). Therefore, the approach to the analysis of discourse cannot be viewed as “independent of the analysis of the purposes and functions of language in human life” (Schiffrin, 1994: 31). As a result, to fully analyse discourse, what it means and how it is formed through the language of the discourse producer, the analyst is expected to go beyond structural analysis by examining the socio-cultural context surrounding the discourse, as it forms the purposes of why the discourse was produced in the first place.

It is this view of discourse that CDA analysts adopt and advocate. Some of definitions of discourse provided by key figures in CDA, describe discourse as a “social action and interaction, people interacting together in real social situations” (Fairclough, 1995b: 18), and

as “language use in speech and writing as a form of ‘social practice’” (Wodak, 2002: 7). Discourse is viewed as part of an action; it is viewed “as practice, not separate from it, therefore, it regards racist discourse as constitutive of racist practice” (Richardson, 2004: 3). Following this example, this implies that certain social practices surrounding the discourse ultimately have an effect in making it racist. The relationship between discourse and the context is viewed as dialectical and interdependent, where discourse is seen as reflecting societal realities while actively and simultaneously constructing, determining and shaping those very same societal realities through the discourse. Fairclough re-emphasises this by stating that “discourse is shaped by structures, but also contributes to shaping and reshaping them, to reproducing and transforming them” (1995a: 73). Social practices, relations and processes affect the production of discourse and how it is used, and these processes and relations can “systematically determine variations in its properties, including the linguistic forms which appear in texts” (Fairclough, 1995a: 73).

#### **2.4.2 CDA: Principles and Aims**

CDA stretches the linguistic analysis further to include both, the immediate context of the discourse, in addition to, the broader cultural and socio-political context surrounding the discursive event and this forms the main part of the critical perspective in CDA. Therefore, when analysing discourse in CDA, the addition of a critical perspective is essential and this is done by viewing discourse from a socio-cultural and political perspective, and how these dimensions influence the language being analysed. As Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000: 449) state:

*CDA’s locus of critique is the nexus of language/discourse/speech and social structure. It is in uncovering ways in which social structure impinges on discourse patterns, relations and models (in the form of power relations, ideological effects and so forth), and in treating these relations as problematic, that researchers in CDA situate the critical dimension of their work.*

Furthermore, Fairclough (1995a) differentiates CDA from other analytical frameworks which he describes as predominantly producing and constituting of “descriptive work”, in that CDA, unlike other approaches, denaturalizes ideologies which have come to be viewed as

natural and “non-ideological common sense”. Through the use of analysis with a critical perspective, it is possible to make “clear social determinations and effects of discourse which are characteristically opaque to participants” (Fairclough, 1995a: 28). Therefore, CDA’s underlying concept is mainly concerned with “the way social power, abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social political context” (van Dijk, 2001a: 352). Van Dijk describes critical discourse analysis as “focusing on the role of discourse in the reproduction and challenge of dominance” (van Dijk, 2001c: 300). He defines dominance here, as the social power exercised by institutions, elites and groups that would in turn result in political, social and cultural inequality. Through conducting CDA, the main aim is to uncover both explicit and implicit construction, reproduction and resistance of these concepts, (i.e. ideological bias, inequality, racism, dominance) in the language, while developing an understanding of the discursive strategies and structures utilized in the process. Furthermore, the historical context of the discourse is viewed as vital in the comprehensive analysis of discourse. Taking into consideration the historical context means to “take into account historical developments of discursive practices (change), intertextuality, and inter-discursivity” (Wodak, 2002: 12).

With these objectives in mind, it is no surprise that CDA research begins by identifying a social problem (Richardson, 2007: 1), and is “primarily interested and motivated by pressing social issues which it hopes to understand through discourse analysis” (van Dijk, 1993: 252). Indeed, CDA declares itself as pro socially and politically active research, it “sees itself as politically involved research with an emancipator requirement: it seeks to have an effect on social practice and social relationships” (Titscher et al, 2000: 147). Some example studies related to various social and political issues include: Richardson’s study of the misrepresentation of Islam and Muslims in British newspapers (2004), van Dijk’s study of Tamil Refugees in the Press (1987a) and Wodak’s study of anti-Semitic discourse in post war Austria (1991). Similar to these studies, the current research identifies with and is motivated by the continuously developing socio-political hostile relations and conflicts between some Western regions and various Muslim communities. Conflicts that are arguably flared up further by the extensive media coverage they attract and continue to receive.

CDA researchers believe discourse analysis studies should lead to real concrete social and political purposes in actively making a change and having an effect on the social reality being analysed in any given study (Titscher et al, 2000: 147). This kind of hands on approach in aim of raising awareness in regard to social inequality and discrimination, among other important issues facing the world today, can have beneficial and positive implications, which hopefully the proposed study can be part of. The potential significance of such work is described by Blommaert, who argues that discourse analysis research should lead to ‘a heightened awareness of hidden power dimensions and its effects: a critical language awareness, a sensitivity for discourse as subject to power and inequality’ (2005: 33). In fact, Toolan (1997) encourages CDA’s active role to be taken even further, where he “opts for a perspective stance: CDA should make proposals for change and suggest corrections to particular discourse” (cited in Blommaert, 2005: 25).

As CDA is mainly motivated by social issues, extensive research has been done on various influential social outlets. Some of the areas CDA has particular interest in include: Media (Fairclough, 1995b; van Dijk, 1991; Bell & Garrett, 1998), Gender (Caldas and Coultard, 1993) and political discourse (Fairclough, 1989, 1992; Chilton & Schaffner, 2002). The media’s influential position as the producers and reflectors of social realities through their discourse naturally attracted the attention and interest of CDA analysts, since it can be viewed as a chief breeding ground for dominant ideological representations. This interest by CDA researchers has resulted in the fact that CDA has “produced the majority of research in media discourse during the 1980’s and 1990’s and has arguably become the standard framework for studying media text within European linguistic and discourse studies” (Bell & Garrett, 1998: 6). In relation to newspaper discourse in particular (the focus of this study), given its significant impact and role in society, it has also received much attention by researchers, where it has and continues to be scrutinized (Fairclough, 1995b; van Dijk, 1991). A comprehensive amount of research has been done by various pioneering researchers, who have profoundly added to the development of CDA in relation to media and others fields. A representative shortlist of these pioneers include: van Dijk (1988a, 1988b, 1991, 1993, 1998a, 2006), Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995a, 1995b, 2003) Wodak (1995, 1996), Reisigl & Wodak (2009), Bell (1991), and Fowler (1991).

### **2.4.3 Positioning CDA**

CDA is a relatively young interdisciplinary approach to analyzing discourse, considered to have developed as a field in the 1980's (Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000: 447). However, its foundation and core principals can be said to have originated and been drawn from various linguistic and social theories and disciplines.

The earliest influences on CDA can be traced back to the 1920's with the Frankfurt School and 'Critical Theory' (van Dijk, 2001a: 352); many of its social concepts and underpinnings developed from "versions of Marxism like those of Gramsci and Habermas" (Johnstone, 2008: 54). This is reflected, for example, in the fact that "according to Habermas, a critical science has to be self reflective...it must reflect the interests on which it is based and it must take account of the historical contexts of interactions" (Titscher et al, 2000: 145). This idea coincides with one of the focal principals of CDA and its approach to discourse analysis. In fact, CDA proclaims to take "its starting-point in social theory" (Blommaert, 2005: 27). This is exemplified by their dependence on various social theories of power and ideology in their linguistic analysis, for instance, Foucault's (1971) "orders of discourse" theory and Gramsci's (1971) theory of hegemony, in the aim of understanding the mediated relationship between discourse and society (see section 2.2.2).

As far as language and discourse are concerned, "CDA may be seen as a reaction against the dominant formal (often 'asocial' or 'uncritical') paradigms of the 1960's and 1970's" (van Dijk, 2001a: 352). These paradigms developed work described as not taking a critical perspective of analysing the discourse, in that, they primarily had "descriptive aims" (Jaworski & Coupland, 1999: 28). 'Critical Linguistics' and in particular work done by Fowler et al (1979) and Hodge and Kress (1979), have laid some of the foundational concepts of CDA, as they offer a critical perspective on language in society. They have a shared claim that discourse is ideological (Wodak, 2002), as well as their shared interest in the relationship between language, power and ideology. Furthermore, critical linguistics' dependence on and use of Halliday's systemic functional linguistics (SFL) plays a key role in CDA today, as it "offers clear and rigorous linguistic categories for analyzing the relationships between discourse and social meaning" (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000: 454).

More importantly, analytical frameworks in CDA are influenced by systemic functional linguistics' multi-functional view of texts (Halliday, 1978, 1994), which claims that each text simultaneously serve three functions: *ideational*, *interpersonal* and *textual*. This would mean any given text is viewed as concurrently reflecting the wider physical, social and mental world (ideational function); reflecting participants attitudes, judgments and values and the social relations between participants and the social actions or events (interpersonal function); connecting parts of the text together in a coherent and cohesive manner, while linking the text to their direct context (textual function) (Fairclough, 2003: 26-27). Having said that, CDA as a discourse analytical approach has been argued to differ from critical linguistics in a number of ways. Fairclough (1995a: 6) highlights one key difference between both areas by explaining that unlike critical linguistics, with most CDA frameworks (e.g. van Dijk, 1988b; Fairclough, 1995a), when analysing discourse, besides focusing on the text as a finished product, special attention is given to the analysis of: (1) text production and distribution (i.e. how producers of the text organize and restructure the order of discourse), and (2) text consumption (i.e. the role of the audience and how they interpret the discourse). Indeed, analysing the text in isolation of production processes and more importantly, the role of audience interpretation, can lead the analyst to assume his/her interpretation is the sole interpretation shared by all recipients of the text in all contexts, thus, limiting the reliability and validity of the findings. More importantly, a comprehensive understanding of discursive meanings cannot be fully achieved without considering the various contextual processes that may impinge upon the discourse. Also, as mentioned by Fairclough, while discourse analysis in critical linguistics focused on detailed micro linguistic analysis of the features texts, it tended to "neglect or play down the discourse practice dimension and intertextuality" (1995a: 11). Intertextuality forms a major part of the analysis of discourse practices in Fairclough's analytical framework, it deals with how texts draw from and are formed by other texts and social contexts. That is, discourse is viewed as "always related to those produced before, simultaneously and subsequently" (Titscher et al, 2000: 148). This, for instance, can be seen in practices related to the construction and development of the text, e.g. editorial practices as part of the institutional processes in the media. This highlights the macro organizational and constructional aspects of the text, which according to Fairclough, play a significant role in how and why a discourse may be shaped.

#### **2.4.4 Methodological Approach**

Although scholars working under CDA share many of the same core assumptions, principals and perspectives in regard to analysing discourse, CDA cannot be viewed as one homogenous method to analysing discourse. It does not advocate or restrict itself to one particular theory or methodological framework that it represents as the sole approach that all CDA researchers are expected to adapt. It “does not have a unitary theoretical framework” (Van Dijk 2001a: 353). Instead, it is viewed as a type of discourse analytical approach that is made up of various theories, frameworks and multiple analytical tools developed by scholars from differing academic and theoretical backgrounds with the common aim of developing an understanding of the linguistic findings in relation to the social context. In fact, many CDA studies take an eclectic approach, drawing on various theories and analytical tools developed by different frameworks that would best fit their research objectives and the type of data examined. This allows for the development of a tailored more efficient analytical mechanism. The socio-cultural approach (Fairclough, 1995a), the socio-cognitive approach (van Dijk, 1987b, 2001b) and the socio-historical approach (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001) are arguably the most prominent developed frameworks in CDA over the years. Drawing on multi-disciplinary theories and offering analytical tools and categorizations, these frameworks strive to illuminate the links between the micro features of discourse and the macro structures it is surrounded by, which as a result, develops further understanding of the production and interpretation processes of the discourse being examined (KhasroviNik, 2010). In accordance with the eclectic approach advocated by CDA, although this research adopts Fairclough’s 3 dimensional socio-cultural framework (1992, 1995a, 2003) in shaping the general approach to the discourse analysis, it draws upon several concepts and widely applied analytical categorizations from van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach (SCA) and Wodak’s discourse-historical approach (DHA). Fairclough’s work has in fact provided and discussed some of these analytical categorizations, however, van Dijk and Wodak’s extensive work, specifically on the ideological representation of social actors or the *Self* and the *Other*, provide analytical categorizations that ultimately better fit the objectives set forward in this research. In addition, the research draws on various social and political theories related to media

(section 2.3), Muslim representation (section 2.1), ideology (section 2.2), and discourse theories (section 2.4).

The following sections will discuss the general CDA analytical framework adopted in this research, Fairclough's 3 dimensional socio-cultural framework. It will also highlight the various linguistic analytical concepts and categorizations drawn from other approaches that are of direct relevance to social group representation and the analytical findings presented in this thesis.

#### **2.4.4.1 Fairclough's Socio-Cultural Framework**

Fairclough's work (1989, 1992) is considered seminal and is viewed as the setting stone for the swift development of CDA as a field. The dialectical relationship between discourse and social structures proposed by Fairclough is translated in the three dimensional analytical socio-cultural framework he developed for analysing discourse. Within this framework, each discursive event is viewed as made up of and thus should be analysed as, a *textual practice*, a *discursive practice*, and a *social practice*; conceptually, these three layers are embedded within each other.

- **Textual Analysis**

The first level, analysing discourse as a text is viewed as descriptive, where formal properties of the text are analysed. By close analysis of newspaper texts, for instance, the analyst explores the textual features that were used and what could have been used instead. Thus, as Richardson (2007: 38) explains, the analyst assumes that the textual content in any given script results from a 'choice'. Linguistic choices made during the production of the discourse are analysed, exploring what has been included in the text and more importantly what was not included, as these can equally be of ideological significance. This process involves a micro analysis of linguistic features, focusing on lexis, syntax and grammar and a more macro analysis, focusing on discourse topics, over all structure, organization and cohesion of and within newspaper articles. Influenced by systemic functional linguistics' multi-functional view of texts (Halliday, 1978, 1994), Fairclough (2003:

27) similarly views the text as multi-functional in the form of each text contributing 3 types of meaning, rather than function per se. These are: *Action, representation and identification*. *Action* is similar to Halliday's 'interpersonal' function, where each text is seen to enact social relations between the participants and the social action or events. *Representation* is similar to Halliday's 'ideational' function, where each text is viewed as reflecting aspects of the wider physical, social or mental world. Fairclough addition of *identification* as a meaning in each text is the main difference from Halliday's multi-functionality theory which proposes a 'textual' purpose, as the third function of any given text, i.e. having the function of connecting parts of the text together and with the social context. Fairclough includes this textual purpose within his *Action* meaning categorization. Instead, Fairclough dedicates the third meaning of any given text to *identification*, which also forms a small part of Halliday's 'interpersonal' function. Here, each text is viewed as reflecting particular judgments, attitudes and values. All these meanings would be available for the analysts, when examining parts of the texts or the texts as a whole.

The extensive amount of textual features or linguistic categorizations that can be examined for ideological significance can be overwhelming for any researcher. Indeed, van Dijk argues that no particular linguistic features and constructs can be described as inherently ideologically driven; instead, textual formations can be used to serve an ideological agenda. With that being said, previous research on social group representation has contributed a comprehensive set of linguistic analytical tools and theories that assist in narrowing the analytical focus on *in* and *out* group representation. Some of these relevant to this research are discussed in section (2.4.4.2).

- **Discursive Practices**

The second level, analysing discourse as a discourse practice, is viewed as interpretative. It involves the analysis of the processes of text production, distribution and consumption (Fairclough 1995: 58), which are influenced by the type of discourse being analysed and the specific social context it is situated within. In the type of data being examined in this study, i.e. newspapers, a form of mass media communication, the discourse examined is 'institutionally based' (Richardson, 2007: 75). Therefore, in addition to examining the news

discourse textually and intertextually taking into account the journalistic form and structure of various genres of news articles (see section 2.3.3), the various institutional factors that may impinge and shape news content in each context should be considered at this level of analysis as well, i.e. ownership, news values and censorship policies (see sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). This stage of analysis would also include the analysis of reader interpretation processes.

In regard to media discourse, this level of analysis is argued as the least developed in CDA (Cotter, 2001; Richardson, 2007); very little attention has been given to news reporting processes and audience interpretation. Although this study acknowledges and discusses the various discursive processes that may affect newspaper discourse in general (section 2.3), particular attention was paid to the analysis of audience interpretation processes some of the articles analysed, in aim of developing further understanding of these processes in relation to the researcher's analytical findings of the texts examined (chapter 6).

One concept central to Fairclough approach to analysing discourse on a discursive level is the concept of intertextuality, a notion of particular significance in newspaper reporting. Intertextuality refers to "how texts draw, incorporate, recontextualize and dialogue with other texts" (Fairclough, 2003: 17). This is viewed as an essential part of analysis, as all texts are made up of elements of other texts, thus can only be fully understood in relation to these other texts and their social context.

The related notion of 'internal intertextuality' is of particular relevance to this study. As Richardson (2007: 100) explains, internal intertextuality, refers to how journalists take elements of texts and incorporate and recontextualize them in others texts or news reports. In newspaper articles, this takes shape in the form of direct and indirect reported speech, i.e. press releases and quotes. How reported speech is framed and contextualized can "frame readers understandings of reported events and, in some cases, this may be ideological" (Richardson, 2007: 103). Although this study does not examine quotes in relation to previous texts, it does shed some light on quotation patterns, with particular attention on quotes by Muslim actors.

- **Social Practices**

The third and final level, analyzing discourse as a social practice, can be described as an interpretive and explanatory process, which involves the critical analysis of texts in relation to the wider socio-political and cultural context of which the discourse is part of or embedded within, e.g. ideologies and power relations in society (Fairclough, 1995a: 57). This involves the immediate contextual surroundings, as well as, the wider historical, social, political and institutional contexts that form the backdrop of the discursive event.

In relation to this study, this would involve the analysis of the immediate surroundings of the news reports or editorials being analyzed, (i.e. aspects in direct relation to the event being reported on), and the wider historical, political and ideological practices and forces that have influenced and shaped the journalistic depiction of Islam and Muslims (see discussion in 2.1). In addition, it will also involve the analysis of related ideological and power relations in contemporary society, i.e. hegemonic processes (see section 2.2).

#### **2.4.4.2 Social Group Representation: Analytical Categorizations**

Representation of social groups and actors has attracted particular interest by a large number of CDA studies (van Dijk 1984, 1987a, 1987b, 1991; Wodak 1990, 1996; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Richardson 2004, 2009; Atkin & Richardson 2007; KhosraviNik 2010; Teo, 2000). Refugees, ethnic minorities, Muslims, immigrants are just some of the social groups whose representation in media texts have been investigated in these studies, all of which have added to the development of the textual analytical approach and the linguistic categorizations that are argued to be typically utilised in dominant representations.

Van Dijk and Wodak's interest in examining prejudiced ideologies and the representation of *in* and *out* groups have particularly added to this development. In analysing European parliamentary discourse on immigration, drawing on their individual approaches (DHA and SCA), they developed and presented several concepts and analytical categories which divides the analytical approach into two major levels (macro/micro), feeding into one another. The macro level is translated into the text by global structures, while the micro level is highlighted by the local structures:

### *Global structures and strategies*

- topics (macro propositions);
- positive Self presentation and Negative Other Presentation;
- legitimation

### *Local structures and moves*

- actor Description (Us vs. Them; categorization, descriptions, attributes);
- rhetorical devices – metaphors, hyperboles, euphemisms;
- indirectness, implicitness, presuppositions;
- argumentation (topoi, fallacies, counterfactuals, causal attributes);

(Van Dijk and Wodak 2000, cited in KhosraviNik 2010)

Positive in-group and negative out-group representation is seen as one key general strategy in discourse on the 'Other'. Therefore, according to van Dijk (1998b: 33), discourse adopts the following evaluative structure:

- 1 Emphasise our good properties/actions
- 2 Emphasise their bad properties/actions
- 3 Mitigate our bad properties/actions
- 4 Mitigate their good properties/actions

These strategies are translated across various linguistic levels of the text, and these include, lexicalization, syntactic structure and broader schematic structures, topics and argumentation.

The following sections will highlight some of these levels, focusing on the analytical categorizations in relation to social representation that are of direct relevance to the current research.

- **Topics**

The first stage of analysis usually involves examining discourse topics or the 'semantic macrostructures' (van Dijk, 1998a: 38). Indeed, van Dijk describes topics as having the most

prominent effect in the construction, manipulation and control of ideologies in the text (van Dijk, 1998b). This argument can be justified in regard to newspaper reporting by the fact that the choice of topic to be included or *not* can manipulate the information readers are exposed to. It is described as a key gate-keeping process (KhosraviNik, 2010), especially in the case of mass media sources. It also works to manipulate and shape the semantic micro structures of the rest of the article. The ‘essential gist’ of a larger amount of text reflected by the discourse topics tends to be highlighted in newspaper headlines and leads (van Dijk, 1991: 72). This is mainly due the structure of newspaper reports or the ‘inverted pyramid’ (Cotter, 2010: 140), which typically orders information according to a hierarchy of importance, with the most important information positioned at the beginning of the article. The ideological significance of this is intensified by the fact that readers commonly use the initial parts of an article to guide the interpretation of the rest of the article (van Dijk, 1991: 73); ‘if people remember anything of a discourse at all after some delay, it is the topic and maybe some details that are personally relevant for the recipient’ (van Dijk, 1998b: 266).

- **Referential and Predicational Strategies**

Examining the lexical items in the text forms another key component of the initial stages of analysis. In this stage, Reisigl & Wodak (2001) emphasise the importance of examining the referential and predicational strategies or what can be described as the discursive construction and qualification of social actors/objects/phenomena/events. Therefore, the naming strategies used to refer to these items and the qualities they are attributed with are examined. In reference to *in* and *out* group actors, this may involve membership categorization devices which work to associate actors with specific groups. Specific traits or characteristics of the item being described are brought to the forefront, becoming a ‘representative depicter’ of that item, while arguably reflecting the social, psychological and political views and interests of the discourse producer (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 46-47). These can be positive/negative or neither and are argued to be at times closely connected to the broader argumentation framing the discourse (ibid.). As Richardson (2007: 50) explains, referential strategies do not only “project meaning and social values on to the referent, they also establish coherence relations with the way that other social actors are referred to and

represented". Predicational strategies can take the form of adjectives, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, comparisons, similes to name a few (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 54). Needless to say, in accordance with the ideological square, these strategies are expected to fit the positive self and negative other representation.

Furthermore, in this stage of the analysis, several socio-semantic analytical categories introduced by van Leeuwen (2008) are viewed to be particularly useful in the analysis of *in* and *out* groups (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). Van Leeuwen emphasises that meanings exist in society, while language is utilized to transfer these meanings, reconfiguring them. Therefore, analysis is argued as having to begin from social constructs, and later be investigated against linguistic entities that indicate these meanings (KhosraviNik, 2010).

The *Inclusion* and *exclusion* of social actors are two such constructs. Including specific social actors while excluding others, van Leeuwen (2008: 28) argues, can indicate the discourse producer's interests and purposes in relation to the target readers or recipients. The linguistic realization of this can be constructed in several ways. One typical example is through agent deletion, a frequently highlighted process in CDA when examining social actions.

Individualisation, assimilation, collectivisation and aggregation (quantification) are other social constructs highlighted by van Leeuwen (2008: 37-38). Dividing social actors this way can again reveal particular interests of the discourse producer. Middle class newspapers, for instance, have been found to individualise elite actors, while assimilating others. Meanwhile, working class papers tend to increasingly generalise 'ordinary individuals' (van Leeuwen, 2008: 37). Furthermore, aggregation or quantifying social actors can advocate particular views or arguments over others, i.e. opinion polls, surveys. This form of reference is frequently utilised to 'regulate practice and to manufacture consensus opinion' (ibid.).

- **Syntactic Structure: Transitivity**

Transitivity in critical linguistics is mainly viewed as "the representation in language of processes, the participants therein, and the circumstantial features associated with them"

(Kress, 1976: 159). It “has the facility to analyse the same event in different ways” (Fowler, 1991: 71). Therefore, it deals with the choices surrounding how the processes and participants taking part in the processes are being described and reported on in the language; simply put, who does what to whom. By examining the role taken by the participants (active/passive) and the processes they are involved in (verbal/mental/material), specific meanings in the text maybe highlighted.

In newspaper discourse, Fowler (1991) explains, the choice of *passive* vs. *active* construction and the voice in a clause can have ideological significance. Therefore, the active verb phrase “*PC shot boy from 9 inches*”, can be chosen to emphasise the agent of the action “*PC*”, thus, the agent is foregrounded; the role or responsibility of the officer in the killing of the boy is emphasised. He continues, when using the passive verb phrase “*Boy was shot by PC from 9 inches*”, the focus and emphasis is transferred to the “*boy*”, thus, foregrounding the boy. Furthermore, he explains, using the same example, that by using a passive verb phrase, part of the clause can be erased, e.g. “*robber’s son, five, killed in his bed*”, deletes the agent “*PC*”; the responsibility of this action is not specified and the boy’s death is foregrounded. Agent omission can also be applied by transforming a process into a state or what is known as *nominalization*, “changing a process into a nominal (i.e. noun-like) entity” (Fairclough 1995b: 26). Fowler (1991), emphasising the possible ideological significance of using nominals in clauses, illustrates for instance, how using the nominal form “*allegations*” in a phrase instead of a full proposition as, “*X has alleged against Y that Y and A...*”, allows the writer to delete important information, including social actors responsible for these ‘allegations’.

Therefore, in news reporting in the press, the construction of the clause, the choice of *passive* vs. *active*, and the deletion of the agent can signify what the news journalist wants to foreground or background, therefore, what he/she considers important. Patterns in the choice of *passive* vs. *active* (patients vs. agents), and the actions the actors are given in the process, i.e. negative/positive, has been instrumental in analysing ideology in the press (Richardson, 2007: 56). Such Patterns can highlight the more implicit meanings. Indeed, as van Dijk states, “minorities are often represented in a passive role (things are being decided or done, for or against them), unless they are agents of negative actions, such as illegal entry, crime, violence or drug abuse. In the latter case their responsible agency will be

emphasized” (2000b: 40). Nevertheless, it is important to note, as Richardson (2007: 58) explains, examples of syntactic structure and transitivity and their effect on meaning should not be overstated. That is, it is important to take into account, the contextual textual surroundings of such examples, since preceding or following clauses may alter or further clarify the meanings in these texts. Also, at times, the deletion of information in the press may be due to editorial decisions based on limitations in newspaper space (ibid.).

- **Modality**

Modality is related to features in the text which function to express judgment, attitude or comment in texts which are made directly or indirectly by the linguistic stance of the text producer (Richardson, 2007: 59; Fowler, 1991: 85). Therefore, modality deals with expressing the text producer’s attitudes, opinions and views towards the situation or event discussed in a statement, and the producer’s attitude towards propositions declared in sentences in relation to their truth.

Modality is signified by the use of modal verbs (*should, may, could, will* and *must*), their negation (*should not, may not, etc.*), and adverbs (*certainly*) (Richardson, 2007: 59). Fowler (1991) explains the comment or attitude expressed by modality can be linked to (a) *truth*, (b) *obligation*, (c) *permission* and (d) *desirability*. To explain further, for example, with *truth* modality, the speakers/writers can express using various modals the degree of commitment of truth they hold to the propositions they produce, or to predict the possibility of the event being described in the proposition of actually taking place (Fowler, 1991: 85). Therefore, *truth* modality could be expressed in varying degrees depending on the choice of modality, where with absolute certainty a statement may read as, “The conference *will* be taking place tomorrow”, while a phrase with less certainty may read as, “The conference *could* take place tomorrow”.

Similarly, the use of *obligation* modality can indicate the degree of belief the speaker has towards the necessity of a specific decision or action happening. Thus, actions and decisions may be described as categorically having to take place by modals, such as, ‘*must*’ or in more cautious manner with modals, such as, ‘*ought*’ (Richardson, 2007: 60). In terms of newspaper discourse, Richardson explains that the use of modality is a common feature in

articles that are known to express opinions, such as, editorials and opinion pieces (ibid.). Therefore, they are often used in articles which are expected to pass judgment and evaluation in addition to reporting on an event. By analysing the choice of modals in the press, researchers can obtain insight into the prominent, but at times, less overt meanings, attitudes and ideological beliefs advocated by the text.

- **Presuppositions**

In analysing discourse, it is important to examine not just the explicit meanings included in the text, but the possible implicit meanings implied as well. An implicit or hidden meaning is referred to as a presupposition in the text, 'a taken for granted, implicit claim embedded within the explicit meanings of a text or utterance' (Richardson, 2007: 63). The choice of particular linguistic structures can trigger such presuppositions. According to Reah (2002 cited in Richardson, 2007), there are a few such structures which have shown to imply presupposed meanings. Change of state verbs, e.g. *stop/begin*, are one example of such structures, suggesting a certain movement or action to have been or to be taking place. Presuppositions can also be triggered by 'wh-questions', for instance, asking '*why are women bad drivers?*' presupposes that women are in fact bad drivers.

Richardson (2007: 64) also argues that hidden meaning can be detected by the use of nominal presuppositions. Here, nouns and adjectives attributing noun phrases presuppose particular meanings, not directly apparent in the text. To support this, he gives an example of the *Daily Express* headline, '*Britain's Asylum system takes new hammering*'; the adjective '*new*', presupposes the asylum system being referred to, to have had previous hammerings (ibid.).

- **Disclaimers**

In discussing racist or discriminatory discourse on minorities and immigrants, van Dijk (1992) emphasises the importance of disclaimers as semantic strategies that socially function as 'face-keeping' or/and emphasising positive self presentation when negatively describing the 'Other'. They can also function as a racism denial strategy. It allows for the avoidance of

direct ideologically driven or discriminatory discourse deemed unacceptable by the general social norms and values.

According to van Dijk (2002: 151), some of these moves or 'disclaimers' include:

Apparent Denial: *'We have nothing against blacks but...'*

Apparent Concession: *'Some of them are smart but in general...'*

Apparent Empathy: *'Of course refugees have had problems, but...'*

Apparent excuses: *'Sorry, but...'*

Apparent Ignorance: *'I don't know all the facts, but...'*

Reversal: (blaming the victim): *'Not they, but we are the real victims..'*

Transfer: *'I don't mind but my clients....'*

These local semantic moves 'instantiate' the macro or 'global' strategies emphasising positive self and negative other presentation (ibid).

- **Argumentation/ Topoi**

Analysing arguments and identifying the main topoi drawn upon in the process is an essential part of Wodak's discourse-historical approach. Argumentation can be defined as the:

*Verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint.*

(van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: 1)

Following this definition, it is expected that in newspaper discourse covering events that had raised conflicting views (*for* and *against*), as is the case with the discourse examined in this research, argumentation will be a key characterising factor. In newspaper discourse, argumentation strategies are particularly evident in opinion pieces, which are commonly viewed as platforms for opinion and debate. More importantly, in analysing these arguments and the particular topoi frequently being drawn upon, dominant meanings

related to social group representation can be highlighted. Topoi here is defined as ‘formal or content related warrants or ‘conclusion rules’ which connect the argument(s) with the conclusion, the claim’ (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009: 110). Therefore, they work to justify the claims. In researching the arguments for and against discrimination of foreigners in the Austrian context, for instance, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) highlight the *topos of threat* and *topos of burdening* as some of the topoi frequently drawn upon in arguments relating social problems, e.g. employment and housing shortages, to the increased presence of foreigners in Austria. Thus, anti-immigration arguments are built upon the premise that foreigners pose a growing *threat* and a *burden* upon Austrian society.

The analysis of arguments initiates by identifying the main arguments included in each article and the argumentation schemes employed in the process. As argumentation involves the act of persuasion, Aristotle’s theory of *Rhetoric* is drawn upon in identifying key argumentation schemes or ‘modes of persuasion’ (Richardson, 2007: 159). These include ethotic arguments (Ethos), arguments which are supported by the good character of the arguer or the use of authority, i.e. a person of expertise to justify the argument. Pathotic arguments (Pathos) are another argumentative scheme based on the use of emotions as means of persuasion, e.g. fear. The final argument, logetic argument (Logos) is the persuasion of the audience through the logic or structure of the argument put forward. As Richardson (2007: 161) explains, the majority of logetic argumentation take the form of *deductive* and *inductive* arguments. When deductive arguments are presented in their complete form, “something is asserted in a number of statements, and from these statements there follows a valid conclusion” (ibid.). Thus, the conclusion is based upon premises that are made explicit in the text. However, arguments are generally presented as *enthymemes*, where the premises are not clearly stated and the audience are expected to fill them in themselves. In inductive arguments, “specific cases are drawn upon to support a general conclusion” (Richardson, 2007: 162). These arguments can take the form of:

- ***Symptomatic argumentation:*** the argument uses an example to signify a broader trend or pattern by highlighting an association or a link between both.
- ***Comparisons/analogy:*** the argument is built upon a comparative relation.
- ***Causation:*** the argument is based upon highlighting consequences and outcomes.

(Richardson, 2007: 162-165)

Such argumentation schemes are usually detected by the use of specific terms and phrases that trigger the particular relation being argued e.g. *evidence of, similarly, as a result*.

Having said, argumentation to persuade, as Reisigl & Wodak (2001: 70) explain, can take the form of 'rational negotiation' or 'strategical perversion', i.e. manipulative arguments, therefore, forming reasonable or unreasonable means of persuasion. With the latter, this can involve the utilization of 'non-argumentative compulsion (emotionalisation, suggestion, demagoguery, propaganda, brainwashing, threatening and so on) force or compel to assent and approval by repressing the ability of rational and logical judgement and conclusion' (ibid.). Argumentation theorists have developed rules and guidelines that characterise and define reasonable argumentation by which arguments can be analysed against. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's pragma-dialectical approach (1992, 2004) in analysing reasonableness in argumentation is one widely used approach, providing a set of rules (10 rules) which should be observed to ascertain the reasonability of arguments, and thus the resolving of difference of opinion. A full list of these rules is presented in appendix 12.

Arguments featuring ideological social representations or discursive legitimisation of negative social representation that may include racist and discriminatory prejudice, as Reisigl & Wodak (2001: 71) argue, have shown to violate many of these rules. Consequently, the analysis of such violations can further enhance an understanding of the ideological representation of social groups. A number of violations or *fallacies* of each of the rules set forward by the pragma-dialectical model can occur. A comprehensive list of such fallacies, some of which are related to the findings of this study is provided in appendix 13.

#### **2.4.5 CDA: Critical Reception**

As with any developing academic field, CDA has and continues to receive critical response from various scholars on issues regarding objectivity, methodology and ambiguity of concepts among other aspects.

Widdowson by far has been the most active and vocal critic of CDA, setting the now infamous debate (Widdowson vs. Fairclough) that played out along a series of review articles (see Widdowson, 1995, 1996, 1998; Fairclough 1996; Chouliaraki & Fairclough,

1999). Widdowson echoed some of the main and most dominant concerns some scholars have regarding CDA. The coming sections will discuss some of Widdowson's and other general scholarly critiques of CDA and the responses to these and how some of the raised issues were addressed in the current research by the utilization of various methodological strategies.

One of the main problems with CDA studies, according to Widdowson, is that it develops ideologically biased results and findings. Widdowson believes that CDA analysts "insist on the primacy of their own ideological position, and so derive from the text the discourse which fits their preconceived ideological commitment" (Widdowson, 1995: 169). CDA scholars are accused of reading their own interpretation into the discourse being analysed and promoting findings which endorse their personal and political agenda. Furthermore, it is also argued that "CDA does not analyse how text can be read in many different ways..." (Blommaert, 2005: 31). By depending exclusively on his/her own analysis and interpretation, the analyst is accused of implying that it is the sole interpretation possible, making the assumption that the average recipient of the discourse will ultimately have the same interpretation. Widdowson takes this further by stating that CDA "cannot provide analysis, but only partial interpretation" (1995: 169), and describes it as "an exercise in interpretation, it is invalid as analysis" (1995: 159). Schegloff (1997) also adds to this critique, claiming that as CDA begins with prior theorizing and assumptions about the context of discourse being analysed, the analyst will consequently find what he/she is looking for in the discourse and present it to the reader.

In regard to the issue of biased interpretation, it is important to clarify that CDA scholars do not impose their analytical findings and/or claim that their interpretation of any given data is the only possible interpretation or analysis that can be developed from the discourse being examined. In fact, Fairclough himself has stated quite the opposite in much of his work:

*A published text can figure in many different processes of meaning making and contribute to diverse meanings, because it is open to diverse interpretations. (2003: 11)*

*Texts may be open to different interpretations depending on the context and interpreter, which means that social meaning (including ideologies) of discourse cannot simply be read off from the text without considering patterns and variations in the social distribution, consumption and interpretation of the text. (1992: 28)*

This would include recipient interpretation processes, which form a major part of Fairclough's analytical framework (see section 2.4.4.1). Nevertheless, although this is emphasized and highlighted in CDA, in practice, admittedly, many CDA studies fail to pay adequate attention to recipient interpretation, which in turn and rightly so develops the above mentioned criticism. The current study aims to add to this analytical deficit by looking into audience interpretations as part of the overall analysis of the newspaper texts. However, it is also important to note that although many studies in CDA do depend on one interpretation of the text (the analyst's) and as admittedly, this could be viewed as subjective at times, it is expected that any credible CDA study would systematically and continuously verify any textual interpretation with linguistic evidence from the discourse.

Furthermore, the analysis of reader interpretation can be viewed as a way in which the analyst's findings can be compared with the general reader of the text. As Cameron (2001: 140) explains, "the analysis is enriched, and the risk of making overtly subjective claims reduced, by going beyond the single texts to examine other related texts and to exploring the actual interpretations their recipients make of them" (Cameron, 2001: 140). This can be done by the use of more than one method for data analysis, in aim of achieving triangulation, consequently strengthening the reliability and validity of the findings.

One method that can and has been used widely (specifically in media research) and was also used in the current research is eliciting reader interpretations through focus group discussions, where group interaction is used to generate data (Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999: 4). Focus groups were conducted with participants who have read a few selected articles analysed in the CDA study and the researcher (analyst) elicits and examines the possible interpretations made by the recipients, comparing them to her own interpretation and analysis of the text. This way, this study did not only develop the important reader interpretation data that is required for a comprehensive understanding of meaning in

newspaper text and the interpretation processes involved, it also allowed for the findings to be verified further and less prone to subjective conclusions.

That being said, arguably, any researcher examining texts qualitatively may risk developing biased interpretations. Discourse analysts working under the field of pragmatics, for example, could have a particular interest in the data and make biased decisions regarding the analysis, and thus be accused of developing findings that correspond with these interests. CDA is merely explicit about its stance and objectives, which could be argued as one of the reasons it has been more prone to such criticism. It remains with the reader to decide on the study's validity and reliability based on its methodological soundness and the analytical evidence provided.

Another criticism towards CDA is raised by Stubbs (1997), who raises questions regarding data selection and the representativeness of findings developed from the data being analysed. Stubbs believes that in CDA, there is "little discussion of whether it is adequate to restrict analysis to short fragments of data, how data should be sampled, and whether the sample is representative" (1997: 7). These are important factors to consider, and they in fact have been addressed in CDA literature (see Titscher et al, 2000; KhosraviNik, 2009). Furthermore, most CDA scholars do give detailed descriptions of the data selection and sampling process in relation to the study's main focus (topic/issue examined), and at times, in relation to a particular time frame taking into account various contextual factors, as is the case with this study (see 3.6.1 and 3.6.2). In regard to representativeness, as with most qualitative studies, the amount of data that can be manually analysed is considerably less than it would be in quantitative studies, which can "offer greater potential to generalize than do qualitative ones" (Hesmondhalgh, 2006: 120-121), by revealing "reoccurring processes of representation that effect our values and beliefs across a large number of cases" (ibid.). Indeed, quantitative analysis can show the reoccurrence of certain linguistic features that may have analytical significance, i.e. revealing reoccurring linguistic structures with ideological bias. Therefore, although qualitative methods of research, such as CDA, can offer indispensable in-depth and detailed analysis of latent meanings in the text, the addition of quantitative textual analytical methods (using computer assisted software) can work to: (1) compliment the study by highlighting manifest meanings in the text, (2) validate "some" of the findings in the qualitative research data, and (3) can cope with larger

amounts of textual data, increasing the generalisability and representativeness of the findings, ultimately achieving some statistical significance. As a result of the clear potential such methodologically combined studies can offer, a growing number of CDA studies have adopted this combined methodology (Hakam, 2009; Orpin, 2005; Baker 2012; Baker et al, 2008; Richardson, 2004, 2009).

This study achieved this methodological combination by adding content analysis, “a systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics” (Neuendorf, 2002: 1), which is considered “by far the most significant quantitative method of textual analysis of the media” (Hesmondhalgh, 2006: 121). By using content analysis, this study was able to systematically quantify the manifest content of the newspaper texts using specific predetermined categories. Moreover, the study drew upon some of the methods utilized in corpus linguistics, which perform quantitative analysis on large bodies of ‘electronically encoded texts’, allowing for the detection of occurrences of particular dominant linguistic phenomena (Baker, 2006: 1-2). Therefore, some of the claims generated by the CDA study of the newspaper texts were examined and cross checked by these more quantitatively oriented analytical methods.

Another critique that has been targeted towards CDA and one this research finds itself agreeing with strongly is raised by Blommaert regarding CDA’s “closure to particular kinds of societies” (2005: 35). Blommaert explains, CDA studies, so far, have been restricted to discourse coming from first world societies and it “takes far too much sharedness for granted when it comes to discourse in contemporary societies in the world” (Blommaert, 2005: 36). Indeed, in CDA, little research has been done on discourses outside Europe and North America and it would be inaccurate to claim or assume that these represent the model discourse across the world. This focus on certain parts of the world can be misleading, as well as limiting when it comes to a comprehensive understanding and analysis of discourse. CDA is in need of studies focusing on different texts coming from across the world, exploring the possible differences and similarities in discourse. Such direction in research can be quite fruitful in developing a deeper understanding of worldwide discourses. This study hopes to add to this apparent void by researching the little known and researched discourse of Arab English language newspapers.

## Chapter 3

### Methodology

This research aims to conduct a comparative study of the ideological discursive representation of Islam and Muslims in the press by focusing on major Muslim related events that attracted extensive media coverage, while raising conflicting views and heated debates between various communities on both a national and international level. The study was carried out by exploring the linguistic constructs and strategies used in a dominant representation of Islam and Muslims in the coverage of these events in major UK based and Arab English language quality newspapers, relating these representations to the wider socio-political context

The main source of data analysed was made up of British and Arab English language newspaper news reports and opinion pieces on the following two events, forming two separate analytical projects:

- **Event A: The 2009 French Face Veil Ban**
- **Event B: The 2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy**

These events have been selected since they both took place post 9/11 and produced conflicts of a socio-political and cultural nature. Both rapidly becoming highly politicised issues, they brought some of the chief pillars of liberal democracies, such as, gender equality, secularism, integration, religious freedom and freedom of speech into the forefront of fierce political and social debates. These debates are prone to producing polarised views which can in turn create an “Us” vs. “Them” dichotomy between the social groups involved, in this case ‘Muslims’ and the ‘West’. To clarify further, the following sections will provide some essential background information on each news event.

- **The 2009 French Face Veil Ban**

On the 19<sup>th</sup> of June 2009, a French parliamentary proposal was made for the establishment of a commission to investigate what was described as the growing practice of face veiling in France, which at the time was thought to possibly lead to a legislation of a law banning the practice of wearing the face veil in public (a law was passed in 7/10/2010 and has been in

effect since 11/04/2011). This was followed a few days later by a major presidential speech backing the parliamentary proposal, in which then French President Nicholas Sarkozy declared the 'burqa', referring to the face veil, as 'not welcome in France'. He cited the practice of face veiling as conflicting with France's secular nature, describing it, among other things, as a form of 'subservience and debasement' of women. These events echoed earlier highly charged controversies in French history, e.g. the 2003 Hijab affair, while simultaneously triggering a domino effect across borders with various government officials following suit by resonating similar sentiments and rhetoric. It is one of the main recent controversial Muslim related stories that had attracted extensive global media coverage and conflicting views among various worldwide communities, mainly comprised of arguments for and against the face veil ban. Some of the main arguments for a face veil ban centred around the protection of national identity, equality of women and security concerns. Opposing arguments mainly viewed the ban as an unjustified act impinging on individual freedom of choice, as well as possibly marginalising and stigmatising Muslim communities further. Currently, in addition to the legislation of a face veil ban law in France in late 2010, multiple similar laws have been issued in various parts of the world.

- **The 2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy**

The series of events collectively referred to and known as the 'Danish Cartoon Controversy' were triggered in September 2005, when *Jyllands-Posten*, a Danish newspaper published a collection of satirical cartoons depicting the Muslim prophet. Accompanied by an article criticising self censorship, the 12 editorial cartoons included images viewed as associating Islam with terrorism and suicide bombings; one cartoon which received particular criticism, for instance, depicts the prophet as wearing a bomb shaped turban with a burning fuse. Although these cartoons were first published on the 30<sup>th</sup> of September in 2005, attracting local Muslim complaint and protest, the cartoons did not attract extensive media attention until early 2006. This sudden media attention was the result of the escalation in events related to the first publication, beginning in January 2006 with the Arab league's official condemnation of the publication and later an official apology by the *Jyllands-posten* to Muslims, while defending its right in publishing the cartoons. This was quickly followed by other various European based newspapers publishing the cartoons, citing freedom of speech. The events escalated even further with worldwide Muslim protests against the

cartoons, many of which were violent, resulting in injury and death. On an international diplomatic level, the events resulted in political negotiations and the temporary closure of Danish and other European embassies in multiple Arab Muslim nations with some nations recalling their ambassadors in Denmark as a motion of discontent. The events also resulted in financial losses by the spread of Danish product boycotts throughout the Middle East, particularly in the Arab Gulf nations. Arguments for the publishing of the cartoons and against selective censorship mainly revolved around freedom of speech. Arguments against the publications of the cartoons were associated with respect of religion, primarily rooted in Muslim religious beliefs forbidding the depiction of the Muslim prophet, as well as arguments for what was described as a responsible application of freedom of speech.

### **3.1 Research Questions**

By investigating the discourse of newspaper articles related to these events, the study aims to answer the following research questions:

- 1. Is there a dominant ideology (hidden or explicit) constructed and reproduced in the discursive representation of Islam and Muslims in news reports and opinion pieces in the British and Arab (English Language) Press?*
- 2. How is this ideology constructed? What are the discourse features and strategies used to construct a dominant ideology in newspaper reports in both contexts?*
- 3. Does the Arab English Language press reproduce, resist or reject the ideology reflected in the discursive representation of Islam and Muslims in the British Press? What are the discursive strategies used?*
- 4. What meanings and understandings do readers interpret regarding the representation of Islam and Muslims from various articles analysed? Do the analyst's analytical findings reflect reader interpretations of the texts analysed?*

### **3.2 Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis**

In endeavouring to explore the research questions put forward, a 3 dimensional qualitative/quantitative research framework (figure 3.1) was especially designed to examine the newspaper data from various perspectives: (1) In-depth qualitative Critical Discourse analysis (CDA), (2) Quantitative Content analysis and Corpus Linguistics (CL), and (3) Qualitative reader interpretation analysis through focus groups.




Figure 3.1 Three dimensional qualitative/quantitative analytical research framework

This 'mixed method research' approach combines both the qualitative methods of CDA and focus groups and the quantitative oriented methods of content analysis and corpus linguistics. The justification and motivations behind this mixed methodological framework, which was mainly developed in response to some criticisms towards CDA, were discussed in-depth in section (2.4.5). However, the main objectives for a combined methodology can be summarised as the following:

- (1) To explore the various facets required to form a comprehensive understanding of the meanings and ideologies that may be found in newspaper texts.
- (2) To achieve methodological triangulation, whereby using more than one method and source of data to explore the same social phenomenon, the findings of the study can be crosschecked (Bryman 2008: 700), consequently, further enhancing the validity and reliability of the findings. In this case, the primary study will be the critical discourse analysis of newspaper texts, followed by the application of quantitative analysis on a larger sample of these texts, and finally conducting a reader interpretation analysis of some of the texts analysed using CDA.

Therefore, the study is divided into three main studies, as table 3.1 illustrates:

Study	Methodology	Data	Analysis
<b>Study 1</b>	CDA	Articles: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2009 French face veil ban</li> <li>• 2006 Danish cartoon controversy</li> </ul>	Qualitative
<b>Study 2</b>	Content Analysis/Corpus Linguistics	Articles: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2009 French face veil ban</li> <li>• 2006 Danish cartoon controversy</li> </ul>	Quantitative/Qualitative
<b>Study 3</b>	Focus groups	Reader Interpretation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Articles on the 2009 French face veil ban</li> </ul>	Qualitative (Quantitative)

Table 3.1 Description of research studies 1-3

Each news event is treated as a separate study. Therefore, news reports and opinion pieces related to each news event (A and B) were collected to form two separate corpora of texts for each event. In addition, the large corpora for each news event were divided into two more corpora, a UK based newspaper text corpus and an Arab English language newspaper text corpus, allowing for a comparative analysis.

The analysis began with general quantitative analysis of each corpus to establish the genre of articles involved and their frequency (hard news/soft news) and the trends in bylined sources. The CDA analysis (study 1) was then applied to each corpus. The content and corpus analysis (study 2) of each corpus followed. The particular discursive and textual features examined and quantified in the quantitative analysis (study 2) were determined by the findings of the CDA study (study 1), allowing the researcher to test some of the findings of the CDA study, which examined a limited sample of articles in relation to a much larger sample of data. The focus group analysis (study 3) exploring reader interpretation of some of the texts analysed using CDA (study 1) was the last study carried out and was only applied to articles related to the '2009 French face veil ban' news event. Further detailed description of the data examined and methods applied in each study (1-3) will be discussed in sections 3.3 - 3.7.

### **3.3 Study 1: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)**

As mentioned in section 2.4.4, CDA analysis takes an eclectic approach to research, whereby, the analytical approach adopted in any given CDA study usually involves a selection process of the linguistic analytical tools and social theories to be applied in the analysis and interpretation of the research data. These are primarily determined by the topic being examined, the type of data being explored and the research questions.

Over the years, a number of key CDA analytical frameworks have been developed. These frameworks offer an analytical mechanism which allows the researcher to explore the text descriptively by in-depth analysis of the text, followed by an explanatory analysis, whereby the textual analytical findings are contextualised and related to wider linguistic and socio-political theories of relevance to the study.

Fairclough's 3 dimensional framework (figure 3.2) forms the main backdrop to the critical discourse analytical approach in this research. Each article selected for CDA analysis was analysed on three levels (textual, discursive and social), these levels were introduced and discussed in section 2.4.4.1.




Figure 3.2 Fairclough's 3 dimensional socio-cultural framework

However, although Fairclough's framework provides a clear structure for the overall analysis, a systemization of the analytical process was required. Ambiguities on how the actual text is approached analytically in practical terms and how these various levels of analysis will be linked needs further clarification, which is the focus of the next section.

### 3.3.1 Textual Analysis

Each article selected for analysis using CDA began with a macro analysis of the primary topics. These were determined by carefully reading each newspaper article and identifying the topic dominating the leading two paragraphs of each article. The selection of the first two paragraphs to determine the dominant topics is due to the importance placed on the initial parts of newspaper articles, as dictated by the journalistic 'inverted pyramid' (see section 2.3.3).

Following the topic analysis, each newspaper article was analysed adopting a three level textual analytical framework (figure 3.3) adopted from KhosraviNik (2010). This framework 'divides the analysis into three domains of social actor, social actions and argumentation' (ibid.).




Figure 3.3 Social representation analysis: Textual analysis framework

In analysing these three levels, various analytical categorizations introduced by van Dijk, Wodak, van Leeuwen, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (discussed in section 2.4.4.2) were borrowed. Many of these are particularly useful in analysing the representation of social groups and have been shown to be manifested and utilized in the reproduction of dominant ideological representations.

The textual analysis began by exploring the social actors/ objects included in the text, e.g. *Muslims, face veiling women, protesters, face veil*, how they are referred to and the qualities attributed to them. This was followed by an analysis of the social actions attributed to these actors and their roles in these actions, e.g. active/passive. The analysis then turned to examine the arguments presented in the text and the main argumentation strategies and schemes utilised, focusing on the topoi drawn upon and the presence of any fallacies.

Therefore, the newspaper texts were approached with the following questions:

- (1) How are social actors and objects named and referred to linguistically?
- (2) What qualities and features are attributed to the social actors and objects?
- (3) What actions and roles are attributed to the social actors?
- (4) What are the key arguments and argumentation strategies used in the discourse?

The research was approached with general pre-assigned analytical categorizations in mind, i.e. social actors, social actions and argumentation. However, it is during the analysis itself that particular linguistic features and mechanisms found to be salient were highlighted. Figure 3.4 lists only those which will be described in the CDA data analysis and findings in chapters 4 and 5. A more comprehensive and detailed description was provided in section 2.4.4.2.




Figure 3.4 Analytical categorizations and features

### 3.3.2 Discursive Analysis

As discussed in section 2.4.4.1, the discursive analysis examines the text in relation the social conditions and processes of text production, distribution and consumption. In this research this involves the particular contextual, institutional and professional journalistic production processes and procedures, characteristic of the UK and Arab English language quality press, discussed in section 2.3.

However, the research also examined the processes of text production in relation to quotation patterns. This analysis initiated during the CDA study of the articles, where the sources quoted and the contents of these quotes were analysed and compared. This was supported further by applying a similar analysis using the quantitative methods of content analysis to a much larger corpus of articles, mainly related to the 'French face veil ban' news event.

Finally, this part of the analysis also examined the much less explored area in CDA studies, the processes of text consumption. This was done by examining reader interpretation of some of the articles covering the '2009 French face veil ban' by carrying out several focus groups in the UK and the Gulf region (Kuwait) (further discussion in sections 3.5 and 3.7).

### **3.3.3 Social Analysis**

The CDA analysis will finally relate the textual findings to the immediate and wider socio-political context with reference to some of the social and linguistic theories discussed in chapter two.

## **3.4 Study 2: Quantitative Analysis**

Following the qualitative analysis of the sample of articles on news events A and B, quantitative analysis was applied on a much larger corpus of articles collected for each news event.

The research employed the quantitative methods of content analysis, as well as borrowing some key analytical methods from corpus linguistics, such as, frequency counts and concordance analysis.

### **3.4.1 Content Analysis**

Content analysis was mainly applied to develop a general profile of the publications covering both events. This involved coding and quantifying: (1) the articles collected (2) the genre of each article, and (3) the bylined sources. Adopting a formal coding procedure, predefined categories were applied to the newspaper articles (units of analysis). This

allowed the research to quantify the prominent genres of news reporting adopted in each corpus and patterns in the use of internal and external sources, highlighting any differences between the UK and Arab corpus.

Moreover, content analysis was applied in analysing quotation patterns in the '2009 French face veil ban' corpus. In this analysis, the first 3 actors quoted directly or indirectly were coded. This analysis was carried out in aim of exploring the frequency of Muslim quotations in the reporting of events. The analysis took a more qualitative approach in analysing the content of all coded quotes, exploring the framing of material being reported. Again, selecting the first three quotes of each article in particular is due to the relevance of initial parts of articles in terms of what is considered important by each newspaper, in accordance with the journalistic 'inverted pyramid' (section 2.3.3).

### **3.4.2 Corpus Linguistics (CL)**

Corpus linguistics studies language on 'a large scale' using computer assisted software applied to large collection of texts that have been electronically encoded (McEnery & Hardie, 2012). The large amount of data that it can examine allows for representative findings and further validated claims. Although CL is quantitatively oriented it also depends on various degrees of qualitative analysis. That is, 'functional (qualitative) interpretation' is viewed as an essential part of corpus-based analysis (Biber: 1998 quoted in Baker, 2006: 2). CL is not considered as one approach, but rather an approach to analysing discourse made up of a set of procedures that can examine patterns in language. The two procedures drawn upon in this research are *frequency lists* and *concordance analysis*.

All articles analysed quantitatively using CL were organised into a corpus representing the UK newspapers and a corpus representing the Arab English language press. Each corpus represented by an individual computer file was loaded into the corpus analysis program, *Concordance* and analysed separately.

### 3.4.2.1 Frequency Word Lists

A frequency word list is 'a list of all the words in a corpus along with their frequencies and the percentage contribution that each word makes towards the corpus' (Baker, 2006: 51). Words lists were compiled according to their frequency in the Arab and UK based corpora for each news event. This formed the initial stage of exploring the contents and determining the focus of newspaper texts in each corpus. As Stubbs (1996: 107) explains, 'no terms are neutral. Choice of words expresses an ideological position'. Baker (2006: 48) supports this regarding the choice of terms used, adding "if people speak or write in an unexpected way or make one linguistic choice over another, more obvious one, then that reveals something about their intentions, whether conscious or not". In the case of this study which compares newspaper texts on the same topics in two contexts, it was interesting to examine what terms are more frequently used in each corpus and the possible similarities and differences in the choice words used to refer to similar phenomena or concepts, e.g. actors and objects, and the possible connotations these choices may carry.

As in most corpus analysis, grammatical words or function words (e.g. *and*, *a*, *to*, *the*) tend to form the majority of words in the top ten highest frequency words in the frequency word lists. However, these usually do not give major insight into the main focus of the corpus examined, and therefore, these terms were excluded from the frequency list presented in the quantitative analysis sections in this thesis. Edited top ten frequency word lists include only the most frequent lexical words and terms, e.g. nouns, verbs, adjectives and lexical adverbs represented by their lemma form, 'the canonical form of word' (Baker, 2006: 55), e.g. lemma 'women'= women, woman, women's and woman's. Moreover, in the case of frequency lists representing the UK and Arab corpora related to the '2009 French face veil ban' news event, the lemma 'face veil et al' represents: *burqa*, *burka*, *burkha*, *burkini*, *burqini*, *veil*, *niqab* and their plural forms. This particular lemma was specifically constructed as a result of the CDA analysis, which revealed the lack of consensus in both contexts in terms of the referential strategies used to refer the 'face veil', with these being the most frequent in both contexts, albeit in varying degrees.

### 3.4.2.2 Concordance Analysis

Concordance analysis is another method borrowed from CL and used in this study. Although this mainly involves a quantitative process, during analysis, qualitative methods may be supplemented, as was done in this study and explained in more detail below. A concordance of any corpus would compile a 'list of all the occurrences of a particular search term in a corpus, presented within the context that they occur; usually a few words to the left and right of the search term' (Baker, 2006: 71). By examining the immediate textual context of a search term, e.g. *burqa*, the researcher can detect particular linguistic patterns in the usage of that term which assists in identifying dominant discourses associated with it. These can, at times, carry negative or positive connotations. Patterns were identified and displayed in a table according to prominence.

In the '2009 French face veil ban' corpus, the search terms examined are *burqa/burka* and *niqab*. In the '2006 Danish cartoon controversy' corpus, the search terms examined are *protester/demonstrators* and *Muslims*.

As the research deals with large corpora of texts which conjure up a very large number of concordance lines containing the search terms, a procedure limiting the analysis further had to be developed. To do this, the 'hypothesis testing' procedure (Hunston, 2002: 52) was adopted. Here, 40 random concordance lines are examined at a time; this process is repeated, identifying and noting any linguistic patterns. The analysis continued with these patterns noted and was stopped when the data did not reveal any new patterns.

This study, unlike most collocation analysis, did not only take into account the few words surrounding the search terms, which tends to conjure up a high number of function words. It stretched the quantitative analysis to include any linguistic constructs and phrases that can be considered as attributes or predicates of the search term. These may include adjectives, prepositional phrases, relative clauses and infinitive clauses, among others. As Richardson (2009) explains, this form of analysis considers the search terms' *ideational* meanings and the possible recurrent representations and ideas associated with the search term being analysed, e.g. *Muslim*. As expected, this process demanded more qualitative

attention. All patterns displayed within a 10 word span (left and right) of the search term were taken into account in the analysis.

It is worth mentioning, in analysing the concordances, the researcher acknowledged that certain terms and phrases which can be characterised as attributes and found to be used frequently, at times, can be contextually framed with different and even contradictory meanings.

For example:

1. *The burqa is oppressive.*
2. *Sarkozy sees the burqa as oppressive, it is not.*

In examining the concordances, these instances were coded and taken into account in the interpretation of findings.

### **3.5 Study 3: Reader Interpretation Analysis**

The aim of developing reader interpretation data are a twofold. Firstly, as mentioned earlier (section 2.4.4.1 and 2.4.5), analysis of the text consumption processes is an integral part of a comprehensive understanding of social meanings (including ideologies) in a text. However, secondly and more importantly, as one of the research objectives is to investigate whether the newspaper articles examined carry particular dominant ideologies in the representation of Islam and Muslims, exploring reader interpretations, in addition to the researchers critical discourse analysis would allow the examining of alternative possible interpretations of the text.

This is of particular importance in relation to a CDA study, where it is argued that ideological discursive constructions often become “propositions that generally figure as implicit assumptions in text” (Fairclough 1995a: 140). They are hypothesized as becoming a naturalised part of the text, and thus, can be taken for granted. By eliciting reader interpretations of some of the newspaper articles illustrating dominant manifest and more importantly latent ideological meanings in the text, the researcher was able to compare her findings with the reader interpretations, while testing the proposed ‘naturalised discursive

meanings' hypothesis. It also allowed for the verification of some of the claims made by the CDA analysis (study 1), further reducing the possibility of subjective conclusions.

### **3.5.1 Reader Focus Groups**

Reader interpretations were ascertained thorough focus groups. The socially oriented structure of focus groups which involve readers discussing and negotiating their understanding of the meanings in the text corresponds with the nature of this study exploring social group representation.

Participants taking part in the focus groups and the internal homogeneity of the groups were determined by the purpose and nature of the study. As the purpose of the study is to examine the representation of Islam and Muslims in the quality press published in the UK and several Arab countries in the Gulf, it was important to conduct focus groups in both contexts and compare the findings, as was done with the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the newspaper texts at the earlier stages of the research.

The reader interpretation analysis was only carried out on articles covering the '2009 French face veil ban' event. Four articles were selected to be analysed in the focus group sessions. These included two articles from the UK based newspaper corpus and two articles from the Arab English language newspaper corpus. The article selection process set out to include articles reflecting key opposing views, *pro* and *against* the legislation of a face veil ban, as well as ensuring the inclusion of articles from newspapers of differing political/ideological stances.

In the selection process, it was also important to select articles which highlighted interesting findings in the CDA analysis conducted by the researcher, in terms of manifest and latent meanings in the text, as one of the main objectives of this study is to explore the analyst's interpretation against that of other newspaper readers. Table 3.2 illustrates the articles selected (A-D) and the rationale for the selection of each (refer to appendix 9 for articles).

Article	Newspaper	Headline	Genre
<b>A</b>	<i>Gulf News</i> (GN1)	<i>France considering ban on burqas, spokesman says</i>	News report
<b>Rationale</b>	Argument for a ban from the (pro ban) perspective of the French government and politicians, excluding any anti-ban views. Highlights the topos of 'threat'.		
<b>B</b>	The Guardian (TG5)	<i>France searches its soul over the veil</i>	Opinion
<b>Rationale</b>	Mainly Illustrates arguments for a ban, did show a few examples of manifest and implicit ideological bias with some negative representations of the practice of face veiling. Draws on the topoi of 'threat', 'difference', 'repression of women', as well as, the conservative vs. moderate Muslim dichotomy.		
<b>C</b>	<i>The Times</i> (TT4)	<i>Women, West Brom, the burka and me</i>	Opinion
<b>Rationale</b>	Against the ban and for freedom of choice, but did illustrate some implicit ideological representations of face veiling and face veiling women, drawing on the topos of 'separateness'.		
<b>D</b>	<i>The Saudi Gazette</i> (SG2)	<i>Mr. Sarkozy, burqa is sign of modesty</i>	Opinion
<b>Rationale</b>	Against the ban. It also showed bias towards the in-group 'Muslims' (in the newspaper context), and depicts the 'West' negatively, drawing on the topos of 'difference', representing them as inferior.		

Table 3.2 Reader interpretation study: Article selection rationales (A-D)

Participants were asked to take part in a study that was exploring the language of newspaper reporting, no further elaboration was given as not to affect the results. Each participant was given a copy of each of the 4 articles, following the same order presented in table 3.2 (A-D). The four samples of articles students were provided with, did not state the newspaper in which the article was published or any byline information. This is done with the aim of reducing the possibility of any influences on interpretation outside the meaning presented in the content (the main body) of the article. Each article was also supplemented with an open ended question, asking the reader to summarise the main ideas of the article.

The focus group participants were also provided with questionnaires (see appendix 10). The main objective of these questionnaires was to verify the background information in relation to the participant specifications set forward. The questionnaire also explored participants' individual views in regard to each article, where the questions presented resembled some of the key leading questions in the focus group sessions. This was done to further explore

individual views in comparison to shared and collective views that may develop during the focus group sessions. The questionnaire was made up of close ended questions (multiple choice questions) and open ended questions to allow for further elaboration. As the reader interpretation study is primarily qualitative, the number of focus group participants vary in each context examined and are limited in number, thus, the quantitative findings of these questionnaires can by no means be viewed as representative. Presenting general questionnaire findings within the analytical discussion of the focus group sessions in chapter 6, is mainly done to reflect the general direction in readers' individual interpretive positions.

Following a pilot study, due to the length of time needed, it was decided that articles and questionnaires would be provided to and carried out by the participants prior to the discussion sessions. Participants were asked to bring in the articles and filled in questionnaires to the focus group session. Moreover, in the Arab context, where most participants consider Arabic to be their first language, they were advised to feel free to code switch during the sessions, depending on their language use preferences.

### **3.5.2 Approaching and Analysing Focus Group Discussions**

The focus groups sessions were approached by adopting a framing method introduced by Krzyzanowski (2008: 170). The session topics were divided into *primary* and *secondary topics*. *Primary topics* were pre-decided by the researcher/moderator prior to the sessions and can be viewed as the "general topics that framed the discussions" (Krzyzanowski, 2008: 170). These general topics were determined by the main aim of conducting the interpretation study represented by research question 4, presented earlier:

*What meanings and understandings do readers interpret regarding the representation of Islam and Muslims from various articles analysed? Do the analyst's analytical findings reflect reader interpretations of the texts analysed?*

In order to explore this question, the discussions were organised by four *primary topics* that were covered during each focus group session:

- (1) **General understanding:** This topic assists in getting the focus group discussion started, eliciting readers' general understanding of the articles they read.
- (2) **Arguments for/against:** This topic gauges readers' general identification and interpretation of key arguments in the articles, primarily made up of arguments for and against the ban.
- (3) **Social group representation:** As the discussion is expected to develop by this stage, this topic aims to directly explore reader interpretation of social group representation in the articles, focusing mainly on investigating readers' interpretation regarding the representation of Muslims and face veiling women and whether they interpret any dominant meanings.
- (4) **Linguistic structures:** The discussion draws to an end by exploring readers' association of any linguistic structures and strategies in text with any dominant representation they view to be depicted in the articles.

During the focus group sessions, these topics were introduced in the form of general non-leading questions with the aim of focusing the discussion on the main objectives of the research question. The researcher, who was the moderator of the focus group sessions, prepared a set of questions under each topic (1-4) to assist in developing the discussion, a copy of the discussion plan is provided in appendix 11. In most cases, all predefined questions were asked. However, as discussions develop naturally between the participants, the order may defer slightly; at times participants referred to and discussed some of the questions before they were asked. When it was required, additional prompts were used to facilitate the discussions. The *secondary topics* are developed by the participants themselves in the discussion of the *primary topics* and are "brought into the discourse in a manner which transcended the primary, structuring topic" (Krzyzanowski, 2008: 170). The analysis of the discussions explored the data revolving around the pre-assigned questions, as well as

exploring new (secondary) topics introduced by the participants and thus deemed necessary in relation to reader interpretations of the articles.

The focus group discussions were recorded using an audio recorder and the discussions were listened to by the researcher and transcribed. As the focus of the analysis was the meaning interpreted by the focus group participants, a more broad approach was adopted in transcribing the spoken data. Speech recorded was translated into written form and pseudonyms were given to focus group participants.

Following these steps, Stuart Hall's (1980) encoding/decoding audience reception model was the framework selected to be applied in the analysis of the reader reception data. This model paved the transition from the previously dominant stimulus-response approaches to audience studies also known as the 'hypodermic needle' or 'effects' model, where a 'narcotic' link between the media and a passive manipulated audience is assumed (Brooker & Jemyn, 2003). Theories on which Hall's (1980) semiotic model is based, rejected this suggested insignificant role imposed on the audience and instead, advocated an alternative conception of a more active audience with possible heterogeneous, selective and negotiated encoding or reading processes. This perception of an active audience is based on the theory that although 'preferred meanings' or dominant messages may exist in the text, the decoding or readings of the text is shaped by multiple social variables. Media institutions, for instance, encode meaningful messages adopting "a particular set of rules that govern the use of visual and linguistic signs within a culture" (Ott & Mack, 2010: 225) or what may be referred to as *codes*. The recipients of these messages decode them by utilizing codes to "decipher the messages and formulate meaning" (ibid.); hence, the meanings intended by the producers and the meaning interpreted by the receiver are not always symmetrically aligned.

Hall's (1980) model suggests the audience can operate their reading and interpretation of media texts from three different positions:

- **Dominant hegemonic position:** Recipients decode the message received in reference to the same codes utilized in the encoding stage. Therefore, the audience "consciously or unconsciously accept it as true" (Ott & Mack, 2010); they accept and possibly reproduce the preferred or dominant readings of the text.

- **Negotiated position:** Recipients illustrate a combination of “adaptive and oppositional elements” towards the message received. The audience generally accepts the preferred or dominant reading while simultaneously illustrating modification and resistance patterns towards it, reflecting their own individual positions.
- **Oppositional position:** Recipients “decode the message in a globally contrary way”. The audience understand and reject the preferred reading and place themselves directly in opposition to the code it is characterised by.

Preferred readings in the texts analysed are based on meanings made dominant in the articles, foregrounded in the headlines and lead paragraphs. The analysis of the focus group data examined the positions the readers adopted towards these preferred readings in the selected articles. It also examined the variations in these positions depending on the contextual and religious variables characterising the focus groups taking part.

### **3.6 Data and Data Collection: Newspaper Texts**

The primary source of data investigated in this research was made up of newspaper texts produced by various UK based and Arab English language quality newspapers. These were made up of ‘hard news’ and ‘soft news’ (see section 2.3.3). The corpus also includes op-ed pieces, editorials and blog posts.

The selection of newspapers to be investigated was designed to include newspapers viewed to be of various ideological backgrounds with the aim of exploring differences in representation and minimizing bias findings towards a particular or dominant ideology. The corpus of UK newspaper articles was collected from 4 prominent quality newspapers (including their Sunday sister papers):

- *The Guardian* (Centre left, liberal)
- *The Independent* (Centre left, liberal)
- *The Times* (Centre Right, conservative)
- *The Daily Telegraph* (Centre Right, conservative)

Although similar to the British context, some *Arabic language* press in various Arab nations may be categorized according to particular internal and external political affiliations and ideologies, *Arab English Language* newspapers which are the form of newspapers analysed in this study are not as clear regarding their political affiliations and ideologies. This, as explained in section 2.3.2, is mainly due to this genre of newspapers catering to expats living in the region, whereby newspaper content is mainly made up of and influenced by international news, rather than local politics and opinion.

However, with that being said, Arab media in general faces various degrees of government control and censorship (Hafez, 2001) (see section 2.3.2.2). Therefore, it was thought useful to analyse newspapers that are published in Arab nations of varying degrees of media freedom. Following Rugh's (1979, 1994) classification of Arab print media, which was more or less echoed by Kamalipour & Mowlana (1994) and Amin (2001), this study will analyse 5 major Arab English language newspapers reflecting nations of varying degrees of media freedom (focusing on the Gulf region).

- *The Kuwait Times* – Kuwait
- *Gulf Times*- Qatar
- *Gulf News* – United Arab Emirates
- *The Saudi Gazette* - Saudi Arabia (2009 French Face veil ban)
- *The Arab News* - Saudi Arabia (2006 Danish Cartoon controversy)

According to Rugh (1994), Kuwait is characterized as having 'diverse press', while the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are characterized as 'loyalist'. However, even between these three nations, the amount of media control can vary (as discussed in section 2.3.2.2). Selecting English language newspapers published in the Arabian Gulf region in particular is mainly due to their popularity in the area. The reason being the large amount of English speaking expatriates living in this particular region in comparison to other Arab nations, forming the target readership of this genre of newspapers.

As one may expect, due to the form of analysis involved, the size of the corpus of newspapers differed significantly in the quantitative and qualitative discourse analysis studies. Nevertheless, in both cases, the data selection process was geared by a contextually sensitive approach in relation to the surrounding socio-political happenings at the time.

Taking into account the main events and actions surrounding each story, articles were collected from the date in which key events triggering the stories took place up until the approximate date when the newspapers selected reflected less interest in the story.

A corpus representing the UK press and another representing the Arab English language press were developed for each news story. Each corpus was divided further to represent each of the 4 newspapers selected to be investigated in each context. The articles were collected from nine different UK and Arab based quality newspaper websites using key query terms related to the news event investigated. In the '2009 face veil ban' study, all articles including the query terms, *burqa/s* and its variations, i.e. *burka/s*, *niqab/s* and *veil/s* were collected and printed out. The same criteria was applied to the '2006 cartoon controversy' story, where all articles including the query terms: *Danish Cartoons* or *Mohammad Cartoons*, *Mohammad caricatures*, *Mohammad drawings*, *Mohammed cartoons*, *Mohammed caricatures*, *Mohammed drawings*, were printed and added to the corpus. To exclude any passing references to these terms, articles were selected for analysis if the query term was allocated in the:

- Headline, lead
- First paragraph, or 2 paragraphs within the text

All articles collected were scanned manually to exclude any articles not fitting within the above mentioned criteria, forming the final collection of articles to be analysed.

### **3.6.1 The 2009 French Face Veil Ban Study**

For the '2009 French face veil ban' story articles were collected between 19/6/09 and 26/10/10 as this period corresponds with many of the key developments related to the French face veil ban. These begin with the initial events which ignited press interest on the 19<sup>th</sup> of June in 2009, followed by 16 months which represented various important developments, e.g. parliament and senate voting, in the build up towards the final legislation of a face veil ban law in France.

The full corpus of data collected is comprised of 550 articles. The Arab based corpus of newspapers was slightly higher in the number of publications, 285 articles were found to contain the query terms, while the UK press corpus was made up of 265 articles. However, a higher frequency of articles does not necessarily mean a larger amount of texts, as was the case in this study. Although the Arab newspaper displayed a higher number of articles, the UK based corpus displayed a higher word count (UK=168830 words, Arab=133902 words). Nevertheless, although this high frequency of articles and words corresponded well with the quantitative analysis, in terms of size, it was clear that the amount of articles had to be downsized to a manageable portion before undergoing a more detailed textual analysis, using the qualitative methods of CDA.

By adopting a systematic downsizing procedure introduced by KhosraviNik (2009), the number of articles was reduced to a more manageable size. This was done by exploring the peak periods of publications for all quality papers involved in the study, which allows the researcher’s data sampling to be more context sensitive in regard to the “relevant socio-political developments”(ibid.) of the particular period being investigated. This procedure was applied to the UK and Arab newspaper corpus separately. In addition to the procedure’s contextually sensitive downsizing advantages, it also assisted in focusing some of the quantitative analysis to key periods with a large amount of publications in each corpus. Fig 3.5 illustrates the peak periods of publications found in UK and Arab based corpora of newspaper articles.




Figure 3.5 Frequency of publications in UK & Arab press 19/06/09 – 26/10/10

As shown above, the number of articles published varied from month to month, with varying peaks in publications, reaching the highest frequency of publications in July'10. This procedure assisted in focusing the quantitative study further; various parts of the quantitative analysis study focused on the 3 key peak periods taking into account peak periods of publications shared by the UK and Arab English language press. These reflect important contextual developments:

- **June 2009:** Marking the period in which key initial political actions were taken, ultimately triggering media interest in the 'face veil ban' story.
- **January 2010:** French enquiry on a ban continues, UK proposal for a face veil ban law, Egypt university ban law.
- **July 2010:** Initial approval of the face veil ban law passed in France, spread of face veil ban proposals across various nations.

However, as mentioned earlier, for the purposes of the more in-depth critical analysis, the amount of data selected was limited further. The highest period of publications was during the July 2010 period, however, the total number of articles in both contexts were still too large to examine qualitatively. Therefore, it was decided that the CDA study will focus primarily on the UK and Arab newspaper publications for the *June* period only (19/06/09 – 31/06/09), an important period immediately following the main event attracting media coverage. Table 3.3 illustrates the frequency of publications during this period:

Newspaper	UK Press				Arab Press			
	The Guardian	The Independent	The Times	Daily Telegraph	Gulf Times	Kuwait Times	Gulf News	Saudi Gazette
June 2009	7	3	6	4	6	1	10	3
<b>Total</b>	20				20			

Table 3.3 Event A: Corpora of articles for CDA analysis

Both the UK and Arab based newspapers showed equal interest in stories featuring discourse on the face veil, with 20 articles published in each context during the same period. These were comprised of news reports and opinion pieces.

The quantitative analysis focused on a much larger sample of articles. However, when additional qualitative analysis was required, the quantitative analysis also focused its

attention on specific time frames. Similarly the selection of articles was context sensitive, focusing on periods of increased frequency in coverage. Table 3.4 illustrates the analytical categories examined and the quantitative methods used, as well as, indicating the specific articles these methods were applied to, according to the peak periods of publication selected.

Analytical Categories	Time Frame	Methodology
Genre Analysis	19/06/09 -26/10/10	Content Analysis
Byline Analysis	19/06/09 - 26/10/10	Content Analysis
Frequency Lists	19/06/09 - 26/10/10	Corpus Analysis
Concordance 'Burqa/s', burka/s', 'niqab/s'	Jun '09, Jan '10, July '10	Corpus Analysis
Quotation Analysis	19/06/09 - 26/10/10	Content Analysis
Quotation Analysis	Jun '09, Jan '10, July '10	Content Analysis

Table 3.4 Event A: Quantitative methods and article sample time frames

### **3.6.2 The 2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy Study**

Articles related to the '2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy' story were collected between 29/09/05 and 31/12/06. This period takes into account the day before the key event triggering the controversy, the publishing of 12 editorial cartoons depicting the Muslim prophet in the *Jyllands-Posten*, a Danish newspaper. Articles were collected until the amount of interest and coverage of articles with the query terms showed a clear decline. The full corpus representing UK and Arab newspapers was made up of 813 articles. As with the '2009 French face veil ban' study, the Arab English language press showed slightly higher

interest with the total number of articles in the corpus reaching 426, while the UK corpus consisted of 387 articles.

Similar to the earlier study, the frequency of coverage over the period of time the articles were collected was examined in aim of highlighting the peak times of coverage.




Figure 3.6 Frequency of publications in UK & Arab press 29/09/05 – 31/12/06

As illustrated in figure 3.6, it was immediately evident in both contexts that the predominant amount of articles were published in February 2006. This period coincides with an increase of anti-cartoon Muslim protests across the world. The UK based newspapers published 273 articles, including the query terms. Thus, articles published in February 2006 alone, made up 70.5% of the total UK corpus. Similarly, although slightly less, the Arab based newspapers were found to have published 260 articles in February 2006 alone, 61.03% of the total corpus covering the 15 month period of data collection. The word count of each corpus were also similar, with the UK displaying a higher frequency of words (UK: 208,136 words, Arab: 150,804 words).

Since in both contexts, the majority of articles were published in February 2006 and as this period represented quite a large amount of data, the quantitative analysis in this study was conducted on this period alone. However, further downsizing of the corpus was undertaken prior to the qualitative study. Again, taking in account the socio-political context, downsizing

was achieved by examining the peak periods of publications of each newspaper in each context during the month of February 2006, as illustrated in figures 3.7 and 3.8.




Figure 3.7 Frequency of publication for Feb '06 in the UK press




Figure 3.8 Frequency of publication for Feb '06 in the Arab press

For each newspaper, all articles published on the date with the highest number of publications were added to the corpus for qualitative analysis. Table 3.5 illustrates the articles examined in the '2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy' CDA study:

UK Press			Arab Press		
Newspaper	Date	No. Of Articles	Newspaper	Date	No. Of Articles
Daily Telegraph	7/02/06	6	Gulf News	15/02/06	6
Times	3/02/06	10	Gulf Times	11/02/06	11
Guardian	6/02/06	14	Kuwait Times	8/02/06	3
Independent	6/02/06	7	Arab News	7/02/06	7
Total	37		Total	27	

Table 3.5 Event B: Corpora of articles for CDA analysis

As shown, the UK corpus of articles analysed qualitatively included a slightly higher number of articles (n=37), while the Arab English language newspaper corpus included 27 articles.

The quantitative analysis will focus on a much larger sample of articles. The quantitative methods of analysis were applied on articles published during the February 2006 period, which made up the predominant amount of articles collected between 29/09/05 - 31/12/06 in both the UK and Arab context. Table 3.6 shows the analytical categories that will be focused on and the methods that will be applied.

Analytical Categories	Methodology
Genre Analysis	Content Analysis
Byline Analysis	Content Analysis
Frequency Lists	Corpus Analysis
Concordance – ‘Muslim/s’ and ‘Protester/s/demonstrator/s’	Corpus Analysis

Table 3.6 Event B: Quantitative methods /analytical categories

### **3.7 Data and Data Collection: Focus Group Discussions**

The focus group sessions were conducted in aim of highlighting the social meaning interpreted from the text by differentially situated social groups. These were determined by the variables of context and religious background. Contextual differentiation was applied by carrying out focus group sessions in the North of England, in the cities of York and Newcastle, while the sample of focus groups representing the Gulf region were carried out in Kuwait.

In terms of religious background, the research was based on the variable of readers describing themselves as Muslim and non-Muslim readers. The Kuwait sample of focus groups were made up of Muslim participants, as it is the main religion practiced in the country. However, in the UK, participants were divided into Muslim and non-Muslim groups with the objective of exploring any differences in interpretation based on religious association. Moreover, those taking part in the Kuwait sample were Kuwaiti nationals, while those taking part in the UK study were British nationals. To ascertain certain degrees of internal homogeneity and to develop comparable data samples from each context, participants taking part in the study were exclusively made up of university students in the age group 18-24.

Muslim groups in Kuwait and the UK were divided further taking gender into consideration. In Kuwait, university students are accustomed to segregated teaching environments. Therefore, being in a mixed gender environment may affect their comfort levels in terms of discussing their personal opinions and views, especially in regard to the face veil ban story, the focus of the articles investigated in the focus groups. Similarly, in the UK, Muslim participants also expressed their preference for segregated sessions.

Moreover, the participant selection process did not set out to include members of the target readership of the various newspapers analysed, as the study was particularly interested in the effects of the religious and contextual variables on reader interpretations. Also, the choice of university students in the UK and Kuwait, with various possible political

affiliations and newspaper reading tendencies, was bound to shed some light on a wide variety of possible interpretations, which the study was interested in examining as well.

However, as mentioned earlier, it was important to keep the participant groups in each context as internally homogenous as possible, to reduce the effect of other social variables in aim of focusing on contextual setting and religious background as the key variables. To do this, a summary of the main participant specifications set forward by the study is as follows:

- Occupation: University students
- Age: 18-24
- Nationality: British (UK sample) or Kuwaiti (Kuwait sample)
- Religion: Muslims or Non-Muslim

Table 3.7 illustrates further details on the focus group data gathered:

<b>Context</b>	<b>Kuwait</b>		<b>UK</b>		
<b>Group Category</b>	<b>Arab Muslim (Men)</b>	<b>Arab Muslim (Women)</b>	<b>British non-Muslim</b>	<b>British Muslim (Men)</b>	<b>British Muslim (Women)</b>
<b>Frequency of Sessions</b>	3	3	3	1	1
<b>Length of sessions (min)</b>	30-60	30-60	30-60	30-60	30-60
<b>Number of participants</b>	4-6	4-5	4-6	4	4
<b>Total no. participants</b>	13	13	14	4	4
<b>Context Total</b>	26		22		

Table 3.7 Focus group sample data

## Chapter 4

### Data Analysis: The 2009 French Face Veil Ban

The following sections will present data findings of the qualitative and quantitative analysis examining articles related to the first news event, the '2009 French face veil ban'.

#### 4.1 Quantitative Analysis: Publications General Profile Analysis

The quantitative analysis began by examining the frequency of articles in the UK and Arab English language corpora of articles. This also involved examining the frequency of articles according to genre in each corpus (news/opinion). Table 4.1 illustrates the relevant frequencies in each corpus.

Categories	UK Press					Arab Press					
	DT	TT	TG	TI	Total	GN	GT	KT	SG	Total	Total
<b>News</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>417</b>
Hard	45	29	31	24	129	63	87	23	33	206	335
Soft	5	19	16	10	50	8	10	9	5	32	82
<b>Opinion</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>133</b>
Column	4	7	37	13	61	13	3	4	7	27	88
Editorial	1	2	0	1	4	12	1	0	4	17	21
Blogs	9	6	4	2	21	0	0	0	3	3	24
<b>Total</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>265</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>285</b>	<b>550</b>

Table 4.1 Event A: Genre analysis

The Arab based corpus of newspapers were slightly higher in the number publications, 285 articles containing the query terms, while the UK press corpus was made up of 265 articles. Both contexts also illustrated greater interest in news articles as opposed to opinion pieces. News articles made up more than half of the articles in the UK corpus (67.8%, N=179), and an even higher percentage of the total number of articles in the Arab corpus (83.5%, N=238). Although both contexts published a much lower number of opinion pieces including the query terms, the UK corpus had a higher percentage of opinion pieces (32.5%, N=86) than the Arab corpus of articles (19.7%, N=47). This difference in the number of opinion

based articles suggests more opinionated discourse in the UK based articles collected. Accordingly, this may result in an increased availability of arguments and argumentation schemes, which are generally featured in opinion based articles in the press. Moreover, the UK corpus also included a higher number of ‘soft news’ articles (18.9%, N=50), which were featured less in the Arab press (11.2%, N=32). As discussed in section (2.3.3), this genre of news reporting, e.g. news features, can also tend to include more opinion than ‘hard’ news, which mainly include up-to-date factual information about a news event. For a list of all articles covering this event and analysed in this study, please refer to appendix 1 and 2.

Regarding bylined sources, quantitative analysis for the whole period covered by the corpora (550 articles) highlighted key differences between the UK and Arab English language press, as figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate:




Fig. 4.1 Event A: UK press byline analysis      Fig. 4.2 Event A: Arab press byline analysis

As illustrated above, there are clear differences in the bylined sources employed in both contexts, where as highlighted earlier, Arab based newspapers are found to depend extensively on external sources for their articles. A predominant 68% (N=194) of the articles published in the Arab newspapers were based on external sources. These were mainly made up of the ‘Euro-centred’ and US based news agencies, i.e. *Reuters*, *Associated Press (AP)*, *Agence France Presse* and *United Press International (UPI)* (refer to appendix 14 for detailed analysis). This is in direct contrast to the UK press, where external sources are found in only 5% of the total number of articles. The majority of articles (N=232, 88%), were bylined by

staff writers, which also included foreign correspondents and special guest writers. One explanation for this lack of dependency on foreign agencies is that UK based quality newspapers are quite large establishments with various resources, thus, depend heavily on their own staff for foreign correspondence and news. These numbers also highlight the amount of Arab based articles that depend on external and mainly 'Euro-centred' discourse in their news coverage, which in turn, may result in increased reproduction of dominant external discourses, which may differ from local discourses and meanings regarding Islam and Muslims.

In the specific corpora of articles published in June 2009 period (the focus of the CDA analysis), the UK based newspapers echoed earlier findings. They predominantly depended on staff writers to source their articles; they were bylined in 18 (90%) of the 20 articles published in the June period, only 2 (10%) articles depended on external sources. However, in the bylined sources examined in the Arab based newspapers during the same period, unlike the findings with the full corpus of articles, a more balanced use of sources was revealed; the 20 articles published in June were divided equally between internal sources (staff writers) (N=10, 50%) and external sources (N=10, 50%). This difference in internal bylined sources may be explained by the newspapers' news values, which reflected particular interest in reporting on local and Muslim scholarly reaction towards the face veil ban as was shown in the topic analysis, which will be discussed in more detail in the following section.

#### **4.2 Qualitative Analysis: CDA**

The following sections will present the qualitative analytical findings, this will be done in a sequential order, each stage (topic, social actors, social actions, argumentation) in the UK corpus will be analysed followed by a comparative analysis of the Arab based corpus of articles. For all articles covering event A and analysed using CDA, please refer to the appendix 5 and 6. Also, although throughout the analysis of the various stages, many examples from the texts are provided, further supplementary examples illustrating similar patterns are provided in appendix 16.

The first stage of analysis will explore the key topics dominating the articles published during the June period of the ‘2009 French face veil ban’ story. This is done by highlighting only the primary topics of each article in the UK and Arab based newspapers.

#### 4.2.1 Topic Analysis

It is no surprise that this event mainly attracted topics that reflected both ends of the spectrum in terms of arguments resonating for and against the practice of wearing the face veil or the legislation of a face veil ban law. Table 4.2 illustrates the main topics found to dominate articles in the Arab and the UK newspapers.

Topic	UK Press		Arab English Language Press	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Repression of women	7	35	2	10
Face veiling and discrimination	3	15	1	5
Face veiling and secularism	3	15	5	25
Face veil and freedom of choice	2	10	4	20
Condemnation of face veil ban	1	5	6	30
UK School Bans Entry with Face Veil	1	5	0	0
Sarkozy’s speech	1	5	0	0
UK and the face veil	2	10	0	0
Face veil as a sign of modesty	0	0	1	5
France and national investment	0	0	1	5

Table 4.2 Event A: Primary topic analysis

At first glance, no significant differences between the choice of topics in the Arab press and the UK press may be apparent, most topics are shared between both contexts. However, differences become quite obvious when exploring the amount of coverage each of the shared topics had received and the genre of newspaper reporting they were covered under,

i.e. news report/op-ed. This can be revealing in highlighting the general attitude of individual newspapers, as was the case in this study.

- **Topics: UK Press**

One of the discourse topics resonating anti-face veil sentiments and which received the most attention was 'Repression of Women', which was the main focus of 7 articles (35%) of the UK corpus. Each newspaper published two articles on the topic, excluding the *Daily Telegraph*, where it was the primary topic in one article only.

Articles where this topic formed the main focus were mainly made of news reports covering the parliamentary face ban proposal and Sarkozy's key note speech, as made evident in some of the headlines, '*Burka makes women prisoners, says President Sarkozy*' (TT2), '*Commission inquiry in France could lead to burka ban*' (TG4). This topic also formed the focus of two op-ed articles arguing against the practice of face veiling, '*Veiled Threat: the burqa, a symbol of repression, has no place in a free society*' (TT5) and '*Sophie Morris: Sarkozy's right: the burqa is a tool of repression*' (TI3). Regardless of the genre these articles were reported under, they generally drew on the topoi of 'repression of women', 'threat', 'separateness' and 'difference' in the representation of Muslims and face veiling women, in particular.

The other discourse topic with anti-veiling sentiments found in the UK corpus was 'Face veil and secularism'. Articles focusing on this topic were mainly made up of news analysis pieces, '*France considers ban on full Muslim veil*' (TT1) and '*Why not ban the full veil, says French government spokesman*' (TG1). They discussed the face veil ban proposal put forward by the French parliamentarians, arguing for a ban on the basis that face veiling clashes with the underlying principals of the French secular approach. These articles also drew heavily on the topos of 'repression of women', as the other motivating factor in the argument for a legislation of the face veil ban. In addition to a news analysis article, the *Guardian* also published an op-ed piece focusing on the same topic, '*France searches its soul over the veil*' (TG5). It argued that the legislation for the freedom of practicing face veiling clashes with French values, while describing the face veil as purely a 'political symbol', drawing on the topoi of 'difference' and 'threat'.

On the opposing side of the spectrum, the topic, 'Face veil and freedom of choice', was the discourse topic found arguing against the face veil ban, thus, advocating that women should have the right to choose how to dress. The two articles taking this topic as their focal point were published in *The Times*, both of which were op-ed pieces. '*Niqabi, interrupted*' (TT6) brought forward a face veil wearer perspective, who is coincidentally the author of the article, drawing on the topoi of 'victimisation'. This article is one of very few articles in the full corpus of UK based articles that gave a direct view from a face veil wearer on the issue. "*Women, West Brom, the burka and me*" (TT4) is the other op-ed piece on the same topic and although it argues for the freedom of choice, the representation of the practice of face veil wearing and those who wear it carried a few negative connotations, drawing on the topoi of 'repression of women' and 'separateness', as will be illustrated in the micro analysis.

'Face veiling and discrimination' was another topic found to be the focus of three articles which were mainly critical towards the ban, highlighting the victimisation of face veiling women, these were all published in the *Guardian*. Two of the articles focusing on this topic were op-ed pieces, '*Brush up your Hegel Sarko*' (TG3) and '*France's burka barrier*' (TG6), while one was a news feature, headlined '*Veiled threats: Row over Islamic dress opens bitter divisions in France*' (TG7). In the arguments critical of the ban, the articles drew heavily on the topos of 'victimisation' through the individualisation of face veil wearers and detailed description of negative actions face veiling women had undergone. In addition, they carried a critical tone towards members of the 'in-group' who are highlighted as the agents of these negative actions toward the women wearing various forms of the veil, the 'out-group'. Nevertheless, although the articles presented arguments against the face veil ban, the representation of the face veil itself and those who wear it carried various negative connotations, drawing on the topoi of 'separateness', 'repression of women' and 'threat'.

The next topic, '*UK and the face veil*' attracted particular attention from the conservative press. The *Daily Telegraph* paid attention to this topic in the article, '*Why the burka is part of Britain*' (DT2), which debates the possible implications should a similar proposal for a ban take place in the UK. Interestingly, however, although the headline may be seen a prelude for an article supporting the face veil as being an accepted practice in the UK, this is somewhat misleading. The main body of the article represents the face veil negatively by

drawing heavily on the topos of 'repression of women'. In the *Times* newspaper, the same topic was the main focus of the article fittingly titled, '*Britain could never debate the burka like France*' (TT3). Published in what is considered a conservative paper, the article discusses the interest and possibility or what would be better described as, the lack of interest and possibility of applying an equivalent face veil ban law in the UK. It pinpoints and argues the various reasons why such a law is not applicable in the UK, while drawing on the topos of 'difference' between 'Us' and 'Them' in the representation of Muslims and Face veil wearers. More importantly, the article sets a platform where the face veil discourse is utilized for political debate, the British Liberal left are criticised as the primary reason why such a law would not be considered in the UK. It argued that France's secular nature and its belief that banning the face veil sustains social cohesion and cultural diversity (positive outcome) is more in par with the British hard right, while the British liberal left are depicted negatively, described as "*always inclined it seems, to defend the rights of liberty's enemies*" (TT3). In this case, '*liberty's enemies*' refers to the face veil wearers or those who are against the legislation of a face veil ban law.

The final three topics received the least attention with each being the primary topic of three separate articles. 'Condemnation of the face veil ban' was one of those topics that had received minimal attention, in contrast to the Arab press, where it formed one of the main discourse topics covered. It was the main topic of a *Daily Telegraph* article headlined, '*Muslim leaders condemn Sarkozy over burqa ban*' (DT3). 'UK School Bans Entry with Face Veil' was another main topic in a news report in the *Daily Telegraph* headlined, '*Muslim pupils and teacher ordered to remove veils*' (DT4). It reports on an individual case where students and teachers were asked to remove their face veils in order to enter the school premises, showing an interest by the paper in highlighting local related stories. Finally, the topic, 'Sarkozy's key note speech', was the focus of a news analysis article in the *Independent* discussing the various topics covered in Sarkozy's speech, however, only a small section (2 paragraphs) was devoted to Sarkozy's comments on the face veil. This is in contrast to other UK newspapers in the corpus, where Sarkozy's comments on the face veil dominated most of the content of the articles which covered the presidential speech, i.e. headline and main body.

- **Topics: Arab Press**

The macro analysis of topics in the Arab press for the June 2009 period was quite revealing in exposing the overall attitude and reaction the different Arab based quality newspapers had towards the face veil ban. As with the UK press, the majority of articles which discussed the face veil presented arguments for or against the ban. However, what became immediately evident was the lack or complete absence of any op-ed articles arguing for the ban and against the practice of face veiling. Moreover, 60% (N=12) of the total number of articles explicitly argued against the ban. The majority of these articles were published in the UAE based *Gulf news*, totalling in 7 articles, while 3 articles were published in *Gulf Times* and 2 in the *Saudi Gazette*. This was in contrast to the UK corpus which involved only 6 anti-face veil ban articles (30%), which were generally less explicit and following a micro analysis, as discussed earlier, were found to be, nevertheless, quite critical of face veiling as a practice.

'Condemnation of the face veil ban' was the most recurrent primary topic in the Arab press (4 news articles and 2 op-ed pieces, 30%). Most of these articles involved direct critical attacks towards the face veil ban, with personalised criticisms specifically targeting then French president, Nicolas Sarkozy. This was clearly evident in some of the main leading headlines: '*Sarkozy's burqa ban stance under fire*' (GN6), "*French president's burqa views leave readers fuming*" (GN7), '*Mufti Sarkozy's 'fatwa' not amusing*' (SG3). The articles involved direct criticism of the 'Other', in this case, the 'West', 'Sarkozy' and 'Western way of living', drawing on both, the topoi of 'discrimination' and 'difference', in their arguments against the ban.

'Face veil and freedom of choice' is the second most recurrent main topic with 4 articles arguing against the ban. These were all made up of op-ed pieces, headlines included '*Liberte includes freedom of dress*' (GN10), '*Sarkozy should be open minded*' (GN5), '*West must respect the Muslim veil*' (GN8) and '*No burqas please, we're French*' (GN9). Similar to the earlier topic, 'discrimination' was one of the key topoi drawn upon in arguing for freedom of choice. However, similar to the UK press, albeit to a lesser degree, linguistic constructs associating women wearing the face veil with the 'repression of women' and a 'threat' were also identified in various parts of these articles.

The last two articles arguing against a ban covered two different topics. 'Burqa and discrimination' was the main topic of an op-ed article featured in the Qatari based *Gulf Times* and is actually an article originally published by the UK based *Guardian*. This article headlined, '*Dress row opens bitter divisions*' (GT6), drew heavily on the topos of 'victimisation'. The other topic, 'Burqa as a sign of modesty', was focused on in a *Saudi Gazette* article headlined, '*Mr. Sarkozy, burqa is a sign of modesty*' (SG2). This article also drew heavily on the topos of 'difference' in the representation of Muslims and face veil wearers. However, unlike the UK press, the difference was utilised to represent Muslims and face veiling women (Us/In-group) positively, while attacking and representing the 'Other' (Them/Out-group) and their *different* way of life negatively and as inferior. The article also drew heavily on the topos of 'discrimination'.

As mentioned earlier, the Arab corpus of articles for the June 2009 period did not include any op-ed articles arguing for a face veil ban. Instead, all articles representing arguments for a ban and against face veiling were news articles reporting on the initial key political events that ignited the face veil ban story, i.e. Parliamentary law proposal for the face veil ban and Sarkozy's key note speech. 'Burqa and secularism' was one of the main topics covered in this group of news articles; it was the second highest topic to receive attention in the Arab based articles (5 articles, 25%). Leading headlines mainly highlighted the actions taken by the French Government officials: '*France open to banning Muslim veil: spokesman*' (SG1) and '*France considering ban on burqas, spokesman says*' (GN1).

The other main topic 'burqa and repression of women' included arguments for the ban drawing on the topos of 'repression of women' as represented by the French government officials. Again, these only involved news articles published in the initial phase following Sarkozy's speech, such as, '*Sarkozy says 'burqas are not welcome' in France*' (GN2) and '*Burqa not welcome in France*' (GT2).

Finally, 'France and national investment' was another topic found in the Arab corpus and was covered in one news article, '*Sarkozy cites national priorities as primary task*' (GN3), which reported and reviewed Sarkozy's key note speech. In regard to Sarkozy's speech, this article centred its attention on Sarkozy's comments and proposals regarding France's

national economy, while a smaller section towards the middle of the article was dedicated to his views on the face veil.

It is important to note that although these articles reported on the argument for the face veil ban and some similarities were found between the UK and Arab based articles, there were key differences in the overall reporting of events. These were highlighted by some interesting variations in quotation patterns and the referential/predicational strategies used in the representation of in and out group, which were revealed during the micro analysis.

#### **4.2.2 Social Object: The Face Veil**

The next level of analysis involves examining how key social objects and actors are referred to and the qualities attributed to them. The issue or object at the centre of the controversy is the 'face veil' and it is ultimately the focus of the various arguments made in the newspaper texts. Therefore, it was important to begin the descriptive analysis by examining the referential and predicational strategies used in reference to the face veil. Although there were some general similarities in the UK and Arab English language press, divergent naming and description patterns were highlighted as well, constructing a base for the macro differences found in the topos drawn upon in the representation of Islam and Muslims in later stages of the analysis, i.e. argumentation strategies.

##### **4.2.2.1 Referential Strategies**

In terms of the referential or naming options used to refer to the face veil in the UK based articles, they were found to be varied, some of these included: *burqa, burka, niqab, veil*. More general terms were also used primarily highlighting the item's function: *covering, dress, garment and clothing*. This corresponds with the findings of the quantitative analysis of the full corpus of articles involved in the larger study, where newspapers were found not to agree on a particular lexical item or spelling to refer to the face veil, e.g. burka, burqa and burkha. Moreover, as with the content analysis findings, burqa/burka was the lexical item most frequently used in the UK newspaper corpus. The *Times* and *Daily Telegraph* also provided some examples of negative and derogatory references towards the face veil, these included: *Cover-up tents, black sack, symbol of darkness* and *bogus symbol of Islamic piety*.

In the Arab press, however, echoing the quantitative analysis, there was a predominant use of the lexical items '*niqab*' and '*veil*', with the use of '*burqa*' to a lesser degree. These naming options may be argued to reflect the Arab papers heightened contextual awareness in regard to naming options available for the face veil. The '*niqab*', for instance, corresponds more with the local referencing to the face veil in the Persian Gulf region. In various Muslim contexts, the accurate definition or function of a '*burqa*' does not correspond with the meaning made prevalent in the UK newspaper discourse. Moreover, the face veil itself is referred to using various labels, some of which include: *niqab*, *boushiya*, *bukh'naq*, *khimar*, *al amira*, while some of the other items of clothing used as a full cover for the body are known as: *abaya*, *chador*, *mantu*.

The preference of 'face veil' to refer to the clothing item in question may reflect the Arab newspapers' awareness of the multiple lexical variations available in various Muslim contexts. The use of *face veil*, therefore, allows them to encompass all these variations under one title that describes the general function of the item under scrutiny as 'a veil covering the face'. This also may be seen as a rejection of 'a one fits all' *Orientalist* theme to Islam, which comes with the predominant use of '*burqa*' to refer to all forms of the face veils or garments that jointly veil the face and body. Other terms, e.g. '*abaya*' and '*jilbab*', which are more common in the region and may be considered more accurate references to the full body enclosing garment (a part of what is meant by the term '*burqa*' in the '*burqa ban*') were introduced in the text as well. Similar to the UK corpus, the face veil was also referred to using generic terms, such as: *garment*, *gown*, *dress and attire*, highlighting their functions as a piece of clothing.

More importantly, some Arab based articles highlighted the semantic variation associated with the face veil depending on context and/or provided critical commentary on what is viewed as an inaccurate reference to the face veil:

*The **burqa** or **abaya** as it is known in Saudi Arabia is a body robe. What covers the head and face is called a **niqab**. But it is not a question of semantics, because Sarkozy meant a head to toe dress when he referred to the **burqa**. (SG2)*

The *Guardian* were found to make similar efforts to highlight the semantic variation associated with the face veil. This was shown in two particular articles which made attempts

at semantic accuracy or/and highlighting the issue of multiple labels that the face veil tends to attract depending on the context:

*I have no definite opinions on the **voile integral – the burqa, sitar or khimar**. (TG5)*

*For a week now, the hundred or so French women who wear **the sitar (a veil that covers the face, incorrectly referred to as the burka) or niqab** have been at the heart of the French political debate. (TG6)*

#### 4.2.2.2 Predicational Strategies

Moving on, the qualities and traits attributed to the face veil through the use of predicational strategies were analysed next. These can take the form of adjectives, prepositional phrases, predicates and collocations. They can also be in the form of a word, phrase, or entire clause, which can describe the preceding or following element in a sentence. One of the more general and common predicational strategies found to be used in reference to the face veil in the Arab and UK based articles, highlighted the amount of coverage the ‘burqa’ is meant to entail. This was illustrated with the use of adjectives, such as, *full, head to toe, full body, all enveloping*, among others.

However, there were some prominent themes found in describing the face veil in the UK and Arab sets of articles. The reproduction of similar predicational strategies were found in both contexts, i.e. negativisation. However, in many instances, diverging even oppositional descriptive qualities emerged in the texts analysed. It is also worth mentioning, as with the referential strategies, some similarities were found between the Arab English language newspapers and the liberally inclined *Guardian* in the UK corpus.

Table 4.3 illustrates some of the key themes found in describing the face veil in the UK and Arab sets of articles.

UK Press		Arab Press	
1.	Negativisation: Topos of repression of women Topos of difference and separation Topos of Threat	1.	Negativisation: Topos of repression of women Topos of threat

2.	Disassociating Religion	2.	Negativisation distancing strategies
		3.	Positive attributes
		4.	Direct association with religion: Topos of religious obligation

Table 4.3 Predicational analysis: Face veil

- **UK Press: Negativisation**

Unlike the referential strategies used, predicational strategies in the UK press attributed the face veil with predominantly negative qualities and traits, drawing on various topoi, which were developed further in the arguments presented in the texts. These included highlighting the face veil as, (1) repressing women, (2) threatening, and (3) different and separate from Western society and its values.

The following are some examples of qualities attributed to the face veil according to topoi:

**‘Repression of women’**

*Symbol of submission*

*Symbol of subservience and debasement*

*Symbol of repression*

*Moving prison*

*Oppressive head-to-toe Islamic dress*

*Oppressive Islamic dress that ‘breaches Individual freedom’*

Tool of repression

Tool of oppression

Coffin that kills the fundamental rights of women

A symbol of servitude and humiliation

Coffin which kills basic freedoms

Incompatible with women’s rights

**‘Difference’ and ‘Separation’**

*The mistrust, alienation and break in communication engendered by the face veil*

*The burqa isolates women*

*Visible statement of difference and separation*

**'Threat'**

*Fundamentalist dress*

*We have known terrorists to try to escape wearing a burka*

*Face covering for women was a fundamentalist practice*

Not an exotic symbol, but a political one

The niqab is a deviation from genuine French Islam which is open and tolerant

Full veil challenges official Islam adopted in France

All articles analysed had numerous examples of negative predicational strategies. Some examples were parts of direct quotes from Sarkozy's speech and other politicians, while some were attributes given to the face veil by various writers for the papers.

- **UK Press: Islamic connection?**

One interesting pattern found in the *Times* that was not as common in the other newspapers forming the corpus was the disassociation of the face veil from the Islamic religion. The face veil was given attributes signalling it as separate from Islam and religion, linking it exclusively to tradition with modifiers such as:

*Purely tribal in tradition*

*Cultural tradition*

*Controversial in Islam*

*Not a religious symbol*

Similar modifiers were found in a few articles published in the *Independent*:

Not a religious sign

Not a religious symbol

In the *Times*, these predicational strategies worked to support an argument representing conservative Muslim societies negatively as using the face veil to assert their power in the

West, drawing on the topoi of 'threat' (further discussion in the argumentation analysis). These modifiers also drew on the topoi of 'authority', where one of the main arguments for the establishment of the face veil ban was supported by the premise that various authorities reject the face veil having any religious foundation. The idea that it is viewed as a religious obligation by some is rejected, therefore concluding that as an item of clothing, it does not *need* to be worn.

Nevertheless, other UK based papers in the corpus were also found to associate the face veil with Islam and religion by the use of attributes, such as, '*Islamic*', '*religious*' and '*religious symbol*'. This emphasis on a religious association was clearly highlighted in the Arab corpus of articles; the face veil is predominantly described as '*religious*' and '*Islamic*' with the frequent use of this association as the main premise for arguments against a ban, as will be seen in the coming section.

