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White knights and black knights. Does the search for competitive bids always benefit the shareholders of “target” companies?

Mucciarelli, Federico M. (2006) 'White knights and black knights. Does the search for competitive bids always benefit the shareholders of “target” companies?' European Company Financial Review, 3 (4). pp. 408-425.

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Abstract

According to the EC Directive on Takeover Bids, defensive measures should be authorised by the general meeting of the target company. The incumbent board can, nonetheless, search for a competing bid, a so-called “white knight”. The rationale underpinning this exception is that competing bids always benefit target’s shareholders. In this paper I will tackle this rationale, arguing that even competing bids could generate a pressure to tender on target’s shareholders and, therefore, in this case should not be considered as a benefit for them.

Item Type: Articles
Keywords: Takeover bids; defensive measure; competing bids; white knight defense; EU takeover directive
SOAS Departments & Centres: Faculty of Law and Social Sciences > Department of Financial and Management Studies > Centre for Financial and Management Studies (CeFiMS)
Subjects: K Law > K Law (General)
ISSN: 1613-2556
DOI (Digital Object Identifier): 10.1515/ECFR.2006.018
Depositing User: Federico Mucciarelli
Date Deposited: 01 Oct 2012 08:51
URI: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/id/eprint/14254

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