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Monetary and fiscal institutional designs

Dimakou, Ourania (2013) 'Monetary and fiscal institutional designs.' Journal of Comparative Economics, 41 (4). pp. 1141-1166.

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Abstract

Two investment decisions in economic institutions are feasible; investments in monetary institutions in the form of delegation of monetary policy to a more conservative or independent central bank, and investments in fiscal capacity, in the form of combating bureaucratic corruption and its consequent fiscal revenue leakages. Within this framework, we investigate the interactions among those two institutional decisions and the obtained institutional structure. The findings provide support of strategic complementarities; investments in monetary and fiscal institutions reinforce each other. In addition, we identify a set of determinants that impact on the government’s decisions to improve economic institutions, particularly, the structure and intensity of the initial corruption level, the amount of distortions caused by taxation and the policymaker’s goals and preferences across its objectives.

Item Type: Journal Article
Keywords: Monetary and fiscal policies Corruption Central bank reform Strategic complementarties
SOAS Departments & Centres: Departments and Subunits > Department of Economics
Legacy Departments > Faculty of Law and Social Sciences > Department of Economics
ISSN: 01475967
DOI (Digital Object Identifier): 10.1016/j.jce.2013.02.001
Depositing User: Ourania Dimakou
Date Deposited: 07 Apr 2014 13:57
URI: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/id/eprint/18284

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