- **Arab Press: Negativisation/ Negativisation Distancing Strategies**

A few examples of negative predicational strategies were found in the Arab articles, drawing mainly on the topoi of 'repression of women' and 'threat':

**'Repression of women'**

*Sign of subservience, a sign of debasement*

*A garment they said amounted 'to a breach of individual freedoms on our national territory'*

*Infringement of women's rights*

*Walking prisons*

*Sign of subjugation*

**'Threat'**

*Increasingly being imposed by fundamentalists*

*Burqa which appears to be like the reproduction of the dress code imposed by the Taliban on women in Afghanistan*

*The historic implications of the burqa are those of radicalism and extremism*

Having said that, most examples of negative predicational strategies were either, (1) parts of quotations by Nicolas Sarkozy and other pro-face veil ban politicians, or (2) presented with the use of quotation marks around particular negative attributes, e.g. *'degrading'*, which worked to distance the paper from this particular view.

Moreover, in most cases where negative predicational strategies are utilized, they are presented within a critical frame. That is, they were either preceded or followed by, (1) mitigation and detachment strategies, or/and (2) critical comments towards the negative view.

*I THINK French president Nicolas Sarkozy has not visited a convent of late. If he had he would have noticed nuns in wimples and robes. **Would he call the dress worn by the nuns 'a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement?'*** (SG2)

*Sarkozy said the burqa was 'a sign of subjugation' and as such was 'not welcome on French territory'. Whether or not one agrees with wearing the burqa, **isn't it a personal matter that should be left to individuals to decide upon? No government or leader should dictate to people what they should wear.*** (GN5)

*'The burqa is a not a religious sign, it's a sign of debasement – I want to say it solemnly' he said, addressing members of both parliamentary houses gathered at the Palace of Versailles for his speech. You could have knocked me down with a feather: **since when did Sarkozy become an authority on Islam?*** (SG3)

The above three excerpts taken from 3 different articles illustrate how mitigation was utilized to frame quotes which attribute the face veil with negative qualities: *'a sign of subjugation'*, *'a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement'* and *'not a religious sign, it's a sign of debasement'*. In all three examples, questions are used as a form of mitigation, which indirectly add critical commentary on the meaning of the quote.

- **Arab Press: Positive Attributes**

One extremely significant pattern found in the Arab corpus that was nearly absent in the UK corpus was the attribution of the face veil with positive qualities, specifically in terms of the positive feelings face veiling women share towards the face veil, and why they opt to adopt it. These positive qualities were also found to be attributed to another form of the Muslim veil, 'the hijab' (the headscarf). These qualities mainly accredited the various forms of the Muslim veil as providing women with: 'power', 'identity' and 'freedom'.

*Burqa is a **sign of modesty** (SG2)*

*It gives her **identity** (SG2)*

*it provides **freedom** from emphasis on the physical and from competing with other women's looks as well as from being sex objects for males to reject and approve. (GN8)*

*It enables women to focus on their **spiritual, intellectual and professional development**. (GN8)*

*Muslim women often talk about what the **hijab symbolises: religious devotion, discipline, reflection, respect, freedom and modernity**. (GN8)*

*wearing the burqa gives them a **sense of freedom** due to the sheer anonymity it provides. (GN10)*

- **Arab Press: Direct Religious Association**

Highlighting the face veil's stance and direct association with Islam as religion was another pattern found in the Arab based articles (mainly the *Saudi Gazette* and *Gulf Times*). The emphasis on this relation was used to support the argument against a face veil ban and for the freedom of choice, where the topos of 'religious obligation' was drawn upon, portraying the face veil as a religious duty that must be practiced by Muslim women. This was partly translated in the text by the use of predicational strategies in reference to the face veil:

*such a garment is **undoubtedly a religious obligation** (SG3)*

*It is a **sign of subservience – not to human beings, fickle fashion trends and social mores – but to the higher Wisdom of the One who decreed it an obligatory protection for Muslim women.** (SG3)*

*There is no doubt that the niqab (a face covering and loose body-length gown) is **a mandatory dress for all Muslim women wherever they are.** (GT4)*

*Islamic dress code **ordained by Islam.** (GT4)*

*The niqab is **obligatory and this was confirmed in the Holy Qur'an.** (GT4)*

*Niqab is a controversial issue, while some scholars see it as **mandatory**, others regard it as **non-obligatory.** (GT4)*

However, the UAE based *Gulf News* also provided two examples where the face veil was disassociated from Islam as a religion:

***Neither the burqa or niqab is ordered by Islam ...They are local costumes, but Muslim women should not be forced to remove them.** (GN6)*

***I agree it is not a religious sign, since several non-Muslims in India also use it to cover themselves. I believe the main objective of a burqa is to avoid the exposure of body parts.** (GN7)*

#### **4.2.3 Social Actors: Muslims and Face Veiling Women**

In both the UK and Arab English language newspaper articles, Muslims and face veiling women were predominantly referred to using assimilation strategies, where they were presented as a group rather than individuals. Collectivisation was realized by the plurality of social actors described:

*Conservative **Muslims** and those sympathetic to them (TG5)*

*refused to talk to **veiled women** (GN10)*

Collectivisation was also displayed by the use of nouns denoting groups, referring to Muslims as a collective entity:

*or from France’s problems with assimilating its **Muslim community**. (T13)*

Similar to findings on predicational strategies used in conjunction with the face veil, qualities attributed to Muslims and face veiling women revealed interesting and diverging patterns in each context. Some of these patterns fall in line with and support the key arguments and topoi found to be dominating articles in each context in regard to the representation of Islam and Muslims.

Table 4.4 illustrates some the key patterns found in the UK and Arab English articles, which will be discussed in further detail in the following sections.

UK Press		Arab English Language Press	
1	Aggregation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High Muslim population</li> <li>• Topos of Threat: Increase in the number of face veiling women</li> <li>• Muslim support for a ban</li> </ul>	1	Aggregation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High Muslim population</li> <li>• Low number of face veiling women</li> <li>• High number of women <u>choosing</u> to practice face veiling</li> </ul>
2	Negative Attribution <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Topos of Repression of women</li> <li>• Topos of Threat</li> </ul>	2	Emphasis on Identity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Highlighting Muslims nationality or civic status in Europe</li> </ul>
3	Good Muslim vs. Bad Muslim dichotomy		

Table 4.4 Predicational analysis: Muslims and face veiling women

- **UK Press: Aggregation Patterns**

In the UK Press, aggregation, a form of assimilation which quantifies groups was found to be used highlighting the large amount of Muslims in France:

***France's five million strong Muslim community*** (TT2)

*France has Western Europe's **largest Muslim Population**, estimated at **5 million**.*

(TG4)

Aggregation was also utilized, drawing on the topos of 'threat', where the practice of wearing the face veil and its wearers were highlighted as increasing in number, working towards a negative presentation of the social actors as a growing problem. Although examples of this were found in all papers involved in the study, it was particularly evident in the *Times*, in addition to the *Daily Telegraph*, which presented numbers dramatically higher than any of the numbers presented in other UK dailies examined.

*She is **alarmed** by the **number of women wearing veils**.* (TT1)

*They are no official figures, but **around 100,000 women** are thought to wear the burqa in France* (DT3)

***Explosion in the number*** of women wearing the full-length veils in France (TI1)

*President Sarkozy took issue with the **proliferation of** women wearing the burqa in France.* (TI3)

As seen above, terms and phrases, such as, *alarmed*, *explosion in the number* and *proliferation*, as well as large numbers draw on the topos of 'threat' in highlighting face veiling as a growing problem which needs to be controlled or solved.

However, aggregation was not limited to emphasising the increasing or large number of women adopting the veil. The *Guardian* provided examples where these accounts are

refuted; quantifying attributes emphasised the lack of women who actually wear the face veil in France:

*Yet the actual numbers of niqab wearers in France appears to be so small that TV news crews have struggled to find individuals to film. Muslim groups estimate that there are perhaps **only a few hundred women** fully covering themselves out of a Muslim population of over 5 million – often young French women, many of them converts’. (TG7)*

As shown above, this account differs quite dramatically from the accounts illustrated earlier. Similar aggregation patterns highlighting a low number of face veiling women in France were also echoed in the Arab based articles, as will be shown later in the analysis.

The final point on aggregation patterns relates to its use in emphasising a consensus in Muslim views supporting the face veil ban. Again, this was mainly found in the newspapers commonly viewed as conservative.

*Measures against face cover are supported **by two of the three women Muslims in the cabinet** (TT2)*

Another example was found in the *Daily Telegraph*, which highlighted Muslim support for a similar ban in the UK and their criticism of the face veiling practice. Following a hypothetical narrative of what would take place if the Queen of England was to follow suit and re-state President Sarkozy’s critical views on the face veil and the desire to ban it, the hypothetical Muslim reaction is described as follows:

*But it would also raise cheers, **not least from some members of the Muslim community**. ‘The French president should be applauded for initiating this debate,’ Dr. Taj Hargey of the Muslim Educational Centre of Oxford told me yesterday. Dr. Hargey describes the **growing** belief that Muslim women should cover their head, face and hands as ‘doctrinaire brain-washing’. (DT2)*

The argument for a ban is supported by drawing on the topos of ‘authority’, where Muslims themselves are depicted as being ‘not least’ of those who would support a face veil ban. The

same topos and the topos of 'threat' are drawn upon further in the following section. A speaker associated with a Muslim institution is individualised and directly quoted as being critical of the face veiling practice. He describes the practice with an explicit negative attribute of being 'doctrinaire brain-washing', a practice that is 'growing' and consequently, posing a problem or *threat* to society.

- **UK Press: Negative Attributions**

There were also instances where the referential and predicational strategies used in reference to face veiling women highlighted negative connotations, drawing on the topoi of 'repression of women' and 'threat'.

*These **caged women** show the power of fundamentalist women to indoctrinate* (TT1)

*These are women who **are the prey of oppression, from masculine domination to fundamentalist Islamic Indoctrination*** (T11)

*I also felt depressed – depressed that here was **a women entirely shrouding her identity in public. Depressed that she was denied even the most basic social interaction with strangers** that comes with walking down a busy street.* (T13)

*The sight of these **imprisoned women*** (TG1)

Negative referencing and predicational strategies, drawing on the topoi of 'threat', were also found in the *naming* of Muslim actors, e.g. **extremists, liberty's enemies, fundamentalist.**

- **UK Press: 'Good Muslim vs. Bad Muslim' Dichotomy**

Finally, as argued in previous research (Mamdani, 2004; Riley, 2009; Jiwani & Dakroury, 2009), a binary dichotomy of 'Good Muslim vs. Bad Muslim' is represented in the text, through the use of particular terms attributed to Muslim actors. As Riley (2009) argues based on an analysis of the Canadian press, 'Good Muslims' attributed with qualities such as

'moderate' and 'progressive' are depicted as: (1) patriotically loyal to the nation they live in and its values, i.e. Canada, (2) aiming to protect and help what are described as 'oppressed' Muslim women, (3) being threatened by 'Bad Muslims'. 'Bad Muslims', on the other hand, are attributed with terms such as, 'Islamists', and are depicted as polarised from 'good Muslims', as they are associated and linked to fundamentalism and extremism.

In the *Times* articles analysed in this study, similar examples were found using attributes, such as, '*moderate*' Muslims and '*conservative*' Muslims:

***Moderate Muslims*** also saw full face covering as a symbol of submission (TT2)

*While many in France, home to more than five million Muslims, have applauded his stance, **conservative Muslims** in Europe and the Middle East have deplored his remarks. The burka, they insist, is a 'symbol of Freedom' (TT5)*

*The burka appears to be tribal in its origin, and this cultural tradition has been given dubious religious sanction by **conservative societies**. (TT5)*

As shown, Muslims who are labelled as '*moderate*' are aligned with the argument against face veiling as they view it as '*symbol of submission*'. Meanwhile, face veiling which is highlighted as oppressive is a practice directly linked with '*conservative*' Muslims by the use of '*conservative societies*' who are depicted negatively, (hence, 'bad Muslim'), where they are attributed with giving the face veil '*dubious religious sanction*'.

Other similar attributes were found in the *Guardian* and the *Daily Telegraph*:

***Conservative Muslims*** and those sympathetic to them are protesting against the inquiry, but with uncharacteristic reserve. (TG5).

***Modern moderate Muslims*** feel banning such religious clothing would prove counter-productive (DT2)

Generalisations are made in both examples. In the first example from the *Guardian*, only ‘*conservative Muslims*’ are presumed to be protesting against the inquiry, as opposed to more liberally inclined Muslims. The second example taken from a *Daily Telegraph*’s sub-heading was even more extreme, ‘*moderate Muslims*’ are directly associated with modernity (a positive quality), making 2 presumptions: (1) there are Muslims that are not ‘Modern’ (2) only (and all) ‘modern’ and ‘moderate’ Muslims feel banning the face veil would prove counterproductive.

- **Arab Press: Aggregation Patterns**

Aggregation, the form of assimilation which quantifies groups was also found to be used in the Arab press, highlighting the large amounts of Muslims in France:

*France has Western Europe’s **largest** Muslim population, **an estimated 5 million people**.* (GN2)

*Home to Europe’s **largest minority*** (SG1)

However, aggregation was not limited to highlighting the large number of Muslim communities, it was also adopted in numerous articles to emphasise the lack or low number of women in France who actually wear the face veil. This worked to reject the representation of the face veil as a significantly growing trend.

*The burqa is causing turmoil in France, although **only a few dozen Muslim women** wear it. This is a new phenomenon not seen in France before, and it is **still considered marginal, in terms of the number of people concerned**. Most French citizens have only seen women wearing the burqa in newspaper pictures or on television, thanks to photographers who watched and waited until they could photograph **one of them**. However, even if this **phenomenon was insignificant considering the number of people involved**, it is not at all a marginal topic in French society.* (GN9)

*Yet the actual numbers of **niqab wearers in France appears to be so small** that TV news crews have struggled to find individuals to film. Muslim groups estimate perhaps **only a few hundred women fully covering themselves out of a Muslim***

*population of more than 5mn, often young French women, many of them converts.*  
(GT5)

Aggregation was also used, specifically in the *Saudi Gazette* to emphasise that many women who choose to don the face veil, willingly do so, negating the argument for a face veil ban based on the premise that it is a form of ‘female oppression’.

*Has he ever spoken to **any of the thousands of Muslim women who willingly choose to wear the burqa/abaya/jilbab and asked them the rationale behind their choice of that garb?** (SG3)*

*Sarkozy chose to call a dress willingly adopted by many Muslim women all over the world as a sign of subservience and degradation. (SG2)*

*But I suspect **that a vast majority of Muslim women in Europe willingly choose to do so for religious and cultural reasons.** (GN10)*

- **Arab Press: Emphasis on Identity**

Arab English language newspapers were found to utilize naming and predicational strategies that reflect or emphasise the actor’s nationality, ‘French’ or civic status, ‘*citizen of France*’, ‘*immigrants*’, rather than simply labelling them merely as ‘Muslims’ or ‘women who wear the face veil’. This is fitting with the topos of ‘discrimination’, extensively drawn upon in the Arab based articles in the representation of Muslims as individuals being discriminated against based on their religion, emphasising that they in fact are ‘French citizens’ who should be receiving equal rights:

*The commission appointed to study the issue must look at the context of personal choice and **immigrant rights.** (GN9)*

*Sarkozy has no right to impose his cultural leanings or his own interpretation of other people’s culture on **citizens** within a democracy born on a platform of liberty, equality and fraternity. (GN10)*

Highlighting face veil wearers as ‘citizens’, who are being discriminated against is more explicitly presented in the next excerpt:

*I still remember my years spent in Algeria in the 1970's, when most Algerian women were veiled. If **young French women of North African descent** are choosing to be covered they are simply adhering to their roots.*

*And why shouldn't they when for decades Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians have been treated as **third-class citizens** in France? (GN10)*

In the next examples taken from the texts, the reference to face veil wearers as primarily ‘French’ is taken a step further, where women who wear the face veil were described as mainly made up of ‘*French converts*’. This works to highlight the practice of face veiling as not exclusive to individuals raised as Muslims or/and to people of various ethnic descents who immigrated to France, i.e. ‘*immigrants*’. It highlights face veiling women in France, as mainly made up of individuals who are ‘French’ and have converted to Islam.

*Muslim groups estimate perhaps only a few hundred women fully covering themselves out of a Muslim population of more than 5mn, **often young French women, many of them converts.** (GT5)*

*A few thousand women wear the burqa in France, **many of whom are French converts who choose to cover themselves to assert their faith** (KT1 and repeated in SG1)*

#### **4.2.4 Social Actions**

The next level of analysis investigates the actions attributed to the social actors (in and out-groups) and the role they are allocated in the process. Patterns and discursive structures in line with van Dijk’s ‘ideological square’ or positive ‘Self’ and negative ‘Other’ presentation have proven evident throughout the analysis on both a macro and micro level of the UK and Arab based newspapers. However, these structures played a particularly evident role in shaping the syntactic structuring of sentences. This can specifically be found with the choice of passive vs. active construction in a clause, which can have ideological significance, highlighting ‘our’ positive and ‘their’ negative attributes. For instance, van Dijk (2000: 40)

explains that “minorities are often represented in a passive role (things are being decided or done, for or against them), unless they are agents of negative actions, such as illegal entry, crime, violence or drug abuse. In the latter case their responsible agency will be emphasized”.

In the corpus representing the UK based articles for the June peak period, the analytical findings echoed van Dijk’s above description with some key differences. Face veiling women were indeed mainly allocated passive roles. However, Muslims in general were predominantly allocated active roles in verbal and material processes. Moreover, the agency of face veil wearers and Muslims in general (out-group) were not limited to negative actions, agency also functioned in highlighting: (1) Face veil wearers’ ‘humanization’ and ‘victimisation’ (primarily found in an anti-face veil ban articles and the *Guardian*), and (2) Muslims’ active role in verbal processes through direct and indirect quotations supporting a face veil ban or being critical of the face veil wearing practice. Therefore, in addition to allocating roles in line with the positive ‘self’ and negative ‘other’ dichotomy, roles of Muslims and face-veiling women (out-group) were also found to be utilised to support the newspapers main arguments, drawing on key topoi, e.g. topoi of ‘repression of women’ and ‘threat’.

In the Arab context, in accordance with the ideological square, Muslims and face veiling women in particular (the in-group in this context) were generally allocated more positive active roles, and at times, presented as patients of negative action taken by various ‘out-group’ members, i.e. Sarkozy. The study also identified some distinct patterns in the roles and actions attributed to face veil wearers/ Muslim women in the various Arab quality newspaper analysed. In terms of social actions, the Arab press rejected the predominant discourse produced in the UK press, through allocating Muslim women with:

- 1) Increased active roles in mental, material and verbal processes, providing the reader with an insider view of their experiences and thoughts.
- 2) An active role in positive actions.
- 3) An active role in choosing to wear the face veil.

- 4) Passive roles as patients of *negative actions* inflected by the ‘Out-group/ Them’; and *positive actions* by the ‘in-group/Us’.
- 5) Passive roles as patients of ‘religious obligation’, highlighted by *obligation modality*.

Similarly, Muslim actors were also mainly represented as agents of verbal and mental processes highlighting their views on the face veil ban. These views, mainly made by elite Muslim scholars, also supported one of the key topoi in the Arab press, the topos of ‘religious obligation’, associating the face veil with religion

Table 4.5 and 4.6 summarise the key patterns found in relation to the social actions of face veiling/Muslim women and Muslims in the UK and Arab Press.

<b>Face Veiling/ Muslim Women</b>	
<b>UK Press</b>	<b>Arab Press</b>
<p>Mainly in <b>passive</b> roles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Patients of critical actions by ‘in-group’ members who are presented positively.</li> <li>• Patients of negative actions by members of the ‘out-group’ (or ‘Muslims’).</li> <li>• Patients of critical attitudes towards veiling and implications of previous bans (<i>Guardian</i>).</li> </ul>	<p>Mainly in <b>active</b> roles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agents of mental, material and verbal processes highlighting their experiences and thoughts.</li> <li>• Agents of positive actions.</li> <li>• Agents in <u>choosing</u> to practice veiling.</li> </ul>
<p>Active Role:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agents in describing their victimisation.</li> <li>• Agents of negative actions leading to their own ‘oppression’.</li> </ul>	<p>Passive roles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Patients of negative actions inflected by the ‘out-group.’</li> <li>• Patients of positive actions by the ‘in-group’.</li> <li>• patients of ‘religious obligation’.</li> </ul>

Table 4.5 Social action analysis: Face veiling women

<b>Muslims</b>	
<b>UK Press</b>	<b>Arab Press</b>
<p>Mainly in <b>active</b> roles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agents of verbal processes highlighting pro ban views and negative opinions on face veiling.</li> <li>• Agents of negative actions, drawing on the topoi of ‘threat’ and ‘oppression of women’.</li> </ul>	<p>Mainly in <b>active</b> Roles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agents of verbal and mental processes highlighting: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the religious perspective towards implications of a ban on face veiling women.</li> <li>- Critical views of the ban.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

Table 4.6 Social action analysis: Muslims

Finally, it is important to note, as apparent from the discussion so far, early on in the analytical process, a distinct pattern in the roles allocated to face veil wearers as opposed to other Muslim actors became apparent. This made it necessary to conduct a more gender focused analysis. Accordingly, the following discussion will begin with the analytical findings related to the actions of face veil wearers/Muslim women followed by an analysis of the actions and roles allocated to Muslims in general, starting with the UK press.

#### **4.2.4.1 UK Press: The Role of the Face Veil Wearer**

Predominantly, women wearing the face veil were allocated passive roles in the UK press, appearing in the semantic category of ‘patients’, whereby something is being done to them or for them. Moreover, when analysing the actions and roles allocated to face veil wearers in the UK press, a contrast between the representation of face veil wearers in the *Guardian* and the rest of the newspapers became immediately evident.

- **Face Veiling Women - Passive Role**

Face veiling women in the *Times*, the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Independent*, were mainly allocated passive roles. In these papers, face veiling women were portrayed as:

- 1) *Patients at the receiving end of critical verbal and material actions taken by members of the 'in-group', i.e. Sarkozy and other authoritative figures for opting to wear the face veil.*
- 2) *Patients of negative actions being inflicted by actors associated with the 'out-group', e.g. their direct surroundings, family or the face veil itself.*

While the *Guardian* portrayed them as:

- 3) Patients of negative actions taken by the in-group, highlighting the topos of 'victimisation', where face veiling women are portrayed as victims of ill treatment.

The following examples place face veiling women as the object of critical verbal and material actions activated by members of the 'in-group':

(a) **take action against women adopting what they called *oppressive head to toe Islamic dress*** (DT1)

(b) **Last year, a Moroccan woman was refused French citizenship after social services said she wore a burqa and was living in 'submission' to her husband** (DT3)

(c) **Mr. Sarkozy made his attack on a small but growing number of fundamentalist women** (TT2)

The critical or negative action taken by members of the in-group towards face veiling women (out-group) were justified by the use of predicational strategies attributed to the face veil wearers, as seen in examples (a-b) from the *Daily Telegraph* and example (c) from the *Times*. As shown above, face veiling women are placed as the patients of action taken by

in-group members with processes such as *'take action against'*, *'refused French citizenship'* and *'attack'*. These actions are justified by the predicational strategies attributed to the face veiling women, such as, *'adopting oppressive head to toe Islamic dress'*, *'living in submission to her husband'* and being *'fundamentalist'*.

In the *Times*, the passive role of the face veil wearers (out-group) also assists in drawing on the topos of 'repression of women', where they were mainly reflected as victims of oppression, where actions are being done to or enforced upon them. Moreover, the 'in-group' are highlighted as agents of positive actions protecting the 'out-group' from the presupposed oppression they are subjected to by their surroundings and the wearing of the face veil:

*President Sarkozy is going to address the issue in a speech on Monday and a string of public figures have **come out largely in support of restrictions in order to protect women from oppression.** (TT1)*

*The measure was mainly intended **to ensure the equality of Muslim girls** and it has worked smoothly. (TT1)*

In both examples above, the assumption is made that Muslim women are indeed oppressed and face inequality, and thus, are in need of protection and help. These are offered by the 'out-group', represented by *'string of public figures'* and the *'measure'*, which refers to the '2003 French hijab ban', imposed by the French government.

This is also clearly highlighted in Sarkozy's speech, which is quoted in numerous articles:

*We cannot accept to have in our country **women who are prisoners behind netting, cut off from all social life, deprived of identity***

The positive/negative polarization of the 'in-group' and 'out-group' is made clearer by the use of the pronoun 'we' and the possessive form 'our'. The in-group 'we' are described as agents of a positive action, refusing to accept and wanting to protect face veil wearing

women in what is described as a negative state imposed on them. The out-group 'women' wearing the face veil are passivised as victims of the face veil, referred to as a 'netting' with the presumption that they are 'prisoners' controlled by it, neglecting the possibility that wearing the face veil can be the result of individual choice.

The positive depiction of actions carried out by the in-group towards the out-group was also evident in the following example:

*Sarkozy sees the clothing bans as a form of discrimination and **he tries to promote policies to bring Muslims, many or most of whom were born in France, into the mainstream community.** (TT1)*

Here, the 'in-group', once again represented by 'Sarkozy', is portrayed as the responsible agent of a positive action towards the 'out-group', 'Muslims'.

As mentioned earlier, face veiling women were also portrayed as patients of negative actions being inflicted by actors associated with the 'out-group/Them', be it, their direct surroundings, family or the face veil itself. In all cases, face veiling women are represented as passive victims of oppression, as shown in the following examples from the *Daily Telegraph*:

#### (1) Family and Surroundings

*Individual expression ceases to have much meaning if **women are being forced** into wearing **cover up tents by male relatives or mullahs** (DT2)*

*It is not a problem that **young girls may choose** to wear the veil or headscarf as long as they have actually chosen to do so, as opposed to this **being imposed upon them**, be it by their **families or environment.** (DT1)*

*The only logical reason why he made those remarks is that he had just been to **Afghanistan where women are oppressed** (DT2)*

(2) *The face veil*

*The **burka isolates women** (DT3)*

In the *Times*, similar examples included:

*I don't believe that **any man should force his wife** to wear the burka (TT4)*

*Such a dismissive response **seems to make** these women and their opinions **every bit as invisible as the burka does**. (TT4)*

Both these examples were taken from an op-ed article arguing against a face veil ban. However, although the writer argues for the freedom of choice in regard to what an individual chooses to wear, the representation of face veil wearers still draws upon the topos of the 'repression of women'. Face veil wearers are reflected as the passive actors of negative actions brought along by (1) the husband, 'man' repressing the women by forcing her to wear the burka, and (2) the 'burka' that makes her invisible.

In the *Independent*, similar examples were provided with the deletion of the agents of the negative actions at times:

*These are **women** who are the prey of oppression, from **Masculine domination to fundamentalistic Islamic indoctrination** (T11)*

*If it emerged that the wearing of the burqa **was imposed** [on women] (T11)*

***She was denied** even the most basic social interaction (T13)*

The negative actions inflicted on the women mainly drew on the topos of 'repression of women', where face veiled women were portrayed as being acted upon and under the control of others.

As mentioned earlier, there were some clear differences in the roles allocated to face veiling women in the *Guardian*, as opposed to the other newspapers examined. Like the other newspapers, face veiling women were mainly allocated passive roles, where they are portrayed as patients of actions being done to them or for them. However, they were portrayed as patients of negative actions arising from:

- 1) *The general critical attitude towards face veiling*
- 2) *Implications of previous similar bans, e.g. the '2003 French hijab ban'.*

In most of the examples presented in the *Guardian*, the topos of 'victimisation' is drawn upon; face veiling women were individualised and detailed descriptions of the negative actions against them were provided:

***Official displays of intolerance towards what some Muslim women wear (TG3)***

*This time, it is about **intervening directly** in the private choice of women, because that choice would be incompatible with living in France. (TG6)*

*A year ago, a Moroccan woman who wore the niqab **was refused** French nationality, **a decision blamed** on her 'submission to her husband and her religious misogynist doctrine'. (TG6)*

*But **to punish** women and not think about ways to fight their male oppressors makes little sense; it goes against the idea that French laws must be the same for everyone. (TG6)*

Here, face veiling women are patients being subjected to negative actions. Nevertheless, in these examples the agents of the action are not directly specified. This was either done by agent deletion, which is made possible by the passive construction of the process or through the nominalised forms of verbs.

Articles did also include examples where the agency of negative actions were explicitly allocated to actors representing the 'in-group', highlighting their role in the victimisation of face veiling women, the 'out-group'.

***Gerin has refused to conduct the town-hall wedding of a woman wearing niqab (TG7)***

***Sarkozy is thus a modern-day Robespierre, proposing some women – whom he presumes to have been silenced by patriarchal society and whose voices he doesn't want to hear – be terrorised in the name of the kind of abstract freedoms France has venerated for 210 years (TG3)***

- **Face Veiling Women - Active Role**

Less frequent were instances involving face veil wearers in active roles. Nevertheless, in the few examples where the face veil wearer was represented as the agent of an action, representation drew on:

- (1) the 'humanisation' of women wearing the veil and their 'victimisation'.
- (2) the topos of the 'repression of women', where face veil wearers are represented as the agents of negative actions, taking an active role in the existence and maintenance of the oppression of women, by the very act of wearing the face veil.

The humanisation of face veiling women was mainly highlighted in the op-ed '*Niqabi, interrupted*' (TT6), published in the *Times*. The article repeatedly represented the face veil wearer as an active agent of everyday activities with the use of the pronoun 'I', emphasising the normality of a face veil wearer's daily life with an increased amount of detail in the description:

*I put on my niqab, my face veil, each day before I leave the house, without a second thought. I drape over my face, tie the ribbons at the back and adjust the opening over my eyes to make sure my peripheral vision is not affected.*

*But is that truly how people see me? When I walk through the park with my little ones in tow, when I reverse my car into a parking space, when I ask how to best cook asparagus at a market stall, what do people see? An oppressed women? A nameless, voiceless individual? A criminal?*

The same article draws on the topos of 'victimisation', where face veil wearers are represented as the victims of negative actions by various sources, motivated by the fact they wear the face veil. Some of these include sources related to in-group members, e.g. newspapers.

*So, three cheers for those women who make the choice to cover, in whatever way and still go out there every day. Go out to brave the scorn and ridicule of those who think they understand the burka better than those who actually wear it. Go out to face the humiliating headlines. Go out to face taunts of schoolchildren.*

The humanisation and topos of 'victimisation' also played a chief role in the face veil discourse found in the *Guardian*. This was done by allocating veil wearers in active roles of verbal, material and mental processes, presenting detailed accounts of their experience as victims, as well as their thoughts on the issue:

*'I feel like I'm being judged walking down the street. People tut or spit. In a smart area West of Paris, one man stopped his car and shouted: 'Why don't you go back to where you came from?' **But I am French. I couldn't be more French,' Said the 23-year-old,** who was born and raised in bourgeois Versailles. (TG7)*

*'But this week, after Sarkozy announced that full veils weren't welcome in France, things have got really difficult.' She said... 'I am qualified childminder and get plenty of interviews because of my CV, but when people see me in person, they don't call*

*back. It's difficult in this country, there's a certain mood in the air. I **don't feel** comfortable walking around.'* (TG7)

***Horia Demiati, 30, A French financier** who wears the standard headscarf with her business suits, said: '**I really fear** an increase in hatred'* (TG7)

The agency of face veil wearers was also related to negative actions, by drawing on the topos of the 'repression of women'. This was illustrated in a direct quotation from Gilbert Collard, a celebrity lawyer arguing against a face veil ban on the premise that it will result in the further isolation of the women wearing it:

*These caged women **show** the power of the fundamentalists to indoctrinate. They **testify** also to an odious idea of women as an object of submission to an all-powerful master who is the exclusive proprietor of her face.* (TT1)

Although face veil wearing women are represented as oppressed by the negative referential strategies used, where they are referred to as 'caged women', they are given an active role in this repression. That is, they are represented as active agents of negative actions illustrated by the process verbs 'show' and 'testify', reflecting them as actively symbolizing the presupposed link between fundamentalism and the face veiling practice, as well as, the existence of female repression.

Similar examples were found in the *Independent*, face veiling women were also given active roles, mainly highlighting their active responsibility in negative actions towards themselves. They are portrayed as playing a part in their own 'oppression' by donning the face veil.

*Here was **a women entirely shrouding** her identity in public.* (TI3)

Later, in the same article, this active agency of a negative action places face veiling women in direct conflict with the positive qualities 'feminists' are described to have advocated and 'fought for' over the years:

*I don't know how many women 'choose' to wear burqas, but the idea **they decide as one to wear the same drab garb they had sported on the previous day** rather stretches the possibilities of the individual, and equal, expression feminists have fought for. (T13)*

Drawing on the topos of 'repression of women', the action of wearing the face veil is put in direct opposition with the positive qualities associated with the feminist concepts of women empowerment and equality.

Finally, in the *Guardian*, women wearing the face veil were also portrayed as actively taking part in negative actions towards themselves as a result of wearing the face veil, drawing on the topos of 'separateness', distancing themselves from society:

*Increasingly, **veiled women chose to look inwards, withdraw from society and benefit from the networks of solidarity offered by salafism, rather than fighting for their choice in the political sphere.** (TG6)*

#### **4.2.4.2 UK Press: The Role of Muslims**

In the UK based articles, actors specified as 'Muslims' were mainly found to be represented as:

- 1) agents of verbal processes, voicing their pro-ban views and their condemnation of the face veiling practice.
- 2) agents of negative actions, at times, drawing on the topoi of 'threat' and/or 'repression of women'.

Starting with the verbal processes Muslims are responsible for, in most newspapers, opinions for and against the ban were voiced by elite Muslim actors. However, the *Times* mainly involved Muslim actors declaring their criticism of the face veiling practice or/and their pro veil ban views:

***Dalil Boubakeur, rector of the Great Mosque of Paris, called the president's remarks 'in keeping with the republican spirit of secularism'.** (TT2)*

**Moderate Muslims also saw the full face covering as a symbol of submission, said Boubakeur.** (TT2)

Measures against face covers **are supported by two of the three women Muslims in the cabinet** (TT2)

Foreign Correspondents here found their home media editing out the fact that the **school veil ban was supported by Muslims.** (TT1)

Muslim actors were also given active roles in material processes. These usually involved Muslims taking an active role in negative actions against the 'in-group' or face veiling women, drawing on the topos of 'repression of women'.

In the *Guardian* article headlined, 'France's burqa barrier' (TG6), Muslims leaders were given the responsibility of a negative action towards the in-group's society by not ensuring the integration of veiled women within the society:

*However, the full veil's very existence challenges the official Islam adopted in France and is one of the consequences of **Muslim leaders' failure to ensure the integration of veiled women** after the 2004 law, and to protect the Muslim community from many Islamophobic acts which followed.*

Similar examples were more frequent in the *Times*, as the following extracts will show. The following 2 excerpts, taken from an op-ed headlined, 'Veiled threat' (TT5), show actions involving Muslim actors drawing on the topos of 'threat':

**Conservative Muslims in Europe and the Middle East have deplored his remarks. The Burka, they insist, is a 'symbol of freedom' and a Western state has no business dictating how Muslims should dress.**

*The Burka appears to be purely tribal in its origin, and this cultural tradition **has been given dubious religious sanction by conservative societies.***

As illustrated, the negative action of giving ‘*dubious religious sanction*’ is activated by Muslim agents, who are referred to collectively as ‘*conservative societies*’. The first phrase which appears earlier in the article clarifies the particular religion of these conservative societies by referring to its members as ‘*Conservative Muslims*’. Furthermore, the article distances itself from the views of conservative Muslims towards the Burka being a ‘symbol of freedom’, by the use of quotation marks.

*Too often **extremists** try to exploit this bogus symbol of Islamic piety to create Muslim ghettos where **they assert** their own personal power. Too often **the issue is a deliberate provocation to challenge** the values and mores of **Western Society**.*

Similar to the above example, in addition to the use of the negative naming ‘*extremists*’ to refer to Muslims, they are allocated with the agency of the negative process of ‘*exploiting*’ the face veil for their own power gaining agendas. The idea of the threat posed by the out-group, ‘*extremists*’ is made clearer by allocating the in-group, ‘*Western Society*’, as the patient of the negative action, whose values are challenged and threatened by the out-group.

Another example of the agency of a negative action which does not draw on the topos of ‘threat’, but nevertheless is negative, was found in the op-ed headlined, “*Britain could never debate the burka like France*” (TT3).

*When **Jack Straw** dared to state the obvious in 2006 by saying that the burka and the niqab were ‘visible statements of separation and of difference’ before **asking politely** that women visiting his constituency surgery consider removing them, it **provoked angry protests from Islamic associations** and the British liberal-left, always inclined, it seems, to defend the rights of liberty’s enemies.*

As shown in the above example, although Jack Straw's comments were critical of burqa wearers, his action as an in-group member are described positively; his action 'asked' is attributed with a positive adjective 'politely'. On the other hand, the out-group, who are referred to collectively as 'Islamic associations' are linked with a negative action described as 'angry protests'. Furthermore, Jack Straw's actions are justified and the writer's stance is made clearer by describing his actions as stating the 'obvious'.

#### **4.2.4.3 Arab Press: The Face Veil Wearer - A More Active Role**

Generally, there was a clear higher presence of active roles allocated to women wearing the face veil in the Arab based press. They were portrayed as agents of actions, and it was the type of actions they were attributed with that proved to be quite revealing. Face veiling women were given the agency of:

- 1) verbal and mental processes, illustrating their feelings and views on the experience of face veiling.
- 2) positive material processes
- 3) the material process of *choosing* to veil

Starting with the first frequently found pattern, active verbal and mental processes mainly focused on unveiling the face veil wearers' reasoning behind adopting the face veil, as well as, exploring their emotions in relation to the practice of face veiling. This was marked in the text through direct and indirect quotations, in addition to, general descriptions. Consequently, Muslim women and women who wear the face veil are given a more prominent presence and voice in the texts. To explain further, the following section will provide some examples.

In the op-ed, "French president's burqa views leave readers fuming" (GN7), a face veil wearer is allocated with the agency of a verbal process, where she is directly quoted. She is also given an active role in a mental process, illustrating how she feels as a woman practicing face veiling:

*Jamie Watson, an American expatriate, was upset by the French President's comments. **She said:** 'He obviously does not understand the concept of a burqa, since he is not a Muslim. It is not up to the people outside the religion to decide what is appropriate for us. And what does he mean by a 'religious sign'? **A burqa, to me, is as relevant as a cross**'. After having embraced Islam a few years ago, **Jamie realised how 'comfortable' she felt** when covered from head to toe.*

Other similar examples of Muslim women and women wearing the face veil in active roles, include:

***Many say** that wearing the burqa gives them a sense of freedom due to the sheer anonymity it provides. (GN10)*

***They think** that Western fashions force women into uncomfortable and undignified outfits and, often in the name of liberation, actually turn them into sexual objects as reflected in modern media and movies. (GN8)*

***Women who wear the scarf point out** that women of many other cultures and religions - Russian women, Hindu women, Jewish women, Greek women and Catholic nuns – often wear head coverings. **They ask** why these women are not viewed as being oppressed. (GN8).*

The active role given to Muslim women and women wearing the face veil also highlights them as agents of positive actions, and associating the veil with positive connotations:

***Muslim women often talk about** what the Hijab symbolises: religious devotion, discipline, reflection, respect, freedom and modernity. (GN10).*

***Whether veiled or not, majorities of Muslim women – even in some of the most conservative societies – support equal rights.** In sharp contrast to their popular image as silently submissive, socially conditioned women who readily accept second-class status, **majorities of Muslim women in virtually every country surveyed say women should have the same legal rights as men.** (GN10)*

These examples correspond with van Dijk's ideological square, where the 'in-group' which represent 'Us' or 'Muslim women', are represented as agents of positive actions. They are

reflected as active and vocal members of society promoting equal rights, instead of women oppressed by their surroundings. In addition, it is worth noting, the term ‘*conservative*’ as an attribute to Muslims or Muslim societies does not carry any of the negative connotations it was found to be associated with in the some of the UK based papers. However, the use of the term ‘*even*’ prior to the phrase, ‘*in some of the most conservative societies*’ in the above example, can be viewed as making a presupposition that ‘*conservative*’ Muslim societies do *not* in fact advocate equal rights.

Another clear pattern found in a few of the *Gulf News* and *Saudi Gazette* articles, is the allocation of veiling women as agents of the mental process of ‘*choosing*’ to wear the veil in all its forms. This draws on the topos of ‘*freedom of choice*’, where it is emphasised that the practice of veiling in general is actually adopted based on personal freedom and choice, rather than being an enforced practice.

*But I Suspect that **the vast majority of Muslim women in Europe willingly choose** to do so for religious and cultural reasons. (GN10)*

*If **young French women of North African descent are choosing** to be covered they are simply adhering to their roots. (GN10)*

*Of course, this isn’t the first time that Western politicians have attempted to interfere in the way Muslim **women choose** to dress. (GN10)*

The action of freely ‘*choosing*’ is also reflected indirectly in the following example:

*Many young Muslim women have **adopted** Islamic dress to **symbolise** a return to their cultural roots and the rejection of Western traditions that in their view shows little respect to women. (GN8)*

In this example, instead of using the verb ‘*choose*’, Muslim women are represented as agents of the verb ‘*adopted*’ followed by another verb ‘*to symbolise*’, which provides a personal reason for their adoption of the ‘*Islamic dress*’. This automatically eliminates the possibility of the practice being enforced upon them.

The *Saudi Gazette* provided even more similar examples. However, in addition to allocating face veil wearers the role of actively ‘*choosing*’ to wear the face veil, predicational strategies

were used, associating face veiling women with positive qualities. Furthermore, some examples drew on the topos of 'victimisation', where although face veil wearers are portrayed as active agents of various processes, they were faced with negative and critical actions brought forward by the 'out-group', 'Them', e.g. Sarkozy.

***Sarkozy** chose to call a dress willingly adopted by many Muslim women all over the world as a sign of subservience and degradation. (SG2)*

*The burqa does not deprive a woman of her identity. On the contrary, it gives her an identity: an identity of being modest in an indecent crowd, an identity of **boldly following her choice amidst a howl of protest**. (SG2)*

*Has **he** ever spoken to any of the **thousands of Muslim women who choose to wear the burqa/abaya/jilbab** and asked them the rationale behind their choice of that garb? (SG3)*

***Women of high moral values prefer to cover for modesty.** (SG2)*

*A few thousand women wear the burka in France, **many of whom are French converts who choose to cover themselves to assert their faith** (SG1)*

- **The Face Veil Wearer – Passive Role**

As with the UK press, Muslim women and face veil wearers were allocated passive roles in some of the actions presented, taking the semantic roles of 'patients', where an action is done to them or for them. However, fitting with the ideological square in the 'Arab context', the syntactic structure utilized, emphasised the 'out-group' in a negative light, while the 'in-group' or 'face veil wearers/Muslim women' are associated with positive and neutral connotations. Muslim women and face veil wearers were either positioned as:

(1) patients undergoing negative actions activated by the 'out-group', e.g. Sarkozy, drawing on topoi of 'victimisation' and 'discrimination'

(2) patients and beneficiaries of positive or neutral actions activated by an 'in-group' source, mainly represented by various sources associated with the Islamic religion.

(3) patients of 'religious obligation'.

Although this syntactic construct was found in various Arab based newspapers, it was particularly evident in the Qatar based *Gulf Times*.

In the article, "*Dress row opens bitter divisions*" (GT6), which is an article originally published in the UK based *Guardian*, the construct of veiled women as victims of negative and at times discriminatory actions were highlighted in several sections throughout the article:

- 1) *As it is, **people** sometimes shout 'Ninja' at me.*
  
- 2) ***Women in standard headscarves** have been **refused access** to voting booths, driving lessons, **barred from** their own wedding ceremonies at town halls, **ejected from** university classes and in one case, **a women** in a bank was **not allowed** to withdraw cash from her own account at the counter.*
  
- 3) *From our figures, the biggest discriminator **against Muslim women** is the **state and state officials.***

As illustrated above, veil wearers are portrayed as victims. This is done by positioning them on the receiving end of negative actions. In the first two examples, the agents of the negative actions are suppressed, where very little detailed information, if any, is given regarding the agents responsible for the negative actions. This is done through the use of the general lexical item '*people*' in example 1, and the passive construction of processes in example 2, allowing for agent deletion and thus the exclusion of agents responsible for the negative actions. However, as the third example shows, which is taken from the following section in the same article, the actors blamed for such discriminatory actions towards '*Muslim women*' are clearly highlighted as the '*state and state officials*', realized by circumstantialization through the use of the prepositional phrase '*against*'.

Other examples clearly position 'out-group' actors as the agents of negative actions against '*Muslim women*' or '*veiled women*', who are given passive roles:

*Here is **France** mustering all capacity, mobilising all her institutions and organising her ranks to wage a perfidious new war against **our sisters** who wear the niqab (SG2)*

That **Sarkozy** has had to take recourse to the marginalisation of **Muslim women** in his attempt to defend the French ideal of 'an open mind' is an irony (SG3)

And earlier, in 2001, **Laura Bush and Cherie Blair** led a brief assault on the **burqa worn in Afghanistan**, which is still being worn out of choice today. (GN10)

Some of the negative actions attributed to the 'out-group' (e.g. 'France', 'Sarkozy', 'Laura Bush and Cherie Blair') involve, waging a 'new war', the 'marginalisation of Muslim women' and 'a brief assault on the burqa'.

As mentioned earlier, Muslim and face veiling women were also passivised in processes activated by various sources associated with Islam as a religion. However, the actions attributed to these sources were mainly positive. Examples of this pattern were mainly found in the *Saudi Gazette and Gulf news*:

*First, he Sarkozy does not believe in **Islam**, which is a heavenly religion that **holds women** in high regard. (GN6)*

Muslim and veiled women were also found to be represented with the use of obligation or Deontic modality, drawing on the topos of 'religious obligation'. Modal verbs and their negations are used to highlight in categorical terms the religious obligations women have to abide by. This highlights the direct connection (to some) between religious obligations and the practice of face veiling. This representation differs quite drastically from the findings in the UK based press, where the denial of such a connection formed one of the premises why the face veil should be viewed as a political statement that poses a threat, and thus, should be banned. The following examples illustrate the use of some these obligation modal verbs:

*However, another Islamic scholar, Sheikh Salem Helal, said Muslim women donning the face veil in France, whether they were expatriates or citizens, **should** leave the country if it was outlawed by the government. 'As long as you accepted to be a French citizen, then you **have to** comply with the laws of the country in which you stay. Muslim women in France **should** even give up their citizenship and return to Muslim countries if they found themselves unable to observe the Islamic dress code. If they have to choose between the face veil and their citizenship, they **have to** go [sic] the face veil and return to Muslim countries' (GT4).*

*But women in France who don't **should not** remove it just to comply with the proposed ban since Muslims **should not** comply with any law that is violating the Islamic teachings (GT4)*

#### **4.2.4.4 Arab Press: The Role of Muslims**

Similar to the representation of Muslim women and face veil wearers, in the majority of articles included in the Arab corpus, Muslim actors were mainly given active roles, where they were agents of actions. However, the actions were limited to verbal and mental processes, which mainly involved individualised elite actors in various Arab contexts. More importantly, unlike the UK press, these actors were mainly made up of religious elite and Islamic scholars who:

(1) provided their thoughts and comments on the face veil ban and the possible implications for Muslim women from a religious perspective.

(2) provided their critical comments towards the ban, emphasising the negative and discriminatory actions carried out by the 'out-group', 'Them' towards the 'in-group', 'Muslims' or 'face veiling women'.

(1) Example of a comment on implications of a ban:

***Shaikh Fayez al Mutlaq, a prominent religious scholar, is of the view that it is permissible for a Muslim woman living in a country, where there is a ban on wearing the burqa, not to wear it. 'It would suffice her wear the Hijab...he told Gulf News if a Muslim woman wants to travel to such a country, which imposes a ban on wearing the burqa, for educational or treatment purposes, then she should respect the regulations of the country by simply wearing the Hijab. (GN6)***

(2) Example of a critical comment towards the ban :

*About the remarks made by **Sarkozy** in which he described the niqab as ‘subservience of women’, **Sheikh Helal said** such statements were mainly **triggered by ‘Islamophobia’ trend**. ‘Such calls have nothing to do with the so-called defending women’s rights. **It is just a disguise for hatred against Muslims. I wonder why we did not hear any European politicians speak out against the Sikhs donning the turban in Europe,’ he added.** (GT4)*

#### **4.2.5 UK Press: Argumentation**

This part of the thesis will highlight the key argumentation strategies used in the UK based newspapers articles, followed by a comparative discussion of the main argumentation strategies used in the Arab corpus of articles.

In the UK based articles, most of the argumentation strategies drew upon topoi introduced earlier in the thesis, manifested in the newspaper texts through various micro strategies used in reference to key social actors/objects and their social actions. However, the argumentation strategies take these topoi further, enhancing the chief argument for the general reader.

Overall, face veiling women and Muslims were mainly represented drawing on the topoi of ‘threat’, ‘difference’, ‘repression of women’ and ‘separateness’. That is, as a direct consequence of wearing the face veil, they are predominantly portrayed as:

- (1) Threatening towards the ‘in-group/Us’ society and its values.*
- (2) Different to the ‘in-group/Us’, its norms and what it is accustomed to.*
- (3) Objects of oppression and subjugation.*
- (4) Separate, promoting seclusion from main stream society.*

These were found to run across the series of articles analysed for this study, with no significant variation in regard to frequency or intensity between the newspapers of varying ideological and political underpinnings. Also, more importantly, it was noted that although some articles overtly argued against a face veil ban, drawing on the topoi of ‘victimisation’

in the representation of Muslims or/and Face veil wearers, they leaned towards a negative representation of the practice of face veiling, drawing on some of the negative topoi mentioned above.

Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning again, argumentation strategies were not exclusive to negative representations of face veiling women and Muslims. In some articles (predominantly found in the *Guardian*), face veiling women were also represented as victims of ill treatment, drawing on the topoi of 'victimisation', at times highlighting the 'in-group' as the agents of discriminatory aggression towards them. However, rather than the use of explicit argumentation strategies, this was mainly translated in the text through the actions, roles and predicational strategies attributed to face veiling women, as pointed out earlier in the analysis.

#### **4.2.5.1 Topos of 'Threat'**

A key topos that was drawn upon in arguing against the face veil was the topos of 'threat' represented by face veil wearers or/and Muslims towards Western society (in-group/Us) and its values. The very practice of wearing the face veil is directly linked to extremist views and thus is reflected negatively as a threat towards the west. As shown earlier in the paper, the referential and predicational strategies used lay the foundation on which the topos of 'threat' is built upon. However, as the following sections will show, the argumentative strategies used crystallised the idea of threat in relation to the face veil even further.

The threat is referred to explicitly in some of headlines leading the articles analysed. One such example is an op-ed in the *Times* headlined, "***Veiled Threat: The burka, a symbol of repression, has no place in a free society***" (TT5). The veil is directly associated with a threat by the use of a homographic pun with the term '*veiled*', where the same term may reflect two different interpretations. The first interpretation views '*veiled*' as a metaphor attributed to the term '*threat*', a non-human entity which is personified with the specific characteristic of face veil wearers (physically covering themselves), as being '*veiled*'. Thus, face veil wearers are reflected as a threat, covering themselves with the veil. Following a micro analysis of the article itself, a second interpretation can be made, which associates the 'threat' with 'extremists'. Here, '*veiled*' is used to describe the '*threat*' as being deliberately,

but indirectly posed by 'extremists' towards Western society by their promotion of the face veil wearing practice. Although the example presents two interpretations, in both, the veil is reflected as 'threatening'.

The idea of 'threat' is developed further in the article itself:

*Too often **extremists** try to exploit this **bogus symbol of Islamic piety** to create Muslim ghettos where they assert their own personal power. Too often **the issue is a deliberate provocation to challenge the values and mores of Western Society.***

In addition to negative explicit referential and predicational strategies, where Muslims are labelled as 'extremists' and the face veil is described as a "bogus symbol of Islamic piety", the excerpt commits a pathetic fallacy (argumentum ad baculum). The writer uses non-argumentative means of persuasion by appealing to the readers emotions in raising fears and concerns by describing face veiling as a product of an extremist ideology which poses a threat by the 'deliberate provocation to challenge' the values of Western society. In addition, a logical fallacy is committed by a hasty generalisation, where 'the issue' or the face veiling practice is generalised as mainly being practiced to challenge Western values, neglecting any other possible motivation behind the practice, whether it be, personal, traditional or religious.

In another *Times* article, the argument highlighting a threat also takes the form of an inductive argument through the presentation of a causal relationship between the spread of fundamentalist doctrines and the increase of women wearing the face veil.

*Niqabs and burqas – the head to toe costumes that cover all or most of the face --- are said to be spreading **as** fundamentalist doctrines gain hold among a small minority of France's five million Muslims. (TT1)*

The use of 'as' suggests a causal relation, where a presumption is made that a fundamentalist ideology is in fact gaining popularity and face veiling is on an increase as a consequence. Face veiling is framed as a direct negative consequence of the spread of

fundamentalism. This argumentative scheme produces a false cause fallacy (Cum Hoc, Ergo Propter hoc), where the cause and effect are described to take place simultaneously, and thus, are established to be directly related. The argument connects face veiling as a direct and exclusive effect of the spread of fundamentalism, ignoring the fact that an increase in face veiling maybe related to other factors, not linked to any fundamentalist ideology.

As mentioned earlier in the referential and predicational analysis, a polarisation between 'moderate' and 'conservative' Muslims was made, where 'conservative Muslims' are portrayed with negative connotations, while 'moderate Muslims' carried more positive connotations. In the following passage taken from the *Times*, the topos of 'threat' is enhanced by linking face veiling exclusively to 'conservative societies' who promote the practice by giving it 'dubious religious sanction'.

*"The burka, however, is different. Not only does it divide European liberals; it also is controversial within Islam. **As many scholars have pointed out**, there is no Koranic foundation in the demand that a women should hide her face. **The Koran** only enjoins modesty in appearance and clothing, and subsequent injunctions that a woman should cover her hair with a scarf or her face with a veil are derived solely from the Hadith, the body of sayings attributed to the prophet. The burka appears to be **purely tribal in its origin**, and this cultural tradition has **been given dubious religious sanction by conservative societies.**" (TT5)*

Here, a symptomatic argumentation (an argument of authority/topos of authority) or what can be described as rhetorical 'Ethos' is used. This is done by using the statement 'as many scholars have pointed out' to support the claim arguing the face veiling practice as having no Koranic foundations. Based on this claim, face veiling is concluded to be exclusively linked to tribal practices by the use of 'purely tribal', with no religious underpinnings, but instead is given 'dubious religious sanction by conservative societies', linking it to 'conservative' Muslims in particular. However, the argument can be considered fallacious on two levels.

Firstly, it commits the fallacy of 'an appeal to an unidentified authority', where the claim is asserted as true because it is supported by 'many scholars', yet the scholars are left

unidentified, leaving their expertise unverified. Consequently, this makes the claim questionable.

Secondly and more importantly, the argument can be considered a fallacious appeal to authority (*argumentum ad verecundiam*). That is, the claim made is regarded acceptable because it is stated by an authoritative source, '*scholars*', although the claim itself is questionable. To clarify this, some background information on the sources of Islamic teachings is necessary.

From a Muslim perspective, Islamic practices and obligations are derived from two sources which are considered divine, the *Quran*, the words of Allah (God), and the *Sunna*, the sayings and practices of the Muslim prophet. These two sources are viewed as complementary in achieving a full and comprehensive understanding of the teachings of Islam and its practices. The Sunna is often used to develop a more precise interpretation of the Quran and it is here where disagreements between scholars may occur. Accordingly, individuals may follow different interpretations depending on their own personal beliefs and convictions. With that being said, the subject of veiling in Islam has raised similar disagreements based on various interpretations between scholars and indeed, between members of the general public.

Going back to the above argument of authority, while there are '*scholars*' arguing that the veil has no '*Koranic*' basis, there are other scholars arguing against this claim. Thus, arguing that the face veil is '*purely tribal*' on the premise that relies on authority involving some '*scholars*' can be considered an inappropriate use of symptomatic argumentation.

Moreover, a similar pattern of drawing on the topos of '*authority*' was also used as the premise for a reoccurring argument in articles published in the *Daily telegraph*. The argument for a ban is built on the premise that various accredited sources have denounced the face veil or disassociated the practice of face veiling with Islam as a religion. This was translated in the text either through, (1) Muslim actors verbalising this argument through direct or indirect quotations, or (2) Other actors arguing against the ban by using various authorities to support their argument.

*Dalil Boubakeur, the rector of Paris Mosque, supported an inquiry, saying that face covering for women was a **fundamentalist practice** originating in Afghanistan that was not prescribed in Islam. (DT1)*

In addition to negative predicational strategies describing the face veiling practice as 'fundamentalist', drawing on the topos of 'threat', it is symptomatically argued by a Muslim actor, 'rector of Paris Mosque', to be associated exclusively with Afghanistan as a country. This is indicated by the phrase 'originating in Afghanistan', rather than having a religious basis.

Ending this section on the topos of 'threat' are two examples taken from the same article, 'France searches its soul over the veil' (TG5), published in the *Guardian*. In this article, the face veil and the practice of wearing it are described as the following:

*In France, women who wear the voile intergral do it **by choice**, not by obligation. **This isn't an exotic symbol, but a political one.***

Here, in addition to the sweeping generalisation that all women in France wear the face veil by choice, we have an example of an enthymeme, where there is an unexpressed premise that women who decide to wear the face veil by choice are symbolizing a political stance. However, while some women may choose to adopt the face veil with the aim of making political statements, others may do so, based on various religious, cultural and personal motivations.

This description of women wearing the face veil and the motivation behind this practice forms the basis of an interesting argument presented further on in the article, which again draws on the topos of 'threat'. A claim is made that a legislation of the face veiling practice would pose a threat to 'social cohesion'.

*Today, our freedom of expression is only curbed by laws against the incitement of racial hatred. If the government supports the burqa, we would have to consider how to deal with a different type of situation. **An Algerian chef** whose sister died when extremists cut her throat recently told me that she would never serve a woman wearing a niqab, because she saw it as a symbol of support for those who murdered her sibling. Today, her attitude could send her to court for racism and refusal to serve*

*a client on discriminatory grounds. If the burqa was legitimised, there would be no reason to permit one political discourse and not two, something which would risk out social cohesion.*

In the above extract, a false analogy is committed and a causal argumentation scheme produces unreasonable argumentation. Firstly, the comparison between the act of a chef not willing to serve a customer based on their choice of dress and a women choosing to wear a burqa, as both being forms of political discourse is unjustified. That is, although the chef may be taking a political stance, one which may be considered racist, not all women choosing to adopt a face veil do so with the aim of making a political statement. More importantly, the act of covering ones face cannot particularly be described as an act of discrimination or racism towards others.

Based on this comparison, a causal relation is presented claiming that legitimizing the face veil would mean that other forms of political discourse would have to be permitted, whether racist or not, i.e. the racist discourse of the chef, and this would consequently pose a threat to '*social cohesion*'. However, as the argument is based on a false analogy, this argument is unjustifiable.

#### **4.2.5.2 Topos of 'Difference'**

The topos of 'difference' is another topos drawn upon in the arguments against the face veiling practice, similarly developing a negative representation of face veiling women. Face veil wearers are represented as 'different', where the act of face veiling is depicted as being in contrast and indeed, counter to the values, beliefs and way of life people are accustomed to in Western society. This topos was mainly detected in the *Times* and the *Guardian*.

In the *Times*, examples where this was highlighted were found in an op-ed article headlined, "*Veiled Threat: The burka, a symbol of repression, has no place in a free society*" (TT5). The sub-heading foregrounds this topos by placing the face veil '*burka*', negatively described as '*a symbol of repression*', as being in conflict with '*free society*'. The following passage found in the article develops the topos further:

*Among European liberals the burka is seen as a symbol of female subservience. And the freedom to opt for such a deplorable status runs counter to other liberties regarded as more important in the hierarchy of freedoms: openness, transparency, equality and opportunity. Within Western society, the covering of the face negates all such fundamental rights.*

Through a hasty generalisation, 'Among European liberals', the wearing of the veil is contrasted with the concept of liberalism associated with the 'Western society', where it is associated with 'female subservience' and described as a 'deplorable status'. This view of the face veil is held in direct contrast to positive qualities attributed strongly to 'liberalism', such as, 'openness, transparency, equality and opportunity'. Therefore, a presumption is made that face veiling women are different in that they do not hold these positive qualities, which are held to be of great importance in Western society.

Further down in the same article, the writer states:

*There are also, in **Western society**, practical objections to any garment that hinders movement, impairs trust or conceals identity. **A woman in a burka** cannot properly drive a car, clear a security check, teach pupils, practice medicine, enter a jewellery shop or carry out a host of mundane activities.*

Similar to the earlier example, women wearing the face veil are placed in direct contrast to the principles held by 'Western society'. This is done through the presumption that the face veil holds the negative qualities of garments that the 'western society' has 'practical objections' to. Therefore, the face veil is seen as not fitting in Western society, as it is unacceptable garment. Moreover, a standpoint is made with no mitigation that face veiled women cannot effectively conduct certain activities and tasks, without any sufficient conclusive support. Not only does the first statement not qualify as conclusive support for the standpoint taken, it commits the fallacy of ambiguity, where it is not clear how or using what criteria one can judge a garment to hinder movement, impair trust, or conceal

identity. More importantly, ambiguity also takes shape of referential indifference, where one may ask, what and who can be constituted as *'Western society'* in this case?

This representation of the difference between 'Us' and 'Them' is also highlighted in the op-ed, *'France searches its soul over the veil'* (TG5), focusing on the same topic of 'secularism and the Face veil'.

*This isn't an exotic symbol, but a political one. **We're** used to showing **our** faces on a daily basis as part of our identity: picking up a parcel at the post office, collecting children from kindergarten. But what then, for women whose face cannot be seen? **In what case would a political position, even one stemming from religious conviction, put someone above the law.***

The difference between the 'in-group' and 'out-group' is highlighted by a contrast of characteristics related to the identity of each group, which is mainly differentiated by the covering of the face. The 'in-group' represented by the aggregated *'we're'* and *'our'* are assigned with the characteristic of showing their face during daily activities (which are described in detail) and this is contrasted with the 'out-group' who are represented as *'women who cannot be seen'*. The contrast based on this characteristic highlights the difference between both groups. Moreover, the question, *'in what case would a political position, even one stemming from religious conviction, put someone above the law'*, highlights the contrast between both groups even further. The question does not only make a generalised assumption that face veiling is the result of a 'political position', but also triggers a negative presupposition that women who dress differently, in this case, 'veiled women', are in fact in conflict with the law.

Further down in the same article, the difference is enhanced further using a metaphor which contrasts face veiling with the qualities of 'French society'.

*In other words, **women wearing the burqa** aren't asserting their right not to be discriminated against – **they're asking for specific rights.***

*If the commission supports the right to wear the burqa, French society will need to look at changing some of its habits. Here, the public space is a bit like a **herbal***

*infusion*: the flavours of many different plants are present, but by blending together they create **harmony of sorts**. It's possible that we could choose to make our tea by **singling out some of those leaves for different treatment** – We've never tried it, but why not? It would, however, mean that **we'd be moving from universality to separatism**.

Using a metaphor centring around the concept of tea making, the French society, a '*herbal infusion*', is placed in contrast with face veiling women who are reflected as '*leaves*' that require '*different treatment*'. More importantly, face veiling women are described as actively wanting to be treated differently, signalled by their active role in '*asking for specific rights*'. Giving them these rights, '*singling out these leaves for different treatment*', would instigate a change to the existing structure of French society, one attributed with '*universality*' and the positive attribute of having '*a harmony of sorts*' to a society attributed with the qualities of '*separatism*'. Face-veiling women are represented as 'different', while also drawing on the topos of 'threat', since this difference would cause a change to the internal structure and the positive qualities or 'harmony' of French society today.

#### **4.2.5.3 Topos of 'Repression of Women'**

Although this topos was highlighted in most of the articles making up the corpus by the referential/predicational strategies and social actions attributed to Muslims and face veil wearers, in terms of argumentations strategies, examples were mainly found in the *Guardian* and the *Independent*. Here, the face veil is argued to cause the repression of women wearing it.

For instance, in a *Guardian* news analysis article on the French parliamentary proposal for the face veil ban, the following presupposition is made:

*government spokesman Luc Chatel said it was important to establish **to what extent women's rights are being compromised by the garments***. (TG1)

As shown, a presupposition is indicated by a wh-question, where to '*what extent*' presumes that women's rights are in fact compromised by the face veil.

Another example was found in the *Independent*:

*But banishing the burqa from public life will not have the knock-on effect of banishing everything Sarkozy does not like about it from the lives of women who wear it, or from France's problems with assimilating its Muslim community. **More likely**, some of these women **will** be kept from public life altogether. (T13)*

In this excerpt, the writer expresses his uncertainty about the positive outcomes of a face veil ban, where he argues that it could lead to further presupposed repression of face veiled women. This causal relation is highlighted by the phrase '*more likely*', and the use of the modal verb '*will*' removes any form of hedging, portraying the truth of them being cut off from society as absolutely categorical. This may be argued as an example of a slippery slope fallacy, where the example suggests that by taking a particular course of action, the situation is guaranteed to go from bad to worse. In this case, it will result in a continued and more extensive version of the oppression supposedly experienced by face veiling women, an unjustified presumed conclusion.

The topos of 'repression of women' is drawn upon again towards the end of the same article through the use of a disclaimer:

*I do not know how many women '**choose**' to wear burqas, **but** the idea **they decide as one** to wear the same drab garb they had sported on the previous day rather stretches the possibilities of the individual, and equal, expression feminists have fought for.*

The form of disclaimer used here is what van Dijk labels as 'apparent ignorance'. The first part of the excerpt highlights the writer positively by pointing out her willingness to accept that there are in fact women who choose to wear the face veil, although this is questioned by the use of quotation marks around the verb '*choose*', distancing the writer from this view. This is followed by the disclaimer signalled by '*but*' and a negative description of the 'out-group', the 'face veiling women', who are presented in direct contrast or as a challenge to the positive features, '*individual, and equal, expression*', feminists fought for.

#### 4.2.5.4 Topos of 'Separateness'

Finally, the topos of 'separateness' was also drawn upon, where face veil wearers were represented as separate from society. In fact, they are represented as wearing the veil with the motivation of distancing or separating themselves from mainstream society. This topos was highlighted in all the newspapers included in the corpus. This argument may work to support European political discourse emphasising the limitations of multiculturalism and insisting on assimilation and integration.

In the *Times*, interestingly, this representation was actually depicted in an op-ed article arguing against a face veil ban, 'Women, West Brom, the burka and me' (TT4). Although the writer argues against the ban, the representation of the face veil and the women who wear it carried negative connotations in line with the Orientalist ideology depicting Muslims as 'separate', as illustrated in the following passage:

*'Come photograph No50 I was actually scowling but no one could tell. This was truly a **liberating** experience and it suddenly made me realise why many Muslim women are reluctant to give up the veil. **It can be truly joyous to pass unseen through the outside world with no obligation to smile or look interested – hidden in your own secret place'***

Here, the writer argues for the face veil by using a false analogy as an argumentation scheme. Wearing the veil is compared to wearing a mascot costume, which the writer personally experienced during a football game. The writer adopts the standpoint that some face veil wearers adopt in arguing for the wearing of the face veil, describing the practice as 'liberating'. However, the falseness of the analogy results from, (1) poor grounds for a comparison between the two items of clothing, and (2) the insufficient argument presented.

In regard to the poor grounds of comparison, the comparison cannot be justified, as there are stark differences between a mascot costume and the face veil and their meaning to their wearers, making them incomparable. Although they both share the quality of physically

covering one's face, they are quite different on a conceptual level. The mascot costume is usually worn for a particular job, typically for entertainment purposes and for specific periods of time. However, viewing the practice of face veiling in the same light would neglect the various intrinsic, personal, traditional or/and religious motivations, as well as, the lifelong commitments veil wearers adopt in following the practice.

Furthermore, the argument itself can be considered insufficient, where the presumption is made that the face veil is essentially worn to limit interaction with the society and to allow the wearers to be '*hidden*' in their '*own secret place*', drawing on the negative connotations of separateness in the representation of women who practice face veiling. This again, overlooks the various other religious, traditional and personal motivations they may have in adopting the practice.

Moving on, the *Daily Telegraph* had a similar example, drawing on the topos of 'separateness', as the following example shows:

*Douglas Murray, director of the think tank, the Centre for Social Cohesion, is one of them. 'People shouldn't have the right to **hide themselves away in society**' he says, '**Cutting yourself off from society is threatening** when we have known **terrorists** to try to escape wearing a burka. Men who said they had to wear balaclavas would be very unlikely to be allowed into banks or to travel on most public transport. **Ask yourself this: can you imagine asking the time or for directions from a woman in a burka?'** (DT2)*

The above excerpt begins with face veiling women being attributed with the action of 'hiding away from society', drawing on the topos of 'separateness' in their representation. The topos of 'threat' is drawn upon next with the use of a symptomatic argument arguing that women wearing the face veil pose a direct threat to society. However, the argument commits a hasty generalisation, where based on a few instances where '*terrorists*' were known to try to escape wearing a face veil, a more general point is made regarding women who cover themselves. The face veil, in general, regardless of who it is worn by, is depicted as threatening, as it is described as a characteristic of the way terrorists appear. This can be

considered as an example of an unreasonable argument, since the supporting premises are not representative or sufficient, (1) not all individuals who cover themselves are terrorists trying to escape, and (2) covering one's self is not characteristic of the way terrorists appear in public. The excerpt ends with presupposition triggered by a question which reasserts the topos of 'separateness', '*Ask yourself: can you imagine asking the time or directions from a woman in a burka?*' Here a presumption is made that asking a face veiling woman for directions or for the time is something people may have a problem imagining or doing, highlighting her separateness and incompatibility with society's regular daily happenings.

At the end of the same article, another example was found in which the same topos is drawn upon:

*If it takes a foreign politician to **prompt** a Muslim to articulate this view, there is something to be said for an **attack** on the burka. At least it **gets** Muslims and non-Muslims talking, not just among themselves, **but maybe even to one another.***

The separateness between the 'out-group' and 'in-group' is clearly highlighted in the analysis which follows a direct quote voiced by a Muslim actor, 'Ahmed Versi', praising the UK as '*heaven compared to France*' in regard to integration and tolerance towards Muslims and the face veil. The writer initiates the analysis of the quote by a presupposition signalled by a change of state verb '*prompt*', which makes the assumption that Muslims rarely or never articulate positive views of the UK. This negative description of 'Them' is followed by a positive framing of the critical action taken by Sarkozy towards the veil, stating '*there is something to be said for an attack on the burka*'; the negative action '*attack*' by Sarkozy (in-group member) is described as having a positive impact. The positive impact is emphasised further in the next part of the excerpt by the use of another change of state verb, '*gets*', which presupposes an interaction dilemma, where Muslims and non-Muslims are assumed as not interacting or voicing opinions on the topic among themselves or one another. Furthermore, the use of the adverb '*even*' in the phrase, '*but maybe **even** to one another*', functions as an intensifying strategy, emphasising the separateness and unlikelihood of these two social groups interacting.

The *independent* also provided similar examples. In the article "*Sophie Morris: Sarkozy's right: the burqa is a tool of repression*" (TI3), which as mentioned earlier, argues against the

practice of face veiling, the topos of 'separateness' was drawn upon heavily. The face veiled woman is argued and represented as being separate and as a non active or engaging member of society as a result of wearing the face veil.

The article presents us with a narrative to establish a relationship between face veiling women and society, which predominately emphasises the separateness and exclusion of face veiling women from mainstream society. This is done by individualising and describing a face veiling woman and her surroundings as she is coming down a crowded high street on a Sunday afternoon, in detail:

*I was stuck in a slow lane behind a pram when I noticed **a women coming** in the opposite direction, who was getting absolutely nowhere, **shoved to the back** not just by the onwards traffic but by those coming from behind her and from all sides too. I remember her because she was wearing a burqa.*

*She wasn't getting anywhere because, if anyone noticed her, **they weren't treating her as part of the scrum**. Pushing your way through the crowd required a degree of engagement with those you're pushing against – **impossible if you cannot make eye contact**. As her skirt was so long and roomy, **who knew whether she had one foot in front of the other**, a stance that signals you're about to start moving, or not?*

As shown in the above excerpt, the face veiled woman is portrayed as separate from her surroundings as a consequence of wearing the face veil. This is mainly illustrated by the use of causal argumentation and a simile.

The woman wearing the face veil is described as being separate from her surroundings and thus being treated differently from others in the crowded street; she is given a passive role, where actions are being done to her, without her involvement or control. She is being 'shoved to the back' and the crowd are 'not treating her as part of the scrum'. This difference in treatment and experience is due to (indicated by 'because') features that enhance her separateness, one being her lack of eye contact and the other being the

inability of others to see the movement of her feet, both of which are consequences of wearing the 'burqa', as it is understood in this particular context.

Further on in the same article, the topos of 'separateness' is highlighted even more explicitly:

*How rubbish it must be to be stuck inside such **heavy black clothing** on one of **Britain's few sunny days**, with **the world swirling** around you as if you were a **lamp post**, for that's about the level of interaction she could have with passers-by without engaging them in a conversation.*

The writer begins with the use of negative predicational strategies in reference to the face veil, referring to it as, '*heavy black clothing*', which is put in juxtaposition with a British sunny day. This is followed by the use of a simile, highlighting the 'separateness' face veiling causes, where the face veiled woman is compared to a '*lamp post*', an object lacking any form of movement, interaction or life as opposed to the '*world swirling*' around her.

#### **4.2.6 Arab Press: Argumentation**

Many of the topoi drawn upon in the Arab press were highlighted extensively in the referential, predicational and social actions analysis discussed earlier. It was also noted, comparatively speaking, that the UK displayed a more extensive application of argumentation strategies than those employed in the Arab corpus of articles.

In terms of argumentation strategies, reproduction of arguments presented in the UK press were minimal, with a few examples of arguments against the practice of face veiling, drawing on the topos of 'threat'. However, in the arguments against a face veil ban, three key topoi were introduced that were not as evident in the UK corpus, the topoi of 'discrimination', 'difference' and 'religious obligation'. Some of these topoi, at times, worked to directly reject and oppose the dominant representations of Muslims and face veiling women found in the UK press.

The topos of 'discrimination' was drawn upon quite extensively in many of the articles analysed. Here, the argument against a ban is built upon the explicit premise that a ban

would be a discriminatory act against Muslims. Therefore, in addition to reproducing the topos of 'victimisation', drawn upon in a few UK based articles, the Arab press takes the argument further by paying more widespread attention on argumentative strategies persuading the reader that the proposal for such a ban is in fact an act of discrimination specifically targeting Muslims. Muslims are not merely represented as victimised, but their victimisation is reflected as being sourced by discriminatory motivations.

As was shown earlier (see section 4.2.5.2), the topos of 'difference' was drawn upon in the argument for a face veil ban in various UK based articles. The same topos was drawn upon in the Arab press, however, the social meanings and actor roles were reversed. To explain further, in the Arab press, this topos was drawn upon in the argument against a face veil ban rather than for a ban. The argument is built on the premise that face veiling is a positive practice and should not be banned. The positive implications of face veiling is supported by emphasising the 'difference' between Muslim women who wear the face veil, 'Us' and women in the West, 'Them'. Unlike the UK press, this 'difference' is positively framed, highlighting Muslim women or the 'in-group' as superior to the 'out-group', possessing positive qualities, as a result of opting to don a face veil.

Finally, the topos of 'religious obligation' was drawn upon in the argument for a ban, representing face veiling women as under the religious obligation to practice face veiling. Similarly, this is another example of a dominant representation of face veiling women that directly rejects and opposes dominant meanings highlighted in the UK press. Meanings which frequently emphasised the disassociation of the face veiling practice from religion, at times, in support of arguments highlighting the practice as a form of social threat.

#### **4.2.6.1 Topos of 'Threat'**

As mentioned earlier, the Arab press was mainly found to produce its own key topoi in the representation of Muslims and face veiling women. However, the topos of 'threat' was one topos found to be utilised in the UK press and reproduced in the Arab based articles, albeit to a lesser degree. Again, similar to many of the examples in the UK press, this topos was

mainly drawn upon in the arguments for a ban, based on what are viewed as various social threats posed by the face veiling practice.

In the article, “*No burqa please, we’re French*” (GN9), which actually argues for the freedom of choice in regard to the practice of face veiling, there were a few examples in which the face veil itself is negatively represented, drawing on the topos of ‘*threat*’.

*Yet, the reality of the matter surpasses the burqa itself. This is seen clearly in the fear that swiped France in reaction to the burqa, **which appears like a reproduction of the dress code imposed by the Taliban** on women in Afghanistan*

As illustrated above, veiling in France is portrayed as the exclusive consequence of a practice ‘*imposed by the Taliban*’, a political group linked with extremism, as well as, the ‘*women of Afghanistan*’. The causal relation is signalled by the phrase, ‘*which appears like a reproduction*’. The causal relation between the practice of face veiling and the idea of a ‘*threat*’ is emphasised further in the following section of the same article:

*The historic implications of the **burqa** are those of **radicalism and extremism**, thus the stir is not an expression of racism against Muslims, as some claimed, but simply a **fear of a drift towards sectarianism.***

Following a direct link made between the ‘*burqa*’ and ‘*radicalism and extremism*’, this is explained as the reason a conflict has risen against face veiling, which is ‘*feared*’ to possibly lead to ‘*sectarianism*’, a term commonly associated with violence and conflict. Therefore, through a causal relation indicated by a ‘*drift towards*’, face veiling is portrayed as a practice to be feared, since it can threaten and harm the relations between various communities in French society.

However, in this example, the ‘*slippery slope fallacy*’ is committed, where the exclusive link of face veiling to the ‘*Taliban*’, ‘*women in Afghanistan*’ and ‘*radicalism and extremism*’ is portrayed as the reason why face veiling may be a threat to community relations in France. The assumption that the face veil is associated with the ‘*Taliban*’ and ‘*radicalism and extremism*’, does not substantiate that the French society will face ‘*sectarianism*’ as a result of some women practicing face veiling. Moreover, by linking face veiling exclusively to the ‘*women of Afghanistan*’, who are forced to wear it by the ‘*Taliban*’, a ‘*hasty generalisation*’

is made on two levels. It is implied that all women who wear the face veil are either, (1) living in Afghanistan, or/and (2) are following the dress code advocated by the 'Taliban'. This clearly neglects the thousands of women wearing the face veil around the world, as a result of various cultural, traditional, religious and personal motivations.

#### **4.2.6.2. Topos of 'Discrimination'**

One of the most recurring topos drawn upon in the Arab based articles is the topos 'discrimination'. Articles argued against the face veil ban based on the argument that such a ban is a discriminatory act specifically targeting Muslims; Muslim actors were repeatedly represented as the victims of not just ill treatment but *targeted* discrimination. This topos was mainly translated in the newspaper texts through the use of analogies as the method of argumentation.

*if he is so worried about women's 'subjugation' to male demands then why single out the burqa? There are many symbols pertaining to women's loss of dignity that are deserving of his attention. He could begin with the **pimps and their scantily clad prostitutes** on display around the country, which offend 64% of participants in a telephone survey who agreed that prostitution was a 'degrading practice for the image and dignity of the women'. He could crack down on the **trafficking of women**, outlaw **breast augmentation** which has no medical benefits, ban **pornographic magazines** from newsstands, or even **control magazines which idealise the female form** and thus inspire anorexia and bulimia in young girls. On that principle he could even attack the **bridal veil**, the **traditional nun's habit** or the **custom followed by Hassidic Jewish women** who shave their heads upon marriage. But, he prefers to focus his ire on a **harmless piece of cloth**. (GN10)*

In this argumentative attack, which specifically targets then French President Nicolas Sarkozy on his actions, Sarkozy's argumentation for a face veil ban on the premise that face veiling women are the objects of male 'subjugation' is portrayed as an act of discrimination against women wearing the face veil in particular. Face veiling women, therefore, are portrayed as 'victims of discrimination'. The writer initiates the argument by using quotation

marks around the term '*subjugation*', which indicates his disassociation with Sarkozy's stance. Moreover, through the use of the question, '*why single out the burqa?*', a presupposition is made that Sarkozy is in fact singling out the face veil as a form of male subjugation. This is followed by an argument that Sarkozy is in fact discriminatory by the use of comparative argumentation, where various forms of what are described as '*symbols pertaining to women's loss of dignity*', are listed as being part of the French community, yet fail to attract Sarkozy's attention, e.g. '*pimps and prostitutes*' and '*breast augmentation*'. Moreover, more directly related traditional, religious and cultural symbols are listed, such as, the '*bridal veil*', '*nun's habit*' and the '*custom followed by Hassidic Jewish women*'. The section ends with a positive description of the face veil, as a '*harmless piece of cloth*', which is the object of negative actions '*prefers to focus his ire*' taken by Sarkozy, a member of the 'out-group'.

A similar form of argument takes shape in another article published in the *Gulf Times* headlined, "*Dressing down*" (GT4):

*Such calls have nothing to do with the so-called defending women's rights. It is just a disguise for hatred against Muslims. I wonder why we did not hear any European politicians speak against the Sikhs donning the turban in Europe.*

As with the earlier example, Muslims are portrayed as the target of negative actions carried out by 'out-group' members, represented as '*European politicians*'. Face veil wearers are compared to '*Sikhs donning the turban*' and it is argued that they have not been targeted for their clothing, as Muslim women have.

However, this argument can be considered an example of a false analogy, since the comparison cannot be justified. Here, the argument is built against the face veil ban on the basis that a ban has been proposed on the premise that face veiling violates women's rights. The writer attacks this as a '*disguise for hatred of Muslims*' by '*European politicians*'. However, based on this argument, face veil wearers cannot be compared to '*Sikhs donning the turban*', as the turbans are worn by males and the argument for a ban is based on the protection of 'women's rights', which does not apply to Sikh 'men', who wear the turban.

Another example of this form of argumentation was found in the op-ed article, 'Mr. Sarkozy, burqa is sign of modesty' (SG2):

I THINK French president Nicolas Sarkozy has not visited a convent of late. If he had he would have noticed **nuns** in wimples and robes. **Would he call the dress worn by nuns 'a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement?'**

Once again, by using comparison as a form of argumentation, women wearing the veil are represented as being discriminated against based on what they wear.

As seen in most of the above examples, the existence of discrimination against Muslims and face veiling women was mainly argued using comparative argumentation. However, in most of these cases, it can be argued that false analogies are being committed, since in most of the analogies, the items being compared are characterised by one crucial difference. The face veil or 'burqa' is being objected to on the basis that it conceals the *face*, a feature not shared by the items it is being compared to, such as, the '*bridal veil*', the '*dress worn by nuns*' and the '*turban*' donned by Sikhs. This, as a result, leads to unjustifiable comparative arguments.

Finally, the topos of 'discrimination' was also drawn upon in the article, "*Liberte includes freedom of dress*" (GN10), which argues that one of the issues that a face veil ban stems out of is the fact that '*many Westerners have a visceral dislike of traditional Muslim attire*'; hence, criticism towards face veiling is in fact the result of discriminatory motivations.

*There are a number of angles to this story – not least that **many Westerners have a visceral dislike** of traditional Muslim attire, **reflected by** a host of **editorials in American and Canadian dailies** in agreement with Sarkozy's argument. For instance, **a headline in the Calgary Herald** reads 'No sane, free person would choose to wear the burqa'.*

The topos of 'discrimination' is drawn upon through the use of symptomatic argumentation, where a direct association is made between the '*editorials in American and Canadian dailies*' and the feelings of '*Many Westerners*', signalled by the phrase '*reflected by*'. Based

on the premise, (1) a *'host of editorials in American and Canadian dailies'* are *'in agreement with Sarkozy's argument'*, and (2) a headline in the Calgary Herald that is critical of face veiling and people who wear it, a conclusion is made that there is a *'visceral dislike'* felt by *'many Westerners'* towards traditional Muslim attire, thus, forming one of the main motivations behind the face veil ban proposal.

However, the argumentation scheme has been incorrectly applied, committing a hasty generalisation or a *'pars-pro toto'* synecdoche; properties of parts are transferred to a whole. The point of views of some editorials published in America and Canada are transferred and reflected as the point of view of *'many Westerners'*, emphasising their active role in a negative action, *'visceral dislike'*, towards an item of clothing associated with Muslims. The actions of some Western editorials is insufficient as a premise and cannot be considered representative of how *'many Westerners'* feel towards the *'traditional Muslim attire'*.

#### **4.2.6.3 Topos of 'Difference'**

One of the topoi found to be drawn upon in the representation of Muslims and veil wearers in the UK press was the topos of *'difference'*. Arguments for a ban were developed on the premise that face veiled Muslim women and the culture and beliefs they adhere to are in direct contrast with the norms and way of life people are accustomed to in *'Western'* countries , such as the United Kingdom and France, thus, posing a form of *'social threat'*. This argument worked to enhance the polarisation between the out and in-groups (Us vs. Them).

In the Arab press and particularly in articles published in the *Saudi Gazette*, a similar topos was detected, however, in this case the stand point taken was against a face veil ban. The discourse declaring face veiled women as *'different'* found in the UK press is acknowledged, even advocated, but with a re-contextualization of this preconceived *'difference'*. This *'difference'* which places face veiling women in a positive light is in fact what forms the premise for an argument against a ban. Here, the roles are reversed and the *'difference'* which is primarily identified by the *'wearing of a face veil'* attributes face veiling women (In-

group/Us) with attractive attributes. They are described as having positive effects on society in general as opposed to 'Western' women, nations and life style (Out-group/Them), which are represented negatively as morally inferior. Based on this description, an argument is made against banning women from practicing face veiling.

One example where this topos was drawn upon was found in the op-ed, "Mr. Sarkozy, Burqa is a sign of modesty" (SG2):

*The debate here is on two counts: the issue of **morality and freedom of choice. Who is indecent and spoils public morals: a burqa-clad woman or the one in a bikini?** Those who are brought up on moral values which teach respect for women and not maintain that they are mere objects of desire and enticement and mannequins for public display, will say a women in a bikini is indecent. But those who have grown up seeing scantily-clad women around them, will find the women in a burqa objectionable. So it boils down to your perception which is a result of your moral values.*

The article argues against a face veil ban based on two premises, (1) individuals should have the right of freedom of choice, and (2) face veiling women are moral. This particular excerpt tackles the issue of morality by drawing on the topos of 'difference'. The writer initiates a 'difference' by making a distinction made between 'a burqa clad women' and 'one in a bikini', in terms of, (1) 'indecenty', and (2) 'spoiling public morals'. This 'difference' is triggered by a 'wh-' question, which presupposes that one of them is in fact indecent and has a negative impact on public morals. The writer proceeds to answer the question in the following section, asserting face veiling women as morally superior. This is done by placing women wearing the bikini as negatively in conflict with individuals attributed with positive moral values that promote 'respect for women', and view women as 'not mere objects of desire or enticement and mannequins for public display'. Meanwhile, individuals described negatively as growing up 'seeing scantily-clad women around them' are put in conflict with face veiling women. Therefore, fitting with the ideological square, the presupposed 'difference' represents women in a bikini (out-group/Them) negatively in opposition to the qualities of positive moral values, while highlighting face veiling women (in-group/Us) in conflict with negative qualities. In addition, individuals (out-group/Them) that view face

veiling women as a problem are highlighted as morally inferior, *'So it boils down to your perception which a result of your moral values'*. Later in the same article, this argument is set forward more explicitly, where the writer declares *'Women of high moral values prefer to cover their modesty' and 'covered women do go about their daily chores unhindered. Hindered are those who look at the burqa as a symbol of subservience'*.

In another example taken from an op-ed titled, *"Mufti Sarkozy's 'fatwa' not amusing"* (SG3), the argument against a ban similarly, highlights a 'difference' between the in-group, 'face veil wearers' and the out-group, 'France as a nation', which are represented with various negative qualities.

*As the head of a **nation** that is self-confessedly proud of its 'laissez-faire attitude towards casual sex' and all the debauched trappings that go with it, one would expect him to be better acquainted with 'debasement'. A visit to just one among the thousands of proudly advertised, government licensed 'adult only entertainment spots' in France would suffice for him to write a detailed dissertation on human debasement and what it comprises. Debasement is the trading in the bodies of women, displaying them and using them as a means of provoking and gratifying unnatural biological urges in strangers. Debasement is the deliberate, systematic dehumanization of women and their relegation to being sexual toys in the hands of profiteers – not the covering of a woman's body in public, that protects her precisely from such predators.*

This excerpt is part of an argument made by the writer against a face veil ban. The writer argues against a ban that is being proposed by the French authorities on the basis that face veiling is a form of *'debasement'*. The writer rejects this claim by highlighting the difference between what the face veil promotes and what France as a *'nation'* promotes. The veil or *'the covering of a women's body in public'*, which is associated with the 'in-group/Us', is attributed with positive qualities of protecting women from 'predators'. Meanwhile, France as a *'nation'* is attributed with a list of negative attributes that exemplify what the writer views as *'human debasement and what it compromises'*, such as, France's proud attitude towards *'casual sex'* and the *'thousands of proudly advertised, government licensed 'adult only entertainment spots''*.

#### 4.2.6.4 Topos of 'Religious Obligation'

As illustrated in earlier analysis, the Arab press made a frequent association between the face veil and religion, through predicational strategies and the individualisation of elite Muslim scholars to support this religious link. Using these strategies, the face veil, at times, was not just highlighted as a religious practice, but as 'religious obligation'. Some of the arguments against the ban in the Arab press were built upon the premise that the face veil is a '*religious obligation*', which Muslim women are required to abide by, making the ban a violation of individual freedom. This argument introduces the representation of Muslims, or Muslim women in particular, as individuals under certain religious obligation and jurisdiction.

One example of such argument was found in the op-ed, '*Mufti Sarkozy's 'fatwa' not amusing*':

*Has he read the **verse of the Qur'an (Surah Ahzab, Verse 59)** which **explicitly enjoins** believing women to wear an outer garment when outdoors, so that they are identified as Muslim women and not harassed? If so, how is **he** qualified to offer a different conclusion from **centuries of Muslim exegetes and scholars** who **affirmed** that such **a garment is undoubtedly a religious obligation**? (SG3)*

In this article, which was highly critical of Sarkozy's negative stance on the face veil, one strategy the writer uses in the argument against the ban was extending a series of questions aimed at then French President Nicholas Sarkozy. Through posing these questions, a symptomatic argumentation, drawing on the topos of 'authority' (or rhetorical 'Ethos') is presented. The writer supports the claim that the face veil is obligatory based on the authority of a '*verse of the Qur'an*' and '*centuries of Muslim exegetes and scholars*' who dictate this to be a fact.

However, as with similar examples found in the UK press, drawing on the topos of 'authority' to support a disassociation of the face veil from religion, the argument commits a couple of fallacies. One fallacy, for instance, is the fallacious appeal to authority (argumentum ad verencundiam). The claim made by the writer is regarded as acceptable

based on an authoritative source for Muslims, the ‘Qur’an’ or the holy book of Islam. The reasonableness of the argument is questioned, since as explained in section 4.2.5.1, interpretations of verses of the Quran can differ between various Muslim scholars; interpretations are and will continue to be a source of scholarly debate. The argument also commits a populist fallacy (*argumentum ad populum*), where the argument is justified based on the claim that *many* authorities, signalled by the use of ‘*centuries of Muslim scholars and exegetes*’, dictate the face veil a religious obligation.

Another similar argument was found in the *Gulf Times* article headlined, “*Dressing Down*” (GT4):

*Al-Mraikhi also criticised the attitude of the French president, saying it was ‘violating the personal freedom of Muslims’. ‘There is no doubt that the Niqab ...a mandatory dress for all Muslim women wherever they are. So France or any other nation has no right to bar Muslim women from complying with the Islamic dress code ordained by Islam’ he said.*

Here, the article individualises a local Muslim scholar, Sheikh ‘*Al –Maraikhi*’, who is quoted arguing against the ban based on the premise that it violates individual freedom. The speaker supports his argument by committing a fallacious appeal to authority (*argumentum ad verendum*). The argument against the ban is based on premise that it would not allow Muslim women to follow their obligatory Islamic duty of wearing the face veil, which is ordained by ‘*Islam*’, the authority utilised to support this argument. As with the previous example, the presumed mandatory status of the face veil is a source of continuous debate.

### 4.3 Quantitative Analysis

The following section presents the quantitative analysis exploring the larger corpora of articles covering the ‘2009 French face veil ban’. The findings are presented mainly in the form of charts and diagrams, further details on the data are provided in appendix 14.

Similar to the initial stages in the qualitative analysis, the quantitative analysis began by examining referential strategies. The qualitative analysis illustrated a lack of consensus on the lexical items used in reference to the ‘face veil’, with the terms, *veil/s*, *niqab/s* and

*burqa/burka/burkha/burkini/s* being the most prominent. Moreover, there were examples, mainly in the Arab English language articles, where the use of ‘burqa’ and how it is defined in the ‘French face veil ban’ discourse is attested to and viewed as problematic. The quantitative analysis began by examining the frequency of these three key labels: *veil/s*, *niqab/s* and *burqa/burka/burkha/s* in the UK and Arab corpus.




Figure 4.3 ‘Face veil’ reference frequency analysis

As Figure 4.3 illustrates, ‘*veil/s*’ is used most frequently in the Arab based articles (0.75%, N=1006) and to a lesser degree in the UK corpus (0.45%, N= 765),  $\chi^2(1, N=302732) = 114.15$ ,  $P \leq 0.1$ . ‘*Burqa*’ is found to be the most prominent term in the British articles (0.61%, n=1040) and used slightly less frequently in the Arab corpus (0.60%, N= 808). The more frequent use of the generic term ‘*veil*’ to refer to the clothing item may be argued to highlight the Arab newspapers’ heightened awareness of the existing semantic variations in different contexts in reference to the face veil, thus, preferring to use a term encompassing all these variations. ‘*Niqab*’ is also found to be more frequent in the Arab articles, 0.55% (N=740) of the complete corpus, while forming a reduced 0.29% (N=505) of the UK corpus of articles,  $\chi^2(1, N=302732) = 117.18$ ,  $P \leq 0.1$ . As mentioned in section 4.2.2.1, this may be argued to be

due to the particular popularity of the ‘*niqab*’, one form of the face veil, in the Arab Gulf region.

The quantitative analysis continued by examining the top most frequent lemmas in both the UK and Arab corpora of articles.

UK Press			Arab Press		
Lemma	Frequency	Overall Proportion %	Lemma	Frequency	Overall proportion%
Face veil et al	2386	1.41	Face veil et al	2669	1.99
Islam	1548	0.91	Islam	1697	1.26
Woman	1319	0.78	Woman	1389	1.03
France	1118	0.66	France	1311	0.97
Ban	1052	0.62	Ban	1201	0.89
Wear	1017	0.60	Wear	998	0.74
Full	921	0.54	Face	735	0.54
Face	693	0.41	law	680	0.50
Public	553	0.32	Public	468	0.34
Religion	511	0.30	Religion	453	0.33

Table 4.7 Event A: Keyword frequency analysis

Table 4.7 illustrates the frequency of the top 10 lemmas in both contexts, in terms of the highest first. As shown, the UK and Arab corpus are characterised with similar key lemmas, highlighting the discourse as revolving around the face veil et al (including burqa, burka, burkha, burkini, burqini and niqab), Islam, Woman, France and a ban. However, frequencies of each lemma varied in each context, with most of the lemmas representing a higher percentage in frequency in the Arab context in proportion to the full corpus. This may be of particular significance with lemmas associated with religion (lemmas: religion and Islam), with words, such as: *Islam*, *Islamic*, *Muslim/s*, *Religion/s* and *religious* etc. The Arab corpus reflected a higher usage of such terms, where they made up 1.59% (N=2150) of the complete corpus, while making up 1.21% (N=2059) of the UK corpus of articles. The  $\chi^2$  in this case being, (1, N=302732) = 81.16,  $P \leq 0.1$ . This increased association with religion in the Arab context corresponds with the qualitative findings, where the face veil was related to religion and religious obligation on the macro and micro levels of analysis, including referential and

predicational strategies, as well as, drawing upon the topos of ‘religious obligation’, using various argumentation schemes.

This discursive association with religion in the Arab corpus was more apparent when examining the concordance patterns associated with the terms burqa/s and niqab/s in both contexts. The following table shows the main descriptive qualities attributed to burqa/niqab/s in the UK and Arab texts. This involved examining the total number of concordance lines including these words (UK: 1545 Arab: 1548).




Figure 4.4 Burqa/Niqab attribution frequency analysis

As fig. 4.4 illustrates, echoing some of the earlier qualitative findings, the Arab based discourse was found to relate the ‘niqab/burqa’ directly to religion, with attributes, such as, ‘religious’, ‘Islamic’ and ‘is obligatory and was confirmed in the Quran’ occurring in 148 instances (9.5%) of the total concordance lines examined. This religious association was found much less frequent in the UK based articles, with only 32 instances (2.07%) linking the face veil directly to religion or describing it as a form of religious obligation. The difference is significant with  $\chi^2(1, N=3093) = 79.14, P \leq 0.1$ .

However, although the Arab based discourse was characterised by relating the face veil to religion, it also reflected discourse contesting this religious association, albeit to a lesser degree. Attributes disassociating the face veil from religion, such as, *'not a sign of religion'* or *'has nothing to do with Islam'* were found in 91 instances (5.87%). The UK Press, also re-emphasising the qualitative findings were found to more frequently (n=85, 5.50%) distance the face veil from religion, than highlight it as having any religious connection.

In both the UK and Arab corpora of articles, the most frequent pattern in descriptive attributions was found to be negativisation, attributing the face veil with negative qualities. However, as with the qualitative analysis discussions, although the Arab press was found to reproduce some of these negative attributions in relation to the veil, this pattern was found to be more prominent in the UK Press (UK=N:340, 22%, Arab=N:222, 14.34%). The degree of difference is confirmed statistically,  $\chi^2(1, N=3093) = 30.54, P \leq 0.1$ . The following chart lists the most frequent negative qualities attributed to 'niqab' and 'burqa' in the UK and Arab corpus.




Figure 4.5 Burqa/Niqab negativisation theme analysis

The majority of negative attributes were similar to those discussed in the qualitative analysis. These include describing the face veil or the practice of veiling as being a form of *oppression*, as *different* from the norm, as resulting in *separating* Muslim women further from main stream society, and as posing a social *threat*. However, negativisation was not exclusively limited to these categories, but also took shape of 'other' general negative predicational strategies with adjectives, such as, '*inhuman*', '*ugly*' and '*absurd*'. These general negative attributes were also presented in the form of negative feelings the authors experience towards the face veil, for instance, it is described as causing them to feel '*depressed*', '*sad*' and '*uncomfortable*'. This form of negativisation was found more frequently in the UK corpus (N=77, 4.98%) than in the Arab English language corpus of articles (N=22, 1.42%),  $\chi^2(1, N=3093) = 31.63, P \leq 0.1$ . The Arab corpus also highlighted the negative effect of the face veil on various levels, in relation to university security (N=11, 0.71%), which can be argued as another form of security threat, e.g. '*identity disguise*' during exams. This was mainly found in articles covering a possible face veil ban at universities in Egypt and these negative attributions highlighted the motives of some of those proposing a ban.

Quotation patterns were examined next, this was done by examining the first three direct/indirect quoted sources in each article collected in the total UK and Arab corpora. As the focus was mainly on the representation of Muslims and face veiling women, it was of interest to examine the frequency of quotations by 'Muslim' actors and 'women who practice veiling'. Actors were coded as Muslims only if they were referred to as: (1) 'Muslims' or (2) as representing 'majority Muslim governments' and 'Islamic associations and groups'. Women who practice veiling were only coded if they were described as women wearing any form of the 'veil'. Moreover, although all other sources coded are labelled as 'non-Muslims', this merely serves an analytical purpose and does not suggest that all of the other sources are in fact non-Muslim, they are just not indicated as such, following the above described criteria.

As the fig. 4.6 illustrates, the amount of Muslim sources and veiled women quoted were quite similar in both the UK and Arab based corpus.




Figure 4.6 Muslim quotation frequency analysis

Muslim sources and women who practice veiling in all its forms were far less quoted in the first three quotations of each article than other sources. In the UK press, Muslim sources made up 14.37% (N=92) of the total number of actors quoted. Veiled women were quoted even less, making up only 5% (N=32) of the total quotes examined. Statistically, the difference in frequency is very significant,  $\chi^2 (2, N=640) = 652.55, P \leq 0.1$ . Similarly, in the Arab articles, Muslims were found to be quoted far less than other actors in relation to the total number of quotes examined, forming 19.36% (N=135) of the quotes. Veiled women also received minimal coverage in the Arab press, in terms of quotations, with only 6.88% (N=48) of the actors being quoted being described as women who wear the veil. Again, statistically, these differences are shown to be significant,  $\chi^2 (2, N=697) = 528.49, P \leq 0.1$ . These low numbers in Muslim and veiled women sources is particularly revealing taking into account the general topic being covered as one being closely related to Islam and Muslims. More importantly, those who would be directly affected by a ban, the veil wearers, would

have been expected to be given a more prominent voice. Although the Arab press does illustrate giving Muslims a slightly higher number of quotes than the UK based articles, this may be argued to be due to the fact that these newspapers are published in predominantly Muslim nations. However, the fact that they are, may also result in the actors not being described as 'Muslim', since they form the majority of the population, unlike the UK context. Nevertheless, the extremely low number of veiled women being quoted in the quotations examined is quite significant in exposing the amount of discourse available that reflect their views on veiling and the ban in either context. Although veiled women may have been quoted in later sections of the articles (not in the first 3 quoted sources), as discussed earlier, following the journalistic 'inverted pyramid' approach, the earlier the information is included in an article, the more important it is regarded by the newspaper. Thus, their exclusion from the initial quoted sources in each article may also be argued to further reveal the increased suppression of their voices in newspaper reporting.

These findings also support the qualitative data, where Muslims and face veiling women were mainly referred to collectively. Individualisation of these social actors, although not as frequent, was predominantly limited to elite Muslim actors representing various Muslim associations in the UK press, and religious Muslim scholars and sheikhs in the Arab English language articles. In both cases, they were mainly positioned as active agents of vocal processes utilised, at times, to support key arguments and opinions for or against the ban, which will be the focus of the next part of the quantitative analysis.

Analysing quotations in terms of the balance of opinions for and against the ban was also interesting to examine. This was done by analysing the first 3 sources quoted in each article and the opinions revealed in these quotations in all articles published in the June '09, Jan '10 and July '10 periods. The following chart reveals the opinions expressed in all the quotes examined. These were either (1) for a ban or/and critical of veiling (2) critical of a ban or/and for the practice of veiling (3) neither or unknown.




Figure 4.7 Opinion quotation frequency analysis

As illustrated in fig 4.7, quotes in the UK press were quite unbalanced in opinion, with opinions for a ban or critical of veiling making up 52.08% (N=150), just above half of the total quotes examined. These were much higher than quotes expressing opinions critical of a ban or for the practice of veiling (25%, N=72), while the remaining quotations did not reflect an opinion either for or against (22.91%, N=66). These findings were found to be statistically significant,  $\chi^2 (2, N=288) = 45.75, P \leq 0.1$ . The Arab press also included a higher number of quotes expressing opinions for the ban or critical of veiling (40.81%, N=100), while opinions criticising the ban or being for the practice of veiling were expressed in 32.65% of the quotes (N=80). Comparatively, however, the difference or imbalance was not as large as in the UK articles. The remaining 65 quotes (26.53%) did not lean particularly for or against the ban. In the Arab based articles, the difference in the frequency of quotations revealing opinions was also found to be significant,  $\chi^2 (2, N=288) = 4.45, P \leq 0.5$ , albeit not as significant as the contrasting frequencies revealed in the UK corpus.

Focusing on the Muslim quotations in particular, the analysis examined the opinions expressed by Muslim sources in the same UK and Arab corpora, during the same period.




Figure 4.8 Muslim opinion quotation frequency analysis

As fig 4.8 shows, the differences were quite revealing and more importantly echoed some of the main qualitative findings. When Muslims were quoted in the UK press, they mainly expressed views arguing for the ban or critical of the practice of face veiling (45.45%, N=20). This was highlighted often in the UK based arguments for a ban in the qualitative analysis, for instance, drawing on the topos of ‘threat’. Muslim actors were utilized to vocally support a ban on the premise that the face veil has no association with Islam and instead is being deliberately used by particular Muslim parties to assert their power in Europe. Nevertheless, as shown in the chart, Muslim sources in the UK press also included comparable views against the ban (36.36%, N=16). Having said that, statistically, these numbers may be argued insignificant in showing a particular dominancy in views (for/against),  $\chi^2 (2, N=44) = 2.14, P \geq 0.5$ .

However, in the Arab articles examined, the imbalance in frequency of opinion, for or against the ban as expressed by Muslim sources was quite substantial and was shown to be statistically significant. Muslims quoted predominantly expressed opinions and arguments against the ban and for veiling (60.37%, n=32), while Muslim opinion for a ban or critical of veiling was much less frequent (16.98%, n=9), this is supported statistically,  $\chi^2 (2, N=53) =$

17.76,  $P \leq 0.1$ . Again, this echoes earlier CDA findings examining the Arab articles published in the June period. Muslims, mainly religious scholars, were repeatedly found positioned in active vocal roles against the ban, drawing on the topoi of 'religious obligation' and 'discrimination'. Moreover, these findings are somewhat expected, since as the qualitative analysis illustrated on a macro level, there was a clear lack or near absence of any articles explicitly arguing against the veil or for the face veil ban.

More importantly, the lack of balanced opinions expressed by Muslim quotes in the UK and Arab press, with each context leaning towards one view more than the other (for vs. against the ban) was found to be statistically significant. Muslims quoted as being for the ban and/or critical of veiling were far more frequent in the UK press (45.45%,  $N=20$ ) than the Arab Press (16.98%,  $N=9$ ),  $\chi^2 (1, N=97) = 9.21, P \leq 0.1$ . Meanwhile, when Muslims were quoted as being critical of the ban and/or for veiling this was more likely to appear in the Arab press (60.37%,  $N=32$ ) than the UK press (36.36%,  $N=16$ ),  $\chi^2 (1, N=97) = 5.51, P \leq 0.1$ . This supports earlier qualitative findings by revealing the clear diverging, and at times, opposing lines of argument found and argued to be practiced in the UK and Arab newspaper discourse.

## Chapter 5

### Data Analysis: The 2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy

The following sections will present the data findings of the qualitative and quantitative analysis examining articles related to the second news event to be explored in this thesis, the '2006 Danish cartoon controversy'. For a complete list of all articles collected for the discourse analysis of this news event, please refer to appendix 3 and 4.

#### 5.1 Quantitative Analysis: Publications General Profile Analysis

Categories	UK Press					Arab Press					
	DTC	TTC	TGC	TIC	TOTAL	GNC	GTC	KTC	ANC	TOTAL	TOTAL
<b>News</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>256</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>352</b>	<b>608</b>
<b>Hard</b>	27	54	101	32	214	67	183	16	74	340	554
<b>Soft</b>	7	11	16	8	42	5	2	0	5	12	54
<b>Opinion</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>205</b>
<b>Column</b>	8	9	54	17	88	11	2	13	39	65	153
<b>Editorial</b>	2	4	6	8	20	2	4	0	3	9	29
<b>blog</b>	2	13	8	0	23	0	0	0	0	0	23
<b>Total</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>387</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>426</b>	<b>813</b>

Table 5.1 Event B: Genre analysis

As with the '2009 French face veil ban' analysis, articles including the query terms were found to be slightly higher in number in the Arab corpus (N=426) in comparison to the UK corpus of articles (N=387). Also, similarly both contexts featured a much higher number of news articles, which made up 66.41% (N=256) of the UK corpus and an even higher 82.62% (N=352) of the total number of articles in the Arab press. This meant, once again, that opinionated discourse was more prominent in the UK press (33.85%, N=131) than it was in the Arab press (17.37%, N=74). Indeed, this was quite apparent in the CDA analysis of the articles, where arguments and argumentation schemes were much less evident in the Arab based articles.

The analysis continued by examining the bylined sources in both contexts. The findings are illustrated in fig 4.9 and fig 5.1 (for further details, please refer to appendix 15).




Fig 4.9 Event B: UK press byline analysis

Fig 5.1 Event B: Arab press byline analysis

The UK corpus was predominantly bylined by internal sources (87%), only 11% of the articles were bylined by external news agencies; the remaining articles did not indicate the sources bylined. Interestingly, unlike the articles examined in the ‘face veil ban’ story earlier, the byline distribution in the Arab based press were nearly equally divided between external sources (52%) and internal sources (47%). This suggests, that unlike the ‘2009 French face veil ban’ corpus of articles, a much larger amount of local discourse may exist in the Arab corpus examined in the ‘2005 Danish cartoon controversy’ study. It may also suggest a higher dependency on the newspapers’ own foreign correspondents, especially since many of the events related to the cartoon controversy, i.e. protests, took place locally, and in other Arab nations, in addition to, various South Asian countries (areas of interest for the target readership).

## 5.2 Qualitative Analysis: Topic Analysis

The following sections will present the CDA analysis of articles related to the ‘2006 Danish cartoon controversy’ news event. All articles examined in this section are provided in appendix 3 and 4.

The qualitative analysis began by examining the primary topics of the articles selected from the UK and Arab English language newspapers. Fig 5.2 illustrates some of the main primary discourse topics found to dominate the articles examined.

Topics	UK press		Arab English Language press	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
<b>Muslim protest against cartoons</b>	18	48.6	13	48.1
<b>Reactions to the cartoons</b>	5	13.5	3	11.1
<b>Muslim boycott of Danish products</b>	1	2.7	2	7.4
<b>Freedom of speech vs. Responsibility</b>	6	16.2	0	0
<b>Freedom of Speech vs. Respect of religion</b>	0	0	3	11.1
<b>Other</b>	7	18.9	6	22.2

Table 5.2 Event B: Primary topic analysis

What became quite clear from the off set of analysing the primary topics covered in both the UK and Arab English language newspaper articles was the prominence of ‘Muslim protests against the cartoons’ as a primary topic. In the UK corpus, it was the primary topic in approximately half (48.6%, N=18) of the articles analysed. Similarly, it was found to dominate 48.1% of the Arab based articles (N=13). As a result, a large part of the analysis on

the '2009 Danish cartoon controversy' news event will be dedicated to articles covering this primary topic (section 5.3).

It was also clear, as one may expect, that the 'Danish cartoon controversy' story mainly attracted topics arguing for freedom of speech, and thus, the publication of the cartoons or for censorship and against the publication of the prophet cartoons. Moreover, despite some similarities in topics, as shown above, the majority of topics and variety of arguments were quite different in each context. The following sections will highlight some of the primary topics dominating articles in the each context, and the diverging representations and arguments on Muslims and Islam.

- **Topics: The UK Press**

One of the key topics found to apply arguments for and against the publishing of cartoons in the UK press was the topic, 'Freedom of speech vs. Responsibility' (16.2%). Reflecting the fact that no UK newspaper actually published the cartoons in question, the majority of articles under this topic represented arguments for freedom of speech, while emphasising its application with responsibility, i.e. selective censorship. The argument for this responsible application of freedom was argued necessary should news content be considered to possibly: (1) cause serious offence to readers, (2) result in negative financial, commercial and profit related implications, and/or (3) endanger the safety and security of the general public. Some of the headlines included: '*When Freedom gives in to fear*' (TGC49), '*No news is good news*' (TIC21), '*Publishing controversial cartoons and being damned*' (TTC6), '*Conscience or Commerce: that is the question*' (DTC16). Having said that, it was these articles, arguing against the cartoon publications that included negative representations of Islam and Muslims, drawing quite extensively on the topos of 'threat'. These arguments were highlighted across all the newspapers analysed.

'Reactions to cartoons', the primary topic of 5 UK based articles (13.5%), also included arguments for and against the publication of the cartoons. These articles mainly involved views and opinions towards the controversy, as well as, reactions by various sources around the world. Headlines included, '*Why the Mohammad Cartoons fail*' (TTC10) and '*The double standards over free speech*' (TIC22). Some of these articles were sympathetic towards Muslims by drawing on the topos of 'victimisation', where the publications were argued to

result in Islam and Muslims becoming victims of racial abuse, hate and discrimination. The topos of 'religious obligation' also highlighted a sympathetic tone towards the Muslim position. Drawing on this topos, the argument against the publications and sympathy towards the negative reaction by Muslims are justified by Muslim religious beliefs and obligations.

Most other primary topics spread across the newspaper articles with no significant high frequencies, most being the primary topics of individual articles. These articles presented standpoints that generally leaned towards arguing for freedom of speech and against censorship. Examples of such articles include, '*Stop cringing and stand up for your own values*' (TIC18), with the primary topic '*Islam and Europe*', and '*A worm's eye view: logic and principle can't resolve the row over the Danish cartoons*' (TGC44), focusing on 'Freedom of speech in Europe' as a primary topic. Again, the topos of 'threat' was frequently drawn upon in some of these arguments, whereby Islam and Muslims (out-group) are represented as posing a threat to freedom of speech and the democracy that is argued to characterise the in-group society, i.e. Europe and the 'West'.

Finally, one interesting topos found to be drawn upon in the UK press, criticising the Muslim reaction and arguing for the freedom to publish the cartoon, was the topos of 'contradiction'. Here, the criticism of the reactions displayed by some Muslims and the argument for the publication of the cartoons are based on the representation of Muslim double standards, whereby, Muslims are represented as demanding selective censorship, yet described as not practicing this censorship in their own media, i.e. when offending other religions.

In addition to argumentation schemes, all the above mentioned topoi were also highlighted on the micro level, through the use of referential and predicational strategies and the social actions allocated to Muslims.

- **Topics: The Arab Press**

The genre of newspaper reporting seemed to have a determining effect on the primary topics and amount of argumentation utilised in the Arab English Language articles related to the 'Danish cartoon controversy' news event. The articles analysed qualitatively, reflecting

the general reporting of the full corpus of articles, were predominantly made up of news reports (N=23, 85%). In fact, the rest of the articles made up of four opinion pieces, were all published in one newspaper, the Saudi based *Arab News*.

The predominance of news reports meant that the majority of articles in the Arab press reported on news updates, covering a wide range of topics with no significant frequency in coverage. Some of the topics covered include, 'Muslim boycott of Danish products', 'GCC requests Danish apology' and 'Danish paper sends editor on vacation'. This focus on *hard news* coverage in most of the articles resulted in the reduced use of argumentation strategies in comparison to the UK press, as will be illustrated in the analysis. Nevertheless, most of the topics and more specifically, the headlines, highlighted the general negative attitude towards the publications: '*JCCI not to invite Danes for forum*' (ANC28), '*French see reprinting as 'unnecessary provocation'*' (GTC58), '*Danish boycott 'success''*' (KTC13).

Having said that, some argumentation was still evident in the Arab based press and the primary topics clearly tended to attract arguments against the publication of the cartoons. 'Freedom of speech vs. Respect for Religion' was one such primary topic covered in 3 articles (11.1%). These articles were dominated by arguments against the cartoon publications on the premise that they lacked any respect for religion. In fact, they were represented as a direct attack on the Muslim religion in particular, drawing on the topos of 'discrimination'. Some of the headlines under this topic include: '*Press freedom Vis-a-Vis respect for the sacred*' (ANC33) and '*Is free speech truly alive and well in the Western nations?'*' (ANC34).

'Reactions to the cartoons' as a primary topic was another recurring topic presenting arguments in support of censorship and against the publication of the cartoons. These arguments mainly drew on the topos of 'victimisation' and 'discrimination' in the representation of Islam and Muslims. This was highlighted mainly by the use of analogies as an argumentation scheme, stressing the out-group's (i.e. Europe/ the 'West') discriminatory role towards Muslims in particular by their 'selective censorship' policies. This was also highlighted in their frequent allocation of passive roles to 'Muslims', on the receiving end of negative actions carried out by 'Western/European' actors. One example of an article with this topic as its primary focus is headlined, '*Europe's uncivilised act*' (ANC32).

### **5.3 Topic in Focus: 'Muslim Protests against the Cartoons'**

As discussed earlier in the literature review, ideological construction can be at its most influential on the macro level with the selection of 'discourse topics' to form the main focus of articles published about various social groups. A clear interest in 'Muslim protests against cartoons' as a dominating topic in the UK and Arab based newspaper articles may be revealing regarding the underlying ideological representation of Islam and Muslims. Therefore, the following section will focus on articles dominated by this particular topic, applying the same research and textual analysis questions presented in sections 3.2 and 3.3.1. This will also assist in minimising the amount of data to be analysed using CDA, adding further focus to the analysis.

This topic did get significant attention in both the Arab English language articles and the UK based texts as a main general direction for the articles. However, key differences were illustrated in relation to news values and what to cover regarding the Muslim protests.

The UK press, as one may expect, gave significant attention to the local (UK based) Muslim protests, and more importantly, the negative reactions and criticisms that they provoked from government officials and the general public. Arguments centred around the need for legal action against the protestors, highlighting their active role in negative actions, drawing heavily on the topos of 'threat'. This was also emphasised in the negative referential and predicational strategies used in describing the protestors and their actions, linking the demonstrations primarily to 'extremist' and 'radical' groups. Another repeated argument found in the UK based articles covering 'international protests' (e.g. protests in Lebanon and Syria) was the standpoint that protests were triggered by unrelated political interests and motivations; they were argued to be planned and executed by various external/political parties and governmental authorities.

The English language Arab press mainly covered international protests, providing detailed descriptions of the actions taken by the protestors and the authorities in various contexts. The analysed articles were largely found to sympathise with the demonstrators, drawing on the topos of 'victimisation'.

### 5.3.1 Headline Analysis

A brief scan of the headlines and leads used in both contexts will reflect some of the key differences in reporting on the protests.

UK Press	English Language Arab Press
<b>The Guardian</b>	<b>Gulf News</b>
<b>Violence, fatwas and online anti-Jew images: A world of protests</b> (TGC40)	<b>Violence erupts at cartoon protests</b> (GNC21)
<i>Downing street statement on weekend cartoon demonstrations</i> (TGC41)	<b>Two shot dead in violent cartoon clashes</b> (GNC23)
<b>Threats that <u>must</u> be countered</b> (TGC42)	<b>Gulf Times</b>
<b>Arrest extremist marchers, police told</b> (TGC43)	<i>Thousands march in Islamabad over cartoons</i> (GTC62)
<i>Lebanon seeks to defuse tensions over cartoons</i> (TGC47)	<i>Philippine Muslim leader urge restraint</i> (GTC64)
<b>Suicide bomber' protestor apologises</b> (TGC48)	<i>Bakhari call for campaign against Denmark over offending cartoons</i> (GTC65)
<i>Danish embassy in Tehran <b>attacked</b></i> (TGC51)	<i>Kenyan riot police <b>clash</b> with cartoon protesters</i> (GTC66)
<i>Rioting with well planned spontaneity</i> (TGC52)	<i>Khaleda demands apology as cartoon rallies erupt</i> (GTC67)
<b>The Independent</b>	<i>41 Pakistani workers <b>detained</b> in Afghanistan</i> (GTC68)
<i>Authorities backed Damascus riots, says protestors</i> (TIC16)	<b>Arab News</b>
<i>Ministers appeal calm</i> (TIC17)	<b>Six die in global protest</b> (GTC29)
<i>Police <u>must</u> bear down on <b>extremist protestors</b></i> (TIC19)	<b>Kuwait Times</b>
<i>Robert Fisk: <b>The Fury</b></i> (TIC20)	<i>Cartoon protests turn <b>deadly</b></i> (KT12)
<b>The Times</b>	
<b>'Let the hands that drew be severed!'</b> (TTC14)	
<b>Daily Telegraph</b>	
<i>I am sorry, says <b>'suicide bomber'</b></i> (DTC17)	
<b>'Suicide bomber' is freed drug dealer</b> (DTC18)	
<i><b>Extremists</b> in demonstration face inquiry by police squad</i> (DTC19)	
<i>Protests cast cloud over IOC</i> (DTC20)	
<i>This soft approach to <b>militant Muslims</b> is a gift to the far right</i> (DTC21)	

Table 5.3 Protest reporting headlines

As illustrated in table 5.3, the lexical choices in the UK headlines highlight a theme of violence in relation to the protests: *'violence, fatwa and anti-Jew images'*, *'The fury'*, *'threat'*. Moreover, in using referential and predicational strategies, such as, *'extremists in demonstrations'*, *'extremist protestors'*, *'militant Muslims'* and *'suicide bomber' protestor'*, an explicit association is made between the protests/protesters and 'extremism', feeding into the key topos of *'threat'* found in the representation of Islam and Muslims in the UK articles. The headline, *'Let the hands that drew be severed'* (TTC14), which quotes one of the placards held in the protests, highlights this sense of threat and fear further. Finally, with the use of the modals, *'must'* and declarative *'arrest'* in the headlines which involve the police, *'Police must bear down on extremist protestors'* (TIC19), and *'Arrest extremist marchers, police told'* (TGC43), a sense of threat and urgency in the demand for police action is emphasised. A more explicit example using the modal *'must'* was also found in the *Guardian* headline, *'Threats that must be countered'* (TGC42).

In the Arab articles, some of the headlines also highlight violence in relation to the nature of the protests taking place, for instance, predicational strategies attribute the protests with terms, such as, *'violent'*. However, there is no link made between the protest/protesters and 'extremism', in fact, the only time demonstrators are explicitly referred to (GTC66), they are referred to simply as 'cartoon protestors'. The headlines in the Arab corpus also paid particular attention to 'death': *'Two shot dead in violent cartoon Clashes'* (GNC23), *'Cartoon protests turn deadly'* (KTC12) and *'Six die in global protest'* (ANC29). This fittingly corresponds with the topos of 'victimisation' in the representation of Muslims emphasised further within the articles. The topos of 'victimisation' is also emphasised in the syntactic construction of active processes involving the *'police'*, e.g. *'Kenyan riot police clash with cartoon protesters'* (GTC66). As was detected regularly in the majority of articles, frontal positioning is used, placing the *'police'* as active agents of actions against the protesters. Finally, in tune with the ideological square, Muslim actors ('Us/in-group' in these newspaper contexts) are highlighted as active agents of positive actions, for instance, *'Philippine Muslim leaders urqe restraint'* (GTC64); Muslims are highlighted as advocating peace. This is another quality repeatedly attributed to 'protests' in the texts analysed, challenging the representation of the protests as mainly violent.

### 5.3.2 Social Actors: Protesters/Demonstrators

As with the ‘2009 French face veil ban’ analysis, protesters in both the UK and Arab press were predominantly referred to collectively using assimilation strategies. They were mainly referred to as a collective group, e.g. anti-cartoon protesters. Collectivisation was also indicated by the use of nouns denoting groups, with terms such as, *crowds* and *mob*. However, there were distinct patterns in both the naming strategies and attributes given to protesters in both contexts, as table 5.4 illustrates:

UK Press		Arab Press	
1.	Aggregation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Large number of protesters (mainly <i>Guardian</i>)</li> </ul>	1.	Aggregation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Large number of protesters</li> <li>• Protesters high death toll (topos of ‘victimisation’)</li> </ul>
2.	Negativisation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Topos of ‘<i>Threat</i>’</li> </ul>		

Table 5.4 Referential/predicational analysis: Protesters/demonstrators

The following sections will further discuss the referential and predicational patterns found in the UK and Arab based articles.

#### 5.3.2.1 UK Press

Aggregation patterns were found to be used, highlighting the large numbers of protesters involved in the protests, this was particularly evident in *Guardian*:

- (1) **Hundreds** of angry protesters threw stones and fire bombs (TGC51)
- (2) **Thousands** protested (TGC40)

In terms of referential strategies, individuals taking part in the protests were generally referred to as protesters or demonstrators, without specifying their religious affiliation. However, one key trend found in all the newspapers analysed was the use of negative referential and predicational strategies in regard to the protesters, highlighting the topos of ‘threat’. Protesters were linked to ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalism’, and at times, this was done with direct reference to ‘Islam’. Some examples include:

*A day after **Islamic extremists** set fire to building housing the Danish embassy... (TGC47)*

*In the long run too, the **Islamist fanatics** may have done themselves damage by revealing so much about themselves in public... (TGC42)*

*A special police squad has been set up to investigate **Islamic extremists** involved in the protests... (DTC19)*

*Elsewhere, as **extremists** continue to burn flags and embassies, and demand executions, exterminations and beheadings because of the mocking of their religion... (DTC21)*

*'Suicide bomber' protester apologises (TGC48)*

*The move comes after growing protests over the failure to arrest the **militant demonstrators**... (DTC19)*

### **5.3.2.2 Arab Press**

Aggregation patterns were also found to be used in reference to protesters in the Arab based articles. These patterns highlighted: (1) the large number of protesters taking part in the demonstrations, and (2) protesters' death toll.

In contrast to the UK based press, estimates regarding the number of protesters taking part in the protests were much higher. Numbers were mainly in the thousands and this was highlighted across the newspaper articles analysed:

***Thousands of Muslims** protested in Malaysia yesterday over controversial cartoons...(GTC61)*

***Thousands of protesters** had gathered on the mall road... (GNC21)*

***Tens of thousands of Muslims** demonstrated in the Middle East, Asia and Africa over the drawings... (KTC12)*

Moreover, as shown above, the protesters, unlike their depiction in the UK press, were referred to explicitly as ‘*Muslims*’ in many instances.

Aggregation also drew on the topos of ‘victimisation’ in the representation of Muslim protesters by highlighting the number of deaths and injured in the protests. Again, this pattern was highlighted across the Arab based newspapers analysed.

*Global protests over cartoons of the prophet Muhammed (peace be upon him) escalated yesterday, with **six demonstrators killed** in Afghanistan, Lebanon and Somalia... (ANC29)*

***At least two people were killed and dozens injured in Lahore...according to Lahore police, those who were killed were shot by security guards of the Union bank as the miscreants tried to set the LDA plaza building on fire... (GNC21)***

***Afghan police shot dead four people protesting yesterday against cartoons of the prophet Muhammed (PBUH)... (KTC12)***

### **5.3.3 Social Actions: Protesters/Demonstrators**

In both the UK and Arab based articles, protesters/demonstrators were mainly allocated active roles. This may somewhat be expected, since the articles are covering the protests and the protesters would be expected to be actively taking part. Accordingly, this demands their frequent role as agents in various actions during the protests. Having said that, there were distinct patterns in each context (Arab/UK) specific to not just the active roles, but the passive roles they were given, drawing on various topoi. Table 5.5 illustrates some of the key patterns.

<b>Protesters/Demonstrators</b>	
<b>UK Press</b>	<b>Arab Press</b>
<p>Mainly in <b>active roles</b>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agents of direct and indirect negative actions (Topos of ‘threat’)</li> <li>• Frontal positioning of protesters in negative actions towards police.</li> </ul>	<p>Mainly in <b>active roles</b>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agents of direct negative actions</li> <li>• Agents of positive actions, i.e. peaceful protests, by various members of society.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Passive roles</b>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Patients under control of organised/political parties (topos of ‘political motivation’)</li> <li>• Patients of criticism by ‘in-group’ members and the request for their arrest (topos of ‘threat’)</li> </ul>	<p><b>Passive roles</b>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Patients of negative actions by police and ‘out-group’ members, topos of ‘victimisation’.</li> </ul>

Table 5.5 Social action analysis: Protesters/demonstrators

### 5.3.3.1 UK Press

In the UK press, protesters were mainly allocated active roles as agents of negative material processes. These involved *direct* violent behaviour during protests and towards the police and *indirect* negative actions through proposed threats. When protesters were allocated passive roles, they were mainly depicted as under the influence of political/organised groups or being criticised for their negative behaviour by ‘in-group’ members, e.g. UK government officials.

- **Active Roles**

In the UK press, Muslim protesters were mainly allocated active roles in negative actions. However, these negative actions displayed two distinct patterns related specifically to the context of the article, in relation to which particular protests were being reported on.

In international news reports on Muslim protests against the cartoons, Muslim protesters were mainly allocated active roles in *direct* negative material processes during the protests, highlighting their role in causing physical damage. Some examples include:

*The mob grew fiercer, and finally the police withdrew. As they moved back, the crowd **smashed** their way into the building housing the Danish embassy and **set it ablaze**.* (TGC52)

*...as the Danish consulate was **set on fire** and a large church was **attacked by a mob**.* (TIC20)

*The first protests took place in Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim nation, when around 150 members of the Islamic Defenders front **tried to storm** the Danish embassy in Jakarta after **pelting the building with eggs**.* (TTC14)

In most cases where protesters were agents of negative violent behaviour, the police were given passive roles and came in second position. The police were also found to be placed in active and first position, if the actions were not directly negative towards the protesters.

In the articles reporting on international protests, this worked to portray the police as not being able to control the protests and violence caused by the protesters:

*throwing the metal barriers and barbed wire aside **they chased the police** up into the narrow alleys of Achrafieh...* (TGC52)

*..**security forces** armed with tear gas and rubber bullets **were taken by surprise**.* (TIC16)

*In the Northern city of Fayzabad **police fired** into the air to disperse a group of **rowdy protesters**.* (TGC40)

*The Lebanese, far from firing bullets into the surging crowds, pushed them back with water cannons.* (TIC20)

*Police fired warning shots to stop protesters from ripping a plaque from the wall of the US consulate in Surabaya.* (TGC51)

In articles covering the local London protests, police were similarly portrayed as taking a soft approach towards the protesters by not taking any legal action. This also involved positioning the police in passive roles on the receiving end of requests by officials to take more action, at times, emphasised further using the modal verb 'must'.

*Scotland yard said **police** received more than 100 complaints about the protest, but **no arrests were made.*** (TIC17)

*...Criticised **police** for failing to arrest radical demonstrators...* (TIC17)

***Police** must bear down on extremist protestors* (TIC19)

*...urged the **police** to make arrests* (TGC43)

Based on the examples found in the reporting on local UK and international protests, the police force can be argued to have been portrayed as being less forceful, and indeed, not in control of the protesters who are explicitly allocated negative actions. This highlights the topos of 'threat' in the representation of Muslim protesters, which was one of the key topos drawn upon in the main arguments found in the UK based corpus of articles.

Negative processes allocated to Muslims also took the form of 'descriptive' *indirect* negative actions, which were mainly detected in articles reporting on the local London protests. In addition to highlighting protesters as agents of negative material processes actively occurring during the protests, emphasis was placed on allocating to protesters negative actions they are *described* to be the agents of in the interpretative analysis of their actions during the protests. These *descriptions* are mainly provided by various 'in-group' actors arguing for legal action against the protesters. Once again, the topos of 'threat' can be seen to be drawn upon, portraying an imminent internal threat posed by the protests and protesters towards British society:

David Winnick, a labour member of the commons Home Affairs Committee, called for **people carrying placards threatening violence and glorifying terrorism** to be prosecuted or deported. (TIC17)

David Cameron, the Conservative leader, urged the police and the authorities to take 'appropriate action' against **people who 'break the law by inciting hatred or inciting people to violence or murder'**. He added: '**many of those people carrying the placards were clearly inciting violence or inciting hatred'**'. (DTC19)

Ashok Kumar, the Labour MP for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland, condemned the demonstrations. '**Muslim extremists are poisoning the atmosphere in this country** in what was, what has been, a great multicultural society,' he said. (DTC19)

The 'threat' towards the 'in-group' was also highlighted by the frequent emphasis of the protesters as active agents 'carrying placards' with various negative statements displaying a 'threat':

Others showed **demonstrators wielding placards threatening a repeat of the September 11 and July 7 attacks and calling for the beheading of those responsible for the cartoons.** (DTC19)

- **Passive Roles**

To a much lesser degree, protesters were allocated passive roles. Passive roles were found to highlight:

- (1) The protesters as being under the control and influence of organised parties, drawing on the topos of 'political motivation'.
- (2) The argument for the arrest of some of the protesters, drawing on the topos of 'threat'.

The first case was mainly highlighted in the *Independent* and the *Guardian* in the reporting of international protests. The topos of 'political motivation' was highlighted by portraying

the protests and protesters as part of well organised and externally motivated political/organised parties and movements. This is as opposed to the protests resulting from individual or general feelings of condemnation Muslims may have felt towards the cartoons.

Syrian protesters who burnt and looted the Danish and Norwegian embassies in Damascus at the weekend **were encouraged to organise** by the Syrian authorities, and **received text messages** from Islamic study centres urging them to gather... (TIC16)

**'The sheikhs told us to send five text messages** to every true Muslim we knew urging them to participate'... (TIC16)

And then in the early afternoon, as suddenly as it had all begun, it ended. **The leaders of the mob turned to the angry young men beside them and told them it was time to leave.** (TGC52)

As illustrated, in addition to highlighting the protesters as following orders and requests by various parties, the 'out-group', represented by: '*Syrian authorities*', '*Islamic study centres*' and '*Sheikhs*', are highlighted as active agents of negative actions encouraging or allowing the violence that took place.

Also, drawing on the topos of 'threat', protesters were allocated passive roles, highlighting the need for legal action to be taken against them. This was translated in the text through allocating 'in-group' members with the active role of demanding legal action against the protesters, with the aim of protecting the British society from any threat. In some instances, this was emphasised further with the use of the modal verbs '*should*' and '*must*'.

*David Winnick, a labour member of the Commons House Affairs Committee, **called for people** carrying placards threatening violence and glorifying terrorism **to be prosecuted or deported.*** (TIC17)

*So far the police appear to have held off taking stronger action against the fanatics because of the **fear**, which may have been well-judged, that it would make an already ugly situation even worse. But no society can allow the **threats** that were made on Friday's march to pass without further action. **Those** who threatened to kill*

***should** answer for their threats. **They should** be arrested, cautioned and placed under surveillance. If appropriate, the authorities **must** not be afraid of bringing charges. **Those** who are eligible for deportation **should** be deported. (TGC42)*

### 5.3.3.2 Arab Press

In the English language Arab newspapers, protesters were also mainly positioned as agents of actions. However, these involved both negative and more positive processes. Protesters were also found to be frequently given passive roles, positioned on the receiving end of negative actions by the police or special forces, highlighting the topos of 'victimisation'.

- **Active role**

When protesters were given an active role in the Arab articles, as in the UK press, they were also found to be placed as agents of negative material processes during the actual protests. Some of these processes include:

*The protesters spat on giant Danish flags... (GTC65)*

*A 300-strong crowd - mainly student members of the Basij militia - torched the facade of a building housing the Austrian embassy in Tehran and pelted the mission with **stones, firecrackers and eggs**, smashing all its windows. (ANC29)*

*...a crowd pelted the Danish embassy with **petrol bombs and stones** for a second day. (KT12)*

However, in contrast to the findings in the UK corpus, protests also included protesters taking part in more peaceful or non-violent protests. An example where this was shown was in a *Gulf News* article (GN21):

***Pakistani parliament members** staged a march here on Tuesday to protest [sic] publication of blasphemous cartoons in European newspapers while police cracked down on a separate student rally after it turned violent at the capital's diplomatic enclave.*

***Some half of the lawmakers from the 340-member National Assembly from both the opposition and government marched from the parliament to diplomatic quarters near the foreign ministry.***

Here, the article introduces the active involvement of another segment of society in the protests against the cartoons, referred to collectively as ‘*Pakistani parliament members*’ and ‘*some half of the lawmakers from the 340-member National Assembly from both the opposition and government*’. This stands in contrast to the more recurring ‘*young*’, ‘*male*’ ‘*bearded*’, and ‘*student*’ protesters referred to in most of the articles, in both the UK and other Arab based newspaper texts.

The active role of various segments of the Muslim community in the cartoon controversy debate was also highlighted in the *Gulf Times* news report titled, ‘*Warning on ‘chasm’ between West and Islam*’ (GTC61):

***A total of 60 religious leaders, government officials, academics and scholars have gathered in the capital to ponder the challenges facing the Muslim world.***

In this example, a different and a more positive representation of the Muslim communities’ reaction to the cartoons is shown. Various segments of the Muslim community are given an active role in taking part in a two day international conference held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, discussing the cartoon controversy along with other relevant issues.

Female protesters were also given an active role in the protests. Again, this was highlighted in the description of a non-violent protest taking place in France:

***Some 300 girls formed a human chain near a French cultural centre to protest the cartoons in France as well as a headscarf ban in French schools.*** (GTC67)

The portrayal of peaceful protests can be described to take a more explicit turn, where in the majority of articles (particularly in the *Gulf Times*), protesters are allocated the positive agency of taking part in peaceful protests or ending the rallies and demonstrations peacefully. The protests themselves are also predicated with the positive quality of being ‘peaceful’ or ending ‘peacefully’:

*...protesters remained **peaceful*** (GTC62)

*The group later broke up **peacefully**.* (GTC64)

*a larger demonstration and march through Nairobi that had been **largely peaceful**, although US and Danish flags were set afire.* (GTC66)

*In the central city of Bhopal, thousands of men crammed the narrow streets around the old quarter's mosques in **silent protest**, blocking roads for several hours.* (GTC65)

- **Passive Roles**

In terms of passive roles, one key contrasting pattern found in the Arab based articles in the representation of Muslim protesters was the positioning of the protesters in the passive role of negative actions, causing death and/or injury. In a few examples, the agents of these actions were not explicitly stated, however, in the majority of instances, agency was allocated to the police or security forces.

*...with **six demonstrators** killed in Afghanistan, Lebanon and Somalia...* (ANC29)

*At least **13 people** have been killed in demonstrations against the cartoons in mainly Islamic countries...* (GTC61)

*According to Lahore police, **those** who were killed, were **shot dead** by **security guards of the union bank**...* (GNC21)

*...with **police** firing on **some 2,000 protesters** as they tried to break into the heavily guarded facility. **Two of the demonstrators** were killed and **five** wounded.* (ANC29)

Topicalization of the police was also noticed in the reporting of clashes between security forces and the protesters. That is, in actions including the police and demonstrators, police and their negative actions towards the protesters were often positioned first in the action (frontal position). Meanwhile, if any negative actions were allocated to the protesters in the same instance, the protesters and their actions came in second position.

A few examples include:

***Police fired on the **demonstrators** after a man shot at them and others threw stones and knives...**Two protesters** were killed, and **three other people** were wounded.***  
(ANC29)

***Afgan police shot dead **four people protesting** yesterday...*** (KT12)

***Local Police fired tear gas and resorted to baton charge to disperse the **mob**...***  
(GNC21)

In the Arab press, the topos of 'victimisation' was also drawn upon by the allocation of Muslim scholars and governmental officials as the agents of vocal processes, highlighting 'Muslims' and 'Islam' as being under attack and as victims of negative actions. At times, these negative actions are highlighted to be inflicted by members or sources related to the 'out-group' or the 'West'. This is done by placing 'Muslims' and 'Islam', the 'in-group', as the passive receivers of these negative actions. This pattern was mainly detected in the Qatari *Gulf Times*:

***'They think Osama Bin Laden speaks for the religion and its followers. **Islam and Muslims** are linked to all that is negative and backward,'** said Abdullah, whose country heads the 57-member Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). **'The demonisation of Islam and the vilification of Muslims, there is no denying, is widespread within mainstream Western society,'** he said. (GTC61)*

*The city's top Islamic leader, Qazi Abdul Lateef, said that the turnout showed that 'attempts by **anti-Islam forces** to defame Muslims...would not be tolerated'. (GT65)*

*The protesters branded the publication of the cartoons 'an act of terrorism' and said they were part of a plot by **European countries** to defame Islam. (GT65)*

### **5.3.4 Argumentation Strategies: UK Press**

As mentioned in the topic analysis, the amount of opinion pieces found to be included in the Arab corpus of articles related to the cartoon controversy was quite minimal. This was even more the case in articles focusing on 'Muslim protests against the cartoons' as their main topic. In fact, all the articles dominated by this topic in the Arab corpus were news reports on the protests. Accordingly, this meant that argumentative discourse was much less prominent. Therefore, argumentation analysis on articles related specifically to the protests was only applied to the UK press.

Two key arguments were detected in the UK based corpus of articles covering the protests. The first one to be discussed was found in articles focusing on local protests that took place in London, and that have developed much criticism and condemnation as a result of the negative actions played out by some of the protesters taking part. This argument was regarding the need for the UK government and police to take legal action against these protesters on the premise that they pose a threat to the general well being of the British public. Building on the negative referential and predicational strategies discussed earlier, the argument drew heavily on the topos of 'threat' in the representation of Muslim protesters.

The second main argument found was utilised specifically in reports and opinion pieces covering international protests, in this case, protests that took place in Beirut and Damascus. The argument revolved around the idea that the cartoon protests were the result of well organised external networks with ulterior motivations and objectives not directly related to the cartoons. Here, the topos of 'political motivation' was drawn upon in the representation of some of the protesters, as well as, the protest organisers.

#### **5.3.4.1 Topos of 'Threat'**

Arguments drawing on the topos of '*threat*' were found across the UK newspapers analysed in this study. One example of such arguments was emphasised in the op-ed, '*This soft approach to militant Muslims is a gift to the far Right*' (DTC21):

*Also, the Government needs to be aware that the impression it gives of influencing the police to shy away from confronting this **evil** is providing a recruiting sergeant for the BNP. That party has just had its best week ever, not simply because of Nick Griffin's acquittal for speaking his unpleasant mind about Islam and black people, but because of the encouragement given to racial hatred by the combined efforts of **militant Islam** and an ineffectual political response to it. Unless we are happy for the extreme Right to win credibility, the Government cannot allow this appeasing and unjust approach to continue.*

In this example, the writer is critical of what he describes as the government's soft approach towards some of the protesters and their negative actions. Drawing on the topos of 'threat', the soft approach towards the protesters who are referred to negatively as 'evil' is portrayed as possibly leading to negative effects on the British society, through the rise of the popularity of the BNP, a political party known for its negative attitude towards 'Islam and black people'. Using causal argumentation, highlighted by the phrase, 'unless we are happy for the extreme right to win credibility, the Government cannot allow this appeasing and unjust approach to continue', it is argued that the BNP will 'win credibility', not just as a result of the lack of political and police action towards the protesters, but by the negative actions carried out by 'militant Islam', encouraging racial hatred.

In terms of the reasonableness of the argument, it can be regarded as fallacious. It commits a 'slippery slope' fallacy, where it argues that by taking a soft approach in dealing with the event, the already existing situation which is portrayed as negative will get worse, ultimately leading to a rise of BNP's popularity. This makes the assumption that the actions taken by the protesters and the government's reaction to them will undoubtedly lead the British public into turning to or favouring the BNP party as their political representation. This argument is clearly unjustified, as it does not only negatively generalise the British public as reactionary in turning in favour of the BNP as a result of certain events, but it also assumes that this consequence is inevitable.

The topos of 'Threat' is drawn upon again towards the bottom of the same article:

*Second, it must take note of the **internationally co-ordinated and highly opportunistic** nature of the protests, which clearly took some months to arrange –*

*the cartoons were first published last September – and draw conclusions from them about the **network of well-organised extremists** that threatens all Western society.*

In this argument, the writer emphasises the importance of the British government taking notice of the danger posed by the protests through the use of symptomatic argumentation. The symptomatic relation triggered by the phrase, ‘*draw conclusions*’, is based on the assumption that the protests which are described as ‘*internationally co-ordinated*’ and ‘*highly opportunistic*’ are a necessary characteristic of ‘*a network of well organised extremists*’, posing a threat to ‘*all Western society*’.

However, the argument can be considered fallacious, since not all well planned, ‘*coordinated*’ and ‘*opportunistic*’ protests can be seen as the result or a characteristic of a well organised network, let alone one co-ordinated by ‘*extremists*’. Furthermore, the argument also makes the presupposition that the protests were in fact organised by extremists and not by various independent Muslim groups/individuals, without any sufficient support.

The topos of ‘*threat*’ was also highlighted in the opinion piece fittingly titled, ‘*Threats that must be countered*’ (TGC42):

*Serious things happened in our midst on Friday – and even more serious things are happening to Danes around the world. **Ministers** do nobody any favours by appearing to imply that the best thing is just to muddle through. **These threats are real, present and serious, and if ministers put their heads in the sand they will lose the argument.***

As with the previous examples, the writer is critical of the government’s stance and reaction towards some of the Muslim protesters and their negative actions during the London based anti-cartoon protests. In line with the main argument for some legal action to be taken against the protesters, causal argumentation is utilized to highlight an imminent threat. That is, it is argued that if the government ‘*ministers*’ ignore the ‘*threats*’ posed by the protesters, which are attributed with the qualities of being ‘*real, present and serious*’, there will be negative consequences, highlighted by the use of the metaphor ‘*they will lose the argument*’. Using this metaphor in combination with the modal verb ‘*will*’ removes any form

of hedging, emphasising that the lack of action by the UK government would ultimately lead to or allow the threat to *win* or prosper.

#### 5.3.4.2 Topos of 'Political Motivation'

The second main argument drew on the topos of 'political motivation', where it was argued that the protests were not just the result of public condemnation of the cartoon publications, but at times, the outcome of well organised external networks with ulterior motivations and objectives. This argument was based on the premise that the protests were either, (1) supported by governmental authorities, or (2) motivated by and resulting from external political parties with various objectives, not directly related to the publication of the cartoons. Drawing on this topos, Muslims are represented as *manipulative*, echoing the closed views of Islam introduced by the Runnymede Trust (1997) (see section 2.1.3).

One instance where this topos was found to be drawn upon was in an opinion piece published by the *Independent* titled, '*Robert Fisk: The Fury*' (TIC20):

*Yesterday's violence may have been inspired by the previous day's assaults on the Danish and Norwegian embassies in Damascus – or were **perhaps** encouraged by the same **Baath party** which **must** have originally permitted the **Syrian demonstrations** to take place.*

***More likely**, the crowds in both cities were allowed by the authorities to stage protests, but the demonstrators quickly became overwhelmed as **Sunni extremists** – in Lebanon, perhaps from the **Salafist Hizb al-Tahrir party in Tripoli**, and **equally Wahhabi-minded Palestinians from Ein el-Helweh refugee camp** – arrived with sticks and stones to assault the Danish property and then attack the St Maroun church and march on the Lebanese foreign ministry.*

The main focus of the above excerpt is the protest that took place in Beirut which resulted in some violence. The topos of 'political motivation' is highlighted by the use of the modal verb '*may*' and the adverb '*perhaps*'. By using the modal verb '*may*', the writer enhances the probability that the Beirut protests were in fact influenced by external forces, in this

case, the events that took place a day earlier in neighbouring Damascus. Moreover, by the use of the adverb *'perhaps'*, the external influence towards a violent protest is specified and enhanced further as being instigated by the *'Baath party'*, the Syrian ruling political party. The involvement of this political party in the Syrian protests is emphasised further by the use of the modal verb *'must'*, describing not only their categorical involvement in the protests by allowing them to take place, but the presumption that they were in fact aware that the protests were going to take place.

In addition to the *'Syrian'* external governmental influence on the Lebanese events, other political influences are highlighted as possibly playing a part, by the use of the adverb *'likely'*, which is intensified further by the addition of the modifier *'more'*. These include, a Salafist group *'Hezb al-Tahrir'* and *'Wahhabi minded Palestinians'*, both of which are considered conservative and religious Muslim political parties, based outside the Lebanese capital Beirut.

The topos of external *'political motivation'* is also supported by the use of assimilation methods, using quantification to highlight the number of foreign protesters involved in the protests that took place in Beirut. Examples of this pattern were found in both, the *Guardian* and *Independent*:

*The authorities said that of **200 people arrested after the riot, 76 were Syrian and 35 were Palestinian.** Many took this as further evidence of Syrian involvement. (TGC47)*

***At least 30 people** were arrested and the Lebanese authorities later announced – predictably – that most were “foreigners”. (TIC20)*

Another argumentation technique which drew on the topos of *'political motivation'* was rhetorical ethos or what may be considered as, a fallacy of *Argumentum ad Verecundiam*. That is, a standpoint was presented as true based on the fact that an authority declares it be so:

***Asad Harmoush, a leader of Jamia Islamiya, the conservative Sunni Muslim group that had helped organise the protest...**'We can't control tens of thousands of people...There has to be an investigation. Obviously there were **infiltrators**.* (TGC52)

*Lebanon's interior minister, Hassan Sabei, resigned late on Sunday after criticism of the failure of the security forces to curb the violence. He said that the protest got out of control because of a **hardcore [sic] of 'infiltrators'** (TGC47)*

This form of argumentation also took the shape of a populist fallacy, another variant of Argumentum ad Populum:

*Syrian protesters who burnt and looted the Danish and Norwegian embassies in Damascus at the weekend were encouraged to organise by the Syrian authorities, and received text messages from Islamic study centres urging them to gather, **according to participants in the riot'**. (TIC16)*

***Many people** in Lebanon have accused Syria of instigating the violence, and said it was part of a broader campaign by Damascus to sow instability and sectarian division in Lebanon (TGC47).*

In the above examples, the standpoint arguing for governmental involvement in the Syrian protests and Syrian external political involvement in the protests that took place in Lebanon are both built on the premise that a certain number of individuals, '*many people*' and '*according to participants in the riot*', declare this to be the case.

This topos also takes a narrative form in the *Guardian* op-ed piece, '*Rioting with well-planned spontaneity*' (TGC52). Here, the argument does not only highlight 'political motivation', but that the protests were pre-planned and organised. This is done by using a narrative form, where the article begins by describing a typical morning in Lebanon's capital, Beirut, listing some of the peaceful daily chores and activities typically witnessed:

*It was one those unpredictable Lebanese Sunday mornings. The ski slopes in the mountains overlooking Beirut would have been crowded with skiers enjoying the brilliant winter sunshine. Walkers were out along the corniche...the chic restaurants were preparing for lunch time...And there were a few men on scooters riding around town broadcasting an imminent protest.*

This is followed by a long detailed description of the arrival of the protesters ‘*young, often bearded men who wore headbands and carried identical flags with calligraphic inscriptions in Arabic*’. A list of their actions (mainly negative) and the police reaction to them followed:

*On the street the riot began to take a more sectarian turn. Throwing the metal barriers and barbed wire aside they chased the police up into the narrow alleys of Achrefieh, well beyond the embassy and deep into the Christian quarter.*

A deductive argument is presented here, arguing that the protest took a ‘*sectarian turn*’, based on the premise that the protesters chased the police ‘*well beyond the embassy and deep into the Christian quarter*’. However, a hasty generalisation is committed, since it is unreasonable to assume that the protest took a sectarian direction based solely on the observation that some protesters ended up in some of the Christian areas of Beirut.

Ending in the narrative form it began with, the article concludes with the following:

*And then in the early afternoon, as suddenly as it had all begun, it ended. The leaders of the mob turned to the angry young men beside them and told them it was time to leave. Obediently, the crowd thinned out and began walking to their buses...The police returned in force...Fireman hosed down the blaze. Crowds of Filipino maids returned from their day off back to their jobs in the homes of the wealthy...Dozens of street sweepers hosed down the roads and collected debris of the day.*

The use of the narrative form, in combination with the actions allocated to the actors involved, highlights the protest as a pre-planned and carefully organised event by particular interested parties. This portrays the protesters as controlled into taking certain actions, rather than choosing to protest freely based on their individual feelings.

#### **5.4 General Analysis: 2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy**

The following section will discuss the key arguments and argumentation schemes utilised in the rest of the articles collected for qualitative data. As mentioned earlier in the topic analysis (Section 5.2), these articles mainly revolved around arguments for and against the publication of the cartoons. Moreover, although both contexts predominantly leaned

towards arguments for selective censorship, the premises and topoi on which these arguments were built and drawn upon were drastically different, highlighting the 'out-group' in each context in a negative light.

The discussion will begin with the analysis of key arguments and topoi found in the UK press, followed by analytical findings on argumentation in the Arab English language newspapers.

#### **5.4.1 UK Press: Argumentation**

As none of the UK based quality newspapers examined in this study actually published the cartoons in question, unsurprisingly, one of the main recurring arguments found was for freedom of speech, while defending selective censorship in avoidance of negative political, social, economical and security related implications. These implications, at times, albeit to lesser degree, highlighted the negative consequences these publications may have on local Muslim communities.

Arguments against any form of censorship were also illustrated in the articles, in keeping with the principals and values of democratic societies. In such arguments, the protection of these values was the main supporting premise for the publication of the cartoons. The Muslim 'double standard' was another claimed premise on which arguments for freedom of speech were built. These were particularly critical of the negative Muslim reaction, arguing that Muslim media has been found to practice selective censorship themselves, publishing offensive material in reference to other religions.

Arguments presented by Muslim actors justifying Muslims' negative reactions were also highlighted in the UK Press. In these examples, the argument against the publication of the cartoons and the justification of Muslim reactions is based on the religious obligations and commitments Muslims are described to have towards their prophet.

To summarise, Islam and Muslims were represented drawing on the following topoi:

- (1) **Threat:** Muslims pose a threat by demands for censorship or/and by their negative reactions should the cartoons be published in the UK press. These include, economical, social and security related threats.
- (2) **Religious Obligation:** Muslims are represented as religiously obliged and committed to demand censorship.
- (3) **Victimisation:** Muslims are represented as victimised by various possible negative implications should the cartoons be published.
- (4) **Contradiction:** Muslims are represented as practicing a double standard in their demand for media censorship.

#### 5.4.1.1 Topos of 'Threat'

One argument that was detected repeatedly in the UK based corpus was the argument for the responsible use of freedom of speech. Drawing on the topos of 'threat', an argument for selective censorship is introduced based on the premise that it would be the responsible step to take by the media, as the publications may lead to negative social and economical consequences.

In a *Daily Telegraph* op-ed, '*Conscience or Commerce: That is the question*' (DTC16), the argument for responsible application of freedom of speech is based on a description of the British multicultural society as one that '*is more fragile than we imagined*'. The fragility is employed as the basis of why the cartoons have not been republished in the UK press, and part of what forms this fragility is the social reality of Muslims living in Britain and how they feel, which is described as the following:

*Some complain of internal prejudice and some are upset at external oppression. Many therefore **identify more with Muslims in Palestine and Iraq** than they do with their fellow British citizens.*

*Instead of becoming assimilated, and perhaps being drawn towards secularism, some of them – and, arguably, it is a minority of the minority – have **deepened their Muslim faith. This has resulted in them becoming unduly hostile to the British state and even the non-Muslim British population.***

The excerpt begins by representing the British Muslim community as distant from the general British public, drawing on the topos of 'separation' by the use of causation. That is, as a result of negative feelings, Muslims are placed in the active role of identifying with foreign Muslims, rather than their '*fellow British citizens*'. This is followed by another causation argument, drawing on the topos of 'threat' in the representation of 'Islam' as a religion. This fallacious cause and effect argument is indicated by the phrase '*this had resulted in*', signalling the action of Muslims who '*deepened their faith*', as sparking their resentment and feeling '*unduly hostile to the British state and even the non-Muslim British population*'. The *post hoc ergo propter* fallacy committed here is based on an unjustified argument that the deepening of Muslim faith by some Muslims in the UK triggers their hostility to the UK and its citizens of other religions.

Similarly, the topos of 'threat' was drawn upon in the *Independent* op-ed headlined, '*Stephen Glover on the press: No News is Good News*' (TIC21). In analysing the reasons behind British newspapers' decision not to publish the cartoons, fears of negative commercial implications are highlighted as a possible factor leading to this censorship decision. In this case, commercial implications that may develop as a consequence of negative reactions from Muslim readers and clients:

*So what explains their reticence this time? One possibility is that our papers are more commercially minded than many on the continent. Some of them have a fairly high proportion of Muslim readers, of whom even the most moderate **might** be appalled by these cartoons. In what is probably the world's most competitive market, **no newspaper wants to face a boycott**. There is also the risk that some of the many paper shops owned and run by Muslims might somehow discriminate against - or be urged to do so by more extreme Muslims – a newspaper which published the cartoons.*

The causation argument is built on the premise comprised of two parts. The publication of the cartoons is argued to lead to:

- (1) The large number of Muslim readers that '*might*' be appalled by a republication, and thus, '*boycott*' the papers.

(2) *'Some of the many'* Muslim owned and managed shops selling newspapers *'might somehow discriminate'* against the newspapers publishing the cartoons.

In both cases, there are profit loss concerns, and in both events, the commercial threats are posed by 'Muslims'. The probability of a threat is intensified by the double use of the modal verb *'might'*, describing the negative actions or effects that could take place resulting from the reprinting of the cartoons. Interestingly, Muslim newspaper agents who may react towards the publications are described with the negative agency of *'discriminating'* against the papers publishing the cartoons.

The same article also ends with an 'apparent empathy' disclaimer, highlighting a sense of threat more directly:

*Had it been my decision, I suppose I would not have published the pictures out of respect for Muslims, **but** I would not have been entirely proud of myself. There is a gigantic culture clash here. **Free speech is under threat.** **And there are millions of Muslims who believe that Western governments can and should tell newspapers what they can, and cannot, publish.***

Forming a positive self-representation, the author begins by empathetically identifying with the feelings of Muslims on the issue, by having the view of not publishing the cartoons *'out of respect for Muslims'*. However, this is followed by the author's criticism of his own stance. More importantly, this apparent empathy is followed by a negative description of *'Muslims'* or the 'out-group', as posing a 'threat' to freedom of speech. This existing threat is indicated by the direct proposition, *'Freedom of speech is under threat'*, which is further supported by allocating to Muslims the mental action of 'believing' that *'Western governments'* should control freedom of speech in the press. The 'threat' of this belief is intensified further with the use of quantification as an assimilation strategy, referring to the Muslims as *'Millions of Muslims'* involved in this mental action or 'belief', committing a populist fallacy.

Another example of a disclaimer highlighting a 'threat' was found in the *Times* news report, *'World press opinion of cartoon row'* (TTC9), reporting on world press opinion regarding the cartoon controversy. This particular opinion was quoted from the *Daily Telegraph*:

*'Our restraint is in keeping with **British values of tolerance and respect for the feelings of others**. However, we are equally in no doubt that a small minority of Muslims would be offended by such a publication to an extent where they would threaten, and perhaps even use, violence. This is a problem that the whole of the Western world needs to confront frankly, and not sidestep'.*

The use of an apparent empathy is indicated by the positive self presentation of the *Daily Telegraph* newspaper as having the positive qualities associated with '*British values*', such as, '*tolerance*' and '*respect*' for others, highlighting feeling of sympathy towards Muslims or the 'out-group'. However, this is immediately followed by a negative portrayal of the 'out-group', or what are referred to as a '*small minority of Muslims*'. This negative portrayal takes shape by allocating to the out-group the agency of negative actions, '*would threaten, and perhaps even use, violence*', thus, presenting them as posing a real danger.

In the op-ed, '*When freedom gives in to fear*' (TGC49), the writer explains the newspaper's position in not reprinting the cartoons. One of the key reasons behind this position, which the writer qualifies as '*a less attractive explanation*' are the negative commercial and social implications that may result as a consequence of republishing. Drawing on the topos of 'threat', these consequences are portrayed as mainly developing from Muslim reactions to a possible republication. Through a set of questions, these reactions are argued to affect newspaper production, risk jobs, as well as other negative social implications:

*The less attractive explanation is pure pragmatism. Do you want **a protest** greeting you next morning? Is it worth having **production disrupted** for the next few months? How will Muslim **newsagents react** to what you print? Freedom of the press is all very well, but newspapers are commercial operations.*

*Not only that, but they should feel some responsibility for their actions. We might ask Danish workers whose **jobs are threatened** by Middle Eastern boycotts if they are happy to **pay the price** for press freedom. Is the principle behind publication of offensive cartoons important enough to have the foreign office spend the next few months **clearing the mess**?*

The topos of 'threat' takes a more direct approach in the representation of Islam and Muslims in the next section of the article. Although the writer acknowledges the importance of pragmatic judgements in not republishing the cartoons, she is critical of it. She argues that the decision not to publish by the press indicates a growing threat towards the concept of freedom of speech in the UK. This is highlighted by the negative active role allocated to Muslims:

*Unfortunately, there is **a strand of Muslim opinion** that questions not only our right to be offensive but also our right to explore and debate these issues.*

A growing threat is also highlighted by the use of the modal verb 'should' prior to the action 'worry', allocated to the in-group 'we':

*That was another pragmatic decision, but **we should worry** that it had to be taken.*

Finally, the topos of 'threat' is highlighted yet again towards the end of the article:

*I suspect the truth is that many **British journalists feel uncomfortable** with the accommodations we are already making, not because they think it is the role of free press to cause gratuitous offence, but because **we have accepted that a large group is to be treated with greater circumspection for fear of what it will do if we don't.***

British journalists are argued to be 'uncomfortable' with not republishing the cartoons in fear of the possible reactionary actions by Muslims. The use of the modal verb 'will' in describing the actions of Muslims who are referred to as 'a large group', removes any form of hedging and portrays their reactionary action as absolutely categorical should the cartoons be republished.

The topos of 'threat' was also highlighted in the *Guardian* op-ed headlined, 'A Worm's Eye View: Logic and principle can't resolve the row over the Danish cartoons' (TGC44). Here, the topos of 'threat' is drawn upon in an argument of a looming danger on two levels. The first level argues that the cartoon conflict can have detrimental effects on the global relations front. However, echoing other articles analysed in the UK based corpus, it also presents the cartoon conflict as posing a threat to the freedom of speech associated with liberalism and the West. In regard to the first level drawing on this topos, the writer uses an analogy as an

argumentation scheme, where he narrates a historical event involving a famous English major, and compares this narrated incident to the cartoon conflict.

The narrative begins by describing 'Major Charles Napier' with the positive qualities of a war hero, who faced challenges and prevailed, continuing his military career. He is described as a 'remarkable soldier who conquered Sind, now a part of Pakistan', 'fought the Turks in Greece' and to have become 'the first British governor of Cephalonia', all after overcoming injuries, such as, 'his leg was broken by a musket shot...and his ribs were broken by a gunshot'. Following this positive description, the narrative continues by retelling the following story involving the major, which took place during one of his conquests:

*When a group of Brahmins petitioned him for permission to burn a widow alive after her husband's death, explaining that it was the custom of their country, he replied that it was the custom of his country to hang those who did so, and if they followed their custom, his soldiers would build a gallows beside the funeral pyre and follow his custom as soon as they had followed theirs.*

The writer makes an analogy between this historical case and the cartoon conflict, by referring to both cases as examples of 'conversations of Multiculturalism'. He states the following:

*All **conversations about multiculturalism** come back to this point sooner or later. In the end it is **force, or the threat of it**, which decides whose customs are followed and whose taboos are honoured...But any attempt to impose one set of customs on the whole world is **now** going to require **more force than the globe can safely contain**.*

Through the use of this false analogy, it is argued that 'force' or 'the threat of it' is what determines which social group ultimately gets its way. However, drawing on the topoi of 'threat', this form of dialogue 'now' or today, where social groups try to impose their own cultural norms and customs, is argued to possibly pose threats on global peace and security. As seen in the above example, no particular social group ('West' or 'Muslims') are given the agency of this conflict and thus, both can be represented to take blame in bringing along this threat.

#### 5.4.1.2 Topos of 'Religious Obligation'

Another topos drawn upon in the representation of Muslims was the topos of 'religious obligation', which was more sympathetic towards the Muslim position. One article this topos was highlighted in was a *Times* news report headlined, '*British Imam warns against overreaction*' (TTC15), which mainly focuses on the Muslim religious reaction to the cartoon row. The article depends heavily on the views of a '*leading British Imam*' in explaining the Muslim negative reactions towards the published cartoons. In his description, he argues that Muslims have been '*hurt*' by the cartoons. Drawing on the topos of 'religious obligation', this '*hurt*' is argued to be primarily based on Muslims' highly valued religious connection with the prophet as dictated by the Quran (the Muslim holy book) and the sayings by Prophet Mohammed.

*Imam Mogra, a theologian and expert in Islamic law or Sharia, explained why Muslims had been so hurt by the caricatures. He said that Muslims started from the position of loving God, which meant total obedience to his messenger, Mohammed. Even moderate Muslims took seriously the Koranic injunctions to listen to the Prophet, and not to be forward in the presence of God or his messenger.*

*They also believe, from chapter 21, verse 107, that God sent Mohammed as his messenger as an act of 'mercy' to the whole world. In addition, Mohammed is reported in the Hadith to have told his followers: 'None of you is a true believer until I become more beloved to him than his child, his father and the whole of mankind'.*

Utilising the argument of authority, the imam justifies the Muslim reaction by explaining that Muslims' close connection with religious scripture and their obligation towards the Islamic religion and the Muslim prophet is the prime motivating drive behind such a defensive reaction. He further explains, '*because of these teachings it is very easy for Muslims to feel hurt and pain when such an important person is vilified in this manner*'. Verses from the Quran, '*chapter 21/verse 107*' and a '*Hadith*' (sayings by the prophet) are used as the supporting authoritative premise.

The topos of 'religious obligation' was also utilized by the imam in an argument against violent behaviour and Muslim overreaction.

***'The Messenger said we must love our neighbour, we must do unto others what we want done unto ourselves, we must care for the poor and needy, we must stand up for justice, we must stand against oppression, we must be honest in our dealings, we must not cheat, lie or swear.'***

***'The Messenger taught that no matter what the wrong or injustice done to us, we do not lower ourselves to that level where we carry revenge. To carry out a terrorist attack because of this incident would not be justified.'***

The argument of authority is used once again in the argument against violent reactions towards the cartoons. This is done by the use of the prophet's sayings, which highlight the prophet and Islam as peace promoting. The prophet is given active roles in positive actions advocating, 'love', 'honesty', 'care for the poor' and 'justice'. These positive actions are further emphasised as a religious obligation upon Muslims, who are referred to repeatedly using the pronoun 'we', and positioned in passive roles prior to the repeated use of the modal verb 'must'.

The topos of 'threat' and 'religious obligation' were also drawn upon in an article focusing on the Islamic jurisdiction regarding depictions of the Muslim prophet. The title of the article leads one of these topoi with a somewhat unrelated headline, 'West tries to calm tensions as militants threaten kidnaps' (TTC8). In accordance with the ideological square, the 'in-group', referred to as the 'West', are attributed with the positive actions of trying to 'calm' tensions, while the 'out-group', who are referred to as 'militants', are attributed with the negative action of 'threatening' kidnaps.

The topos of 'threat' is enhanced further in a standpoint presented at the beginning of the article, arguing that the republication of the prophet cartoons would 'inevitably lead to more terrorist attacks on the West'. This argument is introduced by a 'leading Muslim scholar', Mufti Abdul Barkatulla, a senior Imam at North Finchley mosque. He bases the argument on the premise that verses of the Quran 'rail against slander and mockery of Islam and prayer', citing the following:

*Chapter 9 verse 12 urges all Muslims to 'fight' any who 'revile' Islam. Chapter 104 warns these who slander and defame that they will be hurled into 'crushing disaster'.*

The Muslim scholar uses rhetorical 'ethos' or an argument of authority, citing verses of the Quran to support his claim. In this particular instance, the Quran is attributed with 'violent' themes, urging Muslims to 'fight' and 'warning' others who cause 'slander' and 'defame', of ending up 'hurled into crushing disaster'.

However, the fallacy of unclearness is committed, resulting from, (1) referential indefiniteness, and (2) vagueness. Regarding referential indefiniteness, it is not clear who specifically is/are being referred to in the statements: '*who revile Islam*' and '*they will be hurled into crushing disaster*'. That is, to acquire a full and comprehensive interpretation of these Quranic verses, essential contextual information is required, this would include, the local micro discursive context surrounding these verses and the macro situational context they are referring to.

Moreover, the fallacy of unclearness can also be said to result from the vagueness regarding the verses shared. As mentioned earlier, meanings of Quranic verses are open to several interpretations from various expert Islamic scholars and schools, therefore, the criteria by which these religious obligations/laws should be applied or adapted remain open to extensive debate.

#### **5.4.1.3 Topos of 'victimisation'**

The topos of 'victimisation' was also drawn upon in the representation of Islam and Muslims. This topos was mainly indicated in arguments against the republication of the cartoons, since their publication can cause deep offence and social related implications towards various Muslim communities.

It is important to note that many of these arguments were mainly found in an article highlighting other newspaper views on the cartoon controversy, the article which was published in the *Times* was headlined, '*World press opinion of cartoon row*' (TTC9). Therefore, it mainly reflected the views of other newspaper establishments, in the case of this argument, namely, the *Guardian* and the *Daily mail*.

Starting with the *Guardian*, the following view was selected to be reprinted in the *Times*:

*'It is one thing to assert the right to publish an image of the prophet. As long as that is not illegal – and not even the government's amended religious hatred bill makes it so – then that right undoubtedly exists. But it is another thing to put that right to the test, especially when to do so inevitably **causes offence to many Muslims** and, even more so, when there is currently such powerful need to craft **a more inclusive public culture** which can **embrace them and their faith.**'*

In this excerpt, the topos of 'victimisation' is drawn upon by allocating Muslims with a passive role, where they are portrayed as the object of 'offence'. However, the agents of this action are suppressed. The example continues where a presupposition is made that 'Muslims' and their faith are currently not socially 'embraced'. The nominal presupposition is signalled by the use of an adjective 'more' to modify the noun phrase, 'inclusive public culture', implying that the current system is not as successful in doing so.

Similarly, the *Daily mail* was quoted as stating the following:

*'While the Mail would fight to the death to defend those papers that printed the offending cartoons, it disagrees with the fact that they have done so. Rights are one thing. Responsibilities are another. And newspapers that so piously proclaimed their right to freedom of speech were being – to put it mildly – **deeply discourteous to the Islamic view.**'*

In this example, again, the argument against the republication of the cartoons is based on the premise that it leads to deep offence to Muslims. The newspapers which published the cartoons are attributed with the negative process of being '*deeply discourteous to the Islamic view*'.

The topos of 'victimisation' was also found in a quote by the G100 (Coalition of World Economic Forum) in a *Times* article headlined '*Muslim Cartoon*' (TTC7):

*We are saddened and appalled by the cartoons, and the **irresponsible action of the papers in Denmark and France** in allowing the cartoons to be published. We recognize the importance of free speech and we agree that religions should not expect any favours or privileges against other groups in society. However **to publish***

***such offensive cartoons will be seen by many around the world as an attack on a world faith and only deepens the suspicion between the West and Muslim world.***

As seen in the above example, those publishing the cartoons are represented negatively as agents of an *'irresponsible act'*, albeit with the use of a metonym, whereby the writers of the newspapers are replaced by the papers themselves *'the papers in Denmark and France'*. On the other hand, Islam referred to as a *'world faith'* is represented as victimised through the use of an argumentation of authority. It is argued that publishing these *'offensive'* cartoons would result in *'many around the world'* to see it *'as an attack on a world faith'*. This is presupposed to result in further damage to the already severed relations between the *'West'* and the *'Muslim world'*, by the use of the change of state verb *'deepens'*. Nevertheless, this argument can be seen as an example of a populist fallacy (argumentum ad populum), since the standpoint is argued to be acceptable because *'many'* individuals would share the same view, which does not necessarily guarantee that this is in fact the case.

#### **5.4.1.4 Topos of 'Contradiction'**

Another line of argument found repeatedly in the UK discourse on the cartoon controversy directly rejected Muslim negative reactions towards the cartoons by drawing on the topos of *'contradiction'*. The arguments rejected Muslim requests for censorship based on respect of religion, since the request itself is viewed as a contradictory act by Muslims. Such arguments were based on the premise that although Muslims severely condemn the cartoons' offensive nature, they have been found to reproduce their own offensive publications, related to other religions.

An example of this argument was found towards the end of the op-ed, *'Drawing the Line: Publishing controversial cartoons and being damned'* (TTC6):

*Consistency would also be a virtue. The anger directed at these cartoons by certain Muslims would carry more weight if **pictures that crudely insult Jews and Christians** were not found regularly in the Middle East. To contend that faiths of many forms*

*merit a degree of deference, but not absolute protection, is one notion. To insist that this principle be applied selectively is another, quite indefensible, assertion.*

In this example, Muslims are argued as 'contradictory' by insisting that censorship be applied selectively, this claim is based on the premise that '*pictures that crudely insult Jews and Christians*' are published regularly by various Middle Eastern media outlets. By building the argument on this premise, however, a false analogy is committed based on the fallacy of ambiguity. The article generally refers to '*pictures that crudely insult Jews and Christians*', not clearly illustrating what these '*pictures*' actually entail, i.e. do they mock Christians and Jews in general or do they depict any of the prophets in an offensive manner?

To explain further, Muslim objection towards the Danish cartoons was mainly directed at the act of depicting the Muslim prophet, a sacred figure, whose depiction is forbidden in the Islamic religion. This is in addition to the negative portrayal of the prophet as a bomb shaped turban wearing terrorist, reflecting Islam as a violent religion. This is as opposed to negative cartoons or depictions of individual Muslims, which are occasionally published in the media, and do not raise such condemnation.

This line of argument takes a more detailed approach in the article headlined, '*Muslim Cartoon*' (TTC7). Following the initial section of the article, where the writer highlights the condemnation of the prophet cartoons by a quote made by Muslim and Christian leaders of the C-100 (Coalition of the World Economic Forum), readers are asked to examine an online article taken from *Tom Gross's Mideast Media Analysis* site. The writer describes what the article is comprised of, which is a review of a selection of 'anti-Semitic' cartoons published by 7 Arab nations (all predominantly Muslim), some of which are described as '*moderate or allied to the West*'. Following these examples, the writer asks:

*Where is the condemnation from and of those in the Arab world responsible for these atrocious anti-Semitic images?*

In addition to the negative predicational strategies attributed to members of the 'Arab world', described as '*responsible for these atrocious anti-Semitic images*', a presupposition is made that these '*anti-Semitic*' cartoons are similar to the prophet cartoons, thus, justifying a

condemnation as well. Moreover, the question presented also triggers a general assumption that nobody in the Arab world in fact condemns or has condemned these cartoons.

In support of his argument the writer provides a detailed description of one particular '*anti-Semitic*' cartoon published in a Jordanian paper, and a presumption is made that such a cartoon should call for similar condemnation, but nevertheless was published by the Arab based paper:

*One cartoon depicts the railroad to the death camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau – but with Israeli flags replacing the Nazi ones. It is taken from the Jordanian newspaper Ad-Dustur. The sign in Arabic reads: 'Gaza Strip or Israeli Annihilation camp.' Gross writes: 'This accentuates the widespread libel that Israel's policies towards the Palestinians have been comparable to Nazi actions towards Jews.'*

Although, unlike the earlier example, the writer is less ambiguous regarding what the cartoon is actually comprised of, a false analogy may still be argued to be committed. As mentioned earlier, the condemnation towards the prophet cartoons mainly arose out of what was viewed as the mocking of a religious sacred figure, the Muslim prophet. This stands in contrast to the cartoons published in the Jordanian paper whose main target is the '*state of Israel*' and not the '*Jewish religion*' or any sacred figures per se, as the description of the cartoon above illustrates.

#### **5.4.2 Argumentation: Arab Press**

Argumentation schemes are predominantly found in opinion pieces. Therefore, it was no surprise that most of the argumentation analysed were found in the *Arab News* articles, as it was the only Arab English language newspaper that included opinion pieces in the corpus of Arab based articles selected to be analysed using CDA. This also limited the amount of argumentative discourse available for analysis.

The Danish cartoon controversy discourse in general did reproduce some dominant meanings highlighted in the UK based newspapers. However, arguments exclusively argued against the publication and thus for selective censorship, and the topoi and premises drawn

and built upon in these arguments clearly differed from those in the UK Press. Arguments against the publication of the cartoons emphasised: (1) the importance of respect towards religion, and (2) the negative implications the cartoons may have on Islam and Muslims, drawing on the topos of 'victimisation'. More importantly, as with the '2009 French face veil ban' analysis, Islam and Muslims were depicted as victims of targeted discrimination; Muslims as a social group were argued and represented as being specifically discriminated against by Western media.

Therefore, in the Arab English language articles examined, representation of Islam and Muslims was mainly sympathetic to the Muslim position, drawing on the topos of:

- (1) **Victimisation:** Muslims are represented as victims of ill treatment by the publication of these cartoons and the 'West' in general.
- (2) **Discrimination:** Muslims are reported as directly targeted and discriminated against by the publication of cartoons.

#### 5.4.2.1 Topos of 'Victimisation'

The topos of 'victimisation' was drawn upon in an article headlined, 'Europe's uncivilised act' (ANC32), which directly criticises the 'West' and the publication of the cartoons:

*Policy-makers and opinion-making community in the West have opted to conduct the discourse on terrorism using a terminology that has unwittingly but dangerously indicted the 1.2 billion Muslims in the world. Terms like Muslim terrorists, Islamic terrorists and Islamic terrorism have **led to** the **demonization of the Muslims and Islam**. Whatever the European paper may claim **they** are upholding by ridiculing the holy Prophet, they would not have contemplated doing so in a pre-9/11 environment.*

As illustrated, Muslims are represented as victims of 'demonization' by the 'out-group', in this case the 'policy-makers and opinion-making community in the West' and the 'European papers'. A causal argumentation is constructed, indicated by the phrase 'led to', where the 'demonization of Muslims and Islam' is argued to be the result of discourse chosen and

utilized by 'Them' or the 'Western' sources. 'They' are allocated with the negative act of choosing discourse that has ultimately had negative effects on 'Us' or 'Muslims and Islam'.

In terms of the reasonability of the argument, it can be considered as an example of unreasonable use of a causal argumentation scheme, since it commits a post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. The demonization of 'Muslims and Islam' rests only on the actions (discourse choices) taken by the 'out-group' and not as a consequence of any other factor. Admittedly, discourse on terrorism may result in the negative portrayal of Islam and Muslims, but many other factors unrelated to actions taken by the 'out-group' may also certainly contribute to this presupposed 'demonization' Muslims and Islam are exposed to.

The topos of 'victimisation' continued further down in the same article:

*This is a season of acute polarization. For example if the **online responses of the public are any guide**, this act of insulting the Prophet has unfortunately received widespread public support in many European countries.*

In this example, the representation of Islam as being the victim of negative actions by the 'out-group' or what were referred to as, 'many European countries', continues with the utilization of a *par pro toto synecdoche*. That is, characteristics of a part are incorrectly transferred to a whole. Based on a single observation 'online responses', the writer makes a general assumption that the negative act of 'insulting the prophet' has in fact received 'widespread public support in many European countries'. However, by making a general conclusion about the stance of 'many European countries', be it positive or negative, based on the unrepresentative and insufficient supporting premise of 'online responses', the argument produces a serious presumption and can be considered fallacious.

Moreover, in the argument against the publication of the cartoons, the actions of Muslims, some of which are negative, are justified as being in response to negative actions taken by the 'out-group' or 'western' sources towards Muslims. The topos of 'victimisation' is drawn upon once again, where Muslims are portrayed as victims of mistreatment, which is the main justification behind any negative action they may take part in.

*Deliberately defiling the Prophet is a highly irresponsible act. It is bound to have negative social and political fall-out. It exacerbates the existing social tensions*

*among the locals and the Muslim population. **Within the Muslims** it is bound to create more alienation and resentment toward **Westerners who, have chosen to be completely indifferent toward the faith and feelings of the Muslims across the world. It is the arrogance of these Westerners they will resent. Like millions of Westerners who have opted to not view terrorists as a fringe phenomenon within the Muslims and instead referred to terrorism as Islamic terrorism, many Muslims too will wrongly implicate the Westerners across the board for this blasphemous act against the Prophet. (ANC32)***

In the above excerpt, both the topos of 'threat' and 'victimisation' are utilised in the argument against the publication of the prophet cartoons. The argument begins with the topos of 'threat'. Unlike the UK articles, where the topos of 'threat' is drawn upon in the argument that the publishing of the cartoons would lead to threats being posed on the European and British communities by Muslim actions, the argument here highlights the publications of the cartoons as placing Muslim social realities at stake. They are also argued as jeopardising Muslims' general feelings and perceptions towards Western communities and indeed, the relations between 'locals' and the 'Muslim population' in general. Western sources or the 'out-group' are represented as actively being responsible for instigating this political and social unrest by '*deliberately defiling the Prophet*', which is described as an '*irresponsible act*'.

Having said that, this line of reasoning may be argued to exemplify a slippery slope fallacy, since the act of depicting negative images does not *always* guarantee intensified tensions and more importantly, further '*alienation and resentment towards Westerners*'. Although this may undeniably occur, it may also result in more positive and productive social debates between 'Muslim' and 'Western' communities.

The topos of 'threat' is highlighted further in addition to the topos of 'victimisation' by the use of causal argumentation and passive/active role allocation. Muslims are first placed in the passive role of negative actions by 'Westerners', who are attributed with the negative quality of '*arrogance*' and '*who have chosen to be completely indifferent towards the faith and feelings of Muslims around the world*'. This is intensified by the assumption or sweeping generalisation that '*millions of Westerners*' view terrorism as characteristic of Islam and

Muslims. These negative actions are argued to result in the justified activation of Muslims as agents of the negative action of wrongfully implicating all Westerners for the publication of the cartoons, 'many Muslims too will wrongfully implicate the Westerners across the board for this blasphemous act against the Prophet', thus, jeopardising and threatening international relations.

#### 5.4.2.2 Topos of 'Discrimination'

Comparative argumentation or analogies as argumentation schemes were found to be used time and time again in the *Arab News* opinion pieces in the argument against the publication of the cartoons and for censorship. These arguments mainly drew on the topos of 'discrimination' in the representation of Islam and Muslims. The argument against the publications and for censorship was based on the premise that allowing the publications to continue is a discriminatory act by the 'out-group' or the 'West' against 'Muslims and Islam' in particular. This is supported by descriptions of 'out-group' media or 'European' media as previously practicing selective application of freedom of speech, depending on the event and issues being reported on.

The use of such analogies was found to be repeatedly used in the op-ed headlined, '*Is free speech truly alive and well in the Western nations?*' (ANC34). The concept of non-discriminatory application of freedom of speech in Western nations is questioned in the title itself.

The argument initiates with the following:

*The questions people are asking now are these: **Where** does free speech **end** and incitement **begin**? When it comes to humiliation and insult, have Muslims become fair game since 9/11 and is the West guilty of double standards purporting to hold free speech as an inviolable principle when in reality its media harbors its own red lines.*

Through the use of a series of questions and change of state verbs, several presupposed meanings are made in the text. The first presupposition is made with a 'wh-question',

beginning with 'where' and including two change of state verbs, 'end' and 'begin'. The question presupposes, not only that there is a point that the concept of freedom of speech stops, but that at times it can develop or 'begin' to transform into something more negative, 'incitement'. This is followed by placing Muslims in a passive role, as victims of 'humiliation' and 'insult', without directly indicating the actors responsible for these negative acts. However, agency may be linked to the 'West' in the next part of the text, where a presupposition is made that 'the West' might in fact be guilty of 'double standards' in their application of freedom of speech.

The argument is made more explicit in the following excerpt:

*The fact is **Western networks and papers** are influenced by government as well [sic] audience/reader sensitivities whether they like it or not. So, to my mind, **their** recent cause célèbre touting their freedom to publish over the deep hurt caused to Muslim **communities** is a red herring when the underlying issue is nothing more than a cover for old-fashioned bigotry and incitement.*

Here, both the topoi of 'discrimination' and 'victimisation' are explicitly drawn upon. The argument begins by placing 'Western networks and papers' in a passive role of being under the control of governments and their audience, in regard to their application of freedom of speech. Based on this premise and their negative active role in selecting to publish the cartoons over the deep hurt experienced by 'Muslim communities', they are argued to be 'covering' for their negative qualities of 'bigotry' and 'incitement' towards Muslims in particular.

The article supports this standpoint by highlighting how the 'West' has displayed double standards or selectivity in practicing or advocating freedom of speech. This is illustrated through the presentation of a series of comparable examples and events, where 'Western' sources *did/do* apply censorship laws, actively limiting the degree of freedom of speech that is actually practiced. Some of the examples listed include:

- (1) Limitations in the discussion of the Holocaust in Europe.

*As many of my media colleagues have already pointed out, the **greatest taboo in Europe is discussion of the Holocaust.***

(2) The prohibition of selling of Hitler's Memoir 'Mein Kampf' in Holland...

*In Holland, it's a **punishable offense** to sell Hitler's memoir 'Mein Kampf'*

(3) The Removal of a U.S. peace campaigner during a presidential speech for an expressive item of clothing.

*More recently, the US peace campaigner Cindy Sheehan was **rudely marched away** from the presence of George W. Bush as he was giving his State of the Union address and **arrested** simply for wearing a T-shirt showing the number of US troops killed to date in Iraq.*

(4) Press served with gag order

*And if there is any veracity to a recent memo leaked by the British press, George Bush actually contemplated the bombing of that network's ('Al-Jazeera' added) head office. In that case, the press was **slapped with a gag order.***

All examples presented were taken from the 'Western' context, in which one way or another, freedom of speech was regulated or controlled.

In the Arab news article headlined, '*Europe's uncivilised act*' (ANC32), the argument against the publication of the cartoons focused on highlighting Muslims as being discriminated against by 'Europe', 'Europeans' and the 'European papers' who are attributed with the quality of applying the principles of freedom of speech selectively, depending on the event and parties involved. The argument is constructed through the use of an analogy as an argumentation scheme, in addition to presuppositions put forward through the use of 'wh-questions'.

The argument begins by representing 'Europeans' as actively practicing selective freedom of speech:

*But also the way many **Europeans** have selectively applied the principle of freedom of expression is intriguing.*

This standpoint is supported by the following analogy:

*When the ancient Buddhas in Afghanistan were criminally destroyed by the Taleban, the Europeans screamed murder the loudest. We all did too in the Muslim world. What was the protest for? So destruction of history is blasphemous but the attempted destruction of a people's faith and deeply treasured symbols is not?*

The writer supports his standpoint regarding the selective practice of freedom of expression by comparing two controversial events considered as forms of freedom of expression, and the European reaction to each, these are: (1) the Taleban's destruction of ancient Buddhas' history, and (2) the destruction of Islam as a 'faith' and its '*deeply treasured*' symbol (the Muslim prophet) by the publication of the cartoons. Through the use of a series of 'wh-questions', a presupposition is made that Europeans considered the former a blasphemous act, and thus an unacceptable form of expression, while the latter was viewed as an acceptable form of expression.

In terms of the acceptability of the analogy in question, this example is quite complex. The reasonableness of the analogy as an argument rests on what is meant by 'freedom of expression' and if it differs from 'freedom of speech', and more importantly, what acts fall under each of these concepts. If freedom of expression is viewed as comprising any act, physical or conceptual, tangible or not, than this may be considered reasonable. However, if freedom of expression is understood as the expression of views in the various forms of speech, writing, illustrations and art, the argument would be an example of a false analogy. That is, in this case, the categories, the destruction of ancient Buddha history and the publication of the cartoons, are not really the same and cannot be fairly compared.

This line of argument continues with another analogy further on in the same article:

*Also if the freedom of expression is so sacred, how many **European papers** have dared to support what the Iranian president said about questioning the reality of the Holocaust?*

Once again, Europeans or 'European papers' are represented as discriminatory in taking part in the selective application of freedom of speech. In this example, the questioning of the holocaust is compared to the publication of the cartoons. Using a question, a presupposition is made that unlike the case with the publication of the prophet cartoons, European papers did not dare question the Holocaust in support of the Iranian president's comment on the topic. Therefore, they are portrayed as selecting to forgo their freedom of speech in some cases and not others.

## 5.5 Quantitative Analysis

The following section presents the quantitative analysis exploring the larger corpora of articles covering the '2006 Danish cartoon controversy'. The findings are presented mainly in the form of charts and diagrams, further details on the data are provided in appendix 15.

The quantitative analysis examining a much larger corpus of articles began by developing key word frequency lists. Muslim protests against the cartoons formed a main focal point of the qualitative CDA analysis in the current research. The frequency list of the key lemmas in the total corpus of articles in the February 2006 period in the UK and Arab newspapers also highlighted the prominence of the 'protests' in the texts.

Table 5.6 lists the top 10 lemmas in the UK and Arab English Language newspaper corpora (UK: 208,136 Arab: 150,804).

UK Press			Arab Press		
Lemma	Frequency	Overall Proportion %	Lemma	Frequency	Overall proportion %
Islam	2228	1.07	Islam	2030	1.34
Cartoon	1588	0.76	Denmark	1318	0.87
Denmark	1368	0.65	Cartoon	1277	0.84
Protest	811	0.38	Protest	757	0.50
Publish	705	0.33	Publish	605	0.40
Newspaper	618	0.30	Prophet	576	0.38
Mohammed	607	0.29	World	565	0.37
Prophet	553	0.27	People	510	0.33
Britain	540	0.26	Newspaper	494	0.32
People	539	0.25	Religion	426	0.28

Table 5.6 Event B: Keyword frequency analysis

As illustrated, the lemma '*protest*' formed one of the top lemmas in both the UK and Arab texts, although varying in proportion to each individual corpus examined (UK: 0.38%, Arab: 0.50%). Therefore, similar to the qualitative study, the quantitative analysis will also initiate by examining discourse related to the protests. In this case, the focus will be on the representation of individuals taking part in these protests and their semantic roles.

Following the qualitative analysis, it was found that those taking part in the protests, were generally referred to as *protester/s* or *demonstrator/s*. In the UK February articles, these actors were referred to 389 times (0.18%), while in the Arab based articles, they appeared in the texts on 301 instances (0.19%). Examining the concordance patterns related to these items, in terms of negative and positive attributions was the first level of analysis, as shown in figure 5.2.




Fig. 5.2 Protesters/demonstrators attribution frequency analysis

Protesters/demonstrators were mainly attributed with negative predicational strategies and actions. This was found in both contexts, although to a lesser degree in the Arab corpus of articles (UK: 61.69%, Arab: 45.84%). Negative attributions included predominantly negative actions highlighting the protesters/demonstrators as violent, for instance, *‘protesters ransacked Western businesses’*, *‘protesters pelted police and US led coalition forces’* and *‘demonstrators burned a Danish flag’*. Less frequently, negative attributions took the form of adjectives, such as, *‘militant Muslim protester’*. In the very few instances protesters were attributed with positive qualities, mainly found in the Arab based articles (1.99%), these qualities described them as active in *‘peaceful’* actions, such as, *‘protesters peacefully dispersed’* and *‘protesters remained peaceful’*.

Patterns in the semantic roles given to protesters/demonstrators were examined next. This began by analysing the frequency of active and passive roles allocated to these actors (fig 5.3).




Fig. 5.3 Protesters/demonstrators: Semantic position frequency analysis

Protesters/demonstrators were mainly positioned in active roles as agents of actions, in both the UK and Arab articles examined. In the UK based articles, they were positioned as agents of actions in 241 instances (61.95%), and as patients in 98 instances (25.19%),  $\chi^2(1, N=389) = 58.98, P \leq 0.1$ . Protesters/demonstrators positioned as agents of actions was even more frequent in the Arab based articles (70.43%,  $N=212$ ), while also similarly taking passive roles much less frequently (24.58%,  $N=74$ ),  $\chi^2(1, N=301) = 63.93, P \leq 0.1$ . These findings can be argued as somewhat unsurprising, as the articles examined covered the Muslim protests against the cartoons, which expectedly involve describing the activities taking place and the actions of the protesters/demonstrators, who are the active agents behind the protests.

However, based on the qualitative data, what may be more revealing is examining the type of actions attributed to these actors (Positive/Negative), in relation to their positions as passive patients or active agents. As discussed earlier in the qualitative analysis, one key difference in the representation of protesters in the Arab press was in their positioning as patients of actions. This mainly highlighted them as passive recipients of negative actions by the police or special forces, causing their injury or death, drawing on the topos of 'victimisation'. Therefore, the quantitative analysis examined the semantic roles of protesters/demonstrators in relation to negative actions and the findings are displayed in fig 5.4.




Figure 5.4 Protesters/demonstrators: Semantic position attribute frequency analysis

When protesters/demonstrators were given agency of actions, these actions were more frequently negative in the UK Press (75%, N=181) than the Arab press, where they were responsible for negative actions 56% (N=119) of the total number of instances they were given agency,  $\chi^2(1, N=453) = 18.13, P \leq 0.1$ . However, the frequency of protesters/demonstrators as passive recipients of negative actions in both contexts was more revealing, supporting the qualitative analysis. When protesters/demonstrators were positioned as patients of actions in the UK press, the actions were negative 41.83% (N=41) of the total number of instances examined. However, protesters/demonstrators were highlighted as patients of negative actions much more frequently in the Arab texts (71.62%, N=53),  $\chi^2(1, N=172) = 15.08, P \leq 0.1$ . Moreover, when they were recipients of negative actions, the agent of these negative actions were slightly more likely to be suppressed through agent deletion in the UK press (46.34%, n=19), than in the Arab based articles (30.18%, n=16). However, in terms of agent deletion, this contrast in frequency was not found to be statistically significant,  $\chi^2(1, N=94) = 2.56, P \geq 0.5$ .

The final part of the quantitative analysis on the articles covering the '2006 Danish cartoon controversy' focused on the concordance patterns of the terms, *Muslim/Muslims*, examining any reoccurring thematic collocations. Muslim/Muslims were referred to 1,455

times (0.69%) in the UK articles and 1,317 times (0.87%) in the Arab based articles analysed. Figure 5.5 highlights the top collocation themes in both the UK and Arab press. Only the themes that conjured 50 collocations and above are included, other themes drew very low numbers that may not be as significant.




Figure 5.5 Muslim/s: Attribution frequency analysis

The UK and Arab texts revealed similar concordance patterns suggesting:

- (1) Quantification of Muslims (UK: 18.76%, N=273 / Arab: 17.61%, N=232)
- (2) Emphasis of Muslim feelings of Anger (UK: 9.62%, N=140 / Arab: 11.31%, N=149)
- (3) Muslim association with violence (UK: 7.14%, N=104 / Arab 5.92%, N=78)

'Quantification' was indicated using numbers, e.g. *'170,000 Muslims'* and phrases that suggest quantity, *'many Muslims across the world'*, generally describing population numbers and the quantity of Muslims taking part in a particular action or feeling a certain emotion, e.g. anger. This brings us to another frequent concordance pattern, associating Muslims with feelings of 'anger'. This was indicated by phrases that directly indicate anger, such as, *'cartoons have angered Muslims'*, or by describing Muslims as *'outraged'*. However, to a greater extent, Muslim/s were frequently collocated with phrases such, *'sparks'*, *'uproar'*, *'fanned flames'*, *'welling up'*, *'inflamed'*, *'afame'*, *'boiling over'*, all of which indicate a great extent of 'heated' emotions or anger which the cartoons have caused Muslims to feel. Finally, in both contexts, Muslims were linked to acts of 'violence'. This was done, by the

frequent agency of Muslims in various violent actions, e.g. *'went on a rampage'*, *'looted and burned'*. Such examples were mainly used in describing the Muslim protests against the ban. Violence was also highlighted by attributing Muslims with certain qualities, e.g. they are *'more prone to violence'*.

In addition to 'violence', the UK texts also indicated higher frequencies of other negative, and at times, related concordance patterns, such as, 'extremism' (6.66%, N=97), 'threat' (7.56%, N=110) and 'difference/separation' (3.43%, N=50). All of which, if included at all, were not significantly frequent patterns in the Arab corpus. In fact, comparing the total number of negative attributions included in the top thematic concordance patterns in the UK and Arab corpus (presented in figure 5.7), the difference becomes clearer. In the UK corpus, there were 361 instances of negativisation, while the Arab texts only developed 78 concordance lines illustrating negative attributions. This is statistically significant at  $\chi^2 (1, N=2772) = 185.02, P \leq 0.1$ .

Another interesting pattern found to be more frequent in the UK based texts, was the pattern of 'type', where Muslims were attributed with adjectives that divide them to various *types* of Muslims. These attributions were mainly involved describing Muslims as, *'moderate'*, *'sane and moderate'*, *'mainstream Western'*, *'conservative'* and *'traditional'*. This pattern echoes earlier discussion regarding the representation of Muslims in the '2009 face veil ban' UK based discourse, where the conservative/moderate dichotomy was found to be used in support of arguments for a ban (sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.5.1).

One clear difference between the UK and Arab press was in the pattern of 'victimisation', which was highlighted in the Arab texts much more frequently (24.98%, N=329) than the UK based articles (5.97%, N=87),  $\chi^2 (1, N=2772) = 180.05, P \leq 0.1$ . This echoes the topos of 'victimisation', one of the key topoi argued to be predominantly drawn upon in the representation of Muslims in the qualitative analysis examining the Arab press. Quantitatively, this was mainly indicated by collocations that emphasised the negative effect the cartoon has/had on Muslim feelings. Muslims are emphasised as being victimised by the frequent use of verbs, such as, *'hurt'*, and verbs causing them *'pain'* and *'injury'*. The frequent use of propositional phrases, such as, *'against'*, which highlighted Muslims as victims of negative and discriminatory treatment was also repeatedly detected in the Arab

press, e.g. *'gratuitous bias **against** Muslims'* and *'deep prejudice **against** Islam and Muslims'*. Other attributes highlight Muslims as victims of *'vilification', 'distress', 'marginalisation', 'humiliation', 'alienation', 'insult' and 'demonization'*.

Another frequent concordance pattern found in the Arab press that is closely related to the 'victimisation', in terms of the 'hurt' the cartoons have caused, are attributions highlighting Muslims' religious 'position' in Islam in relation to their negative feelings over the publishing of the cartoons (Arab: 7.59%, n=100). Verbs such, such as, *'consider' 'regard', 'find', 'feel'* and *'believe'* proceeding description of Muslim beliefs and views towards the depiction of the Prophet Mohammed develops a discourse explaining their *position* on the issue. Some examples of this pattern include: *'consider cartoons as blasphemous', 'that's how Muslims feel towards their prophet', 'Muslims regard the cartoons as offensive, as Islamic tradition prohibits any images of the prophet' and 'Muslims cannot digest Denmark's and other European countries position...'*.

In the Arab based corpus of articles, the theme of victimisation was also related to collocations highlighting discourse on Muslims as a minority social group or/and as 'immigrants' in Europe (4.17%, n=55). Muslim/s were frequently collocated with phrases, such as, *'minority in Denmark', 'are citizens who pay taxes', 'block Muslim residents from Denmark' and 'recent migrants and are perceived as double threat'*. This may relate to arguments against the cartoons drawing on the topoi of 'discrimination' and 'victimisation' of Muslims, which were highlighted in the qualitative argumentation analysis of the Arab English language newspaper texts.

One final collocation pattern distinguishing the Arab discourse from the UK based discourse was regarding the 'relationship' or relation between 'Muslims' and others social groups, mainly referred to as the 'West' and 'non-Muslims' (4.55%, n=60). Discourse on this relationship was signalled by the frequent collocation of Muslim/s with the preposition *'between'*. Examples of this collocation include, *'Unbridgeable Gulf between Muslims and the West', 'Inflame relations between Muslims and the west', 'Hostility between Western Christians and migrant Muslims' and 'Drive a wedge between Muslims living in Europe and the non-Muslim population'*. As illustrated in these examples, the use of *'between'* highlights

a relation between Muslims and the other parties and in most cases the negative effects the cartoons can and have had on this relationship. Again, this pattern supports an argument found in the Arab articles against the publication of cartoons based on the premise that it poses a threat on Muslim-Western relations (section 5.4.2.1).

## Chapter 6

### Reader Interpretation Analysis

The following sections will highlight the key findings of the reader interpretation study, based on the analysis of Muslim and non-Muslim focus group interpretive discussions of selected articles (A-D) in Kuwait and the UK (refer to appendix 9 for full articles). Analysis of the discussions adopts Hall's (1980) encoding/decoding audience reception model (see section 3.5.2). The discussion will begin by focusing on the Muslim focus group discussions in Kuwait, followed by presenting key findings of non-Muslim and Muslim focus group discussions in the UK context.

#### 6.1 Kuwait: Muslim Groups

Female and male focus group sessions conducted in Kuwait generally revealed similar readings of the articles, characterised mainly by negotiated or oppositional positions towards the text. However, female participants were less critical than their male counterparts, with a tendency to accept dominant or preferred readings at face value in more instances of the texts examined. Male participants tended to read articles as ideologically driven, pointing out both explicit and implicit ideological constructions in more instances than the female participants. Clear oppositional positions were mainly expressed towards articles A and B, while negotiated and some dominant positions were reflected towards article C and D. In reference to the representation of Muslims, face veiling women and the face veil, discussions highlighted:

- (1) Oppositional positions towards themes of discrimination against Muslims in particular and the representation of face veil wearers as *different*.
- (2) Oppositional positions towards referential and predicational strategies used in reference to the face veil in the majority of articles, apart from article D.
- (3) Scepticism towards the reasons for the ban as indicated in the texts, i.e. women's oppression), and instead negotiated or sympathetic positions towards a ban out of

security concerns, which many participants believed to be the main motivation behind the ban.

(4) Oppositional positions toward themes of female oppression and extremism associated with the representation of face veiling women and the practice itself, instead arguing for women's freedom of choice in choosing to face veil.

### **6.1.1 Arguments of Discrimination**

Oppositional positions stemmed mainly from arguments of discrimination or what was perceived as themes of discrimination in the text towards Muslims as a social group in particular. This was highlighted towards articles A and B. Views shared in the pre-session questionnaires may further support these findings. Representations of face veiling women in both these articles were largely interpreted as negative by the participants in this category (Article A: 70% Article B: 41%). One example where this was highlighted was during the initial stages of the focus group sessions when discussing article A, a news report on the French parliament's interest in a law banning the face veil. The interpretation of the views of the French parliament members against the face veil was viewed as an action against religious choices instead of the face veil as a garment, displaying the participants' interpretation of the face veil, as a clothing garment with religious associations.

**Moderator:** *So, what was the article generally about?*

**Abdullah:** *I think it was about how the French government believes that the **religious choices** of some people is affecting their individual freedoms*

In explaining where they believe the article was published and the reasons behind their views, other participants explained:

**Ahmed:** *if it was in an Arab country they can post this as..like..they want to show France is a country where they are opposing our views **as a Muslim religion** or it can be in France as they can consider a ban just to show the French nationals and to talk about **Muslims as a bad religion** or ..*

**Waleed:** *Exactly, it can go both ways. If they put it in the Arabic like in the Arabs...it will probably cause problem.. because it's very negative on how they speak about the burqas so I don't think they really want to cause problems, cause they actually talk*

*about the parliament and the president and the..so they would be like the government of France..they are against the religion of the Arabs.. so that's why I think they published it in Europe.*

Article A was predominantly viewed as ideologically biased and in favour of a ban by both female and male participants. The link between the participants' oppositional position towards the article's dominant reading and the theme of discrimination is directly expressed by the interpretation of how the 'West' views the 'Muslim minority' in the text:

***Yousif:** When it says that the parliament legislators they said it's [reads] 'a breach of individual freedoms on our national territory'.. number one I see the first thing is the Muslim minority **they see them as completely just foreigners** although it says I think..I am not sure if it was this article that most Muslims in France are attached to France but they see them... as it's a breach on **OUR** national territory, it's **OUR** land ..**OUR** this..**they don't include them as part of it.***

***Ahmed:** but they don't express the West..*

***Yousif:** but the thing is the French Muslims work in the government sector..there are some that contribute to the country..some of them are **French citizens** they wear the veil..so for you to say 'individuals on our national territory'..**it's like you're not including them.***

Similar statements were made by the female participants:

***Manal:** What was really interesting about this article is that he tries to show ..he said that France 'home to largest Muslim minority' when he referred to 'minority' he wants to show ok they are minority so why do they ask for something..because they are 'minority' they don't have to ask for something that is against the law. Although they are large but he used 'minority', because we know that people are more focused on the word 'minority' ...so that's why I think he's with the ban..yeah*

The imbalance of voices for and against the ban in article A was another reason it was viewed as ideologically biased and for the ban. Participants pointed out the absence of any quotes representing views arguing against a ban.

***Hala:** another thing is that he just shows the readers the reasons for which they must introduce this law, he never talks about why they should not introduce the law*

The use of particular lexical items, were also seen as ideological, e.g. '*fundamentalist*', '*minority*', among others. They were interpreted to assist in a negative representation of

Muslims and face veiling women. There were also participants who opposed the article's preferred meaning and described it as having negative undertones, however, they explained that it was a general feeling they felt, not being able to point to any linguistic evidence.

The theme of discrimination was also highlighted in the interpretation of article D. Most of the men taking part in the Kuwait sample leaned towards dominant or negotiated positions, accepting and negotiating some of the preferred reading. In fact, according to the questionnaire, the majority of female and male participants (78%) agreed to be persuaded by article D, which they viewed to be anti-face veil ban and to represent face veiling women positively or '*accurately*', according to some. Although many of the participants agreed with article's arguments emphasising the discrimination towards Muslims, the majority also agreed that the article was ideologically biased, going so far as to describing it as '*angry*' and '*aggressive*'. One argument generally agreed upon was an argument drawing on the topos of 'discrimination', through a rhetorical question presented by the writer, comparing Christian nuns and face veiling women and questioning why one is objected to and not the other.

*Yousif: He feels that the president in the article.. the president and the parliament maybe attacking the burqa because he even states in the first paragraph 'would he call the dress worn by nuns a sign of subservience and debasement'..because it's true nuns are forced to wear the black and white and the veil, not covering their face but their hair and that..but no one has ever talked about it, it's their decision..they believe it's part of their church and they wear that.. Muslims also have a right to wear what she believes is part of her religion*

*Bader: It's like they are saying... it's contradicting their national moto.*

*Ahmed: He's trying to show that **the west are being judged in a different way than Muslims..so they are better judged than Muslims, Muslims are always negative.. Muslims are always put in bad habits***

*Bader: It shows they have double standards.*

Female participants were also found to agree with this comparative argument. However, they emphasised another part in article D, which they agreed with and which once again

highlights the French authorities as discriminatory. In reference to another rhetorical question posed by the writer, 'so how can a country which prides itself on protecting liberty and equality discuss in its parliament an issue which is an infringement on one's freedom?', the following was pointed out by the participants:

**Sara:** *You talk about liberty equality*

**Mariam:** *Yeah France..exactly*

**Sara:** *And you don't allow women to wear whatever they want to be free in whatever they want to choose to wear etc.. So he was like you shouldn't if you have these concepts in your country you shouldn't ban something like..*

**Mariam:** *It's contradiction, they say something..*

**Sara:** *Being hypocrites*

**Mariam:** *Yeah..they're **hypocrites** they say freedom and they do the total opposite*

**Sara:** *They are **oppressing them** in what they have to wear and how to... how they present themselves basically*

Although the women discussing the articles did agree with some of the preferred meaning in article D, such as, the description of what the veil stands for and themes of discrimination against face veiling women, they opposed the representation of Western women as morally deficient.

**Sara:** *He's being extreme..this is not the case with all of the women in the west they don't walk around with bikinis all the time*

**Lama:** *Yeah..he also said that they're brought up to think they are [reads] 'not mere objects of desire or enticement and mannequins for public display'.. they're not all like that*

**Mariam:** *yeah they don't usually care about, ok they care about..it's not like they walk around looking like models and they care what they look like physically, they usually don't actually..so*

**Sara:** *They're doing their daily activities.. they're going on with their daily activities..*

**Mariam:** *if anything I think actually Arab women care about their looks more than Western women actually*

**Lama:** *and he's also saying in a way you're supposed to respect how you are brought up but he's not respecting how they are brought up, because they are brought up.. it's fine to do that..you know*

**Mariam:** Yeah

**Lama:** So he's asking for respect but he's not giving them respect so..yeah

### 6.1.2 Theme of 'Difference'

The theme of discrimination also leads to the theme of 'difference'. The participants detected and rejected the representation of face veiling women as *different* and *separate* from main stream French society. This was indicated in the discussions of article A, yet the participants could not point out the particular linguistic structures that they felt highlighted this representation. In discussing article A, the following was highlighted:

**Jassim:** Maybe **they made it feel like the veiled women are out of this place. It's negative cause you make them sound like they are a different kind of human being..where everyone else is just normal.. unveiled people would be normal women but veiled women would be different**

**Moderator:** Where in the text do you feel this?

**Jassim:** it's mostly a general feeling I am getting

One of the female participants highlighted a particular phrase that she felt assists this interpretation:

**Yasmin:** When she said [reads] 'covered from head to toe', it shows like..it's a black something..black moving...you can see nothing no expression no..I think it was a very negative statement.

The theme of 'difference' in representation of face veiling women was also highlighted by participants discussing article B. One of the readers, highlighted a more implicit example representing face veiling women as different from the rest of society by describing them as 'leaves' that would have to be 'singled out..for different treatment' in France, which is viewed as a harmonious 'herbal infusion'. This representation was interpreted as negative:

**Khalid:** it was kind of negative when they mentioned the herbs.

**Moderator:** the herbs?

*Ali: Yeah*

*Khalid: They want to take the leaves, leave some leaves and take the rest.*

*Moderator: why do you think it's negative?*

*Khalid: because they just separated them from society.. they said the herbs are just a mixture but you should just sometimes take several herbs or specific herbs and just put them away*

### **6.1.3 The 'Burqa': Reference and Description**

Oppositional positions were also clearly taken towards the understanding of the 'burqa' in all articles, excluding article D, which was viewed as providing an accurate description of the 'burqa'. This may reflect participants' heightened awareness of the multiple forms of the veil and the various possible motivations behind wearing it, which may be due to their contextual and religious identification (Arab/Kuwaiti and Muslim). Participants either thought an accurate description of the motivations behind the face veil were not provided or the 'burqa' was described using inaccurate referential and predicational strategies. Either way, these views led to their opposition of some of the dominant meanings, arguing that the newspaper writers do not seem aware of what the 'burqa' stands for or is about. This paved the way for some of the participants to give their own interpretations of the face veil, describing it as mainly practiced as a result of religious convictions. Once again, this was detected early on in one of the sessions examining article A:

*Khalid: I think there is a quote even that **they misunderstood** what the burqa is*

*Ali: hmm...the whole thing*

*Khalid: Burqa is a whole thing that covers [reading text] 'from head to toe'...the burqa is just a part on the face, **they didn't even have a clear idea about what it is***

*Ali: yeah*

*Fahad: because they don't understand what it is, the Arabs know what it is, the Arabs know what the **burqa** is, the **abaya** is. **There it's one.** The burqa, the abaya, it's clothing that covers the whole body...**This is Western thinking..They don't have the right idea.***

The same views were shared by some of the female participants:

**Lama:** *They did not seem to know what the veil or the veiling concept is all about, it's just an appearance and something they would act towards basically*

**Sara:** *Misinterpreted. Like they said it covers the wearer from head to toe, but it does not. There are some other articles that describe exactly what it is but like for this one [article A] I don't think they're sure what it is..they just think it's something that covers the whole body*

**Mariam:** *Yeah*

The participants' understanding of what the burqa is, as a clothing garment and its function, seems to stand in opposition with how it is described in the text. This reflects earlier findings in the CDA analysis of the Arab English language newspapers, where some writers signalled their objection of the descriptions of the 'burqa', dominating the French face veil ban discourse.

However, participants' oppositional stance was not limited to referential ambiguities. More importantly, they felt that face veiling and what it means for its wearers was inaccurately portrayed, disassociating it from religion, which they believe is the primary reason it is practiced. This was evident when discussing article C, readers mainly leaned towards a negotiated position. They understood the preferred meaning of the article which argues against the ban and they agreed with it. Nevertheless, the readers rejected the writer's comparison of the face veil to a mascot costume, his understanding of the motivations behind face veiling, and how he presented his argument against a face veil ban in general.

**Hamad:** *but the **arguments are so weak**...um I mean yeah now I sympathise with them after having this mask on ..whatever..**now I don't have to show excitement or smile..hiding** ..is that really a good enough reason?*

**Khalid:** *No it's not a good enough reason..I don't think it's good enough and women wearing the burqa **they wear it for religious reasons**..you wore just a mascot for a match ...it's not the same..and I mean though he's in favour of the burqa..**the arguments weren't that strong**...more sympathetic*

**Majid:** I think **he gave a negative image at the beginning** 'hot' how he was feeling behind the mascot..he didn't feel good.. 'frustrating'... I don't know where it said that exactly but that's what it said..**so he kind of gave support for the members..yeah it's not good for women**

**Kareem:** yeah he's comparing a mascot costume..**that's not even a comparison**

**Khalid:** Yeah I think what he said 'we cannot accept women prisoners behind a screen' [referring to Sarkozy's speech quoted in article B] kind of goes with what he said about the mascot...but giving women freedom is about giving them the choice whether to wear it or not

**Kareem:** No we disagree with it because **he was comparing two different things**

#### 6.1.4 Arguments against 'Oppression'

Oppositional positions were also taken by the male participants towards the main meanings presented in article B regarding the arguments of why a ban should take place. Discussions developed a form of suspicion towards 'women's oppression' as the main motivation behind the movements for a ban. They opposed these views emphasising that women practice veiling out of free choice, adding that 'oppression' can never be proved. The participants argued that the real reasons behind the ban are in fact not mentioned in the articles. The real motivations for the face veiling ban, as explained by the participants, stem from security concerns. A ban over possible security concerns was sympathised with, developing negotiated positions, although only by a few of the readers.

**Khalid:** they are saying it's about freedom when **they are not mentioning the real reason they want to do this...they cannot say in front of your face..we want to ban this because we are afraid of terrorists..they make up a reason that they are not free and are not the same level as the women in the country..this is a kind of a cover page to not say what's actually inside**

**Majid:** I think there is a part about a school..what if women went inside a school wearing a burqa..wants to take a kid what makes them sure who it is?

**Moderator:** There is a part in the article that says that?

**Majid:** kind of says that..not exactly..but women can take off the burqa in front of women it's not a big matter...they made it look like a security matter ...only bigger

**Hamad:** Some women in some places they would take it off so other people would identify them but in other cases some women refuse to take it off and like maybe in check points or like wherever...In a kindergarten when women go to pick up their kids..right they might allow other women to have a look at their faces..**in some cases they wouldn't and that's the problem.**

**Khalid:** In check points and stuff..I don't know in France they have police women..even in Saudi Arabia when they go to the borders there is a special room where they can take off the burqa and just check on the women, it's just simple..they can bring anyone

**Hamad:** yeah but especially for them...bring women...say there is a check point on the borders between one place and another and this women is travelling with her burqa and there is only one man on the check point and she refuses..

**Khalid:** I don't know..they didn't mention that this happened but if it did..yeah that's a big problem..just take it off at this point..she needs to take it off

**Kareem:** but if you see them at the airport..some of them take it off so their family could see them when they get with their family..they put it on again..it's not..I have seen that happen so it's not much of an issue

**Ali:** I think it depends on the country because if we are talking about Saudi Arabia this is a well known thing...**but when you go to France I mean like they cannot be safe by having someone covered from top to bottom without knowing who's that person...when it comes to political and safety regards..they had a lot of bombers and a lot of problems that makes them really hold on to this kind of thing and make it forcible to happen because you don't feel safe.. they just want to be safe in their country that's what it is..but as I said before the problem is they are not saying this clearly they are just bringing up excuses**

Preferred representations of face veiled women as oppressed or associated with extremism were indicated in article B and were opposed to, pointing to more explicit examples of negative meanings in the text where these particular representations were interpreted. It was argued that many of these women actually choose to practice face veiling and should be given the freedom of choice, despite the participants' personal stance on the issue.

**Yousif:** There is a story about an Algerian Chef..she..her sister was murdered by extremists...She the chef says that she would never serve a face covered women cause they represent the people that killed her sister..**she basically...every face covered women is represented as extremist as..**

**Bader:** Yeah exactly...**that's stereotyping that's wrong**

**Yousif:** *I am not persuaded at all because it talks about the burqa like it's something that undermines women, something that's very negative for the country, it's against equality of human rights.. It's like they are asking for specific rights and stuff like that...She's not basically asking for specific rights..she's doing what she believes is right.*

During this session, one participant then indicated that face veiling women were represented positively taking only the first part of this statement from article B, 'women who wear the voile integral do it by choice, not by obligation. This isn't an exotic symbol, but a political one'. This is viewed as a positive representation and in line with the argument repeated by the majority of participants, arguing for freedom of choice.

**Kareem:** *Some point here it shows it in a positive way because it says they are not forced to wear the burqa*

**Khalid:** *I think that's the answer for why are they saying it's a freedom matter, we should give them their freedom ..they are not forced to wear it so you can't talk about freedom in that case..*

**Moderator:** *And you consider that positive*

**Kareem:** *yeah*

**Hamad:** *They are not forced by society? or by their..*

**Others:** *By their husbands*

**Khalid:** *their families*

**Hamad:** *how would you know that?*

**Kareem:** *Some of them it's ok with them*

The argument for freedom of choice was also seen as a preferred meaning in article C. Again, many of the participants agreed with this argument, for instance:

**Khalid:** *The only part I agree with the article is where he says that women should be free by being given the choice whether to wear the burqa or not, not putting a law that they can't wear the burqa...it's their choice..so I think that's the best thing about this article*

The positive representation of face veiling women, which was viewed as dominating article D, was in line with most of the participants own personal views as well. This triggered a

discussion over the choice of clothing and its link to 'respect towards women', with varying and at times, quite conflicting views.

## **6.2 UK: Non-Muslim Groups**

As a group, the British non-Muslim candidates' interpretations and discussions of the articles revealed some interesting differences in comparison to the Muslim group discussions analysed in Kuwait and the UK. Generally, the participants adopted dominant or negotiated positions towards the texts, accepting the preferred meaning and highlighting some points of conflict. There were slight variations within the groups themselves, with some participants displaying more critical readings than others. Articles A, B and C generally attracted dominant positions with many of the non-Muslim participants accepting the majority of preferred meanings. Article D conjured more oppositional views, where the participants were particularly vocal about their rejection of the preferred meanings.

Discussions highlighted the following:

- (1) General dominant positions accepting preferred meanings in article A, B and C.
- (2) Dominant positions towards preferred meanings in representing face-veiling women as *different*, *separate* and *oppressed*. At times, these themes were reproduced by the readers themselves.
- (3) Religious identification is drawn upon in the interpretation of negative representations of face-veiling women, where the interpretation is frequently found to be framed in relation to 'other' readers, rather than the participants themselves.
- (4) Oppositional positions were not limited to the contents of the articles, but also stemmed from journalistic tone and style of writing.
- (5) Heightened vocal opposition towards articles mainly resulted from interpretations of preferred negative representations of 'in-group' or 'Western' actors, e.g. Western women in article D.

### 6.2.1 Increased Dominant Positions

Article A developed the least amount of conflict in the discussions, most of the participants accepted the preferred meanings and viewed the article as not leaning towards either side of the arguments for or against the ban. No particular representation of face veiling women was viewed to be depicted in the article. The questionnaire responses echoed this stance, unlike Muslim readers in Kuwait and the UK, the non-Muslim British readers predominantly (77%) viewed article A as not leaning towards a particular view, i.e. not arguing for or against a ban. More importantly, although 54% of readers agreed that the representation of face veiling women in article A was predominantly negative, nearly an equal number of readers 46% disagreed. The article was generally described with phrases, such as, 'fair', 'well balanced', 'matter of fact article', containing 'no emotive language' and seeming 'to look at both sides'. Readers generally picked up on its structure as a news piece, rather than an editorial. They described the article as 'not really opinion based', 'just talking about facts', 'just reporting', and to contain 'more information than opinion'. Therefore, the article was generally viewed as simply presenting unbiased facts.

In the few instances the article was viewed as possibly leaning towards a negative view of face veiling, participants hedged this view by emphasising the article's fair and balanced approach.

***Emma:** I think it leaned more towards a negative view point..I thought it was very fair.. but it only talked about how it's a breach of individual freedom and didn't put anything else about possible other viewpoints..it was just..only showed why it would be banned.. I thought*

***Lisa:** where he says about how it hides their face and it's an [reads] 'infringement of women's rights' being [reads] 'imposed by fundamentalists' and like I think like those choice of words kind of can portray a negative view on it just cause they're quite heavy, **but then you have a possibility of law [reads] 'why not' that's quite a kind of..he doesn't seem like they are really into it..not really kind of into actually posing a ban, it's just like why not have a law...why not? So I think it has balance***

In emphasising the article's unbiased characteristics, participants also described the writer's careful choice of words:

**Mark:** *I thought the writer of article was being quite umm..self conscious about what he was writing about..because even in the headlines it says [reads] 'France is considering ban on burqas **spokesman says**'..so he's being cautious in the wording he uses*

**Moderator:** *Yeah..any other examples in the actual article or is it just that example that supports that view..do you think he's being careful somewhere else..*

**Monica:** *He says '**many see the burka**'*

**Mark:** *mmm*

Reader interpretations of article B was the most revealing under this category of focus group participants. Their reaction to this article stood in clear contrast with the other groups examined. They mainly adopted dominant and negotiated positions towards the preferred readings. Very few instances of oppositional positions were found to be taken towards any dominant meanings represented by the article. The article was mainly viewed as representing both sides of the arguments for and against the ban, rather than leaning to a particular view, either way. Participants also pointed out some positive representations. In fact, some of the readers felt the article was written by a Muslim who is sharing his own experiences in the article. Nevertheless, some readers did signal some of the explicit negative representations of face veiling women.

One interesting aspect highlighted in the non-Muslim groups in particular, was the clear role of religious identification when interpreting negative Muslim representations in the texts:

**Melanie:** *I sort of got the impression that she's sort of saying that people who wear the burqa are sort of asking for specific rights they don't want to be equal to others they want more rights they want to be above the law..which is sort of going against her saying I have no definite opinions cause that's quite a definite opinion to have.. **I think a lot of people would be quite offended by that...***

**Anna:** *Yes it also is saying that it would put someone above the law which I think is quite negative*

**Charles:** *Saying that religious law shouldn't be above state law which **obviously for a religious person** that's quite a strong comment to hear because if..if you have faith in*

*a god then you believe that gods law is a above the law of your country so that's why these debates can rage*

As seen in the above examples, readers highlighted negative connotations in relation to 'other' people or people who identify themselves with religion or being '*religious*', instead of these representations being negative in general.

Positive representations were seen as mainly reflected by what was viewed as the representation of veiled women as practicing face veiling by choice. This positive representation, for instance, was signalled as being portrayed in the following statement from article B: '*In France, women who wear the voile integral do it by choice, not by obligation. This isn't an exotic symbol, but a political one*'. As with earlier Muslim participants in Kuwait, the positive interpretation could be argued as readers' general lack of political awareness, or the result of the dominant meaning not being interpreted as negative.

Positive interpretations regarding the representation of Muslims in general were also made by assumptions made regarding article B by one of the readers:

**James:** *The Muslim community at large comes across umm I thinks she's trying to be positive about it all, the author trying to be positive about them in the first paragraph saying that the..um..the burqa supporters are being sort of diffident and not chanting in the streets and shouting being more open to debate...although again in a slightly backhanded comment with [reads] 'uncharacteristic reserve' [laughs]*

Although the article does not specifically state the actions taken by the burqa supporters, but instead describes conservative Muslims and those sympathetic to them as '*protesting against the enquiry, but with uncharacteristic reserve*', the reader interprets the dominant meaning as positive in reference to Muslims in general. He bases this interpretation on the premise that the protesters were are not described as '*chanting in the streets and shouting*'. This interpretation may reflect the participant's schema on what Muslim reactions are typically comprised of and expected to be or/and it may align with the dominant media representation of Muslim reactions. Accordingly, anything opposing these reactions would automatically be viewed as positive.

The interpretation sessions also revealed dominant positions towards preferred meanings analysed and argued in the main CDA study as ideologically biased, representing face veiling women as *different, separate and oppressed*. In fact, some of the readers explicitly expressed their agreement with these meanings, at times, describing the arguments as persuasive and actively reproducing these representations.

#### **6.2.1.1 Face veiling women as ‘different’ and ‘separate’**

In article B, where face veiling was represented as a practice that may lead to the separatism of French society, participants dominant position agreeing with these meanings were highlighted in the following discussion:

**Charles:** *The fact that it does..it does lead to separatism because um obviously if some women are covering their faces and it's very difficult in a society where you've got...that's not the norm and you have to adapt around that and I can understand why people are sometimes a little bit fearful of it cause it's...*

**Marcus:** *he's used the nice sort of the tea simile in paragraph...represent the..umm..choosing to sort of single out some of these leaves is something I don't really agree with..umm*

**Moderator:** *what do you think is the problem with this sort of example?*

**Marcus:** *well he's claimed well we never tried it but why not why shouldn't we but I think..but I think it's good that you know using the tea metaphor tea uhh simile again that we should all blend together uhh but of course that's never truly gonna happen and that's sad to see that and it does make you think*

In one of the group discussions, the topos of ‘difference’ is taken one step further by one of the participants who agreed with the article’s argument of the face veil as foreign or different, portraying those in support of face veiling as separate or not part of the community. The reader rationalises the ban, explaining that women who wish to practice face veiling are responsible for their wishes, and thus, should relocate to a context where they would be able to practice veiling freely.

**Louise:** *I found it interesting umm when the writer says something like they can..they can go to somewhere where it's allowed like Britain, because that's true.. it's like if I lived in a country and then they were like ‘oh we're putting this ban..everyone has to wear a burqa’ I will be like oh well I am leaving whereas I wouldn't fight for it I*

*suppo.. I suppose if you want that freedom then you could just go somewhere where you can live how you want*

**Kate:** *It's not always as simple as that though is it? Like once you've kind of got yourself comfortable somewhere I think I would probably fight for the right for what I wanted where I was living or I would feel like I should be a valued member of that community in the same way..*

**Louise:** *No I know but if I suppose if you didn't win if you fought for it and the ban happened anyway they're not really..it's not really impinging on their rights because they're free to go somewhere else..*

**Kate:** *That's true..yeah*

**Louise:** *So if they did happen to lose they could go somewhere else but yeah*

**Paula:** *I would agree with that*

The citizenship status of face veiled women is not taken into consideration and the responsibility of the consequences they may be faced with, as a result of a legal ban, is completely shifted onto face veiling women for wanting to practice wearing the veil. This shift of responsibility is also reflected by one reader, in the same group, explaining a ban should have been expected by face veil wearers, justifying her arguments by describing France's 'notoriously secular' nature.

**Donna:** *I think because France is such a notoriously secular country and like they ban the cross, which is like a size of 5p umm from being worn..I think that I mean like that they should have expected to have a burqa ban..I don't know..because like that's massive and then compared to like a 5p cross..I don't know I think it was kind of a bit like 'they will never notice if we like wear these all the time' but I think it's kind of like an inevitable thing that was going to happen because France..like because it's not like they are necessarily against religion I don't know..but I think they are trying to keep everybody on a level playing field and that's kind of what their aim is in that and so because of that I think it was kind of expected..like it should have been expected that it was gonna happen.*

Unlike the Arab based texts analysed for this study and some of the views vocalised in the focus group sessions in Kuwait, where arguments of religious discrimination were frequently vocalised, some of the readers in non-Muslim groups reflected quite opposite views. The ban is justified by France's secular nature and they are represented as wanting to keep

'everybody on a level playing field', once again, shifting the responsibility to face veiling women for failing to expect the proposal of such a ban.

### **6.2.1.2 Face veiling women as 'oppressed'**

Readers also accepted some of the preferred meaning portraying face veiling women as oppressed. In fact, one such argument for a ban on the face veil based on its oppressive nature was found particularly persuasive by one reader (referring to article B):

***Paula:** I think yeah some of the points are very convincing like the discrimination one I think was very convincing.*

***Moderator:** What discrimination which one?*

***Paula:** The one about umm..can by [reads] 'some sort of magic trick a women maintained that she was consenting her own discrimination'...what happened if she changed her mind later? I think that's quite an interesting point of like they could be fighting for the burqa but then actually not want it later in life umm..*

Earlier Paula also added the following regarding the same example:

***Paula:** I think the writer was saying how like even these women can be quite naive because ahh the point about umm what if somebody like..like agrees to their own discrimination is that..is that still ok um and I don't... that's quite an interesting question is someone allowed to agree to their own discrimination and how the German judge who found in favour of violent husband because the wife knew he was going to be violent and then I don't know where does that sit? I think he's kind of saying that even although obviously a lot of it is out of choice.., a lot of it is like yah but you know I choose to be discriminated against...like I don't know where's the line..like where do you step in when that happens..*

### **6.2.3 Negotiated and Oppositional positions**

Article C gathered some mixed reactions. Readers generally acknowledged the preferred meaning of the article as arguing against a face veil ban. The article was described as 'funny', 'humorous', 'really interesting' and as 'very light hearted'. Most participants also enjoyed its 'conversational' style. It was also viewed by some as giving the reader a glimpse into the experience of wearing the face veil and giving a voice to face veiling women, through the

comparison of wearing a mascot costume to the wearing of the face veil. However, similar to most of the Muslim participants, some participants also viewed this comparison as 'weak' and 'ignorant', arguing that the main motivations behind women adopting the face veiling practice were not highlighted.

**Charles:** *It's not really about..talking about why women..these women wear the burqa it's saying oh yeah they might enjoy it.. they might enjoy the freedom of it but it's not going into the reasons why..with the humour and the mascot example..it's not really saying obviously they're not doing it as a costume it's not just some kind of uniform it's about the principal of niqab and disguising..you know..so there is no lust there..*

**Donna:** *I think he tried kind of to offer a voice for the argument of women who say that they like wearing the burqa but I don't think he represented them enough as much as he wanted to..maybe*

**Louise:** *I don't think umm..if like the women that actually wear the burqa..I don't think they would be impressed because the writer was saying something like 'oh yeah like it's nice just to be like you don't have..don't have to do any facial expressions and it just makes life easier and umm that's not why they wear it.. they wear it to be like modest like I don't think they would appreciate this article but I can kind of see how it does try to make it relate to like people who aren't religious but..*

One interesting aspect regarding readers' interpretation of the texts was highlighted by some oppositional positions taken. At times, oppositional positions were not exclusively based on the contents of the text, but the style in which it was presented. This was highlighted by one reader's justification for his oppositional position towards article C, which stemmed from the article's 'conversational' style, which he viewed as unsuitable given the 'controversial' nature of the topic.

**Marcus:** *It drew comparisons to being inside it made it seem almost like a costume to put on when really it's..there is a degree of modesty..I mean he mentions that fact that you inhabit this secret world umm and he thinks that's ok..but when talking about African culture uhh he believes there are things which are objectively wrong so **he doesn't appear to be totally appreciative of other people's cultures** umm almost seems to be a constant contradiction.. whilst he sees strength in Sarkozy's attack on the garment **umm I don't know I think I felt it was too conversational the article itself..***

**Charles:** *yeah I think that's the point of it seems to be more of a column piece than a news report it's got lots of humour..making cracks about European politicians like [reads] 'Mr. Sarkozy, the extremely proud owner of a trophy wife' and it makes a comment about Berlusconi and stockings and suspenders at the end.. **it's very light hearted it's not making a serious argument.** But he's..I think what he's trying to do, obviously it's an intense debate and he's trying to bring it back down to 'c'mon we're all...there might be reasons why people enjoy doing it but we shouldn't be really worried about it'..*

**Marcus:** *I mean I don't think humour would have been uhh..humour would have been good in perhaps a different article but to include it in something which you know is such a controversial topic and something so sensitive to many people I don't think..it would've been perhaps dampened down or diluted..perhaps..I don't know..*

As seen in the above discussion between the two readers, reader's preferences and expectations of the appropriate style of journalistic writing and presentation are quite different, with the topic in this case being crucial in determining the suitability of the tone and style of newspaper articles. This oppositional position towards the text based on a lack of 'cultural sensitivity' was highlighted by one reader, Marcus, coincidentally, a non-Muslim British reader of mixed ethnic background. Arguably, ethnic identification may have played a role influencing his interpretation and reaction to article C.

Reader criticism towards the comparison of a mascot costume and the face veil was not limited solely to the above mentioned reasons. Participants in the non-Muslim group, unlike the other groups, also highlighted the difference between the effects of both garments on their contextual surroundings, which were highlighted as quite different. Therefore, the garments themselves are seen to have little in common. Here, the participants draw on their own schemas, portraying the face veil as foreign to society with negative connotations at times.

**Paula:** *I think as well because people like everyone loves the mascot like on the football field and so it's like everyone's like 'oh mascot yeah love it' and then but then if you walked through a town that was..that I reckon that had never really seen a burqa before and just walked through in a full length burqa you would get stared at and like not judged...maybe judged by some people but like people would be very like confused as to why it was..I don't know..I think it is very very different umm and obviously there is their freedom of behind their mask not being judged and stuff but*

*then like I don't know to put like a full length black thing on is kind of like I don't know I don't know [laughs] it's kind of maybe encouraging that...I don't..*

As seen above, as in earlier examples, the reader shifts the responsibility of negative reactions towards face veiling women to the women themselves, who are described as 'encouraging' such reactions. Moreover, discussions highlighted some of the reader's perceptions of how the face veiling woman may behave on a day to day basis, where the face veil is portrayed as limiting her from particular activities.

***Donna:** He was like loving it because you know he was taking pictures with children and stuff but I don't think women in a burqa would be taking pictures with loads of children*

***Others:** yeah [laughing]*

***Donna:** so I think it's a very different experience wearing it every single day*

Oppositional positions appeared more prominent in the discussion of article C, and to a greater extent in the views vocalised against the preferred meanings presented in article D. Oppositional positions were mainly taken towards the negative representation of 'Western' men and women in both articles. Readers also opposed the arguments of religious discrimination against Muslims in particular, as well as, arguments linking people's choice of dress with the concept of morality, two prominent meanings in Article D.

### **6.3 UK: Muslim Groups**

Although only two focus groups were conducted involving British Muslims, there were some significant differences in their reading of the newspaper articles. The men in this category, similar to the Muslim sample in Kuwait, were far more critical than their female counterparts. In fact, they were the most critical of the texts amongst all other focus group participants in this study. Articles were described as ideologically constructed more often by pointing out particular wordings in the text or what they viewed as assumptions made by the articles. The men and women in this category also emphasised that dominant ideologies were not reflected exclusively by what was included in the texts, but more importantly, by

what they believed was kept out of the articles, which they argue to be more telling. The men displayed higher political awareness, associating their interpretation with their general understanding of French politics. They were also more media literate, repeatedly reading texts as ideologically driven, discussing the possible ideological backgrounds of the newspapers producing the texts, as well as, the possible particular audience they may be catering to. Oppositional positions were mainly taken towards the dominant meanings in article A and B, while article C and D attracted negotiated and dominant positions. Discussions highlighted the following:

- (1) Oppositional positions towards the discrimination targeting Muslims, which are argued to exist in the texts, emphasising the actual existence of such discrimination during the focus group discussions.
- (2) Increased awareness and opposition of dominant negative ideological meanings regarding Muslims and face veiling women, i.e. oppression of women, pointing out many 'assumptions' in the text.
- (3) Participant identification of the existence of moderate vs. conservative Muslim dichotomy discourse in the representation of Muslims.
- (4) Increased dominant positions towards the main meanings framing articles C and D, while taking negotiated positions to what were viewed as some assumptions in the text.
- (5) Frequent emphasis on the lack of Muslim and face veiling voices in all the articles examined.

### **6.3.1 Themes of Discrimination**

As in the Arab context, the theme of discrimination towards Muslims was highlighted throughout the discussion. Article A triggered this discussion, both the male and female British Muslim participants took oppositional positions towards the article, declaring it as containing '*reporter bias*', as described by one participant, towards arguments for a ban. It was argued as not representing both sides of the conflict. This was echoed in their individual views in the questionnaires, where 75% of the participants believed the article was for a ban. More importantly 87.5% of the participants believed it represented face veiling women

negatively. The degree of bias in the article's content was argued as possibly having effects on readers with less knowledge regarding the face veil. The women had more difficulty in expressing how they interpreted ideologically biased and negative meanings in relation to the face veil/face veiling women in article A:

**Hanan:** *If it wasn't in favour of the ban it wouldn't just be using quite negative words towards the burqa..like..not even negative words I can't really explain it like*

**Amina:** *One sided opinions*

**Hanan:** *yeah exactly*

**Amina:** *or one sided quotes yeah*

**Hanan:** *it's quite biased I think even in its informing*

**Lama:** *Certainly I think it's not like a huge thing if someone reads this article..*

**Amina:** *He would be swayed quite subconsciously*

**Lama:** *He would read like brush over to be informed of what's happening in politics that time.. but you wouldn't..can't really explain it like*

**Amina:** *You only have the part that wants to ban...and people that don't know much about it.. they will like easily be swayed by it*

**Lama:** *It's not neutral enough.. I don't think for people that are non-Muslims to understand*

This form of difficulty in expressing their interpretations of negative representation was repeated on a few instances in the discussion. One re-occurring and clearly expressed reason that the article was seen as ideologically driven was the absence of arguments against the ban and more importantly, the absence of Muslim voices. Whether face veiling or Muslims who form part of the 'French system', as one participant referred to them, their absence in the article is argued to add to the article's biasness. This led the way to an argument of Muslims being portrayed as separate from French mainstream society, thus, highlighting their discrimination.

**Lama:** *all it mentions is France is home to Europe's largest Muslim minority but then talks about France as if it's like being representative of everyone because it says [reads] 'France is strongly attached to its secular values and to gender equality' but it doesn't include the Muslim minority as being part of*

**Hanan:** *Yeah, when I saw, when I hear secular...I was like..if it's so secular then why do they have such a thing against the burqa?*

**Amina:** *It's quite subjective in what it's says..I think*

**Hanan:** *You would think they would be quite accepting of it but..*

On the other hand, male participants seemed more confident in their oppositional views, stating that the article presented one side of the argument and failed to acknowledge any arguments against the ban. More importantly, unlike any of the other groups, a direct negative representation of face veiling women as victims of oppression was argued to be constructed in the text.

**Abdul:** *Those who wear the veil optionally or forcefully they are seen as they are oppressed and the French legislators are almost seen as the liberators and those individuals who are bringing freedom in a sort of the right to wear what they want in a manner they choose or deem to be correct*

This view paves the way to a brief discussion of French politics, where the participants show their opposition to the French legislators' stance and their understanding of the concept of liberty, which is described as '*one of the main parts of their constitution*'. They oppose the concept of liberty as it is defined by the French legislators, which is viewed as the prime motivator behind the ban. Its application is argued as unjust, discriminating towards minorities in particular, in this case, the Muslim community.

**Abdul:** *To hold the word liberty, are we holding it to neo-translation or are we holding liberty to the translation that was used at the time when the constitution was used...So it's a misinterpretation of the umm constitution if you ask me and it's a breach of liberty whether an individual chooses to dress fully from head to toe or an individual chooses to dress almost close to nothing, you know that seen as individual expression and liberty... to what extent is France actually you know are we giving the freedom of choice? to what extent is liberty..is liberty extended to? is it to the whole of society? Is it to the majority or can liberty not be deemed as liberty to a minority because they are different to whatever they are*

**Hakeem:** *you cannot give justice to the woman whose been forced to wear the veil or the burqa by removing justice from the woman who wants to wear the veil or burqa.. So they are looking or this argument is on a pretext of protecting women who have been forced to wear the burqa.. A. There is no way of ever knowing who is being forced to wear the burqa or not and if there was a way, it's certainly not being*

*implemented and B..you cannot protect a woman who is being forced to wear a burqa by removing the rights of those who want to wear the burqa*

The theme of discrimination was also particularly emphasised in discussing article D, where British Muslim participants predominantly adopted dominant positions towards the preferred reading, agreeing with many of the ideas and arguments presented in the article. The portrayal of the ban as a discriminatory act against Muslims in particular was one key argument presented in article D. The readers identified with this argument and reproduced similar views in their discussions:

**Lama:** *I think if it was a French citizen or British citizen in a Western country..was reading this and how she [referring to the writer] does relate it and compare to nuns and such..she does give what Islam tells us on the concept of hijab..she does do it. certainly, I think it would get people to think a lot..I don't think people would ever compare Muslims to uhhh nuns..*

**Amina:** *She just highlights the double standards in this article in societies especially the West, where one kind of religious persons are not attacked but...*

**Lama:** *another is*

**Amina:** *Another is for almost the same thing*

### **6.3.2 Identifying and Rejecting Assumptions**

As with article A, male participants were quite critical towards article B, pointing out several dominant meanings perceived to depict Muslims and face veiling women in a negative light. Although the female participants were also critical, they mainly highlighted their opposition to more explicit dominant negative meanings towards face veiling women. Their male counterparts emphasised many of the more implicit meanings, which they themselves described as 'assumptions' in the text, presuppositions they rejected. An example of such assumptions was highlighted regarding the views of Muslims in France:

**Hakeem:** *This article is making a lot of assumptions just as the brother was saying, this article is trying.. a lot of its views is kind of trying to speak for the Algerian and Iranian people..I mean it's making the assumption that these immigrants from Algeria and Iran because they fled from political prosecution they will automatically have a view on the burka*

Another participant highlighted an assumption, he believes, was made by the article regarding what Muslim girls would experience if the veil was allowed in schools:

**Zaher:** *Yeah..it's just giving assumptions on what would happen if it was allowed in schools..some young Muslims would be forced..who did you ask? Is it a fact?*

The article was described as ideologically written in trying to sway readers' opinions to reject the face veil. This was supported by what was viewed as irrelevant information in the article, placed to highlight negative aspects:

**Hakeem:** *It's also full of emotions (pointing to comments on Yusuf Al Qaradawi) for example he has a go at Yusuf al Qaradawi at the end..it's got some needless references..they just have to point it out yeah [reads] 'the man with reference to homosexuality, openly wonders whether it is best first to kill the 'active' or the 'passive' one'..its giving this sheikh's views on homosexuality when it's not necessary.. you're debating the veil.. but then you wanna kinda of point out that this guys views on homosexuality..to kind of win the reader*

**Zaher:** *totally agree*

### **6.3.3 Moderate vs. Conservative Muslim Dichotomy**

Interestingly, the British Muslims were the only group that characterised article B to be catering for or representing a particular type of Muslim, the 'liberal' Muslim. In their discussion of the article, it seemed clear that they were aware of the liberal/conservative Muslim representation sometimes found in the media, they indicated this form of discourse in article B. The female participants who were not as critical towards the article, highlighted this divide when describing the article as being pro-Muslim, yet emphasising not Muslims in general, but a more 'liberal' and 'westernised' Muslim, who they believe may be more inclined in agreeing with the French government's views supporting a ban.

**Amina:** *I think it's a bit pro veil*

**Moderator:** *pro veil*

**Amina:** *not really pro veil more like pro Muslim but not necessarily veil*

**Moderator:** *Ok*

**Amina:** *If that makes sense*

**Moderator:** *yeah*

**Lama:** *I feel like it's trying to depict a certain type of Muslim though its.. not Muslims in general*

**Amina:** *yeah, Muslim democrats or conservative Muslims type thing but not necessarily*

**Lama:** *so it's still Muslim but I don't know if its*

**Amina:** *more like a westernised Muslim maybe or a more liberal Muslim that is quite open to the idea of women being forced..not being allowed to wear the burqa*

**Lama:** *and agreeing with the French government..*

The male participants highlighted this divide when discussing the possible contexts this article may have been published in. One of the participants argued that it would only be published in a Muslim country with predominant secular values or in a newspaper based in a Muslim country, but characterised with secular values.

**Hakeem:** *This could either have been published in more of a right wing leaning British umm newspaper or if foreign newspaper..this could possibly be an article in a Muslim country umm from a newspaper which has secular support..so for example in Egypt umm there are secular newspapers..in Saudi Arabia well I am sure there is and in Iraq secular..so it could by all means..this could be in a Muslim country..that wouldn't surprise me at all but it would be from a secular umm leaning newspaper*

**Moderator:** *And you say that because..is there something in the text..*

**Hakeem:** *Because it has secular values*

**Abdul:** *Umm I agree with where the brother is coming from but I completely disagree I don't think they could umm any newspaper could just out rightly just almost go on a slaughter of how extremist you know these individuals are who wear the niqab can get away with it in a Muslim country regardless of how liberal or secular this Muslim quote un quote country can be.. even in Egypt or even Algeria or even in anywhere else..I think..again I think it's Western newspaper..*

**Hakeem:** *The reason umm the reason I disagree is because I know that in certain Muslim countries..Muslims have less rights than Muslims in this country and an example I quote is I think Tajikistan..where um children under the age of 16 cannot go to a mosque..so that's why I am saying that um there is a chance that it could be*

*from a Muslim country though I think I would agree that more likely it's from a umm  
a Western newspaper*

#### **6.3.4 Dominant/Negotiated Positions**

Articles C and D attracted mixed reactions from the British Muslim sample of participants. In both articles, the preferred dominant meanings were generally accepted and even described as reinforcing their own views. Supporting these findings, 87.5% of the UK Muslim participants declared they persuaded by the contents of article C in their responses to the questionnaire. This was expressed to an even greater degree regarding the contents of article D, where all the UK Muslim participants (100%) felt generally persuaded by its ideas. One participant, for instance, in describing how persuaded she was by the ideas presented in article D, stated:

***Amina:*** *I would say it reinforces my own personal views*

Dominant positions mainly reflected the participants' acceptance of the macro arguments dominating both articles, arguing for freedom of choice for women who wish to practice face veiling. In addition, they accepted some of the dominant meanings representing the benefits of veiling, in particular regard to the modesty it offers, which happens to fall in line with their individual views. An example of such agreement with the article was displayed when discussing article C. Participants agreed with the writer's description of the 'Western cult of physical attractiveness' and how problems arising from it could potentially be solved by the face veil. They acknowledged this representation of Western society as being rather negative, yet deeming it as accurate.

***Abdul:*** *It gives the perfect translation of how we look at people..we don't look at their intellect but their physical appearance..by the attractiveness..it gives the correct opinion of how the West deems or holds women..but not always admitted..it's really funny and true at the same time that she feels no longer desirable..no longer receiving approval cause she is older..is she not getting approval cause she's older or cause she's not wise or because she's not polite or of good character or good morals or a firm believer or is it just beauty...her beauty has faded away so does the interest of people*

***Moderator:*** *Do you think that's a negative representation?*

**Abdul:** *I think that's a correct representation of Western society*

**Hakeem:** *I do in terms of social groups I think there is a negative but correct representation of Western men..which I might say I am included in that population..British men gawp at women..I think that's a negative but a correct view.. I can't be biased 'cause I am a man and I am British [laughs]*

Article C also generally attracted dominant positions from the British Muslim female participants with no reservations regarding any aspect of the article. Their accommodating interpretation of the article is triggered by a positive description of who they believe wrote it and the general positive aspects of the article. Their description of the author seemed to imply their surprise and perhaps appreciation of what they believe was a positive take on the face veil by a 'non-Muslim' author, described as '*a very open minded westernised man*'.

**Lama:** *I like the quote saying that [reads] 'to remove a women's choice is using oppression to combat oppression'*

**Amina:** *Yeah that's what I really..I highlighted that bit too..I thought it was quite umm it's good wording..I think it summarises what he thinks*

**Hanan:** *He chooses a different way of writing this article by putting himself in the shoes of women who covered up and **he's sensitive to the choice that women** should be allowed to dress the way that they want*

**Amina:** *He also actually does say that the burqa is actually quite a solution towards a incident he mentioned about women or a friend here..and so **does show that even though he might not practice Islam or whatever such..** or you know he's not a Muslim woman himself or wearing a burqa..**but he does see the benefits of it***

**Lama:** *I think this does actually genuinely cover the debate quite well, just in a sense I don't think it's a Muslim writing it*

**Amina:** *Yeah definitely*

**Lama:** *And for like a non-Muslim to have such a strong view on like the rights of Muslim people who want to wear the burqa*

**Hanan:** *It would be quite persuasive I think*

**Lama:** *It is..it's an argument that definitely would persuade.. if I wasn't a Muslim*

Interestingly, the alignment of the readers' views with the article's general argument against a ban highlighted in the initial stages of discussing article C, seems to steer the readers' interpretation of every aspect of the article as accommodating to that view. That is, even arguments emphasising positive aspects of President Sarkozy's objection towards the face veil in France are inaccurately interpreted by the female British Muslim participants as a criticism of Sarkozy's stance. An example of this is highlighted towards the end of the article, where the author emphasises his 'respect' towards President Sarkozy's 'courage to speak out on the sensitive issue of cultural difference'. One participant interpreted this statement as a criticism of Sarkozy, stating:

**Hanan:** *I think to me what his point was..cause he says [reads] 'a group of us'..this is when he went to Africa..[reads] 'mainly white middle class liberals sat in a village in blah blah blah and spoke to the village elders'..I think what he's trying to say with that point is the fact that..**he went out and spoken to people of different cultures even though he might not agree with it..he's gone out and went out of his way and he is doing the same now..whereas what he's trying to highlight in my point of view is that Sarkozy hasn't done that..he's just..sort of voicing his opinion**'.*

As illustrated, the participant seems to appreciate the writer's attempt to try to understand other cultures and practices, i.e. his visit to Africa and the writing of this article on veiling. The understanding of the article's macro structure as being against the ban and critical of Sarkozy seems to affect the participant's interpretation of all meanings (opposing or not), as in line with this argument. This interpretation may be further affected by the participant's dominant and favourable position towards the macro meanings characterising the article.

As mentioned earlier, although articles C and D did receive dominant positions towards the macro dominant meanings, they did also attract oppositional views negotiating and resisting some of the preferred meaning interpreted. Similar to the Arab context and some of the British non-Muslim participants, the mascot/face veil comparison was generally rejected. Moreover, the author's description of the motivations behind face veiling were rejected and viewed as negative towards face veiling women. The Muslim British men in particular emphasised their opposition:

**Abdul:** *Actually I found it a little insulting to women in burqas..in a niqab or burqa or any sort of veiling they wear..just on the specific fact that first of all..he's using his experience of what he did on a football ground to entertain people and almost became a clown of the people and his experience where he did not have to be happy and did not have to express his expression of his face and people wouldn't know.. and he sort of compared that to umm women in niqab or women in burqa*

**Hakeem:** *He's making some assumptions as well, have to be fair on this article as well, he's kind of suggests maybe some like to wear the burqa 'cause they can't be bothered to smile*

Similarly, although the main argument in article D highlighting the face veil ban as a discriminatory act towards Muslims was overtly accepted, endorsed and reproduced by many of the readers, oppositional views were also voiced against what were viewed as assumptions and generalisations made by the text. These mainly revolved around rejecting what was viewed as a negative representation of women in the West. Two participants highlighted this dilemma clearly by describing how far they were persuaded by the contents of the article:

**Hakeem:** *I am not a 100% I am 50/50.. Like again even if it speaks positively of the burqa..again it doesn't speak well of the Western world.. it gives a negative image of the Western world especially portrays women in the Western world as dressing in bikinis..you know and umm..I don't think that that's true..some people might be wearing it.. umm but it's not the case for everybody..so that is why I am in-between for this one*

**Abdul:** *I agree with Hakeem in that he believes generalisations have been made of British women and I agree with him and I am against these generalisations but when I say I have been persuaded by the argument..I say that in that these generalisations did not have to be made.. the article could have reiterated that you know not every British woman wears a bikini..But I am persuaded in a sense that if the bikini could be accepted why can't a burqa be accepted.. I am persuaded by the argument that if a woman has the legal right to wear a bikini and offend.. a woman should have the right to wear a burqa regardless if it is offensive or not..that is the argument I agree with*

As seen in the above excerpts, the participants seem to agree/disagree with the arguments as far as they correspond with their own personal views and beliefs. Unlike the non-Muslim

British sample, who rejected the overall argument linking morality with choice and form of dress, the opposition here is of the generalisation that all Western women practice wearing the bikini. The argument associating the choice of dress with degrees of morality was not rejected.

British Muslims were also the only group to highlight their rejection of the assumption by article D claiming that in *all* cases women wear the face veil by choice. They indicated this as ideologically biased and explained that there are in fact cases where face veiling women are indeed forced into wearing the face veil. In discussing article D, the women point to this indirectly, while the men highlight specific phrases in the text, criticising them as assumptions.

*Hanan: I think like the purpose of the ban was to combat oppression and that people are forced to be wearing it and she's saying here that people do it for choice **but I don't think she has combated the fact that a lot of people are probably forced into doing it** but you can't like take away force with force. ..I don't know how to say it*

*Hakeem: I think again **it's a massive assumption to say that the answer in [reads] 'all cases will be the latter'** because as a Muslim I'd well say fine there are probably a few individuals who have been forced to wear it.. you know.. they're probably is a few individuals..but the point I am going to emphasise is a few.. because not all Muslims can be good people*

As with the Arab Muslim focus group sessions, the association of the face veil directly with Islam as a religion was also highlighted by some of the British Muslim participants. This was emphasised during discussions of article D. One participant interpreted the author as disconnecting the face veil from Islam as a religion in the statement, '*Sarkozy was right when he said the burqa –the particular type of dress – was not a religious issue. Islam asks its followers – men and women to dress modestly, and so do all religions*'. In response, the reader took an extreme oppositional position to the article, rejecting this meaning.

*Abdul: Actually, this is an incorrect statement, it's absolutely incorrect, to be honest with you if anything..you know..like **it is an issue of religious debate..Most of the Middle East hold it to be compulsory, whether we choose as individuals to believe in that or to follow that..it is up to us and you know we are responsible for what we decide but actually it is a religious debate. a lot of the contemporary and of the past scholars hold it to be***

In this example, religious identification and knowledge seems to trigger and allow the participant to take an oppositional position towards the meaning he interpreted in the text.

### **6.3.5 Muslims/Face Veiling Women: Voiceless**

Throughout the focus group discussions with British Muslims, one common aspect highlighted in regard to all the articles was the lack of Muslim voices, particularly voices of those who would be most affected by a ban, the face veil wearers. One participant, for instance, explains: (further examples in appendix 18)

*Zaher: I agree with him that he says that..people are speaking on behalf of people and making assumptions..because you know there has not been any..there are no quotes from any Muslim women who wear the burqa there's no opinion polls from Muslim women who wear the burqa,..there is..there's not much reference to them in that sense..*

As highlighted earlier, participants believed the articles exposed more dominant meanings by what was not included in the text than by what was. The suppression of Muslim voices formed one of these dominant meanings, according to the British Muslim participants.

## **6.4 Discussion**

The analysis of the focus group discussions suggests an alignment between the researcher's analysis of the dominant discursive representations of Islam, Muslims and face veiling women and instances of reader interpretations reflecting themes of these dominant representations. This is mainly supported by readers highlighting themes of difference, oppression, separateness, threat and discrimination in the representation of Muslims and face veiling women in some of the articles examined. More importantly, the findings also indicate the naturalisation of some of these representations, primarily reflected by some of the dominant positional readings expressed by the non-Muslim British focus group participants. This is affirmed further by the reassertion and reproduction of these dominant negative representations by some of the group members when encountering them in the text, discussing them as commonsensical justifications for a potential face veil ban. As van Dijk (1998b) explains, ideological influence is most efficient if the ideologies presented in the discourse are parallel to the recipients' personal experience (models). This ideological influence can also be viewed as successful if discourse recipients "have no better

alternatives than the proposed ideologically based models for their opinions and actions” (van Dijk, 1998b: 318). The difference in how these dominant negative ideological representations were framed by British non-Muslim and Muslim groups in Kuwait and the UK were particularly revealing. Muslim readers rejected most of these dominant representations framing them as negative, while non-Muslims generally accepted such dominant meanings without any negative or positive framing.

Having said that, these findings by no means suggest that the social groups, distinguished by their religious and contextual backgrounds, responded to the text homogeneously as unified social blocks. Instead, readings displayed active readers with variations in interpretations, shaped by several of their individual, external and internal interpretive frameworks. Individuals interpret the text depending on their social context and by drawing on their own “existing ideologies, attitudes, knowledge, models of experience” (van Dijk, 1998b: 318). Therefore, the decoding of meaning relies heavily on the multilayered facets of the ‘identity’ each recipient inherently brings along when engaging with any given form of discourse. In many instances in this study, as van Dijk (1998b: 85) also emphasises to be typically the case, participants were witnessed to rely on or prefer one or a few of their many social ‘identities’ to dominate their interpretation.

As this study divided readers into social groups based on their religious and contextual background, it naturally hypothesised a difference in interpretation based on these variables. Indeed, religious identification played a pivotal role in the decoding of meanings and reading positions adopted by the Muslim and non-Muslim groups. This was apparent in the key findings mentioned above, where negative representations of face veiling women and Muslims were mainly opposed to by Muslim readers, who identify with their social group as being under criticism. This was frequently highlighted, for instance, by Muslim readers’ use of the pronouns ‘us’ and ‘we’ when discussing how Muslims are represented in the text. Religious identification and the knowledge of the different facets of their religion also gave Muslim participants the confidence and ability to reject what they viewed as some of the dominant negative meanings associated with the face veil and women who wear it. The frequent emphasis on the association of the face veil with religion by Muslim readers in the UK and Kuwait as a premise upon which these representations were rejected was one prime example of this essential knowledge. Meanwhile, this understanding of the face veil

seemed absent in the non-Muslim British group discussions. Instead, in their description of what the face veil is and the principals behind adopting face veiling, the face veil was merely associated with 'modesty' in general, not based on religious convictions or a 'religious obligation' as such. These finding corresponds with the main analysis of discourse on the face veil ban presented in this research, where UK based newspapers were found to frequently utilize the disassociation of the face veil from religion as one premise on which arguments for a ban were built. This discourse was rejected in the Arab English language press, often associating the face veil with religious obligation in the anti-ban argument. Having the knowledge to reject dominant meanings was not limited to being erudite on the possible motivations behind face veiling, but in fact being familiar with the various forms of the face veil and other veiling items worn by Muslim women around the world and the multiple referential strategies they can attain.

Religious identification was also drawn upon by non-Muslims in how they anchor their views towards some of the negative representations of Muslims and face veiling women that they acknowledged to exist in the text. Negative representations were indicated, but with emphasis on them possibly being viewed as negative by 'others' or by those who identify themselves as 'religious'. Framed in this manner, the non-Muslim participants distance the negative interpretation from themselves as readers, instead associating it exclusively with 'others', who depending on their social identity may view them as negative.

The contextual positioning of the participants, i.e. Kuwait and the UK, illustrated particular effects on reader interpretations as well. Oppositional positions taken by some of the Arab Muslims did not simply rest on rejection of meanings in the text, but resonated suspicion towards its content and what in fact they viewed as the article's pre-attempt to 'cover' the real motivations behind the ban. These motivations are believed to be purely driven by 'Western' security concerns, concerns some of the participants were coincidentally sympathetic towards. These suspicions seem to lead to their general dismissal of some of the articles. This reaction to the text may be argued to reflect the 'conspiracism' that tends to form a glaring component of the 'Arab street', found to manifest itself in the general political culture as well as daily discourse reproduced by the mainstream audience (Pipes, 1996; Zonis & Joseph, 1994).

The amplified critical and negative interpretations vocalised by British Muslims and male participants in particular, corresponds with earlier findings from similar studies (Poole, 2002). This response may be argued as a “consequence of exclusion and reality of their position in Britain in their encounters with discrimination” (Poole, 2002: 242). According to Poole, the immediate dismissal of articles and the lack of attention to the textual details displayed by British Muslim readers, particularly the male readers in her study, supports this argument. Although there were instances of such reactions in this study, with some of the male readers steering discussions from the contents of the article to general politics in Europe and the discriminatory treatment of Muslims, in contrast to Poole’s findings, the British Muslim male participants were the most attentive to the textual features, constantly highlighting various sections of the text to support their interpretations. They were extremely sensitive to the implicit negative meanings towards Muslims included in the text, pointing out many of the presuppositions, which they described as ‘*assumptions*’ made by the text. At times, these presuppositions included negative meanings towards ‘Western’ actors in articles arguing against a ban, i.e. ‘Western’ women. Moreover, the British Muslim participants (male and female) were the only group that frequently emphasised the absence of the voices and perspectives of Muslims and face veiling women in the articles examined. They also repeatedly insisted that the articles revealed more by what was not included, instead of what actually was. Having said that, these differences in points of emphasis and the heightened critical stance these readers adopted towards the textual features may also be argued to be the result of their reality or position as Muslims in the UK, and the relevancy of the issue to them as Muslim citizens in a European nation.

As with previous studies (Poole, 2002), ethnic identification in the non-Muslim British sample of participants appeared in participants of other ethnic groups. From the participants of other ethnic groups in this sample, one participant rejected the contents of one of the articles (article C) based on its lack of ‘*cultural sensitivity*’, suggesting a more sympathetic outlook to the Muslim perspective. This was in addition to his clear resentment and rejection of the article’s ‘*conversational*’ style, emphasising its incompatibility with a topic of such ‘*controversial*’ nature. This oppositional stance generated a discussion of conflicting views towards journalistic styles of presentation, reflecting varying reader preferences. Another participant, for instance, found the ‘*conversational*’ style acceptable

and even expected from opinion based journalism. Similar critical reactions were also witnessed towards article D, many participants (Muslim and non-Muslim), despite their reading positions (dominant, negotiated or oppositional), did not appreciate the style in which it was written, describing it as too '*opinionated*' and '*judgy*'.

This conflict in reader oppositional positions towards texts based on the texts' presentational style as opposed to their content, drew attention to limitations posed by Hall's (1980) encoding/decoding model applied to the data collected in this study. The oppositional/dominant/negotiated reading positions offered by the model exclusively target preferred meanings included in the text and not the structure or form of presentation. Indeed, this limitation in the framework was pointed out by David Morely's famous 'The Nationwide Audience' study (1980), not long after the framework was developed. In Morely's study, similarly in some instances, the audience were found to oppose an article based on its 'presentational style' instead of content (Taylor & Willis, 1999: 147). Moreover, the fact that the oppositional position was taken by a British non-Muslim reader of an ethnic minority origin, while other readers predominantly vocalised their agreement with the presentational style, one could argue that cultural differences may account for the varying reader preferences in the current study. However, again, as Shaun Moores (1993: 21) has argued, "this type of difference between cultural ideas about taste could not have been accounted for within the confines of Hall's model".

The genre of journalistic reporting, i.e. opinion vs. news report, was also found to influence how readers responded to the article and its contents, e.g. article A. This was particularly apparent in the British non-Muslim sample of readers who held dominant positions towards article A, accepting its contents and describing it as unbiased on the premise that it was a factual news article and not an opinion piece, separating the author's views from the 'facts' being reported. This stood in contrast with Muslim readers in both contexts who predominantly viewed the article as containing opinions leaning towards arguments for the ban; in fact, British Muslim readers described the article as containing '*reporter bias*'.

Findings were also found to reassert audience theory that upholds the discriminatory and selective nature of audience interpretative processes (Poole & Richardson, 2006). As Pintak (2006) explains, audience approach texts through their own 'world view', thus, interpreting

the texts to fit this view, even if it means reading into the text or adapting the text to correspond with their own personal stance. This selective process was illustrated by a key difference in how meanings in the same text (article D) were rejected, but on two very different levels by Muslim and non-Muslim groups. Whilst non-Muslim readers rejected the negative representation of Western women and the predominant argument linking choice of clothing with morality, Muslims group members rejected the same negative representation, but on a different level. Their opposition to the meanings was based on the author's generalisation of all 'Western' women as '*scantily*' clothed or as women who wear '*bikinis*'. Thus, oppositional positions were adopted so far as they do not conflict with the reader's individual held values and beliefs. It may also be argued that dominant meanings linking morality to body coverage may be naturalised common sense for some of these Muslim readers.

Readers were also found to read into the text or misinterpret meanings, so that it falls in line with their stance. The macro structure of article C was predominantly viewed as anti-ban and this was detected by most participants from the initial parts of the article, i.e. headline and lead. British female Muslim participants' quick acknowledgment and agreement with the article's stance and their appreciation of the author's '*open minded*' and '*favourable*' views towards the face veil seemed to lead them to interpret all meanings, including those that contradict the macrostructure, to be in line with their own position. This also supports arguments relating the effects of the structure of newspaper articles on the audience's cognitive understanding and construction of meaning. As van Dijk explains, the initial parts of news articles, e.g. headlines and leads, are the most influential on reader interpretations, since this 'top level' information of a news article usually functions as the top level of the mental model readers build upon in reference to the issue being reported on (1991: 51). Any alternative meanings/interpretations further on in the article are argued to require extra effort by newspaper readers, who often skim through the information in newspapers.

## Chapter 7

### General Discussion and Conclusions

In analysing newspaper discourse on Muslim related news stories in the British quality press and the less explored Arab English language quality newspapers, the research sought to investigate the existence of any dominant ideological representations of Islam and Muslims as social actors. It was also interested in exploring whether the dominant ideological discursive representations of Islam and Muslims detected in the UK press were reproduced, resisted or rejected in the Arab English language newspaper texts.

Through a specifically tailored qualitative/quantitative methodological approach, the research endeavoured to describe how these dominant representations are translated in the text by highlighting the various linguistic constructions and strategies adopted and utilised. The mixed methods research allowed for the examination of media texts from multiple perspectives with the aim of developing a more comprehensive understanding of the production and interpretation of dominant social meanings. Detailed critical discourse analysis highlighted and uncovered both manifest and covert underlying meanings in the texts. Meanwhile, the quantitative methods of content analysis and corpus linguistics provided further verification of the existence of these meanings on larger corpora of newspaper texts. Moreover, as social meanings are not solely existent in the text, but rather the product of the interaction between text and the recipients of the text, the research explored reader interpretation processes of some of the articles analysed. In investigating these processes, a much less examined area in relation CDA studies, the research was able to shed some light on the significance of the dominant ideological textual meanings argued to exist in social meaning making.

Chapters four and five, each targeting the analysis of articles on a particular Muslim related news event featured the qualitative and quantitative analytical findings, highlighting in detail, a series of linguistic constructs and strategies used in developing a dominant representation of Islam and Muslims in the UK and the Arab based quality newspaper texts. Chapter six featured the analytical findings of reader interpretation processes which were gathered through several reader focus groups conducted in the UK and a predominantly

Muslim Arab context (Kuwait). Chapter six also included a discussion of the possible interpretations of these findings in relation to the research questions set forward in chapter three.

This chapter mainly addresses the findings of the qualitative and quantitative discourse analytical findings on both Muslim related news events in relation to the research questions presented in chapter three. The discussion also relates the linguistic findings to the various relevant socio-political, contextual, institutional and journalistic processes discussed in chapter two.

### **7.1 UK and Arab English Language Quality Press: Diverging Dominant Meanings**

The texts analysed in the UK and Arab English Language quality newspapers both revealed dominant ideological representations of Islam and Muslims with diverging and at times directly antagonistic meanings. These dominant representations, mainly taking shape in the form of implicit assumptions, were arguably increasingly illuminated by the comparative perspective provided by this research. Indeed, despite the extensive reliance of the Arab English language newspapers on foreign primarily 'Euro-centred' news feeds, through various linguistic constructs and strategies, found mainly in internally bylined opinion pieces, the Arab based texts were found to produce their own dominant representation of Islam and Muslims. At times, these representations were found to resist and explicitly reject the Muslim representations and meanings found to be dominating the UK based articles. In correlation with the 'polarization schema' (van Dijk, 1998b), dominant meanings in each context were constructed in a positive 'Self' and negative 'Other' social representation. Moreover, although essentially heterogeneous in their representations of Islam and Muslims, the newspaper texts in both contexts were frequently found to utilise corresponding linguistic constructs and strategies in conveying these dominant ideological meanings. Some of these linguistic strategies include, predicational strategies, e.g. aggregation strategies (quantification), active roles in vocal processes (quotation patterns) and active vs. passive semantic constructions. Interestingly, similarities were also detected in the topoi drawn upon in the main arguments steering the discussions. However, these carried opposing (e.g. topos of difference), and at times, more specific and centralised (e.g. topos of victimisation vs. topos of discrimination) meanings, depending on each context.

Some reproduction of dominant meanings found in the UK based articles, nevertheless, were detected in the Arab English language newspaper texts. These, however, were mainly found in news articles and limited to predicational strategies attributing social actors (Muslims, protesters, Face veiling women) with specific qualities and attributes.

The following sections will delve into these findings further, discussing some of the key patterns found in relation to past research and literature discussed in chapter two, keeping within the scope of the research aims and objectives.

### **7.1.1 The UK Press: Re-contextualising Dominant Representations**

As illustrated in the analysis of UK based articles covering both news events, representation of Islam and Muslims revolved around some key negative meanings or topoi. These included highlighting Islam, Muslims and practices associated with them as *different*, *threatening*, *separate* and *oppressive*. More importantly, some of these representations may be argued as naturalised based on the Muslim/non-Muslim reader interpretation focus group analytical findings, discussed in section 6.4.

These themes in representation echo much research arguing the continued existence and reproduction of some 'Orientalist' depictions of Islam and Muslims, although as argued by Said (1997), adapting themselves to the specific political and social contexts in question. Dominant negative discourses varied in focus depending on the news event examined. In reporting on the '2009 French face veil ban', for instance, dominant representation of Islam and Muslims emphasised their social difference to 'Us' and our values and norms, their repression of women, and 'Them' as a social threat. In the reporting on the '2006 Danish cartoon controversy', however, social representation predominantly centred on the idea of a Muslim threat targeting the 'in-group', be it socially to 'Our' freedom of speech and democracy or physically to 'Our' security. Falling in line with the 'closed' views of Islam, introduced by the Runnymede Trust report (1997), dominant meanings leaned towards what the report described as 'Islamophobic'; Islam and Muslims were represented as, (1) separate, and (2) an enemy to be feared. In this research, such representations were detected in the texts through argumentation schemes maintaining the act of face veiling as being the result of Muslim veiled women's desire to remain separate from mainstream society; if not resulting from such desire, the act of face veiling itself results in this

separation. The topos of 'threat' or the representation of Muslims as an entity to be feared, was even more frequently drawn upon, highlighted in both news events analysed through: (1) predicational strategies, (2) active allocation of Muslims as agents of direct and indirect violent/threatening actions, (3) disclaimers, and (4) fallacious causation arguments, highlighting an imminent threat (social, financial or security related). Also in line with the 'closed' views of Islam and Muslims, as indicated by the Runnymede Trust report, there were instances in which British newspaper discourse highlighted Muslims as 'manipulative', i.e. Muslim protests against the cartoons not resulting from individual Muslim disapproval of the cartoons' contents, but rather, the result of well planned ulterior motives, set forward by various Muslim governments and/or political groups.

Having said that, the UK based articles analysed in this research did illustrate variations in the construction of some these more negative or 'closed' views of Islam and Muslims. Representation of Islam and Muslims as one homogenous, monolithic entity or group with no diverse social, political and religious internal differences and layers has repeatedly been argued as dominating 'Western' media (Richardson, 2004; Said, 1997; Runnymede Trust, 1997). One study specifically argued that no distinction is made between what is referred to as '*Islamists*' and '*Muslims*' in the media (Karim, 2007). Examples of such representations were detected in the analysis of the UK articles in this study as well. The frequent *one fits all* reference to the multiple and quite different forms of the face veil as 'burqa/burka/burkha' in the UK press, might arguably be one such example, reflecting a homogenous discursive representation (see sections 4.2.2.1 and 4.3). However, the UK articles analysed revealed discourse contending this dominant homogenous representation, particularly in reference to 'Muslims' as social actors. Indeed, through the use of predicational strategies, the UK press revealed discourse dichotomising Muslims into two groups or types, *moderate* and *conservative*. This was highlighted in the qualitative analysis of articles related to the '2009 French face veil ban' event, and the quantitative concordance analysis of qualities attributed to 'Muslim/s' in articles related to the '2006 Danish cartoon controversy'. As argued in previous research (Mamdani, 2004; Riley, 2009; Jiwani & Dakroury, 2009), attributing Muslims with such labels allows for the construction of 'Good Muslim vs. Bad Muslim' dichotomy discourse. Good Muslims are those described as '*moderate, regular, modern, mainstream*' and tend to share the values of the 'in-group'. Meanwhile, polarised from

'good Muslims', 'bad Muslims' described as *'Islamist, conservative, traditional'* (as they were referred to in this study), are depicted as displaying 'different' values and beliefs, some of which are considered 'extremist'. Utilizing this dichotomy through the use of: (1) predicational strategies, (2) allocation of specific roles/actions to each of these polarised groups, and (3) the use of argumentation schemes, e.g. causation, the discourse was able to highlight the face veil and those who practice it as posing a social 'threat'; hence, providing a justification for a pro face veil ban argument.

Nevertheless, although the UK based texts did reveal discourse polarising Muslims into such groups (moderate vs. conservative), and although these labels are arguably ambiguous, as individual groups, they remain portrayed as monolithic and static with no internal variations. This suggests every Muslim as having to be either, *moderate* or *conservative*, and in effect, each *type* of Muslim is assumed to ultimately share his/her members' uniform views to various social and religious aspects, i.e. the practice of face veiling. This dichotomy can also be viewed as having the socio-political function of signalling 'group membership' on a macro level. That is, it allows for the proliferation of discourse dividing Muslims into groups that are either in line or allegiance with '*Us*' as the in-group, or belonging to '*Them*', the 'Other' Muslims, in this case, the negatively depicted 'conservative Muslims'.

Moreover, van Dijk (1992) emphasises the importance of racism denial strategies in dominant ideological or racist discourse which have been particularly featured in white dominant group discussions on ethnic relations and minority groups, e.g. disclaimers (see 2.4.4.2). They are applied on a semantic level as 'face keeping' strategies when the 'in-group' negatively describes the 'Other'. Therefore, they function as mitigation strategies in avoidance of the possibility of the 'in-group' being interpreted as discriminatory or 'politically incorrect'. The division of Muslims into two groups, *Bad vs. Good*, can also be argued to form what can be referred to as a '*macro discursive denial of racism*', allowing the in-group to represent 'itself' positively as tolerant. That is, it insinuates that the negative descriptions shared do not apply to Muslims in general, but rather to a particular group of Muslims, 'conservatives'. Adopting such a strategy allows for the avoidance of any conflict with the general norms and laws constraining various forms of religious/ethnic prejudice and discrimination, while legitimating such discriminatory ideologies. This is especially when

these views form part of public discourse produced by newspapers considered to be controlled by the dominant elite, mainly white members of society, writing for the middle and upper social classes (see section 2.3.1.1). Indeed, as van Dijk (1992: 89) explains, denials of racism are not exclusively limited to the individual level, 'but become more influential when they adopt a 'social dimension' (van Dijk 1992: 89), such as the discourse of dichotomy exhibited by some of the British newspapers examined. The social discursive form of denial can function to defend the in-group as whole, and as van Dijk argues, can have the most detrimental social effects, since it 'persuasively helps construct the dominant white consensus' (ibid).

### **7.1.2 The Arab Press: Muslims in the face of Discrimination**

As revealed in the analytical findings of the Arab English language articles related to both news events examined, Arab based texts produced their own dominant representations of Islam and Muslims. Representations, at times, directly opposing or rejecting some of the dominant meanings and representations found in the UK based articles.

In the Arab based texts, the shaping of dominant ideological discursive representations was at its most influential in the primary topics chosen to dominate the articles examined on both news events. The core of conflict represented by both, the French face veil ban proposal and the Danish cartoon controversy, bring the chief principals and beliefs of Islam, some of which are considered to form part of Muslims' religious obligations, into the forefront of fierce social and political debate. With that being said, opinions regarding both news events, i.e. the legislation of a ban and the publication of the cartoons, are bound to conjure arguments for or against a particular action. In the Arab based texts, the almost complete absence of primary topics critical or/and arguing against standpoints considered to be rooted in Muslim religious convictions and beliefs was arguably a crucial determining factor in the dominant ideological discursive representations of Islam and Muslims available in the texts. This can be explained as a direct consequence of the censorship policies generally characterising the Arab media, which as discussed in section 2.3.2.2, strictly forbid any form of criticism towards the Muslim religion or the publishing of views and arguments viewed to be contradictory to its teachings. The widespread condemnation and intense

negative reaction from Muslims across the world towards the cartoon publications, stemming from the blasphemous nature of the cartoons (as viewed by most Muslims), clearly ascertains the expected censorship of arguments for the publication of the cartoons. Similarly, applying censorship to explicit arguments against face veiling could be argued as resulting from its religious significance to some Muslims in the region. A significance which was emphasised in the Arab based texts analysed by the frequent association of the face veil with religion through: (1) predicational strategies attributing the face veil with religion/religious obligation, (2) allocation to Muslim scholars the agency of vocal processes emphasising this religious association, and (3) allocation to face veiling women passive roles of being *obliged* to wear the face veil, using obligation modality. Indeed, this religious association was also emphasised by the Muslim focus group participants in the UK and the Kuwaiti context in particular.

As a result, many of the arguments found in the UK press, for instance, arguments critical of face veiling, drawing on various negative topoi, e.g. topoi of oppression and threat, were not reproduced in the Arab based articles examined. Moreover, although arguments against the publication of the cartoons were frequently found in the UK based texts, the topoi on which these arguments drew were not shared by the Arab press. That is, the UK press primarily involved arguments against the publishing of the cartoons, based on the possible consequential social and economic threats towards the UK in general, argued to result from Muslims' negative reactions.

In contrast, in the newspaper coverage of both events examined, the Arab based texts were dominated by discourse emphasising Islam and Muslims as victims. In line with van Dijk's ideological square, the linguistic construction of this representation clearly displayed and emphasised positive self and negative other presentation. Muslims are argued and represented as victims of ill treatment by various sources representing the out-group or the 'West'. How this victimisation was framed, however, was particularly interesting, forming another key difference in the dominant representation of Islam and Muslims in the Arab and UK press. Although the UK press drew on the topos of 'victimisation' in some of arguments used, the topos was mainly highlighted by the description of Muslims as passive recipients of negative actions, as opposed to the frequent use of argumentation schemes. In the Arab

based articles, the topos of 'victimisation' was centralised further, drawing on the topos of 'discrimination'. In addition to arguing against the face veil ban and the cartoon publications by representing Muslims simply as victims of these actions, Muslims are depicted as victims of *targeted* discrimination by the 'West', emphasising the out-group's negative role even further. Therefore, the arguments against the ban/publications were based on the premise that they were acts designed to discriminate against individual Muslims because they *are* Muslims. In addition to allocating to Muslims the role of passive recipients of negative actions directly targeted at them by various out-group sources, the frequent use of analogies (fallacious at times) as an argumentation scheme worked to emphasise this discrimination further. This, for instance, was found in the Arab based reporting of the cartoon controversy, where incidents/materials considered to be as controversial as the prophet cartoons were listed and argued to have been censored in the 'Western context', emphasising the out-group's selective/discriminatory censorship policies. Such representation, is consistent with much of the continuous angst and apprehension voiced regarding the depiction of Islam Muslims, which as mentioned in the introduction, escalated further in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Indeed, it also correlated with the dominant and oppositional positions taken by the Muslim participants in the focus group discussions, accepting standpoints arguing of the discrimination against Muslims, while reproducing similar arguments in rejection of some of the negative textual meanings on face veiling women and Muslims. It also corresponds with much research (see 2.1.3) maintaining Islam and Muslims as being subjected to racial/religious discrimination and prejudice (Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2004; Karim, 2003; Richardson, 2009; Morey & Yaqin, 2011), among others.

Moreover, the quantitative and qualitative analytical findings illustrated a prominence of referential and predicational strategies that highlight discourses on *immigration*. References and attributions, such as '*French*', '*citizens of France*', '*French converts*', and '*immigrants*' in reference to Muslims, further emphasised the discrimination arguments being presented in the text. This again, echoes various scholarly arguments of the existing and growing discourse in Europe asserting the view of Muslims as an internal enemy. Muslims are argued to stir up particular anxiety in Europe in relation to immigration and multiculturalism (Madood, 2003), and this is explained as evident across the social and political spectrum in

various European nations. This coincides with the continuing presence and development of a contemporary form of racism, *xeno-racism* (Fekete, 2004) or new racism, which according to Madood (1997), are based on cultural agents rather than any biological factors. Focusing on the British context, he exemplifies such racism as when “cultural differences from an alleged British or ‘civilised’ norm [is used] to vilify, marginalise or demand cultural assimilation from groups who also suffer biological racism” (cited in Morey & Yaqin, 2011: 41). Indeed, such themes regarding the lack of assimilation and difference were exemplified frequently in the representation of Muslims in the UK articles examined in the study. In the French face veil ban story, for instance, the topos of difference was extensively drawn upon in arguments for a face veil ban, where the women who wear it and the practice itself are depicted as contradictory to the values and norms of Western or British societies.

Finally, in discussing the prominence of the representation of Islam and Muslims as victims of discrimination in the Arab press, in addition to the possible effects of censorship policies, one must take into account the lack of arguments that were actually available in the corpus of articles covering both events. As illustrated in the genre and argumentation analysis of the articles, news reports as opposed to op-ed pieces were far more frequent in the Arab press, limiting the amount of argumentation to be analysed. The Arab English language newspapers as a genre and its target readership characterised mainly by foreign residents (Rugh, 2004) primarily interested in international news, can be argued to have limited the amount/variety of local opinion provided in the newspaper texts, and thus, the various other possible dominant discourses on the topics analysed.

## **7.2 Ideology of ‘Difference’**

Although the UK and Arab based texts displayed diverging dominant discourses in relation to Islam and Muslims, as mentioned earlier, the construction of these opposing discourses frequently depended on the reproduction of similar linguistic structures and strategies. Echoing past research findings (Poole, 2002; Karim, 2003) characterising Western media discourse as propagating a series of binary oppositions, positioning the ‘West’ (in-group) in a direct polarised and superior position to Islam and Muslims on various levels, the UK newspapers analysed in this study revealed discourse reproducing similar dominant

meanings. More importantly, in some instances, the Arab based newspapers were found to produce ideological discursive representations advocating such binary oppositions further, adapting similar polarised frameworks, serving their interest (the in-group) in the Arab predominantly Muslim contexts. One such instance where this was expressed in discourse produced in both contexts was in drawing on the topos of 'difference' in the representation of in and out groups in reporting on the face veil ban story (section 4.2.6.3). The topos of 'difference' was drawn upon emphasising positive self and negative other through the use of argumentation schemes, and the attribution of positive/negative qualities to in-group/out-group social actors through predicational strategies, differentiating them socially and culturally.

In line with van Dijk's description of how ideologies function (1998a) (see section 2.2.2), the reproduction of such binary oppositions in the Arab press may be argued as exemplifying the production of dominant ideologies resisting or rejecting 'Western' based discourse, in this particular case, discourse directly produced by then French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Alarming though, such discourse also exhibited its own stereotypical and indeed racist images of Western society, a society depicted to be in direct polarised and inferior position to Islam and its principals. Such discursive strategies as described by Barker (1981) and Davidio and Gaertner (1986) are often argued to be legitimate cultural self defence, but in fact form part of racist discourse or "more 'modern' subtle and indirect 'ethnicism' based on constructions of cultural difference and incompatibility" (cited in van Dijk 1992: 93).

These representations, although prompting oppositional positions by some of the Muslim focus group participants, describing them as negative assumptions, they were seemingly naturalised meanings for others from the same category of readers (see section 6.3.4). The possible detrimental effects of such dominant interpretations to negative, and at times, prejudice representations of a different 'Other' by groups of varying social, cultural and religious backgrounds are obvious. Such discourses not only polarise social groups further, but reaffirm the claimed dismal fate of multiculturalism, fuelling the fierce anti-multiculturalism arguments and movements argued to saturate social and political debates since 9/11 (Morey & Yaqin, 2011)

### **7.3 Voiceless Representation**

Finally, discussion of the key findings in this research cannot end without highlighting the startling absence of the 'Muslim' voice in articles covering events primarily related to Muslims, and more importantly discussing laws and actions that may have serious and very real effects on the everyday lives of Muslims living in Europe and beyond. Both the UK and Arab based articles limited their direct and indirect quotes to Muslim elites/scholars, frequently allocating them active vocal roles supporting key arguments presented in the text. The suppression of Muslim voices in comparison to other quotes by actors not described as Muslim or representing a Muslim party/association was further emphasised by the quantitative analytical findings examining the availability of Muslim opinion in newspaper articles (see section 4.3). This absence in voice was also repeatedly emphasised and criticised by some of the Muslim focus group participants, mainly in the UK context.

The lack of Muslim opinion in the UK quality press might stem from the demographic profile of the target readership of these papers (described in 2.3.1.1). Muslims do not make up a large part of elite and middle class members of British society, who are considered to be the prime readers of quality newspapers, therefore, as Richardson (2004) explains, these papers tend to write about Muslims and not for them. The lack of Muslim quotes in the Arab based press may also be explained by the target readership (mainly foreign expatriates) and the over dependency of this genre of newspapers on foreign news agencies. As the newspaper readers are not local nationals, local Muslim opinion on the events may not form great importance in terms of news values.

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there were instances, albeit a few, where the UK press illustrated some interest in exploring Muslim opinion by publishing opinion pieces written by Muslims, e.g. face veiling women, discussing their own opinions about the news event/conflict. However, even in such cases, instances of a homogenous view towards Muslims and Muslim practices were arguably indicated. In reporting on the face veil ban, for instance, many of the women who were asked to contribute to special news features and opinion pieces were in fact women who practice wearing the *hijab* (head cover) and not the *face veil*, two practices that can have quite different meanings to the women who practice them.

#### **7.4 Limitations and Shortcomings**

Although the current research thoroughly prepared for and aimed towards a comprehensive analysis of the ideological discursive representation of Islam and Muslims in the press, it is aware of the following limitations and shortcomings:

- As mentioned in section 2.4.4.1, analysing newspaper texts on a discursive level involving the various processes of media production and consumption has been argued to have received minimal research attention (Cotter, 2001; Richardson, 2007). Although this research shed some light on reader interpretation processes, due to time and space constraints, it did not actively analyse the various relevant journalistic practices (e.g. editorial procedures and journalistic norms and routines) that may impact news production. Exploring these areas could further illuminate the important factors preconditioning news output, thus further informing the analysis of linguistic choices in the text.
- In analysing the concordance of key terms, e.g. Muslim/s, it was noted that in many instances the particular subjects being examined may be referred to using determiners and pronouns, e.g. *they, them, it, these*. As Baker (2006: 90) explains, examining these references “may yield further evidence of patterns or even completely different discourses”. Having said that, concordance analysis of determiners and pronouns tends to develop very large amount of concordance lines, which in many instances are ‘irrelevant’ (ibid.). In addition, as concordance analysis, unlike many other methods of corpus linguistics, demands increased qualitative attention, this direction of analysis can be extremely time-consuming and thus the current study could not afford to explore it in addition to the various areas examined.
- In exploring reader interpretation processes through focus group discussions, the study aimed to shed some light on the complex processes of meaning making, while testing readers awareness and interpretation of the ‘naturalised dominant ideologies’ argued to be interpreted in the texts. However, reader sample sizes forming each focus group based on religion and context variables were limited and not equally distributed, i.e. UK Muslim participants formed a smaller sample of readers compared to other groups

examined. Larger samples are required for increased validity and reliability in the interpretation of findings. Furthermore, the samples which were divided according to context/religion variables cannot be viewed as sufficiently heterogeneous. The research did endeavour to maximise the internal heterogeneity of sample groups by setting particular specifications to be met by participating respondents, e.g. age, university students, nationality, however, the heterogeneity in respondents' other important demographic characteristics were limited. These include race and ethnicity, religious/political affiliations and economic status, all of which can influence the interpretations of newspaper texts. Nevertheless, the religious and contextual variables characterising the sample groups did reveal some insight into meaning making in relation to the discursive ideological representations of Islam and Muslims argued by the researcher as dominating the newspaper texts.

- As the genre of English language Arab newspapers examined in this research primarily caters to foreign nationals living in the region in which they are published, as explained earlier, a large bulk of their content depends extensively on international news through external news wires. This ensues less coverage of local views on the topics examined and the dominant ideologies these may reveal. Although examining this genre of newspapers is important, exploring Arabic language newspapers catering for Arab nationals could develop further more extensive insight into the prevalent discourses on Muslim and Islam in the Arab Muslim context.

## **7.5 Avenues for Future Research**

Throughout the development of the current research and the synthesis of analytical findings along with the limitations encountered, a series of important and possibly fruitful areas for further research were inspired. This final section of the thesis lists and describes some of the perhaps most interesting areas to explore further from a much larger collection of queries and paths that are yet to be addressed and scrutinised.

- First and foremost, extending this research further by replicating the analytical study on Arabic quality newspapers published in the same region, catering for the local Arab readership can add further insight on the discursive meanings shared by predominantly Muslims Arabs for Muslims Arabs. Dominated by local politics and views on national and

international news events, analysis of these newspapers can directly probe into further discursive ideological representations that as mentioned in discussing the limitations, may not be as prominent in the Arab English language press.

- Exploring journalistic production processes preconditioning newspaper output is another area that can lend further insight. Examining intertextuality, for instance, or ‘how texts draw, incorporate, recontextualize and dialogue with other texts’ (Fairclough, 2003: 17) is of particular relevance in news reporting. It can be quite significant in analysing the genre of newspapers examined in this study, which depend highly on incorporating texts from foreign primarily ‘Euro-centred’ news feeds in the articles they publish. How reported speech is framed and contextualized, for example, can “frame readers understandings of reported events and, in some cases, this may be ideological’ (Richardson, 2007: 103). This process among other procedures and norms practiced by the journalistic community can efficiently be examined taking an ethnographic approach. As Cotter (2010: 19) explains, investigating firsthand, the community producing the discourse can “reveal a better sense of what their message, behaviors, and actions mean”. As challenging as it may be obtaining an insider perspective, this path in analysis would ultimately add to an area that has been argued to attract particularly limited research attention.
- As highlighted in the introduction and section 2.3.3, new media (i.e. internet, Facebook, Twitter, online newspapers) and transnational news media outlets have dramatically and arguably transformed the media and communications landscape indefinitely. Not only do they currently attract a vast number of users, highlighting their relevance in meaning making today, transnational Arab media targeting large sectors of the Arab Muslim population can bypass the sometimes rigid censorship policies applied on local national Arab media. This again allows for further insight into ideological meanings that may be unique to the Arab context, especially considering the new media’s powerful role in generating the now infamous events leading to the media coined ‘Arab Spring’. Moreover, the structure of the internet, frequently described as a ‘democratic cyberspace’ (Riley et al., 1998), along with other new media allow for immediate audience response towards meanings they produce, thus revealing their interpretations

of these meanings. Reader message boards, for instance, which are provided at the end of news articles in newspaper websites can attract an abundance of reader interpretation activity, providing researchers rich amounts of raw data previously not as readily attainable.

- Finally, inspired by the findings of this research, investigating 'out-group' representation in media discourse produced in Arab Muslim contexts may be of particular interest. Arab based texts, at times, revealed quite negative, even racist social representations of the 'Other', i.e. West, Western society and its members. Such representations not only polarise social groups further, but can actively proliferate and assist in the reproduction of detrimental social misconceptions and stereotypes. As was the case in this study, exploring such meanings and how they take shape discursively, can function towards raising further social awareness.

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## Appendix 1 – The ‘2009 French Face Veil Ban’ Articles – UK Press

Article	Date	The Times
TT1	21/6/09	France considers ban on full Muslim veil
TT2	23/6/09	Burka makes women prisoners, says President Sarkozy
TT3	24/6/09	Britain could never debate the burka like France
TT4	26/6/09	Women, West Brom, the burka and me
TT5	26/6/09	Veiled threat: The burka, a symbol of repression, has no place in a free society
TT6	26/6/09	Niqabi, interrupted
TT7	5/7/09	France and the burka
TT8	12/8/09	The burkini makes a splash in France
TT9	13/8/09	French Muslim woman wearing ‘burkini’ banned from Paris swimming pool
TT10	3/11/09	Mother of six Houria Chentouf hid terror manual in burka
TT11	7/11/09	As a Muslim women, I think the veil is a mistake
TT12	10/12/09	France and the Burka bride
TT13	13/12/09	France readies law against full Muslim veil
TT14	14/12/09	French politician calls for burka ban under equality and public safety rules
TT15	10/1/10	Banning the burqa unveils some nasty traits in us
TT16	11/1/10	Are you for or against a ban on the burqa?
TT17	15/1/10	Sarkozy aims to outlaw niqab on public transport but outright ban is ‘unworkable’
TT18	15/1/10	France backs away from burqa law
TT19	16/1/10	Veil of Ignorance
TT20	16/1/10	UKIP woos white working class with call for total ban on burkas
TT21	18/1/10	Banning of burkas is oppressive, says the respect leader Salma Yaqoob
TT22	19/1/10	Better to draw a veil over this draft idea, Nigel Farage
TT23	24/1/10	Ban on Burqas receives strong public support in France
TT24	26/1/10	Nicolas Sarkozy backs a ban on full Muslim veil
TT25	27/1/10	In a burka, you’re cutting me off as well you
TT26	27/1/10	French set to ban niqab on public transport
TT27	22/3/10	A ban on headscarves just leaves women out in the cold
TT28	25/3/10	President Sarkozy promises to ban veil in France
TT29	31/3/10	Belgium moves to ban the burqa
TT30	1/4/10	Belgium poised to be first in EU to ban burqa
TT31	22/4/10	Saudi Arabia’s got talent
TT32	26/4/10	Sarkozy seeks capital in Muslim Veil
TT33	30/4/10	Muslim butcher’s many wives ‘no worse than French mistresses’
TT34	30/4/10	Burqa ban is a revival of an older European battle against religion

TT35	1/5/10	Belgium poised to ban full-face Muslim veils in public spaces
TT36	4/5/10	French lawmakers focus on husbands of Muslim women who wear the veil
TT37	9/5/10	Woman in Italy receives first European fine for wearing burqa in public
TT38	19/5/10	Burqa ban may strip designer stores of sales
TT39	19/5/10	First case of French 'burka rage' as shopping dispute turns violent
TT40	30/5/10	Europe vs the burka
TT41	30/6/10	The niqab: fact vs fiction
TT42	19/6/10	Attitude harden in liberal Barcelona towards wearing Islamic dress
TT43	28/7/10	Is it British to ban the face veil?
TT44	14/7/10	A niqab is a symbol of misogyny. It shouldn't be banned
TT45	15/7/10	The burka ban falls in line with France's philosophy of equality
TT46	18/7/10	Understanding the French burqa ban
TT47	18/7/10	Burka won't be banned in Britain
TT48	18/7/10	Government rules out British burqa ban
TT49	19/7/10	Before we ban burkas, ask if we pass the Pankhurst test
TT50	20/7/10	'They wouldn't try to ban the miniskirt, would they?'
TT51	20/7/10	Student veil ban as regime keeps watch for signs of extremism
TT52	20/7/10	Want status? Try being super-religious
TT53	21/7/10	Do us a favour. Let us wear what we like
TT54	21/7/10	Spain rejects burka ban
TT55	24/7/10	Arranged marriage? I learnt about it from Beatrix Potter, says Sayeeda Warsi
TT56	25/7/10	MP faces legal threat for shunning veiled Muslims
TT57	26/7/10	Yes to the Hijab, no to the burka
TT58	26/7/10	Should the burka be banned?
TT59	19/8/10	Judge orders Muslim witness to remove burqa
TT60	1/9/10	Acting tough won't win Sarkozy the trust of the French
TT61	14/9/10	When you can cover your face under the new 'burqa law'
TT62	16/9/10	Religious beliefs and the UK courts
TT63	1/10/10	Burkas to be banned in Dutch deal to reward Wilders for support

Article	Date	The Daily Telegraph
DT1	22/6/09	Nicolas Sarkozy says the burqa is 'not welcome' in France
DT2	24/6/09	Why the burka is part of Britain
DT3	24/6/09	Muslim leaders condemn Sarkozy over burqa ban
DT4	30/6/09	Muslims pupils and teacher ordered to remove veils
DT5	17/7/09	Micheal Nazir-Ali: Burkhas should not be worn where it compromises safety
DT6	4/8/09	Police dress up in burkhas 'to improve community relations'
DT7	15/8/09	Swimmers are told to wear burkinis
DT8	15/8/09	Burkinis give me a sinking feeling
DT9	16/8/09	How the West was lost: the burqini
DT10	22/8/09	The Italians have banned the ridiculous burkini from public pools. Good for them.
DT11	26/8/09	Robber in Burkha fled jewellers with £279,000 haul
DT12	27/8/09	Burka robbers hunted by police
DT13	15/9/09	France's immigration minister is wrong to want to ban the burka and niqab
DT14	26/10/09	French school children encouraged to sing national anthem
DT15	30/10/09	Cambridge university to allow burkhas at graduation
DT16	2/11/09	Mother 'had enough terror documents to fill Marks and Spencer'
DT17	7/1/10	Women who wear burkas in France face £700 fine
DT18	16/1/10	UKIP to call for ban on wearing burka
DT19	18/1/10	Don't ban the burka. Ban liberals instead
DT20	18/1/10	France must ban Muslim veil, says Sarkozy party chief
DT21	22/1/10	Tearing veils off women will help no one
DT22	22/1/10	Paris Imam backs France's burqa ban
DT23	1/2/10	Nicolas Sarkozy rival calls on David Cameron to 'join France ' in Europe
DT24	24/3/10	Mp investigated by police after criticising Muslim veils in parliment
DT25	26/3/10	Man dressed as Muslim woman robs bank
DT26	29/3/10	British artist's contribution to French debate on the veil
DT27	30/3/10	Burkha wearing housewife poised to win Middle East 'Pop Idol'
DT28	31/3/10	Belgium could be first country to ban the burka
DT29	9/4/10	Burka bullying banned by Bangladesh court
DT30	29/4/10	Belgian MPs vote to ban burka
DT31	3/5/10	Husbands targeted by France's anti-burkha law
DT32	6/5/10	Woman in burka sparks flight emergency
DT33	6/5/10	Robber wore burka to carry out jewellery raid
DT34	26/5/10	Spanish town to vote on burqa ban
DT35	19/6/10	It's not in our interest to ban the burka
DT36	21/6/10	Exhibition visitors to pose in Burkhas
DT37	1/7/10	A burqa ban would be un-British
DT38	1/7/10	Ban the burka, says Tory MP Philip Hollobone
DT39	9/7/10	Europeans back burka ban, Americans oppose outlawing Muslim veil
DT40	17/7/10	Burka ban ruled out by immigration minister

<b>DT41</b>	17/7/10	Burka ban: Why must I cast off the veil?
<b>DT42</b>	18/7/10	By refusing to ban the burka, Damien Green is supporting the humiliation of millions of British women
<b>DT43</b>	18/7/10	Caroline Spelman: Wearing burka can be 'empowering'
<b>DT44</b>	19/7/10	Burkas are not empowering
<b>DT45</b>	20/7/10	Syria bans full face veils at universities
<b>DT46</b>	22/7/10	Two Muslim women thrown out of pool for wearing 'burkinis'
<b>DT47</b>	28/7/10	Jeremy Clarkson joins burka debate
<b>DT48</b>	29/7/10	Indian lecturer barred from teaching by students for refusing burka
<b>DT49</b>	30/7/10	Israeli rabbis clamp down on burka
<b>DT50</b>	3/8/10	Baroness Warsi: 'Burka wearing women can engage in everyday life'
<b>DT51</b>	5/8/10	Muslim woman sparks burka debate in Australian court case
<b>DT52</b>	6/8/10	Man at centre of burka controversy 'stabbed'
<b>DT53</b>	10/8/10	Richard Dawkins causes outcry after likening the burka to bin liner
<b>DT54</b>	11/8/10	Soft-line Richard Dawkins permits the burqa-he'll be letting the pope off with community service next
<b>DT55</b>	19/8/10	Australian court orders Muslim witness to testify without burka
<b>DT56</b>	1/10/10	Dutch politicians revolt over burka plans
<b>DT57</b>	2/10/10	British schools where girls must wear the Islamic veil
<b>DT58</b>	7/10/10	Italy move to ban burka
<b>DT59</b>	8/10/10	Magistrates order pregnant Muslim to remove veil
<b>DT60</b>	11/10/10	Al-Qaeda demand end of French burka ban in return for hostages
<b>DT61</b>	13/10/10	Emirati politician backs France over Burqa ban
<b>DT62</b>	14/10/10	Retired French school teacher in 'niqab rage' case
<b>DT63</b>	15/10/10	French MP says UK is 'losing fight against Islamic extremists'
<b>DT64</b>	16/10/10	Islamic face-veil part of 'British way of life'

Article	Date	The Guardian
TG1	19/6/09	Why not ban the full veil, says French government spokesman
TG2	22/6/09	Nicolas Sarkozy says Islamic veils are not welcome in France
TG3	23/6/09	Brush up your Hegel, Sarko
TG4	23/6/09	Commission inquiry in France could lead to burka ban
TG5	24/6/09	France searches its soul over the veil
TG6	25/6/09	France's burka barrier
TG7	26/6/09	Veiled threats: Row over Islamic dress opens bitter divisions in France
TG8	8/7/09	Response: We don't need Hegel. The burka is a cloth soaked in blood
TG9	20/7/09	Western hostility to Islam is stoked by double standards and distortion
TG10	2/8/09	Islam and dress
TG11	5/8/09	Policing under the veil in Yorkshire
TG12	26/8/09	Don't be outraged for Muslim women
TG13	2/11/09	Women who dropped memory stick at airport admits terror charges
TG14	6/11/09	Withdrawal: Word gets louder with every death in Afghanistan
TG15	13/12/09	The world through lens: Saudi daytime TV show.
TG16	22/12/09	France may ban women from wearing burka in public
TG17	9/1/10	What women wear
TG18	14/1/10	Full veil not welcome in France, says Sarkozy
TG19	16/1/10	Sarkozy's veil climb down
TG20	25/1/10	French cross-party committee to recommend partial ban on full veil
TG21	25/1/10	The power behind the veil
TG22	26/1/10	France's attack on the veil is a huge blunder
TG23	26/1/10	'veil committee': no outright ban
TG24	28/1/10	In search of Frenchness
TG25	31/1/10	The young French women fighting to defend the full-face veil
TG26	1/2/10	,France don't ban the burka
TG27	2/2/10	France denies citizenship to Moroccan man who forces wife to wear full veil
TG28	3/2/10	'I refuse to wear the niqab to teach'
TG29	8/3/10	Europe must not ban the burka
TG30	10/3/10	Egypt's chilling conservatism
TG31	10/3/10	Who really wears a burka?
TG32	12/3/10	Mohammed Sayed Tantawi, 1928-2010
TG33	21/3/10	Is France right to ban wearing the burka in public?
TG34	23/3/10	Conservative MP unrepentant for the burka slur after watchdog complaint fails
TG35	23/3/10	MP Philip Hollobone was referred to police over 'paper bag' burka comments
TG36	31/3/10	Belgium moves towards public ban on burka and niqab
TG37	12/4/10	The Saudi housewife who spoke out
TG38	21/4/10	French government prepared total ban on full Islamic veil
TG39	22/4/10	Islamic veils face ban in Belgium

TG40	22/4/10	Belgian government collapses after party quits coalition
TG41	22/4/10	A Belgian face-veil would be senseless
TG42	23/4/10	Muslim driver fined for wearing veil
TG43	23/4/10	A ban to celebrate
TG44	26/4/10	French Muslim in polygamy row hits out at threat to revoke citizenship
TG45	28/4/10	Sarkozy's niqab ban: a legal nightmare
TG46	30/4/10	Afghan feminists fighting from under the burqa
TG47	4/5/10	All parties must stand up to Islamophobia
TG48	4/5/10	Italian police fine Muslim woman for wearing veil
TG49	5/5/10	Muslim woman fined for wearing burqa in northern Italy
TG50	9/5/10	Imam tells Italy that wearing of veil is in tradition with Madonna
TG51	13/5/10	Let them wear burqas
TG52	19/5/10	Nicolas Sarkozy's cabinet approves bill to ban full Islamic veil
TG53	23/5/10	Laicite and the French veil debate
TG54	28/5/10	Juliette Binoche: the Queen of Cannes
TG55	12/6/10	City of Veils by Zoe Ferraris
TG56	1/7/10	UK attempt to ban the burqa would be disproportionate and intolerant
TG57	2/7/10	Burqa bans spread across Catalonia
TG58	7/7/10	Noises off: How burqavaganza pitted theatre against conservative Pakistan
TG59	8/7/10	French burqa debate in a smokescreen
TG60	13/7/10	France votes on the burqa
TG61	14/7/10	Tycoon plans 1M fund to fight French niqab ban
TG61	14/7/10	Racism veiled as liberation
TG63	15/7/10	French niqab ban: beneath the veil
TG64	18/7/10	Copying French ban on burqa would be un-British, says minister
TG65	19/7/10	Syria's niqab ban is part of a clash within Islam itself
TG66	20/7/10	Four councils line up for David Cameron's big society pilot scheme
TG67	20/7/10	Syria bans niqab from universities
TG68	21/7/10	Muslim schoolgirls show faith and fashion are not incompatible
TG69	22/7/10	Manningham-Buller was right about the Iraq war
TG70	25/7/10	If Britain decides to ban the burqa I might just start wearing one
TG71	25/7/10	Niqab ban Tory MP told he is breaking the law
TG72	26/7/10	An MP's posturing talk of a burqa ban
TG73	3/8/10	Burqas and bikinis
TG74	3/8/10	Hideously diverse Britain: What to do when an MP goes bad?
TG75	12/8/10	French woman threatens legal action over 'burkini' ban
TG76	19/8/10	Australian judge orders witness to remove niqab
TG77	23/8/10	Europe's union riven by government attacks on minorities
TG78	26/8/10	France's ban on the Islamic veil has little to do with female emancipation
TG79	14/9/10	France: Senate votes for Muslim face veil ban
TG80	18/9/10	A secularist manifesto
TG81	1/10/10	Dutch far-right party wins pledge on burqa ban

<b>TG82</b>	3/10/10	I migrated to Europe with hope. Now I feel nothing but dread
<b>TG83</b>	7/10/10	'Niqabitch' unveil themselves in Paris
<b>TG84</b>	11/10/10	Geert Wilders and co need Austrian treatment
<b>TG85</b>	14/10/10	French woman faces fine for tearing niqab from tourist's face
<b>TG86</b>	18/10/10	MIA: what was she doing in that niqab?
<b>TG87</b>	21/10/10	When you watch the BNP on TV, just remember: Jack Straw started all this
<b>TG88</b>	24/10/10	My Journey to the heart of Isla,

Article	Date	The Independent
TI1	20/6/09	France split over plan to outlaw burqa
TI2	23/6/09	Sarkozy's Louis XIV moment
TI3	24/6/09	Sophie Morris: Sarkozy's right: the burqa is a tool of repression
TI4	9/7/09	Brandon Robshaw: The burqa should not be worn in class
TI5	13/7/09	Yasmin Alibhai-Brown: Wearing the burqa is neither Islamic nor socially acceptable
TI6	22/7/09	The burqa-clad bombers who terrorise Afghanistan
TI7	16/8/09	Editor at large: Twitter ye not, for not will not change the world
TI8	1/11/09	Our man in Cairo rashly enters Egypt's veil debate
TI9	15/12/09	Burka Barbie, a doll for the modern age
TI10	8/1/10	France moves to outlaw the burka and niqab citing egalite
TI11	8/1/10	Yasmin Alibhai-Brown: They are right to ban the burka, even if it is for the wrong reasons
TI12	13/1/10	The many faces behind the veil
TI13	18/1/10	Ukip calls for ban on burkas
TI14	19/1/10	Joan Smith: Nothing liberal about defending burkas
TI15	25/1/10	Yasmin Alibhai-Brown: The cloak of darkness is no exercise of civil liberties
TI16	27/1/10	Inquiry condemns burka as 'un-french'
TI17	10/3/10	Paris designers react to burka ban
TI18	18/3/10	Rosie Waterhouse: Universities must take action on Muslim extremism
TI19	22/3/10	Sisters. Crucible studio theatre, Sheffield
TI20	22/4/10	Sarkozy launches new law to the burka
TI21	24/4/10	Woman charged in France for driving in full burka
TI22	26/4/10	Polygamy and fraud claims fan burqa row
TI23	1/5/10	Belgium passes Europe's first ban on wearing burka in public
TI24	12/5/10	Burka-clad knifeman robs third travel agent
TI25	17/5/10	Yasmin Alibhai-Brown: Stand up against the burka
TI26	20/5/10	French cabinet unites to pass burka bill that has split country
TI27	20/5/10	'No one should be told what to wear' says artist
TI28	15/6/10	Barcelona is first Spanish city to ban burka
TI29	1/7/10	Rosie Waterhouse: Will the voice of moderate Muslims be heard in city?
TI30	1/7/10	Tory MP proposes law to ban wearing burkas
TI31	7/7/10	Banning the burqa compromises the very principles that we value
TI32	13/7/10	French parliament set to approve veil ban
TI33	14/7/10	Constitutional confrontation looms after vote to ban burka
TI34	15/7/10	Adrian Hamilton: Banning the burka is a lot of hot air
TI35	17/7/10	Champion of UK burka declares war on veil-wearing constituents
TI36	17/7/10	Even in France, a full-scale burka ban remains unlikely
TI37	17/4/10	Leading article: This burka ban does not translate
TI38	17/7/10	Tehmina Kazi: Inconsistency in enforcing laws just breeds resentment

<b>TI39</b>	17/7/10	Rajnaara Akthar: Comments like these fan flames of intolerance
<b>TI40</b>	18/7/10	Joan Smith: Heels show the humanity burkas lack
<b>TI41</b>	18/7/10	Minister says burka ban would be 'un-British'
<b>TI42</b>	19/7/10	Burka ban would be 'un-british'
<b>TI43</b>	25/7/10	Burka ban Tory MP could face legal action
<b>TI44</b>	28/7/10	Christina Patterson: The limits of multi culturalism
<b>TI45</b>	10/8/10	The strange case of a man called Lies
<b>TI46</b>	15/8/10	DJ Taylor: Burning the candle at both ends suits Kiera, but it's not for dave
<b>TI47</b>	7/9/10	Taboo-breaking Syrian soap causes Ramadan stir
<b>TI48</b>	4/10/10	Papal Plots, burqa bans: what does it mean to be secular today?
<b>TI49</b>	6/10/10	Julie Burchill: An up-itself language that deserves to be thrown in the dustbin of History
<b>TI50</b>	8/10/10	France's highest legal authority removes last obstacle to ban on burka

## Appendix 2 – The ‘2009 French Face Veil Ban’ Articles – Arab Press

Article	Date	Gulf News
GN1	20/6/09	France considering ban on burka, spokesman says
GN2	22/6/09	Sarkozy says burqas are ‘not welcome’ in France
GN3	22/6/09	Sarkozy cites national priorities as primary task
GN4	23/6/09	Egyptian Scholar slams French president for anti-veil remarks
GN5	23/6/09	Sarkozy should be open-minded
GN6	23/6/09	Sarkozy’s burqa stance under fire
GN7	23/6/09	French president’s burqa views leave readers fuming
GN8	25/6/09	West must respect the Muslim veil
GN9	27/6/09	No burqas please, we’re French
GN10	29/6/09	Liberte includes freedom of dress
GN11	1/7/09	Strength through tolerance
GN12	2/7/09	Finding freedom in Dubai
GN13	8/7/09	France begins hearing on banning the burqa
GN14	9/7/09	Muslim’s woman’s murder a sign of Islamophobia
GN15	11/7/09	To enforce or ban attire is wrong
GN16	21/7/09	Militants attack Afghan city, 2 burqa bombers killed
GN17	29/7/09	Use of burqa in France is ‘marginal’
GN18	30/7/09	France shouldn’t focus on the burqa
GN19	13/08/09	Suit bought in Dubai: Burqini row in Paris
GN20	7/10/09	Egypt’s to cleric plans face veil ban in schools
GN21	10/10/09	Aim to spread trust, Egypt cleric said
GN22	10/10/09	Egyptian authorities try to reason with those opposed to niqab ban at varsities
GN23	25/10/09	College bans Muslim student over veil row
GN24	30/10/09	Cairo worried over growing extremism
GN25	1/11/09	Cambridge students can wear ‘burqas’ at graduation ceremony
GN26	14/11/09	France will not ban full face veils: Official
GN27	1/1/10	University ban has helped us: niqab trader
GN28	3/1/10	Cairo court upholds niqab ban
GN29	12/1/10	Egyptian university bans replacing niqab with surgical masks
GN30	13/1/10	Egypt varsity bans surgical masks in place of full veil
GN31	16/1/10	Draft law filed in France to ban face-covering veils
GN32	20/1/10	Egypt court revokes ban on niqab at exam halls
GN33	24/1/10	Ayesha unveiled
GN34	3/2/10	France denies citizenship to man who forced wife to wear Islamic veil
GN35	6/2/10	Niqab confusion reigns in France
GN36	11/3/10	Egypt’s top cleric actively courted controversy with his liberal views
GN37	23/3/10	Saudi woman blasts clerics in TV contest poem
GN38	30/3/10	French state council advises against total ban on burqa

<b>GN39</b>	31/3/10	Belgian lawmakers vote to ban Islamic burqa in public
<b>GN40</b>	1/4/10	Belgium votes to ban niqab, burqa in public
<b>GN41</b>	3/4/10	Banning the veil would be indefensible
<b>GN42</b>	14/4/10	Veil pose no threat to European Identity
<b>GN43</b>	17/4/10	Belgium could be first in Europe to ban burqa
<b>GN44</b>	18/4/10	Clothing styles cannot be regulated
<b>GN45</b>	21/4/10	France to ban full Islamic veil from public places
<b>GN46</b>	24/4/10	Woman driver wearing veil fined in France
<b>GN47</b>	25/4/10	French people want law limiting the use of burqa
<b>GN48</b>	27/4/10	'Keeping mistresses is French way of life'
<b>GN49</b>	27/4/10	Niqab is not the issue
<b>GN50</b>	30/4/10	Belgium ban burqa-type dress in public
<b>GN51</b>	1/5/10	Ban burqas across Europe : German EU law maker
<b>GN52</b>	1/5/10	Belgium Burqa ban under fire
<b>GN53</b>	4/5/10	Bigotry drives Belgium's burqa ban
<b>GN54</b>	4/5/10	Italian city fines woman for wearing burqa
<b>GN55</b>	7/5/10	Video threat of attack over veil ban under investigation in Belgium
<b>GN56</b>	19/5/10	Women protest as French cabinet gets veil ban bill
<b>GN57</b>	20/5/10	Women protest as French Veil cabinet approves veil ban
<b>GN58</b>	21/5/10	Weekend review: Veiled affront
<b>GN59</b>	22/5/10	Intolerance on display in France
<b>GN60</b>	31/5/10	Outrage over burqa ban at college exam
<b>GN61</b>	5/6/10	France should not ban the veil
<b>GN62</b>	14/6/10	Barcelona to ban burqa in municipal buildings
<b>GN63</b>	22/6/10	Burqa-clad German man detained close to border with Afghanistan
<b>GN64</b>	23/6/10	Students to bring niqab ban before UN
<b>GN65</b>	2/7/10	Attempt to regulate face coverings
<b>GN66</b>	7/7/10	French parliament debates ban on burqa style veils
<b>GN67</b>	8/7/10	French parliament debates ban on burqa
<b>GN68</b>	11/7/10	French lead West European calls for ban on veils in public
<b>GN69</b>	12/7/10	French veil ban set to pass parliament
<b>GN70</b>	13/7/10	French parliament approves ban on veils
<b>GN71</b>	13/7/10	Veil ban debate continues in France
<b>GN72</b>	15/7/10	Banning clothing is not liberating
<b>GN73</b>	15/7/10	An absolute ban on niqab makes no sense
<b>GN74</b>	18/7/10	A clear case of hypocrisy
<b>GN75</b>	18/7/10	Minister rules out veil ban in Britain
<b>GN76</b>	19/7/10	Opposition party wants debate on buqa ban
<b>GN77</b>	19/7/10	Britain rules out burqa ban law
<b>GN78</b>	21/7/10	Syria bans full Islamic face veils in universities
<b>GN79</b>	21/7/10	Niqab ban report sparks debate in Syria
<b>GN80</b>	23/7/10	Dressed up to show change in attitude
<b>GN81</b>	24/7/10	Muslim woman refused bus ride over veil
<b>GN82</b>	24/7/10	Saudi cleric: Women can forgo veil in anti-niqab countries

<b>GN83</b>	26/7/10	Rights groups warn Tory MP over veil issue
<b>GN84</b>	19/8/10	Australian judge orders Muslim witness to remove burqa
<b>GN85</b>	24/8/10	Bangladesh authorities asked to ensure veil is not forced
<b>GN86</b>	14/9/10	French parliament adopts ban on full-face veil
<b>GN87</b>	16/9/10	Ban on veil undermines European Values
<b>GN88</b>	18/9/10	Islamophobia fuels the fires of hatred
<b>GN89</b>	19/9/10	Woman shuns the burqa despite death threats
<b>GN90</b>	19/9/10	Europe's Islam dilemma
<b>GN91</b>	25/9/10	Renegade France defies Europe
<b>GN92</b>	1/10/10	Netherlands to ban the burqa, says anti-Islam MP's
<b>GN93</b>	4/10/10	Netherlands flirts with extremism
<b>GN94</b>	12/10/10	Doha debates reject ban on wearing of face veils
<b>GN95</b>	16/10/10	French woman on trial for burqa assault on Emirati
<b>GN96</b>	21/10/10	Shiv Sena wants ban on burqa for security reasons

Article	Date	Gulf Times
GT1	19/6/09	France divided over burqa ban plan
GT2	23/6/09	Burqa not welcome in France
GT3	23/6/09	French parliament sets up inquiry into burqa
GT4	28/6/09	Dressing Down
GT5	30/6/09	Dress row opens bitter divisions
GT6	30/6/09	Al Qaeda warns France over burqa Stance
GT7	8/7/09	Paris MP's Discuss banning the burqa
GT8	10/7/09	Is Europe really Islamophobic?
GT9	14/7/09	France row over burqa unveils contradictions
GT10	21/7/09	Burqa-clad Taliban launch daring attacks
GT11	24/7/09	Veiled woman 'barred' from bus in Sydney
GT12	26/7/09	Celebrities and activists get a dressing down
GT13	12/8/09	Pool bans Muslim woman in a 'burqini' swimsuit
GT14	15/8/09	French Minister for ban on Islamic veil
GT15	20/8/09	Women vote for change
GT16	23/9/09	Muslim woman rebuked on burka by judge in Spain
GT17	5/10/09	Top imam orders student to remove face veil: daily
GT18	6/10/09	'Call to ban' niqab stirs controversy
GT19	7/10/09	Cleric told to quit over face veil remark
GT20	7/10/09	Italy far-right party demands burka ban
GT21	8/10/09	Al-Azhar varsity to ban the niqab in women's classes
GT22	2/11/09	Women jailed over terror files
GT23	13/11/09	France will oppose, but not ban, the burqa
GT24	14/12/09	Niqab protest
GT25	22/12/09	University to appeal veil ruling
GT26	6/1/10	Socialists to oppose bill on burqa ban
GT27	13/1/10	France stays divided over compromise on burqa ban
GT28	21/1/10	Court lifts niqab ban
GT29	24/1/10	France moves on burqa ban
GT30	26/1/10	French parliament panel moots ban on the burqa
GT31	27/1/10	Uncertainties over law on Islamic face veils remain
GT32	29/1/10	Islamic school niqab ban is overturned by Egyptian court
GT33	30/1/10	Italy moves towards emulating France on burqa ban
GT34	6/1/10	Students defy Egypt efforts to ban niqab
GT35	2/2/10	No citizenship for men who force their wives to wear burqa
GT36	3/2/10	France to reject men who impose 'burqa'
GT37	10/2/10	Wife-to-be is bearded, cross-eyed behind veil
GT38	17/2/10	Egypt PM says niqab negates a women's personality
GT39	8/3/10	India confounds those who write it off
GT40	17/3/10	Cops kill suicide bombers in burqa
GT41	30/3/10	French govt told to limit burqa ban
GT42	31/3/10	Belgian lawmakers vote to ban Islamic burqa in public
GT43	13/4/10	The poetess who spoke out
GT44	16/4/10	European push to ban burqas appalls women
GT45	18/4/10	Burqa bombers kill 41 at camp for displaced

GT46	18/4/10	Burqa bombers target camp for displaced
GT47	21/4/10	France moves towards banning veils in public
GT48	23/4/10	France wants to apply burqa ban to tourists
GT49	24/4/10	Most French want burqa law but not total ban
GT50	24/4/10	French driver fined for wearing niqab
GT51	24/4/10	Veiled woman driver fined
GT52	26/4/10	French Muslim man hits back at polygamy row
GT53	26/4/10	A Belgian face-veil ban would be senseless
GT54	30/4/10	Belgium's MP's vote to ban the burqa in public
GT55	30/4/10	Belgian vote on veils may echo in Europe
GT56	30/4/10	France law calls for imprisonment, fines for offenders.
GT57	1/5/10	Belgium's Muslims lash out at looming burqa ban
GT58	2/5/10	France expects criticism over burqa ban minister
GT59	4/5/10	Italian city fines women in burqa 500 Euros
GT60	4/5/10	German minister rejects talk of ban
GT61	7/5/10	Covered bandits case sparks talk of burqa ban
GT62	8/5/10	Qaradawi warns of backlash against Europe's niqab ban moves
GT63	8/5/10	Another sign of anti-Muslim Xenobia
GT64	8/5/10	Belgium analyses video threat
GT65	17/5/10	Australian state to vote over burqa ban
GT66	19/5/10	France unveils bill to ban veil
GT67	21/5/10	Pro-burqa protestors plan rallies
GT68	28/5/10	Spanish council bans Muslim veil in public
GT69	28/5/10	57% Swiss favour burqa ban:poll
GT70	2/6/10	Spain towns mull banning complete Islamic veils: reports
GT71	6/6/10	Government warned on burqa ban
GT72	14/6/10	Barcelona to be first major city to ban the burqa
GT73	15/6/10	Anti-burqa ban will not stand: advisory body
GT74	16/6/10	Spain planning burqa ban says minister
GT75	23/6/10	Law makers debate burqa ban July 6
GT76	28/6/10	French PM urges Muslims to reject 'hijacked Islam'
GT77	1/7/10	Catalonia parliament rejects burqa ban
GT78	4/7/10	French 'burqa ban' still goes before parliament
GT79	6/7/10	'Burqa ban' debate begins
GT80	11/7/10	Crises 'sparked' more racism
GT81	13/7/10	French lawmakers back 'burqa ban' legislation
GT82	13/7/10	Amnesty slams French Move
GT83	17/7/10	Saudi students defy Western preceptions
GT84	18/7/10	UK must not seek veil ban: minister
GT85	21/7/10	Niqab ban on Syrian campuses stirs debate
GT86	22/7/10	Afghan women retreat behind veil in fear of Taliban
GT87	23/7/10	Women banned from bus for wearing veil
GT88	25/7/10	Women can obey 'veil ban'
GT89	28/7/10	Zawahiri slams France's veil ban
GT90	3/8/10	Swedish minister moves to ban veil
GT91	8/8/10	School sacks teacher for insisting wearing burqa

<b>GT92</b>	19/8/10	Court tells witness to remove her veil
<b>GT93</b>	12/9/10	Final vote on French burqa ban tomorrow
<b>GT94</b>	14/9/10	'Burqa ban' law clears parliamentary hurdle
<b>GT95</b>	1/10/10	Dutch govt expected with anti-Islam party support
<b>GT96</b>	3/10/10	Wilders supports new anti-Islam party in Germany
<b>GT97</b>	8/10/10	French court expels veiled woman
<b>GT98</b>	8/10/10	Burqa-ban passes last legal hurdle in France
<b>GT99</b>	12/10/10	About -face: French ban on veil wears thin
<b>GT100</b>	15/10/10	Ex-teacher on trial for 'burqa assault'
<b>GT101</b>	15/10/10	Courts uphold's a rape victim's right to wear niqab

Article	Date	Saudi Gazette
SG1	20/6/09	France open to banning Muslim veil: spokesman
SG2	24/6/09	Mr. Sarkozy, burqa is sign of modesty
SG3	25/6/09	Mufti Sarkozy's 'fatwa' not amusing
SG4	1/7/09	Burqa not tool for political maneuver
SG5	9/7/09	France begins burqa ban hearings
SG6	14/7/09	France burqa ban clashes with haute couture
SG7	17/7/09	Demonizing Hijab-wearing Muslim women for politics
SG8	25/7/09	Veiled women barred from bus in Australia
SG9	16/8/09	French minister spits venom against burqa
SG10	12/10/09	Pray for our sisters around the world
SG11	12/10/09	Death-Knell for the face-veil? Not so
SG12	12/10/09	Deconstructing the 'niqab-is cultural' myth
SG13	26/10/09	Why fear?
SG14	1/12/09	A little query
SG15	16/1/10	France closer to banning Muslim veil
SG16	26/1/10	French call to ban veil in public buildings
SG17	27/1/10	French parliament panel calls for burqa ban
SG18	29/1/10	Assuming niqab
SG19	31/1/10	Egypt's veil wearers see it as barrier to harassment
SG20	8/2/10	'Newcomers to France should sign no burqa clause'
SG21	4/3/10	'No burqa no proble, B'desh court tells police'
SG22	1/4/10	Parliament panel in Belgium approves banning of burqa
SG23	10/4/10	Don't force women to cover up: B'desh court
SG24	22/4/10	France set to unveil bill banning veil
SG25	23/4/10	France's new law
SG26	23/4/10	France veil ban
SG27	24/4/10	To wear the veil or not? Leave the choice to women
SG28	24/4/10	Driver wearing Islamic veil fined in France
SG29	1/5/10	French Muslims feel victimised by veil ban
SG30	1/5/10	Amnesty slams burqa ban
SG31	2/5/10	Belgium's Muslims lash out at burqa ban
SG32	5/5/10	Woman fined in Italy for burqa
SG33	19/5/10	How western journalists reported the ban on the burqa
SG34	20/5/10	French cabinet Ok's burqa ban law
SG35	7/6/10	Are you getting enough of vitamin D?
SG36	17/6/10	Barcelona to ban veil in public buildings
SG37	23/6/10	Oz woman asked to remove veil at interview
SG38	2/7/10	UK MP moves bill to outlaw 'burqa'
SG39	8/7/10	French disputes debate ban on burqa-style veils
SG40	10/7/10	French denies citizenship to Muslim man
SG41	14/7/10	French house approves face veil ban
SG42	16/7/10	Veiled way to ban the niqab in France
SG43	19/7/10	Niqab in focus again
SG44	20/7/10	Syria bans face covering veils in universities
SG45	24/7/10	Women 'refused bus ride' over veil

<b>SG46</b>	25/7/10	Muslim women can respect veil bans: cleric
<b>SG47</b>	27/7/10	Man jailed for ripping niqab from Saudi student in Scotland
<b>SG48</b>	30/7/10	Indian students demand teachers wear burqas
<b>SG49</b>	20/8/10	Veil not allowed in court: Australian judge
<b>SG50</b>	16/9/10	Leading Al-Azhar scholar applauds French veil ban
<b>SG51</b>	17/9/10	Does the niqab have basis in Shariah?
<b>SG52</b>	17/10/10	Doublespeak of rights in France

Article	Date	Kuwait Times
KT1	20/6/09	France divided over calls to ban burka
KT2	13/8/09	'Burqini' - clad woman barred in Paris
KT3	14/8/09	Tiny weenie yellow polka dot burqini
KT4	6/10/09	Imam orders student to remove face veil
KT5	7/10/09	Excuse me your Eminence!
KT6	7/10/09	Increasing use of face veil worries Egypt government
KT7	8/10/09	Hayef blasts Tantawi over niqab comments
KT8	9/10/09	Fatwa stirs heated debate over face veiling in Kuwait
KT9	27/10/09	Between hallucination and reality
KT10	3/11/09	Battle over niqab brewing in Egypt
KT11	4/11/09	Azhar in spotlight over ban on niqab
KT12	23/12/09	Clerics back niqab curbs
KT13	1/1/10	A Jewish voice against the 'burqa ban'
KT14	16/1/10	France moves closer to banning the niqab
KT15	29/1/10	To veil or not to veil? Kuwaiti women face off
KT16	31/1/10	Egypt veil wearers see it as barrier to harassment
KT17	14/2/10	More Saudi women than niqab
KT18	17/4/10	Europe grapples with Muslim dress code
KT19	18/4/10	Burqa bombers slay 31
KT20	22/4/10	France to ban niqab from public spaces
KT21	24/4/10	'Veiled driver' fined
KT22	29/4/10	Appeal to ban driving with niqab in Kuwait
KT23	1/5/10	Belgium's Muslims lash out at looming burqa ban
KT24	2/5/10	Belgian vote on veils could echo in Europe
KT25	21/5/10	To niqab or not to niqab
KT26	25/5/10	Who's to blame
KT27	13/7/10	French parliament set to vote on veil ban
KT28	14/7/10	French law makers approve niqab ban
KT29	20/7/10	Syria bans niqab on campus
KT30	24/7/10	Women 'refused bus ride' over veil in UK
KT31	25/7/10	Cleric says women can take off niqab
KT32	5/9/10	French veil ban worries tourists
KT33	20/9/10	'Forced veiling' debate divides Bangladesh women
KT34	21/9/10	Anti-Islam rant sees far-right fly high across Europe
KT35	26/9/10	The psychology of the human mind
KT36	4/10/10	Burqa bans: France, then Netherlands, who's next?

### Appendix 3 – The ‘2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy’ Articles – UK Press

The Times		
Article	Date	Headline
TTC1	1/2/06	Muslim cartoon protester urged murder, court told
TTC2	1/2/06	Museum to house ‘historic’ Danish Mohammad cartoons
TTC3	1/2/06	Religious hatred and Muhammad cartoon
TTC4	1/2/06	A free society must respect all religions
TTC5	2/2/06	The Danish cartoon furore
TTC6	3/2/06	Drawing the line: Publishing controversial cartoons and being damned
TTC7	3/2/06	Muslim cartoon
TTC8	3/2/06	West tried to calm tensions as militants threaten kidnaps
TTC9	3/2/06	World press opinion of cartoon row
TTC10	3/2/06	Peter Brookes: Why the Muhammad cartoons fail
TTC11	3/2/06	Muslim protests spreads to Danish butter
TTC12	3/2/06	Incitement with little insight:
TTC13	3/2/06	Foreigners flee as gunmen hunt ‘targets’
TTC14	3/2/06	‘Let the hands that drew be severed!’
TTC15	3/2/06	British Imam warns against overreaction
TTC16	4/2/06	Gathering storm as protests hit Britain
TTC17	4/2/06	No Buts in Denmark
TTC18	4/2/06	Portraying prophet from Persian art to South Park
TTC19	4/2/06	What price must be paid for free speech?
TTC20	4/2/06	In God’s name
TTC21	4/2/06	Editorials
TTC22	4/2/06	Muslim ire increases, but ‘day of anger’ has few takers
TTC23	4/2/06	Call for holy war at London demo
TTC24	5/2/06	Muslims tell Yard to charge protestors
TTC25	5/2/06	These cartoons don’t defend free speech, they threaten it
TTC26	5/2/06	Focus: Freedom v faith: the firestorm
TTC27	6/2/06	The cartoons and the offence
TTC28	6/2/06	The challenges of intolerance in a generally tolerant society
TTC29	6/2/06	Timeline: The Muhammad cartoons
TTC30	6/2/06	Suicide bom ‘protester’ apologises to 7/7 bereaved
TTC31	6/2/06	Danes in despair as protesters set fire to consulate in Beirut
TTC32	6/2/06	First deaths in Muhammed cartoon protests
TTC33	7/2/06	World leaders rally round as crises deepens
TTC34	7/3/06	Restraint, please – except for taking retaliatory action on Mr Bongo-brains
TTC35	7/2/06	Fake suicide bomber sent back to prison
TTC36	7/2/06	‘Fake bomber’ served jail sentence for drugs
TTC37	7/3/06	UK peacekeepers flown in to calm Afghan protests
TTC38	7/2/06	Call to arrest British radicals as six die in protests abroad
TTC39	8/2/06	Rice accuses Iran and Syria of incitement over cartoons

TTC40	8/3/06	Seriously, I need to know more about this funny cartoon of the Prophet...
TTC41	8/2/06	Analysis: What next in the cartoon wars?
TTC42	8/2/06	Drug dealing 'suicide bomber' is jailed again for breach of parole
TTC43	8/2/06	Children's book that started it all is flying off the shelves
TTC44	9/2/06	Danes accuse the imams of 'speaking with two tongues'
TTC45	9/2/06	All right, I insulted Americans – but they are not planning to behead me
TTC46	9/2/06	Denmark dragged into fresh controversy over IOC decision
TTC47	9/2/06	Sarkozy on free speech
TTC48	10/2/06	New rally warned against placards of hate
TTC49	10/2/06	'God save us from the voices of reason'
TTC50	10/2/06	Unlucky Omar
TTC51	12/2/06	Public anger at Muslim protesters
TTC52	12/2/06	Muslims are trading respect for fear
TTC53	14/2/06	Rioters storm embassies and Western restaurants
TTC54	16/2/06	Divestment: Chief Rabbi on enemies and friends
TTC55	17/2/06	"A true conservative speaks"
TTC56	18/2/06	Police fear right-wing hijack of rally
TTC57	18/2/06	Against religious censorship
TTC58	19/2/06	Minister offers £6m to behead cartoonist
TTC59	20/2/06	Rallies against the Muhammed cartoons descend into sectarian fury and rioting
TTC60	21/2/06	Don't panic. It'll get worse
TTC61	22/2/06	Stand by Denmark
TTC62	23/2/06	BNP publishes Danish cartoon
TTC63	26/2/06	My generation of spoilt brats is being challenged
TTC64	26/2/06	We should fear Holland's silence
TTC65	2/3/06	Support of free speech
TTC66	6/3/06	Mask of the blasphemer
TTC67	8/3/06	Muslim incited terror murder
TTC68	8/3/06	Cartoon protest Muslim is guilty of soliciting murder
TTC69	14/3/06	No stranger to controversy, Dershowitz remains unapologetic
TTC70	15/3/06	Danish paper faces charges over Muhammad cartoons
TTC71	15/3/06	Five arrested over London cartoons protest
TTC72	16/3/06	Three charged over cartoon protests at Danish embassy
TTC73	17/3/06	Danish Muslims sue over Muhammad cartoons
TTC74	21/3/06	Charles criticises cartoons on Middle East tour with Camilla
TTC75	21/3/06	Welsh Church recalls magazine over Muhammad cartoon
TTC76	21/3/06	Prince Charles – Defender of faith?
TTC77	22/3/06	Editor of church magazine quits over cartoon
TTC78	3/4/06	Why must the media attack our soldiers' mission?
TTC79	10/4/06	Praise God or pass the ammunition?
TTC80	21/5/06	Cartoonist draws a line under contest to picture Prophet
TTC81	11/6/06	Ain't no mountain high enough for her
TTC82	11/6/06	It's no joke, this taking of offence

<b>TTC83</b>	23/7/06	Putting the fun in fundamentalism
<b>TTC84</b>	17/9/06	McAleese charm offensive gives trade a boost
<b>TTC85</b>	17/9/06	Leading article: Let the Pope preach
<b>TTC86</b>	25/9/06	Stuff
<b>TTC87</b>	26/10/06	Danish court throws out Muslim cartoons lawsuit
<b>TTC88</b>	28/10/06	'Mickey Mouse Project' plotted to kill Muhammad cartoonist
<b>TTC89</b>	30/10/06	Police call for ban on flag burning
<b>TTC90</b>	9/11/06	Cartoon protester guilty of race hate
<b>TTC91</b>	10/11/06	Cartoon protester stirred race hate

Daily Telegraph		
Article	Date	Headline
DTC1	1/2/06	Danish Humour may be no laughing matter, it must be defended
DTC2	3/2/06	Commentary from Capital spreads
DTC3	3/2/06	Why we will defend the eright to offend
DTC4	4/2/06	If you get rid of he Danes, you'll have to keep paying the Danegeld
DTC5	4/2/06	Demonstrators burn flags on the streets of London
DTC6	5/2/06	I wonder if the Danes will ever be the same
DTC7	5/2/06	Muslims protests are incitement to murder, say Tories
DTC8	5/2/06	Islamic group behind protests 'peddles race and religious hatred'
DTC9	5/2/06	Unchallenged, a man poses as a suicide bomber. Police stop press taking pictures
DTC10	5/2/06	The Tinker-box
DTC11	6/2/06	One law for the bloodthirsty, another for the tolerant
DTC12	6/2/06	Flame of Islamic fury spreads to Beirut
DTC13	6/2/06	Why extremists treat us with contempt
DTC14	6/2/06	Arrest pedlars of hate, Police urged
DTC15	6/2/06	Newspapers reflect nervousness
DTC16	7/2/06	Conscience or commerce: that is the question
DTC17	7/2/06	I'm sorry, says 'suicide bomber'
DTC18	7/2/06	'Suicide bomber' is freed drug dealer
DTC19	7/2/06	Extremists in demonstration face inquiry by police squad
DTC20	7/2/06	Protests cast cloud over IOC
DTC21	7/2/06	This soft approach to militant Muslims is a gift to the far right
DTC22	8/2/06	Muslim protestors face arrest
DTC23	8/2/06	University drops editor over cartoon
DTC24	8/2/06	Redifining the boundaries of free speech
DTC25	8/2/06	Muslim cleric jailed for inciting murder
DTC26	8/2/06	Protestor who dressed as bomber is sent back to jail
DTC27	8/2/06	Free speech? Labour cares more about Muslim vote
DTC28	10/2/06	Have you heard? Retecool.com
DTC29	11/2/06	Thousands protest against prophet cartoons
DTC30	12/2/06	We were brought up to hate-and we do
DTC31	12/2/06	Meanwhile..have you seen what's been happening in Bush's backyard?
DTC32	18/2/06	Ministers forced out as cartoon row escalates
DTC33	26/2/06	Did the Greeks tell the first Jokes?
DTC34	5/3/06	Marginalia: Free speech
DTC35	16/3/06	Arrests over cartoon protests
DTC36	22/3/06	Church cartoon editor quits
DTC37	22/3/06	Charles mends fences over Islam cartoon
DTC38	25/3/06	Jack is a man of straw when Muslims talk of killing converts
DTC39	7/4/06	Arla back on the shelves in the Middle East
DTC40	8/4/06	Danish dairy firm's products go back on sale in Middle East
DTC41	30/5/06	This post has been censored
DTC42	2/6/06	How has this cartoon crises come about
DTC43	16/9/06	The Pope's message of greater dialogue achieves the opposite

<b>DTC44</b>	29/10/06	Police want water cannons to douse religious riot threat
<b>DTC45</b>	2/11/06	Muslims arrested in Old Bailey demo
<b>DTC46</b>	10/11/06	Cartoon protestor guilty of race hate

The Guardian		
Article	Date	Headline
TGC1	13/10/05	Paper threatened over drawings of Muhammad
TGC2	30/1/06	Danish paper sparks angry protests
TGC3	31/1/06	Danish paper sorry for Muhammad cartoons
TGC4	1/2/06	Cartoon row spreads across Europe
TGC5	1/2/06	Bomb threat to repentant Danish Paper
TGC6	2/2/06	Palestinian gunmen in Cartoons protest
TGC7	2/2/06	Prophetic fallacy
TGC8	2/2/06	Anger as papers reprint cartoons of Mohammed
TGC9	2/2/06	More European papers defy Muslim protests
TGC10	2/2/06	Cartoon Controversy: to publish or not
TGC11	2/2/06	Spectator makes cartoon u-turn
TGC12	2/2/06	BBC joins cartoon controversy
TGC13	2/2/06	Cartoons published in Jordan
TGC14	3/2/06	Jordanian editor sacked over cartoons
TGC15	3/2/06	British Muslims protest over cartoons
TGC16	3/2/06	Published and damned
TGC17	3/2/06	Sense and sensibilities
TGC18	3/2/06	UK press hold back in cartoon row
TGC19	3/2/06	It's about discretion and good taste
TGC20	3/2/06	Jack Straw praises UK media's 'sensitivity' over cartoons
TGC21	3/2/06	Norwegian editor apologises
TGC22	3/2/06	Cartoons and their context
TGC23	3/2/06	'I was convinced we had found a solution to living together – not now'
TGC24	3/2/06	The freedom that hurts us
TGC25	3/2/06	European elite scrambles to defuse furore over caricatures of Muhammed
TGC26	4/2/06	Cartoon row escalates and telegram service ends
TGC27	4/2/06	Child's tale led to clash of cultures
TGC28	4/2/06	Should the cartoons have been published?
TGC29	4/2/06	Cartoon controversy spreads throughout Muslim world
TGC30	4/2/06	Syrian protestors set fire to embassies
TGC31	4/2/06	Protests and calls for vengeance spread across globe
TGC32	4/2/06	Does the right of freedom of speech justify printing the Danish Cartoons?
TGC33	4/2/06	Editor's week: Readers echoed internal debate on the Danish Cartoons
TGC34	4/2/06	Insults and injuries
TGC35	5/2/06	How cartoons fanned flames of Muslim rage?
TGC36	5/2/06	Embassies ablaze as Muslim anger spreads
TGC37	5/2/06	Cartoons and freedom: Why we've got to draw a line somewhere
TGC38	5/2/06	We must put a stop to this savage bitterness
TGC39	6/2/06	BBC defends cartoon coverage
TGC40	6/2/06	Violence, fatwas and online anti-Jew images: a world of protests
TGC41	6/2/06	Downing street statement on the weekend's cartoon demonstrations

TGC42	6/2/06	Threats that must be countered
TGC43	6/2/06	Arrest extremist marchers, police told
TGC44	6/2/06	A worm's eye view: <i>logic and principle can't resolve the row over the Danish cartoons</i>
TGC45	6/2/06	Jerusalem post publishes Muhammad cartoons
TGC46	6/2/06	Danish paper rejects Jesus cartoons
TGC47	6/2/06	Lebanon seeks to defuse tensions over cartoons
TGC48	6/2/06	'Suicide bomber' protester apologises
TGC49	6/2/06	When Freedom gives in to fear
TGC50	6/2/06	Cartoon conflicts
TGC51	6/2/06	Danish embassy in Tehran attacked
TGC52	6/2/06	Rioting with well-planned spontaneity
TGC53	7/2/06	Media points finger at Syria for violent rallies as Lebanon fears for its fragile sectarian peace
TGC54	7/2/06	Scotland Yard sets up squad to track protestors
TGC55	7/2/06	Danish friendly threatened by cartoon backlash
TGC56	7/2/06	'suicide bomber' cartoon protestor arrested
TGC57	7/2/06	Major US paper runs cartoon
TGC58	7/2/06	Something rotten?
TGC59	7/2/06	Dave's reform promises go way beyond our ken
TGC60	7/2/06	We have lost our voice
TGC61	7/2/06	Iranian paper to run Holocaust cartoons
TGC62	7/2/06	Student editor suspended after printing cartoon
TGC63	7/2/06	Q&A: The cartoons row
TGC64	7/2/06	Drawn conclusions
TGC65	7/2/06	Cartoons 'part of Zionist plot'
TGC66	8/2/06	Mock suicide bomber back in jail for breaching parole
TGC67	8/2/06	Muslims demand better legal protection
TGC68	8/2/06	Punishment, not martyrdom
TGC69	8/2/06	Blair appeals for Tory support on terror bill
TGC70	8/2/06	Danish Paper Pursues Holocaust cartoons
TGC71	8/2/06	Four die on attack on Nato base
TGC72	8/2/06	Four killed in Afghanistan cartoons protest
TGC73	8/2/06	French weekly prints more cartoons
TGC74	9/2/06	US says Iran and Syria stoking cartoon protests
TGC75	9/2/06	Imams plan 'civil' march to show distress at cartoons
TGC76	9/2/06	Bad news for Danish goods
TGC77	9/2/06	Our Media must give Muslims a chance to debate with each other
TGC78	9/2/06	Danish paper in U-turn on Holocaust cartoons
TGC79	10/2/06	Cartoon editor sent on leave
TGC80	10/2/06	This is not a cartoon war
TGC81	10/2/06	Malaysia bans Muhammed cartoons
TGC82	10/2/06	Unfair and unbalanced
TGC83	11/2/06	Europe's cartoon battle are drawn in shades of grey, not black and

		white
TGC84	11/2/06	Call to reinstate papers closed in cartoon row
TGC85	11/2/06	Snow go in the Hashemite kingdom
TGC86	11/2/06	Thousands join cartoon rally in London
TGC87	11/2/06	Face to faith
TGC88	11/2/06	Reborn extremist sect had key role in London protest
TGC89	11/2/06	Risky Business
TGC90	12/2/06	Why I reject the anarchists who claim to speak for Islam
TGC91	12/2/06	The end of freedom?
TGC92	12/2/06	Muslims fly flag for peaceful protest against cartoons
TGC93	12/2/06	I'm proud of my son – whatever's said about him
TGC94	12/2/06	Print or net, that is the question
TGC95	12/2/06	The end of freedom?
TGC96	12/2/06	My week: Deborah Turness
TGC97	13/2/06	A right to offend?
TGC98	13/2/06	Danes told to leave Indonesia after terrorist threat reported
TGC99	13/2/06	French Muslims to sue press over cartoons
TGC100	13/2/06	This is the real outrage
TGC101	14/2/06	Two killed in Pakistan cartoon protests
TGC102	14/2/06	Even bigots and Holocaust deniers must have their say
TGC103	15/2/06	No offence
TGC104	15/2/06	Russia clamps down on religious insults
TGC105	15/2/06	Three killed in Pakistani cartoon protests
TGC106	15/2/06	'Christian voice is outside, praying for our souls...'
TGC107	15/2/06	Iran demands apology over German cartoon
TGC108	15/2/06	Denmark's new values
TGC109	16/2/06	Western businesses burn in Pakistan riots
TGC110	17/2/06	Cartoons, adolatry and victimhood
TGC111	17/2/06	Europe's contempt for other cultures can't be sustained
TGC112	17/2/06	Cleric offer reward for killing of cartoonist
TGC113	18/2/06	Craving for calm
TGC114	18/2/06	At least 9 killed in Libya as cartoon protests escalate
TGC115	18/2/06	Libya suspends interior minister after cartoon riots
TGC116	18/2/06	Enlightened values
TGC117	18/2/06	15,000 protest in London against cartoons
TGC118	19/2/06	Nigeria cartoon riots kill 16
TGC119	19/2/06	It's so cowardly to attack the church when we won't offend Islam
TGC120	20/2/06	Iranian minister calls for end to cartoon violence
TGC121	20/2/06	Church ablaze as cartoon protests continue across globe
TGC122	21/2/06	Cartoon protest draws from well of discontent
TGC123	21/2/06	Freedom on trial
TGC124	21/2/06	Russian paper closes after publishing cartoons
TGC125	22/2/06	Drawing the line
TGC126	27/2/06	It takes more than tea and biscuits to overcome indifference and fear
TGC127	27/2/06	Muslims who want sharia law 'should leave
TGC128	28/2/06	We need the Lords to hold firm on terrorism bill

TGC129	2/3/06	We must stand up to the creeping tyranny of group veto
TGC130	3/3/06	Anti-semitism, the Jewish way
TGC131	8/3/06	Clarke criticises Danish 'mistake' over cartoons
TGC132	10/3/06	Extreme designs
TGC133	11/3/06	We can defuse this tension between competing conceptions of the sacred
TGC134	15/3/06	Grey area
TGC135	15/3/06	Five arrested over cartoon protests
TGC136	16/3/06	Expelled cleric's aide among five held in cartoon protest inquiry
TGC137	16/3/06	Darfur: the awful silence
TGC138	17/3/06	Student editor sacked over prophet cartoons
TGC139	17/3/06	Danish threatened with legal action
TGC140	21/3/06	Europeans should beware of fishing for US failure in Iraq
TGC141	22/3/06	Editor of Welsh church magazine quits over cartoon of Muhammad
TGC142	22/3/06	Cartoon row claims Swedish minister's job
TGC143	23/3/06	Mother out to seize stronghold of 'unforgivable' BNP
TGC144	23/3/06	A misguided march
TGC145	24/3/06	Free expression and the Yeats principle
TGC146	24/3/06	Freedom of expression for all
TGC147	24/3/06	Sense and sensibilities: Freedom of speech should not be abused
TGC148	17/4/06	Opus Dei paper prints prophet in hell cartoon
TGC149	20/4/06	Us and them
TGC150	25/4/06	Police launch appeal over cartoon protest
TGC151	26/4/06	Police hunt three over cartoon protest
TGC152	5/5/06	Former Islamist leader held over cartoon protest
TGC153	12/5/06	Imam who led cartoon protests to leave country
TGC154	21/5/06	Fresh row over Danish cartoons
TGC155	28/5/06	Yet again we cave into religious bigots. And this time they're Hindus
TGC156	3/6/06	Muslim cartoons were an 'act of inclusion'
TGC157	5/6/06	Hooray for Harper's
TGC158	6/6/06	Security concern at cartoons debate in Moscow
TGC159	6/6/06	Cartoon editor attacks misreporting
TGC160	7/6/06	Iranian journalist attacks Muhammad cartoons
TGC161	28/6/06	We need uncensored voices
TGC162	21/7/06	Indonesian editor charged with offending Islam
TGC163	28/7/06	It's officially great to be a Dane
TGC164	20/8/06	Iran cartoon show mocks Holocaust
TGC165	21/8/06	We don't all back Ahmadinejad
TGC166	22/8/06	Battle lines
TGC167	23/8/06	Why worry about terrorist attacks? You are much more likely to die from smoking or be killed in a car crash
TGC168	10/9/06	Islam? That's a nightclub, right?
TGC169	11/9/06	How to avoid another cartoon crises
TGC170	18/9/06	Faith in each other
TGC171	30/9/06	Common sense and sensibilities
TGC172	30/9/06	How one of the biggest rows of modern times helped Danish exports

		prosper
<b>TGC173</b>	5/10/06	BNP accused of exploiting cartoons row with Muslim leaflet
<b>TGC174</b>	10/10/06	Muslims angry at new Danish cartoons scandal
<b>TGC175</b>	18/10/06	Freedom and falsehoods
<b>TGC176</b>	24/10/06	Rules of engagement
<b>TGC177</b>	26/10/06	Controversy unveiled
<b>TGC178</b>	27/10/06	Danish court dismisses Muhammad cartoons case
<b>TGC179</b>	29/10/06	Get tough on extremist demos, urges Muslim police chief
<b>TGC180</b>	1/11/06	Think before you speak
<b>TGC181</b>	2/11/06	Danish 'cartoons editor' lives in fear after threats
<b>TGC182</b>	4/11/06	Cartoon protester 'called for beheading'
<b>TGC183</b>	10/11/06	Man guilty of inciting race hate at protest
<b>TGC184</b>	29/11/06	Pope praises priest slain in cartoon furore
<b>TGC185</b>	7/12/06	Times and Independent take cartoon awards

<b>The Independent</b>		
<b>Article</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Headline</b>
TIC1	1/2/06	Mohamed cartoons provoke bomb threats against Danish newspaper
TIC2	2/2/06	French editor fired over Prophet cartoon
TIC3	2/2/06	Anger as Paris newspaper prints cartoon of prophet
TIC4	3/2/06	Leading article: this is not just a simple issue of freedoms
TIC5	3/2/06	Mohamed: the messenger of Allah
TIC6	3/2/06	Protestors storm Danish embassy over cartoons
TIC7	3/2/06	Threat to Europeans over 'hostile' Mohamed cartoons
TIC8	3/2/06	Joan Bakewell: There aren't many jokes in the bible
TIC9	4/2/06	Robert Fisk: Don't be fooled this isn't an issue of Islam versus secularism
TIC10	4/2/06	Mohamed: Flesh and Blood
TIC11	4/2/06	Mary Dejevsky: Can a secular society accommodate Islam?
TIC12	4/2/06	Leading article: A more responsible approach to the debate on freedom of speech
TIC13	5/2/06	Hamish McRea: western companies must keep the faith in the Middle East, whatever the tensions
TIC14	5/2/06	Germaine Greer: We've fallen for the street theatre of outrage
TIC15	5/2/06	Leading article: 'Can't take a joke' is the age old taunt of the bully
TIC16	6/2/06	Authorities backed Damascus riots, say protestors
TIC17	6/2/06	Ministers appeal calm
TIC18	6/2/06	Bruce Anderson: Stop cringing and stand up for our own values
TIC19	6/2/06	Police must bear down on extremist protestors
TIC20	6/2/06	Robert Fisk: The Fury
TIC21	6/2/06	Stephen Glover on the Press: No good news is good news
TIC22	6/2/06	Yasmin Alibhai-Brown: The double standards over free speech
TIC23	7/2/06	Dour die in Afghanistan as anti-Danish protests rage
TIC24	7/2/06	'Suicide bomb' protestor arrested
TIC25	8/2/06	Leading article: We should recognize our friends
TIC26	8/2/06	Muslim rally to condemn cartoons and extremists
TIC27	8/2/06	Doborah Orr: We despise this book-handed mullah but his propaganda feeds on our failures
TIC28	8/2/06	Student paper that dared to publish is pulped
TIC29	8/2/06	French weekly reprints cartoons
TIC30	8/2/06	Violent protests are a 'growing global crises'
TIC31	9/2/06	Adrian Hamilton: It's not about free expression, it's about politics
TIC32	9/3/06	Chirac condemns 'overtly provocative' cartoons
TIC33	9/2/06	Leading article: A right that comes with a moral responsibility
TIC34	9/2/06	Johann Hari: Free speech for all, Abu Hamza included
TIC35	10/3/06	Windows smashed at Wiltshire mosque
TIC36	10/2/06	Militant Muslim protestors face arrest
TIC37	10/2/06	How a meeting of leaders in Mecca set off the cartoon wars around the world
TIC38	11/3/06	Muslim rally organisers tell extremists to stay away
TIC39	11/2/06	Richard Ingrams' week: Shackles that bind our free press

<b>TIC40</b>	11/2/06	Howard Jacobson: As Graham Greene once put it, kindness and lies are worth a thousand truths
<b>TIC41</b>	12/2/06	Trail of terror that led to the radical embassy protests
<b>TIC42</b>	12/2/06	Flag traders see profits hotting up
<b>TIC43</b>	12/2/06	The two faces of Islam UK
<b>TIC44</b>	12/2/06	Humera Khan: The bad news: British Muslims have been let down, and extremism is the result
<b>TIC45</b>	13/2/06	Danes are urged to leave Indonesia as protests grow
<b>TIC46</b>	13/2/06	Yasmin Alibhai- Brown: We have an army of barbaric brutes
<b>TIC47</b>	13/2/06	Greg Dyke on broadcasting
<b>TIC48</b>	15/2/06	Two die in cartoons protest as Pakistani violence worsens
<b>TIC49</b>	16/2/06	Johann Hari: Moderate Muslims: the fightback begins
<b>TIC50</b>	16/2/06	Miles Kington: Why I fell about laughing at a cartoon without even seeing it.
<b>TIC51</b>	19/2/06	Danish cartoonist: 'No regrets'
<b>TIC52</b>	20/2/06	Toppling Musharraf: Heat rises on Pakistan leader
<b>TIC53</b>	24/2/06	Five days of violence by Nigerian Christians and Muslims kill 150
<b>TIC54</b>	15/3/06	Five held over cartoon protest
<b>TIC55</b>	21/3/06	Church apologises for cartoon publication
<b>TIC56</b>	26/3/06	Imran Khan: Islam and the West, Jemma and me
<b>TIC57</b>	7/4/06	Morgan's 'Big Mo' cartoon: now for the backlash
<b>TIC58</b>	17/9/06	Leading article: The Pope and the Prophet
<b>TIC59</b>	18/9/06	Pope's apology fails to placate Muslims as violence goes on
<b>TIC60</b>	18/9/06	Leading article: Religion and respect in the global village
<b>TIC61</b>	4/10/06	Has the West been silenced by Islam?
<b>TIC62</b>	4/10/06	Leading article: Beware loose talk about clash of civilisations
<b>TIC63</b>	10/10/06	Anti-Muslim video sparks new outrage against Denmark
<b>TIC64</b>	7/11/06	Comic strip portrays Sarkozy as a power-crazed Napoleon figure
<b>TIC65</b>	10/11/06	Anti-cartoon protester convicted of inciting racial hatred

#### Appendix 4 – The ‘2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy’ Articles – Arab Press

Gulf News		
Article	Date	Headline
GNC1	29/1/06	UAE flays Danish cartoons
GNC2	30/1/06	Danish daily apologises to Saudis
GNC3	30/1/06	Libya to close embassy in Denmark
GNC4	30/1/06	Gaza gunmen warn Danes
GNC5	30/1/06	Danish daily apologises to Saudis
GNC6	1/2/06	No official call for boycott
GNC7	3/2/06	Shock and surprise
GNC8	5/2/06	A matter of dignity for all Muslims
GNC9	5/2/06	Muslims ‘should stand United’
GNC10	7/2/06	Mohammed tells nations to hold civilised dialogue
GNC11	7/2/06	Freedom of speech or blasphemous insult?
GNC12	10/2/06	Gulf News poll scrapped after online manipulation
GNC13	12/2/06	Danish ambassadors leave Iran and Indonesia
GNC14	13/2/06	Danish embassy staff pullout hasty
GNC15	13/2/06	East and West must ‘work to end row
GNC16	14/2/06	Islamic website team to fly to Denmark for talks
GNC17	14/2/06	Solana seeks to calm Muslim anger
GNC18	14/2/06	Iran launches cartoon contest
GNC19	14/2/06	Media ‘can play key role in dialogue with West’
GNC20	15/2/06	Dismissed professor not reinstated official
GNC21	15/2/06	Violence erupts at cartoon protests
GNC22	15/2/06	I was maliciously set up-cartoonist
GNC23	15/2/06	Two shot dead in violent cartoon clashes
GNC24	15/2/06	GCC calls for clear apology from Denmark
GNC25	15/2/06	Iran protests Jesus and Mary cartoons
GNC26	16/2/06	West should change its attitude
GNC27	16/2/06	Yemini editor goes on trial for reprinting caricatures
GNC28	17/2/06	Hundreds of cartoon protestors arrested
GNC29	18/2/06	Ten die in Libya cartoon protest
GNC30	19/2/06	Timeline: Deaths from cartoon violence
GNC31	19/2/06	Use liquidity to cool tempers and create jobs
GNC32	20/2/06	Group condemns publication of caricatures
GNC33	21/2/06	Italy seeks to minimise fallout
GNC34	21/2/06	It was an attempt to provoke
GNC35	22/2/06	Editor defends paper’s action
GNC36	22/2/06	Playing politics with religion
GNC37	22/2/06	OIC asks EU to legislate to protect Islam
GNC38	22/2/06	Academics: Freedom involves responsibility
GNC39	23/2/06	Rice pledges to keep up pressure for Egypt reform
GNC40	23/2/06	Sectarian riots in Nigeria leave 27 more dead

GNC41	24/2/06	Real dynamics of event
GNC42	24/2/06	Free speech doesn't mean spreading hatred is acceptable
GNC43	24/2/06	Follow the noble teachings
GNC44	27/2/06	Annan urges East and West to find common ground
GNC45	27/2/06	Violence over images must end immediately
GNC46	28/2/06	In the interest of world peace
GNC47	1/3/06	Denmark moves to ease rising tension over caricatures
GNC48	1/3/06	Satirical comic misunderstood claims supplier
GNC49	5/3/06	Bush concerned about cartoons
GNC50	6/3/06	Anti-cartoon rally condemns US policies
GNC51	9/3/06	Drawing the line
GNC52	10/3/06	Start a dialogue of cultures
GNC53	11/3/06	Lawyers seek death penalty for Yemini editor
GNC54	13/3/06	Hundreds enter holocaust cartoon contest
GNC55	15/3/06	Emirates delays plan for flights to Copenhagen
GNC56	17/3/06	Mandelson sees initial EU-Gulf free trade agreement in May
GNC57	18/3/06	Radical group holds peaceful rally in Lahore
GNC58	26/3/06	Free-speech activists backoff
GNC59	27/3/06	Man to stand trial over cartoon protest
GNC60	2/4/06	Newspaper cartoon angers Indonesian government
GNC61	3/4/06	Danish products back on shelves
GNC62	6/4/06	Supermarket lifts ban on Danish firm
GNC63	8/4/06	Arla products return to Saudi stores
GNC64	11/4/06	Cartoon protest 'mirrored Muslims' love for Prophet'
GNC65	11/4/06	Muslim fury hits Danish dairies
GNC66	16/4/06	Cartoon controversy discussed
GNC67	1/5/06	Store lifts ban on Danish dairy firm
GNC68	6/5/06	Danish travel to Muslim countries falls
GNC69	6/5/06	Student kills self in prison
GNC70	7/5/06	Man held over cartoon protests
GNC71	12/5/06	Denmark's imam decides to leave country
GNC72	15/5/06	Rafiq unlikely to be free despite bail
GNC73	30/5/06	Malaysia's role in US-Iran stand-off
GNC74	7/6/06	Iranian dissident 'duty bound to criticise regime
GNC75	9/6/06	Debate reignites cartoon row
GNC76	14/6/06	Danish prime minister blamed for cartoon uproar
GNC77	21/6/06	Religious music gaining popularity in Egypt
GNC78	21/7/06	Saudi tabloid survives closure and arrest
GNC79	3/9/06	Holocaust cartoons' issue raised
GNC80	11/10/06	Danish firms fears another boycott
GNC81	16/10/06	Dh10.5m drive to correct image of Islam in the West
GNC82	27/10/06	Islamic group condemns Danish court decision
GNC83	27/10/06	Danish court rejects suit against paper
GNC84	2/11/06	Denmark one of Egypt's worst enemies
GNC85	14/11/06	Culture conflict can't set us free

Gulf Times		
Article	Date	Headline
GTC1	17/10/05	Youth held over link to death threats sent to cartoonists
GTC2	3/12/05	Denmark warns threat over Prophet's cartoons
GTC3	21/12/05	Danish diplomats criticise PM over cartoon scandal
GTC4	19/1/05	OIC slams paper over blasphemous cartoons
GTC5	26/1/05	Saudi cleric seeks action over offensive cartoons
GTC6	28/1/06	Top Saudi cleric warns Denmark
GTC7	29/1/06	Leaflet calls for boycott of products
GTC8	29/1/06	Cartoons prompt Gulf boycott of Danish goods
GTC9	30/1/06	Two Doha retailers boycott Danish goods over cartoons
GTC10	30/1/06	Norway, Denmark sorry for offensive cartoons
GTC11	30/1/06	OIC, league for UN action on blasphemy
GTC12	31/1/06	A boycott should have an objective
GTC13	31/1/06	More outlets withdraw Danish goods
GTC14	31/1/06	Clinton slams prejudice
GTC15	31/1/06	Call for boycott of Danish items
GTC16	1/2/06	Danish PM expresses 'alarm' as fury grows
GTC17	1/2/06	Meeting on boycott of goods
GTC18	2/2/06	Outrage as caricatures row widens
GTC19	2/2/06	Call to continue boycott
GTC20	4/2/06	Boycott of products 'only logical response'
GTC21	4/2/06	Europeans leaders urge calm over cartoons
GTC22	4/2/06	Western press split over controversial cartoons
GTC23	4/2/06	Musharraf condemns offensive cartoons
GTC24	5/2/06	Awareness campaign is a timely initiative
GTC25	5/2/06	Indonesian, Malaysian leaders slam cartoons
GTC26	5/2/06	Govt summons Europe envoys over cartoons
GTC27	5/2/06	Heavily-guarded newspaper stands firm on free speech
GTC28	5/2/06	Qardawi wants envoys recalled from Denmark
GTC29	5/2/06	Danish march over cartoon
GTC30	5/2/06	Turkey urges 'legitimate limits' to reactions
GTC31	5/2/06	Tempered reaction among American Muslims to cartoon row
GTC32	6/2/06	Islam decries violent reaction
GTC33	6/2/06	European leaders slam violence over cartoons
GTC34	6/2/06	Protesters set fire to Danish consulate in Beirut
GTC35	6/2/06	Traders torch flags over cartoons
GTC36	6/2/06	Cleric urges Aussie media not to reprint caricatures
GTC37	6/2/06	QCCI refuses to meet Danish delegation
GTC38	6/2/06	Banning of Danish products boosts sale of other countries
GTC39	7/2/06	Danes close embassy in Jakarta after protests
GTC40	7/2/06	Hundreds rally for peace and dialogue
GTC41	7/2/06	Three Afghans killed in riots over cartoons
GTC42	7/2/06	Pakistani doctors to boycott European drugs
GTC43	7/2/06	Global fury is no faults of our: Danish Imams
GTC44	7/2/06	Protests erupt in many cities against offending cartoons

GTC45	7/2/06	Turkey says priest probably killed by a lone gunman
GTC46	7/2/06	Protests stain Scandinavia's Peace loving image
GTC47	7/2/06	Dhaka to make formal protest over cartoons
GTC48	8/2/06	US faces tough balancing act in cartoon row
GTC49	8/2/06	Danes relieved at US, UK support
GTC50	8/2/06	Outrage spreads in Pakistan
GTC51	8/2/06	Dhaka asks Denmark to apologise over cartoons
GTC52	8/2/06	Eminent scholars urge law preventing mockery of religious, social values
GTC53	8/2/06	Four Afghans killed as cartoon protesters attack Norwegian troops
GTC54	9/2/06	Thousands protest against cartoons in Bangladesh
GTC55	9/2/06	Cabinet urges 'mutual respect' in imbroglio over Danish cartoons
GTC56	9/2/06	Fury over cartoons eases in Indonesia
GTC57	9/2/06	Kashmir group calls for boycott
GTC58	11/2/06	French see reprinting as 'unnecessary provocation'
GTC59	11/2/06	Dutch MP defends European press
GTC60	11/2/06	Editor charged with blasphemy
GTC61	11/2/06	Warning on 'chasm' between West, Islam
GTC62	11/2/06	Thousands march in Islamabad over cartoons
GTC63	11/2/06	Danish paper sends editor on vacation
GTC64	11/2/06	Philippine Muslim leaders urge restraint
GTC65	11/2/06	Bukhari calls for campaign against Denmark over offending cartoons
GTC66	11/2/06	Kenyan riot cops clash with cartoon protestors
GTC67	11/2/06	Khaleda demands apology as cartoon rallies erupt
GTC68	11/2/06	41 Pakistani workers detained in Afghanistan
GTC69	12/2/06	Most Danes lay blame for furore with imams: survey
GTC70	12/2/06	Nationwide strike over cartoons on March 3
GTC71	12/2/06	Thousands protest in London over cartoons
GTC72	12/2/06	Islamic party urges punishment over offensive cartoons
GTC73	12/2/06	Cartoons are part of 'war against Islam'
GTC74	13/2/06	Tens of thousands in biggest cartoon row rally in Turkey
GTC75	13/2/06	Cartoon row angers Iran
GTC76	13/2/06	UN aid work to continue despite security concerns
GTC77	13/2/06	Islam does not need arsonists to defend it
GTC78	13/2/06	Kabul confirms abduction of two Nepalese citizens
GTC79	13/2/06	T-shirts bearing offensive cartoons on sale in the US
GTC80	13/2/06	UK sociologist explains Muslim reaction to cartoons
GTC81	14/2/06	Bangladesh lawmakers condemn cartoons
GTC82	14/2/06	Holocaust cartoon contest on
GTC83	14/2/06	Danish PM stirs controversy with meeting on cartoon row
GTC84	14/2/06	4,000 cartoon protestors tear-gassed
GTC85	15/2/06	Cartoonist denies entering Iranian Holocaust contest
GTC86	15/2/06	Norway religious delegation tenders apology for cartoons
GTC87	15/2/06	British Muslims have been let down, and extremism is the result
GTC88	15/2/06	Muslim nations seek UN ban
GTC89	15/3/06	Two killed in Pakistan as cartoon riots turn violent

GTC90	16/2/06	Political far-right yet to cash in on row
GTC91	16/2/06	EU rallies behind Denmark
GTC92	16/3/06	Politics of hatred is still thriving in Italy
GTC93	16/2/06	Security upped for players in Multan
GTC94	16/2/06	Three more people dead as cartoon riots spiral
GTC95	18/2/06	Meeting slams offensive publication
GTC96	18/2/06	Qaradawi denies escalating tension
GTC97	18/2/06	Muslim Danes see silver lining to cartoon crises
GTC98	18/2/06	Printing of caricatures was a mistake: Clinton
GTC99	18/2/06	Fresh cartoon riots erupt in Dhaka
GTC100	18/2/06	Assembly condemns Prophet cartoons
GTC101	18/2/06	Muslim-West ties 'hit by cartoon row'
GTC102	18/2/06	Pakistan recalls its envoy over cartoon controversy
GTC103	19/2/06	Activists bemoan closure of Russian paper over cartoons
GTC104	19/2/06	Minister offers bounty for cartoonist's head
GTC105	19/2/06	Double history made by racers in 30 minutes
GTC106	19/2/06	Thousands of Muslims rally over cartoons
GTC107	19/2/06	Commonwealth chief calls for dialogue
GTC108	19/2/06	Govt bans anti-cartoon protests in Islamabad
GTC109	19/2/06	OIC head coming tomorrow to discuss common strategy
GTC110	19/2/06	Nigerian protest turns violent, businesses hit
GTC111	20/2/06	Nigeria govt sends in the army after cartoon riots
GTC112	20/2/06	Danish ambassador returns home
GTC113	20/2/06	Paper prints 'apology'
GTC114	20/2/06	Thousands protest against cartoons
GTC115	20/2/06	Police use tear gas to break up cartoon rally
GTC116	21/2/06	Denmark, Norway condemn bounty on artists as 'murder'
GTC117	21/2/06	Nigerian state bans planned demonstrations over cartoons
GTC118	21/2/06	Hamas likely to 'soften its line'
GTC119	21/2/06	Top MMA leader freed, vows to continue protests
GTC120	21/2/06	Pharmacies lend support to Danish goods boycott
GTC121	21/2/06	Anti- cartoon protestors threaten to join Qaeda
GTC122	22/2/06	Nigeria imposes curfew in restive north
GTC123	22/2/06	'Fatwa' on cartoonist wrong, says OIC chief
GTC124	22/2/06	PM rejects enquiry into handling of Danish row
GTC125	22/2/06	Rawalpindi traders close down shops
GTC126	22/2/06	Opposition leaders face house arrest
GTC127	22/2/06	Today's fascists hate Muslims, not Jews
GTC128	23/2/06	Boycott of Danish goods unnecessary: US envoy
GTC129	23/2/06	Protest rallies continue to rage across Pakistan
GTC130	23/2/06	Danish NGO leaving
GTC131	23/2/06	Cartoon parody causes anger
GTC132	25/2/06	Denmark makes overtures to Muslims in Cartoon row
GTC133	25/2/06	Top leader of Islamic party detained
GTC134	25/2/06	Danish goods withdrawal has little impact on stores and consumers
GTC135	25/2/06	Hindu groups offer reward for killing M F Husain

<b>GTC136</b>	26/2/06	Sindh CM boycotts Western products
<b>GTC137</b>	26/2/06	Islamabad 'will take up' cartoon issue at the UN
<b>GTC138</b>	26/2/06	Vatican tells Muslims to turn tolerant cheek
<b>GTC139</b>	26/2/06	2006 will open new chapter in West-Islamic world ties
<b>GTC140</b>	27/2/06	Religious schism feared in multipolar world
<b>GTC141</b>	27/2/06	Shun those not wanting religious co-existence: Rabbi
<b>GTC142</b>	27/2/06	Cartoons boosted extremists: Khatami
<b>GTC143</b>	27/2/06	Top Islamic party leader, Imran among several held
<b>GTC144</b>	28/2/06	Jakarta says war on terror needs tolerance
<b>GTC145</b>	28/2/06	Europe seeks end to 'bitterness with Muslim world'
<b>GTC146</b>	28/2/06	Muslims urged to avoid violence while responding to cartoons
<b>GTC147</b>	1/3/06	Children burn Danish PM's effigy, coffins over cartoons
<b>GTC148</b>	1/3/06	Elite panel urges end to violence and hatred
<b>GTC149</b>	1/3/06	Afghans blame 'infidels' for Iraq attack, caricatures
<b>GTC150</b>	1/3/06	Arab MP's for a ban on religious offences
<b>GTC151</b>	2/3/06	TV stations apologise over cartoons
<b>GTC152</b>	4/3/06	Scholars blame clerics for sectarian violence in Iraq
<b>GTC153</b>	4/3/06	Bush arrives in Pakistan amid protests and strike
<b>GTC154</b>	6/3/06	Italian foreign minister said he never meant to offend
<b>GTC155</b>	6/3/06	Blasphemy issue delays govt's madrassa plan
<b>GTC156</b>	6/3/06	Thousand rally against cartoons
<b>GTC157</b>	8/3/06	Populist party tops Norway Survey after cartoon row
<b>GTC158</b>	8/3/06	Spain, Pakistan agree to work for religious harmony
<b>GTC159</b>	9/3/06	Court upholds MMA leader's detention
<b>GTC160</b>	12/3/06	Pakistan recalls envoy to Norway
<b>GTC161</b>	13/3/06	2,000 protesters stage anti-cartoon rally in Multan
<b>GTC162</b>	13/3/06	Danish rail operator briefly bans book ad
<b>GTC163</b>	16/3/05	Cash and a car for the blood of Danish cartoonists
<b>GTC164</b>	16/3/05	Five held for cartoons protests
<b>GTC165</b>	22/3/05	Charles condemns cartoon violence
<b>GTC166</b>	23/3/05	New groups signals formation of Muslim party
<b>GTC167</b>	26/3/05	US accused of 'creating bin Laden'
<b>GTC168</b>	1/4/05	Gang forces Paris cafe to censor cartoon exhibition
<b>GTC169</b>	2/4/06	Firm sees customers lifting boycott
<b>GTC170</b>	11/4/06	Muslim boycott over cartoons hit Danish dairy exports hard
<b>GTC171</b>	21/4/06	Mission of Al Jazeera international in doubt
<b>GTC172</b>	26/4/06	Danish products finding their way back to shelves
<b>GTC173</b>	7/5/06	Protests erupt in Multan over German prison death
<b>GTC174</b>	7/5/06	Pakistani student dies in German police custody
<b>GTC175</b>	9/5/06	Protest over death of Pakistani in Berlin
<b>GTC176</b>	10/5/06	Sleuths head for Berlin to probe death in custody
<b>GTC177</b>	11/5/06	Room-mate casts doubts on student 'suicide' in Germany
<b>GTC178</b>	14/5/06	Thousands attend Cheema's funeral
<b>GTC179</b>	23/5/06	Religious parties to oppose screening of Da Vinci Code
<b>GTC180</b>	19/6/06	Key issues on OIC meeting's agenda

<b>GTC181</b>	5/7/06	Denmark reopens embassy
<b>GTC182</b>	3/9/06	Controversial cartoons sparked train bomb plot
<b>GTC183</b>	7/9/06	Two Muslims jailed in Denmark raid
<b>GTC184</b>	16/9/06	Violence over pope comments is feared
<b>GTC185</b>	19/9/06	Fears feed clash of rival faiths
<b>GTC186</b>	27/9/06	Court lifts ban on state newspaper
<b>GTC187</b>	8/10/06	Muslims refuse to be provoked by TV cartoons
<b>GTC188</b>	28/10/06	Danish verdict on cartoons slammed
<b>GTC189</b>	9/11/06	Danish Muslims say arrest of seven suspects hurting integration hopes
<b>GTC190</b>	21/11/06	Dutch play down risk of backlash over ban on veil
<b>GTC191</b>	26/11/06	Yemen editor freed on bail

Arab News		
Article	Date	Headline
ANC1	21/10/05	Muslim ambassadors to Denmark protest cartoons about Prophet
ANC2	30/12/05	Arabs FMs slam Denmark over Prophet Muhammad Cartoon
ANC3	20/1/06	Offensive cartoons draw people's ire
ANC4	22/1/06	Islam and the West: Who hates whom?
ANC5	24/1/06	Kingdom blasts sacrilegious cartoons
ANC6	27/1/06	Boycott Danish goods over Blasphemous cartoons
ANC7	28/1/06	Imams back call for Danish boycott in cartoons row
ANC8	29/1/06	We need more than a butter boycott
ANC9	29/1/06	Effect of Danish boycott patchy
ANC10	29/1/06	OIC demands unqualified Danish apology
ANC11	29/1/06	Dodging boycott call, Norway voices Regret
ANC12	29/1/06	Editorial: Irresponsible
ANC13	30/1/06	OIC, Arab league seek UN resolution on cartoons
ANC14	31/1/06	Naif urges Muslim stand on cartoons
ANC15	1/2/06	Danish newspaper apologizes, receives Bomb threat
ANC16	1/2/06	Muslims deserve the same respect as Christians and Jews
ANC17	2/2/06	Danish Imam: Controversy opens important debate
ANC18	2/2/06	Winner in Danish Boycott: Newspapers
ANC19	3/2/06	The power of the Muslim and Arab worlds
ANC20	3/2/06	Something out of Danish Character
ANC21	4/2/06	It's not just about the Danes
ANC22	4/2/06	'Cartoons infused Muslims with a spirit of defiance'
ANC23	5/2/06	Hate speech in the Guise of freedom of Expression
ANC24	5/2/06	Republishing cartoons is stupid and offensive
ANC25	6/2/06	A freedom Gone Too far
ANC26	6/2/06	Musharraf reiterates Kashmir demilitarization
ANC27	6/2/06	A 'Freedom' whose home is the jungle
ANC28	7/2/06	JCCI not to invite Danes for forum
ANC29	7/2/06	Six die in global protests
ANC30	7/2/06	Defending 'The life of Brian'
ANC31	7/2/06	Gulf Muslims step up Danish boycott over cartoons
ANC32	7/2/06	Europe's uncivilised act
ANC33	7/2/06	Press freedom Vis-a-Vis respect for the sacred
ANC34	7/2/06	Is free speech truly alive and well in the Western nations?
ANC35	8/2/06	Protests Over cartoon spread in Pakistan
ANC36	8/2/06	Bigotry as European Chic
ANC37	8/2/06	Thousands take part in Dhaka anti-cartoon rally
ANC38	8/2/06	US facing tough act in cartoon controversy
ANC39	8/2/06	Norwegian troops attacked
ANC40	9/2/06	Editorial: return to sanity
ANC41	9/2/06	A call for respect, calm reflection
ANC42	9/2/06	Danish paper rejected Jesus cartoons
ANC43	9/2/06	Envoy's advert fails to impress many
ANC44	10/2/06	OIC calls for laws to protect sanctity of religions

ANC45	11/2/06	Huge 'chasm' with West: Badawi
ANC46	12/2/06	'Stand firm to face challenges'
ANC47	12/2/06	Cartoon battle lines drawn in shades of gray
ANC48	12/2/06	Denmark now a country of Torn emotions and doubt
ANC49	12/2/06	A caricature of freedom
ANC50	12/2/06	Confusing hate speech with freedom of expression, again!
ANC51	13/2/06	Dialogue needed to end East-West divide: Gore
ANC52	13/2/06	Al Gore calls for 'century of renewal'
ANC53	13/2/06	It takes two to avoid a clash of civilisations
ANC54	13/2/06	Understanding freedom
ANC55	13/2/06	Countryside strike against cartoons soon
ANC56	13/2/06	Anarchists shouldn't be allowed to speak for Islam
ANC57	14/2/06	Are we sleepwalking toward another conflict?
ANC58	14/2/06	Courageous US woman builds bridges of understanding
ANC59	14/2/06	Solana seeks to quell cartoon rage
ANC60	14/2/06	Bangladesh House blasts cartoons
ANC61	15/2/06	Toward a positive media strategy
ANC62	15/2/06	Two dead, hundreds held in Pak cartoon rampage
ANC63	15/2/06	Prevent repeat of cartoon scandal, Saud tells European countries
ANC64	16/2/06	Locals express disgust at West's ignorance of Islam
ANC65	16/2/06	3 More die in Pak cartoon protests
ANC66	16/2/06	Yemen charges journalist over cartoons
ANC67	17/2/06	'Cut ties with cartoon-printing nations'
ANC68	17/2/06	Guilt of the callous few, pain of the decent many
ANC69	18/2/06	OIC calls for emergency meeting on cartoon issue
ANC70	18/2/06	Palestine's democracy and Hamas: What now?
ANC71	18/2/06	Cartoons: Europe needs to examine its own values
ANC72	19/2/06	Indian minister offers bounty
ANC73	19/2/06	Pak envoy, OIC chief to discuss caricatures
ANC74	19/2/06	OIC chief, Aziz to discuss strategy over cartoons
ANC75	20/2/06	Western democracy fails in too many ways
ANC76	20/2/06	MBC team in Denmark to present correct image of the prophet
ANC77	20/2/06	Our choice: Distrust and Hate, or social cohesion
ANC78	21/2/06	Politics behind Pakistan's cartoon chaos
ANC79	22/2/06	'Inter-dependence key to Islamic nations' growth'
ANC80	24/2/06	How free is free?
ANC81	24/2/06	Exercising free speech or spreading hatred?
ANC82	24/2/06	More protests on cartoons in Pakistan
ANC83	26/2/06	Islamabad to raise cartoons issue at UN
ANC84	26/2/06	Free speech or hate speech?
ANC85	28/2/06	Anti-cartoon protests continue
ANC86	28/2/06	UK Muslims: a community left to talk only to itself
ANC87	2/3/06	MQM asks allies to take up cartoon issue at UN
ANC88	3/3/06	Danish Cartoons: Who made the situation uncontrollable?
ANC89	4/3/06	Top Pak court orders blocking of blasphemous websites
ANC90	6/3/06	Rally in Karachi to protest blasphemous caricatures

<b>ANC91</b>	8/3/06	OIC, EU should take cartoons row to UN
<b>ANC92</b>	8/3/06	Taking potshot at the powerless is not bravery
<b>ANC93</b>	12/3/06	Islam, West: Let's not allow extremists to set agenda
<b>ANC94</b>	13/3/06	300 Islamic scholars to attend Manama meet on Prophet
<b>ANC95</b>	13/3/06	Danish cartoons and Muslim reaction: Two wrongs and no right
<b>ANC96</b>	15/3/06	Pak minister discusses cartoons with OIC, MWL
<b>ANC97</b>	16/3/06	Freedom of speech: Whose freedom? What speech?
<b>ANC98</b>	19/3/06	Pak envoy, OIC chief to discuss caricatures
<b>ANC99</b>	19/3/06	Denmark PM's Delhi visit put off over cartoon row
<b>ANC100</b>	23/3/06	Hundreds protest against cartoons in Multan
<b>ANC101</b>	23/3/06	Muslim groups call for ending boycott of Danish firm
<b>ANC102</b>	4/4/06	Products of Danish dairy company return to supermarket shelves
<b>ANC103</b>	8/4/06	Danish TV host's head scarf sparks new row
<b>ANC104</b>	17/4/06	Muslims protest cartoons published in Italy
<b>ANC105</b>	2/5/06	Islamophobia focus of OIC's London conference
<b>ANC106</b>	6/5/06	Germany asked to explain Pakistani's death in custody
<b>ANC107</b>	10/5/06	Kings Abdullah's visit boosted morale of Indian Muslims: MP
<b>ANC108</b>	21/6/06	Textbook with Prophet's sketch withdrawn after protests
<b>ANC109</b>	18/9/06	Both sides feel threats in Pope-Islam controversy
<b>ANC110</b>	19/9/06	Muslims: Fearful fantasies in West's own image
<b>ANC111</b>	19/9/06	Editorial: Chasm of ignorance
<b>ANC112</b>	6/10/06	When US sanctions abuse
<b>ANC113</b>	8/10/06	Danish video sparks fresh outrage
<b>ANC114</b>	10/10/06	OIC deplores Danish video of the prophet
<b>ANC115</b>	12/10/06	'Islamofascists' are roaming America's cartoon world
<b>ANC116</b>	14/10/06	Armenian genocide vote set to fan divisions
<b>ANC117</b>	27/10/06	Danish court rejects lawsuit
<b>ANC118</b>	28/10/06	Hilali message lost in translation
<b>ANC119</b>	26/11/06	Yemen jails journalist over blasphemous cartoons
<b>ANC120</b>	7/12/06	Yemen fines editor over prophet cartoons
<b>ANC121</b>	14/10/06	Yemen bans two journalists over prophet cartoons

Kuwait Times		
Article	Date	Headline
KTC1	21/1/06	Big shame on current world system
KTC2	30/1/06	'Selective' freedom of speech
KTC3	30/1/06	Polemic against the Prophet through Kuwaiti eyes
KTC4	31/1/06	Danish ambassador tries to solve cartoon controversy
KTC5	31/1/06	Awaqaf lashes out on Danish press mockery
KTC6	1/2/06	Kuwait may ban Danish medicine
KTC7	4/2/06	Kuwait leads delegation to discuss cartoon crises
KTC8	4/2/06	Kuwait voices protests against 'hate cartoon'
KTC9	5/2/06	Scandinavian missions burn in Damascus
KTC10	6/2/06	Anger makes people blind
KTC11	6/2/06	Boycotts, protests continue around the world: No end in sight
KTC12	8/2/06	Cartoon protests turn deadly
KTC13	8/2/06	Danish boycott 'success'
KTC14	8/2/06	Violence and democratically-elected govts
KTC15	9/2/06	Kuwait urges calm in cartoon protests
KTC16	11/2/06	Cartoon anger rages unabated
KTC17	14/2/06	America's double standards
KTC18	15/2/06	Cartoon protests take a deadly turn in Pakistan
KTC19	15/2/06	Ironic tips to new ministers
KTC20	16/2/06	The Dwarfs take over
KTC21	21/2/06	Peaceful co-existence of human beings
KTC22	1/3/06	'Opportunities' to rally more support
KTC23	9/3/06	Security industry flourishing
KTC24	11/3/06	We demand respect, says Kuwaiti scholar Muslims call for Danish cartoon apology
KTC25	12/3/06	Egyptians vie for Islamists leadership
KTC26	26/3/06	Egyptian child bearing machines
KTC27	11/4/06	Co-ops mull lifting Danish ban
KTC28	19/9/06	Respect of religion only way out
KTC29	12/10/06	Danish mission in Iran firebombed MP demands ties with Denmark cut

**Appendix 5 – The ‘2009 French Face Veil Ban’ CDA Analysis – UK Articles**

# The Times (TT1-TT6)

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## TT1

### ***France considers ban on full Muslim veil***

France has set itself a troublesome real-life question that could have come from this week's baccalauréat philosophy test: should society dictate how people dress?

The matter arises because parliamentarians are calling for measures to stop Muslim women wearing full veils in public. *Niqabs* and *burqas* -- the head-to-toe costumes that cover all or most of the face -- are said to be spreading as fundamentalist doctrines gain hold among a small minority of France's five million Muslims. President Sarkozy is going to address the issue in a speech on Monday and a string of public figures have come out largely in support of restrictions in order to protect women from oppression. Ministers in Sarkozy's government hold conflicting views on the question.

This new debate over Muslim dress is reviving the passions that surrounded France's 2004 law prohibiting religious head-cover and other symbols of faith in state schools. The justification was the enforcement of *laïcité*, France's tradition that keeps religious expression away from institutions of the strictly secular republic. The measure was mainly intended to ensure the equality of Muslim girls and it has worked smoothly.

The subject goes to the heart of France's ideal of itself as a culturally integrated republic and it creates misunderstanding abroad, obviously in the Muslim world but also in the "Anglo-Saxon" and north European countries which emphasise what they see as religious freedom. First-time French visitors to Britain are often shocked when they come across female police and immigration officers wearing Muslim head-gear, or male officers in Sikh turbans. The French are also taken aback by the constant references to God in the discourse of US politicians. In turn, British and Americans are often unable to understand the positive, egalitarian intentions of the French secular approach. Foreign correspondents here found their home media editing out the fact that the school veil ban was supported by Muslims. It didn't fit the Anglo-Saxon preconception that it was an undemocratic act of discrimination (The degree of support from Muslims was open to dispute, with some polls showing about 60 percent approval and others only a minority).

Only two weeks ago Sarkozy and Barack Obama crossed swords over the existing headscarf ban after the US president took a swipe at it in his speech in Cairo. He said the United States prized freedom of religion and "*we are not going to tell people what to wear.*" To many French ears, that sounded naive. In Normandy on June 6, Sarkozy told Obama that French principles of equality meant that people should not display religious affiliation in state

institutions. *"It is not a problem that young girls may choose to wear a veil or a headscarf as long as they have actually chosen to do so, as opposed to this being imposed upon them, be it by their families or by their environment."*

That is of course the crux of the problem. Who decides whether they have made a free choice? Extending the ban from schools and some state agencies to an all-out prohibition on any face-covering raises big questions. Veiled women who have been questioned over the past few days by the media have generally said that the choice was their own.

Critics, including some government ministers, say a ban on the burqa and niqab would be unworkable and would only force greater isolation on the victims, as the wearers are seen. Gilbert Collard, a celebrity lawyer, made the point today in *France Soir* newspaper:

*"These caged women show the power of the fundamentalists to indoctrinate. They testify also to an odious idea of woman as an object of submission to an all-powerful master who is the exclusive proprietor of her face. But... forbidding this provocation by shadows in the streets would only reinforce their provocation."*

The call for a parliamentary inquiry is led by André Gerin, a Communist MP and Mayor of a suburb of Lyons, who calls the burqa and the niqab *"a moving prison for women."* He has been supported by two young Muslim-born women ministers, Fadel Amara and Rama Yade.

Amara, a rights campaigner who is Housing Minister, said she is alarmed by the number of women wearing veils. *"We must do everything to stop burqas from spreading, in the name of democracy, of the republic, of respect for women."* Yade, Minister for Human Rights in the Foreign Ministry, said today that she supported a prohibition in the name of women's equality and human dignity. The wearing of veils *"is a phenomenon which is visibly spreading,"* she said.

Muslim leaders have mixed views. Dalil Boubakeur, rector of the Paris Mosque, supported an inquiry, saying that face-covering for women was a fundamentalist practice that is not prescribed by Islam. But the national Muslim Council, which is less tied to the establishment, accused lawmakers of wasting time on a fringe phenomenon. *"To raise the subject like this...is a way of stigmatising Islam and the Muslims of France,"* said Mohammed Moussaoui, head of the Council.

I suspect that Sarkozy will not favour a new law. He was not enthusiastic about the school headscarf ban, which was introduced by his predecessor President Chirac. Sarkozy sees the clothing bans as a form of discrimination and he tries to promote policies that bring Muslims, many or most of whom were born in France, into the mainstream community. From that point of view, the President is on the same ground as the activists in the *banlieue* immigrant estates who see him as the devil.

I've made some sweeping statements and this is touchy territory. Feel free to fire away.

And as a footnote, it's worth noting that the government yesterday published its decree banning facial cover during demonstrations. Anyone who wears a mask or other cover will face a 1,500 euro fine on the first offence and double on the second. Police unions are worried that they will be unable to enforce this law which is intended to make life harder for the *casseurs*, the violent extreme-left protesters who try to turn demonstrations into riots.

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## TT2

### ***Burka makes women prisoners, says President Sarkozy***

President Sarkozy threw his weight yesterday behind attempts to bar French Muslim women from covering their faces in public, calling their full-body dress a “debasement of women”.

Mr Sarkozy made his attack on a small but growing number of fundamentalist women in a “state of the nation” speech that was the first by a French President to both houses of parliament since 1873.

Talking in the ornate chamber of the Château de Versailles Mr Sarkozy also rejected calls to raise taxes and promised to accelerate his project to remake France despite the deep recession. His strong words on the niqab and the burka were part of a confident personal performance review that was decried by the opposition as a selfaggrandising stunt.

“In our country we cannot accept that women be prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity,” Mr Sarkozy said to applause in the parliament’s ceremonial Versailles home.

“The burka is not a religious sign. It is a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement,” he added. “It will not be welcome on the territory of the French Republic.”

Mr Sarkozy was adding his voice to a strong consensus that has emerged this month against women in France’s five million-strong Muslim community who wear the full or nearly-full cover of their bodies and faces. The latest French controversy over Muslim dress, which follows the 2004 ban on head-cover in state schools, began this month when 60 MPs from both sides of the house demanded action against the burka and the niqab.

“A debate has to take place and all views must be expressed,” said Mr Sarkozy. “What better place than parliament for this? I tell you we must not be ashamed of our values, we must not be afraid of defending them.”

Many on the Left disapprove of what is seen as a small rise in women adopting fundamentalist dress — they are said to number several thousand. But they are unhappy

with what they see as Mr Sarkozy's enthusiasm for action that would further stigmatise a big immigrant population that is excluded from much of mainstream life.

Muslim leaders reacted cautiously to Mr Sarkozy's words on the niqab and burka. Dalil Boubakeur, rector of the Great Mosque of Paris, called the President's remarks "in keeping with the republican spirit of secularism". Moderate Muslims also saw full face-covering as a symbol of submission, said Mr Boubakeur.

Measures against face cover are supported by two of the three women Muslims in the Cabinet but other ministers are questioning the wisdom of legislation that could be impossible to enforce.

It would also risk further criticism of France abroad. This month President Obama attacked the French headscarf rule in a speech in Cairo, saying that the United States did not believe that the Government should dictate people's dress.

Boosted by victory for his party in the European Parliament elections Mr Sarkozy devoted his speech to promising to continue the reforms that he began implementing after his election in May 2007. He is to stage his first medium-sized Cabinet reshuffle tomorrow to open a second phase of his five-year administration. Among those departing are Rachida Dati, the Justice Minister, and Michael Barnier, the Farm Minister.

The joint parliamentary session at Versailles was attacked by all the opposition parties as an act of selfpromotion by a President with monarchical pretensions. The speech was made possible by a change in the constitution that Mr Sarkozy introduced last year.

Since the late 19th century French presidents had been barred from appearing in parliament under rules intended to reinforce the separation of powers. The Socialist Party boycotted the debate after his speech and MPs from small Green and Communist parties boycotted a session that they depicted as an attempt by Mr Sarkozy to play Louis XIV, the Sun King, who based the Royal Court at Versailles.

## **DRESS CODE**

— In **France** a law was passed in 2004 banning pupils from wearing "conspicuous" religious symbols at state schools, a move widely interpreted as aimed at the Muslim headscarf

— In **Turkey** where 99 per cent of the population is Muslim, all forms of Muslim headscarf have been banned in universities for decades under the secular government. In June 2008 the country's Constitutional Court overruled government attempts to lift the ban, prompting protests

— In **Britain** guidelines say that the full Islamic veil should not be worn in courts, but the final decision is up to judges. Schools may forge their own dress codes and in 2006, courts upheld the suspension of Aishah Azmi, a Muslim teaching assistant who refused to remove her veil in class

— **German** states have the option of choosing to ban teachers and other government employees from wearing Muslim headscarves; four have done so

—The **Italian** parliament in July 2005 approved anti-terrorist laws that make hiding one's features from the public — including through wearing the burla — an offence

— **Tunisia**, a Muslim country, has banned Islamic headscarves in public places since 1981. In 2006 authorities began a campaign against the headscarves and began strictly enforcing the ban

— The **Dutch** Government said in 2007 that it was drawing up legislation to ban burkas, but it was defeated in elections in November and the new centrist coalition said it had no plans to implement a ban

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## TT3

### ***Britain could never debate the burka like France***

President Sarkozy's proposed ban may be pure politicking, but it does expose a fundamental cross-Channel difference

“The burka is not a religious problem, it's a question of liberty and women's dignity. It's not a religious symbol, but a sign of subservience and debasement. I want to say solemnly, the burka is not welcome in France. In our country, we can't accept women prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity. That is not our idea of freedom.”

So spoke Nicolas Sarkozy in Versailles during his first state of the nation address to France's two chambers, the National Assembly and the Senate. He won rapturous applause and there is little doubt that an overwhelming majority of the French agreed with his every word. I say an overwhelming majority because this issue crosses all party lines in France. Republican principles of equality and secularism are so deeply grounded in the French mind that they belong as much to the Left as to the Right.

For someone like me, firmly on the Left, the defence of secularism is the only way to guarantee cultural diversity and national cohesion. One cannot go without the other. However, when I get on Eurostar to London, I feel totally alien. To my horror, my liberal-left British friends find such a position closer to that of the hard Right.

So does Mr Sarkozy's speech mean France is about to forbid its citizens to wear the burka on the streets? Unlikely. Mr Sarkozy's speech should be seen as piece of politics; he wants to reassure his party of his allegiance to the ideals of the French Republic and to undermine even further the awkward position of the Left.

The resurgence of a public debate on religious symbols in France is not innocent on Mr Sarkozy's part. It is another instance of his extraordinary ability to fill the public agenda with new debates and new ideas for yet more reforms to maintain a state of frenzied agitation, which leaves the French feeling both weary and wary. Despite good results at the European election, Mr Sarkozy and his Government are not popular.

With gloomy economic forecasts and discontent in workplaces across France, Mr Sarkozy urgently needed to recapture the nation's attention. But the burka and all ostentatious religious signs have already been banned in state-run schools since 2004. And in hospitals or municipal offices, anywhere where people interact as equal citizens, staff are not allowed to wear hijabs or burka, and patients or members will be told to unveil. The ban in schools was passed in 2004 as a reaction to the Socialist Government of Lionel Jospin, which was seen as violating the spirit of the 1905 law on the separation of Church and State. Its laissez-faire attitude allowed a handful of teenagers to start wearing the hijab in school, provoking national outrage and a debate that lasted until the 2004 law finally enforced the Republican principle.

That such a debate is taking place again reveals the sturdy health of secularism in France, a tradition that doesn't shy away from being confrontational even in a country with the largest Muslim and Jewish communities in Europe.

Similar debates seem impossible in Britain. When Jack Straw dared to state the obvious in 2006 by saying that the burka and the niqab were "visible statements of separation and of difference" before asking politely that women visiting his constituency surgery consider removing them, it provoked angry protests from Islamic associations and the British liberal-Left, always inclined, it seems, to defend the rights of liberty's enemies.

Seen from France, Britain's tolerance of extremist views looks at best naive, at worse dangerous: a recipe for trouble, division and painful soul-searching. Britain's recent questioning of Britishness and what is it to be British, could never happen in France where a sense of common identity has been steadily forged through two centuries during which the Revolution and the Republic have provided the cement of national unity.

If Britain's tolerance of political and religious extremism is often bewildering to the French, it also fascinates them. This tolerance does appeal to some French because of its sheer exoticism. French tourists visiting Britain for the first time, London in particular, are struck by what they perceive as a kaleidoscope of different ethnic minorities going about their day in their religious and cultural attire, cohabitating seemingly peacefully with punks and the half-naked: being free to differ.

What those visitors may discover later is that the price of this peaceful cohabitation lies in a constant bargaining of specific rights for specific communities in the name of cultural difference - the opposite of equality as understood in France. In France, public swimming

pools would never allow women-only sessions to satisfy the demands of a minority. A public space is constructed for citizens to interact freely, and legislation written to remove the barriers of difference that separate them.

Seen from Britain, French principles of equality and secularism are often misinterpreted, and dismissed as authoritarian or prejudiced. But critics of the French approach don't seem to understand that secularism is neutral - the State doesn't recognise any religion in particular but protects them all, guaranteeing cultural and religious diversity by ensuring that one faith does not get the upper hand.

Can our two countries learn from each other? France could certainly try that very British tolerance and Britain could be more rigorous in arbitrating between the common good and the demands of communities. But our two systems are anchored in such different traditions and histories that we can only keep marvelling and staring in bewilderment at each other's approaches to social harmony; both of which are struggling to keep pace with the growing confidence of minorities who, once ignored, are now at the centre stage.

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**TT4**

### ***Women, West Brom, the burka and me***

I think Sarkozy is wrong about the veil - and not just because I was a football mascot for 55 minutes

I was once asked if I'd like to be the mascot at a West Bromwich Albion football match. It involved me having to wear a large thrush costume. I mean, of course, the bird. It wasn't some tasteless promotional event where I was dressed as an irritating rash and then seized upon by a man dressed as a tube of Canesten.

I agreed to be the thrush but only if no one knew that it was me inside. I'm world-famous in West Bromwich so I thought that it would be novel to stroll around in front of 20-odd thousand people and not be recognised.

The outfit was quite heavy and hot, with just a small slit at eye level to stop me walking into things. Before the game, I wandered around, waving to the crowd and having my photo taken with small children. Such is the role of the mascot.

For these photos, I adopted my regulation warm-hearted grin but after I'd posed for about 20 such shots, it occurred to me that this was completely unnecessary because I couldn't be seen. I was getting a bit bored and hot by now and it was a real treat to not have to look happy and enthusiastic.

Come photograph No50 I was actually scowling but no one could tell. This was a truly liberating experience and it suddenly made me realise why many Muslim women are

reluctant to give up the veil. It can be truly joyous to pass unseen through the outside world with no obligation to smile or look interested - hidden in your own secret place.

The French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, took a much more negative view of the burka issue this week when he said: "We cannot accept that women be prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity."

I assume that he wasn't a big fan of Blind Date. He seems to assume that Muslim women are always forced by others to wear the veil. I don't doubt that this is sometimes the case but it doesn't seem to be the whole story. One often hears Muslim women in interviews saying that they like wearing the burka, not just for religious but also practical reasons.

These views tend to be disregarded and seen as the product of indoctrination. Such a dismissive response seems to make these women and their opinions every bit as invisible as the burka does.

The much-demonised garb is seen as a symbol of oppression, but oppression comes in many forms. Lots of British women have said to me that they resent being gawped at just because they're wearing a miniskirt or a low-cut top. I always apologise and say that I didn't mean any harm.

Alternatively, a friend said to me recently that she was saddened to notice that, as she grew older, men had stopped staring at her. She felt that she was no longer desirable, no longer receiving approval. These are two very different problems, both by-products of our Western cult of physical attractiveness and both solved by the burka.

I don't believe that any man should force his wife to wear a burka but I'm not sure that Mr Sarkozy, the extremely proud owner of a trophy wife, is the best man to speak on the matter. Add to this that he was once seen to be checking his text messages during a private audience with the Pope and one might also ask whether religious sensitivity is one of his strengths.

Either way, his call to actually ban the burka on French streets cannot be the answer.

In the late Nineties, I went to Africa with Comic Relief. A group of us, mainly white middle-class liberals, sat in a village in Burkina Faso and spoke to the village elders. We asked about the distinctive scars that many of the men had on their faces and they turned out to be the result of some sort of initiation ceremony.

Someone asked if we could see the ceremonial knife. I think that we were just trying to sound interested. Eventually a rather disappointing little penknife with a dirty wooden handle turned up, and we all passed it around as if it were a beautiful artefact.

One of the women from the production team asked if it was used for any other purpose. "Female circumcision" was the reply. We all went silent and handed the knife back. None of us had the guts to register our disgust.

I sat in a disused army barracks afterwards imagining what I should have said. "I'm sorry. It's one thing having respect for other people's cultures but some things are just objectively wrong." Only the mosquitoes heard my indignation.

Consequently, I do respect Mr Sarkozy for having the courage to speak out on the sensitive issue of cultural difference, but on this occasion I think that he's being too simplistic. It's not as clear-cut as he suggests. I'm not sure that the burka is objectively wrong.

Some Muslim women clearly feel oppressed by it, but then some clearly don't. To ban it is to remove women's choice, using oppression to combat oppression.

Rigid rules that make no allowance for personal choice are more suited to the Taleban than to one of Europe's great democracies. So that's my take on the burka issue - all based on 55 minutes in a thrush suit. Next week: Silvio Berlusconi on why stockings and suspenders should be compulsory.

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TT5

## ***Veiled Threat***

The burka, a symbol of repression, has no place in a free society

In declaring that the burka, the all-enveloping garment that covers a woman from head to toe, was an unwelcome symbol of subservience, President Sarkozy has reignited the vexed issue of religion, culture and personal liberty with implications far beyond his own country. While many in France, home to more than five million Muslims, have applauded his stance, conservative Muslims in Europe and the Middle East have deplored his remarks. The burka, they insist, is a "symbol of freedom" and a Western state has no business dictating how Muslims should dress. But does it?

The issue is as divisive as it is emotive. Libertarians and European liberals have generally argued that religion is a private matter and that its symbols, customs and observance should not be trammelled by law unless its practice is offensive, socially disruptive or contravenes other laws. They maintain that, unless coercion can be proved, a woman should be free to dress how she wishes. In Britain, such tolerance, based on the principles of J.S. Mill, has encouraged diversity in a policy of multiculturalism. Unlike France, where a laicism derived from the French Revolution has demanded the exclusion of religion from state institutions, Britain has not tried to ban the hijab, the Muslim headscarf, or other religious symbols from schools.

The burka, however, is different. Not only does it divide European liberals; it also is controversial within Islam. As many scholars have pointed out, there is no Koranic foundation in the demand that a woman should hide her face. The Koran only enjoins modesty in appearance and clothing, and subsequent injunctions that a woman should cover her hair with a scarf or her face with a veil are derived solely from the Hadith, the

body of sayings attributed to the Prophet. The burka appears to be purely tribal in its origin, and this cultural tradition has been given dubious religious sanction by conservative societies.

Among European liberals the burka is seen as a symbol of female subservience. And the freedom to opt for such deplorable status runs counter to other liberties regarded as more important in the hierarchy of freedoms: openness, transparency, equality and opportunity. Within Western society, the covering of the face negates all such fundamental rights. The mistrust, alienation and brake on communication engendered by a face veil were the basis of Jack Straw's principled but contentious denunciation of the niqab. Such objections apply even more forcefully to the burka.

There are also, in Western society, practical objections to any garment that hinders movement, impairs trust or conceals identity. A woman in a burka cannot properly drive a car, clear a security check, teach pupils, practice medicine, enter a jewellery shop or carry out a host of mundane activities. As Mr Sarkozy said, it is unacceptable for women to be "prisoners behind netting".

Tolerance of the practice is also a licence for intolerance. Too often extremists try to exploit this bogus symbol of Islamic piety to create Muslim ghettos where they assert their own personal power. Too often the issue is a deliberate provocation to challenge the values and mores of Western society. An absolute ban on the burka is unnecessary and unenforceable. But civic education and religious debate - here, in France and in the Muslim world - are the best way to consign to the dark ages this symbol of darkness.

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## TT6

### ***Niqabi, interrupted***

Wearing my niqab is a choice freely made, for spiritual reasons

I put on my niqab, my face veil, each day before I leave the house, without a second thought. I drape it over my face, tie the ribbons at the back and adjust the opening over my eyes to make sure my peripheral vision is not affected.

Had I a full-length mirror next to the front door, I would be able to see what others see: a woman of average height and build, covered in several layers of fabric, a niqab, a jilbab, sometimes an abayah, sometimes all black, other times blue or brown. A Muslim woman in 'full veil'. A niqabi.

But is that truly how people see me? When I walk through the park with my little ones in tow, when I reverse my car into a parking space, when I browse the shelves in the frozen section, when I ask how to best cook asparagus at a market stall, what do people see? An oppressed woman? A nameless, voiceless individual? A criminal?

Well, if Mr Sarkozy and others like him have their way, I suppose I will be a criminal, won't I? Never mind that "it's a free country"; never mind that I made this choice from my own free will, as did the vast majority of covered women of my generation; never mind that I am, in every other respect, an upstanding citizen who works hard as a mother, author and magazine publisher, spends responsibly, recycles and tries to eat seasonally and buy local produce!

Yes, I cover my face, but I am still of this society. And, as crazy as it might sound, I am human, a human being with my own thoughts, feelings and opinions. I refuse to allow those who cannot know my reality to paint me as a cardboard cut-out, an oppressed, submissive, silenced relic of the Dark Ages. I am not a stereotype and, God willing, I never will be.

But where are those who will listen? At the end of the day, Muslim women have been saying for years that the hijab *et al* are not oppressive, that we cover as an act of faith, that this is a bonafide spiritual lifestyle choice. But the debate rages on, ironically, largely to the exclusion of the women who actually do cover their faces.

The focus on the niqab is, in my opinion, utterly misplaced. Don't the French have anything better to do than tell Muslim women how to dress? Don't our societies have bigger problems than a relative handful of women choosing to cover their faces out of religious conviction? The "burka issue" has become a red herring: there are issues that Muslim women face that are more pressing, more wide-reaching and, essentially, more relevant than whether or not they should be covering with a niqab, burqa or hijab.

At the end of the day, all a ban will do is force Muslim women who choose to cover to retreat even further - it is not going to result in a mass "liberation" of Muslim women from the veil. All women, covered or not, deserve the opportunity to dress as they see fit, to be educated, to work where they deem appropriate and run their lives in accordance with their principles, as long as these choices do not impinge on others' freedoms. And last time I looked, being able to see a woman's hair, legs or face were not rights granted alongside "libert?, egalit? et fraternit?".

As a Muslim woman living in the UK, I am so grateful for the fact that my society does not force me to choose between being a practising Muslim and an active member of society. I have been able to study, to work, to establish a writing career and run a magazine business, all while wearing a niqaab. I think that that is a credit to British society, no matter what the anti-multiculturalists may say, and I think the French could learn some very valuable lessons from the British approach.

So, three cheers for those women who make the choice to cover, in whatever way and still go out there every day. Go out to brave the scorn and ridicule of those who think they understand the burka better than those who actually wear it. Go out to face the humiliating headlines. Go out to face the taunts of schoolchildren. Go out to fight another day. Go out to do their bit for society and the common good. Because you never know, if Mr Sarkozy and his supporters have their way, there could come a day when these women think twice about going out there into a society that cannot bear the way they look. And, who knows, I could be one of them. And, while some would disagree, I think that would be a sad day.

# The Daily Telegraph (DT1-DT4)

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## DT1

### ***Nicolas Sarkozy says the burqa is 'not welcome' in France***

President Nicolas Sarkozy has used a major policy speech to declare the burqa was "not welcome" in France and should be banned.

In comments which will reignite the debate about religious clothing in the country, he said the full-body garment was "not a sign of religion, it is a sign of subservience".

Mr Sarkozy used the first presidential address to a joint session of France's two houses of parliament in 136 years to declare his support for a ban, even before hearing from a parliamentary commission set up to study the issue.

"We cannot accept to have in our country women who are prisoners behind netting, cut off from all social life, deprived of identity," Mr Sarkozy told the special session in Versailles.

"That is not the idea that the French republic has of women's dignity.

"The burqa is not a sign of religion, it is a sign of subservience. It will not be welcome on the territory of the French republic," the French president said.

A group of 58 MPs from the Left and Right has called on Parliament to take action against women adopting what they called oppressive head-to-toe Islamic dress that "breaches individual freedoms".

André Gerin, a Communist MP, led the motion for the latest inquiry, calling the burqa and niqab "a moving prison" for women.

Women's rights campaigners, including some Islamic groups, have backed the calls for measures to curb the small but growing trend of wearing burqas among France's five million Muslims.

Fadela Amara, a rights campaigner of Algerian background, who is the Housing Minister, said that was alarmed by the number of women "who are being put in this kind of tomb".

She added: "We must do everything to stop burqas from spreading."

Dalil Boubakeur, the rector of the Paris Mosque, supported an inquiry, saying that face covering for women was a fundamentalist practice originating in Afghanistan that was not prescribed by Islam.

But the national Muslim Council, which is less tied to the Establishment, accused politicians of wasting time on a fringe phenomenon.

"To raise the subject like this is a way of stigmatising Islam," said Mohammed Moussaoui, the head of the council.

It is estimated that some 100,000 women, mainly born in France, have taken to full outfits with face covering. In 2004, France banned religious headcoverings in state schools.

President Barack Obama attacked European laws on religious clothing in a speech in Cairo last week in which he said that the United States prized freedom of religion and would not "tell people what to wear".

Mr Sarkozy responded by telling Mr Obama in Normandy earlier this month that French principles of equality meant that people should not display religious affiliation in state institutions.

He added: "It is not a problem that young girls may choose to wear a veil or a headscarf as long as they have actually chosen to do so, as opposed to this being imposed upon them, be it by their families or by their environment."

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## DT2

### ***Why the burka is part of Britain***

Modern moderate Muslims feel banning such religious clothing would prove counter-productive.

Imagine this scene at the next State Opening of Parliament. The Queen is standing in front of the assembled Lords and Commons, reading from the speech prepared for her by the Prime Minister. "My Government," she says in that familiar high-pitched but colourless voice, "will ban the burka. It is not welcome in Britain. In our country we cannot accept that women be prisoners behind a screen."

The sound of jaws dropping would be audible at the Channel ports. And yet, only two hours' train journey away, it is possible for President Sarkozy to make such an announcement (for Britain, of course, read France). And these weren't off-the-cuff comments. He picked the first time both the National Assembly and Senate have met in one place for nearly 150 years – at the Palace of Versailles, no less – to launch his attack on this form of Muslim dress.

If the Queen were to follow suit, it would arouse fury among many of those who feel they should be allowed to practise their religion in whatever way they choose. But it would also raise cheers, not least from some members of the Muslim community. "The French president should be applauded for initiating this debate," Dr. Taj Hargey of the Muslim Educational Centre of Oxford told me yesterday. Dr Hargey describes the growing belief that Muslim women should cover their head, face and hands as "doctrinaire brain-washing". Dr

Usama Hasan, a reformist London Imam, also has "some sympathy" with Sarkozy: he too does not think it is necessary for women to wear the burka.

These sentiments will reassure those, including the Justice Secretary, Jack Straw, who feels uncomfortable in the presence of women dressed from top to toe in black, with only their eyes visible. Douglas Murray, director of the think tank The Centre for Social Cohesion, is one of them. "People shouldn't have the right to hide themselves away in society," he says. "Cutting yourself off from society is threatening when we have known terrorists to try to escape wearing a burka. Men who said they had to wear balaclavas would be very unlikely to be allowed into banks or to travel on most public transport. Ask yourself this: can you imagine asking the time or for directions from a woman in a burka?"

To Murray, Sarkozy is showing "moral leadership", unlike the "spineless" British politicians who would never dare to reflect the majority view. To do so would risk accusations of committing an offence against religious belief. As he, as well as many Muslims, have pointed out, the Koran says nothing about how women should dress, apart from calling for modesty. The call to cover up comes from the *hadith* – interpretations of the Koran written many years after the death of the Prophet, and largely dictated by prevailing Middle Eastern custom.

"The Koran," says Dr Hasan, "says that Muslims should respect local customs." In Britain or France that doesn't have to mean wearing bikinis. A Muslim waitress was last week awarded £3,000 for being asked to wear a revealing dress. Those who do cover their faces should be subject to regulation. "A naturist is free to walk around naked at home, but not down Oxford Street," says Murray. "The same should go for the veil."

Of course, an exception might be made for Saudi visitors shopping in Harrods, but not for people living and working in this country. But that is not the way the law has been moving over the past 20 years. Equality and human rights have been the buzzwords. School and police uniforms now feature matching headscarves (*khimar*) for those who wish to wear them. In a series of landmark judgments, the right of individuals to follow their own principles of modesty have been gradually established. In Shabina Begum, a 15-year-old schoolgirl won the right to wear the *jilbab*, (a long, loose-fitting garment) leaving only her hands and face exposed. The following year a judge pronounced that a lawyer could cover her face in court, so long as she was audible. In 2007, a teacher lost her appeal against dismissal for covering her face in the classroom; when interviewed for the job, she had not done so.

Meanwhile, on the other side of La Manche, the law has been moving in a different direction. The French constitution is based on the separation of Church and State, allowing for the banning of the headscarf in schools and universities in 2004. Now President Sarkozy, under pressure from both the Left and the Right, wants to go further. "In France," says writer Bonnie Greer, a member of the Franco/British Council, "the revolutionary tradition is all about being a citizen. In Britain and America we believe in individual expression in a very profound way."

Individual expression ceases to have much meaning if women are being forced into wearing cover-up tents by male relatives or mullahs, but many Muslim women deny this is the case. "I wear the scarf and the *abbaya* (long coat)," says Rahana Ali, a 23-year-old LSE graduate. "In the last two or three years several graduate friends of mine have chosen to wear the full *burka*, even though their mothers don't. If they need an ID card for work they will be photographed, but they don't want to display themselves all the time."

And if Douglas Murray were to ask one of them the time: "I can understand why some people find it off-putting, but if a man were to ask them for the time or directions in the street it would not be a problem. People should not judge by appearances."

Other British Muslims are equally outraged by the idea of a government telling them what to do. "I thought it was only the Left who used to ban things," says a journalist, Urmee Khan. Many of them wonder whether Sarkozy has spoken to any of France's four million Muslims. Bonnie Greer doubts it: "Many of my friends who wear the veil are independent, even feminist."

And they are mystified as to why Sarkozy is attacking the *burka* when it is worn by a tiny proportion of Muslim women – well under five per cent. "The only logical reason why he made those remarks is that he had just been to Afghanistan where women are oppressed," says Ahmed Versi, editor of the *Muslim News*, published in Britain. Others claim it is a tactic to secure the feminist vote in France.

Versi fears any attempt to ban clothing will backfire. "Three years ago, when Jack Straw wrote about not feeling comfortable with someone whose face he couldn't see, many more women started doing so in defiance. At our next awards ceremony an artist came to collect an award. Normally she wears a scarf and *abbaya* but she came onto the stage wearing a *nikkab* – a veil over her face. 'Can you hear me?' she called out. 'It makes no difference to my art if I am covered.' "

Versi believes the way forward is through tolerance and understanding, not legislation – and is glad he lives in Britain for that reason. "Britain is the best country in Europe for Muslims. We complain, but we are freer here, and we have more dialogue with government. In France, Muslim organisations are not representative; here they are independent. In France, Muslims live in ghettos and have double the unemployment rate of the rest of the population. Many French women come to university in the UK because they want to study and wear the headscarf which in France they cannot."

Versi goes on to detail the remarkable level of integration he finds in this country, and the growing understanding among Muslims that they should not test people's patience by applying for jobs that they cannot do – a police chef required to cook bacon is going through the courts. "In fact," he concludes, "the UK is heaven compared to France."

If it takes a foreign politician to prompt a Muslim to articulate that view, there is something to be said for an attack on the *burka*. At least it gets Muslims and non-Muslims talking, not just among themselves, but maybe even to one another.

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**DT3**

### ***Muslim leaders condemn Sarkozy over burqa ban***

Muslim leaders in Britain have warned that President Nicolas Sarkozy's calls for the burqa to be banned in France risk fuelling hostility towards Islam.

The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) said Mr Sarkozy's claim that the head-to-toe garments worn by Islamic women signify subservience were "patronising and offensive".

Its criticism comes after Mr Sarkozy used a policy speech on Monday to declare the burqa was "not welcome" in France.

In a move which threatens to reignite the debate over religious clothing in the country, Mr Sarkozy said: "The burqa is not a sign of religion, it is a sign of subservience.

"We cannot accept to have in our country women who are prisoners behind netting, cut off from all social life, deprived of identity."

The MCB reacted by calling on Mr Sarkozy to "desist from engaging in and promoting divisive politics" towards France's Muslim population.

Dr Reefat Drabu, assistant secretary general of the MCB, said in a statement: "It is patronising and offensive to suggest that those Muslim women who wear the burqa do so because of pressure or oppression by their male partners or guardians."

Speaking for the umbrella group of more than 500 Muslim organisations including mosques, charities and community groups, she added: "Such suggestions can legitimately be perceived as antagonistic towards Islam.

"Instead of taking a lead in promoting harmony and social cohesion amongst its people, the French President appears to be initiating a policy which is set to create fear and misunderstanding and may lead to Islamophobic reaction not just in France but in the rest of Europe too."

Mr Sarkozy's presidential address to a joint session of France's two houses of parliament stood in stark contrast to comments made by US President Barack Obama earlier this month.

In a speech in Cairo, Mr Obama said it is "important for Western countries to avoid impeding Muslim citizens from practising religion as they see fit, for instance, by dictating what clothes a Muslim woman should wear".

The MCB said its attack on Mr Sarkozy echoed Mr Obama's plea.

There are no official figures, but around 100,000 women are thought to wear the burqa in France.

France, home to an estimated five million Muslims, passed a law in 2004 banning headscarves or any other "conspicuous" religious symbol in state schools in a controversial bid to defend secularism.

A group of 58 MPs from the Left and Right has called on Parliament to take action against women adopting what they called oppressive Islamic dress that "breaches individual freedoms".

Last year a Moroccan woman was refused French citizenship after social services said she wore a burqa and was living in "submission" to her husband.

In Britain, Jack Straw caused controversy in 2006 when he suggested that Muslim women should abandon wearing the burqa because it was a "visible statement of separation and difference".

Mr Straw, then the Leader of the House of Commons, faced criticism from Muslim groups after disclosing that he asked women to remove their veils at meetings in his constituency office in Blackburn, Lancs.

The MCB said its stance reflected its long established position that individuals must have the freedom to choose their attire on the basis of their religious beliefs.

Shahid Malik, the Communities Minister, said on Tuesday: "It is not the job of government to dictate what people should or should not wear in our society – that is a matter of personal choice.

"There are no laws stating what clothes or attire are acceptable and so whether one chooses to wear a veil or burqa, a miniskirt or goth outfit is entirely at the individual's discretion.

"It is true that many Muslims feel the veil and its rationale are misunderstood and so sensible discussion provides an opportunity to create a better understanding and ultimately ensures we are more at ease with the diverse society within which we live."

Muslim and non-Muslim groups in Britain have supported Mr Sarkozy's claims and called for the burka to be banned here.

Douglas Murray, director of the think-tank the Centre for Social Cohesion, said: "There is nothing in the Koran that justifies the covering of women in what amounts to a black sack."

Diana Nammi, of the Iranian and Kurdish Women's Rights Organisation in London, added: "I fully support President Sarkozy. The burka isolates women."

## DT4

### ***Muslim pupils and teacher ordered to remove veils***

Two pupils and their teacher were ordered to remove their face veils before they could make an official visit to a Roman Catholic school. The party were from an Islamic school in Great Harwood, Lancs and were visiting St Mary's College in nearby Blackburn, which was staging its annual open day.

The two schoolgirls agreed to take off their niqab veils, which leave only slits for their eyes.

However, their teacher refused and was taken into an office at the sixth form college and told she would not be allowed on the premises.

St Mary's College yesterday defended the move, claiming that staff had requested that the trio remove the traditional Islamic veils because they are against the school's dress policy. Its principal Kevin McMahon said: "At the start of one of our 'taster days' for prospective students last week, some visitors did arrive wearing the veil.

"When the policy was explained to them, all except one were willing to remove it. This lady – a member of staff at the school – refused, and opted to leave the premises."

Muslim leaders condemned the college's reaction, saying it threatened to reignite the debate over religious clothing.

Abdul Quereshi, chairman of the Lancashire Council of Mosques said: "I am very disappointed. "The information I have is that this was the action of one individual and now this will once again become a big issue."

Blackburn is the constituency of Jack Straw, the Justice Secretary, who caused controversy in 2006 by describing veils as a "visible statement of separation and difference" and suggested women stop wearing them.

Mr Straw, then the Leader of the House of Commons, faced criticism from Muslim groups after disclosing that he asked women to remove their veils at meetings in his constituency office.

The incident at St Mary's also follows calls by President Nicolas Sarkozy last week for the burqa to be banned in France.

The Muslim Council of Britain condemned the remarks, while Shahid Malik, the Communities Minister, said it was "not the job of government to dictate what people should or should not wear".

St Mary's is a beacon status sixth form college for 1,450 pupils aged 16 to 18.

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# The Guardian (TG1-TG7)

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## TG1

### ***Why not ban full veil, says French government spokesman***

- Government spokesman wades in to divisive issue
- MPs argue women's rights are being compromised

France's ability to reconcile secularism with religious diversity came under fresh scrutiny today after the government said it would not rule out banning Muslim women from wearing the full Islamic veil.

Five years after a law was passed forbidding children from wearing the headscarf or any other "conspicuous" religious symbol in schools, the government indicated it was prepared to wade into another thorny row over the state's right to tell individuals what not to wear.

Speaking after a group of MPs requested an inquiry into the "degrading" use of the burka and niqab, government spokesman Luc Chatel said it was important to establish to what extent women's rights were being compromised by the garments.

"If it were determined that wearing the burka is a submissive act, and that it is contrary to republican principles, naturally parliament would have to draw the necessary conclusions," he said. When asked whether that could mean bringing in legislation to ensure an outright ban, Chatel answered: "Why not?"

Although there are no official figures, several thousand women are believed to wear the full veil in France, and their appearance has long caused consternation among the upholders of the country's staunchly secular values. Last year a Moroccan woman was refused French citizenship after social services found she wore a burka and was living "in total submission" to her husband.

The Communist MP who led the call this week for an inquiry, André Gerin, denounced the garments as walking prisons. In his request, backed by 57 other MPs, mostly from Nicolas Sarkozy's centre-right UMP party, he said: "The sight of these imprisoned women is already intolerable to us when they come from Iran, Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia ... It is totally unacceptable on French soil."

For a ban to be implemented, an investigation would first have to be opened and its results studied for any sign of incompatibility between secular values and the use of the full veil. President Sarkozy, who recently defended France's division between the state and religion during a press conference with Barack Obama, is understood to be in favour of the issue being explored.

Sarkozy's leftwing urban policies secretary, herself a Muslim and former president of a women's rights group, today gave her support to "a total ban" on the burka. "I am for the

banning of this coffin which kills basic freedoms," Fadela Amara told Le Parisien newspaper. "This debate has to clear the way to a law which protects women."

This point of view, however, is not shared by everyone. Muslim leaders have urged politicians not to create more tension between communities.

"To raise the subject like this, via a parliamentary committee, is a way of stigmatising Islam and the Muslims of France," said Mohammed Moussaoui, head of the French Council for the Muslim Faith. He said the full veil remained a marginal choice for most Muslim women, and such a provocative move threatened to alienate those more moderate in their practices.

His plea for the motion to be left alone was echoed by the immigration minister, Eric Besson, who said that, since 2004, France had "managed to strike a balance, and it would be dangerous to call that into question".

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## TG2

### ***Nicolas Sarkozy says Islamic veils are not welcome in France***

- State of nation talk breaks century of precedent
- Cheers as president takes hard line on Muslim dress

Nicolas Sarkozy arrives at the Versailles Palace in Paris. Photograph: Benoit Tessier/AP

Nicolas Sarkozy today took a hard line in France's latest row over Islamic dress, saying full veils and face coverings were a sign of women's debasement and "not welcome" on French soil.

More than 50 MPs, mostly from the president's centre-right UMP party, last week backed calls for a parliamentary inquiry to debate whether Muslim women who wear full-body religious veils with only their eyes visible posed a threat to the republic's secular values and gender equality. A government spokesman had suggested that a law could eventually be proposed to ban full coverings from being worn in public in France.

Sarkozy today used his first state of the nation speech to defend the French republican principle of secularism and attack full Islamic veils.

He said: "The problem of the burka is not a religious problem, it's a problem of liberty and women's dignity. It's not a religious symbol, but a sign of subservience and debasement. I want to say solemnly, the burka is not welcome in France. In our country, we can't accept women prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity. That's not our idea of freedom."

There was raucous applause from MPs and senators. Sarkozy backed the setting up of a parliamentary commission on the issue of full Islamic veils, calling for all arguments to be heard. "But I tell you, we must not be ashamed of our values. We must not be afraid of defending them," he said.

Earlier in his speech, he warned against stigmatising religion in secular France. "We must not fight the wrong battle. In the republic, the Muslim religion must be respected as much as other religions."

Muslim headscarves and all religious symbols were banned in schools in 2004, and the latest row over religious dress is likely to spark more soul-searching and controversy in France.

There are no figures for the number of Muslim women who cover their face, but it is believed to be a very small minority. In France, the terms burka and niqab are often used interchangeably – the former refers to a full-body covering worn largely in Afghanistan with a mesh screen over the eyes, while the latter is a full-body veil, often in black, with a gap for the eyes.

Critics have already warned that the government risks stigmatising Muslims over a minor and marginal issue. After Sarkozy's speech, the leftwing senator Jean-Pierre Chevènement said the subject was difficult because people were free to dress how they liked in public under French law, but full veils could contravene French ideas on gender equality. He cautioned against whipping up "pointless provocations".

Sarkozy's views on Muslim women's dress came as he set out his social and economic reform themes for the second half of his five-year term. He made history as the first French leader in more than 100 years to address a special sitting of both houses of parliament in the sumptuous setting of the Chateau of Versailles.

For more than a century the parliament has sought to preserve its independence by not allowing France's powerful leaders to address MPs and senators directly. The French constitution was changed last year to allow the president this new privilege, but critics on the left accused Sarkozy of weakening the role of prime minister and behaving like a power-grabbing "hyper-president" or monarch.

Sarkozy used the speech to stress that the financial crisis had brought the "French model" of strong public investment and generous social spending back into fashion across the world.

He warned that the financial crisis was not over and France more than ever needed the public sector, economic and educational reforms he has styled himself as the only man brave enough to deliver.

He ruled out tough austerity measures or raising taxes to deal with France's public debt. Instead, he pledged to raise a new public loan to help France out of the economic crisis, despite the country's ballooning budget deficit.

Sarkozy's plans for the coming years included a review of the French retirement age of 60, tough new carbon tax measures, cuts to health spending and building new prisons.

## Breaking with tradition

Nicolas Sarkozy yesterday made history as the first president to address parliament in more than 100 years. Since 1875, France's leaders have been banned from appearing before lawmakers to safeguard parliamentary independence. But Sarkozy changed the constitution last year, allowing him to address parliament once a year. He delivered his US-style state of the union speech to a congress of both houses of parliament – MPs and senators – at the Chateau of Versailles. But critics on the left accused him of weakening the role of his prime minister. Media commentators called him the "Sun President", an allusion to the "Sun King", Louis XIV, who built Versailles. Greens and Communists boycotted the speech, while Socialists left immediately after in protest that the president was not obliged to debate his speech. Sarkozy said he was setting in motion a "profound change" to the French republic that showed the importance of the French parliament.

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## TG3

### ***Brush up your Hegel, Sarko***

Monsieur Président's burka outburst suggests he can't tell his abstract and concrete freedoms apart

Nicolas Sarkozy's problem is that he hasn't read enough Hegel. Let me rephrase that: one of his problems is that he hasn't read enough Hegel. When the French president told a special session of parliament in Versailles earlier this week, "We cannot accept to have in our country women who are prisoners behind netting, cut off from all social life, deprived of identity", he would have done better to hold his tongue, and instead reflect on that passage in the Philosophy of Right in which Hegel distinguishes between abstract and concrete freedom.

The former means the freedom to do whatever you want, which, as you know, is the basis of western civilisation and why you can choose between 23 different kinds of coffee in your local cafe, or 32 different kinds of four-inch wedges the glossies tell you look sexy this summer but in none of which you can walk comfortably. Such is the freedom of late capitalism, which seems to systematically strive to deprive us of an identity that we might construct ourselves.

For Hegel this isn't real freedom, because our wants and desires are determined by society. By those lights, a western fashion victim is as much a sartorial prisoner as a woman in a burka.

Neither is really free. Those that must buy what someone else tells them are this season's must-haves are as much in mental chains as those who put on head-to-toe garment with netting for the eyes because of the strictures of the society to which they belong.

By real freedom, Hegel meant not doing whatever one wants but having the freedom from societal conditioning and the fatuous whirl of desires by using reason. If you come across someone who manages to be really free in this sense in either capitalistic or strict Islamic society then send me their names so we can celebrate their escape.

None of us is really free in that sense. I used to think otherwise. I once wrote an article under the headline "If only we were more like the French: Call me a chippy atheist, but I'd rather see a headscarf ban than Muslim ghettos." I thought forcibly liberating people from their mental and sartorial shackles would make us free. I was wrong. Now I believe the creation of Muslim ghettos is made more likely by official displays of intolerance towards what some Muslim women wear, that the social integration France overtly seeks through its policy of *laïcité*, or secularism, is less likely. One of the reasons for this shift is because of thinking about what Hegel means about freedom in the society to which I belong.

Yes, but, you might well want to say, surely women who wear burkas are more oppressed than those who treat the sartorial laws of Grazia as though they were truly the words of God (which, as you know, they are)? None of what I've said means that I feel anything but depressed when I see a woman in a burka, but that's my problem, something that I can't resolve in the way Sarkozy suggests. What's striking in Sarkozy's speech is that it is yet again a man who denounces women and presumes that they are cut off from social life. They may be cut off from Sarkozy's secular French society, and that may be difficult for allegedly tolerant western liberals, but they are not cut off from all society. In fact they're very much part of the society that many westerners despise as oppressing women.

Sarkozy's remarks, though they're bound to upset some of France's five million Muslims, are consistent with French revolutionary culture and the tradition of *laïcité* that led, in 2004, to the banning of headscarfs in French schools. Doesn't he realise then that his speech exemplifies an abstract freedom of expression which, in Hegelian terms, proceeds from social conditioning, not reason? It seems unlikely. For French political culture, religion is tolerable only if it keeps itself to itself. As soon as a person of faith tries to present what religion means for them in public in France, they risk being accused of fundamentalism.

Sarkozy now goes further, following revolutionary logic in not just chasing those who dress in ways he and French political culture finds intolerable out of public spaces, but pursuing those who dress in a way that is a rejection of western values even into their private worlds. He said: "The burka is not a sign of religion, it is a sign of subservience. It will not be welcome on the territory of the French republic." Even religious justification is bad enough, run the suppressed premises of this argument, but the absence of such despicable justifications is worse.

The woman in a burka is revealed as subservient to patriarchal culture. She must be made free to choose to be more western. Sarkozy proposes, in giving his backing to the establishment of a parliamentary commission to look at whether to ban the wearing of burkas in public, that such imposed freedom would improve her lot.

French venerate such abstract freedoms. We needn't. They were, for Hegel, the basis of the revolution's collapse into the Terror in which, he argued, individuals were sacrificed to the

ill-conceived pursuit of abstract freedoms. Sarkozy is thus a modern-day Robespierre, proposing some women – whom he presumes to have been silenced by patriarchal society and whose voices he doesn't want to hear – be terrorised in the name of the kind abstract freedoms France has venerated for 210 years. Let's see if he succeeds.

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## TG4

### ***Commission inquiry in France could lead to burka ban***

France has set up a commission to study the wearing of burkas and niqabs after President Nicolas Sarkozy said the Islamic veils turn women into prisoners. The 32-member commission will hold hearings that could lead to legislation banning burkas from being worn in public. France has western Europe's largest Muslim population, estimated at 5 million. A growing group of French women wear burkas and niqabs, which either cloak the entire body or cover everything but the eyes. On Monday Sarkozy told lawmakers he supported a ban on burkas, calling them "a sign of debasement" for women.

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## TG5

### ***France searches its soul over the veil***

France's parliamentary inquiry into Muslim women's use of the veil looks set to provoke a vigorous national debate

Even though I was active and outspoken during the 2004 debate on the ban on religious symbols in French schools, I have no definite opinions on the *voile intégral* — the burqa, sitar or khimar. But the French parliamentary inquiry has now been launched, and for the next six months, a debate will take place. The outcome is unknown. When the Stasi commission was set up, all the senior members (except for two) were opposed to legislating on religious symbols. During the hearings, young Muslims told them that if the veil was authorised in public schools, they would be forced to wear it. All the senior members, except one, subsequently asked for a law. But this debate is different: those in favour of the veil are not vocal in supporting the *voile intégral*. Dounia Bouzar, an anthropologist who is otherwise inclined to oppose any prohibition, refers to the "cultish practice" of burqa supporters. Conservative Muslims and those sympathetic to them are protesting against the inquiry, but with uncharacteristic reserve. And the debate was initiated by a communist *député*, but supported by the rightwing majority in parliament.

So will we need a broad and all-encompassing law on Islamic garments, or various decrees addressing one issue after another, as they arise? In France, women who wear the *voile intégral* do it by choice, not by obligation. This isn't an exotic symbol, but a political one. We're used to showing our faces on a daily basis, as part of our identity: picking up a parcel at the post office, collecting children from Kindergarten. But what then, for women whose

face cannot be seen? In what case would a political position, even one stemming from religious conviction, put someone above the law? This isn't a question of religious freedom, but of equality before the law. In other words, women wearing the burqa aren't asserting their right not to be discriminated against – they're asking for specific rights.

If the commission supports the right to wear the burqa, French society will need to look at changing some of its habits. Here, the public space is a bit like a herbal infusion: the flavours of many different plants are present, but by blending together they create harmony of sorts. It's possible that we could choose to make our tea by singling out some of those leaves for different treatment – we've never tried it, but why not? It would, however, mean that we'd be moving from universality to separatism.

Today, our freedom of expression is only curbed by laws against the incitement of racial hatred. If the government supports the burqa, we would have to consider how to deal with a different type of situation. An Algerian chef whose sister died when extremists cut her throat recently told me that she would never serve a woman wearing a niqab, because she saw it as a symbol of support for those who murdered her sibling. Today, her attitude could send her to court for racism and refusal to serve a client on discriminatory grounds. If the burqa was legitimised, there would be no reason to permit one political discourse and not two, something which would risk out social cohesion.

Another point: how can we reconcile specific rights with universal ones? If by some sort of magic trick a woman maintained that she was consenting to her own discrimination, what would happen if she later changed her mind?

A German judge recently ruled in favour of a violent man who beat his wife because, according to her, the woman knew what was in store for her since her husband had made his views clear on the question.

Will we accept that some citizens are less equal than others?

Finally, it would be wise to remember France and the UK are not one and the same – we really do not live in the same country. Some 79% of French Muslims are said to feel strongly attached to the French principle of secularism, also known as *laïcité*, whereas polls have suggested that 40% of British Muslims would prefer laws based on sharia. But Muslims who settled in the UK did it by choice, and often for economic reasons; they didn't flee anything. In France, Muslims are active at the grassroots level on the left. Many are political refugees who escaped from a form of politicised Islam. In the UK, Ken Livingstone could afford to welcome Yusuf al-Qaradawi – the man who, with reference to homosexuality, openly wonders whether it is best first to kill the "active" or the "passive" one. In France, this would be like spitting in the face of Algerian and Iranian political refugees. Given that women wearing the niqab do it by conviction, they can always do it in countries which tolerate such practices – such as Great Britain. But for many Algerian and Iranian women, France is their only refuge from political Islam.

I am still unsure if a law prohibiting the *voile intégral* is necessary, or even possible. I am waiting to hear the different points of view that will be aired during the investigation. But because I am of the left, I will say that I will mainly listen to Muslim democrats.

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## TG6

### ***France's burka barrier***

The controversy over the full-face veil in France has excluded the people it most concerns – the women who wear it

For a week now, the hundred or so French women who wear the sitar (a veil that covers the face, incorrectly referred to as the burka) or the niqab have been at the heart of the French political debate. Nicolas Sarkozy made a speech to parliament stating that the burka was not welcome in France as it was incompatible with women's rights and adding that France shouldn't be afraid to defend its values. A new commission has been set up to determine the best ways to combat the adoption of the full veil, and will eventually propose a law banning it from public spaces.

The role of the state today is different to the one it had in 2004, when a law made it illegal to wear the hijab in schools. This isn't about the republic aiming to preserve the neutrality of its secular institutions by forbidding pupils to wear religious symbols. This time, it is about intervening directly in the private choice of women, because that choice would be incompatible with living in France. The different opinions generated by the debate reveal the difficulties faced by the French state over the past 50 years in determining how best to accommodate its 5 million Muslims.

In France, the niqab is considered a threat to women's rights. This is the president's position. Even a woman who freely chooses to wear it doesn't have a place in France. She automatically becomes a consenting victim who is unworthy of any solidarity. A year ago, a Moroccan woman who wore the niqab was refused French nationality, a decision blamed on her "submission to her husband and her religious misogynist doctrine". But to punish women and not think about ways to fight their male oppressors makes little sense; it goes against the idea that French laws must be the same for everyone.

For others, the niqab is a deviation from genuine French Islam, which is open and tolerant. For the majority of French Muslims, the culprit is salafism – a fundamentalist branch of Islam imported from Saudi Arabia that has about 5,000 followers in France. The Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (French Council of Muslim Worship), the organisation responsible for Islam in France, explains that Islam doesn't prescribe the niqab and that wearing it is a cultural choice. However, the full veil's very existence challenges the official Islam adopted in France, and is one of the consequences of Muslim leaders' failure to ensure the integration of veiled young women after the 2004 law, and to protect the Muslim community from the many Islamophobic acts which followed.

Increasingly, veiled young women chose to look inwards, withdraw from society and benefit from the networks of solidarity offered by salafism, rather than fighting for their choice in the political sphere. The choice to wear the niqab is often linked to the breakdown of the French social model of integration, rather than religious radicalisation stemming from disadvantaged neighbourhoods under the control of extremist or terrorist movements – which is the alarmist argument of Ni Putes Ni Soumises, the group founded by Fadela Amara, who joined the government when Sarkozy created his cabinet and whose street credibility is greater among politicians than it is in the banlieues.

The terms of the debate have changed since 2004. The feminist movements and the left, in particular, now say they reject the ghettoisation effect a ban on the burka would have on women wearing it. France's official position appears isolated when Denmark and Belgium are welcoming their first veiled elected politicians and Obama is reminding the world, in his Cairo speech, that western countries should not tell Muslim women what to wear. France's European neighbours debate the burka with more caution. In those countries, it is not the cultural or religious values of the burka that are being discussed, but legislation around security issues and identification.

What the burka crisis underlines is that the debate on Muslim women's empowerment is crucial. But it has to be conducted with the participation of those who are primarily concerned and also be useful to citizens as a whole, rather than simply reinforcing the political class and its electoral objectives.

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## TG7

### ***Veiled threats: Row over Islamic dress opens bitter divisions in France***

- Moves to ban Muslim face coverings gather force
- Human rights groups warn of growing discrimination

In the northern Paris suburb of Saint-Denis, with its busy market, fast-food joints and bargain clothes shops, Angelica Winterstein only goes out once a week – and only if she really has to.

"I feel like I'm being judged walking down the street. People tut or spit. In a smart area West of Paris, one man stopped his car and shouted: 'Why don't you go back to where you came from?' But I'm French, I couldn't be more French," said the 23-year-old, who was born and raised in bourgeois Versailles.

Once a fervent Catholic, Winterstein converted to Islam at 18. Six months ago she began wearing a loose, floor-length black jilbab, showing only her expertly made-up face from eyebrows to chin. She now wants to add the final piece, and wear full niqab, covering her face and leaving just her eyes visible.

"But this week, after Sarkozy announced that full veils weren't welcome in France, things have got really difficult," she said. "As it is, people sometimes shout 'Ninja' at me. It's impossible to find a job – I'm a qualified childminder and get plenty of interviews because of my CV, but when people see me in person, they don't call back. It's difficult in this country, there's a certain mood in the air. I don't feel comfortable walking around."

This week, France plunged into another bitterly divisive national debate on Muslim women's clothing, reopening questions on how the country with western Europe's biggest Muslim community integrates Islam into its secular republic. A parliamentary inquiry is to examine how many women in France wear full Islamic veils or niqab before a decision is made over possibly banning such garments in the street. More than 50 MPs from across the political spectrum have called for restrictions on full veils, called "degrading", "submissive" and "coffins" by politicians. Yet the actual numbers of niqab wearers in France appears to be so small that TV news crews have struggled to find individuals to film. Muslim groups estimate that there are perhaps only a few hundred women fully covering themselves out of a Muslim population of over 5 million – often young French women, many of them converts.

That such a marginal issue can suddenly take centre stage in a country otherwise struggling with major issues of mass unemployment and protest over public sector reform shows how powerful the symbol of the headscarf and veil remains in France.

Human rights groups warned this week that the row over niqabs risks exacerbating the growing problem of discrimination against women wearing standard Muslim headscarves. Five years on from the heated national debate over France's 2004 law banning headscarves and all conspicuous religious symbols from state schools, there has been an increase in general discrimination against adult women who cover their heads.

"Women in standard headscarves have been refused access to voting booths, driving lessons, barred from their own wedding ceremonies at town halls, ejected from university classes and in one case, a woman in a bank was not allowed to withdraw cash from her own account at the counter. This is clear discrimination by people who wrongly use the school law to claim that France is a secular state that doesn't allow headscarves in public places. It's utterly illegal and the courts rule in our favour," said Renee Le Mignot, co-president of the Movement Against Racism and for Friendship Between Peoples. "Our fear is that the current niqab debate is going to make this general discrimination worse."

Samy Debah, a history teacher who heads France's Collective against Islamophobia, said 80% of discrimination cases reported to his group involved women wearing standard headscarves.

He had rarely seen any instances of women wearing niqabs, even in the ethnically mixed north Paris suburb where he lives. "From our figures, the biggest discriminator against Muslim women is the state and state officials," he said. "What people have to understand is that the concept of French secularism is not anti-religion *per se*, it is supposed to be about respecting all religions."

The current initiative against full Islamic veils began in Venissieux, a leftwing area on the industrial outskirts of Lyon. Its communist mayor, André Gerin, led proposals for a clampdown, saying he saw increasing numbers of full veils in his constituency.

"I call them walking prisons, phantoms that go past us, it's that visual aspect that's an issue," Gerin said. "There's a malaise in the general population faced with the proliferation of these garments. I sense that on the part of Muslims, too."

Gerin said women in niqab posed "concrete problems" in daily life. "We had an issue in a school where a headteacher at the end of the school day didn't want to hand back two children to a phantom," he said. Gerin has refused to conduct the town-hall wedding of a woman wearing niqab. Another woman wearing a full veil was refused social housing by a landlord in the area. The mayor said that when women haven't removed their face covering, it has resulted in conflict with public officials who often felt insulted or under attack. But he denied stigmatising the wider Muslim population.

"The current situation [where women wear niqabs] is stigmatising Muslims," he said. His aim was to "establish a debate with the Muslim community, integrate Islam properly into French life" and expose fundamentalist practices.

Two previous calls for a law restricting full veils have been left to gather dust. This time, the debate is gathering force. There are divisions in the government itself – the feminist Muslim junior minister, Fadela Amara, supports a niqab ban while the immigration minister, Eric Besson, warns it would create unnecessary tension.

Horia Demiati, 30, a French financier who wears a standard headscarf with her business suits, said: "I really fear an increase in hatred." She recently won a discrimination case after she and her family, including a six-month baby, were refused access to a rural holiday apartment they had booked in the Vosges. The woman who refused them argued that she was a secular feminist and didn't want to see the headscarf, "an instrument of women's submission and oppression", in her establishment.

Demiati said: "This niqab debate is such a marginal issue, yet it risks detracting from the real issues in France."

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# The Independent (TI1-TI3)

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## TI1

### ***France split over plan to outlaw burqa***

Racial unrest feared over new law, which goes further than ban on headscarves

A suggestion that the full-length veil, or burqa, might be outlawed in France split the French government down the middle yesterday.

The government's official spokesman, Luc Chatel, said that legislation might be introduced to ban full-length veils if it was proved that they were being "imposed" on Muslim women against their will.

However, the Immigration Minister, Eric Besson, said legal action would "create unnecessary and unwelcome tensions" and re-open the anguished dispute which surrounded the decision in 2004 to ban Islamic headscarves, and other religious symbols, from state schools in France.

President Nicolas Sarkozy, speaking after the EU summit in Brussels, said he would address the subject in public on Monday but warned against surrendering to "emotional" arguments.

Just like the headscarf debate, a dispute over the wearing of the full-length veil has scrambled the normal political boundaries between right and left and has divided France's 4 to 5 million-strong Muslim community. The debate was re-opened by, of all people, President Barack Obama, who said in his speech in Cairo last week that Western nations should not impede the practice of Islam within their frontiers.

This comment was endorsed by M. Sarkozy but criticised by some French politicians, of both right and left, as an attack on France's "headscarf law". André Gerin, a Communist MP who represents a poor, multiracial area in the suburbs of Lyons, tabled a motion this week calling for a commission of inquiry into what he said was an explosion in the number of women wearing full-length veils in France. He said that this was a "direct response" to President Obama's remarks.

At first, M. Gerin's proposal seemed likely to go nowhere but his action was praised on Thursday by Fadela Amara, a left-wing crusader for Muslim women's rights who joined the centre-right French government in 2007. Ms Amara, Minister for Urban Renewal, said she was "in favour of the total prohibition in France of the burqa ... this coffin which kills the fundamental rights of women."

She added: "You only have to go to certain markets, such as in the suburbs of Lyons, to see that there are more and more women wearing the burqa ... These are women who are the prey of oppression, from masculine domination to fundamentalistic Islamic indoctrination."

In a radio interview yesterday, M. Chatel said he supported the idea of an official inquiry. "If it emerged that the wearing of the burqa was imposed [on women], and therefore contrary to our Republican principles, parliament would naturally have to draw the appropriate conclusions."

Asked if this might mean a law, he said: "Why not?"

Such a law might be even more controversial than the head-scarf legislation of 2004. That law applied only to children and teachers in state schools and employees in public buildings. It banned not just head scarves but Catholic crucifixes and Jewish kippas. The suggested new law would ban the wearing of the full-length veil anywhere in public.

M. Besson, another left-wing politician who was persuaded by President Sarkozy to join his government, said a legal ban would be "ineffective" and counter-productive, stirring up racial and religious tensions and reinforcing a sense of persecution among some Muslim communities.

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## T12

### ***Sarkozy's Louis XIV moment***

Parliament summoned to Versailles to hear President

Nicholas Sarkozy yesterday trod where no French president for 161 years has dared, or chosen, to tread when he spoke to parliament.

After a constitutional change, completed a few hours before, M. Sarkozy addressed both houses of parliament gathered in the Palace of Versailles to explain his vision of the future of France and of the world.

Presidential Question Time it was not. The parliamentarians were forbidden to intervene while the President was speaking. They were forbidden to ask questions. The President's 50-minute speech was followed by a debate but M. Sarkozy departed before it began.

As a result, Green and Communist parliamentarians boycotted the speech. Socialists listened in silence but boycotted the debate. President Sarkozy's centre-right supporters gave him a rhythmic standing ovation.

The whole event – transporting both houses of parliament, the government, the Republican Guard and Carla Bruni-Sarkozy to Versailles – cost the French taxpayer €400,000. One Green deputy suggested that it was "the most expensive press conference in history".

In his speech, President Sarkozy attempted a brilliant balancing act. The man who had been elected two years ago to impose "rupture" on French politics said the global recession had

demonstrated that the "French model" was the best in the world. However, he said, this did not mean that "radical" reforms were no longer needed.

Despite the explosion of the indebtedness of the French state, he said there would be no tax rises and no "policy of austerity". Instead there would be a new form of "state loan" – but only for productive investment.

He took a few minutes aside from the macro-politics to address a burning headline issue of the day. The French government is split on whether or not there should be a ban on the burqa, or full-body Islamic veil. President Sarkozy said that the burqa was not a religious symbol but a "symbol of servitude". He supported proposals for a parliamentary inquiry, without saying specifically that he supported a legal ban.

French presidents have been barred constitutionally from addressing parliament since 1875. None has done so since 1848. President Sarkozy pushed through a constitutional change last year, requiring the president to speak to both houses of parliament at least once a year, in the name of "transparency" and the "modernisation" of the French state.

Despite the modesty and humility of these aims, the event rapidly became clothed in monarchical trappings. Satirists and opposition politicians had a field day. President Sarkozy was portrayed by French cartoonists yesterday in the long wig and robes of the absolutist Roi Soleil, King Louis XIV.

President Sarkozy entered the chamber alone, the parliamentarians were forbidden to sit in their political groups. They were seated alphabetically. A debate followed but only after the President had departed. There was no official reply from the Prime Minister, François Fillon.

Opposition politicians and commentators said the event marked the further humiliation of M. Fillon and the prime ministerial office, marginalised by M. Sarkozy's frenetic activity since he became President two years ago.

A lightly reshuffled government – Fillon 2 – will be announced tomorrow. Rather than making wholesale changes, President Sarkozy has decided to do little more than replace two ministers – Rachida Dati (Justice) and Michel Barnier (Agriculture) – who are going to the European Parliament. One government deputy said: "Why bother to reshuffle the government when everyone knows that the real government is the Elysée Palace?"

Burqas and budgets: What he said

In his speech to both houses of the French parliament, President Sarkozy came close to anticipating the result of the planned parliamentary inquiry on the full-length Islamic veil. "The burqa is not welcome on the territory of the [French] Republic," he said.

"The problem of the burqa is not a religious problem. It is a problem of women's liberty and dignity. It is not a religious symbol. It is a symbol of servitude and humiliation."

Among other proposals in his speech, President Sarkozy said that any person made redundant in France should be given one year's salary and training. Despite record

borrowing of 7 per cent of GDP, M. Sarkozy said there would be no tax rises or steep spending cuts.

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**T13**

***Sophie Morris: Sarkozy's right: the burqa is a tool of repression***

As I was pushing my way down a busy high street on Sunday afternoon, I got stuck in one of those awkward crowds at the corner of another large road. There's no real pedestrian right of way in these circumstances, so we all set to the mannered side-stepping and edging forwards required to get through the jam.

I was stuck in the slow lane behind a pram when I noticed a woman coming in the opposite direction, who was getting absolutely nowhere, shoved to the back not just by the onwards traffic but by those coming from behind her and from all sides too. I remember her because she was wearing a burqa.

She wasn't getting anywhere because, if anyone had noticed her, they weren't treating her as part of the scrum. Pushing your way through a crowd requires a degree of engagement with those you're pushing against – impossible if you cannot make eye contact. As her skirt was so long and roomy, who knew whether she had one foot in front of the other, a stance that signals you're about to start moving, or not?

How rubbish it must be to be stuck inside such heavy black clothing on one of Britain's few sunny days, with the world swirling around you as if you were a lamppost, for that's about the level of interaction she could have with passers-by without engaging them in conversation.

I also felt depressed – depressed that here was a woman entirely shrouding her identity in public. Depressed that she was denied even that most basic social interaction with strangers that comes with walking down a busy street. Most of all it depressed me off because it reminded me of what no one – Muslim, misguided liberal or anyone else – can dissuade me of, which is that the burqa is a tool of oppression.

On Monday, President Sarkozy took issue with the proliferation of women wearing the burqa in France, weighing into the debate on whether, as a secular country, the French Republic might outlaw the veiling of one's body from head to toe in public. "The burqa is not a religious sign," he said.

"It is a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement... in our country we cannot accept that women be prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity."

I couldn't have put it better myself. Still, I cannot make up my mind whether I hope Sarkozy gets his way or not. The official French value system is very different to the British one. As part of its struggle to promote equality, France tries to iron out difference, instead of promoting multiculturalism as we do here, and demands assimilation. This attempt to do away with an outward display of Muslim fundamentalism is just the latest evidence of how difficult the French state is finding it to absorb a group of immigrants who do not want to surrender themselves to its secularity. But banishing the burqa from public life will not have the knock-on effect of banishing everything Sarkozy does not like about it from the lives of women who wear it, or from France's problems with assimilating its Muslim community. More likely, some of these women will be kept from public life altogether.

Who am I to judge what another woman can and cannot wear? The strongest pro-burqa argument I can find comes from Muslimah Media Watch in an angry response to an article Yasmin Alibhai-Brown wrote in this newspaper last month. "It [Alibhai-Brown's dislike of the burqa] completely ignores one of the basic rights that feminists, whether in Britain or Saudi Arabia, have fought for, which is that women be able to dress as they please without being judged."

I do not know how many women "choose" to wear burqas, but the idea they decide as one to wear the same drab garb they had sported on the previous day rather stretches the possibilities of the individual, and equal, expression feminists have fought for.

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**Appendix 6 – The ‘2009 French Face Veil Ban’ CDA Analysis – Arab Articles**

# The Gulf News (GN1-GN10)

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## GN1

### ***France considering ban on burqas, spokesman says***

France may introduce a law banning full burqas if a parliamentary commission finds the growing number of women wearing them have been coerced into doing so, a government spokesman said on Friday.

France may introduce a law banning full burqas if a parliamentary commission finds the growing number of women wearing them have been coerced into doing so, a government spokesman said on Friday.

Nearly 60 legislators signed a proposal on Wednesday calling for a parliamentary commission to look into the spread of the burqa in France, a garment that they said amounted "to a breach of individual freedoms on our national territory".

France, home to Europe's largest Muslim minority, is strongly attached to its secular values and to gender equality, and many see the burqa, which covers the wearer from head to toe and hides her face, as an infringement of women's rights and is increasingly being imposed by fundamentalists.

The country has been divided by fierce debates about how to reconcile those principles with religious freedom. "If it was proved after this inquiry that burqa-wearing was forced, in other words that it contradicted republican principles, then naturally parliament would take all the necessary decisions," Luc Chatel, who is the industry minister and government spokesman, said on France2television. Asked about the possibility of a law, he replied: "Why not?"

President Nicolas Sarkozy has not yet spoken on the subject but promised to address the issue in a speech on Monday to members of parliament.

More than 40 legislators from his ruling centre-right party signed the proposal.

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### ***Sarkozy says burqas are 'not welcome' in France***

President Nicolas Sarkozy lashed out on Monday at the practice of wearing the Muslim burqa, insisting the full-body religious gown is a sign of the "debasement" of women and that it won't be welcome in

President Nicolas Sarkozy lashed out on Monday at the practice of wearing the Muslim burqa, insisting the full-body religious gown is a sign of the "debasement" of women and that it won't be welcome in France. The French leader expressed support for a recent call by dozens of legislators to create a parliamentary commission to study a small but growing trend of wearing the full-body garment in France. In the first presidential address in 136 years to a joint session of France's two houses of parliament, Sarkozy laid out his support for a ban even before the panel has been approved - braving critics who fear the issue is a marginal one and could stigmatize Muslims in France. "In our country, we cannot accept that women be prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity," Sarkozy said to extended applause in a speech at the Chateau of Versailles southwest of Paris. "The burqa is not a religious sign, it's a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement - I want to say it solemnly," he said. "It will not be welcome on the territory of the French Republic."

In France, the terms "burqa" and "niqab" often are used interchangeably. The former refers to a full-body covering worn largely in Afghanistan with only a mesh screen over the eyes, whereas the latter is a full-body veil, often in black, with slits for the eyes.

Later Monday, Sarkozy was expected to host a state dinner with Shaik Hamad Bin Jassem Al Thani of Qatar. Many women in the Gulf state wear Islamic head coverings in public - whether while shopping or driving cars. France enacted a law in 2004 banning the Islamic headscarf and other conspicuous religious symbols from public schools, sparking fierce debate at home and abroad. France has Western Europe's largest Muslim population, an estimated 5 million people.

A government spokesman said Friday that it would seek to set up a parliamentary commission that could propose legislation aimed at barring Muslim women from wearing the head-to-toe gowns outside the home. The issue is highly divisive even within the government. France's junior minister for human rights, Rama Yade, said she was open to a ban if it is aimed at protecting women forced to wear the burqa. But Immigration Minister Eric Besson said a ban would only "create tensions." A leading French Muslim group warned against studying the burqa.

## GN3

### ***Sarkozy cites national priorities as primary task***

President Nicolas Sarkozy said on Monday the French state would take out a national loan, from the markets or the public, to finance strategic investments in the wake of the economic crisis.

President Nicolas Sarkozy said on Monday the French state would take out a national loan, from the markets or the public, to finance strategic investments in the wake of the economic crisis.

The French leader said the first task of Prime Minister Francois Fillon's government following a reshuffle on Wednesday would be to "set our national priorities and how to put in place a loan to finance them." In an address to both houses of parliament, Sarkozy said the government would launch a three-month consultation on July 1 with lawmakers, labour leaders and business and cultural leaders to agree on key areas for investment. "Decisions will only be taken after that debate.

Concerning the loan, its amount and modalities will be determined once we have set those priorities," he said, adding that the loan would be taken out "either from the French people or on the financial markets." "I will take the necessary steps to ensure that this loan is exclusively dedicated to strategic priorities for our future," Sarkozy added.

In his speech, Sarkozy lashed out at the practice of wearing the burqa, insisting the full-body religious gown is a sign of the 'debasement' of women and that it won't be welcome in France. The French leader expressed support for a recent call by dozens of legislators to create a parliamentary commission to study a small but growing trend of wearing the full-body garment in France. "In our country, we cannot accept that women be prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity," Sarkozy said to extended applause in a speech at the Chateau of Versailles southwest of Paris. "The burqa is not a religious sign, it's a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement - I want to say it solemnly," he said. "It will not be welcome on the territory of the French Republic."

In France, the terms 'burqa' and 'niqab' often are used interchangeably. The former refers to a full-body covering worn largely in Afghanistan with only a mesh screen over the eyes, whereas the latter is a full-body veil, often in black, with slits for the eyes.

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## GN4

### ***Egyptian scholar slams French president for anti-veil remarks***

French President Nicolas Sarkozy is 'not qualified' to judge the Muslim women's dress code, said Muslim clerics in reaction to his branding of full-body veils as a sign of servitude.

"This man is not qualified to tell Muslim women what they should or should not wear," said Moustafa Al Shaka'a, a member of the Islamic Research Centre, an influential arm of Al Azhar, the Sunni Muslim world's prestigious institution. "First, he (Sarkozy) does not believe in Islam, which is a heavenly religion that holds women in high regard. Another reason is that he belongs to a culture, which is unfair to women," Al Shaka'a told Gulf News.

"One example, Islam gives women the right to keep her family's name after marriage, which is not the case in the West." Sarkozy said on Monday that the burqa is "not welcome" in his country. "The burqa is not a religious sign, it's a sign of servitude," Sarkozy told both houses of parliament. He added that the burqa, largely donned in Afghanistan, is a violation of women's "dignity and freedom".

A group of French lawmakers have called for a ban on the burqa and Sarkozy asked them to "open a debate" on the issue. More common in France is still the niqab, a full-face veil with slits for the eyes. "Neither the burqa or the niqab is ordered by Islam," said Al Shaka'a, who is also a noted Muslim scholar. "They are local costumes, but Muslim women should not be forced to remove them. It's a matter of personal freedom."

There was no official comment from Al Azhar on Sarkozy's remarks. However, Egypt's Ministry of Waqfs (Religious Endowments) has recently started a campaign against wearing the niqab in this predominantly Muslim country. The campaign entails nationwide courses to discourage niqab-wearers.

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## GN5

### ***Sarkozy should be open-minded***

The French president's attack on the burqa is likely to stigmatise Islam and Muslims. It is rather puzzling that French President Nicolas Sarkozy decided in his historic address to the French parliament, the first by a sitting president since the 19th century, to discuss his dislike for the burqa. Sarkozy said the burqa was "a sign of subjugation" and as such was "not welcome on French territory".

Whether or not one agrees with wearing the burqa, isn't it a personal matter that should be left to individuals to decide upon? No government or leader should dictate to people what they should wear. Mohammad Moussaoui, head of the French Council for the Muslim

Religion, is right to say that this is one way to stigmatise Islam and the Muslims in France. At a time when European countries should be focusing on meaningful policies that bridge cultures, Sarkozy's comments stand out as intolerant and negative.

It is hoped the Muslim community, a sizable minority in France, will not be looked upon in a negative light because of this.

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## GN6

### ***Sarkozy's burqa stance under fire***

The president of France's parliament has announced the creation of a commission to study the wearing of Islamic face-covering, body-length burqas and niqabs in France. Leading scholars have reacted sharply to the controversial remarks made by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy on the wearing of burqas by Muslim women.

Leading scholars have reacted sharply to the controversial remarks made by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy on the wearing of burqas by Muslim women.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy is "not qualified" to judge Muslim women's dress code, said Muslim clerics in Cairo, reacting to his branding of full-body veils as a sign of servitude. "This man is not qualified to tell Muslim women what they should or should not wear," said Mustafa Al Shaka, a member of the Islamic Research Centre, an influential arm of Al Azhar - the Sunni world's prestigious institution.

"First he [Sarkozy] does not believe in Islam, which is a heavenly religion that holds women in high regard. Another reason is that he belongs to a culture, which is unfair to women," Al Shaka told *Gulf News*. "One example, Islam gives women the right to keep her family's name after marriage, which is not the case in the West." Sarkozy said on Monday that the burqa, a full-body covering, was "not welcome" in his country. "The burqa is not a religious sign, it's a sign of servitude," Sarkozy told both houses of parliament. He added the burqa, largely donned in Afghanistan, is a violation of women's "dignity and freedom".

A group of French lawmakers have called for a ban on the burqa and Sarkozy asked them to "open a debate" on the issue. More common in France is the niqab, a full-face veil with slits for the eyes. "Neither the burqa or the niqab is ordered by Islam," said Al Shaka, who is also a noted Muslim scholar. "They are local costumes, but Muslim women should not be forced to remove them. It's a matter of personal freedom." There was no official comment from Al Azhar on Sarkozy's remarks. However, Egypt's Ministry of Waqfs (Religious Endowments) has recently started a campaign against wearing the niqab in this predominantly Muslim country. The campaign entails nationwide courses to discourage niqab-wearers.

In Saudi Arabia, a number of leading Saudi scholars reacted cautiously. Shaikh Fayez Al Mutlaq, a prominent religious scholar, is of the view that it is permissible for a Muslim woman living in a country, where there is a ban on wearing the burqa, not to wear it. "It would suffice for her to wear the hijab (Islamic dress covering all parts of the body except face and two hands). He told *Gulf News* if a Muslim woman wants to travel to such a country, which imposes a ban on wearing the burqa, for educational or treatment purposes, then she should respect the regulations of the country by simply wearing the hijab.

Dr Sulaiman Al Twaijri, member of the academic faculty at Makkah's Ummul Qura University, said that the Islamic dress (the hijab) has become a topic of controversy and debate among Islamic scholars not only in different countries but also among those in a single country. "There are some scholars who rule that wearing Islamic dress covering face and hands is obligatory for women. On the other hand, there are others who say covering the whole body except the face and hands is permissible." "There is a third group who are adamant women should cover all parts of her body except the eyes," he said while drawing attention to the ruling made by world-renowned Islamic scholar Shaikh Yousuf Al Qaderi that it is undesirable for Muslim women to wear the burqa in the modern age.

### **Body to study burqa**

Meanwhile, France's parliament has announced the creation of a commission to study the wearing of Islamic face-covering, body-length burqas and niqabs in France. Bernard Accoyer said on Tuesday the commission would include members of all four major political parties in the National Assembly.

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## **GN7**

### ***French president's burqa views leave readers fuming***

Many *Gulf News* readers were enraged after hearing a speech by French President Nicolas Sarkozy on Monday. In his speech, the French leader disapproved of the practice of women wearing a burqa.

Many *Gulf News* readers were enraged after hearing a speech by French President Nicolas Sarkozy on Monday. In his speech, the French leader disapproved of the practice of women wearing a burqa. He was quoted as saying: "In our country, we cannot accept that women be prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity."

Jamie Watson, an American expatriate, was upset by the French president's comments. She said: "He obviously does not understand the concept of a burqa, since he is not a Muslim. It is not up to the people outside the religion to decide what is appropriate for us. And what does he mean by a 'religious sign'? A burqa, to me, is as relevant as a cross." After having

embraced Islam a few years ago, Jamie realised how "comfortable" she felt when covered from head to toe.

Jonard Tabing, a Filipino expatriate, was infuriated by the "prejudiced comments". He said: "Most people are trying to bridge the gap amongst people of different cultures and religions. But, the French president seems to be countering all efforts! He is well aware that his comments will grab the world's attention and make matters worse."

Yousufa Mohammad, an Indian expatriate, is convinced that most people are not aware of the purpose of the burqa. She said: "I agree it is not a religious sign, since several non-Muslims in India also use it to cover themselves. I believe the main objective of a burqa is to avoid the exposure of body parts."

There are some who are in agreement with Sarkozy's comments, however. L.T., a French expatriate, believes that people should respect the culture of the country they reside in. He said: "In France, displaying one's belief is not necessary."

By wearing the burqa ... women are exhibiting their religion or culture. I personally think they are private details that should not be shared ... Everyone is allowed to have their own respective beliefs, but it is extremely important to fit in with the culture."

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## **GN8**

### **West must respect the Muslim veil**

Sarkozy should not seek to dictate to women who follow Islam about what they can and cannot wear.

Speaking in Cairo, US President Barack Obama recently criticised a French law that prohibits Muslim girls and women from wearing body- and face-covering garments in public schools. "It is important for Western countries to avoid impeding Muslim citizens from practising religion as they see fit, for instance, by dictating what clothes a Muslim woman should wear," Obama said.

However, this week French President Nicolas Sarkozy supported attempts to bar Muslim women from wearing body-cloaking robes such as the burqa. "The burqa is not a religious sign," Sarkozy said. "It is a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement. It will not be welcome on the territory of the French Republic."

Sarkozy is not the first major political leader to speak out on matters of Muslim women's dress. In October 2006 Jack Straw, former home secretary, commented in on the wearing of the face veil (the niqab) by Muslim women. Writing in the Lancashire Telegraph on October 5, 2006, Straw argued that it was a "visible statement of separation and of difference". His

comments created a national debate that at the time drew other notable political figures to make similar claims: prime minister Tony Blair, then chancellor Gordon Brown and the shadow leader of the opposition, David Cameron.

The veil is often portrayed by its critics, whether in France or in Turkey, as a symbol of women's inferior status in Islam. Opponents link veiling with backwardness and oppression and Western dress with individuality and freedom. Critics of veiling, Muslim and non-Muslim, stress the importance of self-expression, which they associate with the distinctive way in which a woman dresses and wears her hair.

Supporters of veiling explain that they choose to wear the hijab because it provides freedom from emphasis on the physical and from competing with other women's looks as well as from being sex objects for males to reject or approve. It enables women to focus on their spiritual, intellectual and professional development. Some scholars have argued that in returning to Islamic dress, many Muslim women attempt to reconcile their Islamic tradition with a modern lifestyle.

Many young Muslim women have adopted Islamic dress to symbolise a return to their cultural roots and the rejection of a Western tradition that in their view shows little respect for women. They think that Western fashions force women into uncomfortable and undignified outfits and, often in the name of liberation, actually turn them into sexual objects as reflected in modern media and movies.

Western and Muslim critics of Islamic dress, on the other hand, question those who say it is their free choice to wear the veil.

Women who wear the scarf point out that women of many other cultures and religions - Russian women, Hindu women, Jewish women, Greek women, and Catholic nuns - often wear head coverings. They ask why these women are not viewed as being oppressed. If opponents assume that women of other cultures who cover their heads are liberated, why can't they imagine freedom for Muslim women who wear a veil? Muslim women often talk about what the hijab symbolises: religious devotion, discipline, reflection, respect, freedom and modernity. But too often nobody asks them what the scarf means to them.

Whether veiled or not, majorities of Muslim women - even in some of the most conservative Muslim societies - support equal rights. In sharp contrast to their popular image as silently submissive, socially conditioned women who readily accept second-class status, majorities of Muslim women in virtually every country surveyed say women should have the same legal rights as men.

There are, of course, some important differences between a headscarf and a niqab. Masking the face can make it difficult to communicate directly with others, creating barriers and further isolating the very people that Muslim minorities need to better engage with. More importantly, the niqab can raise legitimate identity concerns, such as with driver's licences or security badges that require a photo. However, this is only a problem when a woman wearing a niqab refuses to accommodate these regulations.

The fear and loathing of any form of veiling sometimes expressed by those who object to what they see as a symbol of backwardness is not all that different from objections to the traditional religious garb and perceived lifestyle of Catholic nuns in the past (and, for some, still today). One could raise similar questions about the dress of Amish women and men, the practice and status of ultra-orthodox Jewish women, and others. Does the 'medieval' garb of the pope, patriarchs and other major religious leaders diminish their intellect or ability to negotiate life in the modern world?

Modernity should not be defined solely from a Western, liberal, secular-centred point of view. Our world today is one of multiple modernities, in which societies are increasingly multicultural and religiously and non-religiously pluralistic. Western societies should respect the rights of Muslim women who choose to wear the veil.

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## **GN9**

### ***No burqas please, we're French***

The commission appointed to study the issue must look at it in the context of personal choice and immigrant rights.

The burqa is causing a turmoil in France, although only a few dozen Muslim women wear it. This is a new phenomenon not seen in France before, and it is still considered marginal, in terms of the number of people concerned. Most French citizens have only seen women wearing the burqa in newspaper pictures or on television, thanks to photographers who watched and waited until they could photograph one of them. However, even if this phenomenon was insignificant considering the number of people involved, it is not at all a marginal topic in French society.

The magnitude of the controversy created by this issue made it appear like an earthquake that is shaking the identity and existence of French society.

In an address to the joint session of France's two houses of parliament on June 22, French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared his support for a ban on burqas.

"In our country we cannot accept women who are prisoners behind netting, cut off from all social life, deprived of identity. That is not the idea that the French republic has of women's dignity," he said.

"The burqa is not a sign of religion; it is a sign of subservience. It will not be welcome in the territory of the French republic," he added.

This announcement was the head of state's reaction to the lengthy parliamentary discussions on the issue.

Sixty Parliament members of all parties submitted a memorandum requesting that a commission be formed to investigate the issue and take all measures against what they described as sectarian deviation.

Subsequently, a 32-member commission was formed, and will submit its recommendations by the end of the year.

Many voices called for an immediate ban of the burqa before this phenomenon spreads, and some even called for a special law in this regard, while others said that every human being is free to choose his or her attire, as long as he or she does not violate the law.

Yet, the reality of the matter surpasses the burqa itself. This is seen clearly in the fear that swiped France in reaction to the burqa, which appears like a reproduction of the dress code imposed by the Taliban on women in Afghanistan.

The historic implications of the burqa are those of radicalism and extremism, thus the stir is not an expression of racism against Muslims, as some claimed, but simply a fear of a drift towards sectarianism.

There is no doubt that immigrants, in general, are subject to injustice and restrictions in France for many reasons not related to the burqa, but to the country's economic and social situations.

Surely, there are some fanatics in France, but they remain a minority, just like in all other countries.

The burqa situation, just like the ban of the hijab (headscarf) in French schools in 2004, brings up the issue of France's distinguished historical background.

In Britain, for example, people face no problems concerning what they wear, even at government department. It is not odd to see British Muslim policewomen wearing headscarves, which is unimaginable in France, a secular country that embraced the separation of religion and state since 1905 and adopted the concept of citizenship, which considers all citizens equal, regardless of their religion.

This is what Sarkozy referred to when said: "We must not fight the wrong battle. In the republic, the Muslim faith must be respected as much as other religions."

The real issue is about personal freedom. If a woman decided to wear the burqa freely and consciously, then preventing her from wearing it would be a violation of her personal freedom, which is protected by the law.

However, if the woman was forced to wear it, banning the burqa by law would be a must in the name of republican values.

In both cases, personal freedom is the keyword.

Another controversial point here is about personal conduct and its relation to the laws and traditions of the country that an individual chooses to live in.

Many people argue that Islamic countries impose heavy restrictions on dress code, thus it is not acceptable to deny other communities with different values this right.

Also, many people are not aware that most French Muslims, or Muslim residents of France, including Dalil Abu Bakr, Dean of the Paris Grand Mosque, expressed their disapproval of the burqa, and some Muslim women's societies called for banning it on French soil.

Thus, it is important for the commission set up by the French Parliament to study the issue carefully and investigate the roots of this phenomenon before making any decision. It is also vital to work silently, as the president of parliament said.

Undoubtedly, the burqa issue and discussions in France were used by some politicians to divert attention from real problems, such as unemployment and buying power, the impact of which was felt heavily in France as a result of the global economic crisis. Also, some parties blew the issue out of proportion for political and electoral reasons.

Although this problem made a lot of noise, it is not expected to linger, unlike the crisis of immigration and immigrants in France.

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## **GN10**

### ***Liberte includes freedom of dress***

Sarkozy has no right to impose his cultural leanings on French citizens.

The burqa worn by Muslim women is "a sign of subjugation" that is not "welcome" in his country, says French President Nicholas Sarkozy.

Communist Party Member of Parliament Andre Gerin goes a step further. He likens it to a degrading "prison". But the movement to ban the burqa and the niqab is described by a spokesperson for the French Council for the Muslim Religion as a way of stigmatising Islam and the Muslims of France.

France's parliament is currently split on the issue, with those against a proposed law that would make wearing the burqa illegal warning this could incite France's five million Muslims.

Firstly, one might question the French president's motive for stirring up this potential hornet's nest. Is he genuinely concerned about the dignity of women or is this another

underhand attempt to erode the Muslim culture, as was the earlier banning of the hijab in public schools couched within a law outlawing religious symbols.

There are a number of angles to this story - not least that many Westerners have a visceral dislike of traditional Muslim attire, reflected by a host of editorials in American and Canadian dailies in agreement with Sarkozy's arguments. For instance, a headline in the Calgary Herald reads "No sane, free person would choose to wear a burqa".

The writer, Licia Corbella, recounts how she donned the garment for 10 minutes while giving a talk at her children's school and ended up "hyperventilating from the oppression of it". She later told the children that "I felt like I was buried". That's her experience and it is probably one I would share should I be persuaded to don a burqa. I must admit, I often wonder how those women who wear it day in and day out in warm climates don't pass out from the heat. But nobody is suggesting that France's First Lady Carla Bruni or Corbella should cover up.

In a free country, it shouldn't be anybody's business what others choose to wear or not wear. Admittedly, if girls and women are being forced to conceal their faces, then something should be done about that.

But I suspect that the vast majority of Muslim women in Europe willingly choose to do so for religious or cultural reasons. Many say that wearing the burqa gives them a sense of freedom due to the sheer anonymity it provides.

Other critics in France say the burqa is being used as a political symbol, but when one remembers that most French Muslims are of North African origin this is nonsense.

I still remember my years spent in Algeria in the 1970s, when most Algerian women were veiled. If young French women of North African descent are choosing to be covered they are simply adhering to their roots.

And why shouldn't they when for decades Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians have been treated as third-class citizens in France?

Sarkozy might wish that France's North African population would assimilate into French society but they've never been given that chance. When it comes to accommodation and jobs they've been consistently discriminated against.

It seems to me that Sarkozy has no right to impose his cultural leanings or his own interpretation of other people's culture on citizens within a democracy born on a platform of liberty, equality and fraternity. And if he is so worried about women's "subjugation" to male demands then why single out the burqa? There are many real symbols pertaining to women's loss of dignity that are deserving of his attention. He could begin with the pimps and their scantily clad prostitutes on display around the country, which offend 64 per cent of participants in a telephone survey who agreed that prostitution was "a degrading practice for the image and dignity of the women". He could crack down on the trafficking of women, outlaw breast augmentation which has no medical benefits, ban pornographic magazines

from newsstands, or even control magazines which idealise the female form and thus inspire anorexia and bulimia in young girls. On that principle he could even attack the bridal veil, the traditional nun's habit or the custom followed by Hassidic Jewish women who shave their heads upon marriage. But no, he prefers to focus his ire on a harmless piece of cloth.

Of course, this isn't the first time that Western politicians have attempted to interfere in the way Muslim women choose to dress.

Britain's Secretary Of State For Justice Jack Straw caused a storm in 2006 when he refused to talk to veiled women at constituency surgeries.

And earlier, in 2001, Laura Bush and Cherie Blair led a brief assault on the burqa worn in Afghanistan, which is still being overwhelmingly worn out of choice today.

As the debate continues to rage in France with calls to set up an investigatory committee, perhaps those who are affronted by Sarkozy's unsolicited judgments will make their own this summer. Geneva, London and Rome are great at this time of year.

# The Gulf Times (GT1-GT6)

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## GT1

### France divided over burqa ban plan

The French government was split yesterday over whether a law should be enacted to restrict the wearing of the full Islamic veil by Muslim women in Europe's most staunchly secular country.

A group of lawmakers is calling for a special inquiry into whether women who wear the burqa or the niqab undermine French secularism and women's rights. The government's spokesman welcomed the proposal for a parliamentary commission that could lead to legislation, but Immigration Minister Eric Besson warned a law would stir tensions in France, home to some 5mn Muslims.

Communist MP Andre Gerin is spearheading the drive for a parliamentary panel that would look at ways to restrict the burqa which he describes as a "prison" and "degrading" for women. The deputy is also mayor of the southern city of Venissieux, home to a large north African immigrant population, where he says the sight of covered women is not a rare occurrence. "If it were determined that wearing the burqa is a submissive act, and that it is contrary to republican principles, well naturally parliament would have to draw the necessary conclusions," said government spokesman Luc Chatel. Asked whether that would mean introducing legislation, he said: "Why not." Home to Europe's largest Muslim minority, France passed a law in 2004 banning girls from wearing veils in state schools as part of the government's drive to defend secularism. Besson, a former Socialist, came out against new legislation on Islamic dress, saying France had already gone far enough in imposing restrictions on wearing veils in government offices and schools.

The proposal has won support from many politicians from both the left and right. France's Muslim council however accused lawmakers of wasting time by focusing on a fringe phenomenon and said it would stigmatise Muslims. "To raise the subject like this, via a parliamentary committee, is a way of stigmatising Islam and the Muslims of France," said Mohamed Moussaoui, head of the French Council for the Muslim Religion (CFCM). "We are shocked by the idea parliament should be put to work on such a marginal issue," he said, saying lawmakers would do better to focus on the thousands of jobs being lost in the economic crisis.

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## GT2

### ***Burqa not welcome in France***

Sarkozy says the burqa is a symbol of subservience, of submission, a problem of the dignity of women.

In a speech he himself called “an important moment”, French President Nicolas Sarkozy said yesterday that women wearing the burqa would not be accepted on French territory. “The problem of the burqa is not a religious problem, it is a problem of the dignity of women. It is a symbol of subservience, of submission. “The burqa will not be welcome in our French republic, “ Sarkozy said during his address before a joint session of the two houses of Parliament in Versailles.

Sarkozy became the first French head of state to address lawmakers in 150 years. The last French head of state to do so was Charles-Louis Napoleon, in 1848. His appearance was made possible by a July 2008 amendment of the French constitution, which had prohibited a sitting president from addressing lawmakers. Sarkozy’s comments on the burqa were inspired by a resolution introduced last week, and now signed by 80 lawmakers, calling for the creation of a parliamentary committee of inquiry into the wearing of the burqa on French territory. A burqa is the most concealing of all Islamic veils as it covers the entire face and body, leaving only a mesh screen to see through.

In his address, the French president also pledged to implement a form of affirmative action to do away with social inequality. “Who does not see that our model of integration no longer works?” Sarkozy said. “To achieve equality, we must know how to give more to those who have less.” To attain that goal, a form of affirmative action would be put into effect that was “not based on ethnic criteria but on social criteria”, Sarkozy said.

When US President Barack Obama came to Paris as a presidential candidate in July 2008, Sarkozy had vowed to implement affirmative action as had been done in the US. But he has run up against widespread opposition to the idea. The project for equality would be a “top priority” of his new government, Sarkozy said, and announced that a ministerial re-shuffle would be announced tomorrow. If in the first part of his address Sarkozy sounded like a left-wing social reformer, with his defence of women’s rights, his call for equality and a vow to improve prison conditions, he soon returned to his favourite subject, the reduction of public spending and the reform of the country’s bureaucracy.

The question of pension reform would be tackled by mid-2010, he said, including a possible increase of the retirement age. He also vowed to continue to reduce of the number of civil servants by replacing only one of two retiring public sector workers. Sarkozy also addressed the problem of France’s growing budget deficit, which Budget Minister Eric Woerth said late on Sunday would balloon to 7-7.5% of GDP (gross domestic product) in 2009 and 2010. The EU’s Stability Pact sets a deficit ceiling of 3% of GDP. Sarkozy said that

the part of the deficit based on structural inefficiency “must be reduced to zero” while that the economic crisis would be reduced by investment. There would be no austerity programme and no tax increase, Sarkozy vowed.

The French president’s appearance before lawmakers, in the context of the pomp of Versailles, was severely criticised by the opposition Socialists and their left-wing allies. Many lawmakers also criticised the cost of the event, which was estimated about 400,000 euros (\$556,000). The Green Party and the Communists boycotted the event, while the Socialists refused to participate in a debate that took place after Sarkozy left the chamber. They charged that the speech was merely one more step in the French president’s plan to broaden his authority and influence over every branch of government, and was additional evidence of what they called his “monarchical regime”.

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## GT3

### ***French parliament sets up inquiry into burqa***

Lawmakers will examine the issue for six months, starting from next month

The French National Assembly has decided to set up an inquiry into the rising number of Muslim women who wear the burqa after President Nicolas Sarkozy spoke out against the full Islamic veil.

In a historic address to parliament Monday, Sarkozy said the burqa was not a symbol of religious faith but a sign of women’s “subservience” and served notice that the head-to-toe veil was “not welcome” in staunchly secular France. Speaker Bernard Accoyer said the inquiry made up of 32 lawmakers from right-wing and leftist parties will be examining the thorny issue for six months beginning in July and report on its findings.

The lower house of parliament was responding to a call from a group of lawmakers, many of whom are from Sarkozy’s right-wing UMP party, for a panel to look at ways of restricting the wearing of the burqa. Home to Europe’s largest Muslim minority, France has been engulfed in debate over whether women’s rights and the nation’s strong secular tradition are under attack when Muslim women cover themselves fully. Some ministers have suggested that a law should be enacted banning the burqa in public places, but critics argue that a better approach would be to resort to education and outreach.

French party leaders decided to set up the fact-finding mission during a meeting, but they did not opt for a full commission of inquiry which has a broader mandate, as called for by the MPs. During his address to both houses of parliament, Sarkozy waded into the raging debate and made clear he supported measures to discourage Muslim women from fully covering themselves in France. “We cannot accept to have in our country women who are prisoners behind netting, cut off from all social life, deprived of identity,” Sarkozy said in the speech delivered at the Chateau de Versailles. “That is not the idea that the French republic

has of women's dignity."

France, home to an estimated 5mn Muslims, passed a law in 2004 banning headscarves or any other "conspicuous" religious symbol in state schools to defend secularism.

In a landmark address to the Muslim world in Cairo this month, US President Barack Obama urged Western countries to avoid "dictating what clothes a Muslim woman should wear". Sarkozy picked up on his comments when they met in Normandy a few days later and argued that France, as a secular state, had set acceptable limits on headscarves at schools and in government offices. The French leader made clear yesterday that he drew a distinction between women who feel faith-bound to respect the code of Islamic dress and the hardline conservatives who enforce the head-to-toe veil.

"We must not wage the wrong battle," he said. "In the republic, the Muslim faith must be respected as much as other religions." France has been caught up in a debate over how far it is willing to go to accommodate Islam without undermining the tradition of separating church and state, enshrined in a flagship 1905 law. Last year a Moroccan woman was refused French citizenship after social services said she wore a burqa and was living in "submission" to her husband. Communist MP Andre Gerin spearheaded the drive for a parliamentary panel that would look at ways to restrict the burqa, which he describes as a "prison" and "degrading" for women. The MP is also mayor of the southern city of Venissieux, home to a large north African immigrant population, where he says the sight of covered women is not a rare occurrence.

France's official Muslim council however has accused lawmakers of wasting time on a fringe phenomenon. Mohamed Moussaoui, head of the French Council for the Muslim Religion (CFCM), said last week that such an approach risked "stigmatising Islam and the Muslims of France".

It is not known how many women wear the burqa in France, but estimates have varied between a few thousand and several hundred.

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## GT4

### *Dressing down*

Muslim countries should ban the Western-style dresses worn by women from Western nations living on their territories in case France barred Muslim women from wearing the Niqab (the face veil), a renowned scholar said in Doha yesterday. Sheikh Mohamed Hassan al-Mraikhi, the imam of Omar bin al-Khattab mosque, said that Muslim countries should respond to the potential French ban on Muslim women's face veil by outlawing the Western-style dresses which are not in compliance with the Islamic dress code. "We have to deal with them in same way in our countries by imposing a similar ban on their citizens

wearing Western-style dress and jeans which violates the Islamic teaching on dress,” he added.

Last week, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, in a policy speech, spoke out against the Islamic Niqab branding it as a symbol of subservience that suppresses women’s identity. Sarkozy backed a proposal to ban the Niqab in public. Al-Mraikhi also criticised the attitude of the French president, saying it was “violating the personal freedom of Muslims”.

“There is no doubt that Niqab (a face-covering and loose body-length gown) a mandatory dress for all Muslim women wherever they are. So France or any other nation has no right to bar Muslim women from complying with the Islamic dress code ordained by Islam,” he said. Asked about the controversy over whether the full face veil is mandatory or not, Sheikh al-Mraikhi criticised scholars who described the Niqab as a “social custom or non-obligatory”, saying that such fatwas gave adherents of other religions the opportunity to step into the debate. “The Niqab is obligatory and this was confirmed in the Holy Qur’an,” he added. However, another Islamic scholar, Sheikh Salem Helal, said Muslim women donning the face veil in France, whether they were expatriates or citizens, should leave the country if it was outlawed by the government. “As long as you accepted to be a French citizen, then you have to comply with the laws of the country in which you stay. Muslim women in France should even give up their citizenship and return to Muslim countries if they found themselves unable to observe the Islamic dress code. If they have to choose between the face veil and their citizenship, they have to go the face veil and return to Muslim countries,” he added.

About the remarks made by Sarkozy in which he described the niqab as “subservience for women”, Sheikh Helal said such statements were mainly triggered by “Islamophobia” trend. “Such calls have nothing to do with the so-called defending women’s rights. It is just a disguise for hatred against Muslims. I wonder why we did not hear any European politicians speak out against the Sikhs donning the turban in Europe,” he added.

Sheikh Ahmed al-Buainain, a Qatari imam of Suhaib al-Romi Mosque at Al Wakrah, also stressed that the French government had no right to ban the face veil, saying that the veil should be part of the personal freedom which they cherish. “In Islam, women are requested to cover their faces. I wonder why they condone nudity in Europe as a personal freedom, but when it comes to the Niqab, then it does not apply. I believe that the current attack on the Niqab is just a way to distorting the image of Islam,” he added.

However, the scholar was of the view that there are two different opinions about women’s face covering among Muslim scholars. “The Niqab is a controversial issue. While some scholars see it as mandatory, others regard it as non-obligatory. But women in France who don it should not remove it just to comply with the proposed ban since Muslims should not comply with any law that is violating the Islamic teachings,” he added.

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## GT5

### ***Dress row opens bitter divisions***

In the northern Paris suburb of Saint-Denis, with its busy market, fast-food joints and bargain clothes shops, Angelica Winterstein only goes out once a week - and only if she really has to. "I feel like I'm being judged walking down the street. People tut or spit. In a smart area west of Paris, one man stopped his car and shouted: 'Why don't you go back to where you came from?' But I'm French, I couldn't be more French," said the 23 year-old, who was born and raised in bourgeois Versailles.

Once a fervent Catholic, Winterstein converted to Islam at 18. Six months ago she began wearing a loose, floor-length black jilbab, showing only her expertly made-up face from eyebrows to chin. She now wants to add the final piece, and wear full niqab, covering her face and leaving just her eyes visible. "But this month, after Sarkozy announced that full veils weren't welcome in France, things have got really difficult," she said. "As it is, people sometimes shout 'Ninja' at me. It's impossible to find a job - I'm a qualified childminder and get plenty of interviews because of my CV, but when people see me in person, they don't call back. It's difficult in this country, there's a certain mood in the air. I don't feel comfortable walking around."

France has plunged into another bitterly divisive national debate on Muslim women's clothing, reopening questions on how the country with western Europe's biggest Muslim community integrates Islam into its secular republic. A parliamentary inquiry is to examine how many women in France wear full Islamic veils or niqab before a decision is made over possibly banning such garments in the street. More than 50 MPs from across the political spectrum have called for restrictions on full veils, called "degrading", "submissive" and "coffins" by politicians. Yet the actual numbers of niqab wearers in France appears to be so small that TV news crews have struggled to find individuals to film.

Muslim groups estimate that there are perhaps only a few hundred women fully covering themselves out of a Muslim population of more than 5mn - often young French women, many of them converts. That such a marginal issue can suddenly take centre stage in a country otherwise struggling with major issues of mass unemployment and protest over public sector reform shows how powerful the symbol of the headscarf and veil remains in France.

Human rights groups warned this week that the row over niqabs risks exacerbating the growing problem of discrimination against women wearing standard Muslim headscarves. Five years on from the heated national debate over France's 2004 law banning headscarves and all conspicuous religious symbols from state schools, there has been an increase in general discrimination against adult women who cover their heads. "Women in standard headscarves have been refused access to voting booths, driving lessons, barred from their own wedding ceremonies at town halls, ejected from university classes and in one case, a woman in a bank was not allowed to withdraw cash from her own account at the counter.

This is clear discrimination by people who wrongly use the school law to claim that France is a secular state that doesn't allow headscarves in public places. It's utterly illegal and the courts rule in our favour," said Renee Le Mignot, co-president of the Movement Against Racism and for Friendship Between Peoples. "Our fear is that the current niqab debate is going to make this general discrimination worse."

Samy Debah, a history teacher who heads France's Collective against Islamophobia, said 80% of discrimination cases reported to his group involved women wearing standard headscarves. He had rarely seen any instances of women wearing niqabs, even in the ethnically mixed north Paris suburb where he lives. "From our figures, the biggest discriminator against Muslim women is the state and state officials," he said. "What people have to understand is that the concept of French secularism is not anti-religion per se, it is supposed to be about respecting all religions."

The current initiative against full Islamic veils began in Venissieux, a leftwing area on the industrial outskirts of Lyon. Its communist mayor, Andre Gerin, led proposals for a clampdown, saying he saw increasing numbers of full veils in his constituency. "I call them walking prisons, phantoms that go past us, it's that visual aspect that's an issue," Gerin said. "There's a malaise in the general population faced with the proliferation of these garments. I sense that on the part of Muslims, too." Gerin said women in niqab posed "concrete problems" in daily life. "We had an issue in a school where a headteacher at the end of the school day didn't want to hand back two children to a phantom," he said.

Gerin has refused to conduct the town-hall wedding of a woman wearing niqab. Another woman wearing a full veil was refused social housing by a landlord in the area. The mayor said that when women haven't removed their face covering, it has resulted in conflict with public officials who often felt insulted or under attack. But he denied stigmatising the wider Muslim population. "The current situation (where women wear niqabs) is stigmatising Muslims," he said. His aim was to "establish a debate with the Muslim community, integrate Islam properly into French life" and expose fundamentalist practices.

Two previous calls for a law restricting full veils have been left to gather dust. This time, the debate is gathering force. There are divisions in the government itself - the feminist Muslim junior minister, Fadela Amara, supports a niqab ban while the immigration minister, Eric Besson, warns it would create unnecessary tension.

Horia Demiati, 30, a French financier who wears a standard headscarf with her business suits, said: "I really fear an increase in hatred." She recently won a discrimination case after she and her family, including a six-month baby, were refused access to a rural holiday apartment they had booked in the Vosges. The woman who refused them argued that she was a secular feminist and didn't want to see the headscarf, "an instrument of women's submission and oppression", in her establishment. Demiati said: "This niqab debate is such a marginal issue, yet it risks detracting from the real issues in France."

#### France's secular separation

France's history of republicanism and anti-clericalism goes back to the revolution of 1789. The secular republic fiercely protects the rigid separation of the state from

organised religion, established in 1905. In 2004, after a heated national debate, a law reasserted France's cherished religious neutrality in public schools, banning the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in state schools - including Muslim headscarves, Jewish caps and Sikh turbans. French civil servants and public sector staff cannot wear religious symbols while working in state offices. But there is no law preventing headscarves or religious symbols being worn by members of the public in public spaces. The current debate over whether to ban full veils from being worn in public places intensified after Barack Obama's recent Middle East speech hit a raw nerve in France. He said it was "important for Western countries to avoid impeding Muslim citizens from practising religion as they see fit - for instance, by dictating what clothes a Muslim woman should wear". This was seen by some politicians as a jibe at France.

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## GT6

### ***Al Qaeda warns France over burqa stance***

Al Qaeda's north African wing threatened revenge against France for launching a "war" against Muslim women who wear full burqas that cover them from head to toe, according to a Web statement posted in the group's name. French legislators expressed concern this month that more and more Muslim women were wearing a burqa or a niqab which cloaks the entire body, sometimes leaving a gap for the eyes.

President Nicolas Sarkozy said the garments were not welcome in France because they are a symbol of the subjugation of women. "Here is France mustering all her capacity, mobilising all her institutions and organising her ranks to wage a perfidious new war against our sisters who wear the niqab," said the statement posted on a website used by Al Qaeda supporters. It said the French were committing these injustices "at a time when their denuded women ... flock to our land and occupy our beaches and streets, outrageously defying the feelings of Muslims". It said France's campaign against the burqa was tantamount to "religious terrorism" and was an incitement to a hatred that would only grow. "This is why we call upon all Muslims to respond to this hatred by another that is more ravaging, we call upon them to confront this French obstinacy," the statement said.

It said Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb vowed "before God not to be silent in the face of these provocations and injustices and do all in our power and take revenge at the first opportunity against France and its interests wherever they may be found, for the honour of our daughters and our sisters". Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is the remnant of an Islamic insurgency that raged through former French colony Algeria for most of the 1990s.

The group was formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), itself a spin-off of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) which was blamed for a series of bombings in France in 1995. France is the home to Europe's largest Muslim minority and is strongly attached to its secular values and ideals of gender equality.

# The Saudi Gazette (SG1-SG3)

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## SG1

### ***France open to banning Muslim veil: Spokesman***

France could impose curbs on wearing the full Islamic veil if a parliamentary commission finds the burka or niqab degrading for women, a government spokesman said Friday. A group of lawmakers is calling for a special inquiry into whether Muslim women who cover themselves fully in public undermine French secularism and women's rights. "If it were determined that wearing the burka is a submissive act, and that it is contrary to republican principles, well naturally parliament would have to draw the necessary conclusions," said spokesman Luc Chatel. Asked whether that would mean introducing legislation, he said: "why not."

Communist MP Andre Gerin is spearheading the drive for a parliamentary panel that would look at ways to restrict the burka which he describes as a "prison" and "degrading" for women. The deputy is also mayor of the southern city of Venissieux, home to a large north African immigrant population, where he says the sight of covered women is not a rare occurrence. Home to Europe's largest Muslim minority, France passed a controversial law in 2004 forbidding girls from wearing veils in state schools as part of the government's drive to defend secularism. "We are facing a major debate," Chatel told France 2 television. The spokesman voiced support for a parliamentary commission, saying: "I think it's important because it will allow us to have a better view of the issue."

The proposal has won support from many politicians from both the left and right, but France's Muslim council accused lawmakers of wasting time focusing on a fringe phenomenon. "To raise the subject like this, via a parliamentary committee, is a way of stigmatising Islam and the Muslims of France," said Mohammed Moussaoui, head of the French Council for the Muslim Religion (CFCM).

"We are shocked by the idea parliament should be put to work on such a marginal issue," he said, saying lawmakers would do better to focus on the hundreds of thousands of jobs being lost in the economic crisis.

A few thousand women wear the burka in France, many of whom are French converts who choose to cover themselves to assert their faith, according to Le Figaro newspaper.

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## SG2

### ***Mr. Sarkozy, burqa is sign of modesty***

I THINK French President Nicolas Sarkozy has not visited a convent of late. If he had he would have noticed nuns in wimples and robes. Would he call the dress worn by nuns “a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement?”

In the first presidential address to the French parliament in 136 years, Sarkozy chose to call a dress willingly adopted by many Muslim women all over the world as a sign of subservience and degradation.

The burqa or abaya, as it is known in Saudi Arabia, is a body robe. What covers the head and face is called niqab. But it is not a question of semantics, because Sarkozy meant a head-to-toe dress when he referred to the burqa.

Sarkozy was right when he said the burqa – the particular type of dress – was not a religious issue. Islam asks its followers – men and women – to dress modestly, and so do all religions. The Islamic concept of hijab is not only physical but also moral. It tells men to lower their gaze in front of women other than their wives and other close relatives. It tells women to be mindful of their gait and garments.

The debate here is on two counts: the issue of morality and the freedom of choice. Who is indecent and spoils public morals: a burqa-clad woman or the one in a bikini? Those who are brought up on moral values which teach respect for women and not maintain that they are not mere objects of desire or enticement and mannequins for public display, will say a woman in a bikini is indecent. But those who have grown up seeing scantily-clad women around them, will find a woman in a burqa objectionable.

So it all boils down to your perception which is a result of your moral values. There is no point praising a Picasso painting in front of a visually-challenged person. However, we can discuss the issue of a person’s freedom of choice. France is a liberal country. Liberté, égalité, fraternité (Liberty, equality, fraternity) is the French national motto. So how can a country which prides itself on protecting liberty and equality discuss in its parliament an issue which is an infringement on one’s freedom? If a woman in a mini skirt is not an issue of debate in France, then why is a woman in a burqa objectionable so long as she does not affect public order? Ask any woman covered head-to-toe in the black robe, whether the dress has been forced on her or she is wearing it by choice? The answer in all cases will be the latter. Women of high moral values prefer to cover their modesty.

In his speech Sarkozy said: “In our country, we cannot accept that women be prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity.” How can Sarkozy pass judgement on others? The burqa does not curb freedom. Covered women do go about daily chores unhindered. Hindered are those who look at the burqa as a symbol of subservience. The burqa does not deprive a woman of her identity. On the contrary, it gives her an identity: an identity of being modest in an indecent crowd, an identity of boldly

following her choice amidst a howl of protests, an identity of being true to her faith and culture. It is strange that something which is moral is being looked down upon while immorality and indecency are being promoted!

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### SG3

#### ***Mufti Sarkozy's 'fatwa' not amusing***

AS a leading member of the Global Coalition Against Allowing Muslim Women Freedom of Sartorial Choice based on their religious obligations and convictions, Nicholas Sarkozy's latest salvo declaring the burqa "not welcome" in France, has, I feel, irrevocably forfeited his right to be taken seriously.

Within minutes of his speech, internet forums, social networking sites and blogs – the 21st century's version of the village grapevine – erupted with hoots of laughter and derision at his feeble attempt to deflect his nation's attention from more pressing matters to the quintessentially French preoccupation with women's clothes.

His ill-timed, clumsily worded, two-minute tirade against the "burqa" could have fitted right into the current international climate of dividing Muslims into two groups: moderates ("good") and fundamentalists ("evil" – "abaya and beard wearing"), had he not taken it upon himself to assert that wearing an outer covering garment when outdoors is not a religious obligation upon Muslim women.

"The burqa is not a religious sign, it's a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement – I want to say it solemnly," he said, addressing members of both parliamentary houses gathered at the Palace of Versailles for his speech. You could have knocked me down with a feather: since when did Sarkozy become an authority on Islam?

Has he read the verse of the Qur'an (Surah Ahzab, Verse 59) which explicitly enjoins believing women to wear an outer garment when outdoors, so that they are identified as Muslim women and not harassed? If so, how is he qualified to offer a different conclusion from centuries of Muslim exegetes and scholars who affirmed that such a garment is undoubtedly a religious obligation? Has he ever spoken to any of the thousands of Muslim women who willingly choose to wear the burqa/abaya/jilbab and asked them the rationale behind their choice of that garb?

If you look at his words from an extremely liberal point of view, Sarkozy might be forgiven for his views on the abaya/burqa/jilbab as being a symbol of servitude: It is a sign of subservience – not to human beings, fickle fashion trends and social mores – but to the Higher Wisdom of the One who decreed it an obligatory protection for Muslim women. What is unforgivable though, is his labeling the garment "a sign of debasement." As the head of a nation that is self-confessedly proud of its "laissez-faire attitude towards

casual sex” and all the debauched trappings that go with it, one would expect him to be better acquainted with ‘debasement’. A visit to just one among the thousands of proudly advertised, government-licensed “adults-only entertainment spots” in France would suffice for him to write a detailed dissertation on human debasement and what it comprises. Debasement is trading in the bodies of women, displaying them and using them as a means of provoking and gratifying unnatural biological urges in strangers. Debasement is the deliberate, systematic dehumanization of women and their relegation to being sexual toys in the hands of profiteers – not the covering of a woman’s body in public, that protects her from precisely such predators.

By calling for a “ban” on the burqa in the first-ever address to lawmakers by a French head of state in over a century, Sarkozy tried to juggle several items on his agenda: projecting himself as both an agent provocateur and a fearless knight in shining armor who is unafraid to save France – more specifically French “laïcité” – from the menacing specter of Muslim “fundamentalism”; appeasing MPs who had urgently pressed for the motion in Parliament, and rallying other bigoted members of the public around his desperately flailing persona as President. Incidentally, this is not the first time Sarkozy has indulged in ‘God-talk’ – dragging theological issues center-stage in a country where a majority of the citizens believe that the State should hold a neutral position in religious matters, and that freedom of conscience and religion are inalienable rights of individuals. The French concept of “laïcité” (‘laicity’) necessitates that the State should “foster emancipation by giving each citizen the opportunity to learn to think freely without being locked in the ideas of his native social group.”

This emphasis on “freedom of thought” has a historical basis: France was subjected to the religious and cultural monopoly of the Catholic Church for several centuries, and when the Republic came into being, it assumed the role of an “emancipator,” helping citizen widen their views – sometimes even against their will. That Sarkozy has had to take recourse to the marginalization of Muslim women in his attempt to defend the French ideal of “an open mind” is an irony that would have been laughable, were it not for the ominous sense of foreboding that overshadows the future of Muslims in France today.

# Kuwait Times (KT1)

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## KT1

### ***France divided over calls to ban burka***

The French government was split yesterday over whether a law should be enacted to restrict the wearing of the full Islamic veil by Muslim women in Europe's most staunchly secular country. A group of lawmakers is calling for a special inquiry into whether women who wear the burka or the niqab undermine French secularism and women's rights. The government's spokesman welcomed the proposal for a parliamentary commission that could lead to legislation, but Immigration Minister Eric Besson warned a law would stir tensions in France, home to some five million Muslims.

Communist MP Andre Gerin is spearheading the drive for a parliamentary panel that would look at ways to restrict the burka which he describes as a "prison" and "degrading" for women.

The deputy is also mayor of the southern city of Venissieux, home to a large north African immigrant population, where he says the sight of covered women is not a rare occurrence. If it were determined that wearing the burka is a submissive act, and that it is contrary to republican principles, well naturally parliament would have to draw the necessary conclusions," said government spokesman Luc Chatel. Asked whether that would mean introducing legislation, he said, "why not.

Home to Europe's largest Muslim minority, France passed a controversial law in 2004 forbidding girls from wearing veils in state schools as part of the government's drive to defend secularism.

Besson, a former Socialist, came out against new legislation on Islamic dress, saying France had already gone far enough in imposing restrictions on wearing veils in government offices and schools. We need to counter the wearing of the burka with education and dialogue. A law would be inefficient and create tensions that we don't need at this time," Besson told Europe 1 radio. The proposal has won support from many politicians from both the left and right including urban affairs minister Fadela Amara, who was born to Algerian immigrants and is an outspoken advocate for Muslim women's rights.

France's Muslim council however accused lawmakers of wasting time by focusing on a fringe phenomenon and said it would stigmatize Muslims. "To raise the subject like this, via a parliamentary committee, is a way of stigmatizing Islam and the Muslims of France," said Mohammed Moussaoui, head of the French Council for the Muslim Religion (CFCM). We are shocked by the idea parliament should be put to work on such a marginal issue," he said, saying lawmakers would do better to focus on the hundreds of thousands of jobs being lost in the economic crisis.

A few thousand women wear the burka in France, many of whom are French converts who choose to cover themselves to assert their faith, according to Le Figaro newspaper. If the lower house agrees to set up the commission, it would draft a report to be released no later than November 30, said Gerin.

**Appendix 7 – The ‘2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy’ CDA Analysis - UK  
Articles**

# The Times (TTC6-TTC15)

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## TTC6

### ***Drawing the Line: Publishing controversial cartoons and being damned***

Some two decades ago, political relations between Europe and the Islamic world were convulsed by the controversy surrounding the publication of the book *The Satanic Verses*. It is depressing that cartoons first printed in a Danish newspaper last autumn appear to have had much the same effect now. It should also not, alas, be surprising. The cultural chasm has, if anything, grown in the past 20 years. Many in Europe today think nothing of mocking the most revered aspects of Christianity — often in a crass, tasteless manner — while the corruption and failure of secular regimes in the Middle East have helped to inspire a revival of Islam, including an extremist strain.

None of which excuses a situation in which the governments of France and Denmark have felt obliged to advise their citizens to avoid areas such as the Gaza Strip where the offices of the EU were stormed yesterday. There is undoubtedly a sizeable aspect of domestic politics surrounding events in the Palestinian Authority and elsewhere. It would also, though, be folly to deny that many individual Muslims have been aggrieved by the very fact of images of the Prophet Muhammad.

This newspaper has had anguish of its own over whether to reproduce the pictures at the centre of this saga. At one level, their appearance might be seen as an appropriate response to the fanatics who have demanded their prohibition and could help the reader to understand both their character and the impact that they might have on believers. But to duplicate these cartoons several months after they were originally printed also has an element of exhibitionism to it. To present them in front of the public for debate is not a value-neutral exercise. The offence destined to be caused to moderate Muslims should not be discounted.

On balance, we have chosen not to publish the cartoons but to provide weblinks to those who wish to see them. The crucial theme here is choice. The truth is that drawing the line in instances such as these is not a black-and-white question. It cannot be valid for followers of a religion to state that because they consider images of the Prophet idolatry, the same applies to anyone else in all circumstances. Then again, linking the Prophet to suicide bombings supposedly undertaken in his honour was incendiary. *The Times* would, for example, have reservations about printing a cartoon of Christ in a Nazi uniform sketched because sympathisers of Hitler had conducted awful crimes in the name of Christianity.

Muslims thus have a right to protest about the cartoons and, if they want, to boycott the publications concerned. To move from there to holding ministers responsible for the editorial decisions of a free press in their nations, to urge that all products from a country be ostracised or, worst still, to engage in violence against people or property is to leave the field of legitimate complaint and enter one of censorship enforced under threat of

intimidation. That free speech is misunderstood in much of the Islamic realm shows how much progress has yet to be made.

Consistency would also be a virtue. The anger directed at these cartoons by certain Muslims would carry more weight if pictures that crudely insult Jews and Christians were not found regularly in the Middle East. To contend that faiths of many forms merit a degree of deference, but not absolute protection, is one notion. To insist that this principle be applied selectively is another, quite indefensible, assertion.

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## TTC7

### *Muslim Cartoon*

On the satirical Christian Ship of Fools website there is a regular caption competition. It pokes fun at Christian icons, bishops and so on. My favourite entry so far to the latest competition is from Lawrence: "Fr. Smith was just adding fuel to the fire in his latest attempt to explain what he meant when he was overheard saying he was 'going to blow some hose'." Not only do Christians not protest at this sort of thing, but they positively relish it. Recently, ShipofFools also ran a contest to find the funniest and most offensive religious jokes that would fall foul of the unamended incitement to religious hatred legislation. Some Christians did find the resulting winners offensive when we ran the results in the newspaper. But the furthest they went in protesting were some miffed emails to me, or to the letters page editor. You can judge the jokes for yourself [here](#).

Muslim leaders have been appealing for calm, and the consensus from other religious leaders, including the Chief Rabbi Sir Jonathan Sacks, is that restraint is necessary, both to guarantee freedom of speech and freedom from religious hatred. Read their comments [online here](#).

Lord Carey of Clifton, former Archbishop of Canterbury, has also sent me a strong comment in similar vein.

In a joint statement with Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, Director of the Cordoba Initiative and a leading Muslim teacher in the US, he says: "As Muslim and Christian leaders, and as members of the C-100 Coalition of the World Economic Forum, we are saddened and appalled by the cartoons, and the irresponsible action of the papers in Denmark and France in allowing the cartoons to be published. We recognise the importance of free speech and we agree that religions should not expect any favours or privileges against other groups in society. However to publish such offensive cartoons will be seen by many around the world as an attack on a world faith and only deepens the suspicion between the west and the Muslim world. We call for calmness and peace. Such actions only prove the necessity to deepen the dialogue between our faiths and cultures." (The C-100 was set up three years ago to bridge the worlds of the west the Muslim world. Prince Turki, ambassador to the US, is co-chairman along with Lord Carey.)

Now look at this page, from Tom Gross's Mideast Media Analysis site.

It shows a selection of cartoons from the media of seven Arab countries, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Syria and Egypt, and from the Palestinian Authority. "A number of these countries are regarded as moderate or allied to the West," writes Gross. "Most print media in the Arab world are under the full or partial control of the ruling regimes. One picture can sometimes be deadlier than a thousand words."

One cartoon depicts the railroad to the death camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau – but with Israeli flags replacing the Nazi ones. It is taken from the Jordanian newspaper Ad-Dustur. The sign in Arabic reads: "Gaza Strip or the Israeli Annihilation Camp." Gross writes: "This accentuates the widespread libel that Israel's policies towards the Palestinians have been comparable to Nazi actions towards Jews."

Where is the condemnation from and of those in the Arab world responsible for these atrocious anti-Semitic images? Melanie Phillips has written a good, robust comment here.

As she says: "More heartening was the reaction by the Jordanian independent tabloid al-Shihan which reprinted three of the cartoons on Thursday. As the BBC reported: 'Muslims of the world be reasonable,' wrote editor Jihad Momani. 'What brings more prejudice against Islam, these caricatures or pictures of a hostage-taker slashing the throat of his victim in front of the cameras or a suicide bomber who blows himself up during a wedding ceremony in Amman?'"

Irene Lancaster, historian and academic based in Manchester, is among the many intellectuals from all faiths and none throughout this country and abroad who are deeply and increasingly concerned by present events. She says: "If God/Muhammad is great, they can rise above all this. In Judaism God is not only transcendent, but a verb not a noun and therefore unable to be pinned down. In addition, Moses is regarded as all-too-human. All prophets in Judaism are human and fallible and by the way, Mohammad is not regarded as one of our prophets.

"What is worrying about the anti-Semitic cartoons by the Arab and Muslim world is that they lead to physical attacks on the Jewish community, with repercussions in church and mosque sermons, inciting people to beat up Jews, which the Archbishop of Canterbury has recently condemned.

"The fact is that at the moment something very nasty has happened to Islam world wide and the point of the Danish cartoon is that it has become an instrument of violence. This was what it was like in the past as well, although philosophers and scientists were influenced by Jewish thought and enjoyed discussing ideas with others. This did not prevent them from supporting the extremism of their governors and soldiers, however, as exemplified by Al Ghazzali the great Muslim mystic, also a supporter of the Almohade regime which was extremely violent.

"As far as the West is concerned, Jews, Muslims and other ethnic minorities and minority religions, not to mention Catholicism in this country, would not have the freedoms they do

have without the rise of democracy and even secularism. Societies have to balance the rights of the majority (in Denmark, probably secular and liberal) against those of the minorities and no minority has the right to demand the implementation of its own rules for all."

She quotes the Jewish law brought in very early in diaspora, that "the law of the land is the law" and in any dispute between Jewish law and secular law, the latter must be followed. "This is why the Dalai Lama has stated that 'the Jews have found the secret of salvation in exile' and feels that we are very adept at treading the fine line between retaining our religion whilst appreciating our status as a minority."

Irene is not just an expert in Judaism and Jewish history. In her recent book, *Deconstructing the Bible*, about Abraham Ibn Ezra (1089-1164), who she has described in a lecture as "A Renaissance Man Before His Time", she emerges as expert in both Jewish and Sufi mysticism. She understands how positive the effect of Islam on civilisation can be.

Personally I had not realised before all this blew up quite how wide-ranging the restrictions on Muslims are when it comes to pictures. Technically, nothing is allowed that shows an animate object. Not even photographs.

It is the case that pictures of Mohammed and his court appear in museums in Islamic countries such as Turkey.

But they would not be displayed in a country such as Saudi Arabia, due to Sharia.

In Islam, just as in other religions, different communities will place different interpretations on the Hadith, the sayings of the Prophet.

Mohammed is recorded in the Hadith, one of the four arms of Sharia, or Islamic law, as having said: "And who is more unjust than those who try to create the likeness of My creation? Let them create an atom, or let them create a wheat grain, or let them create a barley grain." He also said: "Angels do not enter a house in which there is a dog or a picture."

Taken together with the Koranic injunctions on respect for the Prophet, these sayings mean that in strict Islamic interpretations, any representation at all of any living thing is absolutely forbidden. Essential illustrations in academic text books under such jurisdictions might, for example, show a cow but with the head missing.

Technically, the rulings forbid photographs of family members in the home, video cameras and mobile picture phones. But they remain the subject of intense debate in Islamic scholarly circles.

And just as many young British Muslims today photograph their friends and family on their mobile telephones, the Prophet has appeared in art throughout the centuries, along with his court.

Where this has happened, concession is usually made to Muslim sensitivities by ensuring the features of his face at least are veiled or blanked out completely.

Such pictures arose most often in cultures where it was a mark of respect to hang pictures of a reigning monarch or other leader in homes and galleries.

Imam Ibrahim Mogra, of the Muslim Council of Britain, said: "This would happen where the hadith prohibiting it might be overlooked, or merely interpreted differently. For example, some scholars might argue that the intention of the hadith was to prevent worship of the image, and that it was permissible to have an image where the aim was not to worship but to show respect."

He said the debate continued in Muslim families today. "Some are very strict about it and will not have photographs taken except for official documents such as a driving licence or a passport. Others will say it is ok to have photographs taken because they do not intend to worship the pictures. In this country, most people take a relaxed view about photographs."

Yet in the Hadith there are detailed descriptions of what the Prophet looked like. One companion said: "He had a most handsome constitution. Some gave the smile of his beauty to that of the full moon. His nose was thin. His face was smooth. His beard was thick. His neck was the most beautiful. If the rays of the sun fell on his neck, it appeared like a cup of silver mixed with gold. The place between his shoulders was wide."

The writings continue: "The Messenger of Allah, was not excessively tall or short. He was not very pallid nor dark. He did not have curly hair or lank hair. Allah commissioned him at the age of forty. He stayed in Mecca ten years and at Medina for ten years and Allah the Mighty, the Majestic made him die when he was sixty. There were not twenty white hairs in his hair or beard, may Allah bless him and grant him peace."

What a shame the Turks took over Jerusalem in the 11th century and forbade pilgrimages, and that Pope Urban II launched the first crusade as a result. Communities have long memories. Even if the cartoon wars all blow over peaceably, and it by no means certain that they will, it will be a long time before they are forgotten.

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## TTC8

### ***West tries to calm tensions as militants threaten kidnaps***

Even moderate Muslims would regard cartoons as sacrilege, say scholars saddened by the breach of sacred boundary

A LEADING Muslim scholar said that repeated publication of the cartoons would inevitably lead to more terrorist attacks in the West.

Mufti Abdul Barkatullah, senior imam at North Finchley Mosque in North London, said that editors who published the cartoons were “giving more fuel to al-Qaeda”.

He said that one of Islam’s sacred boundaries had been crossed and even moderate Muslims would regard the cartoons as sacrilege. He cited verses of the Koran that rail against slander and mockery of Islam and prayer.

Chapter 9 verse 12 urges all Muslims to “fight” any who “revile” Islam. Chapter 104 warns those who slander and defame that they will be hurled into “crushing disaster”.

Mufti Barkatullah, a member of the Muslim Council of Britain, said: “In other religions, the sacred boundaries have been deleted. Not so in Islam. This is a no-go area at any cost. It will spur on suicide bombers.

“However moderate one is, there can be no compromise on the person of the Prophet. The Prophet is held above everything in the Universe, over one’s own person, family, parents, the whole world. It is less offensive to condemn and vilify God.”

A spokesman for the Muslim Council said that it was not necessarily offensive to publish the cartoons *per se*. It all depended on context. A television programme broadcast them two days ago in Britain to explain why they were controversial. He said that Muslims would not find their use insulting in that context. It was the provocative publication with the intention of stirring controversy that was offensive, he said.

Muslims worldwide obey the Islamic injunction not to display pictures of any animal or human, anything with a “soul”, in their homes and mosques, never mind pictures of the prophet. This element of Sharia, or Islamic law, has become a hallmark of their faith, even though it does not appear in the Koran.

It is in the Hadith — the collection of sayings of the Prophet — that pictures of living creatures are forbidden. The Arab word used for pictures is *surah*, which can mean anything from a two-dimensional drawing to a three-dimensional figure or statue.

Hadith-Bukhari 5:338 has Abu Talha, a companion of the Prophet, quoting him as saying: “Angels do not enter a house in which there is a dog or a picture.” The scripture records that he meant the images of creatures that have souls.

Imam Ibrahim Mogra, a leading Islamic scholar and senior member of the Muslim Council, said: “To depict the Prophet is unacceptable. To depict him as a terrorist is even more painful. It is extremely sad that they have not yet realised this.

“They should have realised from the response to what the Danish paper did that this was not the right thing to do . . . I do not see how the idea of freedom of speech and freedom of expression gives people the licence to cause this kind of hurt to more than a billion people around the world.

“Muhammad is a very, very special person. To us he is more than our parents are. We can imagine, if someone was to make a mockery of our parents in this manner, how hurt we would be. Imagine that hurt, multiplied a million times.”

He said that the teaching on this issue was strict and there were other verses in the Hadith that also supported the prohibition, although exceptions are made to the ban on dogs. For example, a blind man would be permitted a dog, as would a family living on a crime-ridden estate.

There are four sources of Sharia. The Koran is the first, and the second is the Sunna or Hadith, the collection of sayings of the Prophet. The third source is analogy, so where a new difficulty arises, as with scratchcards, the injunction against gambling is extolled to prohibit their use. The fourth source is the “consensus of scholars”.

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## TTC9

### ***World press opinion of cartoon row***

*Newspapers around the world have published editorials this morning addressing the row over the Danish Muhammad cartoons. Here is a selection:*

#### **Al-Akhbar, Egypt** (translated by The Egyptian Gazette)

“How can more than 1 billion Muslims worldwide be so weak compared to the 10-million strong Jewish community in standing up for their beliefs? That the Danish government refuses to make an apology is tantamount to condoning the newspaper’s behaviour, so no one can blame Muslims for their boycott of Denmark.”

#### **Al-Gomhurriya, Egypt**

“It is not a question of freedom of opinion or belief, it is a conspiracy against Islam and Muslims which has been in the works for years. The international community should understand that any attack against our prophet will not go unpunished.”

#### **Al-Shihan, Jordan**

(The newspaper published three of the cartoons before the editor was fired and copies were pulled from shops)

“Muslims of the world, be reasonable... What brings more prejudice against Islam, these caricatures or pictures of a hostage-taker slashing the throat of his victim in front of the cameras or a suicide bomber who blows himself up during a wedding ceremony in Amman?”

“Oh I ask God to forgive me,” editor’s apology.

## **Le Monde, France**

“Religions are systems of thought, spiritual constructions, beliefs that are respected but which can, by turn, be freely analysed, criticised and ridiculed... Secular, republican society is built on religious neutrality and tolerance. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish between religions and those who practise them: devotees must be protected against all discrimination and against all attacks motivated by their religious beliefs.”

## **The Sun**

“The Sun believes passionately in free speech, but that does not mean we need to jump on someone else’s bandwagon to prove we will not be intimidated. It does seem ridiculous, though, that mayhem is breaking out over a handful of cartoons. Can we all get real.”

## **The Daily Mail**

“While the Mail would fight to the death to defend those papers that printed the offending cartoons, it disagrees with the fact that they have done so. Rights are one thing. Responsibilities are another. And the newspapers that so piously proclaimed their right to freedom of speech were being - to put it mildly - deeply discourteous to the Islamic view.”

## **The Daily Telegraph**

“Our restraint is in keeping with British values of tolerance and respect for the feelings of others. However, we are equally in no doubt that a small minority of Muslims would be offended by such a publication to an extent where they would threaten, and perhaps even use, violence. This is a problem that the whole of the Western world needs to confront frankly, and not sidestep.”

## **The Financial Times**

“There is something dishonest, too, about the way Arab leaders defer in these matters to reactionary clerical establishments they rely on to legitimise their autocratic rule. That was for many, many centuries the way it used to be in Europe. The “Christian” west won through to modernity in the teeth of clerical reaction. As Arab and Muslim societies return to that road they will collide with their religious establishments on the way to repossessing their religion. Even Islamist reformers tend to believe this.”

## **The Guardian**

“It is one thing to assert the right to publish an image of the prophet. As long as that is not illegal - and not even the government’s amended religious hatred bill makes it so - then that right undoubtedly exists. But it is another thing to put that right to the test, especially when to do so inevitably causes offence to many Muslims and, even more so, when there is currently such a powerful need to craft a more inclusive public culture which can embrace them and their faith.”

## The Independent

“There is... no doubt that newspapers should have the right to print cartoons that some people find offensive. Indeed it goes to the very nature of the political cartoon that it seeks to make a point through exaggeration, distortion and caricature - a process which is, by definition, intended to needle those being criticised, or their supporters. In a free society it is proper that speech, and other forms of expression, should be free.”

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## TTC10

### ***Peter Brookes: Why the Muhammad cartoons fail***

*Peter Brookes, award-winning Times Cartoonist, discusses the 12 Danish cartoons, first published by a newspaper in September, that have sparked a week of protests, flag-burnings and death threats across the Muslim world*

“I only saw the drawings yesterday. This week I was working on Iran and oil and the 100th British death in Iraq, which were much more important to me. But this escalated yesterday and I saw them. My first reaction, I have to say, was what feeble cartoons.

“Perhaps I don’t understand Danish humour but there was only one out of the 12 - where Muhammad’s turban seems to be a bomb - that seemed to have any meaning.

“But even that one is a poor cartoon. It’s ambivalent. You can read it one of two ways: either terrorism is using the cloak of Islam, is dressing itself as Muhammad, or that Muhammad himself is a terrorist. I hate that ambivalence in a cartoon, not knowing quite what the message is. We could be misreading the intentions of the artist entirely.

“There is an awful duality about cartoonists: on the one hand, we feel we must be able to depict anything, we must be free. So as a rule, I try not to be too sensitive about these things - and all cartoonists are guilty of doing things when we have no idea what the reaction is going to be.

“Last year, for instance, when the horse Best Mate died on the same day as David Blunkett resigned, I combined the two, and had no idea I would get hundreds of letters of complaint - all from horse lovers, of course, no one wrote to defend Blunkett.

“And yet, as a cartoonist, I think there has to be a purpose. I can’t see any reason for these images, they just seem gratuitous. They’re meaningless. Depicting Islam, there is no need to show the Prophet.

“It looks like the artists just didn’t think it through. And yet, they were asked to do it precisely because an author couldn’t find an illustrator who would portray Muhammad. They must have known it was a provocation, they should have been able to foresee

something of the reaction after the Dutch experience of the Theo Van Gogh film, and the *Satanic Verses*.

“Of course now there’s so much happening, everything is moving so fast, that this looks like it will all go on and on. And, ironically, we will have to do cartoons about it.”

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## **TTC 11**

### ***Muslim protest spreads to Danish butter***

The manufacturers of Lurpak butter have been forced to lay-off more than 100 staff in reaction to a boycott of Danish products in the Muslim world over the controversial publication of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed.

Arla Foods, Europe’s second-largest dairy company, said today that it would lay off 125 staff in its factories in Bislev, near Aalborg in the north of Denmark, adding that a further 40 people would see their working hours reduced.

Arla Foods, a co-operative owned by some 11,600 milk producers in Denmark and Sweden, is Denmark’s biggest exporter to Arab countries, accounting for one-third of total Danish exports there.

Arla, for which 8 per cent of its total production is at stake, has been the group hardest hit by boycotts of Danish products across the Muslim world, where anger over the publication, originally in a Danish newspaper, of 12 cartoons depicting Prophet Mohammed continues to swell.

Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, have followed boycott calls, and the populous northern African countries have also heeded the call to shun Danish goods.

Outside Europe, the Middle East is Arla Foods main export destination, with Saudi Arabia as the largest single market.

Butter, feta, processed cheese and full-cream milk powder are the core products in Middle Eastern markets, the company said.

“Our business out there has been completely undermined,” Finn Hansen, the head of the international division of dairy company Arla Foods, said.

“Our products have been taken off the shelves in 50,000 stores. Without a quick solution, we will generate no more turnover in the Middle East,” he said.

Arla said that no job cuts were planned in the Middle East, including in Saudi Arabia, where the company employs 800 staff in a Riyadh factory, where production has been halted.

Plans to extend the factory there have, however, been postponed.

Denmark exported goods worth €1.2 billion (£815 million) to Arab countries in 2004, according to the foreign ministry. Although this represents just 1 to 1.5 percent of total Danish exports, the lost income is taking a big chunk out of the businesses concerned.

“In turnover, this is costing us 10 million kroner [£800,000] a day,” an Arla spokeswoman told AFP.

While dairy companies are worst hit, pharmaceutical companies are also big losers, accounting for 14 per cent of total goods hurt by the boycott. Egypt alone buys 33 per cent of Denmark’s drugs exports to the region.

In Dubai branches of French hypermarket giant Carrefour, the shelves were empty of Danish butter and cheese products.

“Carrefour no longer sells this garbage,” said an Emirati employee of the chain owned by local conglomerate Al-Futaim Group.

In Kuwait City, signs were put up at many malls and shopping centres reading: “We have boycotted Danish products”.

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## TTC12

### Incitement with little insight

Publishing 12 indifferent cartoons a few weeks ago was justified. In today’s climate, it is plainly wrong

PUBLICITY STUNT, courageous act of defiance, or vile anti-Islamic smear? The mocking cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad originally published in Denmark started as a hard-edged joke and have since spread, erupting into the most serious cultural clash between Islamic religious beliefs and Western freedom of expression since Salman Rushdie’s *Satanic Verses*.

In Britain, a series of contemporaneous but coincidental events have conspired to make this a defining moment for free speech in Britain. In London, an Islamic preacher is on trial for allegedly inciting racial hatred with his remarks about Jews and jihad. In Leeds, a jury failed to reach a verdict on two charges in the case of the leader of the British National Party accused of inciting hatred of Asians.

In perhaps the most bizarre irony, if Tony Blair had stayed to vote on Tuesday on the Religious Hatred Bill, the Danish cartoons would be illegal in this country. The single vote

that protected the right to satirise religion in Britain is a measure of how close, and how confused, the issue of free speech has become.

Can speech still be free if it denigrates an entire section of the population? How do you measure and quantify incitement? How do you define satire? Is it enough that a few people should find a cartoon funny when millions find it deeply offensive?

In the miasma surrounding the issue, there are a few, clear standards. The first is that free speech, as I wrote here a few weeks ago, is an absolute in almost all instances, the safeguard of all other rights. The right to say only the right thing is not worth having, let alone fighting for.

The cartoon showing the Prophet wearing a bomb turban is not only offensive but remarkably unsubtle, badly drawn and not very funny. It is also unfair, implying that an entire world religion is terrorist, rather a few fanatical adherents. The sentiments are crass in the extreme. But to silence and repress those opinions, however repellent, risks undermining the principle itself, as does the imprisonment of the historian David Irving for his revolting opinions about the Holocaust.

That said, free speech must have limits in a free society. I am not free to encourage someone to harm someone else on any grounds, whether of race, religion or anything else. But the standard for proving incitement to hatred (one down from inciting physical violence) must be very high; in order to be punished for my words, surely it must be shown that I deliberately, knowingly and intentionally set out to foment hatred of another race. That appears to have been an issue that locked the jury in Leeds, and with which the London jury may now be wrestling.

There is a universal right to be wrong. The cartoons in this case seem to be demonstrably wrong; as wrong, in their way as Irving's hoary Holocaust denials. But that is not enough to warrant censoring either the cartoonists or the historian.

Much depends on context. The demagogue who calls for attacks on other races in the public arena is prompting hateful action; the fulminating historian presenting crackpot reinterpretations of history is not. Similarly, when the cartoons were first published this was a defensible act; to publish them today, amid bomb threats, boycotts and armed gunmen, could be seen as inflammatory provocation. This is not a matter of kowtowing to pressure, nor, indeed, of respecting religious belief; it is a question of finding the crucial but shifting dividing line where free speech tips over into deliberate provocation, a line that changes with changing events.

The Bill to outlaw religious hatred was flawed. It is possible to insult, slander and denigrate a person; it is not possible to insult an idea. Religion is, above all, an idea, and a matter of choice, unlike the colour of one's skin.

Flippant as it may sound, God, Allah, Jesus and the Prophet all have a sense of humour (thank God, Allah, etc), unlike too many of their followers. These religions have been around for too long to be sensitive to ridicule. They can take a joke. Cartoons published four months

ago have suddenly been turned into an unnecessary battle, with both sides deliberately whipping up the furore, one side issuing furious death threats and demanding apologies and censorship, the other fuelling the flame by publishing the images in a way designed to stoke maximum anger. Free speech is essential, but not unrestricted when it foments crime; equally, demands for censorship, in the name of protecting religious sensibilities, are unacceptable.

Both sides should get some perspective. Outraged Muslims should reflect that this is not wholesale assault on religion; no mosques have been burnt; no Muslims killed. And defenders of free speech might temper their high-minded outrage with the reflection that these are 12 not very good cartoons by non-Muslims scoring fairly obvious points as offensively as possible. At least *Satanic Verses* had artistic merit worth defending. Like Irving's opinions, these cartoons are neither interesting nor original; they deserved to be published, and then ignored.

Having looked at the cartoons, I do not think they meet the standard of inciting racial hatred. They are by definition concerned with religion, not race, and cannot therefore be racist. Some are horrible, most are silly and a few are anodyne. I have not seen or read anything that proves the Danish paper *Jyllands-Posten* deliberately sought to whip up anti-Muslim feeling by publishing the cartoons (although republishing them today, in a far more febrile atmosphere, might do just that).

I have no right to demand that my beliefs be treated with the same gravity and solemnity I accord them myself. But I do have the right to believe that anyone who pokes cruel fun on the grounds of religion is a fool, and anyone who deliberately repeats the insult, simply to offend, is motivated more by bias than freedom.

There is a right to draw and publish religiously offensive cartoons. We have the right not to find them remotely amusing.

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## TTC 13

### ***Foreigners flee as gunmen hunt 'targets'***

MILITANTS threatened yesterday to kidnap Western citizens in retaliation for the publication of the caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad.

Western governments tried to ease tensions before today's prayers in mosques, which they fear will increase anger.

Diplomats, journalists and aid workers fled Gaza and the West Bank as Palestinian gunmen searched hotels for citizens of countries where newspapers had printed the pictures, declaring that they were legitimate targets.

The EU, the main financial supporter of the Palestinian Authority, stepped up security at its offices in Gaza after gunmen fired into the air outside and scrawled graffiti saying that the offices were “closed until an apology is sent to Muslims”.

A leaflet handed out by the militant groups Islamic Jihad and Fatah warned “infidels” that there are Muslims who “are tough and ready to become a martyr for their religion” and that “European provocations have placed offices and churches under fire”.

Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, the head of the extremist Hezbollah movement, said: “I am sure there are millions of Muslims who are ready to give their lives to defend our Prophet’s honour.” He said that people would not have dared to insult Islam if the novelist Salman Rushdie had been executed.

However Hamas, the powerful Islamist group that won last week’s Palestinian elections, sought to reassure Westerners. Mahmoud al-Zahar, Hamas’s senior leader in Gaza, paid a visit to a Church to offer Christians his protection.

He assured Father Manuel Musallam, of the Holy Family Church, that he was prepared to station gunmen from Hamas’s military wing to protect the building, telling him: “You are our brothers.”

Mushir al-Masri, a Hamas spokesman, added: “Hamas rejects and condemns the insult to our great Prophet Muhammad. We think demonstrations and rejection are legitimate, but we should not meet abuse with abuse. Hamas rejects any targeting of any institutions, churches or citizens and those who do this do not represent the authentic beliefs of Islam.”

But as tensions increased, France and Denmark issued warnings to their citizens about travelling in Muslim areas, and Denmark and Norway closed their Palestinian offices.

A European Commission spokeswoman said: “Colleagues working in the region are usually there to try to improve the lot of Palestinian people, and those who make the threats should bear that in mind. We oppose all use of violence.”

In Pakistan 400 Muslim students shouted “Death to Denmark” and “Death to France”. They burnt Danish and French flags and an effigy of the Danish Prime Minister. Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the chief of Pakistan’s main alliance of Islamic parties, said: “We have called for countrywide protests on Friday.”

Per Stig Moeller, the Danish Foreign Minister, also gave warning of the risk of today’s sermons fuelling anger. “Now countries such as France, Germany and Austria have published the drawings. This could stir things up further,” he said.

Leaders of Islamic nations stepped up their criticism of the cartoons. A spokesman for President Mubarak of Egypt said: “The President warned of the near and long-term repercussions of the campaign of insults against the noble Prophet. Irresponsible management of these repercussions will provide further excuses to the forces of radicalism and terrorism.”

Egypt's state owned *Al-Gomhurriya* newspaper said: "The international community should understand that any attack against our Prophet will not go unpunished."

President Karzai of Afghanistan said: "Any insult to the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) is an insult to more than one billion Muslims and an act like this must never be allowed to be repeated."

As an economic boycott of Danish produce spread around the Middle East, Arla Foods, Scandinavia's largest exporter of dairy products to the region, announced that it was laying off 125 employees.

Carsten Juste, the editor-in-chief of *Jyllands-Posten*, who originally published the 12 cartoons, said yesterday that he would not have printed them had he known that "the lives of Danish soldiers and civilians would be threatened". He added: "No responsible editor-in-chief.

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## TTC14

### ***'Let the hands that drew be severed!'***

Muslims from London to Jakarta today mounted vigorous protests against cartoons of the prophet Muhammad which have appeared in European newspapers.

Answering the call to mount an international "day of anger", Muslim crowds spilled from Friday prayers into protest demonstrations, demanding apologies from newspaper editors and the governments of a half dozen European countries that have refused to block the publication of the images.

The first protests took place in Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim nation, when around 150 members of the Islamic Defenders Front tried to storm the Danish Embassy in Jakarta after pelting the building with eggs. "Let's slaughter the Danish ambassador!" Read banners carried by the crowd. "We're ready for jihad!" They shouted.

Denmark's best-selling broadsheet, the right-of-centre *Jyllands-Posten*, has been at the heart of the controversy since publishing 12 cartoons depicting Muhammad last September. One of the offending drawings shows Muhammad's turban as bomb with a lit fuse. In another he turns suicide bombers away from heaven because "We have run out of virgins".

Despite the best efforts of the Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who appeared last night on Arabic satellite television to stress his country's respect for Islam, anger has deepened this week after newspapers in Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands reprinted at least one of the images.

Syria and Saudi Arabia have withdrawn their ambassadors in protest at the cartoons and Libya has closed its embassy altogether. According to the Hadith, the sayings of the prophet, all depictions of Muhammad, however complimentary, are considered idolatrous.

Amid demonstrations in Singapore, the country's senior Islamic organisation said that the cartoons had no purpose but hatred: "No one is allowed to ridicule or cast aspersions on the faith of a people under the cloak of free expression," it said.

Crowds gathered in Bangladesh and in cities across Pakistan, where the national parliament unanimously passed a resolution condemning the drawings. "I have been hurt, grieved and I am angry," said President Pervez Musharraf. Last November, Islamic extremists in Islamabad issued death threats against the authors of the cartoons. Newspaper offices are frequently attacked in Pakistan for perceived slights against Islam.

Across the Middle East, Danish dairy produce has been boycotted by an estimated 50,000 shops since Saudi Arabian clerics asked shopkeepers to remove the items from their shelves. As Friday prayers ended in the region, thousands took to the streets to burn flags and threaten violence.

"We must tell Europeans, we can live without you. But you cannot live without us," said Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi, a leading imam in Qatar. "We can buy from China, Japan, Thailand, Malaysia... We will not be humiliated."

The Palestinian Territories have been alive with marches and unrest since the victory of the Islamist group, Hamas, in last week's parliamentary elections.

Today a week of anti-Danish and anti-European protests reached its climax with 50,000 people attending a rally organised by the group, which is yet to take power. Danish goods were burnt and the crowd chanted: "Let the hands that drew be severed!"

Western diplomats have already been forced to abandon their missions in the Gaza Strip after reports of gunmen searching hotels for Europeans, declaring them legitimate targets. The Danish Red Cross has pulled out workers from Yemen and Gaza City after they received death threats.

Arab newspaper editorials held no trace of the ambivalence that led a Jordanian newspaper, *al-Shihan*, to print three of the cartoons yesterday. Instead, Jihad Momani, the newspaper's editor who was fired for his decision to publish, issued an apology: "Oh I ask God to forgive me and I announce to everyone my deep regret for the gross mistake I have committed in *Shihan* without intention, which I fell into in my enthusiasm to defend our religion and the life of the Prophet," he said.

By this afternoon, London also was witnessing furious demonstrations. After a small protest at the BBC television centre last night to complain about glimpses of the cartoons in news bulletins and on *Newsnight*, hundreds of Muslims gathered in Regent's Park to march to the Danish Embassy on Sloane Street.

Placards reading: “Behead the one who insults the prophet” and “Free speech go to hell!” were carried by the protesters. Bushra Varakat, a 26-year-old student from Egham, Surrey, said: “This is our prophet, he did a lot of things for humankind, both Muslim and non-Muslim.

“We don’t know why these silly people use these cartoons unless they were showing how much they hate us. We have to defend our prophet otherwise Allah will punish us. We will not accept this ridicule.”

So far, British newspapers have declined to reprint the cartoons. Most explained their reasons today. *The Sun* said it seemed “ridiculous... that mayhem is breaking out over a handful of cartoons. Can we all get real.” *The Financial Times* said that it found the images offensive, but warned autocratic Arab leaders against letting extremists take over the debate.

In the most extended comment from a Government minister yet on the subject, Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, welcomed the restraint shown by the press in a strong denunciation of the Danish cartoons.

“There is freedom of speech, we all respect that,” he said. “But there is not any obligation to insult or to be gratuitously inflammatory. I believe that the republication of these cartoons has been unnecessary, it has been insensitive, it has been disrespectful and it has been wrong.”

Sir Iqbal Sacranie, secretary general of the Muslim Council of Britain, condemned the images too, but urged British Muslims to resist the entreaties of extremists seeking to hijack the controversy.

“There may be elements that would want to exploit the genuine sense of anguish and hurt among British Muslims about the manner in which the prophet has been vilified to pursue their own mischievous agenda,” he said. “We would caution all British Muslims to not allow themselves to be provoked.”

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## TTC15

### ***British imam warns against overreaction***

A leading British imam has urged Muslims in the UK to look to their own behaviour and see if they are following the Prophet’s commandments in their own lives before lashing out against the controversial cartoons.

Imam Ibrahim Mogra, a preacher in Leicester and a senior member of the Muslim Council of Britain, said that British Muslims were “upset, distraught and angry” about the repeated publication of the offending cartoons across Europe.

“I am urging them to calm down and take stock of their own lives. We should all remain within the law and not be provoked by hot-heads on both sides,” he said.

Imam Mogra, a theologian and expert in Islamic law or Sharia, explained why Muslims had been so hurt by the caricatures. He said that Muslims started from the position of loving God, which meant total obedience to his messenger, Mohammed. Even moderate Muslims took seriously the Koranic injunctions to listen to the Prophet, and not to be forward in the presence of God or his messenger.

They also believe, from chapter 21, verse 107, that God sent Mohammed as his messenger as an act of “mercy” to the whole world. In addition, Mohammed is reported in the Hadith to have told his followers: “None of you is a true believer until I become more beloved to him than his child, his father and the whole of mankind.”

Imam Mogra said: “Because of these teachings it is very easy for Muslims to feel hurt and pain when such an important person is vilified in this manner.”

He said most Muslims believed Mohammed’s teachings were primarily about living in peace and harmony with the rest of the world. So to depict him as a terrorist with a bomb for a turban, as in one of the cartoons, was deeply distressing for Muslims.

He said: “Our own claim to be Muslim depends on our love and respect for the Prophet. If our love and respect is not of the highest level, we are only partly on our way to attaining God’s pleasure.” But he urged Muslims not to over-react.

“We must today stick to our own lives as Muslims as to how much we uphold the teachings of this great person who was a source of guidance and goodness and mercy to this world. Many times we forget some very important things he taught us.

“The Messenger said we must love our neighbour, we must do unto others what we want done unto ourselves, we must care for the poor and needy, we must stand up for justice, we must stand against oppression, we must be honest in our dealings, we must not cheat, lie or swear.”

He said every Muslim should be aware of these commands, every moment of the day. “This is where the true test lies. If we love Mohammed and we love our God, we will do our very best to carry out these teachings in our lives.

“Islam is a positive force in our country. It is not something we should be afraid of or alarmed by. I would say Islam is for Britain a welcome thing, but we Muslims have to ensure we live like Muslims, that we live and breathe Islam.”

He said he was praying that there would be no terrorist reprisals.

“The Messenger taught that no matter what the wrong or injustice done to us, we do not lower ourselves to that level where we carry out revenge. To carry out a terrorist attack because of this incident would not be justified.”

Other religious leaders also urged caution and restraint on members of their own faith communities. The Bishop of Oxford, the Right Rev Richard Harries, said: “Those newspapers that have decided not to print the cartoons at this time have acted wisely and in the public good. Freedom of speech is fundamental to our society and all religions need to be open to criticism. But this freedom needs to be exercised responsibly with a sensitivity to cultural differences.”

The Chief Rabbi, Sir Jonathan Sacks, said: “Civilization needs civility. Judaism says that putting someone to shame is like bloodshed. At the end of every prayer we pray, we ask God to guard our tongue from evil.

“The only way to have both freedom of speech and freedom from religious hatred is to exercise restraint. Without that, we can have one freedom or the other, but not both. Law alone won’t solve the problem.”

Father Allen Morris, the Secretary for the Department of Christian Life and Worship, Roman Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales, said: “Freedom of speech is always something which is exercised in a context. If I know something is going to cause grave offence to someone, I think twice before saying it.

“Others would perhaps be critical of the Christian Church in the West for having become too soft and tolerant to things which they feel ridicule or belittle the Christian faith. When it comes to freedom of speech, there is really no easy answer. It leads us into an area of dialogue. The difficulty is that when people’s passions are aroused, dialogue is not so easy.”

Lord Carey of Clifton, the former Archbishop of Canterbury, issued a joint statement with Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, the director of the Cordoba Initiative and a leading Muslim teacher in the US. They said that they were saddened and appalled by the cartoons, and “the irresponsible action of the papers in Denmark and France” in allowing the cartoons to be published.

They went on: “We recognise the importance of free speech and we agree that religions should not expect any favours or privileges against other groups in society. However to publish such offensive cartoons will be seen by many around the world as an attack on a world faith, and only deepens the suspicion between the West and the Muslim world. We call for calmness and peace. Such actions only prove the necessity to deepen the dialogue between our faiths and cultures.”

# The Daily Telegraph (DTC16-DTC21)

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## DTC 16

### ***Conscience or commerce: That is the question***

It has been quite a week for journalistic philosophers. The debate over the cartoons featuring the Prophet Mohammed have split the newspaper commentariat down the middle.

Does one support the Danish free speech fundamentalists and their supporters across Europe as they proclaim "publish and be damned", or the vast majority of editors who believe that freedom is not absolute and should be circumscribed by a sense of responsibility and courtesy?

The contentious nature of this debate over whether or not there should be limits to liberty became even more complicated when Muslim demonstrators invaded embassies, burned flags and, in London, took to the streets with placards advocating that people be beheaded for asserting their beliefs in freedom.

Then the central question was re-cast. Does one support the freedom of speech of Muslim marchers who incite murder and terrorism or does one demand that the authorities arrest and charge them for overstepping the mark? If so, where is that mark to be drawn?

There was Henry Porter in the Observer approvingly citing Voltaire as the champion of free speech. Though he did not quote Voltaire's famous maxim - "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it" - its principle informed his general argument.

Meanwhile, in the Sunday Times, Simon Jenkins reminded us that Hobbes did not conceive of freedom as an absolute right. Then William Rees-Mogg, in yesterday's Times, offered a treatise on "our greatest prophet of liberty", John Locke, to urge us towards toleration. He concluded that "Locke would not have believed in insulting publications or in violent response".

Doubtless someone will soon mention another of the 17th century's greatest proponents of a free press, John Milton, to justify publication of controversial material.

But the fascinating fact about this journalistic trip back to the philosophers of the Enlightenment, and the scores of other articles which draw on similar arguments, is the underlying assumption in the purity of the freedoms which set us on the path towards a liberal society in the West.

We in Britain have arrived in the 21st century without much concern, outside university tutorials, for either the concepts or practice of liberty. We take all sorts of things for

granted. We "believe in" free speech which, to employ the modern jargon, we view as a "human right".

We are happy with the separation of church and state (even if its unity exists nominally in the person of the monarch). We see secularism as some kind of progress, though we also understand that our culture is imbued with Christianity.

We avert our gaze from conflicts, such as that in the north of Ireland, which appear to be based on religious differences. For want of a better phrase, the problems faced by our ancestors have been "sorted".

But this clash over the cartoons is a further wake-up call that our supposedly tolerant multicultural society is more fragile than we imagined. Following 9/11, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the July bombings, we are being confronted with problems, almost on a daily basis, that we find increasingly difficult to resolve.

Newspapers, in various ways, are reflecting that fact. Senior journalists are struggling to cope with what amounts to a profound cultural challenge. They are not alone, of course, because politicians, police, lawyers, indeed everyone, is trying to do the same.

The British press response to the cartoons controversy shows just how fundamental a change is occurring. Not one paper in this country has dared to publish the cartoons and the reasoning behind that decision has been patiently explained in various editorials.

Most have referred to the cartoons being gratuitously offensive and have asserted, quite properly, that freedom must be curtailed on occasion. There is a widespread misconception that anyone in this "free country" can say anything they like, but that has never been the case.

We have libel laws. We also have laws to curb hate speech, obscenity and blasphemy. Then there is common sense. We do not believe a person has a right to falsely shout "fire" in a packed cinema, rightly regarding it as an abuse of freedom.

While it is true that we have become blasé about insulting Christianity, we have done so on the understanding that it is both the dominant religion and, paradoxically, that the major threat to its dominance is from non-believers (rather than a competing creed).

Secularism is widely viewed as a form of progress. But Britain is not insulated from the rest of the world. Apart from the fact that we have a major economic and political presence all over the globe, we also have a substantial Muslim minority here which, for a variety of reasons (not least our current Middle East military role), feels alienated.

Some complain of internal prejudice and some are upset at external oppression. Many therefore identify more with Muslims in Palestine and Iraq than they do with their fellow British citizens.

Instead of becoming assimilated, and perhaps being drawn towards secularism, some of them - and, arguably, it is a minority of the minority - have deepened their Muslim faith.

This has resulted in them becoming unduly hostile to the British state and even the non-Muslim British population.

Quoting Voltaire, Hobbes and Locke is therefore largely irrelevant in the face of a Muslim fundamentalism which cannot countenance the Prophet being satirised.

The hostility is even more complicated because Muslims do not recognise the split between church and state. Muslim clerics who have been interviewed on TV and radio cannot seem to grasp that the Danish government is not responsible for the decisions of its newspaper editors. In other words, Britain's notion of press freedom - freedom from the state - is seen as meaningless.

What is so fascinating about this clash between their beliefs and ours is last week's united stand by Britain's editors. I am certain that, say 20 years ago, at least one newspaper, and probably more, would have republished those Danish cartoons, no matter how offensive. Editors have traditionally defended their freedom to offend, yet this time they stayed their hands.

Does the restraint indicate sensitivity towards a minority community? Is it due to concerns over threats of violence, either within Britain or to Britons living, working and fighting abroad?

Given also that a large percentage of newspapers are distributed by Muslims, is it due to fear of industrial sabotage? Whatever the case, the impact of this affair on our freedoms demands continuing attention.

It is sobering to reflect that many British people were prepared to risk their liberty, and their lives, to attain press freedom. But did they do so for reasons of conscience or commerce? Though obscured by this row, that really is the key question.

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## **DTC17**

### ***I'm sorry, says 'suicide bomber'***

Omar Khayam reads his apology to the press outside his home

A Muslim protester who dressed as a suicide bomber apologised "wholeheartedly" yesterday to the families of victims of the July 7 bombings and said it was not his aim to cause offence.

Omar Khayam, a convicted drug dealer, said he hoped that he would never have to make such a protest again.

Speaking outside his home in Bedford, he added that his protest remained valid because of the hurt caused to Muslims around the world by the publication of a series of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed.

Accompanied by the chairman of his local mosque and Patrick Hall, the MP for Bedford, he said: "I found the pictures deeply offensive as a Muslim and I felt the Danish newspaper had been provocative and controversial, deeply offensive and insensitive.

"Just because we have the right of free speech and a free media, it does not mean we may say and do as we please and not take into account the effect it will have on others.

"But by me dressing the way I did, I did just that, exactly the same as the Danish newspaper, if not worse. My method of protest has offended many people, especially the families of the victims of the July bombings.

"This was not my intention. What happened in July was a tragedy and un-Islamic. I do not condone these murderous acts, do not support terrorism or extremism and would like to apologise unreservedly and wholeheartedly to the families of the victims.

"I understand it was wrong, unjustified and insensitive of me to protest in this way."

Asked if he would make a similar protest again, he replied: "No, I would not do it again, it has caused offence to a lot of people. I did not want to provoke any violence, it was just to make a point."

Mr Khayam, 22, was among demonstrators outside the Danish embassy in London on Friday. Some wielded placards threatening a repeat of the September 11 and July 7 attacks.

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## DTC18

### ***'Suicide bomber' is freed drug dealer***

A Muslim protester who sparked outrage by dressing as a suicide bomber is a convicted drug dealer who was recently released from prison, it was disclosed last night.

Omar Khayam, 22, was reportedly jailed for five and a half years in 2002 for dealing in Class A drugs, thought to include cocaine.

Khayam, who wore the bomber's outfit during the demonstration in London on Saturday over the cartoons mocking the Prophet Mohammed, served around half of his sentence before being released on licence last year.

The building student is serving the remainder of the term under the supervision of the Probation Service, but could now be recalled to prison for breaching the terms of his parole.

The Islamic faith strictly forbids the taking or selling of drugs - the latter offence is punishable by death in some Muslim countries.

Khayam, from Bedfordshire, apologised yesterday to the families of the victims of the July 7 London bombings for his "suicide bomber" protest.

However, he insisted it remained valid because of the hurt caused to Muslims around the world by the publication of the cartoons.

Scotland Yard officers travelled to Bedfordshire last night and had been expected to interview Khayam.

However they returned to the capital without having spoken to him.

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## **DTC19**

### ***Extremists in demonstration face inquiry by police squad***

A special police squad has been set up to investigate Islamic extremists involved in the protests over cartoons mocking the Prophet Mohammed, Scotland Yard announced yesterday.

The move comes after growing protests over the failure to arrest the militant demonstrators who carried placards threatening violence and suicide bombings.

Charles Clarke, the Home Secretary, joined MPs in sending a strong signal to the Metropolitan Police and the Director of Public Prosecutions to bring prosecutions against the extremists involved in protests outside the Danish embassy in London on Friday.

The Government believes that some of the protesters could be charged with incitement to murder.

The police team will be headed by a detective chief inspector in the public order crime unit and will examine everything from video recordings made by officers to photographs published in newspapers.

Senior detectives promised a "swift" inquiry and said quick decisions would be taken on whether to send files on any of the demonstrators to the Crown Prosecution Service to decide whether to bring incitement charges.

Pictures of Omar Khayam, a Muslim protester who dressed as a suicide bomber, will be among those studied by the Scotland Yard team. Others showed demonstrators wielding placards threatening a repeat of the September 11 and July 7 attacks and calling for the beheading of those responsible for the cartoons.

Downing Street issued a forthright statement condemning as "completely unacceptable" the behaviour of the extremists, but saying it was up to the police to decide whether to prosecute.

Mr Blair's official spokesman said the Government understood the offence caused by the cartoons but said this did not justify the violence seen over the weekend in Syria and Lebanon, including the burning of the Danish embassy. In an emergency Commons statement, Mr Clarke said the police and prosecuting authorities were carrying out "rigorous assessments" about the appropriate way to proceed in individual cases.

"If the police conclude there have been breaches of the law and decide to take any action, we would, of course, support them," he told MPs. He joined Downing Street in expressing solidarity with the Danish government, which he said had done everything possible to handle a very difficult situation.

David Cameron, the Conservative leader, urged the police and the authorities to take "appropriate action" against people who "break the law by inciting hatred or inciting people to violence or murder". He added: "Many of those people carrying the placards were clearly inciting violence or inciting hatred."

David Davis, the Conservative home affairs spokesman, told Mr Clarke it was essential that action was taken against demonstrators who deliberately tried to stir up violence, for the sake of good community relations. He said Friday's demonstrations had "emphatically crossed" a line as to what was acceptable, civilised behaviour.

"Placards carrying the slogans calling for people who insult Islam to be beheaded, or massacred, or annihilated are direct incitements to violence," he said. "Slogans like 'Europe your 9/11 will come' or 'Europe you will pay, Fantastic 4 are on their way', are, at best, indirect incitements to violence, as is dressing up as a suicide bomber."

Ashok Kumar, the Labour MP for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland, condemned the demonstrations. "Muslim extremists are poisoning the atmosphere in this country in what was, what has been, a great multicultural society," he said.

Officials said Mr Clarke would convey the strong view of the Commons that action should be taken.

## DTC20

### ***Protests cast cloud over IOC***

The Muslim world's outrage over cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed printed in a Danish newspaper cast a shadow over the International Olympic Committee yesterday, as members decide whether to hold their next Congress in Copenhagen.

The Congress is the most significant event for the IOC after the Olympic Games. The last was held in 1994, in Paris. At the 2009 Congress, Jacques Rogge, the IOC president, could be seeking re-election and will also be voting on which city will host the Games in 2016.

The IOC session, starting in Turin tomorrow, has to choose between seven cities and until the Muslim protests worldwide, Copenhagen had looked a shoo-in.

But the feeling is that the protests have put the IOC in a difficult position. If members vote for Copenhagen, this could be seen as a defiant message to the Muslim world, yet if they go against, it could look like capitulation.

Rogge insisted the vote would have no relation to the international situation. "We are speaking of a sporting session in 2009 and it will not have an impact. If Copenhagen wins it will be from membership that is absolutely universal from 70 countries."

Despite this, Copenhagen's supporters are despondent and there was talk of how Copenhagen may not have enough hotel beds. The chances for Singapore, which held a session last year, is now being raised.

Tomorrow's session could also add two more sports to the London Games, baseball and softball, which could add £50 million to the cost of staging the Games. They were controversially dropped last year and although Rogge does not want them back, some members will try to force a vote. They know this is their last chance to do so in time for the London Games.

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## DTC21

### ***This soft approach to militant Muslims is a gift to the far Right***

Yesterday in Afghanistan the worldwide mob engaging in an engineered protest about the Danish cartoons claimed its first lives. Elsewhere, as extremists continue to burn flags and embassies, and demand executions, exterminations and beheadings because of the mocking

of their religion and their prophet, the British Government lurches slowly towards a realisation that its response to militant Islam during these frightening events might just have been incoherent and casual.

As has been widely remarked upon, the Foreign Secretary found it much easier to condemn those who exercised (however unwisely and ignorantly) their free speech in publishing the cartoons than he did those who marched on the streets of London last Friday demanding that they be killed.

Mr Straw did eventually catch up with reality, and see that most Britons (including, not least, most Muslim ones) were appalled that a man dressed as a suicide bomber could protest on the streets of London, or that placards should threaten Britain with the arrival of the mujahideen.

Peter Hain who, only the other day, was keen to allow professed IRA terrorists to escape punishment as part of the "peace" process in Ulster, was then wheeled out to pronounce, with a startling lack of consistency, how those who merely threaten Islamic terrorism should now be prosecuted. Despite the strange silence over the weekend of the man who is supposedly in charge of handling these matters - the Home Secretary, Charles Clarke - the Government does appear to be waking up.

It does so too late for the tastes of many people. Mr Straw's initial display of priorities reminded us that it is not the first time we have witnessed the Government's cultural cringe towards undemocratic, repressive and unstable forces.

The whole concept of the Religious Hatred Bill derived from a desire that, even though it was Muslim extremists such as Omar Bakri Mohammed who were the most apparent offenders in whipping up religious bigotry in Britain, the Government was determined to pass a measure whose main beneficiaries would appear to be Muslims.

Such sectarian lawmaking was designed to make Muslims feel better about any sanctions the state might take against rogue members of their community if those rogue members threaten or resort to violence.

However, the Bill is not merely inimical to our freedom of speech, but is also deeply divisive: it was as well the Government was defeated on it last week.

But, as the response to Friday's and Saturday's demonstrations by the police proved, the so-called forces of law and order need far more guidance on how to handle such provocative protests, and a reminder that there are quite enough existing laws that can be applied to such behaviour without needing to pass any new ones.

Sir Ian Blair, in particular, needs to be reminded that if the police are not seen to enforce the law impartially, a terrible poison will be injected into British life.

The Metropolitan Police certainly seems selective in its "softly, softly" approach to dealing with protests. Only 17 months ago, before the rule of the present Commissioner, some of its

officers zealously cracked the heads of protesters from the notoriously dangerous group of psychopaths otherwise known as the pro-foxhunting lobby.

The main offence perpetrated by these people appeared to be shouting, wearing tweeds in a public place, and waving placards saying that they didn't like Mr Blair or his Bill very much.

Maybe Sir Ian, now he is in charge, would have his officers be as mild towards them as they were towards those who openly incited murder on Friday, and who took an infant out on the protest with them wearing a hat inscribed with the entirely reasonable statement "I love al-Qaida".

It would be equally interesting to see how he would respond to a group of fundamentalist bigots from another religion marching on London's streets urging the death of Muslims: I suspect the response would be different to last Friday's, not least because Sir Ian's every move appears to be conditioned by that cultural cringe of his political masters, or by what he interprets to be that cringe. In any case, he has given more proof of his lamentable judgment, and of his sheer unsuitability to hold his present post.

There are deeper and wider issues here, however, than simply why these advocates and inciters of murder were not immediately arrested and charged under existing legislation. Not the least sinister aspect of this whole exercise was that the police tried to restrain newspaper photographers from taking pictures of the protesters.

Why? Was it that someone further up the food chain had decided it would in this case be helpful to have as little evidence as possible of such flagrant wrongdoing?

This takes us to the heart of the problem that the Government has at home. It is its patronising and, I am sure, inaccurate supposition that the British Muslim community is so volatile, so unhinged and so downright unreasonable that any attempt to make some of its more violent members answer to the law when they commit serious crimes would cause a conflagration.

In fact, as should now be apparent, the opposite is true. Many responsible Muslims have called for prosecutions, not least the admirable and immensely brave Labour MP Shahid Malik, whose courage in confronting the small minority of his co-religionists who wreck community relations in this country shames some of his party's leaders.

Also, the Government needs to be aware that the impression it gives of influencing the police to shy away from confronting this evil is providing a recruiting sergeant for the BNP. That party has just had its best week ever, not simply because of Nick Griffin's acquittal for speaking his unpleasant mind about Islam and black people, but because of the encouragement given to racial hatred by the combined efforts of militant Islam and an ineffectual political and police response to it.

Unless we are happy for the extreme Right to win credibility, the Government cannot allow this appeasing and unjust approach to continue.

The Prime Minister and the Home Secretary must urgently observe some harsh realities. They must remind the police that the law is to be enforced equally at all times. The failure of justice to be seen to be done so far after Friday's protests has been highly corrosive, and is a propaganda gift to the BNP on a scale equal to that of Mr Griffin's acquittal.

Second, it must take note of the internationally co-ordinated and highly opportunistic nature of the protests, which clearly took some months to arrange - the cartoons were first published last September - and draw conclusions from them about the network of well-organised extremists that threatens all Western society.

How far do our security services have the measure of those who were waving their placards of death last week, and how much do they know of what else they do to advance militant Islam? Third, it must realise that its duty to protect our people is no longer commensurate with the soft line.

Prosecutions, deportations of those with no right to be in Britain, and (however belatedly) an immigration policy that rejects those who seek to destroy the British way of life are all long overdue.

These things are all within the legitimate and moderate exercise of power by a democratic government. The alternative is the inevitable resolve by the forces of unreason to fight fire with fire, and "rivers of blood".

# The Guardian (TGC39-TGC52)

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## TGC39

### *BBC defends cartoon coverage*

BBC News executives have apologised for any offence they caused by showing the controversial Danish cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad - but said the corporation had stopped short of using "excessively offensive" images.

UK national newspapers decided not to publish the cartoons, which were originally printed in a Danish newspaper and sparked angry protests by Muslims in London, the Middle East and Asia over the weekend.

The corporation used video featuring European newspapers that have published the cartoons on its news bulletins, News 24 and the BBC News website.

"Obviously the BBC does not want to give offence to anyone on either side of this debate," said Peter Horrocks, the BBC's editor of TV News.

"So if people - whichever side of the argument they fall within - have taken offence, I am obviously concerned and I apologise for that.

"In reporting the story, we ourselves had to make a decision about whether we published the pictures in any form and inevitably that's made us part of the controversy.

"[The BBC has] taken the view that still images that focus and linger on the offending cartoons would be excessively offensive so we haven't used those in our television news pieces.

"We've used moving pictures of the newspapers where they've appeared to show people the context in which they've appeared and to give them some flavour of the type of imagery but without focusing closely on them."

The BBC faced criticism from both British Muslims, who said the images were "disrespectful", and from viewers who said not shown enough of the cartoons were shown.

"You cannot report a news subject relating to a visual matter without showing that matter," said Lawrie May, one of the complainants.

"It appears that you are scared of the reaction from Muslims, while you were not concerned about the offending Christians when you screened Jerry Springer - the Opera," said Peter Arnold. "This is a case of double standards."

But Mr Horrocks said it was incorrect to make a direct comparison with the Springer broadcast, which prompted more than 60,000 complaints when it was shown on BBC2 last year.

"The BBC is not the primary publisher of these cartoons so to some extent it's different from Jerry Springer where the BBC was responsible for commissioning the programme," he told the BBC's Newswatch website.

Mr Horrocks denied accusations of censorship by the BBC.

"I think if you compare the BBC's position to the whole of the UK printed press, where there hasn't been any publication whatsoever, we've clearly gone further ...

"But we've taken a decision not to go further than that in order not to gratuitously offend the significant number of Muslims in Britain but also - because we make decisions for our pieces to be broadcast internationally - the very significant numbers of Muslim viewers of BBC World television."

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## TGC40

### ***Violence, fatwas and online anti-Jew images: a world of protests***

The ferocious Muslim protests at the publication of the cartoons in the European press escalated into a global phenomenon at the weekend. The violence appeared likely to intensify despite calls for restraint from some leading clerics. Denmark, where cartoons of the prophet Mohammed first appeared in September, was the main target of arson, threats and calls for an economic boycott.

#### **Syria**

On Saturday protesters in the capital, Damascus, set fire to the Danish and Norwegian embassies. The Swedish embassy, in the same building as the Danish mission, was damaged. Protesters also tried to storm the French embassy but were held off by riot police. No diplomats were injured. The Danish and Norwegian foreign ministries advised citizens to leave Syria as soon as possible. Last night the Syrian foreign ministry said it "expresses its regret regarding the violent acts which accompanied the protests and caused material damage at some embassies".

#### **Iran**

It has recalled its ambassador to Denmark, following the example of Syria, Saudi Arabia and Libya. "Insulting the prophet was unacceptable and a sign of barbarism," the Iranian spokesman, Hamid Reza Asefi, said, adding that Tehran planned to take further action. On Saturday, the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, ordered authorities to form a

committee to review the possibility of cancelling commercial deals with Denmark and other countries where the drawings were published.

### **Palestine**

About 30 gunmen threatened to attack a French learning centre in Nablus yesterday. But after negotiating with police guarding the building, they were allowed only to scrawl on the building: "This place is closed" and "God is great". One of the gunmen, who did not give his name, said they would not allow the centre to be reopened until European leaders apologised for the caricatures. Student protests took place in Ramallah, West Bank.

### **Iraq**

A militant group called for attacks on people from countries where the cartoons were published. Calling itself the military wing of the Army of the Right, its supporters handed out leaflets during a demonstration in the insurgent stronghold of Ramadi. The leaflets said: "The first target of upcoming attacks should be Danish troops. We demand that all clerics in Arab countries issue fatwas [religious edicts] against foreigners and shut all embassies." Denmark has more than 500 troops in Iraq.

### **Afghanistan**

Thousands protested. In the Northern city of Fayzabad police fired into the air to disperse a group of rowdy protesters. The local deputy governor, Shams ul-Rahaman, said the police were preventing some 1,000 demonstrators marching to the offices of the United Nations and other aid groups. In the central Afghan city of Mihtarlam, 3,000 demonstrators burned a Danish flag and demanded that the editors of the Danish newspaper that first published the series of cartoons be prosecuted for blasphemy. More than 100 people gathered at a mosque in the southern city of Kandahar and demanded that the government sever diplomatic ties with Denmark.

### **Saudi Arabia**

Violence was condemned by the world's leading Islamic body. "Overreactions surpassing the limits of peaceful democratic acts ... are dangerous and detrimental to the efforts to defend the legitimate case of the Muslim world," the 57-nation Saudi-based Organisation of the Islamic Summit said in a statement from its secretary general, Ekmelettin Ihsanoglu. He called the protests "regrettable and deplorable".

### **Pakistan**

Demonstrators from Islamic groups set fire to Danish and French flags.

### **Indonesia**

In Jakarta Muslim protesters ransacked the lobby of a building housing the Danish embassy.

### **Jordan**

Two newspaper editors who published the cartoons were arrested at the weekend. Jihad Momani and Hisham Khalidi are accused of insulting religion under Jordan's press and publications law. Mr Momani was fired from the weekly Shihaan after publishing three of the cartoons and an editorial calling on Muslims to be reasonable. "What brings more prejudice against Islam, these caricatures or pictures of a hostage-taker slashing the throat of his victim in front of the cameras or a suicide bomber who blows himself up during a wedding ceremony in Amman?" he wrote. Mr Khalidi's al-Mehwar newspaper printed the cartoons over a week ago.

### **Turkey**

An Italian Roman Catholic priest, Andrea Santaro, 60, was shot and killed in the courtyard of his church in the Black Sea port city of Trabzon, Turkish police said. Witnesses said a teenage boy carried out the attack. It is unclear whether the killing was related to the protests.

### **Netherlands**

The controversy took an unusual turn with a Belgian-Dutch Islamic political organisation posting anti-Jew cartoons on its website on Saturday. The Arab European League's site carried a disclaimer saying the images were used as part of an exercise in free speech rather than to endorse their content. One showed an image of Anne Frank in bed with Hitler. Dyab Abou Jahjah, the party's founder, defended the action on Dutch television, saying: "Europe has its sacred cows, even if they're not religious sacred cows."

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## **TGC41**

### ***Downing Street statement on the weekend's cartoon demonstrations***

Statement released by No10 on the behaviour of some of the demonstrators protesting about the publication of cartoons of the prophet Muhammad in European newspapers

Tony Blair entered the controversy over the publication of cartoons of the prophet Muhammad in European newspapers and the subsequent London demonstrations, calling the behaviour of some protesters "unacceptable". After the weekend calls by the Tories for arrests of some demonstrators the government gave its full support to the police. Here is the full statement released by No10 Downing Street.

"We understand the offence caused by the cartoons depicting the prophet and of course regret that this has happened. Such things help no one.

It is always sensible for freedom of expression to be exercised with respect for religious belief. But nothing can justify the violence aimed at European embassies or at the country of Denmark.

We and our EU partners stand in full solidarity with them in resisting this violence and believe the Danish government has done everything it reasonably can to handle a very difficult situation. The attacks on the citizens of Denmark and the people of other European countries are completely unacceptable as is the behaviour of some of the demonstrators in London over the last few days.

The police should have our full support in any actions they may wish to take in respect of any breaches of the law, though again we understand the difficult situation they had to manage. We also strongly welcome the statements of Muslim leaders here who are themselves tackling the extremists who abuse their community's good name."

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## TGC42

### Threats that must be countered

For centuries, English law has been crammed full of legal powers to arrest people who threaten violence or murder in public, or who go around terrifying ordinary people. On Friday, dozens of prima facie examples of such offences were committed during protests against Danish cartoons which offended Muslims by depicting the prophet Muhammad. One man was dressed in the garb of a suicide bomber, arguably an overt attempt to terrify of the kind that has been illegal in this country since at least the Statute of Northampton in the time of King Edward III, in the 14th century. Others carried placards demanding "Massacre those who insult Islam", "Butcher those who mock Islam", "Europe you'll come crawling when Mujahideen come roaring", "Britain you will pay: 7/7 on its way", several of which appear to breach the law dating from Victorian times that outlaws soliciting to murder. A toddler on the march was dressed in a hat that said: "I love al-Qaida." Many adults on political marches over the years have been convicted of breaches of the peace for much less than that.

This country needs a strategy for dealing with campaigns of this kind. But it is not clear from the aftermath of these events that we really have one. In general, reflecting a strong tradition of tolerance and an adult pragmatic sense that things should be allowed to blow over, the approach here has mostly been the give and take that was reflected by cabinet ministers Peter Hain and Jack Straw in interviews yesterday. Having lost so much support among Muslim voters, Labour ministers have a strong partisan interest in not taking potentially inflammatory actions that become rallying points against them. What is more, in the short term, the public peace may indeed be best served by allowing the madness of Friday to burn itself out. In the long run too, the Islamist fanatics may have done themselves damage by revealing so much about themselves in public and handing valuable intelligence to the police and security services.

But it is not enough to shrug one's shoulders about how difficult these things are, still less to give ourselves undeserved pats on the back. Serious things happened in our midst on Friday - and even more serious things are happening to Danes around the world. Ministers do nobody any favours by appearing to imply that the best thing is just to muddle through.

These threats are real, present and serious, and if ministers put their heads in the sand they will lose the argument. The Conservative front-benchers David Davis and Dominic Grieve were right to address the difficult issue of criminal charges at the weekend. It was encouraging that moderate Muslim leaders also stepped up to the plate too; much more of this is needed if there is to be an effective strategy against the advocates of violence. So far the police appear to have held off taking stronger action against the fanatics because of the fear, which may have been well-judged, that it would make an already ugly situation even worse. But no society can allow the threats that were made on Friday's march to pass without further action. Those who threatened to kill should answer for their threats. They should be arrested, cautioned and placed under surveillance. If appropriate, the authorities must not be afraid of bringing charges. Those who are eligible for deportation should be deported. There must be no witch-hunt to feed further the ugly and exaggerated sense of victimhood surging through the otherwise legitimate protest against the cartoons' gratuitous insult. But public order and confidence require stronger recognition that limits of acceptable protest and public discourse have been crossed. White racists are rightly arrested and charged for their hate campaigns. Muslim fanatics have to face similar severity for their no less repulsive actions. Ours is a tolerant way of life; we must be robust in defending it against its enemies.

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## **TGC43**

### **Arrest extremist marchers, police told**

Muslim organisations blame rogue factions

Mock suicide bomber defends protest costume

Protesters in London who carried placards threatening suicide bombings and massacres in revenge for the Danish cartoons satirising the prophet Muhammad are to be investigated by Scotland Yard and could face arrest.

Metropolitan police are considering the options after the demonstrations at the end of last week. A flurry of cross-party calls by MPs came at the weekend to pursue those responsible on the grounds that the threats were an incitement to murder.

The slogans, written in the same style and in similar black felt-tip pen ink, urged Muslims to use violence. A protester was also photographed wearing a garment resembling a suicide bomber's jacket. The man, Omar Khayam from Bedford, said he had no regrets about his style of dress, telling the Daily Express: "I didn't go there to cause anyone any harm. I went along just to attend a protest. Yet I have been branded a suicide bomber overnight. Did I say, 'Kill Jews?' No. Did I have racist signs on me? No. So why this reaction?" He went on: "Yes, I would do it again to make a point. I could have gone along and held up banners or something, but this made the point better."

Most of the placards appeared on Friday, running through permutations on several themes. They read: "Butcher those who mock Islam", "Slay those who insult Islam", "Behead those who insult Islam", and "Kill those who insult Islam". Some evoked previous al-Qaida suicide bombings: "Europe you will pay, your 9/11 is on the way", or "7/7 is on its way", "Europe you will pay, fantastic 4 are on their way", and "Europe you will pay, Bin Laden is on his way". As well as the rhyming "Europe you'll come crawling, when the Mujahideen come roaring", there were splenetic varieties: "Freedom go to hell", "Liberalism go to hell", and "Freedom of expression go to hell".

The only arrests were of two people carrying copies of the Danish cartoons which triggered the protests. They were escorted away by officers and released without charge.

The shadow home secretary, David Davis, and the shadow attorney general, Dominic Grieve, urged the police to make arrests. "Some of these placards are incitement to violence, and indeed incitement to murder - an extremely serious offence which the police must deal with and deal with quickly," Mr Davis told the Sunday Telegraph.

Mr Grieve, speaking on GMTV, said: "It is certainly not a happy state of affairs where such a demonstration takes place and those people who are acting in that way don't end up under arrest before the demonstration is ended."

Several Labour MPs also called for action. David Winnick, on the Commons home affairs committee, said those carrying banners threatening violence should be prosecuted and, where possible, deported. "Those who are temporarily in Britain, the sooner they are out of the country the better," he said. "Those who have been given permission to live here, insofar as it is possible in law, it would be better for this country and indeed for the Muslim community if that right was removed." The Labour MP Shahid Malik, also on the committee, wrote to Sir Ian Blair, head of the Metropolitan police, calling for prosecutions.

In a statement yesterday, the police said: "Those gathered [outside the Danish embassy] were well natured and in the main compliant with police requests. Arrests, if necessary, will be made at the most appropriate time. This should not be seen as a sign of lack of action ... The decision to arrest at a public order event must be viewed in the context of the overall policing plan and the environment the officers are operating in. Specialist officers were deployed on both days to record any potential evidence should it be needed at any point in the future. All complaints will be passed to the public order crime unit for further investigation."

Anjem Choudary, spokesman for al-Ghuraba, the group which helped organise Friday's protests, told the Guardian: "There were a mixture of different people at the demonstration. They were expressing their freedom. The police had the opportunity to say the placards were offensive. I spoke to the ... control operation. I said, if there's any concerns, you can contact me at any time. They saw them at the beginning of the demonstration. You can't take [the placards] literally. It's ridiculous to say we are intending to bomb [Denmark]." Mr Choudary said he did not know who wrote the placards.

Most Muslim organisations condemned the placard slogans as the work of unrepresentative, extremist factions. The general secretary of the Muslim Council of Britain, Sir Iqbal Sacranie, blamed "agents provocateurs".

Hizb ut-Tahrir, which organised Saturday's protest, agreed. Its spokesman, Taji Mustafa, said yesterday: "We condemn those [placards], those are not acceptable. Many Muslim groups have condemned the Friday protests and the images that were used then ... we must not at this time stoop to the level of those who want to resort to insulting the prophet of Islam as a terrorist."

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## TGC44

### **A worm's eye view: Logic and principle can't resolve the row over the Danish cartoons.**

Major Charles Napier was wounded at the battle of Corunna. "His leg was broken by a musket shot, he received a sabre cut on the head, a bayonet wound in the back, severe contusions from the butt end of a musket, and his ribs were broken by a gunshot," says the Dictionary of National Biography, describing the events of January 16, 1809.

He was captured by the French, and eventually exchanged. He resumed a military career under Wellington, when he was wounded twice more and fought the Turks in Greece with Byron (he was the first British governor of Cephalonia). The men who spread the Empire were tough. Eventually, he came to British India, and in the winter of 1842/3 this remarkable soldier conquered Sind, now part of Pakistan - thereby preparing the ground for the grievances of Hizb-ut-Tahrir and similar extremist organisations.

The dictionary of National Biography does not mention the exchange for which he is now most famous, which apparently came after the conquest. When a group of Brahmins petitioned him for permission to burn a widow alive after her husband's death, explaining that it was the custom of their country, he replied that it was the custom of his country to hang those who did so, and if they followed their custom, his soldiers would build a gallows beside the funeral pyre and follow his custom as soon as they had followed theirs.

All conversations about multiculturalism come back to this point sooner or later. In the end it is force, or the threat of it, which decides whose customs are followed and whose taboos are honoured. I'm not arguing for moral relativism here. I don't think that burning widows or unsatisfactory wives alive is ever anywhere a moral thing to do. But any attempt to impose one set of customs on the whole world is now going to require more force than the globe can safely contain.

In the 19th century there was no question but that it was the customs of European countries which would be imposed on those of the rest of the world. In the second half of the 20th century, this very obviously stopped being true. The row over the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad makes it look as if the present question is whether European countries

will be able to hang on to their own customs and to resolve their disputes within a framework of law that takes for granted that freedom of speech is part of a civilised society.

Within that legal framework, it is possible to debate whether the papers that have done so should have exercised their right to print all or some of the cartoons - myself, I'd not have printed or reprinted the one showing the prophet with a bomb in his turban. But the question underlying all this is whose laws should apply to western newspapers in western countries. One of the origins of the whole row was a report, last autumn, that Danish illustrators were frightened to illustrate a book about the prophet in the wake of the Rushdie affair. The newspaper commissioned the drawings partly as a way of demonstrating against that fear, and some of the demonstrations are clearly intended to make Islam appear more frightening.

But politics, good manners, and principle all suggest that if we must offend people, we do so as politely as possible. This is difficult for newspapers at the best of times, and almost impossible in a world of globalised religions and communications where every insult provokes a response which is itself insulting.

Already one Dutch website has held a competition for the most offensive Photoshopped picture of Muhammad, and some of these are very offensive indeed. In London we have seen the disgusting demonstration with placards calling for fresh suicide bombers. And that has in turn ensured, I think, that the leaders of the fascist British National Party can never be successfully prosecuted. Last week they walked free when a jury could not agree to convict them of inciting hatred against Muslims. After the demonstrations in London, it will be difficult to find a jury whose members all find their views unreasonable.

That's not the only bad news for liberalism. All the large, general principles involved in this row are going to end up as battered as Major Napier at Corunna. The questions must instead be decided by politics, which is to say by the intelligent self-interested use of largely unarmed pressure. In the end some compromise will be struck between the right of newspapers to offend and the right of Muslims not to be offended, but it won't be logical. It just may be better than that. It may be something that all Europeans of any religion can live with. We can hope.

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## TGC45

### *Jerusalem Post publishes Muhammad cartoons*

The Jerusalem Post today became the first Israeli newspaper to publish the controversial Danish cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad that have sparked furore across the Muslim world.

A facsimile of the original page from the Danish paper Jyllands-Posten, in which all twelve cartoons were published, on September 30, is featured in today's edition of the paper.

The image is one column wide and about two-and-a-half inches high, on page six of today's paper, in an article about the weekend protests against the cartoons across the Islamic world.

It is also available on the Jerusalem Post digital edition, available to paying subscribers only, but not on the paper's free-access website.

The Jerusalem Post did not wish to comment on its decision to publish when it was contacted today by MediaGuardian.co.uk.

But in an editorial published today, entitled "The Prophet's Honor", the paper contrasts the outcry that the Danish cartoons are causing in the Muslim world, while "Arab cartoonists routinely demonise Jews as global conspirators, corrupters of society and blood-suckers".

"Arab political 'humour' knows no bounds," the Jerusalem Post editorial said. "A cartoon in Qatar's Al-Watan depicted prime minister Ariel Sharon drinking from a goblet of Palestinian children's blood. Another, in the Egyptian Al-Ahram al-Arabi, showed him jackbooted, bloody-handed and crushing peace."

The editorial added: "There are those who would argue that the controversy does not reflect a clash of civilisations. Yet it is precisely this persistent refusal to acknowledge the obvious that weakens the cause of tolerance and liberty. Must 'understanding' invariably result in the abdication of western values?"

"If anyone wants to appreciate why the west views with such suspicion the weapons programmes of Muslim states such as Iran, they need look no further than the intolerance Muslim regimes exhibit to these cartoons, and what this portends.

"No one wants to add fuel to the fire. Mobs are more easily placated than reasoned with. But once this controversy passes it will be valuable to determine just who exploited the flap to foment anti-Western outrage, and to inquire what 'moderate' Muslim voices said.

"Globalism demands that points of contact between Islam and the west be multi-cultural havens, not flashpoints. For that to happen, tolerance must be a two-way street."

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## TGC46

### ***Danish paper rejected Jesus cartoons***

Jyllands-Posten, the Danish newspaper that first published the cartoons of the prophet Muhammad that have caused a storm of protest throughout the Islamic world, refused to run drawings lampooning Jesus Christ, it has emerged today.

The Danish daily turned down the cartoons of Christ three years ago, on the grounds that they could be offensive to readers and were not funny.

In April 2003, Danish illustrator Christoffer Zieler submitted a series of unsolicited cartoons dealing with the resurrection of Christ to Jyllands-Posten.

Zieler received an email back from the paper's Sunday editor, Jens Kaiser, which said: "I don't think Jyllands-Posten's readers will enjoy the drawings. As a matter of fact, I think that they will provoke an outcry. Therefore, I will not use them."

The illustrator said: "I see the cartoons as an innocent joke, of the type that my Christian grandfather would enjoy."

"I showed them to a few pastors and they thought they were funny."

But the Jyllands-Posten editor in question, Mr Kaiser, said that the case was "ridiculous to bring forward now. It has nothing to do with the Muhammad cartoons.

"In the Muhammad drawings case, we asked the illustrators to do it. I did not ask for these cartoons. That's the difference," he said.

"The illustrator thought his cartoons were funny. I did not think so. It would offend some readers, not much but some."

The decision smacks of "double-standards", said Ahmed Akkari, spokesman for the Danish-based European Committee for Prophet Honouring, the umbrella group that represents 27 Muslim organisations that are campaigning for a full apology from Jyllands-Posten.

"How can Jyllands-Posten distinguish the two cases? Surely they must understand," Mr Akkari added.

Meanwhile, the editor of a Malaysian newspaper resigned over the weekend after printing one of the Muhammad cartoons that have unleashed a storm of protest across the Islamic world.

Malaysia's Sunday Tribune, based in the remote state of Sarawak, on Borneo island, ran one of the Danish cartoons on Saturday. It is unclear which one of the 12 drawings was reprinted.

Printed on page 12 of the paper, the cartoon illustrated an article about the lack of impact of the controversy in Malaysia, a country with a majority Muslim population.

The newspaper apologised and expressed "profound regret over the unauthorised publication", in a front page statement on Sunday.

"Our internal inquiry revealed that the editor on duty, who was responsible for the same publication, had done it all alone by himself without authority in compliance with the prescribed procedures as required for such news," the statement said.

The editor, who has not been named, regretted his mistake, apologised and tendered his resignation, according to the statement.

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**TGC47**

### ***Lebanon seeks to defuse tensions over cartoons***

Political and religious leaders in Lebanon sought to calm sectarian tensions today, a day after Islamic extremists set fire to a building housing the Danish embassy and rampaged through a Christian quarter of Beirut.

The demonstrations - which began, as elsewhere in the Islamic world, in protest against cartoons of the prophet Muhammad published in a Danish newspaper - quickly developed into a sectarian crisis in a nation already fraught with religious differences.

Lebanon's interior minister, Hassan Sabei, resigned late on Sunday after criticism of the failure of the security forces to curb the violence. He said that the protest got out of control because of a hardcore of "infiltrators".

"The one remaining option was an order to shoot, but I was not prepared to order the troops to shoot Lebanese citizens," he said.

Although much of the building housing the embassy was severely damaged by fire, reports suggested the embassy itself, which was on an upper floor, was still intact.

Many people in Lebanon have accused Syria of instigating the violence, and said it was part of a broader campaign by Damascus to sow instability and sectarian division in Lebanon. The Syrian government ran the country as a puppet state until it was forced to pull its troops out last year.

The authorities said that of 200 people arrested after the riot, 76 were Syrian and 35 were Palestinian. Many took this as further evidence of Syrian involvement. In the past year there have been a string of high-profile political assassinations in Lebanon, all blamed on Syria. UN investigators say they believe Syrian intelligence was behind the first and most prominent assassination last year, which killed the former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri.

Walid Jumblat, a Druze leader and one of the most outspoken critics of Syria, directly accused the Damascus regime. "It seems that through sending weapons and men and using some Syrian workers they want to say that Lebanon will face chaos as a result of their departure from Lebanon," he wrote in a newspaper commentary.

Sunday's protest was organised by Lebanon's Sunni clerical authority and by the Jama'at al-Islamiya, a conservative Sunni party linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. Yesterday Asad Harmoush, the head of the party's political bureau, said he condemned the cartoons but had not intended the demonstration to end in violence.

"We refuse the excuse that this is just freedom of expression. Freedom of the press shouldn't oppose freedom of belief," he told the Guardian. He said that a group of around

100 people out of a much larger crowd of several thousand were responsible for Sunday's violence.

"We don't know who they were. But they obviously intended to cause destruction," he said. "Now we say to the Christians that they are a very dear part of our country and that what harms them harms us and that we sympathise and stand with them."

But there is little doubt that the violence was a serious political setback. "It makes a difficult situation much more precarious," said Paul Salem, a political analyst in Beirut. "People are much more anxious than they were two days ago. This is a very fragile, divided and paralysed country. It is a sad kind of mess."

Last night, a crowd of Christians and moderate Sunni Muslims, supporters of the late Mr Hariri, marched through the centre of Beirut to a Maronite church that was damaged during Sunday's riot. They said they wanted to dispel the fear that the divisions in Lebanese society were growing ever deeper.

But some in the crowd were angry. "If Denmark attacked the people of the prophet why didn't the protesters go and attack them in Denmark? Why do they come here and destroy our churches?" said Roy Abu-Abdou, 19, a member of the student wing of the Lebanese Forces, a former Christian militia.

"If they attack us again, especially our religious places, the consequences will be very serious," said Safwat Said, 22, another Lebanese Forces student.

Others were more cautious. "No matter how hard others try to create tension, the Lebanese will never make war with each other again," said Charbil Moussa, 20, a student leader of the Christian Phalangist party.

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## TGC48

### ***'Suicide bomber' protester apologises***

Omar Khayam, left, dressed as a suicide bomber during Saturday's protests in London, and outside his home in Bedford yesterday, right, apologising for his behaviour.

A man who was photographed dressed as a suicide bomber at Friday's protest in London against the publication of cartoons of the prophet Muhammad apologised "wholeheartedly" today to families of victims of the July 7 bombings.

Omar Khayam said he had not intended to cause offence but added that his protest outside the Danish embassy remained valid because of the hurt caused to Muslims around the world by the cartoons, one of which depicted the prophet in a turban with a bomb sticking out of it. The cartoons first appeared in a Danish newspaper in September and have since been reproduced in papers around Europe, although not in Britain.

Speaking outside his home in Bedford, Mr Khayam, 22, said: "I found the pictures deeply offensive as a Muslim and I felt the Danish newspaper had been provocative and controversial, deeply offensive and insensitive.

"But by me dressing the way I did, I did just that, exactly the same as the Danish newspaper, if not worse. My method of protest has offended many people, especially the families of the victims of the July bombings. This was not my intention."

Downing Street today described the behaviour of some Muslim demonstrators in London over the last few days as "completely unacceptable". Some demonstrators carried placards calling for people who insult Islam to be killed.

Tony Blair's spokesman said the police would have the government's full support in any actions they wished to take as a result of the demonstrations, but stressed it was for the police and the Crown Prosecution Service to decide whether arrests or prosecutions were justified.

The statement was released this morning after Mr Blair spoke by phone to his Danish counterpart.

"We understand the offence caused by the cartoons depicting the prophet and of course regret that this has happened. Such things help no one," Mr Blair's spokesman said. "It is always sensible for freedom of expression to be exercised with respect for religious belief. But nothing can justify the violence aimed at European embassies or at the country of Denmark.

"The attacks on the citizens of Denmark and the people of other European countries are completely unacceptable, as is the behaviour of some of the demonstrators in London over the last few days.

"We also strongly welcome the statements of Muslim leaders here who are themselves tackling the extremists who abuse their community's good name."

The home secretary, Charles Clarke, told the Commons today that the response to the publication of the cartoons has "in general been respectful and restrained in the best traditions of British tolerance".

"Decisions on any arrests are a matter for the police and proper authorities. They are taking rigorous assessments. If the police conclude there have been breaches of the law and decide to take any action, we would, of course, support them."

David Davis, the shadow home secretary, who at the weekend called for the demonstrators to be arrested, today reiterated his call for action to be taken against those who deliberately tried to stir up violence, for the sake of good community relations.

"Placards carrying the slogans calling for people who insult Islam to be beheaded or massacred or annihilated are direct incitements to violence," Mr Davis said. "I do expect that action should be taken, and taken soon. "We must continue with our traditions of

tolerance and respect but we must also draw a line as to what is acceptable, civilised behaviour. That line was emphatically crossed at the demonstration last Friday."

The Islamic Human Rights Commission said today that calls for the prosecution of the protestors reflected the "double standards of the west".

A statement from the group said that it did not condone the banners and chants on display, but "it is bemused as to why similar calls are not made to prosecute other irrational hotheads, the British National Party ... [The] IHRC strongly believes that there must be restrictions on freedom of speech but that these must not be selectively applied. Mockery of Jews, black and ethnic minority communities and women is condemned as anti-Semitism, racism and sexism respectively, yet mockery of Muslims is lauded as freedom of expression."

The Metropolitan police announced today that it has set up a squad to investigate the extremists who demonstrated on Friday. The team will examine everything from video recordings made by officers to photographs published in newspapers. Senior detectives promised a "swift" inquiry.

The exiled radical cleric, Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad, called for those behind the cartoons "to be tried and executed".

The Syrian-born preacher, who left Britain last August and has since been banned from returning, warned that countries which refused to put people on trial for insulting Muhammad must "face the consequences".

"The insult has been established now by everybody, Muslim and non-Muslim, and everybody condemns the cartoonist and condemns the cartoon," Mr Bakri told the BBC's Today programme. "However, in Islam, God said, and the messenger Muhammad said, whoever insults a prophet, he must be punished and executed. This man should be put on trial and if it is proven be executed."

The cleric, who lived in Britain for 20 years and was the head of the radical group al-Muhajiroun, which disbanded in 2004, added that Muslims in Britain were not allowed to kill people who insulted Islam because it was against the law of the country.

Al-Ghuraba, an offshoot of al-Muhajiroun, organised the protest outside the Danish embassy in London on Friday, after which Scotland Yard received more than 100 complaints. Specialist police officers were understood to have taken film and photographic evidence and a Metropolitan police spokeswoman said any arrests would be made "at the appropriate time".

Friday's demonstration was condemned by a range of Islamic organisations, from the moderate Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) to the more radical Hizb ut-Tahrir, which Tony Blair is seeking to outlaw.

## TGC49

### *When freedom gives in to fear*

How do we resolve the row over newspaper publication of cartoons of the Prophet? Perhaps we should start with an apology. Many journalists on British newspapers dismiss their continental counterparts - possibly owing to our chronic inability to read foreign languages - as humourless and boring and ostentatiously politically correct. Their bravery in publishing those cartoons warms our hearts and makes us think again.

From our earliest days as cub reporters it is drilled into us that, outside of the law, nothing stops a paper printing what it likes. The quickest way to get a story from the magistrates courts into a local newspaper is to ask the reporter to keep it out.

So why didn't British newspapers pile in to show solidarity with Danes, French, Italians, Germans, Spanish, Dutch, Swiss and - bravest of the brave - Jordanians over this important issue of press freedom? The best Britain came up with was a web link in the Guardian directing curious readers to the cartoons. Shouldn't we at least have followed the lead of BBC and ITV news, which screened shots of the contentious foreign coverage in order to explain the row?

The attractive explanation for our failure to do so is that papers do not print things that their readers may find offensive. Andreas Whittam Smith, the co-founder and former editor of the Independent, told BBC viewers on Friday that this was an issue not of press freedom but of taste and responsibility.

The less attractive explanation is pure pragmatism. Do you want a protest greeting you next morning? Is it worth having production disrupted for the next few months? How will Muslim newsagents react to what you print? Freedom of the press is all very well, but newspapers are commercial operations.

Not only that, but they should feel some responsibility for their actions. We might ask Danish workers whose jobs are threatened by Middle Eastern boycotts if they are happy to pay the price for press freedom. Is the principle behind publication of offensive cartoons important enough to have the Foreign Office spend the next few months clearing up the mess?

Judgments are made at this pragmatic level all the time, sometimes for the greater good, more out of self-interest. When the Sun lost readers in Liverpool as a result of its coverage of the Hillsborough football stadium disaster, it did not defend the principle of free speech. It made a grovelling apology and spent the next 10 years sucking up to Liverpoolians in an attempt to win them back.

Editors are conscious of the power of many groups, whether socially, politically or religiously motivated, to affect the circulation of their papers. All such groups have the right to voice whatever opposition - within the law - they like. All such groups can call for boycotts. The problem in this case is that you don't just get your newspaper boycotted: the editor of the

Norwegian newspaper Magazinet, which was first to reprint the cartoons, said on Friday he had received 30 death threats.

It would be nice if we could dismiss all this, as Whittam Smith seemed to be doing last week, as a matter of good manners. Unfortunately there is a strand of Muslim opinion that questions not only our right to be offensive but also our right to explore and debate these issues. Some Muslim critics have differentiated between the publication of the cartoons as a provocative gesture and their reproduction as a means of explaining the row. But that was not a distinction that made much impact on the small crowd that descended on the BBC last week after it broadcast shots of the relevant continental papers.

And we should remember that, while critics have emphasised the offensive nature of the cartoons at the centre of this row, many Muslims demand that no image of the Prophet of any kind be published. In 2001, for example, the Daily Mail commissioned the Cambridge academic John Casey to write an essay on Islam. Casey's piece was intelligent and sympathetic. Unaware, it seems, of the sensitivities, the commissioning editor asked the picture desk to find a picture of Muhammad to illustrate the piece. A handsome portrait appeared on the page, to the fury of sections of the Muslim population.

At the Daily Telegraph, which produced a meticulously researched supplement on Islam, the then editor Charles Moore was aware of the sensitivities of picturing the Prophet. He was inclined to publish - here was an illustration of the central figure in an historical account - but decided the likely row would undermine the educational value of the supplement.

That was another pragmatic decision, but we should worry that it had to be taken. We would not publish other historical pieces without illustrating the men and women concerned.

I suspect the truth is that many British journalists feel uncomfortable with the accommodations we are already making, not because they think it is the role of a free press to cause gratuitous offence, but because we have accepted that a large group is to be treated with greater circumspection for fear of what it will do if we don't.

This wasn't the time to go in for gestures, but there will be occasions on which papers must act. As the Daily Telegraph put it: "There might be circumstances in which the dictates of news left us with no choice but to publish - and where the public interest was overwhelmingly served by such an act, we would."

In the meantime, we should assert our freedoms in whatever ways we can. I find I have spent a lot of time looking at the various images of the Prophet available on the Google and Yahoo internet picture sites.

### ***Cartoon conflicts***

To describe the clash over the Danish depictions of the prophet as one between freedom and dogma will only fan the flames, says Tariq Ramadan

In Copenhagen last October, as demonstrations provoked by the Danish satirical cartoons about Islam were starting, a reporter from the newspaper that published them told me how intensely the editorial staff had debated whether to go ahead, how uncomfortable many of them had been about the whole issue and, at the same time, how surprised they had been by the strong reaction from Muslims and the Arab embassies. At the time, however, the tension seemed likely to remain within Danish borders.

To Danish Muslims denouncing this as an instance of racism - a provocation capitalised upon by the ever expanding far right in the country - my advice was to avoid reacting emotionally, to try to explain quietly why these cartoons were offensive and neither to demonstrate nor to risk activating mass movements that could prove impossible to master. At the time, a resolution seemed to be at hand.

One might ask, then, why it is that three months later, some find it in their interests to pour fuel on the fire of a controversy, with tragic and potentially uncontrollable consequences? A few Danish Muslims visited Middle Eastern countries and ramped up the resentment: governments in the region, only too happy to prove their attachment to Islam - to bolster their Islamic legitimacy in the eyes of the public - took advantage of this piece of good fortune and presented themselves as champions of a great cause. On the other side, the controversy was just what some politicians, intellectuals and journalists needed to paint themselves as champions of the equally great struggle for freedom of expression and as resistance fighters against religious obscurantism in the name of western values.

We are facing an incredible simplification, a gross polarisation: apparently a clash of civilisations, a confrontation between principles, with defenders, in one corner, of inalienable freedom of speech and, in the other, of the inviolable sacred sphere. Presented in such terms, the debate has unfortunately become a battle of wills, and the question becomes: who will win? Muslims, wanting apologies, threaten to attack European interests, even to attack people; western governments, intellectuals and journalists refuse to bend under threats, and certain media outlets have added to the controversy by republishing the cartoons. Most people around the world, observing these excesses, are perplexed: what sort of madness is this, they ask?

It is critical we find a way out of this infernal circle and demand from those stoking this fire that they stop their polemics at once and create a space for serious, open, indepth debate and peaceful dialogue. This is not the predicted clash of civilisations. This affair does not symbolise the confrontation between the principles of Enlightenment and those of religion. Absolutely not. What is at stake at the heart of this sad story is whether or not the duelling

sides have the capacity to be free, rational (whether believers or atheists) and, at the same time, reasonable.

The fracture is not between the west and Islam but between those who, in both worlds, are able to assert who they are and what they stand for with calm - in the name of faith or reason, or both - and those driven by exclusive certainties, blind passions, reductive perceptions of the other and a liking for hasty conclusions. The latter character traits are shared equally by some intellectuals, religious scholars, journalists and ordinary people on both sides. Facing the dangerous consequences these attitudes entail, it is urgent we launch a general call for wisdom.

In Islam, representations of all prophets are strictly forbidden. It is both a matter of the fundamental respect due to them and a principle of faith requiring that, in order to avoid any idolatrous temptations, God and the prophets never be represented. Hence, to represent a prophet is a grave transgression. If, moreover, one adds the clumsy confusions, insults and denigration that Muslims perceived in the Danish cartoons, one can understand the nature of the shock expressed by large segments of Muslim communities around the world (and not only by practising Muslims or the radicals). To these people, the cartoons were too much: it was good and important for them to express their indignation and to be heard.

At the same time, it was necessary for Muslims to bear in mind that, for the past three centuries, western societies - unlike Muslim-majority countries - have grown accustomed to critical, ironical - even derisive - treatment of religious symbols, among them the pope, Jesus Christ and even God. Even though Muslims do not share such an attitude, it is imperative they learn to keep an intellectual distance when faced with such provocations and not to let themselves be driven by zeal and fervour, which can only lead to undesirable ends.

In the case of these cartoons - as clumsy as they are idiotic and malicious - it would have been, and it would remain, preferable if Muslims expressed their values and grievances to the public at large without clamour, better if they paused until such a time as calm was possible. Instead, what is welling up today within some Muslim communities is as unproductive as it is insane: the obsessive demands for apologies, boycotting of European products and threats of violent reprisals are excesses that must be rejected and condemned.

However, it is just as excessive and irresponsible to invoke the "right to freedom of expression" - the right to say anything, in any way, against anybody. Freedom of expression is not absolute. Countries have laws that define the framework for exercising this right and which, for instance, condemn racist language. There are also specific rules pertaining to the cultures, traditions and collective psychologies in the respective societies that regulate the relationship between individuals and the diversity of cultures and religions.

Racial or religious insults are not addressed in the same way in the various western societies: within a generally similar legal framework, each nation has its own history and sensitivities; wisdom requires acknowledging and respecting this reality. The reality is also

that the Muslim presence within western societies has changed their collective sensitivity. Instead of being obsessed with laws and rights - approaching a tyrannical right to say anything - would it not be more prudent to call upon citizens to exercise their right to freedom of expression responsibly and to take into account the diverse sensitivities that compose our pluralistic contemporary societies?

This is not a matter of additional laws restraining the scope of free speech; it is simply one of calling upon everybody's conscience to exercise that right with an eye on the rights of others. It is more about nurturing a sense of civic responsibility than about imposing legislation: Muslim citizens are not asking for more censorship but for more respect. One cannot impose mutual respect by means of legislation; rather one teaches it in the name of a free, responsible and reasonable common citizenship.

We are at a crossroads. The time has come for women and men who reject this dangerous division of people into two worlds to start building bridges based on common values. They must assert the inalienable right to freedom of expression and, at the same time, demand measured exercise of it. We need to promote an open, self-critical approach, to repudiate exclusive truths and narrow-minded, binary visions of the world.

We are in dire need of mutual trust. The crises provoked by these cartoons shows us how, out of "seemingly nothing", two universes of reference can become deaf to each other and be seduced by defining themselves against each other - with the worst possible consequences. Disasters threaten that extremists on both sides would not fail to use for their own agendas. If people who cherish freedom, who know the importance of mutual respect and are aware of the imperative necessity to establish a constructive and critical debate, if these people are not ready to speak out, to be more committed and visible, then we can expect sad, painful tomorrows. The choice is ours.

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## TGC51

### ***Danish embassy in Tehran attacked***

Iranian protesters burn Danish and French flags in front of the Austrian embassy in Tehran.

Hundreds of angry protesters threw stones and firebombs at the Danish embassy in Tehran today to protest against the publication of cartoons of the prophet Muhammad.

Police had encircled the embassy building but were unable to hold back up to 400 demonstrators as they pelted the mission with stones and incendiary devices.

So far the protesters have not breached the police cordon to get inside the structure, but they managed to throw a handful of firebombs over the building's high outer wall. The embassy had already been evacuated.

The Bush administration today condemned the violent protests against the cartoons that have taken place around the world and urged governments to take steps to lower tensions.

"We understand fully why people, why Muslims, find the cartoons offensive, and we've also spoken out about the importance of the right for people to express their views and freedom of speech in society," the White House spokesman, Scott McClellan, said.

"Those who disagree with the views that were expressed certainly have the right to condemn them but they should be peaceful and we urge constructive dialogue about this difficult issue."

The caricatures were first published in Denmark in September and have since been republished in other newspapers in Europe and elsewhere. Muslims consider any images of the prophet to be blasphemous. One of the cartoons featured Muhammad with a bomb in his turban.

Some 200 Iranian student demonstrators also threw stones at the Austrian embassy in Tehran, breaking some windows and starting small fires. Austria was targeted because it currently holds the rotating presidency of the EU. Members of the Iranian parliament issued a statement warning that those who published the cartoons should remember the case of Salman Rushdie.

The late Iranian leader issued a "fatwa", or religious edict, in 1989 calling for Rushdie's death following the publication of his novel *The Satanic Verses*, which some Muslims found blasphemous.

Iranian radio and television also reported a series of boycotts of Danish medical equipment and consumer goods, and the suspension of trade negotiations with Denmark.

In Afghanistan, two protesters were shot dead and three other people, including two police officials, were injured in the central city of Mihtarlam when police fired on hundreds of demonstrators, an interior ministry spokesman, Dad Mohammed Rasa, said.

Meanwhile, Syria apologised to Chile after a mob set fire to the Chilean embassy in Damascus on Saturday while attacking the Danish embassy, which is in the same building.

In Romania, the country's main press organisation today urged all media not to publish the cartoons, and in Chechnya, the pro-Russian government banned Danish humanitarian organisations from the war-torn Muslim region in protest against the pictures.

Demonstrators threw stones at EU offices in the Gaza Strip and pulled down the EU flag.

In Yemen, a small newspaper, *al-Hurriya*, was closed down and its editor arrested for printing the caricatures, while in Warsaw, the editor of *Rzeczpospolita* - a Polish newspaper that reprinted the images - said that he was sorry if the publication had caused offence to Muslims, but defended it as an act of solidarity.

In Jordan, a majority of parliamentarians demanded that the government cancel agreements with Denmark, Norway, New Zealand and other nations where the drawings were published.

In Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim nation, police fired warning shots to stop protesters from ripping a plaque from the wall of the US consulate in Surabaya, the country's second largest city, witnesses said. Hundreds of demonstrators threw rocks at the Danish consulate in the city before moving on to the US consulate.

In India, riot police fired tear gas and water cannons to disperse hundreds of student protesters who burned Danish flags and chanted slogans in New Delhi. Dozens of protesters torched Danish flags, burned tyres and shouted slogans in several parts of Srinagar, Kashmir, police said.

In Bangkok, about 400 members of Thailand's Muslim minority shouted "God is Great" outside Denmark's embassy, and some demonstrators stamped on a Danish flag.

In Malaysia, an editor of a newspaper that ran one of the drawings to accompany an article about the lack of impact of the controversy inside the country resigned, according to a statement seen Monday.

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## TGC52

### ***Rioting with well-planned spontaneity***

It was one of those unpredictable Lebanese Sunday mornings. The ski slopes in the mountains overlooking Beirut would have been crowded with skiers enjoying the brilliant winter sunshine. Walkers were out along the Corniche, strolling in designer tracksuits. Downtown, the chic restaurants were preparing for lunchtime. And there were a few men on scooters riding around town broadcasting an imminent protest.

It wasn't long before the heavily-laden coaches and minivans began to arrive from Beirut and the rest of Lebanon. They were all full of young, often bearded men who wore headbands and carried identical flags with calligraphic inscriptions in Arabic such as: "There is no god but God and Mohammad is his Prophet" and "O Nation of Muhammad, Wake Up."

There were soon as many as 20,000 of them filling the streets. They walked up past the Christian quarter of Gemmayze and into the even more genteel Christian area of Achrafieh, gathering not far from the Danish embassy, the target of their protest. One man waved a placard in English that said: "Damn your beliefs and your liberty." Another carried a sign saying: "Whoever insults Prophet Muhammad is to be killed."

The police seemed to know the demonstrators were coming and had turned out in force with barriers, barbed wire fences and several large fire trucks. Just a day earlier, the Danish and Norwegian embassies in Damascus had been torched by a furious mob, repeating the

violent protests that have spread across the world from Gaza to Afghanistan to London. On Saturday night, anticipating trouble, the Danish diplomatic staff in Beirut flew home.

The mob stood in the street, chanting their fierce condemnation of the Danish cartoons that spawned this rapidly-spreading crisis. By 11am, the Lebanese police and army were firing tear gas at the crowd. The protesters threw volleys of stones. Some stuffed cotton wool into their nostrils to stifle the effect of the gas.

One group overturned a car and set it alight. Sunni clerics in robes tried to calm the young men down. They were ignored. One cleric, Ibrahim Ibrahim, said his pleas were met with stones and insults. "They are hooligans," he said.

The mob grew fiercer, and finally the police withdrew. As they moved back, the crowd smashed their way into the building housing the Danish embassy and set it ablaze. From the burning building they hung a banner that read: "We are ready to sacrifice our children for you, O Prophet Muhammad." By now dozens of people had been wounded or arrested and at least one person was killed, a protester apparently caught up in the fire at the embassy building.

The many politicians representing Lebanon's fractured sectarian society sensed this was suddenly a situation a long way out of control. "It is the work of infiltrators," said Saïad Hariri, a prominent Sunni politician. "These acts have nothing to do with the Prophet. They are harming Muslims."

On the street, the riot began to take a more sectarian turn. Throwing the metal barriers and barbed wire aside they chased the police up into the narrow alleys of Achrafieh, well beyond the embassy and deep into the Christian quarter. They smashed dozens of parked cars and tossed bricks through the windows of the furniture boutiques and hair salons. Others overturned two police cars and threw rocks through the windows of the St Maron church.

"What is the guilt of the citizens of Achrafieh for caricatures published in Denmark?" said Charles Rizk, the justice minister and a Christian. "This sabotage should stop."

Asad Harmoush, a leader of Jama'ia Islamiya, the conservative Sunni Muslim group that had helped organise the protest, tried to deflect the blame. "We can't control tens of thousands of people. We tried to limit the harm and we extend our excuses to our brothers in Achrafieh and to the security forces. There has to be an investigation. Obviously there were infiltrators."

And then in the early afternoon, as suddenly as it had all begun, it ended. The leaders of the mob turned to the angry young men beside them and told them it was time to leave. Obediently the crowd thinned out and began walking back to the buses, even as the Danish embassy continued to burn. By 3pm there wasn't a single protester left on the street. Later, the Lebanese interior minister, Hassan Sabei, announced his resignation.

The police returned in force, and with nothing to do they began taking photographs of each other in front of the burned-out building. Firemen hosed down the blaze. Crowds of Filipino

maids returned from their day off back to their jobs in the homes of the wealthy, while the wealthy were out patching up their cars. Dozens of street sweepers hosed down the roads and collected the debris of the day.

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## The Independent (TIC16-TIC22)

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### TIC16

#### ***Authorities backed Damascus riots, say protesters***

Syrian protesters who burnt and looted the Danish and Norwegian embassies in Damascus at the weekend were encouraged to organise by the Syrian authorities, and received text messages from Islamic study centres urging them to gather, according to participants in the riot.

"The sheikhs told us to send five text messages to every true Muslim we knew urging them to participate," said a student from the conservative Abu Nour Islamic Institute in Damascus, who wished to remain anonymous. "The authorities gave a green light for us to organise the gathering in public and to participate in it."

The Middle East has for months been a tinderbox of pent-up anti-Western anger, and the publication of caricatures of the Prophet Mohamed was the spark that lit the fuse. But the fury displayed by crowds in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and Iraq may also have been exploited by some Muslim countries to settle scores with Western powers. Syria and Iran face growing pressure from the US and Europe on the issues of Iraq and on Tehran's nuclear programme. And Egypt, one of the first to publicly criticise the cartoons, has been critical of the Danish government for funding critics of human rights abuses.

"This is an organised attempt to take advantage of Muslim anger for purposes that do not serve the interests of Muslims and Lebanon, but those of others beyond the border," Lebanese Social Affairs Minister Nayla Mouawad, a Christian, said yesterday after riots in Beirut.

Wael Bawabigy, a young Damascus trader, who took part in Saturday's violent demonstration, which the White House said could not have happened "without government knowledge and support", said security forces armed with tear gas and rubber bullets were taken by surprise.

Iraq's Transport Ministry has frozen contracts with Denmark and Norway in protest.

## TIC17

### ***Ministers appeal for calm***

Senior ministers appealed for calm as Conservatives demanded that police take action against Muslim demonstrators who threatened retaliation against countries whose media published the offending cartoons.

The fallout from Friday's London demonstrations dominated political debate as MPs and Muslim leaders condemned protesters who carried placards with slogans such as "Massacre those who insult Islam".

Sir Iqbal Sacranie, the general secretary of the Muslim Council of Britain, said that he was "disgusted" by the protests while the group Hizb ut-Tahrir, which has been threatened with proscription, said the placards were "not acceptable."

Peter Hain, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, appealed yesterday for all sides in the controversy to "cool it".

But Dominic Grieve, the shadow attorney general, criticised police for failing to arrest radical demonstrators on Friday. "It is certainly not a happy state of affairs where such a demonstration takes place and those people who are acting in that way don't end up under arrest before the demonstration is ended."

David Winnick, a Labour member of the Commons Home Affairs Committee, called for people carrying placards threatening violence and glorifying terrorism to be prosecuted or deported.

Scotland Yard said police had received more than 100 complaints about the protests but no arrests were made. A spokesman said: "Arrests, if necessary, will be made at the most appropriate time. All complaints made to police will be investigated."

Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, also condemned the placards, and described the attacks on the Danish embassy in Beirut as "absolutely outrageous and totally unjustified and what we want to see is this matter being calmed down."

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## TIC18

### ***Bruce Anderson: Stop cringing and stand up for our own values***

Those who insist on living in a theocracy must find their way to the nearest airport

The embattled Danish newspaper has performed a valuable public service. It may have caused mayhem across several continents; is this the first globalised riot? But the cartoons did not create the tension. They merely highlighted it. They have forced Europe to face a

problem which most political elites would rather ignore, although it will be one of the major questions of the next few decades: How are we to achieve peaceful coexistence with Islam?

A lot of soggy liberals now believe that if no one talked about the problem, it would just go away. Every day, people who used to think like that arrive, at last, in cancer specialists' waiting-rooms. In Christian-Muslim relations, such delay could be equally fatal.

The problems go beyond religion. It is not necessary to be a vulgar Marxist to believe that many Muslims have economic and political reasons for hating the West. It is also true that, for many Muslims, Westophobia is a displacement activity, giving them an excuse to blame their misfortunes on others. No one can predict what the Muslim world will look like in 20 years' time. There is only one point on which we can be certain. It will still generate many more grievances than it can consume.

But religion is crucial, and Christians are handicapped in dealing with this, at least in Europe - where most of them have forgotten to take religion seriously. This is linked to the decline of belief in personal salvation; once people no longer fear hell or hope for heaven, there is less incentive to cling to the Church's teachings. There is a related development. Christians have stopped believing in the superiority of their own faith.

Christians are surely obliged to believe that their faith is based on a unique and transcendent truth: Christ, His divinity, His sacrifice, His resurrection. A Christian in possession of such a truth ought not to be selfish. Indeed, he is enjoined not to hog it to himself but to share it with all mankind. Nor is he entitled to feel superior because he is fortunate enough to be a Christian. But he must believe in the superiority of his faith to the lesser doctrines professed by those who have not yet seen the light.

Yet most European Christians would find that idea indecent; almost worthy of a bill proscribing religious hatred. For the body and blood of Christ, read a purée of live and let live, tolerance and ecumenism. Such Christians have lost contact with historical Christianity and with history. As a result, they not only fail to understand their own religion. They cannot understand other faiths, especially Islam.

Islam has no concept of secularism and the division of authority between church and state. There are comparisons with the jurisdictional disputes between kings and popes during the Middle Ages. The Protestant/Catholic conflict which had such influence on European history for several centuries is equally relevant (it is to be hoped that Christians and Muslims find a quicker, less bloody path to tolerance).

There are plenty of Muslims today - including British subjects - who would regard Hildebrand, that most intransigent of Papal imperialists, as a moderate, and whose faith resembles Calvin's or Philip II's. If keeping them quiescent requires the suppression of a few cartoons, it might seem a cheap price. But there are two objections. The first is cowardice; the second, that the cowardice would not succeed. The cartoons would not be the only concession. As the Danes have realised, there is no point in paying Danegeld. Once you start ordering from the menu of cowardice, you lose control of the bill. The Muslim extremists

would be convinced that, stumbling between cowardice and cultural cringe, the West would always capitulate.

There have already been covert capitulations, especially in Koranic scholarship. Muslims are obliged to believe that the Archangel Gabriel dictated the Koran to Mohamed. No serious free scholar now accepts that the text which we have today was written by one man during a brief period. It underwent changes for a century and a half.

Although this is an interesting point, academics are curiously reluctant to publicise it. There are allusions in learned journals, which no doubt rely on their obscurity to protect them from fatwas (yet what could be more obscure than Salman Rushdie's prose?). The fear of Muslim reaction is already inhibiting Koranic scholarship.

It is time for us to stop cringing and to stand up for our own values. Over the past few decades we appear to have decided that there is a basic entitlement to free speech. Short of the laws on libel and slander and the prohibition against shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre, there are virtually no constraints.

Though we should always be restrained by the dictates of courtesy, we must be free to say what we like on public affairs. Those who find this intolerable and insist on living in a theocracy must find their way to the nearest airport.

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## TIC19

### ***'Police must bear down on extremist protesters'***

Police should come down "heavily" on anti-cartoon protesters who broke the law, a Cabinet Minister demanded today as an extremist cleric called for the artist to face execution.

The Northern Ireland Secretary Peter Hain said the actions of some Muslims in London at the weekend had been "completely unacceptable and intolerable".

Placards threatened a repeat of the 11 September and 7 July atrocities following the publication of cartoons in Denmark depicting the prophet Mohammed, sparking calls for action.

Amid violence in cities across the world - which has seen one death in Afghanistan and embassies torched - UK-based Muslim groups condemned extreme aspects of the demonstrations here.

But radical cleric Omar Bakri Mohammed insisted on the BBC this morning that anyone who "insults a prophet" must be punished and executed.

That did not mean a vigilante murder, he insisted, but warned that any country which refused to put people on trial for such insults would have to "face the consequences".

Reacting to the protests, Mr Hain said on the BBC Radio 4 Today programme: "Demonstrators on the streets over the weekend were doing things and saying things that are completely unacceptable and intolerable.

"The police need to bear down on them very heavily and chase down those who have committed offences and prosecute them where they can get the evidence, because there is freedom of speech on the one hand - that is sacrosanct.

"But on the other hand, incitement to terror, incitement to suicide bombing - all of those are clear infringements of the law.

"And where there is evidence to back that up, then prosecutions will obviously follow and the police are investigating that now."

The demonstration was condemned by a range of Muslim organisations, from the moderate Muslim Council of Britain to the more radical Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which Prime Minister Tony Blair is seeking to outlaw because of claims it backs terrorism.

Hizb-ut-Tahrir organised a less incendiary protest in London on Saturday, which passed off without incident.

The Shadow Home Secretary David Davis has called for a "no tolerance" approach from the police to banners whose slogans consisted of incitement to murder.

Specialist police officers who attended the demo were understood to have taken film and photographic evidence, but no protesters were arrested.

The Metropolitan Police spokeswoman has said any arrests would be made "at the appropriate time".

Lord Harris, a board member of the Metropolitan Police Authority, backed the policing of the demonstrations, saying immediate public safety had to be the first consideration.

"It is much more important to deal with that and to make sure that people in the immediate environment are physically safe and then to assess whether other offences have been committed.

"That, I think, seems to have been the approach in this case, but we will need to look at it in some detail."

Bakri Mohammed, who left the UK for Lebanon in August amid suggestions he might be charged with treason for allegedly praising the July 7 bombers, said on the programme: "The insult has been established now by everybody, Muslim and non-Muslim, and everybody condemns the cartoonist and condemns the cartoon.

"However, in Islam, God said, and the messenger Mohammed said, whoever insults a prophet, he must be punished and executed.

"This man should be put on trial and if it is proven to be executed."

Muslims around the world must not kill anyone who insulted Mohammed "by their own personal, individual initiative", he added.

"We are not saying ourselves to go there and start to look to him and kill him, we are not talking about that. We are talking about Islamic rules. If anybody insults the prophet, he will have to take a punishment."

One man who was pictured dressed up a suicide bomber at the protest has defended his actions and said he wanted to expose "double standards".

Building student Omar Khayam, 22, of Bedford, said: "I would do it again to make a point. I could have gone and held up banners or something, but this made the point better.

"If certain people have the right to do what they want and other people don't, then that is double standards."

\* Hundreds of Afghans clashed with police and soldiers today during a demonstration against the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. One person was killed and four were wounded. Police fired on the demonstrators after a man in the crowd shot at them and others threw stones and knives during the rally in the central Afghan city of Mihtarlam, said a spokesman for the Interior Ministry.

\* Riot police in New Delhi fired tear gas and water cannons to disperse hundreds of students protesting against the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in European newspapers. The protesters chanted slogans and burned a Danish flag before riot police broke up the demonstration.

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## TIC20

### ***Robert Fisk: The Fury***

Religious fury threatens to wrest control from secular governments

After Syria, the fires fanned by Denmark's anti-Prophet cartoons spread to Lebanon yesterday with sectarian intensity.

Anger flashing through the Muslim world over the weekend saw protesters burn Danish flags and attack buildings from Lahore to Gaza. The Islamic Army in Iraq, one of the main insurgent groups, made a blood-curdling call yesterday for violence against citizens of countries where caricatures of the Prophet Mohamed have been published.

"We swear to God, if we catch one of their citizens in Iraq, we will cut him to pieces, to take revenge for Prophet," it said in an unverified internet statement.

In Lebanon yesterday, 2,000 troops fought demonstrators in the heart of Christian Beirut during the day as the Danish consulate was set on fire and a large church was attacked by a mob. Other demonstrators headed for the Lebanese foreign ministry. One protester at the consulate was trapped by flames and died after jumping from the third floor.

Yesterday's violence may have been inspired by the previous day's assaults on the Danish and Norwegian embassies in Damascus - or were perhaps encouraged by the same Baath party which must have originally permitted the Syrian demonstrations to take place.

More likely, the crowds in both cities were allowed by the authorities to stage protests, but the demonstrators quickly became overwhelmed as Sunni extremists - in Lebanon, perhaps from the Salafist Hezb al-Tahrir party in Tripoli, and equally Wahhabi-minded Palestinians from the Ein el-Helweh refugee camp - arrived with sticks and stones to assault the Danish property and then to attack the St Maroun church and march on the Lebanese foreign ministry.

If this is true, it shows how quickly two nationalist Arab governments can be challenged by Islamists within their own countries. The 2,000-strong Lebanese security forces had to be deployed in east Beirut to fire tear gas and live rounds into the air to hold back the rioters.

For Lebanon, divided along sectarian lines as it has been since its creation by the French in the 1920s, it was a grim and bitter day - perhaps the worst since ex-Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated on 14 February last year - which brought Muslim demonstrators into the centre of Christian east Beirut where the Danish consulate is - or rather was - located. Burning fire engines and smashing cars parked in the streets, however, brought back ugly memories of the 15-year Lebanese civil war.

Little wonder, then, that Charles Rizk, the Justice Minister, asked angrily: "What is the guilt of the people of Ashrafieh for cartoons published in Denmark?" Ashrafieh, needless to say, is an almost entirely Christian sector of Beirut.

Fouad Siniora, the Lebanese Prime Minister - who, under the country's unwritten constitution, must be a Sunni - insisted that this was not the way for Muslims to express their anger. One Sunni prelate who appeared on the streets in a vain attempt to calm the demonstrators remarked that "they have done more damage to the name of the Prophet today than the cartoons in Denmark".

Lebanon's Interior Minister, Hassan al-Sabaa, resigned yesterday, becoming the first political casualty of the crisis.

At least 30 people were arrested and the Lebanese authorities later announced - predictably - that most were "foreigners". Whenever any civil unrest occurs in Lebanon, foreigners are always blamed - just as they were throughout the civil war - although it will be interesting to see if there are any Syrians among their number. Christian politicians complain that the Lebanese government, which knew that there would be demonstrations, should have dealt more "firmly" with the demonstrators - for "firmly", read "fatally".

But, in fact, the Lebanese troops managed to avoid shooting any of the protesters dead; "martyrs" would only have provided room for more violent demonstrations - and yesterday's battle in east Beirut was in marked contrast to the way Israeli soldiers deal with Arab demonstrators. The Lebanese, far from firing bullets into the surging crowds, pushed them back with water cannons.

There is no doubting that those preposterous cartoons originally published in Copenhagen last September have lit a small inferno across the Middle East. In Nablus, Palestinian gunmen stormed the French cultural centre yesterday. In Qatar, the government announced it would no longer accept trade delegations from Denmark. Iran recalled its ambassador from Copenhagen.

Muslim demonstrators could be seen on the streets of Beirut yesterday with green banners bearing the legend: "Oh Nation of Mohamed, Wake Up!" The danger for the West - as well as the dictatorships and semi-democracies of the Middle East - is that rather a lot of members of the nation of Mohamed will do just that.

Syria is a largely Sunni nation ruled by Alawites - a branch of Shiism - and it is not difficult to see how even minimum Baathist encouragement of Saturday's demonstrators quickly turned into a Sunni protest. The Norwegian embassy had demanded extra protection from Syria - but was not provided with the security forces it asked for. There will be many questions asked about this among Europeans in Damascus; for it is the same old problem: who runs Syria?

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## TIC21

### ***Stephen Glover on the press: No News is Good News***

If d'Ancona gets the job, he'll have Neil as a very interested spectator

It has taken longer to find a new editor of The Spectator than it did to find a new Pope, but the wait is nearly over. Almost everyone who has followed this saga assumes that the new occupant of this great office will be Matthew d'Ancona, the deputy editor of The Sunday Telegraph. If so, it will represent a setback for Andrew Neil, the chief executive of The Spectator, who was generally believed to be scouring the world for an abrasive, right-wing Scotsman in his own image.

Mr d'Ancona, though not obviously a scion of the privileged and allegedly effete class which Mr Neil despises, is certainly the Establishment candidate. He is a fellow of All Souls and the author of theological books. Politically he tills ground to the left of Mr Neil, and has been as friendly towards the Blairite project as he is now towards the Cameroonian one. Unlike Mr Neil, he has shown little, if any, animus towards the forces of privilege which have supposedly been sucking the life-blood out of this country. Indeed, the interesting thing about Mr d'Ancona is that he seldom evinces a strong dislike of anyone or anything.

If this admirable man should be installed as editor, Mr Neil will claim the credit, and announce that The Spectator is in brilliant hands. So it may be, but they are not the hands he would have chosen given free rein. Now that the Scotsman titles have been sold, the magazine over which he presides is no more than a small outlying province of the Barclay brothers' empire, yet he is not allowed to rule even this slim parcel of land on his own. Aidan Barclay, son of Sir David, has taken part in the interviewing of some 12 candidates for the editorship, along with Mr Neil. Mr Barclay has been advised by wise voices of the merits of a respectable candidate such as Mr d'Ancona rather than an obscure ideologue. Murdoch MacLennan, the chief executive of the Barclay-owned Telegraph Group and the ruler of a far greater territory than Mr Neil could dream of, may also have added his counsel.

None of this means that the magazine is bound to be safe from Mr Neil's depredations. Mr d'Ancona - and let me stress that the appointment is not made, and might still go elsewhere - is said by his detractors to be naturally emollient, and likely to defer to the assertive, crinkly-haired Scot. At the very least, Mr Neil will want a bigger say in the editorial affairs of The Spectator.

Last week it was announced that the magazine had acquired two associate editors to improve its political and economic coverage. Fraser Nelson will join The Business (the little-read but quite good Sunday newspaper of which Mr Neil is editor-in-chief) from The Scotsman, where he was a well-regarded political editor; Alastair Heath is already the economics editor of The Business. The point is that both men will be working for Mr Neil, and yet have been given extra responsibilities on The Spectator. He has actually made two important appointments which should by rights come within the purview of the magazine's new editor.

Mr Neil has also announced that The Spectator will be moving from its charming house in Bloomsbury, which it has occupied since 1975, to premises in Westminster. He will be able to pop into the magazine's new office from an adjacent BBC studio, where he is often to be found, or nip across in his limousine from The Business's home in nearby Victoria. If I were Mr d'Ancona, the prospect of daily visitations from Mr Neil might make me think twice as my hand hovered over the contract.

Mr Neil wants to change The Spectator - to make it less clubby and elitist (as he sees it), more global and hard-hitting - perhaps another version of The Economist. Some may think such a transformation a good thing, but it would certainly kill off the existing magazine, which has been pretty successful, gradually adding sales for more than 15 years while many newspapers have been losing circulation. Mr Neil does not like The Spectator as it is. In a letter to The Guardian last week, he derided the perfectly legitimate suggestion of my colleague Cristina Odone in that newspaper that he wanted to destroy the legacy of Boris Johnson, the last editor. The truth is that he did not have much time for Boris, and that Boris did not have much time for him.

Mr d'Ancona's appointment would be well-judged. It is almost certainly not one that Mr Neil would make left to his own devices. The Barclays have seemingly listened to other voices, and we must hope that they continue to do so. For no one should doubt that in Mr Neil's

restless and driven mind the transformation - I would say probable destruction - of The Spectator is intended to be the consummation of his life's work.

### **No news is good news**

The really interesting question about the cartoons of the Prophet Mohamed is why some respectable European newspapers chose to publish them while (at the time of writing) all British titles chose not to.

One reason might be that our own newspapers have a more finely developed sense of taste. Given the normally rumbustious character of our Press, this may be hard to accept. Many newspapers are happy to report details that might be offensive to Christians in what, after all, was once supposed to be a Christian country.

So what explains their reticence this time? One possibility is that our papers are more commercially minded than many on the continent. Some of them have a fairly high proportion of Muslim readers, of whom even the most moderate might be appalled by these cartoons. In what is probably the world's most competitive market, no newspaper wants to face a boycott. There is also the risk that some of the many paper shops owned and run by Muslims might somehow discriminate against - or be urged to do so by more extreme Muslims - a newspaper which published the cartoons.

This is not to deny that there may be good reasons for eschewing them. They seem stupid and extreme, and the Danish title which first carried them made a mistake, as it has subsequently admitted. A problem arises now because people want to know what has caused the furore. By withholding the cartoons our papers are in a sense suppressing a piece of news. This presumably explains why the BBC and Channel 4 decided to show fleeting images.

Had it been my decision, I suppose I would not have published the pictures out of respect for Muslims, but I would not have been entirely proud of myself. There is a gigantic culture clash here. Free speech is under threat. And there are millions of Muslims who believe that western governments can and should tell newspapers what they can, and cannot, publish.

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## **TIC22**

### ***Yasmin Alibhai-Brown: The double standards over free speech***

This staged clash of fundamentalisms now has an audience of billions. The climax is likely to be grisly. European journalists have got the show fight they wanted, Flemming Rose, the culture editor of Denmark's Jyllands-Posten, sought out controversial cartoonists to create caricatures of the Prophet Mohamed, not because they had something bold and compelling to say, but simply to enrage, like bullfighters goading a bull. Other newspapers have reprinted the cartoons in a supposed act of solidarity. What they have done, in fact, is

belittle freedom of expression. They have taken something precious and turned it into a licence for the intelligentsia to behave like yobs.

These liberal warriors, high on conceit, want to demonstrate that Muslims can never be a part of Europe, because, well, they are too backward to hoot aloud when their revered prophet is shown with a bomb for a turban. I am not amused either, so should I pack the bags? Many of these countries were infamous for their state terrorism against Jews. Since then they have systematically mistreated generations of Muslims.

Right on cue, out came the dishcloths, Bin Laden surrogates with murderous banners and belligerence. A sweetheart baby is held aloft wearing a snug cap with a red heart proclaiming love of al-Qa'ida. Is their faith so uncertain that a few ink lines can shrivel it? Threats and deaths for stupid pictures; what kind of morality is that?

Muslims live as abject prisoners of their dictatorial states. They flee to places where they can breathe easier and speak. Then, a minority turn into the vicious thought-dogs they left behind. Most of us Muslims detest them more than whites ever could.

In an Arab coffee-shop this weekend, emotional arguments raged. I agreed with those who said neither publications nor writers should be harassed, but equally, that Muslims can protest, boycott goods, refuse to be defined by extremism, and question iniquitous double standards.

Muslims are not the only enemies of free speech. Go to Singapore and speak with an unrestrained tongue. I have had death threats from from Americans and white racists who, like Nick Griffin, cherish their right to hate.

And freedom of expression stands aside for money. Google capitulates in China, and Denmark will too, once the boycott of its goods cuts in. Where are the impassioned arguments against the Serious Organised Crime Act that stops people of conscience quietly protesting outside Parliament?

Judgements are exercised daily by newspapers on what should be published. There are internalised restraints of decency and civil duties of care. A media lawyer wouldn't let me criticise Lord Winston because, I was told: "He is very powerful, and also Jewish. It could be taken the wrong way." She won the argument.

In 2002, the New Statesman printed what was viewed as an anti-Semitic cover and the editor was deluged with protest. A cartoon of Ariel Sharon in this newspaper caused similar outrage. The Daily Mail caused offence when it printed a cartoon of the 58 Chinese immigrants who suffocated in the back of a truck. We do not abuse fat people or walk into pubs and announce to the gathered: "Wogs and niggers stink."

Ordinary Muslims have convincingly argued against gratuitous provocation. Now they must reassert as powerfully how they value the freedom to be and to speak in the way Europe allows them to. That should confound and silence their liberal enemies.

**Appendix 8 – The ‘2005 Danish Cartoon Controversy’ CDA Analysis – Arab  
Articles**

## The Gulf News (GNC20-GNC25)

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### GNC 20

#### ***Dismissed professor not reinstated: official***

A Zayed University professor who was dismissed over the cartoon row has not been pardoned, a university official said.

**Dubai:** A Zayed University professor who was dismissed over the cartoon row has not been pardoned, a university official said.

It was claimed by news reports in UAE English dailies that Professor Andrew Hirst, supervisor of the English Language Centre at ZU, was reinstated yesterday. A senior official at the University said: "Whatever you read was wrong."

Students welcomed the university's decision. Mass communication student Nada Ali said that freedom of expression is bound by social responsibility.

She said: "You can't just say anything and cite freedom of speech as an excuse."

The Zayed University official clarified that Hirst will be allowed to complete the current academic year to prevent further disruption of student interests.

The official said: "All links with him will be severed after June 14."

Hirst and Claudia Kiburz, another university professor, were fired last week after Kiburz distributed prints of the cartoons in class.

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### GNC21

#### ***Violence erupts at cartoon protests***

At least two people were killed and dozens injured in Lahore when angry protesters attacked dozens of government and private buildings on the Mall road.

They also set on fire the Punjab Assembly building, McDonald's and KFC restaurants and several bank buildings.

According to Lahore police, those who were killed were shot dead by security guards of the Union Bank as the miscreants tried to set the LDA Plaza building on fire, which houses the Union Bank as well as the McDonald's restaurant.

The Senior Superintendent of Lahore Police Amir Zulfiqar has confirmed that two people were shot dead and several others wounded due to heavy stone throwing.

Thousands of protesters had gathered on the Mall road in response to a strike call given by the six-party religious alliance Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) that wanted to register its protest over the publication of blasphemous cartoons in some European newspapers.

Most of the angry protesters were young students of local schools and colleges affiliated to several militant religious organisations, mostly the student wings of the political parties.

The protesters, who were chanting slogans and carrying banners against some European countries as well as the US, forcibly closed shops on the Mall road and damaged property.

In a bid to control the situation, local police fired tear gas and resorted to baton charge to disperse the mob which retaliated strongly and started pelting stones and crackers on the police force.

A group of protesters made their way into the Punjab Assembly building and set ablaze the room next to the chamber of the leader of opposition in the Assembly.

Most of the violent youth were carrying banners of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the militant wing of Jamaatul Daawa, headed by Hafiz Mohammad Saeed.

The chief minister himself was confined to the Assembly building despite repeated attempts by his security staff to ensure his safe exit from the Assembly premises.

The protesters had set up barricades of burning tyres to block off sections of the city, where most shops and markets remained closed in response to calls for a complete strike.

The protestors also damaged over 200 private cars, three banks and dozens of shops, besides burning a large portrait of General Pervez Musharraf.

The office of Telenor, a Norwegian mobile phone company, was looted and rioters were seen fleeing with computers, mobile phones and other equipment despite the presence of heavy police contingents.

Asked why the protesters were not stopped from taking out the rally on the Mall road despite a ban, Punjab Law Minister Raja Basharat said the ban was lifted for the day after the protesting parties had assured the city district government that the rally would remain peaceful and would not resort to violence.

### **Lawmakers stage march**

Pakistani parliament members staged a march here on Tuesday to protest publication of blasphemous cartoons in European newspapers while police cracked down on a separate student rally after it turned violent at the capital's diplomatic enclave.

Some half of the lawmakers from the 340-member National Assembly from both the opposition and government marched from the parliament to the diplomatic quarters near the foreign ministry.

The two-kilometre walk followed a debate in the assembly during which legislators demanded suspension of diplomatic ties with the countries where the cartoons were published and boycott of their products.

The MPs were led by leaders of opposition Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) Islamic grouping and the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy.

Many government legislators participated in the demonstration, though no top ruling party figure was present in the procession.

Earlier hundreds of students rallied in the capital and trouble broke out when they dismantled the police barrier at the entrance to the diplomatic enclave and started pelting stones, damaging street lights and windows of buildings.

Police fired teargas shells, used water cannons and also baton-charged to disperse the protesters. According to police more than a dozen demonstrators were taken into custody while some demonstrators and policemen were slightly hurt during the turmoil.

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## **GNC22**

### ***I was maliciously set up - cartoonist***

One of Australia's best-known cartoonists, Michael Leunig, yesterday denied entering two of his works in an Iranian newspaper's contest for cartoons about the Holocaust

**Sydney:** One of Australia's best-known cartoonists, Michael Leunig, yesterday denied entering two of his works in an Iranian newspaper's contest for cartoons about the Holocaust, saying they were sent maliciously by someone else.

A media report out of Tehran had said Leunig had submitted the first entry in the contest, launched on Monday by Hamshahri, one of Iran's top five newspapers, in retaliation for the publication of drawings of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH).

Leunig vehemently denied the claim, saying he had been "set up horribly, maliciously".

He said he had been contacted late on Monday by a concerned editor at Melbourne's The Age newspaper, which publishes many of Leunig's cartoons.

"I learned last night that some of my cartoons from a few years back have been submitted as an entry in that competition," Leunig told the Australian Broadcasting Corp radio. "This is a fraud and hoax emanating, we believe, from Australia."

An Iranian web site allegedly ran quotes from Leunig saying he had contributed the cartoons to "express solidarity with the Muslim world", Leunig said.

"These were not my words at all," he said. The two cartoons that were allegedly submitted on behalf of Leunig were rejected for publication by The Age in 2002.

The first drawing shows a ragged-looking man with a Star of David on his back walking toward the Auschwitz concentration camp in 1942 with the words "Work Brings Freedom" over the entrance.

The second drawing in the series shows the same man carrying a rifle walking toward another gate in Israel 2002 with the words "War Brings Peace" over the entrance.

### **German caricaturist receives death threats**

A political cartoonist from a leading German daily has received death threats, the paper said yesterday, after publishing a caricature showing the Iranian national soccer team wearing belts of explosives next to four German soldiers.

Caricaturist Klaus Stuttmann said the idea of the cartoon, published in the Friday edition of the Tagesspiegel daily, was to challenge calls from some politicians for soldiers to provide security during this summer's soccer World Cup in Germany.

But since the cartoon was picked up by an internet site serving Iranian soccer fans over the weekend, Stuttmann has been flooded with hate mail, including death threats, and has received a letter of protest from the Iranian Embassy here, the paper said.

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## **GNC23**

### ***Two shot dead in violent cartoon clashes***

Police used teargas to drive out students who stormed into Islamabad's diplomatic enclave yesterday and pro-testers attacked Western businesses in Pakistan's most violent reaction yet to cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH).

**Islamabad:** Police used teargas to drive out students who stormed into Islamabad's diplomatic enclave yesterday and pro-testers attacked Western businesses in Pakistan's most violent reaction yet to cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH).

In Lahore, police fired tear gas, shot into the air and baton-charged protesters who ransacked a McDonald's franchise and set fire to outlets of KFC and Norwegian mobile

phone firm Telenor. Demonstrators set dozens of vehicles on fire and staged a sit-in near the assembly. Interior Minister Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao said guards at a bank that came under attack shot dead two men.

In Islamabad, up to 400 students stormed past armed police guarding the diplomatic enclave, before being driven back by volleys of tear gas

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## **GN24**

### ***GCC calls for clear apology from Denmark***

Al Atiyyah seeks UN resolution to prevent defamation of all religions

The Gulf Cooperation Council Secretary General Abdul Rahman Al Atiyyah demanded that Europe, especially Denmark, come out with a clear apology to calm down the raging furore over the blasphemous cartoons.

"There should be intensified efforts on the part of Europe to stop such an insulting of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). These efforts must begin with an apology by the Danish government for allowing to publish blasphemous cartoons," he said.

The GCC chief was speaking at a joint press conference with the visiting European Union Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana at GCC headquarters in Riyadh.

Al Atiyyah urged the United Nations to adopt a resolution prohibiting defamation of all prophets and religions. "It is imperative to include an operative provision prohibiting blasphemy in the statute of the new Human Rights Council presently being negotiated at the United Nations," he said.

The GCC chief also deplored the violent acts that followed and warned the Muslims that "such acts would produce a negative impact on their just cause".

Solana expressed deep regret over the publishing of cartoons. "You might have experienced some discomfort from our part on certain occasions ... These were perpetrated by a limited number of people and that can not be generalised," he said.

Solana also favoured the establishment of an independent Palestinian State. Solana arrived here on Monday as the first stop in his five-country Middle East trip mainly aimed at repairing ties strained by the cartoon row.

### **Solana meets Mubarak on ways to defuse row**

EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak yesterday discussed mechanisms to protect religious symbols and beliefs, as part of efforts to defuse a row over cartoons.

On the second leg of a tour of the Middle East, Solana voiced his "profound desire to recuperate relations between the EU and the Muslim world". Solana told reporters he had discussed with Mubarak means to implement principles of a joint statement issued a week ago by the EU, the UN and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference: "We believe freedom of the press entails responsibility and discretion and should respect the beliefs and tenets of all religions," said the statement. Solana said he had discussed means to ensure "religious symbols can be protected". Such steps could materialise through various mechanisms, "and may be inside the new human rights commission created in the UN." He also held talks with Shaikh Mohammad Sayyed Tantawi, head of Al Azhar University.

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## **GNC25**

### ***Iran protests Jesus and Mary cartoons***

The Iranian Embassy in Azerbaijan yesterday protested the publication of cartoons of Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mary by an Azerbaijani newspaper. The Yeni Khabar newspaper published the cartoons in retaliation for the publication of the Prophet caricatures. While condemning caricatures of the Prophet, the Iranian Embassy also denounced the Azerbaijani publication as "rude and immoral insults" motivated by either ignorance or a desire to provoke discord between Muslims and Christians.

### **'No proof against Syria'**

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said he has seen no evidence to back up US claims that Syria and Iran fuelled the demonstrations sparked by the cartoons. But Annan said the two Middle Eastern nations bore the same responsibilities shouldered by other nations and should have prevented rioters from attacking foreign diplomatic missions.

The Danish Government should offer an official apology to Muslims over "irresponsible" cartoons to avoid a clash of civilisations, Syria's ambassador to London Sami Khiyami said.

Denmark's foreign minister Per Stig Moeller said on Monday a government apology for the drawings printed in a Danish newspaper would be pointless.

### **Troops must pull out**

Basra's provincial council yesterday demanded the withdrawal of Denmark's 530-member military contingent from southern Iraq unless the Danish Government apologises for the publication of the caricatures.

## The Gulf Times (GTC59-GTC68)

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### GTC 59

#### ***Dutch MP defends European press***

Liberal Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali said here on Thursday that the European press had been right to publish contentious cartoons. Ali, a close friend of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, who was killed by a Muslim extremist in 2004, said media who “lacked the courage to show their readers the caricatures” should be ashamed.

Somali-born Ali, who describes herself as “a dissident of Islam”, told journalists in Berlin: “I am of the opinion that it was correct to publish the cartoons in Jyllands Posten and it was right to re-publish them in other papers across Europe.” “Shame on those politicians who stated that publishing and re-publishing the drawings was ‘unnecessary’, ‘insensitive’, ‘disrespectful’ and ‘wrong’,” she added, echoing the words of British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw.

Ali said that it was wrong to expect people from other cultures to abide by the Muslim ban on depicting their Prophet. “Demanding that people who do not accept Prophet Muhammad’s teachings should refrain from drawing him is not a request for respect but a demand for submission.” She listed numerous teachings of the Prophet which she rejected and said she believed there was a need to be critical of him to educate people.

The Liberal Party MP praised Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen for refusing to bow to pressure from Muslim leaders in firestorm triggered by the caricatures. “Today we should stand by him morally and materially. He is an example to all other European leaders. I wish my prime minister had Rasmussen’s guts.”

Ali said there was some good in the furore over the cartoons, in that it exposed the fear among artists and journalists in Europe to “analyse or criticise ... aspects of Islam”.

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### GTC60

#### ***Editor charged with blasphemy***

Indonesian police said yesterday they had charged the chief editor of a weekly tabloid with blasphemy for reprinting cartoons depicting the Prophet.

Imam Tri Karso Hadi, chief editor of Peta, could face a maximum sentence of five years in prison if convicted, said Suwignyo, a police officer in Bekasi, east of Jakarta.

The little-known tabloid has withdrawn 3,000 copies of the edition carrying the cartoons, which accompanied a story on the global controversy surrounding the drawings, first published in Denmark last year and since widely reprinted.

Protests against the drawings continued yesterday in Indonesia with more than 1,000 Muslims rallying in the town of Cirebon in West Java, urging the government to sever diplomatic ties with Denmark. "Summon our ambassador in Denmark and immediately sever diplomatic relations with that country because the caricatures have hurt the feelings of Muslims," protest leader Hasan Bajri was quoted as saying by state Antara news agency.

About 300 protestors picketed the Danish consulate in Medan city in North Sumatra. Denmark has temporarily closed its missions in Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim nation, and has warned its nationals to leave the country amid protests staged over the past week. Security concerns over the safety of Danish nationals prompted the cancellation of a friendly badminton match between Indonesia and Denmark as part of preparations for the Thomas Cup championship.

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## **GTC61**

### ***Warning on 'chasm' between West, Islam***

Thousands of Muslims protested in Malaysia yesterday over controversial cartoons as the prime minister warned of a "huge chasm" between the West and Islam.

With Muslim anger boiling over across much of the world due to the drawings, first published in a Danish newspaper, Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi had strong words for the West as he hosted an international meeting on Islam. "They think Osama bin Laden speaks for the religion and its followers. Islam and Muslims are linked to all that is negative and backward," said Abdullah, whose country heads the 57-member Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). "The demonisation of Islam and the vilification of Muslims, there is no denying, is widespread within mainstream Western society," he said.

Abdullah said Western nations wanted to control the world's oil and gas, and blamed that desire along with colonialism and "the imposition of Israel upon the Arab world" for a rift with the Muslim faith. The premier also said Muslims saw the "hegemony" of Western powers "manifested directly in the attack upon Afghanistan and in the occupation of Iraq".

These "have all contributed in one way or another to the huge chasm that has emerged between the West and Islam", he told the gathering of religious leaders and scholars in Kuala Lumpur.

The publication of 12 caricatures by a Danish newspaper in September, and since reprinted in other nations as well as on the Internet, has stirred up Muslim anger and raised questions about the limits of free speech. Muslims regard any portrayal of the Prophet as blasphemy. At least 13 people have been killed in demonstrations against the cartoons in mainly Islamic countries, and thousands rallied after prayers outside the Danish embassy in the Malaysian

capital. Chanting and holding banners saying "Down with Denmark!", the crowd marched on the embassy.

A group of mainly young Muslim men wearing skullcaps, led by opposition Pan-Malaysia Islamic party (PAS) president Hadi Awang, handed over a petition to the embassy. "The Danish government are playing with fire," Hatta Ramli, a PAS central committee member, yelled as he punched his fist in the air.

"There is definitely something rotten in the state of Denmark. You can insult anybody but not our beloved Prophet. If you insult our Prophet, we are ready to die," Hatta said. The protest later broke up peacefully, after PAS members handed out pamphlets calling for a boycott of exports from Denmark.

Police said some 2,000 protesters took part while organisers put the number above 3,000. It was the first mass rally here against the cartoons, and came a day after Abdullah ordered the closure of a local newspaper, the Sarawak Tribune, which reprinted the caricatures -- the only paper in mainly-Muslim Malaysia to do so

.It was believed to be the first newspaper anywhere in the world to be closed down for publishing the drawings. "Sarawak Tribune's publication permit (was) suspended indefinitely with immediate effect," state news agency Bernama quoted him saying Thursday night. Malaysia has also slapped a blanket ban on circulating or even possessing the cartoons. A total of 60 religious leaders, government officials, academics and scholars have gathered in the capital to ponder the challenges facing the Muslim world.

Former Iranian president Khatami is among the participants at the two-day International Conference on 'Who Speaks for Islam? Who Speaks for the West?' which host Malaysia hopes will be an annual event. The conference will address ways to dispel mutual misperceptions through the media and how policymakers can develop policies to ensure that globalisation benefits Muslims and diffuse Muslim grievances towards the West.

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## **GTC62**

### ***Thousands march in Islamabad over cartoons***

Thousands of protesters burned Danish and US flags and chanted angry slogans during a march here yesterday against the publication of cartoons portraying the Prophet Muhammad.

Around 4,000 people marched from a mosque in central Islamabad after the Friday prayers to the capital's main Abpara commercial centre under the watchful eye of a massive police contingent, witnesses said. "Crush Denmark, crush America", the protesters chanted as they also torched an effigy of US President George W Bush. It was the largest rally in the Pakistani capital since a wave of outrage over the cartoons swept across the Muslim world. An alliance of six Islamic parties called the Muttahida Majlis-e Amal organised the

rally. Religious parties also staged noisy demonstrations in the eastern city of Lahore and set ablaze flags of Denmark, France and Norway.

Several hundred youths from the fundamentalist Jamiat Ulema-i Pakistan (JUP) gathered outside the local press club building facing the US consulate, witnesses said. They demanded the government sever diplomatic ties with Denmark and called for boycott of products from the countries where media outlets published the controversial caricatures.

Supporters of the Muttahida Majlis-e Amal also staged a similar protest in Lahore joined by students from the seminaries. Carrying white party flags and chanting "Death to Denmark" and "Friends of Jews and US are traitors," they demanded the government sever ties with "anti-Islam countries." "We will give our lives but we will not keep silence on defiling of our prophet," a banner said while another called for unity in the Muslim world to "defend the sanctity of Islam and its prophet." The authorities had deployed heavy police and the protesters remained peaceful. Another group carried banners demanding "Cancel the visit of US president to Pakistan" and "Fight the crusaders."

Bush is due to tour Pakistan early next month as part of a regional tour. The White House has said that Bush is going ahead with his trip to Pakistan despite widespread outrage over caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad.

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## **GTC63**

### ***Danish paper sends editor on vacation***

The Jyllands-Posten editor who commissioned the cartoons which have angered Muslims worldwide has been sent on holiday after suggesting he would print Iranian cartoons of the Holocaust.

"The editors have told Flemming Rose to take a vacation because no one can understand the kind of pressure he has been under," Jyllands-Posten editor Carsten Juste told Berlingske Tidende newspaper. Juste was not available for comment. But the chairman of the foundation which owns the newspaper, Asger Noergaard Larsen, refused calls to sack Juste and Rose, saying that he fully backed the management and that there is no crisis at the newspaper. "I think you could say that the violence in the Middle East and the boycott of Danish goods looks like a crisis, but we do not have a crisis," Larsen told Berlingske Tidende.

Flemming Rose, Jyllands-Posten's culture editor, told CNN on Wednesday that he would consider publishing proposed Iranian cartoons of the Holocaust. The newspaper later made a public apology and played down his comments. "Flemming Rose has expressed regret for his error of judgment that must be ascribed to the fact that, during the past four months, he has experienced inhumanly hard pressure and been besieged by Danish as well as international media almost around the clock," Juste on his newspaper's website.

In a challenge to Western values of free speech an Iranian newspaper has said it will run a competition for cartoons of the Holocaust during which the Nazis killed nearly 6mn Jews. "Under no circumstances will we allow ourselves to be latched onto the tasteless media stunt of an Iranian newspaper," Juste said. It is unclear if the furore over the cartoons has hit Jyllands-Posten's advertising revenues – a newspaper's main source of income. "I know that some advertisers don't want to be associated with Jyllands-Posten because of the trouble it has made for Denmark abroad," Peter Ottesen, director of Mediabroker, said. "You see some reaction but it's difficult to tell how much."

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## **GTC64**

### ***Philippine Muslim leaders urge restraint***

Muslim leaders in the predominately Roman Catholic Philippines urged restraint yesterday as a group of 200 Muslims staged a rally outside a mosque in the capital to denounce the controversial cartoons. The protesters staged the rally after prayers outside a mosque in Manila's busy downtown Quiapo district. "We are not afraid of America or Europe as long as we are fighting for our religion," one speaker in the rally yelled as he egged the crowd of mostly Muslim men into raising their fists and chanting. The group later broke up peacefully.

But other Muslim leaders in Asia's biggest Catholic nation meanwhile, called on fellow Muslims to show tolerance and moderation in their protests. "Mocking others, irrespective of religious affiliation, is provoking people to nurture hatred," said Taha Basman, president of the Philippine Islamic Council. "But we urge Muslims to exercise restraint and sobriety," he added. "Freedom of the press cannot trample upon the higher freedom of religion. Apologies are required," the Ulama forum, a group of Muslim scholars said in a resolution. The Muslim minority in this largely Christian nation have previously held small rallies against the cartoons.

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## **GTC65**

### ***Bukhari calls for campaign against Denmark over offending cartoons***

Tens of thousands of Muslims across India marched in protest against cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad yesterday, some showing their displeasure in silence, while others chanted "Denmark Die, Die!" In the capital New Delhi, thousands of demonstrators spilled out of the country's largest mosque after weekly prayers and spat on Danish flags as police tightened security in the city's diplomatic district.

Organisers said 15,000 joined the rally of black flag-carrying protesters who also blamed France, Norway and Germany for reprinting the Danish newspaper cartoons. Police

estimated there were 3,000 protesters. Ahmed Bukhari, chief imam of the 17th century Jama Masjid mosque called on the Indian government to demand an apology from Copenhagen over the cartoons which sparked global Muslim anger. "For 1,400 years, Islam has fought its evil enemies and now it will not bow before the satanic designs of France, Germany, Norway and Denmark," Bukhari told his Friday congregation. "Islam and Muslims have been challenged and we will not rest unless nations that humiliated us are punished," he said as protesters set fire to a human-shaped effigy labelled 'Denmark'. Police armed with rifles and teargas stood by. The protesters spat on giant Danish flags spread on the ground before the 20,000-capacity mosque in the congested old quarter. Several children urinated on the red flag before the cameras. Bukhari called on Indian Muslims to launch a nationwide campaign against Denmark.

In the central city of Bhopal, thousands of men crammed the narrow streets around the old quarter's mosques in silent protest, blocking roads for several hours. The city's top Islamic leader, Qazi Abdul Lateef, said the turnout showed that "attempts by anti-Islam forces to defame Muslims... would not be tolerated." Protests also took place in several other cities around the country, including in Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir. A shutdown strike took place in Kashmir on Monday against the cartoons. The protesters branded the publication of the cartoons "an act of terrorism" and said they were part of a plot by European countries to defame Islam.

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## **GTC66**

### ***Kenyan riot cops clash with cartoon protesters***

Kenyan security forces fired teargas at angry stone-throwing Muslim demonstrators attempting to march on the Danish embassy in Nairobi to protest cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad, witnesses said.

Baton-wielding riot police launched teargas canisters to disperse about 300 protesters on a main thoroughfare in the capital after the crowd tried to break through a cordon by hurling rocks and other projectiles, they said. At least one person was injured in the melee, witnesses said. "I just saw something hit me and I fell down," said demonstrator Shaban Kariuki, 18, who was bleeding from the hip.

An AFP correspondent at the scene said the crowd involved had broken off from a larger demonstration and march through Nairobi that had been largely peaceful, although US and Danish flags were set afire.

More than 2,500 people had earlier attended an organised demonstration at a sports stadium before joining up with hundreds of others to parade through the downtown business district, chanting anti-Western slogans. "Are you ready to stand up and fight for your prophet?" Sheikh Ibrahim Lethome of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) asked the raucous crowd at the stadium, which responded with a huge "yes".

“Are we ready to die for the sake of the Prophet Muhammad?” he asked. “Yes,” the crowd replied. “Why is there freedom of expression to insult Muslims but not other religions?” he asked. “Are we ready to respond to our oppressors with peace?” “No,” shouted back the crowd, members of which carried placards pledging to die in the fight against the cartoons that first appeared in a Danish newspaper in September and have since been reprinted in other European newspapers. “We are ready for jihad”, “Denmark, you will see our action”, “We stand ready to defend our religion”, and “We are ready to fight for our holy Prophet”, read some of the banners.

Protesters then set fire to the US and Danish flags, proclaiming that “freedom of expression is Western terrorism” before taking to the streets to denounce the cartoons. At the Kenyan foreign ministry, where the marchers paused briefly, another Danish flag was set alight.

The drawings have sparked outrage throughout the Muslim world, attacks on Western diplomatic missions and several people have been killed in protests. Kenya has a sizeable Muslim minority that is not known for extremist tendencies and Muslim community leaders who organised the demonstration had appealed for the protest to be peaceful. The US, warning of potential violence, ordered the closure yesterday of some US diplomatic offices near the Danish embassy in Nairobi. No serious damage from the protests was immediately apparent.

Apart from the one injured demonstrator, several European journalists were roughed up at one point by angry marchers who accused them of being Danish, witnesses said. Mohammed Idriss, an imam at a Nairobi mosque, said the demonstration was a sign that “we are not going to entertain any more desecration of our Prophet”. “This is the kind of content that has led the world to believe that all Muslims are terrorists,” he told AFP. “Sooner or later, we are not going to be peaceful if the West continues to use freedom of expression to say all kinds of nonsense about Islam and its Prophet.”

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## **GTC67**

### ***Khaleda demands apology as cartoon rallies erupt***

Nearly 20,000 people protested against cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in Dhaka yesterday as the government condemned the caricatures as “extremely arrogant” and urged an apology.

Prime Minister Khaleda Zia’s statement was the first official Bangladeshi response to the cartoons which have sparked Muslim fury worldwide since they were published in Denmark in September and reprinted elsewhere in recent weeks. Without naming Denmark or any other nation, Zia called for an apology, saying, “Such types of provocation at this moment are very undesirable.” “We hope the appropriate authority will tender an apology immediately,” she said. But she urged citizens of the world’s third-largest Muslim nation to refrain from violence. Zia’s call came as 4,000 police were deployed to monitor fresh

demonstrations that erupted in Dhaka outside the main mosque following Friday prayers. There were also protests earlier in the week.

Police said nearly 20,000 demonstrators waving placards reading “Free speech symbolises war against Islam” and shouting “Down with Denmark” started marching towards the Danish embassy from Baitul Mukarram mosque. But riot police blocked the procession one kilometre (roughly half a mile) from the mosque, senior police official Mahbub Alam said. “The cartoons are part of the West’s crusade against Islam. No Muslim can tolerate these cartoons,” said Mohiuddin Ahmed, leader of the Islamic group Hizbut Tahrir which organised the biggest demonstration outside the mosque. “All should be ready to shed blood to preserve the dignity of the Great Prophet,” he told the rally.

Other Muslim groups staged smaller protests and rallies were held by wings of the Bangladesh government’s two Islamist allies, Jamaat Islami and Islami Oikya Jote, with people burning Danish flags. Zia called the publication of the cartoons “extremely arrogant, irresponsible, and spiteful.” Islamic teaching forbids illustrations of the Prophet. “We believe limits of freedom and accountability have been violated by the publication of the cartoons,” Zia said following calls from her Islamist coalition partners to make a formal protest. “We have firm faith in freedom of speech ... but all should remain conscious about their responsibility so this freedom does not hurt anyone’s sentiment, faith (and) dignity,” she said. At the same time, she said, “We do not support any activity to foil peace.” Earlier, some 300 girls formed a human chain near a French cultural centre to protest the cartoons in France as well as a headscarf ban in French schools.

Bangladesh witnessed a spate of small but deadly bomb blasts across the nation in November that Dhaka has blamed on Islamic extremists who are seeking to institute strict religious law in the country. The government says it is doing all it can to crack down on the radicals in South Asian country of 140mn people.

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## **GTC68**

### ***41 Pakistani workers detained in Afghanistan***

Afghan authorities have arrested more than 40 Pakistani workers for inciting violence during a protest against cartoons of Prophet Muhammad in which four people were killed, an official has said. The men were arrested with their Arab boss in Qalat in southern Zabul province where police opened fire to quell rampaging demonstrators on Wednesday.

“The protests were supposed to be peaceful. But we have proof that these men were involved in turning it to violence,” provincial spokesman Gulab Shah Alikhil said. Alikhil said 16 of the 41 arrested men had confessed to having had a “hand in violating the protests”. All would go on trial, he said. The Arab boss was a Saudi national, he said. Authorities in Qalat also planned to expel more than 100 Pakistani workers in coming days, Alikhil said. “We’ll not allow even a single Pakistani worker to work in Zabul any more,” he said. This included workers who entered Afghanistan with a visa.

The deaths in Qalat took to 11 the death toll from five days of protests in Afghanistan against the cartoons, which have appeared in several international newspapers, most of them European.

Protesters in the city pelted police and US-led coalition soldiers with stones and set alight several vehicles and a school, witnesses said. Four protestors were killed in police shootouts and several people wounded. Defence ministry spokesman General Mohamed Zahir Azimi said Wednesday Pakistani workers had played a role in "sabotaging" the Qalat demonstration. A police spokesman said however that the cartoon protest had turned violent after being joined by Afghans who had been at a separate demonstration about jobs in the town going to nationals from neighbouring Pakistan.

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## ARAB NEWS (ANC28-ANC34)

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### ANC28

#### ***JCCI not to invite Danes for forum***

The organizers of the Jeddah Economic Forum 2006 decided yesterday not to invite the Danish delegation at the annual event.

The organizers made the decision in the wake of Muslim anger over the publication of the blasphemous caricatures published by a Danish newspaper on Sept. 30.

The forum, scheduled to be held at the Jeddah Hilton from Feb. 11 to 13, features prominent local, regional and international personalities in business, politics, media and academia.

The Council of Gulf Countries' Chambers and the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce & Industry have praised the positive reaction by businessmen in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf in responding to the deliberate humiliation of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him).

Condemnation of the cartoons mocking the Prophet published in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten has been voiced throughout the Muslim world and in the past few days has taken the form of demonstrations and attacks on some Danish and other Western embassies.

The JEF has assumed tremendous importance in the region and has been attracting the highest caliber of personalities from the United States, Europe and Asia.

Nearly 2,500 businessmen and women from within and outside the Kingdom are taking part at the JEF. It will feature 60 speakers and discuss 32 working papers on promoting perpetual global economic growth.

Makkah Governor Prince Abdul Majeed will preside over the inaugural ceremony on the opening day. The JEF, now in its seventh year, will focus on the theme "Seeding Potentials for Economic Growth: Honoring Identity and Celebrating Common Grounds." The Jeddah Marketing Board, which operates under the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce & Industry (JCCI), is organizing the event.

According to JEF 2006 Chairman Hassan Enany, global speakers include Irish President Mary McAleese, Congo Brazzaville President Denis Sassou N'Guesso, Gambia President Al Hajji Jammah, Ghana's former President Jerry Rawlings, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, former US Vice President Al Gore, human rights lawyer Cherie Blair, Forbes Inc. President & CEO Steve Forbes, Forbes Magazine Editor in Chief Peter Roberston, Vice Chairman of Chevron Corporation, Abdul-Salam Al-Majali, former prime minister of Jordan, Haifa Al-Kaylani, founder and chairman of Arab International Woman's Forum, Mohamed Alabbar, director general of the Department of Economics Dubai and Chairman of Emaar Properties, Bahia Hariri, member of the Lebanese Parliament and sister of Rafik Hariri, Andre Azoulay, counselor to King Mohammed VI of Morocco.

Anwar Ibrahim, former deputy prime minister of Malaysia, and Thoraya Obaid, executive director of the United Nations Population Fund, will also speak at plenary sessions.

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## ANC29

### *Six die in global protests*

Global protests over cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) escalated yesterday, with six demonstrators killed in Afghanistan, Lebanon and Somalia and warning shots fired outside a US Consulate in Indonesia. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called on Muslims to accept apologies offered. Demonstrators in Iran attacked Austrian and Danish missions and Tehran severed all economic ties with Denmark.

The 12 blasphemous cartoons were first published last September by the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten. They have since appeared in newspapers in Norway, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Ireland, Austria, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary.

In Afghanistan, four people were killed and 19 wounded when hundreds of people clashed with police and soldiers during demonstrations against the publication of the cartoons. The worst of the violence was outside Bagram, the main US base in Afghanistan, with police firing on some 2,000 protesters as they tried to break into the heavily guarded facility. Two of the demonstrators were killed and five wounded.

In the central Afghan city of Mihtarlam, police fired on the demonstrators after a man shot at them and others threw stones and knives, said Dad Mohammed Rasa, a spokesman for the Interior Ministry. Two protesters were killed, and three other people were wounded.

At least one person was killed and seven were wounded in the Puntland region of Somalia as security forces clashed with hundreds of protesting Muslims. In Lebanon, a demonstrator involved in an attack on the Danish Consulate in Beirut on Sunday died from his injuries.

A 300-strong crowd — mainly student members of the Basij militia — torched the facade of a building housing the Austrian Embassy in Tehran and pelted the mission with stones, firecrackers and eggs, smashing all of its windows. Later at night, hundreds of protesters hurled stones and fire bombs at the Danish Embassy but nobody was hurt inside the building as the staff had evacuated.

Denmark told its nationals to avoid Muslim countries. A Foreign Ministry warning, which affects thousands of holidaymakers and business executives, listed 14 countries travelers should avoid. They are Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Sudan, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates.

Danish tour operators promptly canceled all trips to Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco.

At a UN environment conference in Dubai, Annan said: “I understand and share their (Muslims’) anguish. But it cannot justify violence, least of all attacks on innocent people. Once again, I appeal to Muslims to accept the apology that has been offered.”

The White House said it understands Muslim anger over the cartoons but that they must also condemn anti-Semitic and anti-Christian “hate speech.” “We would ... urge people who are criticizing these cartoons to speak out forcefully against all forms of hate speech, including cartoons and articles throughout parts of the Arab world which frequently espouse anti-Semitic and anti-Christian views,” said spokesman Scott McClellan.

Thirty Muslim newspaper delivery employees went on strike in southern Austria after the country’s second-largest daily, *Kleine Zeitung*, printed the caricatures. About 1,000 readers did not get their newspapers, and the delivery personnel involved faced possible dismissal. Doctors in Pakistan vowed not to prescribe medicines from firms based in some European countries where the cartoons were published.

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## **AN30**

### ***Defending ‘The life of Brian’***

“Without this there would be no Life of Brian,” said Roger Koeppel, editor in chief of the German newspaper *Die Welt*, claiming that his decision to republish the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad that have caused such offense to Muslims was a free speech issue. “It’s at the very core of our culture that the most sacred things can be subjected to criticism, laughter and satire.” That is true, but it is not the only truth.

There is no contradiction between asserting the right of free speech and condemning those who use it to inflict gratuitous pain on others. Particularly when it is the powerful abusing the vulnerable.

Jyllands-Posten, which originally published the series of twelve cartoons about the Prophet over four months ago, has the largest circulation of any Danish newspaper. Denmark's Muslim community, only 170,000 strong, is one of the most marginalized and beleaguered in Europe, and the governing coalition includes a large party that is explicitly anti-immigrant and implicitly anti-Muslim. The cartoons were neither clever nor funny, and two of them were blatantly offensive. One depicted the Prophet himself as a terrorist, his turban transformed into a fizzing bomb; the other showed him speaking to a ragged queue of suicide bombers at heaven's gate saying, "Stop, stop, we've run out of virgins." They deliberately implied that Islam is a terrorist religion, and Denmark's Muslims quite reasonably demanded an apology. It was still a storm in a very small teacup — but then the usual suspects got to work.

The newspaper refused to apologize, and Denmark's prime minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, sucked up to the anti-immigrant vote by refusing even to meet ambassadors from Muslim countries who wanted to protest about the cartoons. So a group of imams from the Danish Muslim organization Islamisk Trossamfund toured Middle Eastern in November and December with copies of the Jyllands-Posten cartoons, and included some others that were even more offensive.

It took a lot of time and effort to build this into a real confrontation, but the Norwegian Christian monthly Magazinet helpfully republished the cartoons in January, Saudi Arabia and Libya withdrew their ambassadors from Copenhagen, and indignation built steadily in Muslim chat-rooms and blogs on the Internet. By the end of January Danish flags were being burned and Danish goods boycotted in the Arab world, and both the Danish prime minister and the editor of Jyllands-Posten went into reverse, publicly apologizing for the offense that had been caused. But it was too late.

Various right-wing newspapers in Europe including Die Welt and France-Soir saw the Danish apologies as a failure to defend free speech, and republished the offending cartoons on their front pages. This gave radical Islamist fringe groups in European countries a pretext to stage angry demonstrations — the slogans at the London demo called for more terrorist bombs like those of last July and urged the faithful to "Butcher those who mock Islam" — and the confrontation finally achieved lift-off.

Late last week mobs attacked the European Union's offices in the Gaza Strip and the building housing the Danish Embassy in Jakarta. Incensed by text messages saying that Danish right-wingers were planning to burn copies of the Qur'an (though they didn't, in the end), angry Muslims burned the Danish and Norwegian embassies in Syria and the Danish Consulate in Lebanon during the weekend. The idiots, the ideologues and the fanatics on both sides have the bit between their teeth now, and it will take some time for the fury to burn out. But it is important to remember that most people have not lost their heads.

Inayat Banglawala, spokesman for the Muslim Council of Britain, said of the demonstrators who had urged more bomb attacks in Britain: "It is time the police acted, but in a way so as not to make them martyrs of the Prophet's cause, which is what they want, but as criminals. Ordinary Muslims are fed up with them." The 57-nation Organization of the Islamic Conference warned that "Overreactions surpassing the limits of peaceful democratic

acts...are dangerous and detrimental to the efforts to defend the legitimate case of the Muslim world.”

Similarly on the Western side — you can’t really say Christian any more, except for the United States and maybe Poland — the great majority of newspapers did not publish the cartoons. In Britain, in Poland, in Russia, in Canada and (with one exception) in the United States, none did. It is not self-censorship to refuse to publish these abusive images that link Muslims with terrorism; it is simply common courtesy.

It does not mean that no Western cartoonist may ever use the Prophet again (though they will doubtless be more cautious about the context in future). The ban on images of the Prophet is a Muslim tradition, not a Western one. But we live in a joined-up world where everybody can see everybody else all the time, and being polite to the neighbors is a social obligation. Jyllands-Posten and its emulators were very stupid and very rude.

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## **AN31**

### ***Gulf Muslimss step Up Danish boycott over cartoons***

People in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries intensified their boycott of Danish goods as the uproar over caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) raged unabated yesterday.

Scholars and regional trade groups also urged Muslims to use this economic weapon to punish other European nations whose dailies printed the inflammatory caricatures.

Yemen shut down a weekly newspaper yesterday for republishing the cartoons.

The official Saba news agency said Prime Minister Abdul Qader Ba-Jammal ordered the closure of the Al-Hurriya (Freedom) weekly after it reprinted four of the 12 drawings that originally appeared in Denmark’s Jyllands-Posten daily last September.

The paper reproduced the cartoons on Feb. 2 as part of coverage on the protests and boycotts sparked by the drawings.

Qatar’s Chamber of Commerce said it had halted dealings with Danish or Norwegian delegations, urging Muslim states to do the same. In Bahrain, Parliament formed a committee to contact Arab and Islamic governments to enforce the boycott.

“I think a boycott is the decent way of responding to the attack. Anything that has to do with money is very effective,” said Ayman Abdulrahman, an Egyptian executive in Dubai. “I might expand my boycott to include other countries who insist on escalating the situation.”

Supermarket shelves remained void of Danish dairy products and Muslim scholars, social organizations and text messages rallied people to maintain their stand. Many scholars urged Muslims to stick to peaceful protest.

The ban showed signs of harming more Danish firms as Novo Nordisk, the world's biggest maker of insulin, said pharmacies and hospitals in Saudi Arabia had been avoiding its products. "Some customers ask about what's Danish and avoid it," said one pharmacy owner in Riyadh.

"Not a single sachet of a Danish product is left on our shelves," said the director of a Kuwaiti supermarket.

"They have to respect our religion," added Khaled Abdulrahman, a civil servant who was shopping at the store.

Danish-Swedish dairy company Arla Foods said it is losing \$1.8 million of sales a day in the Middle East. Its products were removed from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait.

Branches of French hypermarket Carrefour in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have also stopped selling Danish goods. "Danish products have been removed from all (UAE) branches of Carrefour," one official said.

"I've joined the boycott from the first day ... economics affects politics," said Bahraini trader Ghassan Al-Shehabi.

Some Muslims, however, said the boycott was not the best way to resolve the crisis.

"I think we should seek dialogue, not boycotting products or burning flags in the street which only escalates the problem," said Suha Krimeed, a Lebanese marketing manager living in Dubai.

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## **AN32**

### ***Europe's uncivilized act***

There is no battle to be fought with those who indulged in the ugly act of deliberately insulting my Prophet (peace be upon him). I am numbed with outrage over this uncivilized act they have committed. I would simply say to them yours are no civilized ways. Whatever your claims to the contrary, they actually betray a people with a reactionary mindset.

Those who become possessed by anger when confronted with difficult and challenging situations. Anger halts our ability to probe and to reflect. Instead, depending on our location in life, if we are advantageously placed, we self-righteously give ourselves the license to

pronounce verdict and take action to right a wrong. As many European publications have done. This is their crass response to the growing post-9/11 anti-Islamic sentiment. And for people in the business of opinion making to indulge in such reactive acts is extremely dangerous. It is highly irresponsible. These are people who must play the role of promoting greater understanding - pulling people away from extremist thought and action. Not join the vanguard of anger-prompted extremism.

Policy-makers and opinion-making community in the West have opted to conduct the discourse on terrorism using a terminology that has unwittingly but dangerously indicted the 1.2 billion Muslims in the world. Terms like Muslim terrorists, Islamic terrorists and Islamic terrorism have led to the demonization of the Muslims and of Islam. Whatever the European papers may claim they are upholding by ridiculing the Holy Prophet, they would have not contemplated doing so in a pre-9/11 environment.

Social tensions may have existed in pre-9/11 Europe but in post-9/11 the tensions have vastly augmented. Muslims make for easy targets. So does their faith. This is how a section of the Europeans have opted to express their resentment against the terrorist attacks, as is evident from the contents of the cartoons.

This is a season of acute polarization. For example if the on-line responses of the public are any guide, this act of insulting the Prophet has unfortunately received widespread public support in many European countries. The thrust mostly is that there is no reason to compromise on our value of freedom of expression, that if Muslims can't deal with this they must leave, that Muslims are hypocrites because they show no tolerance toward minorities but expect to be shown tolerance.

In some cases individuals have argued that such cartoons should often be printed to get the Muslims to ultimately be more accepting of freedom of expression! They say this is what we do to our own. Sadly so, we would say. But please do not drag our revered ones in your messy notion of the freedom of speech. You have evolved into a culture which licenses unlimited permissiveness. In spite of our own mistakes, our many shortcomings, our morally and intellectually anemic leadership, there are some touchstones of our civilization. It includes the respect of religion and our faith in God Almighty.

Deliberately defiling the Prophet is a highly irresponsible act. It is bound to have negative social and political fall-out. It exacerbates the existing social tensions among the locals and the Muslim population. Within the Muslims it is bound to create more alienation and resentment toward the Westerners who, have chosen to be completely indifferent toward the faith and feelings of the Muslims across the world. It is the arrogance of these Westerners they will resent. Like millions of Westerners who have opted to not view terrorists as a fringe phenomenon within the Muslims and instead referred to terrorism as Islamic terrorism, many Muslims too will wrongly implicate the Westerners across the board for this blasphemous act against the Prophet.

At the popular level we require a rollback of the school that promotes the dangerous talk of clash of civilizations. For now the cartoon incident will merely serve to reinforce the worst of what many Muslims may believe of a growing intolerant Europe.

The framing and the discussion of the issue of terrorism has created a permissive environment which is responsible for this caricaturing of the Prophet; of hurting the feelings and ridiculing the faith of a huge section of the entire human race. They paid no heed to the protests. Instead they resented and condemned the nature of the protests. True the protests should have been calmer. Frenzied outrage was unnecessary and as were threats to kill. But nothing justified the reprinting of those insulting cartoons across many European countries including France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Switzerland.

The leadership in most of these countries has not been willing to contest the wisdom of publishing cartoons that are highly disrespectful to another people's faith. In fact the degree of insensitivity of the Danish prime minister can be gauged from the fact that when after the September publication the Muslims in Denmark sent repeated requests to meet with the prime minister, he repeatedly ignored their request. Essentially conveying "I really don't give a damn". Subsequently the Muslim leaders repeatedly went to the Middle East and other Muslim countries and showed them what the Danish papers had done. Subsequently the reaction acquired these proportions.

In Denmark the anti-Muslim sentiment has been growing at a rapid pace for the past ten years. The Fogh Rasmussen government has actively sought to dispel and block Muslim residents from Denmark. The cartoon is just the tip of the iceberg.

However that the notion of freedom of expression cannot be translated into unlimited freedom to abuse another's faith is basic common sense. But also the way many Europeans have selectively applied the principle of freedom of expression is intriguing. When the ancient Buddhas in Afghanistan were criminally destroyed by the Taleban, the Europeans screamed murder the loudest. We all did too in the Muslim world.

What was that protest for? So destruction of history is blasphemous but the attempted destruction of a people's faith and deeply treasured symbols is not? This is the perversity of post-modernism which seeks the right to destroy and deconstruct selectively and give that right a sacred status. Also if the freedom of expression is so sacred how many European papers have dared to support what the Iranian president said about questioning the reality of the Holocaust?

Clearly the principle of freedom has to be practiced within some rationale and egalitarian framework. It cannot be an elitist concept that a special color or creed will have more right to exercise. Why does this right not respect another's right to choose what is sacred to them, since that what is sacred is not at the cost of undermining another's interests. Islam abhors suicide bombings and terrorism. Increasingly Muslim leaders are condemning this openly.

Are the Europeans so generous in applying their concept of freedom of expression at the cost of causing great pain and injury to Muslim world? Is it because their bohemianism has a method to it? The method is to attack and disrespect those who are generally viewed as the politically, scientifically and economically the downtrodden of the human race - the weak and the lambasted, the violated and the angry, the reactive and seething?

These are not the ways of a civilized people. These are ways toward pushing for a grand and mad conflict of civilizations. Will the European media see wisdom is stepping back and reviewing their dangerous notion of freedom of expression?

For now the limited apologies that have come were perhaps prompted by the widespread anger and protests emanating from the Muslim world. But wisdom and true civilized behavior demands that we internalize the limits of our own freedoms where it begins to undermine the freedom of another.

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## **AN33**

### ***Press freedom vis-a-vis respect for the sacred***

The Independent once published a cartoon that gravely offended Muslim readers. It happened in the early 1990s when I was editor. The artist had placed some Arabic calligraphy on to a Saudi Arabian flag. Unfortunately it was read as an insult to the Prophet Muhammad. Very quickly our offices were picketed by distressed Muslims. I went out to apologize for inadvertently causing them distress and, very luckily, that was that. No brush fire of angry protests developed. No British embassies were attacked. But I had learned the hard way something about the sensibilities of Muslims I hadn't known before.

So as I now go through the events that have led to demonstrations of Muslim outrage across the world, looking for where we can learn from the mistakes made, I do so with sympathy for both sides. I feel for the editors of the Danish newspaper who started the conflagration, for I once myself caused a small fire. And I perfectly understand Muslim emotions because when the sacred images of Christianity such as the Last Supper or the Crucifixion are mocked in plays or films or used in advertising, I also feel offended and distressed.

The match was lit by the editors of Jyllands-Posten who had noted that a local comedian said he didn't dare make fun of the Qur'an. At the same time a Danish author who had written a children's book about the Prophet Muhammad found that illustrators insisted on working anonymously. The editors saw this as self-censorship and decided to administer an antidote by publishing 12 cartoons that not only actually portrayed the Prophet, itself a taboo for Muslims, but showed him as a man of terror and violence.

Newspapers should indeed expose self-censorship where they find it, though they should remember they are often guilty themselves in relation to the interests of their owners. Newspapers should also, at all times, respect their readers, and this includes not offending them unless the cause is of overwhelming importance.

In its early days, The Independent published a picture of a French businessman gunned down in the streets of Paris, his corpse lying uncovered on the pavement, his blood running down into the gutter. I placed the image on the front page to make a point — that this is

what life has come to. But I received extensive criticism from readers, many of them worried that their children would see the gore. I took note.

In the case of the *Jyllands-Posten*, I believe their editors should have found another means of highlighting self-censorship. However, they did what they did. And what happened next made matters worse. Some angry letters were sent to the editor but then, a few weeks later, two of the artists received death threats. Some 5,000 Muslims demonstrated in Copenhagen. And diplomats from Islamic states complained to the Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

Here is the second turning point. A wise government could have found a way of calming the situation without in any way compromising press freedom or weakening the norms of mutual tolerance. But at the time the prime minister refused to meet the Islamic representatives. Later Rasmussen issued an apology, as did the editor of the *Jyllands-Posten*.

Too late. What happened next, the third turning point, I still find puzzling. On Jan. 10, a Norwegian publication that proclaims Christian values carried a selection of the cartoons. This seems knuckle-headed.

Surely a Christian magazine should be preaching respect for the sacred rather than caricaturing the founder of a major religion. Nonetheless the Norwegian example was followed by a number of daily newspapers on the continent. They convinced themselves that they were fighting a major battle for press freedom.

I take the words attributed to Roger Koppel, editor of *Die Welt*, as representative: "The fact that a European — one of us — had caved in was for us the trigger to say that this was a really important story." Caving in was a reference to the belated Danish apologies. Koppel went on: "It is at the core of our culture that the most sacred things can be subjected to criticism, laughter and satire. We also know that moral double standards sometimes guide certain reactions in the Arab world. If we stop using our right to the freedom of expression within our legal boundaries then we start to develop an appeasement mentality."

Unlike Koppel, I see a difference between subjecting sacred things to criticism, which I accept, and to subjecting them to laughter and satire, which I don't. For example, when I was president of the British Board of Film Classification, the American film *Dogma*, starring Matt Damon and Ben Affleck, came in for examination. Its mixture of religion, swearing, drugs and abortion had attracted a lot of criticism from Roman Catholics in the United States. I found the film thoughtful, and had no problem with its wicked satire of institutional stuffiness and abuses. It didn't sneer at the sacred. It was passed at "15", uncut, and categorized as "black comedy." There was no adverse reaction.

Why have no British newspapers followed the continental examples and published the offensive cartoons? Partly because we don't see our European neighbors as being next door. Ideas and movements of opinion have to jump the Channel. Moreover, we have no tradition of anticlericalism, which is purely a continental phenomenon derived from the revolutions

of the 19th century that dismantled the privileges and political power of the Catholic Church.

Nor do we have a far-right political party of substance generating resentment and hatred of ethnic communities as do our neighbors.

I won't give up an inch of press freedom and I will join whatever protests and take whatever actions are required to defend it. But I don't think that this is the point so far as the Muslim reaction to the Danish cartoons is concerned. Rather I think it should be a principle of civilized society that the sacred in religion is respected. I don't wish the law to enforce this principle, rather I hope that such respect just becomes a feature of a tolerant society.

The decision by the BBC some months ago to screen Jerry Springer: The Opera was a test. I haven't seen it, but it apparently depicts Jesus in a very poor light.

In this context, television is in a different situation from theaters and cinemas. For when you go to see a play or a film, you have informed yourself of what kind of production you are going to see and won't buy a ticket if you think you might find the show distasteful. But free television is different: In showing Jerry Springer: The Opera, the BBC was being just as disrespectful of its Christian viewers as continental newspapers were of their Muslim readers.

In my ideal society, that wouldn't happen.

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## **AN34**

### ***Is free speech truly alive and well in the Western nations?***

Western countries look upon freedom of the press and free speech as somewhat of a sacred cow, which apparently must be defended no matter what. Currently the editor of a low-circulation Danish newspaper is basking in his fifteen minutes of fame following his publication of a series of grotesque cartoon depictions of the Prophet Muhammad, even after expressing a lukewarm apology for the offense those have caused throughout the Muslim world.

Some of his colleagues in Norway, France, Spain, Germany and Switzerland took the view that their papers should also be martyrs to the "freedom" cause and reprinted, while many more have published links to the caricatures on their websites.

The questions people are asking now are these: Where does free speech end and incitement begin? When it comes to humiliation and insult, have Muslims become fair game since 9/11 and is the West guilty of double standards purporting to hold free speech as an inviolable principle when in reality its media harbors its own red lines.

As many of my media colleagues have already pointed out, the greatest taboo in Europe is discussion of the Holocaust. In Holland, it's a punishable offense to sell Hitler's memoir "Mein Kampf" and the British Holocaust denier David Irving today sits in an Austrian jail awaiting trial for his views. When Prince Harry dressed up in a Nazi uniform to attend a fancy dress party, British and European papers were outraged.

Certainly, anything which encourages the rise of neo-Nazi groups and right-wing fascist Fparties, demonizes an entire people due to their religion or race, or hurts the sensibilities of those who survived a policy of genocide and still have numbers tattooed on their arms should be a no-no. But the European media can't have it both ways, and should admit it is, indeed, bound by certain restrictions. Free speech throughout the continent is, therefore, by no means absolute.

Another taboo for the Western press is deviation from the official line over 9/11, about which there are still unanswered questions, and although such are hotly debated on the Internet, the mainstream press won't touch them with a bargepole. Indeed, there is almost a reverence shown to the families of victims as was evident by the sickening deference shown by Oprah Winfrey to a woman who had lost her husband in one of the twin towers and had since got through millions in compensation monies buying designer clothes, cars and luxury items, which had angered contributors to 9/11 charities.

Blair's Britain showed its disdain for the concept of free speech when burly guards dragged an 82-year-old Holocaust survivor out of a Labour Party rally for calling out that obscenely offensive word "nonsense", coincidentally just as the prime minister was telling his audience how lucky they were to live in a free country.

More recently, the US peace campaigner Cindy Sheehan was rudely marched away from the presence of George W. Bush as he was giving his State of the Union address and arrested simply for wearing a T-shirt showing the number of US troops killed to date in Iraq.

Moreover, the Western media and its governments, while trumpeting its own supposed freedoms, has criticized those of other countries. They have blasted Al-Jazeera for showing US troops captured in Iraq and bodies of limbless children lying in their own blood.

And if there is any veracity to a recent memo leaked by the British press, George Bush actually contemplated the bombing of that network's head office. In that case, the press was slapped with a gag order. At the same time, the Pentagon freely admits it has paid Iraqi newspapers to publish US propaganda under the by-lines of local journalists. Why aren't Europe's newspapers screaming about these infringements of their stated sacrosanct principles?

The fact is Western networks and papers are influenced by government as well audience/reader sensitivities whether they like it or not. So, to my mind, their recent cause célèbre touting their freedom to publish over the deep hurt caused to Muslim communities is a red herring when the underlying issue is nothing more than a cover for old-fashioned bigotry and incitement.

Muslims have a right to be angry over the ugly characterization of their beloved Prophet, which many view as the last straw after years of being demonized, marginalized and viewed with suspicion, and they are correct in expressing this anger via the tools of peaceful protest and boycotts.

Sadly, though, these demonstrations have become violent with attacks on Danish and European interests in Gaza, Damascus and Beirut, while there are calls to specifically target Danish troops in Iraq. These only serve as grist to the mill of Islamophobics out to paint Muslims as “terrorists in waiting”.

Ironically, the Danes are some of the most tolerant and peace-loving people on earth and the majority are genuinely shocked that their flag is being burned on the streets of cities from Indonesia to Istanbul, while advisories put out by their government urge them to flee the affected regions. A middle-aged Danish woman interviewed on the BBC expressed her fear of events spiraling out of hand.

It seems that for even moderate Muslims the cartoons represent the last straw. Unfortunately, the Danes are now unfairly shouldering the brunt of anger, which might be better directed at those big powers that have seriously and consistently humiliated Muslims in recent times.

In truth, this contretemps doesn't spring from Danish attitudes or European governments but is down to the irresponsibility of one man. The editor of Jyllands-Posten has succeeded in putting his paper on the map and defended his country's press freedoms — which weren't under attack in the first place — but at what cost?

As Danish-owned dairy companies close down, their workers laid off; Danish expatriates quit their jobs in Muslim lands, embassies burn and Iraqi Christians fearing retribution flee to Syria, we are reminded of the power of the pen and the necessity for those who wield these weapons to show wisdom, sensitivity and restraint. Jyllands-Posten and the cretin who calls himself an editor should be ashamed.

## The Kuwait Times (KTC12-KTC14)

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### KTC12

#### ***Cartoon protests turn deadly***

Afghan police shot dead four people protesting yesterday against cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) that have unleashed waves of rage and soul-searching across the Muslim world and Europe. Tens of thousands of Muslims demonstrated in the Middle East, Asia and Africa over the drawings, first published in Denmark, then Norway and then several other European countries. Some Muslim leaders urged restraint. In Iran, locked in a nuclear standoff with the West, a crowd pelted the Danish embassy with petrol bombs and stones for a second day. Protesters hurled a petrol bomb and broke windows at Norway's mission.

Meanwhile, Denmark's national table tennis team yesterday said that they would not be competing in two Pro Tour tournaments in Qatar and Kuwait on the recommendation of the Danish government. "We will not be going to Qatar and Kuwait because we don't want to risk the lives of our players in the current climate of anti-Danish demonstrations which can deteriorate at any time," Danish table tennis federation president Aksel Beckmann told AFP. "It's a pity to have to pay for a newspaper's initiative, it's a pity for sports but the security of our players is the most important." The federation had planned to send Olympic men's doubles bronze medallists Michael Maze and Finn Tugwell and two other players to the Pro Tour events in Qatar and Kuwait, starting Feb 13, as part of their preparations for the World Cup.

The 12 cartoonists whose work touched off the firestorm were reported to be in hiding, frightened, and under police guard. Iran's best-selling newspaper launched a competition to find the best Holocaust cartoon. Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller called his Iranian counterpart "and demanded in clear terms that Iran does all it can to protect the embassy and Danish lives", a spokesman said. Tehran has cut trade ties with Denmark. Afghan crowds attacked a base of Nato Norwegian troops with guns and grenades and police opened fire, bringing the death toll in protests against the cartoons to nine.

F-16 warplanes flew overhead in a show of force while the Norwegians fired teargas, rubber bullets and warning shots, managing to restore order by early evening. After rioters set Danish missions ablaze in Syria and Lebanon at the weekend, the European Union presidency issued a strongly-worded warning to 19 countries across the Middle East that they were obliged to protect EU missions. Iran's ambassador to Vienna said an attack on

Austria's embassy in Tehran on Monday was directed at "the EU presidency" rather than Austria itself, current holder of the presidency.

Accusing "radicals, extremists and fanatics" of fanning the flames of Muslim wrath to "push forward their own agenda", Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen repeated a call for dialogue with offended Muslims. US President George W Bush called him to express support and solidarity, Rasmussen said. The White House said both leaders "reiterated the importance of tolerance and respect for religions of all faith and freedom of the press". Depicting the Prophet is prohibited by Islam. Moderate Muslims, while condemning the cartoons, have expressed fears radicals are hijacking debate over the boundary between media freedom and religious respect.

Militants in Iraq have called for the seizure and killing of Danes and the boycott of Danish goods over the cartoons, one of which depicts Mohammad wearing a turban resembling a bomb with a burning fuse. In London, protesters have brandished placards demanding the beheading of those who insulted Islam. One dressed as a suicide bomber but later apologised. Copies of a British student paper which reproduced one of the cartoons were hastily shredded and the editor suspended from a student union. A French court however refused to order the confiscation of a magazine which planned to print the images.

Echoing calls for calm by leaders, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said: "I urge all who have authority or influence in different communities ... to engage in dialogue and build a true alliance of civilisations, founded on mutual respect." Further protests erupted yesterday in Pakistan, Egypt, Yemen, Djibouti, Gaza and Azerbaijan. At least 10,000 people marched in the Bangladeshi capital and tens of thousands turned out in Niger's capital Niamey to vent their anger. State assembly members in mostly Muslim Kano, northern Nigeria, burned Danish flags. Croatia became the latest country where a newspaper printed the drawings. The cartoons have appeared in Australia, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Fiji, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, United States, Ukraine and Yemen. Iran, which has withdrawn its ambassador from Denmark, said the cartoons "launched an anti-Islamic and Islamophobic current which will be answered". A radical Muslim group in Belgium put on its website a cartoon of Adolf Hitler in bed with Anne Frank, a Jewish girl who wrote a wartime diary of hiding from Nazi persecution.

Saudi Arabia's Okaz newspaper rejected violence: "Violence, spreading chaos and destroying facilities ... only distorts Islam's image, especially after our enemies have tried to label us with so many accusations," it said. Some Danish Muslims agreed. "Fire and stones are taking things too far," said Copenhagen barber Farzan Khatami. Denmark's Jyllands-Posten daily has apologised for the cartoons, first published last September. The Danish government has refused to do so, saying it is the paper's responsibility. English giants Manchester United

also abandoned a plan to tour the Gulf in the week before the League Cup final. The Old Trafford outfit had been considering travelling to either Qatar or Dubai before facing Wigan at the Millennium Stadium in Cardiff on February 26. But with an English Cup tie against Liverpool scheduled on February 18, they felt the timespan, given the travelling, was not convenient. Club officials have now given up on the idea of and decided not to head east.

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## **KTC13**

### **Danish boycott 'success'**

Al-Qabas conducted a survey amongst citizens on their responses to calls to boycott Danish products. The survey showed that around 80 per cent of Kuwaiti citizens have already boycotted Danish products, responding to calls published in the local press. However, details of the questionnaire showed that 20 per cent of citizens boycotting Danish products have taken such a decision based upon Fatwas and the calls of clergymen and Imams. Meanwhile, 90 per cent of Kuwaiti citizens thought that a more comprehensive boycott should be implemented on various economic and political levels. Only 10 per cent were against the boycott and called for debate to settle the issue. These people also justified opposing to the boycott by the fact that the boycott affects not only Danes, but also Kuwaiti merchants and local agents of these products. The questionnaire also showed that 65 per cent of Kuwaitis have seen the cartoons that started the whole problem and while 35 per cent stressed they had not seen them.

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## **KTC14**

### **Violence and democratically-elected govts**

Fauzia Salem Al-Sabah mistrusts in Al-Rai Al-Aam (Feb 6) the United States. She says that America antagonises democratically-elected governments if these do not dance to its tunes. Instead, America prefers to work with US-friendly dictatorships. For example, Al-Sabah observes, America does not want to accept Hamas which democratically won the latest elections in Palestine. Al-Sabah does not understand why America is massively supporting Israel. At the same time, she is predicting that Israel would disappear as a state in a hundred years like ice in a hot summer day. My comment: Officials from the European Union and from the US have stressed on different occasions that they would co-operate with Hamas if this renounces violence . A peaceful Hamas would be an acceptable partner to all; to America, to the EU, to Israel, and to the rest of the world. Would Al-Sabah accept an Al-

Qaeda-like organisation if it democratically won elections in Kuwait, before this organisation renounced violence ? Would she cooperate with Al-Zarqawi if his terrorist organisation democratically won elections in Iraq before this thug renounced violence ? The Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad wants Israel now to be exterminated. Al-Sabah is more generous with Israel and anticipates that it would disappear in a hundred years. Both predictions are wishful thinking. Ingratitude and treason Nabeel Al-Fadhel criticises in Al-Watan (Feb 6) those Kuwaitis who cannot detach themselves of those Arab "genes" responsible for ingratitude and treason. They audaciously keep criticising America for siding with Israel and forget that this "undemocratic" and "partial" superpower has liberated Kuwait and is aiding lots of countries worldwide. Al-Fadhel stresses, "Kuwait comes first." My comment: Just two figures. The American taxpayers annually support Egypt with \$2 billion of aid. The European taxpayers annually support the Palestinian authority with almost a billion dollars of aid. Reaction to Danish cartoons Commenting on Muslim reaction to the Danish cartoons, Al-Fadhel also says, (Al-Watan, Feb 6), that as media men and women went to cover the demonstration in front of the Danish Commerce Centre in Kuwait City onto which Islamsits called, they (the media people) found a very few people gathered in front of the Centre, most of them were minors. Islamist leaders do not demonstrate themselves, they prefer to vent their venom on TV stations and in newspaper articles. They send simple-minded, violent fellow Muslims to do so. These "cows" (dumb people) do not want to accept any apology for the caricatures. They want to protest until the day of judgement. God and His Prophet (PBUH) are forgiving, but Islamists are not. What kind of Islam are they defending? My comment: Apart from the violent demonstrations in Damascus and Beirut, which obviously were instigated and organised by the Syrian regime, the other demonstrations in Jakarta, London, and elsewhere were very small, maximum a few hundreds. This shows that the majority of Muslims distance themselves from militant and violent Muslims. The majority of Muslims reject violence .

## **Appendix 9 – Reader Interpretation Analysis (Articles A-D)**

# ARTICLE A

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## France considering ban on burqas, spokesman says

France may introduce a law banning full burqas if a parliamentary commission finds the growing number of women wearing them have been coerced into doing so, a government spokesman said on Friday.

Nearly 60 legislators signed a proposal on Wednesday calling for a parliamentary commission to look into the spread of the burqa in France, a garment that they said amounted "to a breach of individual freedoms on our national territory".

France, home to Europe's largest Muslim minority, is strongly attached to its secular values and to gender equality, and many see the burqa, which covers the wearer from head to toe and hides her face, as an infringement of women's rights and is increasingly being imposed by fundamentalists.

The country has been divided by fierce debates about how to reconcile those principles with religious freedom.

"If it was proved after this inquiry that burqa-wearing was forced, in other words that it contradicted republican principles, then naturally parliament would take all the necessary decisions," Luc Chatel, who is the industry minister and government spokesman, said on France 2 television.

Asked about the possibility of a law, he replied: "Why not?"

President Nicolas Sarkozy has not yet spoken on the subject but promised to address the issue in a speech on Monday to members of parliament.

More than 40 legislators from his ruling centre-right party signed the proposal.

## ARTICLE B

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### France searches its soul over the veil

France's parliamentary inquiry into Muslim women's use of the veil looks set to provoke a vigorous national debate

Even though I was active and outspoken during the 2004 debate on the ban on religious symbols in French schools, I have no definite opinions on the *voile intégral* — the burqa, sitar or khimar. But the French parliamentary inquiry has now been launched, and for the next six months, a debate will take place. The outcome is unknown. When the Stasi commission was set up, all the senior members (except for two) were opposed to legislating on religious symbols. During the hearings, young Muslims told them that if the veil was authorised in public schools, they would be forced to wear it. All the senior members, except one, subsequently asked for a law. But this debate is different: those in favour of the veil are not vocal in supporting the *voile intégral*. Dounia Bouzar, an anthropologist who is otherwise inclined to oppose any prohibition, refers to the "cultish practice" of burqa supporters. Conservative Muslims and those sympathetic to them are protesting against the inquiry, but with uncharacteristic reserve. And the debate was initiated by a communist *député*, but supported by the rightwing majority in parliament.

So will we need a broad and all-encompassing law on Islamic garments, or various decrees addressing one issue after another, as they arise? In France, women who wear the *voile intégral* do it by choice, not by obligation. This isn't an exotic symbol, but a political one. We're used to showing our faces on a daily basis, as part of our identity: picking up a parcel at the post office, collecting children from Kindergarten. But what then, for women whose face cannot be seen? In what case would a political position, even one stemming from religious conviction, put someone above the law? This isn't a question of religious freedom, but of equality before the law. In other words, women wearing the burqa aren't asserting their right not to be discriminated against – they're asking for specific rights.

If the commission supports the right to wear the burqa, French society will need to look at changing some of its habits. Here, the public space is a bit like a herbal infusion: the flavours of many different plants are present, but by blending together they create harmony of sorts. It's possible that we could choose to make our tea by singling out some of those leaves for different treatment – we've never tried it, but why not? It would, however, mean that we'd be moving from universality to separatism.

Today, our freedom of expression is only curbed by laws against the incitement of racial hatred. If the government supports the burqa, we would have to consider how to deal with a different type of situation. An Algerian chef whose sister died when extremists

cut her throat recently told me that she would never serve a woman wearing a niqab, because she saw it as a symbol of support for those who murdered her sibling. Today, her attitude could send her to court for racism and refusal to serve a client on discriminatory grounds. If the burqa was legitimised, there would be no reason to permit one political discourse and not two, something which would risk out social cohesion.

Another point: how can we reconcile specific rights with universal ones? If by some sort of magic trick a woman maintained that she was consenting to her own discrimination, what would happen if she later changed her mind?

A German judge recently ruled in favour of a violent man who beat his wife because, according to her, the woman knew what was in store for her since her husband had made his views clear on the question.

Will we accept that some citizens are less equal than others?

Finally, it would be wise to remember France and the UK are not one and the same – we really do not live in the same country. Some 79% of French Muslims are said to feel strongly attached to the French principle of secularism, also known as *laïcité*, whereas polls have suggested that 40% of British Muslims would prefer laws based on sharia. But Muslims who settled in the UK did it by choice, and often for economic reasons; they didn't flee anything. In France, Muslims are active at the grassroots level on the left. Many are political refugees who escaped from a form of politicised Islam. In the UK, Ken Livingstone could afford to welcome Yusuf al-Qaradawi – the man who, with reference to homosexuality, openly wonders whether it is best first to kill the "active" or the "passive" one. In France, this would be like spitting in the face of Algerian and Iranian political refugees. Given that women wearing the niqab do it by conviction, they can always do it in countries which tolerate such practices – such as Great Britain. But for many Algerian and Iranian women, France is their only refuge from political Islam.

I am still unsure if a law prohibiting the *voile intégral* is necessary, or even possible. I am waiting to hear the different points of view that will be aired during the investigation. But because I am of the left, I will say that I will mainly listen to Muslim democrats.

# ARTICLE C

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## Women, West Brom, the burka and me

I think Sarkozy is wrong about the veil - and not just because I was a football mascot for 55 minutes

I was once asked if I'd like to be the mascot at a West Bromwich Albion football match. It involved me having to wear a large thrush costume. I mean, of course, the bird. It wasn't some tasteless promotional event where I was dressed as an irritating rash and then seized upon by a man dressed as a tube of Canesten.

I agreed to be the thrush but only if no one knew that it was me inside. I'm world-famous in West Bromwich so I thought that it would be novel to stroll around in front of 20-odd thousand people and not be recognised.

The outfit was quite heavy and hot, with just a small slit at eye level to stop me walking into things. Before the game, I wandered around, waving to the crowd and having my photo taken with small children. Such is the role of the mascot.

For these photos, I adopted my regulation warm-hearted grin but after I'd posed for about 20 such shots, it occurred to me that this was completely unnecessary because I couldn't be seen. I was getting a bit bored and hot by now and it was a real treat to not have to look happy and enthusiastic.

I was actually scowling but no one could tell. This was a truly liberating experience and it suddenly made me realise why many Muslim women are reluctant to give up the veil. It can be truly joyous to pass unseen through the outside world with no obligation to smile or look interested - hidden in your own secret place.

The French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, took a much more negative view of the burka issue this week when he said: "We cannot accept that women be prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity."

I assume that he wasn't a big fan of Blind Date. He seems to assume that Muslim women are always forced by others to wear the veil. I don't doubt that this is sometimes the case but it doesn't seem to be the whole story. One often hears Muslim women in interviews saying that they like wearing the burka, not just for religious but also practical reasons.

These views tend to be disregarded and seen as the product of indoctrination. Such a dismissive response seems to make these women and their opinions every bit as invisible as the burka does.

The much-demonised garb is seen as a symbol of oppression, but oppression comes in many forms. Lots of British women have said to me that they resent being gawped at just because they're wearing a miniskirt or a low-cut top. I always apologise and say that I didn't mean any harm.

Alternatively, a friend said to me recently that she was saddened to notice that, as she grew older, men had stopped staring at her. She felt that she was no longer desirable, no longer receiving approval. These are two very different problems, both by-products of our Western cult of physical attractiveness and both solved by the burka.

I don't believe that any man should force his wife to wear a burka but I'm not sure that Mr Sarkozy, the extremely proud owner of a trophy wife, is the best man to speak on the matter. Add to this that he was once seen to be checking his text messages during a private audience with the Pope and one might also ask whether religious sensitivity is one of his strengths.

Either way, his call to actually ban the burka on French streets cannot be the answer.

In the late Nineties, I went to Africa with Comic Relief. A group of us, mainly white middle-class liberals, sat in a village in Burkina Faso and spoke to the village elders. We asked about the distinctive scars that many of the men had on their faces and they turned out to be the result of some sort of initiation ceremony.

Someone asked if we could see the ceremonial knife. I think that we were just trying to sound interested. Eventually a rather disappointing little penknife with a dirty wooden handle turned up, and we all passed it around as if it were a beautiful artefact.

One of the women from the production team asked if it was used for any other purpose. "Female circumcision" was the reply. We all went silent and handed the knife back. None of us had the guts to register our disgust.

I sat in a disused army barracks afterwards imagining what I should have said. "I'm sorry. It's one thing having respect for other people's cultures but some things are just objectively wrong." Only the mosquitoes heard my indignation.

Consequently, I do respect Mr Sarkozy for having the courage to speak out on the sensitive issue of cultural difference, but on this occasion I think that he's being too simplistic. It's not as clear-cut as he suggests. I'm not sure that the burka is objectively wrong.

Some Muslim women clearly feel oppressed by it, but then some clearly don't. To ban it is to remove women's choice, using oppression to combat oppression.

Rigid rules that make no allowance for personal choice are more suited to the Taleban than to one of Europe's great democracies. So that's my take on the burka issue - all based on 55 minutes in a thrush suit. Next week: Silvio Berlusconi on why stockings and suspenders should be compulsory.

# ARTICLE D

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## Mr. Sarkozy, Burqa is sign of modesty

I THINK French President Nicolas Sarkozy has not visited a convent of late. If he had he would have noticed nuns in wimples and robes. Would he call the dress worn by nuns “a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement”?

In the first presidential address to the French parliament in 136 years, Sarkozy chose to call a dress willingly adopted by many Muslim women all over the world as a sign of subservience and degradation.

The burqa or abaya, as it is known in Saudi Arabia, is a body robe. What covers the head and face is called niqab. But it is not a question of semantics, because Sarkozy meant a head-to-toe dress when he referred to the burqa.

Sarkozy was right when he said the burqa – the particular type of dress – was not a religious issue. Islam asks its followers – men and women – to dress modestly, and so do all religions. The Islamic concept of hijab is not only physical but also moral. It tells men to lower their gaze in front of women other than their wives and other close relatives. It tells women to be mindful of their gait and garments.

The debate here is on two counts: the issue of morality and the freedom of choice. Who is indecent and spoils public morals: a burqa-clad woman or the one in a bikini? Those, who are brought up on moral values which teach respect for women and not maintain that they are not mere objects of desire or enticement and mannequins for public display, will say a woman in a bikini is indecent. But those who have grown up seeing scantily-clad women around them, will find a woman in a burqa objectionable. So it all boils down to your perception which is a result of your moral values. There is no point praising a Picasso painting in front of a visually-challenged person. However, we can discuss the issue of a person’s freedom of choice. France is a liberal country. *Liberté, égalité, fraternité* (Liberty, equality, fraternity) is the French national motto. So how can a country which prides itself on protecting liberty and equality discuss in its parliament an issue which is an infringement on one’s freedom? If a woman in a mini skirt is not an issue of debate in France, then why is a woman in a burqa objectionable so long as she does not affect public order? Ask any woman covered head-to-toe in the black robe, whether the dress has been forced on her or she is wearing it by choice? The answer in all cases will be the latter. Women of high moral values prefer to cover their modesty. In his speech Sarkozy said: “In our country, we cannot accept that women be prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social life, deprived of all identity.” How can Sarkozy pass judgement on others? The burqa does not curb freedom. Covered women do go about daily chores unhindered. Hindered are those who look at the burqa as a symbol of subservience.

The burqa does not deprive a woman of her identity. On the contrary, it gives her an identity: an identity of being modest in an indecent crowd, an identity of boldly

following her choice amidst a howl of protests, an identity of being true to her faith and culture.

It is strange that something which is moral is being looked down upon while immorality and indecency are being promoted!

## Post Reading (attached to article A-D)

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**After reading the above article, please answer the following questions:**

1. I generally feel persuaded by the views in article (A,B,C,D)?

Extremely Agree

Agree

Not sure

Disagree

Extremely Disagree

2. Summarize your general understanding of the article in 3- 4 lines:

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**Appendix 10 – Reader Interpretation Questionnaire and Research Consent  
Form**

## **Questionnaire**

The following sections target two separate parts of the research. Please read the instructions presented at the top of each section and answer the questions accordingly.

### **Background Information**

Please fill in the information requested or/and tick  the appropriate box:

**Age::**

**Gender:** Female  Male

**Religion:** Muslim  Christian  Jewish

Hindu  Buddhist  Sikh

Other  Please state: .....

### **Article Analysis**

Please read article A, B, C and D and answer the following questions regarding each article by either ticking  the appropriate box or filling in the required information where necessary.

**1. In general, the writer of article A appears to be:**

In favour of the burqa ban

Opposes the burqa ban

Neither

**2. In general, the writer of article B appears to be:**

In favour of the burqa ban

Opposes the burqa ban

Neither

**3. In general, the writer of article C appears to be:**

In favour of the burqa ban

Opposes the burqa ban

Neither

**4. In general, the writer of article D appears to be:**

In favour of the burqa ban

Opposes the burqa ban

Neither

**5. In article A, the representation of face veiling women is generally:**

Positive

Negative

Both

Neither

Are there any aspects in the way the text is written (type of language/linguistic features) to support your view, please provide examples from the text where possible:

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**6. In article B, the representation of face veiling women is generally:**

Positive

Negative

Both

Neither

Are there any aspects in the way the text is written (type of language/linguistic features) to support your view, please provide examples from the text where possible:

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**7. In article C, the representation of face veiling women is generally:**

Positive                       Negative                       Both                       Neither

Are there any aspects in the way the text is written (type of language/linguistic features) to support your view, please provide examples from the text where possible:

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**8. In article D, the representation of face veiling women is generally:**

Positive                       Negative                       Both                       Neither

Are there any aspects in the way the text is written (type of language/linguistic features) to support your view, please provide examples from the text where possible:

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**9. In your view, where was each article published:**

- **Article A:** Arab newspaper                       British newspaper
- **Article B:** Arab newspaper                       British newspaper
- **Article C:** Arab newspaper                       British newspaper
- **Article D:** Arab newspaper                       British newspaper

Thank you for your participation in the questionnaire.

**Consent Form**

Dear Research Participant,

I am a PhD Student at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). I am conducting a study on how people read and understand newspaper articles written in English. I would be extremely grateful if you could take the time and assist me reading some articles, completing this short questionnaire and taking part in the focus group that will follow.

**THE CONTENTS OF THESE DOCUMENTS ARE CONFIDENTIAL AND FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES ONLY.**

I consent to participating in this study and to the questionnaire and focus groups responses being collected and analysed for research purposes. I understand that personal anonymity will be preserved in reports of the data.

**Signature:.....(initials)**

**Date:.....**

## **Appendix 11: Focus Group Primary Topics and Questions – Articles A-D**

**Introduction:** How did you find reading the articles? Where they enjoyable, interesting?  
Were there any problems understanding the articles?

### **(1) Primary Topic: General understanding of the article**

Q1. So what was the article generally about?

Q2. Where do you think the article was published? What encourages you to have this view?

### **(2) Primary Topic: Arguments for/against**

Q1. How does the article represent the face veil ban? Was it for or against, both, neither. What makes you have this view?

### **(3) Primary topic: Social group representation**

Q1. What social groups are involved in the articles? How do you think social groups involved were represented?

Q2. Face veiling women/Muslims? Neg/pos/neither/ both

Q3. Other social groups? Neg/pos/neither/both

Q4. Would you consider the article bias in anyway?

Q5. Do you find yourself generally persuaded by the article?

Q6. How convinced are you by these representations?

### **(4) Primary Topic: Linguistic structures**

Q1. Regarding the previous question, is there any evidence in the text to support your view, the way the language is used, linguistic structures, can you provide examples?

**Final Remarks:** Is there anything else that you found interesting, does anybody want to add anything?

**Appendix 12– Rules of Critical Discussion (Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 208-209)**

<b>Rules of Critical Discussion</b>	
<b>Rule 1</b>	Parties must not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or casting doubts on standpoints
<b>Rule 2</b>	A party that advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if the other party asks him to do so.
<b>Rule 3</b>	A party's attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has indeed been advanced by the other party.
<b>Rule 4</b>	A party may defend his standpoint only by advancing argumentation relating to that standpoint.
<b>Rule 5</b>	A party may not falsely present something as a premise that has been left unexpressed by the other party or deny a premise that he himself has left implicit.
<b>Rule 6</b>	A party may not falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point nor deny a premise representing an accepting starting point.
<b>Rule 7</b>	A party may not regard a standpoint as conclusively defended if the defence does not take place by means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that is correctly applied.
<b>Rule 8</b>	In his argumentation a party may only use arguments that are logically valid or capable of being validated by making explicit one or more unexpressed premises.
<b>Rule 9</b>	A failed defence of a standpoint must result in the party that put forward the standpoint retracting it and a conclusive defence in the other party retracting his doubt about the standpoint.
<b>Rule 10</b>	A party must not use formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous and he must interpret the other party's formulations as carefully and accurately as possible.

**Appendix 13 – Traditional Fallacies as Violations of Rules of Critical Discussion (Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 212-215)**

<b>Fallacy</b>		<b>Description</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>Affirming the consequent</b>	Confusing necessary and sufficient conditions by treating a necessary condition as a sufficient condition
<b>2</b>	<b>Ambiguity</b>	Misusing referential, syntactic, or semantic ambiguity
<b>3</b>	<b>Argumentum ad baculum</b>	Putting pressure on the other party by threatening him with sanctions
<b>4</b>	<b>Argumentum ad consequentiam</b>	Using an inappropriate (causal) argumentation scheme by rejecting a descriptive standpoint because of its undesired consequences
<b>5</b>	<b>Argumentum ad hominem (direct personal attack, abusive)</b>	Doubting the expertise, intelligence, or good faith of the other party
<b>6</b>	<b>Argumentum ad hominem (indirect personal attack, circumstantial)</b>	Casting suspicion on the other party's motives
<b>7</b>	<b>Argumentum ad hominem (tu quoque)</b>	Pointing out inconsistency between the other party's ideas and deeds in past and/or present.
<b>8</b>	<b>Argumentum ad ignorantiam 1</b>	Shifting the burden of proof in a nonmixed dispute by requiring the antagonist to show that the protagonist's standpoint is wrong
<b>9</b>	<b>Argumentum ad ignorantiam 2</b>	Making an absolute of the failure of the defence by concluding that a standpoint is true because the opposite has not been successfully defended
<b>10</b>	<b>Argumentum ad misericordiam</b>	Putting pressure on the other party by playing on his feelings of compassion
<b>11</b>	<b>Argumentum ad populum 1 (populistic fallacy) (variant of argumentum ad verecundiam)</b>	Using an inappropriate (symptomatic) argumentation scheme by presenting the standpoint as right because everybody thinks it is right
<b>12</b>	<b>Argumentum ad populum 2</b>	Defending a standpoint by using non-argumentative means of persuasion and playing on the emotions of the audience
<b>13</b>	<b>Argumentum ad verecundiam 1</b>	Using an inappropriate (symptomatic) argumentation scheme by presenting the standpoint as right because an authority says it is right
<b>14</b>	<b>Composition</b>	Confusing the properties of parts and wholes by ascribing a relative or structure- dependent property of a part of the whole to the whole
<b>15</b>	<b>Denying the antecedent</b>	Confusing necessary and sufficient conditions by treating a sufficient condition as necessary condition

16	<b>Division</b>	Confusing the properties of parts and wholes by ascribing a relative or structure-dependent property of a whole to a part of the whole
17	<b>False analogy</b>	Using the appropriate argumentation scheme of analogy incorrectly by not fulfilling the conditions for a correct comparison
18	<b>Ignoratio elenchi (irrelevant argumentation)</b>	Putting forward argumentation which does not refer to the standpoint under discussion
19	<b>Many questions</b>	Falsely presenting something as a common starting point by wrapping up as standpoint in the presupposition of a question
20	<b>Petitio principia (begging the question, circular reasoning)</b>	Falsely presenting something as a common starting point by advancing argumentation that amounts to the same thing as the standpoint
21	<b>Post hoc ergo propter hoc</b>	Using the appropriate argumentation scheme of causality incorrectly by inferring a cause-effect relation from the mere observation that two events take place one after the other
22	<b>Secundum quid (hasty generalisation)</b>	Using the appropriate argumentation scheme of concomitance incorrectly by making generalisations based upon observations that are not representative or not sufficient
23	<b>Shifting the burden of proof 1 (argumentum ad ignorantium)</b>	Requiring the antagonist in a non-mixed dispute to show that the protagonist's standpoint is wrong
24	<b>Shifting the burden of proof 2</b>	Requiring only the other party in a mixed dispute to defend his standpoint due to the Principle of Presumption of the Criterion of Fairness
25	<b>Slippery Slope</b>	Using the appropriate argumentation scheme of causality (argument from consequence) incorrectly by erroneously suggesting that by taking the proposed course of action one will be going from bad to worse
26	<b>Straw man 1</b>	Imputing a fictitious standpoint to the other party or distorting the other party's standpoint

## Appendix 14 - The '2009 French Face Veil Ban' Analysis: Quantitative Data

- Byline sources: UK press (Fig 4.1)

Source	UK Press
Staff Writer	213
Staff Writer (Special)	19
Reuters	1
Agencies	1
IANS	3
AP	1
AFP	1
PA	5
Relax News	1
Public	1
Uknown	19

- Byline sources: Arab English language press bylined sources (Fig 4.2)

Source	Arab Press
staff writer	75
staff writer (special)	1
Reuters	36
Agencies	21
IANS	5
AP	41
AFP	68
DPA	9
London Evening News	1
Daily Mail	2
Telegraph Group	1
Guardian News&Media	5
CG News	2
Media Line	1
Islam Way	1
PA	0
MCT	1
Unknown	15

- Concordance Themes: Niqab/ Burqa/ Burka/ Burkha et al (Fig 4.4)

Attribute	UK Press		Arab Press	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Negativisation	340	22.00	222	14.34
Physical description	153	9.90	204	13.17
Religious/ Islamic	32	2.07	148	9.56
Distancing religion	85	5.50	91	5.87
Quantification	67	4.53	116	7.49
Origin/ Background	25	1.614	23	1.48
Total no of concordance lines	1545	100	1548	100


- Burqa/Niqab negativisation theme analysis: UK and Arab Press (Fig 4.5)

UK Press Themes	Frequency	%
Oppression	120	35.29
Threat	89	26.17
Other	77	22.64
Different	39	11.47
Separate	38	11.17
Not welcome	10	2.94

Arab Press Themes	Frequency	%
Oppression	71	33.97
Threat	63	30.14
Different	30	14.35
Other	22	10.04
Not welcome	21	10.52
Identity disguise	11	5.26
Separate	10	4.78


- UK press: Quotation patterns – First, second and third quotes (Fig 4.6)

UK Press								
Sources quoted	First	%	Second	%	Third	%	Total	%
Non-Muslim	209	32.65	175	27.34	132	20.62	516	80.62
Muslim	35	5.46	29	4.53	28	4.37	92	14.37
Veil wearer	12	1.87	13	2.03	7	1.09	32	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>256</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>217</b>	<b>33.90</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>26.09</b>	<b>640</b>	<b>100</b>



- Arab English language press: Quotation patterns – First, second and third quotes  
(Fig 4.6)

Arab Press								
Sources Quoted	First	%	Second	%	Third	%	Total	%
Non Muslim	200	28.69	172	24.67	142	20.37	514	73.74
Muslim	51	7.31	41	5.88	43	6.16	135	19.36
Veil wearer	14	2.00	21	3.01	13	1.86	48	6.88
<b>Total</b>	<b>265</b>	<b>38.02</b>	<b>234</b>	<b>33.57</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>28.40</b>	<b>697</b>	<b>100%</b>



- Total Frequency: UK and Arab press quotation patterns – First, second and third  
(Fig 4.6)

Context/Sources	Non-Muslim	%	Muslim	%	Veil Wearer	%	Total	%
UK Press	516	80.62	92	14.37	32	5	640	100
Arab Press	514	73.14	135	19.36	48	6.88	697	100

- Opinion quotation analysis: For/against face veil ban–Frequency analysis  
(Fig 4.7)

Context/ Opinion	For Ban/ Critical of Veiling	%	Against Ban/ For Veiling	%	Neither/Unknown	%	Total
UK Press	150	52.08	72	25	66	22.91	288
Arab Press	100	40.81	80	32.65	65	26.53	245

- Muslim opinion quotation analysis: For/against face veil ban – Frequency analysis  
(Fig 4.8)

Context/ Opinion	For ban/Critical of Veiling	%	Against ban/for Veiling	%	Neither/ Unknown	%	Total
UK Press	20	45.45	16	36.36	14	31.81	44
Arab Press	9	16.98	32	60.37	12	22.64	53

## Appendix 15 - The '2006 Danish Cartoon Controversy' Analysis: Quantitative Data

- Byline sources: UK press (Fig 4.9)

Source	CTT	CDT	CTG	CTI	Total
Staff	94	41	177	57	369
unknown	2	5	0	3	10
AFP	1		0	0	1
Agencies	10		22	0	32
AP	0		6	2	8
PA	0		1	3	4

- Byline sources: Arab English language press (Fig 5.1)

Source	CGT	CGN	CAN	CKT	Total
Staff	37	48	97	20	202
unknown	5	0	0	2	7
AFP	83	0	4		87
REUTERS	32	5	2		39
AGENCIES	16	17	9	5	47
QNA	1	0	0		1
IANS	2	0	1		3
INTERNEWS	9	0	0		9
DPA	6	0	1		7
OXA	1	0	0		1
AP	0	13	1		14
WAM	0	1	0		1
WP	0	1	0		1
INDEPENDENT	0	0	2		2
GUARDIAN	0	0	7		7
LA TIMES	0	0	1		1
OBSERVER	0	0	1		1
JAZEERA	0	0	1		1
KUNA				2	2

- Protesters/demonstrators Analysis: UK and Arab English language press
  - Attribution frequency analysis (Fig 5.2)
  - Semantic position frequency analysis (Fig 5.3)
  - Semantic position attribute frequency analysis (Fig 5.4)

UK press									
Category	Frequency	Neg	Pos	Neither	Agent	of neg action	patient	Of neg action	Agent Deletion
Demonstrators	166	104	1	61	109	90	33	18	7
Protesters	223	136	0	87	132	91	65	23	12
<b>Total</b>	<b>389</b>	<b>240</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>148</b>	<b>241</b>	<b>181</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>19</b>

Arab English Language Press									
Category	Frequency	Neg	Pos	Neither	Agent	of neg action	patient	Of neg action	Agent Deletion
Demonstrators	84	37	1	46	60	31	22	16	10
Protesters	217	101	5	111	152	88	52	37	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>301</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>212</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>16</b>

Attribution	UK Press	Arab Press
Negative	61.69%	45.84%
Positive	0.25%	1.99%
Neither	38.04%	52.15%

Semantic Role	Agent	Patients
UK Press	61.95%	25.19%
Arab Press	70.43%	24.58%

Semantic role/attribute	Agent/neg action	Patient/neg action	Agent Deletion
UK Press	75.1%	41.83%	46.34%
Arab Press	56.1%	71.62%	30.18%

- Muslim/s attribution frequency analysis: UK press (Fig 5.5)

Attribute	Frequency	%
Quantification	273	18.76
Anger	140	9.62
Threat	110	7.56
Violent	104	7.14
Extremism	97	6.66
victimisation	87	5.97
Type	84	5.77
Separate/Different	50	3.43
Position	42	2.88
Oppressed/restrictive	18	1.23

- Muslim/s attribution frequency analysis: Arab English language press (Fig 5.5)

Attribute	frequency	%
Victimisation	329	24.98
Quantification	232	17.61
Anger	149	11.31
Position	100	7.59
Violence	78	5.92
Immigrates	65	4.93
Relationship	60	4.55
Threat	28	2.12
Extremism	17	1.29

## Appendix 16 – The ‘2009 French Face Veil Ban’ Analysis: Qualitative Data Examples

### UK Press: Referential and Predicational strategies - Muslims and face veiling women

- **Collectivisation**

*This point of view, however, is not shared by everyone. **Muslim leaders** have urged politicians not to create more tension between communities. (TG1)*

*Critics have already warned the government risks stigmatising **Muslims** over a minor and marginal issue. (TG7)*

*During the hearing **young Muslims** told them that if the veil was authorised in public schools....(TG5)*

*The measure was mainly intended to ensure the equality of **Muslim girls** and it has worked smoothly (TT1)*

*President Sarkozy threw his weight yesterday behind attempts to bar **French Muslim women** from covering their faces in public... (TT2)*

***Many Muslim women** are reluctant to give up the veil (TT4)*

*Jack straw, who feels uncomfortable in the presence of **women** dressed from top to toe in black with only their eyes visible (DT2)*

*The burka isolates **women** (DT3)*

***Muslim leaders** condemn Sarkozy over burqa ban (DT3)*

- **Nouns denoting groups**

*Muslim groups* in Britain have supported Mr. Sarkozy's claim (DT3)

*The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB)* said Mr. Sarkozy claim....(DT3)

Here, in France and in the **Muslim world** – are the best way to consign to the dark ages this symbol of darkness. (TT5)

The burka appears to be purely tribal in its origin, and this cultural tradition has been given dubious religious sanction by **conservative societies**. (TT5)

Mr. Sarkozy was adding his voice to a strong consensus that has emerged this month against women in France's five million strong **Muslim community**.... (TT2)

France has Western Europe's largest **Muslim population**...(TG4)

His aim was to 'establish a debate with the **Muslim community**, integrate Islam properly into French life' ....(TG7)

*The conseil Francais du Calte Musulman (French Council of Muslim Worship), the Organisation responsible for Islam in France , explains ... (TG6)*

- **Aggregation**

While many in France, home to more than **five million Muslims** (TT5)

The different opinions generated by the debate reveal the difficulties face by the French state over the past 50 years in determining how best to accommodate **its 5 million Muslims**. (TG6)

...Muslim population of **over 5 million** (TG7)

*...has divided France's 4 to 5 million-strong Muslim community. (T11)*

*The head to toe costumes that cover all or most of the face – are said to be spreading as fundamentalist doctrines gain hold amongst a small minority of France's five million Muslims. (TT1)*

*Fadala Amara, a rights campaigner of Algerian background, who is a housing minister, said that was **alarmed by the number of women** 'who are being put in a kind of tomb.' (DT1)*

*Women's right campaigners, including some Islamic groups have backed the calls for measures to curb **the small but growing trend** of wearing burqas among France's five million Muslims. (DT1)*

*Many on the left disapprove of what is seen as **a small rise in women adopting fundamentalist dress** – they are said to number several thousand (TT2)*

*President Sarkozy took issue with the **proliferation of** women wearing the burqa in France. (T13)*

*It is estimated that some **100,000 women**, mainly born in France, have taken to full outfits with face covering. (DT1)*

- **Negative attribute**

*Critics, including some government ministers, say a ban on the burqa and niqab would be unworkable and would only force greater isolation on the **victims**, as the wearers are seen'. (TT1)*

## Arab Press: Referential and predicational strategies - Muslims and face veiling women

- **Collectivisation**

*President Nicolas Sarkozy is 'not qualified to judge Muslim women's dress code' said **Muslim clerics** in Cairo. (GN6)*

*"Most **French Muslims** , or Muslim residents of France..." (GN9)*

*However, the scholar was of the view that there are two different opinions about women's face among **Muslim scholars**" (GT4)*

*Majority of **Muslim women** in Europe willingly choose to do so for religious and cultural reasons. (GN1)*

*refused to talk to **veiled women**. (GN1)*

*By wearing the burqa, **women** are exhibiting their religion and culture. (GN7)*

*That Sarkozy had to take recourse to the marginalisation of **Muslim women** in his attempt to defend the French idea... (SG3)*

*France has been engulfed in a debate over whether womens rights and nations strong secular tradition are under attack when **Muslim women** cover themselves fully' (GT3)*

- **Aggregation: Large number population**

*France's parliament is currently split on the issue, with those against a proposed law that would make wearing the burqa illegal warning this could incite **France's five million Muslims**. (GN10)*

*..but Immigration minister Eric Besson warned a law would stir tensions in France, home to **some 5mn Muslims**. (GT1)*

- **Aggregation: Small number of face veiling women**

*It is not known how many women wear the burqa in France, but estimates*

***have varied between a few thousand and several hundred.** (GT3)*

***A few thousand women wear the burka in France, many of whom are French converts** (SG1)*

### UK Press: Social Actions

- Face veiling women in passive roles in the *guardian* highlighting victimisation (with agent deletion)

*Women in standard headscarves **have been refused** access to voting booths, driving lessons, **barred from** their own wedding ceremonies at town halls, **ejected from** university classes and in once case, a women in a banks **was not allowed** to withdraw cash from her own account at the counter. (TG6)*

*Another women wearing the full veil **was refused** social housing by a landlord in the area. (TG6)*

*Horia Demiaty, 30, a French financier who wears a standard head scarf with her business suits...won a discrimination case after she and her family, including six-month babe, **were refused access** to a rural holiday apartment they had booked in the Vosges. (TG6).*

- *Highlighting in-group actors as agents of negative actions towards out-group*

*What's striking in Sarkozy's speech is that it is yet again **a man who denounces women** and presumes that they are cut off from social life. (TG3)*

*Sarkozy now goes further, following revolutionary logic in **not just chasing those** who dress in ways he and French political culture finds intolerable out of public spaces, **but pursuing those** who dress in a way that is a rejection of Western values even into their private worlds. (TG3)*

## Arab press: Social Actions - Face veiling women

- **Active role in choosing to veil action:**

*Supporters of veiling explain they choose to wear the Hijab because it provides freedom from emphasis on the physical and from competing with other women's looks as well as from being sex objects for males to reject and approve. (GN8)*

*Western societies should respect the rights of **Muslim women who choose** to wear the veil (GN8)*

*And earlier, in 2001, Laura Bush and Cherie Blair led a brief assault on the burqa worn in Afghanistan, **which is still being worn out of choice today.** (GN10)*

- **Passive role of face veiling women as recipients of negative actions by out-group (West):**

*US president Barack Obama urged Western Countries to avoid 'dictating what clothes a **Muslim women** should wear'. (GT3)*

*Last year, a **Moroccan women** was refused citizenship after social services said she wore a burqa and was living in 'submission' to her husband. (GT3)*

*As a leading member of the coalition against allowing **Muslim women** freedom of sartorial choice based on their religious obligations and convictions, Nicolas sarkozy's latest salvo declaring the the burqa 'not welcome' in France, has, I feel, irrevocably forfeited his right to be taken seriously. (SG3)*

*Britain secretary of state for Justice Jack straw caused a storm in 2006 when he refused to talk to **veiled women** at constituency surgeries. (GN10)*

- **Passive role of in-group (positive/neutral)**

*Islam asks its **followers – men and women-** to dress modestly, and so do all religions...It tells **men** to lower their gaze in front of women other than their wives and other close relatives. It tells **women** to be mindful of their gait and garments. (SG2)*

***Islam gives women*** the right to keep her family's name after marriage, which is not the case in the West. (GN6)

- **Active verbal roles: Muslim scholars views connecting face veil to religious obligation and religious Implications of ban:**

***Shaikh Fayez al Mutlaq, a prominent religious scholar, is of the view that it is permissible for a Muslim woman living in a country, where there is a ban on wearing the burqa, not to wear it. 'it would suffice her wear the Hijab...he told Gulf News if a Muslim woman wants to travel to such a country, which imposes a ban on wearing the burqa, for educational or treatment purposes, then she should respect the regulations of the country by simply wearing the Hijab. (GN6)***

However, ***the scholar*** was of the view that there are two different opinions about women's face covering among Muslim scholars. 'The niqab is a controversial issue. While some ***scholars see it as a mandatory, others regard it as non-obligatory.*** But women in France who don it ***should not*** remove it just to comply with the proposed ban since ***Muslim should not*** comply with any law that is violating the Islamic teachings' ***he added.*** (GT4)

***...Islamic scholar, Sheikh Salem Helal, said Muslim women donning the face veil in France, whether they were expatriates or citizens, should leave the country if it was outlawed by the government. 'As long as you accepted to be a French citizen, then you have to comply with the laws of the country of which you stay. Muslim women in France should even give up their citizenship and return to Muslim countries if they found themselves unable to observe the Islamic dress code. If they have to choose between the face veil and their citizenship, they have to go [sic] the face veil and return to Muslim countries' he added. (GT4)***

- **Active role: Muslim scholars critical comments towards ban:**

*Al-Mraikhi also criticised the attitude of the French president, saying it was ‘violating the personal freedom of Muslims’ (GT4)*

*Sheikh Ahmed al-Buainain, a Qatari imam of Suhaib al-Romi Mosque at Al Wakrah, also stressed that the French government had no right to ban the face veil, saying that the veil should be part of the personal freedom which they cherish.....’I believe that the **current attack** on the niqab is just a way of **distorting the image of Islam**’ he added. (GT 4)*

*French President Nicolas Sarkozy is ‘not qualified’ to judge Muslim women’s dress code, said Muslim clerics in Cairo, reacting to his branding of full-body veils as a sign of servitude.....’First he [Sarkozy] does not believe in Islam, which is a heavenly religion that holds women in high regard. **Another reason is that he belongs to a culture, which is unfair to women**’ Al Shaka told Gulf News. ‘One example, Islam gives women the right to keep her family’s name after marriage, which is not the case in the West.’ (GN6)*

### UK Press: Argumentation

- **Topos of Threat**

The use of rhetorical ethos or topos of ‘authority’ to highlight the ‘threat’ face veiling poses towards Western society was also detected in a blog article ‘*France considers a ban on full Muslim veil*’ (TT1). In this argument against the face veil, Muslim actors were individualised as the authority to support this topoi of ‘threat’, where it includes direct and indirect quotes of two key French Muslim figures “*Muslim born women ministers, Fadel Amara and Rama Yade*”. Both of whom are described as having various trustworthy, positive and attractive credentials “*Amara, a rights campaigner who is a housing minister*” and “*Yade, a minister for human rights in the foreign ministry*”.

*“Amara, a rights campaigner who is a Housing minister, said she is **alarmed** by the number of women wearing veils. ‘We must do everything to stop burqas from*

*spreading, in the name of democracy, of the republic, of respect for women'. Yade, Minister for Human rights in the foreign Ministry, said today that she supported a prohibition in the name of women's equality and human dignity. The wearing of veils 'is a phenomenon which is visibly spreading', she said"*

The presupposed spread of face veiling is highlighted as a problem by the mental process 'alarmed' attributed to Amara, emphasising concern. The practice of wearing the veil is also described as a 'phenomenon' that is spreading by Yade. More importantly, this face veil is portrayed as a direct threat, where both authoritative sources place it in direct opposition to democracy, respect of women, their equality and human dignity. Once again, a fallacious appeal to authority is committed, where there is no evidence to substantiate that face veiling as a practice is growing or is a threat to 'democracy' 'respect of women' and 'human dignity'.

- **Topos of Difference**

In the *Guardian's* news analysis piece "Why not ban the full veil, says French government spokesman" (TG1), which focuses on the parliamentary proposal for a face ban and the argument that the face veil is in conflict with France's secular nature, a quote of the communist MP, Andre Gerin highlighted the topos of 'difference' between the practice of face veiling and the women who wear the face veil (out-group) and the French public (in-group).

*The communist MP...he said 'the sight of these **imprisoned women** is already intolerable to **us**, when **they** come from Iran, Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia...it is totally unacceptable on French soil'*

As illustrated above, in addition to the negative referential strategies used, referring to face veiled women as 'imprisoned', a hasty generalisation is committed depicting them as foreign, as 'they', the 'out-group', come from 'Iran, Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia'. This is contrasted to the 'in-group' which is highlighted with the aggregated form 'us', who are unaccepting of this practice in France.

- **Topos of Separateness**

Women wearing the face veil are also argued to turn away from society in the op-ed 'France's burka barrier' (TG6).

*Increasingly, veiled women chose to look inward, withdraw from society and benefit from the networks of solidarity offered by **Salafism**, rather than fighting for their choice in the political sphere.*

In this case, women are withdrawing from society and turning to 'Salafism', which was negatively referred to earlier in the article as 'a fundamentalist branch of Islam imported from Saudi Arabia'. This draws on the topos of 'threat', in addition, to the representation of face veiling women as 'separate'.

### Arab Press: Argumentation

- Topos of Discrimination

*The fear and loathing of any form of veiling sometimes expressed by those who object to what they see as a symbol of backwardness is not all that different from objections to the **traditional religious garb and perceived life style of Catholic nuns in the past** (and for some, still today). One could raise similar questions about the **dress of Amish women and men, the practice and status of ultra-orthodox Jewish women, and others**. Does the '**medieval garb**' of the pope, patriarchs and other **major religious leaders** diminish their intellect or ability to negotiate life in the modern world? (GN8)*

In this excerpt, rather than argue against critics that describe the face veil as 'degrading' for women, the writer chooses to focus on the argument by critics which describes the face veil as 'a symbol of backwardness'. The writer lists several analogies, where face veil wearing women and the practice of face veiling is compared to the traditional clothing worn by 'nuns', 'Amish women and men', 'practice of ultra-orthodox Jewish women' and the 'medieval garb of the pope, patriarchs and other major religious leaders'.

Finally, other examples of argumentative analogies drawing on the topoi of 'discrimination' were found in the op-ed article "West must respect the Muslim veil" (GN8):

*Women who wear the scarf point out that women of many cultures and religions – Russian women, Hindu women, Jewish women, Greek women, and Catholic nuns – often wear head coverings. They ask why these women are not viewed as being oppressed.*

Here, the argumentative analogy focuses on the 'Muslim scarf', another item of clothing worn by some Muslim women that had also received similar objections to those brought against the face veil. Women who wear the scarf are compared to other women who wear the scarf 'Russian, Hindu, Jewish' women among others in aim of pointing out that women from other cultures and religions had not received any form of criticism towards what they wear, hence, Muslim women are being discriminated against.

## Appendix 17 – The ‘2009 Danish Cartoon Controversy’: Qualitative Examples

### UK Press: Protesters/Demonstrators referential and predicational strategies

- **Aggregation**

*Some 200 Iranian student demonstrators also threw stones (TG51)*

*...were unable to hold up to 400 demonstrators (TG51)*

*Hundreds of Afghans (TIC19)*

- **Referential strategies: Threat**

*So far the police appear to have held off taking stronger action against the **fanatics** because of fear...(TGC42)*

*The metropolitan police announced today that it has set up a squad to investigate the **extremists** demonstrated on Friday’ (TGC48)*

*‘**Muslim extremists** are poisoning the atmosphere in this country.....(DTC19)*

*I am sorry says ‘suicide bomber’ (DTC17)*

- **predicational strategies: Threat**

*‘Arrest **extremist marchers**, police told’ (TGC43)*

*A **Muslim protester** who sparked outrage by dressing as a suicide bomber is a convicted drug dealer’ (DTC18)*

*A Muslim protester who dressed as a ‘suicide bomber’ (DTC17)*

## Arab press: Protesters/Demonstrators referential and predicational strategies

- **Predicational strategies: Aggregation (large numbers)**

*Around 4,000 people marched from a mosque in central Islamabad after Friday prayers (GT3)*

*Tens of thousands of Muslims across India marched in protest.. (GT8)*

*More than 2,500 people had earlier attended an organised demonstration (GT9)*

*Nearly 20,000 people protested against cartoons .....(GT10)*

*With police firing on some 2,000 protesters as they tried to break into the heavily guarded facility (ANC29)*

- **Aggregation: Death and injury toll**

*Two protesters killed, and three other people were wounded (ANC29)*

*Two shot dead in violent cartoon clashes (GNC23)*

*Afghan crowds attacked a base of NATO Norwegian troops with guns and grenades and police opened fire, bringing the death toll in protests against the cartoons to nine. (KTC12)*

## UK Press: Social Actions (indirect threat)

*This form of presentation was also highlighted in a lead article published in the Guardian 'Threats must be countered' (TGC42):*

*For centuries, **English law has been crammed full of legal powers to arrest people who threaten violence or murder in public, or who go around terrifying ordinary people.** On Friday, dozens of prima facie examples of **such offences were committed during protests** against the Danish cartoons which offended Muslims by depicting the prophet Mohammed. **One man was dressed in the garb of a suicide bomber,** arguably **an overt attempt to terrify** of the kind that has been illegal in this country...*

- **Protesters active role carrying carrying (threatening) placards:**

*Some wielded placards threatening a repeat of September 11 and July 7 attacks. (DTC17)*

*Protesters in London who carried placards threatening suicide bombings and massacres in revenge for the Danish cartoons satirising the prophet Muhammad are to be investigated by Scotland Yard and could face arrest. (TGC43)*

- **Protesters passive roles (to be arrested)**

*'The police need to bear down on **them** heavily and chase those down who have committed offences and prosecute **them** where they can get evidence, because there is freedom of speech on the one hand – that is sacrosanct. But on the other hand, incitement to terror, incitement to suicide bombing – all of those are clear infringements of the law'. (TIC19)*

*'David Cameron, the conservative leader, urged the police and the authorities to take 'appropriate action' against **people** who 'break the law by inciting hatred or inciting people to violence or murder'. He added: 'many of those people carrying the placards were clearly inciting violence or inciting hatred' (DTC19)*

David Winnick, on the Commons home affairs committee, said **those carrying banners threatening violence should be prosecuted and where possible deported.** **Those** who have been given permission to live here, insofar as it is possible in law, it would be better for this country and indeed for the Muslim community if that right was removed' (TGC43)

#### **UK Press: Police vs. Protesters**

- **Police not having control**

As **they** moved back, the **crowd smashed their way** into the building housing the Danish embassy and **set it ablaze** (TGC52)

**Others** overturned two **police cars** and threw rocks through the windows of St. Maroun church (TGC52)

Hundreds of angry protesters threw stones and fire bombs at the Danish embassy in Tehran today to protest against the publication of cartoons of the prophet Mohammed. **Police** had encircled the embassy building but were **unable to hold back the 400 demonstrators** as they pelted the mission with stones and incendiary devices (TGC51)

- **Police not directly attacking protesters**

said that the **police were preventing** some 1,000 demonstrators marching to the offices of the united nations and other aid groups. (TGC40)

**Lebanese troops** managed to avoid shooting any protesters dead (TIC20)

- **Or allocated a second position after a negative action by the protesters:**

**About 30 gunmen threatened** to attack the French learning centre in Nablus yesterday, but after negotiating with **police** guarding the building, they were allowed only to scrawl on the building...(TGC40)

**Protesters** also tried to storm the French embassy but were held off by **police** (TGC40)

## Arab press: Social actions attributed to Protesters/Demonstrators

- **Active roles in negative actions**

*Angry protesters attacked dozens of government and private buildings on the Mall road (GNC21)*

- **Active roles in peaceful protest**

*The protest later broke up peacefully...(GTC61)*

*No serious damage from the protests was immediately apparent (GTC66)*

- **Passive roles of death and injury (topos of victimisation)**

*Four protesters were killed in Police shootouts and several people wounded (GTC68)*

*At least one person was killed and seven were wounded in the Puntland region of Somalia as **security forces** clashed with **hundreds of protesting Muslims**. (ANC29)*

- **Police in frontal position (topos of victimisation)**

*Police fired teargas shells, used water cannons and also baton-charged to disperse protesters. (GNC21)*

*Police used tear gas to drive out **students** who stormed into Islamabad's diplomatic enclave...(GNC23)*

*Police fired tear gas, shot into the air and baton-charged **protesters** who ransacked a McDonald's franchise and set fire to outlets of KFC and Norwegian mobile phone firm Telenor. (GNC23)*

*F-16 warplanes flew overhead in a show of force while the **Norwegians** fired teargas, rubber bullets and warning shots... (KTC12)*

***Kenyan security forces** fired teargas at **angry stone-throwing Muslim demonstrators** attempting to march on the Danish embassy in Nairobi (GTC66)*

**Baton-wielding riot police launched teargas canisters to disperse about 300 protesters on the main thoroughfare in the capital after the crowd tried to break through a cordon by hurling rocks and other projectiles...at least one person was injured.** (GTC66)

- **Active role of Muslim speakers: highlighting Muslims and Islam under attack ‘victimisation’**

*‘The cartoons are part of the **West’s crusade against Islam.** No Muslim can tolerate these cartoons’ said Mohiuddin Ahmed, leader of the Islamic group Hizbut Tahrir..* (GTC67)

*Mohammed Idriss, an imam at Nairobi mosque..said.. ‘This is the kind of content that has led the world to believe that all Muslims are terrorists’ he told AFP. ‘Sooner or later, we are going to peaceful if the West continues to use freedom of expression to say all kinds of nonsense about Islam and its prophet’* (GTC66)

### **UK Press: Argumentation Analysis**

- **Topoi of ‘Threat’**

The topos of ‘*threat*’ highlighted with the use of a disclaimer was also found in the *Times* opinion piece headlined ‘*Incitement with little insight*’ (TTC12). However, rather than positive *self* description and negative *other* descriptions being allocated to the social actors involved in the conflict of views, the descriptions highlighted social actions.

*The cartoon showing the Prophet wearing a bomb turban is not only offensive but remarkable unsubtle, badly drawn and not very funny. It is unfair, implying that an entire world religion is terrorist, rather a few fanatical adherents. The sentiments are crass in the extreme. But to silence and repress those opinions, however, repellent, risks undermining the principle itself, as does the imprisonment of the historian David Irving for his revolting opinions about the Holocaust.*

The writer begins by the use of an apparent concession, highlighting his agreement that the cartoons are negative, attributing with cartoons with the negative qualities being *'not only offensive, but remarkable unsubtle'* and *'badly drawn and not very funny'*. It is also attributed with the negative action towards a *'world religion'* meaning *'Islam'*. This works to positively represent the writer as analytically *'fair'*. However, this is immediately followed by representing how the action of *'repressing or silencing'* these cartoons, which is what is being requested by some Muslims, poses a threat on the *'principle'*, referring to *'freedom of speech'*.

The topos of *'threat'* was also highlighted in the *Times* op-ed headlined *'Drawing the line'* (TTC6) in discussing the reasons why the *Times* decided not to publish the cartoon:

*Many in Europe today think nothing of mocking the most revered aspects of Christianity – often in a crass, tasteless manner – while the corruption and failure of secular regimes in the Middle East have helped to inspire a revival of Islam, including an extremist strain. None of which excuses a situation in which government of France and Denmark have felt obliged to advise their citizens to avoid areas such as the Gaza strip where the offices of the EU were stormed yesterday.*

The Middle Eastern context is described as experiencing *'a revival of Islam'*, presupposing that Islam was in fact not as popular, and this revival is described as having an *'extremist strain'*, highlighting a threat. This premise is used as the basis on which EU offices were attacked in the Gaza strip.

The topos of *'threat'* and the exclusive connection of Muslim criticism towards the publication of the cartoons to extremists as a social group in particular, rather than various individual Muslims is made even more explicit further on the same article:

*This newspaper has anguish of its own over whether to reproduce the pictures at the centre of this saga. At one level, their appearance might be seen as an appropriate response to the fanatics who demanded their prohibition and could help the readers to understand both their character and the impact that they might have on believers. But to duplicate these cartoons several months after they were originally printed also*

*has an element of exhibitionism to it. To present them in front of the public for debate is not value-neutral exercise. The offence destined to be caused to moderate Muslims should not be discounted.*

Those specifically demanding the prohibition of the cartoons are referred to negatively as 'fanatics'. However, the article does acknowledge that other Muslims may be offended 'moderate Muslims' and it is the offence to those Muslims that creates one reason why the Times have decided not to publish the cartoons, drawing on the topos of 'responsibility'. The quality 'moderate' attributed to Muslims, once again, places them to be in line with 'good', being on good terms with the 'in-group', in opposition to the other Muslims who may not describe themselves as 'moderate' and whose views and opinions are not considered in the article.

The topos of 'threat' was also used in the representation of Muslims an argument against anti-Semitic cartoons produced in the 'Muslim world' in the article headlined 'Muslim cartoon' (TTC7), which reviews reactions towards the publication of the cartoons. However, the victimised social group in this case are the Jews.

*What is worrying about anti-Semitic cartoons by the Arab and Muslim world is that they lead to physical attacks on the Jewish community, with repercussions in church and mosque sermons, inciting people to beat up Jews, which the Archbishop of Canterbury has recently condemned.*

This example follows a section in the article criticising Arab countries for their double standard, where they are described as responsible for 'atrocious anti-Semitic images' in the Arab media. This particular excerpt draws on the topos of 'threat' in representing Muslims, though the use of predicational strategies attributing the cartoons with the adjective 'worrying', as well as causal argumentation, triggered by the phrase 'they lead to'. Therefore, the generalised 'Arab Muslim world' are portrayed as the producers of cartoons which lead to threats on the 'Jewish community', who will be the objects of negative actions such as 'physical attacks' and being 'beat up', resulting from the encouragement of 'church and Mosque sermons'.

The threat posed by Islam and Muslims is also highlighted in the Independent's 'Bruce Anderson: Stop cringing and stand up for your own values' (TIC18). The article argues for freedom of speech and is critical towards any application of censorship. The argument begins by the portraying Danish newspaper's decision to publish the cartoons as having positive implications on the general public:

*The embattled Danish newspaper has performed a valuable public service.*

This 'valuable public service' is claimed to be the following:

*They have forced Europe to face a problem which most political elites would rather ignore, although it will be one of the major questions of the next few decades: **How are we to achieve peaceful co-existence with Islam?***

The achievement of peaceful co-existence with 'Islam' is represented as a problem. The 'wh-question' at the end of the excerpt draws on the topos of 'difference' and 'threat' in the representation of Islam, where it presupposes 'Islam' as a foreign entity which Europe has not achieved peaceful co-existence with and more importantly are still questioning how this can be done, hence, it being a problem or challenge they are faced with.

The threat by Islam is emphasised more directly in the comparative argumentation presented further on in the article:

*A lot of soggy liberals now believe if no one talked about the problem, it would just go away. Every day, people who used to think like that arrive, at last, in cancer specialists' waiting- room. In Christian-Muslim relations, such delay could be equally fatal.*

The current situation in Europe, where the challenge to find a way to co-exist with Islam peacefully is being ignored by 'soggy liberals' argued to lead to serious threatening consequences. This is done, by comparing those who are ignoring the current European 'problem' to patients ignoring warning signs and finally being diagnosed with a potentially fatal illness, cancer. In fact, the article directly heightens the sense of threat by the use of the modal verb 'could' in the phrase 'such delay could be equally fatal'.

Finally, towards the end of the article, the topos of 'threat' is highlighted yet again in the representation of Muslims. In this case, it is used in the argument against the newspapers making any acceptations and applying any form of censorship in relation to the publication of the prophet cartoons:

*If keeping them quiescent requires the suppression of a few cartoons, it might seem a cheap a price. But there are two objections. The first is cowardice; the second, that the cowardice would not succeed. The cartoons would not be the only concession. As Danes have realised, there is no point in paying Danegeld. Once you start ordering from the menu of cowardice, you lose control of the bill. The Muslim extremists **would** be convinced that, stumbling between cowardice and cultural cringe, the West **would** always capitulate.*

Criticism towards the act of censorship or the 'suppression of a few cartoons' is indicated first by attributing the act with the negative quality of being 'cowardice'. This is followed by using a win/lose metaphor in portraying the situation, where censorship which is portrayed as 'cowardice' would not succeed. Using causal argumentation, indicated by the modal verb 'would', it is argued that censoring the cartoons or 'concession' could lead to further compromises by the 'West'. Furthermore, continuing with another metaphor, the argument highlights those taking the decisions to concede are at threat of losing control of the situation. The acts of concession or 'cowardice' are portrayed as being part of a list of concession choices on a 'menu' and by ordering from it, those making the order or 'concessions' are leading themselves to losing control over the 'bill' or consequences resulting from these compromises. These concessions are also argued to lead to 'Muslim extremists' to expect the 'West' to surrender to their demands, highlighted again by the double use of the modal verb 'would'. Also, the use of 'Muslim extremists' makes the generalised assumption, that those who were against the cartoons were either all or only made up of extremists, excluding all other members of Muslim communities around the world. Therefore, the article argues that the act of not publishing the cartoons would lead to future threats towards the future of decision making in Western society primarily by 'Muslim extremists'.

A 'threat' by the cartoon conflict on general social peace also takes form in a causation argument in the *Guardian* article headlined 'A worm's eye view: logic and principle can't resolve the row over the Danish cartoons':

*But politics, good manners, and principle all suggest that if we must offend people, we do so as politely as possible. This is difficult for newspapers at the best of times and almost impossible in a world of globalised religions and communications **where every insult provokes a response which is itself insulting.***

***Already one Dutch website has held a competition for the most offensive Photoshopped picture of Muhammad**, and some these are very offensive indeed. In London we have seen **the disgusting demonstration with placards calling for fresh suicide bombers**. And **that has in turn ensured**, I think, that the **leaders of the fascist British National Party can never be successfully prosecuted**. Last week **they walked free** when a jury could not agree to convict them of **inciting hatred against Muslims**. After the demonstrations in London, it will be difficult to find a jury whose members all find their views unreasonable.*

As seen above, the cartoon publications which were considered an insult are argued to cause or 'provoke a response' of a number of negative consequences that are 'insulting' themselves. This claim is supported by listing a number of negative consequences following the adjective 'already', emphasising that they have already occurred. These consequences are highlighted as harming all social groups involved, as well as, other possible negative social consequences. An in-group member 'Dutch website' is given agency of negative actions in holding a competition producing offensive material. This is mitigated further with the predicational strategies attributing the images published by the website as being 'very offensive indeed'. On the other hand, it highlights the demonstrations, held by Muslim demonstrators, as another negative consequence, where suicide bombings were advocated, although instead of referring to the protesters directly, a metonym was used, replacing the users, 'the protesters carrying the placards' with the objects used, the 'placards', as the agents of the negative action. However, the actions in the demonstrations are portrayed as directly leading to yet another negative consequence indicated by the phrase, 'that has in turn'. The demonstrations are given as the reason why most likely the in-group members,

*'leaders of the British National party', who are attributed with the negative quality of being 'fascist', will not be convicted for their active role in the negative action of 'inciting hatred against Muslims'.*

- **Topoi of 'victimisation'**

In an op-ed in the Independent titled *'The double standards of free speech'* (TIC22), the writer argues against the publication as a result of their negative effects. In one part of the argument, Muslims are represented victims as a result of the publication of the cartoons and other 'in-group' or Western related actions.

The argument begins by allocating various 'in-group' members or actors associated with 'West' as agents of negative actions. *'European Journalists'* are described as 'getting the show they wanted' and *'Flemming Rose'*, the culture editor of the Danish paper that published the cartoons is placed as going ahead with the act of publishing the cartoons *'simply to enrage, like bullfighters goading a bull'*. In addition, *'other newspapers'* that republished the cartoons are allocated with the negative action of *'belittling freedom of expression'* for doing so. Following this platform emphasising the negative role of 'Western' media, the following section was added:

*These Liberal warriors, high on conceit, want to demonstrate that Muslims can never be a part of Europe, because, well, there are too backward to hoot aloud when their revered prophet is shown with a bomb for a turban. I am not amused either, so should I pack the bags? Many of these countries were infamous for their state terrorism against Jews since they have systematically mistreated generations of Muslims.*

In the above example, it is argued that *'European journalists'* referred to as *'liberal warriors'* and the given the negative quality of *'being high on conceit'* aim to prove the incompatibility of Muslims and Islam in Europe, by their publication of the cartoons and Muslim reaction to it. This negative 'European agenda' against Muslims is highlighted further at the end of the excerpt by a symptomatic argument. The countries in which these cartoons were published are given the negative quality of being *'infamous for their state terrorism against Jews'* and

this is connected to their subsequent negative treatment of *'generations of Muslims'* who are positioned in the passive receiving end of the countries *'systematic mistreatment'*.

However, a clear hasty generalisation is committed, where based on insufficient observation, a prejudiced generalisation is made that European countries are innately racist towards particular social groups, in this case *'Muslims'*.

Interestingly, the topos of *'victimisation'* in the representation of Muslims continues, but instead of European countries being the victimisers, the agency of this role is shifted to *'the dictatorial states'* Muslims live in before they move elsewhere.

*Muslims live as **object prisoners** of their dictatorial states. They flee to places where they can breathe easier and speak. Then, a minority turn into the vicious thought-dogs they left behind. Most of us Muslims detest them more than whites ever would.*

By attributing *'Muslims'* with the quality *'object prisoners'*, they are highlighted as being *'victims'* being imprisoned by their *'dictatorial states'*. This forms the premise of the causal argument claiming *'They flee'* these states to get away from the restrictions and have the freedom to *'breathe easier'* and *'speak'*.

- **Topoi of 'contradiction'**

This topos of *'contradiction'* was also shown to be drawn upon in the Guardian news report *'Jerusalem Post published Mohammad cartoons'* (TGC45), which covers the reprinting of the cartoons in an Israeli based paper, the reaction to it, and the papers explanation for its decision to go ahead with reprinting the cartoons. Quoting a *Jerusalem's post* editorial commenting on its decision to republish the cartoon, the following was added:

*But an editorial published today, entitled 'The Prophet's Honor', the paper contrasts the outcry that the Danish cartoons are causing in the Muslim world, while 'Arab cartoonists routinely demonise Jews as global conspirators, corrupters of society and blood suckers'. 'Arab Political 'humour' knows no bounds,' the Jerusalem Post editorial said. 'A cartoon in Qatar's Al-Watan depicted prime minister Ariel Sharon drinking from a goblet of Palestinian children's blood. Another, in the Egyptian Al-Ahram al-Arabi showed him Jackbooted, bloody-handed and crushing peace.*

## Appendix 18 - Reader Interpretation Data

- **UK Muslim Groups: Views on lack of Muslim voices in all articles**

### **On article A:**

***Hanan:** The people in the parliament and you know not really the people that actually live there*

***Amina:** Not the Muslims*

***Hanan:** Not the Muslims at all*

***Amina:** Yeah like **you haven't asked any***

***Hanan:** Just people in power*

***Lama:** or even the Muslims in the French system*

### **On article B:**

***Abdul:** all this was aimed at liberating women from this oppression but a matter of fact **their opinion and their choice hasn't been taken into consideration**..you know.. so it's like me extending a hand of help to you but do you need the help or do you want the help..this is the question..the point of view..the people they were trying.. the very people they were trying to liberate..**their views haven't been taken into consideration**..as a matter of fact **their opinions haven't counted** and how do we know not just by the article but by the sheer number of women who came out on to the streets of France like opposing.. Muslim and non veiling women..even French women who consider themselves liberals and atheist, you know, they sided with them and they said this is their right*

### **On article D:**

***Abdu:** again their opinions and their desires and wishes are completely ignored again. None of the Muslim women who wants to wear it, we have none of that. **We don't have any sort of comments or statistics** you know based on those people who veil given in any of the articles again **you know their views are not taken into consideration**..we are trying to liberate them and they don't know what's good for them..that's the message that I got from all of the...*

***Hakeem:** I think there is a viewpoint from a Muslim women who wears the burqa, but they are speaking umm for them, on behalf of them umm which may not be legitimate and certainly an assumption the answer in all cases will be the latter (by choice) is a massive assumption to make.*